COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

This publication, FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, presents the tactics and techniques utilized by Marine Corps landing forces in counterinsurgency operations, including guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. It is made available to other Services for information and use as desired.

2. SCOPE

This manual outlines the origin, objectives, and characteristics of counterinsurgency operations, as well as the tactics and techniques employed by guerrilla forces. It takes its departure from the U.S. Marine Corps publication, Small Wars Manual, 1940, and places emphasis on the planning and conduct of operations against guerrillas by Marine Corps forces.

3. SUPERSESSION

FMFM 8-2, Operations Against Guerrilla Units, dated 14 August 1962, with four changes.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited. Comments and recommended changes should be forwarded to the Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities, Quantico, Virginia 22134.

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

H. W. BUSE, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change No.</th>
<th>Date of Change</th>
<th>Date of Entry</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# FMFM 8-2

**COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### SECTION 1. GUERRILLA WARFARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Insurgency and Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare Defined</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Guerrilla Defined</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Types of Guerrilla Forces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Evolution of Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Legal Status and the Geneva Conventions of 1949</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Objectives of Guerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Guerrilla Organization, Command, and Control</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Guerrilla Weapons and Equipment</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Guerrilla Operations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION 2. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Military Relationships With Other United States Agencies</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Coordination Procedures</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Status of Armed Forces Agreement</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Landing Force Relationships With Foreign Governmental Authorities</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Landing Force Relationships With Other Military Commanders, U.S. or Foreign</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION 3. INTELLIGENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Intelligence Requirements</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>Intelligence Staff Organization and Function</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Intelligence Collecting Agencies and Sources</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 4. COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>Planning Counterguerrilla Operations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Area Organization, Combat Bases, and Organization of Forces</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Conduct of Counterguerrilla Military Operations</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>Operations From Mobile Sea Bases</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>Riverine Operations</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 5. SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Establishing a Patrol Base</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>Attacking Guerrilla Houses and Camps</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>Ambushes</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>Counterambush Action</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507</td>
<td>Search Procedures</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 6. SECURITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602</td>
<td>Considerations Affecting Security Measures</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603</td>
<td>Security Measures</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604</td>
<td>Rear Area Security</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>605</td>
<td>Airfield Security</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>606</td>
<td>Transportation Security</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 7. COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702</td>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703</td>
<td>Communication Means</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705</td>
<td>Communication Countermeasures</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION 8. AIR SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>801</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>802</td>
<td>Offensive Air Support</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>803</td>
<td>Assault Support</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and Observation</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 9. COMBAT SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>901</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>902</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>903</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>904</td>
<td>Mechanized Units</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>905</td>
<td>NBC Weapons</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>906</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>907</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>908</td>
<td>Naval Ships and Craft</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>909</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 10. LOGISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1002</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1003</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1004</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1005</td>
<td>Medical Treatment, Evacuation and Hospitalization</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1006</td>
<td>Sanitation and Personal Hygiene</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 11. CIVIL POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1102</td>
<td>Civil Administration</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1103</td>
<td>Populace Control</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1104</td>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1105</td>
<td>Civil Forces and Local Individuals</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1201 General</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1202 Social and Economic Considerations</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1203 Morale and Psychological Factors</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1204 Major Training Considerations</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1205 Individual and Small Unit Training</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1206 Orientation</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1207 Troop Indoctrination</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 12. TROOP INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1301 General</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1302 Coordination and Control</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1303 Capabilities</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1304 Limitations</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 13. GUERRILLAS IN SUPPORT OF THE LANDING FORCE

LIST OF REFERENCES  193

INDEX  195
101. GENERAL

a. Throughout military history, guerrilla warfare has formed a powerful weapon in the hands of insurgent forces in their efforts to seize power from constituted authority. Given even limited popular support, numerically inferior guerrilla forces have the capability of defeating or greatly reducing the effectiveness of regularly organized military organizations unless the threat is met by positive counteraction. In weak or newly emerging nations, guerrilla warfare can effectively prevent such nations from establishing or maintaining stable government. Instability in government is an invitation to insurgency efforts to "fish in troubled waters." Inasmuch as there is an increasing number of nations going through the evolution from colony to statehood, there is a greatly increased number of nations faced with this type of revolution. This requires Marine Corps forces to possess a full understanding of the entire problem of subversive insurgency, together with the knowledge of the techniques involved in its defeat.
b. Counterguerrilla activity is a prime element of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program. It complements companion efforts to raise economic and educational levels, to stabilize and improve the political and psychological climate, to firm up the civic status, and to assist its armed forces in developing their own strength in order to contribute to national stability. These more peaceful actions, however, will often not be sufficient in themselves, and the task of meeting and defeating a guerrilla problem—created on the enemy’s terms—may face our military forces. It is the purpose of this manual to outline the counterinsurgency tasks which are within the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force.

102. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. Insurgency Defined. --A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

b. Counterinsurgency Defined. --Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

c. Application. --Although counterinsurgency extends into fields which are not primary areas of Marine Corps endeavor, Marine Corps forces must be prepared to undertake counterinsurgency operations when directed. Operations against guerrillas as treated herein, are a major element of counterinsurgent activity.

103. GUERRILLA WARFARE DEFINED

Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

104. GUERRILLA DEFINED

A guerrilla is defined as a combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

105. TYPES OF GUERRILLA FORCES

a. Guerrilla Forces Emerging From a Defeated Military Organization. --As military forces of a recognized government are defeated or
forced to withdraw, members of these defeated forces, local civilians, or both, organize as guerrillas to disrupt enemy operations. A military force assigned the mission of reestablishing the recognized government may operate in conjunction with this type guerrilla force. (See sec. 13.)

b. **Guerrilla Forces Opposed to the Existing Government.** --Guerrilla forces may be formed to fight for a new political order through the destruction of the existing patterns of society. Guerrillas attempt to obtain popular support through passive consent or terror.

c. **External Military Forces Introduced Into a Country.** --Military personnel may come from another country to assist the guerrillas. This assistance may come in the form of individuals "volunteering" or in regularly organized military forces. Initially, individuals may furnish guidance on organization, tactics, and techniques, and may become key leaders. They can determine requirements for military equipment and for technicians who can be provided to operate or to instruct in the operation and maintenance of equipment unfamiliar to the guerrillas. Certain guerrillas can be evacuated to another country for specialized training unavailable in their locality. When guerrilla forces control a sufficiently large area to the extent that it can absorb additional forces, external military forces may be introduced.

106. **EVOLUTION OF FORCES**

a. **Causes of Resistance.** --Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined, or incited and is usually centered around a desire for:

   (1) Political change.

   (2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

   (3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.

   (4) Economic and social improvement.

   (5) Religious expression.

b. **Resistance Movements.** --Resistance movements may form locally or be inspired by "sponsoring powers." The evolution of the guerrilla force usually follows a sequence of events that form a pattern:
(1) The existence of a dissident group.

(2) The emergence of groups which are willing to bear arms.

(3) The appearance of strong, determined leaders to further organize and orient these groups. As members of underground organizations are identified and resistance grows, guerrilla bands form in secure areas to become the military arm of the guerrilla force.

(4) The exploitation of initial successes to convince elements of the population to support an effective guerrilla organization.

(5) The seeking and accepting of support from external sources.

(6) The employment of equipment and personnel furnished by external sources.

(7) The integration of the guerrilla forces into a regular military organization.

107. LEGAL STATUS AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

a. The Law of Land Warfare. --The law of land warfare says that members of organized resistance movements opposing military forces are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if they meet the following requirements:

(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) They bear arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949

(1) Article 3. --If both sides in a civil war or revolt request and receive military support from foreign powers, the opposing foreign
powers may not be at war with each other. In such a situation and when the belligerents have not been recognized as such, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies. Article 3 is quoted below:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum the following provisions:

"(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (put out of the fighting) by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

"(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

"(b) Taking of hostages;

"(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

"(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the international committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force by means of special agreements all or part of the other provisions of the present convention.

"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

(2) **Parties to Conflict.** --The parties to such a conflict are the legally constituted government and the challenging insurgent force.
Customs of war give other States the right to intervene in a civil war if cruelties not permitted by international codes are practiced by either party.

(3) Application. --Although the Geneva Conventions are binding only in the Territories of the contracting nations, the provisions of Article 3 should be applied whenever adhered to by the opposing forces or when they can be carried out without jeopardy to the military mission.

108. CHARACTERISTICS

a. Characteristics Contributing to Successful Guerrilla Operations

(1) Surprise. --Surprise is the principle of war most essential to successful guerrilla operations. The guerrilla obtains surprise by operating in vast areas that offer concealment and freedom of movement and by conducting operations at night. Through surprise, the guerrilla seeks to overcome the enemy's advantage of numbers, organization, and supporting arms. He masses his forces at selected times and places to attack where defensive forces are weakest. Following the attack, he can quickly disperse his forces to designated areas.

(2) Mobility. --To achieve surprise and avoid fixed positions, the guerrilla relies on mobility. He obtains mobility afoot by being lightly armed, having detailed knowledge of the terrain, and by being relatively free of heavy logistic burdens. Mobility afoot offers advantages when operating in inclement weather, in reduced visibility, and in terrain which would be an obstacle to a more heavily equipped enemy. Even under adverse conditions, the foot-mobile guerrilla converges on a target, strikes unexpectedly, and swiftly disperses prior to the arrival of a stronger opposing force.

(3) Civilian Support. --The guerrilla seeks to obtain or maintain the active support of the populace in his area of operations. This support will be forthcoming in direct proportion to the feeling that is generated by the effectiveness of the guerrilla campaign or the ineffectiveness of the opposing authority. If the guerrilla force cannot gain the active support of the populace, it still attempts to make them at least passive in their support of the opposition.

(a) In general, the populace will probably contain three factions: guerrilla supporters; opposition supporters; and those who, for
one reason or another, prefer not to become involved (neutralist). Among
the active supporters there are guerrilla auxiliaries, collaborators, and
informers. These supporters and the guerrilla force will attempt to
achieve the support of the neutral group through the use of propaganda,
economic assistance, and by making them indirect participants through
the distribution of captured goods, food, and property. Terroristic
methods such as assassination, murder, and the taking of hostages are
often resorted to by some guerrilla units.

(b) With civilian support, the guerrilla force can solve
many of its logistical support problems. The civilian population will
provide manpower; specialists from the various professions, such as
doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, and skilled technicians; food, cloth-
ing, and equipment; hiding places; arms and ammunition; and intelligence.

(4) Area Familiarity. --If he is a native of the area, the guer-
rolla has three advantages over the opposition; first, when not fighting he
can appear to be a harmless civilian; second, he may have an intimate
working knowledge of the terrain over which he operates; and third, he
may have personal contacts with the population which may provide partial
solutions to his problems of intelligence, supply, and communications.
If he is not a native, the guerrilla will seek to obtain these three advan-
tages as rapidly as possible in the area in which his band has been as-
signed to operate.

(5) Depth of Operations. --Guerrillas frequently are organized
into many small units which are dispersed over a large area. This pro-
vides depth to their operations, simplifies logistics, and makes it diffi-
cult to locate them. They attack flanks, rear areas, small or isolated
outposts, lines of communication, poorly trained and armed village
guards, and similar objectives which are least prepared for or capable
of combat.

(6) Favorable Terrain. --Mountains, swamps, forests, and
jungles are favorable to guerrillas because their primary means of
mobility is on foot. These areas do not favor a force that is dependent
upon fixed lines of communication, extensive logistic support, heavy
supporting arms, and mechanical means of transportation.

(7) Intelligence System. --By establishing an intelligence sys-
tem composed of indigenous military personnel and civilians who are
employed by the opposition authority and its military forces, the guerrilla can acquire accurate and timely information. Children may be employed by the guerrillas as intelligence-gathering agents.

(8) Communications. --Communications used by guerrillas may vary from complex communication-electronic equipment to audio, visual, and messengers. Guerrillas will utilize the civilian communication system as well as fishermen, travelers, and workmen as messengers and observers. Every sympathetic civilian is a potential member of the communication system.

(9) External Support. --The guerrillas can usually obtain food and light weapons from local civilian sources, but may depend heavily on external sources for communication equipment, technical personnel, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. External support greatly expands the potential of the guerrilla forces.

b. Characteristics Limiting Guerrilla Operations

(1) Lack of Mass. --A limitation of the guerrilla force is its inability to achieve a final victory without external assistance. It is incapable of concentrating combat power for any extended period, unable to exploit success, and thus compelled to accept something short of victory.

(2) Lack of Means. --Guerrillas must often depend on seized arms and equipment and are usually denied, by nonavailability of both equipment and technicians, the use of weapons other than small arms.

(3) Betrayal. --The guerrilla is vulnerable to betrayal by members of his organization.

(4) Volunteers Without Contract. --The guerrilla commander leads a band of people who regard themselves as patriotic civilians rather than soldiers. They have no contract to bind them to their duties and may at anytime consider family obligations, crop harvests, or business to be more important than the overall guerrilla cause.

(5) Initial Lack of Training and Discipline. --Basically a civilian, the average guerrilla lacks the formal knowledge and the discipline which results from military training. This deficiency severely limits effectiveness during the early stages of guerrilla organization.
Time, the will of the leaders, and imported military personnel and technicians will eventually lessen the seriousness of these deficiencies.

(6) Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare. --The average guerrilla is susceptible to psychological warfare operations directed against him. The guerrilla may become disheartened and disillusioned with the guerrilla cause if skillful propaganda exploits his failures. For the most part, people become guerrillas because they are dissatisfied with existing conditions. To convince them that they no longer have reason to be dissatisfied is to remove their reason for being guerrillas.

109. OBJECTIVES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. Purpose. --The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to contribute to the defeat of the enemy. As most guerrilla forces possess certain limitations, their specific objectives cannot be decisive military action, such as seizing and holding terrain, until expanded and formalized to the extent of conventional forces.

b. Broad Objectives. --The broad objectives of guerrilla warfare are to:

   (1) Reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness.

   (2) Delay and disrupt enemy operations.

   (3) Weaken the morale and will to resist of enemy forces.

   (4) Limit the enemy's development and exploitation of the territory it occupies.

   (5) Develop and strengthen the will of the people to resist the authority of the opposition.

c. Means. --To achieve these broad objectives, the guerrilla assumes the role of a swift, silent, disappearing combatant who selects the time and place of battle. His objectives are accomplished by:

   (1) Attacking and interrupting the enemy's line of communication.

   (2) Inflicting casualties on and harassing the enemy's forces.
(3) Destroying enemy supplies and installations.

(4) Capturing enemy supplies.

(5) Terrorizing the enemy.

110. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL

a. Influencing Factors.--Independence, varying size, and flexibility characterize the guerrilla organization. Some of the factors influencing organization and control are:

(1) The extent of ambushes and raids.

(2) Terrain and enemy capabilities.

(3) Requirements for mobility and surprise (which tend to restrict the size of weapons to be used).

(4) Conducting psychological warfare and political indoctrination:

   (a) To ensure continued loyalty and proper political ideology within the guerrilla ranks.

   (b) To gain or control civilian support.

   (c) To demoralize and to cause the defection of the enemy forces.

(5) The manufacture, salvage, and repair of small arms and demolitions.

(6) Training of new recruits.

(7) Requirement for limited logistic support.

(8) Security of the guerrilla base.

(9) Guerrilla strength.

(10) Degree of outside support and control.
b. Size.--Guerrilla tactical units are usually small bands of 20 to 30 men; however, several bands may join together to form units of considerable size.

c. Support.--Guerrillas may employ young and old, male or female, in supporting organizations and hard core cadres that mend, repair, clean, cook, farm, act as porters, and perform other similar duties. The hard core cadres, properly led, are capable of achieving selected limited objectives to regenerate support of wavering populace.

d. Command.--The guerrilla commander will establish succession of command and designate alternate base areas. Members of the organization normally do not question the commander's authority.

e. Control.--Widely separated small units operating over large areas necessitate decentralized control and provide operational latitude for the small unit commander. The commander provides the necessary guidance and direction to his unit commanders but normally leaves implementation to his subordinates. Exceptions to this general rule are:

   (1) Emergency measures conducted against enemy forces which threaten the security of the guerrilla force.

   (2) Targets assigned specifically to an area commander by the overall commander.

111. GUERRILLA WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

 a. Weapons.--Guerrillas usually possess a variety of light infantry weapons. Weapons as heavy as the 82mm mortar and the 75mm recoilless rifle are commonly employed by guerrillas; however, in some instances guerrillas may employ weapons as heavy as 120mm. Demolitions are required for the destruction of rail lines, roads, and for making grenades and mines to use in raids, ambushes, etc. They improvise additional weapons such as hand-thrown fire bombs; sharpened sticks or nails set in ditches near ambush sites and trails; thin wires stretched across roads and trails at night at heights designed to decapitate vehicle drivers. Guerrillas have a remarkable ability for producing effective explosive devices from materials discarded or lost by opposing military forces. These items include communication wire, batteries, any type of explosive or ammunition, blasting caps, plastic waterproofing material,
and ammunition boxes. Care must be taken to prevent such articles from falling into guerrilla hands.

b. Equipment. --Equipment requirements vary according to the weather and terrain. Shelters are usually made from available vegetation. A small bowl for eating and a pack are the usual equipment carried by the guerrilla. Leaders usually carry fieldglasses, compasses, and maps. Radios are used to contact external agencies. Individual medical supplies may be carried by each person.

112. GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. Planning Considerations. --The guerrilla considers the size of the enemy forces, dispositions, and their movements. He obtains a thorough knowledge of the terrain, road nets, and trails before making a plan. Large-scale operations are avoided, unless tactical surprise and a highly favorable ratio of numerical superiority is assured. The use of small detachments to strike surprise blows at isolated installations, convoys, columns, or detachments is considered in each plan. Consideration is given to the withdrawal and dispersal of the force. Since guerrilla operations are normally conducted at night, the degree of visibility required at night should receive special consideration along with the weather.

b. Areas of Operation

(1) Categories. --Guerrilla operations may extend throughout the entire area of conflict and can be divided into three general categories:

(a) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas. --This area is usually characterized by extremely difficult terrain and is the area in which the guerrilla has his headquarters and camps.

(b) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas' Enemy. --Raidding operations in this area are executed only by small guerrilla units or by individuals.

(c) Area Not Controlled by Either Force. --This is the principal battleground for the guerrilla, and he will attempt to bring more of it under his domination. Large guerrilla forces enter this area and any enemy force is apt to encounter ambush or harassment.
(2) **Size.** --As the situation in a given area becomes more favorable to the guerrilla, the area controlled may expand to the extent that enemy forces find themselves in a virtual siege by the guerrillas.

(3) **Subdivision.** --Areas of operation will normally be aligned within political subdivisions and placed under the jurisdiction of subordinate guerrilla commanders. They exercise civilian control measures, indoctrinate the local populace politically, conduct food and supply collection, levy and collect taxes, and carry out operations against the enemy.

c. **Intelligence and Counterintelligence**

(1) **Intelligence.** --Acquiring area operation intelligence is of primary importance to the guerrilla force and its external sponsoring forces. The guerrilla's existence will depend on his knowledge of the terrain, enemy strength, organization, movements, dispositions, armament, and habits. In addition, the guerrilla may be the source of information for a sponsoring force. The close relationship between guerrilla units and the civilian populace affords many valuable contacts that may provide information of enemy operations, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. The relationship frequently extends to political, economic, administrative, or psychological processes.

(2) **Counterintelligence.** --Guerrilla counterintelligence agents are used to cover all areas of guerrilla operations. Because of the possibility of enemy infiltration and betrayal by his own guerrillas, he must continually seek out spies and informers. Personnel recruited for guerrilla forces are carefully screened before joining and closely observed after joining.

d. **Covert Operations**

(1) **Civil Disturbances.** --While civil disturbances are not essentially military in nature, they can be an effective means to a military end. They are usually associated with urban areas, for they depend on population masses for effectiveness. Inciting a major disturbance enables the guerrilla to achieve some of the effects of combat without actually engaging his forces. Civil unrest directed against the guerrilla's enemy causes that enemy to divert forces, change policies, and weakens his combat power.
(2) Sabotage. --Sabotage is a most effective weapon of covert operations. Properly planned and carried out by both active guerrillas and sympathetic civilians, it affects all phases of the enemy war effort. Physically, it reduces his war potential, which reduces his morale. Sabotage causes the enemy to divert troops to security missions. The guerrilla's successes against the enemy tend to encourage civilians not previously active to commit acts of petty sabotage. These petty acts further harass and confuse the enemy. Successful sabotage results have tremendous propaganda value. These results are hailed as symbols of the resistance, serving to stimulate morale of the guerrilla movement.

(3) Terrorism. --Guerrilla forces may terrorize to intimidate or subjugate the civil population in order to ensure support. Acts of violence including murder, arson, bombings, and kidnappings are normally directed toward elements of the population who lack adequate protection or self-defense. Such acts are normally conducted on the person, family, or property of persons who are leaders in civil, economic, educational, or social fields.

e. Overt Operations

(1) Ambush

(a) The value of ambush lies in the surprise and shock effect. In planning an ambush, the guerrilla commander has an advantage in selecting the terrain, position, and time, which enables him to employ a small force to achieve success. The ambush is employed against moving or temporarily halted targets to kill the enemy and to capture his supplies and equipment.

(b) Three conditions for an ambush are desirable: terrain of a constricting nature, a method of halting or sealing off the target, and the delivery of maximum firepower in a short period of time.

(c) The ambush force usually permits enemy security elements to pass through the main ambush area. Attack of the main body commences upon a prearranged signal and is normally of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal. If the enemy cannot react or reinforce, the guerrilla may stay long enough to salvage any usable equipment and destroy the rest. To cover movement to and from the ambush area, the guerrilla employs extensive security measures. To cover his withdrawal,
the guerrilla may employ secondary ambushes to destroy or delay the enemy reinforcements.

(d) If the ambush fails, the guerrilla withdraws on pre-arranged signal and disperses in many directions, falling back to secondary ambush sites to destroy or delay any pursuing enemy.

(2) Raids

(a) Like the ambush, the raid is dependent upon surprise for effectiveness. However, it is directed against stationary targets and is therefore more complicated and risky.

(b) The purpose of the raid is normally the destruction of key enemy installations or the capture of personnel, supplies, or equipment. The side effects of harassment and reduction of enemy morale may prove as beneficial as the destruction of the target. Raids are also conducted to raise guerrilla prestige in an area and to gain propaganda advantages for justification of the guerrilla cause before world or area opinion.

(c) Guerrilla raids differ very little from raids planned and executed by conventional forces. Three elements are generally required to accomplish the mission: a force designated to eliminate enemy security; a force to accomplish the mission; and a force to cover the withdrawal.

f. Security

(1) Requirement. --Because of his precarious position, the guerrilla must maintain strict security. His relatively weak forces depend almost entirely upon secrecy and deception for their existence. Security is the primary protective measure against surprise, espionage, observation, and interference by the enemy. Only those personnel actively involved in directing guerrilla operations are permitted knowledge of guerrilla dispositions. False information may be disseminated to deceive the enemy and to assist in covering security leaks.

(2) Measures. --Measures adopted to maintain security include locating the camp and its installations in difficult terrain, keeping these facilities mobile, and maintaining alternate locations in a continuous state
of preparedness. Radio and other communication facilities maintain strictest security and are frequently moved to avoid detection.

(3) Civilian Population. --Maintenance of adequate security control of the civil population is a pressing security problem. It requires the guerrilla to have continuous knowledge of all personnel movement in his area and to maintain up-to-date information on known and suspected security risks.

g. Defensive Considerations

(1) Limitations. --Guerrilla units avoid defensive combat. Their relative lack of mass and means places them at a distinct disadvantage in static defense against regular forces. If forced to assume the defensive, the guerrilla takes every possible advantage of terrain and his mobility to avoid being fixed in position.

(2) Encirclement Threat. --Encirclement is a major threat to the guerrilla force. The security system is oriented to provide warning of encirclement in adequate time to react. Plans are made and rehearsed that provide many alternate routes of egress from the installation or scene of action. The guerrilla leader, upon being encircled, has three possibilities for survival:

(a) Plan and execute a breakout at the earliest possible time.

(b) Dissolve his units and disappear on an individual basis, abandoning much of his equipment and supplies in order to survive to fight again.

(c) Hold his force together, find the nearest defensible terrain, and organize the strongest possible perimeter defense.

(3) The Breakout. --The breakout is usually the most feasible course of action. If he chooses to dissolve his force, the guerrilla commander may lose much of his equipment and may suffer the loss of an organization which must be rebuilt. A breakout requires careful planning. The guerrilla force attempts to slip through existing gaps. When no gaps exist, the force seeks weak points in the enemy's encirclement. If it becomes evident the breakout will fail, the guerrilla commander
divides his forces into small units to exfiltrate enemy lines to predesignated assembly areas.

(4) **Exterior Support.** --Guerrilla forces exterior to the encircled area may be of great assistance to the encircled forces by executing diversionary attacks.

(5) **Short-Duration Defense.** --When required, the short-duration defense of a position may be planned as an adjunct to other operations to gain time to accomplish a mission, to hold the enemy's main body while other units attack his flanks and rear, to allow time for reassembly of forces, or to protect their withdrawal.
SECTION 2

LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

201. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps forces may be called upon to participate in counterinsurgency operations in countries with which the United States has mutual security or other agreements or at the request of a country with which no prior agreement exists. A Marine Corps force may operate as part of a larger military force in counterinsurgency situations or it may be the only or principal U.S. force so engaged.

b. In countries with governments friendly to the United States, counterinsurgency operations of U.S. forces will be in accordance with the provisions of agreements between the United States Government and the government of the country concerned.

c. In some instances, U.S. diplomatic representation may not be present in the country where operations are to take place. Frequently,
however, U.S. diplomatic and other agencies will be active in the country. In such cases, military operations must be fully coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies involved.

202. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES

A clear understanding of the relationships between the military forces and other U.S. agencies in the country is essential for proper coordination of counterinsurgency operations. Other U.S. agencies which may be involved include:

a. Chief of Diplomatic Mission. --The chief of the United States diplomatic mission, the ambassador if one is designated, is normally the senior authority on foreign policy and the senior coordinator of the activities of all U.S. governmental agencies in the country to which he is accredited. The chief of the diplomatic mission does not command U.S. military forces operating in the country.

b. United States Embassy. --The ambassador's staff includes political, economic, cultural, administrative, and armed service sections, staffed by officers trained in their specialty and with experience in the country to which assigned. They maintain contact with their counterparts, both in the local government and other U.S. governmental agencies. The chief of mission closely coordinates the activities of the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), which is the country agency of the Agency for International Development (AID); and the United States Information Service (USIS), the country agency of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIS office is concerned with the field of cultural, informational, and educational exchange between the United States and the local government. This agency usually operates offices at the large population centers and under certain conditions, one-man offices in small towns of a host country. Within countries receiving U.S. economic aid, the aid program is administered by the USOM Director. While the Director is responsible to the Agency for International Development in Washington, his activities in the host country are coordinated by the chief of the diplomatic mission. The Director, AID, in Washington reports directly to the Secretary of State.

c. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). --Countries in receipt of United States military aid normally have a MAAG present to
supervise and administer the military assistance program. MAAG activities are conducted under the direction of the Department of Defense, through the unified commander involved. MAAG relationships with the chief of diplomatic mission are usually prescribed in executive orders or other instructions. The chief of mission provides foreign policy guidance to ensure that MAAG efforts are in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Depending upon the mission of the particular MAAG, these activities assist the host government in such matters as reorganization, equipping, training, and logistical support of military forces. They may be joint or uniservice.

d. The Country Team.--With many U.S. agencies operating in a foreign country, their areas of interest and responsibility often overlap. The best interests of the United States and the host country are served if activities of these agencies are well coordinated. The chief of the diplomatic mission may accomplish coordination in part through regular meetings of the "Country Team," a working group made up of representatives of all major U.S. governmental organizations operating in the country. In countries where U.S. military forces are based, the military commander or his representative normally participates as a member of this team.

203. COORDINATION PROCEDURES

a. General.--U.S. military forces operating in a foreign country fall within the chain of command extending from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commander to whose command the forces are assigned. Although the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, if present, is not in this chain of command, close coordination of military activities is effected with the diplomatic mission and other U.S. agencies. In some cases, relationships between the diplomatic representative and the military commander may be further delineated by executive order.

b. Staff Functioning.--Deviations from normal staff responsibilities, procedures, and techniques within the landing force are avoided in dealing with outside agencies. Although one senior representative to the Embassy's liaison office or country team should be appointed, the general and special staff continue to supervise and coordinate matters within their usual areas of staff responsibility. The necessity for a controlled, coordinated effort by all elements of the landing force in dealing with outside
agencies is analogous to the importance of the overall unity of effort of all U.S. agencies within the country concerned. Unilateral, uncoordi-
nated action by landing force staff members is avoided. However, indi-
vidual staff officers may work directly with U.S. agencies or local govern-
mental authorities within the limits of established policies.

c. Landing Force-Diplomatic Mission Coordination

(1) The relationship between the landing force and the diplo-
matic mission is primarily one of coordination. Instructions concerning
these relationships should be set forth in initiating directives. Coordi-
nation is facilitated by the establishment of formal liaison with the diplo-
matic mission and by participation of landing force representatives in
the activities of the country team and civil affairs committees, if formed.

