Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship

edited by Charles Barry
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in memory of
Samuel Nelson Drew
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
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Foreword

No one can doubt that relations between the United States and its European allies stand at the threshold of a new epoch, but we are uncertain about how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should develop to meet the new challenges. We do know that the trans-Atlantic relationship has been uniquely enduring, peaceful, and successful in warding off common dangers. History would judge us harshly if we squander such a potent resource as NATO, instead of re-tooling it for new tasks—not just regional and military tasks, but global issues that concern us across the full spectrum of collective interests.

In the past five years we have devoted much of our energy to the problems of Russia, Bosnia, and counterproliferation. However, we have perhaps neglected the best tool with which to address these problems: the "West-West" relationship among the NATO nations. A healthy relationship cannot be assumed; it must be nurtured. Without mutual understanding and common purpose, we risk endangering the peace so preciously won. With these goals in mind, the authors in this volume address ways to reshape fundamentally the relationship between the United States and Europe, focusing on NATO.

When three U.S. peace negotiators and a French colleague lost their lives on the road to Sarajevo with new proposals to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we were all reminded that the search for peace is never without risk. May the supreme sacrifice of those valiant and dedicated men inspire us all to redouble our efforts in serving the cause they served so well.

ERVIN J. ROKKE  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force  
President, National Defense University
Acknowledgments

This volume evolved from a workshop held at the National Defense University in June 1994, co-sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The workshop participants, drawn from both sponsoring institutions, as well as from the National Defense University faculty and serving officials of the U.S., German, British and French governments, were brought together to assess the future of trans-Atlantic relations, the so-called "West-West relationship," in the new era of international affairs unfolding before us.

In this volume nine specialists discuss several themes: the evolution of trans-Atlantic relations since the end of the Cold War; the emergence of a new, broader European identity; the prospects for continued U.S. commitment to European security; and some strategies for keeping strong ties across the Atlantic. A summary of the contributors' major points can be found in the Overview of Trans-Atlantic Relations. In the concluding chapter—Forging a New Trans-Atlanticism—a distillation is offered on the path now indicated for the future, and on the choices to be made by policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Grateful appreciation is due to Lieutenant Generals Paul Cerjan and Ervin J. Roke, respectively the former and current Presidents, National Defense University, to Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and to Professor Dr. Michael Stürmer, Direktor, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, for their strong support for both the workshop and the subsequent research associated with production of this volume.

Special recognition also goes to Major General John O.B. Sewall, Vice Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies and Dr. Stuart Johnson, the Institute's Director of Research, for their advice and counsel in orchestrating the focus and realization of this project, and for protecting such a lengthy undertaking from encroachment by other, no less pressing priorities.

Appreciation and recognition is no less due the many learned participants in the workshop and the authors of this volume who contributed their collective expertise to furthering ideas on the future of the western world. In particular, personal thanks to Dr. K. Peter Stratmann, co-director of this project from the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, for his great interest in and strong contributions to our institute-to-institute programs.

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Neither this volume nor the individual articles in it should be construed to reflect the official position of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik or its Board of Trustees, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or judgement.

CHARLES BARRY
WASHINGTON, DC
OVERVIEW

Trans-Atlantic Relations

This is a book devoted to the state of relations between the United States and its allies in western Europe. The regions of central and eastern Europe, and of the former Soviet Union states, are all dealt with in detail, but only in the context of being trans-Atlantic concerns. History is likely to judge the ties that have been cemented between Europe and the U.S. over the past fifty years as the most significant international relationship of all time. Those ties go far beyond the political-military, that is, the Atlantic Alliance. They are truly multifarious: ideological, cultural, social, historical, linguistic, economic, financial, diplomatic and military. After almost four hundred years, the bonds between America and Europe have become each other’s most enduring and significant link in the world at large. Since the Second World War, the last epochal event in world history, the relationship has been fused closer together than ever before, dominated by common survival interests, and embodied most visibly in NATO. Not in spite of, but largely because of the broader trans-Atlantic relationships, NATO has survived beyond the tumultuous end of a Cold War that had been, in fact, its only raison d’être. But, will it all yet unravel?

NATO is striving to remain a viable institution for the future by adapting to three new challenges. First, the Alliance is extending security and stability to much less stable regions to its East and South. Second, NATO is revamping its structures to become an effective crisis management tool wherever the collective interests of its members are threatened. These first two tasks might be called the future tasks of the Alliance. Put another way, if NATO can not fulfill its members’ needs to prevent and manage crises, then continued investment in its institutions would make little sense to either legislatures or the public. The third challenge—the one talked about least across the Atlantic—is that of reforging the old relationship among the allies themselves, in order to take account of new aspirations and a new environment. The work of rebalancing NATO from its U.S.-dominated Cold War character to a more equal partnership is a delicate process, one
fraught with dangerous possibilities of a complete U.S. withdrawal, or of a Europe eagerly assuming responsibilities before it is able. However, if a new Euro-Atlantic bargain is not found, then the Alliance will ultimately wither and the first two tasks will not matter—there will be no collective to either join or protect.

The Alliance is far from completing the renovations necessary for it to successfully address any of its three new tasks. However, it has given priority to the first, extending stability to the East (albeit much less so to the South), and a great deal of satisfaction is justified by progress in that area. Eastern Europeans may not agree. Their satisfaction will come only with full membership in NATO and the EU, yet full membership is unrealistic in the near term. Still, successive responses to demands for inclusion have been met first with diplomatic liaisons, then through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), then through the Partnership for Peace (PPP) and now through a study to define a road map toward full membership for at least some aspirants. Without question, the task of extending security eastward has received the most attention, and enjoyed the greatest progress, not least because the objective is clear and the advocates are many. Still, continued momentum is crucial, lest some lose hope of being afforded a collective security option, and conclude that their only future is in nationalistic solutions or destabilizing secret pacts.

The second task, the management of crises beyond NATO borders, has a more spotted record, but still can be accorded a measure of satisfaction in that the Alliance is actively addressing the issue, especially on the military side. The question of "out of area or out of business" has been favorably resolved, the new Strategic Concept focuses the Alliance notably on crisis management, a crisis management exercise regime is now in place, and so-called "peace support operations" doctrine and concepts are in development. Even the struggle to agree on a Combined Joint Task Force concept may soon bear fruit (although the reason for its frequent frustrations have more to do with trans-Atlantic relations than crisis management). Also, NATO engagement in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia must be mentioned as a step toward a new role. The tragedy itself was not of NATO's making, but the fact that NATO is engaged in the conflict—one that so far defies resolution by all comers—is testimony to the Alliance's mettle as a crisis management tool.
The third task, that of reforging the trans-Atlantic relationship, is unique from the first two. It is not about external challenges, but about the allies' relations with each other. In an institution of NATO's renowned inertia, it is unsurprising that many refuse to concede the need for a new Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, or new Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations. Not unlike a marriage or a business partnership in a period of uncertainty, it is easier for NATO members to deal with third party issues, such as relations with the East or Bosnia, than to broach the sensitive question of their own future ties.

There is no mistaking that relations are less intense, and that Europe and the U.S. have new, broader agendas with less in common than before. When this leads to friction, the allies parry the fundamental issues and engage only in tactical struggles over communiqué language, or construct ad hoc arrangements to temporarily by-pass discord, or simply table the debate to await more favorable conditions for resolution. They concertedly skirt the painful underlying debate over competing visions of their common future, one (U.S. advanced) with NATO at the center of European security and the other (French espoused) with NATO at the periphery. Some believe the Alliance could not survive a full blown debate over future relationships. The instincts of experienced diplomats are that a slower incremental approach will ultimately yield a hybrid solution acceptable to all without weakening the relationship itself. Time will tell.

NATO relations are unsettled particularly by repeated downward revisions of the U.S. presence in Europe, and by the intensification of Europe's quest for an independent identity in security and defense. While both concerns appear to have been recently sated, in fact they are far from endgame, and the final outcomes are unknown.

As 1995 draws to a close, the U.S. maintains approximately 100,000 troops in Europe, the symbolic centerpiece of its commitment to European security. This will mark the first time a reduction in U.S. forces will have been reached without a further reduction already having been announced. But pressures for more cuts are evident as the U.S Congress becomes enthralled with the idea of a balanced budget, likely constraining defense resources further still, in real terms. The U.S. Army, the prime supplier of forces in Europe is faced with another reduction in end strength to
475,000, and looks hungrily at cuts in Europe in order to stay
invested in its power projection concept called Force XXI.

On the European side, the logical extension of the 1986 Single
European Act and fears of a U.S. military withdrawal have
spawned bolder ideas for the embodiment of the concept of a
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). From a low
profile mention in NATO's July, 1990 London Declaration to the
approximately 28 references in the January, 1994 Brussels
Declaration, ESDI has gained momentum as an essential adjunct
of European integration. On the eve of the next
Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, which will address reforms
of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and will look
particularly at common foreign, security and defense policies, the
EU and WEU are collaborating to make significant advances in
firmly establishing ESDI.

More and more observers worry the U.S. intends to be a
backdrop rather than a leader in European security affairs. Some
in Europe, too, see NATO's ultimate role as an insurance policy for
when the WEU and OSCE are unable to manage crisis or defend
Europe. On both sides is a feeling that Europe ought to be the
primary agent for its own security, while doing so in a way that
protects U.S. interests as well. Reality is that for many practical
reasons, while Europe is proceeding in that direction, it will be
years if not decades before the NATO alliance—with the U.S.
actively leading every step of the way—will be able to assume a
role second to the WEU in European security. It is not even clear
yet that the goal of a European defense capability can be achieved.
For the remainder of this decade at least, the allies must forge a
new, more balanced relationship.

This volume is an analysis of the third challenge for the U.S.
and Europe, that of forging a new trans-Atlantic relationship. Will
NATO survive? Can it survive with fewer than 100,000 or even
no U.S. troops present in Europe? Will the integrated military
structure ultimately be re-built around the CJTF concept, perhaps
obviating the need for U.S. combat forces actually on the ground
in Europe? Or, will a small, rapid response task force be a
sufficient level of U.S. presence? Perhaps a new relationship built
around the growing U.S.-EU relationship will come to the fore
and evoke an essentially bi-polar cooperation. The fundamentals
that underpin the eventual answers to these questions are the
subject of this book. Each author's contribution represents a
different piece of the puzzle. The aim is to encourage the all-too-
hesitant dialogue on the future of the Alliance: Is it to be at the
center of European security or an adjunct to the WEU/OSCE
regime? As Vaclav Havel asserted recently, "the alliance needs a
new formulation of its raison d'être, its mission and its identity
before enlarging to include former communist nations in Eastern
Europe." Prudence dictates that the future of the "West-West
marriage" be determined before bringing more children into the
trans-Atlantic household.

Two Future Realities: The New Europe
and America's Role In It

Part One lays out an assessment of progress since the end of the
Cold War, and parallel analyses of the factors on both sides of the
Atlantic creating pressures for a new trans-Atlantic relationship.
The first two authors, Drew and Simon, look at NATO's evolution
in the three task areas cited in the introductory paragraphs above.
The final four authors (Schmidt, Barry, Schweigler and Sullivan)
present in-depth analyses of the tectonic shifts occurring beneath
the two main pillars of the relationship, ESDI and Américan
engagement.

In the initial chapter, Nelson Drew provides an insider's
analysis of NATO's struggle to adapt. For any bureaucracy,
especially a multinational conglomerate like NATO, the
transformations achieved since 1989 must be regarded as
phenomenal. Yet, given the pace of events, have they gone far
enough or deep enough? NATO may have stopped short of
crucial re-engineering on which there is yet no consensus. Issues
such as the future missions of the integrated military structure, or
the proper role of NATO among European security institutions are
unresolved. To fulfill the principles of its 1991 Strategic Concept,
NATO members will have to overcome varied fault lines between
rhetoric and reality on both sides of the Atlantic. Competing
visions for the future, competing national priorities and divisive
institutional competition reflect the tensions among erstwhile allies.
Still, there is little choice but to press on with incremental
transformations; as Colonel Drew observes, it would be impossible to recreate NATO today.

Two major challenges looming over NATO's future are Bosnia (Drew: "the test case from hell"), and the uncertain confluence of a future NATO and an emergent European (vice trans-Atlantic) security and defense identity (ESDI), one that signals a European desire to act alone on some security and defense matters. Will these historic challenges become rites of passage into a new order, or risk renting the Alliance asunder? Whatever the challenges, the enduring NATO mission is to prevent the domination of Europe by any hostile hegemon. In the fortuitous absence of a hegemon, the allies must concentrate on maintaining cohesion, bringing former adversaries closer to the fold of Western democracies, and providing a rationale for American engagement in Europe's security affairs. The special challenge for the U.S. is to define the vision for the future and to lead the alliance to it with appropriate pace and momentum.

In Chapter Two, Jeffrey Simon chronicles the trans-Atlantic communities' efforts to extend security eastward, analyzing NATO initiatives principally in light of the aspirations of the four so-called Visegrad states, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Almost as the bricks still tumbled down from the Berlin Wall, NATO began its choreography of careful steps and mini-steps to draw closer to its former adversaries. One could hardly fault the caution underlying NATO's approach. Not only were there decades of acrimony and estrangement to overcome, but the Alliance was simultaneously unhinged from all else that was familiar, both in terms of its former tasks and its internal glue. In parallel to NATO's incremental moves to bring new partners in, the Alliance began to venture out by agreeing to peacekeeping operations for the CSCE, and later for the UN. Procedures were soon advanced to include "cooperation partners" in NATO peacekeeping operations. Finally, at the same January 1994 summit that approved the latest program for bringing new states into NATO, the Partnership for Peace initiative, the allies also agreed to form NATO-led Combined Joint Task Forces for a wider array of cooperative military operations outside NATO's area, including crisis management.

Dr. Simon cautions that PFP could readily have several unintended negative consequences if not wisely executed and
appropriately resourced. The "16 plus one" construct of each partner state's PFP agreement could foster dysfunctional competition inside of cooperation mechanisms. The heavy military content of PFP programs, coupled with the great importance accorded Western contacts in partner's governments, accentuates the roles of military leaders over civilian leadership, undermining civilian control of the military and civil-military relations in former communist states. Fortunately, some of these problems have been recognized, such as the need to provide added resources, and PFP is gaining credibility in at least the Visegrad states. The next and perhaps final step could be full membership. In fall, 1995 a year-long study that outlines steps to full membership is being completed and briefed to PFP states. However, Simon observes, consideration of full membership carries with it a whole new set of challenges, especially regarding "who" and "how," and under what criteria a state or groups of states might be identified for invitation to join NATO. For the present, it is important to concentrate on getting PFP right, and answering the questions as to whether or not it will be a watershed initiative in its own right.

Peter Schmidt, in Chapter Three, examines the concept of a European security and defense identity (ESDI) from a German perspective. Up until the end of the Cold War, the various initiatives spawned to further ESDI (many of them pre-date the coining of the acronym itself) focused on collective European action within the Atlantic Alliance. Since 1989 however, the dominant trend has been development of capabilities and structures separate (or separable) from NATO.

There are new factors at work, both promoting and restraining the evolution of ESDI, and Schmidt notes that these factors will continue to bear on ESDI development, meaning evolutionary not revolutionary progress for the remainder of the decade. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty institutionalized ESDI by establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the EU. The WEU Declaration at the same summit asked the WEU to advance a common defense policy, and a number of thoughtful papers have been developed. The next intergovernmental conference in 1996 is set to address these matters further.

Dr. Schmidt discourses on the integrative pull of the EU and WEU, noting that even the central Franco-German axis includes differences on defense and security policy, and that other states act
in concert to counter what is seen as a sometimes too-dominant Franco-German team. Schmidt asserts that the trans-Atlantic partnership will be crucial for years to come, that Europe will need a collective "pillar" within NATO to meet U.S. burdensharing demands, and that the goal of ESDI must yield at times to the need for a strong NATO. The strategies available to the European nations to deal with these competing realities are few, and only one seems at the fore at present: ESDI must be pursued both inside and outside the Alliance, and it will necessarily operate on an intergovernmental basis, not in the federative way desired by ardent integrationists. This, therefore, will be the basis on which Europe deals with the multitude of challenges facing the development of priorities for ESDI.

In the fourth chapter, Charles Barry examines ESDI and its implications for NATO from an American point of view. The U.S. has always encouraged European integration in principle, even in the field of defense. However, European integration is still seen by most Americans as "European business," and for a long time even general knowledge of the ESDI phenomenon in the U.S. was extremely limited. In fact, although the U.S. had supported the concept of European integration since the late 1940s, it was quite cool to the idea following the Cold War. As awareness grew, Americans were both suspicious of a competitor to NATO and unclear about its intended purpose. The popular burdensharing argument provided some logic, but it was inconclusive: why couldn’t the Europeans just do more as individual nations? Seeing ESDI as a matter for Europeans was a kind of solution: it did not openly resist the idea, but it offered no encouragement in the hope the idea would remain of little consequence.

ESDI is not defined in precise terms by its advocates, but Barry points to five manifestations of ESDI that comprise its totality: the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the WEU and its common defense policy (CDP), armaments cooperation, European forces, and operational activities. Taken together, Barry contends these activities create an identity that is neither national nor trans-Atlantic, but distinctly European. Also, all of these initiatives are active and enjoy degrees of momentum that range from small to significant, suggesting that ESDI will continue to grow in visibility and (but more slowly) capabilities. Barry contends that, the assertion that ESDI will make NATO stronger notwithstanding, it
is not at all clear yet how ESDI will assume some of NATO's tasks without diminishing the Alliance's influence and credibility. Nonetheless, ESDI is the logical extension of the process of European integration. Therefore, as ESDI moves forward with at least tacit trans-Atlantic agreement, one area that will be watched closely is the allocation to NATO and WEU commitments of shrinking defense resources across Europe.

Gebhard Schweigler begins the assessment of the American side of the trans-Atlantic relationship, pondering whether the departure of the U.S. from Europe, unthinkable a few short years ago, is more possible now because the Soviet threat has disappeared. Will the U.S. quit the alliance? Professor Schweigler's premise is that such an eventuality would require both the U.S. and Europe ("all of Europe!") to find it no longer in their interest to continue. The prospects for such a double negative, or in Schweigler's parlance, "go-go scenario" is the subject of this chapter. Europeans are increasingly interested in a defense identity outside of NATO and independent of the U.S. Americans episodically threaten withdrawal if their European allies do not assume more of the cost of U.S. forward presence. But, asks Schweigler, how realistic is a "go-go scenario"? He reviews continuing European security concerns, from unstable nuclear states to crises that demand U.S. resources for effective response to embracing the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and concludes Europe will need the U.S. in NATO for a long time to come. His findings are backed by the weight of European public opinion, and particularly the opinions of Germans, which reflects the vast majority support U.S. presence in Europe. Schweigler also analyzes American sentiments, with special devotion to dissecting the concept of isolationism. He finds the adherents to an "America First" philosophy are actually of many persuasions, only some of which lead to isolation. By and large, the U.S. is, for reasons ranging from demographics to economics to security concerns, becoming not isolationist but globalized. For Europe this probably means less intense engagement, but no American retreat. Dr. Schweigler closes by noting the importance of a community of common values to the maintenance of peace, and pointing out that such a community requires constant care and attention.
Brian Sullivan contemplates American links to an integrated Europe in the future, contending that it will be future German-American relations that determines the direction and harmony of trans-Atlantic ties. Dr. Sullivan observers that history’s lessons about the duration of alliances and the collapse of great powers tell us that neither NATO nor a Europe free of hegemons should last very long now that the Cold War is over. However, while those lessons were central in shaping past U.S.-German and U.S.-European relations, there are indications the U.S. is resolved not to allow the historic patterns of conflict in Europe to be repeated. Central elements in this U.S. strategy are to grow close to Germany and to renew efforts at closer U.S.-European relations. Success in these undertakings will break the pattern of earlier missteps and create the opportunity for lasting peace.

The experiences of the 20th century have created a broad consensus that it is not in U.S. national interests to see Europe dominated by any power. Sullivan asserts that it is this intent, more than the need to demonstrate commitment, that explains a continuing U.S. military presence in Europe. The first task is to prevent the successful NATO alliance from dissolving along with the Soviet threat by redirecting it to purposes relevant to the era that lies ahead. The second task is to purposefully, at times together but also in pursuit of national policies, thwart the lessons of history and keep Europe from descending into war again as it has repeatedly in the past.

**Strategies for a Future Partnership**

Part Two concentrates on strategies for the future, using as a foundation, the elements of the earlier analyses: what has been set en train, U.S. engagement, and Europe’s emerging collective identity. Whereas Part One analyzed where we have come to, Part Two attempts to define where we are headed and how we should go about getting there.

Stuart Johnson begins Part Two with an examination of the major themes of current U.S. foreign policy, the context in which American relations with Europe are sustained. Since the Cold War, the U.S. has struggled, and in many respects continues to struggle, with a replacement for the trans-Atlanticism of the Cold
War. What strategy is suggested by an analysis of American policy making since 1989? Johnson identifies four key U.S. foreign policy questions that have emerged: the future of China; control of the Persian Gulf; the future of Russia; and, how European nations will relate to each other and to the U.S. A view gaining prominence is that the U.S. needs a strong European partner to help face not only regional but global challenges. The success of a vibrant Paris-Bonn axis provides the opportunity to develop an effective security framework, especially beyond NATO borders.

Johnson writes that current policy debates are badly focused. At one end of the spectrum is the debate over interlocking political structures, and at the other is the argument about numbers of troops and the commitment they represent. As an alternative to seeking the ideal Platonic institutional relationships, Johnson suggests adopting the bottom up strategy followed by the builders of European integration. With respect to forces, Johnson argues for role specialization, where unique capabilities can be brought to military planners instead of simple numbers of troops forward deployed. A related—and more contentious—proposal put forth by Johnson is that Europeans would avoid the costly acquisition of capabilities that the U.S. can provide, such as intelligence. Johnson’s concept calls for a much looser coupling of forces than the current NATO structure, and the fielding of forces that are "complementary" rather than standardized, which has never enjoyed marked success. An advantage of this theory is that it protects U.S. forward forces from Congressional criticism by demonstrating that forces acquired for NATO contingencies provide capabilities that U.S. allies do not have and will not invest in duplicating, so long as the U.S. remains demonstrably committed to European security.

Reinhardt Rummel explores what lies in store for Europe and the U.S., concentrating on what is, to most observers, an unknown facet of the trans-Atlantic relationship—the growing ties between the U.S. and the EU. In late 1990 the United States and what was at the time the European Communities (EC), signed the joint Declaration on U.S.-EC Relations, signalling a formal commitment to regular bureaucratic and diplomatic contacts in pursuit of common political and economic interests. Experience over nearly five years has shown respectable, albeit still nascent, progress on topics of bona fide importance. While the relationship has neither
accelerated nor declined, it is an area where more can and should be produced in the future. Rummel contends that the U.S. and EU, acting together, are more effective than any other national or multinational actor in international affairs. He also holds that strong U.S.-EU relations are the strongest external interests of the two partners, and that third party states have major interests in the relationship as well.

Dr. Rummel holds that the U.S.-EU "Dialogue" is much broader and holds greater potential than the higher profile and still essential, but narrowly applicable, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Six categories of common interest to the U.S. and EU member states—economic growth, crisis management, transformations across Europe, environmental protection, arms control, and problems of over population—all pose serious challenges in the decade ahead, and the U.S.-EU Dialogue seems to be better aligned than any other fora to meet these challenges. Will the U.S and Europeans opt for a new Dialogue on all these issues versus NATO, OSCE or the UN? Certainly more needs to be invested in the U.S.-EU relationship, and the vexing topic of how the constellation of Euro-Atlantic fora ultimately harmonize their various spheres of cognizance is far from resolution.

Christoph Royen presents an insightful and thought provoking analysis of the Russian attitude toward trans-Atlantic relations, especially as embodied in the NATO Alliance. The Russian prism is forged largely by historic attitude about national power, regional influence, and Russia’s greatness. Yet the overriding factor during an extended period of agonizing transition is one of suspicious ambivalence toward both a continuing U.S. role in Europe, and the potential rise of a great power continental competitor in the EU.

What is Russia’s agenda? It will remain shrouded in the uncertainty of that nation’s political future for some years to come, but certain tentative attributes—what the West will be obliged to account for in its strategic planning—have emerged from the trauma of the Soviet collapse. First, Russia aims to exercise influence across the CIS states, or the near abroad, which as Royen argues, could include the Baltics. Second, Russia hopes to thwart emergence of a too powerful competitor in Europe, primarily the U.S. through NATO, but also with a long term eye on the EU. Russia’s tactics include forestalling NATO expansion as well as
direct participation in international decision making, such as the Bosnian Contact Group. These actions allow Russia to buy time while internal problems slowly move toward uncertain outcomes. The aim is to stay engaged as a great power at acceptable (minimal) cost and keep the playing field open by frustrating the emergence of another dominant great power actor. Russia makes no secret of its preference for the OSCE over any other security organization, especially NATO.

The final chapter returns to the overarching theme, forging a new trans-Atlantic relationship. Charles Barry highlights a new trans-Atlanticism already being forged by re-cast relationships between the U.S. and Europe in a host of international organizations. Oft heard criticism notwithstanding, the key European and trans-Atlantic institutions have adapted admirably, and have demonstrated they are to be counted among the survivors in the new era and century stretching before us. Barry argues that NATO, OSCE, WEU, the EU, and a number of other organizations are sound future investments. They are crucial to a strong, forward looking trans-Atlanticism that itself is the linchpin of a new world order that will eventually append a future Russia as well as an emergent China.

The broadening sinews of trans-Atlanticism cannot be taken for granted, especially as a new generation of leaders takes charge—a generation that will only have read of the fusing experiences of the 1940's and 1950's. Old ties must be nurtured and refreshed if the relationship is to remain strong for the challenges ahead. The trends are positive overall: after a longer than anticipated period of uncertainty, signs point to a continued relationship that will be both broader and more balanced.

The least defined factor in the relationship is the weight of U.S. leadership. Will the U.S. see itself as an active leader intent on using its European relationship globally as well as regionally, or will the U.S. opt for a management by exception strategy, leading in European affairs only when its own interests are at stake? The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has revealed both that the Europeans are not yet ready to lead, and that the Americans are not certain of the future role they want to play in Europe. This is an area of analysis where much additional research is warranted and where policy making is far from complete.
Time is not on our side. The peace that has been purchased at tremendous cost throughout the Cold War and World War II before that, is fragile and vulnerable so long as a new order or paradigm to protect it is missing. As Barry concludes, the U.S. and Europe could wake up to find it suddenly gone amidst a fury of crises and conflicts, and then we will collectively ask: What the hell happened?
PART I
America’s Role in
the New Europe
FROM BERLIN TO BOSNIA: NATO in Transition, 1989-1994

S. Nelson Drew

There is a story, popular within the halls of the U.S. Mission to NATO, that during the Carter Administration one of the foreign service officers in the European division of the State Department had a stamp prepared for use on all papers concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That stamp, the story goes, read simply, "NATO, at this time of unprecedented crisis within the Alliance. . ." Whether the stamp actually ever existed or not, the story provides more than a grain of truth about the way in which the United States traditionally thought (or did not think) about NATO. By and large, the routine functioning of the Alliance, and the American leadership role in it, were taken for granted. The mere fact that a paper might have to be prepared on some aspect of NATO policy was in itself a sign of crisis . . . that things were not as they should be.

If the issues facing NATO in the late 1970's could be described in terms of crises, there may not be a suitable word left in the English language to describe the status of the Alliance as seen from the United States over the past five years. During this period, even the "routine" functioning of the Alliance has ceased to be routine, and the nature of the American leadership role has been called into question on both sides of the Atlantic. From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 through the first use of NATO forces in combat in Bosnia in 1994, NATO has struggled to keep pace with changes in the trans-Atlantic security environment that have been so dramatic as to have been previously unthinkable.
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Indeed, in the fall of 1989, as the Berlin Wall was coming down, a survey of over 30 NATO and SHAPE staff officers could find only two who were willing to consider adopting a new NATO strategic concept to replace MC 14-3's twin pillars of "forward defense and flexible response" within the next decade. "After all," it was explained, "MC 14-3 took seven years to gain Alliance approval, when there was consensus about the nature of the threat." It would be "too difficult" to attempt to craft a new strategy—NATO would just have to make do with the old.¹ Yet in little over half a year from the date of this survey, the NATO summit in London directed the Alliance to undertake a "fundamental" revision of NATO's integrated force structure and its strategy.² By the end of 1991, NATO had adopted its new strategic concept. From that point until today, the Alliance and its members have struggled to keep pace with a rapidly evolving security environment in their efforts to adapt the instruments of NATO policy to match the vision put forward in that strategy.

NATO Transformed?  
Rome and the Strategic Concept

The speed with which NATO moved to craft and adopt its new strategic concept was astonishing to anyone who had studied the pace of change within the Alliance for the previous 40 years. From the meeting of Heads of State and Government in London in July of 1990, when the Allies agreed "on the need to transform the Alliance to reflect the new more promising era in Europe," to the adoption of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation took only 16 months.³ The transformation of the Alliance signaled by those two documents was remarkable. The basis for NATO strategy since 1967, contained in MC 14-3 (a classified Military Committee document agreed to by only 15 of the 16 Allies), was replaced by an unclassified strategic concept agreed to by all 16 Allies in which the word "threat" was no longer used to describe challenges to Allies' security. At the same time, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation set out a new "institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues" in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) between NATO
and the newly independent Baltic states and all the former members of the Warsaw Pact. With the adoption of these two documents, NATO committed itself to "realise in full [a] broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects," and, within this context and in conjunction with other regional and international organizations (including an emerging European Security and Defense Identity), to "protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion" throughout the trans-Atlantic community.

Yet even before the final event of the Rome Summit (a performance—some might say "significantly"—of Mozart's "Requiem Mass" at the Vatican), there were signs of strain in the fabric of this bold new tapestry the Allies had attempted to weave. NATO was entering a period in which the pace of change in the European security landscape exceeded the institutional capacity to adapt to it. The first evidence of this came from within the Alliance. At a press conference immediately after the signing ceremony, French President Mitterand made statements that seemed to many in the U.S. delegation to distance his government from elements of the documents just signed. Then, at the first meeting of the NACC in December 1991, another shock (this time external to NATO) was dealt to the vision of Rome: at the end of the meeting, the Soviet representative was informed by Moscow that, officially, he had not been present, because on that day the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Allies who had been concerned that the NACC might be unwieldy with 25 original members found themselves overnight confronted with the thorny problem of whether or not to automatically admit all the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

By the time members of the Alliance began to prepare themselves for the next round, it was increasingly evident that the vision of stability and security in a trans-Atlantic community stretching from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" was not being matched by reality. The Rome documents had been intended as a roadmap to help the Alliance advance toward this goal, but there was in fact no NATO capability in place to implement the policies needed to promote peace and stability in the face of serious challenges. And serious challenges there were. While one segment of Europe had
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met in Maastricht at the end of 1991 to adopt a charter seeking to overcome centuries of European nationalism, other segments, freed from the repression of years of Communist domination, had begun renewing ages-old nationalistic and ethnic conflicts with a vengeance. If NATO was to make good on its pledges in Rome, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Alliance would have to be prepared to commit its forces to a type of operation that had heretofore never been considered as an Alliance mission: peacekeeping.

NATO Peacekeeping Meets the "Test Case From Hell"

NATO's struggle to reconcile the vision of trans-Atlantic security put forward in Rome with what can only be described as the "test case from hell"—the breakup of the former Yugoslavia—has exposed all of the potential fault lines associated with the harsh reality of the post-Cold War security environment. These have included the gap between the desire for European unity (and a common foreign and security policy) and the reality of the post-Maastricht state of affairs in Europe; the associated tension between NATO and the WEU as vehicles to implement trans-Atlantic and European security decisions; the inability of the French government to accept the usefulness of the NATO integrated military command structure for crisis management and peacekeeping operations; the tension between a desire to continue American leadership and domestic pressures to reduce American commitments abroad; and the difficulty of moving a consensus-based organization such as NATO from an essentially reactive posture (collective response to a Warsaw Pact attack) to a "pro-active" one (in which consensus is required to act in "gray areas" to prevent a conflict from erupting or spreading).

Making It Up As We Go Along

Many NATO planners had already drawn the conclusion that the Rome language setting out Alliance missions in times of "peace, crisis and war" would require the Allies to develop collective crisis management procedures that might include peacekeeping, but the
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breakup of the former Yugoslavia brought the issue into sharp focus. Following the precedent-setting agreement of the Allies to "support, on a case by case basis...peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the CSCE" at the Oslo meeting of Foreign Ministers in June of 1992, an effort was made to develop a NATO peacekeeping policy addressing "practical options and modalities," independent of the ongoing Alliance response to events in the Balkans. It proved impossible to do so, as the requirements of NATO to react far outpaced the ability of its members to reach agreement in principle on a broad policy that might guide those reactions. As a result, NATO, which for years had enjoyed the luxury of long-range detailed planning for potential allied military operations that never occurred, was reduced to "making it up as it went along" on the road to the first actual use of force in Alliance history.

NATO was not unique in this regard. Indeed, all of the organizations that were supposed to form the basis for "a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other," as called for in Rome, were attempting to make it up as they went along—not surprisingly, since they all reflect the national policies of their members, and their members are to a large extent the same group of nations. Even the UN was not immune, as its members and bureaucracy struggled to adjust to a new post-Cold War environment in which, for the first time in its history, a central goal of UN peacekeeping efforts was not merely keeping a regional conflict from becoming a venue for superpower confrontation. This combination of factors directly contributed to tensions in developing smooth coordination between NATO (whose involvement in the past would have certainly heightened the risk of superpower confrontation) and the UN Peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia.

In fact, the initial call for NATO assistance in the Balkans was not directed to the Alliance at all, but to the CSCE and its members, acting in other regional organizations. Since NATO had agreed in Oslo to support CSCE peacekeeping operations, a copy of the request was passed to the office of NATO Secretary General, Manfred Woerner. At that point, there was not even consensus within the Alliance on whether NATO could begin preliminary
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planning on how to respond to the request before the CSCE had formally acted on it (a problem, since the relevant CSCE bodies were not in session at the time). It was not until the following December (by which time it was evident that, for the types of missions that would require an Alliance response, CSCE had little or no expertise) that the NATO Allies agreed to modify their original language on peacekeeping to include operations on behalf of the UN directly. For the United States, where pressure had been building for NATO to "go out of area or out of business," this was a critical step for the Alliance.

Cracks in the New "Security Architecture"?
The struggle to find the correct relationship among the various elements of the new European security architecture in the aftermath of Maastricht inevitably led to trans-Atlantic discord over the relationship between NATO and the WEU in dealing with the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The United States has always been fiercely ambivalent about the emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity, and nowhere has this been more manifest than in the tortured history of sanctions enforcement operations in the Adriatic. While official NATO and WEU statements made every effort to put a good face on what is publicly described as the "cooperative" effort between NATO and WEU in this operation, the reality was, until the eventual merger of operations after nearly a full year, what occurred was exactly the sort of competition and wasteful duplication of effort about which the U.S. has always been concerned. Yet in this case, the wound was, at least in part, self inflicted by the United States. Washington pressed at first for Europe to take the lead in responding to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and therefore resisted initial efforts to involve NATO in the Adriatic. It was only after the WEU had determined to act, using naval assets that were also committed to the newly created NATO Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), that the U.S. articulated its case for the Adriatic to be a NATO operation.

By this time, however, it was politically impossible for the WEU not to become involved, since the issue had become a test of Europe's ability to respond collectively in the spirit of Maastricht.
From Berlin to Bosnia

The result was an artificial division of the Adriatic into two zones, with NATO and WEU swapping from one to the other at periodic intervals. Even the current, more successful, joint NATO/WEU operation (with unity of military command maintained through the NATO chain, but responding to joint political decisions of the NATO and WEU Councils) is somewhat artificial from an American standpoint, as the views of all the individual WEU member states could just as effectively be articulated through NATO council sessions.

Deterrence and the Use of Force:
NATO Goes to Peace

A far more positive effort from an American perspective has been NATO's role in monitoring and enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and the subsequent agreements to provide close air support to UN peacekeepers and to use air strikes to compel Serbian compliance with withdrawal agreements around Bosnian "Safe Areas." In these cases, the command and control arrangements have been drawn directly from the NATO integrated command structure, with modifications as required to permit interface with the UN and participation by nations not normally part of NATO's integrated military structure. Nevertheless, it is evident that strains continue to exist both within the Alliance—where the French government has resisted every effort to use the existing NATO command structure for any non-Article 5 operations—and in NATO coordination with the UN—where the initial authorization to use NATO air power for CAS to protect UN peacekeepers was delayed for so long that the forces were no longer in contact. The modest success of the application of NATO air power to the no fly zone and the situations around Sarajevo and Gorazde (the first actual uses of force in Alliance history) nevertheless provides some indication that the concept of deterrence, which NATO is uniquely positioned to bring into the equation, may have a role in future peace support operations. If this proves to be the case, NATO will have taken a significant step toward developing a capability to foster stability in the post-Cold War European security environment.
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The real test of the Alliance's relevance to the new environment—at least in the eyes of many of its member states—will be whether or not NATO is prepared to deploy and command forces to support successful implementation of a peace plan for Bosnia. It is on this issue that the potential for discord within the Alliance seems most dramatic. At its heart is the almost other-worldly "chicken and the egg" dispute between the United States—which refuses to commit its forces unless they are part of an operation using the NATO command structure—and France—which argues that command relationships can only be agreed on the basis of which nations have committed the most forces, and thus will not seriously consider using the existing NATO chain of command unless the U.S. has already committed its forces. From the American perspective, this position strikes at the very core of the Alliance, since it implies that any non-Article 5 military operation would evolve an "ad hoc" command arrangement totally dependent on the number of forces each nation commits.

**NATO, the U.S., and ESDI**

It was in part the evidence of the impasse this dispute could create within the Alliance that helped shape a revision in the U.S. approach to the NATO relationship to ESDI at the January 1994 Summit. In theory, the United States had always been supportive of European efforts to forge a common foreign and security policy, and a European security and defense identity (ESDI) to help implement it as called for in Maastricht. Yet seen from a European perspective, the efforts of the U.S. had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the threat of a massive attack on Europe receded, and Europeans, for the first time since the end of WW II, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate security needs without direct assistance from the United States, the U.S. was seen to be ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of the Alliance to develop their own security identity. The U.S., on the other hand, saw the development of ESDI as a logical extension of its long standing desire for European states to assume a more equitable share of the burden of their own security, but the
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benefits of this development to the U.S. would be lost if it took place in a manner that set up a competition for scarce defense resources between NATO and ESDI commitments. The tension between a European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competitor for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies.

Initially, the United States adopted what might best be called a "hands off" policy toward discussions of the possible shape of an emerging ESDI. The source of this approach was two-fold. On the one hand, there was no desire in the U.S. to contribute to the emergence of a competitor to NATO. On the other, the shape of ESDI was seen, legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. The result was a period of nearly two years which saw the trans-Atlantic debate on ESDI reduced to a cycle: European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements it found acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own devices, the European Allies would never be able to agree on any alternative to acting within NATO.

