AMERICA'S TOTAL FORCE: Can Army Reserve Components Adequately Support the National Military Strategy of the 1990s?

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Representing over fifty percent of the deployable forces in the US Army, reserve components are relied on today, more than at any other time in this country's history, to shoulder a crucial share of the nation's defense. Significant changes in the world's geopolitical landscape since 1990 have caused dramatic reductions in our active forces and resulted in an ambitious new national military strategy that includes a frenetic operational tempo, decreased deployment times and increased readiness requirements for many previously unheard of missions. While numerous initiatives have been undertaken recently to enhance the readiness of Army reserves, their ability to accomplish these new missions remains in question.

This paper reviews the origins of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's Total Force and tracks its development through the 1970s and 1980s until its "final examination" during Operation DESERT STORM. It also examines Active Component initiatives undertaken to enhance the viability of reserve forces and the recent designation of select RC units as early wartime deployers. The author then addresses several recurring and unresolved maladies that face reserve commanders, tying their hands in the struggle with unit readiness. He finally presents recommendations that would remedy many of these reserve-unique issues.
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United States Army War College
STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Can Army Reserve Components Adequately Support the National Military Strategy of the 1990s?

by

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June 1996

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This paper reviews the origins of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's Total Force and tracks its development through the 1970s and 1980s until its "final examination" in the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT STORM. It also examines numerous Active Component initiatives undertaken in the last decade for the purpose of enhancing the viability of reserve forces, as well as the recent designation of select RC units as early wartime deployers. The author then addresses several recurring and unresolved maladies that face reserve commanders, tying their hands in their day-to-day struggle with unit readiness. He finally presents several recommendations that would remedy many of these reserve-unique issues.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

The Army of today is advancing Active and Reserve Component integration in ways that have produced a fundamental and qualitative change in the character of our force structure. The Army has fully integrated the RC and is fundamentally dependent upon reserve forces in the earliest deploying power projection forces.¹

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, 1992

To accomplish the myriad of requirements set forth and directed by the President in the National Security Strategy and further delineated by the Secretary of Defense in the National Military Strategy (NMS), the United States Army now must rely upon its Reserve Components (RC) more than at any other time in this nation's history. It order to realistically achieve the required state of reserve readiness, senior Army leadership must commit itself to a strategic re-evaluation of its reserve forces and undertake to implement appropriate steps to truly integrate them with the Active Component (AC) into one cohesive Army fighting force.

Several important improvements in overall support to the RC must be accomplished before the RC can realistically be factored into today's NMS by Army war planners. Foremost, reserves must be allocated increased funding and additional full-time support personnel, both of which would provide unit commanders with the necessary tools to realistically train to and maintain readiness standards. In addition, appropriate benefits must be provided to all RC soldiers participating in designated early deploying RC

units in order to attract and retain top quality personnel. Finally, senior Army leadership must force a radical overhaul in active Army attitudes and mind-sets toward the reserves, beginning at the company and battalion officer level. Every leader in the Army must understand his/her responsibility in creating a truly integrated Total Force, without the divisiveness created by the cynicism and intolerance prevalent in today’s force.

The integration of the RC into the active force is not a new idea. Since the inception of the Total Force Policy in the Nixon administration in 1970, senior leadership has espoused an integration of both the Active and Reserve Components. Today’s Army policy regarding reserve forces states that the RC:

are full partners with the AC in implementing the Total Force Policy and are integrated into virtually all theater operational plans ... [M]ost operational missions cannot be successfully conducted or sustained without using the Reserve components.²

While these expressions of unity and harmony sound enlightened and appear managerially and fiscally astute, they have been largely ineffective. Many reservists feel that Army support for the Total Force concept has been luke-warm at best and, in fact, little more than lip service paid to anxious congressmen and taxpayers. The schism between Active and Reserve Components, that has existed since early in American military history, remains, although perhaps not to the same degree.

Moreover, ambitious and costly RC readiness enhancement programs of recent years that were designed to increase the accessibility, deployability and overall readiness of the RC have been only marginally successful in increasing RC unit readiness. This failure can be attributed to the fact that many readiness

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issues which have existed for decades remain unresolved, despite the infusion of billions of Department of Defense (DoD) budget dollars since the inception of Melvin Laird’s Total Force.

Several outside organizations have examined the relative readiness of the today’s reserves and have found systemic issues that must be addressed. For example, the Brookings Institute, in its study on reserve component readiness, noted that:

[t]he contemporary Army’s unprecedented dependence on the reserves is a risky venture. Defense planners are heavily basing the nation’s security on the expectation that today’s Army reserve will be able to accomplish what few of their predecessors were able to do -- go to war on short notice.³

The same study also questioned the issue of senior Army leadership’s increased reliance on the use of reserves:

This unprecedented dependence on the reserves has been instituted with little public fanfare or debate, yet the consequences could be dramatic and far-reaching.... Of major concern is that the reserves are being counted as the equivalent of their active counterparts. Army reserve forces cost much less to maintain in peacetime, but they are also less trained, less equipped and less ready than active forces.⁴

Despite the seriousness of these issues, the long standing reserve readiness-related problems are not insurmountable. Several practical and relatively cost-effective measures can be taken to ensure Army RC mission preparedness for the future. Some of the recommendations presented later in this paper will undoubtedly be criticized by Army traditionalists who advocate safer, but essentially ineffective, “enhancements” in reserve readiness. A “business as usual” approach and status quo mentality, however, defy the enlightenment associated with the

⁴ Ibid., 2.
often-mentioned Revolution in Military Affairs and far-sighted planning associated with FORCE XXI development. Much worse, failure to adequately address remaining RC readiness issues in America's Army represents a very risky approach to national defense, especially at this uncertain juncture in post-Cold War history.
CHAPTER 2

TOTAL FORCE POLICY BACKGROUND/HISTORY:

Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces... [This] requires that the capability and mobilization readiness of Guard and Reserve units be promptly and effectively enhanced. We are taking steps to do so.\(^5\)

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 1971

Beginning in the early 1970s, Army war planners have advocated an increased reliance on reserve forces in order to fulfill Army mission requirements. For example, Cold War operational war plans of that era included a number of RC units in deployment sequences and orders of battle. This dependence upon the RC continued to grow through the 1980s. Today, the integration of Army components has taken on a new and important dimension as the RC fills the void left in the AC force structure by the draw-down begun after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Budget cutters in the early 1990s, who advocated "more bang for the buck," helped bring the reserves into favor with Congress, especially those legislators pushing for a "Peace Dividend" and demanding major DoD budgetary cuts.

The Total Force concept was conceived and developed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970 to address several major issues stemming from painful experience in the Vietnam War. President Johnson’s Administration, for political reasons and with apparent lack of attention to lessons learned in

\(^5\) Ibid., 63. Also see Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1972, 36.
previous American conflicts, had refused to conduct any major mobilization of reserves in the war in favor of conscription.\(^6\) In fact, as it turned out, the reserves forces during the Vietnam war had become a haven for individuals desiring to avoid being drafted and going to war.

