THE PROLIFERATION OF PEACE OPERATIONS AND U.S. ARMY TACTICAL PROFICIENCY: Will The Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?

A Monograph
By
Major Robert J. Botters, Jr.
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 95-96

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
### Title and Subtitle

The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?

### Author(s)

Major Robert J. Botters, Jr.

### Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)

School of Advanced Military Studies, Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

### Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)

Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

### Abstract (Maximum 200 words)

See Attached

### Subject Terms

- Peace Operations
- Tactical Proficiency

### Security Classification of Report

Unclassified

### Security Classification of This Page

Unclassified

### Security Classification of Abstract

Unclassified

### Number of Pages

64

### Price Code

Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

239-18
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to stay within the lines to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1. **Agency Use Only (Leave blank).**

Block 2. **Report Date.** Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. **Type of Report and Dates Covered.** State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. **Title and Subtitle.** A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. **Funding Numbers.** To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

- **C** - Contract
- **G** - Grant
- **PE** - Program Element
- **PR** - Project
- **TA** - Task
- **WU** - Work Unit
- **Accession No.**

Block 6. **Author(s).** Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. **Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es).** Self-explanatory.

Block 8. **Performing Organization Report Number.** Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es).** Self-explanatory.

Block 10. **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number.** (If known)

Block 11. **Supplementary Notes.** Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. **Distribution/Availability Statement.** Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

- **DOD** - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
- **DOE** - See authorities.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 12b. **Distribution Code.**

- **DOD** - Leave blank.
- **DOE** - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.
- **NASA** - Leave blank.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 13. **Abstract.** Include a brief (Maximum 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. **Subject Terms.** Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. **Number of Pages.** Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. **Price Code.** Enter appropriate price code (NTIS only).

Blocks 17 - 19. **Security Classifications.** Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. **Limitation of Abstract.** This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.
ABSTRACT


In the post Cold War era, the United States Army has undertaken an ever increasing number of operations that are classified under the general heading of peace operations. In order to address the difference in military operations, the Army modified its keystone doctrine for war FM 100-5 and published FM 100-23, Peace Operations. The emergence of a peace operations doctrine implies a fundamental difference in training, organization, and execution between peace operations and traditional warfighting operations. Although both FM 100-5 and FM 100-23 address war and peace operations, they do not address how participation affects tactical units. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has focused it's training on traditional combat operations. However, events of the post Cold War era indicate that tactical units must have the flexibility to do both warfighting and peace operations.

This monograph examines the scope and complexity of peace operations and the effects that these operations have on Army tactical units. It also analyzes the degree to which tactical unit core competencies are reinforced or degraded by preparation for and execution of peace operations. The monograph defines tactical unit core competencies and examines peace operations conducted by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

The conclusions reached in this study suggest that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units. Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations, if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert J. Botters, Jr.

Title of Monograph: The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will The Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?

Approved by:

[Signatures]

William S. Knightly, MMAS
Monograph Director

Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS
Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.
Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 14th Day of December 1995
ABSTRACT


In the post Cold War era, the United States Army has undertaken an ever increasing number of operations that are classified under the general heading of peace operations. In order to address the difference in military operations, the Army modified its keystone doctrine for war FM 100-5 and published FM 100-23, Peace Operations. The emergence of a peace operations doctrine implies a fundamental difference in training, organization, and execution between peace operations and traditional warfighting operations. Although both FM 100-5 and FM 100-23 address war and peace operations, they do not address how participation affects tactical units. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has focused its training on traditional combat operations. However, events of the post Cold War era indicate that tactical units must have the flexibility to do both warfighting and peace operations.

This monograph examines the scope and complexity of peace operations and the effects that these operations have on Army tactical units. It also analyzes the degree to which tactical unit core competencies are reinforced or degraded by preparation for and execution of peace operations. The monograph defines tactical unit core competencies and examines peace operations conducted by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

The conclusions reached in this study suggest that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units. Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations, if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills.
I. INTRODUCTION

...the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995.¹

The dynamic and unpredictable post Cold War environment demands that we maintain military capabilities flexible and responsive enough to cope with unforeseen threats.²...We recognize that peace operations are often different from traditional military operations in the tasks and capabilities they require of our Armed Forces. We are continuing to develop appropriate doctrine and training for these operations. National Military Strategy, 1995.³

In the post Cold War era, the United States Army has undertaken an ever increasing number of operations that can be classified under the general heading of peace operations. The United States National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and the National Military Strategy have embraced these operations in securing the interests of the United States. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti, and peripheral participation in the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) are representative of these operations.

TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-first Century, appears to embrace this role when it states, "...we are entering a new era where war is no longer deemed a productive means of pursuing strategic objectives." ⁴ The U.S. Army has modified it's keystone doctrine for war, Field Manual 100-5 OPERATIONS, to include operations other than war.⁵ The identification of roles other than war is also a subject of contemporary media and academic interests. Samuel Huntington, Eaton Professor of the
Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, notes the United States Armed Forces has a pre-Cold War legacy of participation in operations other than war. What is absent from his analysis is the difference between these pre-Cold War and post-Cold War peace operations.

In order to address this difference in military operations, the Army published Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, in December 1994. Field Manual 100-23 endorses Huntington's assessment, while noting the transformation of peace operations:

Peace operations are not new to the Army... What is new in the number, pace, scope and complexity of recent operations... Commanders must understand the dynamics of peace operations and how actions taken in one operation may affect the success of another.

This doctrine defines peace operations as encompassing three activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Support to diplomacy includes peacemaking, "a process of diplomacy"; peacebuilding, "post conflict actions" and preventative diplomacy, "diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis." Peacekeeping involves "military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties." Peace enforcement is the "application of military force or the threat of it's use... to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions." Peacekeeping implies a low threat of imminent violence to peacekeepers or belligerents. Peace enforcement implies an impartial force must be present to maintain peace.

The emergence of peace operations doctrine implies a fundamental difference in training, organization, and execution, between peace operations and traditional
warfighting operations. Field Manual 100-5 defines the tactical level of war as "... concerned with the execution of battles and engagements", which are executed by maneuver and fires to achieve a specific objective.11 Field Manual 100-23 states: "Peace operations are conducted to reach a resolution by conciliation among competing parties, rather than termination by force. The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peace operations."12 Although U.S. Army doctrine addresses war and peace operations, it does not adequately address how participation in both may affect tactical forces. Traditionally, U.S. Army tactical units focus on combat operations. A primary benchmark of tactical unit readiness in the Army, is the ability to achieve results in combat operations. Accordingly, training at the tactical level places significant emphasis on combat readiness. However, events of the post Cold War era indicate that tactical units must have the flexibility to do both warfighting and peace operations.

The late U.S. Army General (Retired) Maxwell Thurman, former Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, testified before Congress on the impact of peace operations on warfighting readiness. He observed tactical forces involved in peace operations lose collective warfighting skills. In his view, this necessitates extensive post peace operations training "to regain the level of operational proficiency which they held at the outset of that duty."13

Current doctrine is ambiguous concerning the ability of forces to transition from peace operations to warfighting. Field Manual 100-23 states that forces organized for peacekeeping operations in a permissive environment may be inappropriate for peace enforcement operations in a non-permissive environment and vice-versa.14 United States
Army doctrine acknowledges there is no continuum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, one of the tenets of Army operations, versatility, implies forces must be able to operate in a multi-threat environment. "Forces must be prepared to move rapidly from one geographic region to another and from one type of warfare to another in quick succession."  

