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THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FROM THE SEA:
ISSUES FOR THE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

by

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As an Advanced Research Project

A paper submitted to the Director of the Advanced Research Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Title:** Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander

**Abstract:** Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NTBMD) will offer joint power projection forces robust TBMD capability by 2005. However, such defensive power projected from the sea is power projected from a unique and complex arena, where combat takes place in three competing environments which by their very nature cause conflicting tasking of limited assets. The tremendous promise of NTBMD must therefore be studied with this inherent operational complexity in mind. Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense can only realize its full potential if the Maritime Component Commander understands and addresses the key issues involved in its operational employment.
Abstract of

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FROM THE SEA:
ISSUES FOR THE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

As a fractious world evolves into the new millennium, the quest for strategic security will drive many nations to acquire advanced weapons of war. Since the 1980s, the systems most favored by the striving nations of the developing world as both symbols and instruments of power have been Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM). When deployed in concert with chemical, biological or nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the TBM-WMD system presents a truly daunting challenge to American military forces, threatening as it does three vital centers of gravity: those forces themselves, the unity and resolve of potential regional partners and allies, and the political will of the U.S. to exercise a military option.

Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NTBMD) will offer joint power projection forces vital, flexible and increasingly robust Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capability in the next decade. Weapon and sensor development, Battle-Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I) architecture, and Command and Control issues are all being addressed with vigor, a measure of the gravity of an evolving and imminent threat.

However, defensive power projected from the sea is power projected from a unique and complex arena, a world where combat takes place in three dimensions, against many dissimilar threats, in three overlapping, competing environments which by their very nature cause conflicting tasking of limited assets. Therefore, the tremendous promise of NTBMD must be studied with this operational complexity in mind. Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense can only realize its full potential if the Maritime Component Commander understands and addresses the key issues involved in its operational employment.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A sense of urgency informs Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander. Theater Ballistic Missiles armed with chemical, biological or nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction will be developed and deployed by hostile forces in the developing world, posing an imminent threat to U.S. and coalition forces which must operate in that world. The gravity of this evolving threat is recognized in the National Military Strategy. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) systems are also evolving, but with the exception of the PATRIOT PAC-2 missile system, none are yet fielded. Recognizing this constraint, this study looks ahead ten years, to 2005, toward the challenge of joint and multinational power projection operations against a TBM-WMD armed adversary. In such a regional contingency, the first TBMD-capable forces on the scene are likely to be naval. It will thus be the duty of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander to plan, fight, and win the initial TBMD battle in order to enable the introduction of follow-on TBMD forces from the other Service Components, as the campaign moves inland from the littoral.

Research Method

The anticipated value of this study arises from its highlighting of particular issues with which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must concern himself in order to
perform the essential enabling task of delivering TBMD from the sea. To this end, the summer of 1995 was spent reviewing the current literature, followed by research trips to several key "nodes" within the naval and joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense communities. These included Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division; the Program Executive Office, Theater Air Defense (PEO TAD-B); the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; and the office of the Navy’s Director for Theater Air Defense (N865). This initial effort led to further travel as an observer for TBMD Wargame 95B, held at the National Test Facility, Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado in September, and finally, to a personal project briefing for RADM Rodney Rempt (N865) at Newport, Rhode Island, in October.

Project Format

The completed Advanced Research Project is a five-chapter, unclassified study designed from the outset to raise more questions than it answers. With that purpose in mind, expeditious accessibility and wide dissemination are essential to facilitate further research—thus the specific intent to remain unclassified. The properly cleared reader, however, is encouraged to pursue possible areas of further inquiry at any appropriate level, using the more than 70 military and non-military sources in the bibliography as points of departure.
Chapter Summary

Chapter I sets forth the purpose of the study in some detail, along with its enabling assumptions. The specific details of future conflict and the actual capabilities of yet-to-be-fielded systems cannot be determined in advance. This paper, however, is not devoted to an in-depth examination of specific technical issues—and indeed cannot be, due to both its unclassified nature and, more importantly, the impossibility of discussing in detail what is still being developed. The intent is to examine, at the level of the Flag Officer serving as the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, the implications of these capabilities, and the difficult issues to which they will give rise ten years hence. In order to discuss these issues in a meaningful manner, certain capabilities and conditions must be assumed.

Chapter II provides the reader with a brief overview of the TBM-WMD threat which will face U.S. forces in the near-term and into the future. Current active defense capabilities against that threat are explained, as are the potential consequences of any diminution of TBMD research and development in the face of continuing budgetary constraints. The chapter concludes with a survey of projected U.S. naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities to 2005.

The central portion of the study, Chapter III, establishes a set of first principles that enable the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander facing a TBM-WMD threat to focus his attention. Each of these four areas of
concentration--Logistics; Command, Control and Intelligence; Warfighting; and Rules of Engagement--is examined to place the operational challenge of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense within the multi-mission complexity of maritime warfare in a littoral theater.

Successfully performed, TBMD is unlikely to remain a purely naval mission. Indeed, the vital nature of naval TBMD is to enable complementary Army and Air Force systems to enter the theater and contribute to the battle. According to the National Military Strategy, allied and coalition assets will, whenever possible, also be an integral part of such a U.S. effort. Chapter IV, then, examines potential joint and multinational contributions to the campaign's overall TBMD operations.

Finally, Chapter V summarizes the study by considering the essential nature of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense through specific defining characteristics derived from the preceding sections. These essential TBMD "themes" are:
- The challenge of conflicting missions and limited means.
- The reality of hard choices.
- The fact that Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is one mission enabling many, rather than an end in itself.

The pervasive impact of these themes on both Theater Ballistic Missile Defense forces and the officers who control and direct these forces is examined, to show that TBMD is an enabling capability.
TBMD Areas of Concentration

Given the likelihood of a dispersed, theater wide TBMD battle, the challenge of Logistics illustrates the value of a straightforward Operations Analysis approach to the vital discussion of fuel and Vertical Launch System rearming—a discussion which reveals the true complexity of war in the littoral—where the TBMD mission will not exist in isolation.

The area of Command, Control and Intelligence considers that same complexity at three different levels: above the JFMCC at the NCA level; among competing Component Commanders at the Theater level; and from the JFMCC down to the unit level. Significant operational friction is held to exist at every level: political versus military objectives up the chain; mission versus mission at the Theater level; and effective decentralized control versus efficient centralized control of TBMD engagements down the chain. Encompassing them all, comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace is essential to the JFMCC's mastery of the subtleties of the TBMD mission, and thus his ability to make the hard choices necessary for its effective execution.

Warfighting specifies some of the hard choices which will face the JFMCC in light of his own logistical limitations and the operational priorities of his superiors. The logistically competing but operationally complementary natures of Navy Theater Wide [upper tier] capability and Navy Area [lower tier] defense are considered. This discussion illustrates the vast potential defensive leverage of upper tier systems, as
well as the essential requirement for lower tier systems in the conduct of amphibious power projection.

The vital issues of national policy and international law which must inform U.S. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense operations are presented under the rubric of Rules of Engagement. The confluence of political constraints on U.S. actions with the tactical challenges posed by the speed and lethality of enemy TBM-WMD systems will likely result in two trends: Defensive TBMD ROE (i.e., engaging incoming TBMs) will become increasingly permissive, while Offensive TBMD ROE (i.e., Attack Operations—"SCUD-hunting") will remain centrally-controlled and highly restrictive. The JFMCC and his subordinate commanders must be able to operate effectively within the bounds of this dichotomy.

**Essential Nature of TBMD**

The conundrum posed by conflicting missions which must be executed with limited means affects the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's every decision when confronting the TBM-WMD challenge. A clear grasp of his superiors' operational intent will allow an initial triage of missions, sorting out what must be done now from what can wait; but even then the tyranny of numbers and the challenge of distance may force an apportionment of assets more thin than doctrine demands.

Conducting operations while facing a TBM-WMD threat will require that the JFMCC make hard choices. These will be all-encompassing and continuous, part of an iterative process of
evaluating mission priority, unit tasking, tautness of command and control, degree of political constraint, and the impact of the NCA's overall intent on the TBMD Rules of Engagement in place. Making these difficult choices in a timely, forthright manner, and whenever possible in accordance with Joint TBMD doctrine, will help ensure a smooth transition of the TBMD fight when the campaign begins to move inland from the littoral.

Such a transition will only have been made possible through a successful TBMD battle waged by the Maritime Component "holding open the door" for follow-on TBMD forces deploying into the theater thus defended. This capability cannot be considered in isolation. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in general, and TBMD delivered from the sea in particular, exists to enable the successful conduct of other operations in the face of the TBM threat.

This study presents a preliminary analysis of the many inherent and unavoidable complexities of TBMD conducted from the sea. As present and future commanders envision this mission and prepare the Navy to meet its challenges, they should recognize that, however important TBMD certainly will become, it will be a supporting and enabling function so that other naval and joint operations may occur. Most importantly, they should find the principal lessons of this study illuminating, realistic, and deserving of additional detailed investigation.
CHAPTER I.

ASSUMPTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

U.S. Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense tasked against the threat of ballistic missiles possibly armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction will be one of the key new military capabilities deployed in support of Joint Operations over the next ten years. Technical development issues and doctrinal command-and-control questions are gradually being resolved as near-term systems approach initial operational capability. As with many new military capabilities, programs and studies tend to focus on discrete areas, rather than on an integrating overview of flag-level concerns affecting operational naval TBMD. (For the reader’s convenience, every acronym used in this study is presented with its full compound terms written out in a Glossary beginning on page 145.) This research project will address that need by examining the issues which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may have to consider when operating against a TBM-WMD threat.

The intended approach is straightforward, written by a serving Surface Line officer with extensive AEGIS experience. The assumptions which inform the remainder of the study are detailed immediately, to avoid the loss of credibility felt by a reader who encounters "emergent assumptions" down the line.

The nature of the missile and WMD proliferation threat and the worldwide dynamics that drive it provide a background in the nature of the TBMD challenge, now and into the future.
The basic tenets of Joint TBMD are set forth, and current baseline capabilities to respond to the threat are examined, along with an overview of naval Active Defense TBMD capabilities as currently projected for ten years from now.

The middle chapter is the heart of this study. In a logical progression, it sorts out and sets forth those critical issues to which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must pay personal attention when tasked to operate against a TBM-WMD threat. Quite simply: what questions will keep him awake at night in his Flag Cabin, and how might he possibly address them? Much like a Defense Support Program satellite will soon cue a TBMD AEGIS cruiser, the intended purpose of this study is to detect and pass on the nature and parameters of the problem, not to consummate the intercept and solve that problem. Too much is yet uncertain; too much is still evolving. If this paper succeeds, it will do so by illustrating the scope and direction of that evolution, thereby providing a sound intellectual basis for dealing with uncertainty.
An Unprecedented Challenge

Theater Ballistic Missiles transcend the accepted boundaries of conventional warfare. In speed and altitude, they exceed the envelope of conventional AAW defenses, while in range they may cross AOR boundaries of geographic CINCs, thus exceeding the "envelope" of traditional in-theater Command and Control. When armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction or targeted against population centers, the asymmetric political leverage they potentially provide to otherwise impotent aggressors is a new and profoundly unsettling phenomenon. The military response to such unprecedented capability must inevitably be joint.

In an era of reduced U.S. overseas presence, the first American Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capability on the scene of a developing crisis is likely to come from the sea—but it will be enabled, supported and eventually reinforced by the complementary capabilities of all branches, and possibly bolstered by the synergistic contributions of allies and coalition partners. The ability of these forces to stand firm, build up, and wrest the initiative from hostile forces either diplomatically or operationally, may well rest on the ability of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander to execute the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense mission not in isolation, but in the midst of the messy complexity of multi-mission warfare in the littoral.
Bounding the Problem

The current state of ferment in the TMD/TBMD arena is the sure sign of a dynamic challenge dynamically addressed. Different concepts, architectures and systems compete for funding and patronage in an evolutionary process which will eventually produce coherent doctrine and capable hardware. In order, however, to examine the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense issues of concern to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander ten years hence, the problem must be bounded. The following assumptions do so:

- This study is primarily concerned with the Active Defense capability of Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses under the command of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) in a littoral theater in 2005.

- In 2005, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will have available Navy Area Defense (NAD) capability, using the SM2 Block IVA interceptor.

- Navy Theater Wide (NTW) capability also will be operational, in the form of the SM2/LEAP exoatmospheric interceptor.

- All Navy TBMD interceptors will be launched by AEGIS combatants. New programs such as the VLS "arsenal ship" will not implemented by 2005.

- The projected basic Theater Ballistic Missile Defense BMC4I (Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) architecture of a Joint Planning Network (JPN), Joint Data Network (JDN), and Joint Fire Control Network (JFCN) will have been implemented. These new networks will be based on current initiatives (the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) for the JPN; the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS/LINK 16) for the JDN; Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for the JFCN).¹

- Stereo Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite TBM launch-cueing information of the type now received and processed by the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) will be available onboard AEGIS combatants.
SBIRS-LEO, the Space-Based Infrared System-Low Earth Orbit component of the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) (derived from the SDIO Brilliant Eyes concept) will not yet be operational.²

As Theater Ballistic Missile Defense concepts continue to evolve, common themes emerge from otherwise disparate documents. By 2005, some of these themes are assumed to be fully accepted as tenets of joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense doctrine, to include:

- The keystone of effective Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is centralized planning with coordinated, decentralized execution.³

- Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is considered a subset of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and thus of Theater Air Defense (TAD), rather than a separate mission.

- Within the Joint TAD chain-of-command, the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is responsible for TBMD Active Defense, while the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is responsible for TBMD Attack Operations (offensive operations directed against TBM launchers, C2 nodes and support infrastructure).

Operational Assumptions

Finally, this study examines what is assumed to be the most challenging kind of operational contingency envisioned for a U.S. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander:

- An emergent crisis in 2005 involving an undeveloped theater, facing a littoral opponent from the developing world who possesses multiple WMD-capable TBM systems.

- This WMD threat includes baseline weaponized (20kt fission/single reentry vehicle-per-TBM) nuclear capability.

- Some enemy TBM systems have sufficient range to hold the capitals and major population centers of possible U.S. regional coalition partners at risk.

- Potential regional allies have no organic TBMD capability. However, some of their TACAIR, SOF and C2 assets could
contribute to multinational Attack Operations, and their naval forces could contribute to non-TBMD maritime tasking.

- U.S. ground-based TBMD systems are not forward deployed in the region, and the ports and airfields through which they will be delivered are currently undefended against TBM attack. Once the ports and airfields are secure, U.S. Army THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) and PATRIOT PAC-3 (ERINT) will be available. MEADS, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (formerly known as CORPS SAM), entangled in budgetary infighting since the mid-1990s, is not yet available.

- Air Force fighter-launched Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) assets and wide-body transport (B747) Airborne Laser (ABL) platforms are operational, but have not yet been deployed to the as-yet undefended airfields in theater.

- The Joint Force Commander views amphibious power projection as an option in his Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Several potential Amphibious Objective Areas are under consideration. Once ashore, Marine units will have TBMD-Enhanced HAWK interceptors available.

- Enemy short-range missile capabilities (SS-21, FROG-7, SMERCH Multiple Launch Rocket System) are robust, as are his littoral defense Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), Mine Warfare capabilities (MIW), diesel submarine and Fast Patrol Boat forces. On paper, his Air Order of Battle is impressive, but his level of pilot training and quality of aircraft maintenance are questionable. His air arm has never faced an opponent possessing U.S.-level proficiency.

While other kinds of situations are expected to arise, the above conditions are regarded as the most stressing while remaining within the timeframe of the next decade.
CHAPTER II.
NAVAL TBMD OVERVIEW

As the new millennium approaches, the United States looks out on a world in ferment, nations and peoples attempting to define their place in an international order shattered by the end of nearly three generations under a bipolar system. Pessimists preach a dark future: "Technology is changing how man knows, and the resulting dislocations are culturally cataclysmic. Half the world is looking for God anew, and the other half is behaving as if no god exists." Optimists couch their views in terms reflecting the dichotomy within the common Chinese character for chaos and opportunity. "We live at a fantastic moment of human history.... The spread of the Third Wave economy has galvanized all of the Asia Pacific region, introducing trade and strategic tensions, but at the same time opening the possibility of rapidly raising a billion human beings out of the pit of poverty."^5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff take the middle ground and see "a world in which threats are widespread and uncertain, and where conflict is probable, but too often unpredictable."^6 To the JCS, that world holds four principal dangers for the United States:

- Regional instability
- The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Transnational dangers [e.g. terrorism, drugs]
- Dangers to democracy and reform^7
Threat, Vulnerability, and Defense

These four challenges are intertwined in a dynamic emerging from the confluence of international instability and the worldwide diffusion of technology. As more and more nations see themselves as standing alone before their enemies, no longer sheltered by the suzerainty of a superpower, they also are increasingly able to buy, steal or indigenously develop the technologies through which they hope to "achieve strategic security—the chance of a millennium." Often, these striving nations believe that this chance is to be found in the complementary technologies and synergistic power of Theater Ballistic Missiles and the second "principal danger"—Weapons of Mass Destruction.

TBM and WMD Proliferation

Evolution, whether of organisms or organizations, occurs due to the selective pressure exerted by the surrounding environment, and will continue for as long as that pressure exists. The selective pressure of the international environment may drive the leaders of developing nations toward the acquisition of Theater Ballistic Missiles as a means of achieving strategic security, both for their peoples and for themselves. This is the vital, indeed primal "demand side" of the proliferation equation. Why nations who otherwise lack significant political or military leverage wish to acquire such disproportionate capabilities is often more important than how they achieve that goal. In a world of increasingly
decentralized technology and an ever-expanding base of scientific knowledge, these nations will succeed. Unless the pressure for nations to assure their own strategic security can be eliminated, supply-side controls on proliferation are doomed to eventual failure. Determined proliferators will arm themselves before they will feed their people. For example, as of mid-October 1995:

The Iraqi government has used a covert network of purchasing agents and dummy companies to buy millions of dollars worth of sensitive missile parts from firms in Europe and Russia.... The missile-related orders reflect Iraq’s willingness to spend tens of millions of dollars to rebuild a key facet of its prewar military capability, even though the country’s leaders claim it is financially strapped.

Consider what Third-World nations stand to gain from such decisions. These weapons confer national prestige upon a regime and its leader; then allow formidable international intimidation of regional foes; and they are available on the world arms market as turn-key systems, with required training levels which are achievable in the developing world.

No longer the exclusive Cold War preserve of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, TBMs have been successfully employed in tribal civil wars in Afghanistan and Yemen, proving that neither a national technical infrastructure nor a highly-trained tactical air arm is necessary to strike quickly and deeply at an enemy’s key military and political targets. Even against a nation with modern, well-trained forces, unless capable Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses are fielded, such strikes
will get through, expending replaceable TBM "ammunition"
rather than valuable TACAIR pilots."

By 2005, more than twenty countries will be able to field
some form of TBM capability, including key regional powers in
the flashpoints of Northeast Asia, the South China Sea
littoral, the Indian subcontinent, Southwest Asia, the Levant
and North Africa. International efforts to counter TBM
proliferation, including such Western supply-side "technology
cartels" as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), may
increasingly push these same nations toward the development of
indigenous technology.

The nature of indigenous technology in the Third World
will tend to limit missile accuracy more than it does warhead
lethality. In this regard, the intelligence community will
have to closely monitor emergent TBM applications of Global
Positioning System (GPS) technology. In general, however, the
precise guidance systems necessary to achieve a small Circular
Error Probable (CEP) with a ballistic system are simply harder
to design and manufacture than are, for example, basic
chemical warheads for that same system. This "selective
pressure" will thus encourage the evolution of systems with
poor accuracy but powerful payloads.

Historically, the targets of choice for systems thus
constrained have been civilian population centers; large,
soft, stationary targets of dubious military value but of
great political importance. Therefore, these systems may not
be able defeat a developed nation militarily, but they can
confer potent political leverage through the threat, as French 
strategic planners once put it, to tear off an arm.

Readiness to exercise that option, though, may not be 
constrained by traditional concepts of strategic deterrence. 
Speaking specifically of small nuclear forces in the 
developing world, Jerome Kahan identifies three factors which 
increase the likelihood of use for any form of WMD:

Strategic discourse between...adversaries may be 
nonexistent, raising the prospect of a breakdown in 
deterrence at the regional level....

Third World states tend to have imperfect and incomplete 
intelligence information about their relative positions 
in a conflict....

Small nuclear forces, especially in the hands of 
technically unsophisticated countries, may well be 
deficient in command and control arrangements.12

Thus, by 2005 the United States may face a variety of regional 
powers deploying tenuously-controlled TBM systems of 
prodigious reach, with problematic accuracy offset by powerful 
warheads.

Why, in a discussion of Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense, should Weapons of Mass Destruction, especially 
nuclear WMD, be emphasized when these devices have yet to be 
combined with TBMs and used in regional conflict? The 
"leverage" inherent in a given weapon system derives, in part, 
from how effectively it can engage and neutralize its intended 
target. During Operation Desert Storm, the United States 
gained great leverage from the conventionally-armed TOMAHAWK 
Land Attack Missile (TLAM), successfully conducting 
operational fires to the full depth of the theater with this
weapon in the critical early days of the war. That leverage
was gained by what was, in effect, nothing more than a slow-
fighting 1000lb bomb. However, TLAM was in reality a "system of
systems," a weapon whose nominal power was multiplied by
precise accuracy gained from complex guidance systems, systems
in turn supported by an unrivalled National Technical
Intelligence system, a comprehensive Mapping, Charting and
Geodesy system, and a mission-planning system employing a
national network of experts with access to massive
computational power. All the missile had to do was fly to a
given point in three dimensions and explode--but the
synergistic support systems which planned the mission for that
one missile had marked and mensurated that point to within
inches.

In developing nations, these support systems are
generally missing. National Technical Intelligence with which
to conduct strategic reconnaissance is limited or nonexistent
(as noted by Kahan). While in a permissive pre-hostilities
environment, an intelligence operative with a handheld GPS can
record the coordinates of a stationary target, but the TBM
system tasked against that target is unlikely to be able to
take advantage of the precision thus provided. Though enhanced
ballistic missile systems that approach U.S. cruise missile
accuracy will someday be fielded, supply-side proliferation
controls and the resultant limitations of indigenous
technology will tend to push that day into the future. Thus,
while First World land attack cruise missiles gain their
leverage through stealth and accuracy derived from a system of systems, Third World Theater Ballistic Missiles stand alone, and must rely on speed and brute force.

The solution for poor targeting of denied areas, and poor system accuracy once a TBM gets there, is to increase warhead lethality. As long as accuracy remains constrained, this is an evolutionary imperative for TBM systems, and therefore represents an imminent threat for TBMD forces. In 1991, crude chemical warheads were available for Iraqi SCUDs, but were not used. In 2005, TBM-weaponized WMD could include chemical and biologic unitary and submunition warheads, and that most challenging threat of all—the TBM-carried nuclear weapon.