This view was itself based on a reasonably accurate assessment that there was, for the foreseeable future, no militarily viable alternative to NATO. It overlooked the fact, however, that from the outset, the European need for ESDI had been political, not military. Although the events in Bosnia seemed to support the contention that there was no military alternative to collective action through NATO, they also served to exacerbate the political pressures for Europe to demonstrate an ability to act on its own. These pressures, however, did not lead to agreement among the European states as to how they should act on their own, or through what vehicle: NATO, WEU, CSCE, or something totally new such as the EuroCorps. The result was a growing inability to obtain political consensus within the Alliance for NATO to act, with no real alternative in place. At the same time, the debate in Washington over the feasibility of committing American ground forces to Bosnia heightened awareness that, in the post-Cold War environment, there might be cases when it would be in the
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interests of the United States for Europe to have the capability to employ military forces without the direct involvement of American troops. What followed was Washington endorsement of a "separable, but not separate" ESDI that could draw on existing NATO assets and command structures to conduct operations at the behest of the European Union—a concept that eventually emerged as the twin ESDI and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposals of the January 1994 Summit.\textsuperscript{10}

The CJTF concept of NATO force employment was a logical outgrowth of the new strategic concept, which notes that, "to ensure that... Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary."\textsuperscript{11} Thus the CJTF concept does not need ESDI as a justification, but rather permits the Alliance to adapt to its own requirements in a manner that is supportive of—rather than in competition with—ESDI. At the same time, the CJTF concept builds on the lessons learned in both the Gulf War and the experience of the former Yugoslavia to date by providing a capability for NATO forces to be augmented, if required, by forces from nations not in the Alliance, such as those that could be made available under the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative.

**Partnership or Membership?**

PFP, like CJTF, emerged as a hybrid response to multiple sets of requirements. Like CJTF, it found parts of its heritage in the Alliance experience with Bosnia. In this case, it was the requirement to fashion plans that included both the UN and the non-NATO nations already engaged in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia that brought into sharp focus the potential problems of combined operations with forces that had neither the training nor standard procedures that NATO forces and commanders take for granted. If NATO forces were to make good on the strategic concept's call for effective crisis management, it was evident that some mechanism had to be found to develop a common basis for operations with other members of the European security community. At the same time, there was growing pressure from
many of the former members of the Warsaw Pact to go beyond the NACC to attain the status of full NATO membership. While there was no consensus among the Allies on the issue of membership, there was, certainly from the American perspective, a sense that the Central and Eastern European states had a legitimate concern that the NACC would never be able to fully bridge the gap between NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact if it failed to include a defense component.

Earlier attempts by the United States to build a "Defense Ministerial" component within NACC had failed due to continuing French suspicions of the Defense Planning Committee (the venue within NATO for Defense ministerial level meetings) where they do not occupy a seat. But Paris had insisted, and the Alliance had acquiesced, in full participation in all Alliance deliberations concerning peacekeeping operations. By mid-1993, this had translated into a more active, if not consistent, French role in the NATO Military Committee, and a tendency for NATO Ambassadors to make almost all decisions regarding Bosnia in the forum of the Council in Permanent session rather than the DPC. Moreover, the French had led the way in insisting that NATO make its defense planning processes more transparent to potential non-NATO peacekeeping partners as part of its efforts to ensure similar transparency to Paris. As a result, there appeared to be a window of opportunity to promote NATO cooperation with the NACC partners and other European states in defense matters—at least those associated with peacekeeping. Despite the popular perception in the press that PFP was merely "an alternative to expanding NATO into Eastern Europe," it was originally conceived to fill a set of legitimate needs in its own right.

It was not, however, merely happenstance that PFP also was designed to provide a vehicle to draw the Central and Eastern European states into a closer relationship with NATO that fell short of their aspirations for membership. The Alliance would have been hard pressed to emerge unscathed from a full blown debate on membership expansion. Even if there had been consensus on the principle of immediate membership expansion—and there clearly was not—it would have been impossible to reach consensus on precisely which nations should
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be first in line to join. The issue was tied up not only with the
collisions of several Allies not to provide ammunition to potentially
destabilizing nationalist elements in Russia, but also with the
thorny problems associated with the pace of membership
expansion in other European organizations such as the EU and
WEU.

The PFP concept avoided this no-win debate, while at the same
time providing some immediate benefits to the partner states
through joint exercises and training with NATO forces. It also
served the interests of both the Alliance and its prospective new
members by making it possible to develop some performance-
based standards for consideration of future membership expansion.
The ability of partner states to meet their obligations under PFP,
to include transparency in defense planning, democratic standards
of civilian control of the military, and an ability to fund their own
participation in exercises, should provide a useful indicator of
which states are capable of satisfying the requirements of Article
10 of the North Atlantic Treaty that new NATO members must "be
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

NATO Without Barbarians

The mere fact that NATO must now seriously consider which of
its former adversaries from the Warsaw Pact are best in a position
to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area through
eventual membership in the Alliance is, in and of itself, testimony
to the pace at which the Alliance has sought to adapt to the new
security environment. But even in light of the pace of change
within the Alliance, it is easy to make the case that the Alliance
has still not adapted rapidly enough. Indeed, there are those on
both sides of the Atlantic who would argue that the Alliance
cannot adapt to the new security environment: that it is an
institution whose time has come and gone, and that the
appearance of adaptation over the past 5 years is nothing other
than a classic case of a bureaucracy seeking to justify its continued
existence after the reason for its existence has disappeared. One
is reminded of a poem about ancient Alexandria that has been
often repeated within the halls of NATO over the past 5 years:
"Why this sudden bewilderment? This confusion? Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, Everyone going home, lost in thought? Because night has fallen, and the Barbarians have not come! And some of our men, just in from the border, Say there are no Barbarians any longer. Now what's going to happen to us without the Barbarians? They were, those people, after all, A kind of solution."

The answer to the question of what will happen to NATO without the "barbarians" depends primarily on whether or not the Alliance remains a bargain to its members. It seems obvious today that it would be impossible to recreate NATO in the absence of the overwhelming immediate threat that was seen to exist from the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. If NATO is worth sustaining in the absence of that threat, then it must be perceived by its member states as continuing to satisfy their legitimate security needs, and to do so at a price that is cheaper than the alternatives of either unilateral action or working through another organization.

For the United States, this means that NATO cannot become, as some members of the Alliance would have it, merely an insurance policy against the eventuality of a renewed Article 5 threat from some future resurgent "barbarians." Nor is it merely a question of NATO going "out of area or out of business." NATO has already gone "out of area" in its response to Bosnia, and demonstrated a willingness to use force (albeit after extensive and sometimes fierce debate) in the process. But for NATO to maintain its relevance to the security interests of the United States, it must continue to adapt as an institution in order to enable itself to make good on the new strategic concept and the vision of enduring peace and stability in the London and Rome Declarations. This will not be an easy task. There is a tremendous difference between the ability to generate consensus to respond to an Article 5 attack on a member of the Alliance and the ability to generate and sustain consensus to deploy NATO forces to engage in crisis management or peace support operations outside of the territory of its immediate member states. But as the Harmel
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Report on The Future Tasks of the Alliance noted over a quarter of a century ago, it is one of the main functions of the Alliance to "pursue the search for progress toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved." In this process, "the North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation."315

The Alliance has come a long way since its inception, when Lord Ismay is reported to have made his now infamous statement of NATO's three purposes: "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." But it is important not to lose sight of the broader truths behind this "politically incorrect" shorthand. NATO's mission is not just keeping the Russians out, but preventing the domination of Europe by any hostile hegemon. That can be accomplished, as it was for 40 years, by a hostile standoff, or, as it must be in the future, by concerted efforts to bring our former adversaries more closely into the fold of Western democracies through programs such as NACC and PFP. NATO must provide a valid rationale for America wanting to be kept in, through a workable program of equitably shared roles, risks and responsibilities without wasteful duplication or competition. The CJTF proposal has the potential to advance this concept, if the Alliance can find a way to implement it. And NATO must be prepared to extend the benefits of participation in the integrated military structure to all of Europe, as it once did for Germany, not to "keep the Germans down," but to ensure that, as a result of a sense of real collective defense which only the integrated military structure of NATO provides, no member of the Alliance need ever arm itself to the point where it is more of a threat than an ally to its neighbors. If NATO can continue to fulfill these basic purposes, then its members need not worry about what's going to happen to them without the barbarians!

Notes


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9. For an example of the "official" view of the early NATO/WEU efforts in the Adriatic, note the language in the Communiqué Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 17 December 1992.
11. The Alliance's Strategic Concept: Paragraph 47.
12. The creation of the "Group on Defense Matters" provided a setting for meetings of NACC and NATO defense ministers, but the GDM has no formal NATO charter.
14. Constantinos Kavafis, Greek poet, as cited by Theodore Couloumbis at the opening conference of the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany, June 1993. The poem has also been used in presentations at NATO HQ in Brussels by David Nicholas, formerly Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO, and Major-General Dr. D. Genschel, GEAR, formerly Director of the Plans and Policy Division of the IMS.
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2

Eastern Europe and the Partnership for Peace

Jeffrey Simon

NATO has grappled with a Europe in transformation since the revolutions of 1989 and has reached out to countries of the former Warsaw Pact since its July 1990 declaration. The Alliance had to decide how to accommodate the East after the November 1991 Rome summit adopted a new strategy to replace the doctrine of Flexible Response which dated from the late 1960s. The summit also began to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War era by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to address Europe’s eastern security issues.

While NACC had laudable goals, its limitations were obvious. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the decision to include former republics as new members meant that rather than the anticipated five non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet Union, NACC would have twenty-plus new members. The great diversity among NACC partners (for instance, between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to demands for differentiation and membership in the Alliance by many NACC members. Thus, despite well-intended goals, demands placed on NACC by cooperation partners made the organization’s lack of preparation evident. NATO’s most recent response came in January 1994 when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) adopted the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program.

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The Track Record

NATO responses to developments in the East—first to former Warsaw Pact members and second to new states emerging from the disintegrated Soviet Union—have been extraordinary and insufficient. The institutional response has been extraordinary in that many new initiatives have been taken in a short time. They have been insufficient in that events moved so quickly that NATO's responses have not kept up with regional expectations.

London Declaration. Only months after the revolutions of 1989, NATO extended a "hand of friendship" to the East at the London summit in July 1990. NATO asked the six members of the Warsaw Pact—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union—to address the NAC in Brussels and enter into regular diplomatic liaison to share ideas and intensify military contacts in an era of historic change.¹ That summer newly appointed liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in briefings at NATO headquarters.

East German Absorption. The transformation of East Germany from a key Warsaw Pact member to part of a unified Germany in NATO was unexpected and rapid. The Soviet position on the security framework for Germany underwent mercurial changes. While Mikhail Gorbachev refused to accept a Germany-in-NATO framework in a meeting with George Bush in June 1990, his concession to Helmut Kohl the following month indicated that he had little choice in the matter. In reality the Soviets ceded control when the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) failed to stabilize its situation as a reformed communist state in late 1989; de facto unification occurred with the economic and monetary union of the two German states. The Soviets also decoupled political unification from security issues in conceding that all-German elections could occur irrespective of the two-plus-four agreement of September 1990.² With unification in October 1990, Germany's five new eastern Laender (the former GDR states) enjoyed protection under article 5 of the NATO treaty: "an armed attack against one... shall be considered an attack against... all." This expansion eastward by the Alliance occurred without the need for a new protocol of association as employed on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1951.³
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Copenhagen NAC. NATO took another step at the Copenhagen NAC session on June 6 and 7, 1991 when the allies agreed to implement a broad set of further initiatives "to intensify . . . [NATO's] program of military contacts at various levels" with Central and East European (CEE) states. CEE contacts would be intensified with NATO headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and major NATO commands; in addition, NATO would invite military officers from CEE to its training facilities for special programs on civilian oversight of defense. Experts would meet to discuss security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms control, and conversion of defense industry to civilian purposes. NATO invited CEE experts to participate in "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs and exchange views in areas such as air space management. NATO information programs also were expanded to the CEE region.

NAC Ministerial. NATO treated all former Warsaw Pact countries alike until August 21, 1991. During the attempted coup in Moscow, a NAC ministerial statement differentiated the Soviet Union from other former Warsaw Pact states in suspending liaison "pending a clarification in that country." The statement also noted:

We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrangements with the Central and Eastern European democracies now take on added significance.5

Rome Declaration. At a summit in Rome in November 1991, NATO approved broadening its activities with the Soviet Union and CEE to include meetings with NAC at the ministerial level in NACC, NAC at ambassadorial level, NATO subordinate committees (including the political and economic committees), and the Military Committee and other NATO military authorities.6

North Atlantic Cooperation Council.7 In December 1991 the foreign ministers of "former adversaries" (including Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) met at the inauguration of NACC to adopt
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a "Statement on Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation" which endorsed annual ministerial level NACC meetings, bimonthly NAC meetings with liaison ambassadors beginning in February 1992, other NACC meetings as circumstances warrant, and regular meetings of the political, economic, and military committees with liaison partners on security and related issues.

Activities snowballed during 1992. At a meeting in February at ambassadorial level NACC adopted a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation." An extraordinary meeting in March 1992—which extended membership to 35 states (including former Soviet republics except Georgia)—endorsed a plan for planning, conversion, economics, technology, societal challenges, information dissemination, policy planning consultations, and air traffic management.8

NACC defense ministers (with Georgia but less France) met for the first time in April and decided to convene a meeting of NACC chiefs of defense staffs (CHODS), a high-level seminar on civilian control of the armed forces, and workshops on restructuring and environmental clean-up of military installations.

Out of Area Peacekeeping

In addition to creating NACC, the Rome summit in 1991 adopted a new strategic concept to replace Flexible Response. This concept moved NATO's military emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

Oslo NAC. In June 1992 NAC foreign ministers convened in Oslo and agreed "to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of CSCE (Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe)."9 NATO moved "out of area" immediately after, and with the Western European Union (WEU) dispatched naval units to the Adriatic to enforce a U.N. embargo. Many NACC members saw this as a chance to broaden cooperation with NATO, and their foreign ministers attached "particular importance to enhancing the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes [and expressed willingness] to contribute."10
A NAC ministerial meeting in December 1992 made a parallel offer to the United Nations, noting its readiness "to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the U.N. Security Council." NACC indicated that NATO and cooperation partners would share their experiences with one another and with CSCE in the areas of planning and preparing for peacekeeping missions and would consider combined training and exercises. It also approved a work plan with specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC ad hoc group on cooperation in peacekeeping to discuss political and conceptual principles and practical measures for cooperation.

Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC partners was evident in February 1993 when the military committee met for the first time in a cooperation session. When NACC defense ministers met in late March they recognized the importance "of the ability to act in a cooperative framework" in peacekeeping tasks and "ensure(d) that a high priority be given this work." In April, under U.N. resolution 816, NATO began no-fly zone enforcement operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the military committee met with CHODs to discuss possible NATO intervention in Bosnia should a peaceful solution fail.

*Athens NAC.* A NAC ministerial communique in June 1993 noted the development of a "common understanding on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping [and] enhancing of cooperation in this field" with cooperation partners. The Athens NACC in June adopted the ad hoc group's detailed Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and agreed to accelerate the program, including sharing experience on peacekeeping planning, training, and logistics. As a result of this session, Prague hosted a high-level seminar on the conceptual and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping.

On balance NATO has been responsive in a short time; but is it enough? The CEE states believe that more than meetings are needed to secure European peace. Because NACC expanded to 36 members rapidly, it is in danger of being "neutralized" as a security institution. How should NATO respond? What roles should NATO and NACC play in a crisis? These questions are raised particularly by the four Visegrad states—Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—which express a desire for a
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differentiated role in NATO. They want criteria and time-lines on becoming Alliance members and they agree to accept NATO security responsibilities.

The Brussels Summit: A Watershed?

Although it took NATO almost a quarter of a century to adopt a strategic doctrine to replace Flexible Response, one can argue that NATO needs another new strategic concept because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, efforts by Russia to reassert influence over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and insecurities in Central Europe. In addition to evolving and more flexible force structures, NATO’s strategic tasks aside from NACC should include policies that:

• Legitimize democratic leaders in the new states in Europe, and by doing so, help to promote their political, military, economic, and social programs.

• Urge sub-regional transparency and cooperation (such as the Visegrad states, Baltics, and Balkans) to discourage ethnic tension and conflict as well as regional arms races. NATO should prevent divergent security perceptions from arising in CEE subregions in order to prevent nascent fault lines in Ukraine from developing into fissures such as in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Likewise, it should work to prevent the Czech-Slovak, Hungarian-Ukraine, and Polish-Ukraine/Belarus borders from becoming a new East-West dividing line, which is more likely to occur with need to control emigration.17

• Promote psychological security by deepening ties with major Western structures—NATO-NACC, European Union (EU), WEU, and CSCE—and engage Russia and Ukraine in European institutions.

Whether the January 1994 NATO Brussels summit actually was a watershed remains to be seen. It attempted to fuse a flexible force structure for peacekeeping—the so-called combined joint task force (CJTF)—and NATO’s need to stabilize the East through PFP.
To support a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance through WEU, the summit agreed that in future contingencies "NATO and WEU will consult . . . through joint Council meetings . . . [and] stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available . . . for WEU operations."\textsuperscript{18} As a result the summit endorsed CJTF in order to facilitate contingency operations, including peacekeeping conducted with participating nations from outside the Alliance.

Though the summit did not accede to Central Europe's desire for immediate membership, PFP did establish NATO's long-term commitment to expansion, leaving vague both the criteria and timelines.\textsuperscript{19} Under NAC authority, active PFP participation is deemed a necessary but insufficient condition for joining NATO. Partner states will engage in the activities of political and military bodies at NATO headquarters as well as a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons to "work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in . . . peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations . . . \textsuperscript{20}"

While the goals of CJTF and PFP are explicit and can be seen as hedging against possible future problems in the East, their implementation might have immediate, unwitting, and unwanted regional implications. PFP could undermine CEE sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors into competitors; it could also erode domestic support for the region's democratic reformers, fragile civil-military relations, and sub-regional security perceptions and expectations.

\textit{Sub-Regional Cooperation.} In January 1990 Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel visited Hungary and Poland and called on both to coordinate their "return to Europe." Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary met in Visegrad, Hungary, in February 1991 and created the so-called Visegrad triangle\textsuperscript{21} to demonstrate the ability of the three to overcome historical differences and deal with their impending withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the exit of Soviet forces, and the regional security vacuum as well as to coordinate their eventual "return to Europe."
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This was to be achieved through institutions like the European Community (EC) and NATO.\textsuperscript{23} In October 1991 a second Visegrad summit in Krakow, Poland, issued a declaration which openly welcomed the Genscher-Baker statement on broadening NATO and stressed their desire to join EC.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed since then the Visegrad states have signed agreements of association.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, EC plays essential economic and political roles in stabilizing the Visegrad group. These countries have also made NATO membership a priority. At a third summit in Prague in May 1992 they emphasized that NATO and a sustained U.S. presence were of the utmost importance for European security and declared the group’s desire to be full members of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{25} NATO enjoys great prestige and influence with these countries because it commits America and Canada to maintaining the stability of Europe. At the same time NATO is the only organization that has requisite bases, communications, equipment, and forces to defend Europe.

Between February 1991 and May 1992 the Visegrad triangle held a total of three summits, three meetings of defense ministers, two of foreign ministers, and two each at the deputy defense and foreign minister level. These sessions dealt with economic, political, and military matters and involved the triangle’s Eastern security policy and efforts to integrate into EC and NATO. This healthy development toward sub-regional cooperation started to unravel following the June 1992 Czechoslovak elections which led to the "velvet divorce" in January 1993. The separation of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic into the Czech Republic and Slovakia did more than draw a new state boundary at the Moravian-Slovak border. Both the psychological and regional security implications have been much larger: the new borders caused the Czech Republic to turn westward, weakened the Visegrad group, and created conditions for potentially isolating Slovakia, resulting in renewed tensions with Hungary and reverberations that extend to Ukraine.

The January 1994 NATO summit delayed the decision to admit the Visegrad states. Rather than encouraging forms of sub-regional cooperation and stability, the PFP program adopted by the summit has had the unfortunate effect of transforming former regional
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partners into competitors. By stressing willingness and ability to cooperate in Alliance military activities, PFP rewards those partners who are prepared to get closer militarily to the Alliance first.

The CEE response to PFP varies and reflects unrealistic expectations, misunderstandings, and cleavage within the region. For example, Romania and Bulgaria initially greeted PFP with enthusiasm and relief because it closed off the immediate entry of the Visegrad states into NATO. Formerly fearing that they would be left behind, PFP established a "level playing field" in what has now become the race to join NATO. In the Visegrad group, PFP legitimizes the Czech Republic's goal to achieve NATO membership first, rewards competition over cooperation, and undermines any further prospects for the group's development. In the Baltic, similar competition has resulted.

In order to circumvent the negative consequences of bilateral PFP-NATO agreements and sub-regional competition, NATO should encourage partners to cooperate with their neighbors to minimize the disadvantages of competition and to achieve common goals. It must work to ensure that each agreement remains transparent to neighbors.

Though PFP agreements are bilateral, overall NATO-partnership projects should be crafted and developed along sub-regional lines to encourage Visegrad, Balkan, and Baltic common efforts. For issues such as control of air space, PFP projects can be developed on a sub-regional basis; for issues such as environmental emergencies, the projects could be designed for broader cooperation.

Democratic Reformers. PFP initially represented an effort to placate Russia and to support Yeltsin and Russian "reformers," but it has the undesirable consequence of undermining political support for CEE democratic reformers and, correspondingly, American and Western credibility in the region. This has occurred because Russians and Central Europeans perceive security as a zero-sum game, a situation which has evolved not just from the experience of the 1945 Yalta Treaty and forty years of the Cold War, but also from Yeltsin's so-called "secret letter" to American, German, British, and French leaders condemning NATO's
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expansion. When Yeltsin expressed alarm over admitting East European countries to NATO, proposing instead that "relations between Russia and NATO be several degrees warmer than the relations between the Alliance and Eastern Europe . . . [and that Russia and NATO together] offer [Eastern Europe] security guarantees," he gave the zero-sum formula reality. In effect, Central and East Europeans see Yeltsin's proposal as a "Yalta-2" formula for condominium over Central and Eastern Europe.

As Henry Kissinger noted: "No reasonable observer can imagine that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Slovakia could ever mount a military threat against Russia, either singly or in combination. The countries of Eastern Europe are terrified, not threatening." To the extent that Central and East Europeans perceive PFP as an indication of the West succumbing to Russian pressure, the West will lose credibility and influence.

PFP also has significant implications for domestic politics. For as long as the countries of CEE see the West as supporting economic and political platforms to "return to Europe," electoral support for democratic reformers will continue. One message of the Autumn 1993 Polish elections that returned post-communists to power was that the Suchocka government could not demonstrate successful integration into Western institutions, not just NATO but also EU. The same applies to the May 1994 elections in Hungary.

If PFP is to meet Central Europe's international and domestic needs, it must muster enough political and financial power to visibly strengthen the platforms of democratic reformers. PFP will otherwise postpone a decision that NATO has avoided—whether to grant membership to Central Europe. As all new democracies in the East are at risk, the NATO summit may have lost valuable time by not bolstering reform-minded leaders. If PFP fails to generate visible programs, NATO's prestige, influence, and support may be lost on future CEE leaders and their societies. For such projects to succeed, however, financial resources will be necessary.

Civil-Military Relations. Because PFP seeks to develop military cooperation which will ultimately lead to participation in CJTF, political participation is secondary. By stressing military rather
than political forms of cooperation, PFP requires the military to develop partnerships with unintended consequences. First, PFP favors states with strong military traditions and institutions (it is easier for Poland to allocate defense resources than Lithuania). Second, civilian control over the military is a new experiment for partners and is tenuous at best. By pushing the military to the fore, PFP jars Central Europe’s civilian efforts to control the military. Thus, rather than stressing common values and developing the political pillar of partner cooperation, PFP has elevated the role of the military in domestic affairs and promoted the military pillar in Alliance cooperation.

To mollify the negative impact of PFP it will be necessary to emphasize its political content. Hence, not only should contact among foreign and defense ministers continue, but partner summits should be convened. PFP member states should participate on Alliance committees, and programs should be developed to encourage sub-regional cooperation.

Security Perception—Ideals and Reality. At best, PFP tends to hedge against the possible contingency of Russia turning sour. At worst, it perpetuates an ideal which Central Europeans perceive as an illusion—a Europe that may no longer exist. In the wake of the 1989 revolutions, budding democratic institutions led to euphoria and an idealized image of a "unified" Europe. By making the criteria and time-lines for NATO admission vague, PFP perpetuates an idealized image of an undivided democratic Europe and ignores the realities facing Central and East Europeans.

Central Europeans already see a divided Europe, believing that democratic reform has failed in most of the former Soviet Union, that various forms of authoritarian rule are likely to remain for the foreseeable future, that Russia is pursuing an imperial foreign policy which threatens security, and that their democratic governments are all at risk. For these reasons and others, PFP could fail if it is not carefully implemented. If PFP fails to enhance sub-regional cooperation and stability, provide visible programs which strengthen democratic reformers, bolster civilian control over the military, and enhance psychological and physical security, then NATO likely will be forced to take a position on membership—probably sooner rather than later.
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One drawback of expansion in a crisis scenario is that NATO would lose potential deterrent effect provided by early expansion (for instance, preventing crises from occurring in the first place). Those who argue against expansion claim that it will precipitate the rise of nationalists in Moscow and thus are blind to the deterrent effect of Russian threats and expansion. The split is between those who see NATO expansion as a catalyst for Russian "lawlessness" and others who see it as a deterrent against Russian expansion.28

Strategic Implications of Expansion

Any NATO expansion has significant sub-regional and strategic implications. PFP extends NATO's article 4 right of security consultations (but not article 5 security guarantees) to all willing NACC members and non-NACC neutrals who sign "partnership" agreements with NATO. For an unspecified period a partner would channel defense efforts in participation with NATO into a broad range of multilateral missions such as search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Then when a partner is able to contribute to NATO force goals and has demonstrated adherence to democratic values, it can become a full NATO member and acquire the article 5 guarantee.

By stressing the above factors, the PFP approach tends to ignore specific criteria for NATO admission, the time needed to achieve those standards, and the strategic and stability impact of the sequencing of CEE members. If criteria for admission were clear, they could provide standards for electorates to judge performance and legitimize the programs of regional leaders. Sequencing membership is also likely to significantly impact on continuing cooperation with neighboring states excluded from the initial round of expansion. For this reason, when NATO does decide to expand it should consider admitting blocs of states (for example, the Visegrad group, Bulgaria/Romania in the Balkans, or the three Baltics) to limit destabilization.

Three variables will affect regional and sub-regional stability during expansion: the number of members admitted; timing admissions, either simultaneous or step-by-step; and, if step-by-step, the sequence. In other words, the order of admission may
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inadvertently undermine CEE stability. Simultaneously admitting the Visegrad members, for example, encourages and rewards multilateral sub-regional cooperation over competition. Multilateral cooperation is better than bilateral because of peer pressure in moderating cleavages. The inclusion of Slovakia (with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) is important because of its central location. Slovakia is the only Visegrad state to border on all others and is therefore crucial in developing the group as a strategically defensible bloc. The timing of admission should be simultaneous. Sequencing acceptance of those countries over a long period is likely to exacerbate differences and ethnic tension, undermine cooperation, and alienate precisely those members who we most want to moderate.

Overall, U.S. bilateral and multilateral PFP policy should consciously encourage Visegrad sub-regional cooperation. It should guard against policies that inadvertently divide the group and turn them into competitors. Also, American policy should ensure that other Western institutions (such as EU and WEU) support these goals.

What if NATO decides to admit only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic? Without Slovakia, geostrategic problems would emerge. First, this would result in Slovakia’s alienation from the West; the Slovak-Czech border fault line would become a fissure, with reverberations to Ukraine. Second, assuming that Austria has not joined NATO, Hungary would not share a border with any NATO member and be a NATO "island." Third, because Hungary has Trianon treaty-related issues with three neighbors—namely, Vojvodina (Serbia), Romania, and Slovakia—ethnic divisiveness would be exacerbated. Since Bucharest and Bratislava would likely fear Budapest’s future "blackball," sub-regional competition and tension could result.

And if NATO admits only Poland and the Czech Republic? While some might make a case for accepting them since they are ethnically homogenous and would address Germany’s first line of eastern security, it would alienate Hungary and isolate Slovakia. Also, NATO would likely lose leverage in moderating ethnic issues among those states and Romania. Any sub-regional Visegrad cooperation would be destroyed and local competition heightened.
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And if NATO decides against expansion? The result could be sub-regional cooperation of a new kind. If PFP is unsuccessful in moderating the skepticism of CEE leaders, and their expectations for a "return to Europe" remain unfulfilled, PFP could be perceived as another Western "betrayal" of the region like those of 1938, 1948, 1956, and 1968. Western-oriented leaders would be undermined, thereby setting the stage for a return of post-communist or, even worse, right-wing nationalist leaders.

If EU trade barriers continue to have negative impact on the economies of CEE, and NATO increasingly becomes irrelevant to regional security interests, Western rejection and the fear of both Germany and Russia may lead to a new kind of cooperation. When Central and East Europeans think of a Europe without NATO, three alternatives come to mind: first, cooperating with Germany and France to form a triple alliance which would mean German dominance; second, maintaining Atlantic linkages by cooperating with America and Britain; and third, seeking entente with Russia and, in striking the best possible deal with Moscow, accepting "Finlandization with a human face."

The January 1994 NATO summit which approved PFP may prove to be a watershed. Despite its limitations, if PFP receives adequate resources and is implemented properly, it will reinvigorate the Alliance and foster a new European security architecture. But if PFP is not launched properly, it could well undermine European security and unravel NATO as well.

Notes

1. NATO Information Service, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (Brussels: NATO Information Service, July 5-6, 1990), articles 7 and 8.
3. Ed. note: Greece and Turkey had lobbied strongly for full membership from NATO's inception. However, concerns by the Brussels Pact powers over their distance from NATO's center and competition for military equipment, and U.S. fears of overextension given the Korean crisis, lead to a compromise of associate status in September, 1950.
Eventually, the realization that Greece and Turkey could bring 25 divisions to the weak Alliance and pose a third front to the Soviet Union, plus their significant troop contributions to the Korean campaign and political reforms at home, brought full membership in February 1952.


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19. NATO's January 11, 1994 declaration noted that: "We expect and welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." Ibid., 4.

20. Ibid., 5.


23. The Krakow declaration stressed association with EC as a priority and called for "the speediest conclusion of discussions about associate status in EC." See European Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), 104-8, for the declaration's text.


26. For the full text of Yeltsin's secret letter on NATO expansion see Mlada Fronta Dnes (Prague), December 2, 1993,6.


28. William Odom notes that PFP (read non-expansion) "provides a vehicle for reactionary Russian leaders to cause trouble within NATO"; see The Boston Globe, January 11, 1994, 15.

29. Ethnic tensions between Hungary and Romania likely would become more intense.

30. This is a consequence of the January 1, 1993 division of the former Czechoslovakia.
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ESDI: A German Analysis

Peter Schmidt

Until the end of the Cold War the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was defined, for a variety of reasons, as a process for the development of some sort of convergence of West European security interests within the Atlantic Alliance. The most prominent of those reasons were to balance American predominance, to better promote a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to tie Germany—supposedly vacillating between East and West—not only into an Atlantic, but also into a tight European political framework. ESDI was primarily a political concept developed by the West European member states in their search for a greater convergence or identity of interests while not changing the basic political and military structure of the Alliance and Europe. Nevertheless, a part of ESDI’s political approach in the 1980s targeted the promotion of security related political fora outside NATO: the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the Western European Union (WEU). While at that time these institutions were never meant to deal with hard-core issues of Western security and defense policy towards the Soviet Union, in today’s political situation they represent the nucleus for West European endeavors to create an independent security structure.

Since the failed attempt to establish a European Defense Community in the 1950s, Europeans have never been close to establishing the necessary consensus needed to change the basic security and defense structures in Europe. Due to this lack of consensus, the prospect for a common European approach to security and defense, including a new institutional structure, depended on outside factors, e.g., a new European policy of the United States, or a dramatic political shift in the Soviet Union. Yet, the U.S. never showed interest in a fundamental change of the
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European-Atlantic security structure, despite periodic calls for a two-pillar approach in the Alliance and demands for a more equitable American-European sharing of the burden of Europe's defense. As David Calleo once observed: "The U.S. was striving for hegemony on the cheap; the Europeans for independence on the cheap." The other major outside power, the Soviet Union, did not alter its antagonistic approach in its relations with the West for nearly five decades. All this allowed the Alliance to maintain a rather cohesive political-military structure within which basic security matters have been negotiated; ESDI remained a secondary concept.

This examination of the prospects of ESDI from a German perspective therefore begins with a sober analysis of the new factors promoting and restraining the prospects of ESDI: Is there still a predominance of outside factors, or are internal variables more influential today? After this analysis, the strategies of the European nations to deal with these new factors are identified: what is the institutional pull of the Maastricht regulations in security and defense matters, and where does Europe fit into Atlantic Alliance institutions? Then, an intermediate assessment of the current and future problems of ESDI is meant to provide the background to highlight the special interests of Germany in this context. Looking at the evolving elements of a new security system, what kind of structural problems are discernible in the process of realizing the idea of ESDI? Next is a look at the special criteria of the current situation from a German vantage point: Is Germany in a special situation, and what are its specific interests? What are the guiding principles of German foreign policy for influencing the further development of ESDI? Finally, the chapter's conclusion aims at an evaluation of the overall development and tries to assess the endeavors towards ESDI against the background of Germany's interests.

After the "Big Change":
Factors Promoting and Restraining ESDI

It was the political revolution in, and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union which brought about the new structure of international relations. New types of challenges and risks have
since emerged and major changes have taken place in West European security structures. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed an important impetus for West European cooperation. However, some old problems have remained and others have since appeared. In the last four years, moreover, a number of intervening variables beyond the Soviet factor and the Eastern revolutions have both promoted and restrained the development of Western security structures, and ESDI in particular.

**Factors Promoting ESDI**

In certain countries, including Germany, the unification of Germany raised anew the question of how to lock Germany into tight security frameworks. Many observers did not regard a continued integration into NATO as a reliable option to tie in Germany, because NATO was expected to deteriorate into a much looser structure. The only real alternative to NATO was seen as strengthening and enlarging cooperation within a West European structure.²

The future direction of U.S. policy towards Europe did not always appear to be outlined clearly: Pacific orientation? Domestic policy as a priority? Such uncertainty raised the question of whether the Europeans should not play a much greater role in their own security affairs in order to be prepared for a possible American withdrawal from European security structures.

The dimensions of perceived new risks and challenges extend beyond traditional security issues such as defense, arms control and CSBM.³ Humanitarian aid, the problem of how to stem a tide of refugees, pollution, drug trafficking, etc. have all become security concerns. These developments have changed the relative weight of those international organizations that have been major actors in international affairs for the last 40 years, and have given the EC/EU a greater role in present and future affairs. Therefore, why not coordinate all these security related issues within a single European framework?

The new situation in Europe has also increased the chances of a renationalization of security and defense policies. Such a possibility is regarded by many Europeans as rather dangerous. In light of these fears, the EC/EU has become a modern
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framework for the preservation of political and economic multilateralism.

Russia still entertains a more critical view of NATO than it does of the EU and ESDI. Such preferences facilitate the promotion of ESDI, including certain steps towards enlargement, without prompting Moscow's immediate resistance, though Russia's influence is not comparable with the role which the SU formerly played as an impetus for West European cooperation.

Already existing limitations on national security strategies have increased due to defense resource policies which may be regarded as dividends of peace. In many European countries, closer security and defense cooperation has thus become an even more urgent task, preferably in the EC framework, especially in the face of an uncertain NATO and possible American disengagement.

Factors Restraining the Further Development of ESDI

The new, non-antagonistic policy of the FSU/Russia and the rather passive behavior of China creates greater possibilities for a more active United Nations as a world-wide collective security organization, and the overall prospects for the concept of collective security. Indeed, the UN/SC has become an active player in European security affairs. This is especially true of the Security Council, as it consists of a smaller number of national actors. In theory, the collective security approach does not require collective defense organizations. This raises questions, such as, can the OSCE support ESDI as a regional arrangement under the UN Charter, rather than building solely on the UN?

Despite the fact that the number and intensity of regional crises and wars calls for international engagement, domestic issues have become a matter of primary importance in many countries. Major international actors are in danger of becoming more inward-than outward-looking. This does not bode well for greater investment in multilateral concepts.

The possibility of the re-emergence of Russian imperialism cannot be excluded. Scenarios based on this assumption favor keeping NATO as a security police. Against this background, ESDI represents only a second-rank concept. Still, existing inner-
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European divergences necessitate a continued role for the U.S. as pacifier, and as a leader in difficult international situations. The scope and multitude of security challenges demand substantial efforts in wider frameworks than Western Europe/EU can provide; they demand the combined efforts of all western nations.

The Europeans, therefore, have to deal with contradictory forces and factors. Much more so than in former times, internal factors (unification, danger of renationalization) play a prominent role. Factors from outside Europe now have a more restraining effect on the development of ESDI. Therefore, much has depended on the internal convergence and divergence of interests, the level of integration already reached inside the EC, and the question of how far the Community has already taken on a life of its own. The situation has been further complicated because national interests have had to be reformulated, and new factors have become the subject of different national interpretations and priority rankings. In this situation, the handling of the political process by major actors is becoming a decisive element in the political outcome of key issues.

Strategies of Change

Since 1990, the deepening, adaptation and enlargement of existing institutions has dominated the international diplomatic scene. Every organization has tried to adapt itself to the changes in the international environment. The most striking change, however, occurred in Western Europe: the EC countries initiated the effort to create a political Union, leading to the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty broadened the scope of integration and cooperation within the EC. In the field of security and defense, however, the intergovernmental structure of cooperation in these policy areas has prevailed almost unchanged. Moreover, a distinction has been established between security aspects of the Union to be dealt with on the CFSP level and defense aspects for which the WEU should become responsible. At the same time the WEU is to play the role of the linchpin with NATO.

Thus many observers share the view that the growing sophistication of institutional structures was given greater priority than the implementation of policy. Yet, a multitude of institutions
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cannot replace the political will of the states concerned. At the same time, there is evidence that it is not institution building per se, but the successful actions of the organizations concerned which will determine their relative weight and their role as security institutions in the future.

Yet, this fact also contributes to the competitive behavior of the institutions concerned, instead of promoting closer cooperation.

"An Ever Closer Union"
(Including Security and Eventually Defense)

Security and Defense as an Integrative Factor?
Contrary to traditional beliefs, the reform of West European security institutions in 1990 started from the assumption that security and defense matters would strengthen the integrative pull of the EC. This assumption is questionable, since the multitude and the character of the new security challenges make it rather difficult to develop a common policy within a diversified entity like the EU without clear leadership—a problem which will be aggravated by the envisaged enlargement of the EU. To a certain extent, the Franco-German team plays a leadership role. Nevertheless, their interests differ considerably in important areas. As a result, France and Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than on hard-core security policies.

In addition, the leading role of the Franco-German team elicits opposition, as shown by the recent refusal by London to accept Paris’ and Bonn’s choice for the President of the EU Commission.

There are also doubts whether there is enough common ground in the economic area to support a more or less homogeneous approach to security and defense since, firstly, economic interests are not homogeneous inside the EU (e.g., the North-South-split), and secondly, different economic concepts prevail in the member countries (e.g. the neo-mercantilist versus the neo-liberal approach). One could argue that the EC/EU was able until recently to live with this economic split, but there is today a much greater demand for cohesiveness, and a much broader range of issues is at stake, posing a much greater challenge to the decision-making capacity of the EU than hitherto. And, it is the continued existence of major economic differences and the much broader
range of political issues at the EU level that leads to doubts regarding the decision-making capacity of the EU as a whole. Whereas the Community's economic policy endows the Commission with some power for consensus building, and majority rules are applied, the institutional structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) offers only a very moderate leverage for overcoming these divergences.