This monograph examines the special scope and complexity of peace operations and potential detrimental effects that these operations have on Army tactical units. Does the preparation for and execution of peace operations degrade the ability of tactical units to maintain core competencies in warfighting skills? Can tactical units rapidly transition from peace operations to warfighting missions and vice-versa without significant training?  

In order to address these questions a number of historical case studies are examined. These case studies are peace operations conducted by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. This monograph analyzes tactical operations in Northern Ireland, the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.  

Canada and the United Kingdom have unique national experiences in the conduct of peace operations. The British have twenty six years of continuous peace operations experience in Northern Ireland, and extensive experience in conducting peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. The British Army has participated in UNPROFOR since 1992. Canada has participated in every United Nations peacekeeping mission since 1957. It also provided peacekeeping forces to UNPROFOR. These experiences provide an opportunity to observe the long-term or cumulative effect of participation in peacekeeping operations.
on tactical forces.

The U.S. Army's entry in peace operations is divergent from both British and Canadian experiences. Absent a tradition of participation in modern peace operations, the U.S. Army entered peace operations as a post combat operation during OPERATION DESERT STORM. This monograph will analyze OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia for effects of recent peace operations on U.S. tactical forces.

Evidence is presented in the next four chapters. Chapter II examines tactical unit core competencies in warfighting skills. Tactical unit core competencies involve multiple elements performing a sequence of specific warfighting skills to accomplish a mission. The chapter explains current U.S. Army training doctrine, how core competencies are identified, trained, sustained, and measured. Chapter III describes the Canadian perspective on peace operations and answers the question: does the preparation and execution of peace operations degrade the ability of units to maintain core competencies in warfighting skills? Although the Canadian Army has not participated in a major combat operation since World War II, it does possess over thirty-five years of United Nations and multi-lateral peace operations experience. Additionally, Canada's participation in the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) demonstrates the emerging complexity of post Cold War peace operations.

Chapter IV examines the British conduct of peace operations in Northern Ireland and UNPROFOR to determine the effects participation in peace operations have on warfighting skills of British tactical forces. As NATO allies, the Canadian, British, and U.S. Army share a common doctrine for tactical warfighting operations. NATO
standardization agreements have insured the interoperability of forces for combined arms operations. To execute common doctrine requires common core competencies in warfighting skills. This linkage between US and NATO core competencies allows the U.S. Army to apply lessons learned from allied experiences in complex, modern, peace operations. Chapter V examines recent United States efforts in peace operations. The Somalia case analysis is an example of tactical forces transitioning between peace and warfighting operations. The analysis will focus on the first six months of Operation Restore Hope and effects on tactical forces core competencies. Chapter VI synthesizes the analysis from previous chapters and presents conclusions.
II. Training Core Competencies

Training is the cornerstone of readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense. Training is the means by which the Army's quality soldiers and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in combat. Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in war - The Army's basic mission.16

The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is successful application of warfighting skills.17

Tactical units train to maintain individual and collective core competencies in warfighting skills. The U.S. Army identifies core competencies as mission essential tasks. A mission essential task is "a collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission."18 Units identify mission essential tasks from war plans, contingency plans, and external training directives which support an organization's wartime mission.19 While contingency plans are instrumental in determining essential tasks, external directives specify component tasks that relate to the essential tasks. Battle Drills and Mission Training Plans (MTP) are external directives which facilitate training under a general category of warfighting operation. These categories of warfighting operations are not similar between combat arms or the next higher headquarters. Furthermore, potential tasks required of units in combat is too expansive to allow proficiency in every task.20 The Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force lists fifty-three mission essential tasks as critical operations. Therefore, tactical unit commanders determine the tasks/core competencies essential for units to accomplish wartime missions and narrow their training focus accordingly.21 The U.S. Army standardizes training to achieve
proficiency in warfighting skills throughout the force. The principles of the U.S. Army training model are leader training, individual training, and collective training. The goal of standardized training is to develop competent, warfighting leaders, soldiers proficient in warfighting skills, and combat effective units.

After unit commanders identify their mission essential tasks and unit training plan, leader and individual training is planned on those skills determined necessary to accomplish these tasks. The standardized individual training objective is to ensure soldiers achieve warfighting proficiency in critical tasks. Leader core competency is achieved through training in individual tasks, tactical exercises without troops, battle simulations, and collective training exercises.\(^\text{22}\) Regardless of duty or military occupational specialty (MOS), deployed soldiers are subject to hostile activity. Individual training prepares soldiers to "fight, survive and win in combat."\(^\text{23}\)

Training individual tasks to standard and relating individual training to collective mission essential tasks is crucial. Soldiers must be trained to standard, once trained, they must maintain this proficiency. This responsibility is shared by the soldier and the noncommissioned officers within his unit.\(^\text{24}\) External directives such as MOS specific soldiers manuals identify critical individual tasks which support unit missions. The Army's Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks identifies ninety-nine additional individual tasks which are applicable to all soldiers. Individual training is the foundation of effective combat training for units. Individual proficiency in warfighting skills "increases the competence of each soldier and contributes to the development of an efficient unit."\(^\text{25}\)
Collective Training

Effective training molds human and material resources into cohesive, combat ready units.\textsuperscript{26} Although the Army recruits individuals, it fights as units.\textsuperscript{27}

"Collective training involves the interaction of multiple elements rather than a single element or individual."\textsuperscript{28} Collective training is conducted at all echelons from squad to corps. Proficiency in core warfighting skills at each echelon is predicated upon subordinate unit proficiency in critical combat tasks. Collective tasks are inherently difficult to train and sustain adequate warfighting proficiency. Collective warfighting skills are oriented on combined arms training, "Army doctrine requires combined arms and services teamwork...Combined arms proficiency develops when teams train together."\textsuperscript{29} Combined arms are defined as the application of several arms, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation.\textsuperscript{30} Integration of different combat arms is not the only constraint on achieving proficiency in warfighting skills. Personnel turnover in leader and key individual positions necessitate recurring sustainment training to overcome loss of task proficiency. Standardization of collective training reduces this stress on units. External training directives facilitate a commander's training program to achieve collective proficiency in warfighting skills.

Battle drills and mission training plans are the linkage between identification of critical, core combat tasks, and training tasks to standard for both small and large units. Battle drills are collective actions involving a set of "core drills" for squads, sections, and platoons. Drills are "initiated on cue, such as an enemy action or leader's order and
are a trained response.\textsuperscript{31} These actions train core individual, leader, and collective tasks deemed critical, by the Army, for success in combat.\textsuperscript{32} Crew drills are core "collective actions that the crew of a weapon or a piece of equipment must perform to use the weapon or equipment successfully in combat."\textsuperscript{33} Weapon systems requiring crew drill within an infantry or armor battalion include machine gun teams, mortar crews, Bradley fighting vehicle crews, and tank crews. Cannon artillery, air defense artillery, and aviation units execute similar drills as members of the combined arms team.

Mission training plans (MTP) are "descriptive training documents which provide units a clear description of what and how to train to achieve wartime proficiency."\textsuperscript{34} Mission training plans facilitate training of large units in warfighting operations.