Much debate currently swirls about the defensive difficulties posed by various incarnations of putative chemical submunition warheads. The sound and fury of these Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) arguments tend to push the reality of the nuclear threat into an indeterminate future scenario. Modern chemical weapons, biological agents and toxins are indeed deadly, and it is possible to design a worst-case submunition warhead to carry them which will give TBMD interceptor engineers cold sweats—but an important fact gets lost in the debate. Chemicals and bio-agents kill. Nuclear weapons obliterate.

Since August 1945, nuclear weapons have had a special resonance in world affairs, unmatched by the other two members of the WMD unholy trinity. The use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts has been universally decried—and, in those
cases, universally tolerated. One wonders what the world community would have done if the final offensives of the Iran-Iraq war had been heralded by tactical nuclear exchanges rather than by the muffled midnight bursts of mustard and cyanide shells. Likewise, had the Libyan CW plant at Rabta actually been producing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), might it not have disappeared under a swarm of TLAM long before the hardened facility at Tarhuna was built? Also, note that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) draft Theater Missile Defense Command and Control Plan contains a nuclear—not biological, not chemical—annex, for nuclear weapons attack everything simultaneously, burning, blasting, poisoning, and causing the C2-vital electromagnetic spectrum to fibrillate even as they turn the very sand to ash and glass.

Proliferators in the developing world know this. Chemical and biological weapons are more easily produced—but they are the B-Team. A-Team capability is available for a sufficient investment of time and treasure. Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa and North Korea know this. It is hoped that before the murder of Hussein Kamel al-Majid, the Intelligence Community interrogated the Iraqi inner-circle defector and WMD-development chief concerning the details of the Iraqi nuclear program in early 1991—thereby suggesting how the similar Iranian program may be progressing today. "The Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology mirrors the push by President Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear bomb in Iraq
over the last 15 years. The Iranians use many of the old Iraqi smuggling routes and contacts...." Both in the Gulf and beyond, the TBM-WMD threat is imminent. By expedience and necessity, that threat in the short term will be chemical and biological. By evolutionary imperative, the threat in the future will be nuclear.

Three Centers of Gravity

WMD capability will give Theater Ballistic Missiles a degree of leverage which they have not demonstrated heretofore. Conventional SCUDs arcing into Haifa and Tel Aviv presented the United States with a severe, but ultimately manageable, operational and diplomatic challenge. The same could not have been said if those SCUDs had been carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction. WMD-capable TBMs will be able to hold at risk not only specific individual targets, but entire centers of gravity, both military and political.

At the operational-tactical level of conflict, an enemy so equipped can threaten the military center of gravity consisting of the opposing power projection force itself. One way of doing this would be by interdicting ports, airfields, supply depots and fixed assembly areas." Aggressor forces employed chemical TBM barrages against just this target set early in the Northeast Asia MRC of Global Wargame '95. Using conventional TBMs, the Iraqi military attempted the same tactic, for the same reasons, against rear areas such as Jubayl, Saudi Arabia in 1991. These conventional attacks
were largely ineffective. However, were a credible chemical, biological or nuclear threat to be posed, it probably would force the assembly, concentration and resupply of a power projection force to take place outside the range of hostile TBM systems; such a threat-induced operational requirement would make the movement-to-contact phase of a major campaign measurably more complex and costly.

Also at the operational-tactical level of conflict, a second way of attacking the military center of gravity is to use the TBM-WMD system against concentrated formations of combat forces. Hence, the Desert Storm model of massive force marshalled, magnified, then suddenly unleashed in high-tempo, synchronized combat probably will be difficult to emulate. Heavy ground forces concentrating in fixed assembly areas in theater would likely be superseded by more maneuverable (thus more survivable), albeit lighter forces deployed from longer range--perhaps by means of an extended period of air and naval strike tasking, followed by airborne and amphibious operations that would themselves attempt to minimize their suitability as targets for WMD.

At the operational level of war, the WMD-TBM vulnerable center of gravity is political, the cohesion of U.S.- allied regional coalitions. Multinational operations are an integral part of the National Military Strategy, for "our Armed Forces will most often fight in concert with regional allies and friends, as coalitions can decisively increase combat power and lead to a more favorable outcome to a conflict."17
However, when facing a TBM-armed adversary during the timeframe of this study, the territory of the United States itself is unlikely to be directly threatened, while that of regional allies may well be. If that threat is chemical, biological or nuclear, the political leadership of likely coalition partners may look to their own strategic security and decide that making common cause with the U.S. against a local hegemon is not an option. "A window for internationally supported military action against a proliferator may close as the country gains the capability to retaliate against additional countries at greater ranges."¹⁸

If, however, the National Command Authorities see U.S. vital interests set sufficiently at risk, the nation can pursue unilateral military action. This is a fundamental tenet of the National Military Strategy. However, such a course not only risks potential collateral damage to and direct retaliation against U.S. friends in the region, but also focuses attention on a vital and vulnerable third center of gravity at the strategic level of war, the political will of the American people.

Since facing German mustard gas and phosgene in 1918, American forces have not had to operate on a WMD battlefield, and the American body politic has never felt the stunning shock of a nuclear weapon. While overwhelming American conventional military superiority can directly threaten a regional enemy’s ability to make war on American forces, that enemy could in turn use TBM-delivered WMD capability to
threaten American will to make war on him. In the media-age, U.S. military action is increasingly dependent on the vicissitudes of public support—and the American public does not support long wars or heavy casualties. The public reaction to hostile use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, covered minute by minute on CNN, might well influence popular support for national policy.

Emotional popular reaction can sway policy either way, however. Thousands slain at Pearl Harbor stiffened national will, while eighteen dead at Mogadishu catalyzed collapse. Public perception of world events cannot always be accurately predicted by military and political professionals. What is certain, though, is that in our democracy, however imperfect, public perception determines public support for national military action, and if the strategic security of the United States is not perceived to be at risk, that support might well evaporate. The initiation of armed conflict is the ultimate expression of the political will of the people of a democracy, and such conflict cannot long continue unsupported by that will. ¹⁹

Four Pillars of TBMD

An imminent threat to these vital centers of gravity—the military force itself, the cohesion of a regional alliance or coalition, and the political will of the American people—demands a robust response. As Theater Ballistic Missile Defense systems and doctrine have evolved since Desert Storm,
discussions of Joint TBMD capability have settled upon a common construct of "Four Pillars of TBMD"—actually, three pillars and a plinth—Active Defense, Attack Operations, and Passive Defense, all supported by a base of Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I).

TBMD Active Defense, the interception of Theater Ballistic Missiles in flight, is the focus of this study; it is the centerpiece of naval TBMD capabilities. In the era of the Soviet threat, an early, basic tenet of U.S. naval anti-air warfare doctrine was "Shoot the archer, not the arrow." Destruction of strike aircraft offered far greater defensive leverage than attempting individual intercepts of their inbound weapons. Since TBMds are ground-launched, Active Defense assets must face the arrows, and this constraint defines the nature of Active Defense operations.

Entirely aside from the mechanical and mathematical challenges posed by small, high-speed ballistic targets, Active Defense is innately difficult, because it must start out "behind the power curve." Planning for TBMD Active Defense attempts to compensate for the challenging nature of the target by working to achieve defense in depth—early sensor cueing, followed by multiple shot opportunities for complementary interceptor systems throughout the course of an inbound missile's flight. In the Joint TBMD environment of 2005, this might include airborne laser and air-launched missile attacks against a Theater Ballistic Missile while it
is still in boost-phase (ascending, rocket motor burning); Theater-Wide TBMD system attack during ascent-phase (after boost, before apogee); multiple Theater-Wide system interception opportunities during midcourse flight (after apogee, before reentry); and endgame attacks by Area Defense TBMD systems in the terminal phase (following reentry).

The defining characteristics of TBMD Active Defense thus include:

- The need for the earliest possible warning of TBM preparation and launch, along with the most rapid netted cueing of Active Defense sensors and systems;

- A related requirement for close, highly automated coordination between complementary defensive systems in the Joint environment;

- A tactical preference for systems which achieve intercept early in the TBM trajectory, in order to mitigate WMD warhead effects and avoid the need for single-target endgame defense; and

- Rigorous fire discipline and reliable kill assessment, to prevent wasteful expenditure of a limited interceptor inventory.

All of these requirements are likely to be magnified by a potential force mismatch between the number of TBMD interceptors available in theater, and the number of TBMs in the enemy Order of Battle at the outset of hostilities.

Attack Operations--aggressive interdiction of enemy TBM assets and infrastructure on the ground--have the highest potential defensive leverage, and pose by far the greatest operational challenge of any pillar of TBMD. If successful, they can destroy missiles and associated WMD before launch, decimate vehicles and infrastructure to prevent further
launches, and put fearful pressure on enemy TBM launch crews to run, hide, and fire in sloppy haste—if at all. If, on the other hand, the friendly force’s Attack Operations are relatively unsuccessful, they can entangle vast numbers of strike, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft needed elsewhere in theater, and fruitlessly risk highly-trained Special Operations personnel deep in enemy territory.

Along with basic Passive Defense measures and area defense-capable PATRIOT Active Defense, rudimentary Attack Operations formed the only coalition TBMD capability available during Desert Storm; the results were decidedly mixed. Attack Operations will evolve and advance by 2005, but they will still have to be able to overcome the basic challenge they face today—an extremely demanding tactical timeline.

A defining construct for Attack Operations is the military mnemonic of the "OODA Loop," the cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. The combatant who has sufficient information and agility to consistently operate "inside" his opponent’s OODA loop, deciding and acting faster, is likely to prevail. Against TEL-mobile TBMs, the Attack Operations OODA cycle is very challenging. Attack assets, either airborne or ground-based, must be in position, armed, fueled and alert when a TBM launch occurs or a TEL is detected. These assets must then be able to orient on their designated target and initiate an attack before the TEL moves and hides. The decision timeline from detection to attack is measured in minutes, and is still not consistently met, nearly five years
after Desert Storm. During the recent ROVING SANDS 95 Joint Tactical Air Operations Exercise, "even with special operations forces and a Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle dedicated to locating [an] SS-21 battery, it successfully fired all missiles--many with [simulated] chemical warheads--against some 20 corps and division targets."\(^{20}\)

Furthermore, although Attack Operations form a pillar of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, the nature of these actions is distinctly offensive, carried out by U.S. or coalition forces on territory controlled by the enemy. Rules of Engagement and Command and Control issues are therefore certain to be different, and likely to be more constrained than those associated with Active Defense. While a commander may see much to be gained through the vigorous pursuit of Attack Operations, his actual freedom to carry them out, especially in the early days of a conflict (when Active Defense forces are likely to be severely challenged) may nonetheless be distinctly circumscribed.

The defining characteristics of TBMD Attack Operations include:

- High defensive leverage due to a potential ability to prevent or degrade TBM launches and destroy WMD on enemy territory;

- High difficulty and high danger due to a compressed decision cycle and the need for operations on or over enemy territory;

- A need to address the emergent threat of an enemy’s coordinated use of highly capable SAMs (e.g. SA-12) to defend TBM launch areas;\(^{21}\)
- The likelihood that mission execution and Rules of Engagement will be under very restrictive centralized control; and

- The imperative for continuous improvement of sensor-to-shooter connectivity, and cross-service linkage of joint sensors (including those Active Defense sensors that can aid Attack Operations).

Passive Defense "reduces the probability of and minimizes the effects of [TBM] attack by limiting an enemy's target acquisition capability, reducing the vulnerability of critical forces and supporting infrastructure, and improving the potential to survive and resume operations after an attack."22 The very limitations that cause regional aggressors to rely on TBM forces may tend to decrease the utility of some classic Passive Defense measures such as the use of decoy targets and EMCON. Hostile systems with long range, large warheads and poor CEP are most likely to be fired against large, fixed area targets such as ports and airfields, and they are more likely still to be simply launched against cities as terror weapons attacking political centers of gravity.

Passive Defense directed against an enemy’s limited Battle Damage Assessment capability, or used to enhance dissemination of Early Warning to civilians, has more promise. Dispersal, Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) passive measures against WMD, inoculation of personnel against bio-agents, and temporary fortification of military facilities and individual units can be accomplished through training, doctrine and habit.23 By their very nature, military

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formations are acculturated to the basic practices of Passive Defense, and thus are resilient and survivable if properly equipped and well-led. The same may not be said of urban civilian populations. Aggressors know this, and "soft" population centers are thus attractive as TBM targets.

Such Douhetian thinking is borne out by the results of the recent Global Wargame '95 at Newport, Rhode Island, and Wargame 95B at the National Test Facility, Falcon AFB, Colorado. Both examined major hostile TBM efforts directed against non-military population centers. In a regional conflict, then, the CINC might well reap significant benefits through multinational-force coordination of Passive Defense efforts for population centers on his Theater Defended Assets List (DAL). "It is critical to plan for and disseminate TM [Theater Missile] launch warning and impact area prediction to civil authorities, as well as coalition forces.... The theater CINC and his subordinates should consider assisting the host nation civil authorities in establishing passive defense measures for the civilian population."

The defining characteristics of TBMD Passive Defense thus include:

- The vital importance of Intelligence and Early Warning. The specific capabilities of the threat must be well understood in order to plan effective Passive Defense measures. Implementation of those measures in a timely manner (and with a minimum of false alerts) requires effective Early Warning;

- Despite an understandable propensity on the part of military commanders to concentrate on the maintenance of their military capabilities and the welfare of their men, political realities may well shift that concentration toward provision of Passive Defense for threatened civilian populations; and
Early Warning of a TBM launch and a determination of the likely target are relatively easy to obtain. Presently, it is harder to disseminate this information quickly, effectively and jointly.

Intelligence, early warning, and information dissemination are each vital to effective Passive Defense. A key enabler, then, for this pillar of TBMD is the capability which also supports Active Defense and Attack Operations, the plinth beneath the pillars: Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.

BMC4I for the TBMD battle encompasses far more than issues of Command and Control. It is indeed an "architecture," a commander's "system of systems." BMC4I seeks to overcome the greatest difficulties of TBMD--distance (great) and time (little)--by integrating focused intelligence collection, early warning, sensor cueing, defensive system response, and assessment of system effectiveness.

As TBMD systems and capabilities evolve toward 2005, the BMC4I core concept of integration becomes critical, much more than just a matter of semantics. Under the necessary developmental discipline imposed by the need for joint TBMD operations, more and more systems are achieving a degree of interoperability, either through initial design, or by means of "gateways" added to older systems. "Interoperability suggests a compatibility of communications means and message formats. It produces a capability to share information directly."25
This is constructive, but strictly evolutionary. The NAVCENT portion of lessons learned from the major TBMD training exercise ROVING SANDS 95 reads, in part: "We are still a long way from true interoperability .... We are not sharing data, merely conducting communications, passing tracks and overlays...and providing correlation." As envisioned for joint TBMD, BMC4I seeks to achieve the revolutionary seamless battlespace implied by true integration. Thus, in the words of the Joint Staff: "Integration suggests more than just compatibility. It suggests a decision to respond to shared information in accordance with prearranged conventions and agreements. The net effect is a degree of synergy which would not otherwise occur."

The characteristics of BMC4I for effective TBMD include:

- An overall responsibility for comprehensive coordination of the TBMD battle, from initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), to interceptor kill evaluation and assessment of damage to protected assets following TBM attack;

- The need to disseminate TBMD surveillance and warning data derived from National Technical systems in such a way that time-critical defensive operations in theater are supported, while National Technical capabilities are not compromised;

- A fundamental importance of the execution of TBMD Active Defense, Attack Operations, and Passive Defense;

- The pivotal objective of achieving a "system of systems" for TBMD which is truly integrated, allowing automated exchange of data between joint TBMD components in a seamless manner (design requirements of the projected Joint Planning Network (JPN), Joint Data Network (JDN), and Joint Fire Control Network (JFCN) reflect this goal); and

- A daunting degree of complexity which currently presents the most massive and difficult technical challenge of any dimension of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.
Present Capability

The international tendencies and trends which demonstrate the need for capable Theater Ballistic Missile defenses are compelling, as is the historical evidence of that need stemming from Desert Storm. However, before examining the TBMD-related issues of concern to a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander in 2005, it is necessary to establish "ground truth," a brief, accurate description of where U.S. Active Defense TBMD capabilities stand now. If a regional contingency involving a TBM-armed, WMD-capable adversary were to erupt tomorrow, what Active Defense systems could U.S. forces bring to the fight?

Baseline TBMD Active Defense Capability

"Today, the nation’s existing TBM defense capability rests with the PATRIOT system and its evolving improvements." In the numerous exciting reports of ongoing TBMD development, it is easy for the seagoing operator to become deceived by the whirl of programs and budgets, COEA studies, R&D pilot ventures, operational test and evaluation, battlegroup workups, "future studies," and wargaming simulations. Thick briefing books and lengthy slide presentations show a plethora of systems in advanced stages of development, either being tested or awaiting further funding. There is, however, only one Active Defense weapon ready to go to war now, and that is PATRIOT (MIM-104).
PATRIOT was conceived as a mobile, all-weather air defense missile, with the XMIM-104 design specified in 1965.\textsuperscript{29} TBMD capability was not available until the deployment of PATRIOT Advanced Capability 1 (PAC-1) in 1988. PAC-2, the PATRIOT version that earned fame in the Gulf War, was not deployed until Desert Shield in 1990. Thus, the current version of the MIM-104 is a product-improved variant of an interceptor designed three decades ago.

Since Desert Storm, the missile has been modified twice, first under the PATRIOT Quick Response (QR) Program (1991-1992), and more recently through the introduction of PATRIOT PAC-2 GEM (Guidance Enhanced Missile) in February 1995. "We will field about 350 of these missiles, which will provide the principal improvement in our defensive capability until the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 begins deployments in fiscal 1998."\textsuperscript{30}

PATRIOT is an area-defense weapon, intercepting TBMs in the terminal phase of their trajectory, well inside the atmosphere, and engaging them with a proximity-fuzed blast-fragmentation warhead. This type of system has inherent limitations against TBM chemical submunitions, a critical concern which drove the selection of an entirely new missile, the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT), using hit-to-kill technology, for PATRIOT PAC-3. The very short standoff range of PAC-2 intercepts also makes likely effectiveness against a barometric-fuzed nuclear TBM problematic, and destruction of very-high-speed long range TBM reentry vehicles impossible.
The system itself, consisting of headquarters, communications and support equipment, 4-cell Launching Stations (LS) organized into 8-LS Fire Units (FU), each with its own MPQ-53 radar, and 6-FU Battalions (192 missiles), is air-transportable, but not tactically mobile.\textsuperscript{31} Emplacement and relocation of Fire Units can be done expeditiously, but PATRIOT cannot "fire on the move." In effect, it is a fixed point defense system for stationary targets.

Getting PATRIOT into theater takes lift. Lots of lift. Movement of a PAC-2 Battalion with one full missile reload takes 301 C-141 sorties.\textsuperscript{32} Moving two Fire Units from Germany to Israel during Desert Storm "required more than 50 C-5A’s, and because of beddown limitations and refueling requirements, diverted over 120 sorties each day [through 48 hours] from other high priority lift requirements."\textsuperscript{33}

Since regional deployment of PATRIOT means installation of U.S. military equipment and personnel on foreign soil, such deployment is unlikely prior to imminent hostilities, except in relatively developed theaters such as Western Europe or Northeast Asia (e.g. South Korea). Even in such "TBM-rich" environments as the Arabian Gulf, political sensitivities may impede timely deployment or reinforcement of this single U.S. TBMD Active Defense system.

TBMD as a "System of Systems"

The relatively short range and limited mobility of PATRIOT PAC-2 restrict the nature of Active Defense TBMD plans
built around this system. Current concepts feature "bubbles of protection" provided for specific critical assets. "The composite envelope, which is the collection of fire units producing the protected envelope and the critical assets in the area under the envelope, is designated an enclave."\textsuperscript{34} Since Desert Storm, interim TBMD enhancement efforts have involved initiatives to expand the volume of PATRIOT enclaves. Because the MPQ-53 radar outranges the MIM-104 interceptor itself, one way to enlarge an enclave would be to move Fire Units downrange (down the likely threat axis) from the radar supporting them. The Quick Response (QR) program of 1991-1992 did just this, giving the system the ability to "deploy missile launchers up to 12km from their associated fire-control radar, which enlarges the defended area."\textsuperscript{35} However, given the absolute performance limitations of the PAC-2 missile, further enhancements to the Enclave concept have had to come from other areas, such as improving overall system performance through leveraging BMC4I and pursuing the synergistic effect of a "System of Systems."

Enclave defense with range-limited weapons has always demanded a measure of grit from warriors. In 1775, holding Breed's Hill outside Boston, Colonel William Prescott considered the effectiveness of his smoothbore muskets, scant artillery and limited ammunition, and told the patriots commanding the batteries "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." Today's PATRIOT battery commander cannot fire until the white-hot meteor of a reentering TBM streaks through
the sky inbound to his enclave. At least Prescott could see
the British coming for a long time. Early warning as to the
size, nature, and disposition of a threat increases
situational awareness and thus the efficiency of the defense.
For the TBMD battle today, that warning comes from space.

Current TBMD space-based early warning depends on Defense
Support Program (DSP) satellites originally deployed to detect
strategic ICBM launches. Their capability against smaller TBMs
with associated lower signatures is limited, but has been
enhanced by USSPACECOM through the implementation of the ALERT
(Attack and Launch Early Report to Theater) system. "It is the
operational version of prototype TM [Theater Missile] warning
efforts developed by the Tactical Exploitation of National
Capabilities (TENCAP) office under the Talon Shield
program." ALERT and its theater-deployed derivative, JTAGS
(Joint Tactical Ground Station), process information from
multiple satellites viewing a single launch, thus gaining
"stereo DSP" data.

System software calculates tactical parameters such as
time, latitude, longitude and altitude for comparison
with known theater ballistic missile profiles....
Identifying the missile by means of the profile
allows...a least-squares fit of observed altitude and
downrange distance as a function of time.... Loft can be
added to the four-state fit as a fifth parameter to
permit manipulation of the profile in both altitude and
downrange distance.37

The ALERT system can thus provide TBM launch time and
estimated launch position (critical for Attack Operations),
probable missile type (which may have specific engageability
and warhead implications), missile state vectors (for
midcourse prediction) and impact point prediction (for efficient Area Defense and effective Passive Defense).

ALERT, however, is part of the national Tactical Event System (TES), located in proximity to many other national capabilities near Colorado Springs, Colorado. Communications restrictions imposed by the need to filter other sensitive national systems data carried on the same nets can retard dissemination of ALERT fused data. The system can meet a warning goal of 90 seconds—but that window represents elapsed time from sensor to CINC—not sensor to TBMD shooter. Studies have shown that some enemy missiles may impact their targets before the associated ALERT cues reach the in-theater defensive assets that need them. The operational BMC4I solution to this time lag is the modular, truck-mounted, air-mobile DSP theater processing node--JTAGS.

The JTAGS system can process, fuse and disseminate information from up to three DSP satellites (if its dish antennae can "see" that many of the geosynchronous sensors). Two prototypes are now operationally deployed, one in Germany and the other in South Korea. The contractor has an option for production of a further five units. JTAGS-processed DSP information provided in-theater to an Army Force Projection Tactical Operations Center (FPTOC) can enhance existing TBMD Active Defense capability by quickly determining which of several enclaves may be threatened by a given TBM launch, forwarding the cueing information to the correct PATRIOT Information Coordination Central (ICC) vehicle at the
battalion level, and thence to the individual MSQ-104 ECS Engagement Control Stations.

