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**Abstract:**
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Using brief case studies focusing on Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, RESTORE HOPE, and SUPPORT, the paper acknowledges the recent success of the tactical level Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). As such, the authors target the Theater/Country level of operations as most need of reform. They suggest a conceptual framework for evaluating humanitarian crisis response; identify three broad areas for improvement: human resources development, planning, and in-country coordination; and suggest recommendations for both the military and NGOs.
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UNEASY PARTNERS:
NGOs AND THE US MILITARY IN
COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

by

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ABSTRACT

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Uneasy Partners:

NGOs and the US Military in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

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The authors were National Security Fellows at Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government during the 1995-96 academic year, when they researched and wrote this paper.

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Executive Summary

Since Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the combined effort to save Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in 1991, the US military and humanitarian relief organizations have found themselves increasingly committed to working together during complex humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian interventions will no doubt continue and will necessitate increased cooperation: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and military participants often cite a need for a stronger partnership. However, in order to achieve successful, sustainable results, both partners must examine and understand fundamental limits to cooperation, such as purposes, principles, goals, and cultures. With this understanding, NGO and military policymakers can draw upon their unique strengths to develop and implement policies, procedures, and coordinating mechanisms that improve the effectiveness of their cooperative efforts.

Military and NGO involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies can be understood using a two dimensional framework. Stages of response to a crisis over time are represented on the horizontal axis and level of authority is represented on the vertical axis. Figure A below depicts this representation and shows that the most fertile areas for improvement lie at the Theater/Country level of operations.

Three recent complex humanitarian crises provide the basis for analyzing military-NGO interaction and demonstrate strengths and weaknesses of current practice. The experience gained in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda points to several ways in which such interaction could be more efficient and effective. While notable successes have been achieved in each case, future
operations will be more effective to the extent that we develop seasoned operational leaders, plan ahead, and improve in-country coordination. Figure A shows these areas for improvement as Human Resource Development, Planning, and In-Country Coordination.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

![Conceptual Framework Diagram]

STAGES OF CRISIS RESPONSE

Figure A

**Human Resource Development**

The vast gulf of misunderstanding between NGOs and the military has decreased significantly with their cooperative experiences in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda. Nonetheless, efforts in training, education, and experience that develop mutual understanding will pay large dividends the next time NGOs and the military meet in the midst of a complex humanitarian emergency. Recommendations in this area include professional personnel exchanges, cooperative education, and a wider exchange of professional and scholarly writing.
Planning

Cooperative planning both before a crisis erupts and during the early stages of a crisis will translate into increased compatibility at the field level. It also allows both organizations to agree on strategic goals, to target areas of close cooperation, and to maximize their organizational efficiencies. The long term success of humanitarian relief operations is significantly increased by integrating the NGO and military planning processes.

In-Country Coordination

In-country policy coordination of the diverse actors in a humanitarian emergency is the weakest link in the current system. Although, in past crises, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) coordinated military and NGO activities, it focused on the day-to-day routine; senior level decisions and policy coordination has been a function of personality rather than design. The military, in consultation with NGOs and other US government agencies, should immediately begin to introduce the concept of a Policy Coordination Group into joint military doctrine and planning.

These prescriptions are not a panacea, but rather a genuine attempt to build on what has been successful in previous humanitarian relief operations and to correct shortcomings that have hindered those same operations.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Why It Matters

Most assessments portray the international environment as unstable in the underdeveloped world; an unfortunate but intractable feature of the post-Cold War world. In their recent book, War and Anti-War, futurists Heidi and Alvin Toffler summarize the environment today as...

... a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d'etat, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding (and even distant) countries.

One cannot predict exactly how complex humanitarian emergencies will affect US security interests, but prudent decisionmakers must develop knowledge and capabilities to cope with them. When military forces are called upon to participate in a complex humanitarian emergency, they will be working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a variety of capacities. NGOs and the military will need each other to succeed, and each can be an enabling force for the other. Each can help the other to perform its own mission more effectively. Each is a force-multiplier, or to use an older and more general metaphor, each provides leverage.

NGOs are the critical element in the solution of these complex humanitarian emergencies. Development-focused NGOs address the deterioration of fragile economic, political, and social institutions. If this deterioration is not checked, the resultant instability progresses to the level of armed conflict, causing further and more rapid deterioration; then humanitarian relief NGOs intervene in an attempt to contain massive suffering and death. The military is capable of
establishing the secure environment that NGOs require to perform efficient humanitarian relief; in effect, it provides the shield behind which relief and development can occur. In extreme emergencies the military also provides unequaled logistic capabilities.

NGOs, therefore, are more intimately familiar than intervening military forces with local cultures and politics and the degenerative processes that lead to sub-state conflict. Thus, they can provide a vital, objective perspective independent of domestic political pressures and UN political biases. However, the diversity of the NGO community and its inherent activist nature require policymakers and military commanders to evaluate NGO inputs from an informed perspective. As important, NGO planners must evaluate information provided by the military from an equally informed perspective. NGOs and the military must understand fundamental differences between their two communities in purposes, principles, goals, and cultures.

There are clearly instances when each must pursue its own objectives separately from the other. Indeed, during a military (non-humanitarian) intervention, many NGOs will try to distance themselves from military forces in order to maintain neutrality. Certain NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders, as a matter of long-standing policy, attempt to keep liaison with the military to a minimum. It is just as important simply to acknowledge such situations in some instances, as it is to attempt enhancing cooperation in others.

Enhancing effective interaction between NGOs and military forces can strengthen both partners during a complex humanitarian emergency. It is certainly worth the effort in an age of dwindling resources and increased demands.

A Brief Review of Recent Experience

Experience gained during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq in 1991, Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, and Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda in 1994 has added greatly to both the NGO and military knowledge base. Each operation was different; each had its own challenges, constraints, and lessons learned.4
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a humanitarian mission that grew out of the US involvement in Operation DESERT STORM. The military was clearly in charge, yet relied heavily on NGO input and advice. The significant lesson learned here was the realization on both sides that NGOs and the military could operate together during a humanitarian intervention. The military began to understand the complex landscape of the NGO community, cultural differences, and how NGOs operate. NGOs recognized the benefits, if not the necessity in this situation, of operating in an environment secured by the military. They saw first-hand the resources that the military could bring to bear and the flexibility it could exhibit when required. Perhaps the most important benefit was the introduction of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept designed to coordinate operations at the field level.

Operation RESTORE HOPE provided a different set of lessons. The US military did not have the strong "bully pulpit" it had in northern Iraq and the number and diversity of involved organizations was significantly greater. The situation was also considerably more complex. The success of the operation was much less clear and depended greatly on one's perspective. The central lesson that the military learned was to avoid letting the mission evolve, that is, to avoid "mission creep." Nonetheless, the NGO-military experience in Somalia did provide a common basis for greater discourse and furthered each community's understanding of the other - not an insignificant benefit of the experience.

Finally, during Operation SUPPORT HOPE the military intervened with a clear, narrowly defined mission. It applied the "no mission creep" lesson from Somalia quite well (perhaps to its
extreme) and, within the context of this circumscribed mission, declared the operation a complete success. From the NGO perspective, cooperation was not as effective as one would have expected following earlier experiences, but the effort is nevertheless instructive.

**Areas for Improvement**

Clearly, NGOs and the military achieved significant success in all three operations, most notably in the ability to coordinate and cooperate in the field. The real need for improvement is at the theater/country level, especially during general and specific planning for a complex humanitarian emergency, as well as during actual implementation.

The first area needing improvement involves the shrinking, yet still vast, lack of understanding between the communities. While conferences, exercises, scholarly discourse, and experience have begun to ameliorate this shortcoming, NGOs and the military can still make significant headway in **Human Resource Development** through training and education that will yield tremendous returns in future coordination and cooperation.

The second area involves **Planning**. NGOs and the military can achieve improvements in coordination by strengthening cooperative planning both before a crisis erupts and during specific crisis planning.

The third area for improvement involves **In-Country Coordination**. Recommendations in this area address issues of strengthened policy coordination in the affected country. This need for in-country policy coordination among the NGO community, the military, UN agencies, other US agencies, and host government organizations is beyond the capability of the existing Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept.

**Organization Of The Paper**

The first chapter of the paper describes the nature of NGO-military interaction in a complex humanitarian emergency. It briefly discusses why NGOs and the military are often at odds and further defines the four key constraints on effective coordination. Accounting for these constraints enables NGOs and the military to build better coordination mechanisms. These
issues of purpose, principles, goals and culture will always limit, to some degree, how closely and how far NGOs and military forces can walk together in a humanitarian intervention.

This chapter continues with a conceptual framework for understanding the various points where NGO-military coordination can and should occur. Experience over the last five years has yielded a fairly sophisticated mechanism for coordination at the field level during the response to a complex humanitarian emergency. However, there is considerable weakness in coordination at the theater/country level during general and specific planning for a crisis as well as during the implementation itself. The model highlights this weakness as the focus of the paper.

Chapter 2 takes a more detailed look at the three recent complex humanitarian emergencies mentioned earlier and forms the basis for the specific prescriptions in the areas of Human Resource Development, Planning, and In-Country Coordination that follow in Chapter 3.