Warfighting operations are defined as:

...a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; and the process of carrying on combat to include movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.\textsuperscript{35}

The MTP for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force identifies five critical warfighting operations with fifty three critical tasks. While the MTP for the next higher headquarters identifies three warfighting operations and seventy two critical tasks.\textsuperscript{36} Each operation requires training core subtasks to achieve and sustain proficiency in warfighting skills and missions. Achieving proficiency depends on the quality of training and the frequency of training. The US Army recognizes "...procedural proficiency is lost faster than proficiency on tasks requiring cognitive skills."\textsuperscript{37} The key to retaining individual, leader, and collective proficiency in warfighting skills is
sustainment training.

**Sustainment Training**

The cornerstone of the Army Training and Evaluation Program is the concept of sustaining proficiency. Training to sustain and retain proficiency in core warfighting competencies is an ongoing process. Experience has shown that proficiency is retained through repetitive training in collective tasks. Factors affecting retention of proficiency are length between training periods, difficulty of tasks being trained, and personnel turnover.

In 1982, the U.S. Army Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) sought to determine "the quantities and type of munitions for soldiers, crews, and units to attain and sustain weapons proficiency." This effort also identified the frequency of training determined necessary to sustain proficiency in warfighting skills. Sophisticated weapons systems necessitate training events are evenly spaced throughout the year. Mechanized infantry, armor, and cannon artillery crews, require monthly gunnery training and biannual gunnery livefire exercises. These STRAC standards combined with evaluation outlines in MTP's provide unit commanders a common standard for sustaining and measuring proficiency in warfighting skills.

In 1987, the U.S. Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) began a study of effects of unit training before and after rotations to combat training centers such as the National Training Center (NTC), Ft. Irwin, California. The ARI findings indicate that units often returned to the NTC without the post rotation proficiency achieved within the last year. Orientation on other missions between
rotations led ARI to warn once units achieved proficiency in critical warfighting skills "...they must be provided with opportunities to practice skills and tasks to sustain that level of performance." But how is proficiency measured?

**Measuring Unit Core Competencies**

Core competencies are measured both objectively and subjectively utilizing external directives and unit commanders' assessments. Weapons qualification and gunnery scores provide objective measurement. For large units mission training plans list standards that must be met for each critical task. In small units battle and crew drill execution standards are the standard for measurement. Objective evaluations can be both an internal or external function. Internal evaluations are inherent in training at all levels, while external evaluations are conducted by the unit's higher headquarters.

Subjective measurement of core competencies remain with the unit commander. ARI noted in it's study *Determinants of Effective Unit Performance*:

No single or even a few unit tasks can be selected as a focus for objective measurement; instead there are tens of complicated missions...involving hundreds of tasks performed at numerous echelons from infantry fire teams and squads through platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, possibly corps and theater Army. There is so much to measure that experienced military judgement has provided the only practical basis for estimating unit capability and training needs.  

This is exemplified in the difficulty in objectively measuring leadership and unit cohesion. Both are intangible qualities critical to combat success. Experience shows both indicators are best determined by experienced unit commanders. The commander's assessment, as the final determinant of a unit's ability to conduct warfighting operations, is recorded in the Unit Status Report (USR). The USR is
"designed to measure the status of resources and training of a unit at a given point in
time." 43 The commander's subjective analysis is not determined in isolation of objective
measurement. However, the subjective assessment recorded in the USR "allows senior
decision makers to judge the employability and deployability of reporting
units." 44

The paradox confronting the Army is how to evaluate emerging tasks in peace
operations. Emerging doctrine implies new training requirements. With only limited
experience in modern peace operations, where can the Army evaluate the potential
effects of training these new requirements on requirements to sustain warfighting skills?
An examination of peace operations conducted by both the US and allied armies provide
some utility in answering the question.
III. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Environment

Canadian forces have extensive experience in the conduct of peace operations. Canadian Army Major General (retired) Lewis Mackenzie notes, "Canada has participated in every UN peacekeeping mission and has supported a number of non-UN missions, such as the multinational observer force in the Sinai Desert, two missions in Indochina and Vietnam, and the European Community's military monitor mission in the former Yugoslavia." The involvement of Canada in peacekeeping originated during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Lester Pearson, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposed replacing British and French forces in the canal zone with lightly armed UN peacekeepers. This served two functions, first it potentially reduced tensions in the region, and second, it removed the threat of superpower confrontation. This was perceived in Canada's interest considering the geographic proximity to the United States and Russia. Subsequently, "peacekeeping has been acknowledged as a cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defense policy."

Canadian objectives in peace operations have been summarized as:

To help prevent the escalation of regional conflicts to the point where they might involve the superpowers militarily and thus present a threat to global peace and security, including the national security of Canada; to help attenuate the socio-economic effects and the human suffering engendered by war; and to support the United Nations as a multilateral institution for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

The Canadian experience in peace operations matured throughout the Cold War. During this period, Canadian peace operations were conducted in permissive
environments requiring combat forces without conducting warfighting operations.

Permissive environments are defined as requiring:

...consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political agreement.\textsuperscript{49}

Peace operations conducted in Cyprus, Sinai, and the Golan Heights were paradigms of what became referred to as traditional peace operations.

**Preparation**

In 1989 Canadian soldiers were deployed on eight traditional peace operations. Three of these operations required company or battalion sized elements.\textsuperscript{50} Once committed to a peace operation, the Canadians executed a standard training and deployment model, developed through years of orientation on permissive environments. Units would begin planning for scheduled rotations six months before deployment, with an area specific, ninety day training period prior to movement. Training focused on individual or specialized warfighting skills, not the collective training required for combined arms operations. After a six month rotation, units required six to seven months for post operations recovery to include administrative requirements, training, and requalification on traditional warfighting skills.\textsuperscript{51}

The effect of over extension on peace operations further complicates pre-deployment training at the tactical level. The diverse nature of these missions preclude a formal evaluated training structure. Tactical forces preparing for rotational peace operations receive some mission-specific training requirements. The Canadian Forces Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations provides the requirements, yet the rotational unit
commander provides his own assessment of pre-rotational training readiness. This is more appropriate for units assigned to scheduled rotations, or missions in a permissive environment, not an immediate deployment to a non-permissive environment. The non-permissive environment in the Former Yugoslavia has created disorder in the Canadian view of traditional peace operations.

**Traditional Environments**

Canadian participation in the United Nations Force in Cyprus became symbolic of Canada’s commitment to traditional peace operations. From 1964 to 1993 almost all Canadian combat arms soldier served in Cyprus, some five or six tours during their careers. However, this mission required forces organized as infantry. Participating armor and artillery units incurred a significant post deployment training period to reacquire small unit and battalion warfighting proficiency.

Current Canadian force structure does not facilitate commitment to long duration peace operations. After a military draw down in 1991, Canada’s Army organized as three brigade groups, eliminating the division as a tactical organization. These brigade groups are structured as combined arms teams with armor, artillery, infantry and engineers. Combat support and combat service support formerly at division are within the brigade group. Canada’s NATO commitment, formerly forward deployed in Germany, is now a Canada based force of one brigade group.

**The Canadian Experience in UNPROFOR**

"No language can describe adequately the condition of that large portion of the Balkan peninsula-Serbia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and other provinces-political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit...hatred of all races,
animosities of rival religions and absence of any controlling power...nothing short of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in these parts." 