The MPQ-53 radar, though, cannot yet accept such external cueing data directly, which is a major goal of current TBMD BMC4I integration efforts. Exercises are ongoing, especially involving AEGIS SPY radar data provided to PATRIOT via the Navy’s new Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). For example, one recent test "was designed to show how CEC could help defend Europe.... A total of 31 simulated 'Scud' missiles were 'launched' from locations in North Africa. The launch and predicted impact point of each target, together with 'very near real time' control data, was calculated by CEC and transmitted to [a] PATRIOT battery some 1,450km away...."39 What must be borne in mind, however, is that such recently demonstrated capabilities are experimental rather than operational. Again quoting CENTCOM lessons-learned from the recent ROVING SANDS 95 exercise: "The inability to real time cue and coordinate sensor data between AEGIS SPY and PATRIOT MPQ-53 radars limits our effectiveness."40

Implications of the Baseline

The implications for TBMD Active Defense of failure to move beyond this baseline are far-reaching. The procurement power of such TBMD organizations as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the Program Executive Office, Theater Air Defense (PEO-TAD) is not in doubt; but fiscal constraint has been a significant factor in Department of
Defense program planning since 1985. Hence, in considering the state of U.S. theater defenses against an evolving threat, one must carefully consider what James Edward Pitts has called the "consequences of not funding." 41

Regarding PATRIOT during Desert Storm, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson: it was not the fact that it did its job well that amazes, but the fact that it did it at all. The current system, especially when deployed with the latest Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) and supported by JTAGS, will be quite capable against that same baseline threat. However, as the first section of this chapter explained, the "baseline threat" is inexorably evolving beyond the PATRIOT PAC-2 engagement envelope, pushed by two great TBM trends: increasing ballistic missile system range and the frightening capability of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Increasing Theater Ballistic Missile range, (which can be achieved by decreasing payload, adding stages, or simply strapping on additional boosters) increases reentry velocity. Baseline defensive systems with limited standoff range, such as PATRIOT PAC-2, rapidly reach a point where they cannot acquire, track, launch, and achieve intercept quickly enough. The kinematics of the attacking missile have gotten inside the OODA loop of the defending interceptor. Such absolute physical limitations can only be overcome by fielding a different system; this fact has compelled development of PAC-3 ERINT and even longer range systems such as SM2 Block IVA Navy Area Defense (NAD), Army THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense)
and the very long range Navy Theater Wide (NTW, using the SM2/LEAP missile) system. None is a substitute for another; all are complementary components of an evolving Active Defense system-of-systems.

In addition to providing robust capability against long-range, high-speed systems, or shorter-range, high-apogee (lofted trajectory) TBMs, exoatmospheric TBMD systems such as THAAD and NTW provide an essential capability against Weapons of Mass Destruction, which—to repeat—baseline systems do not. Even a highly lethal Area defense hit-to-kill design such as ERINT will cause the release of some WMD components into the air upon intercept consummation. Only the Theater defense systems have the ability to make the kill in space, forcing any surviving WMD materials to careen into the atmosphere unshielded.

Theater-wide systems also extend the battlespace, a primary goal of any commander, while the baseline system does not; indeed, the current baseline system surrenders not only battlespace, but also vital intelligence to the enemy. The fixed enclaves and point-defense limitations of PAC-2 announce clearly which assets on the DAL the CINC intends to defend, and thus conversely which he is willing to sacrifice.

The CINC may not even be able to make that admittedly difficult choice expeditiously, for political sensitivities may constrain his ability to emplace TBMD assets before the onset of hostilities. Once conflict commences, strategic lift sensitivities could inhibit his ability to reactively deploy
Active Defenses even more. "When a crisis occurs, the real-time decision to devote scarce airlift assets to move a PATRIOT battalion instead of infantry or artillery equipment will be difficult and pressing."\(^{42}\)

If the TBM threat continues to evolve, then Joint TBMD capability must progress beyond the baseline. In the military world, as in the natural world, over-specialization is an invitation to catastrophe. A robust response to an evolving threat requires diverse capabilities fully integrated through a common BMC4I architecture. During the crucial early days of a regional contingency, when "the Navy kicks open the door and holds it open for the heavy land forces," the TBMD Active Defense capabilities most likely to be picked from that diverse palette by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be naval.\(^{43}\) If the U.S. military moves resolutely beyond the baseline, the JFMCC will have flexible, deployable, multi-tiered naval TBMD capability available by 2005. The projected characteristics of those specific systems are the subject of the next section.
Naval TBMD Active Defense Capabilities to 2005

"The Navy TBMD system shall be comprised of two tiers, which provides for an area (lower tier) defense and theater wide (upper tier) defense. The Naval TBMD system shall provide capability against the full range of TBM threats for protection of joint forces, sea and air lines of communications, command and control facilities, vital political and military assets, supporting infrastructure, and population centers." If current initiatives remain funded and on schedule, this layered-defense approach to naval TBMD will be fielded by 2005. Navy Area defense (NAD) will be provided by the SM2 Block IVA interceptor, while Navy Theater Wide defense (NTW) will likely depend on the SM2/LEAP variant, carrying an infrared-homing Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile. Sensor capability will be built around the AEGIS-organic SPY radar, with offboard cueing from JTAGS-type fused DSP data. Because of the highly automated, highly integrated, self-contained nature of modern warships, much of the framework for the projected joint TBMD BMC4I architecture is already in place on AEGIS combatants. As stated in Chapter 1, for this study that architecture is presumed to be fully functional by 2005.

Navy Area Defense (NAD)

The SM2 Block IVA NAD interceptor represents the latest stage in the remarkable evolution of the Navy's Standard Missile, a weapon whose roots reach back to the TARTAR and
TERRIER offspring of the BUMBLEBEE Anti-Air Warfare program of the 1950s. NAD is one of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization "core" TBMD systems, and thus (along with PATRIOT PAC-3 and THAAD) has a great deal of developmental and bureaucratic momentum. A contingency capability of two NAD AEGIS cruisers with at least 35 SM2 Block IVA missiles each will put to sea during FY 1998.\textsuperscript{45} By 2005, a substantial portion of all AEGIS combatants will be NAD-capable, with several hundred missiles in inventory.

The Block IVA missile itself is a boosted, high-mach, long-range, solid-fuel interceptor with "dual mode" terminal homing (IR primary and semi-active RF secondary), and a blast-fragmentation warhead specifically enhanced for the TBMD role. The combination of precise guidance (which increases the chance of a direct "skin-to-skin" hit or very near miss) with a powerful explosive warhead makes this interceptor extremely potent.\textsuperscript{46} Proximity-fuzed, it therefore does not suffer the one major drawback of kinetic-energy hit-to-kill systems--their all or nothing gamble on flawless guidance and successful terminal homing.

Like PATRIOT PAC-3, SM2 Block IVA will be multi-mission capable, lethal against cruise missiles and manned aircraft in addition to TBMs. However, as shown during ROVING SANDS 95, its "defended footprint" will be far larger than that of PAC-3, allowing a rudimentary layered defense using only "lower tier" systems if PATRIOT is in place in a littoral enclave. Against a simulated 600km-range TBM, an NAD
engagement at 120km was recorded, many times that shown for PAC-3 against the same target.\textsuperscript{47} Maximum intercept altitude, which is critical against WMD warheads, is also considerably greater, at 35km—a height of over 113,000 feet.\textsuperscript{48} Additionally, it should be noted that for short range TBMs with apogees (highest point of ballistic trajectory) of less than 70km, NAD will be the only naval Active Defense system capable of engaging, because the Navy Theater Wide LEAP interceptor functions outside the atmosphere, above 70km.

Such figures, however, need to be evaluated carefully. The defended footprint of any Area Defense TBMD interceptor decreases as the velocity of the incoming TBM target increases. Ballistic missile terminal velocity is a function of system range; so the longer the range of the enemy system, the smaller the area that can be defended by lower tier systems. For example, against a 900km-range TBM, NAD engagement range drops to 65km, or approximately 35 nautical miles—ranges familiar to shipboard operators of early fleet AAW SM2 variants.\textsuperscript{49}

The thoughtful reader must beware of oversimplification. The concept of a "defended footprint," in effect an NAD enclave, represents a complex geometry dependent on many factors, including TBM range and related terminal velocity, reentry vehicle radar cross section (RCS), and the spatial relationship between the AEGIS ship and the asset it is defending. Furthermore, in a littoral environment, naval Area Defense systems will have to provide greater coverage than
equivalent ground-based systems because of the prospect of a shoalwater "buffer" between the TBMD ship and the DAL target it is defending. Area Defense systems generally benefit from collocation with the assets they are defending, but it often will be difficult for an NAD ship to patrol in close proximity to the asset it is assigned to protect. Until ground-based systems are emplaced in theater, NAD ships will need all the reach they can get to "hold open the door."

Well forward, defending an Amphibious Objective Area or other military asset against short-range TBM threats, that inland NAD "reach" will be considerable. Defending political or population targets far from the main military engagement, however, not only takes multi-mission ships and tethers them to single targets; it also shrinks the footprint area and engagement altitude of their defended envelopes markedly, against just those hostile systems (long range TBMs) most likely to be employed with WMD, weapons which tend to negate the value of close-in point defense. This long-range, politically-targeted, WMD-capable threat postulated for 2005 drives the need for another layer of protection to complement the versatile, capable, but limited scope of Navy Area Defense. That seagoing "upper tier" capability is Navy Theater Wide defense.

**Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTW)**

Interception of Theater Ballistic Missiles outside the atmosphere using Theater Wide Active Defense systems is
fundamentally different from the more intuitive "goalkeeping" defense accomplished by lower-tier systems. Conceptually, it may be helpful to analogize Theater Wide defenses as being akin to long-range CAP engaged in the classic AAW outer air battle, with Area defenses fighting the close range battle within the battlegroup's Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ). As with CAP aircraft, the area defended by an NTW ship depends more on the location of the defensive platform than on the location of the defended target.

Rather than an enclave-like defended footprint surrounding a single target, NTW involves an "Area of Negation," within which a single AEGIS ship can patrol in order to intercept TBMs enroute from a hostile launch area to many different friendly targets. Herein lies the tremendous leverage of NTW, and the explanation for TBMD briefing slides that show a handful of NTW ships defending all of Southern Europe or all of Japan from TBM attack. The kinematics of the NTW interceptor have eliminated the need for these ships to be collocated with single defended assets. Instead, the ships are positioned either somewhat forward in large Areas of Negation that allow multiple exoatmospheric midcourse and descent-phase intercepts in support of hard-pressed Area Defense systems, or well forward, where they can exercise the upper tier capability unique to the Navy Theater Wide system—Ascent Phase Intercept.

Ascent Phase Intercept is the Holy Grail of naval TBMD. The only Active Defense technique that can possibly exceed its
leverage is Boost Phase Intercept (BPI), attacking TBMs with high-powered lasers or specialized air-to-air interceptors while the missiles are still accelerating away from their launchers. Though the Navy is experimenting with modified PHOENIX (AIM-54) for the BPI role, Boost Phase equipment and doctrine remain primarily in the Air Force corner of the Joint TBMD arena. Ascent Phase Active Defense, by contrast, engages the strengths of NTW AEGIS combatants, which can patrol in international waters off a hostile shore, with their SPY radars looking inland, awaiting (but not requiring) a DSP cue. As soon as a launch is detected and ROE are met, an NTW interceptor can be on its way downrange to destroy the TBM as soon as it rises above the atmosphere to an altitude of 70 kilometers (the minimum engagement altitude for LEAP). Such a proactive capability produces a defended area covering tens of thousands of square miles.

The only TBMD weapon that will do this is the SM2/LEAP. At 6.56 meters, it is the same length as the SM2 Block IVA, but the NTW missile is actually a 4-stage system, starting with the Mk72 booster and Mk104 solid rocket motor it shares with the NAD interceptor. "The inertially guided, nozzle controlled Advanced Solid Axial Stage (ASAS) motor will constitute the third stage.... The fourth stage will be the autonomous LEAP KKV [Kinetic Kill Vehicle]." Guidance technologies used in this extremely long range system include missile command uplink, inertial, GPS, and imaging infrared terminal homing. The interceptor warhead is the LEAP itself,
though it contains no explosive charge. Maneuvering autonomously with thrusters, it homes on the IR signature of the hot TBM revealed against the cold vacuum of space, closing for the kill at 4.5 kilometers per second. That is $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the velocity of the fastest rifle bullet. The kinetic energy of a moving object equals one-half the object's mass times the square of its velocity. Thus the small (18kg) but very fast LEAP packs a serious kinetic punch. When combined with the squared inbound velocity and much greater mass of the incoming TBM, the energy released in the eventual collision is tremendously destructive. If that TBM is carrying a chemical, biological or nuclear payload, the components are shattered and dispersed outside the atmosphere.

The potential capability of this system is so significant that challenges to its development have proven to be not only technical, but political. There has been considerable controversy surrounding the potential effect of NTW on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Again, though, it is necessary to review the numbers carefully. When considering Russian strategic systems "ICBM speed of 6-7 km/sec easily outdistances the 4-5 km/sec of the interceptor, precluding an ascent phase intercept. If an AEGIS ship is near the terminal target of the ICBM--by the time an interceptor can be fired and flown out to intercept, the RVs [Reentry Vehicles] are below the minimum altitude of the exoatmospheric hit to kill vehicle."52 Consequently, while the SM2/LEAP is potentially extremely capable against medium range ballistic missiles, it
is not capable of effectively engaging the high-speed reentry vehicles of a strategic ICBM.

The eventual influence of modern theater ballistic missile defense technology on a treaty involving strategic defense signed nearly a quarter century ago is still being hotly debated, but naval TBMD Active Defense development is continuing apace, and should be available as currently envisioned in 2005. "Both the Navy Area TBMD and the Theater Wide capability have been certified by the Department of Defense to the Congress as fully treaty compliant."}^{53}

Sensors

The primary sensor for naval TBMD Active Defense will be the AEGIS SPY radar. The TBM-tracking capabilities of SPY are being explored and expanded through the use of Non-Tactical Data Collection (NTDC) software "patches," experimental modifications that will lead to a tactical TBMD-capable program version. Thus modified, SPY radars have "demonstrated the ability to track TBMs at ranges well in excess of 500km...."}^{54}

As with any radar, tracking range is highly dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) of the target, and SPY autonomous ranges against more challenging TBMs will decrease accordingly. Here, battlespace can be regained through cooperative tracking by two AEGIS ships, the forward "picket" linking tracks to a consort downrange until the second ship can acquire the target. This capability has been demonstrated
in several TBMD Extended Tracking Exercises, including recent Joint Task Force (JTF-95) demonstrations of the new Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the present-day precursor to the Joint Fire Control Network postulated for 2005. JTF-95 tests included "a CEC cueing and composite tracking of a TBM target, initially detected by USS ANZIO's SPY-1 radar just after launch.... Other CEC units...were all automatically cued to acquire the target within seconds. Each maintained a single composite track on the target until it splashed down."\textsuperscript{55}

Cooperative tracking against low-RCS targets can also be enhanced by stationing ships off-axis from the threat trajectory. Multiple aspects of the TBM are thus illuminated by the SPY radars of more than one ship. What might be a very challenging target head on may give a useful return from its beam aspect. The composite data shared via CEC takes advantage of this phenomenon, and thus provides all platforms in the network with the best possible track on the target TBM.

Battlespace can be gained not only through sharing track data between radars, but also by using the RF energy of any given radar more efficiently. SPY must search for and detect a TBM before it can acquire and transition-to-track. If radar waveforms and anticipated search volume can be "fine-tuned" early for TBM detection, SPY can acquire and track much faster, thus gaining time in the all-important TBMD OODA loop. Offboard cueing is the key to efficient radar management and early detection.
In 2005, cueing to AEGIS will be primarily a USSPACECOM function, via theater-based JTAGS, CONUS-based ALERT, and the third component of the Tactical Event System, the Navy's Radiant Ivory-derived TACDAR (Tactical Detection and Reporting) capability. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must therefore bear in mind that "as friendly operations shift in time and place, the T[B]MD planner must continually re-evaluate the areas to be covered by DSP, and effect continual coordination with USSPACECOM to obtain that coverage."56 He must remember, however, that these sensors are in a geosynchronous constellation, and are therefore a long way out in space. Any modification to the geometry of that constellation will therefore involve many miles of satellite repositioning, with the associated consumption of limited thruster fuel. It will also take time. The need for stereo DSP coverage should be established and agreed upon in the initial TBMD planning process, rather than when enemy launches commence.

A significant limitation of national overhead sensors such as the DSP constellation is an inability to gather data on TBMs after boost phase, when the hot plume of the rocket motor no longer exists. This cueing gap will not be fully remedied until the Space-Based Infrared System - Low Earth Orbit (SBIRS-LEO) is deployed (pending full funding) after 2005. Even then, since SBIRS-LEO is by definition a low-earth orbit system, it will have periodic, multi-pass coverage rather than the continuous "staring" coverage given by a
geosynchronous sensor. Without post-boost information, JTAGS-type data will be sufficient to support search volume limitation and waveform selection for SPY, but will *not* meet criteria for an optimum *single beam cue*, "an uncertainty volume small enough to be covered by a single beam of an FCR [Fire Control Radar] system."\(^57\)

The importance of post-boost-phase sensors for supporting single beam SPY cueing has been clear to the Navy for several years, as shown by the work of Robert Powers, advocating the adaptation of infrared search and track (IRST) equipment to the E-2C aircraft.\(^58\) Airborne IR systems can continue to track a TBM after its motor burns out by sensing skin heating of the missile body caused by the friction of its passage through the atmosphere. The E-2C/IRST concept is now known as Gatekeeper, but it is currently unfunded.\(^59\)

The Air Force has taken the lead in post-boost tracking systems with AWACS EAGLE (Extended Airborne Global Launch Evaluator). "This sensor consists of a passive infrared surveillance sensor (IRSS) and an eye-safe laser-ranger installed in the AWACS test E-3 (TS-3)."\(^60\) EAGLE will have contingency capability in 1998, and will be fully operational by 2005. The system has sufficient accuracy to pass a single-beam cue to SPY, a signal example of the essential joint synergy of effective Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.
CHAPTER III.

ISSUES FOR THE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

What, then, are the TBMD issues with which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must specifically concern himself? When considered in light of projected U.S. naval capabilities and anticipated regional threats ten years hence, areas of useful concentration for his particular attention coalesce around four key topics. These are:

1: Logistics
2: Command, Control and Intelligence
3: Warfighting, and
4: Rules of Engagement.

Logistics will be dealt with first, since this subject clearly illustrates the value of a straightforward Operations Analysis approach in order to bound an important discussion—a discussion which, when so bounded, reveals important caveats regarding the true complexity of war in the littoral, an arena of conflicting missions prosecuted with limited means.

Command, Control and Intelligence follows, and considers that same complexity at three separate levels of leadership: above the JFMCC at the NCA level; among competing Component Commanders at the Theater level; and from the JFMCC down to the unit level. Encompassing all levels, comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace is held to be essential to the JFMCC’s mastery of the subtleties of the TBMD
mission, and thus his ability to make the hard choices necessary for its effective execution.

The section on Warfighting derives its arguments directly from the debates illustrated in the preceding pages, setting forth some of those hard operational choices which will inevitably face the JFMCC, in light of his own logistical constraints and the operational intent of his superiors. The contrasting but complementary capabilities of Navy Theater Wide and Navy Area Defense TBMD are thus considered.

Finally, the essential issues of national policy and international law which must inform U.S. TBMD operations are presented in the section on Rules of Engagement. As the final portion of the core chapter in this study, this consideration of the legal dilemmas and the inherent uncertainty with which the JFMCC must wrestle perhaps represents an allegory, a cautionary tale, for the whole topic of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense delivered from the sea.
Logistics

With the general background provided in the preceding chapters, the reader is in a position to anticipate the issues that will confront the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. For simplicity, this section will begin with the most straightforward: the physical characteristics of one's own force, and an Operations Analysis-type approach to the issues that arise. The JFMCC must be fully cognizant of the key capabilities and limitations of his own forces. In preparing for the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense mission, one of his primary concerns must thus be logistics, especially the unique stresses TBMD will place on the vital tasks of refueling and rearming his AEGIS combatants.

Iron Logic of Fuel: CG versus DDG

In a rapidly developing conflict against a TBM-capable foe, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may find himself cast as the JFC's Leonidas, holding the pass at Thermopylae as the Persian arrows rain down, buying time for reinforcements to arrive in theater. If the limited naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capability initially available in theater is likely to be overmatched by sheer numbers of hostile missiles at the outset of a fight, then that capability must be used both effectively and efficiently.

One of the strengths of modern U.S. naval combatants, and especially AEGIS ships, is their multi-mission versatility. Costly, complex and capable, these ships excel at the "up, out
and down" missions of AAW, ASUW and ASW. Their role as potent TLAM strike platforms was critical during Desert Storm: by 2005, naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense will be a major new AEGIS mission. The TBMD battle, however, is unlikely to take place in isolation, and will thus have to be conducted in both competition and cooperation with the other important missions given to the maritime component of the Joint Force, as its ships, aircraft and Marines stand fast and secure the rapid buildup of land and air power in theater.

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must use his highly capable but numerically limited AEGIS assets wisely, both in how he apportions them for a variety of missions and how he assigns them different tasks within the TBMD mission. Different ships and different missions are not created equal. For example, NTW brings more to the fight than NAD. If, however, enemy TBMs are short-range and low-apogee (<70km), this is a moot point, for they will not be engageable by Theater-Wide defenses. Nonetheless, the highest-leverage hostile systems will generally be those with the longest range, able to reach out and touch political targets, able to threaten the political centers of gravity of coalition cohesion and national will-to-fight.

NTW counters this threat and counters it efficiently, by fielding a system with kinematics that allow TBM engagements in the ascent phase, during midcourse, and during descent before the endgame of area defense systems. One NTW platform can thus defend many targets on the DAL. Therefore, when faced
with a robust enemy TBM order of battle and an ad-hoc defense by whatever naval TBMD capability is currently deployed in theater, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should seek to maximize the NTW portion of the naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense mission.

If possible, the JFMCC needs to get his NTW-capable AEGIS ships close to the enemy TBM launch areas and keep them there. *Herein lies the rub.* Both AEGIS cruisers (CG 47/52 class) and AEGIS destroyers (DDG 51 class) will, by 2005, be capable of performing the NTW mission. But which ship is more *efficient* at a task which is, in effect, an anti-missile deterrent patrol in a distant, perhaps isolated NTW Area of Negation? A straightforward Operations Analysis approach may prove useful.

In a hypothetical contingency, an AEGIS cruiser and destroyer are steaming in company with the CV and the AOE, having just refuelled to 100% capacity (98% available). They are both ordered to proceed at 25 knots to separate NTW patrol areas, both 1000 nautical miles distant. Upon arrival, they are each to patrol at quietest speed in accordance with their class Combat Systems Doctrine, until they reach a fuel state of 50%, with contingency authorization to remain on station to 30% fuel. An escorted AO will refuel them on a regular RAS circuit until they are relieved by other NTW units.