The proliferation of complex humanitarian emergencies and the high likelihood of US military involvement in some of these crises, will compel closer cooperation between NGOs and military forces. Understanding fundamental differences between NGOs and the military is as critical as building coordination mechanisms in order to work together effectively. Implementing recommendations at the theater/country level in Human Resource Development, Planning, and In-Country Coordination will yield the best results.
Notes for Chapter 1


3. While in our discussion the term “NGO” is taken to mean relief-focused international, US, and indigenous non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), most of the lessons learned during our research come from the experiences of some of the larger NGOs including World Vision, Save the Children, Medecins Sans Frontieres, CARE, OXFAM, International Relief Committee, Refugees International, and Irish Concern. These NGOs tend to have the most extensive historical contact with military forces within the context of complex humanitarian emergencies.

4. While military involvement in Haiti and Bosnia have provided opportunities for NGO-military interaction, the focus of this involvement has not been strictly humanitarian. Accordingly, the three operations PROVIDE COMFORT, RESTORE HOPE, and SUPPORT HOPE provide the basis for our analysis and recommendations.


Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

The environment in which NGOs and the military operate together is extraordinarily complex. Coordination would be relatively simple if there were only one NGO and one component of the military working together. Such is not the case. NGOs themselves are extremely diverse and bring their own goals, cultures, and attitudes about the military to the field. The differences among foreign NGOs and US NGOs, advocacy, relief and development NGOs, secular and non-secular NGOs compound the complexities. Add to this the many independent UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), remnants of local governments, various community based organizations, and foreign coalition partners, and the relief environment approaches chaos.

This paper addresses the narrow slice of this environment dealing with the relationship between major relief NGOs and the US military. Even with this simplification, the relationship is as complex as the human emergencies that they attempt to resolve. First, there are inherent differences between the two communities that place systemic barriers limiting their degree of cooperation and mutual understanding. The effects of these constraints can be mitigated through cooperative mechanisms but they cannot be permanently overcome. Second, the range and scope of integration which occurs between all levels of their organizational structures, is influenced by the numerous other players in humanitarian emergencies. This is a complex interactive process that requires a conceptual framework to portray the NGO-military interface. The conceptual framework presented is designed to depict graphically how the military and NGOs interact at different stages of a complex humanitarian crisis. It identifies where coordination is strong and clarifies where more interaction is needed.

Indeed, it's difficult to imagine two more dissimilar cultures. The former is highly disciplined, hierarchical, politically and culturally conservative, tough, with a mission to defeat the enemy. By and large, American (NGOs) are independent, resistant to authority, politically and culturally liberal, sensitive and understanding, with a mission to save lives.¹

Andrew Natzius
Vice President
World Vision
Constraints

The relationship between the military and non-governmental organizations is not simply one of recognizing the benefits of mutual collaboration and then coordinating efforts without bias. There are fundamental differences in purposes, principles, goals, and cultures between NGOs and the military.

**Purposes.** The military is driven by national interests and accountable to the domestic political process. NGOs have a humanitarian purpose and are accountable to their donor base.

**Principles.** The military is an instrument of force, oriented toward principles of battle, victory, and defeat. NGOs rely on their accessibility to the local population to facilitate relief operations and are oriented toward principles of neutrality.

**Goals.** Military humanitarian operations focus on short term relief over reconstruction and rehabilitation while NGOs strive to conduct relief operations within the context of a long-term development strategy.

**Cultures.** The military is hierarchical and generally seeks to control its operating environment. The NGO community is decentralized and succeeds by building consensus.

These critical areas not only define the respective concept of relief operations for each community, but also influence their ability to understand and adapt to the needs of the other. These differences are real, and when not accounted for, hinder the success of relief operations. In successful operations, NGOs and the military recognize their differences, mutually develop a coherent strategy, and then work together to execute a coordinated relief effort.

**The Framework**

Military and NGO involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies can be understood using a two dimensional framework. Stages of response to a crisis over time are represented on the horizontal axis and level of authority is represented on the vertical axis. The time continuum proceeds from the general planning stage through the specific planning stage to the implementation stage. The echelon of authority continuum proceeds from the national level
down through the theater/country level to the field level. Graphically, this framework is pictured in Figure 1.

![Conceptual Framework Diagram]

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

**LEVEL OF AUTHORITY**
- National
- Theater/Country
- Field

**STAGES OF CRISIS RESPONSE**
- General Planning
- Specific Crisis Planning
- Implementation

Figure 1

**Three Levels of Authority**

The three levels of authority are characterized not only by the seniority of the decisionmakers but also by the scope and range of expected results. At the most senior level, national authorities set policies and objectives. The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff comprise this national level of authority for the military. NGO presidents and directors comprise this level for NGOs. While there is no over-arching authority for NGOs, INTERACTION, Inc., headquartered in Washington, DC, serves as the professional association for some 150 member NGOs, and is also at this level of authority.

The middle or theater/country level, represents the critical link between national policy objectives and tactical or field level execution. The principal military actors are the regional theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and the commanders of the subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTF) formed to handle particular crises. The CINCs and their staffs develop plans, sponsor exercises, and provide direct input to the Department of Defense (DOD) budget process. The designated JTF commander will normally be the senior military commander in the country.
during the implementation stage of a humanitarian intervention. Thus, he will be the military commander most visible to NGOs at this middle level, but his mission and freedom of action are ultimately determined by the theater CINC.

For NGOs, mid-level decisions are made by either regional directors or program directors in-country. The distinction between national policymakers, program directors, and field workers is not always clear-cut. In most NGO relief operations the three levels of activity are always distinguishable, but the same person may perform functions at different levels. An NGO may not staff all three levels with its own personnel. A program director may have a staff hired entirely from the indigenous population.

The lowest level of activity is the field level. Military actors at this level include the actual units that make up a Joint Task Force. NGO actors are the field relief workers, many of whom are volunteers, charged with implementing a program.⁴

**Three Stages of a Crisis**

During the General Planning stage, NGOs and the military prepare themselves to affect future humanitarian emergencies by developing ideas, plans, equipment, resources, and training. The military, of course, is always preparing for a host of other potential commitments, while NGOs are normally simultaneously engaged in conducting several humanitarian interventions while preparing for the next one. In general, the military needs at least one to two years to formulate new doctrines, draft formal contingency plans, procure equipment, and train personnel. During this first stage, NGOs develop principles for action including policy guidance, engage in fundraising, and to some extent, develop an understanding of the military as a potential partner. Also during this general planning stage, both NGOs and the military engage in training, refine existing contingency plans, and conduct exercises to test their plans.

The second stage, Specific Crisis Planning, begins when a specific humanitarian emergency develops and requires both military and NGO leaders to decide what, if any, actions to take. For the military, this second stage is a formal, well-defined process known as Crisis Action Planning.⁵
NGOs go through a similar crisis assessment and planning stage, although this stage for NGOs may occur months or even years before the military begins specific crisis planning. Usually, a small team of NGO representatives or contractors will be sent to the scene of the emergency to determine possible options. They will forward recommendations for programs back to the senior directors who will then decide whether to commit available funds and/or solicit additional funds from donors. The result of the assessment/planning process may be a program for intervention.\(^6\)

The Implementation stage begins when NGO or military personnel arrive in country to intervene in a crisis. At this stage NGOs and the military strive to implement plans and work together to resolve the crisis.

**Beyond the Success of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)**

The analysis of three operations in the next chapter reveals that coordination at the field level of authority during the implementation stage is well developed. Most observers have found a high degree of cooperation in this last stage - often to their surprise - as lower level military and NGO representatives try to cope jointly with the situation on the ground.\(^7\) The experience and trust that has developed during past operations have also led to various formalized mechanisms. The most important of these is the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Figure 2 shows the CMOC in the context of the model.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

![Diagram of Conceptual Framework]

**STAGES OF CRISIS RESPONSE**

*Figure 2*
However, decisionmakers have demanded too much of the coordinating mechanisms at the field level. Clearly, that is where operational problems and resource shortfalls have been traditionally solved, but the roots of such problems lie elsewhere. Actions taken during earlier stages and decisions made at higher levels will determine what can be accomplished in the short time available during the crisis intervention.8

In spite of the success of the Civil Military Operations Center concept, it has its limitations. Used widely at the field level, many military planners consider it to be the only essential link. This view saddles the CMOC with more functions than it can effectively discharge and often discounts the full potential of NGOs in a humanitarian crisis. If the CMOC is not organized and staffed properly, NGOs may perceive it as an unnecessary bureaucratic cog in the military machine. One NGO participant in a recent military-sponsored exercise characterized it as an effort to get the NGOs to agree that establishing a CMOC resolves all difficulties, when really, "coordination requires that something be exchanged. NGOs will not come to a (CMOC) meeting unless there is something to gain (i.e., logistical support or information)."9

When the interface is limited to just the CMOC level, NGOs are often treated as merely part of the environment. In this situation, military forces will tend just to cope with, to placate, or to manipulate NGOs, depending on the perspective of the commander. Unfortunately, when this type of relationship develops, the military sacrifices the enormous benefits of perspective gained from active cooperation with NGOs.