Nevertheless, at the same time there is a certain economic need for a joint approach in the field of defense. The demand for a peace dividend has very much lowered the expenditures for the military in most countries. Scarce resources, therefore, increasingly force states to look beyond their borders, to form coalitions and alliances, to introduce some sort of a division of labour which can best be done in an integrative political framework. For smaller countries, there is the great question whether they will be able to maintain full-fledged armed forces. Yet, integrative tendencies are balanced by two counter-trends. The first is the very open question of what purposes and contingencies military forces will be needed for in the future, and whether there are sufficient reasons for downgrading the relevance of full-fledged armed forces. The counter trend is the realization that there is more than one way to solve this problem: fixed frameworks like the EU are only one option; another is cooperation among key countries in the EU or beyond, including the USA within or outside the Atlantic Alliance framework. The Atlantic option still carries much attractiveness, because there is no major contingency conceivable for the years to come in which the Europeans would be ready and able to act alone.15

In addition, there is the problem that a regional crisis may elicit rather different reactions in capitals. All security frameworks face this problem of diversity: the coalitions of the capable and the willing are often much smaller than the membership of a certain institutional combination.

**The Inside Versus the Outside Alliance Approach**

Whereas traditional Europeanization efforts tried to pursue the goal of greater European identity inside and outside the Alliance (EUROGROUP, EPC, WEU), the emphasis today is on
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organizations not directly related to NATO. But, an outside approach may create suspicions as to whether this strategy will add to Atlantic solidarity or work against it.

The outside approach is the expression of a desire for more far-reaching goals than in former days. The ESDI approach of today is not only intended to be part of a broader Atlantic framework, but also the notion of autonomy is becoming more and more prominent. In the eyes of a number of important observers, Western Europe should become an independent actor in security and defense affairs.\(^16\) On the institutional level, the results of these endeavors are very complicated and confusing.

The Atlantic Declaration of 1990 established a bilateral EU-U.S. relationship with regard to certain important issues (proliferation, international crime, terrorism, refugees, and environment).\(^17\) At the same time, the multilateral structure of NATO is to be maintained. Further, there are indications the NATO structure is at times overarched by a new bilateral CFSP-U.S. relationship, even in important security affairs (see, for instance, the negotiations on Bosnia). All this is leading to an institutional structure of great complexity, a diffusion of responsibility, and to overlapping responsibilities.

The WEU as a Passe-partout

The WEU is playing the role of a passe-partout in European security and defense affairs: it represents both the possible defense arm of the EU and the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. According to the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 it can play a role in all UN-approved contingencies and even come into action in case of self-defense at the request of one or several states (Article 51 of the UN Charter).\(^18\) Nevertheless, these options are of a hypothetical nature as the WEU still suffers from a lack of military resources and political resolve to implement these far-reaching options.

In conceptual terms and on the institutional level, the development of the WEU has followed the independent European approach rather than the two-pillar model. This is especially true for the WEU/Central and East European relationship, where the WEU is extending privileges to a few potential new EU members
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(from the Baltic states to Romania), while NATO is trying to establish institutionalized relations with all states of the former Warsaw Pact. Against this background, the argument that NATO should not invite new members because this would lead to a new dividing line within the new and wider Europe is not convincing. In fact, the EU/WEU is about to do just that, while NATO is following an all-European approach.

On the one hand, this approach may be regarded as some sort of division of labour between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. On the other hand, however, the smaller WEU does not possess many assets which could be used as a framework for extended cooperation. NATO's rather elaborate institutional structure in Brussels and its extended command structure is much better qualified to fulfill this task.

NATO: From Collective Defense and East-West Policy to Regional Crisis Management—Where does Europe Fit In?

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the view that NATO should take on more than its traditional task of collective defense became gradually predominant. Otherwise, the Alliance would be in danger of fading away. This is known as the "out-of-area" or "out-of-business" thesis.

As a result, while maintaining its military integration, NATO has been searching for ways to adapt its military and political structures to the new task of regional crisis management. At the same time, however, the WEU has also been looking for a role in regional crisis management. In terms of "legal options", the WEU even has some advantages over NATO. To a certain extent, the WEU is legitimized to act. Yet, WEU still lacks the resources needed. NATO, on the contrary, is limited by the political will of certain Alliance partners (especially France) but has the necessary potential to act. Thus, the implied division of labor between NATO and the WEU is that the WEU is to act where NATO is not willing to act. In reality, however, the WEU tries to compete with NATO, and NATO is trying to limit the WEU's scope.

The official reading of the situation is that the promotion of ESDI by the American government during NATO's January 1994 meeting has solved this problem. However, that is not yet
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discernible. Still, especially the French want to have a more or less automatic access to NATO resources, whereas the U.S. tries to maintain some control and major influence. The naval operation in the Adriatic provides one example: "NATO" and "WEU" ships control the embargo in a parallel action, though formally under a common command and—though this is conceptually very questionable—under the joint political control of NATO and the WEU Council.

ESDI: Current and Future Problems

The Multiplicity of Security Actors:
No Clear Division of Labor
The current security regime in Europe is characterized by a great number of actors (states, international organizations and special fora) that feel legitimized to negotiate and to implement security measures in Europe. A clearcut division of labour, either regionally or functionally, is yet to be worked out. This leads to a lot of political maneuvers to hide real intentions (if there are any) and interests. It also results in severe coordination problems. The attempts made by some states and various organizations and fora to settle the Bosnian problem illustrate the institutional complexity.

Negotiating and Legitimating vs. Implementing Institutions: A Reasonable Division of Labour?
With regard to the new institutional developments in the security sector, it is necessary to distinguish between negotiating or legitimizing institutions and implementing institutions. There are institutions which negotiate and legitimize a settlement in a regional crisis, and organizations which provide the necessary tools for the implementation of that settlement.

In the case of Bosnia the following division of labour is practiced:

Negotiating/legitimating a political settlement:

- States on a unilateral level, primarily the U.S. 24
- The UN in cooperation with the EU (Stoltenberg, Owen), and the EU on a unilateral basis. 25
- Ad-hoc structures, (the London Contact Group, International Conference on Former Yugoslavia).
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Implementation and control of certain measures:
- The UN: peace-keeping and possibly enforcement, humanitarian and economic aid, arms control.
- OSCE: monitoring, conflict prevention in near-by areas.
- The EU: monitoring, conflict prevention, economic sanctions and incentives, humanitarian aid.
- The WEU: embargo control, peace-keeping, enforcement on a limited scale.
- NATO: monitoring, embargo control, peace-keeping, enforcement.

During the break-up of Yugoslavia, one of the major problems was the lack of intensive coordination between the negotiating structures establishing peace plans and the military structures which were to guarantee and secure these plans. It is obvious that a great deal of the problems resulted from the lack of an integrated political-military structure. The two military institutions in Europe, NATO and the WEU, are more and more turning into military tool boxes, lacking a tight political framework. With regard to this point, the WEU has a certain advantage over NATO: it is attached to the political framework of the EU/CFSP, whereas the NATO Council seems to be more and more controlled by a bilateral EU/CFSP-American negotiating team and other bodies like the Contact Group.

From this arrangement a rather heterogeneous interrelationship has emerged: NATO is relying more and more on the bilateral CFSP-American relationship as a political framework, whereas the WEU is heavily dependent on NATO's military assets, but is primarily attached to the EU's CFSP. This raises the important question of whether NATO will be able to survive as a military tool box. Currently there seems to be no alternative to NATO for binding the U.S. to Europe in a substantial sense.

The Intricate Russian Factor
Until recently, an important question was whether the democratization in Russia had reached the point of no return. Today, one may find several possible scenarios for Russia's future in academic analyses. One of these scenarios describes Russia's
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internal turmoil spilling over into its foreign policy. There is already a certain connection between Yeltsin’s behavior on the international stage and Russian domestic troubles. For example, with regard to Russia’s Bosnian policy, domestic pressures forced President Yeltsin to block the implementation of certain enforcement measures against Serbia. There are also indications that Russia would feel humiliated by a possible enlargement of NATO, at least partly because of domestic tensions.30

The efforts of developing an ESDI, however, are not yet impeded by the overlapping of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Moscow currently has no objections against the policy of strengthening and enlarging the EU. Among Moscow’s political elite, many still think that the most powerful opponent is not the EU but NATO.

Nevertheless, Russia’s rather positive view of the EU’s policy might change rather rapidly. This change might take place because the current Russian criticism of NATO enlargement is not based on an analysis of the political power situation in Europe, but rather, it reflects only historical and outdated assessments. It is not NATO which, for Russia, represents the real competitor for power and influence in Europe, but a possibly strengthened and expanded EU. NATO addresses only one political aspect: security, whereas the EU is of an all-embracing nature and therefore much more of a competitor than the security-centered Alliance.31 Once the EU/WEU starts to develop a real defense dimension detached from the U.S. and the Alliance, there is reason to believe that Russian policy will change.

If Moscow begins to base its policy on the assumption that the EU is about to become a political-economic-military power bloc,32 it might oppose certain measures for strengthening and enlarging the EU/WEU in the near future. As a conceptual project, the Western policy is contradictory. On the one hand there is criticism of Moscow’s notion of the "near abroad" aiming at the re-establishment of a special Russian influence zone, on the other hand it is quite obvious that we are establishing something similar: WEU’s associated partnership zone from the Baltic to Bulgaria currently looks very much like a traditional buffer zone.33
The Defense Resources Gap
The Europeans have recognized that they are lacking many of the capabilities needed to wage military campaigns on a larger scale (C3, strategic transport, etc.), especially with regard to a regional crisis outside the Alliance area. This problem is, implicitly, well documented in the French White Paper on Defense. Thus, only in one of the military scenarios serving as a reference point for French defense planning does the WEU play a central role, while other scenarios use wider frameworks or national French resources.34

Beyond national attempts to reallocate resources, the general access to Alliance assets is currently seen as a solution to this problem. There is, however, no common approach being taken by the West European states in this regard, because each approach is based on different visions of the future Union and NATO.35

Differing Visions of the Future Union and of NATO
Forecasts regarding the future development of the Union and NATO are complicated due to contradicting views on the future structure of the Union: federal or intergovernmental, a Europe with a number of well-defined but limited responsibilities, or a Europe dealing with a wide range of issues. The debate is rather confusing. For example, the federalists support the Maastricht treaty, though this treaty puts more emphasis on intergovernmental than on federal approaches to European integration. Such contradictory approaches are also reflected in the variance between NATO’s reform policy and the policy of the WEU for the building up of military structures. NATO emphasizes new military structures which are "separable but not separate" from NATO, while the WEU puts greater emphasis on the establishment of more or less autonomous European structures.

As these two concepts are based on different philosophies, opposing policies surface with regard to the EuroCorps and CJTF, despite the fact that a contractual link exists between the EuroCorps and NATO, and though CJTFs are also to be used by the WEU. While the EuroCorps is widely understood as the nucleus of a future European army, the idea behind the CJTF concept is to give NATO's military structure the necessary flexibility for new regional tasks including the possibility, in case
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NATO is not willing to respond as a whole, to act on a European scale separately from NATO.36

Coalitions of the Willing Versus Alliances:
Can the EU/WEU Tandem Settle this Problem?
One of the major problems facing any alliance is a fair burden sharing. Because of the predominant role of regional crisis at present, it is an important question whether ESDI can contribute to a solution of the burden-sharing problem. The current CFSP regulation does not offer a solution. The decision on whether the EU or individual states should carry the financial burden is taken on a case-by-case basis, with the consent of all member states needed for each decision. This creates a latent tension between those countries which are ready and willing to contribute politically and financially to the settlement of a regional crisis, and those who are not. Compared to NATO, neither CFSP nor the WEU provides an advantage in this respect.

EU Enlargement: Potential Consequences for ESDI
The EU has now extended its membership to include former EFTA countries, yet the question of how this will change the EU’s cohesion in security affairs is still an open one. Starting with the assumption that national constituencies will accept EU membership, the following problems are already discernible.

First, with the membership of Finland, the EU now shares a border of 1,300 km with a troubled Russia.37 This might put security and defense questions into the center of the EU’s policy more than in the past and consequently strengthen ESDI. Nevertheless, given Russia’s significant potential, this may also give more weight to the Atlantic link and NATO than to the more limited WEU framework. At the same time, Finland is still anxious to preserve its autonomy in defense matters. How these different policies will ultimately fit together is very much an open question.

Second, the new members have not yet decided to join the WEU. In case some of them do become WEU members, how will this affect NATO? The ideal solution for these new WEU member states would be to become NATO members at the same time.38
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Such an immediate dual membership, however, carries a double prerequisite: the new WEU members must agree to dual membership and all NATO countries must ratify NATO’s enlargement.39

Lastly, the new members bring their own traditions in security matters into the EU and possibly into the WEU. How will this influence EU/WEU’s cohesion in security matters, provided the decision-making mechanism of the CFSP will not be changed and the WEU will adhere to the consensus principle?

How these problems will be dealt with during the upcoming new intergovernmental conference on the reform of the Maastricht treaty still is an unanswered question.

ESDI: THE SPECIAL CRITERIA OF A GERMAN ASSESSMENT

Germany’s Many Burdens

Germany has cut down its military forces to 370,000 men and is ready for further reductions. Yet, these cutbacks of military personnel do not only reflect the end of the Cold War, but also the difficult financial situation in Germany which has turned the Bundeswehr into the main savings source for the federal government. So far, the financial transfers to the new Länder add up to the immense sum of 420 billion DM. Germany’s financial contribution to the EU is about 23 billion DM (as net amount, after subtracting transfers from the EU to Germany),40 far ahead of other countries’ contributions.41 (France’s and the UK’s net contribution is far below 10 billion DM). Even more financial burdens are added by the fact that, among Western countries, Germany carries the largest financial burden for the stabilization of Eastern Europe. Almost two thirds of the EU member states’ financial transfers and loans originate in Germany.42 Moreover, Germany provides shelter to a great number of refugees, especially from former Yugoslavia. No other country has undertaken comparable efforts.

This situation certainly affects Germany’s view of ESDI. Germany can contribute only in a very limited way to the establishment of an autonomous European defense structure.43 Therefore, it would prefer broader and less expensive frameworks like the existing NATO with its well-established, full-fledged and
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effective military structures. To the disappointment of the French, German financial woes have the effect that there is not much money left for filling gaps in European military capabilities.

Multilateralism as a Must

For a number of historical and societal reasons, the integration of the German armed forces in multilateral frameworks is a must. NATO is the most integrative military framework for Germany. The WEU’s military planning apparatus provides for such a framework only to a certain extent, since it is an integrative framework only on the level of military units. This is not comparable with the integrative pull and coherence of NATO’s military command structure. Therefore, Germany will be very reluctant to give up NATO’s military integration.

Germany’s Strong Interest in Stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe

Germany has a conspicuous interest in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe, as is indicated by its significant financial transfers to the region. Bonn is therefore interested in involving as many countries as possible in a policy of economic, political, social, and military stabilization. In the military field, NATO provides the best multilateral framework for these efforts. Therefore, Germany is interested in engaging as many institutions as possible in this region. That is the reason for Bonn’s strong inclination for giving the WEU a role in the region, too, although it is currently able to play only a moderate role in this regard.

A Certain Idea of Europe

The political drive towards a more integrated EU is still strong in Germany, despite present criticism. The Maastricht treaty has been approved by an overwhelming majority in the Bundestag, and no major political party has voiced substantial objections against a further strengthening of the EU, even in the field of foreign policy. For that reason Germany did not react positively to the American offer to be a "partner in leadership". Due to the factors mentioned above—its many financial burdens, the need for multiple multilateral frameworks, the stability of Central and Eastern
Europe, and a belief in the value of a more integrated Europe—Germany has a stake in balancing its European and Atlantic ambitions, and in continuing its role as mediator between France and the U.S. in their frequent disputes.

**Conclusions**

**General Trends**
Six trends can be discerned from this analysis of ESDI. First, developments in Western Europe are dominated by the further institutionalization of European security structures apart from NATO. The strengthening or "deepening" of these institutions is accompanied by growing conflicts of interest. In security policy, the diversification of interests inside the EU has a structural basis, and is a result of the many and diversified challenges and risks of a non-vital character that the EU currently has to face. The number and variety of these challenges and risks puts the development of an ESDI under duress.

Second, there seems to exist, on the one hand, an interest in maintaining and strengthening the links among the EU states whereas, on the other hand, differences continue to grow. Despite the political will to develop West European institutions further, current institutional structures do not provide enough leverage for overcoming the cleavages among the varied fundamental positions of West Europe’s powers.48

Third, it is evident that the test-case for ESDI will be regional crisis management. Due to the fact that regional crises will most likely be of a non-vital character with regard to West European interests, the preparedness to play an active role depends on the following factors:

- A fair sharing of costs and benefits among the parties interested in a settlement of the crisis.
- The calculability of the political and military burdens and risks.
- A rather broad coalition of countries contributing to the crisis settlement.
- With regard to the above three factors, the Atlantic alliance maintains an advantage in comparison with the WEU.
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Fourth, the overall political development of ESDI works to NATO's disadvantage. The historical advantage of NATO—the strong link between the political and military spheres—is disappearing. The WEU, on the contrary, largely depends on a single EU/CFSP framework.

Fifth, it is rather unlikely that NATO can survive as merely a military "tool box". The alliance will need a fully-shared political rationale and institutional framework in order to continue to function effectively in the future.

Finally, domestic trends in the U.S. have begun to impact ESDI. The U.S. House of Representatives has recently accepted a proposal calling for a far greater European financial contribution to the stationing of American forces in Europe. The aim is for Europe to reimburse 75 percent of the total cost of the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe.\(^{49}\) This would force those responsible on both sides of the Atlantic to think about a common new rationale, and to shift from the notion of burden sharing to the concept of responsibility sharing.\(^{50}\) Given the need that a broader understanding of security, burdens and responsibilities has to be defined very soon,\(^{51}\) it is not so much a problem of how better to orchestrate the existing security institutions, but of developing a common vision as to how to deal with a regional crisis that will benefit the Alliance in today's world.

Germany's Special Interests

Germany's special interests are twofold: on the one hand there is rather a strong interest to maintain and develop the overall EU framework (i.e., the institutional approach); on the other hand Germany has a number of special interests which de-emphasize the role of the ESDI concept. These sometimes contradicting interests have led Germany—at least until recently—to play the role of mediator between France and the U.S.\(^{52}\) This is especially true for cases where the ESDI is connected with the concept of "independent actions."

German interests can be summarized as follows: due to the tremendous burdens it carries with regard to Central and Eastern Europe as well as to the EU, Germany no longer has sufficient financial means to promote and finance ESDI. Therefore, Germany
remains strongly interested in the functioning of a broader NATO framework.

Germany's special interest both to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union and to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe (to prevent the building of a new wall between the different parts of Europe) has had a triple effect. That is, it gave rise to:

- The desire to give the Central European states a certain special status, if not membership, at least with regard to the EU;
- The demand to have NATO provide for a broader non-discriminatory framework for West European cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, thus looking for a broad strategic alliance to settle the problems of Central and Eastern Europe; and,
- The endeavor to create CJTFs which are "separable but not separate from NATO," for cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe.

There are many reasons for Germany to remain the outstanding promoter of a stable and functioning Atlantic link. Nevertheless, there is a need for a new Atlantic debate on the political rationale of the Alliance and the institutional provisions to re-establish a strong political framework for European-American ties. The recent European-American split on the question of an arms embargo with regard to Bosnia is proof of this. In this debate, Germany should be the outstanding promoter of cooperation between Western Europe and the USA.

Notes

2. A further, though purely hypothetical alternative, was the buildup of military structures in the UN.
3. This, for example, is a paramount topic of the German White Paper 1994.
4. Regarding the Baltic problem, even NATO would probably not be able to undertake effective defensive preparations.
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5. The West’s policy with regard to Bosnia provides at least some evidence that the U.S. still has to play a leadership role in order to change the course of action.

6. The American acceptance of ESDI formulated in the NATO communique of January 1994 is not at all comparable with the great effort Washington undertook to force the Europeans to take the first steps toward European integration in the 1950s.

7. This is of special importance because, historically, Europe closed ranks only when there was a major outside threat (see Hagen Schulze, *Die Wiederkehr Europas*. Berlin: Siedler, 1990).


10. For the change from a "defense last strategy" to the opinion that security and defense may already contribute today in a positive manner to the further integration of the Union, see Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, West European Integration and Security Cooperation: Converging and Diverging Trends, in: Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside the European Pillar* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), 3-24.

11. This is not only true for the security field. In economic policy, for example, there is a growing gap between the neo-mercantilist approaches of the Commission, France and other states, and German interests (see, for example, the report in: *The European*, No. 210, 20-26 May 1994, p. 1, "Kohl Courts the French in Fight Against Red Tape." There were two major problems under discussion at a high-ranking, two day meeting in Mulhouse which began on May 30: the German interest in the deregulation of EC legislature and the strong German plea for enlargement of the EU. In both cases, France tends to support opposite views. A more recent security problem is Rwanda: Germany has not been inclined to support French policies in Africa until now.

12. There are, nevertheless, some positive signs like the Franco-German initiative with regard to Bosnia. The Balladur plan for the preemptive settlement of possible conflicts in Central Europe has also been accepted by Germany.
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13. The differences in economic performance among the EU countries are still twice as great as among the states of the U.S (see Heinz-Herbert Noll, Lebensbedingungen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft gleichen sich nur langsam an, in: ISI, Informationsdienst, Soziale Indikatoren, Nr. 9, Mannheim (ZUMA), Januar 1993, S. 11).

14. Nevertheless, the EU has a rather strong decision-making structure in this area. Only the Commission has the right to take initiatives, and majority decisions are taken by the Council.

15. See footnote 34.

16. The WEU's Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 is a good expression of this vision.


18. An optimistic and positive view of the WEU's options is provided by Luisa Vierucci, "WEU: A Regional Partner of the United Nations", Chaillot Papers, 12, December 1993.

19. See the Kirchberg Declaration of WEU of May 9, 1994, in which WEU member states offered the status of associate partners to their consultation partners in Central Europe.

20. Moscow, however, is currently not opposing the EU's extension but only NATO's enlargement. Nevertheless, this might change if the EU/WEU develops a clearly defined defense dimension.


24. See the Croatian-Muslim agreements under the sponsorship of the U.S.

25. See, for example, EU's action plan of November 1993.

26. One could argue that this is not a problem because of the fact that the main actors are represented in all fora. However, the point is, while in a robust organization like NATO small countries exert influence
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too, the political decisions taken at a contact group level are not backed up by analysis of their military implications by an international staff.

27. This development is at the heart of the unilateral American decision of November 10, 1994 no longer to take part in the arms embargo with regard to Bosnia. Beyond the problem of right or wrong, the decision indicates a lack of political relevance of NATO's political framework. As this event illustrates, the emphasis American military leaders place on the argument that the Alliance can be held together by military requirements is misleading. The main bonds of NATO are political in nature.

28. An example is the confused story of American-European diplomacy with regard to the Bosnian war in May 1993.

29. The negotiations between NATO and the WEU regarding the problem of the WEU's use of NATO assets is currently blocked by rather traditional French positions.


31. One might even argue that Moscow should be interested in the establishment of an enlarged NATO providing the necessary reassurance for Central European states which would be the prerequisite for mutually advantageous political and economic relations between these countries and Russia.

32. The critical point will not be whether or not the EU already has a substantial military capacity. Some indications that this might come about in the foreseeable future provide a sufficient basis for such a suspicion.

33. This does not mean that for reasons of "Realpolitik" there is a need for such a security approach. Nevertheless, a more balanced policy, taking into account that there is still some reason for a positive assessment of the Russian development, would put more emphasis on NATO's enlargement than on the enlargement of the EU.

34. See Livre Blanc sur la Défense, Paris 1994, pp. 63-71. This White Paper on defense distinguishes six possible scenarios for the possible use of force: (1) a regional conflict not threatening the vital interests of France (Gulf type contingency), (2) regional conflict which could threaten the vital interest of France (including an actor with nuclear weapons), (3) conflict threatening the national territory of France outside France proper, (4) a conflict where France is involved because of a bilateral agreement,
(5) an operation to maintain international peace (some sort of enforced peace-keeping) and (6) a reemergence of a major threat to Western Europe. Scenarios 1, 2 and 6 can only be addressed by wider alliances than EU/WEU; 3 and 4 are to be nationally addressed by France; scenario 5 is the only possible contingency (if it does not reach certain limits) which can be addressed by autonomous European actions.

35. The debate on "Kern Europa" provides an idea of these differences.

36. Not by accident, the UK's MoD, in the Statement of the Defence Estimates 1994, expresses the demand to create a separate European defense capability within NATO, and sees the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept as the principal means of achieving it (p. 15). The French White paper emphasizes European ambitions (pp. 31-34) and puts the EuroCorps in the center of new structures (p. 34). The German White Paper 1994 takes an intermediate position by declaring that collective defense remains a task for NATO only, and that the WEU should only operate autonomously if NATO does not want to become involved in a certain conflict. There is, however, some change in the British attitude towards ESDI (see "Britain Changes Tack to Back European Power Bloc in Nato," in: The Times, 28 October 1994, p. 17), which is crucial for the further development of ESDI. This will, however, not solve the resource problem.

37. Some believe that the Finnish border with Russia may provide the major push for a real security and defense dimension of the EU (see Uwe Nierlich, Toward NATO 2000: Internal Structure and the Scope for External Commitments, Discussion Paper, Seventh Review on Future Tasks of the Alliance, Ebenhausen, April 15-17, 1994). The more convincing argument, however, from my point of view, is that the "Russian problem" provides more reasons for a strong Atlantic link than for a real European security and defense dimension.

38. The German White Paper seems to be more in favour of enlarging the WEU than NATO. It welcomes new members to the EU and WEU, but is in favour only of NATO being 'opened to the East', (pp. 44-45).

39. For a sober analysis of this point, see Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica 1993.

40. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht, November 1993. The Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Vol. 37, February 7, 1994 (L 34) gives the following figures for national transfers to the EU for 1994 (excluding transfers from the EU to the states concerned): Germany 21.2 billion, France 13.4 billion, the UK 8.1 billion DM.
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41. For France the net amount is about two billion DM. There are many indications that nine out of the twelve member states (exceptions: the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany), get too much money from Brussels (see the report of Winfried Münster, "Die Mär vom Schokoriegel," in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26/27 November 1994, p. 31).

42. Combining all private and public payments, the OECD has published the following figures (in billions of U.S.-dollars): Germany 27.5, USA 3.4, France 1.7, UK 0.7. German private direct investment (1990-1993) adds up to about 25% of all foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe (see Wall Street Journal, Europe, April 17, 1994, pp. 25 and 30).

43. A RAND study has come to the following conclusions: "The modest systems of the low case ($27 billion over 25 years) provide some independent capability, but for many uses, they will require the aid of robust U.S. systems to minimize risk. The high case ($95 billion over 25 years) will provide more robustness, but even this will not match the level of U.S. robustness... Thus, the question becomes whether the greater capability afforded by the high case is worth the 150 percent cost increase over the low case." (M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, The Independent European Force. Costs of Independence, RAND, Project AIR FORCE, Arroyo Center, National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica 1993). According to press sources, a Franco-German study in 1992 concentrating on the question of strategic air transport called for at least 20 C-5 Galaxy-type aircraft.


45. For the German willingness to be a team player, see Reinhardt Rummel, The German Debate on International Security Institutions, April 1994.

46. See Chancellor Kohl’s speech in the Bundestag, January 13, 1994, in which he said that it is in the "vital interest" of Germany that the neighbours in the East have the concrete perspective to become a member of the EU (Bundestagsdrucksache, 202. Sitzung, Bonn, Donnerstag, den 13. Januar 1994, p. 17413).

47. About 50 percent of the foreign trade of Central and East European countries is with Germany. In terms of investment, German enterprises are second in this region, after U.S. companies.

48. The possibilities for arriving at decisions by a majority of two thirds of the votes to initiate common action are very limited, and
depend on a strict prerequisite: each member state has to agree beforehand that the two thirds rule can be applied.

49. See "House Backs 'Burden-Sharing' for Allies," in: Washington Post, May 20, 1994, p. 18. The proposal includes provisions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops in case the Europeans are not willing to agree. [ed.note: This House proposal, known as the Franks-Shay Amendment, was subsequently defeated in the Senate and had no actual effect. However, Peter Schmidt's point remains important, as the Franks-Shay proposal has been but one of a growing number of congressional actions which show a U.S. willingness to see relations with Europe from a more unilateral perspective. This is especially well defined in the new, Republican-controlled 104th Congress.


51. See the figures above ("Germany's Many Burdens") with regard to the German burden.


53. Some argue that Germany might lose interest in a good German-Russian relationship after the Russians have left Germany. This might be true to a certain extent. Nevertheless, at least two other factors will still constitute good reasons for a strong interest in good relations: the Russian debts to Germany, and the influence Russia can exert on Central Europe, a region which is now in very close contact with Germany.
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ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?

Charles Barry

Americans, even devout Europe-watchers, have yet to take serious note of the profound changes subtly overtaking their European allies—the other half of what is slowly evolving toward a *de facto* bi-polar NATO alliance. The halting, slow yet persistent advance of Europe's integrative forces, forces which are hard to define, goes almost undetected in Washington. However, already in the 1970's integration began to seep from Europe's marketplace into European politics. Today, it is on the verge of becoming a significant factor in the foreign, security, and defense policies of America's most important allies.

With the bold Franco-German initiative for a treaty on political union in 1990, extra-economic integration picked up speed, and that some form of union will unfold is no longer in serious doubt. What it will be, however, remains to be seen. Surely it has the potential to force changes equally as tectonic as the end of the East-West paradigm. At the very least, there will be a new chapter in the history of U.S.-European relations. At the other end of the spectrum, Europe's supranational integration could herald the autumn of the nation-state system that has dominated world affairs for more than one hundred and fifty years.

There are myriad explanations for the recent cooling of American interest in Europe. Most often heard are the Post-Cold War "turns" toward domestic priorities and the Pacific Rim. Also cited is the old saw that, by its very psyche, America is an isolationist power who needs constant proof that foreign engagements are in its interest. But perhaps more germane are
two less profound factors. First, the array of competing interests, both domestic and international, makes it daunting for any region to hold sway on the American scene without a strong constituency. Second, the unalterable geographical facts of life allow America to ignore a lot more of what goes on overseas than many other powers, great or small.

The American perception of European integration is much like a ship that gradually appears on the horizon, that is, as a distant, growing curiosity. To carry that analogy one step further, it is still too early to tell what tack the ship is taking. Notwithstanding the generally inchoative state of Europe's identity in security and defense, it is more than a mere curiosity incubating among NATO European members. As a collective European identity becomes better defined, the U.S. will have to take note of what the clustering of its allies outside the alliance portends for trans-Atlantic relations. In that pursuit, this chapter puts forth an American assessment of Europe's integration as it extends into the field of security.

European integration's most far reaching effect from a U.S. standpoint, will be the emergence of a European security and defense identity, or ESDI. ESDI is the overarching term to refer to the various collective arrangements among European members of NATO that are more than national but less than trans-Atlantic. An obvious question is, "Can such a construct be meaningful without spelling the end of NATO? Theoretically at least, for a group to form within a larger group and not be subordinate is incongruous and ultimately unworkable. How ESDI will work in practice has not been defined. Nonetheless, all NATO members, including the U.S., have committed to the principle of growing a European "pillar" within NATO that can also act independently.

Nor can a European pillar within NATO be a mirror image of the United States, two equal halves of the whole; there are many unique characteristics of both the U.S. and European participation in NATO. However, two points are relative to the evolution of ESDI. First, NATO is predominantly about Europe's security, and only much less so the security of North America. NATO has a markedly less universal role in U.S. strategy than for the European members of NATO. In this regard the U.S. involvement in
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European security affairs will always be seen by some on both sides as that of a benevolent intruder. In part, ESDI aims to reduce Europe's reliance on the U.S., an objective both sides support officially, but which the U.S. is still coming to grips with bureaucratically.

Second, Europeans retain 10 to 14 sovereign votes (depending on how you count the WEU's various memberships) in the North Atlantic Council, but are increasingly collective in their policy decisions. Each vote in NATO is meant to represent a sovereign nation, not a fraction of a "WEU caucus" on decisions supposedly freely deliberated without pre-established positions. Although NATO may ultimately become a bi-polar alliance, a long period of transition must be anticipated wherein Europe will have to demonstrate often that discussions in the NAC are truly among nations free of pre-determined positions.

A Long Held Dream and New Opportunities

In the 1940's and 1950's, the vision of Jean Monnet was to create a United States of Europe. Monnet saw such a construct as the only possible salvation from repeated wars: a Europe tied so completely together that war would no longer be a valid policy option. It was a dream he realized would only come in the distant future, after the slow and painstaking process of building functional relationships in the economic arena. Monnet's successor integrationists have not lost sight of that dream. Instead they have followed his example, slowly wrapping Europe in economic bonds that today would be almost impossible to break. Yet Monnet's vision was not just of economic union but of full political union as well, the kind that necessarily meant extension into foreign and security policy, and defense.

The concept of a political community and a defense community was first advanced in 1952 as the Pleven Plan. Both communities failed in 1954, due to French political constraints. The reality was that Europe was not ready for such broad commitments. Over the next 40 years, advancing at times and at times stagnant, the identity of Europe began to take shape.

Following the growth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, '52), the European Atomic Energy Community
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(EURATOM, '57), and the European Economic Community (EEC, '57), the 1960's saw anemic integration. President DeGaulle of France was an ardent opponent of the "fiction" of integration.

The late '60's and '70's saw a return to functionalism and incremental progress. It also saw new initiatives that signaled latent interest in a European identity for security and defense. In 1968 the EUROGROUPS were established within NATO with the intent of collaborating on selected functions and responding to American demands for more equitable burdensharing. In 1976, this time outside of NATO, the European members of the Alliance formed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) aimed at European cooperation in the armaments industry. By the mid 1980's, with the re-awakening of the WEU and the push toward a single market and political union, conditions began to favor new opportunities.

The end of the Cold War brought new opportunities to pursue ESDI (as it was just beginning to be called). With the Soviet threat receding suddenly and U.S. troop reductions being announced almost as fast, Europeans saw both the need and the opening to advance the concept of a collective identity. The WEU had been awakened in 1984 and re-dedicated to a European identity in 1987. It was seen as the prime tool for furthering ESDI.

On the EC side, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that had operated informally since the early 1970's to coordinate external affairs for the 12 became, with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, a legal part of the EC. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl initiated the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference on Political and Monetary Union. By the time a treaty was proposed at Maastricht in late 1991, the political union of Europe included a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and an invitation to the WEU to get engaged in defense on behalf of the Union.

France was also trying to loosen the confines of U.S. intrusion into European security affairs—without loosing then altogether. The U.S. at first obliged by reducing forces still further, and worrying Europeans that the U.S. could soon leave Europe on its own. Russia was not the Soviet Union, but it still had the capacity
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to intimidate. The U.S. role (or lack of one) in Bosnia, militarily, was another factor favoring European cooperation on ESDI.

In January 1994, the U.S. gave ESDI a strong green light endorsement at the Brussels summit. Therefore all the stars were finally at the right configuration to put ESDI squarely on a European-paced development plan: Russia, the U.S., the Bosnian conflict, and the agendas of the major European powers.

However there was also one other powerful force, and that was the force of European integration itself. In a global political economy, Europe realizes it must have a common foreign and security policy to complement its economic policies globally. The only thing to limit ESDI now would be the Europeans themselves.

The Many Manifestations of ESDI

What exactly is ESDI? It can be described as a concept of collective security and defense that is distinctly "European," meaning in this context the countries belonging to the European Union (EU) or to the Western European Union (WEU). It is necessary to note that the membership of these two institutions are not presently synonymous, and therefore some "European" positions accrue to one and not the other. ESDI also means to imply that the identity is neither national in character nor U.S. inclusive (NATO), but distinctly European in its interests, positions, and activities.

References to a security and defense identity go back to the WEU's 1987 Platform on European Security Interests (Hague Platform), and the broader concept of a European identity appears in EC documents dating back to 1970. As a concept, ESDI has only rarely been described and is conveniently left vague by its WEU and EU proponents. To understand ESDI's true character, it is necessary to explore its six principal manifestations, which are all intergovernmental:

Common Foreign and Security Policy. The broadest and one of the most recent manifestations is the EU's "third pillar" agreed on at Maastricht, the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP. CFSP is a tangible element of Europe's new Union structure. It is one of two new "pillars," appended to the old EC and overarched by the European Union. Like other provisions of the Maastricht
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Treaty that only came into force in November, 1993 following a difficult ratification ordeal, CSFP is just getting organized and bureaucratized. Essentially it will attempt to expand the foreign policy coordination functions of the old European Political Cooperation, and it will also seek new cooperation on security policy. CSFP is the highest entity for common European effort in the area of security.

The Western European Union. While the WEU was formed in 1954, and can trace its lineage back to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, its modern history is more germane here. Essentially dormant for almost three decades, the WEU was awakened in 1984 to address the growing concerns of its members that the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations was such that western Europe needed to develop its own defense capabilities. The 1987 Hague Platform spelled out that the new identity would be completely compatible with NATO but would give Europe its own distinct identity. At the 1991 Maastricht summit a separate WEU Declaration was agreed to strengthen the WEU, "in the longer term perspective of a common defense policy within the EU which might in time lead to a common defense, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance." In January 1993 the WEU headquarters moved to Brussels to serve as a bridge between the EU and NATO. Since then it has taken on a number of new staffs, including a military planning staff.

A Common Defense Policy. Exactly where a Common Defense Policy (CDP) would be resident, under the EU or WEU (which conceivably might merge), is not clear. However, in response to Maastricht, the WEU forwarded to the EU initial papers outlining the concept of such a policy in 1995. The fact that this occurs less than two years after Maastricht's ratification is indicative of the current momentum of Europe's integration. When adopted, CDP could include all aspects of European defense, including collective defense under the Brussels Treaty.

Cooperation in the Field of Armaments. Armaments cooperation has not proven as effective as other initiatives, however, its continued pursuit is another manifestation of the desire for an identity (and indeed a capability) to compete in the arms industry as Europe. The Euro-Fighter is over cost and behind schedule, and the PAH II helicopter has not competed favorably with American
products even in European markets. However, in 1992 the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) was subsumed, including its Euclid research and development program, into the WEU and re-named the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). In 1995 the WEAG is expanding to occupy new offices in a building next to the WEU headquarters. Again, this can be seen as a manifestation of a distinctly European identity, albeit for now, more of a potential than a reality.

*Eurocorps and other military collaborations.* The five nation Eurocorps, the recently announced EuroMarFor and EuroFor, and a number of other collaborations, including Anglo-France air forces planning, exhibit a desire to move beyond agreement and field real capabilities. While there are sound rationales for the creation of each of these capabilities, which will likely all be responsive to both WEU and NATO, the Eurocorps model is instructive in that it was formed outside NATO and then offered to NATO in the same manner as it was to the WEU. The satellite center at Torrejon, a recently extended program, the addition of an intelligence staff and a command and control situation center at WEU headquarters are all manifestations of an expanding ESDI.