All ships have unique fuel consumption curves, and consumption rates will vary with sea conditions and degree of bottom fouling, but using the generic data contained in Class Tactical Manuals,61 the CG 47 Class Combat Systems Doctrine,62
and a recent unclassified message from the AEGIS Program Office, basic fuel consumption comparisons between the two AEGIS classes can be made. They are instructive.

After a 1000nm sprint, the cruiser can remain on station at 13 knots for 6 days to 50% fuel, with a load on the electrical plant sufficient to keep SPY radiating at high power. Shifting the main plant to the non-standard-configuration Low Speed Quiet Mode (by following classified information in the Combat Systems Doctrine) should boost endurance to 7½ days at 5 knots. If the decision is made to drop to 30% fuel, on station time is 10 days at 13 knots and just over 12 days at the Low Speed Quiet Mode 5 knots.

Note the reason for the high 13 knot patrol speed. The cruiser, like most U.S. twin screw combatants with Controllable Reversible Pitch (CRP) propellers, is most quiet with both shafts powered and both props at 100% pitch. The Prairie/Masker system must also be aligned in accordance with the specific, classified parameters in the class Combat Systems Doctrine. Below 100% pitch, the props cavitate. The slowest speed the cruiser will normally make at 100% pitch on both shafts is between 12 and 13 knots. Low Speed Quiet Mode achieves improved quieting, lower speed, and greater fuel economy, but at the cost of a non-standard plant configuration that takes engineering control away from the bridge watch team.

Under the same conditions, the endurance of the DDG is strikingly different. Patrol time to 50% is just under 3 days
at 13 knots, with about 5½ days total to 30% fuel state. The DDG 51 Class Combat Systems Doctrine does not yet detail a Low Speed Quiet Mode configuration for the class, but if a setup similar to that for the cruiser is presumed, then endurance to 50% would be boosted by a day, and to 30% by 2 days, maintaining a patrol speed of 5 knots. Thus at the lowest speed and lowest fuel state, the cruiser can remain on station more than 1½ times as long as the destroyer. At a more responsive 13 knots and a more responsible 50% fuel state, the cruiser will have lasted twice as long as the destroyer—and will have done it with 35% more VLS cells.

While this simplistic arithmetic shows that the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may wish to favor the cruiser for the NTW mission, it also helps to highlight one of his greatest logistical challenges: the iron logic of fuel. Warships have redundant weapons, redundant sensors, and plenty of manpower. When the fresh fruit and vegetables run out, the galley can still serve macaroni and cheese well into the next century. Fuel, however, is an absolute. Empires were built around coaling stations for good reason, and the NTW cruiser captain who does find himself at 30% fuel in the face of the enemy is not going to sleep well.

To fight the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense battle efficiently, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should favor Navy Theater Wide systems if he can. In order to defend the DAL and be prepared to establish an Amphibious Objective Area, he will also have to retain Navy Area Defense
assets for both endgame TBMD defense and conventional AAW.

By the very geometry of their missions, NTW and NAD assets will tend to be widely separated, as they are best employed at opposite ends of a ballistic trajectory that may extend for hundreds of nautical miles. Under the umbrella of layered defense that they provide, other ships will go about other essential missions—and they will all need fuel.

The days of the Amphibious Ready Group and Carrier Battlegroup moving about the theater as near-contiguous blocs of military power and logistical organization have been over for some time, but the unique time-distance stressors associated with Theater Ballistic Missile Defense have the potential to overwhelm current ad-hoc logistics solutions to dispersed tasking. Recent events such as those involving AEGIS combatants in the Adriatic, or UN-sanctioned Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) board-and-search operations in the Northern Red Sea, have seen the frequent use of Allied Replenishment-at-Sea (RAS) assets and unescorted U.S. auxiliaries. Examples include everything from a Canadian Forces oiler fueling the Red Crown AEGIS CG off Montenegro, to a lone USNS T-AO rotating down to Hurghada, Egypt, to support the MIF. In future contingencies involving TBMD, allied or coalition logistical support is not initially guaranteed, and thus may not be counted upon to augment U.S. RAS capability in theater at the very moment U.S. naval TBMD assets may be spread farthest and thinnest.
Even as the theater develops, the fuel problem will remain challenging. In the Phase 2 (Day 70) portion of the 2005+ scenario of NTF Wargame 95B, 18 TBMD-capable AEGIS combatants ranged the length and breadth of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, escorting 3 CVNs, performing TLAM strikes and local AAW, and conducting NTW and NAD patrols. Replenishment was not simulated.

If the enemy TBM effort against the Defended Asset List develops in a manner not anticipated by the JFMCC's initial resource allocation, then TBMD assets may have to be shifted rapidly, with the resulting full-power sprints consuming even more fuel. Knowing this, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must carefully evaluate his ability to carry out a robust, flexible TBMD plan while still providing his ships with sufficient fuel for safe operations and combat tasking.

VLS Capabilities and Limitations: Reload and Loadout

A warship cannot live without fuel, but it cannot fight without ammunition. As weapons systems become increasingly complex and specialized, the ability of a weapons platform to execute a given mission is increasingly tied to its reserves of a specific munition. If the AEGIS CG demonstrates superior endurance for the remote NTW mission, that advantage is squandered if the ship carries an insufficient loadout of NTW interceptors.

If all its SM2/LEAP missiles are gone after two days on station, the CG's superior fuel reserves are rendered
irrelevant. Except as a sensor or cueing platform, the ship is useless for NTW, and is probably out of position for any of the other missions it is potentially capable of performing. Furthermore, unlike fuel, VLS reloads cannot be provided on station. The ship must leave its patrol area and proceed to port, perhaps taking itself out of the fight entirely.

As originally designed, the Mk41 Vertical Launching System and its variants have a nominal Underway Replenishment capability. The practical limits of this capability are sufficiently great that in the late 1980s, the Center for Naval Analyses studied a series of possible improvements. The results of that study, driven by the old Soviet Regimental Raid threat, are still relevant in light of the emerging TBMD mission.

Looking at older ship classes, CNA found that "typical rates for the transfer of large missiles between ships at sea [were] on the order of two to six missiles per hour." In regard to VLS, "limited testing of the VLS UNREP system indicates the fleet can expect about 3 missiles per hour as a consistent strike-down rate in calm seas (sea state 3 or less)."

However, the two most important VLS munitions in the current inventory, TOMAHAWK and SM2 Block IV, cannot be transferred at sea at all, since they are several thousand pounds too heavy for the launcher-installed VLS handling crane. This problem first became a major issue during Desert Storm, when hundreds of TOMAHAWKS were launched in a matter of
days, and entire VLS magazines had to be reloaded in theater.

In the TLAM strike world, standard operating procedures were developed, tested, implemented and finally incorporated in detail into the NWP 3-03.1 series (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-C/D) Employment Manual). Referring to TLAM rearmament procedures while discussing TBMD is instructive primarily because the logistical challenges of TOMAHAWK and TBMD missile size and weight are similar. The Mk14 VLS canister for TLAM and the Mk21 canister for SM2 Block IV and its variants are the same size, and while TLAM will probably remain the heavier of the two missiles, encanistered weights are within 1000lbs of each other.

NWP 3-03.1’s rearming site requirements are clear:

Rearming requires pierside handling facilities, airfields and airlift capability (lower volume and higher expense), seaport and sealift capabilities (slower, higher volume, and lower expense), and trucking from seaport or airfield to pierside.... Any ordnance-certified mobile crane with a "power-down" mode having sufficient rated capacity, boom length and hook height may be used to load.... QR [Quick Reaction] teams may also be used to support loading and unloading operations at anchorage with a barge and floating crane or cross-decking operations with a destroyer [tender].

How many tenders, both AD and AS, will the Navy actually have in 2005? Also left unstated is the fact that "double-ended" VLS ships such as AEGIS cruisers and destroyers can be rearmed twice as fast if two cranes are available (a frequent bone-of-contention at stateside Weapons Stations). With both cranes swinging canisters, and enough forklifts and pierside handlers to keep up with them, a motivated AEGIS crew can
completely reload the ship's VLS systems in one (long) day. Note the optimum requirements, though: a pier of sufficient length and with water alongside to accommodate ships up to 563 feet long and 33+ feet in draft; cranes, forklifts, trucks and/or flatbed rail rolling stock, and contiguous or near-contiguous cargo ports or airfields. Such a facility is precisely the kind of "logistics node" that the JFMCC will either be attempting to defend or seize early in a regional conflict. When in friendly hands, such a facility is a prime TBM target in its own right, as seen at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on 16 February 1991, when an Iraqi SCUD impacted within yards of an ammunition pier berthing seven ships, a supply barge, and the USS TARAWA.69

Logistics for supplying the rearming site itself are daunting. If airlift is used to expedite VLS reloading, more than four dedicated C5 sorties will be needed to fully rearm a single AEGIS CG with TBMD and TLAM munitions.70 What must be borne in mind, though, is that the AEGIS ship thus reloaded can then protect that same airfield in order to allow the 128 C5 sorties required to move a PATRIOT Battalion into theater.71 Furthermore, the Joint Force Commander will still be confronted with the reality of competing missions, only one of which is TBMD.

The logistical challenges associated with rearming VLS combatants in theater clarify the reason that current CONOPS tend to state that follow-on loads of VLS munitions will arrive in the magazines of deploying combatants. If VLS
reloading or load "tailoring" via crossdecking will thus be difficult in an engaged theater of operations, then the initial loadout with which a VLS AEGIS ship departs homeport is crucial to the combat effectiveness of that ship.

By 2005, there will be over 5500 VLS cells arming the AEGIS combatants of the fleet. Competing for this finite space will be SM2 Block IVA, SM2/LEAP, 4-missile packs of Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM), Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA), TOMAHAWK TLAM-C and D variants, and perhaps the anti-armor TOMAHAWK TSTARS and a navalized version of ATACMS.

Only one of these missiles, the Navy Area Defense SM2 Block IVA, is a true multi-mission weapon, with capability against aircraft, cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles. With single-mission weapons, however, initial VLS loadout is a zero-sum game. For every missile loaded to support Mission A, Mission B loses capability.

One of the historical strengths of naval forces has been their ability to carry out a variety of missions. The maritime component is versatile, flexible, mobile and survivable, an adaptable "force package" for the JFMCC to task as required. There is thus a strong institutional prejudice toward mixed-mission loadouts for VLS AEGIS ships. These combatants were designed and built at great expense to do many missions and do them all well. Furthermore, the true nature of any regional contingency seldom becomes clear before battle is joined. If maritime forces are to be first on the scene, then they must
be capable of responding immediately to a variety of hostile challenges.

This is all true—to a point. Mixed loadouts are appropriate, but the theater CINC and the officers he may potentially task as Joint Force Commander and JFMCC should use peacetime Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace as a tool, to best match loadout to potential tasking for combatants prior to deployment. By 2005, this will become a far more complex process than that which determines the current, common 70/30 loadout split between SM2 and TLAM.

For example, if there is a significant long-range TBM threat in theater which can be leveraged by forward-positioned NTW, then consideration should be given to increasing the SM2/LEAP load percentage in deploying AEGIS CGs for that theater. The "Chinese puzzle" problem of shuffling VLS canisters around the battlegroup could be solved by swapping TLAM for LEAP with AEGIS DDGs, which in turn would be tasked with the brunt of potential NAD and Strike missions. Every AEGIS combatant would retain the multi-mission NAD interceptor, but would otherwise "load the dice" with the single-mission missile best suited to a given ship type and the unique challenges of a particular deployment in a particular theater of operations.
Command, Control and Intelligence

Issues of Command and Control contrast with issues of Logistics because C2 does not answer easily to the rational power of numbers. Considered in isolation, logistical problems lend themselves to mathematical solutions, to the computational clarity of Operations Analysis. This is not true of command in war. Van Creveld writes: "So far, I have spoken of command as if it were solely a rational process (or rather, a combination of processes) in which information is used to orchestrate men and things toward performing their missions in war. This is not strictly true, however, since war is an irrational business par excellence." A significant danger when studying any new and evolving form of warfare is to be seduced into oversimplification, into generalized force-on-force comparisons, into enumeration of technical characteristics rather than operational complexities. The purpose of discussing TBMD Command, Control and Intelligence issues is to muddy the waters upon which the preceding logistical arguments float, and thus prepare the reader for the complex realities of warfighting which follow.

The exercise of efficient and effective Command and Control in war finds its counterpart and helpmate in the decision-theory art of "satisficing," a dynamic, ever-evolving cycle of demand and compromise which attempts to counteract the fog of war by resolving internal conflicts. These may be conflicts of mission, conflicts of tasking, conflicts of rank, conflicts caused by lack of data, or even
conflicts stemming from information overload. The commander who exercises effective command and control is the commander who can best resolve the incessant tension between conflicting missions and limited means, a tension which is inherent in all military operations.

This tension will affect the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander at three levels: above him, at the JFC/CINC/NCA level where Theater Ballistic Missile Defense will be highly visible; at the Theater level, where the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must work out initial TBMD plans in competition with other missions and prepare for the eventual shift of the AADC and/or JFACC roles ashore; and at the individual unit level, where the JFMCC must balance the importance and visibility of the TBMD mission with the distinctly limited number of naval platforms and interceptor missiles initially present in theater.

The resolution of these tensions associated with competing tasking and levels of command must take place under the rubric of mission, the overall intent of the CINC and Joint Force Commander. Finally, the potential impact of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense on that mission can only be evaluated through the rigorous execution and thorough understanding of the TBMD-related Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).
Political Nature of TBMD: C2 up the Chain of Command

The asymmetric power granted an aggressor through possession of TBM capability elicits an asymmetric response from those threatened by that power. The hundreds of SCUDCAP missions flown over the western desert of Iraq during Desert Storm, the redeployment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) special mission assets, and the dozens of C5 sorties flown to support a rudimentary TBMD area defense capability for Israel stand as testimony to this.

In 2005, the commanding officer of an NTW-capable AEGIS cruiser positioned for ascent-phase intercept off the North African littoral could well find his single ship defending many of the capitals of Southern Europe against attack by nuclear, biological or chemical-capable TBMs. This degree of threat, and the potential leverage of a single ship against that threat, will resonate up the chain-of-command in a way that the conventional AAW mission never has. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must anticipate both support and interference commensurate with that resonance. How he deals with this inevitable phenomenon will directly affect his ability to support the Joint Force Commander, both with Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and with the other essential missions under his purview.

The netted Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I) architecture assumed for a 2005 scenario will be vital to the efficient execution of the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
mission, but will inevitably affect the freedom of action of every level of the chain of command, making each subject to the guidance of all levels above, delivered in real-time. Nelson could not have gotten away with holding his long glass to his blind eye if First Sea Lord Sir John Jervis had been sitting at a Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) terminal in Whitehall.

Indeed, to chafe at such centralized oversight has been an identifying trait of naval components throughout history. In the Joint context, however, and especially in regard to joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, centralized, high-level "meddling" is both inevitable and understandable, for Theater Ballistic Missiles are uniquely "political" weapons, and have been so since the first V-2s smashed into the streets John Jervis once walked.

In the simplest terms, the mission of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense forces is to safeguard areas on the theater Defended Assets List (DAL) as prioritized by the CINC and Joint Force Commander. It is instructive that at National Test Facility Wargame 95B, whose TBMD portion simulated the defense of Southern Europe against a WMD-capable TBM threat from the Levant and North African littoral, the first priority on the DAL was the regional national capitals target set, followed by major friendly population centers, with the defense of military targets a distinct third. Similarly, in the Global '95 game, limited NTW assets were completely expended in the Northeast Asian MRC defending the population centers of an
essential ally at the direction of the National Command Authorities. These game results acknowledge the primacy of political centers of gravity in the TBM target set. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must be prepared to deal with the consequences.

Military forces possessing unique capabilities related to political centers of gravity tend to see their command and control architectures "stovepipe" toward centralized control by the National Command Authorities. Strategic nuclear forces assigned to the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) or special mission units assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) come immediately to mind. Naval forces have traditionally been resistant to such centralized consolidation of control, as seen in the debate over the ballistic missile submarine force during the post-Cold War creation of USSTRATCOM, the preservation of a degree of Naval Special Warfare autonomy within USSOCOM, and, during the years that nuclear TOMAHAWK was deployed, the designation of that weapon as "tactical" -- thus keeping the ships and submarines carrying it under Navy control.

To this day, naval doctrine espouses flexibility and individual initiative based on a clear understanding of mission. Indeed, the newly-published Naval Doctrine Publication 6 "Naval Command and Control" cites historical precedent and states that:
Armed with an understanding of their senior’s intent, the subordinate commanders were expected to conduct a wide range of operations on their own initiative. This style of command has been an enduring characteristic of naval operations and continues to distinguish the way naval commanders exercise command and control today.

While acknowledging the spirit of independent initiative that lies at the soul of the naval service, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must grapple intellectually with the fact that modern command and control technology will inevitably erode that independence. In the specific arena of Naval TBMD, especially high leverage Theater Wide defense, that erosion will be accelerated due to the overarching political importance of particular targets to be defended. NTW assets may well come under the direct control of the Joint Force Commander, the CINC, or even the NCA; and as a theater matures, the JFACC and AADC may well be consolidated -- potentially putting those same ships at the beck and call of an Air Force general ashore.

The details of such command relationships represent novel arrangements for both the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and the surface Navy. The potential of naval TBMD is so great, though, that conventional notions of naval autonomy must be respected only insofar as they bring to bear the maximum effect of these new capabilities. As with other naval assets of recognized political or strategic importance, such as ballistic missile submarines since their introduction and carrier battle groups in recent decades, commanders of naval surface assets may well have to adjust familiar arrangements.
to cope with new challenges. Theater ballistic missiles represent such a challenge in our age, a challenge which may require development and acceptance of new command and control relationships for maritime forces. To do otherwise is to risk marginalizing key naval capabilities in future conflicts.

The degree of connectivity and consultation demanded by the NCA for the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense mission may well exceed that now associated with sensitive Special Operations and peacetime TLAM strikes. When tasked as Area Air Defense Commander, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be responsible to the Joint Force Commander for TBMD active defense plans. These plans will have their basic grounding in the theater-specific TMD CONOPS, which in turn will be based on Joint doctrine and Joint CONOPS.

CONOPS are by their very nature quite general, and plans, by necessity, are specific. The ability to articulate the plan up the chain of command will be an essential skill for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander if he is to preserve a degree of autonomy. Specific TBMD knowledge above the Theater level may well be based on CONOPS, leading to a constant chorus of secure SATCOM and teleconferencing in search of clarification and detail. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander cannot avoid this, and should not attempt to forestall it by flooding unsolicited detail up the chain in a preemptive attempt to remain unfettered. He must plan for an ongoing, interactive dialogue unique to this particular
mission, a dialogue perhaps best handled by a dedicated TBMD cadre on his staff.

Much as in Special Operations or TLAM mission planning, a small team set up as a dedicated node of corporate knowledge at every level of the chain of command can facilitate understanding and clarity of purpose, and decrease confusion and repetition when discussing the mission in real-time. If the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander can thus aggressively and lucidly detail his plan and his progress up the chain, he decreases the very real risk that he will be bypassed down the chain by the NCA giving rudder orders directly to the commanding officer of an NTW AEGIS ship.

Competing Missions: C2 at the Theater Level

During an emerging crisis in an undeveloped theater, facing a TBM-armed, WMD-capable adversary, the Joint Force Commander may assign duties as both Area Air Defense Commander and Joint Force Air Component Commander to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. If substantial U.S. Air Force assets are already positioned in theater, the JFACC could well be separate, although the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander might retain Area Air Defense Commander responsibilities due to his force’s Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capability and mobile, survivable carrier-based airpower. As operations progress and the theater matures, the cycle may be completed by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander relinquishing Area Air Defense
Commander duties to the JFACC ashore. The point of these permutations is simple: if the JFMCC is likely to be the pivotal component commander in the crucial early stages of a conflict involving Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, then he must pay particular attention to the complex relationship and competing operational prerogatives of the Area Air Defense Commander and the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

When facing Theater Ballistic Missiles, the moment of greatest danger occurs early in the conflict, due to the likely mismatch of offense and defense. The enemy TBM inventory will be at its maximum, while U.S. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense assets will for the moment be limited to those deployed in theater, unless a lengthy (and unlikely) pre-hostilities period has allowed an unopposed friendly force buildup. "Naval TBMD provides the earliest capability just when the heaviest TBM attack intensity is likely, and when other TBMD systems are still enroute or present only in small numbers."78 Such a "window of vulnerability" starkly highlights the conflicting missions of the JFACC and AADC, a conflict which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must be able to resolve.79

The basic dichotomy is that of offense and defense. The nature of modern offensive operations drives air planners to seek diverse target sets that have a synergistic effect when struck simultaneously (e.g., local C2 nodes in combination with a regional power grid). The goal is to enhance combat effectiveness by conducting parallel operations to the full
depth of the theater, shocking the enemy with a pulse of power rather than by incremental attacks delivered sequentially. In pursuit of decisive concentration, this style of operation demands a certain "critical mass" of aircraft and cruise missiles in order to bring an adequate weight of metal to bear on enough targets in a sufficiently short period of time. The Joint Target Coordination Board and the Joint Target List (JTL) are established to ensure the optimum employment of this critical mass.

However, in the operational circumstance where the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is most likely to be designated as JFACC and Area Air Defense Commander, available strike assets will by definition be limited, primarily to the airwings on the one or more CVs in theater, and the TOMAHAWK inventories in the VLS magazines of their escorts. These same VLS-capable combatants will be desperately needed to redress the early Theater Ballistic Missile Defense window of vulnerability, as will be JFACC-controlled TBMD Attack Operations sorties.

The Joint Target List and the Defended Assets List will thus be set in opposition to each other. It will be up to the triple-hatted JFMCC/JFACC/AADC to cut this Gordian Knot while simultaneously discharging traditional naval-component missions such as SLOC protection, CV escort, Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) operations, ASW, MIW and protection of MPS assets as they arrive in theater. The challenge is accentuated by the inevitability of limited assets, and
exacerbated by the improbability that these diverse tasks will be geographically compatible for any given placement of the force assets.

Strike units and those conducting reconnaissance and ASW/MIW sanitization of potential Amphibious Objective Areas will tend to be well forward. NTW assets will patrol large "Areas of Negation," TBMD launch baskets covering thousands of square miles, dynamically determined and continuously reshaped by automated planning tools evaluating enemy TBM disposition, capability, and an optimum defended footprint. Units protecting the DAL as Navy Area Defense platforms will be restricted to rigidly limited patrol areas as goalkeeper for a particular target. Ships conducting escort and logistics support missions must be able to range the full depth of the theater.

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is unlikely to have enough ships, aircraft, and VLS cells to fully service the Joint Target List, provide initial defense-in-depth to the DAL, and prepare both his forces and an AOA for power projection operations ashore. He must, in effect, continually prioritize and subject to risk analysis all of his subordinate missions as JFACC, AADC and Maritime Component Commander in order to best support the overall intent of the Joint Force Commander.