In past operations a vacuum has existed at the country level in terms of formal policy coordination between government and non-governmental actors. NGOs, the military, and other actors must improve in-country coordination while each remains accountable to its superiors at the national level.10 In addition to improved in-country coordination, other areas at the theater/country level are ripe for improvement. Human resource development, characterized by the growth of experienced, educated leaders in both NGOs and the military, should be taking place well before a specific complex humanitarian emergency emerges. Likewise, early
cooperative planning before the emergency erupts and as it begins to develop, will increase coordination. Figure 3 depicts the focus of recommendations presented in chapter 4.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

![Diagram of Conceptual Framework]

**STAGES OF CRISIS RESPONSE**

**Figure 3**

**Some Caveats**

Reality is not as simple as the conceptual framework indicates. The first caveat is that the stages of response to a crisis are clearly not always identical for NGOs as for the military. The second caveat is that there are a number of critical actors involved throughout a crisis that don’t show up in the conceptual framework.

The stages of response to a crisis occur in sequence over time, but the duration of each varies enormously. As previously mentioned, general military preparation takes about two years; the length of time needed to develop doctrine, conduct contingency planning, or acquire funds in the federal budget cycle. Crisis assessment may take several weeks. Crisis planning for the military often occurs in days, with some military elements moving toward the stricken area even before the plan is complete. The implementation stage of military operations usually lasts two to six months, although residual forces may remain in the region for years. The beginning points and duration of these stages for NGOs may be considerably different from those of the military. Generally, NGOs will have initiated a response to a complex humanitarian emergency long
before the crisis becomes so extreme that military action is contemplated (relief operations in northern Iraq were a notable exception with military forces playing a major role on the ground before the arrival of NGOs). NGOs will normally be executing their programs when the theater commander begins the specific planning stage, a key consideration for military planners. In addition, military forces will usually complete their mission and withdraw from the host country months before the NGOs have completed their programs. Appendix 1 depicts in more detail activities that NGOs and the military accomplish during the various stages of a complex humanitarian emergency.

For clarity of focus, this framework discusses only NGO and military agencies. There are actually other critical actors in each phase and at each level of interaction: the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), UN agencies, and coalition military forces. The OFDA, in particular, through its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), provides a critical link between the military and NGOs on scene. In addition, indigenous actors such as the host government, opposing factions, militias, displaced persons, community based organizations, and the general population must ultimately be considered. As most disaster specialists have come to realize, the participation of the local population is critical to the long-term success of any humanitarian intervention. Factoring in their role in finding solutions to a humanitarian emergency is vital to both NGOs and the military.\textsuperscript{12}
Notes for Chapter 2


2. By law, only the President and Secretary of Defense - referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA) - can deploy US military forces or commit them to action. At the national policy level, one should also include the Service Headquarters which train, equip, and organize forces, and the various Doctrine Commands which develop common principles and procedures for military action.


5. Crisis Action Planning consists of six phases: (I) situation development, (II) crisis assessment by the NCA, (III) course of action (COA) development by the CINC, (IV) COA selection by the NCA, (V) execution planning by the CINC, and (VI) execution. In reality, the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether.


7. Capt Chris Seiple, USMC, "Square-Dancing into the Future: The US Military/NGO Relationship and the CMOC in Times of Humanitarian Intervention," diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 1996, 31 and 53. Mark Gorman, of RCI, told Seiple, "If they (the military) hadn't been there, it would have been much different. They provide horsepower and efficiency...(The relationship was) a real honest partnership (and I have) a profound respect for the military." Seiple 69.

8. Seiple 50, "...it was the above structure (Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT with two subordinate JTFs and the OFDA DART) and, more importantly, strategy that framed the relationship between the NGOs and the US military (in northern Iraq).

9. Seiple 56.

10. Some may question whether the independent-minded NGOs would be able to select a single spokesperson to represent their interests in such a forum. Seiple cites an example in northern Iraq. There the NGOs organized themselves under the "NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq" (NCCNI) and elected a chairman, Mark Gorman of the International Rescue Committee, who had been chairman of a similar committee in Thailand, the "Coordination
Committee of Displaced Persons (CCDP). The NCCNI "allowed for a single NGO voice with which the military could coordinate."

10. Forces remained in country for the duration shown: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: 3 months (5 April-15 July 1991, residual forces still in place), Operation RESTORE HOPE: 5 months (9 December 92-May 1993), and Operation SUPPORT HOPE: 2 months (22 July-30 September 1994).

Chapter 3: Three Recent Examples-Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda

The US military and NGOs have conducted cooperative operations during three recent complex humanitarian emergencies: northern Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992-93, and Rwanda in 1994. These three examples demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of current practice. Men and women of good will on both sides have shown uncommon dedication and often considerable imagination in making the relationship work to achieve common purposes. Nevertheless, the experience gained in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda points to several ways in which interaction could be more efficient and more effective. In particular, it shows that learning each other's capabilities and developing a common strategy on the ground in the midst of an extreme humanitarian emergency usually causes confusion, inefficiency, and friction -- and even the loss of additional lives that might have been saved. While notable successes have been achieved in each case, future operations will be more effective to the extent that we develop seasoned operational leaders, plan ahead, and improve in-country coordination.

The Nature of Modern Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Each year from 1978 to 1985 saw an average of five complex humanitarian emergencies...by contrast there were 17 in 1992 and 20 in 1993. The increase in these emergencies appears to be one of the few clear patterns in the new world order.¹

The introduction of armed resistance to outside aid has fundamentally altered the nature of humanitarian relief in many parts of the world. Regimes prevent the delivery of aid to their citizens living in areas outside their control and under that of guerrillas, while guerrillas prevent assistance from reaching areas that are under central government control.²
Northern Iraq - Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The joint efforts of the US military and NGOs in saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who fled from Iraq into the mountains of southeastern Turkey in April 1991 marked the first collaboration of this type in recent history and has been universally regarded as a stunning success.

When it all began, the prospects for success were not bright. The military had no contingency plans for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, much less any involvement with NGOs, prior to the operation. The idea that military forces and NGOs might become partners in humanitarian relief would have been dismissed by most participants on both sides. Most had no experience working together and no experience dealing with a humanitarian crisis of the magnitude found in Iraq. Many also brought unfavorable attitudes about their counterparts. If the human obstacles were not enough, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT also had to overcome the stark difficulties of terrain and weather and the seemingly insoluble dilemma of persuading the Kurds to come out of the mountains to a region ostensibly controlled by the Iraqi government. However, several factors helped the participants overcome the initially dim prospects for success.

First of these factors was the extraordinary ability and experience of the operational leaders involved, both civilian and military. The civilians included then US Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz (currently president of the Carnegie Endowment), Andrew Natsios (then head of OFDA and now Vice President of World Vision), and Dayton Maxwell, head of the OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Another invaluable member of the team
was the late Fred Cuny, president of the relief consulting firm INTERTEC and one of the premier experts in humanitarian relief. Cuny was on contract as a consultant to the DART. According to General John Shalikashvili, commander of the Joint Task Force and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Fred Cuny was the expert on almost everything we did. To me he was the hero of that operation.”

The military partners in the team also included some extraordinarily able leaders: General Shalikashvili, Marine Major General Anthony Zinni, the task force deputy commander, Army Major General Jay Garner, who commanded the sub-unit in Iraq, and numerous less senior officers in the field. The NGOs had high praise for the military participants. For example, Rick Hill of INTERTEC said of General Garner, “His openness to the relief community, willingness to work with the UN and with the NGO community, his accessibility, willingness to listen and respond to requests and comments from the non-military community, as well as his firm yet sensitive handling of military issues” were vital contributions to success. In short, PROVIDE COMFORT had the benefit of an an all-star team of operational leaders.

A second factor contributing to success which should not be overlooked was the inherent versatility of military units like the US Army’s 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which were highly suited for this type of operation. With prior training in low intensity conflict tactics, the Special Forces were rapidly able to assess humanitarian requirements in the camps even before NGO operatives began to arrive. The MEU
had the capability to mount an impressive tactical logistical effort in the mountains and to confront Iraqi military and police units with the threat of force when required.

The third critical factor in success was a coherent operational plan that integrated military and NGO activities to achieve clear objectives using compatible strategies. This plan was initially conceived by Fred Cuny. In the words of Andrew Natsios, he was "the mind behind it,... the premier master strategist in complex humanitarian emergencies."8

A fourth factor was effective policy coordination by the operational leaders on the ground.

The challenge in Iraq was threefold: first, to stabilize the population in the mountain camps; then to move them into more supportable camps in the lowlands; and finally, to persuade them to return to their homes. The military mission began as a straight forward emergency airlift of supplies to the mountain camps but rapidly evolved in order to meet the other two challenges.9

Cuny’s insight and skill can be seen in all phases of the operational strategy.10 He recommended siting the transit camps near Zakho in Iraq to induce Kurds from the surrounding area to move rapidly through the camps and back to their homes. To convince the Kurds that the security zone was indeed secure, Cuny proposed that Kurdish workmen be invited to help build the camps and later suggested that Kurdish clan leaders come to inspect the camps. These measures served to empower the refugees and involved them in the solution to the crisis.11 Cuny designed the layout of the camps - blocks of eight tents facing together - to be compatible with Kurdish family structures. He came up with a tactic for neutralizing the Iraqi police left in
Zakho: requiring them to wear identification badges. As expected, this announcement caused the Iraqi police to retreat to the south.