The comments of British Prime Minister Disraeli before the House of Lords over one hundred years ago are still applicable. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the subsequent UNPROFOR mission have changed the traditional view of peace operations.

Recognizing conditions were not appropriate for traditional peace operations, the United Nations authorized a military and diplomatic liaison team to prepare for possible deployment of a peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 21 February 1992, established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an "interim arrangement to create conditions of peace and security for twelve months." Initially, UNPROFOR deployed to protect Serbian communities in Croatia. To reduce ethnic tensions in Bosnia, UNPROFOR's headquarters was established in Sarajevo. This decision would inadvertently create conditions for establishing a UN peace operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. On 6 April 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina as a sovereign nation and multi-ethnic civil war followed.

Environment

Forces assigned to UNPROFOR in 1992, found the environment in the former Yugoslavia more complex than traditional peace operations. For the first time, the United Nations intervened in a civil war without the consent of all warring parties. Territorial boundaries did not reduce ethnic conflict, rather it exacerbated the crisis in
both Croatia and Bosnia. Within Croatia, Serbian communities desired affiliation with the Serb republic. In Bosnia, the Croat community looked to Croatia for protection from both a Muslim government and separatist Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government looked to West Europe and United Nations for protection from perceived designs of both Croatia and Serbia. While the Bosnian Serb community sought an independent Serbian state affiliated with the Serbian Republic. The localized animosity between ethnic populations could improve or deteriorate without warning. Deployed forces were incapable of alleviating these conditions. Units participating in UNPROFOR would change the traditional view of peace operations.

Canada organized for UNPROFOR duty in Croatia in 1992 assuming a traditional peace operation. UNPROFOR's priority for deployment of UN forces into Croatia were to combat support and combat service support units. The intent was to establish a communications and logistic infrastructure before the arrival of a multi-national military mission.

Canadian task organization consisted of a combat engineer regiment and one infantry battalion, not deployed as a combined arms task force. The engineers were to conduct counter-mine operations throughout Croatia. The Canadian infantry battalion was to conduct traditional peacekeeping operations, protecting the Serbian minority in Croatia. Furthermore, the infantry battalion organized as two large companies, not the five companies, fifteen armored personnel carriers, and reconnaissance element requested by the United Nations. 57 This reorganization occurred prior to the unit's notification for deployment from home station in Germany. The infantry battalion
reorganized with an infantry company from another regiment. Reorganizing with an active duty company avoided challenges inherent in assimilating reservists, yet the battalion would not conduct extensive collective training before deployment.

As conditions in Croatia continued to deteriorate before deployment, Canada recognized the necessity to deploy its contingent as a combat force with eighty three armored personnel carriers, heavy weapons, and additional ammunition. Here the paradigm of traditional peace operations began to transition to warfighting operations. The United Nations was oriented on traditional peace operations and concerned the task organization appeared to present an offensive force thus inappropriate for UNPROFOR. Canada deployed the equipment for force protection. The equipment would also provide flexibility for transitioning between peace and warfighting operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Upon arrival in Croatia, both infantry companies would receive indirect artillery and mortar fire, removing any pretense of a traditional peace operations environment.

**Execution**

Canadian task organization and mission changed with the surrender of the Sarajevo Airport to UNPROFOR by the former Yugoslavian Army and Bosnian Serb forces. In order to promptly secure the airport UNPROFOR required a credible military force in Bosnia. The Canadian infantry battalion, initially deployed for traditional peacekeeping in Croatia repositioned over 300 kilometers to Sarajevo.

The environment required another modification to the task organization. The Canadian battalion retained the two company structure, deployed TOW missile systems,
mortars, and a combat engineer company from the engineer regiment in Croatia.

Tactical missions while assigned to UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo, were unlike traditional peace operations. The priority for the Canadian forces were twofold: secure the Sarajevo Airport to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure safe movement of humanitarian aid from the airport. This movement required the infantry to establish security corridors between the airport and city. The engineer company's priorities at the airport were counter-mine operations, mobility, and survivability.61

Canadian movement to Sarajevo proved difficult requiring a show of force to pass Bosnian Serb road blocks. In Sarajevo, the Canadian forces conducted operations as a tactical combat force rather than a traditional peace operation. Airport security, escort security for humanitarian assistance, and security for Bosnian government officials utilizing the airport, were not traditional peace operations. Additionally, Canadian tactical forces engaged in anti-sniper operations throughout the city.62

UNPROFOR's mandate was not the cessation of hostilities within Bosnia or Sarajevo. This would adversely effect tactical units in Bosnia. Impartiality demonstrated by tactical units to violence conducted between Bosnian Serb and government forces was considered inaction by the Bosnian government. Canadian and UN forces could not defuse civil misperceptions solely through the delivery of aid. This civil dissatisfaction should not be considered a measurement of tactical proficiency. It is possible, a prompt, hard, diplomatic response may have precluded the deterioration of conditions, and salvaged UNPROFOR's reputation.63
Effect on Core Competencies

The preparation for peace operations in permissive environments did not allow a rapid transition to a non-permissive, complex peace operations environment. Organized and deployed for traditional peace operations in Croatia. The Canadian contingent was only capable of executing traditional warfighting operations after modifying the task organization to include TOW missiles, mortars, and engineers.

The senior tactical commander in Sarajevo would recommend that future peace operations task organization include combined arms to avoid reorganization once deployed. Major General Mackenzie suggests the balance between combat task organization for peace operations is tenuous. As the first UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo commander, MG Mackenzie cautions the balance must rely less on offensive capability and more on force protection. He states, "I am hesitant to ask for the equipment for fighting a battle in a peacekeeping operation, because it would make it look as though we were going to take a side." The assessment is flawed if one considers operational mandates and environments will change. Assets must be present for flexibility to transition from one environment to another.

Recent Effects of Participation in Peace Operations on Tactical Units

Canada recognized over-commitment to peace operations as the causal factor in detrimental effects upon Canadian tactical force warfighting skills. In 1992 elements from each of the three brigades were supporting UN peace operations. Although the total unit strength equalled one brigade group, the units were not organized as a brigade. The forces deployed included: an infantry battalion and engineer regiment in Croatia, an
infantry battalion and engineer squadron in Bosnia; an infantry battalion, reconnaissance squadron and some engineer elements in Somalia; a battalion in Cyprus; logistic elements in Cambodia, and the Golan Heights, and engineers in Kuwait.\textsuperscript{66}

Over-commitment to peace operations is an operational and tactical concern for the Canadian Army. These deployments placed the Army, "at the maximum limit of its expeditionary capability for formed units."\textsuperscript{67} Although the Canadian Army could continue operations with units rotated from Canada, additional taskings would require troops to return to peace operations within six months. Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain warned that additional UN commitments," would interfere with the training process that allows us to remain professional. We must allow a minimum of one year for troops between taskings."\textsuperscript{68}

Over-commitment, combined with reduced budgeting, and downsizing has limited collective training above the battalion group during the last four years. From 1991 to July 1995, there were no brigade group level training exercises.\textsuperscript{69} Training is funded for battalion groups preparing to deploy on peace operations.