*Operational initiatives.* The WEU has launched a number of operational initiatives to "show the WEU flag." Along the way they are learning hard lessons about operational deployments that may serve them well in later years. During the 1988 Iran-Iraq war, the WEU sent minesweepers to join operations in the Persian Gulf. In the 1991 Gulf War the WEU again deployed a flotilla to the Persian Gulf to assist the American-led task force. In the Balkans crisis, the WEU has participated since 1992 in the arms embargo. Today the WEU Maritime Force continues its role in patrolling the Adriatic in *Operation Sharp Guard*, while concurrently the WEU conducts the Danube River embargo operation and administers Mostar jointly with the EU. It is reasonable to conclude that the commitment to participate in enduring operations is a laudable trend, even if the operations themselves have not always been smoothly executed.
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Problems in Developing a Common Identity

It is daunting enough to pursue ESDI in the realm of policy: a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a Common Defense Policy (CDP), and a re-vitalized WEU. Such agreements, though relatively modest in investment costs, are certainly the necessary underpinnings in establishing a common identity in security and defense. All the agreements reached by European parties are intergovernmental in nature, meaning the participants see fit to invest something short of a full commitment to the collective. The more difficult part of ESDI lies in acquiring common defense capabilities, i.e., the commitment of military resources, and investment in capabilities such as command and control structures, strategic lift, space-based intelligence, communications, and automation-information processing systems. There are European proposals to acquire at least some of these capabilities. However, agreements thus far reflect decisions to pool meager spending to achieve optimum output from current capabilities. Little is being provided to acquire added capabilities.

The first problem is the struggle between supranationalism and the sovereignty of states, and of contemplating what kind of political-military leadership architecture a supranational entity like the EU would need. The solution accepted for the remainder of the decade appears to be strict intergovernmental political arrangements in the EU and the ad hoc operational military command practices of the WEU. Although such a system could work in a crisis, it is far short of either the amalgamated U.S. model or the pluralistic integrated military structure of NATO. The U.S. much prefers the more reliable, proven NATO to the WEU’s institutional ad hoc-ery.

The second concern is resources. Europe’s falling force levels and declining defense budgets appear to have bottomed out, but there are few signs of growth in modernization and research investment, making investments in new organizations all but impossible. A major contributing factor is Europe’s recent recession, from which recovery is slow, with high unemployment expected to continue through 1995. Besides the acquisition of new capabilities mentioned above, ESDI will need major investments in a deployable logistics system, training and exercises and a host of
related costs, not least of which will be the pending shifts of some European countries to professional forces. With modest investments in WEU operationalizing still going on, these resources may be diverted, directly or indirectly, from NATO.

A third issue is nuclear weapons. In all the policy developments thus far there has been no mention of the nuclear side of a defense identity. Yet how can Europe's common defense identity be complete without arrangements that address a common nuclear umbrella? Indeed, the 1948 Brussels Treaty upon which the WEU is founded called for (in Article V) all members to "... afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." France and Britain, the two European nuclear powers, have only the barest bi-lateral collaboration on the subject of nuclear weapons. Would a European Army not have access to the most powerful weapons of two of its member states? If it did, would non-nuclear states effectively have a veto over nuclear employment? There is a lot of work to be done in this area before ESDI becomes whole.

Another issue is dividing military responsibilities, at least for planning and exercises, between NATO and WEU. What security tasks are trans-Atlantic? What is to be European? In the former Yugoslavia this has been decided either on the eve of deployments or after the fact. Longer term, such divisions of responsibilities should be arranged in advance for any contingency. This is especially important in selecting exercise scenarios and partnership units for training.

A particular concern in dealing with the U.S. Congress or the public is the danger of overselling ESDI as a stand alone European military capability. The result of such a perception is predictable: increased pressure (if not outright legislation) demanding the withdrawal of forward deployed U.S. forces.

Each of these problems weighs heavily on the U.S. view of ESDI. The U.S. is wary of any initiative that competes in European capitals for the dwindling defense resources available to NATO. Clearly, in the absence of major operational employment, defense budgets will be level or declining for the next several years. As a result, any investment in forces or capabilities outside the Alliance will likely translate into reductions in contributions to NATO. As
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far a the nuclear issue is concerned, the U.S. sees the potential for an ESDI that excludes nuclear weapons, and by default, one that implies a reliance on the U.S. nuclear guarantee beyond NATO. The solutions to these problems are not readily apparent. They will require time and attention to resolve, and compromise as well.

American Reactions to ESDI

Historical
Since World War II the U.S. has generally supported the need for increased cooperation among European states, including those in the area of security. That consistency reflected the fact that, even as war neared its end, the U.S. had come to its own conclusions about the latent dangers of European disunity. It had become an accepted truth in the U.S. that Europe's nationalistic fragmentation was at the root of the continent's repeated wars, especially those in this century that had cost the U.S. so much in blood and treasure.

For this reason, as Europe looked to the U.S. for postwar assistance, the U.S. insisted on a priori intra-European cooperation before launching either the 1947 Marshall Plan or the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. In the case of NATO, the U.S. insisted that Europeans demonstrate their commitment to a common defense through the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as a precondition to even opening negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty. Later, in the early 1950s, the U.S. openly supported the ill-fated European Defense Community as the proper vehicle for re-arming Germany inside a common European defense structure.

As the Cold War unfolded the U.S. came to speak of itself as a "European power," and to regard NATO as the proper forum for expression of collective European will in matters of security and defense. After the abandonment of the European Defense Community (EDC) initiative and the admission of Germany into NATO in 1954, all matters of security and defense pivoted on NATO and the East-West confrontation. Even European obligations under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty were subsumed within trans-Atlantic obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Later, when the burden-sharing debate made its debut in the 1960's, the U.S. sought increased resource contributions from its European allies as individual nations. The U.S. took the position that Europeans must do more as they emerged from the devastation of the war and re-established strong (and competitive) economies. Especially in Congress, there seemed to be no justification for the U.S. to continue to bear the same share of the defense burden as it had in the early 1950's. But, far from sponsoring collective European burden sharing, the U.S. merely asked for greater contributions from each individual ally.

President Kennedy's 1962 reference to the European allies collectively as a "European pillar" of NATO suggested a definitive cohesion that did not exist. However, Washington was less concerned about misleading images than in rallying those on the other side of the trans-Atlantic partnership to do more. Besides, given the gross imbalance between the U.S. and any of its European allies, there seemed no harm, and perhaps even a little utility, in creating the illusion of a solid, collective European identity. Today, the pillar image remains vague—both in what it is and how it relates to the rest of NATO—but it has not fallen into disuse. The U.S. regards the "pillar" concept as a cooperative "caucus" of European allies, the aim of which is to achieve greater burden sharing within the Alliance. The Europeans themselves are not of one mind. Some see the pillar as standing alone, capable of action inside or outside the Alliance. Others tend toward the American interpretation. This situation is bound to change soon as the Europeans institutionalize their "pillar" in the WEU and look for modalities that will harmonize the WEU and NATO.

As was the case with the ill-fated EDC, the U.S. was both supportive and mildly wary of European efforts to coalesce institutionally, first in the EUROGROUP initiatives in 1968, and in a more direct challenge to U.S. dominance in the armaments marketplace, in the Independent European Programme Group in 1976. Under EUROGROUP and its various sub-groups, European members of the Alliance sought to make the European contribution to the Alliance as strong and cohesive as possible. Under the IEPG, the Europeans sought a collective identity in the armaments industry to counterbalance what they correctly saw as a
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tremendous advantage for the U.S. The IEPG was formed outside of NATO (unlike the EUROGROUP) for the express purpose of including France. Indeed, both the EUROGROUP and the IEPG represented attempts to resolve the longest running dilemma for the allies: how to draw France closer without risking American disengagement.

As new concepts of a distinct European identity grew in the 1980's with the re-awakening of the WEU, the U.S. was reassured by the declaration that the WEU would become the European pillar only within and consistent with the NATO alliance. In addition, the U.S. did not see the potential for a challenge to NATO's exclusive role for three reasons. First, the Rome declaration and Hague Platform documents that defined the new WEU role, declared the dominance of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Second, the ever-present Soviet threat guaranteed a continuing deference to the strategic U.S. connection. Finally, the U.S. saw little evidence that the new identity would have much substance for the foreseeable future.

The Americans hoped the WEU initiative would generate greater burden sharing. Yet, as one European intellectual put it: while the Europeans were now beyond accepting a free American lunch on defense, and fully understood the need to pay a greater share, their objective was to participate in ordering the lunch, too.

American Attitudes Since the End of the Cold War
In the euphoria following the breech of the Berlin Wall in November, 1989, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker spoke in Berlin of a security architecture for Europe comprised of NATO, the EC and CSCE. Baker overlooked the WEU as a principal player. Even later, as Europeans, notably France, furthered the ESDI concept, a senior U.S. official at NATO headquarters admonished the author, saying, "Stop mentioning ESDI." If we ignore it, the Europeans will forget about it too, after awhile." I did not agree.

Steady pressure from Europeans, coupled with the views that, firstly, ESDI would never amount to anything, and secondly, it was a useful bargaining point for negotiating with allies on language the U.S. wanted, caused the U.S. to endorse more and
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more ESDI and related verbiage in NATO communiques ranging from the London and Rome Declarations to many other documents. However, U.S. support did not appear to back up the rhetoric until the most recent summit in Brussels in January, 1994. A key reason for U.S. reticence was, perhaps with too much cynicism, seeing the U.S. role being marginalized to that of a nuclear insurance policy underwriting European military activities.

As the debate wore on through low-level interventions and counter-interventions, the U.S. position began to be affected by other forces impacting U.S. politics. With the Cold War declared over, the internal public debate was less restrained and demands grew for a peace dividend. Too, U.S. trade now was greater with Asian countries as a group than Europe, arguing that U.S. economic interests and therefore policies should shift toward Asia. The effect of these unrelated arguments was to create a public and a Congress more open to embracing the idea of ESDI. Yet, the U.S. Administration was still wary of the initiative. In 1992 President Bush posed the question directly to the U.S. allies: "if you intend to go it alone, now is the time to tell us." They backed down, reassuring the President of the primacy of NATO.

The Current U.S. Position
In November 1992 a new Administration came to power on the theme of change and responding to domestic concerns. The circumstances were right for a fundamental shift in the U.S. position on ESDI. By the time of the January 1994 NATO summit, several aspects of the new Administration’s approach toward Europe and NATO were evident. First, the U.S. would pursue a dialogue with Russia both bi-laterally and through NATO, with bi-lateral relations in the fore. Second, the U.S. wanted to continue NATO’s evolution toward making it a tool that addressed security concerns such as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And, finally, the new Administration intended to influence NATO less directly and in a more detached stance than its predecessor. All these policies made it possible to shift away from the old opposition to ESDI and offer genuine support for the European initiative.
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The 1994 NATO summit communique contained 28 references to ESDI, the WEU and related concepts such as CFSP and the Eurocorps. The signal was clear: the U.S. would not stand in the way of ESDI, and in fact would help it emerge through a new proposal call the Combined Joint Task Force (see below). Still, the cautionary watchwords remain (and are endorsed by all the allies): separable but not separate; transparency and complementarity; not in competition with NATO; does not dilute or destroy NATO.

In sum, the U.S. recognizes and accepts the reality of ESDI and is committed to furthering it within the context of the broader NATO structure. However, the United States wants an ESDI that will not result in the U.S. facing fait accompli positions at NATO consultative meetings.

The Promise of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

In January 1994, NATO leaders approved an initiative to give the alliance's decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different capabilities for the future. Alliance military authorities were directed to adopt a command and control concept known as Combined Joint Task Forces, or CJTF, the method used so successfully in the Gulf War, for NATO.

NATO's immediate tasks have changed, though it remains, at core, an alliance for collective defense. However, the military structure that remains is still optimized for NATO's core task of collective territorial defense. Lacking is a capacity to address new missions called for by the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, such as crisis response and peacekeeping, even as some NATO commands are "making it up as they go along" right now in places like the Balkans. The CJTF concept will give NATO's military forces mobility and flexibility; and make them better suited for crisis response across a new spectrum of peacetime operations.

What is unique about NATO's CJTF initiative—and unprecedented in military doctrine—is that it will institutionalize the task force concept, a command and control arrangement normally employed for crisis response by ad hoc coalitions. In fact, deploying CJTF's is intended to become the primary modus operandi of NATO in peacetime. Task forces are formed rapidly, employed for specific short-term contingencies, and then
disbanded. With the CJTF concept, NATO's military hopes to invent a unique, hybrid capability that combines the best attributes of both coalition and alliance forces: that is, rapid crisis response by highly ready multinational forces, backed by political terms of reference, standardized procedures, regular exercises and in-place infrastructure. CJTF will give the allies a stand-by capability for the conduct of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and other operations called for under the new Strategic Concept. Of course, CJTF's might also be used for collective defense, if required.

The central political issues frustrating the CJTF initiative relate to the role of the Major NATO Commands (MNCs) in the planning and conduct of so-called "non-Article 5" operations. The French-dominated view resists extending MNC authority to non-Article 5 tasks, at least not without increased oversight in the form of additional staffs at NATO HQ. France wants more political input earlier in the planning process to preclude dominance of crisis response by the MNCs, particularly SACEUR, such as France perceived (as a self-selected outsider to the military command) to have existed during most of the Cold War. The U.S.-led position is that the NAC under current arrangements exercises sufficient political review, and in any case it would be a mistake for political oversight to occur down at the operational level of the MNCs. The U.S. also wants to ensure NATO does not end up with two chains of command, one for Article 5 and another for non-Article 5.

Other contentious issues include: defining the support role of NATO commanders during WEU-led operations; the potential for the WEU to select their own headquarters (perhaps including national commands or under the new Eurocorps headquarters) to function as a CJTF; and the WEU's access to NATO assets. From an outside perspective, it seems the role of supporting CINC should pivot on U.S. doctrine which already incorporates this function in a proven concept. Another solution may be possible if NATO can agree to some use of WEU-selected CJTF HQ, although common C² procedures and handover provisions would be essential. The issue of access to NATO assets is clearly multifaceted, and presumably will require the categorization of assets, at least into those routinely available and those necessarily provided on a mission-by-mission basis. Another challenge will be
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the cost accounting of assets provided from nations, and from one organization to another.

There is cautious speculation that most issues are moving painstakingly toward compromise. Optimistically, with the French elections over, and if NATO can focus on CJTF sufficiently in the midst of the Balkan crisis and expansion concerns, there is reason to believe real progress may occur by the spring 1996 ministerials. In any case, the critical matter of adapting a NATO integrated military structure to comply with the guidance of the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept must be moved forward without delay.

The essential underpinnings of CJTF C² are few but important. First, it must support the three main objectives of the NATO transformation process: address new missions, reach out to non-members, and facilitate WEU operations. Second, it must ensure that collective defense requirements can take priority if they arise. Third, it must preserve both the trans-Atlantic nature of the alliance and a single integrated military structure. Finally, it must be done with minimum added cost. These criteria dictate that CJTFs be organized as C² entities that can respond to NATO's integrated military structure, and that they rely primarily upon the resources of selected Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs).

If NATO members agree, a CJTF headquarters and related support assets could be provided to WEU. The forces required would be solicited by WEU from its members, associates, and partners—21 nations in all. In this employment option, a NATO military command (MNC or MSC) would probably assume a support role. In July 1994, WEU provided NATO with a concept paper outlining broad operational requirements for a CJTF, but direct staff-to-staff participation was only agreed to in April 1995. The recency of direct coordination notwithstanding, some observations can be made on how a CJTF might operate under WEU and what challenges will be faced.

Once a decision is taken in the NAC, NATO will direct one of its MSCs to stand up a CJTF and prepare it for deployment. During the stand-up process, the CJTF headquarters will be mission- and force-tailored. At an appropriate point, control of the CJTF would be transferred to WEU. There is a possibility that, as negotiations between the WEU and NATO on the concept for a
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European-led (WEU) CJTF unfold, the way may open for employment of a national headquarters from a WEU member state as a CJTF HQ, in lieu of a NATO-provided HQ. In addition to the variant of national headquarters, another potential candidate for a WEU-led CJTF is the Eurocorps, a headquarters responsive to NATO but outside the integrated military structure.

The size of a WEU-controlled operation, and hence composition of the CJTF headquarters and forces deployed, is expected to be smaller than NATO-led operations. This is based on the assumption that if a crisis is large enough to concern all of the allies (not just European members), NATO would direct the operation. Another factor is that, while WEU missions under the Petersberg Declaration are essentially the same as NATO’s, WEU is only in the initial throes of adapting to its new role, and has no formal military C² structure similar to NATO.

Agendas for the Future

The immediate challenge is to re-balance the trans-Atlantic partnership in a manner that builds on and does not weaken NATO. That points unmistakably toward a bi-polar relationship. This can be done concomitant with the extension of the western security systems eastward. The pace at which we are able to accomplish these twin tasks—re-balancing the pillars of the alliance and extending security to the east—will be driven by how much attention they receive on the agendas of Washington and Brussels et al.

What is near certain, however, is that NATO will not be able to bring in the eastern states, and then deal with unfinished business in re-casting west-west relations. At present, the western allies find it easier to ignore their internal marital problems and focus principally on the east, where hopeful states are eager for any progress toward joining the club. Yet when the cooperation partners finally reach the threshold, NATO, the WEU, and the EU may all find their houses are still undergoing major renovation and are not ready for new arrivals. Both tasks will need to proceed simultaneously.

Indications are that the North Atlantic Treaty can provide the basis as well as sufficient flexibility for a future relationship. Nor
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is it essential to revise the new Alliance Strategic Concept, although amending Part III to address interests beyond NATO borders and peacekeeping could be part of a new bargain. U.S. engagement and forces will continue to be essential to peace in Europe for as far out as future plans can be defined. In other words, the basic agreement and the need for that agreement appear to be an enduring bedrock on which to build.

The central elements of a new trans-Atlantic security partnership will be a greater role for Europe in Alliance decisions, responsibilities and burdens, and a continuing senior partner role for the United States wherever American interests are at stake. The primary agent of a more unified and independent Europe will be the European Union. For the near term, anyhow, the Union will be only the collective expression of its sovereign members, most importantly France and Germany. There is no way of predicting where the metamorphosis toward a more united Europe may plateau, but the surrender of national sovereignty in the area of defense will take a good deal of time—if it happens at all.

Although the EU will be the central organization, the WEU will perhaps attract more attention in the security arena. The WEU, busily operationalizing its new headquarters in Brussels, and having absorbed the IEPG armaments cooperation and many EUROGROUP functions related to NATO, has achieved new momentum. The WEU is the emerging expression of European security and defense decisions on everything from crisis response in the former-Yugoslavia to security relations with Central and Eastern Europe. Also, like the WEU, the recent activation of the Eurocorps headquarters in Strasbourg, France provides notable definition to Europe’s capability and intent to meet the U.S. as a full partner.

All these developments notwithstanding, political Europe—the Europe slowly coalescing toward political union—is a very newborn entity whose adult form will not be distinguishable for a long time. It will need and benefit from a big brother in the security field for a while, and not just as a catastrophic insurer. The U.S. wants Europe to begin by taking on the political-economic burdens of crisis prevention, and making the initial military response to regional crises.
In turn, Europe needs assurance the U.S. will stand behind it, still fully committed to European security and defense through NATO. Until Europe can acquire its own capabilities in such areas as intelligence, information warfare, and strategic lift, its military reactions to crisis will be largely tethered to U.S. commitments of support in these functional areas.

In concept, then, when a crisis is still on a small scale, European-led diplomatic and even military initiatives could end the predicament short of reaching regional or global proportions. Europe assumes a greater role in regional security and stability, with an engaged, collaborative U.S. in a close support role. In situations where the NATO Treaty’s Article Five is invoked, or a fast building crisis takes on global implications, the U.S. would be the logical leading partner.

**Conclusions**

The overriding characteristic of ESDI is that it is growing with increased momentum. Although national positions cover a wide range—and many nations’ positions are far from well defined as internal debates carry on—all ten WEU member powers support the establishment of an ESDI, with a bona fide capability to act separately from the Atlantic Alliance when required. The U.S. now genuinely supports the emergence of ESDI. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that some separate European identity is somewhere in the future.

The issues are how rapidly it will arrive, and under what principles will it share the stage with the Atlantic Alliance. Both of these issues go to the heart of the current problem: how two separate organizations can divide responsibility for the same tasks and in the same geographical space, while serving two different, independent masters (NATO and the WEU/EU). NATO is anxiously attempting to move away from sole reliance on collective defense and into the new security "markets" of crisis management and peacekeeping. Likewise, the WEU reasserts its collective defense role only generally (albeit pointedly) while expanding its crisis response and peacekeeping capabilities as rapidly as resources allow.
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Since the earliest days of the Alliance, there has been a fundamental tension between European cooperation and Atlantic cooperation. The two concepts are essentially incongruous. It has been the weakness of ESDI and strength of the external threat that kept tensions manageable throughout the Cold War. Now things are very different. The growth of ESDI and evolving trans-Atlanticism must be managed more carefully than ever before. It is true that the U.S. and the Atlanticist-leaning allies accept ESDI as an unsuppressible aim of all European allies. Europeans, including France, support the need for a continuing U.S. presence in NATO’s integrated military structure.

The relationships between Atlanticist and Europeanist, between NATO and the WEU, between ESDI and trans-Atlantic security and defense cooperation have entered a period of dynamic shift. Whereas during the Cold War NATO was the unchallenged champion of collective defense and crisis response, today the WEU responds to crises alongside NATO, as in the Balkans. In future, both institutions may assert legitimate roles in both collective defense and crisis response. In the end, as Europe succeeds in its bid to integrate, it should no longer require U.S. leadership for regional crisis response. It will only need U.S. political-military backing and, naturally, assurances for collective defense. Even then, defense situations may not automatically necessitate a call on America.

Therefore, as ESDI grows stronger and assumes a greater role, the trans-Atlantic burden of European security will quite naturally shrink in scope. This should be an acceptable scenario for the Allies, so long as NATO neither draws down too fast nor needlessly resists the growth of ESDI. The essential criteria will be to preserve and indeed strengthen what has been achieved through NATO, and therein lies the answer as to how fast ESDI should move forward.
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Notes

1. The Pleven Plan was named for the French Prime Minister in 1950. In his October speech to the French Assembly, he proposed a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC). See Martin Holland, European Community Integration (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 29.

2. See Alfred Cahen, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 2, The Western European Union and NATO (Brassey's UK, 1989), 91.

3. The other pillar is the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. For a concise description of the European Union and its three pillars see the "U.S.-EC Facts and Figures" published quarterly by the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Mission to the EU, Brussels, Belgium.


5. EUROGROUP is an informal arrangement within the Alliance. From its inception in 1968 until 1992, it consisted of several sub-groups, each chaired by a member state, for the aim of strengthening key aspects of their contributions to NATO and launching an information campaign in America to help allay burden-sharing concerns. The sub-groups were EUROCOM (communications), EUROLOG (logistics), EUROLONGTERM (long term planning), EUROMED (military medicine), EURONAD (armaments cooperation), and EURO/NATO Training (training facilities). In 1992, primary responsibility for EUROGROUP and all sub-groups but EUROLONGTERM and EURO/NATO Training were taken over by the WEU. See NATO Facts and Figures (NATO Information Service, 1989), 20-22.

6. Ten years after NATO established its Council of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in 1966, the 13 European members of NATO—all but Iceland—established the IEPG with the aim of promoting European collaboration in defense equipment matters. The IEPG focused on three areas: operational requirements, research and technology, and opening up European defense equipment markets. In December 1992 IEPG functions were transferred to the WEU and the IEPG was replaced by the Western European Armaments Group or WEAG.

7. Peacetime for NATO is essentially anything short of collect defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In future, NATO intends to rely primarily on the CJTF concept to provide a military response to crisis in non-Article 5 situations.

8. France left the integrated military structure in 1966 in order to operate independently except in the event of an actual attack on NATO territory. Ever since, France has sought to increase layers of political
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oversight on the activities of the major NATO Commanders, especially planning for non-Article 5 scenarios. The MNC are now only SACEUR and SACLANT, both Americans.

9. In addition to ten full members, there are two associate members and nine associate partners that could provide forces to WEU. The full members are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom; Norway and Turkey (two non-member European states who are in NATO) are WEU associate members; and the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia are associate partners. All these nations may provide forces to a WEU operation. Iceland is also an associate member but has no forces, and there are five WEU observer states, namely, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden.
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American Engagement in Europe: The Go-Go Scenario

Gebhard Schweigler

Entanglement or Isolation?

"It takes two to tango," President Ronald Reagan used to remind critics of his approach toward the Soviet Union. Since then, the "Cold War Tango" has become history. The collapse, first of the Wall in Berlin and then of the Soviet empire, has brought to an end the well-ordered, though extraordinarily dangerous world of superpower bipolarity. The new world order appears to be very much in flux. Along with the new ebb and flow of international politics, the American engagement in Europe has been put in doubt: Could it be swept away by new—or old—historical forces? "It takes two to stay entangled" might be the proper answer to those who worry about an end to the American engagement in Europe. While it is conceivable that this "entangling alliance" could be canceled unilaterally, it is far more likely that it will break apart only if both sides find it no longer in their interest to maintain it. The European-American alliance will most surely dissolve only if the United States wants to leave for home, and if Europe wants it to go home. Such a development, where both sides desire an end to their entanglement and want the United States to go, can be termed the "go-go scenario."

The "go-go scenario" in some quarters appears to have replaced the Cold War Tango as the international development with the greatest political sex-appeal. The "bumping and grinding" of domestic politics in both the United States and Europe, and the "veil show" behind efforts in Western Europe to establish a security
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identity of its own, continue to attract the close attention of many observers. There is even the occasional call to "take it all off." Such demands usually arise from the desire for a more equitable burden-sharing arrangement—something which American congressmen have come to refer to as "burden-shedding." The latest such congressional proposal, which did indeed amount to a political striptease of sorts, called for the European allies to reimburse 75 percent of the non-personnel cost of U.S. troop stationing in Europe; for each percentage less, the U.S. would have had to withdraw another 1000 soldiers. That proposal, accepted by the House of Representatives but ultimately rejected by the Senate, could be seen as reflecting an underlying American mood. Thus is the "go-go scenario's" political sex-appeal enhanced and maintained. But how realistic is it?

European Perceptions and Interests

For the "go-go scenario" to come true, Europe—all of Europe!—would have to be convinced that it is in Europe's interest to sever military ties with the United States, that U.S. military guarantees are no longer needed, and that an American military presence in Europe to make those guarantees credible is no longer required. Quite likely, such a separation of military ties would also result in looser political and economic relations, a development Europeans would have to be willing to accept or might perhaps even desire.

Not too many years ago, the "go-go scenario" would have appeared ludicrous. Today, the idea that Europe and the United States might amicably agree to go their separate ways does not quite seem that outrageous anymore. One intervening factor has obviously been the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Now that the alliance's glue has dissolved into (hopefully) historical oblivion, the cohesiveness of the bonds that tied Europe and America together seems in doubt. Another factor has been the reunification of Germany, which—fifty years after the Second World War—saw Germany reemerge as a member in good standing of the community of nations. If the original purpose of the alliance was indeed to keep the Russians out and the Germans down by keeping the Americans in, the alliance would appear to have lost
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its rationale. Five years after the end of the Cold War it is becoming quite clear that the new world order is neither as peaceful nor as threat-free as many might at first have hoped. It was not just the unfolding of unfortunate events in the former Yugoslavia that served as a reminder of the unsettled nature of politics in Europe. The failure of the two most important successor states of the former Soviet Union, Russia and the Ukraine, to get their houses in order similarly tends to serve as a reminder that the potential for great unrest still exists. Thus, distrust of Russia is still fairly strong among Western publics, as is dissatisfaction with the general state of the world. Such distrust and dissatisfaction are not as strong as Cold War fears of the Soviet threat, but they do contribute to a recent sense of the importance of maintaining a certain level of military preparedness to guard against remaining—or reemerging—risks.

The critical question is whether Europe can deal with these remaining risks on its own, or whether it needs to rely on U.S. help. In some areas, the answer seems quite obvious. For instance, control of the nuclear weapons now in the possession of four successor states simply requires American involvement. Only the United States has both the political clout and the technical means to help arrange the dismantlement and safe handling of some 35,000 nuclear weapons left behind by the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, until a sufficiently large number of nuclear weapons have been dismantled in the former Soviet Union, the comparatively small nuclear arsenals of the two European nuclear powers, France and Great Britain, will not suffice to offer a credible deterrent against the risk presented by nuclear weapons in the hands of potentially unreliable regimes. Thus, Europe remains interested in the protection afforded by the American nuclear umbrella.

In other security areas, however, Europe could conceivably become self-sufficient. It certainly commands enough manpower and economic resources to provide for more. Not only have various U.S. Administrations (and congressional zealots) at times pressed Europe to do more for its own defense, but the European countries themselves have agreed, at least in principle, on the need to establish a security and defense identity of their own. Yet,
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Western Europe, lacking such essential military assets as real-time satellite intelligence, massive airlift capabilities, and power-projection air forces and navies, is at this point militarily not capable of dealing with major crises. (That it also lacks, for the time being, the political capabilities adequately to engage in crisis-management was made amply clear in the course of the catastrophe unfolding in the former Yugoslavia.) Conceivably, Western Europe could acquire those assets, but only at tremendous costs. The willingness of European publics to agree to such defense expenditures—which amount to a costly duplication of efforts—is very much in doubt. Thus, it remains in Europe's interest to rely on an alliance in which the principal partner continues to make vitally needed assets available. Thus, the premier role in European security affairs will continue to be played by NATO. This reflects the state of public opinion in Western (and Eastern) Europe, which places much more confidence in NATO than in the Western European Union (WEU).

Many Europeans may feel a strong desire to overcome their dependence on the United States. Basically, they would like to think that they are a peaceful people, capable of handling their own affairs. Thus, to admit that they still need to rely on the United States as their pacifier can be psychologically difficult. That pain, however, is somewhat ameliorated by the realization that they are enjoying a good bargain as long as they can import security from the United States on the cheap. For many Americans, the situation is almost the reverse; they feel that the United States should no longer be so dumb as to expend a considerable portion of its defense efforts on a Europe that seems to relish the free ride which has been provided by the United States. Yet one overwhelming reality remains: most Europeans (and quite likely many Americans as well) are not yet certain that Europe could indeed live in peace without the pacifying presence of American power—a presence that serves a balancing function, a reassuring function, and a leadership function. The United States and Europe will continuously have to adjust the terms of their trans-Atlantic bargain at the margins in order to allow for more acceptable burden-sharing arrangements and to placate the desires
for greater independence on both sides. But at the core, the alliance remains very much in the interest of the Europeans.

Europe’s alliance with the United States—and more specifically its provision for the stationing of American troops in Europe—was concluded not only in order to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat. It was also a measure designed to keep a possibly resurgent Germany under control. Has that rationale for the alliance’s existence disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany? Certainly the Germans themselves are firmly convinced that they no longer represent a threat to peace in Europe. During the course of the Cold War, the Germans (most certainly those in the Federal Republic) internalized many of the constraints that were originally imposed upon them from the outside. As a result, they lost almost all taste for the exercise of power; they also developed a distinct fondness for the integration of Germany into supranational organizations, from NATO to the European Union. Germany succeeded in rehabilitating itself.

The question remains, however, whether united Germany will turn out to be a new Germany—one that will not only be more powerful, but will also take new and possibly irresponsible delight in the exercise of power. Thus, the question concerning the future of the American engagement in Europe hinges to a considerable degree on the path Germany is likely to take. Were Germany, for instance, to fulfill the extreme expectations of some so-called “realists” and find its way “back to the future” as an insecure European power (looking for security either in a reversal of alliances or in the acquisition of nuclear weapons), the potential role of the United States in Europe and vis-à-vis Germany would be dramatically different than were Germany to remain solidly in the fold of the Western alliance and reliably beholden to the terms under which it achieved reunification. Even under less dramatic circumstances there would still remain the question whether Germany will eventually emerge as a more “normal” power, ready and willing to take on new responsibilities, or whether it will seek to stay in the comfort of the cocoon which it spun for itself during the Cold War. A Germany that plays less of a role than it is being assigned as a result of its location and status in Europe could be
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as upsetting to alliance politics as a Germany that attempts to overreach its power.

Germany's future role will emerge as the result of a complex interplay of domestic and international developments. The starting point for this process, however, offers more than reasonable assurance that united Germany will behave responsibly and reliably, and certainly not become a threat to alliance cohesion. The very terms under which unification took place sought to ensure that. They locked united Germany into a position of external as well as internal continuity. Rather than setting up a truly new Germany by merging its Eastern and Western portions into a new constitutional entity, the five new Länder of the former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic, which thus never went out of existence and therefore never shed any of its external ties and obligations. Not so incidentally, this process also had the effect of keeping the East Germans (comprising slightly less than a quarter of the total population) in a political position where they are unable decisively to influence German politics, not even by veto. The new Germany accordingly is very much like the old Federal Republic writ large.

A good deal of polling data shows a strong and continuing German interest in maintaining the alliance, as well as somewhat mixed feelings for having American troops in Europe stationed almost exclusively on German soil (where, depending on local conditions, they can be as much of a nuisance as a welcome provider of jobs and income). Attitudes of this kind will likely continue to fluctuate. But underlying such fluctuations is a solid bedrock of support for the alliance, which is composed of a long history of friendly relations, the continued perception of remaining risks, and the need of the Germans to hold onto an anchor of stability in turbulent times. There is also the realization that Germany's difficult geopolitical situation in the heart of Europe is made somewhat easier as long as the relationship with the United States—and the presence of American troops—reassures potentially worried neighbors. Overall, this state of public opinion is also reflected in German politics. No major party has endorsed a drastic shift away from the alliance. For the foreseeable future,
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united Germany is not going to "send the boys home" or bring the alliance to an end. Much of German politics will thus remain old.

But new policies will have to be pursued in response to new external conditions and demands. For instance, a united Germany, internationally rehabilitated and potentially powerful (as a demonstration of which it is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council), cannot abstain from some of the tasks that have to be performed in order to make or keep peace in international trouble spots outside the NATO area. Germany some time ago began to test the envelope of a self-imposed constitutional constraint by having small German military units participate in UN activities in Cambodia and Somalia, in NATO activities in the sky over Bosnia, and in WEU naval blockade measures in the Adriatic Sea. Now that Germany’s Constitutional Court has ruled favorably on the legality of the Bundeswehr’s involvement outside NATO’s traditional area of business, Germany is likely to become engaged more and more in such activities.

By now, public opinion is clearly in favor of it; eventually, politics will follow suit. It may be too early yet to speak of Germany’s "geopolitical maturity". While German public opinion has moved in the direction of supporting peacekeeping missions of the Bundeswehr, it remains quite adamantly opposed to participation in UN-sanctioned military interventions such as the Gulf War. The "culture of reticence" as a result of the internalization of external constraints is likely to prevail for a long time to come.

One of the overriding concerns of German foreign policy after the end of the Cold War is to provide for peaceful and stable conditions along its Eastern border. For that reason, Germany considers the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe (along with Ukraine and Russia) as a zone of democratic and economic stability of primary importance. Germany is not alone in that desire (which in some quarters is misunderstood as a German longing to re-establish a predominant political and economic position in Eastern Europe). Ever since Secretary of State James Baker declared the goal of establishing a community of democratic nations "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," the idea of enlarging the Western community has informed alliance policies. President
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Clinton raised it almost to the level of a doctrine when his National Security Adviser Anthony Lake proclaimed "enlargement" as the proper policy to follow "containment." The United States will have to be involved to a significant degree in the process of establishing a peaceful, democratic, and relatively prosperous Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe are looking to NATO to fulfill their security requirements, and to the EU to satisfy their economic and political needs. American involvement is thus expected and required. The urgent task of reconstructing Eastern Europe is another, perhaps even a primary reason for the continued interest of all European countries in maintaining the American engagement in Europe.

The magnitude of the problems to be solved on the way to enlargement can be perceived only dimly. Yet historical and current experiences offer some clues. The United States provided 1 percent of its GNP for a period of five years by way of the Marshall Plan to help Western Europe recover from the ravages of the Second World War. Germany discovered after its reunification that it will likely need to spend some 5 percent of its GNP for a period of at least ten years to bring its eastern portion up to the level of Western Germany. Surely the United States and Western Europe together are not going to invest 5 percent of their GNP (which would amount to roughly $600 billion per year) or even 1 percent of their GNP in order to help Eastern Europe recover politically and economically from the Cold War. Just as evidently, however, the resources that have been provided so far (little more than $100 billion over the past five years) will not suffice to do the job.

The alliance's answer to that dilemma is rapidly proliferating programs for partnership, from the Partnership for Peace offered by NATO and the associate partnership developed by the WEU, to the "partnership for development" proposed by experts from the E-10 (Eastern European states) and the G-7. Russia represents a particular problem in these partnership proposals. While the United States would prefer to conduct its relations with Russia on the basis of a "pragmatic partnership", Russia is insisting on "true partnership" (which means it is insisting on a special status as a "partner for peace"). But in all instances the goal of these
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partnership programs is to help lay the groundwork for lasting reforms as a precondition for closer East-West cooperation. The fact that partnership—with the perspective of eventual membership—is now on the agenda is not without long-range significance. In particular, it unites Western Europe and the United States in a joint effort to enlarge their own community and to bring its benefits to Eastern Europe. American entanglement in European affairs is therefore being strengthened in the wake of the Cold War, and not weakened.

American Perspectives and Interests

The United States, through various administrations, has always insisted that it would not leave Europe unless it were explicitly asked to do so. Europe has never yet formulated such a request; nor, as the foregoing analysis has attempted to show, is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Since one should not needlessly doubt such fundamental protestations on the part of American presidents—which have, after all, guided American policies for almost one quarter of the United States' existence—there is a strong presumption that the American engagement in Europe will be maintained.

Yet the possibility that the United States might change its course drastically and decide to remove itself from Europe should not be ruled out entirely. As the result of fundamental attitude changes on the elite or public opinion level, Americans might become disillusioned with their engagement in Europe and turn their attention elsewhere. In short, Americans might adopt new definitions of their national interests. The debate over what constitute American national interests is as old as the Republic. Over the years, certain patterns have emerged. There is always a sizable group of Americans who argue in favor of "America First." That group is itself split into what might be termed a liberal wing, i.e., those who prefer that political attention be focused on the solution of domestic (primarily social) problems, and a "realist" wing that argues that the United States should not get involved in foreign problems because to do so would either be too costly or might sully America's soul, thus risking America's decline. The American public apparently took to the (liberal) argument that the
Cold War had produced significant fault lines in American society that now need to be fixed. Governor Bill Clinton—with his unofficial campaign slogan "It's the economy, stupid!"—rode that wave of feelings into the White House. Ever since, the Clinton Administration has largely followed a policy of assigning priority attention to domestic problems. This has created the impression that the United States might, in fact, revert to a policy of isolationism, if not by design then by default.

"Realist" critics of continuing American involvement abroad have kept up their pressure to convince Americans to follow a true policy of "America First." But the "realists" themselves are not of one persuasion. From a different perspective, one that recognizes the importance of America being Number One in the world, it is equally realistic to argue in favor of America’s broader interests in a secure, democratic and prosperous Europe, as did former Secretary of State James Baker, when he wrote that "the nightmare America and her allies must avoid is a fractured and fascist Europe." That nightmare might become true if Washington fails "to increase West-West coordination and cooperation." The Clinton Administration shares that perspective, when it claims: "If there is one thing this century teaches us, it is that America cannot afford to ignore conflicts in Europe."4

There is also a liberal side to the "America as Number One" perspective. Unlike the "realists" view with its emphasis on narrowly defined national interests (particularly the maintenance of a balance of power), it does not necessarily see a danger to America’s well-being lest the United States control events around the world. Rather, it is interested in promoting American values abroad, simply because the replication of such values is considered America’s mission and thus confirms the moral and political exceptionalism of the United States. A somewhat more sophisticated view, frequently propounded by President Clinton, also holds that a world organized along the American model will therefore be a more peaceful and prosperous one.

American attitudes towards international involvement tend to fall into these four broad categories of liberal and "realist" perspectives in regard to "America First" or "America Number One" positions. The lines between these categories are by no
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means firmly drawn, neither in terms of the underlying arguments nor in the way public opinion presents itself. This can lead to a confusing picture of public attitudes. Public confusion, in turn, merely tends to mirror the similarly perplexing nature of published arguments (and, more recently, the apparently quite unsettled foreign policy pursued by the Clinton Administration). Nevertheless, some broad conclusions concerning the state of American public opinion regarding the United States' international involvement—and especially its engagement in Europe—are possible.