(2) Members of the diplomatic mission may not be familiar
with landing force methods of operation. Orientation briefings for these
officials should be arranged at an early date to avoid misunderstanding.
Orientation briefings by the diplomatic mission staff for the landing force
are of equal importance. The landing force may develop and recommend
procedures to the diplomatic mission as necessary for the conduct of busi-
ness between the landing force and agencies of the local government.

d. Landing Force-MAAG Coordination. --Relationships between the
landing force and MAAG are normally conducted on a basis of coordina-
tion as defined in directives from higher authority. The missions of these
two military activities may differ greatly. The Chief, MAAG, can be of
great assistance to the landing force commander. Being well established
in the country, the MAAG will have working agreements with the local
military commanders and will be familiar with conditions in the country
as well as with the personalities involved both in the local government
and U.S. Diplomatic Corps. Assistance from the MAAG in the initial
days of operation will be particularly valuable.

204. STATUS OF ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT

Status of Armed Forces agreements are necessary when counterin-
surgency operations are conducted within a friendly foreign country. If
a status of Armed Forces agreement already exists prior to arrival of the
landing force, its provisions may be extended to include personnel of the
landing force. However, if no such agreement exists, one should be
negotiated as soon as possible. This will normally be accomplished through diplomatic channels. The landing force may submit recommendations to the diplomatic mission as appropriate and assist the mission as required in drafting proposed agreements.

205. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

a. General. --Prior to or immediately upon arrival of the landing force in the foreign country, the landing force commander should establish contact with appropriate officials of the foreign government. Contact is made initially through the U.S. diplomatic mission, if one is present, and may continue through the diplomatic mission during the early phase of the operation. When the landing force is firmly established and operating ashore, the defense ministry of the host government may become the principal point of contact for the conduct of routine landing force business with the local government.

b. Subordinate Military Commanders. --Subordinate military commanders assigned independent missions establish liaison with local officials in their area and, work through and cooperate with these authorities within limits established by higher authority. Detailed instructions should be issued to subordinate commanders concerning their relationship with local military and civil officials. At times it is advisable to assign diplomatic advisers to subordinate commands.

c. Participation in Governmental Functions. --A landing force involved in a counterinsurgency operation will not, as a rule, participate in local police, judicial, or other governmental functions unless required by the exigencies of the situation. The landing force may reinforce local police and military forces in the suppression of dissident forces. One of the most important duties to be performed by a commander in an operation against guerrilla forces is to gain the cooperation and assistance of local police and judicial agencies. Police and judicial pressure in suppressing underground organizations, combating sabotage, controlling traffic in arms and ammunition, and enforcement of criminal and civil laws provide both direct and indirect assistance to the landing force commander.
206. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER MILITARY COMMANDERS, U.S. OR FOREIGN

a. Provision of Forces. -- Operating under current doctrine (NWP-22(B)/LFM 01, JCS Pub 2), amphibious operations can serve as an important adjunct to the overall counterinsurgency mission, either in an independent or supporting role. Recognition must be given to certain factors that have a direct bearing on the execution of an amphibious operation; these are:

(1) The operation may be a completely independent operation where the entire amphibious task force (ATF) is assigned from the resources of a responsible Fleet organization to include all elements necessary.

(2) The operation may be one in which the amphibious task force (ATF) is augmented or supported by either U.S. and/or foreign forces not embarked, and therefore not placed under control of the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).

(3) The operation may include Marine forces assigned to an ATF as the landing force from a command operating in the host nation and following termination of the amphibious operation, the forces provided may revert to the parent operational commander.

(4) Combination of (1), (2), and (3) above.

b. Coordination Considerations. -- Within the above types of provision of forces, particular attention must be paid to the following areas:

(1) Command Relationships

(a) Independent fleet amphibious operations will be in accordance with the doctrine set forth in NWP 22(B) and JCS Pub 2.

(b) In a situation where operational control over the landing force changes from the CATF to a supported commander, subject change is predicated on the establishment of the landing force, including Commander Landing Force (CLF), afloat and termination of the amphibious operation.
(c) CATF may assume control of forces ashore and operating within the amphibious objective area (AOA) during and subsequent to the assault phase of an amphibious operation.

(d) In some cases the supported commander may provide certain specialized units, U.S. and/or foreign, to the ATF because of the special political, geographic, hydrographic, or cultural environment. Procedures for control of these forces must be mutually agreed upon by both the appropriate fleet commander and the support commander.

(2) Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)

(a) Requirements. --The overriding consideration in determination of the AOA is that it must provide the sea, land, and air space required to accomplish the ATF mission. The size may vary from one operation to another. Normally, no problems are encountered when the objective area is located in a hostile area; however, in a counter-insurgency environment, the opposite is true in most cases.

(b) Semihostile Environment. --The environment of the proposed amphibious objective may not be entirely hostile, as visualized in NWP 22(B), in that land, sea, and air space may be within the territorial boundaries of a friendly foreign nation containing friendly forces: U.S. military, friendly foreign civilian personnel, and/or installations. The additional factors that must therefore be considered in determining the size and shape of the AOA should include the following:

1. Presence of friendly foreign military and/or civilian personnel, and/or installations.

2. Presence of U.S. military and/or civilian personnel.

3. Presence of civil air, rail, and waterways.

4. Command relationships, particularly where an amphibious operation is to be conducted in support of a unified or subordinate unified commander.

(c) Excluded Areas. --Consideration of the above factors may well result in an AOA with entirely separate dimensions for the land,
sea, and air space. The land area may abut friendly foreign installations which are inviolated; whereas air space may intersect civil air requiring a safety tunnel of exclusion. Further, commercial waterways within the land and air portion of the AOA may be excluded for the safe passage of friendly foreign traffic.

(d) Content of Initiating Directive. --Regardless of the above consideration that might limit the AOA in its traditional form, it must be explicitly defined and the command relationships within the AOA must be clearly prescribed and promulgated in the initiating directive as published by the responsible fleet commander. Likewise, the details of fire support and fire coordination must be expressly defined in the initiating directive in order to ensure that all forces in the AOA are fully aware of the inherent responsibilities of the CATF.

(3) Intelligence. --The intelligence procedures must encompass all U.S. agencies, both military and civilian. Extreme care in the dissemination process of amphibious intelligence must be exercised to ensure the validity, accuracy, and timeliness of the information.
SECTION 3

INTELLIGENCE

301. GENERAL

Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential for successful operations against guerrilla forces. To conduct counterguerrilla operations without a sound intelligence basis is to invite frustration and waste in futile expenditures of time, materiel, and troop effort against an elusive enemy. To conduct effective counterguerrilla operations, both combat intelligence and counterintelligence efforts must be directed to provide answers to these basic questions: Who is the guerrilla? Where is he now? Where will he be in the immediate future? Guerrilla forces, employing to a large extent intelligence and counterintelligence measures which depend upon and integrate with a sympathetic indigenous environment, are difficult to identify, locate, and fix. The guerrilla, by virtue of his attempts to enlist both active and passive support from segments of the local populace, presents special problems to our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts not encountered in "conventional" combat operations. Before he can be separated from the civil populace, fixed, and destroyed, the guerrilla must be positively identified; all members at every combat and support
echelon must be motivated and trained to participate in this fundamental task.

a. **Timeliness.** Rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence is essential. The elusiveness and mobility of small guerrilla forces quickly outdates information concerning their location. Reaction time for the conduct of combat operations is a critical factor and reactions must be based on reliable intelligence. A concerted effort must be made by every intelligence section to rapidly develop accurate order of battle information applicable to the projected area of operations for its unit.

b. **Personnel.** A larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is required for counterguerrilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining adequate interrogator-translators and qualified interpreters. In addition, officer and enlisted intelligence personnel must be provided to the landing force to permit continuous operation of the combat operations center and to staff appropriate task groupments in subsequent operations ashore.

c. **Responsibilities.** Every Marine must have an understanding of the basic techniques and value of intelligence and counterintelligence in counterguerrilla operations. This is necessary because of his own immediate requirements and because of the requirements of higher headquarters. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He must report anything unusual concerning the civil population and the guerrilla force, no matter how trivial. Small unit operations are the basis of counterguerrilla operations. Every troop leader and individual in contact with the enemy or civilian population must be thoroughly intelligence conscious. Small unit commanders must process and act promptly on intelligence information gathered by units.

302. **INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS**

The guerrilla force, the civil population, and the terrain are virtually inseparable factors in guerrilla warfare. To destroy the guerrilla movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required of all three as follows:

a. **Guerrilla Force.** The following intelligence is sought concerning the guerrilla force:

(1) Identification, composition, organization, and disposition of the guerrilla force.
(2) Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points, and trails.

(3) Strength and combat efficiency of the guerrilla force, to include: status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

(4) Guerrilla force methods of operation in tactics, politics, economics, proselytizing, and propaganda.

(5) Guerrilla force arms and equipment.

(6) Capability of guerrilla forces to attack installations and disrupt lines of communication.

(7) Supply sources of food, commodities, weapons, ammunition, and means for providing logistic support to the guerrilla force.

(8) Factors which caused or contributed to the development and continuing motivation of the guerrilla force.

(9) Relationship between the guerrilla and civil population.

(10) Relationship with and degree of support from any external forces or sponsoring power.

(11) Psychological vulnerabilities.

b. Civil Population. --Recognizing that several items of desired intelligence pertaining to the guerrilla force also bear directly on the civil population (for example, items (4), (7), (8), and (9) above), we seek the following intelligence concerning the civil population:

(1) Identification of hostile, neutral, or uncommitted and friendly elements.

(2) Motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population.

(3) Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.

(4) Effect of local authorities and police on civil population.
(5) Capability of the area to furnish food.

(6) Availability of water and fuels.

(7) Vulnerability of friendly civil population to terrorism.

(8) Estimated effect of civil populace and resources control measures, such as: curfews, search and seizures, movement restrictions, food and commodity controls, pass and tag systems, relocation, and suspension of certain civil liberties.

(9) Psychological vulnerabilities.

(10) Relationship of local authorities and police with the guerrilla force operating in the vicinity of their community.

c. Terrain.--An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counterguerrilla operations. Terrain information is continuously collected and processed. The resulting intelligence is promptly disseminated usually via special photo studies, reports, and overlays contained in intelligence estimates, special reports of annexes to operation plans, and orders. Particular effort is made to collect information concerning the following:

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or secure areas. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

   (a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

   (b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

   (c) Covered withdrawal routes.

   (d) Located within one day's foot movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

   (e) Adequate water supply.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communication.
(4) Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on seasons when the streams are at flood stage.

(5) Areas where drinking water is not available.

(6) Areas where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

(7) Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

(8) Location of likely guerrilla or counterguerrilla ambush sites.

(9) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

(10) When guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power: location of areas suitable for airdrops, boat or submarine rendezvous, and roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas.

(11) Location of all known or suspected harboring sites for the guerrilla force.

(12) Location of all known or suspected guerrilla strongpoints, field fortifications, weapons emplacements, and antiaircraft positions.

303. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

a. Modifications. --The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of friendly units, the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, and the presence of indigenous military and paramilitary units, dictate modification of normal intelligence procedure. Intelligence section organization and functions are modified as required at all levels of command having an intelligence section. The criteria is the nature and extent of the intelligence effort required to support the mission, availability of qualified personnel within the landing force as a whole, and the personal preferences of the intelligence officer and the commander. Combat operations normally will require augmentation with interrogator-translators, air observers, counterintelligence personnel, order of battle analysts, interpreters, and possibly imagery interpreters, reconnaissance and surveillance specialists, and technical intelligence personnel.

b. Counterguerrilla Intelligence Functions. --The intelligence section at landing force level may be organized by the establishment of special
subsections to accommodate a special function. For example, a covert collection unit may be required to supervise agent activities. A records subsection may be created to develop and maintain information concerning the civil population and guerrilla force. The most important counterguerrilla intelligence functions include the following:

(1) Combat Intelligence. --The primary requirement of combat intelligence is to locate the guerrilla force. Emphasis is placed on overt collection of information. Most of the functions of the conventional combat intelligence subsection are applicable. Special attention is given to the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence. Careful attention to seemingly minor guerrilla preparations and activities is essential to the development of meaningful intelligence on impending guerrilla operations. Assignment of order of battle analysts to specific geographic areas is desirable to maintain continuity in concentrated analysis and development of meaningful intelligence, particularly from those sources over which the landing force has no direct control or influence.

(2) Clandestine Collection. --Clandestine collection is extremely important in counterguerrilla operations. Every effort is made to infiltrate the guerrilla force and hostile civilian elements with reliable agents. Indigenous persons are usually capable of infiltrating the guerrilla force; they have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain; and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with, members of the guerrilla force. Potential agents are carefully screened to ensure that they are not double agents; their reliability is constantly checked. The recruiting, training, and handling of agents requires highly trained intelligence personnel. Because of the sensitive nature of agent operations and the emphasis placed on clandestine collections, this function is usually separated from combat intelligence. However, the results of clandestine collection are given to the combat intelligence subsection. Clandestine collection of intelligence must be closely coordinated at the highest level of command having cognizance over the specific area of operations. Normally clandestine collection responsibilities will be assigned to counterintelligence personnel who have received special training in this function.

(3) Aerial Reconnaissance. --Functions of the aerial reconnaissance subsection are essentially the same as for conventional operations. Special attention is directed toward preplanned and on call reconnaissance and observation missions in direct support of widely separated battalions and smaller units. Included will be a continuing requirement to ensure,
under various tactical situations, compatibility of communication equip-
ment and frequency assignments between supporting aircraft and supported
ground element, particularly with regard to units smaller than battalion.
See paragraph 804 for details on aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Psychological Operations. -- The added emphasis of psycho-
logical operations requires that all intelligence be evaluated in terms of
psychological application. The efforts of the intelligence section and the
psychological operations agencies are closely related. For example, the
intelligence section is interested in the guerrilla food supply; whereas,
psychological operations agencies are interested in whether or not appeals
developed on a food theme would cause disaffection, or even surrender.
In addition to working closely with each other, intelligence personnel and
psychological operations personnel provide mutual assistance in the execu-
tion of their respective tasks. See paragraph 406 for a discussion of psy-
chological operations.

(5) Biographic Data. -- Records on guerrilla commanders and
members, and key members of the hostile civil population, should be main-
tained. Frequently, the operations or behavior of these individuals develop
a pattern which, recognized, may aid materially in the conduct of opera-
tions against them. The names and locations of families, relatives, and
friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable
sources of information and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas.
In communities friendly to the guerrilla force, some persons are respon-
sible for collecting food and providing other aid for the guerrillas, such as
relaying messages and providing temporary security. Every effort must
be made to discover these persons. Instead of immediate arrest, it is bet-
ter to watch their activities and seek to apprehend the guerrillas contacting
them. Establishment and maintenance of records concerning black and
gray lists should be restricted to those units having the capability to ad-
minister them. Such efforts should be coordinated and supervised by the
counterintelligence team assigned to the landing force.

(6) Interrogator-Translators and Interpreters. -- Fleet Marine
Force interrogation-translation teams are limited in number and language
spread. Consequently, commands preparing for operations against guer-
rilla forces should utilize available personnel that have the appropriate
language facility and document reading capability to assist unit intelligence
personnel. These personnel must be afforded maximum possible combat
intelligence training prior to operations. They may be integrated into the
intelligence section of tactical units or be assigned as augmentation to,
and operate under, interrogation-translation teams. In cases where
personnel with language capabilities are not available, landing force commands will normally employ indigenous personnel as interpreters and document translators for duty with interrogation-translation teams. However, it is essential that these personnel be carefully screened and constantly supervised by qualified intelligence personnel. Because of general lack of military background of indigenous personnel, bilingual dictionaries should be obtained prior to embarkation to assist in their training.

(7) Counterintelligence. --Guerrilla forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to offset the superior combat power of the counter-guerrilla force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely on the effectiveness of the guerrillas' intelligence agencies, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize his intelligence system. To assist in achieving surprise in counterguerrilla operations and to counter the guerrilla intelligence system in general, assigned or attached counterintelligence personnel will normally ensure that:

(a) Security indoctrination lectures, surveys, evaluations, and inspections are conducted in order to maintain an adequate level of personnel, document, and physical security.

(b) Standing operating procedures and operation orders contain appropriate instructions and guidance relative to personnel, document, physical, and related security and counterintelligence functions.

(c) Civil security measures are instituted as requirements dictate. Such items as security screening of civilian employees, institution of curfews and other circulation control measures, and monitoring of suspect political groups will normally be accomplished or coordinated by counterintelligence personnel.

(d) Embarkation security measures are adequate, ensuring the maintenance of the necessary secrecy in troop and unit movement and protection of equipment from sabotage attempts.

(e) Appropriate advice and assistance on censorship or suspension of civil communications is provided.

(f) Appropriate investigations are conducted when disregard or violation of censorship or security regulations occur. Additionally, counterintelligence personnel may conduct security investigations into incidents wherein espionage, sabotage, or subversion are suspected.
(g) U.S. personnel who have escaped or otherwise been returned to U.S. control subsequent to capture are properly debriefed for intelligence and counterintelligence of immediate tactical value.

(h) Liaison with friendly intelligence and police organization is maintained so that timely and accurate information concerning enemy activity may be received.

(i) Special counterintelligence operations such as the following are conducted:

1. Operation of informant nets.

2. Surveillance of known or suspected guerrilla force agents.

3. Maintenance of blacklist files and planning of operations to apprehend personnel listed therein. Special emphasis will be given to planning operations to apprehend guerrilla infrastructure personnel.

4. Reemployment of enemy guerrilla agents in aggressive counterintelligence operations.

5. Identification, neutralization, and exploitation of counterintelligence targets.

6. Such other special operations as may be directed by higher headquarters.

(8) Miscellaneous Functions.--Other functions, which may take on added importance in counterguerrilla operations and which may require additional specialists, include such fields as communications, sociology, politics, and agriculture.

(9) Administration.--These functions handled by the administrative subsection are not unusual in counterguerrilla operations, unless there is a requirement for large-scale maps in sufficient quantities for distribution down to and including the rifle squad level.

304. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING AGENCIES AND SOURCES

Intelligence collecting agents include trained agents, intelligence specialists, various civilian agencies and individuals, and troop units. Units
and individual troops play a prominent part in the collection effort. All troops must realize the importance of reporting, as accurately as possible, every piece of information which they obtain about the guerrilla force, civil population, and the topography of the area. The sources from which information is obtained include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Patrol Reports. --A primary source in the collection effort is the patrol report regarding: food cultivation, food dumps, camps, trails and roads, arms and ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment, and tactics.

b. Surrendered and Captured Guerrillas.--A surrendered guerrilla can be an extremely valuable source of information for both immediate tactical exploitation or for developing intelligence on a broader scale. They can be particularly useful in the role of returning to guerrilla-held areas to gain additional information or solicit further surrenders. Such use of surrendered guerrillas can best be accomplished and coordinated by higher level intelligence in units. Care must be used in handling surrendered and captured guerrillas in order to avoid nullifying the psychological advantage gained. The following points must be considered in each case:

(1) Avoid "advertising" the fact that a guerrilla is a prisoner until competent authority has decided how best to exploit him.

(2) Strictly prohibit the abuse, maltreatment, or harassment of surrendered or captured prisoners.

(3) Restrict interrogation to a minimum number of people, and ensure that interrogation is accomplished by qualified interrogators whenever possible.

(4) Expedite captured guerrillas to the landing force collection point for processing. Immediate exploitation of a captive by the capturing tactical unit should be undertaken only when such exploitation will result directly in lives saved or when a substantial tactical advantage can be expected to occur from such exploitation. Such retention must be reported immediately. Any lengthy retention must be approved by landing force headquarters.

c. Captured Documents.--All captured documents should be forwarded immediately to the landing force intelligence section for translation. In cases where interrogator-translator subteams are directly supporting widespread forward tactical units, these personnel may initially screen captured documents prior to forwarding to higher headquarters. To ensure prompt processing of documents, the following considerations must be kept in mind:
(1) Do not separate documents captured together. Documents must be translated and analyzed in context with each other in order to be meaningful.

(2) Use capture tags attached to the document or package of documents to note the identification and capture circumstances.

(3) Keep separately captured documents apart from each other with capture tags attached to each document or package of documents.

(4) Do not deface or write directly on the surface of any captured document.

(5) Make every effort to keep documents dry. If documents are wet when captured, dry by airing, if possible, prior to forwarding.

(6) Forward all wallets and personnel effects intact, annotating the contents on the capture tag.

d. Dead Guerrillas

(1) Sometimes the identification of dead guerrillas is the only means of identifying the enemy organization in the area. Identification can be accomplished best by onsite inspection and interrogation of POWs and local inhabitants by intelligence personnel when circumstances permit.

(a) If onsite inspection is not feasible, or if bodies are believed to be of special significance or require special identification, they should be delivered to a higher echelon intelligence section via helicopter.

(b) Ground evacuation of dead guerrillas should not be undertaken if decomposition has set in, or will set in before delivery.

(2) Identification techniques can be applied on the spot and include the following:

(a) Photographs. -- For successful photography of the body, the face should be washed and the hair should be brushed back from the face. The eyes should be opened before photographing. A minimum of two full photos at short range should be taken.

(b) Fingerprints. -- In fingerprinting, the main principle to be observed is cleanliness of both the equipment and the fingers to be printed.
(c) **Description.** -- The following information is required for a description:

1. Sex.
2. Race.
3. Apparent age.
4. Height, build, and facial features.
5. Teeth, scars, and deformities.

e. **Information Obtained From Civilians and Agents.** -- Unit intelligence sections should be notified of any civilian possessing information of intelligence interest. Agents are handled in accordance with procedures discussed in paragraph 303. Normally, subordinate units of the landing force should not develop their own agents or informers to acquire information. Persons claiming to be agents shall be detained and segregated and counterintelligence personnel contacted for disposition.

(1) It is of great importance that all captured communication equipment be recovered for inspection. Units capturing guerrilla equipment should note the following:

(a) Type of set; i.e., transmitter/receiver, transmitter, or receiver.
(b) Make, name, and number of set.
(c) Location at time of capture.
(d) Frequencies shown on dials at time of capture.
(e) Direction of the aerial (including compass bearing).

(2) Captured equipment is expeditiously reported to the unit intelligence section. Frequency dials are carefully read before the set is moved and, if possible, locked to prevent change during transit.

g. **Monitoring.**

(1) Units receiving a signal of unknown origin should immediately report it to the intelligence section. This report includes frequency
and call sign. All information obtained during the monitoring is sent to the intelligence center.

(2) Documents relating to communications and those found in proximity to communication equipment are sent to the intelligence section as quickly as possible.

h. Food Cultivation

(1) Guerrillas may be forced to cultivate for food supply. If this occurs, either the crops are destroyed or used as lure to trap the guerrilla. Guidance will be necessary from experts to say whether the amount of cultivation is sufficient only for the local population, or if it is so large that the guerrillas may live off it as well.

(2) Units discovering cultivations will report:

(a) Location.
(b) Size.
(c) Type.
(d) Condition; e.g.,

Stage 1 - Freshly cut.
Stage 2 - Cut and cleared.
Stage 3 - Prepared and hoed.
Stage 4 - Growing crops tended.
Stage 5 - Growing crops untended.
Stage 6 - Harvested.
Stage 7 - Disused and overgrown.

i. Arms and Ammunition

(1) Units recovering arms and ammunition from guerrillas will report to the unit intelligence section:

(a) Description and identification of weapons.
(b) Quantity and caliber of ammunition.
(c) Date ammunition was manufactured and whether or not the ammunition is serviceable.
(d) Whether or not the ammunition has been reloaded and resized.

(2) All new ordnance items and those encountered in the area for the first time, including mines, explosives, and boobytraps, will be recovered, deactivated by competent personnel, and forwarded to the intelligence section for technical examination whenever possible; otherwise, intelligence and technical personnel should make an onsite examination of the items. In any case, a full report should be made by the capturing unit giving circumstances of capture, serviceability, condition, identification marks/numbers, and technical data.

j. Aerial Reconnaissance.--Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, is discussed in paragraph 804.

k. Local Military and Civil Authorities.--Close liaison must be maintained at all levels of command with local military and civilian authorities. The use of liaison officers at local military and governmental headquarters is advisable on a continuous basis in order to exploit the information available to those agencies. Their assistance in identifying local loyal elements and guerrilla forces must be solicited. Their knowledge of local terrain must be exploited. The information obtained should be processed through unit intelligence channels.

l. Ground Reconnaissance.--An aggressive program of ground reconnaissance must be conducted in an effort to find enemy guerrilla bands. Agent and other reports of movement and location of guerrilla elements can be used as a basis for determining the areas to be covered by fixed and moving ground reconnaissance units. Particular attention should be paid to coverage of suspected enemy safety zones, supply and ammo caches, and training areas. See subparagraph 906 for a further discussion of reconnaissance units.
SECTION 4

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

401. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps experience and knowledge in planning for amphibious operations offer a distinct advantage in planning counterguerrilla operations. Those procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning operations against guerrillas which are similar to planning the amphibious assault include the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all echelons of the forces involved. At higher echelons, parallel planning starts with the inception of the operation.

(2) The complex nature of counterguerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does not initially exist and is unpredictable.
during the operation. Accordingly, plans must be flexible and responsive to meet the problems of combat and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. LFM 02, Doctrine for Landing Forces, provides additional information concerning the landing force in counterinsurgency operations.

c. This section covers such features of counterguerrilla operations as area organization, combat forces, organization of forces, conduct of combat operations, and psychological operations.

402. PLANNING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations

(1) Area Control. --The establishment of strict control within the resistance area is required, particularly when a close relationship exists between the civil population and the guerrillas. Positive control is essential in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(2) Concurrent Operations. --A number of diversified actions such as tactical operations, psychological warfare, civil populace control, and civic action (political, social, and economic) are conducted concurrently. This requires a single authority at each level of operation to assure agreement of purpose, coordination, and control.

(3) Intelligence. --The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. Friendly troop deployments, the nature of the enemy, and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population impose special requirements. Additional intelligence and counterintelligence personnel are required.

(4) Guerrilla Force. --Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strength of the guerrilla force usually includes: motivation, knowledge of the area, and irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses usually include: dependence on an unreliable supply system and general support of the civil population, and lack of good communications, air support, and heavy weapons.
(5) Application of the Principles of War. --Although counter-guerrilla operations differ from normal combat, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility is largely achieved by well-trained, fast-moving, unburdened infantry and by use of helicopters. Surprise is accomplished by superior mobility, offensive action, and good security, including deception. Mass is usually characterized, not by heavy fire power and large troop concentrations, but by sufficient forces at the right place at the right time. Economy of force is reflected in the organization of forces and organization of the area to assure that only essential forces are employed and that the most advantageous dispositions are made. Guerrillas rely heavily on surprise; good security will minimize this problem and at the same time enhance the achievement of surprise by counterguerrilla forces. Cooperation/coordination is carefully observed between counterguerrilla forces and with civil authority. Although the overall operation is complex in nature, simplicity, particularly in plans, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike normal operations, objectives essential to accomplishing the mission are seldom related to geographic features; in counterguerrilla operations the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) Small Unit Actions. --The majority of counterguerrilla operations consist of small unit actions. Because of the nature of guerrilla warfare, small units are required to establish control over the area and to make contact with the guerrillas. Small units are capable of engaging most contacts because most guerrilla groups are small in size. In addition to providing detailed coverage of an area, small units have the degree of mobility to respond to guerrilla activity.

(7) Areas of Responsibility. --The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas or areas coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific areas of responsibility are assigned to subordinate forces capable of conducting independent counterguerrilla operations within their area from a base or bases established within or adjacent to the area. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, the guerrilla activity, and the estimated guerrilla force. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion size task forces, which will be assigned an area responsibility.
(8) **Terrain.** --Terrain will influence the organization of the area, the size and composition of forces, and the tactics and techniques employed by the counterguerrilla force.

(9) **Communications.** --The extreme dispersion of units in operations against guerrilla forces places a heavy demand on the communication means throughout the counterguerrilla force. Augmentation by communication personnel and equipment is usually required.

b. **Specific Considerations.** --Planning for military operations against guerrilla forces requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, and social) and the military situations. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's estimate:

1. **Terrain and Weather**
   a. Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.
   b. Existence of possible guerrilla bases.
   c. Effect of weather and seasons of the year on both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

2. **Inhabitants**
   a. Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy and their morale, strength of will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship. Particular attention is given to the following:

   1. Farmers and other rural dwellers.
   2. Criminals and "tough" elements.
   3. Persons known to adhere to the ideologies of the guerrillas.
   4. Former members of armed forces.
   5. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or tendencies.
(b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla force and guerrilla support activities.

(c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.

(d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(e) Knowledge of the attitudes, customs, and traditions of the indigenous population.

(3) **Guerrilla Resources.** --The resources available to the guerrilla force, including the following:

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.

(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.

(c) The availability of water and fuels.

(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) **Sponsoring Power.** --Guerrilla force relations with any external sponsoring power, including the following:

(a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.

(b) Communications with the guerrilla force.

(c) Capability to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) **Guerrilla Organization.** --The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including the following:

(a) Their origin and development.

(b) Their strength, morale, and status of training.

(c) The personality of the leaders.
(d) Relations with the civil populace.

(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.

(f) Status of equipment and supplies.

(g) Effectiveness of communications.

(h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.

(6) **Friendly Forces.** --The size and composition of friendly forces available for operations against the guerrillas, including the following:

(a) Own forces.

(b) Other military units available in the area if needed.

(c) Civil police, militia, and self-defense units.

(7) **Local Relationships.** --The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla force.