The JFMCC must be utterly forthright in assessing his own capabilities and evaluating the tasking given him from above. If Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is a priority, and his
forces are spread too thinly over the DAL, he must call for either more assets or a reduction in the defended target set.

To this end, a precise delineation of mission, from the CINC through the Joint Force Commander to the JFMCC is essential, so that the Maritime Component Commander may reconcile his conflicting responsibilities through a clear statement of commander’s intent. That statement also will provide guidance and continuity when and if the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Area Air Defense Commander duties shift to other service components later in the campaign.

Fire Discipline and Effective Defense: Unit Level C2

In future conflict, several factors may motivate aggressors to use their TBM capability early. First is the intuitively-obvious Theater Ballistic Missile Defense window of vulnerability. Interceptor inventory in theater is unlikely to be initially robust, especially when spread over a DAL encompassing political as well as military targets.

The other significant motivator for early TBM use is a relic of strategic deterrence theory—the threat of "use it or lose it." In the Cold War context of nuclear-armed ICBMs, the increasing need to launch quickly and early in any given exchange was directly proportional to the enemy’s hard target "siro-busting" capability. In the context of TBMs, the equivalent of siro-busting is Attack Operations, the pillar of joint TBMD which seeks out and destroys missiles, Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEls) and support vehicles on the ground.
Joint exercises such as the ROVING SANDS series show that much work remains to be done in this difficult area. However, evolving sensor-to-shooter capabilities, new systems such as the pod-mounted APG-76 synthetic aperture radar for attack aircraft, and geo-predictive databases such as GALE (Generic Area Limitation Environment), developed and deployed by DIA, all show that the relative immunity of the Desert Storm-era SCUD TEL is eroding quickly. Any potential enemy with a fundamental grasp of the open literature will appreciate that by 2005, U.S. Attack Operations capabilities will pose a significant threat to his TBM forces. Thus, if the correlation of offense and defense will be favorable to him before U.S. capabilities in theater can build up, and he understands that Attack Operations will become increasingly effective as those forces build up, he will be sorely tempted to launch early and often.

The initial JFMCC force structure for the 2005+ phase of NTF Wargame 95B showed an "AEGIS-rich" CVBG composition which included four DDGs and two CGs per battlegroup. Once again using a rudimentary Operations Analysis approach, a nominal VLS capacity for such a force is easily determined. Credit 90 cells to each DDG and 122 to each cruiser. Allow four cells each for Vertical Launch ASROC, and apportion the remaining cells 70%/30% for SM2 and TLAM. This gives 60 available NAD/NTW cells in each DDG, and 82 in each CG. Current sources indicate a projected availability of approximately 10 NTW interceptors per AEGIS combatant in the 2002-2008 timeframe.
thus leaving 50 NAD cells in the DDG, and 72 in the cruiser. When employed in the NAD role, SM2 Block IVA is an endgame weapon. As such, presume a "shoot-shoot" salvo doctrine (two interceptors launched against a single TBM). The end result is a total Theater Ballistic Missile Defense "engagement capacity" of 10 NTW engagements and 25 NAD engagements for each DDG, with 10 NTW and 36 NAD for each cruiser. In a battlegroup with four DDGs and two CGs, the grand total will be 172 NAD engagements and 60 NTW engagements.

This is initially impressive, but deliberately simple-minded. Navy Area Defense shooters must, in effect, be collocated with the DAL assets they are defending, while Navy Theater-Wide engagements are best conducted as close to the TBM launch point as possible, in order to attempt intercept in the ascent phase. Ships assigned the many other missions of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, including escort duty, Maritime Interdiction Force patrol and TLAM strike, may not be in position for either NAD or NTW tasking. Finally, real-world equipment performance must be taken into account. The demonstrated reliability of even the best complex systems is somewhat less than 100 percent.

Thus, once the Joint Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander have completed their initial appraisal of the Defended Assets List and Joint Target List, and have decided what portion of the available naval component can be dedicated to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (or can conduct TBMD tasking while executing other missions), the
JFMCC will find his actual engagement capability to be much more modest. When set against the likelihood of a preemptive main effort by enemy TBM forces, the need for rigorous fire discipline becomes obvious.

With individually guided interceptors such as NAD and NTW SM2 variants, the Probability of Kill, $P_k$, against an incoming target does not vary directly in accordance with the number of rounds in the air, as it would with VT-fuzed "dumb" projectiles from anti-aircraft artillery. Blackening the sky with SM2 may possibly boost $P_k$ incrementally, but it will surely deplete VLS cells drastically. The netted C2 architecture projected for 2005 is correctly seen as the key to a solution for this problem, but the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should reflect carefully on how he chooses to use the capabilities that the Joint Planning Net, Joint Data Net, and Joint Fire Control Net will give him.

The traditional naval response to limited SAM inventories has been close control of the inner air battle—indeed effect circling the wagons and having the Force Anti-Air Warfare Commander issue "take" orders. If the Joint Data Net and Joint Fire Control Net are implemented as currently planned, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (as AADC) could conceivably do the same for the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense battle. This is not the intent of the netted C2 architecture.

The TBMD battle is likely to be fluid, dispersed and sporadic, flurries of rapid launches followed by varying
periods of quiet, as TELs attempt to relocate, rearm, and hide from Attack Operations forces. Fluid conditions in battle are best dealt with by tactical formations having good communications, a thorough grasp of doctrine, and mission-type orders which allow them maximum flexibility in achieving coordinated, decentralized execution of the commander's intent. In the context of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, fire discipline must derive from doctrine and planning rather than from centralized control by the Area Air Defense Commander. "The AADC will invoke positive control procedures to control engagements only under rare circumstances, such as defending against known WMD."\textsuperscript{87}

The Theater Ballistic Missile Defense plan should seek to position NTW shooters as far forward as possible, to shorten the TBM-launch to first-intercept timeline. NTW kill assessment will depend on "tactical telemetry in all missile stages and recording of essential AEGIS systems data. Additionally, it will include telemetry of kill vehicle seeker imagery to the firing ship."\textsuperscript{88} Consummation of an NTW intercept can take several minutes. Developing a plan to take advantage of early intercept opportunities will increase time available for kill assessment, and decrease pressure on other units to launch.

Preplanned responses to a "positive-no-kill" determination should follow sequentially in accordance with doctrine all the way to the NAD endgame, so that no TBMD shooter along the target’s trajectory is forced to fire-by-
default and thus chance wasting missiles. "Decisions could be based on pre-established algorithms for maximizing engagement opportunities against specific targets or for maintaining balanced inventories."  

If correctly designed and promulgated to TBMD units through mission-style orders, the Area Air Defense Commander's Theater Ballistic Missile Defense plan should be capable of execution with minimal direct intervention. The AADC is then free to coordinate decentralized execution of the plan by remotely monitoring remaining VLS inventories, observing the enemy level of effort against the DAL, and realigning his forces as necessary as the battle progresses.

Intelligence Preparation (IPB) of the TBMD Battlespace:

"The days, weeks and months preceding hostilities must be used to plan, prepare and organize for the execution of TMD active defense, which is accomplished in terms of minutes and seconds." Execution of the Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace is the responsibility of the Area Air Defense Commander. If the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is tasked as the AADC, this vital work will devolve upon him, to include the complex TBMD subset of Theater Missile Defense intelligence preparation.

As component commander for the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense assets likely to be first committed, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must use intelligence as a vital
adjunct to enhance his ability to exercise effective TBMD command and control. The Naval Doctrine Command cites five elements comprising IPB:

- **Battlespace evaluation** defines the area of operations and focuses intelligence assets on the battlespace.

- **Terrain analysis** evaluates the effects of geography, terrain and bathymetry on friendly and adversary capabilities to maneuver, attack, employ sensors and communicate.

- **Meteorological assessment** analyzes the effect of weather on operations.

- **Threat evaluation** encompasses a detailed study of the threat and a predictive analysis of probable adversary courses of action—and friendly force survivability in each case.

- **Threat integration** ties the previous steps together to give the commander [a] multi-dimensional view of the battlespace.\(^2\)

The structured IPB process helps the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander transition from the comfortable generalities of a theater CONOPS to the difficult specificity required for combat operations. IPB will initially raise far more questions than it will answer, but these questions will both focus specific intelligence collection requirements, and help define Theater Ballistic Missile Defense within the context of the overall mission which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must carry out.

Specific Theater Ballistic Missile Defense C2-related intelligence issues of concern to the JFMCC include:
- **Issue:** Enemy TBM system ranges.

- **Impact:** Maximum range will determine the rough scope of the DAL. Short range systems with apogees of less than 70 km are not engageable by NTW. If the enemy TBM Order of Battle is short-range only, ships otherwise assigned NTW patrol areas may be retasked.

  NAD capabilities can still be severely tested by systems such as FROG-7 and SS-21. The limited leverage of NAD may increase the need for Attack Operations, and thus make the success of the Area Air Defense Commander’s mission more dependent on the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

- **Issue:** Enemy TBM inventory.

- **Impact:** Once the TBM/TBMD interceptor correlation of forces is made, the severity of the initial window of vulnerability can be determined, and the potential impact of the TBMD mission on the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) can be evaluated.

  If the TBM/TBMD correlation is so heavily favorable to hostile forces that U.S. objectives would be jeopardized before the balance could be redressed, the NCA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Force Commander and JFMCC may have to consider the military, political and ROE implications of preemptive Attack Operations.

- **Issue:** TBM warhead types.

- **Impact:** If there is significant confidence that the enemy has both the technical capability and the political will to use Weapons of Mass Destruction, then the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander can expect far more intrusive guidance from the Joint Force Commander, CINC and NCA--and may wish to exercise more centralized control of the TBMD battle down the chain of command. The importance of NTW will increase with the need to achieve exoatmospheric destruction of nuclear, biological or chemical warheads.

- **Issue:** Enemy TBM reentry vehicle (RV) radar cross-section.

- **Impact:** Has MASINT (Measurement and Signals Intelligence) ever been successfully collected against the RV types known to be deployed? The answer will affect ship stationing. It will determine both cued and uncued RV acquisition ranges for the SPY radar, and the need for AEGIS sharing of offset track data via the Joint Fire Control Net against challenging low-RCS targets.
- **Issue:** NTW Area of Negation size, shape and location.

- **Impact:** The current TPT (Theater Planning Tool) will evolve by 2005 into an automated TMD decision aid which is fully integrated into the Area Air Defense Commander's BMCI architecture. Such a system will use projected TBM launch areas, target lists, missile types, and Joint Force Commander DAL priorities to determine the optimum Area of Negation launch basket for NTW patrol units.

  Such areas are crucial because of the high defensive leverage of NTW, with which a single ship can potentially defend many DAL targets. However, much like TLAM strike launch baskets, Areas of Negation cannot be considered in isolation. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must ensure his subordinate commanders overlay the automated decision aid output with traditional information and intelligence on water depth, bottom contour, territorial boundaries, islands, shipping lanes and fishing grounds.

  As with TLAM strike planning, preparation for the primary mission must take into account all warfare areas which may affect its execution, to include ASW and MIW. For NTW ships in far-forward ascent phase intercept Areas of Negation, the capabilities of enemy fast patrol boats, coastal surveillance, maritime strike, and shorebased ASCM batteries must also be considered. For all AEGIS ships, historical data regarding local meteorological impact on SPY radar propagation and NAD interceptor infrared seeker performance should be included in the planning process. IPB is iterative, a constantly evolving game of "what if?" designed to reveal answers to issues driven by enemy capabilities and actions. Comprehensive intelligence preparation allows the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander to better anticipate possible enemy courses of action, and to exercise effective command and control to counter them.
Warfighting

If the great strength of naval combatants lies in their innate ability to perform many different missions, then one of the greatest challenges facing the Maritime Component Commander will be to prioritize those missions in support of the Joint Force Commander's operational intent, and apportion his limited assets accordingly. To do so both effectively and efficiently, the JFMCC must have a clear understanding of the operational capabilities and limitations of his combatants, and the zones of friction which exist between their competing missions.

Reality of Competing Missions

The degree of mutual interference between competing missions varies with the protean nature of conflict. A DDG providing Navy Area Defense protection to an Amphibious Objective Area may also be able to support Marines ashore with its 5" gun, and fire SM2 missiles to destroy enemy aircraft counterattacking the beachhead. That same DDG, tasked to provide NAD for a vital port while land-based TBMD systems are offloaded and made ready, may not be able to support the JFMCC with any other mission.

Such tradeoffs are difficult to anticipate, and must be dealt with as operations progress and requirements become clear. What operational planners can do in anticipation of regional contingencies is to try to illuminate constants, "first principles" of mission overlap and conflict that do not
tend to vary (or tend to vary less) as the specifics of a
given contingency change.

One such constant is the mission capability of different
platforms. Missions themselves are mutable, but ships and
their associated systems are known and quantifiable. Conflict
and friction between overlapping missions can be decreased if
an optimum match between platform and mission is sought.

In a theater where the TBMD mission will be leveraged by
both NTW and NAD, logistical considerations of endurance and
magazine capacity may cause the CG to be favored for NTW
tasking. Reduced radar cross-section, and improved track
processing in the littoral environment provided by the
SPY-1D(V) radar, may cause the DDG to be favored for the AOA
support role. For this mission, the DDG’s lack of organic
helicopter capability is offset by the ability to provide
support and an agile staging deck for the diverse rotary wing
assets of the ARG. The DDG’s less-robust fuel endurance, which
could be a critical liability on detached NTW patrol, may be
of no consequence when operating with the battlegroup in the
CV escort role. Both classes of AEGIS ship are versatile,
powerful and highly capable. The JFMCC and his battlegroup
commanders must constantly review the overall intent of their
tasking, and ensure that class-specific capabilities are
focused to best effect.

When potential friction is inherent in a mission rather
than as a byproduct of platform characteristics, the JFMCC
must look more closely. Two critical missions that will
conflict regardless of ship type will be NTW TBMD and TLAM Strike. Both require ships forward-positioned in circumscribed launch areas, and both require dedicated, competing VLS capacity. Friction thus exists at the outset, and must be resolved by the JFMCC and his subordinates.

This inevitable operational friction between Strike tasking and NTW defense will be severe. The improved W36 warhead fitted to the Block III TLAM-C is still only a 1000lb-equivalent weapon, and is therefore most effective in massed strikes by one or more ships, potentially using a significant portion of their available VLS capacity. Launch timelines and Time-on-Target windows tend to be rigorous, to achieve maximum effect from a given "pulse" of striking power. Thus, timely arrival in designated TLAM launch baskets is critical, closely monitored by the JFACC and his TOMAHAWK Strike Coordinator (TSC). The resulting shipwide tactical focus on Strike, from receipt of the first INDIGO tasking message until the last TOMAHAWK drops its booster and transitions to cruise flight, does not contribute to the expeditious execution of the equally challenging NTW mission.

Of course, the impact of TLAM on TBMD can be ameliorated by maximizing the use of DD-963 platforms as strike assets; but unless the conditions of the conflict are extremely permissive, or enemy capabilities distinctly limited, the SPRUANCES will still require AAW protection. Furthermore, by 2005, the lead ship of this revolutionary class will have served for more than three decades. Until and unless programs
such as the VLS Arsenal Ship go forward, the preponderance of the fleet's VLS capability will be mounted in AEGIS ships.

Decreasing the inherent friction between NTW and Strike will require the close cooperation of the AADC and the JFACC, respectively responsible for TBMD and TLAM operations. If these duties all devolve upon the JFMCC early in the conflict, so much the better, one might say, for this would allow unity of command to foster unity of effort. A "first-cut" on the degree of mission overlap can be achieved by comparing the most likely TLAM launch baskets with the most likely NTW Areas of Negation, as established by the TOMAHAWK Mission Distribution System Theater Mission Library, peacetime intelligence preparation of the battlespace, and the automated TBMD planning tool resident in the JPN. If these expanses of ocean are mutually exclusive—in effect, Venn diagrams which do not overlap—then Strike evidently will be a dedicated mission perhaps best apportioned to a mix of DD-963 and DDG-51 combatants, with NTW tasked to CGs. Ideally, these cruisers will have been loaded out with a reduced TLAM VLS cell count, in order to increase their LEAP capacity.

If, however, there is significant Launch Basket/Area of Negation overlap, the AADC and JFACC have something to work with, and can attempt an accommodation. For example, how is the DAL affected if NTW ships patrol only that portion of an Area of Negation which overlaps TLAM launch baskets? How can the JFACC adjust TOMAHAWK missions so that the size of those
launch baskets is increased, to give maximum coverage of NTW patrol areas?

If NTW ships can still patrol effectively within a TLAM launch area, the JFACC and his TOMAHAWK Strike Coordinator can maximize the utility of such TLAM as remain in the cruiser VLS cells by assigning these ships strike missions which allow large launch baskets. TLAM mission profiles which use GPS primary guidance, which do not require enhanced Time-on-Target control or Precision Strike Tomahawk (PST) capability, and which do not require maximum range flight past the First Preplanned Waypoint (FPPWP), tend to increase the size of the useable launch basket.²⁴

Neither Strike nor NTW can be considered in isolation. When their distinguishing sources of friction (launch baskets vs. areas of negation) are rigorously compared, areas of friction can perhaps be resolved into areas of overlap, with multi-mission capability thus enhanced. The JFMCC must ensure that a comprehensive, cooperative comparison of mission characteristics and operational objectives is made, both at the Theater level and by his subordinate commanders.

**TBMD Action Group (TAG) Concept for NTW**

The Maritime Component Commander's means to carry out a variety of missions come to him prepackaged in discrete units --ships. With a limited number of ships available in theater, and a limited number of potential reinforcements to bolster them, the JFMCC must constantly weigh the relative leverage a
given mission gives him against the number of ships required
to accomplish that mission.

In a force-on-force analysis, Navy Theater Wide TBMD
capability often appears to give the JFMCC great leverage,
with a single ship defending multiple targets on the DAL. That
leverage, though, must be tempered by the real-world
complications of other warfare areas and multiple hostile
threats, the impact of systems reliability issues, and the
concomitant requirement for systems maintenance even in the
face of the enemy.

That said, the defensive leverage of NTW remains, and is
potentially so great that the JFMCC may wish to consider
providing a robust, survivable capability through the use of
dedicated, mutually supporting assets, a TBMD Action Group, or
TAG Team. Such a concept is really a specialized maritime
version of the generic Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
construct of the Active Defense Group (ADG), "comprising
relatively autonomous packages of both sensors and
shooters.... In general, these ADGs were assumed to possess
all of the capabilities required to detect, acquire, track,
engage, and kill hostile missiles."\textsuperscript{95}

The advantages which accrue when two NTW ships are
assigned to a single NTW patrol area are significant.
Intuitively obvious is the doubling of VLS inventory and the
potential for mutual support in a multi-threat environment.
Additionally, if continuous NTW defensive coverage is to be
guaranteed, the vital issues of systems maintenance and
equipment casualties can only be dealt with meaningfully by two identical platforms operating in concert.

The NTW mission is best carried out in close proximity to the enemy. A littoral foe sufficiently advanced to field long-range TBMs can probably comprehend the significance of SPY radar emissions detected by his coastal EW sites. Depending on the nature of the aggressor and the characteristics of the operating area, threats posed in opposition to an NTW cruiser could include diesel submarines, ASCM-armed fast patrol boats, mines, shorebased ASCMs, strike aircraft, or even unconventional stratagems such as Special Operations Forces deployed from merchant vessels, fishing craft, minisubs or fast motorboats. As in aerial combat, diverse challenges can best be met by two platforms covering each other while executing the primary mission.

Secondly, the advantages of mutual support are defined not only by the nature of the threat, but also by the nature of the sensors critical for TBMD. *SPY radar energy is a finite quantity.* As more and more of it is "squeezed" into the specialized waveforms required for TBM detection and tracking, less will be available for horizon search and other functions. This is not a new phenomenon—but the unique demands of TBMD tend to exacerbate the problem. A Navy requirement for TBMD enhancement of the AEGIS Combat System is the ability to perform TBM engagements and self-defense concurrently; but TBM tracks will still require a significant percentage of total radar energy and processing power.

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The human factor must also be considered. If a given NTW ship is responsible for the defense of a dozen key political targets and population centers on the DAL, all threatened by the WMD-capable missiles of a bellicose regional power, the attention of the CIC watch team will understandably gravitate toward the TBMD mission. If it does not, vociferous SATCOM consultations between the JFMCC and the cruiser CO will make it so. Training, doctrine, and deckplate professionalism can resist--but probably not overcome--such tactical tunnel-vision. Under these circumstances, it will be prudent to have a heavily-armed partner helping with the close-in threat.

The scouting and ASW capability inherent in the dual helicopter SH-60 LAMPS detachment organic to each cruiser, plus LAMPS HAWKLINK, the Joint Data Net, TBMD cueing from space-based sensors, and the track-sharing capability of the CEC-derived JFCN, will allow effective mutual support from well over the horizon. The lower the non-TBM threat, the more this baseline can be lengthened. Such separation of TAG platforms allows extended cooperative tracking of TBMs, as shown in the RED TIGRESS test of 1993, the USACOM JTF-95 TBM exercise in August 1994 and Cooperative Engagement Capability workups of the EISENHOWER Battlegroup, and more recent PACFLT extended tracking exercises during 1995. The resulting increased tracking time will facilitate multiple NTW shot opportunities, and improve the timeline for kill assessment. If, for some reason, space-based TBM launch cueing is not available, cooperative tracking by NTW ships will be
vital, in order to preserve an engagement window constrained by the time lost between TBM launch and first detection by the forwardmost SPY radar.

Looking toward 2005, evolutionary advances in enemy TBM technology will likely reduce reentry vehicle radar cross section. Cooperative tracking by NTW ships on a widely spaced baseline can help overcome the RCS challenge posed by more advanced high-ballistic-coefficient ("skinny and pointy") separating RVs, by simultaneously radiating multiple aspects of the target and using a track derived from the strongest return. Such a capability also helps hedge against the eventual deployment of penetration aids on more advanced TBM systems, and will facilitate kill assessment against any TBM following intercept.

The TAG concept, however, has operational value that is greater than the sum of its parts for reasons that go beyond mutual defense and enhanced TBM engagement. The mundane realities of required maintenance, systems limitations and real-world reliability are equally important.

The essential sensor for naval TBMD engagements until well into the next century will be the SPY radar. Versatile, capable and reliable, various versions will have been in service with the fleet for more than twenty years by 2005. Like any complex sensor, though, SPY requires maintenance.

The primary radar of an AEGIS ship is not brought on line at the beginning of a deployment, and secured six months later. The Systems Test Officer (STO) on a cruiser would like
about four hours out of every 72 with the radar down for
maintenance. Various "work-arounds," such as shutting down the
forward or aft arrays only, and then maneuvering the ship to
ensure coverage of the likely threat axis, are possible; but
these are stopgap measures, and the system will eventually
degrade.

Thus, if a single ship is assigned to an NTW patrol area,
the JFMCC is confronted with a simple but serious dilemma. In
order to remain fully mission capable, SPY must shut down
periodically. Whenever it does, a portion of the DAL is put at
risk for the duration of the maintenance period. Furthermore,
if the NTW ship is optimally stationed well forward, an adept
enemy may well detect the moment that SPY secures, and thus be
able to exploit the resulting window of vulnerability of both
the DAL and the ship itself.