On the whole, the American public remains rather more internationalist-minded than isolationist-inclined.\footnote{5} Still, there can be little doubt that the current mood is one of emphasizing the primacy of domestic problems. To the extent to which such concerns are not being met, Americans are likely to register their disappointment and dissatisfaction. After a slight respite at the beginning of President Clinton's term in office, Americans, one year later, in fact showed themselves highly dissatisfied "with the way things are going in this country today."\footnote{6} For a slight majority of them, it seemed obvious that "America is in a state of decline."\footnote{7} Yet the interest in the United States' playing a credible leadership role internationally remains almost as strong as the desire to concentrate on domestic issues.

Of course, the dissatisfaction with the Clinton Administration's foreign policy performance had a lot to do with the way the American involvement in difficult trouble spots—from Somalia to Haiti and Bosnia—actually played out. But the Administration's uncertain conduct merely reflected the public's own hesitation. The Clinton Administration at first sought to take account of this hesitant public mood by following a policy of "assertive multilateralism," designed to have the United Nations—with strong American leadership and participation—play a more prominent role. That policy, which seemed to rest on strong public support for the United Nations and its world-wide peacekeeping missions\footnote{8} as well as on the American public's desire not to have the U.S. involved alone or bearing most of the burden, nevertheless faltered when it began to appear as if the U.N. was going to be engaged in too many missions with uncertain risks, potentially high costs, and
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no clear "exit points." President Clinton's foreign policy *leitmotiv* has always been: "Together where we can, on our own where we must." After that reassessment, it would seem that "together" will remain rather restricted, and "on our own" will not be invoked all too often by his administration.

In general, Americans prefer (by a margin of 60 percent to 40 percent) that their armed forces be used only when national interests are directly at stake. Yet they are prepared to support their President in case he orders the use of military force, even if a majority of the public originally disagrees (such a "rally-round-the-flag" effect has been frequently observed in the past). The question of helping to defend Western Europe seems to have disappeared from American public opinion polls after the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of (formerly) Soviet troops from Germany and Eastern Europe. This is realistic enough, even though Russia is still not discounted entirely as a potential threat, or trusted to live up to the expectations now placed upon it. Thus it is somewhat difficult to gauge the public's commitment to the American military engagement in Europe. Available data do suggest, however, that the American public remains in favor of NATO and the American military presence in Europe. There is (surely a reflection of the state of public opinion on the subject) no strong demand within the American body politic for a withdrawal from NATO, and only a moderate demand for an adjustment of the American military presence in Europe on the basis of a more adequate burden-sharing arrangement.

In short, the general sense of confusion and hesitation about the American role in world affairs after the end of the Cold War has so far not led to either an all-around isolationist impulse or to a specific desire to reduce, much less end, the American engagement in Europe. Europe will, of course, have to meet American expectations that the United States not bear the burden of leadership alone. Given professed European intentions concerning the desirability of shared leadership, the rapidly multiplying schemes of partnership, and—last but by no means least—actual European involvement in hot crisis spots, that should, in the end, not become a problem for European-American relations
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(even if irritations over who is to do how much where and when inevitably arise). The two seem destined to stay entangled.

Yet there does remain the possibility—which is a nagging fear in Europe—that the United States might reorient itself away from Europe and toward Asia. The Clinton Administration initially raised that possibility almost to the level of political dogma with occasional prominent references to the "primacy of Asia" and the importance of "big emerging markets". Within the Administration, the possibility of such a shift to Asia led to spirited debates, which were reflected not only in any number of conflicting policy statements, but also in the difficulties the Clinton Administration apparently faced in arriving at basic policy documents. Thus the congressionally mandated annual report on the nation's national security strategy was delayed because of bitter disagreements between the Pentagon (which insisted on defining national security in traditional geopolitical military terms) and the State Department (which wanted to place greater emphasis on such new foreign policy concerns as economic prosperity, population growth, and global climate change and thus tended to focus on the presumed "soft power" of economic and cultural relationships). These differences, too, reflected a lack of agreement as to the relative importance of Europe and Asia.

By now—but especially after the President's first forays to Europe—such disagreements appear to have abated. Europe and Asia are considered to be of equal importance to the United States. This more even-handed approach reflects some important underlying realities—not least the fact that, as far as the American public is concerned, Europe, in terms of politics and economics, remains the preferred object of orientation.

The attractive appeal of Asia rests primarily on the tremendous economic growth potential of the Pacific Rim countries. An Administration that is dedicated to the proposition that its primary obligation is to correct domestic economic ills and in the process make the United States strong internationally as well must consider such an area of dynamic economic growth as a target of top priority. But there is the problem of a huge trade deficit incurred by the United States in its trade with Asia. In having to deal with the problems this deficit causes, the United States must
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necessarily turn its political attention to Asia; yet the constant
dissension also tends to distract from the appeal otherwise
exercised by the Pacific Rim countries.

Trade and investment opportunities aside, American political
attention remains riveted to some extent on Asia simply because
the Cold War has not yet been fully won there. Of the five
surviving Communist countries, four are in Asia. To curb North
Korean ambitions, especially with regard to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons, must be a top priority of American foreign
policy (and is considered as such by public opinion). Another top
priority is China. Dealing with China presents enormous
difficulties to the United States. On the one hand, the United
States fully supports China's gradual process of economic reforms,
which has led to rapid economic growth, from which the United
States has also benefited greatly. On the other hand, China clearly
violates American ideals of democracy and human rights. Caught
in that conflict of interests (and needing China's help in dealing
with North Korea), President Clinton finally decided to suspend
the application of one of the last vestiges of Cold War legislation,
the Jackson-Vanek Amendment linking human-rights behavior
with American trade concessions, and grant China
most-favored-nation status. This decision was based on the hope
that China's approach to reform—economics first, politics
later—might in fact work better than the various "shock therapies"
tried in Russia and Eastern Europe, thus leading to an
improvement in China's human rights performance as well.

Underlying the United States' relations with Asia are two
issues not generally faced in relations with Western Europe. One
is the definite need for a continued American military presence,
arranged in a series of bilateral treaties, in order to keep various
potentially warring countries at peace; the Clinton Administration
is prepared to meet that task. The other is a still lively competition
with the emerging new Asia over the most promising roads to the
future. In Asia, the United States has not yet been accepted
generally as a role model and thus feels challenged and, at times,
even threatened. In Europe, all protestations over "cultural
dominance" and such notwithstanding, the American role model
has largely prevailed. This makes European-American relations
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seem less challenging and exciting. In the final analysis, however, that lack of ideological competition also provides for a sounder basis of mutual relations.

One final worry of many Europeans is that the United States might shift away from its close affinity with Europe as the result of major demographic changes. Current projections do indicate likely changes among the American population that are far greater than any such population shifts previously. Still, they hardly argue for a dramatic reorientation of American foreign policy. There is reason to believe that the "melting pot" will continue to function and that Americans will remain more of one mind than become a people composed of strongly differentiated—and pursued—identities. The unifying strength of the United States is clearly evident in the process of national homogenization that has taken place over the past decades. As a result, the importance of regional differences has declined significantly. The effects of this process can also be observed on the political landscape, which has become widely leveled. American politics has become more national and less regional. This development counteracts the potential effects of the gradual shift of the center of American social, economic, and political life away from the Northeast to the Southwest. The emergence of a "national establishment" that "looks like America" and thus reflects the globalization of American society will have the effect of globalizing American foreign policy interests.

Globalization is the exact opposite of isolationism. That is the good news for America's partners, as is the fact that a more globalized American foreign policy in many instances lies in the immediate interest of the European countries themselves. The not so good news for Europe may be at least twofold. One is the increasing problem of political gridlock stemming from demand overload, resulting in foreign policy indecision of the kind the Clinton Administration has so far amply demonstrated. The other is the likelihood that the United States will, in the end, be forced to pay somewhat less attention—and devote fewer resources—to European affairs. Everything considered, however, it appears highly unlikely that the United States will lose all interest in
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Europe. Its basic engagement in trans-Atlantic relations should not be in doubt.

From Engagement to Community

In the early years of the Cold War, a Princeton-based team of American social scientists raised the possibility that, as a result of the American engagement in European affairs, a transatlantic "pluralistic security community" might be formed.13 Such communities had arisen before at different times and under different circumstances. Their most important characteristic was that war among the members of such a community had become unthinkable. To achieve that happy state of affairs, community members had to share basic (democratic) values, enjoy a high degree of economic intercourse (resulting in a comparatively high standard of living for all), and conduct their relations on a mutually predictable basis—the result of shared values, much knowledge about each other, and functioning institutional ties. After the end of the Cold War, it can be argued with a great deal of certainty that just such a "pluralistic security community" has indeed been formed between Western Europe and North America. This community appears to have taken on a life of its own, independent of the threats that originally tied it together. Because of this internal dynamic, it will not dissolve quickly now that these threats have faded. The basis of shared values remains strong, the level of economic interchange is higher than ever, and the institutional ties have not been broken. These facts allow it to weather new challenges, particularly in the economic sphere that now looms so much larger in importance.

Yet the maintenance of this community does require constant care and attention. It must strive to live up to its shared values, internally as well as externally. It must maintain a strong economic base with a high level of intra-community trade. It must produce the kind of knowledge about each other that allows continued mutual predictability of behavior. It must retain the institutions that tie it together. And its members must be willing to consider the interests of others and to engage in necessary compromises. To fulfill all these tasks is by no means easy, as developments since the end of the Cold War have shown.
Domestic problems of increasing urgency and the reluctance to engage in international crises of immediate relevance (such as in Bosnia) threaten to erode the basis of shared values. Economic problems increase the temptation to protect domestic interests through protectionist legislation or the creation of regional trading blocs. A decrease in the number of people immediately familiar with other countries (most drastically the result of reductions in the number of troops deployed overseas) might lessen the range of predictability. And the need to downsize military establishments could put NATO at risk—still the major tie that binds the transatlantic community together institutionally.

The political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic appears to be aware of these risks. The fact that much effort is being devoted to forestall them speaks both for the strong interest in the community and the likelihood that it can be maintained. The best evidence for that commitment is also the major task the community now faces: its enlargement to the east. A community no longer convinced of its worth would not seek to expand its reach and scope. Thus while there is no cause for complacency, there is reason for optimism. The "go-go scenario" will not be played out.

Notes
2. For evidence of the German public's readiness to have Germany take on a more active role internationally, see Ronald D. Asmus, "German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993," Report prepared for RAND and the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation, Santa Monica, CA: 1994; Frederick Kempe, "German Leaders Lag Public In Readiness for Global Role," Wall Street Journal-Europe, February 16, 19, p. 2; and "Neue Supermacht Japan?" Der Spiegel, 14/1994, p.81. In the latest available poll, 67% of the Germans thought it right that the United Nations employ military force to help make and keep peace in international crisis areas; 57% agreed that Germany should contribute troops to such efforts if the UN requests them.
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4. From a speech by Anthony Lake at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1994, quoted according to "Lake: Bosnian-Croatian Agreement Places Pressure on Serbs," U.S. Policy Information and Texts, April 8, 1994, 2.


6. In early 1992, the number of the "dissatisfied" stood at 68%; in early 1993, only 50% expressed their dissatisfaction. By March 1993, the level of dissatisfaction had reached 71%. Quoted according to "Opinion Outlook," National Journal, April 16, 1994, 920.


8. In March 1994, 77% of Americans agreed that the UN had contributed to world peace. About 89% said "it was important to cooperate with other countries by working through the United Nations." ("Poll Shows 4 Nations Differ On the Main Threat to Peace," New York Times, April 2, 1994, 6.)

9. In May 1993 (as in a series of polls since 1986), 57% said they would support sending American troops to a conflict abroad "if the president deems it is in the U.S. interest," while 39% pleaded for following public opinion and keeping the troops home. (See "Americans Still Internationalist in Outlook," 25.)

10. In early 1994, for instance, NATO was viewed with "positive feelings" by 40%, with "negative feelings" by only 14%. ("World Wire," Wall Street Journal-Europe, March 11, 1994, 1.) In the Chicago Council poll of October 1994, 56% of the public and 57% of the leaders were in favor of keeping the American commitment to NATO the same (a higher level of support than prevailed in 1990). A similar majority on the part of the public (54%) and a much larger majority on the part of the leaders (91%) also expressed themselves in favor of using U.S. troops if Russia invaded Western Europe. No other country or region enjoyed such a high level of potential military support. (See American Public Opinion 1995, p. 35.)


12. In the October 1993 Los Angeles Times poll, 50% of the public held Europe to be "most important" to the United States; only 31% accorded such prominence to Asia. Among the "influentials" the vote
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was generally the reverse; only members of the defense and security community (along with representatives from science and engineering) thought Europe to be more important than Asia. (See "America’s World Role: Divided We Stand," *Los Angeles Times*, November 2, 1993, H2.) In April 1994, 44% (against 38%) of the public said the United States should look toward Europe for more profitable trade relations. ("World Wire," *Wall Street Journal-Europe*, May 6, 1994, 1.) And, in October 1994, 49% as against 21% of the public considered Europe to be more important to the United States than Asia. Among the leaders interviewed for the Chicago Council report, 42% preferred Europe and 38% voted for Asia as the region of primary importance for the United States. (See *American Public Opinion* 1995, p. 23.)

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6

The New American-German Relationship and Trans-Atlanticism

Brian R. Sullivan

For want of better words, recurrent patterns in the history of relations among states are often described as "lessons of history" or "laws of history." The nature of the American-German relationship over the past five or six years, as well as its prospects for the future, brings to mind two of these so-called lessons or laws. The first is that an alliance rarely long survives the threat that led to the formation of that coalition. The second is that nothing creates the preconditions for war more than the rise or collapse of a major power. If these axioms are true, then—given the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the severe economic decline and ethnic conflicts being experienced by the Russian Federation—the American-German alliance and the general peace of Europe should both be heading toward disaster. And if these catastrophes are propelled by some kind of law of historical inevitability, then one can only join with James Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus in declaring that "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake."

Yet there are exceptions to the rule and, one might add, laws were made to be broken. Since 1989, the American-German alliance has survived the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Neither the fall of Russian power nor the rise of Germany to uncontested first place in overall political and economic strength among the countries of Europe has brought the continent to the brink of war. Quite the contrary. Despite the
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ongoing conflict in the western Balkans, Europe is less threatened by the prospect of general war in the mid-1990s than at any time since the forced retirement of Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor of Germany in 1890. Nor does the tragedy of a great European war appear at all likely in the foreseeable future. Despite the bloodshed in Bosnia, Moldova and the Caucasus region, the NATO states and the countries on which they border are far more secure than they were a decade ago.

A Long History that is Relevant

But before the so-called laws cited above are dismissed out of hand as worthless, one should consider that both appear to have been highly operative in shaping American-German relations throughout most of the twentieth century. The United States reluctantly abandoned its traditional isolationism to enter the Great War in April 1917 only because Germany appeared close to gaining mastery of Europe through military conquest. If Germany had succeeded, it would probably have become the greatest power on earth, completely upsetting the international balance. However, the American-British-French anti-German coalition dissolved less than three years after the defeat of the Central Powers in November 1918. American isolationism, an already powerful factor in United States foreign policy, was strengthened by the temporary disappearance of the German threat that had given rise to American support for British and French security. The withdrawal of an American commitment to come to the defense of Britain and France led, in turn, to the collapse of British and French commitments to each other. The resulting lack of Western resolve and the vacuum created by the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires created many of the preconditions for World War II. Most of the other preconditions were created by the sudden re-emergence of Germany as a great power in 1935-38.

The new German menace led to the creation of another countering alliance in 1940-41. But the destruction of the Nazi threat to Europe also led to the rapid demise of the anti-Nazi coalition. The Grand Alliance of 1941-45 fell apart about a year after the defeat of Hitler. The simultaneous 1944-45 debut of the
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Soviet Union and the United States as the major powers in Europe—as well as in the world—rapidly led to the danger of war, one that hung over the continent for the next forty years, to the division of Germany and to the formation of both North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, given the operation of the "laws" cited above, why have previous patterns been broken since 1990-91? And if these rules are no longer valid, is it merely an accident or the result of decisions made and policies followed by the states involved? Why has the relationship between Washington and Bonn survived the demise of the Soviet threat and the reunification of Germany? What chances are there that the relationship will remain healthy long past the day when the partnership becomes one between Washington and Berlin? This chapter attempts to answer these questions.

What Shapes the American Perspective

While it is hardly the intent here to consider all the causes and consequences of the two World Wars and of the Cold War in Europe, the general nature of those struggles must be considered in order to understand the basic nature of the present American-German relationship and the direction in which it appears to be headed—at least from the American point of view. In the century following the dismissal of Bismarck as Chancellor of the German Empire, first Germany and then Russia tried to gain and maintain hegemony over Europe. In each case, the United States intervened in Europe successfully to defeat such attempts. While it prompted serious American national debates in 1916-17, 1940-41 and 1946-49, each time a consensus developed that the domination of Europe by a single power did or would present the United States with deadly threat to its own security. Beginning in 1942, the United States established what was to become a permanent military presence in Europe, first to overturn the German hegemony, then to occupy a defeated Germany and, finally, to deter the Russians from establishing their own dominion over the continent. But the American military presence in Europe, which remains concentrated in Germany, although reduced after major force withdrawals, no longer serves any of such purposes.
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True, American forces in Germany may reassure some Europeans that the United States is both ready and physically able to restrain a German move to dominate the continent. Others may see the continuing American military presence in Germany as a guarantee that the United States remains committed to European defense against a possible eventual revival of the threat of invasion by Russian ground forces—or, at least, against pressure on Europe from a future revivified Russia. But neither of these hypothetical possibilities seems all that likely to occur from an American perspective. After all, if the United States government entertained serious fears of a third German attempt to dominate Europe, it would have hardly provided its enthusiastic backing for German reunification, especially given certain reservations on the part of the British, French and Italians. And the decline of the Russian economy to a size somewhere between that of Britain and Spain, clearly makes the Russian Army less and less formidable with every passing day.¹ The wretched performance of the Russian Army and Air Force in Chechnya provides fairly convincing evidence of what the collapse of the Russian economy and the resulting shrinkage of the Russian defense budget has done to Russian military capabilities.

Nor does the United States seem at all interested in becoming the master of Europe. It would hardly have reduced its forces in Germany by two-thirds if it did. American nuclear weapons, although useful for deterring the declining remnants of the Russian nuclear threat, seem to be irrelevant for the purpose of dominating the continent, even if Washington contemplated the idea. Certainly for all its size, the American economy (with a 1993 gross domestic product of $6.4 trillion) almost is matched by the economic power of the European Union, especially after the latter’s expansion by three new and prosperous members. (The Fifteen had a 1993 combined gross domestic product of $6 trillion).² In fact, the combined gross domestic products of Sweden, Finland and Austria alone are about 35 per cent that of Russia; a sign not only of Russian economic collapse but of the growing economic power of the European Union.³

Thus, even were it so inclined, the United States obviously could establish true hegemony over Europe only with the greatest
difficulty, if at all. Certainly the United States does exercise great influence in Europe. But as differences over the policies to be followed in Somalia, toward Iran, in Bosnia and regarding the eastward expansion of NATO demonstrate, the United States hardly controls its European allies.

**Forces: Symbol of American Resolve**

Instead, the continuing American military presence in Germany seems to represent something other than just a symbol of ongoing commitment to the defense of its NATO allies. Rather, it is an indication of American resolve that the patterns that dominated European history up to the downfall of the Third Reich will not recur. The foundation on which that resolve is based is the closest possible American-German cooperation, both to prevent any future conflict between the two countries and to prevent the emergence of a hegemony being established over Europe by any state. Thus, it seems to me that the new underlying purpose of American forces in Germany is not to occupy nor to protect nor to deter but to link American and German foreign and security policies in the most tangible manner possible. To some extent, this cooperation means the emergence of a new "Special Relationship," partially to replace the already badly-eroded relationship between Washington and London but of a fundamentally different nature. To a greater extent, American-German cooperation logically points to an American commitment to the increasing integration of the countries of the European Union to, first, the status of confederation (perhaps in twenty to thirty years) and, eventually, to a federation—in other words to the creation of a United States of Europe sometime in the second half of the 21st century.

That continued American-German cooperation seems to lead to the formation of a united Europe (at least as far east as the borders of the former Soviet Union) may not seem obvious at first consideration. But logic indicates that such, in fact, is the most sensible goal, even if unarticulated or possibly unconscious on the American part. For such a solution to the German question appears to be the only one that can satisfy American, German and other European needs and concerns. After all, the fear that attended German reunification (a fear enunciated, for example, at
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the infamous "Chequers Weekend" held for the benefit of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in March 1990) was that a powerful reunited Germany would quickly come to dominate the continent. The subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union and the precipitous decline of Russian power only increased such worries.

True, the German government bound itself to decrease the size of its armed forces as a quid pro quo for reunification and then carried out its commitments with punctuality and alacrity. But, as the events of 1919-33 in Europe make uncomfortably clear, for all the unquestioned good faith of the German government and people, such decisions can be reversed. Furthermore, many Europeans did not so much fear a crude German attempt to lord it over the rest of Europe by the threat or use of force but worried about German domination being gradually asserted by economic and demographic power.

Contemporary German Influence

The most relevant indication of contemporary German power is a comparison of the present economic balance in Europe with those of 1914 and 1939. On the eve of World War I, the German economy was roughly equalized by that of Britain. Following the German seizure of industrialized Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939, even the suddenly increased economic might of the Third Reich was still matched by that of both Britain and the Soviet Union. But in the mid 1990s, the size of the German economy exceeds that of its nearest European competitor, France, by about one-third; that of Britain by more than one-third; and that of Russia by nearly two times. Furthermore, once the huge ongoing investment in rebuilding Germany's northeastern region (estimated at eventually about $1.5-2 trillion) starts to bring economic and social returns, the size of the German economy relative to the other European states is almost certain to grow even larger.

From a practical viewpoint, there are only a few ways in which to balance the actual and relative increases in German power in a way that would reassure the other European states. One is through an ongoing commitment of American power to European security. For, despite all the late 1980s theorizing about the decline
of the United States, the present size of the American economy is considerably larger in comparison to the combined European economies than it was in either 1914 or 1939. It is quite possible that such an American economic advantage might increase over the coming decades. American economic growth has been exceeding the average of European Union member growth for a number of years. The successful restructuring of the American economy and ongoing European difficulties in dealing with their huge welfare payments burdens may give the United States even more economic advantages over coming decades. Furthermore, American defense spending exceeds the sum of that of all European states combined and seems likely to continue to do so for the indefinite future. Thus, an American guarantee that it is determined to prevent the emergence of either a hegemon or a semi-hegemon in Europe would be credible.

But what form is such an American commitment likely to assume in the coming decades? American troops may remain in Germany for some time to come. But, if the continuing decline of Russia is a correct hypothesis, then it seems highly improbable that American forces will remain in Germany for more than another two or three decades. In fact, if Western and Central Europe continue to make the transition to the post-Soviet era in a relatively peaceful manner, it is quite conceivable that American forces might be withdrawn from Germany sooner, perhaps even during the administration that succeeds that of President William Clinton. Whenever such a withdrawal occurs, American security ties to Europe probably would revert to the form they had in the very early days of NATO: a treaty commitment to defend Western and Central Europe but without the presence of significant—or even any—American ground and air combat forces on the continent. But such an American diplomatic and security guarantee alone probably would not be enough to reassure Germany’s European Union and NATO partners, no matter how carefully and inoffensively the Federal Republic of Germany conducted its foreign affairs. Fairly or not, the influence of the First and, especially, the Second World War is likely to haunt both European and American consciousness for a very long time, possibly well into the twenty-first century.
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A Transformed NATO is Crucial

The answer to these quandaries can only lie in the transformation of NATO into an alliance with a different purpose and in the strengthening of the European Union as an offset both to the rise of German and the decline of Russian power. To a certain extent this has already occurred on an informal level. This reality helps to explain why the so-called "laws of history" cited at the beginning of this chapter have not operated to destroy the American-German alliance. That is, the alliance has survived and even been strengthened because it has been transformed to serve new purposes. But for the sake of political and psychological clarity, the process needs to be formalized, to allow NATO to survive indefinitely, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and to prevent the shift in the European balance of power of 1989-91 from destabilizing the continent over the next several decades. In other words, European NATO forces, not those of the WEU, should become the military arm of the European Union. The Union itself should evolve into a system in which German power would no more threaten the other members of the European Union than California's huge economy and large population presently upset the other forty-nine American states. Such an arrangement could also help reassure Russia about the role of Germany in Europe as the European Union expands eastward, perhaps one day even to include such former Soviet republics as Ukraine.

Furthermore, such a NATO solution appears to be the only one which could promise the United States peace in Europe, particularly after its near-inevitable military withdrawal sometime in the next quarter century. For if denied both the security it presently enjoys as a result of American forces stationed on its soil, but also denied that reassurance which Germany would acquire as a member of a tightly integrated European Union, Germany would hardly choose to remain in isolation in the center of Europe. Far more likely, it would create a German-dominated coalition along it southern and eastern borders, and perhaps in other directions, as well. Alternatively, Germany might seek a security arrangement with Russia. In either case, Germany might very well feel forced to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a means of defense. However arranged or announced, such a move on
Germany's part undoubtedly would terrify the other European states. The resulting instability and suspicion that would sweep Europe might have dreadful consequences. The similarity of these hypothetical situations to those of Europe in 1912-1914 or 1939-41 are frighteningly obvious and must be avoided.

But such hypothetical German actions and alignments would be almost as dangerous for the United States as for Europe. Despite all the recent ongoing and likely transformations of the international system, the peace of Europe, as well as its freedom from the domination of a single power, remains one of the prerequisites for American security. The lesson that a general European war inevitably leads to American involvement is a reality not only indicated by the events of 1914-1917 and 1939-1941. Even in the most isolationist period of American history, that of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon involved the United States in four conflicts: three undeclared wars—with France, Spain and the Barbary Pirates—and the formal War of 1812 with Britain. It seems clear that whatever foreign policy the United States were to follow, whether internationalist or isolationist, the general peace of Europe is essential to the United States itself remaining at peace. Emerging technologies are only going to make the Atlantic narrower, further increasing the American-European interdependence.

But is the United States really willing to seek a permanent solution to the "German problem" in European history by actively working toward the creation of a united Western and Central European state, possibly a great pan-European state? If the very members of the European Union have backed away from the Maastricht process, is the United States going to push them back down a similar path to confederation? After all, is not a united Europe what the United States has fought two world wars to prevent? One might cynically observe that American enthusiasm for a united Europe seemed to evaporate once the Soviet Union collapsed. Perhaps more objectively, one could argue that a Europe united by the voluntary decisions of its member states eventually might prove every bit as menacing to American interests as a Europe forcibly united by Napoleon, Hitler or Stalin.
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Common Cause in European Unification

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that, someday, the United States of America and the United States of Europe might be involved in conflict with each other. But while foreign policy should be forward looking, it only can attempt to shape the immediate future. To try to carry out a foreign policy to prevent the hypothetical problems of a century hence would be absurd. For the foreseeable future, the alternatives to a joint American-German decision to reinvigorate the process of European unification seem even more threatening to the security interests of each. These frightening alternatives have been outlined above. Given the contemporary misgivings of the other members of the European Union about the possibility of being dominated by the new Germany, they require tangible American guarantees that movement toward confederation will involve no such danger. Given American concerns about the long-term potential threat posed by a united Europe, the United States needs to be intimately involved in providing for and in shaping European security on a permanent basis. Given the irremovable reality of Germany’s geographic position in Europe, Germans must have both security along their eastern borders and protection against any other threats from the east.

All these needs can be met by a reoriented and reinvigorated NATO and by the integration of Germany, its continental allies and, eventually, all its neighbors into a European confederation. However, as the derailment of the Maastricht process made clear, this is not going to come about by good intentions or wishful thinking. Such ends can only be accomplished by the application of power in a prudent, patient but creative manner. But contrary to opponents and critics of a revived movement toward European unification and an enhanced trans-Atlantic community, such goals are hardly impractical. Quite the opposite. Recent commemorations of events of World War II remind us of the cost of previous American-German hostility and, far more serious, of the terrible consequences of general war in Europe. Ongoing events in the western Balkans suggest what might be the fate of the members of the European Union were the process of integration not to succeed. As the two most powerful states
involved in maintaining the peace of Europe, the attainment of European unity and the escape from the destructive patterns of the European past have become the historical responsibility of the United States and Germany. It must be hoped that both logic and wisdom will lead them to assume that responsibility.

Notes

1. In 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated the gross domestic product of the Russian Federation to have been $775 billion in 1993, that of Spain to have been $498 billion and that of the United Kingdom to have been $980 billion. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1994 (Washington, 1994), 331, 368, 415.


4. On the decline of the American-British relationship, see, for example, Matthew d'Ancona, "Battle of Britain's future role," The Times, May 9, 1994, 7.


9. In 1914, the combined GDPs of Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Germany totalled about 108 percent of that of the United States. In 1939, the combined GDP of the same five countries totalled about 115 per cent of that of the United States. In 1993, the combined GDP of the five European countries equalled only about 80 percent of that of the United States. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, passim; CIA, The World Factbook 1994, passim.
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PART II
Strategies for a Future Partnership
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Strategies for a New Trans-Atlantic Relationship

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The trans-Atlantic relationship that served its member nations so well from the end of World War II to 1990 is proving hard to replace in the post-Cold War era. But then so are other elements of western strategy: our struggle to articulate and follow a coherent long-term strategy in Europe is the rule and not the exception.¹ The present United States Administration has come under considerable criticism from a number of influential opinion leaders for just this problem. The critics have included leading columnists, former government officials of both parties, academics, and of course the Republican leaders in the U.S. Congress.² The purpose here is not to enter that debate on one side or the other, but to analyze the direction U.S. foreign policy is taking to see whether a strategy for a new trans-Atlantic relationship suggests itself.

Whatever side of the debate one is on, critical or supportive of the Clinton administration, priorities are now emerging that will form the foundation of U.S. foreign policy for our entrance into the twenty-first century. Those priorities will set the broad context of a new foundation for cooperation between the United States and Europe in general, and Washington, London, Paris and Bonn in particular.

The process has not been smooth or particularly well defined, but four critical areas have emerged which the administration’s national security team has increasingly focused on as keys to the future security of the United States and its allies. The four challenges enjoy rough equivalency, which reflects more than just
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the balanced global character of U.S. foreign policy; it also provides a window on a slowly coalescing strategic vision that embodies advancement of America’s national interests in a multi-polar world.

The four key foreign policy challenges for the United States focus on the future of China, the question of who controls the Persian Gulf, the future of Russia, and the way in which Western European nations will relate to each other and to the U.S.

China

China is a nation with remarkable economic, political, and, yes, military potential. As a cooperative partner, it can serve as a force for stability in Asia, and indeed in other parts of the globe. As an adversary, it can complicate greatly the quest for stability and peace in Asia. The administration is giving high priority to examining our relations with China over a broad spectrum of issues with an eye to developing a cooperative, strategic relation with Beijing. This will require making some hard decisions in setting priorities and balancing off competing interests. It will also require skillful diplomacy.

The Persian Gulf

Since the mid-1970s, this region has commanded a great deal of attention from Washington and this will not change. We are engaged diplomatically and militarily in the region to limit Saddam’s ability to re-tool his military forces and to impose his brutal rule on the Kurdish population in the north of Iraq. We are keeping a wary eye on Iran as well, and in both cases we are watching closely any indicator that these nations are closing in on acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It seems clear that the United States has adequate staying power in the Gulf. The bedrock of our policy, to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil from the region, will continue to be among the highest priorities of our national security strategy.
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Russia

Russia's still sizable arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads poses a challenge for the West—we must continue our vigilance to ensure that the dismantling of the strategic nuclear delivery systems called for in the START agreements proceeds and that the remaining systems remain under tight, competent control. Beyond that, every indication is that with every passing year, we have less to fear from Russia as a direct military threat—at least in the foreseeable future. But Russia can be a problem for the west. While it may be in our interests, or at least not contrary to our interests, to have modest numbers Russian troops on Tadjik-Afghan border, or even in the Caucasus for a short time, we do not want to see the restoration of the "empire". This brings us close to home. It is important that we work together to strengthen the sovereignty to the key nations on Russia's western border, Ukraine in particular but the Baltics as well.

At the same time, to the extent that democracy takes hold in Russia, the chances of re-establishment of the "empire" or any aggressive threat to the West diminishes.

Western (and Central) Europe

Lastly, but not last in importance for us in the United States, is the need for a stable, secure Europe with strong trans-Atlantic ties. Here, we are witnessing a shift in perspective on the part of the U.S. government. We were of two minds: wanting a Western Europe that was willing and able to share with us the burden of defending against the Warsaw Pact while at the same time viewing with some suspicion movements on the part of our European allies to form security structures outside of NATO. Today, there is a view that continues to gain prominence that the United States needs a strong Europe to serve as a partner with us in the challenges that we face together. The success of a strong Paris-Bonn partnership to form the core of a strong security grouping with competent military forces is seen less and less as a threat to NATO and more as an opportunity to provide an organizing framework for efficient trans-Atlantic cooperation in meeting
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challenges to stability and security in Europe, particularly out of the traditional areas of NATO operations.3

Challenges to the Trans-Atlantic Relationship

The current policy debate about the U.S. security policy toward Europe and its participation in a trans-Atlantic relationship is badly focused. At one end of the spectrum is a debate that tends to focus on the conceptual question of which "framework" or "architecture" is the superior vehicle for U.S.-European cooperation in security matters. This discussion has even proved divisive at times and hardly provided stronger trans-Atlantic bonds. At the other end of the spectrum, far too much attention has been paid to the simplistic metric of counting the number of U.S. troops on the continent as the determinant of the relationship with little consideration of what these troops would do. It is not just our European allies that focus on numbers. The U.S. Congress does the same and our own debate in Washington is less than enlightened as a result.

The error of the first approach can be seen through an analogy with the European Union. European integration did not begin with debates about sovereignty and the power of transnational superstructures. Rather, Europe came gradually to these overarching issues by building up microeconomic agreements into a strong cumulative structure. The same logic applies to the U.S.-European security relationship. To begin by searching for the ideal Platonic security structure is exactly the wrong way to go about maintaining strong trans-Atlantic ties.

Treating U.S. troop levels in Europe as the measure of the health of the U.S. commitment to the alliance is no better and indeed ignores the demise of the Soviet threat. Sending U.S. conventional forces to Europe to do the same task as European conventional forces made some sense when they were heavily outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces. This makes no sense today and will be increasingly difficult to defend as questions are raised in the U.S. Congress and in some parts of the Administration: "Why are U.S. troops substituting for what European troops can do themselves?"
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A better approach is to build a trans-Atlantic relationship from the bottom up by constructing a framework for military cooperation based on the relative strengths of the militaries involved. In this framework, the allies could plan for a variety of strategic possibilities by identifying and cultivating the comparative military advantages: the diverse skills found in the various armed forces that yield military strength. For a crisis in or near Europe, strengths of European forces would include:

- Active combat forces present in the region
- Considerable local knowledge of the cultural and geographic characteristics of the crisis area
- Specialized units tailored to the terrain and operating conditions of the crisis area
- Sizable recallable reserve forces should rotation of personnel be necessary
- Relatively short lines of communication for resupply.

In the case of the United States, comparative advantages include:

- Deployable command, control, and communications systems
  - Ability to exploit satellite and reconnaissance aircraft systems to provide detailed battlefield intelligence
  - Strategic airlift capability
  - Sustainable naval operations to include a powerful ground strike capability
  - Stealth aircraft and standoff precision guided munitions for attacking heavily defended high value targets.

The payoff of approaching military cooperation in this way go beyond the specific military plans that could grow from it. For example, this approach allows efficiencies to be identified, provides a clear rationale to the U.S. Congress and public of the utility U.S. forces have in Europe, and provides a bottom-up foundation for cooperation at the senior policy making levels.4
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**Efficiencies**
Maintaining the elements necessary to deploy far from our shores—those comparative advantages cited above—have been, and will continue to be, an integral part of U.S. force planning. We face no serious invasion threat nor the prospect of heavy fighting near our borders; and since military power is brought to bear only when and where it is needed, considerations of deployability will always be integral to our force planning process. Since these are already in our infrastructure, it makes eminent sense for these capabilities to be brought to the table by the U.S. as we contemplate together the need to use military force on the periphery of NATO. Duplication of these capabilities by European militaries would be costly and divert limited resources from the challenge of maintaining those forces that provide a comparative advantage in the European region.

**Rationale**
An explicit recognition of comparative advantages would further help the U.S. administration in the burden sharing debate with our Congress. When our European allies were outnumbered by a large Warsaw Pact threat, there was some logic to sending U.S. conventional ground forces to do the same job as European conventional ground forces. This argument no longer holds sway and if our presence continues to be viewed through this prism, it is just a matter of time before Congress reduces the number of U.S. forces in Europe even further through legislative diktat. Articulating the U.S. military's continued presence in Europe on the basis of a cooperative deployment in which we have a unique role to play (as opposed to a redundant role) will not guarantee Congress's enthusiastic support but it does give a strong strategic rationale for continued robust military presence on the continent.

**A Foundation for Cooperation at Higher Levels**
A key advantage in this approach is that our co-operation begins first and foremost in the context of sound, competent, common sense military planning. This does not eliminate the question of
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which organization is best suited to take charge of an operation, but it can only improve the context in which that discussion takes place. For example, an acknowledgement of a key complementary role for U.S. forces eliminates the need to debate whether the U.S. should be in on deliberations over a planned military operation or not. The U.S. would be by definition and this could defuse concern from Washington over being excluded from the early stages of deliberations about an operation in which it might later be asked to take part.

There are a number of successful examples of an analogous bottom up approach to high level cooperation. The European Union has come as far as it has through a focus on building blocks. It began with negotiations over coal and steel, not broad conceptual debates over sovereignty and the meaning of a transnational authority. Over time, industrial goods and services were included in negotiations and only after these issues were agreed to (and digested) were the big issues of monetary and political union put on the table for serious discussion. By first establishing a legacy of utility through providing tangible economic benefits, overarching, conceptual issues of monetary and political union could be discussed.

A similar strategy is needed for our trans-Atlantic relationship. We should not try to anticipate what cannot be known, but if we commit to bringing key capabilities to the table, and talk openly about them in the several security fora that have emerged in Western Europe (NATO, WEU, NACC, CSCE, PFP, etc.), the pieces will be in place when we need to assemble them into a competent force package.

A further benefit of planning for complementary militaries is that planning could be greatly simplified. While integration of air defense, intelligence, and logistics gives way to complementary programs, then the ties between Europe and the United States will resemble modular building blocks rather than fully integrated military systems. Administrative overhead effort can be reduced and put into "tooth" rather than "tail."

The military staffs of the United States and the European allies will also have a new kind of demand facing them in this
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In the past, U.S. forces designated or deployed in Europe were built to be fully integrated with their counterparts—or at least that was the intent. An American corps was organized to plug holes if necessary in the NATO "layer cake" and a such had to be custom tailored to the center region of Europe. Today, it is no longer imperative to maintain staffs to co-ordinate operations among units from different nations. With a complementary approach, a much looser coupling is possible.

In effect, the need for standardization—a goal sought at considerable expense but only partially achieved—has been replaced in large part by the need for compatibility, and this is much simpler and much cheaper to attain. Examples of compatibility range from the obvious (European allies should buy equipment that can fit in U.S. C-5 aircraft) to the visionary (European allies could consider designing their aircraft to land on a U.S. aircraft carrier).