403. AREA ORGANIZATION, COMBAT BASES, AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

a. **General**

(1) **Requirements.** --The operational area and military forces must be organized to provide:

(a) Unity of action and area administration with civil forces.

(b) Secure bases from which to conduct operations.

(c) Security detachments for protecting critical military and civil installations, essential routes of communication, and key communities.

(d) Forces for conducting tactical operations against guerrilla forces.
(e) Forces for civil populace control and tasks of a police
nature such as road blocks and search and seizure.

(2) Indigenous Personnel. --To minimize the requirement for
military units, maximum use is made of indigenous organizations and
individuals, consistent with their reliability and capability, and policy
agreements. Organizations such as village self-defense units, police,
or friendly guerrillas may exist or be organized to provide local defense
and to assist in establishing and maintaining civil populace control. Sup-
port for indigenous organizations, such as arms, ammunition, food, and
communication equipment, is normally required. Individuals may be
employed as laborers, informants, guides, interpreters, and translators.
For detailed discussion, see section 11.

(3) Terrain. --Terrain will affect the organization of the area
and the organization of forces. Area boundaries should not divide key
terrain features. Guerrillas are likely to exist in areas of rugged or
inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps.
Conversely, since the guerrillas must seek their support from the local
population, they can be encountered in hamlets and villages, particularly
in rural areas. Such areas are difficult to control and therefore may
limit the size of the lower echelon areas of responsibility and influence
the organization of forces as a result of the following:

(a) The requirement for extensive patrolling emphasizes
the role of infantry. The need for support by artillery and air does not
diminish however. Constant pressure by aggressive well-trained troops
will keep the guerrillas off balance.

(b) The use of combat support elements may be precluded
or their effectiveness limited. This is particularly true in the case of
tanks, trucks, and certain artillery pieces.

(c) The requirement for air support, particularly heli-
copters, is emphasized.

b. Area Organization

(1) Boundaries. --The entire area of operations is subdivided
into areas of responsibility using clearly defined boundaries. Although
it is desirable for areas of responsibility to coincide with political
subdivisions to ensure maximum cooperation from civil authorities, in many cases, boundaries must be dictated by overriding military considerations.

(2) Area and Sector Assignment. --Areas of responsibility are normally assigned to infantry battalions. Sectors of the area of responsibility may be further assigned to subordinate rifle companies. It may be necessary to further assign definite sectors to platoons.

(3) Size. --The size of the area assigned to a battalion depends on the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla activity, size of the guerrilla force, the forces available, and the mission. For example, if the area is heavily infested with guerrillas, sufficient forces are available, and artillery is assigned to battalions, the limits of their areas may roughly correspond to the range of artillery fire support. On the other hand, it is conceivable that battalions may be assigned areas as large as 300 square miles. Naturally, a battalion cannot expect to operate concurrently over an area that large. If the battalion commander cannot assign company sectors encompassing the entire area, he must divide the area into sectors and determine a priority for their occupation and clearance, coordinating with adjacent units, as necessary. In such cases, particular attention must be paid to the movement and regroupment of guerrillas from occupied sectors to cleared sectors.

(4) Pursuit. --Area or sector boundaries should not prevent the pursuit of guerrilla forces into an adjacent area or sector. Operation orders, SOPs, or other means of coordination should provide for this contingency.

(5) Flexibility. --It must be realized there are no firmly established rules or principles governing area organization. The differences in areas, which are certain to exist, must be accommodated by flexibility in both planning and execution. Changes in the situation, or experience factors, will often produce changes to the initial area organization.

(6) Identification of Degree of Area Control. --For the benefit of troops and civil populace and for purposes of security, it is desirable to identify the degree of control existing in any specific area. The following designations based on traffic light colors may be used:

(a) RED AREA. --Area under part-time or continuous control of guerrillas. Any persons therein are suspected members of
the guerrilla force. Troops will maintain a combat status and vehicles must travel in convoys with an armed escort.

(b) **YELLOW AREA.** Area in which guerrilla forces periodically appear but which is under neither friendly nor guerrilla control. Troops must carry individual weapons in such areas and must not move alone. Vehicles must have at least one guard, armed, riding in the open. Curfew and other population control measures are strongly enforced.

(c) **GREEN AREA.** Area under positive friendly control. Stringent population control measures are lifted. Troops must not move alone. Vehicles may travel without guards.

c. **Combat Bases**

(1) **Location.** Combat bases are established by battalions within or immediately adjacent to their area of responsibility. In some cases, particularly where the battalion area of responsibility is large, rifle companies may establish combat bases in their sectors. A combat base is moved as often as necessary for security purposes and to remain within effective striking range of guerrilla units. Patrols operating from battalion or company combat bases may establish temporary patrol bases to extend their operations. When practicable, helicopters and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment and support of troops to reduce the number of combat bases. See paragraph 603 for a discussion of combat bases established in conjunction with a static security post.

(2) **Size.** A combat base is the focal point for all tactical operations conducted in the area concerned; however, the base may also accommodate elements conducting nontactical missions in the area. The size of the base will vary with the size of the unit and will be in response to security considerations. Establishment and maintenance of communications with operating units is an additional consideration.

(3) **Security.** A combat base is located to facilitate its own security. The defense of the base is a major consideration since the majority of troops will be absent most of the time conducting operations. Whenever possible, bases are established on the most defensible terrain in the area. Positions encircling the area are prepared and protective
obstacles are employed. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive positions and occupied as required.

(4) Organization. --The comfort and health of the troops are major considerations in the organization of a combat base. Whenever practical, overhead shelter is provided. Messing facilities are established and operated to meet the irregular arrival and departure of forces. Either standard or field expedient showers should be constructed; this and other water needs require an adequate water supply. Some form of physical recreation is provided. Although the highest standards of discipline and sanitation are maintained in the combat base, troops not on guard should be made to feel that it is a place to rest and relax. To maintain good morale in his unit is one of the major challenges presented to a commander during counterguerrilla operations.

d. Organization of Forces

(1) Adaptability of FMF Units for Counterguerrilla Operations. --The flexibility inherent in the Fleet Marine Force for forming task groupments to conduct amphibious operations is readily adaptable to counterguerrilla operations. The doctrine for organizing battalion landing teams is particularly applicable. It is not only significant that FMF units can be rapidly task organized for counterguerrilla operation, but it is equally important that while so employed they retain the capability to revert quickly to the amphibious role for which they are primarily designed. The organization, training, and equipment of FMF units for helicopterborne operations in the amphibious assault especially qualify such units for counterguerrilla operations.

(2) Size and Composition. --The force initially committed should be carefully organized to effect destruction of the guerrillas. Insufficient combat power and faulty organization can only lead to a long frustrating period of indecisive activity. Initial assignment of insufficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would have been required originally. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the guerrilla force, and the attitude of the civilian population. The fact that guerrilla forces usually operate in extremely difficult terrain and without air support, heavy caliber weapons, and armor, reduces the requirement for certain types of combat support forces and combat service support forces. However, the nature of guerrilla force operations usually requires that the counterguerrilla
force be provided with augmentation in such fields as psychological warfare, civil affairs/military government, intelligence, and communications.

(3) Battalion-Size Task Forces. --Whatever the size of the overall force operating against guerrillas, the formation of battalion-size task forces will normally be required. The independent or semi-independent nature of the operations and the diversified missions normally require that a battalion receive augmentation and/or unit reinforcements prior to the conduct of operations. Reinforcements may include appropriate units of reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, motor transport, amphibian vehicles, and engineers. Augmentation may include intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, communications, maintenance, military police, medical, and aviation. Battalion task forces must be prepared to revert to normal land combat operations under their parent regiments, when the hostile threat requires action by larger forces.

(4) Organization. --Within the battalion task force and/or its subordinate rifle companies, units are most frequently organized as follows:

(a) Patrols. --Patrols are extensively used and may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced company. Patrols must be specifically organized and equipped to perform one or more of a variety of missions, and if necessary, for extended commitment over a long period of time. Organization may include appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and members of the civil police. See section 5 for a discussion of patrolling.

(b) Reaction Force. --A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to rapidly engage reported guerrilla forces or reinforce other friendly forces. This force ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by foot, surface vehicle, or helicopter.

404. CONDUCT OF COUNTERGUERRILLA MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. General. --The doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla operations is based on both experience and theory. Experience has shown that there is no pat solution to the problem of defeating guerrillas, that variations in method of operation will be required with each new situation.
Among other things, guerrilla-counterguerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation by the opposing commanders. Commanders must be ever alert to change or adapt their tactics to meet the specific situation at hand.

b. Sequence of Operations. --In general, counterguerrilla operations are conducted in the following sequence:

(1) Organization of the Area. --A commander assigned the mission of combating a guerrilla force moves his unit into the area, establishes subordinate areas of responsibility and combat bases, and employs appropriate security measures. Subparagraph 403c discusses combat bases; and section 6 discusses troop and installation security and the security of transportation.

(2) Isolation of the Guerrilla Force. --Measures directed at populace control and isolation of the guerrilla force from all forms of support are initiated. Much of this effort is accomplished by police-type operations and conducted by either military or civil forces or a combination of both. For a discussion of civil populace control measures see section 10. A discussion of search procedures is contained in section 5. Military responsibilities in connection with the civil populace are discussed in section 10. Psychological operations are commenced to create civilian support for the counterguerrilla effort and civilian and guerrilla disaffection from the guerrilla cause. Paragraph 406 discusses psychological operations. Denial operations (discussed below) to deny guerrillas contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power, are initiated.

(3) Actions Against Guerrilla Force. --Harassing operations, primarily patrolling, are conducted against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations in general are discussed below and the tactics and techniques of patrolling are discussed in section 5. Reaction operations (discussed below) are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against the civil community or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Elimination of Guerrilla Force. --Once a guerrilla force has been located and can be fixed, elimination operations (discussed below) are conducted against it.

(5) Post-Destruction Operation. --After the destruction of the guerrilla force, military forces may participate in the efforts to prevent its resurgence.
c. Concurrent Operations.—While the sequence above is considered normal, it is not intended to indicate that one step of the sequence must be successfully concluded before the initiation of the next. Conversely, the conduct of these steps should overlap in time, with police-type operations, psychological operations, and combat operations being conducted concurrently.

d. Combat Operations.—In general, the four types of combat operations normally conducted against guerrillas include denial operations, harassing operations, reaction operations, and elimination operations. For a discussion of small unit tactics and techniques in connection with these operations, see section 5. The four types of combat operations are as follows:

(1) Denial Operations

(a) Objectives.—Operations to deny the guerrilla force contact with, and support by, an external sponsoring power are initiated early and conducted concurrently with other operations. Denial operations require effective measures to secure border or seacoast areas to prevent communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla force. The scope of these operations will vary and will be determined by such factors as the extent of the border or seacoast area, terrain, and methods and extent of external support.

(b) Conduct.—The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment, whether by air, land, or water, must be determined at the earliest possible time. Border areas are secured by the use of patrols, static security posts, ground and aerial observers, and reaction forces. Extensive use is made of informers and agents. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, and cleared areas are established along the border. Radio direction finding and jamming may be required. Ground surveillance radar is used. Interdiction by various fire support means may be employed and when appropriate, blockade operations by Navy ships and craft.

(c) Other Considerations.—The achievement of success in denial operations may be exceedingly difficult. External support is an important feature of guerrilla operations and as denial operations are intensified, his methods of contact will become more difficult to detect, and often frustrating to a commander of a counterguerrilla force. Perseverance and ingenuity will be essential to success.
(2) Harassing Operations

(a) Objectives. -- Harassing operations are conducted night or day to prevent guerrillas from resting, conducting operations, and receiving support. Such operations will inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge about the terrain and the enemy. Harassing operations are executed primarily by extended patrols and larger combat units. Since guerrilla troop and supply movements are generally executed to provide concealment during the hours of darkness and inclement weather, maximum use must be made of harassing fires, both aviation and artillery, during these periods. The use of air support radar teams to control air-strikes is very effective in supplementing artillery range limitations.

(b) Conduct. -- Harassing operations are conducted primarily by the use of:

1. Aerial and ground reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units, bases, and camps.

2. Continuous aerial surveillance during daylight hours.

3. Extensive patrols and raids against guerrilla bases, camps, outposts, and supply caches.

4. Ambushes.

5. Airstrikes and artillery fires, especially during the hours of darkness and inclement weather.

6. Mining guerrilla routes of communication.

(3) Reaction Operations

(a) When Conducted. -- Reaction operations are conducted by mobile combat reaction forces operating from combat bases. Reaction operations are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against civil or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance. Reaction operations are often conducted in connection with denial and/or harassing operations.

(b) How Conducted. -- When a guerrilla force is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage and destroy the guerrilla
force. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatched if needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Reaction operations will often consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. Once the escape of the guerrilla force has been blocked, the attack is continued to destroy it. The mobility required to envelope and block is provided by helicopters, ground vehicles, and by accelerated foot movement.

(c) Preplanning. --Throughout counterguerrilla operations, commanders at all echelons continually locate possible targets at which the guerrilla might strike and prepare plans for decisive reaction. Guerrilla targets might include important road and railroad junctions, desolate stretches of road and railroad, bridges, key military and police installations, civilian communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and homes of important persons. Reaction plans for such situations are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Potential guerrilla targets should be carefully reconnoitered. To facilitate reaction to a guerrilla attack on such targets, each target and rendezvous point near the target are assigned a code identification. Whenever possible, helicopter landing zones or truck release points are used as rendezvous points. By use of a code designation for the potential target and rendezvous points, orders to the reaction force can be simplified.

(d) Night Operations. --Since guerrilla forces are most active during the hours of darkness, reaction forces must be prepared to conduct operations under the same conditions.

(4) Elimination Operations

(a) Characteristics. --Guerrillas not destroyed by denial, harassing, and reaction operations are often forced by such operations into situations which will require elimination operations aimed at their destruction. Elimination operations are difficult to execute, and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops are thoroughly briefed and, when practicable, rehearsed. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature disclosure of the operation. Elimination operations usually possess the following characteristics:

1. Guerrilla Force Located. --A guerrilla force is definitely located. This may be accomplished during the conduct of denial
harassing, or reaction operations. Forces conducting elimination operations are rarely committed to operations in suspected areas.

2 **Guerrilla Force Vulnerable.** --The guerrilla force is in a reasonably vulnerable situation, susceptible of being fixed in position, or engaged by surprise attack by the counterguerrilla forces.

3 **Guerrilla Force Large.** --The guerrilla force is most often of considerable size.

4 **Friendly Force Larger.** --A force conducting elimination operations is normally much larger than the located guerrilla force. Depending on the size and location of the guerrilla force and the tactics to be employed, it will vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced division; however, one or two reinforced battalions will be most common.

5 **Containment.** --As a prerequisite to destruction of the guerrilla force, every effort is made to contain it. In elimination operations, the degree of success is most often proportionate to the degree of containment. A frontal assault will rarely find an objective, because the guerrilla will seldom defend terrain, favoring withdrawal or escape to engagement. Efforts to fix or contain the guerrilla force will include encirclement, double envelopment, blocking positions on routes of escape, use of supporting fires, or the convergence of two or more forces on the guerrilla force. If the situation does not favor or permit containment, it may prove successful to conduct surprise attacks against the guerrilla force, followed by aggressive pursuit.

6 **Daylight Execution.** --The final steps taken to contain a guerrilla force, and all operations conducted against the guerrillas after containment, are accomplished during daylight hours. Escape is the normal guerrilla reaction to being contained, and darkness facilitates its achievement.

7 **Helicopter Utilization.** --Mobility requirements suggest the employment of helicopterborne troops whenever possible. The use of helicopterborne troops allows a greater freedom of movement, more rapid execution, and an excellent chance of achieving surprise.

(b) **Encirclement.** --The encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and
achieving decisive results. The remainder of this paragraph (404) discusses the considerations related to encirclement and the various destruction tactics used when encirclement is achieved.

1 Troop Requirement. --The terrain, size of the guerrilla force, and troop availability will determine the troop density of the encirclement. In turn, troop density will dictate the destruction tactics following encirclement. The encirclement usually requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and the use of helicopterborne reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

2 Timing. --The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation is aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the guerrillas. Surprise and security may be achieved by conducting the movement to encirclement during the hours of darkness. The encirclement should be completed during early daylight hours to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

3 Occupation of Line of Encirclement. --Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Maximum use of helicopterborne troops will contribute speed to the early phases of the encirclement. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement. A guerrilla force may be expected to react immediately upon discovering that it is encircled. To attempt escape, the guerrillas will probe for gaps, attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt exfiltration of the encirclement, individually or by small groups. Accordingly, every effort is made to simultaneously occupy the entire line of encirclement or if this is not possible, the most likely escape routes are covered first. In addition, upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions, and deploy strong patrols to their front so that early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received.

4 Aircraft Employment. --Aviation plays an important role in operations featuring encirclement. Attack aircraft are employed in a close air support role. Observation aircraft and helicopters are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and as a command vehicle for the commander to control his forces. Helicopters are used to rapidly transport troops to the line of encirclement, or to shift forces from one area to another. The armed helicopter may be used to close the encirclement.
in those areas that cannot be otherwise dominated by other supporting arms, and to prevent the enemy from fleeing the encirclement. Additionally, helicopters equipped with loudspeakers can be used to direct movement of civilians as well as warn the indigenous population not to flee.

5 Elimination of the Guerrilla Force. --Once the encirclement is established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

   a Enticement to Surrender. --The guerrillas are enticed to surrender by psychological warfare techniques such as loud-speaker broadcasting and use of leaflets. This technique has proven effective historically and should not be disregarded.

   b Contraction of the Encirclement. --Operations may consist of a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger forces, it is more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

   c Dividing the Area. --Another technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each sub-area. This technique may also be used in conjunction with contraction of the line of encirclement, after "critical mass" occurs.

   d Hammer and Anvil. --Another technique, usually employed after some degree of contraction, is to have a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the stationary force by offensive action. Either element may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element, while the stationary element holds the guerrilla force in place. This technique is most effective when the blocking or stationary force is located on, or immediately in the rear of a natural terrain obstacle.
e. Variations. --Variations of the operations described above include such techniques as having forces encircle an area and await the enemy attempt to escape as he is subjected to intense saturation type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical aircraft. Flushing fires are discussed in paragraph 902.

   Mission Terms. --The familiar statements of missions and tasks found in operation plans and orders will not always convey a clear picture of the type of operation to be conducted in counterguerrilla warfare. Below are described three mission terms which are considered more precisely descriptive of missions or tasks likely to be assigned to the counterguerrilla force and/or its subordinate units. They are: seize and occupy, search and destroy, and clear and hold.

   (1) Seize and Occupy. --The objective of this mission is the seizure and occupation of a designated area for development of a base to be used for subsequent operations. It is a likely initial landing force mission. This mission may be repeatedly assigned subordinate elements of the landing force as the required network of combat bases is developed.

   (2) Search and Destroy. --The objective of this mission is to locate the enemy and either destroy him or drive him from the area. Troop units are assigned this task when the exact location of the enemy is unknown. This mission is sometimes referred to as "search and clear," or "fix and destroy." The terms are essentially synonymous.

   (3) Clear and Hold. --Although similar to a "search and destroy" mission, the main emphasis of this mission is to hold the designated area. Elements of the landing force are most likely to receive a clear and hold mission when sufficient forces are available to consolidate and control the designated area; or when participating in internal defense operations, the host country military, paramilitary, or governmental agencies are prepared to follow up with measures designed to restore an area to firm, friendly government control on a permanent basis.

405. OPERATIONS FROM MOBILE SEA BASES

   a. General. --Landing force units operating against guerrilla units from a mobile sea base are an effective means of combating insurgency. As previously discussed in subparagraph 403c, the doctrine for operations against guerrilla units normally requires that combat bases be established
to serve as a focal point for operations. The mobile sea base concept is entirely compatible with this doctrine.

b. **Flexibility.** --Counterinsurgency forces based at sea possess the mobility and flexibility required for operations against guerrilla units. Furthermore, the problems associated with a buildup of forces ashore for support and security are greatly reduced.

c. **Mobility.** --The inherent mobility of the amphibious task force as a whole, combined with that of helicopterborne units, will normally ensure a mobile sea base superiority in this capability.

d. **Movement Means.** --Operations against guerrilla units which are conducted from mobile sea bases may employ either landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles, helicopters, or a combination of these movement means as follows:

1. **Helicopters.** --Helicopters are particularly suited to operations against guerrilla units and to operations from mobile sea bases. Helicopters can lift landing force elements directly from the mobile sea base into surprise attacks against guerrilla units or to positions to block avenues of escape during encirclement operations. Helicopterborne forces operating from mobile sea bases are free from dependence on beaches, airfields, or overland lines of communication.

2. **Landing Craft/Amphibian Vehicles.** --Landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles will be the primary movement means in situations where unfavorable geographic or meteorological conditions restrict the employment of helicopters. Generally, areas possessing a system of waterways near the coast will be favorable for landing craft and amphibian vehicle employment.

3. **Combination of Means.** --The use of both helicopters and waterborne craft and vehicles will provide the ideal tactical movement means in some situations. Operations of this type may include landing by one means and withdrawal by another. Other examples include the convergence of forces against insurgent elements, or the conduct of encirclement operations where there is a significant advantage in the commitment of forces from several directions.

e. **Concept of Operations.** --Landing force operations from a mobile sea base may be conducted as independent operations, as a part of an
amphibious operation, or in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. The concept of employment in each of these general categories is discussed in the following subparagraphs:

(1) **Independent Operations.** --When operations from a mobile sea base are conducted as independent operations comprising the total military effort of the counterinsurgency, their speed and flexibility contribute to their effectiveness. During periods of political uncertainty, for example, the establishment of a military force ashore may be an untimely, undesirable, or irrevocable move. In contrast, in operations from a mobile sea base, the landing force may be committed at a precise time and place, with ready withdrawal as an inherent operational characteristic.

(2) **Operations as Part of a Larger Force.** --Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed as part of large-scale counterinsurgency amphibious operations as follows:

(a) **Initiatory.** --To initiate operations preparatory to the full employment of larger forces at a particular time and place.

(b) **Search.** --To determine the whereabouts of insurgent forces and to develop the situation ashore in order that the remaining forces may be committed at the most advantageous time and place.

(c) **Exploitation.** --To exploit those situations where other landing force elements have contacted or contained insurgent forces.

(d) **Isolation.** --To conduct denial and/or interdiction operations aimed at isolating the insurgents from their source of supply.

(3) **Operations in Conjunction With Other Counterinsurgency Operations.** --Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. In these situations the landing force may be employed either as a reaction force in coordination with forces ashore, or as a force to operate in areas otherwise inaccessible.

f. **Navy Elements.** --The Navy elements of a mobile sea base force; e.g., landing craft with operating personnel; may be employed in support of landing forces, either U.S. or indigenous. Navy support capabilities include troop mobility on inland waterways, resupply, surveillance, denial
of waterways to insurgents, and training of indigenous personnel in the naval aspects of warfare in inland waterways areas.

g. **Particular Applicability.**—The doctrine for operations against guerrilla units expressed in other sections of this manual is valid for such operations conducted from a mobile sea base. Although mobile sea base forces are effective in harassing and denial operations, they are particularly suited to the conduct of reaction and elimination operations.

h. **Employment Considerations.**—Employment considerations which require emphasis include the following:

(1) **Reaction Force.**—Regardless of the size of the force or the mission, an element of appropriate size is retained, normally aboard ship, as a reaction force to rapidly engage reported insurgent forces or reinforce other friendly forces.

(2) **Preparatory Measures.**—To minimize delay in reaction and elimination operations, the following preparatory measures are initiated early in the operation and developed throughout:

(a) **Landing Areas.**—Potential landing beaches and helicopter landing zones are selected, reconnoitered, classified as to suitability, and are assigned an identifying code.

(b) **Targets.**—Potential targets for insurgent action are located, reconnoitered, and assigned a code identification. Reaction plans for such situations are prepared in detail, and whenever possible, are rehearsed.

(3) **Harassing Forces.**—Forces conducting harassing operations such as ambush and raid patrols are committed and withdrawn according to precise schedules and usually remain ashore for several days.

(4) **Reaction/Elimination Operations.**—Two general types of employment apply to mobile sea base helicopterborne forces in reaction or elimination operations:

(a) **Simultaneous Landing.**—The simultaneous landing of units adjacent to insurgent forces in landing zones favoring immediate encirclement. This employment exploits surprise and avoids troop
exhaustion but is dependent upon the availability of suitable landing zones.

(b) Coordinated Action. --The second type of employment involves landing, assembly, and reorganization prior to the attack or pursuit of guerrilla units. Coordinated action is facilitated by establishing control of small units before engaging the insurgent forces, thereby minimizing danger to helicopters and troops in the landing phase.

(5) Readiness. --A high state of operational readiness is essential. The requirement for quick response to situations ashore frequently will be a dominant factor.

(6) Withdrawal. --The capability to withdraw and return to the parent ship is an inherent characteristic of operations from a mobile sea base. A major consideration is the determination of the time of withdrawal. In certain harassing operations such as patrolling, the hour of withdrawal can be preplanned. In reaction or elimination operations, or at any other time contact with insurgent forces is made, withdrawal is not conducted until the insurgent force is destroyed or contact is completely broken. Based upon these contingencies, planning for operations from a mobile sea base must ensure flexibility and freedom of action for forces ashore.

(7) Fire Support. --Fire support will include field artillery, either previously established ashore or accompanying the combat units; naval gunfire to the limit of its ranges; and air support. The air support capability should be emphasized as it may be the only fire support means available in operations at great distances inland.

1. Austere Helicopter Bases. --The depth of operations ashore may be extended significantly by the temporary establishment of austere helicopter bases at points near the extreme radius of action from parent ships. These temporary bases are essentially refueling stations and when helicopters are the only means of stockpiling fuel, their availability for other operations is greatly reduced. Therefore, a decision to conduct operations beyond the helicopters' radius of action from their parent ship must be carefully weighed, and should employ minimum forces necessary to accomplish the mission. When helicopter bases are established, they should be simple, well-guarded, and should exist for a limited duration. If for no other reason, these operations should be conducted
periodically for the purpose of convincing the insurgents that they have no safe haven beyond the radius of action of the helicopters from their parent ship.

406. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. Mission.--In a counterguerrilla warfare situation, the mission of psychological operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and civilian agencies in the control and administration of the area of operations.

b. Responsibilities.--Psychological warfare operations are planned and conducted at all echelons. All personnel participating in operations against guerrillas should have an understanding of the purpose and themes of the psychological warfare program supporting the operation. Commanders must maintain liaison with psychological warfare agencies at higher echelons and must:

(1) Constantly seek guerrilla psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited.

(2) Plan and conduct psychological operations to provide direct support of combat operations.

(3) Plan and conduct psychological operations to facilitate civilian control, promote civic action programs and enhance the prestige of the duly constituted government.

(4) Assist in the evaluation of psychological warfare programs by collecting and forwarding feedback information. Close liaison with intelligence and civic action agencies must be maintained by psychological warfare personnel to accomplish this important facet of psychological operations.

(5) Ensure when possible that the psychological effects of military operations are favorable. These psychological effects tend to have greater impact than the effects of propaganda. Often the psychological advantage or disadvantage resulting from tactical operations may weigh more heavily on the ultimate outcome of the conflict than the tactical advantage gained or lost. Commanders should always consider the security of the people. All possible amends should be made for unpreventable damage inflicted by combat.
c. Reference. — FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, provides basic information with regard to the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, its organization, procedures, methods, and techniques. It further describes the procurement and use of intelligence for psychological warfare, the nature of propaganda and the means of communication utilized in its dissemination, and the operational employment of psychological warfare in support of military operations.

d. Psychological Indications. — Psychological indications are those evidences or manifestation of attitudes, whether positive or negative, which may point to the existence of guerrilla or civilian psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda. Personnel participating in combat operations against the guerrillas and those in contact with the civil populace must be alert to psychological indications. Essential elements of information (EEI) may be announced to assist in the determination of indications. Indications may be vague clues, definite signs, or information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured guerrillas; obvious resentment against (or respect for) their leaders among prisoners; or worry (or lack of worry) among civilians or captured guerrillas about conditions in the area.

e. Propaganda. — Propaganda is planned and employed in operations against guerrillas to achieve the following:

1. Demoralize, divide, and disorganize the guerrilla force.

2. Induce defection of guerrilla force members.

3. Reduce or eliminate civilian support of the guerrilla force.

4. Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the guerrilla force.

5. Win the support of noncommitted civilians.

6. Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.

7. Win approval for the presence of the military force.
f. Target Audiences.--For purposes of planning and conducting the propaganda program, the population in the area is divided into the following target audiences:

(1) Guerrilla units.
(2) Underground elements.
(3) Civilians sympathetic to the guerrilla; those who provide information, supplies, refuge, and other assistance to the guerrillas and the underground.
(4) Uncommitted civilians.
(5) Civilians sympathetic to the forces operating against the guerrillas.

g. Propaganda Themes.--Propaganda themes are based on recognizable aspects of friendly civil programs and on the following potentially divisive characteristics of target audiences:

(1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the guerrilla force and civil populace.
(2) Rivalries between guerrilla leaders.
(3) Danger of betrayal.
(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla force.
(5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.
(6) Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the guerrilla forces.
(7) Terror tactics and other inhuman practices employed by guerrillas.

h. Techniques.--The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in most psychological warfare techniques. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, and emotional appeals to persuade the target audiences to adopt a course of action.
rather than to order it to take such a course of action. When the guerrilla force or its civilian supporters are demoralized, the authoritative approach may be effective.

i. **Inducements.** --The granting of amnesty and rewards may induce the guerrilla and his civilian supporters to defect from the guerrilla movement.

j. **Attitude.** --The conduct and attitudes of the individual participant in operations against guerrillas will have a decided psychological influence on the civil populace, and indirectly the guerrilla force.

k. **Communication Media.** --Psychological warfare media are the means or channels of communication to the guerrilla force and civil populace. Media of particular interest to the force conducting operations against guerrillas include the following:

(1) **Leaflets.** --Leaflets and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrols, and agents. Depending on the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet, it may be either primarily textual or primarily pictorial. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. Weather and enemy countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of leaflets. Surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes have proved valuable in past operations against guerrillas.

