WAR TERMINATION:
Why, When, Who, What, Where, and How

by

James C. Walker
LtCol USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

14 June 1996

Paper directed by
Capt. Jackson, USN
Chairman, Department of Joint Military Operations

Captain Ken Peters, USN
20 May 1996
Classical military thought dictates that a state should never start a war without knowing how it plans to end the war -- never take the first step without considering the last. War termination plans are that last step. Despite the general acceptance of this maxim, war termination plans receive little emphasis or attention in the military. This paper examines both the theoretical and practical aspects of war termination plans, focusing on the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars. The basic questions related to war termination (why, when, who, what, and how) are examined in detail. Understanding the answers to these basic questions will enable military planners to realize the importance of war termination plans and will facilitate successful incorporation of war termination plans in future conflicts. Since the United States is likely to participate in future conflicts as part of a coalition, the role of coalitions in war termination plans is also considered.
ABSTRACT

Classical military thought dictates that a state should never start a war without knowing how it plans to end the war -- never take the first step without considering the last. War termination plans are that last step. Despite the general acceptance of this maxim, war termination plans receive little emphasis or attention in the military. This paper examines both the theoretical and practical aspects of war termination plans, focusing on the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars. The basic questions related to war termination (why, when, who, what, and how) are examined in detail. Understanding the answers to these basic questions will enable military planners to realize the importance of war termination plans and will facilitate successful incorporation of war termination plans in future conflicts. Since the United States is likely to participate in future conflicts as part of a coalition, the role of coalitions in war termination plans is also considered.
"...every war must be conceived of as a single whole, and that with his first move the general must already have a clear idea of the goal on which all lines are to converge."

"...the need not to take the first step without considering the last."

These quotations from Clausewitz provide a basis for the often cited axiom that a state should never start a war without knowing how it plans to end the war. War termination plans. This paper will examine both theoretical and practical aspects of war termination by looking to historical examples, particularly the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. Analysis of the Gulf War demonstrates that the American military has yet to grasp the importance of war termination plans. As Gen. Schwarzkopf's chief foreign policy advisor at CENTCOM stated afterwards, "We never did have a plan to terminate the war." Examination of the basic aspects of war termination--why, when, who, what, where, and how--serves two purposes. First, it provides a basis for military planners to understand the importance of war termination plans. Secondly, examination of those basic aspects can facilitate successful incorporation of war termination plans into future conflicts. With the United States likely to participate in future conflicts as part of a coalition, the role of coalitions in war termination plans will also be considered.

**Why?**

*Why Study War Termination- Historical Background*

Thoughts of war may evoke images of valiant warriors fighting gloriously to the bitter end -- total victory or absolute defeat. This classical paradigm is echoed in the focus on the destruction of enemy forces found in the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and Corbett. History has demonstrated that wars are terminated in three ways: (1) Total conquest and subjugation; (2) Capitulation; and, (3) Negotiated agreement. Only 13% of all interstate wars since 1800 have ended via the classical paradigm of total conquest and subjugation. This surprisingly low incidence of wars of total conquest may reflect the influence of Sun Tzu's philosophy of always providing
the enemy some option other than total defeat. "...wild beasts, while at bay, fight desperately. How much more true of this in men! If they know there is no alternative they will fight to the death." Wars end by capitulation when both sides agree to purely military conditions to cease fighting, as was seen at Saratoga in 1777 when the British were promised safe passage to leave for England upon their agreement not to reenter the war. Only 20% of interstate wars since 1800 have ended by capitulation. Negotiated agreements (often called cease fires or truces) have been the means to terminate the remaining 68% of interstate wars. The modern paradigm of war reflects a shift from destroying military forces to use of military force to resolve political or societal issues. Unfortunately, political or societal issues are not easily resolved by military force. For example, Israeli military victories in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 failed to resolve the political and social issues with their Arab neighbors. The impact of political and social issues, combined with the absence of the Cold War, will make negotiated settlements even more likely in future conflicts. War termination plans become more important as negotiated settlements become more likely.