In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, many policy makers in the Nixon Administration speculated that Johnson’s moratorium on the mobilization of the RC had been a major strategic mistake and also had contributed directly to the lack of American public support. They argued that public support would have been much stronger and more resolute if America’s “Citizen Soldiers” had been mobilized and deployed. General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the final years of the Vietnam War and the early post-Vietnam era, in critiquing President Johnson’s policy concerning RC mobilization, remarked, “They’re not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.”\(^7\)

The objective of the Total Force concept was to:

give concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces.\(^8\)

James R. Schlesinger, Laird’s successor as Secretary of Defense, underscored his commitment to the Total Force and codified it as a “policy” in 1973 when he stated, “Total force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy, which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole.”\(^9\)

\(^6\) Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1215.15H, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces (1994), (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1994), 5. Only 37,000 guardsmen and reservist were mobilized late during the Vietnam war, many of whom were called up for Pueblo crisis contingency planning, which centered on the Korean Peninsula.

\(^7\) Office, Chief of Army Reserves, 2.

\(^8\) Ibid., 24.

\(^9\) Binkin and Kaufman, 25.
Not surprisingly, the major impetus for this renewed sense of urgency concerning Total Force was fiscal; in 1973, Congress capped the active Army strength at 781,000 soldiers. As a result, the Administration began to realize that reserve forces were a relative bargain and inexpensive to maintain, especially when compared to the active force.

Concerns about the ability of the RC to accomplish its increased role in National Defense, however, surfaced soon after the implementation of Schlesinger's policy. Many policy makers doubted that RC units could deploy reliably and expeditiously enough to reasonably augment and sustain AC units in combat. These concerns, expressed by the 1976 Defense Manpower Commission, may have been prophetic of troubles later encountered in Operation DESERT STORM (ODS):

The Total Force Policy is still far from a reality, and the expectation of it may have been overstated. To assume that many National Guard or Reserve units will be operationally ready for deployment overseas 30 to 90 days after mobilization is not realistic; a more practical readiness time for most units would be from 120 to 180 days. There are some anomalies and some great differences among and within the Services as to the conditions of their Reserve components, and their support, readiness and what can realistically be expected from them.  

During the 1970s and 1980s Army reserve forces expanded as the nation countered the "Evil Empire's" (the Soviet Union's) threat in Europe and the Cold War crested. Actual RC personnel strength stood at approximately 560,000 in 1976 and peaked at over 780,000 in 1989. Concurrent to this dramatic increase in personnel, the overall number of RC units also substantially

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increased. Secretary of Defense Weinberger highlighted the Reagan Administration's view of the key role of the RC when he spoke to the Congress of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers in August 1982:

We can no longer consider Reserve forces as merely forces in reserve....Instead, they have to be an integral part of the total force, both within the United States and within NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to defend our freedom.\textsuperscript{12}

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs James Webb described the prominence of the RC in contingency planning during the Reagan administration when he testified before Congress in 1986 that "...the Total Force Concept of the early 1970s is a reality in 1986, so much that contingency plans to counter aggression in both hemispheres cannot be effectively executed without committing National Guard and Reserve forces in the same time frame."\textsuperscript{13}

Increased expenditures were made for the procurement and upgrade of equipment and facilities for the expanding RC force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. The United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) noted in 1993 that, between 1981 and 1991, significant expenditure increases and resulting procurements of Mission Essential Equipment in both USAR and ARNG units had been accomplished. USAR units increased from 26 to 68 percent of "major equipment" items on hand and the ARNG improved from 69 to 74 percent.\textsuperscript{14} The same GAO report also indicated, however, that many of these new expenditures and procurements may

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 50. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Binkin and Kaufman, 36. \\
have been largely wasted because of piece-meal and disjointed approaches to solving serious equipment shortages. As a result, serious shortages of key equipment were discovered in many RC units at the onset of ODS by dismayed and sometimes cynical mobilization station commanders and AC units higher in the warfighting chain of command. Furthermore, many other items of equipment which had not been officially labeled as “mission essential” on unit MTOEs, but which were in fact necessary for the conduct of the war, were found to be critically short. The GAO reported that “Army procurement and distribution priorities account for many reserve units remaining under equipped and being more slowly modernized than the active force.”

Operation DESERT STORM highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of Army reserve forces and the relative effectiveness of the many endeavors in the 1970s and 1980s that were intended to enhance their readiness. The Gulf War was the first significant mobilization of the RC since the later stages of the Vietnam War and the first real test of RC mobilization capabilities since the Berlin Crisis in 1961. While USAR combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units at echelons above division and corps performed better than expected during the Gulf War, ARNG combat round-out brigades proved problematic — only one of the three brigades earmarked for mobilization were eventually certified as combat ready. Due to apparent readiness problems with those brigades early in the mobilization process, Army senior leadership made the early decision to omit them from the call-up list. While numerous rationalizations and excuses have been offered to explain these units’ inability to successfully meet the deployment criteria of

15 Ibid., 12.
16 Ibid., 44. A total of 113,254 Army reservists were mobilized. Four National Guard combat divisions, a Reserve training division and numerous support units were mobilized. One-third of all mobilized reservists were individuals used as fillers for other units.
Army war planners, the bottom line is that they never completed the mobilization process and failed to receive "validation." The war was conducted without them.\textsuperscript{18}

While the Gulf War demonstrated that CS and CSS reserve forces could successfully execute the mobilization process and perform well with their active colleagues, it must be noted that the active Army at the time was a well-equipped, Cold War oriented active force of over 760,000 personnel, many of whom were forward based in Germany. This allowed war planners to exercise a degree of selectivity in choosing RC units for mobilization. Furthermore, the phased and deliberate build up for ODS, which lasted for more than four months prior to the actual start of the ground war, allowed the RC an enormous amount of preparation time. This abundance of time provided Army senior leadership the ability to closely manage the entire mobilization process, a luxury we cannot plan on in the future. These issues relating to reserve CS and CSS unit readiness during the Gulf War were discussed in an extensive 1993 Rand Corporation study:

Although the observations of this study apply to the ODS experience, two caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting them for the future Army. First, the requirements and timing for most unit types were such that the Army could afford to be selective, picking the units that appeared to be the most capable or ready. If the Army had needed to call a larger group of units or if the timing had been more compressed, it might have encountered more problems. Second, the ODS deployment was an intensively managed process, which received large infusions of effort and resources to ensure success. In 1990, the Army had an inventory that had been built and supplied to fight the Warsaw Pact, with its rich array of resources. The future Army will be smaller and the same resources may not be available to correct deficiencies. To compensate, it may become necessary to identify early

deploying RC units and resource and train them to minimize the need to correct deficiencies.\textsuperscript{19}

The author is not attempting to minimize the accomplishments of hundreds of thousands of reservists and guardsmen during the Gulf War. America’s citizen soldiers distinguished themselves well during ODS -- which happened to be the first use of the involuntary Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). As General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during ODS, noted, "These part-time warriors have been indispensable to our military readiness, and they showed their stuff in Desert Storm. They represent citizen soldiery at its finest."\textsuperscript{20} Our world today, however, is a much different place than it was in 1990. Accordingly, in any assessment of reserve readiness, it is important to study the political and practical realities which make today’s environment much different from that of Operation DESERT STORM.