(2) **Loudspeakers.** --Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles or aircraft as well as lightweight public address equipment that can be hand carried are employed in close support missions. Loudspeaker appeals may be made from aircraft over areas known or suspected to contain guerrillas. During elimination operations, particularly when an encirclement is achieved, loudspeaker surrender appeals are made to the guerrillas. If effective, such appeals will reduce the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance. Loudspeaker appeals should be brief, and made in simple, easily understood language. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification. Surrender appeals should always include specific instructions on how to surrender. Loudspeaker messages are particularly effective when used in conjunction with specific combat actions. For example, a message to an encircled force may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.
(3) Radio Broadcasts. --Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both guerrilla and civilian targets. The audience is limited, however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate wavelength and who will listen if they can.

(4) Other. --Imagination and ingenuity will produce other effective psychological warfare media. Examples are: village bulletin boards, periodic newsletters, and face-to-face persuasion by personnel in contact with civilian population.

407. RIVERINE OPERATIONS

a. General. --In areas where land transportation systems are inadequate or cannot be used, increased emphasis must be placed on waterborne and airborne transportation means. Heavy reliance will be placed on the helicopter to support both tactical and logistical operations. The increased mobility provided by the helicopter over conventional land transportation is even more vital when the primary alternate means are slow, channelized, relatively vulnerable rivercraft. Due to the micro-relief of most delta river areas, ground observation and orientation will be difficult. Helicopters will be required for some of these tasks. Armed helicopters will be valuable for patrolling waterways to prevent the escape of enemy forces during assault operations. The many dispersed, small unit actions will require helicopters for resupply and medical evacuation. Due to the sparsity of firm, dry ground in a delta area, helicopters may be required to operate from LPHS to support riverine operations. Also, it may be necessary to employ special techniques, such as hovering to load and unload troops and supplies, in certain areas. Load factors will probably require adjustment due to the poor hovering-out-of-the-ground effect.

b. Waterway Utilization. --In spite of the advantages of the helicopter, they will frequently not be available in the desired quantity and, in any event, there will be a requirement to use the waterways. A waterway, like a road or railway, is simply a means of communication. If waterways are regarded as such, it will be evident that the tactical principles which govern their control and use for military operations are essentially the same as those which apply to land lines of communication. It follows, that the type of equipment required for such operations on the water, while differing in appearance from that used on land,
will need to serve comparable purposes. The requirements for mobility, armor, firepower, and transport capacity, which are satisfied on the ground by a range of wheeled and tracked vehicles, will have to be met on the waterways by an array of floating craft, adapted to achieving the same ends. Moreover, ground oriented forces will need to learn to look upon waterways as something other than obstacles to be crossed; while maritime forces operating inland will need to become familiar with the principles of ground combat which will influence the characteristics and employment of the craft which they employ. It is significant that these same considerations are applicable to the amphibious attack, and thus, much of the doctrinal basis of those operations has some application--of varying dimensions--in river warfare.

c. Reference.--FMFM 8-4, Doctrine for Riverine Operations, sets forth the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed by Marine Corps forces conducting operations in a riverine environment.
SECTION 5

SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

501. GENERAL

a. **Applicability**. --Operations against guerrillas are characterized by small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This section contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. It includes establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambush, counterambush action, and search procedure. See FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, and FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad, for additional details on special tactics and techniques.

b. **Historical Examples**. --To show the importance of small unit operations, two historical examples are given: an operation conducted in August 1954 in the Philippines and an operation in 1954-55 in Malaya.

(1) The Alert Platoon. --Counterguerrilla operations were conducted by the Philippine Army during the period 1946-60. Beginning in
September 1950, through personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

(a) Typical of small unit operations was the action of the alert platoon of the 17th Battalion Combat Team in the vicinity of Manila, 16-17 August 1954. About midnight, an intelligence agent reported the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for an attack. Immediately, the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With two civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. The terrain and a full moon favored their movement. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

(b) About 200 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions. At 0430, 17 August, the first group advanced toward the objective while members of the second group positioned themselves along the guerrilla's avenue of withdrawal. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they formed into skirmishers about 60 yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry opened fire, but was immediately knocked down. A fire fight continued for about 20 minutes and then the guerrillas broke contact. Attempting to withdraw, they were shot by members of the second group from their ambush positions. This was only one of hundreds of such actions that took place during this period.

(2) Operation "Nassau."--During the period 1948-1960, the British conducted many difficult operations in Malaya. By 1951, the British forces established well-defined objectives and then began a counterguerrilla operation.

(a) Victory in this counterguerrilla operation is attributed to good intelligence work, effective communications, rapid deployment of troops, and food control measures. Rapid deployment was achieved by deploying small units in battalion controlled operations.

(b) Operation "Nassau," typical of the battalion-sized operations in Malaya, began in December 1954 and ended in September 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about 30 yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a
system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about 21 December 1954. On 9 January 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp, day and night, so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them.

(c) Plans were modified; harassing fires were restricted to nighttime only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for three months without results. Finally, on 21 March, an ambush party, after 45 hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map and local morale rose a little.

(d) Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon accounted for two more terrorists. The number 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food.

(e) On 7 July, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, 23 terrorists remained in the swamp with no food and with no communications to the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population were lifted.

(f) This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells; 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition; and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each terrorist represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" was considered a success for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.
502. PATROLLING

a. General. --Aggressive small unit patrols are a necessity in counterguerrilla operations. To make contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops will be occupied primarily with patrol activity in an effort to locate them. Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results. Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics, variations of normal techniques is necessary.

b. Patrol Authority. --The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although overall patrolling policy and certain special patrols may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and need for rapid response makes it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalions, companies, or platoons may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination problems, and troop availability. The actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority are improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. The assignment of operational areas will require considerable coordination to avoid patrol clashes and to permit the pursuit of guerrillas from one area to another. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their parent command(s). Although patrol authority may be decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. To prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOPs should be devised.

c. Planning and Preparation by the Command. --The echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols has numerous responsibilities in connection with their planning and preparation. Depending on the echelon, responsibilities may include all or most of the following:

(1) Training. --Preparation of training programs and exercises relative to patrolling with emphasis on the locale and situation wherein operations are to be conducted.

(2) Selection of Patrol Leaders. --Selection is based upon experience and leadership abilities. Insofar as possible, patrol leaders are rotated to avoid excessive use of a selected few.
(3) **Formulation and Assignment of Patrol Missions.** --Only the commander of the echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols can approve the assignment of patrol missions.

(4) **Patrol Order.** --This order provides the instructions, information, and guidance needed by the patrol leader to plan, prepare, and accomplish the mission.

(5) **Coordination.** --Ensures coordination among the staff, patrol leader, and other units.

(6) **Assignment of Control Measures.** --Assigns control measures such as time of departure, time of return, checkpoints, general route, and communications.

(7) **Arrangements for Support.** --Includes arrangements for fire support, logistic support, transportation, and the assignment of personnel with special qualifications needed to accomplish the mission.

(8) **Supervision.** --Commanders and staff officers actively supervise all phases of patrol planning and preparation, giving patrols the benefit of their own training and experience.

(9) **Debriefing.** --Debriefs patrol upon return.

d. **Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.** --The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order, and after making sure he understands all instructions, information, and guidance, uses the patrol planning steps in his planning and preparation for the patrol mission. The patrol planning steps are:

1. **Plan Use of Time.** --The patrol leader mentally outlines everything that must be done before departing on his mission and allots time for each action. The technique of "backward planning" helps to allow time for all necessary actions. The sequence may vary according to such factors as availability of personnel for coordination, times at which a reconnaissance can be made, and extent of coordination by the command echelon.

2. **Study the Situation.** --Enemy and friendly troop dispositions, strengths, and capabilities will influence the patrol's route, size, organization, weapons, and equipment.
(3) Make a Map Study. --A thorough map study will assist in the reconnaissance and may influence patrol size, organization, equipment, and route.

(4) Coordinate. --The patrol must coordinate movement, fire support, and transportation. The commander may perform some of the coordination, but the patrol leader should doublecheck to ensure complete understanding.

(5) Select Men, Weapons, and Equipment. --Selection of men and weapons will normally be limited to the patrol leader's own unit, and the size is usually prescribed by the command.

(6) Issue a Warning Order. --As soon as possible, the patrol leader issues a warning order to all members of the patrol. (See fig. 1.)

(7) Make a Reconnaissance. --While the patrol prepares, the patrol leader makes a visual (aerial, if possible) reconnaissance.

(8) Complete Detailed Plans.

(9) Issue the Patrol Leader's Order, --(See fig. 2.) The patrol leader orally issues the detailed plan to the patrol. By the use of visual aids and questions, he determines that all members of the patrol understand their jobs.

(10) Inspect and Rehearse. --The patrol leader holds rehearsals (day and night, if the patrol operates at night) to ensure operational proficiency of the patrol. In rehearsals, the patrol members must become thoroughly familiar with the action they are to take during the patrol. The patrol leader holds an inspection before and after rehearsals to determine the physical and mental state of preparation of the patrol.

f. Debriefing. --An SOP for the immediate debriefing of returning patrols is essential. The entire patrol should participate, using a terrain model or large scale map, in tracing the patrol routes and correlating various actions and observations of the patrol members. Debriefing must be done in a relaxed and informal atmosphere. The use of a debriefing form will assist the patrol leader in making his report. The debriefing officer can prepare a thorough report as the debriefing progresses. (See fig. 3.)
FORMAT FOR PATROL WARNING ORDER

The patrol warning order consists of the following minimum items of information:

1. A brief statement of the enemy and friendly situation.
3. General instructions:
   a. General and special organization.
   b. Uniform and equipment common to all, to include identification and camouflage measures.
   c. Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.
   d. Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and who will supervise patrol members' preparation during patrol leader's absence.
   e. Instructions for obtaining rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
   f. The chain of command.
   g. A time schedule for the patrol's guidance. As a minimum, include meal times and the time, place, and uniform for receiving the patrol leader's order.

Figure 1. --Format for Patrol Warning Order.

503. ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE

a. General. --To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are established by company or smaller units and occupied for a few days or less.
FORMAT FOR PATROL LEADER'S ORDER

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.--Weather, terrain, identification, location, activity, and strength.
   b. Friendly Forces.--Mission of next higher unit, location, and planned actions of units on right and left, fire support available for patrol, mission, and route of other patrols.
   c. Attachments and Detachments.

2. MISSION
   What the patrol is going to accomplish.

3. EXECUTION
   Subparagraph for each subordinate unit.
   a. Concept of operation.
   b. Specific duties of elements, teams, and individuals.
   c. Coordinating instructions.
      (1) Time of departure and return.
      (2) Formation and order of movement.
      (3) Route and alternate route of return.
      (4) Departure and reentry of friendly area(s).
      (5) Rallying points and actions at rallying points.
      (6) Actions on enemy contact.
      (7) Actions at danger areas.
      (8) Actions at objective.
      (9) Rehearsals and inspections.
      (10) Debriefing.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   a. Rations.
   b. Arms and ammunition.
   c. Uniform and equipment (state which members will carry and use them).
   d. Method of handling wounded and prisoners.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
   a. Communications
      (1) Signals to be used within the patrol.
      (2) Communications with higher headquarters--radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times to report, and special code to be used.
      (3) Challenge and password.
   b. Command
      (1) Chain of command.
      (2) Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader in formation.

Figure 2. --Format for Patrol Leader's Order.

b. Deception.--A patrol base is secretly occupied. Secrecy is maintained by practicing carefully planned deception techniques. Deception plans should include the following considerations:

   (1) If possible, the march to the base is conducted at night.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation of Patrol</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TO:**

**MAPS:**

A. **Size and Composition of Patrol**
   - Description of the terrain: dry, swampy, jungle, thickly wooded, high brush, rocky, deepness of ravines and draws; condition of bridges as to type, size, and strength; effect on armor and wheeled vehicles.

B. **Task**
   - Strength, disposition, condition of defense, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, exact location, movements, and any shift in disposition; time activity was observed; grid references where activity occurred.

C. **Time of Departure**

D. **Time of Return**

E. **Routes (Out and Back)**

F. **Terrain**

G. **Enemy**

H. **Any Map Corrections**
   - Enemy prisoners and disposition; identifications; enemy casualties; captured documents and equipment.

I. **Miscellaneous Information**

J. **Results of Encounters With the Enemy**
   - Miscellaneous information: civilians, their location and activity.

K. **Condition of Patrol**

L. **Conclusions and Recommendations:**
   - Including to what extent the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.

**Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit of patrol leader**

**M. Additional Remarks by Interrogator**

**Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit/date of debriefing**

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**Figure 3. --Patrol Report Form.**

1. The route selected avoids centers of population.

2. If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol in remote areas are detained.
(4) Patrols crossing inhabited areas deceive the populace by marching on indirect routes.

(5) At night, in the desert or in dense vegetation, navigation and control require special consideration.

(6) Scouts operate forward of the main body of the patrol.

(7) Bases are located beyond areas that are patrolled daily.

(8) If security permits, smokeless fuel is burned.

(9) The base is not established on an existing trail and normally not more than one trail should be made into the base. It is camouflaged and guarded.

(10) After a reconnaissance, the base is occupied as quickly and quietly as possible. Security is established beyond sight and hearing of the base.

(11) The route to the base is selected by use of photos, maps, ground, and aerial reconnaissance.

(12) If practical, the patrol leader makes an aerial reconnaissance.

(13) Terrain features that are easily identified are selected as checkpoints and rest breaks.

(14) Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued. If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

c. **Locating the Base**

(1) The base must be secret and secure. A patrol operating from a base unknown to the enemy increases the possibility of guerrilla contact. A secure base permits the troops to rest.

(2) The base should be located on dry, easily drained terrain for health and comfort.
(3) The base must have facilities of terrain suited for the erection of adequate radio antennas.

(4) If it is anticipated that an airdrop or a helicopter resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone or landing point should not be located too close to the base.

d. **Layout of a Base.** --All units should have an SOP for quickly establishing a base. After an SOP has been used during training, laying out a base becomes simple routine. The patrol leader indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.

e. **Sequence of Establishment.** --A suggested sequence for establishing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:

(1) **Leaving the Road or Trail.** --The jungle and heavy woods provide the best security from surprise and the best conditions for defense. Generally, the best method to use in leaving the trail or road is:

   (a) Select the point to leave the trail or road.

   (b) Maintain security while the column moves off the trail.

   (c) Have men at the end of the column camouflage the area where the exit was made from the trail.

   (d) Continue movement until a suitable bivouac site is reached.

(2) **Occupation of the Bivouac Site**

   (a) This occupation is based on a platoon of three squads, but the force may be larger or smaller. Using the clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.
(b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader stands in the center of the base, indicates 12 o'clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each squad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. One fire team maintains security and the remaining two prepare positions for defense.

(3) Digging-In. --The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to be occupied. Shelters are not erected until adequate individual protection is assured. Clearing of fields of fire is accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) Sentries. --Upon completion of defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least one sentry, the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted closer to squad positions than during daylight. Additional sentries may be posted on the trail and on key terrain features.

(5) Water. --A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point and spots selected for drinking and for bathing. Normally, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for 24 hours or less. Security is provided.

(6) Garbage. --Each squad digs a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat menace.

(7) Perimeter Path and Marking Trails. --Narrow paths are cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position and around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may be strung waist high along each path as a guide.

(8) Smoking. --Smoking is permitted only when authorized by the patrol leader. Police of the trash incident to smoking must be strictly supervised.

(9) Radios. --Personal radios must not be permitted on patrol.
f. Base Alert. --The critical periods for defending the base are dawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:

(1) Enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the nature of the ground to his front and flanks.

(2) Allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

(3) Provides a definite cutoff period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the morning alert, the daily routine begins.

(4) Enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment.

g. Alarm. --The patrol must have a suitable alarm system to signal the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This alarm system should not sound foreign to the operational area and must not be easily detectable by the enemy. The system must be designed so as to allow sufficient reaction time by the patrol.

h. Administration of a Base

(1) Cooking Fires and Smoke. --The smell of cooking and smoke can carry up to 200 meters in the woods or jungle. Fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy or when guerrilla patrols are active. If cooking is permitted during daylight hours, only smokeless fuel is used.

(2) Location of Heads. --Heads are located in protected areas.

(3) Disposal of Garbage. --Garbage and trash must be disposed of as it occurs. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and food are buried and camouflaged.

(4) Water Purification. --The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.
(5) Cooking. --When each man carries his own rations, cooking will be done on an individual basis. If 5-in-1 or 10-in-1 type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. Leaving a Base. --Before leaving the base, all signs of occupation are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. A careful check is made for discarded cigarette butts, empty cigarette packs, and trash from ration containers. The area is left to appear as though it had not been occupied.

504. ATTACKING GUERRILLA HOUSES AND CAMPS

a. Attacking Houses. --In planning an attack:

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers, or intimidated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.

(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(4) The patrol is no larger than required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.

(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.

(6) All available cover is used.

(7) All avenues of escape are covered either physically or by fire.

(8) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. Attacking Camps. --Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.
(1) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.

(2) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches. This can be traced on the ground.

(3) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction, slowly and cautiously.

(4) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of withdrawal.

(5) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.

(6) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event of refusal, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

c. Destroying Captured Bivouacs.--The value of a camp as a known enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites they have previously found satisfactory, particularly if shelters have been constructed.

505. AMBUSHES

a. General.--An ambush is an effective means for attacking patrols, columns, and moving vehicles. It is normally executed in terrain which restricts movement, such as trails, roads, bridges, stream crossings, and similar areas. The terrain must afford concealment to the ambushing unit. Maximum fires are placed on the target. As a rule, an effective ambush lasts only a few minutes. There are two types of ambushes; immediate and deliberate.

b. Immediate Ambush.--An immediate ambush is one initiated by the unexpected approach of the enemy. The situation provides little or no time for planning, reconnaissance, or detailed position choice. Success in this type of ambush is dependent upon discipline, prior training, and decisive leadership.

(1) On signal from the individual first seeing or hearing the enemy, the nearest elements of the ambush group take cover and remain
still, even though the most desirable positions cannot be reached. Other elements seek better positions but on the same side of the road or trail as the first elements. Machinegun positions are chosen with as much care as the circumstances allow.

(2) Ideally, the ambush leader signals open fire when the enemy is within the ambush. However, if the ambush is discovered, any member may give the signal.

(3) Cease fire, pursuit, and reassembly are conducted by SOP as the leader directs.

c. Deliberate Ambush. --An ambush is deliberate when there is time for planning, preparation, briefing, and, if possible, rehearsal.

(1) Planning

(a) Intelligence. --Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents, photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Information such as sightings of smoke, camps, patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks is evaluated prior to selecting the area for the ambush. The commander obtains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and the manner in which the guerrilla will react when ambushed. Details of the enemy might include:

1. Time of movement, strength, organization of the guerrilla patrol, and type of supplies and arms carried.

2. Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties, and similar detachments.

3. The guerrillas' technique of patrolling.

4. Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between men.

(b) Clearance. --The time of departure, route used, location of ambush, time of return, signs and countersigns, and friendly patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with those forces that need to know.
(c) **Time Factor.**--The time for departure and establishing the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla patrol to be ambushed, the necessity for being undetected, and the route which the patrol will use.

(d) **Security.**--Security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the operation. Briefings and rehearsals are conducted in secure places. Secrecy is maintained in coordinating other operations that may take place in the vicinity of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconnaissances to the front, flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. The password, signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are established. A secure route over which the ambush party can move to the ambush site is selected. The plan will normally provide for the patrol to move to the ambush site during darkness.

(e) **Ground.**--Terrain which affords cover, concealment, and command of the site is selected for the ambush. All possible approaches are considered.

(2) **Preparations**

(a) The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:

1. Weapons are zeroed and tested.
2. Ammunition, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(b) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes:

1. Thorough briefing.
2. Rehearsal, when time allows.
3. Final checking of weapons.

(3) **Preliminary Briefing.**--A first briefing should be given at the base camp to all members of the ambush group. It should be given in time to allow adequate preparation and rehearsal. A thorough preliminary briefing will reduce the time required for final on-site briefing. The
preliminary briefing may be in the form of a five-paragraph order and it should particularly set forth all signals to be rehearsed and used:

(a) Enemy approaching.
(b) Commence firing.
(c) Cease firing.
(d) Check killing zone.
(e) Withdraw from killing zone.
(f) Withdraw from ambush position.
(g) Abandon the position.
(h) Reassemble.

(4) Final Briefing. -- A final briefing is held in the ambush area. This is limited but must include:

(a) Positions and directions of fire.
(b) Variations from rehearsal in individual tasks.
(c) Orders on completion of ambush.
(d) Review of checklist of common causes of ambush failure:

1 Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
2 Disclosure by footprints.
3 Lack of fire control.
4 Leaders badly positioned.
5 Lack of all-around security.
6 Misfires and stoppages through failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.

7 Lack of noise discipline; i.e., talking, coughing, shifting about, clattering water canteens.

8 Springing the ambush too early.

9 Using a poor signal to spring the ambush.

10 Lack of sufficient firepower being placed along the entire ambush position.

11 Failure to pursue by fire when the ambushed guerrillas jump into the underbrush.

12 Failure to boobytrap or block off opposite side of trail and escape routes.

(5) Rehearsal. --Rehearsals will increase chances for success. Rehearsals are not carried out at the ambush site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

d. Conduct of the Deliberate Ambush. --The principles of offensive and surprise dominate the ambush. Positioning of the ambush group, discipline in waiting, and fire discipline are paramount factors in applying those principles.

(1) Positioning

(a) Killing Zone. --The ambush group commander, after reconnaissance, chooses a killing zone and determines the extent of the position, bearing in mind that guerrillas usually move with long intervals between one another. A killing zone of 60 to 100 meters is desirable.

(b) Positions. --Having chosen the killing zone, the commander assigns elements of the group to specific positions which cover in depth the killing zone and all approaches to it. Positions in line of fire from friendly troops and in spaces difficult to cover by fire are given over to obstacles.
(c) **Obstacles.** --Obstacles consist of mines, Claymore weapons, sharpened stakes, ditches, barbed wire, or any other devices that can kill, wound, or delay the guerrillas. All members of the ambush group must be familiar with the locations and nature of obstacles used.

(2) **Discipline in Waiting.** --Lying in ambush is a real test of training and battle discipline. Once the group is in position, each individual should be carefully concealed but able to see his complete sector of fire and be prepared to open fire on signal. While waiting, all hands should be alert to detect any sign of improper concealment and noticeable noises or odors. Hair tonic, shaving lotion, and, particularly, insect repellent, can betray an ambush.

(a) **Short-Term Ambush.** --In an ambush planned for less than 12 hours, all positions should be manned constantly with all hands lying alertly in waiting.

(b) **Long-Term Ambush.** --When an ambush is set for longer than 12 hours, relief must be planned. One method is to divide the group into three parties; one lying in ambush; one in reserve; and one at rest. On relief, ambush goes to reserve; reserve to rest; and rest to ambush. Firing positions are relieved successively, never all at once. Parties in reserve and at rest will establish security, maintain silence, and refrain from cooking or smoking. When the group is not large enough to divide into three parties, sufficient people to maintain observation will lie in ambush positions while the balance rest. The party at rest will provide its own security. At indication that enemy approach is imminent, the reliefs in reserve and at rest quietly return to firing positions.

(3) **Fire Discipline**

(a) **Opening Fire.** --All members of the ambush group must clearly understand the signals and method for opening fire. The commander will designate the individual who is to open fire. When there are several possible approaches into the ambush, alternate positions are chosen from which firing shall begin. Ideally, firing is withheld until the entire enemy party is within the ambush.

(b) **Spotted Ambush.** --If the ambush is prematurely spotted, any individual in the ambush group may initiate firing. Caution must be exercised, however, to ensure that the ambush has really been spotted.
A moving guerrilla is naturally wary and constantly searches the trail as he moves. He may look directly toward an ambush position but not actually see it, if it is properly concealed. At times he may even appear to be in eye contact with the ambusher. Firing must be withheld until the guerrilla takes a positive action such as shouting an alarm or attempting to shoot or flee.

(c) Positions in Depth. --In organizing the ground, the ambush group commander will have established positions in depth on all avenues of approach to the chosen killing zone. These positions serve two functions:

1 Security. --Personnel in positions of depth alert the main ambush positions, by prearranged signal, of the approach of the enemy; during the ambush they watch for possible arrival of enemy reinforcements or counterattack by enemy elements which may have escaped ambush; after the ambush they provide cover for the search of the killing zone and for the main body's withdrawal from the zone.

2 Escape Prevention. --When the ambush is sprung, positions in depth should not open fire unless their assistance is vital to success. Rather, they should hold fire on the chance that additional enemy troops will pass by to enter the killing zone. As the enemy attempts escape, however, fire is opened from depth to kill him or drive him back into the killing zone.

(4) Night Ambush. --Although the techniques used in day and night ambushes are generally the same, night ambush requires some additional considerations.

(a) Positions for night ambush are relatively close together for ease of control. The ambush group moves into position, not during darkness, but, at the latest, while there is sufficient daylight to allow good orientation.

(b) Weapons firing down trail have fixed flank limits of fire to eliminate danger to friendly troops.

(c) Difficulty of concealment is lessened at night but so is shooting accuracy. Emphasis is placed on the use of automatic weapons and shotguns.
(d) Immobility and silence are doubly stressed. No relief of firing positions is made. Any movement or noise is attributed to enemy approach.

(e) All hands must be positively familiar with signal systems and fire control instructions.

(5) Illumination. --The success of a night ambush may depend on artificial illumination. Only in open country with a bright moon and no chance of clouds is it possible to rely on an unilluminated ambush. Infrared devices such as sniper scopes may be used to great advantage. As a general rule, all night ambushes are provided with artificial illumination. Illumination at ground level is placed to prevent the ambush party from receiving glare. There are a variety of night illumination aids available: hand illumination grenades, trip flares, rifle grenades, hand fired illuminants, parachute flares fired by mortars, artillery, naval gunfire, and parachutes dropped from aircraft. One possible method of employing illumination is to commence firing before illumination. Illumination is then fired behind the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing zone and to collect arms and equipment should have illumination. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

(6) Postambush Procedure

(a) Search. --The ambush is terminated by arranged signal. When firing ceases, an appointed detail, under cover of the other members of the group, conducts a search of the area. The search party checks the ground and the bodies of the dead, collecting documents, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Equipment too heavy or bulky to carry is destroyed.

(b) Assembly and Withdrawal. --On signal, the ambush group abandons firing positions and assembles as planned under cover of the men in appropriate positions of depth. When assembled and organized, the main body is joined by the covering party and the entire group withdraws unless a reambush has been planned.

(c) Reambush. --Most military forces, including guerrillas, try to recover their dead and wounded. The practice may be based
on political, disciplinary, religious, or purely humane reasons. Although most such recoveries will be made by relatively large or well-supported forces at an appreciable time after the ambush, some will be made immediately afterwards by small parties. When knowledge of the enemy indicates the latter habit, the ambush group commander may leave a small party in position at the killing zone to repeat the ambush. Normally, such a reambush, if not productive within one to two hours, should rejoin the main body for abandonment of the area.

506. COUNTERAMBUSH ACTION

a. General

(1) Planning.--In planning for defense against ambush, initially consider the available forces. The small unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely plans for the following:

(a) The formation to be used.
(b) March security.
(c) Communications and control.
(d) Special equipment.
(e) Action if ambushed.
(f) The reorganization.

(2) Formation.--A dismounted unit employs a formation that provides for all-around security while en route. March interval is based on the type of terrain, limits of visibility, size of the patrol, and to a certain extent, on the means of control available. The interval between individuals and units at night is closer than during daylight. The interval is great enough to allow each succeeding element to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. However, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol leader is located forward in the formation but not so far that he cannot move throughout the formation as the situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they may distribute their firepower evenly. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.
(3) **March Security.** --Security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary whether the unit is on foot or motorized. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until followup units can be deployed to assist in countering the ambush. However, if not detected, the enemy may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The alternative is to move adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled like frontal security, and plans are made for the rear guard to assist in countering the ambush either by envelopment or by supporting fire. Aircraft flying reconnaissance and surveillance missions above the column increase security. If the column is ambushed, fighter and attack aircraft can provide support. Communications between these elements is a must.

(4) **Communications and Control.** --Consistent with security, all available means of communication are used to assist in controlling the small unit. March objectives and phase lines may be used to assist the commander in controlling his unit. Communications with security elements is mandatory. Detailed prior planning, briefing, and rehearsals for all units will assist in control. Alternate plans are made to prevent confusion and chaos. An ambushed unit notifies higher headquarters as soon as possible to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) **Special Equipment.** --It is often necessary to provide the unit additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineer tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always necessary, including panel sets or smoke grenades for identifying the ambush to aircraft.