Why?
Why Plan for Termination – And Why We Don't

Adherence to Clausewitz's admonition to consider how to end a war before beginning one is reflected in United States military doctrine, although the principle does not occupy a position of importance. In a discussion of combatant command strategic planning Joint Pub 3-0 states, "Before forces are committed, joint force commanders must know how the national command authorities intend to terminate the operation..." This guidance may erroneously lead military planners to believe that termination plans are not their responsibility. Doctrine further states that a fundamental of any campaign plan is to "...clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post hostility activities." War termination roles are included as one of the common planning considerations for all
plans. The keystone warfighting doctrine for the Army, FMFM 100-5, devotes just four paragraphs of generalities to conflict termination. The relative importance of conflict termination in doctrine is seen by the fact that the effect of terrain and weather on defensive operations is discussed in equal length. At the practical level, such minor attention to conflict termination in doctrine means that the subject is unlikely to receive the attention of military planners. Other areas recognized as more important by their emphasis in both doctrine and training will take priority. One possible consequence of this lack of attention is a repeat of the scenario in the Gulf War where we had no termination plans.

Lack of attention to conflict termination in doctrine is but one of the reasons conflict termination is ignored or relegated to an insignificant role in United States planning. "There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult- to begin a war, and to end it."

History has demonstrated the truth of De Tocqueville's words, and Americans exhibit continued reluctance to study war termination. This is partly due to the American ethos. As the remaining world great power it is easy to believe that we will have the superiority to dictate the terms of war and peace. Thus, all plans assume full military victory and further assume that military victory will bring the desired end state. Planning for war termination also carries a perception of weakness or uncertainty as to military superiority. Initial planning for something more than total victory is not part of the American military process, despite our experiences in Korea and Vietnam. The consequence of military force is easy to calculate, but termination plans must incorporate the more difficult calculations of the effects of political, diplomatic, and economic factors. These areas are less adaptable to precise military planning and less familiar to military planners.

Adherence to the Weinberger and Powell doctrines on the use of military forces also may foster less attention on the importance of war termination plans. By limiting use of military force to situations where we employ overwhelming forces in support of vital national interests with full public support, we almost presume the ability to
achieve success. Even if the exact limitations of these doctrines are not followed, their
general philosophy underscores the American focus on military success. Such focus
leads to avoidance of war termination study. Ignorance of the importance of conflict
termination planning was best seen in the Gulf War. On 27 February, as the war
neared what became the magic 100 hour mark, Gen. Powell asked Gen. Schwarzkopf
to draft a set of military conditions that Iraq must meet to make the cease fire
permanent. No prepared plans existed in theater or in Washington. Under extreme
time constraints and the fatigue of war, Gen. Schwarzkopf dictated the terms off the
top of his head. "I'd spent an hour pacing the tile floor of the war room dictating the
so-called terms of reference." His dictated terms were sent to Washington, approved
almost in totality, and became the terms of negotiation at Safwan. With no other
political guidance, Gen. Schwarzkopf was prepared to "...go to Safwan and wing it." This scenario stands in stark contrast to the detailed planning that characterized
almost every other aspect of the coalition effort.

When?
When Do You Negotiate?

Use of negotiations in war termination plans requires advance planning for
when to negotiate. Historical use of negotiations in war termination presents two
alternatives. Fighting can continue while negotiations proceed, or negotiations can
wait until after one side is victorious. Continued fighting while negotiating will often
include some temporary halts or cease fires.

The first modern successful use of negotiating while fighting was in the Russo-
Japanese war. That conflict was successfully concluded by the Peace Conference at
Portsmouth while fighting continued. Despite the success at Portsmouth,
Connell negotiating while fighting has numerous disadvantages. The decision to negotiate
may be perceived by the enemy as a sign of weakness, and domestic and international
support may be influenced. Military morale may also suffer as soldiers question
risking their lives while negotiations are underway. Finally, allies and coalition
partners must be considered, as occurred in World War II when the United States, British, and Russians decided there would be no negotiations while fighting continued.\textsuperscript{21} Despite these limitations, negotiating while fighting was the United States' choice in both Korea and Vietnam. These conflicts illustrated that negotiating while fighting can be a long and expensive process. Negotiations took over 2 years in Korea and over 4 years in Vietnam. Both wars continued while negotiations stalled due to the use of conditions and attention to such trivia as the table shape and size. In addition to the financial burden of such extended conflict, there were grave human costs. In Korea there were over 80,000 casualties during the negotiation period.\textsuperscript{22}