With the camps established in Zakho, and with many of the Kurds beginning to come out of the mountains, it became clear that one further step was necessary to persuade the majority of them to return to their homes. The US military security zone would have to be expanded southward to include Dohuk, originally home to over 300,000 Kurds. This proposal went to President Bush via OFDA/State Department channels, and in response orders came down the military chain of command to expand the zone southward into Dohuk. 12 This was the final military action, based on civilian reassessments on the ground, that ensured the rapid and complete success of the operation.

Although this plan evolved over the course of the intervention, NGO and military strategies were integrated throughout. The plan was based on a clear appreciation of the local situation and available external and internal resources. The mission was to stop the suffering and dying. The final objective was to return the refugees to their homes as rapidly as possible. The strategy was to use external military forces to establish a security zone and to involve the Kurds themselves as much as possible in the other parts of the solution.

Finally, it is important to note that the operation was managed by a team of leaders at the operational level. Though never organized as a formal policy coordination body, the leaders of the various elements were able to monitor the progress of the operation toward its objectives, to consult with each other, and to recommend changes in course. The OFDA DART provided the
key link at the operational planning level.\textsuperscript{13} Input was relayed back to policymakers in Washington to permit rapid but deliberate expansion of the mission. The exceptional ability of all the operational leaders enabled this informal, ad hoc process to work.

\textbf{Somalia - Operation RESTORE HOPE}

With the success of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT fresh in mind, the Bush administration had high expectations for effective NGO-military cooperation when it decided to help solve the complex humanitarian emergency in Somalia in December 1992. Operation RESTORE HOPE, the US military operation which lasted until June 1993, successfully averted the immediate threat of famine, but its achievements are now overshadowed in the public mind by the disastrous UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) operation which followed. The problems which led to this reversal have been the subject of searching examinations at several levels including the Presidential Decision Review which ultimately established stricter criteria for US involvement in multi-lateral peace operations.\textsuperscript{14} It is not necessary to belabor all of those problems here. However, it is useful to highlight the divergence of military and NGO operational strategies summed up by Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University when he said, "We would have been better off if we had listened to the NGOs."\textsuperscript{15}

As in the Kurdish refugee crisis, the time available for crisis action planning was extremely short. The military units involved were first notified to start planning on 20 November; the
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Marines went ashore in Mogadishu on 9 December. The total time for planning and deployment of forces was only eighteen days.\(^{16}\)

Colonel Kevin Kennedy, a principal operations officer for the First Marine Expeditionary Force and later director of the Mogadishu Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), stated that "during the planning phase for the deployment, there was no contact at the operational level with representatives of the humanitarian organizations working in Somalia."\(^{17}\) In fact, even the OFDA humanitarian experts were not included in the deliberations about Somalia.\(^{18}\)

Nevertheless, the NGOs had given considerable thought to the problem. Back in September, Fred Cuny had developed a proposal for military support of relief operations in Somalia which included a suggested strategy, objectives, and an operational concept. Cuny had even recommended the shape of the force to be employed: a combined task force "built around a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) operating out of Mombassa under the command of US Central Command."\(^{19}\)

Cuny's concept was significantly different than the operation eventually mounted by the military. His idea had been to use the expeditionary logistic capabilities of a MEU to bypass Mogadishu, where inter-clan warfare posed the most severe threat to relief workers and troops alike. Cuny cautioned that

US planners should develop operational concepts that will minimize risks to any US forces, avoid increasing risks to the NGOs operating in the country, and ensure that the factions in Somalia do not come to perceive the presence of US forces as a military intervention in their conflict."\(^{20}\) (emphasis added)
Military planners decided that the magnitude of the operation required the use of Mogadishu as a port of entry. The initial success of this strategy obscured the validity of the underlying rationale for Cuny's plan. "The most successful humanitarian operations," he had written, are those that are carried out without having to use force. The purpose of the intervention is to save lives, not increase the level of violence or direct it to the outside forces. Thus, all military activities in support of humanitarian operations should be planned to avoid contact with armed elements, operate only in relatively secure areas, and not conduct activities that surprise the warring factions.\(^{21}\)

After the withdrawal of overwhelming military force at the end of Operation RESTORE HOPE, the latent hostility of clan militias toward the remaining foreign military presence in Mogadishu became manifest. In the ensuing escalation of violence, UN operational leaders adopted a new strategy of direct military confrontation.\(^{22}\) This new plan diverged sharply from NGO objectives and strategies. Thus, an operational plan which failed to link humanitarian and military objectives with compatible strategies led to a deadly confrontation in the streets of Mogadishu.

**Rwanda - Operation SUPPORT HOPE**

A third complex humanitarian emergency which found NGOs and the US military paired as uneasy partners was the Rwanda crisis of 1994. Drawing on conflicting lessons from Iraq and Somalia, the operation was more constrained than previous efforts, and its accomplishments are still debated.

When an airplane carrying the President of Rwanda was shot down near Kigali in April 1994, an orgy of ethnic bloodletting ensued. Rwanda Government Forces, dominated by the majority
Hutus, instigated or condoned the massacre of an estimated 500,000 Tutsis. The Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front counterattacked and ousted the government in July, spawning a massive exodus of Hutu refugees fearing reprisals. Almost overnight, enormous refugee camps sprang up in neighboring countries and overwhelmed the local capacity to provide fresh water and food. Cholera broke out, and the death rate in the camps rapidly approached 6,500 per day. During the fighting, the situation inside Rwanda had been so chaotic and dangerous that even most NGOs pulled their people out. However, the situation in the refugee camps provided a new incentive and a new opportunity for international action.

As they considered what to do, humanitarian NGOs and the US military had the two models of recent collaboration before them. Uppermost in the minds of military decisionmakers was the tragic denouement in Somalia, which seemed to indicate that foreign military intervention in complex humanitarian emergencies might ultimately be both costly and futile. At a minimum, it confirmed the imperative to avoid "mission creep." NGOs had also seen the joint Somalia operation drift into what they considered an ill-advised strategy which backfired and left them in a precarious situation. However, they continued to be mindful of the potential benefits of collaboration with the military previously demonstrated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Thus, it was inevitable in many ways that the NGOs would be less than satisfied with the US military operation in Rwanda, code-named Operation SUPPORT HOPE, which began in July 1994. The NGOs were convinced of the need for an aggressive large-scale intervention, while US policymakers were skeptical that it could achieve lasting results. The NGOs were convinced
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of the need to provide guidance to the military, while the military was determined to ignore any advice that might lead to an expansion of the mission.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, even within the narrow scope of the mission assigned to the US military, coordination with the NGOs was not as effective as it could have been. The deficiencies are worth noting because they highlight some of the areas that offer the highest potential for improvement in future NGO-military interactions.

As before in Iraq and Somalia, there were no military contingency plans from which to work, and crisis action planning was extremely compressed. The President ordered the military into action on 20 July 1994, and on the same day the Commander-in-Chief of US forces in Europe activated Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE and designated Army Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder to command it. General Schroeder immediately deployed an assessment team from Germany which arrived in Goma, Zaire on 22 July.\textsuperscript{24}

In his After Action Review, General Schroeder highlights the difficulties imposed by compressed crisis assessment and planning:

The impact of compressed time affected JTF operations in a number of complex and sometimes subtle ways...The compression of deployment and simultaneous execution phases made deliberate planning almost impossible. Additionally, collecting, evaluating and disseminating information was done on the fly... A preplanned deployment would probably admit to a more deliberate establishment of relationships between military and UN/NGO organizations; mutual objectives can be discussed and some understanding can be arrived at concerning organizational structures, capabilities and so forth. But in the case of Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and UN/NGO community in theater literally 'met on the dance floor'.\textsuperscript{25} (emphasis added)

This lack of a thorough assessment with NGOs at the country level masked a divergence of views on strategy. The political context in-country was exactly reversed from the situation in
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Iraq three years before. Rebel forces representing the oppressed Tutsi minority had routed oppressive government forces, driving them out of the country. With the massive exodus of Hutu refugees went the remnants of the government and of the militias that had perpetrated the massacres. It was as if Saddam Hussein had been defeated by the Kurdish insurgents, and had fled to Turkey with his supporters. Once established in the camps, the Hutu authorities coerced their followers into staying. NGO relief experts, taking a page from the Iraq playbook, wanted to induce the refugees to return home by establishing “islands of security” in Rwanda. The US military stuck to its logistic support role, resisting an expanded mission that would place troops in a peacekeeping role between Tutsis and Hutus. The lack of coordination between NGO and military leaders during crisis assessment also caused friction over the type of equipment the military brought to the mission.

There was little room for NGO-military policy coordination during implementation. Although the mission of the US military was explicitly to support humanitarian operations, the nature of that support was precisely circumscribed to prevent "mission creep." Operation SUPPORT HOPE amounted to an autonomous "contract" operation, and the terms of the contract were not open for renegotiation.