The need for compatible, rather than standardized forces, means that military planners could act more like strategic assemblers than resource allocators. NATO Cold War demands required a careful annual budgetary expenditure when there was a fixed threat. In the new environment, military planning will require instead an ability to pool different forces with different kinds of capabilities like modular building blocks to confront contingencies that we cannot define in advance.

In Cold War NATO, warning time was key. Warning of Soviet mobilization would have triggered a response by the NATO alerts system which integrated NATO forces in a complex process tailored to an invasion of Western Europe. In the new environment, nothing will be so clearly defined. We will not have the luxury of studying threats for years. Using the concept of modular building blocks we can cut down on response times by permitting a rapid assignment of tasks to forces and a rapid configuring of compatible units.

Defense planning conceived of as strategic assembly permits officials in each country to focus on its own core capabilities with lesser need to coordinate programs. This is fortunate since despite considerable effort, coordination between alliance nations was
imperfect at best even during the Cold War. Were the United States to concentrate on complementary military capabilities, the issue of why the U.S. is committing forces to Europe has a clear, easily understood answer: It makes no economic sense for Europe to build forces that parallel those of the United States because they do not have the same global interests as the United States.

Thus, the issue of cooperation is best dealt with through capacities rather than in a disagreement about the ambiguous institutional geometry of two pillars, the American relationship to the WEU, or the voting rules in the CSCE. These latter are contentious issues, and whatever resolution they receive will undoubtedly change as events alter current positions.

**The Risk of Doing Nothing**

We should make no mistake about the fragility of the military basis for the maintenance of a robust trans-Atlantic alliance. As recently as 1990, the U.S. had 300,000 military personnel in Europe of whom 230,000 were in Germany. The Bush administration, recognizing that it was appropriate to reduce our deployment in Europe, determined in 1991 that 150,000 troops would suffice as a prudent minimum. Two years later, the new leadership of the Office of Secretary of Defense conducted a Bottom up Review of U.S. force needs and determined that 100,000 would suffice. We are approaching that number now. But the pressure persists on that deployment and it is still vulnerable to moves by Congress (or the U.S. Army leadership for that matter) to withdraw more forces.

If no clear articulation of why U.S. forces are needed in Europe is forthcoming, the trend downward could very likely continue until the force that is present is a mere token with no capability to speak of.

A capabilities approach to alliance cooperation does not necessarily translate into a lower (or higher) force level. Naturally there is a correlation between force levels and capabilities. This proposal is not intended to present a new calculus to address the question "How much is enough?" in terms of numbers. It is intended to shift the debate away from the sterile consideration of numbers alone to give policy makers and Congress a more robust
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metric for determining the right types of forces and how to equip them. It is also intended to broaden the lens our allies use as they look at the U.S. commitment to Europe so that should we move to a number other than 100,000 troops, they will look in finer detail at the full implications of such a change.

The question of numbers cannot be avoided altogether, however. Our present deployment of U.S. Army combat forces supports a corps headquarters and our tactical fighter wings support the overhead needed to conduct modern air combat operations. There is not much room for further reduction before we would be cutting into to the very capabilities unique to U.S. forces. Moreover, this proposal for a new division of labor should not be seen as a call for complete disengagement of any participation of U.S. ground forces in an allied operation. We still have four combat brigades in Germany and these are available for joining with other European forces. In peacetime, these forces may well have a key role to play in training with and exercising with military units from former Warsaw Pact or neutral nations who have joined the Partnership for Peace and in whose militaries the army is the dominant service. Once again, this should not be the primary role nor the strategic justification for U.S. forces in Europe. Congress and the public are unlikely to support U.S. troops in the theater indefinitely if they are perceived as only (or even primarily) "substituting" for European forces.

Related Challenges

Two other key issues are the declining resources for defense and the obstacles posed by the German constitution to a robust participation of the Bundeswehr in coalition operations on the periphery of Europe where crises are most likely to arise. Both issues require bold and persistent efforts in order to bring adequate resources, both military and political, to bear under a new strategy.

The question of declining resources is well known. Since Mr. Gorbachev's seminal speech to the United Nations in December 1988 when he began the massive and lengthy withdrawal of Soviet (then Russian) troops from Europe, the U.S. defense budget has
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dropped from $350 billion to $250 billion today. From 18 U.S. Army divisions in 1988 we will have only 10 in our active force next year, while the number of active tactical fighter wings has dropped from 26 to 13 in the same time. The budget numbers for European members of NATO are not all that different. In short, we have to make do with less, which means efficiency is a must and a strategy for investing in and combining complementary military capabilities is a near imperative.

Consideration of how the Bundeswehr can participate in a new trans-Atlantic relationship can only be worked out through a thorough and informed debate in Germany, and with the passage of time. Nevertheless, there is ample need for the logistical, medical, staff, and financial support, to name a few possibilities, that have been provided either by Germany or by other nations with similar constitutional or legislative restrictions.

Conclusion

This is an important time for both sides of the Atlantic to be both creative and constructive. The need for strong trans-Atlantic ties remains key to United States' strategy as we approach the 21st century. But success in maintaining those ties is by no means guaranteed, and we will have to cope with both policy differences and budgetary pressures. Strains that have grown up over the question of how to cope with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is an example of the former, and the continued strain to keep a robust U.S. presence in Europe is an example of the latter. In this context, we are best advised to make sure that the U.S. maintains a sufficient military role in Europe to stay engaged with its continental NATO partners.

The key is to build the trans-Atlantic relationship from the bottom up, and to assign the U.S. military a unique and important role to play in Europe's security. Each nation's military brings a comparative advantage to the table, and by focusing each ally's contribution on its respective advantage, overall competence would be enhanced. This concept has the not unintended benefits of generating further cost-saving initiatives and of providing a clear rationale to the U.S. Congress on why U.S. forces remaining in
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Europe is important. With robust military cooperation "on the ground," NATO's inherent trans-Atlantic ties will be strengthened. A sound but yet to be implemented command concept for employment of a new, complementary military is the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative accepted in principle at the January 1994 summit. This concept should be operationalized.

There are other advantages to the U.S. and its allies in maintaining a robust deployment of U.S. troops in Germany. It allows us to keep in close operational contact with allied forces with whom we will be deploying in coalition operations outside of the NATO area. Furthermore, access to bases in Europe for deployments on the rim of NATO or as far away as the Middle East is a key part of our military strategy for that region.

It is arguable that a strong U.S. military presence in Europe has never been the sole glue of NATO, only its most important. In the era that lies ahead, the cohesive properties of military presence will diminish along with the size of the threats they are there to oppose. That reality notwithstanding, a credible U.S. military presence in Europe remains essential to the interests of the U.S. and its allies. Our strategy will have to take account of this fact for a long time to come.

Notes

1. See Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, Sections 2 and 3. RAND (Santa Monica: 1994).
Dr. Reinhardt Rummel, a political analyst at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, specializes in the European Union’s foreign and security policies. Dr. Rummel’s recent research projects include the future relationship between the European Union and NATO, the concept of a conflict prevention policy of the European Union, and the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference on reforms of the Maastricht Treaty.
New Venues in Trans-Atlantic Relations

Reinhardt Rummel

This chapter provides some thoughts on the prospective evolution of the trans-Atlantic relationship, a relationship which is basically sound, but has been running through a series of mutations during the first half of the 1990s. NATO, the prime link between Western Europe and North America during the Cold War, has a new rival, the dialogue between the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Administration, based on the November 1990 Transatlantic Declaration. While most of the public attention has been focusing on the laborious and sensitive reform of the Atlantic Alliance, the evolution of the EU-U.S. dialogue may be the secret success story of the last five years and a major element in the restructuring of the trans-Atlantic connection in the long run. "For different reasons, both sides tend to be cautious in publicly revealing the extent of their bilateral diplomacy, so there is an element of mystery in what they do. Some EU member states accept foreign policy cooperation with the U.S. in practice but do not wish to draw attention to it in public." 2

Is this "Quiet Dialogue" underestimated? 3 President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, is reported to have not known of the Transatlantic Declaration when he started his job in the White House. Little has been written on its origin, evolution, and prospects. 4 Yet, the Dialogue’s relevance may grow fast, because it reflects the dynamics of the EU-centered integration process and deals with a breed of international issues which figure high on the post-Cold War trans-Atlantic agenda. The Dialogue, originally a platform of mutual information, has gradually moved to a forum of consultation and cooperation. It has produced
common declarations and some joint actions. Nothing essential, so far, but partly reaching into security matters such as the discussion of the plan on ethnic cohabitation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What is the potential of the Dialogue? Does it represent the modernization of European-American relations? What is its strategic function within the trans-Atlantic relationship? Is it the appropriate answer to the new challenges which have emerged for both sides of the Atlantic after the end of the Cold War? And finally, what is its status and role in relation to NATO?

**Common Challenges:**

**An Agenda for the Second Half of the Nineties**

The best way of harmonizing intra-European security cooperation with a continuing American role in European security is to identify common challenges. In the first phase after the Cold War, trans-Atlantic partners were preoccupied with reassuring each other that the close European-American relationship will continue, albeit in a different fashion. The upcoming period will have to focus more on the question: which are the common concerns and which is the most efficient way of trans-Atlantic cooperation in addressing common problems?

**Future Trans-Atlantic Relations in a New Context**

While not antagonistic, the future international context is likely to be less cooperative and more competitive, with new struggles for influence between China, Russia, Japan, the U.S., and the European Union. Compared to the situation in 1990, the context for trans-Atlantic cooperation has changed significantly on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans have pushed ahead their process of unification and cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe as well as with Russia. In the United States the Clinton Administration has launched a domestic reform program and cleared some items on the external agenda such as relations with Japan, and the conclusions of NAFTA and APEC. Jointly the EU and the United States elaborated solutions to multilateral trade issues (Uruguay Round, founding of WTO) and to a new set of security challenges (NATO adaptation, CSCE—now OSCE—institutionalization). Washington and European capitals
cooperated in international crises during the Gulf War, the Somalia mission, and the Bosnia conflict. Taken together these experiences from the short period after the Cold War demonstrate new difficulties as well as new opportunities of Euro-American cooperation.

They also prove, and this is more important, that the potential for action emanating from this relationship is significantly higher than that of other actors in world politics, such as other big powers (Japan, Russia, China) or international organizations (UN, OECD, OSCE). Joint Euro-American approaches are particularly efficient in all those areas in which the degree of international interdependence has increased. Tokyo still has problems with reaching beyond competitive goals of trade relations; Moscow continues to be incalculable in its external behavior and could be a cooperation partner but also an aggressive challenger; Beijing is hard to pin down to Western standards. Multilateral organizations, conferences, and regimes seem to have much less power of initiative and implementation than the Euro-American bilateralism has. They depend more often than not on the Atlantic stimulant, on conceptional ideas, and paradigmatic implementation. Solutions to global arms control, international environmental issues, and problems of overpopulation would lack a driving force, if the EU and the U.S. did not take on a pioneering role. Since the world has been relieved from the constraints of the East-West antagonism, cooperative solutions to worldwide challenges have a more realistic chance. They ask, however, for a more extensive responsibility sharing of many states. There are not that many viable actors around, able and willing, to take over the burden of cooptive leadership.

Yet it would be counterproductive to placate such joint leadership as the most important axis in world politics. Such language produces psychological resistance precisely among those states on which the trans-Atlantic partners would want to rely for their collaboration. Another warning needs to be stressed here: mutually dependent cooperation invariably includes disadvantages. This can not be avoided if one of the partners blocks initiatives of the other (as Washington has done at the Rio Conference) or if even both sides obstruct a solution (as in the case
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of the Uruguay Round). In these cases problems will not be solved, and that will be to the detriment of others as well, which makes it obvious to what extent the solution of global challenges depends on trans-Atlantic initiative and support. We are talking here about a necessary, albeit not a wholly sufficient precondition, because depending on the issue Russia, Japan, and China will have to join the enterprise.

The EU-U.S. Dialogue also holds a relatively high potential for assertiveness in comparison to NATO. All official documents confirm the Alliance as the "essential forum" of consultation in trans-Atlantic security and defense policy, but NATO is likely to share an increasing part of security tasks with its two primary actors, the EU and U.S. On the European side, the bulk of stabilization and crisis management comes under the responsibility of the EU. These are areas within which NATO can offer political and diplomatic links (note NACC and PFP) but hardly any economic or financial instruments in order to develop security structures. For reasons of burden sharing, Washington has transferred most of the responsibility of stabilization in Eastern Europe to the EU and thus has diminished NATO's role in the process. With respect to conflict prevention and systemic transformation (democracy, market economy, rule of law) NATO's contribution is inferior to that of the EU-U.S. collaboration. The European Union and the United States are managing a large part of today's security order in Europe.

In relation to their tasks and roles both the EU and the U.S. lack the appropriate scope of means. Moreover, for most of the items on the new list of common challenges for the EU and the U.S., there is a lack of political acceptance among the public. Politicians have not yet made the convincing case in this regard. Political barriers continue to limit joint action in the traditionally sensitive area of foreign and security policy. This is why the initial euphoria with new opportunities for cooperation after the end of the Cold War has been turned into a disillusionment. It is important now to realize that both sides of the Atlantic are under the same kind of pressure. This situation reinforces the demand for joint reaction.
Toward an Agenda of Common U.S.-European Challenges
In the second half of the 90s, the U.S. and the EU are confronted with a range of international challenges which (theoretically) demand joint action. The list includes, chiefly, the following items:

Economic growth. Further liberalization in world trade is indispensable to enhance global economic growth and to reduce unemployment. This is a contribution to the stabilization of societies, especially if connected with the respect of human rights, social and environmental standards.

Crisis management. Scarce resources dictate an improvement in crisis management, a better orchestration of multilateral institutions and a more comprehensive (diplomatic-military-economic) approach to dealing with conflict. Wars such as in Bosnia need to be dampened, potential new armed disputes such as some fear in Crimea need to be prevented.

Transformation. The task of enlarging the zone of democracy, market economy, and the rule of law is by no means completed. In many of the Central and East European states as well as those of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) old communist elites are back in power. These countries need to be "socialized" by inclusion in the Western networks of cooperation and integration.

Arms control. Many countries of the former two military blocs suffer from conversion problems in their industries which have domestic as well as international consequences. Arms export monitoring and transfer controls for sensitive equipment and know-how are facing new challenges (plutonium fraud). The Non-Proliferation Treaty is struggling toward renewal.

Environmental protection. Reducing global devastation of nature and the atmosphere is a challenge for generations of mankind (see Rio Conference). Pressing security related problems include the clean-up of polluted areas such as military bases and nuclear test sites. The improvement of standards and safety in nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe is still pending.

Problems of overpopulation. Many international problems are caused by overpopulation but policies of birth control are hard to get accepted or implemented (see Cairo Conference). Therefore, the problematic consequences need to be taken care of:
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uncontrolled migration, malnutrition, mass disease, lack of education, socio-political aggression, systemic instability.

The EU as well as the U.S. are highly affected by the international challenges of these six issue areas. Economic growth, arms control, and environmental protection have already been mentioned in the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration as areas of major common concern. In practice, the Dialogue has also dealt with crisis management and stabilization issues. Only the control of overpopulation and its consequences will be a relatively new subject to the Dialogue. In the meantime, the common interest in the other subjects has become more specific: in the field of crisis management, a shift from conflict regulation to prevention is on the way; concerning stabilization, the emphasis has moved from ad hoc emergency measures to more structural approaches.

The EU is likely to draw on the trans-Atlantic Dialogue to consult with Washington or to gain American collaboration in all of these six problem areas. For activities concerning crisis management and systemic transformation, Brussels will need to rely on substantial assistance from the U.S.; in all other cases at least conceptual help is required and some discourse on the division of labor. The first three issue areas remind Washington of its interests in Europe, the other three problem fields can—and this is also the view of the present U.S. administration—only be covered by an active Euro-American collaboration.\textsuperscript{10}

As of now, the EU is in all of the six issue areas a valuable, if (according to the subject) differing, dialogue partner:

- Concerning economic growth, systemic transformation, and environmental issues, since Maastricht the EU disposes of extended communitarian competencies and instruments;
- In the field of crisis management and arms control, the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military arm, the Western European Union (WEU), are developing a growing set of joint actions;
- The overpopulation problem can be addressed with instruments of all three pillars of the EU.\textsuperscript{11}
New Venues in Trans-Atlantic Relations

For the second half of the 90s, the EU plans to complete economic and monetary union, to intensify security and defense cooperation, and to communitarize some sections of the collaboration in justice and home affairs. If these plans materialize, the Union will improve its status as a trans-Atlantic dialogue partner for all six issue areas. A revision and adaptation of the Transatlantic Declaration may then be a logical step.

The EU-U.S. Dialogue's substructure which is built after the one of CFSP is quite efficient. It does not have to be expanded or deepened much to cope with the new catalog of tasks. If one examines important co-actors, however, such as parliaments and non-governmental organizations, the situation is less promising as there seems to be a deficit of trans-Atlantic consultation and policy coordination among them. The upcoming period of the Dialogue may, however, be less preoccupied with adding new mechanisms than with use of the existing network in order to develop a common trans-Atlantic working agenda. The primary goal is to adapt the expectations and the behavior of the partners in the dialogue. What is needed in this regard is:

- Better strategic planning agreement on the basic goals of foreign and security policy;
- More flexible mode of consultation and cooperation, going beyond calendar meetings, picking up problems as they occur and dealing with them on a continuous basis, at least at sub-cabinet level;
- Collaboration which gradually moves form consultation to coordinated and joint action (a promising recent trend).

Such focus can be promoted by setting priorities within the list of six issue areas, or by selecting pilot projects from this list and enhancing the EU-U.S. Dialogue accordingly. To the extent that the Dialogue shifts its function from information platform to action forum some of the potential trans-Atlantic conflicts will be shown under new light. Conflicts may grow in number but will be reduced in importance given common operational ambitions. However, that assessment will only come true if the structure of
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the partnerships is rendered more balanced, which means that burden and gains, success and failure have to be shared equally.

In the defense field the trans-Atlantic partnership is characterized by contractual solidarity and burden sharing. In the economic area the relations are guided by competition and fair trade. But, in the realm of the EU-U.S. Dialogue a common yardstick which would measure input and output is still missing. For the above-mentioned six issue areas on the trans-Atlantic agenda, categories of competition and of burden sharing are too narrow and (therefore) dysfunctional. They do not express the appropriate degree of common responsibility sharing. The necessary innovation will have to include:

- Agreement on subjects or projects of "common responsibility"
- Rules for those cases where one of the two partners want to deviate from the common plan
- An assurance that one partner is not exploiting the situation if the other invests unilaterally in solutions to a problem of common concern
- An understanding on the components which will be included in the overall calculation of the balanced partnership.14

Rules for a cooperative partnership should allow for a rather pragmatic choice of roles for both the EU and the U.S. They would amount to a catalogue of mutual pledges to each other, not a guarantee to deliver to the outside world. The next few years will show if the two partners can handle the agreed areas of common concern and manage a common code of conduct. The EU will have to define and assert its interests, which means to grow with the challenge while it is going through more stages of integration. For the U.S. things seem to be more transparent, although the intensified Dialogue is a rather new field of commitment and its repercussion will affect the intra-American policy making process. To what extent are the Administration and Congress prepared to comply with the protocols of such bilateralism? Similar questions will be raised by national parliaments and their voters on the European side. The political
acceptance and the resources in both the EU and the U.S. will finally decide on the reach of a further operationalized Dialogue.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Premises and Interests in Trans-Atlantic Relations}

The scope and structure of trans-Atlantic relations will be determined by the range of common and conflicting interests at both sides of the Atlantic. In the second half of the 90s, Washington will continue its energetic protection of U.S. interests, while the Europeans are likely to try out a higher level of assertiveness. Both sides will be under increasing demand by third parties to help with their problems and to drive the international agenda.

All those who traditionally regard NATO as the central organization of trans-Atlantic agreement and solidarity will continue to assign a maximum of common tasks to the Alliance, and will reform its capabilities to deal successfully with this assignment.\textsuperscript{16} An alternative approach would be to start from the nature of the challenges and then draw conclusions as to whether and how the trans-Atlantic cooperative structures have to be altered to meet these challenges. During the first period after the Cold War the first method seemed to produce the best results, in the upcoming period one can afford to try out the second approach.

Not all questions with trans-Atlantic reference can be listed on the working agenda of the EU-U.S. Dialogue, unless the Dialogue is designed to encompass all other bilateral and multilateral bodies where Europeans and Americans meet. So far, this view is held on neither side of the Atlantic and does not seem likely to emerge in the medium term. In the long run, however, it is not excluded and would charge the Dialogue with a trans-Atlantic role of orientation and leadership, similar to the function of the European Council in the political system of the EU. For now, the scope of the Dialogue’s activity remains limited, even though it has increased steadily in recent years. Today, the Dialogue covers a range of issues which, except for the UN, is wider than any other forum in which the U.S. and the EU member states are represented. It has overtaken the G-7 in this regard alone, not to mention the
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organizational substructure and the frequency of meetings of the Dialogue. Yet, its political impact and its institutional significance remain relatively modest.

The selection of subjects to be included in future cooperation between the EU and the U.S. will depend on the character of the challenges and on the stakes of those participating in the Dialogue. Some criteria for agenda topic are:

- The two sides hold opposite views on a problem and only their bilateral compromise offers prospects of a solution;
- Both sides aim at compatible or congruent goals and have interests in common;
- Neither of the two can solve the problem in question unilaterally;
- The two sides need to join in order to coopt third parties.

Europe’s Interest in Trans-Atlantic Relations

The member states of the deepened and widened EU continue to need Washington’s strategic help, but feel more prepared for balanced competition and cooperation across the Atlantic. To the extent that the Union, since November 1993, has opened new areas of community law (such as environmental protection) and new fields of cooperation (such as questions of international organized crime), it has the possibility to discuss and decide policy in these matters together with third parties, in our case with Washington.

The representatives of the EU, including those from the European Commission, have an interest in promoting integration, strengthening the EU’s involvement in international relations, and—above all—cooperating with the U.S. as their most important external partner. This preference will grow with the scheduled EU enlargement in 1995 and EU revision in 1996. Moreover, the EU is more dependent on the American preparedness for cooperation than vice versa. It is doubtful that the EU can find an equally efficient cooperation partner somewhere else.17

The U.S. Interest in Europe

The United States’ foreign and security policy—positioned among isolationism, collective security, and selective engagement—tries to
influence a rivaling European international actor even as it seeks a partner in leadership. In so doing, Washington is adding new questions to the agenda of the EU-U.S. Dialogue: where can EU policies harm American interests? Where should the U.S. expect to be relieved of security responsibilities by the Europeans? And, where does collaboration with the Union increase the efficiency of U.S. foreign and security policy? More so than during the Bush Administration, President Clinton’s team has taken an interest in the EU-U.S. Dialogue. In addition, the U.S. now actively supports the build-up of a European security and defense identity. The EU is gradually responding to an old American desire for a competent European interlocutor. The aim is for a strong and capable EU that is not mainly a competitor but a partner in leadership, a partner who contributes to the enormous tasks of economic transformation and political stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.

In pursuit of these goals, President Clinton stressed the relevance of the EU and the European unification process at large: "The EU remains America’s most valued partner . . . strong and more unified Europe makes for a more effective economic and political partner . . . strong relationship between us is good for America." The U.S. ambassador to the EU clarified the American position further, when he noted: "Mr. Clinton used the meeting to send the clearest message that any American president has given of unequivocal support for the historic process of European integration. He stressed his firm commitment not only to the European Union as a fact of life but to a stronger, more self-reliant and, at times, more independent Europe as a positive force for Americans. The President and his Administration conceive that a more united Europe comes not at the expense of our bilateral ties but in their augmentation. Such a Europe is in our national security interest for a variety of reasons."

The positive American evaluation of the European integration process and of the EU implies automatically a higher appreciation of the EU-U.S. Dialogue, even if this is not expressly stated by Washington. While only in 1993 the U.S. seemed to favor the Asia-Pacific over the trans-Atlantic region—a development which was misinterpreted on the European side as a negligence of
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Europe—1994 has looked more like a "Year of Europe" for Washington—albeit now within the context of a balanced partnership. Numerous remarks of U.S. representatives underline the new policy on the Potomac toward Europe. Clinton visited Europe three times in the first half of 1994 and each time stressed his interest in and sympathy for the European unification process. The "rediscovering" of the old continent is certainly due to the American realization that political and economic change in Europe, and European regional conflicts (in the CIS, in Russia, in Bosnia) affect the United States in more fundamental ways than the Administration originally expected. "Europe is certainly not the only important part of the world. But it harbors both conflicts and opportunities which are central to America's most vital national interests. . . .[I]t is my conviction that this is a time for innovation in our approach to the continent. The days of traditional solutions are past."

After the settlement of major trade conflict between the U.S. and the EU in the GATT framework, questions of foreign and security policy have recaptured the trans-Atlantic agenda. This was demonstrated also by the American preparedness to engage more actively in the Bosnian peace process via the use of NATO assets to enforce UN decisions and via attempts of the Contact Group to find and impose a (territorial) peace plan for Bosnia. A conflict prevention and early warning system was established for trans-Atlantic disputes in trade and economic matters in order to avoid a spillover into foreign and security policy.

Third Party Interest

Other states and international organizations know that in many cases one needs both Brussels and Washington to solve problems on the international agenda. This means that Europeans and Americans are not the only ones interested in their working agenda. Third parties will ask them to assist or to join in with both EU instruments and NATO assets. It seems likely that the duo EU-U.S. will increasingly be approached by others to provide assistance because both actors are needed to tackle regional or global problems successfully.
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More often than not, all three sides will have a simultaneous interest in an EU-U.S. collaboration. The way in which such a subject is going to be treated on the trans-Atlantic agenda will depend on whether it implies explosive items for European-American relations, whether it opens up chances for shaping events, whether it produces rather unilateral gains, etc. The more subjects the Dialogue englobes, the more important the concertation with international organizations will become.

Alternative Futures for Trans-Atlantic Relations

The trans-Atlantic relationship used to be structured as two largely separate areas, the defense and the economic realms. In the second half of the 90s, it will be shaped by relations in three fields: defense, economics, and a sphere of overlap in security and economics. Which of these areas will dominate the European-American relationship and thus lead to either a re-establishment of NATO's predominance, or the emphasis of the economic core, or the balancing of security and economic institutions?

Today, neither North America nor Western Europe can afford to organize the increasing variety of their relations predominantly within the intensive, yet (concerning its expertise and its instruments) rather narrow, link via NATO. After the end of the Cold War a much wider panoply of common strategic interests determines trans-Atlantic relations. As was demonstrated during the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, even a reformed NATO can only cope with a segment of these strategic tasks. This applies even to some of the security related issues. A broader basis of strategic cooperation between the U.S. and the EU seems necessary in order to complement NATO with its tasks and to take responsibility for all those tasks which NATO is not equipped for. The idea is to assist and transcend NATO, not to replace it.

The EU-U.S. Dialogue represents the necessary additional basis, still in an embryonic fashion, which must be further developed. The Dialogue is not an alliance based on contractual solidarity. The commitment to a solidaric cooperation derives from political
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factors and from the conviction that mutual dependence and the size of challenges demand common answers. At least, that is the theory. We are talking about tasks which flow from the often repeated value system which North America and Western Europe have been sharing for centuries, and which is confirmed and renewed in the catalog of common challenges described above. Europeans and Americans have to go beyond NATO and develop a larger community, one responsible for protecting their broader value system. Such a responsible community cannot be created by concluding a contract. It has to grow with the common tackling of these tasks. The objective is to internalize a new solidarity in areas which up to now were looked at only in terms of competition and in areas where no such joint responsibility yet exists.

The EU-U.S. Dialogue and the NATO Alliance are also different in regard to their mode of operation. The Dialogue's performance is less characterized by American dominance, common assurance against risks, and crisis intervention capabilities but rather acts via cooperative leadership, cooptive power, and coordination of international organizations. Compared to NATO, the EU-U.S. Dialogue relies more on software instruments in international relations, yet both compete for a substantially reduced budget. NATO is working hard to renew and justify its existence, while it has to cope with diminishing defense capabilities in Europe and a decreasing support for NATO expenditure in the U.S. The EU-U.S. Dialogue can't wait to be discovered as an increasingly important strategic bound over the Atlantic. Dialogue and Alliance must complement each other, and lift the trans-Atlantic community to a new level of cooperation for regional and global security.

Notes
1. Ed. note: "Transatlantic Declaration" is a commonly used term to refer to the Declaration on U.S.-EC Relations, signed in Rome, November 23, 1990.
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3. This was the view of the U.S. Representative to the EU in Brussels, Stuart E. Eizenstadt, in his article "The United States Backs the Process of European Integration," International Herald Tribune, 19 August 1994, 4.


5. "In the trade sphere, the GATT agreement showed that no multilateral accord was possible until the EU and U.S. had come to an agreement. Indeed, it was embarrassing in view of the ostensibly multilateral nature of the GATT to see the degree to which everything eventually turned on an understanding between the U.S. and the EU. Clearly neither was in a position to form alternative coalitions or to bypass the need to reach an accommodation with the other." Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock, "Learning to Cooperate: the Clinton Administration and the European Union," International Aff airs 70 (1994) 3, 474.

6. After the end of the Cold War, Washington’s policy of containment was replaced by a concept of enlargement concerning Western market economy oriented democracy. The most recent approach of the Clinton Administration puts the notion of "integration of Europe" on to the foreground and thus refers to the EU as the prime actor. See Gebhard Schweigler in Chapter 6 of this volume, "The American Engagement in Europe: The Go-Go Scenario."

7. The situation is also characterized by the unfulfilled hope for a peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. A significant shift from military to civilian means did not materialize.

8. For one of the most recent examples the "jobs-summit" of the G-7 in March 1994, see David Goodhart, "U.S. and Europe Discover Unusual Consensus," Financial Times, 14 March 1994, 4.

9. Two things are relevant here: First, both sides independently pushed these subjects to the top of their list of priorities. Second, these issues are not separable anymore along geographical lines, economic or security aspects, domestic or foreign policy matters. All these problems are intertwined. Solutions need to be more complex and do not allow for isolated treatment.
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11. The three pillars of the EU defined at Maastricht consist of the economic and monetary union, the common foreign and security policy, and the cooperation in justice and home affairs. While the first column is run on a communitarian regime, the other two are based on intergovernmental cooperation.

12. Some interesting discussions are going on this regard in the Trans-Atlantic Policy Network, Brussels, and its "Draft Project proposal for a European Strategy Towards the United States." Of relevance here is also a joint research project of the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations which deal with the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Some attractive work on EU-U.S. relations has also been done by a Task Force of the Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

13. See the proposal of a common action plan of Peter Ludlow, Thomas Fröllesen, and Erik Jones, EC-U.S. Relations, op. cit.

14. Any proposal on a new burden-sharing system which will include, among others, economic factors is the right direction. See, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, A New Security Order: The United States and the European Community in the 1990's (An occasional paper of the European Community Studies Association, U.S.-EC relations project), Pittsburgh, June 1993, 41.

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16. Most proponents of this line refer to the political goals of NATO and to the reference to economic matters which is be found in article 2 of the Washington Treaty.

17. See in this regard a speculative, yet interesting article, which analyzes the potential bilateral axes between great powers of tomorrow: "The New World Order. Back to the Future," *The Economist* 8 January 1994, 19-21. With respect to the relationship between the U.S. and the EU, the author reaches the following conclusions: "If America is the power with the widest range of choices, the narrowest belongs to Europe . . . Europe also has the shortest list of prospective friends. . . . The Europeans' choice is stark. They can work with America in a new, outward-looking version of the Atlantic Alliance, or they can drift off alone and wait for the squalls to hit them." p. 20.

18. See the results of the NATO summit meeting of 11 January 1994.


23. One danger is that others might be tempted to play the EU and the U.S. against each other. A coordinated or common policy toward third actors (Japan, China, ASEAN) implies a high potential of conflict for trans-Atlantic relations which should not be underestimated. Both partners could be tempted to strengthen their relative position with the help of others. This phenomenon emerged toward the end of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round. See Tom Buerkle, "EC Warns U.S. on Using Asian Card," *International Herald Tribune*, 17 November 1993, 13.


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Russia and the Future Trans-Atlantic Alliance

Christoph Royen

The period when, under the impact of "New Thinking" in Mikhail Gorbachev's and Edvard Shevardnadze's Soviet Union, a "Communist" USSR was ultimately succeeded by a "democratic" Russia, and when many in the West and some in Russia came to believe that earlier bloc versus bloc antagonism had been replaced by a new era of peace and cooperation among independent states and free societies, proved short-lived. At that time a minority even concluded that the trans-Atlantic alliance had lost its purpose and, therefore, following the example of the Warsaw Pact, should be dissolved as well. The less radical majority thought in terms of preserving a healthy alliance for future dangers; but certainly the Western alliance should undergo serious transformation, enabling it to engage in true partnership with Russia.¹

Since 1993 it has become increasingly clear that these assumptions and visions were at least premature. On the one hand, both NATO and the trans-Atlantic partners in the U.S. and in Europe found it hard to redefine their common purposes in a new world, suddenly deprived of evident front lines and challenges, and to reorganize their relations. On the other hand, Russia's domestic transformation into a pluralistic democracy and a functioning market economy turned out to be an extremely difficult task, threatened by mounting contradictions and failures. As a consequence, Russian society became disillusioned with transformation, whereas the political elites, including President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, began to look for compensation in the field of foreign relations. Here they hoped to regain for Russia the status of a "great world power" to be
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respected not only by the other post-Soviet successor states in the
so-called "near abroad," but also in the "far abroad" by the U.S. and
Western Europe.

From here we gain the genuine background required to
understand and to analyze Russia’s present and future attitude
toward the trans-Atlantic Alliance. That attitude is characterized
by a basic ambiguity: Russia attempts to avoid renewed isolation
and to gain a legitimate role in shaping developments across the
entire European continent. Yet, at the same time, Russian policy
demands the outside world’s recognition of a "traditional special
sphere of influence", comprising unequivocally the other 11
members of the "Commonwealth of Independent States" [CIS], and
probably also, not withstanding the recent withdrawal of Russian
troops, the 3 Baltic states, and potentially even adjacent parts of
the former Warsaw Pact area. Since the eastern half of Poland had
been incorporated for more than a century into the tsarist Russian
empire until 1918, Poles wondered where those "traditional"
spheres are located. This example reminds one that in evaluating
Russian policy it is not sufficient to scrutinize present official
enunciations and elite debates. At the outset one has to recall that
some of the traditional roots of Russia’s attitude to the Western
alliance and to reveal equally ambiguous elements in the heritage
of the past.

The Heritage of the Past

Parity Between the Two Superpowers

Soviet leaders used to emphasize, as the greatest achievement of
their foreign policy, the fact that U.S. President Richard Nixon, in
May 1972, by signing the SALT I Treaty and a separate agreement
on the fundamentals of Soviet-American relations, had recognized
the strategic parity of the USSR and confirmed the ascendance of
the first socialist state to the status of a superpower with equal
authority in world affairs. How much this equal status had
 corresponded also to a desire of broader strata in Soviet society,
which shared their leaders' triumph over the proof that their
sufferings in "building socialism" had not been in vain and could
no longer be discarded as an historic error committed by a
backward country, ironically, became visible only after the end of
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Soviet communism. Now it was fashionable to show unabashed admiration for everything American, by queuing for McDonald's hamburgers, and to display accompanying hopes by wearing baseball caps and T-shirts with both the American and the Soviet flags. And yet, the Western visitor could discover a deep-seated ambivalence in conversations with Russian friends brooding over the question: Will the rest of the world, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, continue to respect us? Likewise, the visitor was struck with the permanent tendency among his Russian hosts to evaluate perspectives of partnerships, whether in business, science, or in the arts, primarily with Americans, before considering Western partners elsewhere. On the level of foreign policy, such sentiments are reflected in frequent references to Russia still being a "big" or even a "super"-power, contained in official statements as well as in the writings of Russian analysts and journalists alike. While more thoughtful authors recently had to admit that U.S. policy might be less inclined to treat Russia as an equal, they still profess a preference for the U.S. as a special partner. The alternative, to view Western Europe as a more adequate partner for Russia's contemporary needs and potential, is found only rarely.

Ambivalent Views of U.S. Role in Europe

The political significance of such differences may be gauged from recalling again the early 1970's. These were the years when Western Europe's integration proved earlier Soviet predictions of the EEC's preordained failure wrong. Soviet decision-makers, therefore, felt sufficient reason to ask themselves whether established propaganda, exhorting the West Europeans to "shed the fetters of U.S. hegemony," might meet acceptance in Western Europe's capitals and result in the emergence of a new dynamic power center which would attract and fascinate the neighbors in the Soviet orbit of Central Eastern Europe. However, only a few Soviet authors dared to suggest running such a risk in order to weaken U.S. positions. The mainstream followed the Politbureau's line which had concluded that "Big Two-ism" with the other super-power was, after all, the safer road.
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In the 1990's Russia's foreign policy-makers have to come to grips with a comparable constellation: In Europe they see the European Union intensifying ("deepening") its integration, despite the intervening challenge to "broaden" its membership to include former EFTA countries and some of the former COMECON members. In the U.S. they discern a new administration, bent on reducing the American profile in Europe, while torn between supporting President Yeltsin as the best hope for continued reforms and discussing ways to counter Russian "neo-imperialism" by "neo-containment." Different, though, from the 1970's this time a third factor enters the picture. United Germany seems to intrigue the fantasy of Russian thinkers trying to sort out, what role this country—after overcoming the short-term economic burden of raising the new provinces of the former "German Democratic Republic" to an equal living standard with the western parts of the FRG—might play in Europe: Will it lead the EU to an even stronger alliance with the U.S.? Or will it guide the EU to an independent superpower position? Or will Germany's weight and dynamism turn out irreconcilable with the EU's coherence, and thus revive for Russia somewhat forgotten older constellations: the option of a special German-Russian relationship, or, conversely, the danger of Germany expanding eastward, excluding Russia from Europe?

Obviously, given the complex equation to be solved, Moscow has no complete answer, yet. While the German option may simply be too fresh and too fraught with historical ballast to evoke a clear-cut response, most authors tend to dismiss it or view it with little concern. Anyway, the old school of germanisty in the Soviet foreign policy establishment has lost its influence, and successors will have to grow. The years of East-West détente, instead, have produced a generation of Russian actors and experts who continue to pay central attention to the U.S. Among them we find wide-spread apprehension with a possible tougher attitude of the U.S. But it is balanced by expectations that U.S. engagement in Europe will hedge against unpleasant surprises. This position is likely to be adopted by the political leadership as well. At the same time, one should not exclude recurrent attempts to challenge that position by stressing the divergence of Russian and American
interests, while suggesting instead increased chances for cooperation with Western Europe.  

**From Ideological to Geopolitical Schemes**

A third element of continuity may appear less obvious. However, by comparing Soviet literature on foreign policy with recent Russian debates, a striking similarity is surfacing: The previous thinking and interpreting of world affairs used to explain them by invoking standard textbook formulas of communist ideology, postulating the "global class struggle." This method freed one from weighing the arguments and, especially, from discussing unorthodox approaches, since these formulas were described as unquestionable "objective laws" (obshchie zakonomernosti) of development. Now, after these textbooks went into the wastebasket we find, instead, something like a substitute tool in the frequent references by Russian authors, when they draw on supposedly equally indisputable "laws of geopolitics." A favorite role among the pertinent laws is accorded to various forms of a dangerous "vacuum," resulting from Russia's insufficient resolve or capacity to maintain its external influence. Where earlier the danger was described in terms of hostile "capitalist imperialism," waiting to exploit such weakness by filling the "vacua," at present the vacated areas are allegedly threatened by the influx of a variety of inimical forces, like Islamic fundamentalists, resurgent China, and also superior Western alliances.  