(6) **Action If Ambushed.** --If ambushed, the most immediate reaction should be intensive fire into the suspected hiding places of the attackers. Determine the flanks of the attacking unit and begin a flanking movement. The ambushed unit must suppress the natural reaction to hit the deck and dive for cover. Ambush sites usually have booby traps and
antipersonnel mines surrounding them. A counterambush plan must be devised and rehearsed. Immediate action and counterattack procedures must be so thoroughly rehearsed that members of the unit must know instinctively what action is to be taken. Unit leaders must have prearranged signals which will move their men instantly into the counterambush plan.

(7) Method of Attack. --If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly on actions and alternate actions to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested. If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Reaction Force. --A reaction force, prepared to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for employment in the event a patrol is ambushed or for other purposes. The reaction force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, checkpoints, and designated helicopter landing sites, and through communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushed, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. He designates his position by reference to checkpoints, designated helicopter landing sites, terrain features, smoke panels, or other means. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to lead the reinforcements into position. A system for rapid employment of reaction forces against ambushes makes the ambush less likely to be employed by the guerrilla.

(9) Reorganization. --The reorganization after an ambush involves assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy pressing the attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization is impossible because of guerrilla action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

b. Dismounted Units

(1) General. --Immediate action (IA) drills are thoroughly taught and practiced. The underlying principles must be simplicity, aggressiveness, and speed.
(2) Immediate Action Drills. --The IA drills used, when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

(a) Where only the foremost elements of a patrol are caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling attack is carried out by the remainder of the patrol.

(b) Where the entire patrol is ambushed in open ground, an immediate assault is launched.

(3) Encircling Attack. --The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a guerrilla ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and maneuver taught in small unit tactics.

(a) Formations are designed so that only part of a patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations are practiced and the distances correctly observed, the whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opening burst of fire.

(b) As the unit advances, the patrol leader always has the terrain situation in mind. He takes control of the battle by signalling or shouting "Envelop Right (or Left)." This should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The troops will have practiced the drill and will know their positions in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of fire to cover the maneuvering element. If the leading element has smoke grenades, these are used to screen the elements caught in the killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault. --The immediate assault is used when the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road. A small patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within such an ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, requiring an assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol is in the killing zone. The patrol moves as quickly as possible to a position outside the killing zone and then assaults the guerrilla position.

c. Mounted Units

(1) General. --The guerrilla will ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and organized from which he can kill by firing at point
blank range. The principle behind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area which the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone, unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counterattack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) **Immediate Action Technique.** --When vehicles are fired upon:

(a) Drivers drive out of the killing zone.

(b) Vehicle guards return fire immediately.

(c) When vehicles are clear of the killing zone, they stop to allow unloading and offensive action.

(d) Subsequent vehicles approaching the killing zone will halt short of the area and their occupants take offensive action.

(e) When vehicles are forced to halt in the killing zone, troops quickly unload under the covering fire of the guards who use smoke to provide screening.

(3) **Counterattack**

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can be carried out by those troops who are clear of the killing zone. If there are no such troops, then a frontal attack under cover of smoke is made.

(b) In action when troops have not entered the killing zone, the convoy commander will launch an immediate flanking attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from machineguns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops are beyond the killing zone and others are short of it, the group which has not yet entered the ambush zone should initiate the attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counterambush action is by moving into the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire
to our flanking attack and afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the guerrilla killing zone.

(e) It is possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the guerrilla's initial burst of fire. It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counterattack. This is clearly stated in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing.

(f) The techniques outlined above are practiced repeatedly in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

(4) Vehicle Unloading Drill

(a) General. --In an ambush, the guerrilla first tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing zone by the use of mines or obstacles and by firing at the tires and driver. He then tries to kill the troops in the vehicle. It is essential that the troops unload instantly when a vehicle is brought to a halt in a killing zone.

(b) Vehicle Loading. --To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill. --When the vehicle is forced to stop:

1. The vehicle commander shouts "Unload Right (or Left)" to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

2. Vehicle guards immediately throw smoke grenades and open fire on the guerrilla positions.

3. Troops unload over the side away from ambush and run in the direction ordered.

4. As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, guards follow to join in the attack.

(d) Training. --Counterambush drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads; e.g., infantry squads and platoons. Where
miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a movement, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

(5) Experience. --Experience has shown, particularly in heavy undergrowth or jungle, that the most efficient ways to destroy an ambush is to immediately deliver an intensive high rate of fire into the ambush position and to conduct an immediate assault. Aggressive reaction is the key to defeat of an ambush.

507. SEARCH PROCEDURES

a. General. --Misuse of police or military authority can adversely affect operations against guerrillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material during searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies is not as damaging to a guerrilla movement as is the apprehension of the suppliers and agents. Proper use of police powers will gain respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time it may increase the civilian population's sympathy for and support of the guerrillas. Searches are preferably conducted by civil police or self-defense forces. Military searches may be required when these forces are unavailable, unwilling, or inefficient.

b. Authority. --Authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform searches and seizures in places and areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their police authority) for purposes of apprehending a suspect or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect

(1) General. --The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous acts. During a search, one Marine must always cover the searcher. However, the searcher must be tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be antiguerilla.
(2) The Frisk Search. -- This method is a quick search of an individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is preferably conducted in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the suspect face away from him. The suspect's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) The Wall Search. -- The wall search renders the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position. It is particularly useful when two Marines must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as follows:

(a) Position of Suspect. -- The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as parallel to and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) Position of Searcher's Assistant. -- The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher and to the rear, covering the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes positions. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) Position of Searcher. -- The searcher approaches the suspect from the side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. He places his foot in front of the suspect's near foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's foot can be pushed back from under him.

(d) Searching Technique. -- In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's headgear, then checks the hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs,
and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completion of the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(4) **Search of More Than One Suspect.** --When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall but far enough apart so that they can not reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. After being searched, suspects are moved to the left of the line, resuming position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching each suspect, the searcher does not pass in front of his assistant.

(5) **Strip Search.** --This type search is usually considered necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is preferably conducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depending on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. Clothing and shoes are removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(6) **Searching Women and Children.** --Marines must be reminded that the resistance movement will make maximum use of women and children for all types of tasks where search may be a threat. The search procedures must be thorough regardless of age or sex. All belongings, packages, bundles, packets, etc., must be checked for messages or contraband. It is desirable when searching women and children to have a local political chief present to dispel any later accusations of molesting.

d. **Searching a Village or Built-Up Area**

(1) **General.** --The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to such an extent that they will be driven by anger to
collaborate with them. The large scale search of a village or built-up area is normally a combined police and military operation. It is pre-planned in detail and rehearsed. Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided and the information needed about the ground is obtained from aerial photographs. Both vertical and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the case of large cities, the local police may have a detailed map showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops. --Since villages and built-up areas vary, a force is task organized for each search. An organization consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accomplish the following:

(a) To surround the area to prevent escape.

(b) To establish roadblocks.

(c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces outside the area.

(d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to identify a suspect.

(e) To escort wanted persons.

(3) Command and Control. --Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. For smaller search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native police, when feasible.

(4) Method

(a) Approach. --An area is approached and surrounded before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Sometimes it is advisable to drive into the area; on other occasions, it is better to disembark at a distance. The method depends on the available approaches, exits, and the local situation.
(b) Surrounding the Area. --During darkness, troops should approach silently by as many different routes as possible. When close to their positions, they should double time. After daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, lack of troops makes it impossible to completely surround an area for any length of time. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves. --If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from entering the area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large scale movement outside the isolated area.

(d) Search Parties. --The officer in command of the operation announces the search, a house curfew is enforced, and all inhabitants remain indoors or gather at a central point.

1 Each search party should consist of at least one civilian policeman, a protective escort, and a woman searcher.

2 In searching a building, all occupants are gathered into one room. The police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to isolate suspected persons.

3 Buildings are searched from bottom to top. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage.

4 After a house is searched, it is so marked. Persons awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched building.

5 In the case of a locked house or resistance, entry is forced. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, it can be nailed up and a sentry placed outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.

6 When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house remains while his house is searched; otherwise, he is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating.
7 A problem in searching is the accusation of theft and looting which can be made against troops. In small searches, it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been stolen, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.

(e) **Escorts.**—Wanted persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally undertake this task, therefore, escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

**e. Searching of Vehicles/Roadblocks**

(1) **General.**—Roadblocks are necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to prevent smuggling of contraband items. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civil population understand that they are a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(a) **Types.**—There are two types of roadblocks, deliberate and hasty.

1 **Deliberate.**—This type of roadblock is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It may have no immediate specific result but serves as a deterrent to unlawful movement.

2 **Hasty.**—This type of roadblock is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty roadblock is intended to achieve specific purpose.

(b) **Location.**—Concealment of a roadblock is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back without being noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well-placed roadblock.

(c) **Troop Dispositions.**—A roadblock must be adequately manned to prevent ambush and surprise. An element of the roadblock
should be concealed an appropriate distance (100 to several hundred meters) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn and flee. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time, troop relief is provided at a rest area nearby so that the troops can be turned out quickly.

(d) Special Equipment Required. -- For the roadblock to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and English should denote the vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point. Adequate lighting is needed at night. Communications are required among the various troop units. Barbed wire obstacles are placed across the road and around the search area. Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to stop a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method. -- The roadblock may be established by placing two parallel lines of concertina barbed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between them depends on the traffic. The enclosure formed can then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the traffic which can be searched quickly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained woman searcher. An officer or NCO must always be on duty or close to the search area. All occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle being searched. The owner or driver should watch the search. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. When searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. In searching vehicles, depending on the type and cargo, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

105
SECTION 6

SECURITY

601. GENERAL

In areas threatened by a guerrilla force, measures must be taken to safeguard troops, installations, key civilian communities, and lines of communication. The scope of guerrilla activity threatens all elements of the forces operating against them. The characteristics, capabilities, and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be constantly studied to determine the pattern for security and the emphasis to be placed on its various aspects. Vigilance and sound security measures will not only minimize interference with operations, but will tend to discourage guerrilla operations.

602. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SECURITY MEASURES

The type and effectiveness of security measures employed depends upon prevalent conditions and operating procedures.
a. Adequate Warning.--Adequate warning is essential for timely and effective reaction. The forces, agencies, and devices employed in normal land combat are used to provide warning. These include such security measures as: advance, flank, and rear guards; outposts; patrols; and ground surveillance radar. Continuous ground and aerial reconnaissance is conducted to detect security threats. Maximum use is made of civilian informants and other indigenous personnel.

b. Effective Communications.--Effective communications are essential to adequate warning, control of security activities, and timely reaction. Multiple and emergency means are established to ensure reliable communications in the event of failure of the primary system as a result of malfunction, destruction, or guerrilla interference.

c. Timely Reaction.--All elements and personnel of a counterguerrilla force must be prepared to react instantly to a security threat. Reaction forces, discussed in paragraphs 403 and 404, are particularly effective when adequate warning is provided. Immediate action drills are discussed in section 5. In all situations, weapons are kept available for instant use.

d. Care in the Establishment of Installations.--Special attention is given to the selection of combat bases, patrol bases, and other installations. Paragraph 403 discusses the establishment of combat bases and section 5 covers the organization of patrol bases. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Since guerrillas are not as heavily armed as conventional ground forces, installations may be grouped closer together so that they may be guarded as a unit. The manner of securing an installation is altered frequently to prevent the guerrilla force from obtaining detailed accurate information after the composition and habits of the defense.

e. Supply Discipline.--Supply discipline must be strictly enforced, and it must be emphasized to troops that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away may be recovered by the guerrillas and used against them. Arms and equipment must be salvaged from battle areas and from civilians who have collected them. Any equipment or supplies which would normally be discarded must not be left in the battle area.

f. Troop Indoctrination.--Psychological indoctrination of troops should be oriented to minimize the anxieties which may stem from the
nature of guerrilla operations; however, contempt for the guerrilla must be guarded against. Troops in areas considered secure may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance. In units that have not experienced a surprise guerrilla attack, methodical supervision to maintain security discipline will be necessary. Since guerrilla force operations are spasmodic, long quiet periods require that particular attention be paid to security vigilance. Troop indoctrination and training are further discussed in section 12.

g. Designations of Clearance of an Area. --For security purposes, a system may be established for the designation of the degree of control existing in any specific area. Such a system, based on traffic light colors, is described in paragraph 403.

603. SECURITY MEASURES

Security measures are either active or passive; however, the best security is provided by a combination of both. Actions and measures which enhance security against guerrilla threat include the following:

a. Offensive Operations. --Constant pressure is maintained against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations to include patrols, raids, ambushes, air attack, and use of supporting fires deny the guerrilla the opportunity to conduct operations.

b. Use of Obstacles and Aids. --Appropriate use is made of physical obstacles and aids such as wire, mines, illumination, searchlight, and restricted areas.

c. Deception. --Deceptive operations, including communications, are conducted when appropriate. Deceptive measures such as cover, concealment, and camouflage are employed.

d. Police-Type Operations and Civilian Control. --Police-type operations and civilian control measures are essential to security. Curfew, movement restrictions, roadblocks, search and seizure, and related measures are commonly employed. These and other techniques of civilian control are covered in section 10, and certain police-type operations are covered in section 5. As a defense against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision.
e. Static Security Posts

(1) Purpose. --A static security post is any organized security system for the protection of fixed military or civil installations and transportation facilities, such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. They are utilized as necessary to secure areas against guerrilla attack. The size of the post depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the guerrilla force, the attitude of the civil populace, and the importance of the area being secured. Static security posts may vary from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company, or maybe a battalion securing an airfield or key communication center. A battalion may establish a combat base in conjunction with a static security post, with subordinate units operating from the base within the battalion's area of responsibility.

(2) Organization. --The organization of a static security post will vary with its size, mission, and distance from reinforcing units. Reliable communications are established between security posts and the parent unit combat base. The parent unit should be prepared to employ reaction forces to assist the security post.

(3) Composition. --To maintain tactical integrity of military units of the counterguerrilla force, maximum use of indigenous forces is made, consistent with their capability and reliability. Militia, self-defense forces, and police may be employed for this task. Every effort is made to avoid the piecemeal commitment of combat forces to static security duty.

f. Security of Lines of Communication. --For a discussion of techniques used in transportation security, see paragraph 606.

604. REAR AREA SECURITY

a. General Considerations. --Rear area security in a conventional operation includes the planning for and employment of counterguerrilla measures when a guerrilla threat exists. Because the rear area is threatened by other enemy action in addition to guerrilla action, rear area security embraces a variety of defensive measures; it cannot be directed only to the guerrilla menace. Both before and during a conventional operation, the enemy's capabilities to interfere with the operation are carefully assessed and the security of the rear area is established to
accommodate the various possibilities. Accordingly, rear area security measures often represent a compromise based on enemy capabilities. For example, dispersion required under nuclear threat encourages and favors guerrilla action; when both threats exist, units are dispersed and particular attention is paid to the guerrilla threat. However, when a nuclear threat does not exist, dispersion is minimized to provide security against guerrilla threat.

b. Other Considerations. --When a guerrilla threat exists in a conventional operation, security of the rear area includes the use of the security measures covered in paragraph 603, as appropriate. Additional factors in rear area security which must be considered are:

(1) Mission. --The accomplishment of the primary mission must not lose precedence, and whenever possible, enemy actions are overcome with minimum interruption to it.

(2) Command. --A commander is usually assigned responsibility for the overall security of the rear area. As rear area defense commander, he is responsible for the integration of local security plans into the overall area plan. His plans provide for unity of effort and for the most efficient use of available defensive means.

(3) Augmentation. --Specific combat units may be assigned the mission of assisting in security of the rear area. The type and size of the force depend on the characteristics and size of the area, enemy capabilities, and availability of forces. When the guerrilla threat is significant and the rear area units and installations cannot successfully cope with it, reserve elements of the combat units are assigned the mission of conducting counterguerrilla operations. This assignment must be considered as a secondary and temporary mission. When a major guerrilla threat is anticipated, combat units other than reserve elements may be assigned to the operation to conduct counterguerrilla operations as a primary mission. Combat units assigned a counterguerrilla mission conduct operations similar to the counterguerrilla combat operations covered in paragraph 404.

605. AIRFIELD SECURITY

a. General Considerations. --Security of Marine aviation units within an airfield complex includes an organized defense system for the
enforcement of aircraft, working and billeting areas, and personnel. During both conventional and counterguerrilla operations, the immediate defense network will usually be internal in nature, and the security measures and characteristics enumerated above apply as the enemy situation dictates. Organizationally, the internal security of the airfield is the responsibility of the senior aviation commander and is normally subordinate to the infantry unit, if assigned, responsible for rear area/base defense.

b. Implementation Considerations. --Because the aviation elements may occupy several nonadjacent areas within the airfield complex, the responsibility for defense may require extensive subdivision. The rear area defense force commander is responsible for the coordination of separate units into the local security plan and the integration of the local security plan into the overall airfield security plan. In addition, the following factors are included in the security framework:

1) The security force is manned by either qualified infantrymen (OF 0300) or guards (category "B" OF 8151). In some instances, further augmentation may be required from the squadrons attached to the Marine aircraft group. Additionally, each squadron will supply a provisional reaction force deployed as the enemy situation warrants, under the operational control of the rear area defense force commander.

2) The rear area defense force commander will ensure that adequate means are established for reducing the possibility of damage or destruction to aircraft and equipment by enemy infiltration, sabotage, or artillery/air attack. Such measures include aircraft dispersal, protective revetments, strict control of indigenous personnel, and roving patrols supplemented by sentry dogs when available.

606. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

a. General Considerations. --In areas where guerrillas are known or suspected, the security of all forms of transportation is of paramount importance. Adequate security is not simply a matter of the number of personnel involved. It results from special training, sound movement procedures, and a general awareness of the magnitude of the problem. The following paragraphs describe procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland water movement. For counterambush techniques, see section 5.
(1) **Security of Information.** --Maximum precautions are taken to prevent the guerrillas from gaining advance information of vehicle movement. It should be remembered that:

(a) The telephone system is seldom secure.

(b) Radio messages in the clear can be easily intercepted.

(c) The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed.

(d) Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be furnished on a need-to-know basis. Drivers and escorts should be briefed as late as feasible.

(e) Plans should include alternate routes and deception measures.

(2) **Convoy SOPs.** --SOPs should be established to cover:

(a) Approval authority for convoy movement.

(b) The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.

(c) The organization of the convoy.

(d) The weapons and ammunition to be carried.

(e) The preparation of the vehicles. (Detailed instructions regarding tarpaulins, tail gates, and windshields.)

(f) Immediate action drills.

(g) Security measures.

(3) **Road Classification.** --The highway system may be classified corresponding to the degree of clearance of an area as set forth in paragraph 403, to identify the degree of control existing.

(a) **Red Roads.** --Those which are considered to be in the combat area and subject to ambush or interference.
(b) **Yellow Roads.** --Those where there is a very limited risk of guerrilla ambush.

(c) **Green Roads.** --Those which lie within the city limits of major towns and such other roads designated by the responsible headquarters. Subject to restrictions, which local commanders may impose, military personnel are permitted to travel on these roads in any type of vehicle.

b. **Vehicle Movement Considerations**

(1) **Convoy Commander.** --The convoy commander, detailed for every convoy, will position himself where he can best control the convoy. He issues the necessary orders to initiate the march and ensures that instructions contained in SOPs and in march orders are followed.

(2) **Vehicle Commanders.** --A commander is designated for each vehicle. His duties will be to ensure alertness of all embarked personnel and to assist in maintaining convoy formation by controlling the driver. The primary mission of the vehicle commander is to command the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed. He is located in the back of the vehicle with the troops.

(3) **Vehicle Guards.** --In troop carrying vehicles, four men should be posted as guards. These men are posted two at the front and two at the rear, and each is assigned an area of observation covering the $90^\circ$ from the center of the road to the side in each direction. These guards should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke and fragmentation grenades. (A phosphorus smoke grenade can be particularly useful as an antiambush weapon.) When ambushed, guards cover the troops disembarking. They can also assist in the traffic control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander if the vehicle behind halts or drops back.

(4) **Briefing.** --All personnel traveling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed to include:

(a) Details of timing, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact, and action to be taken if contact is broken.

(b) The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.
(c) The distribution of personnel to vehicles.

(d) The distribution of weapons.

(e) The action to be taken in the event of guerrilla attack.

(5) Preparation of Vehicles. --Personnel traveling in vehicles must have all-around observation and fields of fire and be able to throw or fire grenades without hindrance. They must be able to debark from the vehicle rapidly without restriction. Therefore, vehicles cannot be loaded to the capacity allowable for administrative movement. Also, the configuration of the vehicle must be altered. The term "hardened vehicle" applies to a vehicle which has been prepared for counterambush action:

(a) Canvas, bows, and wooden sideboards removed.

(b) Tailgate removed or placed in the horizontal position.

(c) Front glass windshield down or removed.

(d) Doors removed or secured in an open position.

(e) A piece of pipe, wood, or metal affixed to the vehicle extending above the driver's head to prevent decapitation by wire stretched across the road.

(f) Sandbags placed on the floorboards and bed of the vehicle.

(g) Sections of scrap armor plate used to reinforce sandbags in the bed of the vehicle.

(h) Chicken wire over open windows to repel grenades.

(i) Removal of equipment that will slow up troop unloading and that is not essential to the vehicle's safe operation.

(6) Use of Armored Vehicles. --When a convoy of few vehicles is escorted on red roads, the armored vehicle should be centrally placed in the convoy. An armored vehicle at the front or rear of a convoy may be prevented from moving into the ambush area by halted vehicles. The
armored vehicle can be a mobile CP for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of about five or six and, when sufficient armor is available, one should be placed with each block. For vehicle convoys, the inclusion of an armored vehicle has two important effects on ambush action:

(a) Provides covering fire for the counterattack.

(b) Provides protection to anyone caught in the ambush by driving into the danger area and engaging the enemy at pointblank range.

(7) Convoy Communications.--Unit SOPs may designate the means and use of communications for convoys. The march order specifies the communication security required. Communications with other forces is desirable. Methods of intracolumn communications include:

(a) Visual Signals.--Visual signals are most commonly used for column control. These may be arm-and-hand, flashlight, or flag signals. Visual signaling must be easily understood, rapid in transmission, and cover all the basic column maneuvers such as starting, stopping, changing speed, and changing direction. Helicopters or other aircraft covering the column can employ smoke grenades or other such means for emergency signals. Each color is coded for a specific message such as ambush ahead, bridge out, guerrillas sighted, or road impassable. A similar system is employed for signaling from the column to aircraft.

(b) Radio Communications.--When communication security permits, radio is the principal means of communication during a march. Its use is generally specified in orders, unit SOPs, and communication operation instructions.

(c) Audio Signals.--Whistles, horns, or bugles are used to attract attention, to warn personnel of further transmission of commands, and to spread alarms. Voice commands and verbal messages are used when the situation permits.

(d) Other Methods.--A road message may be written on a board and posted along the route or displayed by an individual who stands at a vantage point where he can be plainly seen by all drivers. A message may be posted at the head of the column and picked up after the last.
vehicle of the column passes. Written messages, orders, and overlays are usually delivered during scheduled halts. Messages may be delivered by helicopter to selected helicopter landing sites along the route.

(8) Precautionary Tactics. --Troops may disembark to check any likely ambush areas before the convoy moves through. Such tactics are unlikely to surprise guerrillas in position; however, the guerrilla may move as soon as they see the troops. This examination of likely ambush positions will make the guerrillas less confident of their ability to execute an ambush without danger to themselves.

c. Security Measure Requirements by Road Classification. --The special security requirements for vehicular traffic will vary dependent upon the degree of clearance existing in the area to be traveled.

(1) Red Roads

(a) All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(b) Travel at night will be restricted to operational necessity.

(c) Movement of single military vehicles will not be permitted.

(d) Troop convoys of tactical units will provide self-protection. Armored vehicles should be used if available.

(e) Groups of administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible. The scale of escort for such convoys should be about one armored vehicle to every five vehicles.

(f) Interval between vehicles will normally be 150 meters; on red roads it is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to catch several vehicles.

(g) Convoys should always be escorted by troops.
(h) Whenever possible, helicopter or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in controlling the convoy.

(i) Red roads may be further divided into subcategories and special precautions for certain sections of road may be stated.

(2) Yellow Roads

(a) An armored escort vehicle is not essential.

(b) Personnel riding in military or civilian police vehicles will be armed.

(c) Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(d) Military personnel may travel alone in civilian cars but must be armed.

(e) Convoys up to 10 vehicles will move at normal interval and in blocks.

(f) Convoys of more than 10 vehicles should be approved by the commander of the operational area concerned. Convoys of more than 10 vehicles will move in blocks of not more than 5 or 6 vehicles.

(3) Green Roads. --There are no special measures concerning the movement of military convoys.

d. Guarding Officials

(1) When moving by road, indigenous authorities or other high ranking officials may require the protection of a troop escort. In such cases the following should be considered:

(a) The strength of the escort will depend on the circumstances; a platoon will be adequate in most instances.

(b) There should be an armored vehicle available in which the official may travel if deemed necessary.
(c) Throughout the move, the vehicle carrying the official must be closely supported by a second vehicle carrying at least one automatic weapon and "bodyguard" troops. If possible, this vehicle should be armored.

(d) The vehicle carrying the official should not bear any special distinguishing marks.

(2) Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the official on the action he wishes him to take in the event of attack. Regardless of the seniority of the official, the escort commander is in command of the move.

e. Protection of Railroads and Trains

(1) Operation of Railroads. --Railroads may be operated by the civil population, by the military and civilians combined, or by the military alone. In any event, liaison and protective measures must be established.

(2) Train Guards

(a) Train guards may be military police or other troops assigned to the duty. Economy of personnel will result if a unit is attached to a particular railroad organization for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.

(b) The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and, when possible, should have radio communications with units that can provide support in the event of ambush.

(3) Security Measures. --Security measures which may be taken for rail movements are:

(a) Trains should run on irregular schedules.

(b) Security elements should precede and follow trains.

(c) Flatcars loaded with sand can be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or track cuts.
(d) Automatic weapons may be mounted on cars.

(e) A right-of-way may be cleared and declared a restricted zone where shoot-on-sight conditions may apply. If clearance of the entire right-of-way is impractical, vegetation surrounding critical locations such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges is cleared.

(f) Air reconnaissance may be conducted over the right-of-way.

(4) **Security of Tunnels, Bridges, and Stations.** --Critical installations such as tunnels, bridges, and stations are guarded.

(5) **Troops Embarked on Trains.** --Security troops riding in regular passenger cars should disembark through all exits and windows. Because disembarking rapidly from a passenger car is difficult, the technique employed is planned and rehearsed. If practical, security troops should use flatcars.

f. **Protection of Waterways.** --Critical points along rivers and waterways should be guarded. Points along the banks offering favorable ambush sites are cleared of vegetation. Other security measures include:

(1) Irregular scheduling of craft.

(2) Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.

(3) Providing security for each craft or each group of craft.

(4) Providing adequate communication means for each craft.

(5) Establishing waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.

(6) Patrolling the waterway by air.
SECTION 7

COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

701. GENERAL

a. In general, the communications capability within the Fleet Marine Forces is adaptable to counterguerrilla operations. The similarity of communications requirements between amphibious operations and counterguerrilla operations includes such things as the need for communications for command of the force as a whole, for special forms of control, and for coordination between diversified forces in the conduct of common or related operations.

b. The terrain in which the guerrilla usually operates and the methods of counterguerrilla operations impose definite limitations on the normal employment of the infantry communication system. Mountains, jungles, and other areas with heavy vegetation greatly reduce the rated distance capability of radios. The lack of roads, trails, or good trafficability severely restrict the employment of vehicular radio sets. The
problem is complicated further by the wide separation of units and extensive long-range patrol operations.

702. REQUIREMENTS

a. The communication system must provide the commander with the capability of control and maneuver, rapid reporting of guerrilla movements, security and warning, and for handling normal administrative and logistic requirements. A communication system is required between military and civil agencies. Ground-to-air communication is established for all air-supported ground operations. Operations characterized by continuous small unit actions require a communication system that is reliable, rapid, secure, and flexible. A clandestine communication system is often required between intelligence agents and headquarters of higher echelons. The use of civilian police, self-defense units and friendly guerrillas in civilian population control or small scale operations requires a communication system for coordination and control by the counter-guerrilla force.

b. The added burden placed on the communication system requires that the problem be met by ingenuity and improvisation as well as augmentation by personnel and equipment.

703. COMMUNICATION MEANS

a. Radio. --Radio is the primary means of communication. Great reliance is placed on portable radio equipment, capable of necessary transmission distances to control units operating in widespread areas. All units, particularly the infantry battalion and its subordinate units, require portable radios to facilitate mobility. Infantry platoons may be employed in situations that require a net of their own to coordinate patrols, raids and ambushes. Transmissions must be kept to a minimum so that high priority traffic such as reporting guerrilla contact and issuance orders to reaction forces can be rapidly transmitted. Predetermined codes will greatly assist in shortening transmission times. Emission control will enhance security and surprise. The counterguerrilla force radio equipment will include the following:

(1) High Frequency (HF). --In heavy vegetation high frequency radio sets may be used extensively; in some instances they may be required by rifle squads. HF sets are commonly used to pass intelligence
information and control patrols during denial and harassing operations, and to control and coordinate units participating in reaction and elimination operations. In situations where increased ranges are required, HF radios may be employed rather than very high frequency (VHF) equipment. When operating in areas with heavy vegetation, the effectiveness of vertical antennas is greatly reduced, and the use of half-wave and three-quarter wave horizontal antennas is required. To give satisfactory results, antennas must be set up in cleared areas and/or elevated above the surrounding vegetation. The noise level of HF receivers can be reduced by using CW emission instead of voice transmissions and by using headsets rather than speakers. The use of single sideband (SSB) radios will greatly increase capabilities in the HF range.