The military intentionally kept the NGOs at arm's length. In the three separate Civil Military Operations Centers that were set up in Goma, Kigali, and Entebbe there was very little daily contact between NGO and military representatives. NGO requests came to the CMOCs via UN coordinating bodies. On one hand, this arrangement kept the NGO-military relationship
simple; on the other, it inevitably led to missed opportunities for more effective cooperation. The most critical of these missed opportunities was the lack of a coordinated transition plan at the end of the military operation. R.M. Connaughton contends that “a general criticism of the military in Rwanda was that they raised levels of expectation and had no plan or programme for handover on their departure.”

The friction caused by compressed planning and insufficient coordination in country was compounded by the NGOs’ unfamiliarity with military logistics and transportation systems. NGO representatives expressed frustration at their inability to track their cargoes in the military airlift. Likewise, military logisticians complained that users failed to follow standard procedures for shipping and documenting cargo, which complicated in-transit tracking. This friction detracted from the efficiency of an otherwise highly successful effort. The US military airlift flew 380 long haul sorties into the Rwanda Crisis Area and an additional 996 sorties within the area; it delivered over 15,331 tons of supplies - an enormous logistics accomplishment.

Not surprisingly, final assessments of Operation SUPPORT HOPE were sharply divided. Military participants praised its efficiency; some NGO participants - though by no means all of them - criticized its effectiveness. General Schroeder, in his summary report on 28 September 1994, stated

Operation SUPPORT HOPE assisted in relieving the suffering of millions and was successfully concluded with no loss of life or serious injury to United States military personnel. The clarity and precision of the mission given the JTF allows me to report that the JTF fulfilled all assigned tasks...I believe that SUPPORT HOPE will stand as an example of how the military can have an important and appropriate effect on humanitarian operations.
Secretary of Defense William Perry praised the operation as having achieved its goals "under budget and ahead of schedule."\textsuperscript{35}

Reviews from the civilian humanitarian experts were mixed. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and some NGOs commended the military logistics effort. However, others were disappointed by the US military's inflexibility and seemingly abrupt departure without a careful transition. Typical of this view was Connaughton's assessment that "despite the rhetoric, it must be said that (American forces) achieved much less than they were capable of achieving... Operation SUPPORT HOPE had been an exercise in visibility, not in creating any impact of long-term significance."\textsuperscript{36}

It is unfair to criticize the military for failing to accomplish what it was not assigned to do in Rwanda. However, it is worthwhile for policymakers to note that the military could have improved the outcome of its assigned mission through better interaction with NGOs. This deficiency was not due to a lack of energy or dedication but rather to systemic weaknesses in planning and in-country coordination.

**Lessons Learned**

Several observations emerging from this brief survey point toward recommendations for enhancing NGO-military interaction in future crises. Coordination at the tactical level during implementation is essential, but by itself it is not enough to maximize the effectiveness of joint efforts. Actions taken earlier at the theater/country level frame NGO-military interaction on the ground and define the possibilities for success.
First, experienced NGO and military leaders who understand the capabilities and objectives of their counterparts can make the most of their joint efforts, regardless of other obstacles. Even before they arrive in-country, military commanders can benefit from the NGOs' knowledge of the local situation and of the types of strategies that work best in humanitarian relief. Similarly, NGO leaders can benefit from a more thorough understanding of military logistics and security capabilities. Both sides can clearly benefit from more extensive exchange of information and ideas during the general planning stage before a specific crisis materializes. Programs to facilitate human resource development will be examined in the next chapter.

Second, a coherent operational plan that integrates military means and humanitarian ends is another key to successful joint action. Fred Cuny and the operational commanders on the scene provided such a plan in northern Iraq. The initial plan for Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia established common objectives and compatible strategies, although friction over the issue of disarming Somali guards foreshadowed latent differences. After US forces were replaced by the UNOSOM II force, the operational plan broke down as military and humanitarian strategies diverged. In Rwanda, the US military developed its initial operational plan on the fly with little input from the NGOs; the lack of coordinated planning led to inefficiencies in execution. In all three cases, the time available for planning was extremely short, so that plans inevitably evolved after military operations had already begun. While specific circumstances of future NGO-military operations cannot be predicted, planning at the theater level which incorporates NGO inputs can help to frame the problem when a crisis suddenly erupts.
Finally, the CMOC alone is not an adequate forum for the full range of NGO-military exchanges necessary during the implementation stage. In northern Iraq, the military mission was successfully expanded four times following consultation between senior operational decision-makers on the ground. The ad hoc processes run by the DART worked, but only because of the extraordinary ability of the individuals involved. In Somalia, the military mission expanded after RESTORE HOPE without a thorough joint NGO-military reassessment. Ambassador Robert Oakley noted, “The problems created by lack of clarity, foresight, and consistency at the highest political levels...encouraged, and were compounded by, misjudgments in the coordination, management, and execution of policies on the ground during UNOSOM II.”37 In Rwanda, the US military rebuffed NGO efforts to influence operational decisions. All three cases point to the need for an institutional framework such as a Policy Coordinating Group of senior in-country decision makers to monitor and reassess the plan during implementation.

The international relief community recently suffered a tragic loss which underscores the need to develop seasoned leaders and to institutionalize coordination mechanisms for NGO-military interaction. In April 1995, Fred Cuny disappeared while on a humanitarian mission to Chechnya.38 The success of future NGO-military interaction should not be left to depend on a few exceptionally talented individuals like Cuny. Instead, the possibilities for systematic leadership development, planning, and coordination at the operational level should be pursued by both NGOs and the military. Specific recommendations for enhancing these three critical areas will be examined in the next chapter.
Notes for Chapter 3


3. It is worth noting that US military intervention in complex humanitarian emergencies is the exception rather than the rule. The UN listed 25 ongoing humanitarian emergencies in 1995 with the US military playing a role in only three (Iraq, Bosnia, and Haiti).

4. Seiple, 44.


7. Rick Hill, President of INTERTECt, letter to the authors, 5 April 1995.


12. Seiple, 49.


16. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) notified the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) to start planning as the JTF Command Element for a possible military intervention. Four days later, USCINCENT briefed courses of action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they briefed the President the next day. When a Warning Order was issued on 3 December, course of action development and course of action selection had already effectively occurred. Execution planning was accelerated, and the Execute Order was issued on 5 December. The first elements of JTF Somalia, embarked aboard ships, were already in position near Mogadishu by that date and went ashore on 9 December.

17. Colonel Kevin Kennedy, USMC, quoted in Seiple, 162.


22. "The political approach followed [during RESTORE HOPE], which emphasized dialogue with all and persuasion backed by firmness, was replaced by a more peremptory, intrusive attitude. UNOSOM II quickly reached judgements on the avenues of political reconstruction it considered appropriate for Somalia, backed the factions that supported them, and asserted its readiness to employ coercion if thwarted." John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Somalia and Operation RESTORE HOPE (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press) 153.
23. General Schroeder, commander of the Joint Task Force, wrote “The task given Joint Task Force (JTF) SUPPORT HOPE was to provide humanitarian assistance as opposed to nation-building or peacekeeping. At the time US forces entered Rwanda, conditions were so chaotic, and the need for nation-building and peacekeeping so great, that these functions exerted a powerful pull on JTF planning. Maintaining the focus on what we had been told to do -- avoiding “mission creep” -- took constant attention and emphasis at all levels of command.” United States European Command, Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994 After Action Review (Stuttgart: United States European Command, 1994) 1.


27. Rick Hill, letter to the authors, 3 April, 1996. According to John Hirsch and Ambassador Robert Oakley, “The UN plan for intervention was modified at the behest of the United States in late May to provide for establishing several safe havens inside Rwanda. This could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives but it was never implemented, in part because neither the United States nor any other major power gave it political, logistical, or financial support.” Hirsch and Oakley, 160.

28. Deployment of Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) was a particular source of contention. Connaughton states that “Oxfam criticized the American water purification equipment as “inappropriate to the task. The equipment they flew in was designed to provide high quality water for small numbers of people; whereas, what was actually needed was safe water for hundreds of thousands of people.” Lionel Rosenblatt, President of Refugees International, pointed out that by focusing on the high-tech ROWPUs, military planners failed to support the simpler, more effective, and more sustainable solution of using tanker trucks to transport and purify water from nearby Lake Kivu. “This particular issue generated more heat than light between the military and the humanitarians,” Connaughton adds. “There can be no argument, however, that it was the product of a hot plan rather than adequate field assessment within an establish contingency plan.”

29. Routine NGO requests came to the CMOCs via UN coordinating bodies like the On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in Kigali. Seiple, 237.

30. Connaughton, 32.
31. Larry Thompson of Refugees International wrote, “During the Rwanda operation the most frequent complaint I heard from NGOs about the military was the difficulty which they had getting information about when their stuff—eg relief supplies—was going to be hauled to Rwanda...Improvements in communication seems a critical need.” Larry Thompson, letter to the authors, March 20, 1996.

32. Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994 After Action Review 11


36. Connaughton, 29.

37. Hirsch and Oakley, 155.

Chapter 4: Prescriptions

The emergence of failed states and the need to respond to complex humanitarian crises is a reality of the current international environment. It is in the interests of both the military and NGOs to develop the people and the mechanisms to coordinate their response to these human emergencies. Everyone wins when a humanitarian relief response is well coordinated. The suffering is alleviated, NGOs can again focus on long-term development, and the military does not draw excessive resources from its primary war fighting mission.

Experiences in northern Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda show that the military and NGOs can overcome their organizational constraints and act in harmony. Bridging the barriers is a function of people, planning, and in-country coordination. Knowledgeable personnel coupled with active coordination mechanisms lead to team building, a sense of partnership, and cooperation that are critically needed during the chaos of a humanitarian crisis.

The military and NGOs need to increase cooperation in three areas: human resource development, planning, and in-country coordination. Although this needs to be a cooperative effort, the military should take the lead in many of the recommended programs. Most NGOs are

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Military establishments that are likely to be committed to humanitarian operations need to develop a body of in-house expertise on civilian disaster relief.¹

Fred Cuny
Intersect Relief and Corp.

Success in complex humanitarian emergencies will be determined by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best, rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems they will confront in a humanitarian emergency.²

Andrew S. Natsios
Vice President
World Vision
small, diverse, and decentralized and do not possess the support structure to establish and run long-term training programs. Conversely, the military has the centralized structure to coordinate long-term programs and can provide the continuity to develop mutual understanding with the diverse NGO community.

**Human Resource Development**

The knowledge and personality of the people involved is a critical component of success in a cooperative NGO-military humanitarian relief effort. The military and NGOs need to foster mutual understanding by developing a small cadre of expert personnel in military-humanitarian operations. The military needs experts who understand the dynamics of complex emergencies, humanitarian assistance strategy, and the workings of the world relief system. The NGOs need experts on military capabilities, limitations, planning, and operational procedures. Once trained, these experts should be placed in key positions during the planning and implementation phases of a response. Additionally, intellectual forums need to be fostered to increase the body of knowledge on military-humanitarian operations. Increased knowledge on the part of both organizations leads to the flexibility, mutual trust and cooperative atmosphere needed to plan and coordinate relief efforts.

**Recommendation:** The military should permanently assign one or two military officers to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), deployable as Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) members.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the recognized government expert on international disaster relief. OFDA has the responsibility for planning crisis response and coordinating US assistance with relief organizations and host governments. To assist in-country coordination of disaster relief, OFDA has established Disaster Assistance Response Teams, known as DARTs, to augment embassies and US Agency for International Development
(USAID) missions. DART membership is ad hoc and consists of specialists from OFDA, other government agencies, and civilians who are contracted for the specific crisis. A DART functions as OFDA's initial assessment team and in-country disaster response field coordinator. Normally, a DART will be on the disaster scene well before the military, and its assessment may initiate the policy review for military involvement.

As the central coordinator for US relief efforts, OFDA provides the perfect training ground for a small cadre of military humanitarian relief experts. Officers assigned to OFDA would gain invaluable experience in governmental and non-governmental relief systems while also developing personal contacts within the relief community. Their position within OFDA would allow them to coordinate general planning and specific crisis planning between the military and NGOs. During specific humanitarian crises requiring military involvement, these officers would augment the Joint Task Force staffs as specialists and liaison officers.

**Recommendation:** The Joint Staff should develop and provide to major US NGOs a consolidated list of military courses available to relief personnel. The list should include courses in organization, terminology, logistics, communications and transportation. NGOs should make key personnel available for these training opportunities.

Like their military counterparts, NGOs need to learn about the military, its capabilities, and how to work with them. Hugo Slim points out

> the art of military liaison and cooperation will need to be developed ... civilian relief workers have to develop creative working relationships with the military... They must find a common language... They must constantly identify respective areas of distinctive competence and comparative advantage... and develop operational partnerships accordingly. The civilian relief community should not miss the chance to close with its military counterparts and have a go at their hearts and minds.\(^5\)

By providing training opportunities, the military will ensure that NGOs have the necessary procedural knowledge to coordinate activities with operational military forces. Knowledge of military procedures will decrease the problems attributable to "communication" and will facilitate access to the full range of military capability. Additionally, relief workers training in military schools will develop personal contacts and a better understanding of military culture.
With limited funding and a small personnel base, NGOs will find it difficult to make full use of military training opportunities. Despite these difficulties, NGOs need to find ways to make personnel available for the training programs. Participation will enhance NGO capability to participate in the planning process and to coordinate military support through the full spectrum of relief operations.

**Recommendation:** *The Theater Commander should coordinate with major NGOs to send "military observers" to humanitarian operations.*

This idea is not without precedent. European militaries already lend personnel to work with the Red Cross. Military observers provide the Theater Commander with a first-hand evaluation of events in his area and enables military personnel to experience NGO operations in action. If military involvement is a final outcome, the experience gained by military observers will be critically important to the planning and implementation process. Additionally, observers' knowledge of NGO operations will facilitate a more cooperative atmosphere. Relief agencies, for the most part, are very decentralized entities with a great deal of authority delegated to field representatives. To the uninitiated military member, this may appear to be inefficient, however, learning these processes early could head off misunderstandings later.

**Recommendation:** *The military should establish an internship program with major NGOs. Officers completing the internship would form a cadre of specialists to augment military staffs for complex humanitarian operations.*

Each military service should establish a training program which assigns appropriate military personnel to train with leading relief-oriented NGOs on a six-month or year-long basis. Modeled after similar Training With Industry (TWI) programs, the target group for this program would be civil-affairs personnel, foreign area specialists, logisticians, transportation specialists, and medical personnel who might support future humanitarian assistance missions. Emphasis should be placed on establishing internships with the NGOs most likely to have contact with military forces. This program would foster better understanding of NGO organizational culture, decisionmaking, organizational structure, and resources. Another benefit would be the
development of personal contacts that could be used by both communities during future
operations.

**Recommendation:** *The Theater Commander should identify qualified and experienced
personnel to fill specifically identified billets during complex
humanitarian emergencies*

The importance of selecting qualified, experienced personnel has been repeatedly emphasized
by practitioners in both the military and leading NGOs. Andrew Natsios writes,

> how well this humanitarian response system works with military forces in peace-
> keeping operations, whether or not the forces operate under the UN banner, will be
determined by the quality of military and civilian leadership and its familiarity with
the humanitarian response structure.\(^7\)

The Army recognizes the importance of personality and of identifying the right person for the
right job. Army doctrine specifies, "Individual training for peace operations duties should
emphasize the personal characteristics of patience, flexibility, self-discipline, professionalism,
impartiality, tact and inquisitiveness."\(^8\) Qualified and experienced personnel for key positions
need to be identified during the general planning stage.\(^9\)

**Recommendation:** *NGOs should actively recruit former military personnel for key positions
that interface with the military both in the field and within the policy-
making structure.*

A number of former military personnel work for NGOs; this practice should be expanded and
not limited to executive-level positions. NGO field operatives with military experience are a
valuable resource for NGOs and can assist in bridging cultural gaps and smoothing out difficult
situations during complex humanitarian emergencies.

**Recommendation:** *The military should expand the pool of available military civil affairs
specialists to augment Joint Task Force staffs during complex
humanitarian emergencies.*

The bulk of civil affairs specialists will likely remain in the reserve components, and, in the
era of military downsizing, the number of active duty civil affairs units are not apt to be
significantly increased. Thus, a way to build the pool of available personnel with the requisite
civil-military expertise is to open these occupational fields to other members of the active force
as an alternate or secondary professional specialty. Volunteers would receive the required
training, professional certification, and cultural understanding necessary to work within the
army’s civil affairs community and would provide their unique expertise to conventional combat
units.

**Recommendation:** The military and NGO community should encourage the use of
professional journals as an avenue of communication.

There has been a recent increase in professional writing among military personnel on
"operations other than war." However, most of this writing is focused on the military audience
and not on NGOs. NGOs and the military should encourage cross-cultural publication of key
articles in professional journals. Military authors should contribute to journals like Disasters and
International Peacekeeping, while their NGO counterparts should write for professional military
journals like Naval Institute Proceedings, Military Review, and Parameters. This interchange
will significantly broaden the dialogue between the military and NGOs.

**Recommendation:** The military and NGOs should broaden the development, exchange, and
distribution of after-action reports on humanitarian operations.

After-action reports help identify problem areas and possible solutions. Wide distribution
encourages increased thought and the development of more innovative approaches to problems.
Both the military and NGOs should encourage after-action reports and develop a wide
distribution system that ensures their dissemination and review.

**Recommendation:** The military services should develop and endow chairs in Humanitarian
Assistance Operations at senior military schools.
The US Army Peacekeeping Institute and other military service War Colleges should establish an NGO chair and allow the NGO community to select experienced humanitarian relief professionals to fill such positions annually. Similarly, the services should establish a "visiting professor" program in humanitarian operations at the service war colleges.

**Recommendation:** *The military should expand conferences and exercises to foster closer personal and professional contacts between the two communities.*

Conferences and exercises provide an outstanding forum for the exchange of views and the development of common procedures. The military needs to expand these training opportunities and encourage NGO participation.