The cruiser has redundant systems which will decrease its
own vulnerability, such as the SPS-49 air search radar, EW and
chaff systems, CIWS, HARMPOON, and the SPQ-9 radar incorporated
in the Mk86 Gun Fire Control System (GFCS). Good technicians,
given warning, can also bring SPY out of maintenance quickly.
However, the timeline of TBMD engagements is so challenging
that even the most agile Combat Systems team may not be able
to bring the radar back up and generate the required highpower
waveforms quickly enough, once a TBM launch is remotely
detected and cueing data is passed to the ship.

Two ships in mutual support can decrease the impact of
both planned SPY maintenance and the inevitable, unexpected
component failures which occur in even the best maintained complex combat systems. Additionally, the redundant radar coverage thus provided will allow continuous NTW coverage during evolutions such as LAMPS launch and recovery, and Underway Replenishment, all of which require temporary degradation of SPY coverage by the ship involved.

Finally, the concept of a backup shooter for critical launch operations has been validated for years by TLAM CONOPS. TLAM pubs such as the NWP 3-03.1 series serve as useful examples of how a related mission has been exhaustively analyzed and addressed in light of actual operational experience. Some of the lessons thus incorporated are directly applicable to the NTW mission.

At least one real-world TLAM contingency mission in recent years would have failed if assigned to a single ship. Last minute combat systems casualties were operationally overcome by the use of a mutually supporting backup shooter, who successfully fired the mission in the Adriatic. The same principles apply to high-leverage, high-visibility NTW tasking. If the ship designated to engage cannot get the shot off—for whatever reason—a second cruiser sharing the TBM track via the JFCN can respond immediately in accordance with established AEGIS TBMD doctrine, and thus preserve as much of the intercept/kill evaluation/refire decision timeline as possible.

With so much potentially riding on NTW, the JFMCC should give serious consideration to the TAG Team concept. The extra
assets committed may dramatically increase the likelihood of mission success.

**Amphibious Objective Area Protection: USMC Concerns**

While the unique characteristics and challenges of Navy Theater Wide defense help illustrate the central TBMD theme of resolving conflicting missions and limited means, Navy Area Defense must not be neglected. It is a complementary rather than an inferior capability, and it is essential to the pivotal TBMD tenet of layered defense. In specific areas of the Joint Force Commander’s operational concept and intent, it may indeed dominate TBMD planning. Amphibious Operations represent just such an area.

As Desert Storm demonstrated, amphibious assault is not necessarily required for successful power projection against a littoral objective. Indeed, as Marine Corps critics never tire of pointing out, a major opposed landing has not been attempted by U.S. forces since Inchon, which by 2005 will have receded more than half a century into history. However, the successful conclusion of conflict will often require the introduction of ground forces onto hostile territory, and those ground forces will increasingly require protection from both air-breathing threats (e.g., aircraft and cruise missiles) and TBMs, protection which NAD can provide until land-based systems are in place to shoulder the defensive burden.
In a perverse twist of operational logic, the gradual spread of TBMs and persistent proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction may in fact revive the utility of some types of amphibious operations. One of the centers of gravity which WMD tend to hold at risk is the power projection force itself. Large, relatively fixed land force buildups, such as took place in Saudi Arabia prior to the beginning of the Desert Storm ground war, are clearly vulnerable if they fall within the range of WMD-capable TBM systems. Operational maneuver from the sea can give the Joint Force Commander potential alternatives.

A recent RAND Corporation study of the implications of regional nuclear proliferation states: "An overwhelming operational need is to engage the regional opponent with forces that can operate effectively from beyond the enemy missile range or independently of fixed bases." Until the sea echelon is in place and actually assaulting the AOA, TBMD-capable amphibious power projection forces remain mobile, difficult to locate, and equipped for both active and passive defense against WMD. Once the assault begins, tactical and logistical agility are required on the part of the enemy in order to bring his WMD assets to bear on the AOA; more importantly, he will have to make the political decision to use Weapons of Mass Destruction on an objective he is attempting to defend.

In some circumstances, then, the JFC may wish to employ operational maneuver from the sea. To do so with confidence,
he will require robust NAD assets. The Navy’s Director for Theater Air Defense (N865) has written: "We must be able to force our way ashore even under the threat or actual conduct of TBM strikes." In this context, the Marines are primarily concerned with the threat posed by short-range systems such as FROG-series artillery rockets, the SS-21 mobile SRBM, and the powerful Russian-built SMERCH Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

ROVING SANDS 95 demonstrated both the Active Defense potential of NAD, and the difficulty of Attack Operations directed against the small, fast-moving SS-21 TEL, while the challenge posed by modern multiple-launch rocket systems is so stressing that DOD has committed an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to address this problem alone. Recent U.S./Israeli initiatives to accelerate development and deployment of the laser-based *Nautilus* anti-rocket defense system have shown promise. However, until such systems and the doctrine for their employment are proven and fielded, the solution to the extended-range (70km), course-corrected, guided-submunition-capable SMERCH probably lies with enhanced Attack Operations, and will thus remain under the purview of the JFACC rather than the Area Air Defense Commander. FROG-7, SS-21, and WMD-capable MRBMs targeted on the Amphibious Objective Area will remain as important targets for the NAD platforms supporting the amphibious operation.

Because of their kinematics, systems such as the SS-21 and FROG-7 (with apogees below the 70km minimum engagement
altitude for LEAP) are unlikely to be vulnerable to Navy Theater Wide defenses. These shorter range systems, however, will enter the NAD SM2 Block IVA engagement envelope in the endgame. In 2005, the need for defense of the AOA against both manned aircraft and cruise missiles will bolster the utility of the multi-mission SM2 Block IVA interceptor, and will thus favor a VLS loadout of NAD (and strike weapons) for the Amphibious Objective Area support role.

In addition to its NAD role, SM2 Block IVA represents a critical resource for the JFMCC in support of the multitude of naval missions that take place concurrently with TBMD. In 2005, the NAD interceptor will be the primary AAW weapon for surface combatants riding shotgun for the CV, escorting MPS ships, and protecting Underway Replenishment Groups shuttling throughout the theater resupplying TAG Teams, MIF forces, CVBGs and one or more ARGs. Indeed, this overarching need for conventional force AAW protection has been a primary driver for the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile program, since the ESSM VLS 4-pack will provide enhanced self-defense for VLS platforms, while freeing up more launcher space for SM2 variants.

Platforms, though, will still be a critical concern for the JFMCC. If the Defended Assets List must be protected by several TAG Teams, and an AOA defended by NAD-capable DDGs, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may be confronted by very hard choices regarding CV and URG escort—especially if a credible diesel submarine threat exists. A recent Naval
Institute Proceedings article sums up the aftermath of a hypothetical enemy submarine attack succinctly: "How will the naval component commander of the Joint Task Force explain that all of his other surface ships had valid missions at the time, and that he had no more available for anti-submarine warfare protection?"^{105}

While NTW may get the most visibility in its political operational-strategic defensive role, NAD will be a key military operational-tactical enabler, allowing friendly forces to regain the initiative and take the offensive. The JFMCC's operational vision (and its associated timelines) must determine how he apportions his limited assets between these two vital categories of TBMD in order to provide the force protection necessary to complete his other missions, and thus fulfill the operational intent of the Joint Force Commander.
Rules of Engagement

"ROE should not delineate specific tactics, should not cover restrictions on specific system operations, should not cover safety-related restrictions, should not set forth service doctrine, tactics, or procedures.... ROE should never be 'rudder orders,' and certainly should never substitute for a strategy governing the use of deployed forces, in a peacetime crisis or in wartime."¹⁰⁶ So wrote Captain J. Ashley Roach, JAGC, USN, in his seminal 1983 article "Rules of Engagement." Twenty-two years later, the TBM challenge of 2005 may force the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander to reevaluate his approach to Rules of Engagement as they apply to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.

Nature of Modern Conflict: Impact on TBM Defense

NWP 1-14M, the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, states that "U.S. rules of engagement reaffirm the right and the responsibility of the operational commander generally to seek out, engage and destroy enemy forces consistent with national objectives, strategy and the law of armed conflict."¹⁰⁷ ROE are shaped by operational, political, legal, and diplomatic forces,¹⁰⁸ and thus tend to evolve as these forces change over time. The unique operational and political characteristics of Theater Ballistic Missiles will have a signal impact on the evolution of Rules of Engagement crafted to counter them.
The ease of deployment and speed of employment associated with Theater Ballistic Missiles make the transition from peace to war potentially very rapid when these weapons are available to an aggressor. This destabilizing alacrity was noted in the early days of Great Power strategic deterrence, when the first ICBMs figured prominently in pessimistic "Bolt from the Blue" scenarios for Armageddon. If Theater Ballistic Missiles can be launched with little warning, and once launched can proceed to their targets at velocities measured in kilometers per second, then peacetime ROE are likely to be in effect when an initial TBMD response is required. To be effective, that response must be reactive, rapid, and robust.

Peacetime ROE derive from the national right of self defense, but once a TBM leaves its TEL, national rights, international politics and missile kinematics collide. The missile itself may not pose any direct threat to a U.S. Navy ship capable of intercepting it, but in a "worst case" scenario, the potential humanitarian and political impact of a single WMD warhead striking a foreign capital or major population center may be so great that the NCA orders a TBMD engagement. Is this unilateral action to be justified under a loose interpretation of national self-defense, as an effort to protect U.S. citizens or commercial interests in the area under attack? Perhaps, for "by the year 2000, thousands of U.S. nationals and substantial numbers of U.S. military forces will be in foreign lands and vulnerable to potential nuclear attack by nuclear-armed regional states." If not, though,
shall the NCA then cite the inherent rights of individual and collective self-defense enumerated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter?

These questions are rhetorical, posed to focus attention on the unique nature of the problem. TBMs may be launched with little or no warning. The warheads they are capable of carrying imply such potent physical consequences that a single successful strike could lead to a political victory for an aggressor. System velocities are greater than any other weapon except strategic ICBMs. System ranges are such that TBMs may cross the sovereign territory of uninvolved third parties enroute to their targets. The obvious and troubling corollary is that interception of these same weapons may thus occur over these third party countries, raining down post-engagement debris, unexploded warheads, failed interceptors, and possibly WMD component contaminants, ranging from fissile materials to lethal chemicals to biologic agents and toxins. Who will world opinion hold accountable for the results: the aggressor--or an unsolicited defender?

Between now and 2005, the United States is likely to be the only nation with both the technological infrastructure and financial wherewithal to be able to develop and deploy naval Theater Ballistic Missile defenses with more than a local point-defense capability. The NCA, CINC, JFC, and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must carefully ponder the Pandora’s Box of political and legal issues thus opened.
NTW capability will vastly expand the regional leverage of the JFMCC. It also will vastly complicate the traditional "catalytic" employment of naval forces, described by Roach as overtly political tasking to "deploy units or fleets for the purpose of catalytic force without any clear objectives in mind.... in the hope that the Navy will do something to resolve the situation and nothing to aggravate it." Such tasking has always lain at the heart of the "naval presence" mission, but the time/speed/distance challenges inherent in Theater Ballistic Missile defense may well move the execution of that mission back toward the spirit of the 18th and 19th centuries. In that era, the commanding officer of a warship was expected to act forcefully in the best interests of national policy as expressed in his sailing orders, without recourse to higher authority. In the Age of Theater Ballistic Missiles, as in the Age of Sail, that awesome responsibility may again devolve upon individual naval officers, who may be forced to carry out defensive actions that may make national policy without prior or real-time guidance from national leaders.\footnote{112}

**Defensive Rules of Engagement must be Permissive**

True "Bolt from the Blue" strategic attacks are rare. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then there usually is a progression of political trail blazes leading up to the point of open conflict. That these markers are often seen clearly only in retrospect shows that, while the actual
attack represents merely the culmination of gradually increasing political hostility, the physical ability to achieve strategic surprise has remained constant from Pearl Harbor to Kuwait City.

In order to counter the capacity for strategic surprise and political leverage provided to regional powers by TBMs, defensive Rules of Engagement must be permissive. Despite Roach's dictum decrying ROE system-specificity, Rules of Engagement for theater ballistic missile defense must be shaped by the unique nature of the threat. The high velocities attained by TBMs and the potential consequences of WMD warhead use argue the need for very rapid, if not automatic, engagement. Normally, the counter-argument set in opposition to such a permissive and deadly defensive environment involves the challenge of deconfliction, how to best prevent the possible engagement of friendly assets. However, the very kinematics that make TBMs such challenging targets also aid deconfliction. Quite simply, unlike civilian and military aircraft, there is no such thing as a friendly incoming TBM.

Furthermore, the nature of cueing systems directed against ballistic missiles entails that the actual target, or most likely area of impact, becomes clear only as the hostile missile hurtles along its trajectory. As previously explained, interception is best attempted as early in that trajectory as possible, in order to allow time for kill assessment and follow-on shots. Thus, the ROE-driven decision to engage a TBM with a Theater-Wide defensive system needs to be made before
the exact target of the hostile missile is known. The U.S. would therefore be delivering a defensive stroke without being able to articulate precisely what, or who, was being defended. Alliances, coalitions, treaties or the lack thereof would be rendered moot. Clearly, the legal implications thus arising from the physical characteristics of offensive and defensive systems must be fully understood and dealt with before these defensive systems are ever deployed.

One possible approach would be a public declaration by the U.S., based on the same legal reasoning which guides international law regarding piracy. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas states in part that "All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state [emphasis added]." The United States could argue that it and other nations have the right to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by unilaterally engaging Theater Ballistic Missiles over the high seas, and over land when outside the earth's atmosphere (exoatmospheric NTW intercept), for "there is no legally defined boundary between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of outer space...[which]... begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth's atmosphere and extends to infinity." Appendix B to Enclosure A of the current Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, while beyond the classification of this paper, is instructive in regard to this issue.
Such a permissive, unilateral national policy would have to be carefully couched in terms clearly deriving from the well-defined international right to repress acts of violence "on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state." Navy Theater Wide engagements would take place over the high seas and/or above the airspace of any nation, since this system is both sea-based and exoatmospheric. Serendipitously, when potential TBM trajectories are plotted from likely aggressors to likely targets on the current world scene, 70 percent of those trajectories cross international waters at some point.  

Successful consummation of an exoatmospheric intercept harms only the TBM and the interceptor. The LEAP kill vehicle itself is kinetic, with a net explosive weight of zero (excluding thruster fuel). It cannot engage an airliner, bomb shelter or babymilk factory. Additionally, exoatmospheric intercept tends to mitigate the effects of debris on the land below, whether friendly, neutral or hostile. Weapons components, toxic compounds, wreckage and errant interceptors will all tend to fragment, scatter and burn up upon reentry.  

ROE issues involved with Navy Area Defense capability are in some ways more easily resolved. The smaller defended footprint of the NAD system can make its use de facto an act of self-defense by a U.S. warship, especially when employed against Weapons of Mass Destruction, which might only have to detonate in the vicinity of the ship in order to be potentially deadly to it and its crew. Unit self-defense
provisions of U.S. peacetime ROE might thus suffice for initial employment of NAD in an emergency. Planned, coordinated use of this capability by the JFMCC during the course of a campaign, however, will require a degree of international political cooperation in the framing of specific U.S. ROE, as with the deployment of ground-based area-defense PATRIOT units to Israel during the Gulf War.

Offensive Rules of Engagement will be Restrictive

TBMD Active Defense is a relatively "pure" form of warfare, a contest of sensors and projectiles that, if ideally successful, results in no loss of life on either side. Its Rules of Engagement can therefore be written as permutations of the universal right of unit and national self-defense.

However, the in-flight interception of TBMs represents only one pillar of TBMD. In the course of a regional conflict, a strictly defensive strategy will almost certainly fail in the long run. Consequently, Attack Operations, the aggressive interdiction of TBMs, TELs and their support infrastructure on the ground, will be a vital part of any campaign involving TBMD. Nonetheless, under the purview of the JFACC, this portion of the overall TBMD mission is likely to have very different Rules of Engagement.

In the early stages of a regional contingency, the JFMCC may well find himself dual-hatted as AADC and JFACC, and will once again have to resolve fundamental operational conflicts within the TBMD mission, this time in regard to the ROE. The
basic ROE dilemma that he will face with respect to Attack Operations is this: tactically, as AADC he will need rapid, forceful action against the hostile TBM Order of Battle in order to decrease pressure on his limited Active Defense TBMD resources. Operationally, however, as JFACC he is likely to find timely execution of Attack Operations initially prohibited by proscriptive, circumspect guidance from the National Command Authorities.

Consider, for illustrative purposes, that during NTF Wargame 95B, the Joint Force Commander:

a. Established initial TMD ROE as the Right of Self Defense.

b. Refined the ROE automatically to identify as hostile, those ballistic missiles:

1. Determined to originate from designated hostile nations.
2. Determined to impact within the defended area of USEUCOM AOR, and
3. Assessed as part of the designated hostile nation operational order of battle (OOB)

c. Authorization for attack on forces of designated hostile nations within the hostile nation's borders remains with the NCA.[emphasis added]¹¹⁷

Specific Rules of Engagement were (in operational sequence):

A: The interception of a ballistic missile in self defense (own forces within kill zone of impact point) is permitted.

B: The interception of a ballistic missile, whose predicted impact is within own territory or designated friendly nations, is permitted....

C: The attack on forces of a nation which has been positively identified as having launched ballistic missiles against own or designated friendly nations is permitted.
D: The interception of a ballistic missile, whose predicted impact point is within the territory of third nations, is permitted.118

Note that all Active Defense-related ROE are aligned with the principles of self-defense. The NCA, however, has retained specific control of authorization for Attack Operations. This clearly includes the use of TLAM or other strike assets available in the same AEGIS ships which may be tasked with the forward-positioned Active Defense NTW role. Thus, these ships are potentially subject to two separate sets of ROE governing the actions of two different commanders, one quite permissive for the AADC's execution of Active Defense, the other very restrictive for JFACC prosecution of Attack Operations—both supporting different aspects of the same TBMD mission.

Furthermore, in the course of directing the required Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace as AADC, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may find that the enemy TBM Order of Battle is such that his available Active Defense forces will be insufficient to effectively protect the most significant targets on the DAL. The AADC must then seek supplementary ROE from the NCA to allow the JFACC to mount preemptive Attack Operations in the face of an imminent TBM strike, in order to destroy enemy capabilities and "level the playing field." The JFMCC must be confident in making the argument that justification under peacetime ROE may still be found in international law—within the concept of anticipatory self-defense.
Guy R. Phillips, commenting on the broad implications of U.N. Charter Article 51, states: "Because the article is silent on what constitutes the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,’ this allows the broad use of force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack.... The majority position supports this latter interpretation." When faced with critical operational risks such as an insuperable Active Defense "window of vulnerability," the JFMCC must always remember that the Rules of Engagement under which he must operate need not necessarily be more restrictive than the provisions of international law. He must be prepared and willing to argue forcefully for ROE which will realistically allow him to carry out his missions in support of the Joint Force Commander’s operational intent.

On the other hand, the JFMCC must also appreciate that prevention of a conflict involving WMD-equipped Theater Ballistic Missiles surely will rank among the NCA’s highest priorities. Consequently, the NCA will be most reluctant to initiate preemptive Attack Operations which hold little promise of being completely successful in destroying all TBMs and associated WMD prior to their use. The NCA rightly and rationally will hope the crisis can be resolved without hostilities being initiated—especially by the U.S.—even under the legal principle of anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent attack. Hence, as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization already acknowledges: "Perhaps the most crucial period for establishing clear, unambiguous ROE is that
period before the outbreak of hostilities, when mistakes could affect national efforts to resolve the potential conflict through political or economic means.  Robust naval TBMD forces, provided with clear (and perhaps public) Rules of Engagement, will have great leverage as regional tools of deterrence and diplomacy. However, if either unnecessarily fettered or insufficiently controlled through the malicious effects of unsound ROE, such forces could bring about the worst consequences of the "catalytic" use of maritime power.

Long before hostilities commence, during the vital months of pre-deployment planning and workups, the flag officer most likely to be tasked as JFMCC must consider current NCA guidance and the latest theater CONOPS, and work through these issues with his staff, his battlegroup commanders and his AEGIS ships’ commanding officers. He must realistically game the ROE and the IPB, insisting upon clarification (where required) and comprehensive supplementary measures (where possible) from the theater CINC and the NCA. Only then will he be able to sail with the assurance that all concerned recognize the harmonious nature of the full spectrum of TBMD tasks—which must nonetheless be executed under dissonant Rules of Engagement.

At the end of the day, though, the truth about Rules of Engagement for Theater Ballistic Missile defense appears to be the following: While defensive ROE for Active Defense are likely to be clear and permissive, offensive ROE for Attack Operations should be anticipated to be mutable and
constrained, evolving continuously throughout the course of the conflict in accordance with direct guidance from the NCA. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will need to make his peace with this situation and attempt to ameliorate it at every opportunity, as the tactical situation develops and national policy clarifies.
CHAPTER IV.

JOINT TBMD OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

As a regional contingency in 2005 matures and the U.S. response in theater gathers momentum, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should see more and more of the TBMD effort transitioning ashore. If he has done his job well as AADC and JFACC, the power projection force available to the Joint Force Commander will have remained mobile, sustainable and capable. Essential logistics nodes will be secure, to support the three major phases of a contingency operation: "build up in theater, reinforce the force, and a shift to offensive operations." Forehanded protection of the CINC's Defended Assets List by the naval TBMD forces available at the outset of conflict will have demonstrated U.S. resolve, and reassured threatened regional powers. Betrayed by a neighbor and shielded by the United States, these nations will have become committed coalition partners against the aggressor in their midst.

In such a postulated mission successful to this point, America will have shown the world a technically adept defensive battle waged by U.S. forces against the otherwise unanswerable ballistic blows of a local bully. U.S. public opinion, bolstered by media coverage of the successful fight waged by these outnumbered assets, and now sympathetic to the demonstrated concerns of the coalition, will support the vigorous prosecution of multinational military operations to
defeat the aggressor and destroy his TBM and WMD capabilities. Given these happy circumstances, the JFMCC will require a thorough understanding of the follow-on TBMD capabilities for whom he has "held open the door," and a clear concept of how he will transfer control of the subsequent TBMD battle to other elements of the Joint Force, as directed by the JFC. He should prepare for the consequences of success. He must plan to work himself out of a job.
Joint TBMD Active Defense Capabilities to 2005

The sequential nature of the events just described is in part a rhetorical device, emphasizing the essential "enabling" role of the naval component in the phased execution of joint operations. Naval forces will clearly not carry 100 percent of the defensive burden until some magic moment in the campaign when Army, Air Force and Marine TBMD assets are suddenly declared to be sufficiently robust, and a time-out is called to effect transition of the main effort to shore-based elements.

As explained in the C2I section of Chapter III, Command and Control of joint TBMD forces is a dynamic, mutable function. The JFMCC must understand the capabilities of non-naval systems and be able to incorporate such systems into his plan as they become available, often before these assets have built up sufficient organic strength in theater for their particular Component Commanders to be considered for overall command of the TBMD effort.