Fighting while negotiating can increase the cost to the enemy, but has significant military disadvantages. Military alternatives are often restricted. Potential bomb targets selected by Gen. Ridgeway in Korea were rejected in Washington due to their possible impact on negotiations, and the same scenario was repeated in Vietnam. The difference in Korea was that political restraints were ultimately removed when Gen. Ridgeway cited military necessity.\textsuperscript{23} A second military disadvantage is the military advantage that can be gained when one force continues to operate when the opposition stops to negotiate. During negotiations in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese routinely took advantage of cease fires to regroup, resupply, and gain military advantages. Similar lessons were learned in Korea. "If there is one lesson from Korea, it is probably this one: Never stop to talk. Talks progress remarkably rapidly when the military campaign continues as before."\textsuperscript{24} These experiences make it unlikely that temporary halts will be a part of future United States planning.

The ultimate disadvantage of fighting while negotiating is that the negotiations swing with the fortunes of war on the battlefield. In both Korea and Vietnam there was a close correlation between battlefield pressure and negotiation progress. "Leaders failed to realize the relationship between the military pressure applied on
the ground to the results obtained at the conference table. When pressure was put on the Chinese armies, the results were quickly evident at the table. When we let up on the ground, their recalcitrance quickly returned." Chinese and North Korean recalcitrance were ultimately overcome by escalation of the air war in early 1952 and Pres. Eisenhower's threats of massive retaliation. Similar threats of increased bombing and military action in Cambodia prompted successful negotiations in Vietnam.

The second alternative is to negotiate after one side is victorious. This has been the strategy in two-thirds of modern wars. Many of the issues that might potentially be subject to negotiation are settled by the war and, "Diplomacy is always more effective when supported by victorious arms." This was the United States choice in the Gulf War, and will likely be our choice in future conflicts. The numerous disadvantages of negotiating while fighting are eliminated, and the choice is well suited to our position as a global power and our strategy to exert overwhelming military power.

**When?**

**When to Terminate**

When to terminate a war should be a rational decision based on policy objectives and an objective evaluation of the relative strengths, weaknesses, and positions of the forces. The policy objectives define the military objectives and limits. A rational decision to terminate war requires both knowledge of the policy objective and advance military planning. Planners seeking rational decisions of war termination must also recognize the influence of irrational factors. Key individuals may prevent a rational decision, as was the case with Hitler. Emotions, pride, casualties, and public opinion are further factors limiting rationality.

When a state decides to terminate a war it must recognize of these rational and irrational factors and balance many competing interests. "The whole purpose of combat and war is to create a situation in which victory on the battlefield can be
promptly translated into a politically advantageous peace." Military leaders must accept and plan for the fact that the termination point will be determined by more than purely military factors. Military judgment may be subordinated to political judgments, as it was in the Gulf War. The 100 hour termination point was selected for political and public relations reasons even though the stated objective of destroying the Republican Guard had not been achieved. "From an operational point of view, the war should not have been ended until both escape routes were blocked by allied ground forces and the Republican Guard destroyed." Political concerns in response to the media coverage of the "Highway of Death" and focus on the nice round number "100" overcame concern for military objectives. With no termination plans of his own, Gen. Schwarzkopf had little with which to counter the political considerations.

Recognizing that many factors will determine when to terminate a war, geography is one constant that should be considered in all termination plans. Operational plans must incorporate termination plans that include the effect of geography on the war and the subsequent peace. Peace has often centered on geography, as with the 38th parallel in Korea. Occupying strategic points, occupying areas easy to control after the cease fire, and seizing territories for bargaining purposes are some ways that operational plans can assist war termination and the ultimate peace. Occupation of territory may also impose rights and duties under international law. Such geographic concerns were factors near the end of the Gulf War as ground troops were quickly moved to strategic locations. Unfortunately, lack of preplanning prevented control of all escape routes for the Republican Guard. Failure to plan for war termination prevented the best use of geography.