\textsuperscript{19} Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., [Rand], Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 7.
CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF ARMY RESERVES TODAY:

Maintaining the Army’s role as a strategic force requires the full integration of the active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. When needed, the Guard and Reserve provide highly trained units and individual soldiers to support combat operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is crucial that the Army have ready access to those units and individuals when the nation calls.\textsuperscript{21}

Honorable Togo D. West, Secretary of the Army
United States Army Posture Statement FY 96

The role of the RC in today’s national defense is dramatically different than that of the “weekend warriors” of twenty-five years ago. Due to the demise of the Cold War and subsequent reductions in AC force structure and changes in the NMS, the complexity and demanding nature of the RC’s role is even greater than during the days of ODS in several critical ways.

First, current operational plans now call for select United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) early deploying contingency units to deploy into theaters of operations prior to their AC counterparts. Many other RC units will deploy simultaneously with the active force and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their active brethren in battle. This is in stark contrast to yesteryear’s RC, who were considered by the AC as second-stringers; operational plans then called for reserve units to be held in the background, mobilized only when absolutely necessary and even then only during the final desperate stages of

\textsuperscript{21} Honorable Togo D. West and General Gordon R. Sullivan, \textit{United States Army Posture Statement FY 96 - Serving the Nation, February 1995}, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), 85. This document was presented to Committees and Subcommittees of the US Senate and House of Representatives of the First Session of the 104th Congress.
a national military crisis. Even in those extreme scenarios, the RC would be given only secondary missions.\(^{22}\)

This change in the scope of the RC’s role is due at least in part to reductions in total manpower. Today’s overall Army force structure, both AC and RC, is much smaller than in 1990. Reductions of approximately one third of the active force (770,000 to 495,000), with corresponding reductions in RC force structure (776,000 to 616,000), have required Army senior leadership to increase dependence upon the RC to fill force requirements stipulated in revised war operations plans and contingency plans.\(^{23}\) Selected RC early deploying units designated as Force Support Package (FSP), CONUS Sustaining Base (CSB), or Enhanced Brigades (EB) have more demanding training requirements and performance standards. The amount of preparation time allowed many FSP and CSB units from receipt of the mobilization order until deployment into theater is as little as 21 days.

Second, recent changes in the geopolitical landscape and corresponding DoD-directed changes in the NMS have dramatically increased the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for both RC and AC units, and also have broadened the scope of the Army’s war-time and peace-time operations. Statistics indicate that operational deployments of Army units since 1990 have increased by over 300%. Moreover, on any given day an average of 19,000 soldiers are deployed overseas to approximately 77 countries.\(^{24}\) Army reserve forces have played a key role in these deployments, thus demonstrating DoD’s increased reliance on them.\(^{25}\)

Many of these operations have been non-traditional Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), such as Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and PROVIDE

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 22.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Reserve Forces Policy Board, p.x.
PROMISE/JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. The MOOTW operations referred to by Secretary of the Army West in this chapter’s opening quotation have become an important consideration in RC unit training. They include a wide range of military actions where Army forces are used as instruments of foreign policy for purposes other than traditional warfare. The categories of MOOTW are:26

Arms Control - Army units may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty, serving as escorts in the movement and safeguarding of weapons of mass destruction, with or without the consent of applicable host nations (HN).

Combating Terrorism - These activities, supported by special Army units, can take either an offensive or defensive form, with the former being conducted primarily outside CONUS.

DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations (CD) - Army participation in these operations is now a major ingredient to the National Drug Control Strategy. Missions include detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; and support for American law enforcement interdiction.

Nation Assistance - These sophisticated multi-service operations, which include Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense, have as their primary objective assistance to HN in developing internal programs designed to promote stability. These missions also include the establishment of institutions responsive to the needs of HN citizens.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations - Army units may support in the assistance to and removal of civilian non-combatants from foreign nations, as seen recently in Liberia.

Civil Support Operations - These operations include humanitarian assistance operations, military support to civil authorities and assistance for civil disturbances.

Peace Operations - Three general types of peace operations which may involve Army participation include: Peace Making, Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia falls generally into the Peace Keeping form of Peace Operation.

Support to Insurgencies - These operations have been historically the province of Special Operations Forces (SOF); however, Army non-SOF units can also be expected to participate in key support roles.

The frustrations and concerns of many in the military, and in other parts of the government, regarding these "new" missions, was underscored by Andrew Natsios, former US Special Envoy to Somalia, when he wrote:

Armies are trained to close with and destroy the enemy; that is what armies are supposed to do if they are to carry out their role of protecting the countries which raise them. Expecting soldiers to show the kind of restraint and diplomatic skills required to function as humanitarian policemen in emergencies goes beyond their current training.27

DoD expects Army reserves to provide qualified troops and well trained units for all military missions, including both traditional war-fighting operations and the aforementioned MOOTW. Multiple, yearly deployments have become commonplace and have created serious practical problems for reservists, both at home and with employers. RC Commanders have been required to intensify their training programs, with few authorized increases in available training time, to ensure their personnel are sufficiently trained and prepared to deploy with greatly reduced post-mobilization training time. Exacerbating the situation, training requirements for MOOTW missions are, in most cases, totally new and much different from those for conventional wartime missions.

Finally, another significant post-Cold War change since the early 1990s and Gulf War is the dramatic reduction in American forward based active component units of Cold-War Army strength in Europe. As of late 1995, 341 units, over 70%, had been inactivated in Europe and 650 installations worldwide (514 in Europe) had been closed.⁸

In contrast to today’s strategic situation, a significant percentage of ODS force structure deployed to Saudi Arabia from Europe. This key factor allowed CONUS based RC units additional post-mobilization preparation time. As result of the elimination of most active component units in Europe, today’s CONUS based forces, both AC and RC, must be prepared for quicker deployment into their designated theaters of operation and must be in a higher state of readiness.

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⁸ General Dennis J. Reimer, August 1995 briefing.
CHAPTER 4

ARMY RESERVE READINESS "ENHANCEMENTS":

The role of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard has never been more critical to an effective national defense than it is today. Because the cost of maintaining a regular Army capable of meeting potential threats has long been recognized as prohibitive from an economic standpoint, the Army’s leadership has developed defense strategies that place increasingly greater reliance on the reserve components....it is critical that Army leaders ensure that reserve soldiers and units are highly trained.29

General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 1989

Several initiatives during the 1980s and early 1990s resulted from senior leadership’s desire to benefit from lessons learned from the Gulf War and greatly underscored concerns of war planners about RC readiness. Active force structure cuts were well underway during this period, and it had become apparent that the Army would have to rely heavily on the reserves to accomplish wartime missions associated with the new NMS.

General Burba, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), responding to recommendations by the Department of the Army Inspector General’s assessment of round-out brigade performance during ODS, implemented BOLD SHIFT in 1993. This ambitious program was approved by the Army Chief of Staff and was “chartered to improve AC/RC readiness and thereby enhance the Total Force for evolving National Military Strategy.”30

29 General Accounting Office, Army Training - Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservist’s Training, 10.
BOLD SHIFT dealt primarily with the improvement of RC readiness, specifically with respect to those units earmarked as members of the Contingency Force Pool (CFP).\textsuperscript{31} Initially, it involved over 125 USAR and ARNG units and included at least one unit from each of the RC’s Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC). It examined a host of readiness issues, some of which included: reorganizations and realignments; operational readiness exercises and other readiness evaluation tools; individual and soldier training; leader training and development; training involvement of the wartime chain of command (WARTRACE); and full-time support to reserve units. A number of conclusions and recommendations generated from this project resulted in new standing readiness doctrine and operating procedures.