Several Active Defense systems currently under development by other services are likely to be operational by this study's target date of 2005. All are in some way complementary to Navy Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide systems. Some provide unique capabilities not otherwise available to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. This section will give a concise overview of non-naval TBMD Active Defense capabilities anticipated to be available in ten years.
Army Active Defense

Like Navy TBMD, Army Active Defense will be built around a two-tier concept of defense-in-depth, with PAC-3 PATRIOT providing Area Defense, and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system covering the upper tier. PAC-3 replaces the GEM interceptor of the final version of PATRIOT PAC-2 with the smaller hit-to-kill ERINT (Extended Range Interceptor) missile. ERINT is not a pure kinetic weapon (like LEAP), since a small ring-type tungsten fragment warhead called a "lethality enhancer" is fitted.\(^1\)\(^2\) When fired against a TBM, however, ERINT is intended to hit its target directly. Indeed, this new missile was selected in large measure because of its agile, hit-to-kill design. A multi-mach kinetic impact is one of the best non-nuclear kill techniques against the rugged chemical submunition warhead, a particular threat that has become the designated bête noire of TBMD Cost Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) Lethality studies.

Much like Enhanced Sea Sparrow's relationship to the larger, vertically launched SM2 series, PAC-3 ERINT is designed to use existing launchers—and also fits four missiles in the same size canister as a single PAC-2 GEM. Thus, lift requirements for PATRIOT formations remain unchanged and challenging—but each Fire Unit can bring to bear four times its previous complement of interceptors.

The defended footprint for PAC-3 will be greater than that of PAC-2 GEM, primarily due to improved kinematics of the ERINT missile. PAC-2's less-efficient command guidance and

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Track-Via-Missile (TVM) terminal homing are replaced in ERINT by inertially-guided flight to a Predicted Intercept Point, calculated by the fire control system and programmed into the missile before launch, followed by active terminal homing using a K, band emitter. As shown by the results of ROVING SANDS 95, however, the PAC-3 footprint will still be only a fraction of that for NAD SM2 Block IVA.

The Army’s upper tier of TBMD protection will be provided by THAAD, the Theater High Altitude Air Defense system. The initial THAAD User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) of four launchers, two mobile ground-based radars (GBR), two vehicle-mounted command and control systems, 40 missiles and support equipment will be ready for contingency deployment by the turn of the century. NTF Wargame 95B planners concurred, assuming a robust THAAD operational capability for their 2005-era scenarios.

The system itself is unique in the TBMD arena, in that THAAD missiles can consummate intercepts both outside and inside the atmosphere. This fills a gap in the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s naval TBMD engagement envelope. NTW, because of the strictly exoatmospheric capability of the LEAP, cannot destroy targets below 70km. As explained in Chapter III, many common shorter range TBMs reach apogee below 70km, and are thus never engageable by NTW. Navy Area defense is limited by the kinematics and aerodynamic controls of the SM2 Block IVA missile to a maximum intercept altitude of 35km.
The resulting "engagement gap" from 70-35km is filled by the versatile THAAD.

Guided by updates from the ground-based radar, the multi-stage missile uses a specially shielded IR seeker on a thruster-controlled kinetic kill vehicle to achieve hit-to-kill intercept of its TBM target. The inevitable engineering tradeoff for the versatility thus offered by endo- and exoatmospheric capability is no capability against the TBM ascent phase. This remains the high-leverage province of SM2/LEAP.

Like Navy Theater Wide defense, THAAD has been the subject of intense debate in regard to the ABM Treaty. Treaty compliance has been certified for UOES flight tests, but questions remain about the type and scope of cueing that future BMC4I architectures may provide to the highly capable, Strategic Defense Initiative-derived THAAD ground-based radar. In 2005, any Treaty-related restrictions on full BMC4I integration of this powerful sensor could have a significant effect on the overall TBMD capability of a joint power projection force.

For the JFMCC, then, the key points of interest regarding Army Active Defense in 2005 include:

- Capabilities and limitations of the evolved, improved PATRIOT PAC-3 lower tier system. Still lift-intensive and not tactically mobile (does not travel with maneuver elements of the ground force).

- Highly capable upper tier system. THAAD will be more mature than NTW in 2005. It fills the 70-35km altitude gap in joint TBMD layered-defense concept.
- THAAD lift requirements are far less challenging than those for PATRIOT PAC-3. A THAAD battalion with 4 Fire Units and 288 missiles will require 40 C5 sorties, or 94 C141 sorties.\(^{177}\) This will be further ameliorated in 2005 by the contributions of the C17 airlifter.

- THAAD is *not* a substitute for PATRIOT, any more than NTW can replace NAD. These are complementary capabilities, and indeed, current Army doctrine emulates dual-capable AEGIS ships by placing THAAD and PATRIOT in mutually-supporting layered enclaves. As THAAD and PATRIOT formations begin to arrive in theater, the JFMCC must take this into account when configuring the ground-based coverage of an expanding TBMD plan.

In ideal circumstances, the incorporation of THAAD and PATRIOT PAC-3 in a fully-integrated joint TBMD Active Defense plan will allow the JFMCC four layers of protection, with NTW positioned for ascent-phase and long-range midcourse intercepts, THAAD covering the upper tier exoatmospheric and very-high-altitude endoatmospheric threats, Navy Area Defense providing robust capability below 35km, and fast, agile PAC-3 destroying leakers in the endgame.

**Air Force Active Defense**

Both during and after Desert Storm, significant U.S. Air Force contributions to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense focused on the critical task of Attack Operations and the overall enabling capability of BMC4I, especially TBM launch detection and defense cueing via TALON SHIELD (and now ALERT). However, just as ascent phase intercept represents the highest leverage form of Navy theater-wide active defense, boost phase intercept (BPI) is an emerging high leverage niche for Air Force active defense.
No BPI systems are currently fielded, but two concepts show potential for partial deployment by 2005. BPI(KE) (Kinetic Energy) is a straightforward (if difficult) proposition: mount a TBMD kinetic kill vehicle on a modified air-launched missile, load the missile on a tactical aircraft such as an F-15, have the aircraft loiter near the anticipated TBM launch site (much like current Attack Operations SCUDCAP doctrine), then shoot down the rising TBM in an air-to-air engagement.

The second proposed system, BPI(DE) (Directed Energy) is potentially far more capable—and certainly far more exotic. Also known as the Airborne Laser (ABL), a modified Boeing 747 transport will be equipped with a full TBMD BMDI suite, an EAGLE-type infrared tracking and ranging device—and a 200-shot, chemically-fueled, weapons-grade laser firing through a trainable nose turret. When a TBM launch is detected and a boost phase engagement is ordered:

Inside the 747, some 300 to 600 kilometers away, a tracking laser illuminates the first missile. Its reflected beam measures the distance between the missile plume and the red hot glow of the missile nosecone. A computer aboard the 747 determines the length of the missile body and the missile’s location, course and direction.... Invisibly, a second, high-energy laser fires from the 747’s nose, striking the first missile’s body, which...explodes, its warhead and debris falling back onto the launch pad whence it came.128

That enthusiastic account of a BPI(DE) engagement highlights, by contrast, some of the specific vulnerabilities of the other Air Force BPI program, the fighter-launched Kinetic Energy missile. With KE interceptor designs currently
based on missiles such as HARM, the BPI aircraft must loiter relatively close to a TBM launch area, almost invariably well inside enemy airspace. The BPI(KE) interceptor is a single-purpose weapon, and thus cannot be used for self-defense of the launching aircraft against an air threat. For this reason, all BPI F-15s tasked (by the JFACC rather than the AADC) during the 2005 scenarios of NTF Wargame 95B were escorted by F-22 fighters. Besides the inevitable banter in squadron ready-rooms about Eagle drivers needing a hand from Lightning drivers, such tactics obviously cause the number of aircraft put at risk for this difficult mission to rise sharply--aircraft which are now also unavailable for other vital non-TBMD tasking.

Potential hostile forces are well aware of this, so current wargaming works to model the defensive threat thus evolving. ROVING SANDS 95 lessons-learned specifically note the pernicious impact of enemy use of highly capable SAM systems such as SA-12 to defend TBM launch areas and hide sites.\textsuperscript{129} Layered defense is a game that two can play, and the JFMCC/JFACC tasking BPI-capable TACAIR assets will have to determine whether that game is worth the candle.

The technically-ambitious ABL program works to overcome some of these obvious risks. The 747 aircraft is self-deploying, although, like AWACS, it will require in-theater support, including secure, defended airfields. Additionally, refueling and maintenance facilities for the chemical laser will have to be provided. However, if the system works as
intended, it can potentially operate outside enemy national airspace, conducting pre-hostilities anti-missile deterrent patrols much like the NTW AEGIS cruiser described in Chapter III. Once hostilities commence, the leverage of such a capable BPI system, especially against WMD-configured Theater Ballistic Missiles, is unmatched by any other Active Defense capability, ensuring as it does that all WMD warhead components fall back upon their purveyors, meting out poetic justice without endangering friendly forces, the populations of coalition members, or neutral third parties.

Characteristics of Air Force TBMD Active Defense thus of interest to the JFMCC in 2005 include:

- A significant degree of uncertainty as to which programs and capabilities will actually exist. BPI programs are all less mature, and therefore seem more vulnerable to cancellation, than are other Active Defense initiatives.

- BPI(KE), if fielded, is a potential high-leverage adjunct to Attack Operations, and is thus the only TBMD Active Defense system likely to be tasked by the JFACC (as in Wargame 95B). This is just as well, because the JFACC will have to balance the ends-ways-means tradeoffs between TACAIR tasking for BPI, TACAIR tasking for Attack Operations, and TACAIR tasking for a multitude of non-TBMD missions.

- BPI(DE), the ABL, can potentially offer a major non-naval TBMD capability to the JFMCC early in a conflict. If a not-too-distant airbase is available for ABL staging, or if naval TBMD forces can secure an airfield "bastion" for ABL and logistics use, carrier aircraft can provide initial defensive escort for the laser platform and it can begin operations expeditiously.

With a fully-integrated BMC4I architecture in place, ABL would not only be a primary Active Defense asset, but also an invaluable sensor node, providing very accurate cueing to both other Active Defense systems and Attack Operations forces.
BPI(DE) is thus a bold gamble. For Congressional review, it must show impressive results, on-schedule and on-budget. If ABL works as hoped, it will most certainly bolster the Air Force's "Global Reach, Global Power" contribution to national defense.

**Marine Corps Active Defense**

As the likely leading ground element of any power projection operation in a littoral theater, the Marines have specific requirements for organic TBMD Active Defense:

- Any such system must be relatively mobile, to allow movement with Marine combat elements once they begin to advance from under the defended footprint of Navy Area Defense ships protecting the Amphibious Objective Area.

- The system must have capability against those enemy weapons seen as most threatening to Marines, threats such as tactical aircraft and short-range missiles, to include SS-21 and FROG-7. Medium and long range TBM threats are not the primary concern, and are generally considered targets for the more capable naval systems offshore.

With PATRIOT still insufficiently mobile and the HAWK-successor MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System, ex-CORPS SAM) in budgetary limbo, the Corps is continuing its proud tradition-of-necessity of wringing every last ounce of value from its equipment--by modifying the venerable HAWK system for a limited TBMD role through 2005. In addition to upgrading the MIM-23K missile's warhead and fuzing to improve performance against TBM targets, the Marines are incorporating an improved BMC4I capability in the form of a mobile Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP). The ADCP "receives TBM data from the TPS-59 radar and from other sources" including
JTIDS/LINK 16 and the Tactical Data Distribution System (TDDS).\textsuperscript{130} JTIDS/LINK 16 will thus provide connectivity with the 2005-era Joint Data Network, while TDDS receive-capability will allow receipt of JTAGS and ALERT data. Further modifications are planned to the TBM-mission-unique TPS-59 radar, modifying it to accept external cueing.\textsuperscript{131}

When considering HAWK’s potential contribution to the joint TBMD Active Defense effort, the JFMCC should consider:

- By 2005, TBMD Active Defense HAWK will be a USMC-unique system. Over twenty foreign nations field some version of HAWK, but none are TBMD-capable.

- This is strictly a terminal-phase, point defense system, with far less capability than PATRIOT PAC-3.

- As with PATRIOT at ROVING SANDS 95, if the geography is favorable, an NAD AEGIS ship can act as a poor-man’s upper tier—providing a layered defense in concert with HAWK units deployed in a hard-pressed Amphibious Operations Area.

A TBMD Area Defense system for ground forces which has the true tactical mobility needed by the Marines will not be fielded until some permutation of the MEADS program gains sufficient support and funding to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and succeed HAWK. 2005 will mark the 45\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of baseline HAWK’s IOC.
Joint TBMD Command and Control

Though he may have gained crucial early leverage through the adept use of naval TBMD systems, as a regional conflict progresses the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be able to incorporate more and more capabilities from other service components as the necessary systems arrive in theater. He will have to integrate these systems smoothly into the overall TBMD plan, both to increase the vigor of that plan and to consciously move toward a point in the cycle of planning, coordination and execution where he will be able to turn over command of the TBMD battle to another component commander. For example:

Transition of a JFACC/AADC from afloat to ashore may occur when the shore based capability to perform these responsibilities, to include command and control of joint air operations, is established. Factors dictating such a move include air sortie generation exceeding JFACC Afloat capabilities, the preponderance of tactical air assets shifting ashore, or the shore based facility establishing the best C4I capability to control joint air operations.122

The smooth transition of a major subset of a theater operation from one commander to another is essential. Such transitions can be planned and ordered in accordance with the evolution of a campaign, or a transition may be required due to any one of a number of the unexpected contingencies that are to be expected in the fog of war. Communications difficulties, death or disablement of key personnel, or a sudden shift in the operational or political objectives of a conflict can all require the shifting or restructuring of key command relationships.
No matter how well he has done, the JFMCC must thus be prepared to hand off the TBMD fight. To be able to do this expeditiously, he must have planned, coordinated and executed the TBMD mission from the outset in a manner that has been fundamentally understood by all components in the Joint force.

**Coordinating the Joint TBMD Effort**

"Inherent in effective JTMD operations is an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural interoperability."

Chapter I clearly states that in 2005, the JFMCC will have the technical interoperability required, through the Joint Planning Network, the Joint Data Network, and the Joint Fire Control Network. The hardware and software of a fully-netted BMC4I architecture will be there for him to use—but people will run these systems, people will use them, and people will approve and execute the TBMD plans that result. Once the main effort of Theater Ballistic Missile defense begins to shift away from naval systems, the greatest challenge facing the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be people and the service cultures they represent. He must have procedural methods and mechanisms in place to ensure that joint TBMD planning, coordination, execution and eventual transition proceed in a manner that is as integrated as the technical systems that support these functions.

Common language, common procedures and a common approach to problem solving are relatively easy to impose on Command and Control systems. It is much harder to do so with the
people who use those systems. Administratively, this is a function served by Joint Doctrine and a carefully codified joint planning process. Operationally, the job of coordinating the execution of a common plan by different systems from different service components is very challenging. How this challenge will be answered in 2005 is not yet clear. However, present day simulations such as NTF Wargame 95B and ROVING SANDS 95 have seen two different approaches to the coordination problem emerge—the use of a Theater Missile Defense Advisor (TMDA), and the recommended creation of a Theater Air Defense Commander (TADC).

**Theater Missile Defense Advisor**

"Each intermediate command layer between the planner and the executor adds latency to orders and data and risks misinterpretation and confusion, which increases the probability of error." In attempting to bolster the joint coordination function, commanders risk striking a devil’s bargain by adding another link to a chain of command already burdened with the unusually stressing timeline of the TBMD battle. In the USEUCOM concept used during NTF Wargame 95B, this link was added above the AADC, in the person of the Theater Missile Defense Advisor (TMDA).

"The major role of the TMDA is to plan, coordinate and deconflict TMD operations (passive defense, active defense and...attack operations).... The TMDA is responsible for unity of effort in TMD planning and will issue mission type orders..."
to the AADC [emphasis added]...."135 While the TMDA may be a Component Commander, he is more likely to be a member of the JFC staff, and is thus in effect an agent of the JFC directing the TBMD battle above the JFMCC (who, for the purposes of this study, is tasked as AADC and JFACC).

"A TMD command structure is usually formed by assigning available assets into a relationship that is consistent with the CONOPS, comfortable to the Commander in Chief (CINC), and acceptable to the Service participants."136 The origins of the TMDA "coordination from above" approach lie in the very proactive effort by a CINC (USEUCOM) to answer the question "What can be done now to improve joint coordination of the TBMD battle?" This CINC's answer has been the creation of the USEUCOM TMD Cell, a cadre of TMD (TBMD and cruise missile defense) corporate knowledge supported by a deployable BMC4I node known as "TMD-in-a-Box."

This theater-unique aggregate system includes the EUCOM-deployed JTAGS, connectivity to current BMC4I assets such as TDGS, and the ability to use GALE, the Generic Area Limitation Environment. "Taking a direct feed from the JTAGS, this terrain delimitation system has...refine[d] [a TBM] launch point to less than 500 meters in less than 60 seconds."137 The implications for enhancing Attack Operations are obvious.

Having thus created a very capable team, the CINC will be wont to use it. The intent is clearly to have a mobile coordination, command and control capability to support this very difficult mission at whatever level that support is most
needed. The step from augmentation and advice to direction via "mission type orders," however, is a short one.

A Theater Missile Defense Advisor, supported by the CINC's TMD Cell and its associated TMD-in-a-Box hardware, is clearly in a position to usurp TBMD command, planning and execution functions originally described in Chapter III as being under the purview of the AADC and JFACC, and thus in this study, the JFMCC. In large part, this concept is a response-of-necessity by a CINC who feels that "The lack of an effective theater missile defense is a potential warstopper for this theater."138

In 1995, with a fully-netted TBMD BMC4I architecture still in the future, the leverage provided by a trained staff cadre equipped with a unique, highly capable command and control node makes the TMDA concept very attractive. It takes care of business right now. However, in 2005, with full BMC4I in place throughout all components, the JFC might well be able to forestall adding this "extra link," while keeping the TMD Cell to augment the staff of whichever Component Commander is designated AADC. If that commander is the JFMCC, he should heed the specific mission of the Cell, for it is what he must ensure happens when prosecuting joint TBMD—"expedite the flow of information, provide a dedicated focus on the JTMD mission, and provide a 'translation' node between disparate Service systems."139
Theater Air Defense Commander

Alternatively, an additional coordination "link" can be added below the Component Commander level. This approach has also found favor with a theater CINC. USCENTCOM lessons learned from ROVING SANDS 95 read, in part: "Intra and Inter Service TBMD firing coordination is not yet possible in real time.... Up to seven Army and Navy interceptors engaged a single TBM.... The AADC needs to have a multi-service Theater Air Defense Commander to address [these] problems."\(^{140}\)

Actually, since the proposed Theater Air Defense Commander (TADC) works for the AADC, this particular coordination enhancement adds two parallel links to the chain of command. While the TADC coordinates TBMD Active Defense for the AADC, the complementary Urgent Attack Commander (UAC) coordinates TBMD Attack Operations for the JFACC.

For Active Defense, the main job of the TADC is to "arbitrate the gray areas" between Service TBMD control centers with overlapping defended footprints or overlapping sensor coverage. Under the current architecture, these subordinate control centers are the Force Anti-Air Warfare Commander (FAAWC) for naval TBMD, the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) for the Air Force, the Marines' Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) for HAWK, and the Army's Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for PATRIOT (and eventually for THAAD).

During ROVING SANDS 95, when uncoordinated, these control centers tended to engage-by-default. If a TBM was engageable

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by the weapon system they controlled—they fired. Kill rates were excellent, but interceptor expenditures were unsustainably high. Strict apportionment of geographic engagement zones reduced interceptor wastage to zero—but nine TBMs got through.\[14\] Clearly, some form of dynamic coordination is called for, to ensure effective engagement of targets with an efficient use of interceptors. This is the gray area through which the TADC must navigate.

Again, though, this is an ad-hoc solution to a problem that exists now, due to systems limitations that exist now. If additional layers of command and control, such as the TMDA and TADC, become part of Joint TBMD Doctrine in order to address these limitations, then it is the responsibility of commanders and planners to continually evaluate the contribution of these positions as BMC4I technology matures. Once anointed in doctrine, levels of command and control tend to remain, even as their practical utility is eroded by the evolution of technology. The joint TBMD chain of command from CINC to shooter needs to be as short as possible—so long as that chain can effectively coordinate the disparate elements of the joint TBMD force structure into an efficient, synergistic whole that puts hot metal on target.
Joint TBMD in Coalition Warfare

The *raison d'être* for robust U.S. Theater Ballistic Missile defense capability, to include forward deployed naval TBMD forces, is the defense of vital American interests overseas. Admiral William Owens has written:

Sea-based theater-missile defenses, then, should be considered not only in military terms, in which their mobility and flexibility figure heavily, but in their political payoff. They are a prime example of the way advanced military technology with overseas naval forces can provide the kind of deterrence, alliance maintenance, and coalition building the new era calls for.\(^{142}\)

As seen during Desert Storm, deterrence, alliance maintenance, and coalition building can be fostered by TBMD from all components. In 1991, these contributions came from Army PATRIOT and Special Forces, Navy TACAIR and SEALs, and Air Force AWACS, JSTARS, SCUDCAP, and DSP Theater Early Warning. In 2005, all components will be able to contribute significantly to joint U.S. Active Defense, Attack Operations, Passive Defense and BMC4I capabilities.

However, as these forces build up in theater, the JFMCC must hark back to his own *raison d'être*—his mission in support of the Joint Force Commander's operational intent. In accordance with the National Military Strategy, that mission, whenever possible, will be carried out in concert with those same alliances and coalitions that U.S. TBMD can do so much to bolster. If Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is an essential enabling capability to allow the Joint Force to carry out its mission in support of coalition objectives in a multinational (formerly "combined") operation, then coalition TBMD systems
should be integrated to the maximum extent possible into that capability. In order to do so, the JFMCC and his successors as AADC and JFACC will need a basic understanding of evolving foreign TBMD capabilities, and the significant barriers to integration which will inevitably exist.

**Allied TBMD Capabilities**

Again making the allusion to natural systems first used in Chapter II, the evolution of international TBMD capability is most vigorous in areas where environmental pressure caused by an imminent TBM threat is greatest. Such areas of high selective pressure include Northeast Asia and the Middle East.

Israel is a case in point. Surrounded by hostile regional powers since birth, it has developed not only its own nuclear-capable TBM force, but is now embarked on a substantial Active Defense program to counter the TBM-WMD initiatives of Iran, Syria and Libya, and the demonstrated capabilities of Iraq. The indigenously-developed but U.S.-supported ARROW interceptor program began in 1988, and has now evolved into ACES (ARROW Continuation Experiments), using the smaller ARROW 2 missile. The U.S., which is providing the majority of funding for ARROW, will use the results of flight trials to reduce the risk associated with national programs such as THAAD.