Who?

Who Negotiates

If negotiations occur, who will represent the state? This has been a continual concern throughout history and has often highlighted the friction between military and political leadership. In the early 19th and 20th century political leaders delegated
the power to make peace in distant places to military leaders. During this period the war aims were generally total conquest or capitulation, so little negotiation authority was actually delegated to the military. The practice was largely necessitated by poor communication means and the inability or impracticality of accompanying the forces. More contemporary practice divides termination into a military settlement phase followed by a political phase. The military phase deals with purely military issues such as cease fire terms, evacuation of wounded, and POWs. Political leadership would later deal with territorial issues, security guarantees, reparations, and nonmilitary issues. This temporal division works well assuming there will later be a formal treaty. The absence of formal treaties in modern practice (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War) and increases in the technological capacity to coordinate combat and diplomacy make such temporal divisions less likely in the future. As in the Gulf War, military leaders are likely to become the state's representative in negotiations.

Political leaders are naturally reluctant to lose control over negotiations that could have political repercussions. Past American practice of delegating negotiation authority to military leaders has run the full gamut. In Korea military leaders dominated the negotiations with limited input from State Department. As Gen. McArthur said, "... You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military." Such total trust has rarely been exhibited, and Gen. McArthur was ultimately relieved for failure to accede to political controls (among other things). America went to the opposite extreme in the Vietnam negotiations where there was very limited military involvement, and the pendulum swung back to full military conduct of negotiations in the Gulf War.

Are military leaders suited to serve as negotiators? Military leaders are trained to recognize the separation of military and political or diplomatic functions, and traditionally expect that they will fight the wars and civilians will come in to negotiate the peace. When told that he would negotiate with the Iraqis, Gen. Schwarzkopf commented, "That took me by surprise- it had never crossed my mind
that I'd have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals..." Some believe military leaders are not competent negotiators since they have "neither the desire nor the time to consider the shape of peace and the aftermath of war." There is little military training to cultivate the necessary skills in negotiating, concessions, and bargaining. In Korea Gen. Ridgeway was reluctant to make any concessions that might create the appearance of weakness and routinely called for "more steel" and "less silk" in negotiations. Such generalities may be less true today with more politically oriented military leaders familiar with military engagement in nontraditional roles such as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and disaster relief. A military leader's emotions and connection to the battlefield may also limit effectiveness during negotiations. Gen. Schwarzkopf noted he was calm when he left Riyadh for Safwan, but became mad as he flew over the battlefields and the burning oil wells. A final impediment to military negotiators is their natural concern for their troops and desire to get them home. This appeared to be a driving concern of Gen. Schwarzkopf at Safwan. "For Schwarzkopf, diplomatic concerns were subordinated to the need to work out an understanding to repatriate the Allied prisoners and go home." Gen. Schwarzkopf's agreement to the Iraqi request for permission to fly armed helicopters ultimately helped Saddam's regime maintain control and put down the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions. The decision has been attributed to Gen. Schwarzkopf's lack of concern for 'nonmilitary' issues or his focus on the ground troops. "The decision reflected Schwarzkopf's surprising disinterest in the internal situation in Iraq. The entire focus of the discussions had to do with the risk the Iraqi forces posed to the Allies, not with the fighting in Iraq." Gen. Glosson told his aides that the decision was the work of Army generals preoccupied with the terms of withdrawal of ground forces "...who were blind to the use of airpower and the broader political and diplomatic ramifications of the Iraqi conflict." Military leaders placed in negotiation roles must recognize and address all of these factors that can limit their effectiveness as a negotiator.
Even if military leaders serve as negotiators their scope of authority has traditionally been limited. President Lincoln instructed Gen. Grant to confer with Gen. Lee only "...for capitulation of Gen. Lee's army or on some minor and purely military matter...you are not to decide, discuss or confer upon any political question." \(^4^4\) In Korea Gen. Ridgeway was similarly limited to military issues, although what was "purely military" in that Cold War setting was difficult to determine. In the Gulf War Gen. Schwarzkopf was under few negotiation limitations. "The White House took the view that the generals were engaging in mere technical talks on cease-fire lines and did not need to be told how to negotiate with the Iraqis." \(^4^5\) Gen. Schwarzkopf did not seek political guidance, and there were no senior civilians present at Safwan. \(^4^6\) No State Department representative was present or substantively consulted. The total lack of political and civilian involvement and lack of limitations were more likely the result of inexperience and poor planning than of intentional delegation. One White House aide commented that, "Norm went in uninstructed. He should have had instructions. But everything was moving so fast the process broke down." \(^4^7\) Proper planning and the use of technological communication means make it unlikely that future military negotiators will enjoy such a wide scope of authority. Limitations will be present and military negotiators must plan to operate within such limitations.