In addition, a number of older programs established in the 1970s and 1980s have survived and still provide full-time AC assistance to reserve units. These programs include the Full-time Support (FTS) Program, Readiness Groups (RG) and Directed Training Associations (DTA).\textsuperscript{32}

The Full-time Support Program provides Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Active Component, Military Technicians (MILTECH) and Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) personnel to RC unit Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs). These personnel serve on a full-time basis in RC units and provide continuity and day-to-day management of the unit for the reserve commander. Specifically, FTS personnel are chartered to provide “organization, administration, recruiting, instructing and training in RC units.”\textsuperscript{33} The “typical” FTS model found in most RC companies includes five full-time personnel: one civilian Unit


\textsuperscript{32} United States Army Training Board, Training and Organization of the US Army Reserve Components: A Reference Text for Total Force Trainers, (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, Training and Doctrine Command, 1987), 41. Many other programs became obsolete and were formally abolished, while others just faded out of existence without any formal inactivation.

\textsuperscript{33} United States Army Training Board, 42.
Administrator (UA) (either MILTECH or DAC) and four AGR NCOs (Operations NCO (E7), Supply NCO (E5/6), Maintenance NCO (E5/6) and Administrative NCO (E5/6)). AGR officers and NCOs, E-8 and higher, generally are assigned to battalion and higher level troop units in staff positions, as well as in staff positions of higher RC and AC commands and military schools. With few exceptions, AGR officers are prohibited from serving in command positions.

Readiness Groups (RGs) were created as subordinate elements of the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) and were given the responsibility of overseeing the management of training and wartime readiness of RC units. RGs are relatively large AC Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, each commanded by an 0-6, and are geographically dispersed throughout the United States, where they support all RC units, both ARNG and USAR, in their designated areas. The two remaining CONUSAs, First United States Army and Fifth United States Army, are accountable to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) for overall Training, Operations, Mobilization and Deployment (TOM-D) oversight to all reserve component units in their geographic areas. CONUSAs serve as FORSCOM's action agencies concerning all RC readiness issues.

The Directed Training Association (DTA), one of the remaining remnants of the now-defunct CAPSTONE Program, was developed in order to provide AC "big brother" units to specially designated RC units. In this program, RC units are formally "associated" with a corresponding type and size AC counterpart unit which has the mandate of providing peacetime training assistance and supervision, as well as equipment support for training.

Another important descendent of the CAPSTONE program is WARTRACE. While DTA addresses the wartime readiness training aspects of CAPSTONE, WARTRACE was developed to replace CAPSTONE's
actual wartime alliances. WARTRACE "uptraces," or aligns, RC units to their AC wartime chain of command. The AC "higher," acting on guidance from the theater "warfighting" Commander in Chief (CINC), is responsible for reviewing and approving the RC unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Yearly Training Plan (YTP).

A recent FORSCOM reserve readiness enhancement program, undertaken in 1993, was designated the Active Component Dedicated Support of Reserve Component Units Program Assessment. This initiative, originally approved and funded under Title XI of the FY 1994 Defense Appropriations Bill, provided for the assignment of 2,000 AC soldiers in positions supporting RC training. 3,000 additional AC billets were later approved. The program created several other types of small AC TDA units, dispersed throughout America, with missions of dedicated training support and oversight to RC select units. Two types of these support units are Resident Training Detachments (RTDs) and Resident Training Teams (RTTs). They are composed of between 4 and 15 AC officers and NCOs and are geographically located, like the CONUSAs and RGs, throughout CONUS to best support their RC unit.

RTDs are stationed for duty and physically co-located with their supported RC battalion or brigade, and their subordinate units. RTTs are located centrally in order to provide regional coverage for several RC companies and battalions. Neither are part of the reserve peacetime chain of command and both come directly under the aforementioned regionally based RGs for command and control.

RTDs and RTTs are also components of an umbrella program entitled Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE). GFRE

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34 Director of Operations (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Forces Command, Memorandum, dated 9 March 1993, to DCSOPS, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Subject: Active Component (AC) Dedicated Support to Reserve Component (RC) Units Program Assessment, on file at HQ, FORSCOM, Atlanta, GA.
emerged after ODS as a result of recommendations generated by a DA level study group.

Regional Training Brigades (RTBs) are another GFRE-generated TDA unit with the sole duty of assisting RC units. They report directly to the CONUSAs and focus on preparation and execution of RC unit collective training, with special emphasis on lanes and gunnery training at the company level. They are also prime players in the conduct of RC unit Annual Training (AT), where they oversee the completion of RC readiness evaluations using the Training Assessment Model (TAM).37 These units are currently still in their activation phase and are not yet all “on line.”

Other organizations created under the GFRE program include: Organizational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Teams; Divisions (Exercise) (DIV-EX); Field Exercise Brigades (FEB) and Battle Command and Staff Training Brigades (BCST).

DoD Resources committed to the GFRE program, along with its many predecessor programs, highlights the legitimate RC readiness concerns of the AC. The AC has demonstrated that it is willing to expend resources to resolve RC problems.

37 Fifth United States Army (5th USA) Staff briefing, "Regional Training Brigade (RTB),” San Antonio, TX, 1994.
CHAPTER 5

EARLY DEPLOYING RC UNITS:

Just as the national military strategy has changed to reflect the realities of the changing world, so has the Army Reserve changed. As the nation's military posture evolves into a continental US-based force, the Army Reserve has focused on providing early-deploying combat support and combat service support units to the contingency force pool (CFP) of America's Army.38

Major General Max Baratz, Chief, Army Reserve, 1994

In the early 1990s several categories of RC units, earmarked by Army war planners as early deployers, were given a high priority in funding, logistical upgrade and training support. With the exception of the ARNG’s Enhanced Brigades (EB), which are Combat Arms (CA) maneuver commands, the majority of today’s early deploying RC force structure is CS and CSS and either are members of the Force Support Package (FSP), the descendent of the earlier CFP, or have been designated as CONUS Base Sustaining (CSB) units. The vast majority of FSP and CSB reserve units are in the USAR.39

The FSP program is the successor to the CFP, which was implemented shortly after the Gulf War in order to meet the demands of the new NMS, specifically the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) strategy. Using lessons learned from ODS and addressing MRC scenario force requirements, Army senior leadership created a “pool” of CONUS based CS and CSS units, at

39 The “Off-Site Agreement” of 1993 between the USAR and ARNG resulted in transferring the majority of RC combat arms units to the ARNG and most of the CS and CSS units at echelons above division and corps (EAD and EAC) moved to the USAR.

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echelons above division (EAD) and corps (EAC), to support the deployment and sustainment of CONUS based combat divisions.

Reductions in the active force structure after ODS created critical shortages in AC CONUS based support units. These units were needed to adequately support the NMS’s two MRCs “to be conducted nearly simultaneously.” The new CFP force list included many AC CONUS-based CS and CSS units, and a significant percentage of USAR units. CFP was divided into two categories, CFP 1 and CFP 2. CFP 1, further divided into support package decrements 1 through 4, provided support to the five and one-third CONUS based maneuver division Crisis Response Force (CRF), deploying into MRC A. CFP 2, packages 5-7, supported the Early Reinforcing Force (ERF), which consisted of the remaining three and two-thirds CONUS based divisions earmarked for deployment into MRC B. This pool of units was to be “tailored” during any given contingency to meet the requirements of the theater CINC and scope of the operation, e.g. geographic location, type of threat, size operation, etc. By 1995 the CFP included 1468 units (546 USAR, 331 ARNG and 591 AC).\(^4^0\)

In late 1995, the CFP evolved into today’s Force Support Package. The FSP is somewhat smaller than the CFP, but very similar in concept. The differences between the CFP and FSP involve operational implementation -- how the packages are to be deployed and in which manner their higher wartime command will be configured. While FSP maintains CFP’s two-category structure, FSP 1 and FSP 2, the smaller support package decrements of CFP’s support packages have been eliminated.