**Planning**

Cooperative planning is the next area for improvement. Cooperation between the military and NGOs in the development of general concept plans and specific crisis response plans will have the greatest impact on operations at the lowest cost. The military and NGOs each bring unique capabilities to the planning table. NGOs understand the culture, politics, geography and long term development needs of a state in crisis. The military understands logistics, planning, organization, and its own relief assistance capability. Planning cooperatively allows both organizations to agree on strategic goals, to target areas of close cooperation, and to maximize their organizational efficiencies. The long term success of humanitarian relief operations is significantly increased by integrating the NGO and military planning processes.

**Recommendation:** *The Theater Commander should develop concept plans for potential humanitarian assistance operations which incorporate NGO inputs. These plans should be tested in command post exercise which include NGO participation.*

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq is the best example of a coherent plan that integrated the NGO-military effort. When military and NGO officials develop their conceptual plans early they are more likely to cooperate on overall strategy, coordinate their relief effort, and develop mutual measures of effectiveness. An operational plan need not require detailed
cooperation in every activity; it may simply define participants, areas of responsibility, and relief aid logistical requirements. For example, the military and NGOs could identify suitable airfields, ports, and relief centers. They could also determine the location, size and shipment priority of NGO relief aid, as well as a "shopping list" of military capabilities and equipment.

Neither the military nor NGOs can develop detailed contingency plans in advance for every possible humanitarian emergency. The potential circumstances, the possible levels of involvement, and the list of NGOs likely to participate are too numerous and varied. Most of the detailed planning will still have to be done during the crisis assessment and planning stage. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop concept plans for developing complex humanitarian emergencies where US involvement is possible. Over the last couple of years the military has conducted three separate evacuations of US nationals from Liberia. These evacuations had been planned for months, if not years, in advance. Similarly, the military, in conjunction with NGOs, should also be developing a corresponding relief assistance plan. When possible, the concept plans should be tested and refined in command post exercises that bring together military and NGO participants.

**Recommendation:** *The Theater Commander should ensure that NGO input is incorporated into his planning for a specific crisis.*

The more the military and NGOs coordinate during the general planning stage, the easier specific crisis planning becomes. If the Theater Commander has developed concept plans in concert with the major NGOs, he already has significant input to begin planning the relief response for a specific crisis. More importantly, he has established a relationship with NGOs on which he can draw as he provides feedback to the National Command Authority on various courses of action. Similarly, if the military has a representative within OFDA, the Theater Commander has significant access to NGO concerns and recommendations.

**Recommendation:** *The Theater Commander and major NGOs should develop mutual Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).*
Properly developed measures of effectiveness (MOE) can guide both NGO and military leaders in developing their plan of action and adjusting it throughout the operation. Both the military commander and the NGO director are in this crisis together; they need each other to accomplish their individual and collective goals. Accordingly, they need to develop appropriate MOE together. The military commander will want to measure his effectiveness in those areas for which he is responsible, such as security or logistics. The NGO director may be concerned with agricultural development or with public health measures. Development of the MOE together ensures that both the military and the NGOs are aware of each other’s objectives and how the two organizations can work together to achieve those objectives.

A particularly powerful benefit of joint MOE development is the shared vision, common ownership, and sense of mutual trust that the process creates among the participants. The trust that NGO and military officials have developed during the pre-crisis contingency planning is furthered as they negotiate what most accurately measures the effectiveness of their combined efforts. While various participants in the humanitarian crises in Somalia and Rwanda had their own MOE or indicators, there were no jointly developed MOE. This lack of jointly developed MOE may explain some of the confusion and disagreement on whether these operations were successful.10

Recommendation: The military and NGO community should expand electronic information sharing during the general planning stage.

Internet-based information networks are cheap and efficient means to enhance information sharing. Although one network, VITANET, already exists, it is not effective or user friendly enough to meet current requirements. An up-to-date electronic information system should be established as the central data base on humanitarian operations. The best clearinghouse for such an effort would be within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Recommendation: The military should streamline NGO access to military information.
In Rwanda, the US Joint Task Force Commander, Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, found the exchange of information crucial to winning what he described as the information war. He articulated three goals for information processing in a complex humanitarian emergency: acquiring the data required to determine success, disseminating ground truth to appropriate agencies, and servicing the information needs of other agencies and NGOs. Having the correct information not only permitted the military to be more effective, it became one of the vital benefits that could be brought to the UN and NGO agencies in the field.¹¹

The Joint Task Force Commander should establish clear guidance as to what military information can be shared. While some portions of intelligence and information available to military forces in a humanitarian assistance operation will undoubtedly be classified, there are significant unclassified resources that may be useful to NGO representatives. The first step in streamlining such a process is to keep access from becoming a bureaucratic roadblock to the free exchange of information. Establishing user-friendly standards for requesting information by NGOs is crucial. Once this is done, there is a wide variety of assistance that the military can provide in the information arena.

**In-Country Coordination**

In-country policy coordination of the diverse actors in a humanitarian emergency is the weakest link in the current system. Although the CMOC, in past crises, coordinated military and NGO activities, it focused on the day-to-day routine; senior level decisions and policy coordination in humanitarian emergencies is currently a function of personality and not design. As a result, there were no formal coordination bodies established in any of our examples that incorporated both the military and NGOs in a senior policy group.
**Recommendation:** The military should recognize the need for a senior, in-country Policy Coordinating Group (PCG) as doctrine for humanitarian operations. The PCG should include senior military leadership, senior US civilian leadership, as well as senior leadership from the NGOs, UN agencies and coalition military forces.

The purpose of the Policy Coordination Group is to provide a structured forum for senior decision makers to discuss relevant issues and to coordinate relief policy. Membership and structure would vary according to the specific situation. In some cases, a PCG structure may already exist and it is only a question of participation. Where no PCG structure exists, one needs to be established to ensure review and coordination of relief policy. Since it is a coordinating body, participating organizations would still have complete control of their individual relief operations.

All three historical examples demonstrate the need for a leadership team of senior decisionmakers in-country. In northern Iraq, the need to expand the Allied security zone to include Dohuk required a major operational decision. The US Disaster Assistance Response Team headed up a consultation process which defined the problem from both humanitarian and military perspectives and provided sound recommendations to policymakers in Washington. During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the senior civilian and military leaders headed by Ambassador Robert Oakely and Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, (the JTF commander), provided successful joint direction to the operation. But when the US-led effort passed control to the UN-led UNOSOM II, military and humanitarian objectives diverged and the consultative link with policymakers in Washington weakened. Seeking to satisfy the humanitarian requirement for a low profile while pursuing an aggressive military objective that
required heavier forces led to disaster in the streets of Mogadishu. In Rwanda there was little room for the military to change its overall objectives. Consensus may not have been possible, but misunderstandings could have been reduced by more effective consultation between the theater/in-country leaders. Even the best plans - both military and humanitarian - have to be continually monitored and evaluated.
Notes for Chapter 4

1. Frederick C. Cuny, *Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief* (Dallas, TX: INTERTECTOR Relief and Reconstruction Corp., 1990) 27.


3. Rick Hill, President of INTERTECTOR, letter to the authors, 3 April 1996.

4. Hill


6. Interview, Paul Giannone, Director of Emergency Preparedness, Mitigation, and Planning for CARE, 8 April 1996.


9. Zinni, in his "20 Commandments for Peacekeeping Operations," lists several commandments that require significant skills not emphasized in military training. Some of these which argue for careful selection of key people include: know the culture and the issues, don't make enemies, open a dialogue with everyone, encourage innovation and non-traditional approaches, and personalities are often more important than process.

10. Frederick M. Burkle, et al., "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: III. Measures of Effectiveness," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* January-March 1995: 48. The US Marine Corps exercise EMERALD EXPRESS '94 dealt with the issue of jointly developed MOE. In this article Dr. Frederick Burkle and his colleagues describe this process and the results. As might be expected, various participants proffered MOE that was germane to their mission or area of expertise. The final outcome though was four categories of MOE that all the participants agreed upon. These categories were Security and Level of Violence, Infrastructure, Medical and Public Health Issues, and Agriculture and Economic Issues. Specific MOE for these categories are included in Appendix 2.


12. Cuny, *Disasters*, 246. Writing to NGO program directors, Cuny stated, "throughout the course of a program, it is important to analyze actions and event. Two activities are required: monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is the process of watching
the program to ensure that it is operating smoothly... Evaluation, on the other hand, is a detailed review of the program upon completion of an important milestone or at the end of a specific period.
Chapter 5: Conclusions

Future of NGO-Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

This paper has assumed that the post-Cold War world will see a continuation of complex humanitarian emergencies resulting from, among other things, the proliferation of failed states and the increase in worldwide ethnic conflict.

For the foreseeable future, the already overburdened international response system will, from time to time, include military forces working as part of a coalition of traditional humanitarian NGOs who have always responded to such conflicts. Finally, in spite of the amount of early warning that may precede a future complex humanitarian emergency, there will never be enough time to adequately plan a comprehensive response once a crisis erupts.