**What?**

**What is the Negotiator's Authority?**

There is no legal obligation to negotiate or to accede to an opponent's request to negotiate an armistice. International law does recognize an armistice as a way to cease fighting, \(^4^8\) but a state is always free to continue to fight. Once the decision to negotiate is made, the authority of the negotiator must be clarified. Historically, negotiators were given the title of plenipotentiary in formal treaty negotiations, and that title carried with it the full power to negotiate and bind the state. Formal diplomatic procedures were in place to verify and exchange letters of authority. \(^4^9\) Formal letters of authority have not normally been used in the twentieth century, and
negotiators' authority now generally derives from their position and presence at the negotiations.

The lack of formality in contemporary negotiations can lead to doubt as to the scope of a negotiator's authority. Gen. Schwarzkopf and Prince Khalid had no clear delineation of their authority as they entered negotiations for the coalition in the Gulf War. Gen. Schwarzkopf wanted some sort of written authority, but none was given. "If need be, I would go to Safwan and wing it. For one thing, the talks would be limited to military matters, and I understood what needed to be done: for another, our side had won, so we were in a position to dictate terms. Even so, I knew I'd feel better walking into that meeting with the full authority to speak for the United States." Gen. Ahmad, negotiating for Iraq, apparently had clear authority to agree on the spot to the military terms of reference proposed by the coalition and quickly agreed to most of them. At the same time, Gen. Schwarzkopf questioned his authority to negotiate if Iraq did not agree to the original terms. Allowing negotiators to enter negotiations with any doubt as to their authority reduces their effectiveness, and is particularly unwise due to the minimal effort necessary to extend written authority. Termination plans should include specific delineation of negotiation authority.

Where?
Where to Negotiate and What Formalities to Use

Where to hold negotiations must also be considered in war termination plans. Determination of the final site may be dependent on progress on the battlefield, but basic planning must still occur. Where negotiations occur can impact military strategy, influence the tone of the negotiations, and can be used by either side for public relations purposes. The seemingly simple issue of site selection has proved difficult throughout history.

In the Korean War, Kaesong was selected as the original site for negotiations. When the United States agreed to the site it was in a neutral area, but by the time negotiations began North Korea held the area. North Korea harassed negotiators
with extreme security measures and attempted to use the site for public relations purposes to portray the United States as a defeated nation asking for peace. As a result, the negotiations were ultimately moved to Panmunjom. Some lessons were learned by the United States from this experience, and when North Vietnam proposed Phnom Penh and then Warsaw as negotiation sites both were rejected. Paris was ultimately selected as a neutral site.

Historical lessons were disregarded as the United States selected a negotiation site for the Gulf War, a further indication of lack of planning for war termination. Gen. Schwarzkopf selected Safwan as the site, and confirmed the decision with Gen. Powell. Unfortunately, Safwan was not under coalition control when the cease fire went into effect. The VII Corps, which had erroneously reported the area to be under coalition control, was then ordered to take the area. Occupying Iraqi forces originally refused to withdraw, but ultimately gave way to VII Corps demands and show of force. During the negotiations Iraq protested the taking of Safwan after the cease fire. This protest led to Gen. Schwarzkopf's ill-advised promise that, "There will not be one single coalition force member in the recognized borders of Iraq, as soon as, as rapidly as we can get them out... and you have my guarantee." Thus, at least partly due to lack of care in negotiation site selection, the coalition lost the potential leverage of occupying southern Iraq.