All FSP units must be prepared to deploy into any theater of operation. Accordingly, they must train to “generic” Mission Essential Task Lists (METL), void of the geographical orientation requirements of the CAPSTONE era. A total of 1025 Army units (492 AC, 355 USAR and 178 ARNG) have now been designated FSP.

\(^4^0\) United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), Staff briefing, “CFP Overview,” Atlanta, 17 Jan 1995.
This reduction in size, as compared to the CFP, clearly reflects the Army's overall reduction in force structure. The mission of FSP is to:

 provide the National Command Authority a rapid contingency response force and power projection capability by packaging combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units to support 5 1/3 CONUS divisions plus 2 Corps and 1 Theater requirements in support of National Military Strategy.\footnote{Forces Command (FORSCOM), Staff briefing, "Force Support Package Overview/Implementation," Ft McPherson, GA, 9 Nov 95.}

Significantly, there is no mention of the ERF or the 3 1/3 divisions in FSP's mission statement -- two of those divisions had been inactivated by 1995.

The other type of high priority, quick deploying reserve CSS unit is designated as CONUS Base Sustaining. These critical units are, in many cases, the first CONUS-based RC units to become operational in a crisis. While they rarely depart CONUS during a time of conflict, they have extremely critical missions including: establishing and operating key embarkation ports and terminals (air and sea); supporting the medical processing requirements of mobilization and deployment operations; augmenting the staffs of major commands; and taking over the operation of key CONUS installations. To date, FORSCOM has not officially recognized these units as warranting priority in support; however, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) has ranked them high, immediately behind FSP units, in their tiered resourcing program. There are approximately 84 units recognized by USARC as CSB.

The aforementioned RC enhancement programs, many of which were developed after ODS, support primarily early deploying RC units. For example, RTTs and RTDs dedicate the overwhelming majority of their time and resources in the support of USAR and ARNG FSP, CSB units, as well as the EBs.
The United States Army Reserve Command, FORSCOM’s major subordinate command with overall peacetime command and control for the majority of all USAR units, is instrumental in the support and overall resourcing of all USAR units. USARC has implemented a tiered resourcing model for the entire USAR force structure of approximately 1600 units. Under this model, the majority of all available RC, USAR and ARNG training funds and logistical resources are allocated to FSP, CSB and EB units, leaving non-early deploying units, sympathetically known as “Have-nots,” anemic and poorly trained. In most cases, Have-nots have been stripped of key personnel and mission essential equipment in order to beef up higher-tiered units. Most of these units receive minimal training money and must rely solely on weekend inactive duty training (IDT) and reduced Annual Training (AT) to accomplish their METL training requirements. As a result, it can be assumed that these skeletal units are omitted from most war plans.

USAR special operations units, e.g. Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) units, come directly under the command and control of United States Army Special Operations Command. USARC has input into these units only on matters of Reserve pay.
CHAPTER 6

READINESS "CHALLENGES" AND NEED FOR CHANGE:

The only probable means of preventing hostility for any length of time and from being exempted from the consequent calamities of war, is to put the National Militia in such a condition that they may appear truly respectable in the eyes of our friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies.43

George Washington

Despite the designation of selected RC units as "early deployers" and the resulting efforts to provide them with prioritized resourcing, many problems continue to plague reserve readiness. While demonstrative improvement has been made in the last decade, and ODS demonstrated that the RC can be a viable counterpart to its active sibling, recurring systemic issues have either been ignored or not addressed because they are regarded as sacred cows. Several of these existing problems are endemic to the fundamental structure of the reserve components. This chapter describes several of these RC readiness "challenges."

Unit Training Time:

The author interviewed key AC personnel in several RGs and in other AC units supporting RC readiness as well as numerous reservists in various ARNG and USAR units during the course of this study. One common slogan that was repeated over and over by RG personnel in near mantra-like obsession was "One Army - One

Standard." The manner in which the expression is usually said underscores the negative opinion that many AC personnel have concerning RC reliability, and their insistence that RC units must maintain the same training standards as the AC. They generally ignore or omit the fact that most RC units have only 39 days per year to train, as compared to 240 for their AC counterparts.

The issue of insufficient RC training time has been raised on numerous occasions by both internal Army reviews and by outside agencies. The GAO noted in its 1989 assessments of the RC:

Reserve Components have only a fraction of the time their active duty counterparts have to accomplish the multitude of training required of all Army units. Therefore, it is imperative that the limited training time available be used effectively....Active units have an average of 240 days training days a year. Reserve units are generally authorized 38 days a year, and National Guard units have 39 days a year to accomplish training. In other words, reserve units have less than one-sixth of the time available to active units to meet equal training standards and requirements.\(^4\)

This already untenable situation is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of reservists feel that most RC training time is spent toiling with administrative and "housekeeping" tasks, most of which is totally unrelated to their wartime METLs.\(^5\) These tasks range from preparation for visits from various higher commands on "assistance visits" or inspections, to tasks totally superfluous and unrelated to readiness, e.g. Personnel Records updating, urinalysis, HIV testing and organization day, etc. While efficient managerial practices by unit leadership minimizes wasted time and increases the quantity of tasks accomplished,

\(^4\) United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Army Training - Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists' Training (June 1989), 34.
\(^5\) Ibid., 36.
many hours of key drill weekends are still “burned up” with these non-METL related requirements.

Not counting this wasted time, most RC units actually have little more than three weeks per year, spread over 12 monthly “drills” and Annual Training, to train and prepare for combat. Furthermore, much of this remaining training time is spent on mandatory individual Common Task Training (CTT), which usually has little value to the unit’s collective wartime mission. For example, an RC Water Distribution Company may spend three to five days of its valuable training year on mandatory individual weapons qualification and the conduct of rudimentary infantry-type training, instead of “technical” training on pumping and transporting water.

Many RC units also waste several hours of a monthly drill weekend transporting troops and equipment to and from training areas which are not located nearby. Studies show that units travel an average of 40 miles to local training areas and 154 miles to major training areas. Rifle ranges are on average 65 miles away from reserve centers/armories. While the Army has attempted to reduce training time lost to this geographical dispersion of RC units, training hours are still lost to movement and unnecessary administrative requirements.

The resulting minimal amount of legitimate collective training time may have been acceptable during the pre-Total Force days when RC units were not seriously factored into war plans, or even more recently during the Gulf War era, where plans allotted a large amount of post-mobilization training time to resolve training deficiencies prior to the actual deployment into theater. Today’s reality, however, dictates that this “standard” RC training time is totally insufficient to maintain readiness. Despite being early deployers, units designated as FSP, CSB and EB cannot adequately train to “One Standard” and support

46 Ibid., 34.
warfighting theater CINCs with only 39 days of pre-mobilization training. This point is especially valid when considering that most of these early deployers must be in their assigned theater of operations within 21 days of mobilization.