Another impact of extended Canadian peace operations on tactical units has been the activation of reservists to meet personnel requirements since 1992. In 1993, thirty percent of forces in Bosnia were reservists. Major General Mackenzie states this is practical only in low-threat environments. His comments are based on the necessity for cohesion among units deployed in higher threat peace operations. He emphasizes units with reservists can not achieve adequate cohesion without one year of unit training. As evidenced by General de Chastelain's comments, tactical units do not have this luxury,
nor is training for peace operations focused at the collective level. The recent experiences of the 2d battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry substantiate this observation. The 2d PPCLI deployed to Croatia in 1993 with reservists comprising 42 percent of its total strength. This became more significant when applied to the rifle companies. Rifle companies were approximately sixty-five percent reservists. The inclusion of reservists necessitates that Canadian pre-deployment training is for the greater part a review of individual skills.

The significant impact for the Canadian Army is that units are training for peace operations. These units are not meeting "the requirement to maintain the combined arms team: armor, artillery, infantry, and engineers with all the combat service support that is required." These effects on tactical units has resulted in a Canadian Senate report suggesting: "It may be Canadians need to fortify themselves against the argument that something must be done in all the conflict situations around the world."
IV. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Environment

It was not the same as Cyprus and Aden, and the ordinary soldier, and perhaps the Army as a whole, were not prepared for the type of internal policing which they had to carry out. There was no defined enemy. Soldiers who had been trained to kill found that in Ulster they had to become diplomats. One minute they might be patrolling a Roman Catholic Area, the next a Protestant area and their task of impartiality was always a difficult one.74

The internal security operation in Northern Ireland represents twenty-six years of participation in peace operations for the British armed forces. The operation has required the efforts of over 300,000 military personnel since August 1969.75 On 14 August 1969, The British Home Secretary announced the commitment of the British Army:

The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland has been instructed to take all necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore law and order, troops will be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished. This is a limited operation and during it the troops will remain in direct and exclusive control of the General Officer Commanding, who will be responsible to the United Kingdom Government...76

Only three battalions were garrisoned in Northern Ireland when peace operations commenced. Rapid introduction of tactical forces did not facilitate transitioning soldiers from a conventional warfighting orientation to peace operations. The British Army paradigm of colonial experience in urban areas did not provide utility for forces committed to Northern Ireland. The limited training tactical forces possessed was oriented to defeat rioting in colonies where forces formed ranks, warned the crowd to disperse, and opened fire if required.77 In Northern Ireland, soldiers found themselves positioned between two equally dangerous elements within their own nation.
The Army recognized two objectives, "One was to defeat the terrorists, the other was to create a political structure which would allow the province to be governed normally." The first objective would be met through the increased presence of soldiers in the region. This lessened the initial violence, but did not conditions contributing to long term civil order. Subsequently, the Army was no longer able to "avoid confrontation by rational discussion."

"The first units sent to Northern Ireland were able to deal with the riot disorders reasonably well." These forces were deployed to Northern Ireland from home station in England and operational assignments abroad. When the escalation of violence included exchange of small arms fire with soldiers "it became obvious that the situation was deadly serious and would require special and concentrated training." In 1972, 129 soldiers and police were killed. These conditions and lessons learned were to contribute to a revised assessment of the mission. The "Army knew it was committed to a long hard campaign...and had seen the situation change from communal disturbances to a terrorist offensive." In the absence of an adequate peace operations doctrine, the army developed tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the environment and political conditions of Northern Ireland.

Preparation

Initial forces were "rushed out at little or no notice as both the Government and the military merely reacted to events." Experience showed that units required specialized training and reorganization before being sent to Northern Ireland. In 1972, Northern Ireland Training Teams (NITATS) were developed to transition forces from a
warfighting organization to a force organized for peace operations in an urban environment.\textsuperscript{86}

It has been difficult to transfer tactical lessons learned in Northern Ireland to traditional warfighting operations as a conventional force. The transition between warfighting operations to peace operations on tactical units is evidenced in the collective skills and rules of engagement determined necessary to operate in Northern Ireland. Tactical units must demonstrate proficiency in five main collective tasks: collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence; modified techniques for patrolling in urban and rural areas, checkpoint and roadblock operations, individual weapon proficiency, and drills for riot control.\textsuperscript{87}

**Organization**

The command and control of tactical units are unlike that found elsewhere in the British Army. A brigade in Northern Ireland is not organized as a combined arms force, nor involved in conduct of tactical operations. The brigade commander provides "policy for several independent commands in his area...much more in the business of management and co-ordination than command."\textsuperscript{88} The brigade's operational area is divided among regiments, battalions, or companies.\textsuperscript{89}

The majority of forces assigned to Northern Ireland are infantry battalions, or other combat arms units organized as infantry battalions. In September 1994, there were eighteen units assigned to Northern Ireland; six garrison battalions, six infantry battalions serving tours of thirty months, and six battalions serving emergency tours. The later include battalions of the Royal Artillery, Royal Armored Corps, and Royal
Marines, serving as infantry. Emergency tours have extended from four and one half to six month tours.

Although the command structure at the battalion level remains the same, "battalion and platoon commanders have had fewer demands put upon them in the peculiar circumstances of Ulster." These same conditions however, have been the proving ground for company commanders and noncommissioned officers throughout the British Army.

**Training**

Pre-deployment training and unit reorganization begin six months before each rotation. Additionally, replaced units will reorganize and conduct post deployment training for a similar period. Army units not assigned to Northern Ireland have habitually provided soldiers to fill personnel shortages for rotating forces.

Training does not focus on combined arms or technical training of specialized support units. An infantry officer stationed in Northern Ireland complained, "The last time we did a battalion attack? I simply can't remember. That may be military history or even a military secret!" Branch immaterial, collective training is conducted in three stages. The first stage involves individual training in basic infantry skills including: marksmanship and patrolling. The second stage is located at a training facility resembling the area units are scheduled to occupy during a rotation. This involves situational exercises to stress junior leaders in the conduct of patrols. The third stage exposes company commanders to situational exercises resembling actions encountered during previous rotations.
Execution

The province of Northern Ireland is divided into operational areas with forces assigned to assist civil authorities in "containing disorder and terrorism." These areas are both rural and urban, with Company commanders having significant responsibility in deploying "approximately 100 men over large areas to keep the peace." One company commanders's area of responsibility had a population of 25,000 civilians. Experience has shown that the best method for keeping this peace is by maintaining a visible presence through the use of constant patrols. The conduct of patrols in Northern Ireland serves two functions "domination of the ground so as to deny enemy freedom of movement and secondly, to get to know the area intimately in order to build up a detailed knowledge of the area and its inhabitants."

Patrolling in urban areas is modified to cover more area and reduce the target size for terrorists. This results in junior noncommissioned officers having increased authority and responsibility in Northern Ireland. Corporals lead four man patrols on the streets of urban areas and are often required to execute actions not normally within their traditional level of authority. One battalion commander commented, "the average age of my battalion is 21. We are a young army and we are fighting a corporal's war."

Patrolling is extensive in rural areas as well, especially along the border with Ireland. Unlike urban areas, rural patrols are conducted within traditional small unit warfighting parameters to include aviation support.