Decisions must also be made as to the formalities of the negotiations and whether any written documents will be signed. Formal peace treaties, binding under international law, have not been used since World War II. Contemporary practice focuses on limited agreements or armistices, like the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam." In the Gulf War, the United States decided that there would not be any written agreement, although a tape recording of the negotiations was made for the permanent record. This position may have been dictated by the United States' preoccupation with a quick ending and lack of planning for war termination. Insistence on some written agreement has numerous
advantages. First, a written agreement removes doubt as to the substance of the agreed terms. Secondly, it provides a basis for future enforcement of the terms by the parties or by external agencies such as the United Nations. Finally, a written agreement can be a valuable public relations instrument both domestically and in the international community. These potential advantages of written documents will be overcome by geographic, logistic, and time constraints unless there is adequate war termination planning.

**How?**

**How to Plan for Termination**

Effective war termination planning requires more than an occasional doctrinal reference or repetition of Clausewitz's maxim that you should never take the first step in war without considering the last. It requires a change in emphasis at both the theoretical and the practical levels. At the theoretical level it requires a commitment of attention to the interplay of all aspects of war -- from the military means to conduct the war to the political, economic, and social factors that influence the war. Restricted focus on the military means of war prevents a grasp of the larger perspective of the connection between war and peace. "The object of war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." With steady focus on a vision of the post-hostility environment, war termination plans can form the connection between war and peace.

At the practical level, war termination plans must openly receive sufficient attention and emphasis to become a reality early in the planning stage. During the war itself other concerns will naturally take priority. As Gen. Schwarzkopf said of war termination in the lessons learned report to Sec. Cheney, "The rapid success of the ground campaign and our subsequent occupation of Iraq were not fully anticipated. Thus, some of the necessary follow-on actions were not ready for implementation..." He could have more candidly reported, "We figured the war would
take longer and we hadn't gotten around to war termination plans yet." The same lessons learned noted that, "Documents for war termination need to be drafted and coordinated early." Like any other aspect of military operations, termination plans require advance action. At a minimum, documents can be drafted in advance. Branches and sequels should be incorporated to provide alternatives based on subsequent events. The friction and uncertainty of war will likely cause further modifications by the end of hostilities, but advance planning remains vital.

How to achieve recognition of the importance of termination plans is no simple task. Formal lessons learned are one step. War termination planning and the likely roles of military leaders in war termination can receive greater emphasis in military training and education. At the most basic level, a conflict termination Appendix could be incorporated in the planning process as a required Appendix to all operational plans.  

Impact of Coalitions

Since World War II the United States has always fought in some sort of coalition, and coalition warfare is the likely option for future military involvement. Therefore, war termination planning must also consider the impact of coalitions. Coalitions have many practical advantages, but they also have inherent problems due to the different cultures, customs, interests, military capabilities and strategies of coalition members. These problems must be addressed in war termination plans.

Coalition members are bound together by common interests and unity of purpose. Members share these common interests while maintaining many divergent national interests. The worldwide interests of a great power will not always coincide with the limited interests of a small state participating in the coalition. Competing interests may require a leading state concept to settle concerns and goals of the partners. Differing state interests can limit military operations and increase the influence of diplomatic action. President Bush explained that he stopped the Gulf
War quickly in part because "...the coalition was agreed on drawing the Iraqis from Kuwait, not on carrying the conflict into Iraq or destroying Iraqi forces."\textsuperscript{64} As victory approaches, coalition partners are even more likely to depart from any common interests and pursue their individual state interests. Near the end of the Vietnam War the different interests of the United States and South Vietnam were apparent. The United States was focused on a way to get out of the war while South Vietnam maintained focus on political independence. These competing interests were highlighted when President Thieu refused to agree to many of the terms negotiated by Kissinger in Paris. Maintaining coalition unity during the war termination phase will always require special attention.