Despite these shortcomings, little has been done over the years to significantly increase the amount of reserve collective training time. Several funding options are available for unit commanders to entice unit members to work extra hours, in addition to those prescribed by the standard Inactive Duty Training (IDT) drill weekend. These options include Active Duty for Training (ADT), which is primarily used for individual attendance in Army schools, and Active Duty for Special Works (ADSW), which allows commanders to obtain personnel support for projects when the duties are deemed essential to the unit but cannot be adequately completed by the assigned full-time support personnel. While these options allow the unit to bring select individuals on active duty for short periods of time, however, they are in no way intended to be used for collective unit training. RC commanders have few viable options available to increase the duration of their training.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{Attrition:}

Data provided the author by USARC and ARNG units indicate that the overall annual rate of attrition in USAR FSP and CSB units is approximately 27 percent. The Army National Guard reports an overall 21 percent attrition rate, with EBs considerably lower. Disturbingly, these percentages all increase to over 50 percent for individuals between 18 and 25 years old. Most attrition occurs before the expiration of first term

\textsuperscript{47} Annual Training (AT), with MUSARC approval and close fiscal resourcing, can presently be extended to a total of 29 days.
enlistments -- the first three years of an individual's RC career. Primary factors contributing to attrition within the USAR, in addition to expiration of the individual's appointment or enlistment, are: unsatisfactory participation, voluntary reassignment to the Individual Ready Reserve, and transfer to the ARNG and AC. 48

High attrition rates are basically a function of the current form of enlistment contract. When conscription ended in the early 1970s, the "teeth" were taken out enlistment contracts. Prior to that time, soldiers who "quit" their RC units or failed to meet other contractual obligations, faced the reality of being forced on active duty. This threat served as a powerful incentive to keep reservists and guardsmen actively participating in monthly drills and Annual Training. Unfortunately, this powerful leverage is no longer available to the commander. If a soldier is recruited into a unit, attends basic and advanced individual training and, after arriving at the unit, decides he wants out, he generally is released to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) without serious consequence. Moreover, many recruited individuals receive valuable specialty training, such as nurse training, at the expense of the Army, and then immediately quit in order to move to a new location where civilian employment awaits.

Current rules indicate that if a soldier receives nine unexcused absences (U's), he will be involuntarily transferred out of the unit and into the IRR. This rule provides little incentive for soldiers to stick to their obligation, especially if their dedication to military service is less than wholehearted. Additionally, commanders in the USAR are required by USARC policy to personally contact all individuals who have "U'd" out of their units and to make extraordinary efforts to convince them to return. This requirement to plead with laggard

48 Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1994, 44.
soldiers not only distracts from unit discipline, it highlights the gravity of the problem -- retaining young, first-term soldiers represents a serious resource drain on the RC and greatly impacts readiness. The continual loss of young soldiers not only represents a huge financial burden in wasted schooling costs, it also contributes to serious shortages in qualified personnel.

Full-time Support:

The Full-time Support (FTS) program was developed in the early 1980s to augment drilling reservists and guardsmen and deal with the rigors of day-to-day personnel management, training preparation and logistical headaches in RC units. It was rightfully believed by policy makers that, given the increased role of the RC in national defense, additional full-time unit personnel were needed to maintain RC readiness.

Concurrent with the expansion of the FTS, the Army increased the scope of its Active Guard Reserve (AGR) program. The stated purpose of the program was to:

organize, administer, recruit, instruct and train the Army National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS) and the US Army Reserves. ARNGUS and USAR officers and NCOs serve under Title 10, US Code 672(d) and serve in a Federal Status. Personnel of the ARNG serving an AGR tour in their state serve under the provisions of Title 32, US Code 502(f)(2).

While the overall percentage of FTS-to-Reservist ratio has increased overall in the last ten years, Army RC’s overall percentages -- USAR’s 9.1% FTS and ARNG’s 13.1% FTS -- are still considerably smaller than those of the US Naval Reserve (24.8%),

US Marine Corps Reserve (17.3%), Air National Guard (32.8%) and US Air Force Reserve (31.7%). The typical model for full-time personnel in an "average" USAR company includes five individuals: one civilian (GS 7) Unit Administrator (UA), and four AGR NCOs -- Operations Sergeant (E7), Supply Sergeant (E5/6), Personnel Sergeant (E5) and Maintenance Sergeant (E5/6). The civilian is usually a Military Technician who also holds a reserve position in the unit.

The ARNG FTS model is similar to that of the USAR, but has a few subtle differences. Most notably, their current model eliminates the civilian administrator, but retains the four AGR NCOs -- Readiness Sergeant (E7), Training Sergeant (E6), Supply Sergeant (E6) and Administrative Clerk (E4/5). They are presently phasing out their civilian (GS7) Administrative Supply Technicians (ASTs) through retirement and normal attrition.

Different commanders take different approaches in their decisions as who serves as FTS supervisor or "leader" during the periods when the commander and other reserve leadership is absent. Although many UAs feel it is their duty and part of their job description to serve as the unit leader when the commander is absent, most AGR NCOs feel the opposite. Consequently, conflicts between UAs and AGRs are prevalent in many commands. The absence of an FTS officer at the company level appears to be root cause for the majority of these conflicts. The resulting turmoil has greatly negated the intended purpose for the FTS staff and, consequently, has led to a readiness degradation in many RC commands.

Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 8 February 1996.
**Active Component Attitudes:**

While many AC officers and senior non-commissioned officers fully understand and genuinely support the role played by reserve forces in our national defense, a number of key individuals assigned to AC units chartered to support the RC and enhance its readiness continue to harbor resentful, patronizing and negative attitudes. During the course of this project, the author interviewed a number of AC personnel assigned to RGs and other AC TDA units with RC support missions. Questioned AC personnel were guaranteed anonymity in an effort to secure objective answers and insights.51

Several recurring attitudinal themes surfaced. A large number of AC personnel stated that they felt RC soldiers participated in reserve units only for monetary benefits and that the majority of reservists thought of their units as "social clubs", sources of "pocket money" and only as means of securing funds for college education, etc. Some referred to reservists as "slugs" and many other insulting sobriquets were used to describe America's citizen soldiers.

Another recurring theme centered around the ability of RC units to accomplish their wartime missions. Many indicated that their supported RC units could never complete the mobilization process and would never deploy into their designated theaters of operation. The majority of the interviewed AC personnel felt that RC combat maneuver units should not be in the ARNG, citing numerous examples of the ARNG's inability to achieve standards and many other problems associated with ARNG accessibility and readiness.

51 Research for this study included indepth interviews, both telephonically and in-person, with approximately 45 active components officers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to 17 AC units and organizations with reserve support missions. The author's questions dealt with their views of overall RC unit readiness, relative quality of "drilling" reservist/guardsman, the quality of RC FTS personnel (AGR and DAC) and the overall ability of "their" RC units to accomplish their wartime missions.
The quality of AGR personnel was another major source of AC contempt for the RC. One RG deputy commander agreed with his subordinate when that officer labeled most AGRs he had observed as "two time losers -- they failed first as active Army NCOs and Officers and then failed a second time as civilians." They cited their beliefs that most AGRs fail to meet military standards of grooming and personal conduct and that most arrived in their units without the necessary physical and MOS qualifications.