(2) Very High Frequency (VHF).—FM radio sets are used to the extent that line of sight transmission conditions exist. These sets are used for short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. In this connection, manual or automatic airborne retransmission should be employed wherever the requirement exists to pass radio traffic over difficult terrain or extended distances in support of specific short-term actions.

(3) Ultra High Frequency (UHF).—UHF radio sets are used for ground-to-air and air-to-air communications. Additional UHF sets may be required to accommodate the increase in air support activity.

b. Wire.—Wire communication is used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communication to guerrilla force action dictates that wire be used only in secure areas and within combat bases and installations. However, if the area of operations is covered largely by heavy jungle growth, helicopters may be used to lay wire which will rest on top of, or high up in the growth. This technique will make it difficult for the guerrillas to locate or destroy the line. When wire is laid near roads, over unsecure routes, or long distances, guerrillas may use counterguerrilla force's communication wire to electrically detonate mines/booby traps.

c. Radio Relay.—Radio relay use is consistent with line of sight conditions and mobility of the equipment. Radio relay sites are protected against guerrilla force raids and sabotage and should be located, when possible, in secure areas or installations.
d. **Messenger.**—Messengers are the most secure and reliable means of communication and the best means of transmitting maps, overlays, and long messages. Helicopterborne messengers are most often employed. Messengers who travel by vehicles must be provided security guards or travel with armed convoys. Reliable indigenous persons may be used; they are less conspicuous and usually have a thorough knowledge of the area, including trails. Aircraft can be used to drop and pick up messages.

e. **Visual.**—The use of arm and hand signals, semaphore, lights, smoke, pyrotechnics, mirrors, and panels find considerable application in counterguerrilla operations, particularly at the small unit level. Panels for ground-to-air signaling and marking, and pyrotechnics for prearranged signals are the most frequently required visual means other than arm and hand signals. In patrolling, ambushing, and other small unit operations where surprise and security are essential, additional arm and hand signals may be devised.

f. **Sound.**—The use of sound devices such as sirens, whistles, bugles, and weapon-firing may be used to signal the commencement of an attack or ambush, or for warning purposes. The use of less audible techniques such as rifle-tapping or twig-snapping may be used for warning at night, in patrol bases, or during patrolling. Airborne loudspeakers may be particularly effective in controlling the movement of large units or transmitting messages to isolated units or patrols.

704. **SECURITY**

a. It must never be assumed that guerrilla forces do not have the capability of performing communication intelligence operations or countermeasures. Normal security precautions must be observed since a guerrilla force must be credited with the capability of tapping wire lines, monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a sponsoring power or a conventional enemy force that can conduct communications intelligence operations.

b. All communication facilities are considered important targets by guerrilla forces and must be protected from sabotage or guerrilla attack.
705. COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES

a. While the guerrilla force usually will not possess sophisticated communication equipment or training comparable to the counterguerrilla force, it will normally depend to some extent on radio communication for contact with a sponsoring power, its underground element, and for control and coordination of its subordinate elements. There are different objectives to consider in countering a guerrilla force's communications. These are:

(1) Intercept and decode his transmissions.

(2) Intercept his couriers.

(3) Jam his radio traffic.

(4) Deceive and mislead him by false transmissions.

(5) Find and destroy or capture his communication equipment.

b. The countermeasure mission assigned will depend on the desired result or product. If communications intelligence is desired, then subparagraphs (1) and (2), above, are the objectives. If the guerrilla force depends on his communication equipment for information and control in a fast moving tactical situation, and is desired to deny him that information and control, then subparagraphs (3) and (4), above, are the objectives. However, it should be kept in mind that communication deception is an exacting technique that requires as much knowledge of the enemy as he has of himself. Probably the final objective will be subparagraph (5), above, and would take place concurrent with the destruction or capture of the guerrilla force itself.
SECTION 8

AIR SUPPORT

801. GENERAL

The operational capabilities of Marine aviation units in counter-guerrilla warfare generally encompass offensive air support, assault support, and aerial reconnaissance. Marine air support tactics and techniques are readily adaptable to this type of warfare. See FMFM 7-3, Air Support, for detailed information on air support operations.

a. Offensive Air Support.--Offensive air support, which may be classified as either close or deep support, includes: attacking and destroying enemy installations, equipment, supplies, and personnel within the objective area; participating in the destruction and interdiction of ground and surface targets outside the objective area; and, when appropriate, the planning and conducting of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare operations consistent with the capability of assigned aircraft and equipment.
b. Assault Support. --Assault support includes providing the vertical assault lift (troops and supplies) required by the force; providing the assault fixed-wing air transport airlift required for movement of high priority cargo and personnel; and providing airdrop of critical materials to combat elements from conventional assault transports and from high performance aircraft.

c. Aerial Reconnaissance. --Aerial reconnaissance provides the force with a means to: obtain specific and immediate intelligence needs by visual, photographic, or electronic methods; conduct visual reconnaissance of enemy and friendly activities; adjust supporting fires; conduct active and passive electronic warfare operations and locate and communicate with isolated friendly units.

802. OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

In addition to their normal offensive air support missions, the use of attack aircraft to support pursuits, raids, reaction operations, and elimination operations utilizes both the mobility and fire power of these aircraft to the maximum. Such use also will have a deteriorating effect on the morale of the guerrilla force. Effective offensive air support may be difficult to provide and of limited value because of guerrilla capability for rapid dispersion, effective camouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of clinging to his enemy or mingling with the populace. Satisfactory results can be achieved from offensive air support against observed guerrillas when reaction to requests for strikes are prompt and under the control of a forward air controller (FAC) or tactical air coordinator airborne (TAC(A)).

a. Control and Coordination. --Normal measures for the control and coordination of offensive air support such as the fire coordination line may not be practical in counterguerrilla operations due to extensive patrol action and the nature of the terrain. Therefore, unit commanders may find it necessary to establish additional or other control and coordination measures to ensure troop safety and coordinate offensive air support with ground operations. The difficulty of marking friendly positions by panels and/or the lack of prominent landmarks for pilots, requires extensive use of smoke and good ground-to-air radio communications. Positive identification of targets and coordinating fires with the movement of friendly troops in areas of guerrilla warfare requires extensive briefings for pilots, a thorough and up-to-date SOP for air-ground operations; good communications; and an emphasis on control procedures. As targets
are generally fleeting type targets, instantaneous response and minimum reaction time is required for decisive action.

b. Close Air Support. --Close air support missions consist of pre-planned and on call missions. On call missions are more likely to be used in counterguerrilla operations, therefore, every effort must be made to shorten the time required for planning and executing these missions.

(1) Immediate engagement of targets as they appear will allow little time for briefing pilots. Ordnance loads should be predetermined. Ground or airborne alert aircraft for on call missions provide the most rapid response to requests for close air support.

(2) Close air support provides supporting fires that other supporting arms cannot provide due to range, defilade, or the limitations of terrain. Aircraft may be the only fire support available to ground units conducting long-range combat operations. Close air support can be used to conduct flushing fires on known or suspected guerrilla areas. The ability of the pilot to observe target areas not visible from the ground permits him to attack these targets.

(3) Aircraft ordnance used in counterguerrilla warfare must be capable of penetrating heavy vegetation, being used close to friendly forces, and be able to cover wide areas. Heavy growth affords some degree of protection from blast and fragments, but high blast weapons are more effective than rockets and/or strafing fires. In open areas, strafing is the most accurate and effective weapon for use against personnel. Fragmentary bombs with VT fuses, napalm, or chemical and biological agents are extremely effective against guerrilla concentrations. The use of nonlethal biological/chemical weapons have many advantages against a guerrilla force and are most effectively dispensed by aircraft.

c. Deep Air Support. --Deep air support is normally classified as that air fire support conducted beyond the fire support coordination line. However, since the FSCL may not be used in counterguerrilla operations, it is often difficult to clearly separate deep air support from close air support. Deep air support missions conducted during counterguerrilla operations generally consist of search and attack or armed reconnaissance missions which do not require close coordination between ground forces and aircraft conducting the mission after the aircraft are airborne.
(1) Search and attack missions are normally run as a specific search mission; e.g., a limited area such as potential landing zone.

(2) Armed aerial reconnaissance missions serve a two-fold purpose. They are conducted to collect information as well as to attack targets of opportunity, such as guerrilla units, installations, and bivouac areas. They are generally conducted by high performance aircraft. Care must be taken not to subject friendly civilians to attack.

d. Air Support Radar Team.--Maximum use should be made of air support radar team's (ASRT) capability during periods of darkness and inclement weather. This action denies the guerrilla freedom of movement during the periods he could normally feel safe from air attack.

803. ASSAULT SUPPORT

Assault support operations provide for the air transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment in the area of operation by helicopters and/or fixed-wing transports. Such operations may be tactical or administrative in nature.

a. Helicopter Support.--The advent of the helicopter is the most significant innovation for the conduct of operations against guerrillas. Its introduction as a vehicle of war had a remarkable influence on certain principles of war. Detailed information on helicopter employment may be found in FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations.

(1) Effects on Principles of War.--The most favorably affected principle of war is that of maneuver, which in turn influences the application of such fundamental principles as offensive, mass, surprise, and economy of force. The use of helicopters greatly reduces the ratio of opposing forces. In this connection, two other principles of war are enhanced: economy of force--which requires the most advantageous distribution of the forces available, and its corollary, mass--which requires the concentration of combat power at the decisive place at the decisive time. Finally, the helicopter helps provide for the application of the principle of the offensive, which is the basis of tactical doctrine for defeating guerrillas.

(2) Helicopter Employment.--The advantages offered by helicopters should challenge the imagination of commanders at all echelons,
although their employment may be limited by such factors as availability, terrain, and weather conditions. Helicopters may be used:

(a) To conduct aerial reconnaissance and surveillance over known or suspected guerrilla areas in order to develop more accurate intelligence. The hover capability will facilitate detailed investigation of a specific area, but will increase the vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire.

(b) To keep detected guerrillas, suspected guerrillas, or civilians under constant surveillance during daylight.

(c) To familiarize commanders and key personnel with the terrain and other characteristics of the area.

(d) As a means for civilians, defectors, and/or patrol leaders to identify guerrilla camps and routes that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to describe by map inspection.

(e) To transport reaction forces, weapons, and equipment quickly to an area where the guerrillas can be engaged. This procedure will also ensure the commitment of fresh troops. In addition, the transported force can normally carry heavier weapons and more ammunition than guerrilla units.

(f) To keep guerrilla movements under surveillance during a fire fight, move troops from one area of the fire fight to another, and airlift troops not in direct contact to points along routes of escape.

(g) To introduce/pickup patrols and to construct/remove patrols and roadblocks in isolated areas.

(h) In an assault support capacity, by using the assault support helicopter (ASH) concept and delivering suppressive fires by hand-held weapons from transport helicopters.

(i) To resupply, deliver maintenance personnel, or withdraw damaged equipment for rear area repair.

(j) To provide reconnaissance/surveillance escort for armored columns or vehicular convoys. In this connection, they may be
used to deliver troops ahead of the column for such tasks as obstacle removal, traffic control, and security in villages along the route.

(k) For psychological warfare operations, such as leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, the frequent appearance of helicopters at many places and over a wide area has certain psychological value, suggesting intensity in the operations against the guerrillas.

(l) To evacuate casualties. This is of prime importance in the case of isolated units and patrols.

(m) To provide line of sight radio communications by acting as relay, to conduct wire laying missions when feasible, and to perform courier service.

(n) To assist in winning the support of the civilian population by rapidly transporting troops to besieged communities and conducting various mercy missions such as flood evacuation and the delivery of needed food, supplies, and medicine.

(o) To transport civil affairs personnel and civilian authorities to isolated villages and areas, permitting better control and a wider coverage of influence.

(p) To apply defoliation material on guerrilla crops, camps, and assembly areas.

(q) As a means for command control.

(r) As a means of establishing, maintaining, and checking isolated static security posts.

(s) To adjust fires, artillery, mortars and naval gunfire, and to direct and control various air support missions.

(t) In target acquisition and damage assessment.

(u) To conduct photographic missions employing hand-held cameras.
(v) To conduct illumination missions on a limited scale, employing flares or searchlights.

(w) To deliver chemical ordnance (CS/CN) either as a riot control measure or tactically against enemy positions or suspected enemy areas.

(x) Although normally employed as the last minute fire suppression weapon in a selected landing zone and not as a close air support weapon the armed helicopter can provide limited close air support for ground troops in emergency situations or as an interim measure until fixed-wing support is on station.

(3) Planning Factors. -- The employment of helicopters requires planning and coordination between ground, aviation, and all supporting arms units. The following factors are considered commencing with the initial planning phase and continuing throughout the operation:

(a) The extent of helicopter participation and the determination of priorities for helicopter support missions.

(b) The location and development of helicopter bases to include adequate maintenance facilities.

(c) The requirement for efficient utilization and immediate response of assigned helicopters. Centralized control of the helicopters may allow the most efficient method of utilization but the immediate response factor may be best satisfied by having the helicopters in a stand-by alert status at the tactical unit's combat base.

(d) The problems of loading and unloading by both air and ground units involved must be given special considerations. The pilots must be able to compensate for changes in atmospheric conditions, winds, altitudes, fuel reductions, and distances to be flown. The counter-guerrilla unit commander must be prepared to adjust his personnel and equipment to meet the changing load carrying capabilities of the aircraft.

(e) Landing zones are selected jointly by the counter-guerrilla commander and the helicopter unit commander. The troop commander is primarily concerned with selecting landing zones that can support his scheme of maneuver and tactical plan. The helicopter unit commander is concerned with the ability of the helicopters to get in and
out of the landing zone, the number of helicopters that can operate in the zone at one time, and whether or not the landing zone requires improvements.

(f) Landing zones are selected throughout the entire area of operations during the planning phase. Selected landing zones should be reconnoitered as time and conditions permit.

(g) Landing sites located in rugged or densely overgrown landing zones may require clearing. These sites may be large enough for several helicopters or only large enough to be used for emergency resupply by externally loaded helicopters. Teams composed of infantry and engineer personnel trained to debark from hovering helicopters and equipped with suitable tools are employed to clear selected landing sites.

(h) Helicopter coordination and control may require additional communication equipment and personnel to ensure adequate ground-to-air communications.

(i) Security of the helicopter in the air and on the ground presents varied problems to the helicopter unit commander and the counterguerrilla unit commander. Effective security of helicopter bases and grounded helicopters must be provided for. Security of the approach and retirement lanes against ground fire is essential. This protection is provided by use of fixed-wing attack aircraft and/or armed utility helicopters and by the selection of helicopter routes to avoid villages and known enemy positions. Special attention is given to the security of the landing zones. The possibility of guerrilla ambushes and/or mined landing zones can be expected.

b. Fixed-Wing Transport Support. --Fixed-wing transport aircraft have the capability of operating from relatively short, unimproved fields. This, coupled with their air delivery capability, provides a significant extension to the logistic and operational resources of forces engaged in operations against guerrillas. For detailed information on air movement of personnel and equipment see FMFM 4-6, Air Movement of FMF Units.

(1) Administrative Movements. --Administrative air movements consist of the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Tactical considerations in loading, movement, and unloading are of minor importance. Such movements may be divided into--
(a) Scheduled flights; conducted on a predetermined recurring basis.

(b) Unscheduled flights; conducted on an as-required basis.

(2) Tactical Movements.--Tactical air movements consist of movement of personnel, and cargo in which loading, movement, and unloading are determined by tactical considerations. Such movements, to accomplish a specific tactical mission, are made into or near enemy controlled territory. Tactical air movements consist of the following types of operations:

(a) Air landed operations wherein tactical units and/or cargo are disembarked/unloaded after the aircraft has landed.

(b) Air delivery operations wherein supplies and equipment are unloaded from the aircraft in flight.

(3) Other.--Fixed-wing transport support is utilized for many of the same purposes as are helicopters. Such support is especially useful when missions are beyond the lift and/or range capabilities of the helicopter.

804. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

Various types of aircraft are used to provide reconnaissance and observation for the ground commander. This reconnaissance and/or observation may include photographic and electronic as well as visual observations. For additional information on aerial reconnaissance and the units which provide it see FMFM 5-1, Marine Air Wing and FMFM 7-3, Air Support.

a. Aerial Photography.--Aerial photographs provide recorded information that can be assessed objectively and reproduced in quantity.

(1) Photographic reconnaissance is conducted to provide map substitutes or supplements and to obtain information on such things as targets, target damage assessment, suspected guerrilla cultivation, newly cleared areas, roads, and trails.

(2) Photographic reconnaissance is valuable in confirming intelligence gained from other sources.
(3) Most photographic reconnaissance missions are conducted by high performance aircraft of the Marine composite reconnaissance squadron. However, the Marine observation squadron has a limited capability; aerial observers, using hand-held cameras, are capable of providing pinpoint photography of specific areas or targets.

b. Electronics Reconnaissance. --Electronics reconnaissance is the interception and analysis of enemy electromagnetic emissions other than signal communications. There are two primary categories of aerial electronics reconnaissance, radar and electronics countermeasures (ECM) reconnaissance. In counterguerrilla operations we will only concern ourselves with the radar reconnaissance. See FMFM 2-3, Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations, for detailed ECM operations.

(1) Infrared. --Infrared is valuable in penetrating camouflage and in collecting information at night. However, its effectiveness is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation. The information obtained should be corroborated by other means. Airborne infrared detection devices can cover large areas quickly, but are limited to line of sight coverages. These devices are not vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, but are susceptible to enemy deception measures.

(2) Side Looking Aerial Radar (SLAR). --SLAR can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator. Information obtained should be supplemented by other means such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the exact nature of the activity detected by SLAR. Airborne radar can cover large areas quickly and can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly positions. SLAR is dependent on line of sight and may be detected, jammed, or spoofed.

c. Visual Reconnaissance. --Visual reconnaissance plays an important part in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. Direct communication between the reconnaissance aircraft and tactical unit headquarters is essential. In conducting visual reconnaissance missions, the following methods may be employed.

(1) Area Search. --An area search is a general, continuous search covering the entire area of operation for intelligence information and for detection of changes. Accordingly, the same observer should be
assigned when possible to reconnoiter the area. Although guerrillas will seldom be seen, except when surprised or on the run, there will be signs of his existence even in areas possessing good concealment.

(2) Specific Search. --A specific search is one conducted to obtain specified information concerning a limited area such as possible drop zones and/or helicopter landing zones. It may be used to follow up information gained from agents or informer reports, ground reconnaissance, or photographic or other visual reconnaissance means.

(3) Route Reconnaissance. --A route reconnaissance is essentially a specific search. It is conducted for the purpose of determining route conditions, to report on convoy movements, and in conjunction it may provide security escort for convoys. Particular emphasis is placed on locating possible ambush sites.

(4) Unit Reconnaissance. --Unit reconnaissance missions are missions required by specific units of the counterguerrilla force, and may include contact and command or staff reconnaissance missions.

(a) Contact reconnaissance missions are conducted to locate and reestablish contact with patrols who have lost communications with tactical headquarters. Long-range patrols may include the preplanned use of contact reconnaissance for prescribed times and locations. These missions are also used to maintain contact between widely separated units.

(b) Commanders or their staffs may conduct personal terrain reconnaissance missions in the area of operations. To ensure maximum benefit, a thorough briefing should be conducted before each flight and prominent landmarks marked on the maps carried by the personnel.
SECTION 9

COMBAT SUPPORT

901. GENERAL

Employment of combat support may be limited in guerrilla warfare. Rugged terrain that provides the guerrilla an area for operating forbids unlimited movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles and restricts the employment of supporting weapons. The employment of artillery, naval gunfire, and mechanized units in quantity may not be possible, although every effort is made to provide maximum combat support consistent with realistic requirements. Areas that possess navigable coastal and inland waters will be suited for the employment of naval ships and craft. Support provided by reconnaissance and engineer units can be most effective in rugged terrain. In planning the amount and type of combat support required, a detailed study of the terrain is conducted. Care is taken in planning the combat support to ensure that it can be effectively employed. The unnecessary burden that will be imposed on logistics and the additional problem of security associated with noneffective units is to be avoided. Generally, combat support which is air transportable by certain fixed wing aircraft,
helicopter and aerial resupply drop can provide effective support in guerrilla operations.

902. FIELD ARTILLERY

a. General.--Field artillery properly employed against guerrilla forces is a major asset to the commander. Proper employment of artillery is attained by modifying the conventional principles, techniques, and tactics. The vague enemy situation and difficult terrain require the artillery commander to exploit every means to provide adequate and continuous fire support. Although the principle of massed artillery fires is applicable against guerrilla forces, most firing will be accurate surprise fires on temporary and fleeting guerrilla targets. For a complete discussion of artillery employment against guerrilla forces, refer to FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support.

(1) Counterguerrilla Operations.--The planning, composition, and employment of artillery units is based on the landing force plan of operation. The artillery plan is based on a careful study of the terrain, road nets, and the enemy situation. Support may be required for numerous patrols, ambushes, roadblocks, and similar guerrilla-type operations.

(2) Conventional Operations.--The planning, organization, and employment of artillery in conventional operations differs from counterguerrilla in that two concurrent operations may be conducted, one against guerrilla forces and the other against conventional forces. Diversion of artillery from the primary mission is a guerrilla tactic and diversion must be avoided. When required, a specific force, including artillery, is assigned to conduct operations against guerrilla forces which significantly threaten conventional operations. This force operates in the same manner as it would for counterguerrilla operations.

b. Organization for Combat.--Artillery must provide adequate fire support, including massing of fires; and the weapons employed should be those that can best support the operation. There is no standard organization for operations conducted against guerrillas. The artillery units are organized to be employed in specific terrain, to combat a certain size guerrilla force, and to support the tactics and techniques to be employed during a particular operation.
(1) **Light Artillery Support.** --As light artillery can be moved by helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, landing craft, and on the ground, it can be delivered to areas that are inaccessible to other artillery.

(2) **Medium Artillery Support.** --Medium artillery, self-propelled and towed, provide increased accuracy and range over light artillery. However, medium artillery requires better roads and stronger bridges.

(3) **Heavy Artillery Support.** --Although restricted to good roads and strong bridges, its long range can provide support to deep patrols and widely separated units.

(4) **Amphibian Howitzer.** --The amphibian howitzer (LVTH) can be employed in areas possessing poor roads, little or no bridging, and in areas too wet or otherwise unsuitable for conventional artillery. Its 360-degree turret traverse also affords rapid support in any direction.

(5) **Searchlight Support.** --Searchlights can be employed to prevent infiltration, limit night movement of guerrillas, locate friendly patrols, and for patrol orientation. They can also be employed to assist in night close air support.

(6) **Target Acquisition Agencies.** --If guerrillas employ mortars or artillery, sound, flash, and radar ranging can be utilized. Artillery aerial observers should be of sufficient numbers to provide constant surveillance. Because of the requirement for extensive patrolling, the number of artillery forward observers assigned to infantry units may not be sufficient to meet all forward observer needs. Therefore, small unit leaders should receive training in the rudiments of fire planning and forward observer procedures to ensure this capability is available when required.

(7) **Survey Capability.** --In addition to normal survey requirements, need exists for a greater number of surveyed control points (SCP) throughout areas to facilitate target location, transfer firing data and computation of corrections to be applied to firing data. Extensive survey operations can also aid in orientation of patrols. To accomplish such extensive survey, augmentation of additional survey teams will normally be required. In engagements of short duration where SCPS have not been established, fire will generally be directed from an observed firing chart.
In these instances, artillery units can rapidly establish common direction by simultaneous astronomical observation. Helicopters can provide a valuable asset to rapid survey of the area of operations to establish a common grid.

(8) Changes, Modifications, and Additions. --Any changes, modifications, and additions that are incorporated in the artillery structure are carefully considered. Special training may be necessary if animals, new type equipment, or special procedures are employed.

c. Artillery Staff Planning. --Staff estimates are prepared for the commander to assist him in making decisions. The decision to provide artillery support in operations against guerrillas will require imagination on the part of the staff in preparing its plan.

(1) Intelligence. --The target acquisition agencies are exploited to locate targets. Rapid processing of target intelligence is vital in order to deliver fires as expeditiously as possible.

(2) Operations. --Fire planning and fire direction techniques follow the conventional methods. Fire direction should remain centralized insofar as possible; however, decentralization may often be necessary due to widely dispersed operations and special task assignments. The operation may require decentralization of mutual defensive fires, countermortar fires, harassing and interdiction fires, flushing and barrier fires, and fires to support attacks. Coordination and control of fires require detailed planning. Training of personnel should include training in guerrilla warfare and in techniques required for operating any special equipment.

(3) Logistics. --Related to the total guerrillas killed, ammunition expenditures by artillery may appear excessive. The requirement for displacement of artillery may result in greater than normal POL consumption. Position area security may require abnormal amounts of barbed wire, concertina, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines. Other specialized equipment is considered in planning. The movement of supplies, protection of dumps, and distribution of widely dispersed units must be provided for. The resupply of artillery ammunition is a paramount consideration in planning and conducting operations against guerrillas. The relatively great distances over which ammunition must be transported coupled with the relatively large expenditure rates and weight of ammunition, combine to create a complex logistics problem. Consideration should be given to
unit distribution resupply to batteries from control base ammunition supply points to avoid repeated handling at forward ammunition dumps.

d. Fire Support.--In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans utilized in conventional artillery support. Among these are:

(1) Countermortar Fires.--The normal countermortar techniques are utilized in target accumulation, target selection, and target attack. However, in operations against guerrillas, the target will be even more fleeting and temporary than in normal countermortar operations. Accordingly, rapid dissemination of countermortar target information is essential in order that a quick response can be made by supporting arms. Plans are prepared on active locations.

(2) Counterguerrilla Fires.--The accumulation and collection of counterguerrilla targets are provided by the normal target acquisition agencies and the infantry sources. Fires are planned on guerrilla installations, camp areas, communication routes, and known positions. Many of these targets may be unoccupied during firing of a counterguerrilla program; nevertheless, effective neutralization of installations may be obtained. A counterguerrilla program of fires can be prepared preliminary to supporting an infantry attack on guerrilla areas. Individual fires may be prepared to force the guerrilla into a particular area.

(3) Defensive Fire Plans.--Defensive fire plans are devised to protect rear area installations, to prevent infiltration in strength, and as mutual fires in defense of other installations. Defensive fire plans require careful coordination and control when planned concentrations are near friendly military installations and occupied civilian areas.

(4) Harassing Fires.--Harassing fires are designed to disturb the rest of the guerrilla, to curtail his movement, and by threat of loss, to lower his morale. Consideration should be given to the use of daylight harassing fires when circumstances warrant. Also, illumination fires can be employed as a method of harassment in areas where fires can be observed.

(5) Interdiction Fires.--Interdiction fires are fires placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.
(6) **Reconnaissance by Fire.** --Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause him to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas to produce a reaction from the guerrilla force. Because the fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs are taken before and after the program is fired. Maximum aerial observation is used during the firing to detect and report guerrilla activity.

(7) **Flushing Fires.** --These fires are prepared to support infantry operations by "flushing" the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near defined paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

(8) **Barrier Fires.** --Barrier fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape and denying the guerrilla reinforcements.

(9) **Deception Fires.** --These fires are placed away from friendly troops and are designed to deceive the guerrillas and to cover friendly troop movements. Deception fires can be used to distract and mislead the guerrilla force while friendly troops approach from other directions.

(10) **Illumination Fires.** --The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops, by exposing guerrilla activity, and deterring infiltration. It can be utilized for orientating lost patrols.

(11) **Survey by Fire.** --Location of guerrilla activity can be provided from replot data. Survey by fire using center of impact (CI) and high burst (HB) techniques with HE, WP, and illumination shells will give accurate location of targets, patrols, etc. Patrols that possess the necessary communications can determine their position or those of the enemy from adjusted coordinates provided by the artillery FDC.

(12) **Chemical Fires.** --Chemical fires may be utilized effectively against guerrilla forces to screen friendly troop movements, to confuse the enemy, and for casualty effect. White phosphorus (WP) is best suited to marking guerrilla activity for air or infantry attack. WP can also be used as a casualty agent, to burn vegetation, and destroy supplies. Other
toxic and nontoxic chemical shells are ideally suited to counterguerrilla tactical operations against a foe ill-prepared for it.

(13) **Biological Fires.** --Missiles and rockets of field artillery can deliver biological fires against personnel, animals, and crops which contribute to the guerrilla effort. These fires are ideally suited to counterguerrilla operations since nonlethal doses can be utilized to retard the activity of the guerrilla in areas that are inhabited by friendly or neutral civilians. These people can be treated or even inoculated against the biological agents used. Food can be issued to replace crops and animals of friendly civilians lost through this action.

e. **Employment Considerations.** --The employment of artillery requires movement to complement the infantry scheme of maneuver. Selecting position areas in rough terrain to extend the range and support capability for infantry units operating in widely dispersed areas will require extensive reconnoitering. To prevent wasteful expenditure of ammunition, forward observers and artillery air observers should be provided with a target criteria. This criteria should state what comprises a counterguerrilla target and the normal means and amount of artillery fire to be used. The coordination of fires on rear areas, farms, and built-up areas is based on guidance received from the artillery commander.