The impact of coalitions will be particularly evident during any war termination negotiations, and who speaks for the coalition will likely be an issue. The British request for representation at Panmunjon was denied due to fears that it would complicate negotiations and lead to similar demands from all allies.\textsuperscript{65} The British chose not to press the issue, and the only ally present at Panmunjon was South Korea.\textsuperscript{66} As a result there were constant worries about British support for negotiated terms. Similar problems arose in the Gulf War when coalition members demanded to be present and sign any termination documents. Pressure to participate diminished when Gen. Schwarzkopf told coalition members that no documents would be signed.\textsuperscript{67} Ultimately, only the United States and Saudi Arabia participated in the negotiations.

Military commanders must understand each nation's goals and how they can affect conflict termination and the desired end state.\textsuperscript{68} Cultural, religious, and ethnic differences and sensitivities become even more important as the common purposes that brought the coalition together are achieved. In the Gulf War, the United States was ready to meet with the Iraqis, but Prince Khalid hesitated because the Iraqi delegation was too junior in rank. Higher ranking officers were ultimately sent by the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{69} Prince Khalid agreed to let the United States lead the negotiations, but insisted on raising a few Arab issues, including an Iraqi promise "...that their military
personnel will never cross the border into our kingdom." Termination plans must take the particular sensitivities of coalition members into account.

CONCLUSION

War termination plans have received little emphasis or attention in the military despite their important role in any conflict. The absence of war termination plans in the Gulf War demonstrated that they may be ignored even when there is a prolonged planning stage. Despite an historical affinity with the traditional warfighting aspects of planning, in recent years the importance of other areas, such as logistics, have slowly gained recognition. No military leader would contemplate entry into war without a detailed logistics plan. Military leaders need to acquire a similar recognition of the importance of war termination plans. Examination of both the theoretical and the practical aspects of termination planning-- the why, when, who, what, where, and how-- provides a foundation for that recognition. War termination plans must be a part of those "last steps" considered before taking the "first steps" of entry into a conflict.
NOTES


2 Ibid., 584.


7 Cimbala, 28.

8 Pillar, 25.

9 Ibid.

10 Cimbala, 30.

11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington: 1 Feb 1995), xii.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Pub 5-0 (Washington: 13 April 1995), II-20.


18 Ibid.

20 Pillar, 51.

21 Ikde., 85.


24 Hobbs, 306.

25 Ibid.

26 MacDonald, 179.

27 Pillar, 30.

28 Phillipson, 74.

29 Douglas McArthur, quoted in Hobbs, 317.

30 Gordon and Trainor, 423.


32 Hague Convention IV (1907), Art. 42-56.

33 Schwarzkopf, 472.

34 Cimbala, 113.

35 Randle, 29.

36 Pillar, 33.

37 Schwarzkopf, 470.


39 MacDonald, 126.

40 Schwarzkopf, 482.

41 Gordon and Trainor, 444.

42 Ibid., 447.

43 Ibid., 448.

44 Pillar, 32.
45 Gordon and Trainor, 444.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Hague Convention IV (1907), Art. 36-41.
49 Phillipson, 124.
50 Schwarzkopf, 480.
51 MacDonald, 118.
52 Ibid., 122.
54 Schwarzkopf, 473.
55 Ibid., 447.
56 Cimbala, 29.
57 Schwarzkopf, 485.
58 Liddell-Hart, quoted in Handel, 9.
59 Gordon and Trainor, 515.
60 Ibid.
61 Lee, 56.
62 Lee, 12.
63 Cimbala, 63.
64 Gordon and Trainor, 416.
65 MacDonald, 164.
66 Ibid., 128.
67 Schwarzkopf, 477.
68 Jt Pub 3-0, VI-2.
69 Gordon and Trainor, 443.
70 Schwarzkopf, 480.
Bibliography


Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instructional JSCP. Washington: 1996.