The majority of interviewed AC officers and NCOs felt that duty with the RC was ruinous to their careers. Most acknowledged that the Army had gone to extremes to make them feel otherwise by saying they were in "competitive" billets. They were emphatic in their disbelief of this official "party line" and were quick to cite numerous examples of how their peers, seniors and subordinates alike had their careers ruined because of RC duty.

Undoubtedly, some of these AC soldiers were attempting to candidly "tell it like it is," hoping to genuinely improve the entire system through open and honest discussion. Indeed, many of their observations and insights were based on legitimate experiences and highlighted some serious problems. Furthermore, it must be noted that a number of AC personnel, both officers and NCOs, praised their RC colleagues and their respective reserve component units for both their military professionalism and combat readiness. Unfortunately, AC individuals with positive views concerning the RC were few and definitely in the minority.

Of particular concern, was the manner and tone in which many AC soldiers presented their views, and their total lack of enthusiasm for improving their RC units. Most were openly cynical, and some were outright hostile, in their feeling about the RC as an institution -- their comments, in general, evidenced a deep-seated resentment for their counterparts in the RC and disdain for the Total Force. Additionally, many seemed to harbor
pent-up bitterness toward the Active Army for placing them in the "Reserve World." One prominent officer assigned to an RG described one of his subordinate officers as having "gone native" when that officer displayed too much concern for the welfare of his RG unit's personnel.
CHAPTER 7

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I will fight to ensure that the troops we send into battle are the best in the world. But as we scale back our military in the aftermath of the Cold War, a strong role for the National Guard and the Reserve, in my view, makes more sense, not less....Desert Storm proved once again that the Guard and the Reserve can get the job done and do it right.\(^\text{52}\)

William J. Clinton
Presidential Candidate, September 1992

Resolving RC readiness issues may include political risks and require Government leaders and policy makers to make costly and controversial decisions that defy “conventional wisdom.” They will need to fight that business-as-usual mind-set which permeates much of government. If the recommendations presented below are taken and implemented, many serious RC readiness problems will be alleviated and overall reserve readiness will be greatly enhanced. These recommendations address the problem areas identified in Chapter 7. Specifically, they concern Unit Training Time, Full-time Support and Attention/Retention.

**Unit Training Time:**

**Drill Weekends.** In order to accommodate the early deployment times required of select RC units (FSP, CSB and EB), an increase in annual Inactive Duty Training (IDT) from 24 to 36 days per year for all FSP, CSB and Enhanced Brigades is recommended. Currently, the “standard” drill weekend consists of

four (4) Unit Training Assemblies (UTA), two on Saturday and two on Sunday. This Multiple Training Assembly (MUTA-4) begins at 0700 hours, Saturday and ends at 1700 hours on Sunday. An increase of two monthly UTAs would increase the standard drill weekend to a MUTA-6, beginning Friday morning and continue through Sunday. This extra day of monthly unit training would not only provide for longer collective training, but would provide additional time for movement to and from local training areas, maintenance time and time to accomplish other administrative tasks.

Annual Training. AT is the key and absolutely essential ingredient to RC collective training. As such, it must be increased from 14 days (15 days for the ARNG) to a minimum of 21 days per year. The current two-week schedule (14 days for the USAR and 15 days for the ARNG) allows units to train to their METL for only 7-8 days, the majority of that being used up in a readiness evaluation (TAM). Generally, two to three days are required at "both ends" of the AT period for unit preparation for movement and actual movement, and an additional two days is used during the recovery phase at the end of AT at home-station for maintenance, etc. With major training areas often being hundreds of miles away, this preparation time is necessary and inevitable.

Adding one additional week of AT would allow units at least 8 days of sustained collective training prior to participating in their AC administered TAM evaluation and still provide for necessary preparation, movement and recovery time. Realistically, a reserve unit needs one full week of collective training to transition back into an Army environment and build the necessary unit cohesiveness and team-work necessary to be successfully evaluated.

Some opposition may result from this increase in monthly reserve duty and Annual Training. Both civilian employers and the reservist's families may oppose the change initially.
Reservists may feel that this increased amount of time with the unit will create morale problems due to family separation and difficulties with uncooperative employers. Prior to signing up for duty with these units, however, members of FSP, CSB and EB units must understand that increased monthly participation is a condition to their membership, and that they must have accommodating civilian employers and tolerant families. The obvious payoff for reserve personnel is an increased amount of military pay and the prestige of belonging to elite units. The author will address incentives for personnel in select RC units later in this paper.

**Commander's Estimate of Training Status and Prerogative to Increase Training Time.** One of the basic ingredients of successful military command is the periodic assessment of training and combat readiness. Once completed, commanders use such assessments to adjust and fine tune training plans. All effective commanders perform this process, at least subliminally, on a continual basis.

When AC commanders conduct their “estimates” and determine that their units need additional training, they usually coordinate with their battalion commander and operations officer, readjust training schedules and conduct the required training. This is usually a relatively routine and simple process. Unfortunately, RC commanders do not have this luxury. The constraints of a combined 39-day training year, coupled with other ambiguous and time-consuming administrative requirements, has handcuffed RC commanders’ ability to adequately train their units.

In order to provide some of the training latitude allowed AC commanders, RC unit commanders for select units at the battalion and higher levels should be given the authority to increase IDT and AT training days in their command by 25% without higher approval. This option, if used to the maximum, would allow
select RC units training time of 45 days of IDT and 27 days of AT without approval from the MUSARC or USARC level. A combined 72 days of unit training, a near 100% increase from the present standard, will allow unit commanders sufficient time to properly train their personnel, thereby enhancing unit readiness.

**FULL-TIME SUPPORT:**

An essential element of RC unit readiness is the presence of FTS personnel. As noted earlier, the Army reserves have a much smaller ratio of FTS personnel to reserve personnel in RC units than do any of the other services. Interestingly enough, the USMCR, which has the mission most comparable to that of the Army RC, has the second smallest percentage of FTS personnel to reserve personnel ratio. The high percentage of FTS in the USNR and Air Force RCs is usually attributed to the "technical requirements" of maintaining aircraft and Navy vessels. Moreover, these services often cite "real world missions" in support of their active counterparts to justify their large FTS populations. All such justifications aside, recent experience clearly indicates that readiness of RC units of any service is tied directly to the quantity and quality of FTS personnel assigned to those units.

Of course, the relationship of readiness and personnel is a personnel management issue. A significant impediment to the efficiency of the Army FTS program, and therefore to unit readiness, is the lack of day-to-day leadership in most RC units. The pejorative state of relationships that have developed between UAs and senior AGR NCOs exacerbates the situation and degrades unit readiness.

In contrast, as a major component of their AC to RC support program, the USMC assigns AC "Instructor-Inspectors" to each of their USMCR units, down to the company level. These I-Is, who
complement the units’ FTS staffs, serve in command-designated billets, which are considered career enhancing. The I-Is essentially command the unit for 28 days of the month, but during periods of IDT and AT, they stand back and allow the unit reserve commander to step in and take over command. The continuity in unit management and administration, FTS stability and unit preparedness resulting from this full-time leadership underscores the USMC’s commitment to both their Total Force and RC unit readiness. It also demonstrates their practical approach to resolving day-to-day problems while remaining sensitive to the reservists’ need to command their own units. This program serves as an outstanding example of how full-time leadership in units resolves lower-level FTS friction while enhancing readiness.