Faced by a bellicose, impoverished, unstable, TBM-capable North Korea, Japan may soon leverage its technological investment in the AEGIS program into its own substantial naval
TBMD capability. "The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force is indicating a growing interest in equipping their existing...and planned...AEGIS destroyers with Theater Wide capability for the defense of Japan."145

Other nations have either expressed interest in particular aspects of the U.S. TBMD capability projected for 2005 (such as CEC or LEAP), or already possess "entry level" TBMD systems such as PATRIOT PAC-2. NATO states will take part in the collective implementation of LINK 16, the designated precursor of the future Joint Data Network. Still others are pursuing cooperative national programs (such as SAMP/T in France and Italy), or are planning to buy newly available Russian Active Defense systems such as the S-300PMU-1 GRUMBLE or S-300V GLADIATOR/GIANT family.

The proliferation of such capabilities should be seen as a positive trend, for it provides a defensive means of restoring a TBM-perturbed balance of regional power. The alternative is a system built on strategic deterrence, TBM facing TBM in a low-rent balance of terror which, as described in Chapter II, may not work in the clinch.

Any wide deployment of TBMD Active Defense systems will exert its own form of evolutionary pressure, tending to increase the pace of development and deployment of TBM penetration aids and low radar cross section reentry vehicles. Such refinements, though, push the envelope of indigenous capability, and raise the cost of development or open purchase for the potential user. In regions of international tension
where once a few TBMs with WMD warheads might have guaranteed a political victory for an aggressor, a layer of TBMD Active Defense may substantially raise the cost of the hostile force structure needed to give enemy leaders any confidence in such a plan. This expensive game of move and countermove by offense and defense is inevitable, but to abstain from the contest is to leave the field to the offense, and thus to the aggressor. If international TBMD forces are common in 2005, a U.S. Joint Force will find its own TBMD capability enhanced through multinational operations—if its commanders can successfully navigate the challenges of multinational TBMD employment.

**Coordinating the Multinational TBMD Effort**

In a multinational TBMD operation, responsible commanders must "consider those areas peculiar to multinational operations such as force capabilities and disparities, information and equipment security levels, and procedural and organizational differences that may influence the ability to achieve combined unity of effort." If the selective pressure of a growing worldwide TBM threat drives the evolution of national TBMD systems, successful incorporation of these systems into an existing joint U.S. TBMD structure will be driven by BMC4I integration. Efficient multinational TBMD operations require fully integrated BMC4I for the same reasons as efficient joint operations. TBMD planning must be done to common standards, with common language and symbology. TBMD coordination must be theater-wide and highly automated,
so that upper and lower tier systems can work together to provide layered defense with reasonable interceptor expenditure rates. TBMD execution must be responsive in order to meet a challenging timeline. The actions thus ordered must follow commonly-held Rules of Engagement.

The 2005 BMC4I architecture is designed to do all these things for the joint force. Expanding these functions into the multinational force will be more difficult. Equipment commonality is a major initial hurdle, one with which even a formal alliance like NATO has been struggling for years. Integrating a Japanese AEGIS DDG or an Israeli PATRIOT battery into a U.S. joint operation will be possible. Doing the same with the Russian S-300PMU-1 batteries that an emergent coalition partner bought because U.S. equipment was too expensive may well be another story. The commander in charge of the multinational TBMD effort may have to allocate Active Defense assets on the basis of how well they can be integrated, tasking the systems that must stand alone with specific, limited missions that have a proportionally smaller effect on the TBMD battle as a whole.

In addition to the physical and technical problems of integrating disparate systems, there is the security problem inherent in the "I" of BMC4I. Much of the power of a netted architecture comes from its ability to disseminate Intelligence, the stuff from which decisions come. Much of the intelligence that supports joint U.S. TBMD warfighting is derived from sensitive national systems. If this information
is to be used to facilitate multinational TBMD operations, it must be appropriately sanitized. "In coalition warfare it is essential that issues of releasability of intelligence information and products be resolved early in the crisis (beforehand, if possible)."\textsuperscript{147}

At the same time, it should be remembered that this works both ways. Coalition partners threatened by a regional hegemon are likely to have had intelligence operations running against that threat for some time. The information thus derived could be vital to the accuracy of the multinational forces TBMD Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace--but only if U.S. planners have access to it. In 2005, the systems for multinational TBMD are likely to be in place. Integrating those systems and the information they require will be the central challenge for planners and commanders.
"Uncertainty is pervasive in TMD [Theater Missile Defense]. There is uncertainty in when and where threats will develop and what threat characteristics will be. And since TMD is still developmental, there is uncertainty in how developments will go, and how fielded systems will operate even against known threats."\textsuperscript{148} Commanders must be able to deal with uncertainty. Through reflection, experience, and good professional judgment, they must be able to render decisions and move ahead \textit{without necessarily having all the facts}.\textsuperscript{149}

Indeed, to wait for all the facts may well be to wait in vain. Uncertainty is an inevitable characteristic of warfare. One task of the commander, then, is to ascertain what is knowable while recognizing what will remain uncertain. To bound that uncertainty, the commander must carefully examine what is known, evaluate the reliability of that intelligence, then plan to the best of his ability for what is unknown.

For this study, the threat posed by conventionally-armed Theater Ballistic Missiles is known, and has been demonstrated in combat against U.S. forces, coalition partners, and neutral third party states. The true threat of TBMs carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction is unknown, as systems so configured have yet to be used in conflict. Nevertheless, a good deal of knowledge exists to reduce the realm of uncertainty even about
the TBM-WMD threat. For example, international pressures that create conditions favorable for their development and use exist, and have been increasing since the end of the Cold War. There are known weapons programs in several states which will eventually lead to the deployment of these systems.

Therefore, this study holds that the future TBM-WMD threat to regional neighbors and U.S. forces is imminent. The scope of that threat is uncertain. Planning carried out to counter it must thus be comprehensive, flexible, and capable of execution through both joint and multinational operations. Even without all the facts, planning and preparation for the TBMD battle must evolve along with the threat, for the evolution of that threat over the next ten years is not in doubt--it is certain.
TBMD and the Maritime Component Commander

The ages-old utility of deployed naval forces rests on two simple facts: naval forces are versatile, and naval forces are present. No matter how great a particular capability may be, it is of little use to a CINC if it is not present in theater when needed. Assuming that the traditional nature of their employment will continue through 2005, naval forces will be present, available for crisis-response orders from the regional CINCs. These forces are planned, programmed and budgeted to receive significant TBMD capability before 2005.

A naval officer can observe the evolution of the TBM threat; he can track the national response through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System; and he can watch how Navy TBMD systems fare in the POM (Program Objective Memorandum). He should begin to look at this emerging operational challenge, and frame questions (when will SM2 Block IVA reach IOC?) for which he may get answers, and others (when will Iranian SCUD chemical submunition warheads reach IOC?) for which he will not. The evolution of TBM-WMD systems presents such an unprecedented challenge that the number of questions on any Flag Officer’s "I want to know" list will always exceed the available answers, well past 2005.

This study has not attempted to provide answers to the major questions likely to confront the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander executing the TBMD mission in 2005. To do so would be intellectually presumptuous and factually dishonest—because the answers are not out there. Even if they
were, the conditions bounding any given operational situation are unique and mutable. For a given contingency in 2005, what countries will be involved? What U.S. interests will be threatened? If a Joint Force is committed, what will be the CINC’s goals, and what, therefore, will be the JFC’s missions and the resources dedicated to accomplishing them? Under what political constraints will the NCA, the CINC, and the JFC have to operate?

That said, though, this study is premised on the assumption that it is worthwhile for the naval officer to think about this problem, to reflect upon what he knows and what he does not know, in order to better frame the decisions he may have to make ten years hence in a foreseeable U.S. response to an imminent threat. Rather than looking for specific answers to nebulous questions, this study has attempted to establish first principles--areas of concentration such as logistics, command, control and intelligence, warfighting, and rules of engagement. The naval officer might best focus his intellect on these aspects of the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense problem he may face in the future, as naval forces under his command operate in a deterrent posture, escalate to the first U.S. forces involved in a TBM-WMD regional conflict, and "hold open the door" for the follow-on TBMD capabilities of the Joint Force.

During the process of research, reflection, and preparation of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, three themes
became prominent. They are the keys to understanding what the
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will find of value
when he is preparing to deploy in 2005; they also are the keys
that any other officer in the chain of command who is
responsible for countering the TBM-WMD threat must understand.
These themes are:
- The challenge of conflicting missions and limited means.
- The reality of hard choices.
- The fact that Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is one
  mission enabling many, rather than an end in itself.

Conflicting Missions, Limited Means

When making his initial reckoning of what is known and
what is unknown, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
must consider the nature of the threat, the nature of the
mission responding to it, and the operational intent of the
NCA, the CINC and the Joint Force Commander. The nature of the
threat will determine how the JFMCC would wish to apportion
his TBMD forces; and, given the limited means available to
him, the scope of the mission will tell him whether or not he
will be able to do so. The operational intent of the national
and theater level commanders will indicate how much or how
little freedom the JFMCC can expect to have in carrying out
actions which support that intent.

So, for example, if the immediate goal of the NCA centers
on coalition building prior to contemplation of offensive
operations, then TBMD efforts are likely to be politically
driven, dedicated to highly visible protection of friendly regional population centers on the CINC's Defended Assets List; these actions will be closely controlled from above. Conversely, once the operational focus shifts to preparations for the offensive, the JFMCC may have more freedom of action—but also a far greater number of tasks to be accomplished with his limited maritime component assets. In addition to TBMD, his forces may be called upon to carry out many naval missions in theater, perhaps including sea control, embargo enforcement, MPS escort, mine warfare, littoral ASW, and finally Strike and amphibious power projection in support of offensive operations.

The overarching constraint of limited means must inform the JFMCC's every decision. While by no means unique to the TBMD mission, this constraint will be more acutely felt due to the dreadful consequences of even a single failure. A clear grasp of the CINC's operational intent will allow an initial triage of missions, what must be done now versus what can wait; but even then the tyranny of numbers and the challenge of distance may force an apportionment of assets that is more thin than doctrine demands. Escorts may have to be pulled away from the carrier in order to guard the DAL. An NAD ship, its SM2 Block IVA interceptors expended, may have to transit without rearming to a vital TLAM launch basket when the primary TOMAHAWK shooter suffers an equipment casualty. An NTW ship may have to remain on station despite falling more and more into a critical fuel state. This inevitable collision of
limited means with conflicting missions implies that while doctrine can be a guide, any presumptive answer will have to be scrutinized with regard to the mission and the particularities of the actual situation. Every decision will be a compromise, and every compromise implies hard choices.

Reality of Hard Choices

The hard choices faced by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will involve more than mission priority and unit tasking. The JFMCC must understand the essential nature of the TBMD mission so well that he can take a vigorous and articulate stand on fundamental issues of Command and Control. With centralized planning and decentralized execution as his goal, he must balance the need for defensive effectiveness with the requirement for efficiency driven by his limited interceptor inventory—and make a choice.

For instance, as AADC, he must decide how much of the theater-wide engagement coordination function he will leave to his subordinate commanders and the automated BMC4I architecture, and how much he will reserve for himself and his staff. The process of making this hard choice must be timely, responsive—and iterative. The TBMD battle will be fast, fluid and ever-changing. Thus the ability of the JFMCC, as Area Air Defense Commander, to observe, orient, decide and act must be at least as fast—and always ongoing. The level of engagement coordination may require fine tuning from day to day, hour to
hour, or even minute to minute. The JFMCC must appreciate this situation and be able to impose his will upon it.

Hard choices also imply acceptance of risk. Constrained by limited means, the JFMCC may be able to defer some missions. Others he will plainly and simply have to carry out. Indeed, the matter of calculated risk permeates realistic planning for TBMD, from logistical questions of acceptable fuel states and marginal rearming ports to political compromises between force protection and foreign population defense. Thus, if the ascent-phase NTW mission is deemed essential by the NCA, but not enough AEGIS ships are available to support forward-positioned TAG Teams, then the JFMCC may acknowledge the TAG concept--yet press on with an NTW ship sent in harm’s way, at best with a non-AEGIS consort but perhaps, at worst, alone.

Political factors bear directly on hard choices regarding Rules of Engagement. The JFMCC has a duty to his subordinate commanders to press for ROE that increase their freedom of action and decrease the risk to their ships, aircraft and men. He also has a duty up the chain of command. The JFMCC must display the nicest respect for the responsibilities of senior civilian and military authorities, doing his utmost to understand the policies, objectives and instructions his force is being used to implement, assuring that those authorities are informed to their complete satisfaction of any aspect of his force’s operations and plans. Thus, with regard to the more offensive tasks of TBMD such as Attack Operations and
TACAIR-delivered Boost Phase Intercept, the JFMCC will specify the tactical and operational advantages they offer, but place those concerns with due regard for their subordination to overall national policy. His aim must be to assure that the "catalytic" use of naval power truly supports national policy, helping to resolve conflict rather than accelerating or exacerbating it.

Finally, when directed by the Joint Force Commander, the JFMCC must be able to make the hard choice to relinquish the TBMD battle to the commander of another component. To do so effectively, he must have made other choices in preparation for the transition, beginning with a decision to plan his TBMD fight jointly. To the greatest extent possible, planning methods, language, and execution should adhere to commonly-held joint standards. Otherwise, the TBMD battle cannot be handed off expeditiously as the fight moves inland from the littoral. The JFMCC must make the hard choice early to eschew the naval tradition of improvisation, and bring his likely relief into the process as early as possible, "training" him, in effect, for a seamless turnover.

One Mission Enabling Many

The importance of that turnover from component to component, of the transition from afloat to ashore, is representative of the very essence of Theater Ballistic Missile defense. Though this mission may well begin under the purview of the Maritime Component, it belongs to all
components, for, like the threat which it counters, TBMD transcends traditional boundaries. It is one mission which enables many, and can therefore never be considered in isolation.

The pace of current research and development, the major funding that must be apportioned among competing systems, and the detailed media coverage of defense industry developments all tend to focus the attention of officers upon TBMD as an end in itself. It is indeed a unique mission—but it does not stand alone. TBMD is a tool that allows other missions to proceed toward the strategic objective—remembering that (to use one example) "from the point of view of Israeli, Saudi or other coalition leaders and populations, any attempt to distinguish...threats and defenses as either 'theater' or 'strategic' is in effect to create a distinction without a difference." 

To that end, the officer charged with TBMD planning and execution for any component should maintain a clear operational vision. He must see TBMD as an enabling mission in support of the CINC’s operational intent and the NCA’s strategic goals. He must acknowledge it as being inherently a joint mission.

As such, TBMD in 2005 will depend on the unifying and coordinating power of BMC4I. Only upon the supporting plinth of Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence can the TBMD pillars postulated for 2005 stand. Without netted planning, netted data, and netted
fire control, joint coordination and execution at the speed required for the TBMD battle will be impossible.

That said, this same officer must beware of technological overconfidence. New systems will work, and work well—but seldom as well as engineers and tacticians hope. For that reason, planners and commanders must hold to the goal of centralized planning with decentralized execution. Such a vision will better survive Clausewitz's "friction," which comprehends why even the most reliable technological systems perform less well under the tremendous pressure of war.

Of course, the pressure of war affects the performance of men as well as machines. What men uniquely perform is high-level reasoning and creative thinking; both of these decline abruptly under stress. It follows, then, that the JFMCC—and everyone in the chain of command above and below him—must bear this in mind as they envision operations against the threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles. Whether the commander succeeds or fails in countering that threat probably will be determined principally by how well he has prepared himself and his subordinates for so demanding a trial by combat.

This study has been a spotting round, something to begin to get the range on a problem which may require many salvos in the future. If it has been at all successful, that has been because it marks some of the right issues and identifies important questions. These issues and questions, and many others, will of course require further study.
In a fractious world that often seems to have lost its bearings, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense delivered from the sea will give the United States a vital and flexible capability to counter the growing threat of TBMs--and the horrific Weapons of Mass Destruction they can carry. For the naval officer who must actually sail upon that sea and personally defeat an enemy who would use such weapons, this great defensive capability cannot be considered in isolation--

In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely.

*Alfred Thayer Mahan: *Naval Strategy, 1911
**GLOSSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>Area Air Defense Commander</td>
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<td>AAW</td>
<td>Anti-Air Warfare</td>
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<td>ABL</td>
<td>Airborne Laser</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ACES</td>
<td>Arrow Continuation Experiments</td>
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<td>ADCP</td>
<td>Air Defense Communications Platform</td>
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<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Attack and Launch Early Report to Theater</td>
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<td>AOA</td>
<td>Amphibious Objective Area</td>
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<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCM</td>
<td>Anti-Ship Cruise Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASUW</td>
<td>Anti-Surface Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATACMS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Missile System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC4I</td>
<td>Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence</td>
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<td>BMDO</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Boost Phase Intercept</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPI(DE)</td>
<td>Boost Phase Intercept (Directed Energy) [ABL]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI(KE)</td>
<td>Boost Phase Intercept (Kinetic Energy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Cooperative Engagement Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Circular Error Probable</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Combat Information Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close-In Weapon System</td>
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COEA  Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
CONOPS  Concept of Operations
CRC  Control and Reporting Center
DAL  Defended Assets List
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DSP  Defense Support Program
EAGLE  Extended Airborne Global Launch Evaluator
EMCON  Emissions Control
ERINT  [Patriot] Extended Range Interceptor
ESSM  Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile
EW  Early Warning
FAAWC  Force Anti-Air Warfare Commander
FPPWP  First Preplanned Waypoint
FPTOC  Force Projection Tactical Operations Center
FROG  Free Rocket Over Ground
GALE  Generic Area Limitation Environment
GBR  [THAAD] Ground Based Radar
GCCS  Global Command and Control System
GEM  [Patriot] Guidance Enhanced Missile
GPS  Global Positioning System
HEU  Highly Enriched Uranium
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IOC  Initial Operational Capability
IPB  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JFACC  Joint Force Air Component Commander
JDN  Joint Data Network
JFC  Joint Force Commander
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JFCN</td>
<td>Joint Fire Control Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Maritime Component Commander</td>
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<td>JMCIS</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Command Information System</td>
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<td>JPN</td>
<td>Joint Planning Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance &amp; Target Attack Radar System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAGS</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Ground Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTIDS</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Information Distribution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTMED</td>
<td>Joint Theater Missile Defense Planner</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile</td>
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<td>MEADS</td>
<td>Medium Extended Air Defense System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIW</td>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple-Launch Rocket System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPP</td>
<td>Mission-Oriented Protective Posture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Navy Area Defense [lower tier]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTF</td>
<td>National Test Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTW</td>
<td>Navy Theater Wide [upper tier]</td>
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<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>Observe, Orient, Decide, Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>PATRIOT Advanced Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>P_k</td>
<td>Probability of Kill</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBWS</td>
<td>Space-based Warning System (DSP + TES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCUDCAP</td>
<td>SCUD Combat Air Patrol [for Attack Operations]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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150
SRBM  Short Range Ballistic Missile
TACAIR  Tactical Aircraft
TACDAR  Tactical Detection and Reporting
TADC  Theater Air Defense Commander
TAOC  Tactical Air Operations Center
TBM  Theater Ballistic Missile
TBMD  Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TDSS  Tactical Data Distribution System (ex-TRAP)
TEL  [TBM] Transporter-Erector-Launcher
TES  Tactical Event System (ALERT + JTAGS + TACDAR)
THAAD  Theater High Altitude Air Defense
TIBS  Tactical Information Broadcast Service
TLAM  TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile
TM  Theater Missile [TBM or cruise missile]
TMD  Theater Missile Defense
TMDA  Theater Missile Defense Advisor
TOC  Tactical Operations Center
TPFDL  Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TPT  Theater Planning Tool
TRE  Tactical Receive Equipment
TRAP  TRE and Related Applications (now TDSS)
TVM  Track-Via-Missile
UAC  Urgent Attack Coordinator
UOES  User Operational Evaluation System
URG  Underway Replenishment Group
VLS  Vertical Launch System
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
NOTES:


2. Ibid.: 2-26. The initial draft states "If a decision to deploy [SBIRS] LEO occurs, the first delivery would be in 2006, based upon a fiscally constrained budget." Under these circumstances, earlier operational capability is clearly unlikely.

3. Ibid.: 3-4.


7. Ibid.


21. CENTCOM lessons learned section of Director, Theater Air Defense (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned" (23 May 1995), briefing package.


26. NAVECENT lessons learned section of (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.


31. BMD0 TMD C2 Plan draft: 2-5 and 2-6.


36. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 2-8.


38. Hewish and Beal: 33.


40. (N865) "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.


42. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 3-7.

43. RADM Rodney Rempt, USN, quoted in NAVCENT lessons learned section, (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.


46. Director, Theater Air Defense (N865), "Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense" (6 July 1995), briefing package.

47. (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.


49. (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.

50. NSWC Dahlgren Division, "Naval TBMD COEA," draft briefing package.

52. (N865), Naval TBMD White Paper: 11.
53. Ibid.: 11.
54. Ibid.: 7.
57. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft, Appendix G: G-6.
60. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 2-20.
63. AEGIS PROGRAM MANAGER WASHINGTON DC (PMS400F) 141726Z FEB 95, "CG-47 CLASS FUEL CONSUMPTION," naval message.
64. NTF Wargame 95B Player Handbook: 22.
68. NWP 3-03.1 (REV. A): N-1.
70. NWP 3-03.1 (REV. A): N-1.


75. Much of the scenario for NTF Wargame 95B was built upon this premise, albeit with more and more ships as the game progressed.

76. Global Wargame 95 Senior Executive Seminar, "TBM and NBC Issues: Seminar #6" (Newport, R.I.: 27 July 1995).


78. (N865), Naval TBMD White Paper": 7.


80. (N865), TBMD Draft ORD: 24.


84. NTF Wargame 95B Player Handbook: 19.


86. (N865), TBMD Draft ORD: 26.

87. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 3-14.

88. (N865), TBMD Draft ORD: 32-33.

89. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 3-28.

90. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 3-15.


100. (N865), Naval TBMD White Paper: 1.

101. (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.


109. Ibid.: 49.

110. Kahan: 5.


112. RADM Rodney Rempt, USN, Director, Theater Air Defense (N865), interview by author, 13 October 1995.

113. NWP I-14M: 3-4.

114. Ibid.: 2-11.


118. Ibid.: 31.


120. Kahan: 15.

121. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 3-11.


123. Hewish and Beal: 28.

124. NSWC Dahlgren Division, "Naval TBMD COEA," draft briefing package.

125. BMDO TMD briefing package.

126. Ibid.


129. (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.
130. Hewish and Starr: 32.


136. BMDO TMD C2 Plan draft: 8-8.


140. (N865), "ROVING SANDS 95 Exercise Lessons Learned," briefing package.

141. Ibid.


144. Hewish and Beal: 31.


146. JCS PUB 3-01.5: II-9.


149. Many thanks to Professor Frank M. Snyder, Professor Emeritus of Command, Control and Communications at the Naval War College, for this succinct thought.

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SOURCES: (GOVERNMENT)


SOURCES: (MILITARY)

AEGIS PROGRAM MANAGER WASHINGTON DC (PMS400F) 141726Z FEB 95. "CG-47 CLASS FUEL CONSUMPTION." Naval message.


SOURCES: (MILITARY/WORKING PAPERS)


SOURCES: (INTERVIEWS)


Rempt, Rodney, RADM, USN. Director, Theater Air Defense (N865), interview by author, 13 October 1995.