Of course, one cannot overlook the contrast between the geopolitical situation of the U.S., shielding that country from foreign aggression by surrounding oceans, and Russia's geographic disadvantage of being open to external invaders throughout its history. Naturally, such a history leaves its impact in Russian perceptions of the surrounding world. Nevertheless, the inherent contemporary problem with this kind of reasoning rests with a lacking readiness to differentiate between a variety of possible developments, to take a closer look at the intentions of those "hostile" forces, and, consequently, to search for ways to harmonize the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. Below we will return to this aspect in the specific context of Russia's vehement objection to NATO's eastward extension.
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Seeking Russia's Role in the World
From "Romantic" to "Realist" Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy debates in Russia, both in the parliament and among experts, and almost from the start of Russia's new role as primary successor to a dubious Soviet heritage, centered around alleged neglect of Russia's national interests by Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his presidential mentor. Opponents claimed that the foreign minister held naive, "romantic" convictions, according to which the surrounding world, whether in the "near abroad" or in the "far abroad", was ready to respect and honor Russia's return into the community of democratic nations. Yet, these critics continued, reality showed a much darker picture where other post-Soviet successor states disregarded Russia's legitimate rights and tried to secure for themselves residual assets of the Soviet heritage, while rejecting common responsibilities. To make matters worse, Kozyrev's adversaries declared, the other heirs' nationalism subjected 25 million Russians living in the "near abroad" to discrimination and would force them, unless Russia extends its protection, to leave their homes and their jobs for an uncertain future in Russia proper. At the same time, the advocates of "realism" maintained, the U.S. and other Western states (including Germany, despite its billions in Russian "aid") weren't interested, verbal assurances not withstanding, in welcoming Russia into the community of "mankind's shared values" (obshche-chelovecheskie tsennosti). Rather, so the argument concluded, the West was relieved, that a dangerous competitor had disappeared, and did not wish to see it replaced by a new, potentially more healthy rival.  

These reproaches and recriminations lasted well into the following year [1992. ed.], when Kozyrev and Yeltsin adopted tougher language and took to more assertive actions in dealing with the "near abroad," this time giving rise to Western apprehensions of "neo-imperialist" tendencies in Russia's foreign policy. However, it is important to note that Kozyrev himself, already in February 1992, had criticized Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in almost identical terms for their "romantic" foreign policy based on a "rosy" view of reality. On the same occasion, he also announced a subsequent policy of promoting and
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safe-guarding of Russia’s national interests. Understandably, though, it would have been difficult to confront the smaller members of the CIS with massive Russian pressure right after the foundation of the "Commonwealth" on December 21, 1991. Somehow, therefore, the outside observer gets the impression that the entire debate, with its strong invectives, had less to do with substance and more with competition for influence in Moscow. In the meantime, but long before the December 12, 1993 electoral success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky threatened the Western world out of its complacency, Kozyrev and Yeltsin began to outdistance their critics with postulates for Russia’s big power status and with admonitions addressed to the West to respect Russian interests as those of an equal partner. Thus the West should have been prepared for Russia’s strong reaction in early 1994 to NATO’s bombing missions in Bosnia, even if these missions had been authorized by the UN Security Council with Russia going along. The ensuing Russian demand to be admitted with equal rights to the deliberations of the G-7, merely serves as an additional illustration of the change.

And yet, we may wonder, whether we should see this as a change to "realism" based on evident legitimate interests. At any rate, the mass of statements insisting on Russia’s right to take part in every decision on developments in former Yugoslavia, contrasts with the absence of any attempt to explain which vital Russian interests are affected in that area. Neither the permanent references to traditional bonds of friendship with the orthodox brother-Slavs in Serbia, nor the argument that Russian society feels strongly about any neglect of the Serbians’ cause, carry convincing force. Therefore, the new "realism" might be more of a device to detract attention from real problems at home.

Russia as Peacemaker and Integrator in the CIS

By now, it is common wisdom that the disappearance of the former Soviet communist arsenal of repression has unleashed the forces of nationalism and chauvinism throughout post-Soviet space. Equally true is the West’s obvious reluctance to engage in post-Soviet conflicts in the CIS with more than diplomacy. Hence, Russia’s tendency to assume the functions of peace-making by
peace-enforcement can hardly be criticized as being "imperialist" in principle. Justified objections can only be raised against certain circumstances and conditions created by Moscow in advance or during and after carrying out its peace-enforcing missions.\textsuperscript{16} Attempts to organize together with other CIS members "collective" security structures,\textsuperscript{17} have merely demonstrated that even there, where—as in Tajikistan and in South Ossetia—Russian forces were joined by contingents from other post-Soviet successor states, the "allies'" role was negligible.

The dominant role of Russia in the CIS is even more pronounced in the field of economic relations. Initial euphoria with independence in the new states and the hopes of their societies to reach welfare and Western support more directly on their own initiative, have already been reversed by the realization that almost\textsuperscript{18} all of these states depend on Russian subsidies. And it does not make much difference whether their leaders, as in Kyrgyzstan, were seriously engaged in political and economic reform, or whether they paid merely lip service to transformation or did not even pretend to change more than the facades. For Russia this seems to open the path to voluntary reunion and re-integration, including increased leverage to protect the Russians in the "near abroad."\textsuperscript{19} Advocates of a more assertive Russian policy, thus, might feel vindicated.

But on closer inspection, they would have to admit that re-integration contains the danger of detaching Russia from real reforms, and of getting entangled in webs of formal channels for the flow of subsidies into uncompetitive relics of the Soviet economy, and for the stabilization of power possessed by former communist \textit{apparatchiks}, brandishing new national flags and symbols. Seen this way, those in Russia who are concerned with constructing a solid basis for Russia's future place in the world, might reject any re-integration and demand prior domestic transformation in their country as well as in other CIS states, before following the successful example of post-war integration in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{20} Others try to find a compromise between conflicting options and demands by suggesting both the "enlightened egotism" of selective bilateralism, and "leadership
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instead of direct control” as the best available ways to serve Russia’s short-term and long-term interests in post-Soviet space.²¹

Claims to Extended "Spheres of Interest"
Kozyrev’s²² and Yeltsin’s closing ranks with other proponents of an allegedly sober, hard-nosed policy of pursuing national interests and securing an undisputed sphere of influence around Russia, corresponds merely superficially to a concept to guide Russia to its legitimate place in the world. As Russian commentators have pointed out, particularly counterproductive are attempts to preempt by such a policy the growing strength of a coalition for the restoration of the Soviet Union, formed between outright nationalists and the ardent defenders of the Soviet system’s superior virtues. Because this will only direct the distrust and resistance of the outside world from Zhirinovskiy or similar extremists to the center of Russian policy-making.²³ Moreover, hopes to use a more assertive foreign policy to counter mounting frustration in Russian society and to unite it behind the government, misunderstand the reasons leading to the strengthening of the anti-democratic forces in the elections of December 1993. Russian voters were not interested in Zhirinovskiy’s crazy designs to restore Russia’s glory.²⁴ They were simply fed up with the incompetence of the reformers, which brought material improvement and exciting business opportunities for a minority, while the majority experienced decreasing social and job security, and in particular, an unprecedented rise of crime and corruption.²⁵ A veteran Western observer of the international scene, therefore, concluded after listening at a conference abroad to Russians arguing for the equal treatment of their country, that the Russian speakers apparently were driven more by emotions than by a clear definition of their interests.²⁶

Wrong Priorities
Reviewing the Russian debates on foreign policy in general, and on Russia’s role in the world in particular, gives reason for concern because this debate is premature. It detracts, consciously or unconsciously, from the tasks of domestic transformation. And to make the matter more serious still, in turning to the realm of
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foreign relations, Russia has hardly any instruments to play a role, except military power. That, however, reminds us of the Soviet Union which, after the original "internationalist" revolutionary appeal had exhausted itself, relied almost exclusively on its impressive military capacities. Here it does not matter, whether the rest of the world overestimated those capabilities. The decisive point is, that the Soviet Union's super-power status lacked the civil foundation, which enables the U.S. to win allies and adherents by relying on a superior economy and, no less important, on the global fascination with the "American way of life." If Russia re-enters the steep road to superpower status without these additional prerequisites, it will not only fail to gain lasting influence. It will eventually share the fate of the Soviet Union, which collapsed because the Soviet leaders were unable to build their external power projection on solid internal fundamentals.27

Russia and NATO

Why Russia Cannot Become a Member
One would have to search hard to find among the responsible representatives of the Atlantic Alliance somebody willing to advocate NATO's extension to include Russia. But Russian mainstream opinions, independent of more liberal or more centrist convictions, do not really differ from this.28 In particular, those Russian authors, who view NATO not so much as a relict of the Cold War and, therefore, do not call for its dissolution, nourish no hopes to join the Western alliance. They admit openly that such an extension would simply mean an overextension, making it impossible for NATO to assume any meaningful responsibility. De facto, it would mean the end of NATO.29 Hence Russian decision-makers and their advisors will have to decide, if they 'can't join it', whether they should 'beat it' or seek some mutually beneficial partnership.30

NATO's Eastward Extension: A Threat for Russia?
The well-known recent controversies over the urgent requests by Poland and other East Central European states caused an equally well documented wave of protests from Russia. For the context of the present analysis we should focus on that part of the Russian
counter-arguments, which provide an insight into the apprehensions still associated with NATO in Russian minds.

Some influential authors stress the danger of Russia's "isolation" resulting from NATO's extension. As Jerzy Milewski, president Lech Walesa's closest aid in defense and security matters mused, it is not so easy to imagine such a huge powerful country being isolated. But probably that concern rests on scenarios where Western interest and support for Russia's transformation gradually decreased to a minimum, ultimately abandoning the reformers to their fate. Yet, it seems that such an undeniable danger is connected with many other aspects of the general relationship between Russia and the West. Hence, the argument does not carry special weight in the debate on NATO's extension. Another argument, offered frequently and with particular emphasis, reveals, indeed to a surprising degree, how much Western self-understanding of the alliance still differs from Russian perceptions. Russian authors, apparently, seem convinced that by pointing to the loss of 1500 kilometers between Moscow and the eastern border of NATO's original territory, they have come up already with an irrefutable argument. The implicit assumption, which seemingly does not require any further discussion, is strikingly simple: Once NATO's weapons and men are closer to Moscow, the increased danger for Moscow is obvious and Russia is forced to take additional expensive measures to deter the would-be aggressors. Alas, we are right back into the eternal debates, familiar also in the West: Should prudent defense policy be dominated exclusively by "capabilities" and "worst case" scenarios? Or does a "realistic" assessment call for the inclusion of "intentions" into the overall balance as well? Russian officials and experts demonstrate, that they, despite all the talk about an end of the East-West-conflict, prefer to "play it safe" and to rely on the "laws of geopolitics" and "objective" capabilities which can be measured and counted.

Russian speakers retort by asking their Western or East Central European interlocutors: 'Why do you need extension anyway? And against whom? Doesn't this show that you yourselves don't believe in peace with Russia and distrust us? So why are you so surprised that our society in Russia is deeply worried with NATO
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coming closer and, therefore, will not tolerate it silently? If our government proves unable to prevent NATO's extension, the Russian people will support extremist forces! Apart from the questionable value—already discussed above—of such references to alleged Russian public opinion, this Russian counter-argument, maybe inadvertently, admits a rather significant fact: democratic virtues, such as tolerance and the readiness for fair bargaining and compromise between conflicting interests, are still underdeveloped in Russia. Hence, there are reasons to be concerned with potential "intentions" of future Russian leaders. However, at this juncture we should concede that—contrary to fears expressed, for example, in Poland—scenarios which start with a "red-brown" leadership in the Kremlin bent on expanding Russian rule to Eastern Central Europe are far-fetched, because such a leadership would be occupied sufficiently with restoring its rule over post-Soviet space. What is more, it would lack the domestic allies Stalin had in 1944/45 in the countries liberated from German occupation.35

And yet, the Russian discourse on the issue of NATO's extension reveals an additional problem: Russian top politicians as well as other speakers betray a clear lack of "empathy," i.e., the ability to put themselves into the shoes of their smaller neighbors and to try to imagine how a Pole, an Estonian, an Ukrainian, or an Azeri will react to Russian words and actions. As long as they can remember, Russian leaders always felt that they alone had the right to decide what was good for the smaller nations, too. While that attitude did not preclude, as many Russians emphasize nowadays correctly, Russian sacrifices for the material and cultural development of smaller neighbors, such benevolence and magnanimity still depended on Moscow's discretion. Maybe, Andrey Kozyrev was not even aware of this psychological aspect, when he suggested to a Polish audience, that their security needs could be dealt with through common guarantees by Russia and the West.36

Therefore, reading in Tallinn or in Warsaw the contents of the new Russian military doctrine adopted early in November 1993—according to which "the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of states bordering on the Russian Federation" is regarded as a "factor furthering the escalation [pererastanie] from a military
danger to a direct military threat for the Russian Federation," unless Russia has given its prior consent in the UN Security Council or "some other regional organ of collective security"—is something different from reading the same text in Moscow. From here it is not too far to an even more unequivocal case of self-serving arguments in the Russian debate on NATO extension, where Russian spokesmen do not hesitate to explain their opposition by adducing the interests of Russian arms manufacturers threatened by a definite loss of the former Warsaw Pact markets, once this area is incorporated into the Western alliance. Finally, insinuations that behind NATO's extension one should keep an attentive eye on Germany's potential interests were met, at least in Poland, with vivid recollections of that German bugaboo's earlier function in cementing Polish-Soviet friendship.

In summing up, we cannot but conclude that the Russian contribution to the debate has failed to make the case that a threat, emanating from NATO's eastward extension, is plausible. Rather, these contributions themselves re-enforce uneasy feelings among Russia's neighbors and partners, about how deeply rooted "old thinking" still is among that country's political elites. Instead of insisting on a purely negative attitude and on designing potential countermeasures, Russia's leaders would be better advised to accept Western ideas of a special treaty between NATO and Russia, and at the same time to gain the confidence of their neighbors in Eastern Central Europe. NATO's members as well as future candidate members, though, should make it clear to the Russians that extension of the Alliance is not motivated so much by fear of Russia. The primary intent is to end more than two centuries wherein Central East Europe has existed and suffered between stronger powers, and to do so by joining a democratic community of states. Russia's neighbors would gain valuable support for their inner stability and, hence, would not engage in anti-Russian designs. The old "buffer zone" protecting Russia from the West would then be replaced by an area of self-assured partners.
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**NACC and PFP: Placebos or Building Blocs?**

If NATO membership for Russia is neither desired nor deemed feasible by all sides concerned, naturally the question arises whether there are forms of cooperation below the level of alliance membership which could serve mutually accepted interests. The "North Atlantic Cooperation Council" [NACC] owes its birth in 1991 to a previous era, when the Soviet Union had let the member-states of the Warsaw Pact choose to change their common political system, and, as a consequence, had to terminate that pact’s existence. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and his German colleague, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, therefore, deemed it important to have a common organization, suitable to mediate and influence the security relations between the USSR and its former allies. However, before this idea of a "trialogue" could be tested, the Soviet Union ended its own existence. The quick decision adopted by NATO's members to offer NACC membership to the 15 heirs of the USSR, may have been unavoidable. But it could not possibly address the concerns of such a variety of members in a form satisfying everybody. East Central Europeans, obviously, felt degraded by sharing NATO’s attention with, say, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Azerbaijan. But these newcomers to international relations and conferences also sensed that their needs and worries could not adequately be understood, much less taken care of by the Atlantic Alliance. Hence, NACC suffers from its collective size and is viewed by Russians as an empty shell to be used for completely new contents under different auspices. Therefore, recently Russian spokesmen have begun to propose severing NACC’s strings to NATO and to include it into their schemes for pan-European security under the authority of the CSCE (OSCE since 1995). "Partnership for Peace" (PFP) seems to draw a lesson from NACC’s failure. Based on President Bill Clinton’s initiative, presented in the autumn of 1993, it was supposed to avoid the collective approach and to open, instead, the individual paths lacking in NACC. However, the crux of the matter, of course, rests with the obvious fact that a purely individual approach to security problems misses the most important issues of relations between neighbors in the same area. And being aware of the East Central Europeans’ pressing for
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NATO membership as the "real thing", the authors of PFP were forced to split the offer without openly saying so. Thus they invented the suggestion that participation in PFP would amount to a test on the resolve and capability to engage in meaningful military cooperation as a precondition for eventual NATO membership. Yet, at the same time, the fathers of PFP could not and did not wish to hide the different nature of such a contest. For some candidates it was meant as a serious preparatory stage for eventual acceptance into the Atlantic Alliance. For others, first of all for Russia, but also for the Central Asian and the Transcaucasian CIS members, that perspective was foreclosed.

Russian leaders initially were not sure whether the offer contained anything worthwhile for them. After some months of discussing the pros and cons, they opted for the old prescription of 'if you can't beat it, join it.' First they tried to exploit NATO's desire to have them on board by demanding a special role, making their PFP different from everybody else's participation and conforming to Russian aspirations to be respected as a "big" or even a "super"-power. NATO's member governments quickly realized that to meet these Russian conditions fully would automatically reduce the value of PFP for those partners who regarded themselves as future NATO members, and who were ready to do their best to meet NATO's expectations and standards. The Russians, equally aware of NATO's dilemma, showed flexibility and agreed to sign practically the same general framework agreement as all the smaller participants.

However, following the decision of the North Atlantic Council on December 1, 1994, to "initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge," Russia's foreign minister Kozyrev promptly refused to sign the prepared "Individual Partnership Program" with NATO. Simultaneously, as President Yeltsin's "cold peace" speech showed at the CSCE summit in Budapest a few days later, the Russians were frustrated also with the failure of their project to transform CSCE into the central instrument for coordinating European security. Moreover, Russia's brutal war, started right after the Budapest summit, against the rebellious republic of Chechnya indicated that Moscow,
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for the time being, instead of partnership preferred a demonstration of power.

The Disregarded WEU

Before we can discuss this cornerstone of Russia’s future relations with the Atlantic Alliance, we should take a brief look at Russia’s attitude toward the Western European Union (WEU). Thus far, Russian comments and analyses show a clear tendency to attribute to WEU only a marginal role. While West Europeans like to call WEU the “European pillar” of NATO, Russians seem inclined to view it more as an appendix. Conforming to those prevailing assessments, Russian speakers rejecting NATO’s eastward extension, offered only side remarks that they would, of course, have no objections if the East Central Europeans were admitted to full membership in the EU and in the WEU. Apart from this particular aspect, one could find occasionally additional evaluations of WEU’s significance. One author saw WEU’s positive value in contributing to the control of potential German expansionism.\(^{43}\) Another group of analysts maintained, negatively, that WEU’s narrow focus of interests might enhance Russia’s isolation and exclusion from Europe.\(^{44}\)

To be sure, in explaining Russia’s generally relaxed view of the WEU, we should not overlook parallels in the West. After all, not only Americans, but also the majority of West European experts for many years regarded the WEU as a side alley not to be compared with the main road of NATO.

However, beneath the smooth surface of Russia’s benign neglect for WEU, more recently some signals of a changing attitude have been observed. When the WEU decided in late 1993 to give observer status to nine East Central European states, including the three Baltic countries, the echo in Moscow was muted. Yet, when the WEU five months later (under French-German prodding), raised that status to the level of “associated partnership”, suddenly critical comments and concerned inquiries emerged from the Russian foreign and defense ministries.\(^{45}\) Certainly, the WEU is far from entering the headlines of the Russian press. Thus, we are forced to speculate. One might dismiss, of course, the recent raising of eye-brows in Moscow as motivated exclusively by
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Western discussions, suggesting to the Poles and other impatient candidates for NATO membership that by entering WEU, they would gain almost the same security guarantees, due to the extensive symbiosis between the WEU's and NATO's treaty obligations.

Nevertheless, we should not exclude that some Russian analysts already look ahead to the WEU review conference, planned for 1996, and see it in conjunction with EU integration. Such analysts would certainly note the constant discussion in the EU over how to square the circle of combining "deepening" with "broadening" the EU. And, they cannot be absolutely sure about the failure of EU's ambitious plans. Hence they would have to prepare at least one scenario for the first years after the turn of the millennium, in which the EU comes closer to representing a European superpower. That, in turn, would rejuvenate the old debate from Soviet years, as to whether it is in Russia's interest to support the rise of such a second, rival power on the European continent, or whether Russia should follow the example of the late Leonid Brezhnev and opt again for "Big Two-ism" with the U.S. Of course, as popular wisdom has it, one can never enter the same river twice. Too many intervening variables and additional factors may lead Moscow's decision-makers to try the other road this time, or to discover that the situation of having to choose only between the U.S. and Western Europe belongs to a time, when the world was structured much more simply by basic bloc dichotomy.

OSCE and Regional Collective Security as Russia's Challenges of NATO

There is no need to re-quote the myriad of recent statements coming from Moscow, announcing Russia's preference for the CSCE/OSCE as the supreme body to coordinate and to organize peace and security "between Vancouver and Vladivostok." More relevant for our purpose is the question, "what role Russian policy reserves for NATO?" Almost nobody in the Russian foreign policy establishment is suggesting that the future OSCE will make NATO superfluous. Instead, Western observers, earlier, had noted with attention two modes of Russian parlance: Some statements seemed to postulate NATO's "subordination" under the OSCE.
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Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, however, during his visit to Brussels in May, 1994 appeared to have set the record straight by describing OSCE's envisaged function as "coordinating." Whether this is sufficient to dispel apprehension in NATO's Secretariat and in the members' capitals remains to be seen. The difference between the two modes can vary between stark contrast and invisibility. The other architectural aspect has to do with Russian schemes showing both NATO and the CIS on the same level as equal sub-regional structures to be "coordinated" at the OSCE "top." Apart from an instinctive reluctance in the West to see a rather dubious, hardly efficient, in fact chaos-ridden assembly of new states raised to one's own level, the essential problem is directly connected with that basic ambiguity of Russian policy in Europe, emphasized at the outset of our analysis: Under the conditions of de facto hegemony by Russia in the CIS, Western adoption of Russia's scheme comes close to improving Russia's position into a de jure hegemony.

One of the more liberal Russian analysts draws our attention to a closely related third consequence, not to be neglected: Contrary to official Russian claims, the establishment of such de jure hegemony could—if the OSCE proves less efficient in its coordinating role than Russian blueprint designers expect—initiate a new split of Europe, as Russia, via the CIS, would be tied primarily to its Eurasian space. This argument serves to vindicate those in Russia who oppose CIS re-integration (as discussed above) and criticize the West for condoning Russia's concentration on post-Soviet space. Such criticism, summed up in the specter of a "new Yalta" now separating the beneficiary of the original Yalta split from the rest of Europe, cannot be dismissed lightly. It is tempting for Western politicians and societies to welcome relief of any co-responsibility for the uncertain fate of post-Soviet space and its difficult heritage. And yet, we still have not invented a modern version of the Chinese wall, so brilliantly described in that famous Russian utopian novel "We" by Evgeniy Zamyatin almost seven decades ago. Finally, Russian designs for a transformed OSCE have to answer the fundamental question: Who is going to influence the OSCE's decision-making process? Until now, most of the pertinent descriptions and drafts include some kind of a
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steering organ, usually called—with minor variations—"European Security Council." Predictably, in that forum the U.S. and Russia will be represented permanently. Some additional permanent members are recruited either from major European countries, like France, Great Britain, and Germany, or—as one author proposes—a permanent seat is accorded to the EU. As in the UN Security Council, additional members are participating for a limited period of time. A variant might bring in sub-regional groups with a rotating mechanism restricted to that group's members.

The decisive element hinges, of course, on resolution of the vexing dilemma between the principle of consensus, which would seem to correspond to the idea of international democracy, and the "upper class" version of the same principle, called veto power, on the one hand, or the revolutionary solution of deciding by (qualified) majority vote, on the other. Not surprisingly, Russian authors tend to regard veto rights for permanent members as evidently normal and correct. As a comfort for the "lower classes" they point to equal veto rights for "them," i.e., the Western leading powers. Others just skirt the issue. But at least one Russian contribution to the debate seems to design a mechanism of decision by two-thirds majority.

However, governments—and not just Moscow—will hardly follow that latter proposal. Thus, it is likely we will end up with another model of consensus and veto, which practically reenforce each other. But since the OSCE is supposed to provide for peace and security by providing mandates to NATO or the CIS (and perhaps other fora), the potential victims of aggression will justly ask: How would such a supreme pan-European guarantor of security, where action can be blocked by one of the carriers of veto-power, reliably protect our country? Obviously, this leads us back to the opening remarks, since we can safely assume that Russian planners are equally aware of this elementary flaw in their concept.

The conclusion seems evident: The "great debate" on pan-European security is likely to serve as an umbrella under which Russia attempts to organize the heritage incurred from the USSR. The members of the Atlantic Alliance will have to make up
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their minds whether and how they can contribute to pan-European security, while avoiding another edition of the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Cf. Sergey Blagovolin, "On foreign and military policy of Russia," Svobodnaya Mysl', no. 18 (December 1992), 3, 9-10. Different, though, from most of his colleagues, the author is decidedly optimistic that this is a realistic perspective.

2. At the same time, Soviet ideologists struggling with ruptures within the "world communist movement," tried to rebut Chinese insinuations, that the U.S. and the USSR were forming a conspiracy of the superpowers against the aspirations of the "third" world. Therefore, they maintained, parity and equality with the U.S. by no means were to be confuted with a harmony of goals.


6. Cf. Arbatov (n.3), 33; idem, "Three angles of view on the problem of Poland's joining NATO," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 October 1993, 4 (in Russian); Anatoliy Utkin, "USA-Western Europe: The changing role of Germany," SSHA, no. 2 (February 1994), 6-25 (in Russian). See also the published versions of a report by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR], presented by its director, Evgeniy Primakov, Izvestiya, 26
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November 1993, 4, and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 November 1993, 1-3 (both in Russian).


8. See Aleksej Boguturov et al., "Washington and the post-Soviet states," SSHa, no. 1 (January 1994), 44 (in Russian); Arbatov, Russia's Foreign Policy, n. 3, 34.


12. Kozyrev developed his ideas at the Foreign Ministry's conference mentioned above, DVMIDRF (n.11), 33-36.

13. An indirect admission of this fact can be seen in the second report of the SVOP group (cf. note 11) "Strategy for Russia (2)," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 May 1994, 4-5 (in Russian), where its authors declared in their introduction that they were motivated by "ever more signs suggesting
that the pendulum of . . . Russian politics is swinging towards a policy which is potentially more dangerous than the one conducted in 1991-1992."


15. Cf. Deputy foreign minister Vitaliy Churkin in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 11 (16 March 1994), 14 (in Russian); Andrey Kozyrev's article in International Herald Tribune (n. 3); Sergey Shakhray, the prominent leader of the "Party for Russian Unity and Agreement" [PRES], according to the Russian newspaper Rossiyiskie Vesti, 13 April 1994, 1, qualified NATO's bombing of the Serbian positions at Gorazde as "a slap in the face for Russia's prestige."

16. The CSCE (since 1995, the OSCE), thus far, has only developed rules for peacekeeping mandates. Therefore, Moscow's expectations to receive the OSCE's mandate for Russian peacemaking in the CIS must be turned down a limine for legal reasons. However, parallel Russian requests addressed to the UN will certainly cause some questioning of Russia's peacemaking practices.


18. Turkmenistan might be able, even without any reforms, to market its huge natural gas reserves to foreign customers paying in hard currency. But until now, Ashkhabad had to learn several times that Moscow finds ways to limit such competition in the world market.

19. The frequent use of the term "near abroad" in this analysis should not be interpreted as an approval by this author. On the contrary, the term tends to blur the distinction between those post-Soviet states which are united in the CIS, and the three Baltic countries, thus suggesting that Russia still views the latters' independence as inferior compared with the sovereign states of the "far abroad." Hence, it needs to be replaced by something like "new abroad," which, in fact, gradually is gaining acceptance in Russian official documents.

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22. On rather tough remarks, reportedly made by the foreign minister at a conference of his ministry, see "Kozyrev—for military presence in the states of the neighborhood," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 January 1994, 1. These remarks caused considerable concern, especially among the Baltic neighbors.
23. See Aleksey Pushkov, "Kozyrev started a game on foreign turf," Moskovskie Novosti, no. 4 (23-30 January 1994), A13 (in Russian); the same author, however, defended president Yeltsin’s request to be admitted to the G-7 summit in Naples in July 1994; cf. his article: "Yeltsin in Naples: Guest or participant?" Moskovskie Novosti, no. 27 (3-10 July 1994), 5 (in Russian); for a noteworthy criticism of Russia’s policy in ex-Yugoslavia, see Pavel Kandel, "The Bosnian Wheel: By Pacifying the Serbs Moscow Loses the Trust of its Western Partners," Segodnya, 5 August 1994, 3 (in Russian).
24. Cf. the critical assessment of official opinions by Maksim Sokolov, "Slavology and Balkanistics in the Russian Leadership," Kommersant, no. 6 (22 February 1994), 7 (in Russian); see also the presentation of opinion research results by Igor Klyamkin, "Integration starts from ‘below,’" Delo, no. 30 (July 1994), 1-2 (in Russian).
25. Before the recent killing of a prominent television star, these dark sides of Russian reforms have been inadequately reflected in Western journalists’ accounts or in statements by leading politicians. Because even if their authors are able to leave the comfortable, but isolating hotels, conference rooms, or negotiation tables in Moscow, where they can only meet the successful "new Russians," in order to familiarize themselves with real life in Russia, they, usually, still were eager to portray president Yeltsin and his team as partners deserving Western trust and support.
27. Similar concerns are expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s aide, Anatoliy Chernyaev, "The Kozyrev doctrine is a provocation," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 April 1994, 14 (in German); see also Dmitriy Trenin, "Vision of a ‘cold war,’” Novoe Vremya, no.1. (January 1995), 23 (in Russian), who emphasizes Russia’s economic consolidation as the cardinal condition of security in Europe.
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in this formation a place for Russia and how to define this place under new realities," Novoe Vremya, no. 7 (February 1994), 26-28 (in Russian); Aleksey Pushkov, "Russia and the West: In front of a watershed," Moskovskie Novosti, no. 14 (3-10 April 1994), 12-13 (in Russian); Manki Ponomarev, "Russia has joined the program of partnership: What next?" Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 July 1994, 3 (in Russian).


31. Cf. in particular Sergey Karaganov, Deputy director of the Moscow based Institute of Europe, Member of the Presidential Council and Co-chairman of the SVOP-group (cf. n. 11), "Extension of NATO leads to the isolation of Russia," Moskovskie Novosti, no. 38 (19 September 1993), A7 (in Russian).


33. Cf. Arbatov, Three angles (n. 6); the report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] (n. 6); Viktor Litovkin, "33 pages of arguments for," Izvestiya, 24 May 1994, 4 (in Russian). The article reports extensively on a study produced by the Russian Center for Problems of National Security and International Relations under the chairmanship of Sergey Rogov, where the arguments around "Partnership for Peace" are analyzed. See also the adamant statement by Sergey Karaganov at an international conference in Berlin, Financial Times, 24 January 1995, 2.

34. This economic element figures prominently in the SVR-report (n. 6).

35. These considerations have led this author to address a Polish audience and to argue for the priority of EU membership for the four Visegrad countries. Cf. Christoph Royen, "The extension of EU and NATO and the Coalescence of Europe," Polska w Europie, no. 13 (January 1994), 77-85 (in Polish).


38. Cf. Arbatov, Three angles (n. 6); the SVR-report (n.6); Vladimir Lukin in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 42 (19 October 1994), 15 (in Russian).

39. Blagovolin, Is there (n. 28), shares this assessment. For an unexpected reflection along similar lines in the Russian Armed Forces' daily, see Ponomarev (n. 28). The author suggests that Russian distrustful reactions to the WEU's decision to accord "associated partnership" to nine
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East Central European states, including the three Baltic countries, will be taken in those countries as a confirmation of their own fears of Russia.


42. See the thoughtful article by Dmitriy Trenin, "Will NATO extend eastward?" in Novoe Vremya, no. 43 (November 1994), 18-20 (in Russian); cf. also Vladimir Kozin, "The Extending Alliance and Russia," Segodnya, 20 January 1995, 3 (in Russian).

43. Arbatov, Russia’s Foreign Policy alternatives (n. 3), p.33.


46. As dissenting opinions, cf. Blagovolin, On Foreign and Military Policy (n. 1), 5, who declared that CSCE was no conceivable substitute for existing structures, especially not for NATO; similarly, see Kozin (n. 42).

47. For an exception to this general observation, cf. Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, "Partnership in the Name of NATO?" Argumenty i Fakty, no. 22 (June 1994), 3 (in Russian). The USSR’s last minister of defense and the first and only Chief Commander of the short-lived United Armed Forces of the CIS apparently sees no function for NATO once the OSCE has reached its full blossom.

48. At least, that seemed to be the impression from the visit of Russia’s minister of defense, Pavel Grachev, together with president Yeltsin in Bonn; cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 May 1994, 1-2; Atlantic News, no. 2623 (18 May 1994), 1.

49. According to an unofficial English translation.

50. For such apprehensions cf. "Russia Calls the Shots: Moscow’s Diplomats are Outplaying the West," The Times, 27 May 1994, 19; Frederick Bonnart, "Is There Really Room for the Russians?" International Herald Tribune, 8 June 1994, 8.

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52. Vitaliy Portnikov, the newspaper’s military commentator, together with two other authors, comment under the common heading: "We Do Not Want to Frighten the World," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 June 1994, 3 (in Russian).

53. Zagorskiy (n. 20).


56. Arbatov (n. 55).

57. Ibid.

58. Chudakov et al. (n. 44).

59. Igor' Bocharov, "For New Europe—A New System of Security," SShA, no. 7 (July 1994), 42-48 (45). Also Aleksey Arbatov, in a recent draft manuscript, proposes the possibility to overrule a veto with a qualified majority of 90 percent. However, his article does not yet contain this possibility; see "Russia: National Security in the 90’s" Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, no. 7 (July 1994), 5-15, and no. 8-9 (August-September 1994), 5-18 (13).
10

Forging a New Trans-Atlanticism

Charles Barry

Six years is a long time—longer than any predicted it would take—to discern the shape of the geopolitical house that will support America’s and Europe’s common interests in the 21st century. Now, thankfully, the rough outlines of a new trans-Atlanticism are finally visible, although certainly much remains to be sorted out, not merely the details but substantive matters as well. Still, serious doubts that trans-Atlanticism would endure in a new epoch have faded as more details begin to unfold. Those who forecasted (or encouraged) the quick abandonment of NATO have been silenced, though all recognize the alliance must change much more if it is to meet future needs. Those that mused Europe might soon become a unilateral crisis manager have tempered their ambitions, yet most accept that Europe must come to manage its own security. Those who foresaw Russia teetering on the edge of chaos for a long time have gained wide acceptance, but the consensus is that relations with Russia are no less crucial, and that they can be managed. Finally, those who pined in vain for assertive U.S. leadership reminiscent of the Cold War have come to realize that, too, is history. It is this last reality, the nature of U.S. engagement in European security, that is at once both the least defined and most unsettling concern.

The New Trans-Atlanticism

The "under construction" relationship shaping up between Europe and North America foreshadows a mix of renovated multilateralisms and a fresh, new bi-polarity. It will be a noticeably more balanced relationship, the nexus between a more
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detached U.S. leadership and the gradually merging foreign and security policies of EU/WEU countries. Bi-polarity will strengthen even more as a European body politic coalesces. Around these two poles other powers will participate in the spectrum of trans-Atlantic fora, via arrangements ranging from full membership to ad hoc—the so-called variable geometry of multiple, overlapping organizations. Notable among those linkages can be foreseen special relationships with Russia, for both the EU and the United States.

All this continues to emerge from the old Cold War institutional system through an uneven metamorphosis. There have been spurts of growth and periods of aimless competition as tides of consensus on how to proceed ebbed and flowed. Now, barring the failure of the major powers to maintain control over the trends they set in motion over the last six or so years, Europe will be a collective power unto itself, with little or no U.S. tutelage, within the next one to two decades. However, the process of shifting from a U.S.-led Europe to a U.S.-supported Europe is quite delicate, and it can not be pushed too fast. Above all, the U.S. can not expect too much European leadership and cohesion too soon, as it did in Bosnia. After all, one facet of the forty-five-year-long Cold War was to ensure that no European leader emerged to dominate western Europe. The most practical replacement for U.S. stewardship—and leadership—in Europe is the EU; and that entity is a long way from defining itself. One truth is historically certain and beyond reasonable doubt today: if the U.S. fails to provide adequate leadership in Europe right up until an acceptable successor is ready, the vacuum that would result will lead to war for all. Therefore, the objective of the new trans-Atlanticism is an EU-led Europe, one that is both supportive of and supported by the U.S. in regional and global security matters. A corollary to this aim is that an EU-led Europe must be an acceptable neighbor to Russia as well.

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

A fully transformed NATO—perhaps even a new name to underscore its new era relevance—will remain the central and most visible manifestation of trans-Atlanticism for a long time to come.
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The trans-Atlantic cohesion that flows from NATO is simply no less than the crown jewel in the foreign policies of each of its members, not least of all the United States. NATO's unparalleled success, not only in collective defense but in harmonizing relations among its members, has led NATO members to decide unanimously not to abandon, but to reforge the Alliance to their future needs. That process started in London in 1990, and in 1995 the Alliance knows its transformation must reach a lot further still before the organization is truly capable of its future roles.

Instead of military preparedness for a unitary mission of territorial defense, NATO strives to become a security organization characterized by both political and military flexibility, and responsive to less cataclysmic crises that might arise rapidly and come from any of an array of potential trouble spots on NATO periphery, or even further away. NATO's enduring uniqueness is threefold: it keeps the U.S. routinely in the crisis prevention and response equation; it nourishes a political-military cadre of bureaucrats and policy makers seasoned in international cooperation during crisis; and, it brings a mature political-military institution capable of carrying out its decisions either independently or in cooperation with others. These capabilities make NATO the foremost—and in the near term, the only fully equipped—crisis management agency in Europe.

NATO programs like the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the recent study of eventual NATO expansion, have already helped extend security and stability across Europe, and thereby alleviated many pre-crisis conditions. No non-crisis objective is more important to NATO's purpose than extending the stability and security enjoyed by its members beyond its territory. Eventually, NATO may also take in new members, as it has done in the past. However, the objectives of extending security and stability and NATO expansion are not congruent. Security and stability are already being extended through ongoing programs that demand little in return except that the beneficiaries remain at peace. However, membership means bringing a measure of additive security to the collective whole. From this perspective, the number of new members may be much smaller than some observers suggest.
Reforming the Trans-Atlantic Relationship

Notwithstanding NATO's adaptation and potential expansion, its previously exclusive multilateral role in trans-Atlantic cooperation will be diluted by a growing U.S.-EU intercourse on foreign and security policy issues. The ultimate nature of the EU—be it federative, confederative or intergovernmental—is less important in this respect than to understand that a firm decision has been taken by all its members to have a collective as well as sovereign identities in foreign and security policies. As a result, trans-Atlanticism, which has heretofore been almost exclusively bilateral and NATO-multilateral, will enjoy an increasingly active, quasi-bilateral U.S.-EU component.

The Western European Union (WEU)

A fundamental element of future trans-Atlantic relations will be the nature of Europe. But, what exactly is the European half, or "pillar," of the relationship? Will it be amalgamated into one or remain pluralistic? In the security and defense arena at least, that pillar will be embodied in the WEU. As to whether Europe melds into a single entity or retains lines of sovereignty, the answer will have to await the passage of time.