The Army should create AGR/AC command billets for selected RC units, from the company through the brigade command level. All company command billets should be designated for AC personnel, and battalion and higher commands should be commanded by AGR officers. This arrangement will not only enhance FTS efficiency and increase unit readiness, but also will integrate AC with AGR officers into one system. By working for and with AGRs, AC personnel will be compelled to modify their negative attitudes toward the RC. Moreover, with experienced AGR officers in command of higher level organizations, many of the morale problems and lack of team work found in recent studies regarding the FTS will be alleviated.

These recommendations will undoubtedly create a large degree of controversy, particularly among reservists and budgeteers. The reservists are likely to believe that such a program would preclude aspiring officers from holding key command positions and ultimately destroy their reserve careers. Budgeteers will argue that an increase in AGR force structure would “bust the budget.” Both of these legitimate concerns, however, can be addressed and

resolved. Reserve command positions would not be eliminated. Under this program, reserve commanders, working in concert with their full-time AC/AGR counterparts in a dual-command system, would continue to serve as unit leaders, with the only difference being that they will serve primarily during periods of IDT and Annual Training. During these reserve duty periods, the AC/AGR commanders, like the USMCR’s I-Is, would step back and merely advise and serve where they can best be used. In the event of disagreements between the RC and AC/AGR commanders, the AC/AGR commander would have the final say. Both officers would have the same rating scheme.

The costs associated with funding these new AGR positions should be offset by a corresponding reduction, and possible elimination, of same rank positions in the aforementioned AC RTTs, RTDs and RGs. Even though funding for AGR and AC officers is derived from two different sources, the overall costs to taxpayers should be nearly offset by corresponding AC reductions.

**RETENTION:**

Retaining quality soldiers in early-deploying RC units is absolutely essential in order to maintain readiness and the overall viability of the RC. Current attrition rates of over 50% of first-term enlistments is both a waste of tax-payers’ money due to lost training funds, and a serious breach in RC unit cohesiveness and ability to accomplish collective wartime METL. Solutions to this serious problem need to address several systemic issues. First, there is currently little advantage or benefit for reserve soldiers to serve in select early deploying RC units where they are expected to work additional hours, sometimes without pay. Tangible benefits must be provided to individuals willing to serve in FSP, CSB and EB units. If the
nation requires the RC to share the responsibility of early deployment with the AC, it also must be willing to adequately compensate this new breed of "Citizen Soldier" and make it worth his/her while. Next, enlistment contracts need to be given "teeth" in order to force compliance and provide commanders with the ability to deal with unit attendance and discipline problems. Finally, going hand-in-hand with increased benefits, standards for participation in selected RC units must be uncompromising and made more demanding.

**Benefits.** In order to enlist the caliber of soldiers necessary for FSP, CSB and EB duty, we must make the expenditures of time and effort worth while. Any costs associated with additional benefits would be significantly offset by the corresponding reduction in wasted training funds wasted due to high attrition. Once a reservist has served successfully with a select RC unit (FSP, CSB or EB) for six months he should be eligible for the following benefits:

- **"Green" Identification Cards.** Provide reserve members of select RC units DD Form 2 (Active) Identification Cards and all associated benefits, including enrollment in Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) and the Army health care system, unlimited use of local commissaries, Overseas Space "A" travel and all other services provided to active personnel by military installation.

- **Bonus Pay.** Provide all select RC unit members with Bonus pay equal to 20 percent of their base pay.

- **Distinctive Headgear.** Provide all unit members with distinctive headgear, or a distinction badge or tab, approved by USARC and National Guard Bureau (NGB) and authorized by HQDA. For example, the tan beret of the now-defunct Alaska Infantry Brigade could be used for all members of Select RC units.
Enlistment Contract/Officer Service Obligation. Current legal documents serving as membership contracts for reserve obligation should be rewritten to include language which obligates individuals to 1 1/2 years active duty service at one of the Army Training Centers (JRTC, NTC, CMTC) should he/she fail to fulfill the membership obligations stipulated in that contract. Furthermore, the individual should understand that this active duty service will be rigorous, e.g. soldiers will be used as OPFOR for ongoing training rotations.

Participation Rules. As mentioned above, RC unit members currently are not considered for elimination from the unit and subsequent involuntary transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve until they have accrued nine U’s (unexcused absences). This Rule should be modified to reduce the number to three for members of select RC units. Moreover, all soldiers should fully understand that “Elimination” does not mean the usual transfer to the IRR, but service at an Army Training Center, possibly as OPFOR, for 1 1/2 years. An increase in benefits and prestige must correspond to increased standards and participation requirements.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS:

Greater reliance is being placed on the reserve components, as typified by the inclusion of RC units into warfighting contingency plans and peacetime operations. The recent use of reserve forces through the PSRC in support of wartime operations, as well as employment of RC personnel in numerous humanitarian, peacekeeping, drug interdiction and domestic crises clearly demonstrates the need for reserves to maintain the capability to serve when required, anywhere in the world.\(^5\)

Reserve Forces Policy Board, January 1995

While tangible improvements have been made in the readiness of Army reserve forces since the inception of Melvin Laird’s Total Force Policy in early 1970s, the basic framework and tenets of how RC units train and prepare for war have remained relatively unchanged. The majority of improvements have been the by-product of an ambitious series of active component programs which have provided, among other things, direct AC involvement in the oversight and hands-on management of RC mission related training. However, age-old problems of insufficient training time, misguided and inefficient full-time staffs and reserve retention problems have changed little in the last 25 years.

The Gulf War clearly demonstrated that Melvin Laird’s concept of Total Force is viable. Combat support and combat service units proved that, with sufficient post-mobilization train-up time and additional equipment and supplies, they could adequately carry out missions prescribed in National Military Strategy. On the other hand, DESERT STORM also showed, in not uncertain terms, that reserve combat arms units were not up to the task. Their failure to meet deployment criteria demonstrated

\(^5\) Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1994, 10.
how incredibly tough it is to train combat maneuver units to standard in only 39 training days per year, no matter how much post-mobilization training is provided or to what level of equipment and resource infusion. Their difficulties essentially refuted the 1980s doctrine of Round Out/Up, in which key ARNG brigades and battalion were counted upon to fill force structure gaps in the active Army force.

Unfortunately, the elation resulting from the Gulf War victory and associated reserve successes was short-lived, as changing geopolitical realities became obvious and new military requirements surfaced. Active Army force structure was reduced by over 35%, the majority of our bases in Europe were closed, and the National Military Strategy changed from one of Containment to one based on Power Projection. This new NMS, based on the demise of the USSR and Cold War, clearly relies on the responsiveness and flexibility of CONUS-based units to deploy quickly to any theater. New Army doctrine resulting from the NMS has had great impact on Army reserves, by increasing their role in future conflicts and broadening the scope of their responsibilities due to MOOTW. Additionally, post Cold War changes resulted in substantially reduced post-mobilization training time and overall deployment time for units designated as early deployers.

While the readiness of Army reserve components has improved over the last 25 years due primarily to Total Force policy enhancements, significant problems remain. These challenges must be remedied with new solutions. If these problems are not addressed honestly and resolved, the RC cannot realistically be expected to meet revised war plan deployment time-lines and counted upon to fulfill NMS directed expectations.