This paper has examined the successes and failures of NGO-military coordination in previous humanitarian crises and has proposed a conceptual framework to guide the development of key prescriptions for improvement. These prescriptions are techniques and procedures which can be put in place between crises so that, as a specific crisis emerges, a streamlined, coordinated NGO-military response can save lives. The

Where Do We Go From Here?

In future complex humanitarian emergency missions, when more direct military support to relief agencies may be needed or more serious threats arise, coordination and cooperation must be closer. Military officers can improve this relationship. But relief workers have to meet them halfway. The efforts of military commanders to improve coordination with NGOs is likely to yield greater cooperation.¹

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prescriptions are directed at expediting the transition from the immediate, life-threatening emergency phase of a crisis to the equally important reconstruction, development, and nation-building activities that follow.

The theater-country level of authority (the operational level in military doctrine) is the most fertile area for improvement for two reasons. First, relief operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda reveal this level to be the weak link between what donor nations and NGOs hope will occur in the humanitarian response and what actually does occur at the field level. Second, this is the level at which NGO-military coordination will yield the most visible results in the field. At this intermediate level, decisionmakers continuously evaluate and revise policy as the humanitarian environment changes. The ability to flexibly modify policy is essential to having the correct actions occur at the field level of relief operations.

NGOs and the military have strengthened low-level coordination mechanisms like the Civil-Military Operations Center. The CMOC concept works well and is becoming more institutionalized. However, the CMOC is not intended to make or change policy and it should not be expected to go beyond its original task: saving lives. Reforms must be made at the higher theater level where policy is made or changed as the situation develops.

Recommendations for improved coordination will require a concerted effort and hard work by both the military and NGO communities. Clearly, in the era of public and private downsizing, creating additional bureaucracy or pursuing costly changes are not desirable responses. No more acceptable is the alternative of muddling through with ad
hoc arrangements during complex humanitarian emergencies. Many of the recommendations in this paper can be implemented cheaply and quickly and will yield a stronger NGO-military response.

As seen in each of the case studies, success in humanitarian responses is highly personality driven. Therefore, the military and NGOs must keep development of human resources a high priority. Virtually all prescriptions in the area of human resource development can be low cost. Clearly, many smaller NGOs are fiscally unprepared to expand training. However, the military already has an extensive training infrastructure in areas with direct application to humanitarian assistance such as medical support, field engineering, transportation, and logistics. Consequently, the military should take the lead in immediately expanding invitational NGO participation in military training programs. The more these opportunities are developed, the larger the pool of trained people from both communities grows. The net result for all is increased cross-cultural personal contacts.

Similarly, military exercises and conferences like the Marine Corps’ EMERALD EXPRESS need larger NGO participation. When NGOs conduct their own conferences, they should invite military participants to attend and contribute.

NGOs and the military should immediately implement prescriptions in the area of planning that merely require consultation. Increased dialogue may be the only near term result, but that increased dialogue enhances the ability to plan.
In the area of in-country policy coordination, the military, in consultation with NGOs and other US government agencies, should begin immediately to introduce the concept of a Policy Coordination Group into joint military doctrine and planning. Advertise now that during the next crisis in which US forces are committed, this will become the country-level equivalent of the well-known local CMOC. Establish generic ground rules as to how this body will interface with policymakers, military forces, participating NGOs, other international actors, and the CMOCs.

These prescriptions are not a panacea, but rather a genuine attempt to build on what has been successful in previous humanitarian relief operations, and to correct shortcomings that have hindered those same operations. US Army Colonel Karl Farris, the director of the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute sums it up best when he says

the bottom line is that the military commander must work with and depend heavily on civilian relief organizations to complete the military humanitarian assistance mission and taskings. The Joint Task Force’s humanitarian assistance mission cannot successfully conclude until in-place organizations are operating effectively. Therefore, successful interaction between organizations is key!2
Notes for Chapter 5


Appendix 1 - *Activities at Each Stage of Response to a Complex Humanitarian Emergency*

**GENERAL PLANNING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF AUTHORITY</th>
<th>NGO ACTIONS</th>
<th>MILITARY ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>Research, Advocacy, Fundraising, Budgeting</td>
<td>Research and Development, Doctrine, Procurement, Force structure, Budgeting Training and Exchange Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATER/ COUNTRY LEVEL</td>
<td>Ongoing Assessment</td>
<td>Planning and Exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD LEVEL</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PRODUCTS:**
1. Doctrine, principles, budgets. (e.g., PDD 25, FM 100-23, Cuny: *Disasters and Development*, Minear and Weiss: *Handbook for Practitioners*).
3. Knowledgeable individuals, trained and equipped units.
**Uneasy Partners**

Appendix 1 - Activities at Each Stage of Response to a Complex Humanitarian Emergency

**PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC CRISIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF AUTHORITY</th>
<th>NGO ACTIONS</th>
<th>MILITARY ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>Crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATER LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY LEVEL</td>
<td>Assessment teams</td>
<td>JTF Assessment teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD LEVEL</td>
<td>Recruit volunteer staff</td>
<td>Increase unit readiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRODUCTS: 1. Warning, Alert, and Execute Orders.
2. Operation Orders and NGO Program Proposals.
Appendix 1 - Activities at Each Stage of Response to a Complex Humanitarian Emergency

**IMPLEMENTATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF AUTHORITY</th>
<th>NGO ACTIONS</th>
<th>MILITARY ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>Monitor and Review, Fundraising</td>
<td>Monitor and Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATER LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor and Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY LEVEL</td>
<td>Supervise Programs</td>
<td>Command and Control Transition to civilian/UN control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD LEVEL</td>
<td>Deliver food/water</td>
<td>Security operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide shelter</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>Infrastructure repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>Health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Vital services (water, power)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2 - Measures of Effectiveness Developed During EMERALD EXPRESS '94
From Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, January-March 1995, “Complex Humanitarian Emergencies III: Measures of Effectiveness.” by Frederick M. Burkle

Security and Level of Violence

1) Number of violent acts against each distribution center.
   Source: Military J-2 (Intelligence), NGOs, UN agencies
   Each reporter may define "violent" act.

2) Number of violent acts against the convoys.
   Source: Military J-2 (Intelligence), NGOs

3) Fraction of inventory stolen from distribution centers.
   Source: NGOs, UN agencies

4) Fraction of inventory stolen from convoys along each key transportation route.
   Source: NGOs, UN agencies

5) Fraction of security for the distribution center assumed by the host nation or international agency security guards.
   Source: Military J-3 (Operations), NGOs, UN agencies
   This is a transition measure that indicates the ability of the host nation or international agencies to conduct the security mission.

6) Fraction of security for the convoy taken over by the host nation or international agency.
   Source: Military J-3 (Operations), NGOs, UN agencies

Infrastructure

1) Fraction of visual flight rules (VFR) day capable airfields by aircraft type.
   Source: Military J-3 (Operations), Air Force, Special Operations (JSOTF)
   This is the number of operational VFR day capable airfields divided by the desired number of VFR day capable airfields for aircraft type (C-130, C-5, etc.).

2) Fraction of all key transportation routes that are convoy-suitable.
   Source: Military J-4 (Logistics and Transportation)
   Suitable for convoys means that the required number of convoys at the required weight can use the key transportation routes to get to their intended distribution centers. In calculating this measurement, the numerator is the number of key transportation routes that can be used to move required supplies from port of departure to distribution centers.
Appendix 2 - Measures of Effectiveness Developed During EMERALD EXPRESS ‘94

The denominator is the number of key transportation routes that are needed to transfer supplies to distribution centers.

3) Fraction of infrastructure repair effort met by host nation or international agencies.  
   Source: CMOC, NGOs  
   This is a transition indicator measuring the ability of the host nation or international agency to sustain or repair the distribution system.

4) Fraction of potable water sources reestablished.  
   Source: Military J-4 (Logistics and Transportation), NGOs, UN agencies  
   This is the number of water sources repaired divided by the number of water sources requiring repair at the start of the operation.

Medical and Public Health Issues

All of these MOEs rely on data that already are collected in the form requested by NGOs and public health organizations.

1) Crude mortality rates.  
   Source: Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and NGOs  
   This is a critical indicator of improving or deteriorating health status and is used to show the impact of the mission.

2) Less than 5-year-old crude mortality rate.  
   Source: CDC and NGOs

3) Cause-specific mortality rates for diseases.  
   This measure can be used in assessing whether death rates are starvation or disease related.

4) Severe malnutrition measurements are linked to chances of survival  
   Arm measurements, in conjunction with height and weight data, indicate whether an individual suffers from severe malnutrition.
Appendix 2 - Measures of Effectiveness Developed During EMERALD EXPRESS '94

Agricultural and Economic Issues

The UN and NGOs are the source of data to support these MOEs.

1) Market price of food.
   Increased prices indicate shortages.

2) Market price of animals.
   In a period of increased distress, many people may try to sell livestock, which may be evidenced by declining market prices for animals.

3) Household surveys.
   Surveys can be used in assessing the amount of food in homes and individuals' purchasing power.

4) Fraction of land cultivated or used to raise animals
   Increased cultivation indicates an improved capability for self sustenance.
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Interview with Professor Judith Stiehm (Florida International University, Visiting Professor at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute), 20 October 1995.