(1) **RSOP.** --Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position will follow the normal principles. Security and all-around fire capability are emphasized. A search for easily accessible position areas is made to prevent the requirement for building extensive roads, clearing areas, and cutting access ways. This also applies in selecting position areas for helicopterborne and airpack artillery. Security measures on the march and while occupying the position are considered. A compact position area is desirable, providing there is little or no threat of enemy counterfires.

(2) **Security.** --Security measures against guerrilla infiltration and attack are carefully considered by the artillery commander. In addition to planning the normal local security to include patrols and listening posts furnished by artillery personnel, employment of direct fire utilizing time-fused shells, ricochet burst with delay-fused shells, and beehive rounds to defend against guerrilla attack are considered. Direct fire sectors can be assigned to each gun section as is done in antimechanized
defense. Illumination of approaches into the position are planned. Illumination fires can be included in mutual defensive artillery fires. When not committed elsewhere, the mortar battery of the direct support battalion can provide defensive fires for the battalion installations. Joint installations and command post for artillery and infantry can provide greater protection and simplify the local defense problem. Passive defense techniques are considered. The use of wire, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines may be extensive. Emphasis is placed on the training, equipping, and employment of the security section. When organic personnel and weapons are inadequate in providing for security, the commander may obtain additional security means from the supported commander. Artillery units required to operate away from infantry protection should displace at least every 48 hours as a passive defense measure against coordinated guerrilla ground and mortar attacks. Stereotyped defensive postures should be avoided.

(3) Movement. --When providing support for operations conducted over a large area, artillery is frequently moved. Adequate roads and bridges are necessary for movement on land. Roads and access ways can be improved somewhat by organic means. In some instances, engineer support will be required to construct bridges and roads. Self-propelled artillery is particularly hampered by its size and weight when moving in rugged and undeveloped terrain. When land movement is not possible, helicopterborne or airpack artillery delivered by aerial drop are substituted.

(4) Coordination. --Fire support is carefully planned. Guide lines provided by the commander and the use of the "traffic light" system of areas contained in subparagraph 403b, will facilitate coordination. A criteria is stated by the commander to specify the number of guerrillas and the size and type installations that constitute a legitimate artillery target. The amount of ammunition that may be expended against counter-guerrilla targets may be stated, if required. The commanders can control fire discipline and preclude unnecessary expenditures of ammunition. Clearance to fire, as furnished by each agency concerned must be expressed positively; silence denoting consent is not sufficient.

(5) Observation. --In order to provide the most effective support, it is important that a completely integrated observation plan be instituted to cover each area of operation. The following observation means should be fully integrated:
(a) Observation Posts. --Artillery and infantry observation posts should be established in conjunction with each other and fully coor-
dinated by the intelligence officers.

(b) Aerial Observers. --The intelligence and operations officers coordinate infantry and artillery aerial observers surveillance of the area of operations. In addition to performing observation and photographic missions, these observers relay requests of ground ob-
servers with patrols.

(c) Electronic Surveillance. --The ground surveillance and countermortar radars of infantry and artillery should be integrated in the observation plan. Limitations imposed by terrain and vegetation may be overcome by local or isolated area employment. Adequate protection for equipment and operators must be provided.

f. Execution of Artillery Operations. --Weapons such as tanks, antitanks, and amphibian howitzers may be included in certain fire sup-
port operations. If employed, heavy and medium artillery will normally execute fire missions on distant targets while light artillery may be able to accompany the task forces in many operations.

(1) Artillery Support Considerations. --In providing artillery support, all problem areas need to be carefully analyzed. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of self-propelled artillery, the use of helicopterborne artillery, air delivery and resupply, and the capability of artillery communications are examined. Ammuni-
tion requirements must be considered.

(2) Techniques of Support. --Forward observers with patrols, reconnaissance elements, and large or small task organizations will in-
crease the number of guerrilla sightings and targets of opportunity. For-
ward observers operating in dense vegetation or rugged terrain should be capable of adjusting fire by sound. To provide for troop safety, fire for effect on initial data is placed at a greater distance from troops than in normal operations. Within transfer limits, adjustments on checkpoints or terrain features will ensure accurate surprise fire on guerrilla activity and provide for troop safety. Trained aerial observers will be of particu-
lar value in adjusting fires, coordinating movements, reporting guerrilla activities, locating friendly elements, and acting as radio retransmission station for ground elements. Calibrated artillery pieces, the use of
survey, registration, and metro corrections will ensure greater accuracy and troop safety.

(3) Native Guides. --Native guides and interpreters may be necessary in batteries and battalions to assist in movement from one position area to another. Their knowledge of the terrain and language can often preclude delay by assisting in the reconnaissance for position areas and routes. They can be invaluable to the observers and commanders for orientation and target information.

(4) Offensive Action. --As offensive operations progress, forces are directed toward isolation, encirclement, and destruction of guerrilla units. The value of artillery increases during this period. Planning of artillery fires, target acquisition, and attack of guerrilla targets may approach conventional warfare. The use of flushing fires to force the guerrilla in a desired direction and barrier fires to seal off the possibility of withdrawal and to deny reinforcements, is applicable. The destruction of guerrilla installations, the constant harassing and interdiction of facilities and routes of communication, will hamper and destroy the morale of guerrilla forces. Artillery is positioned to support the scheme of maneuver against a fixed guerrilla force, to exploit the maximum number of weapons, and to provide massed fires.

(5) Pursuit. --Artillery is invaluable in the pursuit of escaping guerrilla elements. The demoralizing effect of artillery fires on a defeated guerrilla force should not be overlooked. Helicopterborne artillery is ideally suited to accompany the infantry pursuit of guerrilla remnants.

903. NAVAL GUNFIRE

The demoralizing effect of naval gunfire on guerrillas may justify the use of gunfire support against targets smaller than would normally be considered appropriate or when there is little probability of inflicting material damage. Naval gunfire spotter should be provided for platoon or larger size units operating within range. When assigning spotters to units of less than company size, alternate communications must be provided in instances where normal communication equipment would adversely affect the unit's mobility. Spotting teams must be trained in operational techniques, preferably with the same units with which they will be employed. Maximum use should be made of air spotters.
904. MECHANIZED UNITS

a. Tanks

(1) Employment.--Advanced, coordinated planning characterized by initiative, imagination, and an understanding of combat support can largely reduce limitations placed on tank units as a result of rugged or marginal terrain. In the conduct of operations against guerrilla units, commanders can employ tanks as follows:

(a) As a blocking force for search and destroy and clearing operations.

(b) As a point element with or without infantry mounted on tanks in the conduct of deep patrols.

(c) As rapid reaction forces.

(d) As the nucleus of a motorized/mechanized force.

(e) To patrol LOCs.

(f) To participate in mobile defense of vital areas.

(2) Firepower.--In areas where mobility is entirely restricted by terrain, the long-range firepower of the tank can be exploited (4,800 meters direct, 17,850 meters indirect):

(a) To support patrols and sweeps in an overwatching role, with direct fire from strongpoint positions.

(b) To conduct indirect fire mission on targets of opportunity or harassing and interdicting fires.

(3) Battlefield Illumination.--In an environment characterized by night operations, tanks can provide immediate battlefield illumination, both visible white light for target acquisition by all weapons and infrared illumination for surveillance or target acquisition by weapons mounting infrared sighting devices.

b. Ontos.--In a counterinsurgency environment where guerrillas are relatively inadequately trained and modestly equipped, the Ontos can
be utilized in a limited tank role. Because of its mobility in marginal terrain, the Ontos can often travel where other tracked vehicles cannot. The Ontos is not unduly restricted by narrow roads, trails, defiles, or bridges. Mines are less of a problem for the Ontos than for other tracked vehicles (or even most wheeled vehicles) because of its smaller width and reduced ground pressure. In the limited tank role, the Ontos may be employed for convoy escort, direct fire support for reducing fortified positions, indirect harassing and interdiction fire support, and other combat support roles, limited only by the imagination of the commander.

c. Amphibian Vehicles

(1) General Employment. --The capability of amphibian vehicles to provide infantry transport, direct and indirect fire support, a command post or fire direction center, and flexible communications with other ground units or air elements will greatly improve operations. In areas where waterways offer the most readily available avenue of mobility, the LVT is especially valuable. Amphibian vehicle/infantry teams employed in connection with helicopterborne forces may have the requisite mobility and firepower to outmaneuver and destroy an elusive enemy.

(2) River Patrols and Blockades. --In areas containing numerous waterways and rivers, the use of combined LVT and infantry teams can be effective in controlling both sides of river banks during operations against guerrillas. Size and composition of river patrols vary with size, type, and scope of the specific operation but should not be less than three LVTs. The use of an LVTH-6 should be considered in such operations to provide increased firepower and shock action. Infantry personnel mounted on top of LVTs provide 360° surveillance. LVT/infantry teams may also be employed effectively in a blockade and search role to prevent the movement of guerrillas and their supplies by water means.

905. NBC WEAPONS

a. Nuclear Weapons. --Nuclear employment requires a well-defined target. In counterguerrilla operations, seldom will there be a target of sufficient size to justify the use of a nuclear weapon.

b. Chemical and Biological Weapons. --Under certain conditions chemical and biological (CB) weapons may increase the combat power of counterguerrilla forces. Employment of such weapons will require proper
authorization, a decision which will have been taken in concert with the friendly government and forces. Our own and friendly forces operating in proximity to CB targets must have protection suitable for the agent selected for attack. It is unlikely that guerrilla forces can obtain CB defensive equipment. Where guerrillas are relatively weak, they will typically be well-concealed and located in remote areas. Lethal C or B agent attacks over large areas by support aircraft during carefully selected weather conditions offer the optimum means for destruction of these forces. Persistent lethal or persistent vesicle chemical agents may deny routes or areas to guerrillas in isolated regions. When guerrillas are strong, they may be found close to or mingled among a non-combatant population. In this situation nonlethal incapacitating chemical or biological agents are ideal. The period of incapacitation must be long enough so that counterguerrilla forces may move in, disarm and imprison belligerents, and seek out hidden arms. Riot control agents (CS and CN) are particularly suited for use in situations where it is desired to flush-out or incapacitate the enemy temporarily since their use is less restricted. Riot control agents are effective in driving guerrillas out of caves and tunnels or temporarily denying their use by guerrillas. Permanent denial can be achieved by utilizing powdered CS agents. See section 11 for riot control agents in civil disturbances.

906. RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

a. Reconnaissance units, with their mobility and operational capabilities, provide the commander with valuable means in conducting operations against guerrilla forces. Their most important role is to gather information.

b. The reconnaissance battalion, Marine division, has the mission of conducting reconnaissance in support of the division and/or its subordinate elements. Reconnaissance personnel can be used as helicopter-borne forces for deep reconnaissances, for attacking small isolated forces, and for reconnoitering helicopter landing sites and drop zones. In counterguerrilla operations, consideration may be given to employing the battalion or subordinate units as a mobile reserve. In antiguerrilla operations, units may be employed to conduct limited tactical operations against located guerrilla bands, patrol rear areas, reconnoiter isolated areas between tactical units, and provide convoy escort.

c. See FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance, for detailed discussion of missions, organization, and concept of employment of reconnaissance units.
907. ENGINEERS

a. Tasks. --Included among the engineer tasks which face the tactical unit commander are:

(1) Neutralization of guerrilla mines, booby traps, and obstacles in tactical operations.

(2) Clearing vegetation along potential ambush sites.

(3) Destruction of facilities and/or areas of value only to the guerrilla force.

(4) The construction and/or maintenance of roads to operational areas to ensure rapid employment against guerrilla forces.

(5) Operation of ferries at river crossing sites in areas where guerrillas can readily destroy bridging.

(6) Possible construction of secure settlements for the civil population.

(7) Clearing landlines of communications daily by conducting route minesweeping operations.

(8) Providing engineer support, including contingency bridging, to convoys which may be organized to move through uncleared areas.

(9) Clearing and destruction of tunnels, caves, and other fortifications as required.

b. Field Expedients. --Field expedients should receive emphasis. All units should be proficient in simple engineer work such as erection of barbed wire fences, obstacle clearance, and field expedient bridging. To make maximum use of the civilian population, engineer personnel may be used to train and supervise laborers.

c. Mines. --Mining and mine removal cannot be overemphasized. Training in employment of our own mines, and mines and booby traps employed by the guerrilla, should be stressed. A favorite tactic of the guerrilla is to employ mines on trails, roads, and in built-up areas.
Once he becomes familiar with our selection of helicopter landing sites, these too may be mined. All units should train in mining and mine removal to deny the guerrilla freedom of movement and to assist in defense of all installations.

908. NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT

a. Ships. --Naval ships can be employed to disrupt guerrilla supply channels maintained by local coastal or rivercraft, provide sea transport for rapid concentration of ground forces, attack guerrilla formations in areas close to the sea, and prevent seaward infiltration or escape of guerrilla forces.

b. Craft. --If terrain and inland waterways are suitable, small craft can aid the mobility of tactical units. Combat support may be provided through LCVPs, LCMs, and LCU's by mounting mortars, tanks, and artillery for fire support directly from the landing craft, or when infantry is available to provide protection, weapons may be landed to provide support. These and other craft can provide service support such as evacuating casualties, supplying and resupplying, operating ferries, and by providing craft with jury-rigged helicopter platforms where this would be the only means for landing.

c. Guerrilla Countermeasures. --Precautionary steps must be taken against guerrilla countermeasures involving ambushes employing recoilless rifles, "frogmen" with demolitions, or underwater mines.

909. AIR

Air support includes all forms of air support given by aviation units to forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations. See section 8 for a discussion of air support in operations against guerrilla units.
SECTION 10

LOGISTICS

1001. GENERAL

Operations against guerrillas present special logistic problems that require detailed planning. The logistic support system must be flexible enough to provide self-sufficiency for the tactical unit, pre-planned resupply, and prepositioned supplies and service installations. Security must be established to protect supplies against raids and ambush even in "safe" areas. Although some type of transportation can usually be provided, units must be prepared to man-carry supplies or utilize pack animals. Individual preventive maintenance on all equipment must be stressed. Medical requirements include mobile units with surgical capability; greater self-sufficiency of medical personnel attached to tactical units, and thorough first aid proficiency on the part of all personnel.
1002. SUPPLY

a. Planning.-- Forces operating against guerrillas should carry a minimum of supplies in order to maintain their mobility. Small units should be prepared to live off the land when necessary. The commander must determine the amount and type of supplies needed for the entire operation. After estimating the expected resupply transportation support and the supplies which will be available locally, he must decide both the supplies to be carried with the unit and stock levels to be maintained at the resupply base(s).

b. Types.-- Generally, the major supply requirements are for subsistence and ammunition. The amount of POL supplies required will depend on the amount of automotive transportation included in the tactical organization, plus the amount needed to maintain communication facilities. Necessary items of clothing should be available at prepositioned locations on an "as required" basis. There may be a requirement to provide essential items of subsistence and medical supplies to civilians.

c. Procurement.-- Replenishment schedules must be planned utilizing prearranged delivery of supplies to tactical units by air, land, or water transportation. While emergency combat rations can suffice for a few days, provisions should be made to deliver standard rations periodically. Smokeless heat tablets should be provided. POL may be procured locally, but care should be taken to determine its reliability; delivery will generally be possible by 5-gallon containers only. Local procurement should not deprive the civil populace of scarce materials. On the other hand, only the necessary amounts of subsistence, medical supplies, and clothing should normally be supplied to civilians. No POL or ammunition should be turned over to civilians unless specific authority has been granted. Water consumption rates will vary with local temperature and activity of Marines in the field. In some areas two quarts per day may sustain drinking needs; in hot, humid areas this figure may double. Native water chemically treated by the individual may be utilized.

d. Prepositioned Supplies.-- Temporary supply points should be established at static defense or security installations to replenish troops and supplies.
1003. TRANSPORTATION

a. General. --The success of operations depends, to a large measure, on transportation support that can be maintained. This applies to tactical displacements, supply and service support, and the evacuation of casualties. Resources of the guerrilla tend to limit him to foot mobility. Forces operating against guerrillas will also frequently rely on foot mobility; wheeled vehicles will often provide such forces a decided advantage. See paragraph 606 for discussion of transportation security.

b. Helicopters. --Helicopterborne forces arrive fresh and are quickly deployed. Helicopter support during combat is particularly desirable since resupply, reinforcement, and evacuation by other means are often infeasible. The use of helicopters for supply and evacuation offers a high degree of logistic support flexibility from the highest echelon down to the squad patrol; (See par. 803.)

c. Fixed-Wing Transport. --Fixed-wing aircraft delivery is perhaps the most satisfactory means of resupply for tactical units beyond helicopter range. (See par. 803b.) If electronic guidance systems are available, all-weather parachute or freedrops can be used. The chief disadvantages of this method are that the locations and sizes of the drops may give information to the opposing guerrillas as to the location and size of the receiving unit and that some supplies may drift into areas where they will be recovered by the enemy. There is also a damage risk.

d. Landing Craft. --Landing craft can be used to move troops, supplies, and surface vehicles on inland waterways. Armament can be mounted on the landing craft for combat support. Tanks and supply laden vehicles can either be off-loaded or used while waterborne. (See par. 606e and 908.)

e. Rail. --Existing rail facilities may offer good transportation over part of the supply route but will seldom extend to the forward areas. Since rail shipments are easily sabotaged or ambushed, security considerations may often rule out use of rails even though otherwise feasible. See paragraph 606e for discussion of security measures for rail movement.

f. Land Vehicles. --Rugged terrain usually limits the types of vehicles which can be used in the forward areas. However, LVTs, track-laying prime movers, and mechanical mules may provide cross-country mobility.
g. Other Means. --When no other transportation is available, 
troops move on foot and supplies are man-packed. Native carriers and/ 
or pack animals can be employed. When pack animals are used, their 
owners or other native handlers should be hired, if possible.

1004. SERVICE

a. General. --It will not be feasible to attach heavy maintenance 
support units to tactical organizations; therefore, they should be located 
at the bases or static defense installation closest to the combat areas. 
For the organization of maintenance support areas see FMFM 4-1, 
Logistic and Personnel Support. Preventive maintenance should be given 
a high priority. Contact repair teams may be flown to the tactical loca-
tions for unit replacement repairs or unserviceable equipment may be 
helicopter lifted to the support area. Movement of the tactical unit should 
not be delayed by lengthy maintenance operations. Inoperative vehicles 
which cannot be repaired or evacuated should be destroyed or cannibal-
ized.

b. Planning. --Service support planning must consider the com-
plete operation, the organization of the force, and its equipment. Spare 
parts and replacements must be spotted at locations where they can be 
easily transported to the tactical areas. When extended operations are 
planned, it may be advisable to attach repair teams to the tactical units. 
Only essential combat replacement items should be stocked. Time must 
be allocated before and after each mission for repairs and replacements.

c. Execution. --Emphasis is placed on replacement of component 
parts by mobile maintenance teams helicopter-lifted. Temporary repairs 
and local civilian repair facilities should be used as much as possible. 
Requests for service support will be passed over normal command or 
administrative radio channels to the logistic support area commander.

d. Security. --Maintenance personnel must be trained and equipped 
to protect themselves and their installations from guerrilla attacks and 
sabotage. In addition, the commanders of the tactical units concerned 
must provide for their safety when they are working in their tactical 
areas.
1005. **MEDICAL TREATMENT, EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION**

a. **General.** Medical support must be as flexible as the tactical operation. Flexible, mobile medical support units, with a surgical capability, support tactical operations against guerrillas from the nearest base or static installation. Small unit casualties are evacuated to medical units by the most expeditious means available, usually helicopter. Further evacuation will be in accordance with normal doctrine.

b. **Initial Care.** Initial emergency medical treatment is by organic hospital corpsmen. The use of small tactical units in widely dispersed areas requires that each man be trained in basic first aid measures so that he may save his own life or that of another because the unit may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation. First aid training must emphasize practical application of emergency treatment.

c. **Evacuation.** Organic medical personnel should be placed with the companies and platoons, especially when units are operating at considerable distance from the parent unit. Only necessary medical supplies and equipment are carried by medical personnel. Evacuation is accomplished by the most practical means available. Unit commanders must make every effort to evacuate casualties as they occur so as not to reduce tactical mobility. (Helicopters should be considered the primary evacuation means for isolated units or long-range patrols, even when helicopter landing sites do not exist in the vicinity. A long-range, platoon-size patrol with casualties can clear a helicopter landing site in much less time than it would take to evacuate the casualties overland. Engineer personnel with tools and demolitions could debark from hovering helicopters to assist in clearing a site. It is a matter of hours versus days.) Company and platoon medical personnel are required to establish casualty collecting points pending evacuation. Evacuation plans must be carefully coordinated at the lowest levels. Radio nets and procedures for requesting evacuation helicopters are identical to those used in amphibious warfare. Procedures for locating and marking evacuation stations for both day and night evacuation operations must be established prior to commencement of operations. Helicopter evacuation under hostile fire and/or conditions of darkness should be reserved only for the critically wounded and/or where such evacuations are deemed an operational necessity.
d. Treatment of Civilians.—Use of military medical personnel to assist in treatment of civilians is a powerful psychological weapon to gain support of the local population. Medical personnel should assist, particularly when civilian casualties are the result of guerrilla actions, but without depleting stocks required by troops. (See par. 1104.)

1006. SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE

The importance of hygiene and sanitation must be emphasized. Every effort is made to prevent sick casualties through good sanitation and hygiene practices. Individuals and small units may often be isolated from sanitary food and water supplies. Most local diseases can be controlled and prevented. Depending on the area of operations, head nets, insect repellents, and water purification tablets should be issued. All troops must receive intensive indoctrination in preventive measures prior to being committed to combat if they are to continue as a potent fighting force. Care of the feet is of prime importance.
SECTION 11

CIVIL POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS

1101. GENERAL

Successful operations against guerrillas will depend to a large extent upon the attitude of the civil populace. One of the guerrilla's greatest assets lies in his identification with a popular cause and his ability to conceal himself within the populace. His success depends on civil populace support. Based on the attitude of the civilian populace, the military/civilian relationship will range from severe populace control--where the populace is sympathetic to the guerrilla cause--to limited control and a generous program of civic action, where the populace is sympathetic with the counterguerrilla efforts. Civil affairs and civic action are the major factors in developing favorable public opinion. They are an effective instrument for fostering active civilian opposition to the guerrilla force and active participation in, and support of operations against guerrillas.
1102. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

a. Objectives. --Civil administration conducted by military forces should accomplish the following:

(1) Support military operations.

(2) Fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or customary law.

(3) Implement United States policies.

(4) Provide for smooth and prompt transition back to civil control.

b. Responsibility. --The commander's responsibilities may vary from complete social and economic control to limited security control in specified combat areas. He may be authorized civil controls in combat zones similar to those exercised in occupied areas, but any such authority will be specified in treaties or other agreements with the local governing bodies. The commander may be assigned responsibility for absolute control subject only to the limits set by international law and regulations contained in policy directives. (See NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, and FMs of the 41 series.)

(2) In areas where the government friendly to the United States has sufficient control, the commander's responsibilities will usually be limited to advice, assistance, and negotiations.

(3) Total responsibility for control over liberated areas is rapidly transferred to the local government. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the reestablished power. Close liaison and ample support is provided for the reestablished government and its organized forces until it is entirely self-sufficient. Such support may be administered through advisory and liaison groups.

c. Approach. --Commanders must realize that operations against guerrillas will seldom solve the problems of the area in which they occur.
The guerrilla force is only a symptom of the overall problem which caused the resistance movement to arise in the first place. Throughout military operations, a positive program of civil assistance must be conducted to eliminate the original cause of the resistance movement. While administration will normally be conducted by the civilian agencies of the national government in situations short of war, the military force will normally possess many of the technical, managerial, and administrative skills needed and may be called on to provide assistance for portions of the program such as:

1. Stabilization of social and political institutions.
3. Establishment of acceptable living standards.
4. Provision of individual and group equality.
5. Establishment of an acceptable educational program.

1103. POPULACE CONTROL

a. General. --Rigid and strict control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace that is collaborating with guerrilla forces. Public attitudes must be judged carefully. Control and restrictions are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose the guerrilla force should be supported. The basic objective is to physically and ideologically isolate the guerrilla force from the populace.

b. Measures. --Administrative measures and punishment are exercised with care. If the people become so frustrated as the result of control and punishment that they feel their lot might just as well be thrown in with the guerrillas, the purpose of the control measures is defeated. However, rigid enforcement and stern punishment are necessary. Half-heartedness or laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are apprehended and justly punished. The guerrilla force may initiate acts of violence in communities that are cooperating. Unjust or misplaced punishment is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas. Every means is used to publicize the nature of offenses for which punishment is imposed. The populace must be made to realize that the action is taken to enforce law and order.
c. Methods.--Administrative measures to suppress an unfriendly populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with guerrilla forces may include:

(1) Employment of roadblocks. (See par. 507e.)

(2) Search and seizure operations. (See par. 507.)

(3) Constant surveillance by block control.

(4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.

(5) Prevention of political meetings and rallies. (See par. 1103d.)

(6) Registration and documentation of all civilians. (See par. 1103e.)

(7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.

(8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means. (See par. 1103g.)

(9) Controlling all movement. (See par. 1103f.)

(10) Curfew. (See par. 1103h.)

(11) Censorship.

(12) Control of the production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of food-producing areas. (See par. 1103i.)

(13) Controlled possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money. (See par. 1103j.)

(14) Complete evacuation of areas, if necessary. (See par. 1103k.)

d. Prevention of Illegal Political Meetings.--The political parties which support the resistance movement are outlawed; however, parties
may take on new names or profess other interests in order to meet for coordination of efforts. All meetings and assemblies must be carefully observed, preferably by civil police. The military commander should be kept informed of all scheduled assemblies and meetings in order that he can be better prepared to control them if necessary. Religious services on church premises may be exempt from all restrictions. Permission may be granted to hold public entertainment, sports meetings, and other similar events having no connection with political activities, such permission should be granted only after consultation with counterintelligence personnel and investigation of the persons requesting such permission and the organization they represent to make certain that it is not a cover for prohibited activities.

e. Registration of All Civilians

(1) Civil affairs units are charged with the responsibility for screening civilian officials, employees of the military, and/or quasi-military organizations of Allied forces by means of processing questionnaires. Civil affairs units coordinate their activities with counterintelligence agencies. Responsibilities include the establishment of an office of record, and establishment of an archives center for documents pertaining to the people in the area of operations.

(2) The purpose of this activity is to seek out and control all elements which are hostile to the allied operations. It also assists in counterintelligence with its responsibility for the investigation of, and action against, subversive individuals actively opposing the legal authority or engaging in activities prejudicial to the political objectives of the operation.

(3) In the early phases of operations, activities of this type are limited to the screening of only such important public officials as is immediately essential to the maintenance of order and the security of persons and property.

(4) The discharge of this responsibility may be achieved by the establishment of an agency with two subordinate elements:

(a) The Records and Statistics Unit

    1 Receives questionnaires from all sources, assigns serial numbers to them, and prepares the accompanying forms.
Par. 1103

2 Indexes, records, and files questionnaires and related documents.

3 Prepares statistical information and reports for higher authority.

4 Checks payrolls and personnel records to ensure that no local employee has escaped registration and screening.

(b) The Operations Unit

1 Evaluates the questionnaires and extracts pertinent information from them.

2 Searches and evaluates civil service records, police records, and records impounded by counterintelligence.

3 Receives and evaluates oral and written denunciations of civilians in government or civil affairs service.

4 Conducts special investigations as required.

f. Establishment of Restricted Areas.--Military and critical civil installations such as police facilities, communications centers, utilities activities, and supply agencies may be designated as restricted areas to prevent guerrilla interference. These installations should be fenced off, gate guards established, and warning signs conspicuously posted. Whenever possible, vegetation or obstructions are cleared at least 100 meters on both sides of the fence. Fenced areas are patrolled and persons attempting to cross the fence or flee the cleared area are apprehended or shot. Persons entering or leaving the area are searched. Percentage of persons searched in detail depends on the amount of traffic, degree of security required, and degree of support the civil population in the area is suspected of rendering the guerrilla.

g. Restrictions on Communications and Transportation

(1) Communications.--In cooperation with civil police, the military may restrict general civilian usage of telephones and telegraphs. The use of radio transmitters may also be restricted. Censorship of mail may be imposed. Search parties should be alert for written
messages. Printed matter such as books and newspapers may be coded to convey messages to guerrilla forces.

(2) **Transportation**

(a) Gate checkpoints should be established to control traffic entering restricted areas and specified villages and settlements. The following principles should be followed:

1. The officer or NCO in charge should be responsible for movement through the gate and should not take part in actual search.

2. Hurdles or barricades are used to channel traffic.

3. Strict crowd control is exercised so that searchers are not crowded by persons waiting to move through the gate.

4. When only a percentage of persons are being searched, no prior indication of selection should be given and search patterns should be avoided.