The WEU (with its own version of variable geometry memberships) is working toward a common European defense policy and the attendant operational arrangements necessary for collective military activities. The WEU is rapidly building capabilities into its headquarters and gaining valuable experience with deployed forces. The number of critics still calling the WEU ineffectual is dwindling. There is a convincing air of commitment and "hustle" at the new WEU headquarters in Brussels that can hardly be dismissed as wheel spinning. More and more analysts have begun to take the fully awakened Rip van Winkle of Europe as a serious security player for the future. That means NATO will have to share its heretofore exclusive role in military affairs with a more credible WEU. The cautions often heard that the WEU must not be oversold (especially to the U.S. Congress) remain good advice for now. However, as anyone familiar with the metamorphosis within WEU since 1992 will be inclined to agree, the mid to long term is destined to be a much different story.
Forging a New Trans-Atlanticism

Some Europeans want the WEU to eventually replace NATO as the lead agency for regional crisis response, and even initial collective defense. This attitude reflects, in part, conclusions drawn about the meaning of U.S.-European differences over the Bosnia crisis, and the belief that there will be future crises in which the Americans refuse to participate. In referring to the need for post-Cold War crisis response, M. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the French Ambassador to WEU, noted, "It is vital that measures are adopted to ensure that, in the long term, the Europeans can take primary responsibility in this area, including on the military level."

Every proponent of the re-vitalized WEU stresses the principle of its complementarity with NATO, along with the concept of an independent European capability. That point is also clearly stated in all the WEU re-vitalization documents: the 1984 Rome Declaration, the 1987 Hague Platform, the 1991 Maastricht Declaration on WEU, and the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. The 1994 NATO summit’s Declaration catch-phrase of "separable but not separate" attempts to capture the concept neatly and avoid the more obvious appearance of a "have your cake and eat it too" proposition. No good explanation has been divined as to how the 10 WEU members will be able to debate and cast their votes freely in NATO fora once having determined their collective position in WEU. Indeed, an increasingly more naked incongruity is the specter of "an organization within an organization" (WEU members within NATO), both independent and addressing essentially the same topics. Therefore, establishing solid NATO-WEU relations should be the first priority as the two organizations, one struggling through adaptation and the other teething on re-birth, seek to operationalize some level of political-military compatibility.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

No less than NATO or WEU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE) is solidifying a central role in Europe's new security plexus. During the latter half of the Cold War, CSCE proved a dogged and potent tool for opening eastern Europe to the individual freedoms and military
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transparency that contributed much to ending the Cold War. Those same safeguards will be no less essential for the future. The momentum of OSCE is an encouraging indication that it will continue to be an effective sentry in the new era, with a particular focus on crisis prevention and conflict resolution. What is more, OSCE is destined to be a stronger, more frequently exercised sinew of the trans-Atlantic link.

Since the historic Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, OSCE has taken impressive strides toward institutionalization, transforming itself from a deliberative process to an implementing organization. Along the way, the blueprint has undergone numerous modifications as its architects seek to address the most significant substance of European security: resolving current conflicts and the root causes of future crises. For example, the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference retitled the Warsaw Office of Free Elections as the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and expanded its portfolio accordingly. The same session established the High Commissioner for National Minorities. Also in 1992, the consensus minus one concept was adopted; and the Forum for Security Cooperation was inaugurated, which moved arms control agreements beyond the old NATO-Warsaw Pact model to encompass all of Europe. In June, 1993, the position of Secretary-General was established to strengthen the overall management of OSCE operations. The most recent (December, 1994) Budapest Review Conference further amended the design through a series of new titles (including the change from CSCE to OSCE), and intra-organizational support directives aimed at enhanced effectiveness.

Yet, where OSCE has really shown its security potential is as a framework for far reaching treaties on European security, and (more recently) through its official missions for fact finding, rapporteur and monitoring purposes, under the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). OSCE has been central to the conclusion of the CFE (equipment), CFE 1A (personnel) and Open Skies (overflights) treaties related to arms limitations and confidence building. OSCE’s achievements in the human dimension and in confident-building measures have stood out as perhaps its greatest contributions and its enduring hallmark. OSCE’s missions to
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Georgia, Estonia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Latvia have earned OSCE respect as a bona fide contributor to Europe's future security. OSCE's persistence in conflict resolution is evident in the encouraging achievements of the OSCE Minsk Group in Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, its ongoing Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in the former Yugoslavia indicate OSCE willingness to assume its responsibilities, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, for making every effort to reach pacific settlement of local disputes and to assist the implementation of UN resolutions.

In its trans-Atlantic role, OSCE is a mainstream forum for cooperation on humanitarian, minority rights, and democracy initiatives, all long-term staples of American foreign policy in central and eastern Europe. Although some in Europe would like to make more use of OSCE in crisis response, and Russia would like to second both the CIS and NATO to its resolutions, the U.S. is quite satisfied with continuance of the traditional (and largely unfinished) work of CSCE. OSCE is broader in focus than either NATO or WEU, providing a unique venue for addressing the root causes of conflict. Notably OSCE remains a political institution not based on a legally binding treaty like NATO, WEU or the UN; its actions are political and under existing commitments do not allow economic or military intervention. But most telling, with 53 members the consensus-driven OSCE is too unwieldy for operational crisis response. Rather, it is well suited for exposing and treating the early signs of crises, and for conflict resolution.

Unquestionably, OSCE is a potent complement to NATO and WEU. The power of public diplomacy, innovative confidence and security building measures and internationally accepted high standards for human rights are some of the salient products already apparent from the enduring Helsinki process. From a trans-Atlantic perspective, American membership in OSCE extends the legitimacy of U.S. security interests beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area to all of Europe.

The Council of Europe (CE)

The lower profile Council of Europe (CE), virtually unknown in the U.S., remains an important values-based gateway to the EU.
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The CE is a co-agent with OSCE for facilitating Europe's social and economic progress, environmental development, and for the safeguard of human rights. Like the OSCE, the CE has taken initiatives on the topic of minority rights\textsuperscript{12} in recent years, as a particularly salient concern in conflict prevention. The CE maintains close relations with the EU, WEU and OSCE as well as other European organizations. It is easy to foresee the employment of regional and institutional caucusing in the OSCE as a technique for advancing initiatives, and for coordinating organizational agendas. The smaller (33 members versus 53 OSCE members) CE may provide Europe with a special advantage for European initiatives. Just as the WEU affords a defense forum "within" NATO where Europeans are free of superpower participation, CE offers a venue "within" OSCE on economic and humanitarian issues where neither the United States nor Russia currently has a voice.

The Trend: Toward Real Complementarity

The briefs above attempt to describe the discernable institutional trends that inform the debate on the future of trans-Atlanticism. In short, each institution has passed through its own crucible of direction seeking, internal politics, grand visions and competition for survival. That phase is largely over. Each actor has come to realize its own limitations in dealing with a new slate of problems that at times seem to defy resolution even as they demand to be resolved. Institutions as well as the great powers have realized that center stage is less attractive when the role is cast in Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Chechnya, and when failure is a distinct possibility. However, the lessening in inter-organizational rivalry is noticeable and welcome.\textsuperscript{13} So, too, is the narrowing of fractious gaps between the U.S. and French views of trans-Atlanticism, and between the NATO and Russian views of Europe's future structures. Europe is leaving behind its post-Cold War wandering—a time when all argued about which way to go without much leadership. We have started down the long road to a new order, a set of relationships that—in a macro sense anyway—Europe, the United States, and Russia all see as in their collective interest.
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In the business of preserving peace and avoiding war, what is most in need of each institution's contribution is the prevention and management of crisis—the stage between peace and war that we strive to avoid. Our common interest should be to re-design each security institution to help prevent crisis, and thereby, conflict. Of course, where prevention fails, Europe must have the tools at hand to manage and ultimately to resolve crisis and conflict. Bosnia shows our collective citizenry is not persuaded to pay the cost in blood to eradicate all conflict, and that Europe will never be free of conflicts that threaten the general peace. But, even local conflicts must be vigorously contained, and ultimately resolved politically, if the peace that has been won is to endure.

Fortunately, the area of greatest concern, the fragile new states of Central and East Europe, have established effective ties to both trans-Atlantic poles: to the U.S. via NATO, and to the west Europeans via NATO, the EU, WEU and CE. For young governments not far back from the brink of both political and economic instability, ties to only one end of trans-Atlanticism alone would be unacceptable. The obvious aims are full membership in both NATO and the EU (with WEU membership being seen as essentially automatic). Still, for states not acceding to full membership, there are layers of peripheral linkages that provide a menu of access to mainstream security structures that can satisfy most national objectives. NATO has its auxiliary North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program; the EU has its Europe Agreements,14 and TACIS and PHARE15 aid programs; and, the WEU has its Associate Partners. All provide links to western stability and are the sinew of a spreading sense of security.

The U.S. and France:  
Two Divergent Views, Both Essential

It is impossible to fully explore the future of trans-Atlantic relations without discoursing on the seemingly interminable contest between the U.S. and France in the conduct of NATO affairs. The essence of the struggle is about political power in Europe. The unstated reality is that the U.S. has become nearly as fond of its powerful role as Europe's benevolent hegemon as
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France has grown to despise it. The contest is not a new one, dating back to the early days of the Alliance and breaking into the open with DeGaulle’s summary decision to quit the integrated military structure in 1966. Nonetheless, in the wake of the Cold War, the friction has increased as France and the U.S. struggle in earnest to advance competing views of NATO’s future place in Europe’s architecture. Choosing to avoid open debate over that fundamental question, the two protagonists wage nearly constant bureaucratic battles at the tactical level over NATO decision making (CJTF comes to mind) and the wording of communiques that might advance advocacy of either a NATO-centric European security apparatus or an EU/WEU-centric one.

Perhaps unwittingly, the perception of a U.S. less interested in Europe and America’s reticence to engage in Bosnia have strengthened the French view that Europe cannot accept a security system that must go first to NATO for crisis response. Rather, the French argue, Europe must have its own option to respond, especially in crises short of territorial defense. Europe should become master of its own destiny, supported by the U.S. but unfettered by any U.S. droit de regard in security matters Europe is capable of handling on its own.

Conversely, Europe’s utter failure to perform as a crisis manager in Bosnia and its anemic defense budgets expose how unprepared Europe really is to stand on its own in the near term. Over time, both the U.S. and France will be proved right. In the near to mid term the NATO-centric model is the only real option. In the long term, the Europe-centered view is the most desirable objective. It is not a question of if Europe will become its own primary crisis manager and collective defense overseer, but when. Today, all should accept the continuing need for NATO because it is simply too obvious. In the longer term, why should Europe not be responsible for its own crisis response and initial collective defense? What other region of the world is more capable in terms of wealth, military power, common values, advanced institutions, and modernity?

As the French press for greater independence from the U.S. in security matters, they are also anxious to avoid triggering a full U.S. withdrawal from Europe. A Europe without a U.S. presence,
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specifically in Germany, is no more in France’s interest than a U.S. dominated Europe. France has no sure claim to political leadership among European powers. Concerns about the still-to-be defined role of Germany, a realization of the fragility of the emergent European political integration, and worry about possible Russian moves to fill in for an absent U.S. are some of the many reasons France as much as anyone wants the U.S. to remain. An often asked question is, “What European national would be an acceptable replacement for an American SACEUR?” The answer has always been, “no one.”

So, the French walk a tightrope, trying to reduce U.S. influence as much as possible without going too far. But, in the longer term, success of the French model is in everyone’s interest, and therefore it is likely to prevail. At the 1994 Brussels summit, the U.S. signalled its bona fide acceptance of ESDI as a concept it can live with (although no one has articulated how). It takes only a slightly active imagination to envision a NATO in 20 years that is shallower even as it is broader, becoming a back drop to Europe’s effective management of its own security affairs without a resurgent Soviet-style threat. A European SACEUR may indeed be acceptable by then, with perhaps a small North American planning staff amidst a predominantly European headquarters. Just as important is to develop a scheme to gradually transfer to the EU and WEU (which presumably will become one at some point) the responsibility for their own security—backed up by the U.S. and Canada via a whole new NATO. A useful endeavor would be for the U.S. and France to sit down and explore this transformation in a first order debate, and to craft a common U.S.-European strategy to bring it about in the spirit of enduring allies.

Roles for the CIS and Sub-Regional Cooperation?

One still-imponderable institution is the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Can this unpopular and anemic successor to the USSR garner true allegiance from its members, and become a complementary part of Europe’s security architecture for the twelve former Soviet republics? Few signs point in that direction, and in the West there is no enthusiasm for supporting what most see as just a new tool of Russian hegemony.
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That the political and economic end-state of all CIS members remains in doubt makes uncertainty itself the central trend in the CIS. Still, some conclusions can be formed with modest certainty about CIS states and relations with the rest of Europe. First, Russia will always warrant special consideration simply due to its size and strength. Like the U.S., Russia can probably never be a member of the EU or WEU. Nor is it possible to envision Russia and the U.S. as co-lead nations of NATO. For the remainder of the so-called newly independent states (NIS), full membership in western organizations is a distant prospect at best.

Yet rampant nationalism is at cross purposes with regional peace and stability. Therefore, another conclusion is that some form of multilateral connectivity across the former Soviet Union—other than OSCE—is desirable. For this reason the west might hold out hope for the CIS to take healthy root, a possibility only if it becomes a truly voluntary, consensus-based organization. That would be a radical change from the present Russian-dominated CIS. Only time will tell if the CIS is salvageable or whether other prospects are necessary.

Whatever structure finally takes root in Europe’s east, it must be a complement to, rather than a potential adversary for, NATO. There is no reason why that cannot be so. As for eastern links to the EU, more and more the rapidly fading European Free Trade Association (EFTA) seems to be the model. In the 1960s EFTA provided the means for Europe’s EC core to link market-wise to countries on the periphery. That should be a comfortable way to proceed in the CIS today.

Few other sub-regional cooperations have been spawned in the wake of the East-West paradigm. Three worthy of mention are the Visegrad triangle, the Central European Initiative (CDI) and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS).16 The bulk of these groups’ agendas focus on cultural, trade, and economic openness. Such functional exchanges foster reassurances and trust on a broad basis, and provide a healthy environment for the normalization of relations. It is in the interest of all Europe to encourage sub-regional cooperation, especially along functional lines.17
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A Concert of Super-EuroPowers?
The detectable phenomenon of more direct and more intense collaboration by the great powers outside of institutions makes a separate examination of the roles of the U.S., EU and Russia crucial to an analysis of European security. That does not mean a concert that diminishes roles or blocks the voices of lesser powers. Rather, it suggests the catalyst for consensus and an engine for action that can link institutions and facilitate cooperation. For the near to mid term the bureaucratic and value-based cultural ties between the U.S. and EU make them a much closer match than with Russia. In this respect, the vision of a "concert" is more of a "two plus one." Ultimately, it is in the interest of all parties to normalize the role of Russia.

The United States
Since the Gulf War, the U.S. has befuddled its European allies by not exercising its customarily assertive leadership in Euro-Atlantic affairs. There have been two salient voids that Europeans have long yearned to see Washington fill. The first has been to provide a vision of a new world (or at least new European) order that would cement the suddenly won peace in a renewed trans-Atlantic bargain. Instead, and not specific to either Administration that followed the Cold War, American policies focused primarily on its own immediate concerns: Russian nuclear weapons under an unstable regime, domestic politics and a pent-up demand to look toward Asia. What Washington has accomplished in European affairs since approval of NATO's new Strategic Concept in late 1991 has been incremental, not evidence of a grand design allies could rally behind. One thing the U.S. certainly has not had on its agenda is a definitive renewal of its trans-Atlantic marriage vows. In order to affirm its future commitment to Europe, the U.S. will have to first make the case for continued investment in NATO to Congress and the American people. That has not been done, nor is there any indication that a need to do so is recognized. U.S. policy makers apparently have concluded that adequate public support exists for NATO, and that Europe is of obvious importance to most Americans. Yet some analysts worry that, to
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the average American, investment in Europe in lieu of greater investment at home is not an obvious priority at all. In turn, they believe America’s leaders will have to make convincing arguments to the people.

The second need Europeans looked to America to fill has been leadership in resolution of the Balkan crisis. Even as the situation deteriorated, the U.S. made it clear that Yugoslavia was a problem for Europeans. Alongside its allies, the U.S. has expended great treasure to provide humanitarian relief, exert economic pressure, engage in diplomacy and posture militarily, but until recently it has not provided leadership. The price of leadership is military engagement, a price the U.S. has up to now seen no reason to pay. After the May 1995 UN hostage crisis, Europeans turned, at last, to solving the crisis themselves. Recent U.S. initiatives notwithstanding, if Europe were to succeed without American leadership it would have a permanent effect on relative U.S. weight in trans-Atlantic relations.

Whether by design or default the U.S. is sending a lasting signal that future U.S. leadership in Europe will be less assertive and less intrusive than during the Cold War. The U.S. intends to lead only when its vital interests are at stake and when a collective response is appropriate. Russia’s recovery, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and extending security eastward (an interest heightened by domestic political pressures) are policy topics directly related to vital U.S. interests. General European peace will always matter and so the Washington Treaty will not fade away, nor will the American commitment in terms of forward deployed troops—at least not right away. However, in responding to smaller crises around Europe, the American role will be less that of leader and more as co-participant or simply a supporting actor. Clearly, greater European leadership will be required in those situations. Such are the trends on which trans-Atlanticism will proceed to address European security issues.

The European Union Powers

On the European side, the story is one of cautious amalgamation toward collective leadership. The aims of the major powers in western Europe, primarily Germany, France and the United
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Kingdom, have been gradually harmonizing on security affairs. While the immediate post-Cold War period saw the UK staunchly opposed to a separate security and defense identity (ESDI), Germany being solicitous while extolling the preeminence of NATO, and France trying to move back America’s benevolent hegemony—all now actively support the development of a European defense capability that can, when necessary, act independently. With ratification of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the adjacent WEU Declaration, the ESDI concept—first spawned by the 1984 re-birth of the WEU—has finally taken hold. Concurrently, the 1990 U.S.-EU Declaration has begun to establish a pattern of regular (albeit still superficial) bilateral consultations between the two "trans-Atlantic partners" on a range of issues, including some related to security matters.

Will it be Europe’s traditional major powers or the upstart EU that become America’s future trans-Atlantic partner(s)? For a long time to come the answer is that it will be both. Europe’s political merging has spawned a certain schizophrenia that will not soon go away. Nonetheless, the EU—or the major EU powers—will wield increased power in European security affairs because of the less intense U.S. engagement. The EU has stopped looking for the old style U.S. direction and has begun to act on its own. The EU will be a more equal partner in European security, and may at times be in the lead with the U.S. in support. This trend was discernable in the European response to the hostage crisis. Finally convinced they needed to find their own solution, European powers launched their own reaction force. Such actions are harbingers of future trans-Atlantic relations and crisis response.

Russia

Russia has settled into the long, slow struggle toward recovery that most scholars admit could lead anywhere. No one writes off reform, but few seem to expect a western-style democracy. In the near to mid term, Russia could end in a neo-authoritarian state with nascent democratic trappings. Much later, over scores of years, Russia might evolve into a true democratic state. What is clear is that the political philosophy of New Russia will remain largely unsettled for a considerable time to come. We also know
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that the outcome in Russia is nearly immune to external pressures or influence. Gone is the fleeting euphoria that western culture and business methods would quickly prime the pumps of human ingenuity, and establish a great boom of industrial activity and individual enterprise. Ossetia and now Chechnya demonstrate that Russian leaders are quick to use power in lieu of protracted negotiations where it is expedient.

Russia is not yet a steady ally, but a sort of Jekel and Hyde ally-antagonist that can be part of a problem or part of its solution. Currently Russia is a part of the solution in Bosnia and part of the problem in Chechnya and Iran. Also Russia has ideas counter to the West on the roles of NATO, NACC and OSCE. In external relations, Russia defiantly insists on being accepted as a fully engaged great power, be it in the G-7, NATO or as a member of the Contact Group on the Balkan crisis. Unlike China’s internal renovation of the 1970s and 80s, Russia cedes none of its international profile as a superpower because of internal chaos and ruin. For trans-Atlantic policies, Russia will necessarily have to be treated as a special actor. The U.S.-EU relationship can afford neither to have Russia fully in or to leave it completely out. Both institutional and bi-lateral options should be explored.

In sum, three super-actors are afoot in European security affairs, and seem disposed to collaborate in managing crisis when the stakes get high, as in Bosnia. Neither the U.S. nor Russia have quit the European arena—far from it. But both have backed off considerably from their deep involvement during the Cold War, and are now content that the Europe they see emerging under EU management looks to be an acceptable regional neighbor and partner. Therefore, the "new" Europeans, although still far from sure of who or what they are, will henceforth be the principal force in defining Europe’s new order. In crisis management and resolution, the U.S. and Russia can join with the EU, providing a supra-venue for consensus building or breaking through deadlocked negotiations. As a steering group for broader actions under the UN, OSCE, NATO or elsewhere, the three powers represent a sort of informal concert for policy making. The Contact Group currently seeking solutions to the Bosnian conflict is an example of superpower collaboration that transcends more
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difficult consensus building in larger fora. At the same time, through those very forums, the courses of action of the superpowers are given essential legitimacy and enduring implementation.

European Crisis Management and the Balkan Conflict

It should come as no surprise that parts of Europe, freed from external restraint, have devolved again into war. Even the 19th century’s Concert of Europe saw localized conflicts throughout Europe’s first extended period of peace from 1815 to 1854. However, what the Concert did successfully—and the task that faces today’s security structures—was to prevent the spillover of local conflicts into general war. The most important task in the Balkans, then, is to contain the conflict, at least within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Anything else that might be accomplished is secondary and must not endanger the collective vital interest of conflict containment. Closely related to containment is the collective interest in remaining collective: we can not risk the prestige of great international institutions like the UN or NATO by making the Balkans the test case of their worth.

All concerned powers have exerted tremendous energy and resources, unilaterally and through every available security institution, toward resolution of the Balkan conflict. Yet, four years since the break up of Yugoslavia, none of the root causes of the crises in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have been resolved, and there are no assurances that a stable peace in Bosnia will exist anytime soon. Some problems simply defy rapid solutions, and in that respect the Balkans crisis is a prime example.

In what may have been, in hindsight, the most consequential diplomatic decision of the conflict, the U.S. declined—for what appeared to be sound reasons on the surface—to take a lead role in resolution of the crisis in 1991. Since then, earnest effort by the UN and EU have resulted in mistakes and failures, as well as an occasional success. Absent a clear leader, no common strategy has been followed. Incrementalism and reactive tactical decisionmaking were more the rule. Some observers see disputes
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among NATO allies at times as approaching the rancor of the 1956 Suez crisis. In addition, the initiative has nearly always been in the hands of the warring parties themselves. The worst fear has been that perceptions of weakness, disarray and lack of resolve could trigger miscalculations by the parties, who then might take decision that spawn spillover. Then, the international community would have no choice but military intervention to prevent a wider regional war. However, the "international community" is far from cohesive and there is a danger of outside powers supporting one side or the other, a situation that harkens back onerously to the beginnings of World War I.

In the main, however, the world leaned into political resolution of the Balkan crisis, and showed no intention of letting go, though old initiatives were repeatedly abandoned in favor of new ones. Was that a failure of crisis management? Or was it the nature of an intractable conflict that will require a lot more time before the parties want peace more than war? While the conflict went on, it was, in fact, contained and even curtailed by external initiatives. Humanitarian assistance was provided to millions, surely reducing the number of casualties, probably by thousands. Local resettlement efforts stemmed some of the refugee flow, and military patrols prevented air attacks and limited the influx of arms. Wisely, the temptation to resolve the conflict quickly by force was resisted (and should continue to be). Diplomatic initiatives were near continuous, and—perhaps most importantly—communications were always open for when the parties tired of killing and desired peace. The one area where the world community did not succeed was in remaining impartial to all sides.

Crisis management can be sub-divided into crisis prevention, crisis response and crisis resolution. In the Balkans, crisis prevention was not mobilized quickly enough and has generally failed. Lessons must be learned, and prevention policies should be enacted should indications be seen of proximate or similar crises. A key prevention factor is the protection and enfranchisement of minorities.

Crises that cannot be prevented require response across the full spectrum of international power—diplomatic, economic, and
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military. The power of public diplomacy, invoked through the UN, OSCE and special envoys is a potent tool. Bilateral diplomacy can have a special effect when close relations exist with a belligerent. Economic action, notably sanctions, is another strong tool, although it is gradually being recognized as a more complex process of both acting against belligerents and supporting the economies of "innocent bystander" states who are impacted adversely. Once a crisis occurs, both diplomatic and economic solutions tend to achieve results only over time.

Military power has a variety of crisis response uses, including: lending credibility to diplomacy; enforcing economic sanctions; isolating the troubled area; protecting civilians; and facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid. In the Balkans, military forces have also been inserted as UN peacekeepers, forces that have traditional been employed when peace was already in hand. The gamble that they might serve as a catalyst to create peace did not pay off, and they have become a protection force for humanitarian aid on a shrinking scale. The gamble having failed, they (and therefore a large part of the humanitarian aid effort) may soon be withdrawn. Military power also can be used in its traditional role for crisis response. Such employment would call for adherence to standard military doctrine calling for forces sufficient to achieve success, and would mean entering the conflict on behalf of one of the parties.

Sadly, effective management of the Balkan crisis has proved elusive. That is not a reason for the Euro-Atlantic community to be satisfied simply to contain the conflict. All nations are justifiably outraged. With execution of the Dayton agreement, the initiative has shifted from the warfighters to the peacemakers and peace enforcers. Still, the motives to resume fighting lie just below the surface. Through the momentum of the IFOR operations, socio-political and economic reconstruction, and continuing international diplomacy, the initiative must be retained.

For future crises, we might conclude that the UN is not an appropriate agency for protection or peace enforcement, or that NATO should not get mired in long term, traditional peacekeeping with its demand for total impartiality. Humanitarian assistance is a UN strong suit, and traditional military operations seem more suited to NATO, or perhaps the WEU. The EU, Russia and U.S.
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are well placed to push diplomatic initiatives and to arrange economic relief to neighboring states impacted by UN embargoes.

Clearly, crisis management and eventual conflict resolution in the Balkans remain a long haul proposition. In the end, what can be expected, at best, is an uneasy status quo ante bellum, without permanent resolution of root causes. Indeed, just as today’s combatants are the children of yesterday’s conflicts, the children who survive this conflict will likely grow up to be tomorrow’s crisis perpetrators.

Another reality of crisis management is that the public in developed countries are coming to expect quick solutions with few or no casualties when military forces are employed for less than clear vital interests. For a variety of social reasons, developed countries place a higher value on human life than is accorded in less developed countries. That leads to demands for compelling reasons before sending forces into harm’s way. Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the U.S., the hoped-for leader in responding to any world class conflict such as Bosnia. However, without clearly defined links to vital national interests and achievable military objectives, the U.S. was unable to justify committing ground forces. Under the Dayton peace agreement, risks have been brought in line with interests and the limited objectives seem achievable. Should U.S. forces sustain higher than expected casualties, it will be important that the interests identified are worth the price, and that the added costs have brought success.

Summary Points

In the main, Europe’s future security architecture has achieved its initial definition; it is being guided by identifiable trends. Those trends have been set in motion first of all by the great powers, and then advanced by the principal institutional bureaucracies that span Europe. Although it has been a long time coming, much longer than anticipated, Europe and the U.S. are at last on the road to a new order. The U.S. has underscored its commitment to NATO, however its more passive leadership style demands more of its EU allies in terms of crisis response, and, at times, that means filling a leadership void. The EU and WEU are responding by doing more to develop their own defense capabilities, yet they
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are still far from having a capability on which to wager our collective hopes for success, in Bosnia or anywhere else. The challenge is for both sides to bring about Europe's independent capabilities without risking the broader trans-Atlantic relationship on which our collective well-being depends.

All the principal institutions and organizations matter, all are needed, and all venues should be brought to bear in complementary fashion on the prevention of crises and the resolution of conflict. This is easier now that the period of high competition seems to be ameliorating. Nonetheless, a lot of work remains before any institution reaches its new state and full potential.

Much more thinking is necessary in order to "enfranchise" Russia and the NIS countries into the fabric of European security. OSCE is the place to start, but in the long run it will not be enough. And, although memberships will likely expand, there are practical limits on the size of NATO, WEU and EU. For Russia, special ties to each of these institutions is essential. For the rest of the NIS, further consideration should be given to advancing the role of the CIS, or advocating creation of another such structure. The moribund and tainted CIS would have to be almost totally recreated in order to be acceptable, either by its members or by outsiders.

Until December 1995, Bosnia and the broader Balkan crisis had been handled incrementally, through a series of new ideas or reactive measures, with no specific great power crisis-response strategy being followed, and no discernable success beyond the most central interest of preventing spillover. To do more was impossible given the lack of political will and the realities of the conflict itself. Now the U.S. has asserted leadership, devised a strategy, and taken the initiative away from the warring parties. Follow-through will be crucial. Otherwise, we will revert to muddling through with sporadic risks of a wider war that few are prepared to counter and no one can tolerate.

Perhaps more than expansion, Russia, or even Bosnia, the U.S. and Europe should first of all be forging a new relationship with each other. Together they should ponder carefully, fully, and intimately their commitment to the future of trans-Atlanticism. On
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both sides, it is a topic for public debate as well as policy making discourse. Leaders in every member nation should show cause why investment in NATO is a national priority (and it surely is!). Without genuine commitment to a continuing common security framework there may be no Alliance worth joining, no collective for Russia to work with, and no hope of solving crises like Bosnia. Trans-Atlanticism is the greatest success story in the history of international relations, the longest peace in the annals of modern diplomacy. But there is one thing it can not be, and that is a maintenance-free relationship. In these uncertain times, it likely needs more nurturing and care than it is getting.

Epilogue

In the last scene of the 1966 film The Sand Pebbles, the mortally wounded hero, U.S. Navy petty officer Jake Holman despairs "I was home! What the hell happened?" In the mid-1920's, Holman's dying lament from central China seemed as apropos to the failing American gunboat diplomacy he was a part of as it was to his own personal fate. Today, with the work of securing peace still largely incomplete, the western world could find itself in Holman's predicament: suddenly turned upside down by a crisis it had not even imagined. In that instant, we might also wonder, 'what the hell happened' to the peace that had been won by the Cold War.

A world adrift is a dangerous place. Who can know when a new regional hegemon will appear, or what China's re-entry into global affairs will bring, or how Russia will behave when it stands erect once more? We only know these events will happen, and when they do the world would be far better if a future Euro-Atlantic relationship were already well seated. China, Russia, and potentially adventuresome powers that are destined to make their debuts should find an orderly world to join, not a world in disarray over Bosnia, trade disputes or re-emergent nationalism.

The western allies lie at the core of a sort of "Euro-Atlantic footprint" of nations that together represent the greatest reservoir of international power, and the largest region of general peace in the world. These nations provide a logical foundation on which to build a new order: Most of the world's wealth, arms and
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political power resides in this Euro-Atlantic footprint. The NATO allies also have at their disposal the most successful collective defense alliance in history. In fact, few probably took notice more than ten years ago, in 1984, when NATO's stewardship of peace among west European powers surpassed the previous record set by the Concert of Europe in the 19th century. To those who say NATO's mission is over, we must firmly but resolutely say: 'no, this tool of cooperation is essential to the future peace.' As Lieutenant General Ervin Rokke, President of the U.S. National Defense University, cautions, the serious business of security and defense is like the hazardous sport of wing walking—the first rule is: don't let go of something solid until you have something else firm to hang onto. There is simply nothing firm to grasp other than the NATO alliance that is even on the horizon. At the same time, NATO must be made to serve future needs, and so it must be renovated completely, keeping what works, discarding what is no longer required, and adding where necessary. A new NATO must earn the confidence of those it serves and who resource its existence.

All of this requires U.S. leadership. Just being the leading power is insufficient. Rather, an active agenda must place the Alliance unquestionably at the center of Euro-Atlantic relations, and therefore central in international affairs for the future. Such a concept is far from old thinking. Change is always about what to keep and what to make new. The Alliance is the safety net that allows progress toward more varied relationships (notably U.S.-EU and OSCE) that will join on NATO to weave a stronger, more diverse trans-Atlanticism. Why should the U.S. go it alone in other regions of the world, and why should Europe go its own way in European crises, especially when U.S. interests are at stake?

In February 1947, President Truman, leading a nation fed up with war and Europe's endless troubles, and facing a hostile Congress along with a re-election campaign, took bold steps to convince the American people to resource both Europe's recovery and its defense with money and forces. Taking his case first to Congress and then to the American people he convinced them to launch the Pax Americana, an era that today stands at a crossroads. Allies, potential adversaries and even many Americans ponder
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whether the U.S. will now turn strongly onto a new tack, and continue to assert the age of American peace. If so, it will be a tack that demands continued investments in lives and treasure in return for peace on America’s terms. Alternatively, the U.S. might reef its sails and steer a safer course of self-interest, allowing leadership to devolve to regions and to nations whose interests cause them to bring the greatest power to bear locally. Without a menacing Soviet adversary which gave Truman cause to be expeditious, new-era America continues contemplating its terrible choice even in 1995 without any sign of decision. Perhaps many American’s believe that somehow the status of "the only remaining super power" will keep Pax Americana going without direct involvement in crises beyond their vital interests. Perhaps. But, whether or not America asserts its leadership, it will not be enough to simply declare that the U.S. still intends to be the world’s leader. Leadership must be exercised or it will surely be questioned by friends and challenged by foes. More than diplomatic and military leadership in time of crisis, a leader must advance an appropriately specific agenda or vision of global affairs. This must be evident not least of all to the people (including allies) being led.

Eventually NATO may be superseded by a new organization or yet more innovative, useful relationships. If so, our common interests will be best protected if the process of change is evolutionary and self-apparent. Whether NATO or an appropriate NATO successor, the core of common security must be solid, otherwise extant ties risk being anchored to uncertain pacts and ultimately mistrust. With the trans-Atlantic concept made fast, relations with the Pacific and the South can be linked, extending peace and stability as far as possible. Many strong ties already exist from both Europe and the U.S. to countries such as Japan and Australia. Such a global vision must be espoused to allies and to the public. In short, those who believe in the central utility of NATO and the primary nature of the Euro-Atlantic axis must sell these concepts in earnest to the people who will be asked to pay for them. Especially in the U.S., as former U.S. Senator Howard Baker said, Americans need a bumper sticker reason for NATO.29 Whatever the marketing strategy, all NATO allies need to engage their publics in the worth of NATO today and for their posterity.
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We share the common burden of locking in the peace that has been won for future generations. We must not linger too long in accomplishing that feat, lest we suddenly find ourselves asking the question, "We were home! What the hell happened?"

Notes

1. See the 1990 London Declaration, July 1990. The Declaration was the product of the London Summit of NATO heads of state, and the first agreement to begin adapting NATO to the realities of a post-Cold War environment.


3. See Declaration on U.S.-EU Relations—also commonly referred to as the Trans-Atlantic Declaration, signed in Paris, November, 1990. The U.S-EU Declaration established a regime of regular political contacts on several issues, including terrorism and counter-proliferation.

4. For a thoughtful variation of this assessment see Uwe Nerlich "The Relationship between a European Common Defense and NATO, OSCE and the UN" in Toward a Common Defense Policy (Laurence Martin & John Roper, eds.), The Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris 1995, 70-71. Hereafter cited as Martin and Roper. Nerlich offers that if the EU advances further, the result is likely to be a binary NATO. As noted elsewhere in this paper, a binary relationship is indeed in the offing, however it remains to be seen whether and when the European collective would opt for such a relationship inside NATO or as a separate venue through the EU.

5. See Martin & Roper, et al. At Maastricht, both the Treaty on European Union and the subsequent WEU Declaration called for the eventual formulation of a common defense policy. The upcoming EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, which is to review progress on this and other aspects of Maastricht, has already spawned an number of excellent works on this topic. Martin & Roper contains an especially rich collection of papers on CDP.


7. For the Rome and Hague documents see Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO, Brassey's (UK), 1989, 83-96, For the Maastricht and Petersberg Declaration see Nanette Gantz & John Roper
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8. For a full explanation see "CSCE: Meeting the Challenges of a New Europe" by Amb. Nils Eliasson, in NATO Review, Autumn 1992, 18. Amb. Eliasson describes the consensus minus one concept, adopted at the January 1992 CSCE Council Meeting in Prague: [it] "provides that, in order to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law, decisions can be taken against the will of a state concerned in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation of existing CSCE (OSCE) commitments."


10. Declaring recently that the negotiations process is "almost irreversible" OSCE's 13 nation Minsk Group seems to be making admirable headway toward a political resolution. See OSCE Press Release 34-95, June 95.


14. The EU has completed Europe Agreements on trade with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. It is negotiating agreements with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.

15. PHARE is the EU's principal program of economic assistance to Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. TACIS is the EU's primary program for providing economic assistance and fostering democracy with the 12 New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and (since 1994) Mongolia.

16. The so-called Visegrad triangle to coordinate members' "return to Europe" lasted only from early 1991 to late 1992, and its member were Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The 1991 CEI for political and
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economic cooperation evolved from the Pentagonale/Hexagonale group, and it included 10 members: Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia. The 1992 CBSS for cooperation on most non-military relations has 10 members: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. For added information on Visegrad see Jeffery Simon, "Partnership for Peace" in Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 94, 41 and Chapter 2 of this book. For information on CDI and CBSS see The World Factbook 1994, CIA, Washington, D.C., 456-458.

17. An enduring 1957 Princeton study of the role of international organizations and the preservation of peace indicated that peace was facilitated among states that achieved greater organizational and institutional ties across a wide range of social areas. Military ties were less productive than non-military, and functional ties that provided strong communications about other states and focused on domestic needs gave the best results. See Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957, 167-169, 201-202.

18. See Alberta Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics, The Brookings Institution, 1991, especially editors own conclusions about Europe's future beginning on pg 257. Also Martin Holland, European Community Integration, St, Martin's Press, NY, 1993, Chapter 1 on federalism versus inter-governmentalism, and chapter 5 on creating a common foreign and security policy. Both works indicate, as suggested here, that federalism in some unique form will gradually arrive, but inter-governmental methods will dominate foreign, security and defense policies through the end of the decade and likely beyond.


22. Between the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the 1854-56 Crimean War between Russia and Great Britain, the loosely conducted Concert "congresses" managed to avoid war between the great powers. However, many lesser conflicts were tolerated, often with great power participation.

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26. The latent elements of power resident in Europe and North America dwarf those of any other region of the globe. For instance, 22 of the 25 OECD (most industrialized) countries; six of the G-7 (largest economic powers); three of the five permanent members of the UNSC; and three of the world’s five nuclear powers are located on one end or the other of the Euro-Atlantic axis. In addition, the EU-15 and the U.S., with GNPs of $7,293.8 billion and $6,736.1 billion respectively are the richest powers in the world. In addition, the U.S. and Western Europe are collectively the greatest producers of arms in the world. Add to all of this, a common cultural heritage (shifting immigration notwithstanding, 6 of 10 Americans claimed European ancestry in the 1990 census) and common social values, and you can readily see the great potential to be harnessed toward securing peace and dealing with a plethora of global concerns.

27. On May 15, 1984 a new modern era record for peace, i.e., periods without major power conflict, was set. The earlier record of 38 years, 9 months and 5 days (June 22, 1815 to March 27, 1854), the time between the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo to the Crimean War, was broken on that date. See Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy’s Law Apply to History?" Wilson Quarterly 9, no.1 (New Year’s Day, 1985): 88.


29. Anecdotal story told to the author by Vice Admiral Ray, Deputy Chief, NATO Military Committee, referring to comments during a visit by Senator Baker to NATO HQ in 1994.
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