Patrols are debriefed by the company commander, with the overall collection effort directed by the battalion intelligence officer. While an urban patrol might engage
a suspected terrorist in conversation on the street, a rural patrol might continue the
conversation with the suspect's family later. This effort is intended to keep the terrorists
off balance and aware of overt surveillance.\textsuperscript{104}

**Effect on Core Competencies**

The peace operation in Northern Ireland has significant tactical effects. Tactical
effects on initial units may best be summarized:

In 1969 when the Army moved onto the streets, the common military and
political, view was that the crisis would be resolved by the deterrence of the use of
force; by the use of force, particularly lethal force; and by the reassurance which the
presence of the Army would give. Placed in such a situation, however, the soldier was
under extreme pressure. He was continually reacting to events, to natural pressure from
the people, or from terrorists. There was no clear guidance, and soon he saw that all his
activities were ineffective other than in a very local sense. This applied to all ranks,
from the GOC down to the section level.\textsuperscript{105}

This would suggest that units can not rapidly transition from warfighting
operations to peace operations without significant training. The British Army recognized
these limitations and established the rules of conduct for forces assigned to Northern
Ireland, command and control structures, pre-deployment, and post deployment training,
to prepare soldiers for the environment. Royal engineers, responsible for bomb disposal
and search teams in the British Army, can not cover every Northern Ireland request.
Therefore, units scheduled for rotation must organize and train soldiers as ammunition
technicians prior to deployment.\textsuperscript{106}

The high requirement for infantry battalions has become a force structure issue
within the British Army. Specifically, the preponderance of Britain's Army is infantry.
Routinely, more than twenty percent of Britain’s infantry force is assigned to Northern
Ireland. Additionally, the Army has become stretched through commitments to Northern Ireland, NATO, and the UN. A House of Commons has recognized the problem of "overstretch in the Army, and infantry in particular" as the British Army transitions to a smaller force. The report notes, "even the principal elite forces of the Army are so committed...that they have difficulty in preparing for their wartime role of even meeting the required levels of readiness and availability." In addition to concerns for infantry, the government notes there is a "detrimental effect on primary role training of using armoured or artillery regiments to meet one emergency tour slot in Northern Ireland."\(^{107}\)

The preparation for and execution of peace operations in Northern Ireland degrades the ability of tactical units to maintain collective core competencies in warfighting skills. However, the effect on tactical forces has proved positive at the small unit level.\(^ {108}\) Participation in peace operations has done much to enhance the maturation of junior leadership. Company commanders and junior noncommissioned officers have gained invaluable experience in near combat conditions in Northern Ireland.

In her analysis of cohesion as a force multiplier, U.S. Army sociologist Dr. Nora Stewart attributes British tactical success in the Falklands to unit cohesion developed during tours in Northern Ireland.\(^ {109}\) The importance of cohesion for tactical forces is that "cohesive units are better able to withstand the deprivation and stress of the battlefield than noncohesive units."\(^ {110}\) Although units participating in the Falkland Islands War did not rapidly transition from Northern Ireland to combat, seven battalions had Northern Ireland experience within two years of the conflict. Two Royal Army and one Royal Marine battalion had concluded peace operations tours in Northern Ireland within
the previous twelve months.¹¹¹ This is significant as the British Army does not experience the personnel turnover in units realized by the United States Army. These units retain the cohesion developed during difficult tours and assignments.

**The United Kingdom's Experience in UNPROFOR**

Bosnia was a very unique area, and the task equally unique. There was no template to be drawn from my experiences in the Army and the easy solution of 'it has worked somewhere, so it will work here' was clearly a non-starter. It wasn't a task the British Army had done before.¹¹²

As the second British battalion commander in Bosnia, Colonel Duncan's comments echo those of earlier commanders in Northern Ireland. The assessment of his battalion group's mission in Bosnia reinforces an appreciation for the complexity of non-traditional peace operations. Although deployed as a peacekeeping force, Colonel Duncan's battalion was compelled to use force over 69 times.¹¹³

**Preparation**

The United Kingdom offered forces to the United Nations to support the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia, not as a force to separate belligerents.¹¹⁴ The British Army did not possess a point of reference for commitment of forces to an incomplete UN headquarters, and established a UK operational headquarters in Croatia.¹¹⁵ This allowed the British contingent to execute operations without excessive UNPROFOR guidance. Furthermore it allowed UNHCR to task the British contingent (BRITIFOR) for assistance without consulting UNPROFOR.¹¹⁶
Organization

For this mission the British contingent did not deploy with UN task organization limitations. The BRITFOR initially deployed a battalion group consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion equipped with the Warrior fighting vehicle, engineers, logistical and ordnance support. The infantry battalion included twenty-four Milan anti-tank missile launchers and 82mm mortars. The British avoided the debate over task organization, as the Canadians had proven the utility of armored vehicles in Sarajevo. The Canadian assessment of "Noise impresses, size impresses, and numbers impress," negated concerns that the Warrior is an inappropriate vehicle for use on humanitarian missions. The debate may have more merit had the conditions been permissive and in keeping with traditional peace operations. The task organization was deemed appropriate after UNPROFOR lost two soldiers to direct fire while on convoy escort duty.118

Training

Pre-deployment operations for the initial British battalion groups were hindered by the absence of information on the area of operations and mission. These were Germany based units, tasked to conduct simultaneous, planning, reconnaissance, and training prior to deployment. Pre-deployment training was facilitated by the British 1st Armoured Division and the Army’s Training Organization in Germany which produced a tailored, tactical training plan for the battalion. Individual training efforts did not diverge from traditional warfighting skills; medical training, gunnery, and physical fitness.119

Collective training included Warrior gunnery and sniper training. The
significance of Warrior gunnery training included the first live fire exercise for many in the British contingent. The absence of information concerning conditions and combatants in the battalion operating area however, did not facilitate development of "combined arms field training" appropriate for the combined arms nature of the operation.\textsuperscript{120} Collective tactical exercises concluded with convoy operations, anti-ambush drills, route clearance and security, anti-sniper training, and dealing with the media.\textsuperscript{121}

**Execution**

The initial British Territorial Area of Responsibility (TAOR) covered 180 kilometers by 40 kilometers and included eighty five percent of the primary aid route in central Bosnia.\textsuperscript{122} UNPROFOR Headquarters assigned missions to provide escorts for the UNHCR aid convoys through the area of responsibility, and provide assistance to endangered people as required.\textsuperscript{123} To facilitate convoy movement, the BRITFOR created the conditions necessary for movement of aid. To preclude interference with British operations, and provide for force protection, battalion commanders informed all warring factions that BRITFOR would promptly respond to any personnel or mission threat.

Similar to operations in Northern Ireland, the battalion would assign company commanders local areas of responsibility and encourage active involvement in local negotiations. Patrols were conducted by platoons for route reconnaissance, convoy escort, and to gather intelligence. The coordinated effort allowed the battalion to anticipate areas requiring additional efforts to maintain conditions favorable for the delivery of aid. This resulted in all 923 UN convoys passing through the TAOR successfully delivering aid.\textsuperscript{124}
Effects on Core Competencies

The cumulative effects of peace operations on British core warfighting competencies in the non-traditional environment of Bosnia would appear less than those identified in Northern Ireland. Forces assigned to operations in Bosnia are operating within their standard organization, to include command and control structures. The single greatest factor contributing to degradation of collective and individual competencies is the "lack of ranges and training aids to practice individual and crew served weapon firing, prevent[ing] individuals and units from maintaining their pre-deployment standards." The initial battalion group deployed without adequate proficiency on the Warrior fighting vehicle. These forces had not developed the imbedded skills necessary to achieve or sustain proficiency on the weapon system.