5. A careful watch should be made for suspicious actions; e.g., attempts to evade search, uneasiness, etc.

6. Younger men and women are the most likely carriers of illegal goods.

(b) Roadblocks and checkpoints may be established on a temporary, surprise basis or may be semipermanent in nature. Armored vehicles are especially valuable as mobile checkpoints. Local security against guerrilla attack must be provided. Roadblocks and checkpoints may produce relatively few tangible results; their value lies in restricting and hampering guerrilla resupply and in impressing the neutral population with a "show of force".

h. **Curfews**

(1) Curfews are one of the simplest and most effective means of isolating the civilian from the guerrilla and preventing civil interference with military operations.
(2) Exceptions to curfew restrictions may be granted to--

(a) The clergy.
(b) Doctors and midwives.
(c) The civil police.
(d) Public officials and employees specified by civil affairs officers.
(e) Firefighting personnel.
(f) Emergency repair crews of water, gas and power concerns.
(g) Private employees, who provide essential services.
(h) Other individuals approved by civil affairs officers.

(3) Except as noted in subparagraph (h) above, the power to grant exemptions may be delegated to the local police. All exemptions should be numbered serially, and the reason for the exemption, conditions of exemption, and the name of the issuing officer clearly stated.

(4) Commanders should see that curfew regulations are rigidly enforced, preferably by civil police. This can be determined by checks on all persons on streets after curfew hours and by spot-checks of residences to determine that residents are at home.

(5) See figure 4 for an example of a curfew notice.

i. Food and Restricted Article Control. --In cooperation with civil agencies, close supervision of the harvesting, distribution, and sale of food and other articles required by guerrillas can effectively reduce civilian support. The development of a food and restricted article control plan will include the following considerations:

(1) Foodstuffs must be defined to include all types of prepared or unprepared food, grain, oil, sugar, and canned goods which may conceivably be used for human or animal consumption.
NOTICE

CURFEW

Until further notice no person within _______ will be permitted to move on the streets or outside his own house between the hours of ______ and ______ without a permit from ________

Any person found in the streets without a permit between those hours will be severely punished. All persons are warned that military guards/civil police are instructed to shoot any person seen outside his house after hours and who is attempting to hide or escape.

Exceptions to this order include ____________________________

__________________________

Signature
Name, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Figure 4. --Curfew Notice.

(2) Restricted articles are defined and usually include paper, ink, medical supplies, flashlights, clothing, and cloth.

(3) Restrictions involving the sale, movement, or possession of foodstuffs and restricted articles are carefully drawn up and thoroughly publicized.

(4) The procedures regarding search of houses, stores, individuals, and vehicles are clearly defined.
j. Control of Weapons

(1) Prior to issuance of any order or decree disarming the civil population, it is necessary to analyze all features of the undertaking. Plans should include--

(a) Measures necessary to strengthen existing civil laws in existence.

(b) Forces necessary to enforce the order or decree.

(c) Form and method of promulgation of the order or decree.

(d) Designation and preparation of storage areas for arms, ammunitions and explosives.

(e) Disposition of munitions collected.

(f) Method of accountability for such munitions, including preparation of necessary receipts, tags, and permits to be used.

(g) Designation of types and classes of munitions to be turned in.

(h) Exceptions to the order or decree. These persons will be issued a special permit.

(i) Agencies (civil and/or military) who will collect, guard and transport the material.

(j) Instructions governing the manufacture and importing of munitions.

(k) Time limit for compliance and penalties assigned thereafter.

(2) The problem of retaining knives, machetes and certain agricultural tools can be a source of difficulty and misunderstanding. The working machete or knife is practically the only implement found on farms or forests in many areas of the world; it is used for clearing land
as well as harvesting crops. Civilians cannot be deprived of general utility tools. The disarming order (or supplementary instructions) should describe these weapons sufficiently to properly guide subordinates executing the order.

k. Relocation of Villages and Settlements

(1) The military commander may evacuate or relocate civilians from guerrilla areas. This will assist in isolating the guerrilla by depriving him of local support and will free innocent civilians from terrorism through better protection. Clearing civilians from guerrilla areas also simplifies tactical operations. Resettlement towns and villages may be fenced off; occupants of individual houses near the resettlement village may be required to move into the enclosure. Military, civil police, or civil defense units provide surveillance against guerrilla intrusion. Measures similar to those taken for restricted areas (see par. 1003g) may be employed.

(2) The law of land warfare prohibits deportation of civilians from their country. However, total or partial evacuation of a given area may be undertaken for the security of the population or imperative military reasons. To the greatest practicable extent, persons evacuated must be accorded proper accommodations, satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition. Members of families should not be separated.

(3) In situations where the law of land warfare does not apply, treaty agreements regarding the rights of civilians must be respected.

(4) Relocation/evacuation planning includes consideration of the following:

(a) Transportation. — Civilian transportation is used whenever possible.

(b) Distance. — The distance of the move should be as short as possible, consistent with the requirement for adequate security of the new location.

(c) Control. — Movement should be made by rigidly controlled convoy.
(d) **Screening.** --Security screening and documentation should be accomplished as soon as possible.

(e) **Identification.** --Evacuees may be provided with and required to wear a tag identifying him by name, location from which evacuated, and destination.

(f) **Briefing.** --Adequate briefing to explain the purpose of the move is accomplished by leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means, prior to the movement.

(g) **Personal Effects.** --Each person is allowed to take a predetermined amount of personal effects.

(h) **Rations.** --If available, food for the period of the movement is provided to each family at the time of departure, or it may be issued at designated points en route.

(i) **Housing.** --Housing in the relocation area should be such that it will not endanger the health of evacuees, nor unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by evacuation.

(j) **Medical Care.** --Available civilian medical personnel are used when required, supplemented by military medical personnel. Particular attention is given to elderly persons, pregnant women, the blind, crippled, and very young children. Appropriate measures must be taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

(k) **Religious Needs.** --The religious needs of evacuees are provided for at the relocation area.

1. **Rewards, Bribes, and Inducements.** --In addition to possible rewards for information leading to the killing or capture of guerrillas, bribes and inducements may be given to civilians who inform military or civil authorities of illegal actions taken by other civilians; i.e., curfew violations, illegal possession of weapons, restricted articles, or food. Rewards may take the form of local currency, additional food and clothing, or critical supplies. Persons who inform should not receive additional confidence or privileges that may violate security. Inducements should be scaled to the value of the information received.
m. Establishment of Clandestine Intelligence Nets.--Clandestine nets can be used as a means to report civil violations of control measures as well as information about the guerrilla force. This covert method should supplement the overt acts of inspection and enforcement by military and civil authorities. (See par. 303b.)

n. Riot Control

(1) Plans should include provisions for coping with civil disturbances. Whenever possible, local civil police or civil defense units should be employed to quell riots, strikes, or disturbances. Military action is used as a last resort. See FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, for details regarding the techniques to be employed.

(2) Chemical riot control munitions are very effective in dispersing riots and violent demonstrations. They do not cause permanent injury and their use is less restricted than is the use of other chemical weapons. Enemy propaganda reaction must be expected, but there will be a propaganda reaction regardless of the means used to thwart the objectives of the rioters. All friendly forces, including indigenous civil police, will require gas masks. Expedient protection available to the rioters, such as transparent plastic film over the eyes and wet cloths covering the nose are effective.

1104. CIVIC ACTION

a. General.--Military civic action is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other such fields contributing to economic and social development. Civic action serves to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U. S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) Opposition to the guerrilla force and support for counterguerrilla efforts by the local population are a by-product of civic action.

b. Cooperation.--Military civic action should be carried out in cooperation with civil authorities and agencies. Care must be exercised not to impair the military effectiveness of participating units and where possible the projects should complement those of other government agencies. Care must also be exercised not to create the image of the
"giver of great and bountiful gifts", but rather to create an image of a government truly interested in the needs of its citizens and an honest, sincere effort to meet those needs within its resources and capabilities. In this regard, the best approach is that of "helping the people to help themselves".

c. Criteria for Civic Action Projects. --Projects can range from the execution of individual deeds to full scale military operations; e.g., clearing and protecting a village; and can encompass everything from an individual imparting his particular skill to a native, to helping him solve a problem or better his condition, to providing security for a village. Though responsibility for civic action in an area of operations is the responsibility of the commander of forces in that area, projects and operations should be adapted to the situation in particular locales and sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions. Though local circumstances may impose other standards, experience thus far has proved the guidelines listed below to be sound:

(1) The village or hamlet chief is the source of information on needed projects in his area and concentration must be on the ones he wants. Civic action is most effective when originated by the local people, even though another activity may seem superior to an outsider. To the villager the choice between a dam producing hydro-electric power and a short-cut path through the rice paddies from his village to the water well is, more often than not, a choice between that which is at best a dream and that which is practical.

(2) A project must have a fairly short completion time or have phases that provide frequent opportunities to evaluate its effectiveness.

(3) Results should be observable, measureable, or tangible. They should also lend themselves to publicity designed to inspire emulation by other military units and social groups.

d. Examples of Civic Action Projects. --The need for many civic action projects is obvious; e.g., medical care, but other opportunities exist which are not so striking in their need. Examples of civic action projects and objectives are listed below. These should be considered representative and not all-inclusive.
(1) **Public Health and Sanitation**

(a) Civil action medical teams composed of doctors and/or corpsmen to treat disease and injuries, and dispense vitamins, worm pills and other medication. Corpsmen should be used as much as possible in the civic action medical teams and doctors used only in cases requiring their degree of training. Since the training of indigenous health officials is usually and roughly equivalent to that of a corpsman, routine treatment by highly trained doctors can undermine confidence in local workers not so highly trained.

(b) Improving sanitary standards--by education; construction of facilities; e.g., showers using barrels, etc.; and examples of unit and personal field hygiene.

(c) Devising acceptable methods of disposing of human waste.

(d) Providing safe water supply systems.

(e) Eradicating malaria and other insect-transmitted diseases.

(f) Teaching sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.

(2) **Agriculture and Natural Resources**

(a) Constructing simple irrigation and drainage systems.

(b) Building or repairing rice paddy dikes.

(c) Increasing or improving production of animals, grains, or vegetable food products.

(d) Transporting agricultural produce or seeds.

(e) Clearing land for farming.

(f) Grading and bulldozing operations.

(g) Devising and constructing flood controls.
(h) Protecting harvested crops from guerrilla confiscation.

(3) Industry and Communication

(a) Assessing and developing acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction.

(b) Constructing housing and other buildings.

(c) Setting up and operating emergency communication centers in time of disaster.

(4) Transportation

(a) Constructing, repairing, or improving roads, trails, and bridges.

(b) Constructing, repairing, or improving inland waterways, wharves, and harbors.

(c) Removing individuals from disaster areas.

(5) Community Development, Social Welfare, and Housing

(a) Preparing plans, surveying, and supervising construction of houses and community building such as schools, civic centers, orphanages, and medical centers, etc.

(b) Sponsoring of worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and hospitals.

(c) Musical concerts.

e. Local Employment. --Civic action programs are often designed to employ the maximum number of civilians until a suitable economy is established. The energies of unemployed and perhaps discontented civilians should be directed into constructive channels supporting the purpose of the friendly campaign.
f. Emphasis. -- A successful civic action program must be pursued as actively and deliberately as military operations if the counter-insurgency mission is to be accomplished. A vigorous military civic action program provides the professional military man with an unusual opportunity to be a statesman.

g. Reports. -- The submission of timely, accurate, and comprehensive reports of events concerning civic action is a continuing requirement. Information is required to keep higher headquarters informed of the activities of the unit and is necessary to permit analysis, planning, and publication of information that will enable other units to benefit from experiences gained. Reports should not be limited to the progress of successful projects but should include any incident which could be detrimental to the relationships between the people and the military force or the government. Of particular interest are apparent or actual attempts by insurgent elements to inhibit the civic action program through intimidation, terror, or other means.

1105. CIVIL FORCES AND LOCAL INDIVIDUALS

a. General. -- To lessen the requirement for military personnel, maximum use is made of local individuals and civil forces sympathetic to the friendly cause. The use and control of such forces depends on national and local policy agreements and suitable security screening. Civil forces require assistance and support by the military force. Assistance is required in an advisory capacity for organization, training, and the planning of operations. Support is required in supplying arms, ammunition, food, transportation, and communication equipment.

b. Use. -- Careful evaluation is made of the civil force's potential use so as to realize their full effectiveness. Their utilization must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature organization and exploitation of such forces may invite treachery. Commanders must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization to screen persons available for use. Guerrillas may be expected to infiltrate agents into any locally organized unit. Even when there is some doubt about their loyalty, individuals may still be used on certain nonsensitive duties to release more troops for military operations. It may also be possible to use them in other areas where they do not have a close relationship with the local populace. Within some areas, sympathetic nationals may be too few to assist in combating the guerrilla force. Within a guerrilla force
it is not uncommon to find subordinate elements opposing each other over political or organizational differences. Properly maneuvered, the factions may even be induced to fight each other. A guerrilla movement split by internal strife is far easier to deal with than a completely unified force. The employment of civil forces and individuals may include the following:

(1) Self-Defense. -- Local individuals of both sexes who have had any kind of military experience or training should be organized into self-defense units. Self-defense units are organized according to villages, counties, and provinces. The units must be capable of repelling terrorists attacks and preventing loss of supplies and equipment. If possible, self-defense forces should be sufficiently strong to enable them to hold an attacking guerrilla force until the arrival of mobile military reaction forces.

(2) Police. -- Local and regional police are employed primarily to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas. They are most effective in areas which are densely populated. Other national or military-like units are effective in maintaining order in rural and remote areas.

(3) Allied Force. -- Whenever possible, friendly units native to an area are employed against guerrillas. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable. The military commander controls friendly units capable of combat operations through a liaison party and logistic support. These units are usually organized, trained, and possess equipment prior to their utilization and are employed in small scale combat operations. Allied forces using weapons, uniforms, ammunition, and other equipment that differs from ours imposes a complex logistic burden that must be resolved. Those civil forces and local individuals without experience or training may be employed as:

(a) Intelligence agents and informers.

(b) Propaganda agents.

(c) Government and key civil leaders.
(d) Security forces.
(e) Labor and service forces.
(f) Trackers and guides.
(g) Interpreters and translators.
SECTION 12

TROOP INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING

1201. GENERAL

a. Training Program. -- A separate and distinct program of training is neither necessary nor desirable to prepare military forces for operations against guerrilla forces. However, there is a necessity that training for operations against guerrilla forces be effectively integrated into all phases of the prescribed training program for all units. Troops must be trained to realize that the prime difference between conventional warfare and operations against a guerrilla force is the nature of the opposing force. A military force, well-trained in counterguerrilla operations, will be capable of minimizing the strengths and exploiting the weakness of a guerrilla force.

b. Attitude of Civilian Population. -- The success of operations against guerrillas is affected by the attitude of the civilian population in the area. It is important that the local populace be favorably impressed by the standard of conduct of all units. Troops are oriented in their
relations with the civil populace, the ideological and social customs of the country, and in respecting public and private property. Needless destruction of public and private property, and abusive use of police and military power against civilians cannot be tolerated. Claim officers should be available throughout the area of operations for immediate settlement of claims when property is damaged or destroyed. A friendly, courteous, and considerate manner toward the population as a whole by all units in a country will have a direct bearing on military operations. If this positive attitude is achieved, civil agencies and the civilian population will assist in the detection and control of guerrillas.

1202. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

a. Cause of the Problem. --Troops should be indoctrinated in the political, social, economic, religious, and racial conditions, customs and conflicts in the country. Furthermore, it must be understood that the basic causes of the situation may stem from a variety of political, social, economic, or religious problems. The application of purely military measures alone may not be sufficient to achieve the purpose of the operation; however, the efficiency of military operations can be greatly increased when troops understand the total problem.

b. Extent of Guerrilla Resistance. --The guerrilla resistance encountered may not be confined entirely to those bearing arms, but may also come from elements of the population providing moral and material support to the guerrilla. Such resistance may come from a majority of the population, or it may be confined to a strong minority with vested political, economic, or religious interests that thrive on chaos or political unrest in the country. On the other hand, a situation may arise where the bulk of the population is economically stable. Under these circumstances, a condition of political unrest would adversely affect the popular interest, and the bulk of the population may be expected to support the intervening force, providing it is apparent that the objective of the intervention is the speedy reestablishment of political stability.

c. Extent of Guerrilla Support. --Normally, the bulk of the population of the country is not in sympathy with those dissident forces which operate to their social and economic disadvantage. However, through ignorance, fear of reprisal, local political conditions, or other factors, the people in an area may be compelled to support such forces. Similarly, ignorance on the part of personnel of the landing force with respect to social customs, religious customs, superstitions, racial and ethnic
loyalties, background of an area, and the basis of the local economy may serve to turn popular opinion against the landing force. An understanding of these various social, religious, and economic factors by all elements of the landing force is essential to accomplishment of the military mission and indeed, the entire military/diplomatic effort.

d. Points for Continued Attention. --The following considerations, with respect to the character of a local population, must receive continued attention by the landing force and its various elements.

(1) Social customs, such as class or racial distinctions, dress, etc., must be recognized and accorded due consideration.

(2) Local political alignments and affiliations must be understood and recognized; any appearance of political favoritism by personnel of the landing force must be avoided.

(3) Religious customs must be recognized and respected.

(4) An understanding of the basis of the local economy, and the economic status of the various segments of the local population is vital to an intelligent appreciation of the attitudes of the population toward the operation.

1203. MORALE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

a. Attitude Toward the Guerrilla. --Troops must be indoctrinated to appreciate the effectiveness of guerrilla forces and never to underrate them. To regard guerrillas as inferior opponents may lead to carelessness and may result in serious losses. Conversely, guerrilla capabilities must not be overrated. Analysis of historical events will reveal that a well-trained, well-equipped, well-organized, well-led, aggressive military force is more than a match for any guerrilla force.

b. Attitude Toward Counterguerrilla Warfare. --Troops employed in operations against guerrillas are subjected to morale and psychological pressures different from those found in normal operations. Commanders at all echelons must conduct an indoctrination and training program which will offset these pressures, which result in a large degree from the following:
(1) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible results in arduous and often unexciting operations. Operating against an elusive destructive force that seldom offers a clear target, that shows little interest in seizing and holding terrain, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again, is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat.

(2) Severe living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.

(3) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security duty.

(4) A reluctance to take repressive measures against women, children, and old men who may be active and willing supporters of the guerrilla force or who must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.

(5) Anxieties resulting from reported or observed guerrilla force atrocities and conversely, the impulse to take vindictive retaliatory measures because of such atrocities.

c. Morale and Welfare. --As a result of wide separation between combat organizations involved in counterinsurgency operations and because it may not be feasible to rotate units to rear areas for periods of rest and relaxation, consideration in planning for counterinsurgency operations should be given to such morale and welfare matters as:

(1) Establishment of local rest and relaxation centers by capitalizing on locally available natural assets; i.e., beaches, lakes, etc.

(2) Establishment of a rest and recreation program outside the combat area utilizing organic air transportation as well as transportation that may be made available by higher headquarters.

(3) Establishment of a decentralized clubs system.

(4) Establishment of a decentralized exchange system.

d. Other. --Although a maximum effort should be made to provide morale and welfare services, troops must be conditioned to expect and accept deprivations through indoctrination and experience on field problems
of extended duration. Such conditioning is especially important for support troops who are most likely to be effected by boredom, drudgery, and lack of enemy contact while in a semigarrison situation.

1204. MAJOR TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Counterguerrilla Environment. --All troops subject to participation in counterguerrilla operations must be aware of the characteristics of the individual guerrilla and methods of guerrilla operations. In addition, all troops must be trained in both active and passive measures which they can employ for their own safety and for effective countering of the guerrilla force. Since there are no frontlines or rear areas as such in counterguerrilla operations, combat support and combat service support troops must be alert to the possibility of guerrilla attack on their installations. At times, combat service support troops may find themselves, on short notice, taking an active part in tactical operations. Similarly, all troops should be familiar with the control measures imposed upon the populace which may require extensive troop effort throughout an operation.

b. Reaction Time Available. --Since an enemy guerrilla force will always strive to attack with maximum surprise, often at unusual times and places, troops must be trained and disciplined to be constantly on the alert. Extensive use of immediate reaction drills during training is required. Furthermore, once contact has been made with a guerrilla force, there is seldom time for the issuance of detailed orders for the conduct of the operation. Success will often result from the immediate coordinated reaction the unit makes in the absence of orders or a detailed reconnaissance.

c. Crosstraining. --The semi-independent nature of operations against guerrilla forces requires that, insofar as possible, troops be crosstrained in the use of communication equipment and all individual and crew-served weapons.

d. Helicopter Training. --The employment of helicopters in unit training should be emphasized. The possible advantages of the helicopter, listed in paragraph 803, should be exploited in training exercises.

e. Marksmanship Training. --Marksmanship training should emphasize accurate and quick firing. The fleeting nature of most guerrilla contacts and the need for total destruction of all members of a
guerrilla force require that all troops be capable of firing quickly and accurately.

f. Individual and Unit Training. --Individual and unit training must develop an aggressive and offensive state of mind in each individual, for it is by offensive action only that a guerrilla force will be destroyed.

1205. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING

In addition to the above considerations, normal individual and small unit training should emphasize:

a. Physical conditioning.

b. Tactics and techniques for combat in urban areas, mountains, deserts, swamps, and jungles.

c. Long-range combat patrolling.

d. Techniques of raids, ambushes, and ruses, and techniques to counter these operations.

e. Night operations.

f. Aerial resupply techniques.

g. Riot control.

h. Police-type patrolling and operations of roadblocks.

i. Tactics and techniques of combat in built-up areas.

j. Techniques of search and seizure operations.

k. Survival techniques.

l. Target identification.

m. Close combat marksmanship.

n. Use of animal transport.
o. Convoy escort and security.
p. Use and detection of mines, demolitions, and booby traps.
q. Counterintelligence and interrogation.
r. Fieldcraft and improvisation.
s. Tracking and land navigation.
t. Advanced first aid and preventive medicine measures.
u. Silent movement.
v. Observation.
w. Boat handling.
x. River-crossing expedients.
y. Map and compass training.
z. Carrying casualties without the aid of modern medical equipment.

aa. Navigation without the aid of landmarks.

1206. ORIENTATION

a. Prior to entry into an area of operations, troops receive an orientation on the nature of the terrain and weather, unusual health hazards, characteristics of the populace, their relations with the civil populace, and the ideological, social, and political situation in the country.

b. Troop orientation should stress that the local populace must be favorably impressed by their standards of conduct and by the efficiency with which they pursue their duties.

1207. TROOP INDOCTRINATION

Troops should be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the situation in areas where their commitment is possible.
SECTION 13

GUERRILLAS IN SUPPORT OF THE LANDING FORCE

1301. GENERAL

a. The development and support of friendly guerrilla forces, as well as the doctrine and plans for their employment, are primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Army.

b. Marine landing forces may conduct operations with support or assistance from guerrilla forces located within or near the objective area. Because of the complex nature and value of guerrilla support, an understanding of their organization, capabilities, and limitations is essential. See FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

1302. COORDINATION AND CONTROL

a. Echelon. --In an amphibious operation, the establishing authority will specify in the initiating directive the amphibious task force commander's responsibilities and authority in connection with the guerrilla
forces. Operational control of guerrilla forces is initially assigned to the amphibious task force commander and is subsequently passed on to the landing force commander. Coordination and control of guerrilla forces will rarely be delegated below landing force level.

b. Liaison With Guerrilla Force. --A liaison detachment with detailed knowledge of the guerrilla force will be assigned to the headquarters that is charged with the operational control of the guerrillas. This detachment provides the communication link with the guerrilla forces and makes recommendations concerning their employment.

1303. CAPABILITIES

a. Prelanding Operations. --Guerrilla forces may be employed to conduct the following prelanding operations:

(1) Conduct cover and deception operations to deceive the enemy as to the time and/or place of the landing.

(2) Interdict enemy lines of communication to delay or deny the enemy approach to the beachhead or withdrawal from the beachhead.

(3) Gather information for intelligence purposes.

(4) Provide evasion and escape assistance to downed aviators, reconnaissance units, etc.

(5) Assist in the conduct of psychological operations.

(6) Capture designated indigenous personnel.

(7) Seize key installations to prevent destruction by the enemy.

(8) Conduct operations to isolate selected portions of the objective area.

(9) Seize and hold portions of the landing area to facilitate the landing.

(10) Seize and/or clear and mark landing zones or seize and hold adjacent key terrain.
b. Postlanding Operations.--Once the landing has taken place the above tasks may be intensified and the guerrillas may be assigned additional missions to:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance operations for the landing force.

(2) Operate as a regular tactical unit, after being trained and equipped.

(3) Provide for rear area security.

(4) Assist civil affairs personnel.

1304. LIMITATIONS

a. The landing force should not formulate plans that are dependent on specific guerrilla successes. Significant guerrilla support limitations are:

(1) Infiltration of guerrilla forces by enemy agents could cause the compromise of landing force plans. Only information essential to guerrilla operations should be provided and counterintelligence must be applied.

(2) Existence of guerrillas in the area of operations may restrict fire support including offensive air support.

(3) Communications between guerrillas and the amphibious task force or landing force may be unreliable.

(4) Lack of training, weapons, or supplies may prevent guerrillas from conducting operations of a significant nature.

(5) Normal dispersion of guerrilla forces reduces their reaction time to orders from higher headquarters.

b. Certain of the limitations described above may be overcome by the introduction of contact teams into the area prior to landing to establish better communications with the amphibious task force or landing force and to exercise more positive control over the guerrilla.
FMFM 8-2

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### INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aerial reconnaissance</strong></td>
<td>303b(3), 801, 804</td>
<td>32, 127, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air support</strong></td>
<td>801</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assault</strong></td>
<td>801b, 803</td>
<td>128, 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Close</strong></td>
<td>802b</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control and coordination</strong></td>
<td>802a</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deep</strong></td>
<td>802c</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-wing transport</strong></td>
<td>803b</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopter</strong></td>
<td>803a</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offensive</strong></td>
<td>801a, 802</td>
<td>127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconnaissance and observation</strong></td>
<td>804</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambush by the guerrilla</strong></td>
<td>112e(1)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambushes</strong></td>
<td>505</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area organization</strong></td>
<td>403, 403b</td>
<td>46, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Areas of guerrilla operations</strong></td>
<td>108a(4), 108a(6), 112b</td>
<td>7, 7, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Forces Agreement</strong></td>
<td>204</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored vehicles</strong></td>
<td>606b(6)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery staff planning</strong></td>
<td>902c</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological warfare</strong></td>
<td>905</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boats</strong></td>
<td>904c, 908</td>
<td>150, 153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captured documents</strong></td>
<td>304c</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil disturbances</strong></td>
<td>112d(1)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil populace control measures</strong></td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian registration</strong></td>
<td>1103e</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication and transportation</strong></td>
<td>1103g</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curfews</strong></td>
<td>1103h</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food and restricted article denial</strong></td>
<td>1103i</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence nets</strong></td>
<td>1103m</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political meetings</strong></td>
<td>1103d</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relocation</strong></td>
<td>1103k</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restricted area</strong></td>
<td>1103f</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rewards</strong></td>
<td>1103l</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Riot control</strong></td>
<td>1103n</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-defense units</strong></td>
<td>1105b(1)</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapon control</strong></td>
<td>1103j</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil populace considerations</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic action</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil administration</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil forces and local individuals</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populace control</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clandestine collection</td>
<td>303b(2),</td>
<td>32,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1103m</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close air support</td>
<td>802b</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting agencies and sources</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat bases</td>
<td>403c</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat intelligence</td>
<td>303b(1)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat support</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery staff planning</td>
<td>902c</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>902e(4)</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterguerrilla operations</td>
<td>902a(1)</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment considerations</td>
<td>902e</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire support</td>
<td>902d</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized units</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval gunfire</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval ships and craft</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC weapons</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>902b</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance units</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlight support</td>
<td>904a(3)</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>902e(2)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High frequency (HF)</td>
<td>703a(1)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>703d</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio relay</td>
<td>703c</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound</td>
<td>703f</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultra high frequency (UHF) radio</td>
<td>703a(3)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high frequency (VHF) radio</td>
<td>703a(2)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Wire</td>
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<td>Counterguerrilla operations</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>Conduct of</td>
<td>404</td>
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<td>404d(4)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>402</td>
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<td>Reaction operations</td>
<td>404d(3)</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>201</td>
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<td>203a</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
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<td>Landing force coordination</td>
<td>203c, 203d</td>
<td>22, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Covert guerrilla operations</td>
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**D**

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**E**

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<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>404d(4)</td>
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<td>1005c</td>
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</table>

**F**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>902</td>
</tr>
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<td>Fingerprints</td>
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<td>902e(4)</td>
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**G**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Page</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>107b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla defined</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla forces, types</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
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<td>Defensive considerations</td>
<td>112g</td>
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<td>Evolution of</td>
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<td>107</td>
</tr>
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<td>Operations</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>112d</td>
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<td>112e</td>
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FMFM 8-2

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<td>502</td>
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<td>Page</td>
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<td>902e(2)</td>
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<td>112f</td>
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<td>1004d</td>
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<td>505</td>
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<td>1002a</td>
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<td>1202</td>
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<td>1205</td>
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<td>1206</td>
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<td>Troop indoctrination</td>
<td>1207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-wing transportation</td>
<td>1003c</td>
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<td>606b(4)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>606b(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>606b(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy SOPs</td>
<td>606a(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding officials</td>
<td>606d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>606b(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>606e</td>
</tr>
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<td>506c</td>
</tr>
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<td>606b(2)</td>
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<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
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<td>Vehicles, land</td>
<td>1003f</td>
<td>157</td>
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<td>Security of</td>
<td>606a(1), 606c, 606e</td>
<td>113, 117, 119</td>
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