The British efforts in Bosnia suggest tactical forces organized for combat, are prepared to operate in non-traditional, non-permissive, peace operations environments. After his rotation, Colonel Duncan stated: "I believe that if you train for a high intensity operation and get it right, you can step down to anything else." The British conduct of operations in Bosnia would also suggest tactical units can transition between peace operations and warfighting operations if organized and equipped for warfighting operations.
V. The United States Army in Somalia

Environment

"[OPERATION] RESTORE HOPE was conducted in that twilight area between peace and war—an environment of political anarchy, with no Somali government or normal state institutions, and an unprecedented United Nations Chapter VII mandate authorizing peace enforcement by all means necessary."\(^{128}\)

This assessment by General Hoar, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, defined the environment which introduced the U.S. Army to the complexity of modern peace operations. The United States intervened in Somalia to protect humanitarian relief efforts from interference by warring clans and banditry. These conditions transcended traditional peacekeeping operations and exceeded the level of UN or allied expertise in peace operations. The United States intervention would be an attempt to achieve stability, creating conditions favorable for the United Nations to assume the mission. This intent was announced on 4 December 1992, by Secretary of Defense Cheney: "We believe it necessary to send in U.S. forces to provide U.S. leadership to get the situation stabilized and return it to a state where the normal U.N. peacekeeping forces can deal with the circumstances."\(^{129}\)

United States Army tactical preparation began with a warning order 30 December 1992. On 3 December 1992, the 10th Mountain Division (L) received notification it would become the Army Force Headquarters (ARFOR). Division movement on began 7 December 1992. The Joint Task Force headquarters, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit, directed the Marines ashore in Somalia on 9 December, with Army forces directed to arrive on 12 December, seven days ahead of schedule.\(^{130}\) The ARFOR area of
operations, southwestern Somalia, was recognized as "the center of the famine belt" while native Somalis in the region constituted "...a medieval civilization armed with twentieth century weapons." Further complicating efforts was the vastness of the area. At one time, the ARFOR area of responsibility covered an area extending 500 miles from Belet Un to Kismayo, encompassing 21,000 sq. miles. Unlike traditional UN peace operations involving a battalion or brigade group, the United States deployed over 10,000 soldiers to Somalia. The operations of the 10th Mountain Division (L) during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE provides an opportunity to observe effects of participation in peace operations on warfighting skills of diverse tactical units.

**Preparation**

The fact that operations other than war, and peace operations, were not doctrinal publications prior to deployment of tactical forces in Somalia did not adversely affect the forces deployed. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE would provide a point of departure from traditional peace operations. Field Manual 100-5, OPERATIONS, did not include a chapter on operations other than war until 14 June 1993.

The immediacy of the United States' intervention did not resemble traditional entry into a traditional peace operation. Traditional U.N. operations precede deployment of forces with a military and diplomatic liaison team. These teams are established to create political conditions for stability, facilitate accommodation of military forces, and identify requirements before troop movement. The rapid deployment of forces to Somalia did not allow for detailed planning and units arrived with limited information on conditions in ARFOR's area of responsibility. To further complicate the deployment, a
force ceiling of 10,200 soldiers, mandated by the National Command Authorities (NCA), would pose significant challenges for task organization, operations, and movement.  

The deployment into theater was further influenced by commitment of other national forces. As multi-national forces were committed, U.S. Army tactical units could receive a fragmentary order changing unit mission and area of responsibility while awaiting air movement into theater.  

Although this did not produce an adverse effect on tactical unit execution, nor is a change in mission unique to peace operations, preparation for the operation proved difficult.

Organization

Unlike the British or Canadian case studies, the United States Army deployment in Somalia provides an opportunity to examine the effects on tactical units other than infantry battalions. Effects resulting from the mandated force ceiling of 10,200 soldiers in theater are also considered. The division received personnel ceilings after uploading ships for deployment. Operations involving the division light cavalry squadron provide an example of the tactical effects of participation in peace operations. Eventually, the division cavalry squadron deployed with approximately fifty percent strength in personnel, and one hundred percent of unit equipment. Only 180 ground and air troops of the squadron's 360 personnel would deploy.  

The multi-functional flexibility of unit personnel allowed the squadron (-) to conduct traditional and non-traditional ground and aviation missions despite the personnel shortage.
Training

When alerted, the division had concluded disaster relief operations in Florida within the previous six weeks. The division did not anticipate involvement in the operation and units were conducting training in their wartime tasks. The division cavalry squadron headquarters and ground troop were conducting field training exercises when alerted, and returned to garrison to begin pre-deployment operations.

The training conducted after notification for deployment was of short duration and competed with planning, preparation of equipment, for movement, and new equipment training on the MK-19, GPS, and mine detectors. The ground troop non-mission essential task training included security for non-governmental relief organizations and checkpoint operations. The squadron (-) deployed to Somalia on 7 January 1993, thirty six days after training combat tasks at home station.

Execution

The cavalry squadron (-) ground troop operated primarily along main supply routes, while the aviation troops operated throughout the ARFOR area of responsibility. Traditional ground tactical unit missions included area reconnaissance, convoy escort, and raids. Non-traditional tasks included 'village assessments", and checkpoint operations. These missions were designed to gain intelligence, determine assistance requirements, and establish a military presence. The non-traditional aspects of the mission found junior leaders participating in negotiations with village leaders, civilians, and humanitarian assistance organizations. These decisions were made independent of higher authority, and did not adversely effect tactical or operational
The squadron's aviation missions included both traditional and non-traditional warfighting skills. Traditional operations included support of the ground troop in area reconnaissance and raids. Non-traditional missions included providing aviation command and control for the division ready brigade, and becoming ARFOR aviation headquarters upon redeployment of the division aviation brigade. The transition between providing humanitarian assistance and conducting combat operations proved less difficult than doctrine suggests, evidenced by the squadron's participation in a combined U.S. / Belgian raid on Somali forces. The squadron's aviation elements verified Somali noncompliance with an ultimatum to move personnel and weapons from a restricted area, then attacked and destroyed the Somali forces. The Belgian forces comprised the ground element and entered the area to conduct further reconnaissance after the attack. Tactical force versatility in Somalia included brigade staffs. The division artillery brigade conducted operations as a combined maneuver headquarters for operations in southern Somalia.

Traditional warfighting skills were conducted simultaneously with operations to provide assistance. Engineers conducted counter mine operations, road, and bridge construction. The Division Support Command provided traditional logistic support and transportation of humanitarian aid. The distinction between peace operations and warfighting was often blurred. Units participated in traditional combat operations and infrastructure repair with "civic action projects a part of every unit's mission."
Effect on Core Competencies

Participation in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE did not adversely effect the warfighting skills of tactical units assigned to the 10th Mountain Division (L). The mission from 30 November 1992 to 4 May 1993, the division "conducted missions that were derived directly from mission essential tasks lists."\(^{150}\) The experience of the division suggests tactical units organized and trained for warfighting operations can rapidly transition between both peace operations and combat operations in the same environment.\(^{151}\)

The division attributes mission success to well trained units, "units that are trained for war are prepared to conduct operations other than war."\(^{152}\) The caution for future operations is to avoid reducing a unit below designed capability. If success is predicated upon unit readiness, the Army should avoid commitment of reduced units to peace operations. The effects of participation on tactical force warfighting skills did not appear to be detrimental if units operated within traditional task organizations. However, there are actions taken at the strategic or operational level, such as force ceilings which could impact on the effectiveness of tactical forces. These higher level decisions, and subsequent effects on tactical units, may prove the greatest challenge for the U.S. Army in peace operations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Does the preparation for and execution of peace operations degrade the ability of tactical units to maintain core competencies in warfighting skills? Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills. Conversely, units trained and organized solely for peace operations, at the expense of collective core competencies in warfighting skills, do not possess the flexibility to transition between operations. Case studies examined in this monograph suggest units can also transition between peace and warfighting operations without significant training. This fact has not been overlooked by NATO and is an integral component of the military aspects of the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). The agreement includes access to training areas for the Implementation Force (IFOR) within Bosnia to facilitate sustainment training of collective core competencies. ¹⁵³

The Canadian Army peace operations examined in this monograph demonstrate that units focused exclusively on peace operations training tend to significantly degrade their tactical core competencies and hence their warfighting skills. In the Canadian example, commitment to multiple peace operations has interfered with the training tactical units require to retain proficiency in core competencies. ¹⁵⁴ The resultant degradation of warfighting skills necessitates significant post deployment retraining of small units and battalions to regain warfighting proficiency. Canadian participation in UNPROFOR identified the fact that units must be organized and trained as a combined arms team to
retain an ability to transition between peace operations and warfighting operations.

The British experience in peace operations appears contradictory. Tactical units participating in operations in Northern Ireland typically realize a degradation of collective core competencies. These units do not focus on combined arms or technical training of specialized support units, nor do they operate within traditional warfighting organizations. Subsequently, units operating in Northern Ireland do not maintain pre-deployment proficiency in collective core competencies in warfighting skills. As a result, tactical units require a significant post operations training period before achieving adequate levels of wartime readiness.

On the other hand, British tactical units operating in UNPROFOR do not appear to suffer a significant degradation of core competencies as compared with units operating in Northern Ireland. In UNPROFOR, tactical units operated as a combined arms team within their standard organization. This avoided the loss of collective core competencies and facilitated the transition between peace operations and warfighting operations. The absence of training areas to conduct sustainment training proved the greatest factor in the loss of individual and collective core competencies in warfighting skills. As mentioned earlier, this shortcoming has been identified and corrected through specific provisions found in the Dayton Agreement.

The 10th Mountain Division (L) participation in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, suggests tactical forces organized for combat can successfully transition between peace operations and warfighting operations. The successful conduct of tactical operations indicates units trained for warfighting operations are prepared for peace operations and do
not require significant pre-deployment training.

The challenge before the U.S. Army is how to maintain proficiency in traditional warfighting operations while executing non-traditional peace operations. Traditionally, the Army had the luxury of a large force to commit to multi-dimensional environments. The current ten division force structure does not allow such flexibility. General (Retired) Frederick M. Franks, Jr. stated, "We will not have room for specialists. We must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy and willing to perform many missions, a team that is versatile and agile."\textsuperscript{155} The U.S. Army's FM 100-5, \textit{Operations} states: "Forces must be prepared to move rapidly from one geographic region to another and from one type of warfare to another in quick succession."\textsuperscript{156} Units prepared for combat possess this flexibility.

The evidence presented in this monograph suggests tactical forces organized with a combat task organization can maintain an ability to transition from peace operations to warfighting operations and vice-versa. Units organized for operations in other than traditional or primary warfighting roles invite significant degradation of core competencies. The U.S. Army should avoid non-traditional organizations for peace operations and remain focused on preparing units for combat operations. This is the best possible solution for the Army as it enters the post Cold War era of complex, modern peace operations.
NOTES


7. United States Army, FM100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS, p. v

8. Ibid., pp. 2-6.

9. Ibid., p. 2.

10. FM 100-23, Chapter 1, p. 2-6.


12. FM 100-23, p. v-vi.


14. FM 100-23, p. 12.

15. FM 100-5, p. 2-9.

17. FM 100-23, p. 86.


19. Ibid., p. 2-1.

20. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. Ibid., p. 7.


32. Ibid., p. 1-1.

33. Ibid.

34. FM 25-100, p. g-6.

36. ARTEP 71-2-MTP identifies offensive operations, defensive operations, retrograde operations, reconnaissance and security operations, and movement to contact as critical wartime operations (p. 1-3). ARTEP 71-3-MTP identifies only offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations as critical wartime missions (p. 1-3).


38. Ibid.


41. Ibid., p. 72.

42. Ibid.


44. Ibid., p.1.


46. Ibid., p. xv.


48. Ibid.

49. FM 100-23, p. 4.

50. Paul D. Mason, General, Chief of the Defence Staff, *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, p.8

51. Lieutenant Colonel M. Swan, Canadian Army Liaison, personal interview, 4 Dec 95.


57. Mackenzie, p. 106 & 127.

58. Ibid., p. 135.

59. Ibid., p. 148.


62. Ibid., p. 280 & 284.

63. Ibid., p. 295.


65. Ibid.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Lieutenant Colonel M Swan, personal interview, 4 Dec 95.

70. PPCLI AAR, p 4/5.


77. Ibid., p.23-24.

78. Ibid., p.33.


81. Ibid., p. 66.


83. Dewar, p. 56.

84. Ibid., p. 181.

85. Dodd, p. 62.

86. Hamill, p.121.

87. Ibid., p. 62.

88. Dewar, p. 177.

89. Dodd, p. 62.


91. Ibid.

92. Dewar, p. 178.

94. Dewar, p. 68.
95. Dodd, p. 58.
96. Hamill, p. 196-197.
97. Dodd, p. 62.
98. Hamill, p. 178.
100. Dodd, p. 63.
102. Dodd, quoting Lieutenant Colonel Brian Nichols, CO 3d Bn the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, p. 58.
103. Ibid., p. 64.
104. Hamill, p. 188.
105. Ibid., p. 280.
106. Ibid., p. 187.
110. Ibid., p. xii.
113. Ibid., p. 16.


117. Stewart, p. 37.


120. CALL, p. C-3.

121. Stewart, p. 12.


123. Ibid., p. 11.


125. CALL, p. 16.

126. Stewart, p. 11.

127. Ibid., p. 18.


131. Oakley, p. 48.

133. 10th Mtn AAR Summary, p.19.
134. Ibid., p.18.
135. Ibid., p. 19.
137. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
142. Vowels and Witsken, p. 27.
143. Ibid., p. 28.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., 27.
146. 10th Mtn AAR Summary, p.23.
147. Ibid., p. 19.
149. Ibid., p. 25.
151. Ibid., p. 21.
152. 10th Mtn AAR Summary, p. 27.
153. Annex 1A to the *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Hercegovina*, Article VI, item 9a.


155. General Frederick M. Franks, quoted in FM 100-23, p. 86.

156. FM 100-5, p. 2-9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES


MacInnis, J.A. MG, Canadian Army, "Cyprus-Canada's Perpetual Vigil.". Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer 1989, 21-29.


Naylor, Sean D., "Well Done But Warlike It's Not.", Army Times, 3 July 1995, 10 and 16.


**BOOKS**


**STUDIES AND MONOGRAPHS**


MILITARY PUBLICATIONS


GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS