"QUASI-WAR":
Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other than War

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT
"QUASI-WAR": TRAINING INFANTRY SMALL UNITS FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by Major Michael F. Beech, USA, 56 pages.

This monograph examines whether infantry small units, trained and equipped solely for war, can successfully conduct operations other than war (OOTW). Many military professionals argue that units trained for war can readily adapt to OOTW. Yet, other professional soldiers and military experts believe that OOTW requires unique capabilities which normal war fighting training alone does not provide. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, the number and frequency of peacekeeping and other OOTW in recent history has increased. In light of these changes and emerging US Army peacekeeping doctrine the issue of training units for OOTW missions has gained in importance. Initially the monograph describes both the arguments for, and against, training units specifically for OOTW, and describes US Army OOTW and training doctrine.

The monograph examines selected small unit actions in four separate OOTW from 1989 to 1995. The case studies include operations Just Cause (Panama), Restore Hope and UNOSOM II (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and Restore Democracy (Haiti). Infantry rifle company, platoon, and squad actions in these historical examples provide the data for the analysis to determine if training units for war adequately prepared them for OOTW. Examination of the case studies includes comparisons between the unit's wartime training, changes to their normal training in preparation for the operation, and the actual tactics the units used to accomplish their mission. The monograph examines the unit's training and analyzes the impact of that training on the unit's ability to successfully accomplish its mission.

The monograph concludes that infantry small units require specialized training, beyond traditional combat training, in order to effectively conduct OOTW. The need for restraint in OOTW fundamentally changes the ways small units operate and the means they need to accomplish their mission. Implications discussed in the conclusions include an analysis of the Army's fundamental training concepts, institutional education system, and organization.
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1. Introduction

On 21 July 1993, 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry deployed to the former Yugoslavian state of Macedonia to join other UN peacekeeping forces along the Serbian border. Prior to deployment the battalion conducted only one week of peacekeeping training. The brigade commander believed that disciplined troops, well-trained on their war fighting tasks needed no special peacekeeping training. Preparations for their upcoming peacekeeping mission did not prevent the battalion from training for, and marching in, the annual 4th of July parade. Irrespective of the brigade commanders views, once in Macedonia a veteran UN peacekeeping battalion trained the 6th Battalion on peacekeeping operations before they could begin their mission.¹ In contrast to the US brigade commander, an UN commander in Macedonia, Brigadier General Tryggve Tellesforsen believed that soldiers needed training to "break the mind set" of focusing on an enemy.² The US and UN commanders' contrasting views regarding training for peacekeeping, illustrates an ongoing controversy within the US Army. Can units trained and equipped solely for war successfully conduct peace operations ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and other operations other than war (OOTW)?³

The arguments against training units specifically for OOTW point to the similarity between war fighting skills, and tasks conducted in OOTW. Some military professionals argue that when a brigade or division conducts a peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operation, the squads and platoons are conducting tasks identical to those conducted in the course of preparing for war.⁴ A report on peacekeeping operations (PKO) published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned listed eighteen critical individual skills necessary for PKO.⁵ Of the eighteen tasks, twelve were identical to conventional tasks found in the training manuals, such as land navigation and marksmanship. These tasks are basic to any infantry unit. Observing the similarity in the task lists, opponents of specialized OOTW training argue that units prepared for war can easily adapt to OOTW. They further argue
that disciplined soldiers and intelligent and flexible leaders can overcome the minor differences between the tasks required for war and those specific to OOTW. Supporting this view, General Frederick M. Franks, while commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, wrote, "we will not have room for specialists . . . we must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy, and willing to perform many missions, a team that is versatile and agile." Other soldiers and leaders believe that although the wartime and OOTW tasks appear similar in name, they are distinctly different in purpose and practice.

The arguments for specialized training for OOTW are based on the belief that OOTW is fundamentally different from war. Proponents for specialized OOTW training argue that the purpose of traditional infantry tasks are to kill and destroy enemy forces. In OOTW however, forces must prevent collateral damage and casualties. The advocates of special training for OOTW declare that forces designated and trained solely for war fighting focus on closing with and destroying the enemy and must change their mind set and attitudes before conducting OOTW. Adopting this view the Center for Low Intensity Conflict stated, "Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment in attitude and approach from those we would normally find on the field of battle." Emphasizing the differences between conventional and OOTW tasks, and the need for a change in mind set, some military professionals argue that OOTW requires specialized weapons, tactics, and training. The CALL peacekeeping report noted, "units selected for peacekeeping duty require 4-6 weeks of specialized training." Both sides of the controversy point to recent history and Army doctrine as proof of their arguments.

In light of recent history and emerging US Army doctrine, issues involving OOTW have gained in importance. The demise of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the bipolar world and ushered in a new era of ethnic and religious unrest. As a result, OOTW and peacekeeping in particular have become widespread since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In its first forty years the UN conducted only thirteen military interventions. Since
1988 the number of peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN has nearly doubled. In recent years the Army has deployed thousands of troops around the world in places like, Panama, Somalia, Northern Iraq, Macedonia, Rwanda, and Haiti in support of peacekeeping and other OOTW. National security policies and directives have adjusted to meet these trends.

National policies and security strategy acknowledge the importance of OOTW. President William J. Clinton's national security strategy stated, "in addition to preparing for major regional contingencies we must prepare our forces for peace operations." The national strategy identifies five tasks which US forces "must accomplish." In keeping with President Clinton's statement the tasks include, peace operations, counter terrorism and other contingencies such as humanitarian assistance missions. Although the strategy states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win in war it also directs the military to prepare for OOTW. The changing world environment, together with the requirements of the national strategy demands military doctrine which can accomplish both war and OOTW.

Recognizing the relevance of OOTW and the need for a force which can both win in war and conduct OOTW, the Army included a chapter on OOTW in its keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 Operations. In this manual the Army defines OOTW as:

"Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."

The army lists 13 activities for OOTW, ranging from low threat missions such as support of domestic civil authorities to tasks which are akin to combat such as attacks and raids. Although FM 100-5 states that the nine principles of war apply to OOTW the Army developed separate principles for OOTW activities. Of the six OOTW principles three are also listed in the nine principles of war. The remaining three OOTW principles;
legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance are unique to OOTW. A clear understanding of legitimacy and restraint is critical to accomplishing an OOTW mission.

The principles of restraint and legitimacy are intertwined. The aim of legitimacy is to seek "the willing acceptance of the people". Doctrine, recognizing that the use of excessive force in OOTW could undermine attempts to gain legitimacy, includes the principle of restraint. Describing the significance of restraint and its relationship to legitimacy FM 100-5 states, "The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short and long term goals." Subsequently restraints are placed on weaponry and tactics in OOTW. These restraints take the form of directives by a military commander and are called rules of engagement (ROE). Although commanders may impose ROE in war, the doctrine acknowledges that in OOTW the controls on the use of force are more restrictive. Despite the inclusion of OOTW and its three unique principles in FM100-5, training doctrine is based primarily on the Army's mission to fight and win wars.

Army training doctrine, delineated in FM 25-100 Training the Force, focuses on the army's war time mission. Battle focus, is the Army's training concept which derives training requirements from the units war time missions. Units develop mission essential task lists (METL) from their critical war time mission and focus all available time and resources to support METL training. The critical war time tasks, as defined by the infantry company mission training plan (MTP), are movement to contact, attack, raid, ambush, reconnaissance and security, defend, and retrograde. Detailed standards and methods for executing these tasks are described in the MTPs. Mission training plans are the principle source documents for small unit training. Through the process of battle focused training small unit training plans are linked directly to the Army's primary purpose, "to fight and win the nations wars," not to conduct OOTW. Based on the concepts of battle focus training doctrine, units focus training on traditional war fighting tasks and should not train for PKO in the course of their normal training.
This monograph examines unit training and the subsequent impact of that training in OOTW environments. Examining four recent OOTW from 1989 to 1995, the monograph determines if training units and soldiers solely for war adequately prepares them for OOTW. An analysis of historical examples provides a variety of unit experiences under widely diverse conditions for the purpose of determining if common problems or lessons arise with traditional war fighting training and OOTW. The monograph uses the terms, "traditional" and "conventional" to describe combat between the armed forces of the US and the armed and uniformed military forces of another nation-state. Traditional training then refers to the tasks which directly support the accomplishment of traditional war fighting tasks, such as assaulting a bunker. The term "specialized training" describes training not normally associated with war fighting tasks such as establishing a pedestrian checkpoint. The scope of the monograph is limited to the infantry company, platoon, and squad levels in OOTW. Operations that pose virtually no threat of hostile acts or intent by a belligerent force, such as most domestic support and disaster relief missions, are excluded from the monograph. Examining four case studies, the monograph begins with a study of Operation Just Cause, Panama 1989 to 1990.

II. Operation Just Cause
Panama

On 15 December, 1989 the National Assembly of Panama declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States. The US relationship with Panama had been deteriorating since General Manuel Noriega took control of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) in 1981 when Panama's former leader, General Omar Torrijos, died in a plane crash. Following a series of weak presidencies Noriega seized control of the country in 1987 by removing President Roberto Herrera. Throughout Noriega's rule the
US government consistently urged Panama to establish a civilian government. Noriega resented US interference in Panamanian. Straining US - Panamanian relationships even further, Noriega was indicted on drug charges in US Federal Court in February of 1988. Subsequent to Noriega’s indictment the PDF increasingly and openly harassed US servicemen and civilians living in Panama. The US continued its diplomatic and economic pressure to persuade Noriega to conduct free and open elections.25

Noriega, whose army ran the election processes, expected that he would defeat the opposition party in the elections on 7 May, 1989. Nevertheless, on 7 May the opposition party’s Guillermo Endara won the elections in Panama. Noriega declared the elections void and used his newly formed Dignity Battalions, to attack opposition party leaders in the streets of Panama City.26

In response to the tumultuous elections and growing hostility toward Americans in Panama, President George Bush ordered the deployment of approximately 2,000 troops from the United States to Panama in order to protect the lives and property of US servicemen, and civilians. The operation was designated Operation Nimrod Dancer. In addition to the security of US servicemen and their families, the deployment of an infantry brigade from the 7th Infantry Division and a mechanized infantry battalion from the 5th Division, provided an added benefit: the prepositioning of forces for future operations to remove Noriega from office and neutralize the PDF.27

Operation Blue Spoon, the invasion of Panama, later renamed Operation Just Cause, began on 20 December 1989. Following the shooting death of a Marine lieutenant and the detention and assault of a Navy lieutenant and his wife by the PDF, the National Command Authority ordered the execution of Operation Just Cause. The operation’s objectives as expressed in the plan were to:

1. Protect US lives and key sites and facilities.
2. Capture and deliver Noriega to a competent authority.
3. Neutralize PDF command and control.
5. Restructure the PDF.

In addition to the security forces deployed to Panama to conduct Operation Nimrod Dancer and the infantry brigade permanently stationed in Panama, the assaults against the PDF were conducted by two brigades from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment, who made airborne assaults into Panama from their bases in the US. In two days US forces in Panama had neutralized all PDF resistance and on 3 January 1990, Noriega surrendered to US Forces and was taken into custody by the US Drug Enforcement Agency.\textsuperscript{28} Although Operation Just Cause was presented to the public as a resounding success, it is filled with lessons for infantry operations and training in OOTW.\textsuperscript{29} An analysis of these lessons begins with an examination of the tactical situation.

The primary threat to US soldiers in the first days of Operation Just Cause was the PDF. The PDF was a uniformed professional military force which was scattered across Panama in small company and battalion sized compounds. Identification and engagement of the PDF while in their compounds was not a significant problem in the early days of the Operation. However, many of the compounds were in the midst of civilian communities and US facilities. The primary concern of US soldiers at Ft Espenar, which sits on the northern tip of Gatun Lake, consisted not only of the 8th PDF Company, but also several hundred occupied US government family quarters within small arms range of the PDF compound. Furthermore, the Commandancia, Noriega's headquarters, and other H-Hour PDF targets in Panama City, were adjacent to city blocks of shoddy wooden structures tightly packed with thousands of Panama's abject poor. Control of the civilian population continued to gain in importance for US units as the operation continued and Noriega's government collapsed. After two days the PDF was neutralized and consequently US soldiers, who had destroyed the only element of power and control in Panama had now inherited the task of establishing law and order in Panama's cities. As a result, defeat of the PDF did not end threats to US troops.\textsuperscript{30}
On the afternoon of 22 December a infantry company of the 7th Division crossed Manzanillo Bay in a LCM-8 landing craft and waded ashore into the streets of Colon, Panama's second largest city. Their mission was to secure the "Free Zone," which was a business center vital to the Panamanian economy. Intelligence reports indicated that Dignity Battalion members and armed gangs were attempting to loot businesses in the Free Zone, which was defended by well armed store owners. Upon entering the streets of Colon the US soldiers were greeted by thousands of cheering Panamanians waving American flags. Sporadic automatic weapons fire directed at the soldiers broke the jubilant atmosphere and sent the crowd, and the soldiers, diving for cover. With the streets crowded with panicking civilians it was impossible for the soldiers to clearly identify targets. The crowded streets made it impossible to suppress the snipers with automatic weapons fire without risking the death of innocent civilians. Based on the presence of armed friendly and hostile civilians, and a desire to minimize casualties and collateral damage, the ROE set strict limitations on the use of force. The ROE prevented the soldiers from using indiscriminate weapons fire and required soldiers to minimize civilian casualties. The ROE prevented soldiers from employing traditional combat responses in hostile situations.

The ROE in Panama changed five times by the completion of the operation, but all five contained the same key tenants: use the minimum amount of force required by the threat, and when returning fire use precise techniques. The US troops operating in Panama's confined city streets found traditional techniques of operating in urban terrain (MOUT) inappropriate under the ROE. Any imprecise weapons firing by US soldiers in the crowded cities could result in the unnecessary civilian casualties. The ROE card issued to the soldiers warned the troops were not to "spray" their fire into a general area. The presence of civilians in close proximity to military targets and the abundance of lawless armed civilians caused changes in the ways units conducted MOUT operations in Panama.
Traditional MOUT training and doctrine was of little use to the soldiers operating in Panama. The MOUT standards and performance measures as expressed in the infantry platoon and squad drill manuals and in MTPs focus on applying the maximum force possible, albeit small arms, to facilitate freedom of movement and destruction of the enemy. The following excerpts from the performance measures of Battle Drill #6, "Enter and Clear a Building," explain in detail how to conduct the task:

- Gain suppressive fire . . . In adjacent positions [to the building] and isolate the building [by fire].
- Throw cooked off grenades (ROE dependent) and engage all likely enemy with positions with rapid short bursts of fire.
- Enter a room: Two soldiers enter the room simultaneously one goes high the other low . . . this method puts more fire in the room more quickly.
- If available the platoon or squad will suppress with large caliber weapons.
- Assign each soldier a target or area to cover
- Increase the rate of fire just before entering the building.  

These time tested and proven methods are appropriate when the purpose is to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the enemy force. The training manuals, however, provide no nonlethal solutions or proportional response techniques for conditions that include civilians in close proximity to the target, or for situations where the enemy is indistinguishable from friendly civilians.

Traditional infantry MOUT tactics as stated in the Drill manuals and MTP's lacked nonlethal alternative methods to area suppression, throwing cooked off grenades, and maximum fire power. Lacking nonlethal options, the manuals seem to suggest that soldiers merely ignore those aspects of the performance measures that conflict with the ROE. Stripping away the lethal methods expressed in the performance measures, however, the MTPs and drill manuals offers no solutions to replace the use of deadly force. Summarizing the disparity between traditional MOUT tactics and the tactics required in Panama, a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report noted, "soldiers could not always use standard room clearing techniques" and "units should employ
damage limiting techniques." Yet, the squad leader who consulted the training doctrine for guidance on how to enter and clear a building using damage limiting techniques did so in vain.

Unit after action reports and articles in professional military journals following Just Cause noted the inadequacy of traditional tactics in OOTW. An officer in the 7th Infantry Division who had deployed to Panama in October of 1988 as part of Operation Nimrod Dancer, commented, "the possibility of civilians in the area is not taken into account" and "the emphasis [in training] is on active room clearing, these techniques are not realistic in most low intensity conflicts." Corroborating this view, Captain Stacy Elliot, who was a platoon leader in the 5th Battalion 87th Infantry, wrote:

"For too long the Army doctrine has been that all MOUT environments would be considered void of all civilian population. It is critical that we incorporate hostile and docile civilians on the objective areas [in training exercises]. Passive room clearing, [and] quick fire techniques should be taught."

Recommending changes to infantry training doctrine, Maj. Robert G. Boyko, an operations officer of a infantry battalion in Panama during Just Cause urged, "TTP [tactic, techniques, and procedures] must change / we are more likely to face enemy mixed with civilians . . . this requires selective fire control in an effort to minimize collateral damage." The lack of sufficient OOTW training doctrine and nonlethal weapons created significant problems for soldiers in Panama who were required to apply minimum force.

The lack of alternative means of defense short of deadly force often resulted in unfortunate incidents. Manning a road block in the city of Colon on the evening of 21 December, soldiers of the 7th Division had been under sporadic but ineffective sniper fire throughout the day. Their mission was to isolate the city and prevent the reinforcement or withdrawal of the PDF forces at the Military Zone II Headquarters. Suddenly a large passenger bus approached the road block through the darkened streets, stopped
momentarily, turned out its headlights, and raced towards the soldiers. The soldiers fired
at the vehicle which prudently stopped again. The occupants of the vehicle, civilians
including several children, surrendered to the troops. Luckily none of the civilians were
injured. These particular troops, who had received months of ROE training and
experience in Panama, prevented catastrophe by directing their fires at the buses tires and
engine compartment.38 Nonlethal weapons such as rubber bullets, tear gas and anti-
vehicle obstacles such as caltrops could have assisted the troops in stopping the vehicle
without endangering the lives if the occupants.39 In this case the lack of nondeadly
weapons nearly resulted in a disaster, which was averted only by the unit's ROE training
and previous experiences.

Units preparing for Operation Just Cause, realized that their doctrine did not provide
adequate techniques for OOTW and modified their training focus. The 4th Battalion, 17th
Infantry had several months of planning and preparation for Operation Just Cause. Prior
to their deployment to Panama in October 1988 in support of Operation Nimrod Dancer,
the battalion conducted several weeks of ROE and MOUT training at Ft Ord. After
deploying to Panama the battalion conducted crowd control, urban patrols, check points
operations, and other security missions as part of Operation Nimrod Dancer. The security
missions required the soldiers to exercise the ROE continuously. The unit also continued
to plan and rehearse for their Just Cause missions. Recognizing that MOUT doctrine did
not fully provide solutions to the requirements of the ROE the unit developed innovative
training methods.40

The 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry replaced the standard situational training exercises
found in the MTPs with training vignettes developed by the small unit leaders. Company
commanders incorporated noncombatants and strict ROE into all their training exercises.
Leaders in the units, without the benefit of doctrinal nonlethal methods, created training
vignettes and associated performance measures through discussions and war gaming. One
company commander admitted that the tactics they developed to employ graduated
responses were arrived at through "trial and error." Units experimented with various techniques in training exercises and adopted the tactics which worked the best. The primary sources for information in the battalion on the application of ROE and MOUT tactics for situations involving civilians were the battalion commander and advice from units in the 7th Division which were returning from security operations in Panama.41 Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Brooks, the battalion commander, had a wide range of experiences in infantry tactics in OOTW.42 Much of the unit training was based upon his experiences and on the lessons learned from other units. Development of adequate means and methods to employ ROE and prevent civilian loss of life and collateral damage was left to the innovation and initiative of the units rather than doctrinal solutions.

The traditional infantry weapons and tactics established in training manuals failed to fully meet the demands of Operation Just Cause. Restrictions on the use of force and requirement to minimize casualties characterized the environment in Panama. These conditions required nonlethal tactics, that traditional training did not provide. As a result, soldiers and units were left to their own devices to adapt to the situation. Veterans of Operation Just Cause realized that OOTW required specialized tactics and training. Despite this realization, three years later units in the 10th Mountain Division rediscovered the dilemma of conducting OOTW with units trained for war.

III. Operations Other than War in Somalia: Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II

On 4 December, 1992 President Bush announced the commitment of US forces to Somalia in East Africa in order to provide a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies to the starving population. United States military involvement in Somalia had
begun six months earlier to provide food for millions of starving Somalis, victims of a persisting and brutal civil war. On 25 August, 1992 US military began flying more than twenty flights per day and carrying tons of relief supplies into Somalia from a staging base in nearby Kenya. However, without forces to secure the relief supplies and convoys, warring factions stole much of the food and medicine meant for the famine's victims. Despite the best efforts of the US and UN, millions of Somalis were still dying and the famine was spreading. Both the administration of President George Bush and the UN Security Council recognized that without a secure environment the relief effort would continue to fail. Urged on by growing public sympathy for the plight of the Somalis, the Bush administration encouraged the passage of UN Resolution 794 which authorized the use of direct military force to establish a secure environment in order to distribute the relief supplies. 43

United States armed intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, began on 9 December, 1992. The first US Army combat units from the 10th Mountain Division began to arrive in Somalia three days later. The operations were primarily humanitarian assistance, but also included peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 44 However, operations in Somalia failed to conform to any OOTW categories described in Army doctrine. 45 The mission of US forces in Somalia was to secure key installations and food distribution points as well as provide security for relief convoys. To accomplish this mission approximately 20,000 soldiers took part in Operation Restore Hope which was completed on 4 May, 1993 when US operations in Somalia transferred to UN control.46

US Army participation in the operation, designated United Nations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), began on 4 May, 1992 and continued until 31 March, 1994. Operations in Somalia were placed under UN control and forces from other nations such as Pakistan replaced US units. As a result, US troop strength in Somalia was reduced to approximately 3000 soldiers. The 10th Mountain Division continued to provide the majority of US combat forces in Somalia with one to two infantry battalions and an
aviation task force. This force was designated the UNOSOM quick reaction force (QRF). The mission of the QRF was to react to threats against UN forces in Somalia. Although humanitarian support continued, the focus of operations shifted to peace enforcement which included direct military action against the Somali clans, disarmament of the population, and capture of recalcitrant clan leaders such as Muhammed Farah Aidid. On 3 October, 1993 eighteen US soldiers died in a raid to capture Aidid and some of his key leaders. Following this disaster, President Clinton, on 9 October 1993, ordered the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia, setting a deadline of 31 March. This ended US military involvement in Somalia.47

Operations in Somalia presented the 10th Mountain Division with a challenging tactical environment. The tactical situation in Somalia was characterized by an ambiguous threat. Unlike in war, the soldiers in Somalia had no clearly distinguishable military targets. Instead, hostile belligerents in Somalia were difficult to identify. Hostile Somali clansmen wore no uniforms and were hard to distinguish from noncombatants.48 Additionally, Somali civilians carried weapons openly to protect themselves against thieves and rival factions, which made identification of hostile Somalis even more arduous.49 Some Somali civilians, paid by private relief organizations as security guards, were authorized by US and UN commands to carry weapons, which further confused identification between friendly and enemy civilians.50 Soldiers could not merely shoot armed Somalis on sight without risking killing a friendly Somali. Exacerbating the problem of fighting a nonuniformed enemy, most engagements between soldiers and Somalis occurred at night, at close range, and in the immediate vicinity of noncombatants.51 Somali militiamen typically used civilians as cover from direct fire. In June, 1993 Somali gunmen fired from behind women and children at US troops who were coming to the aid of a Pakistani Army checkpoint which was under attack.52 Under these conditions soldiers could not employ overwhelming force. The presence of noncombatants in close proximity to an indiscernible enemy required units to develop more discriminate and precise methods of
employing force. In addition to hostile clansmen, soldiers also confronted a plethora of nondeadly threats.

Unarmed but hostile civilians posed one of the most difficult tasks in Somalia for US soldiers. Soldiers were frequently attacked by unarmed thieves, rioters, and lawless individuals armed with sticks, rocks, and other primitive weapons. Knowing the restrictions placed on US soldiers for the use of force, the Somalis exploited this information. As a result, lawless Somalis were careful not to behave in a way they knew would elicit a deadly response from a soldier. Somalis quickly learned not to expose or point weapons at American troops. Secure in their knowledge that US soldiers would not shoot unarmed civilians, Somalis mobbed relief convoys and store houses despite the soldier's verbal warnings and demonstrations of military prowess. Armed only with deadly weapons, and prohibited from using deadly force against unarmed civilians, the soldiers were initially incapable of effectively protecting the relief supplies or themselves. Given the variety of threats and close proximity of noncombatants, the strict restrictions on the use of force were necessary to preclude the unnecessary deaths of innocent civilians and minimize collateral damage.

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) established ROE for US soldiers in Somalia as a means to control the use of deadly force. The ROE authorized the use of deadly force without provocation against organized armed militia, technicals and other crew served weapons. This ROE became known to soldiers in Somalia as the "Four No's": no technicals, no visible weapons, no militia checkpoints, and no armed bandits. Confronted with one of the "Four No's" application of the ROE was not difficult.

When 10th Division units conducted missions in Somalia that were similar to combat missions, the ROE posed few problems. Infantry units in Somalia destroyed several militia weapons stock piles and militia strong holds. On 12 June 1993 the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry conducted a raid against a known militia stronghold. Attack helicopters and an
US Airforce gunship (AC-130) supported the raid. The battalion destroyed a large weapons cache which included artillery pieces, air defense guns and anti-tank rifles, and captured 36 militiamen. However, the attacks against known militia strongholds, although proudly recounted in great detail in unit after action reviews, were rare. Applications of the ROE in most situations were not so clear, as when lawless individuals acted in a hostile manner.

The ROE was not clear in non-life threatening situations where the use of deadly force was inappropriate. Soldiers could use deadly force against a hostile act or intent, but the threat of death had to be immediate. The ROE provided no specific guidance on the alternatives to deadly force if a soldier was confronted with unarmed thieves or mobs. The ROE cards carried by all soldiers in Somalia merely stated, "use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat." Under less clear situations, such as attacks by robbers or crowds, application of the ROE was left to the judgment of the small unit leaders and individual soldiers. Their decisions would be based on their experiences in traditional war fighting training which focused on destroying enemy forces with overwhelming fire. This presented new problems for soldiers and units who were trained and equipped for war.

The 10th Mountain Division training prior to Operation Restore Hope focused on traditional war fighting tasks. During the year prior to their deployment to Somalia infantry small units in the 10th Division concentrated training on battle drills such as, squad attack, actions on enemy contact, and knocking out a bunker. Units continued their emphasis on traditional war fighting tasks in the months immediately preceding their deployment and conducted a series of squad, platoon, and company live fire exercises. During the exercises units often trained without any restraints on the use of force. Training did not include employing nonlethal force or any techniques for the sort of graduated and proportional response which units in the 10th Division would be required to use in Somalia. Emphasizing the disparity between the war fighting training and the skills
needed to conduct operations in Somalia, one officer noted that once in Somalia soldiers were required to interact "with various types of civilians in ways we had not encountered in training."66 The 10th Division units had virtually no time to change their training focus to OOTW tasks between the time the units were alerted and when they deployed to Somalia.

The belief that units would have sufficient time to train for OOTW missions prior to deployment proved incorrect in the case of the 10th Mountain Division. The first unit to deploy from Ft Drum (A company, 2-87 Infantry) was alerted on 3 December, 1992 and arrived in Somalia on 12 December.67 The deployment progressed rapidly. Ninety percent of the units that deployed to Operation Restore Hope had one month or less to prepare for the operation.68 As a result the battalions that followed the first company had only a little more time to conduct ROE training than did A company, 2-87 Infantry. Units had to rely primarily on their traditional war fighting training and adapt to the situation once in Somalia.

Restrictions on using area suppressive fire, indirect fire, fragmentation grenades and other weapons in the mist of the ever present noncombatants prevented soldiers from employing traditional war fighting methods. The ROE and the threat situation (combat among civilians) prohibited the use of overwhelming fire power. The soldiers in Somalia were under the standing orders of Major General Thomas Montgomery, Commander US Forces in Somalia during UNOSOM II, to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage.69 Success of the mission depended not on destroying enemy forces but upon minimizing civilian deaths and destruction of property. Ambassador Robert Oakley, special envoy to Somalia, described the challenge of using US military forces in Somalia when he stated:

"This challenge involves the mind set that looks at the local populous as potential allies rather than enemies, that gives repeated warnings before application of force and limits application of force to the minimum level required."70
The mission and ROE prevented units from employing area weapons such as suppressive direct fire, artillery, and hand grenades against suspected positions as they would in war. Under these restrictions on the use of force, soldiers of the 10th Mountain on 5 June, 1993 attacked militiamen in the vicinity of the "Cigarette Factory" in downtown Mogadishu. During the engagement attack helicopters were called to assist in the attack. Under the ROE the aircraft were not able to engage the targets requested by the infantry units because the targets were not clearly identifiable and the risk of collateral damage was too great.\textsuperscript{71}

Operations in Somalia required small unit tactics which traditional war fighting training did not provide. Instead of conducting surprise attacks as desired in war, units normally gave repeated warnings and then only attacked with the minimum amount of force necessary.\textsuperscript{72} Giving the enemy warnings is in stark contrast to conventional tactics seeking surprise, but the ROE required giving verbal warning or warning shots when ever possible.\textsuperscript{73} Describing the difference between operations in Somalia and their traditional war fighting training one officer noted, "the measure of success was not the volume and accuracy of fire but discipline, control and level - headed thinking of the soldiers."\textsuperscript{74} Soldiers grounded on conventional tactics were uncomfortable with new this new definition of success.

Initially the units in Somalia found that conducting the most dangerous and more traditional infantry tasks, such as knocking out militia road blocks and air assault raids against militia strong holds, were easier than conducting crowd control and cordon and searches.\textsuperscript{75} Units had trained extensively on traditional infantry attacks and raids.\textsuperscript{76} For units trained for war it was more difficult to conduct operations requiring employment of nonlethal means and proportional and graduated force. Highlighting the disparity between unit training and the requirements in Somalia an infantry battalion operations officer complained that at the start of the operation "effective methods of defense short of deadly force were practically nonexistent."\textsuperscript{77}
Many of the units and soldiers deploying to Somalia had never trained using graduated response techniques. Units in Somalia conducted operations which one officer described as "totally new" to his battalion. These totally new tasks included cordon and searches and checkpoint operations; such operations were the most regularly conducted tasks in Somalia. Cordon and searches were so frequently performed that the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry after action report noted: "the situation [in Somalia] had evolved into a series of cordon and searches." Yet, the QRF after action report complained that the infantry company and platoon training manuals did not address cordon and searches or checkpoint operations, and "subtasks should be better identified." The 10th Division, trained and equipped for war, had difficulty conducting missions which depended on minimizing collateral damage and loss of life.

Initially soldiers lacked weapons or techniques of employing nonlethal force, resulting in unfortunate incidents. A Somali child, carrying a small container, ran toward a US Army truck traveling in a convoy. A soldier sitting in the back of the truck believed the container carried an explosive or some other weapon. Lacking a nonlethal weapon and armed only with an M16 rifle to defend himself, he shot the child. The box, however, did not contain an explosive. Based upon previous incidents of Somalis attacking convoys, a military court found the soldier had made a reasonable judgment and had correctly applied the ROE. Units, as well as individual soldiers, experienced similar problems when engaged with hostile mobs.

An infantry platoon from 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division was conducting a patrol when asked by local authorities to help stop the looting of a nearby food warehouse. Upon arriving at the site they discovered approximately 200-300 Somalis were looting the store house. Without the benefit of nonlethal weapons to disperse the unruly crowd, the soldiers fixed bayonets and cleared the rioters away from the store using rifle butts and shooting into the air. Their tactics did not control the crowd for long, however, and the soldiers had to use "increasing violence" as the crowd became more
daring. Eventually a company of reinforcements arrived. To avoid the further escalation of violence the soldiers began the orderly distribution of the food. As night fell the crowd was becoming even more violent, so the battalion commander gave the order for the unit to withdraw. The unit withdrew under the cover of mortar illumination and left the remaining bags of grain for the Somalis to fight over.\textsuperscript{84} Without nonlethal weapons and methods of crowd control the unit was unable to subdue the crowd, and accomplish its mission. Effective methods of crowd control were not the only training deficiencies; in addition, traditional methods of actions on enemy contact failed to minimize civilian casualties.

A platoon from 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division conducting a mounted night security patrol in Somalia happened upon a group of armed bandits who appeared to be in the process of robbing a civilian vehicle. Startled by the patrol, two bandits fired upon the approaching patrol who immediately returned a large volume of fire. The action resulted in what the unit after action report described as the "effective suppression of the bandits." From a distance of approximately 30 meters the patrol placed "continuous" and "heavy" fire in the direction of the bandits. Six Somalis were killed and seven more were wounded in the engagement. The unit report laments that only one of the Somali casualties was a confirmed bandit. No casualties were sustained by the patrol.

Considering the close proximity of the bandits to the noncombatants, the unit investigation found the civilian casualties were "unavoidable."\textsuperscript{85} Based upon the ROE the patrol's actions were appropriate. The patrol had employed deadly force against one of the "Four Nos." and the patrol resorted to deadly force to defend themselves against hostile act. Immediately returning a large volume of fire on enemy contact is consistent with the standards prescribed by the infantry drill manuals for the platoon and squad levels.\textsuperscript{86} In this case traditional and doctrinally correct infantry tactics failed to minimize civilian casualties.
Soldiers and units in Somalia used innovation to meet the demands which traditional war fighting training and doctrine did not provide. In order to protect themselves against attacking thieves and mobs soldiers strung barbed wire around their vehicles and troops riding in the vehicles carried sticks and tent pegs. One industrious soldier produced a cattle prod to ward off antagonists. Eventually the units were equipped with batons and pepper spray to fend off nondeadly hostile acts.87 Units constantly searched for more precise and less deadly munitions and techniques to adapt themselves to the threat and limitations on the use of force.88

Several units of the 10th Division in Somalia recognized the need to change their tactics and developed training plans to adapt these tasks to OOTW. After arriving in Somalia the 1st Battalion, 22 Infantry "shifted its training focus" and developed a training program which allowed one rifle company each week to focus on OOTW training. The battalion used training scenarios that involved hostile and nonhostile civilians. Graduated and proportional use of force was incorporated into training vignettes.89 Training exercises tested more than the soldiers ability to memorize the ROE, it also affirmed the soldiers ability to apply and understand it. They also developed check lists and standards for conducting patrols, checkpoints, and cordon and searches to help train unit leaders.90 Experiencing the same need to change tactics another battalions of the 10th Division also sought different training solutions.

Recognizing that traditional MOUT tactics were ineffective in situations requiring the controlled use of force, the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry in Somalia requested mobile training teams from the 75th Infantry to train their soldiers on the "close quarter battle" (CQB) techniques.91 A rifle company executive officer noted that "we were not allowed to enter and clear it [a building] as described in the 7-8 Drill Manual . . . partly because the current rules of engagement required us to selectively engage targets considered a threat." Soldiers learned to use concussion grenades, rather than the deadly fragmentation grenades which caused more collateral damage and were dangerous to use in close
proximity to friendly troops and noncombatants. The mobile training team taught the soldiers more precise marksmanship techniques called "quick fire" and "instinctive fire techniques. These techniques required soldiers to engage 3x5 card size targets in live fire exercises rather than the standard large silhouette targets. The units adopted the CQB tactics over doctrinal MOUT tactics, put forth in the MTPs, to overcome the inadequacy of their war fighting tactics in meeting the requirements of OOTW.92

Traditional war fighting tactics and doctrine did not adequately prepare the soldiers of the 10th Division for operations in Somalia. An ambiguous threat in the midst of noncombatants characterized the conditions in Somalia and created a need for restraint and nonlethal weapons and tactics. The conditions in Somalia were fundamentally different from battle focused training which contained a clearly defined enemy on a battlefield void of civilians. Lacking nondeadly weapons and proportional and graduated response techniques the units often failed to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. Failing to provide the necessary training and resources for the units to adequately conduct their mission the Army entrusted its responsibility to unit innovation. As a result units improvised new tactics and weapons after deployment to Somalia to cope with the problems for which their traditional training did not provide; specifically, these units replaced traditional war fighting skills and instincts of using maximum force with new OOTW skills and instincts of minimum force. As Operation Restore Hope was drawing to an end in Somalia, the soldiers of the Berlin Brigade were about to depart on their own OOTW experience in the former Yugoslavian state of Macedonia.
IV. Operation Able Sentry
Macedonia

With US troops still committed in Somalia the Clinton administration was reluctant to become involved in the three way war between the Serbian Militia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations Protectorate Force in former Yugoslavia faced with ever increasing violence, needed more troops and urged the US to provide assistance beyond the ongoing logistical support. The Clinton administration looked for a solution to help the UN without committing US ground troops to Bosnia. The deployment of a small US force to the relatively stable Macedonian - Serbian border would free UN forces there for use in the more unsettled areas in Bosnia.93

UN forces had first arrived along the Serb - Macedonian border at the behest of the Macedonian government. Answering their request, the UN approved resolution 795 which established a preventative military presence along the border between Serbia and Macedonia. In response to the increased involvement of the UN and America's NATO allies in Bosnia, President Clinton authorized the employment of US troops to Macedonia. On 15 June 1993 the Berlin Brigade was alerted to deploy to Macedonia to take part in the UN peacekeeping mission. This event marked the first use of US combat troops as part of a UN peacekeeping force in the troubled former Yugoslavian states.94

On 22 August 1993 approximately 300 soldiers of the Berlin Brigade's 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry assumed responsibility for a sector along the border between Serbia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. The mission of the small battalion sized task force was to observe and report any developments along the border which could undermine the stability of Macedonia. From its base camp near Skopie Macedonia, the battalion occupied from four to nine observation posts and patrolled the border. Although the exact location of the border was in dispute, no serious incidents occurred between the US and Serb forces.95 Nevertheless, an examination of the 6-502nd
Infantry's training and preparation for this mission provides valuable insights into the problem of conducting peacekeeping missions with units primarily trained and equipped for war.

The 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry did not conduct PKO predeployment training of any significance. Although the unit had approximately one month to prepare for the mission several factors prevented them from executing their planned peacekeeping training. The Berlin Brigade Commander believed that soldiers trained for war could readily conduct PKO. In addition to the lack of interest in PKO training exhibited by their higher commander, the unit's efforts at conducting training were stymied by a multitude of training distracters to include preparation for a 4th of July parade and other "garrison taskings." As a result the unit conducted only one week of their predeployment training plan. Unit training plans were limited not only by time and training conflicts, but also by the failure of the Army to provide small unit peacekeeping training doctrine.

The unit's predeployment peacekeeping training consisted of an ROE briefing in the post theater and a few days of exercises in the local training area in Berlin. The lack of a peacekeeping MTP or drill manual made training more difficult. Without the benefit of an Army PKO drill manual or MTP to consult, the unit referred to military police manuals for training methods. For several tasks the unit developed their own training standards. Reflecting on the inadequacy of the predeployment training, a company commander in the battalion remarked that his training standards were more aggressive and offensively oriented than the UN standards the unit would later learn in Macedonia. Training needs of the battalion, however, did not go unfulfilled. The 6th Battalion did not serve as the test case for the brigade commander's belief that units trained for war could conduct PKO; instead a PKO training program awaited the arrival of 6-502nd Infantry in Macedonia.

The commanders of UN forces in Macedonia believed that PKO required specialized training. Knowing the US troops were trained almost exclusively for combat, Brigadier
General Finn Saemark-Thorsen, Commander UN Protectorate Forces (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia, was initially skeptical of using American soldiers as peace keepers and ensured that the US battalion received extensive training prior to assuming their mission on the Serbian border. General Thorsen's predecessor as UNPROFOR Commander in Macedonia, Brigadier General Tellefsen, expressed similar views. Emphasizing the unique mind set required for PKO Tellefsen, commented, "A soldier who can communicate through his mind rather than his weapon is what peacekeeping is really all about." This advice was particularly appropriate in view of the volatile Serbian border where any overreaction on the part of a UN peace keeper could escalate into conflict between the UN and Serb forces. With this in mind, UN commanders advised the US troops to solve problems at the lowest levels and defuse border conflicts through negotiation rather than force. As a result of the UN commander's lack of confidence in the ability of units trained solely for war to effectively serve as a peace-keepers, the UN required the 6-502 Infantry to undergo special peacekeeping training after arriving in Macedonia. The training was sponsored by veteran peacekeeping units. The Nordic Battalion, a collection of veteran peacekeeping units from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, trained the US forces for several weeks before assuming their mission on 22 August 1993. Training focused on special peacekeeping skills.

Tasks trained by the Nordic battalion included establishing an observation post, patrolling, searches, site security, and ROE. The PKO training consisted of tasks which at first glance appear similar to conventional war time infantry skills, such as patrolling. However, the necessity for units to maintain neutrality required a complete change in how the tasks were executed. Patrolling, a common infantry small unit skill, is executed drastically differently in a peacekeeping environment than it is in a combat situation.

American troops preparing for war are trained to avoid contact when conducting patrols and when establishing observation posts. In PKO the purpose of the patrol is to show a military presence in order to deter hostility. When conducting a PKO patrol the
purpose of the mission requires the soldiers to expose themselves openly to the belligerents rather than avoiding contact. An after action review of a PKO training exercise in Macedonia warned the US troops to, "telegraph your actions and go out of your way to let the Serbs and locals see you." Recognizing the disparity between PKO patrols and combat patrols, a CALL peacekeeping report agreed that PKO patrols "are totally different from normal combat patrols." In the absence of US Army PKO small unit training publications, American troops in Macedonia relied upon Nordic unit tactical manuals, and standing operating procedures. The special PKO expertise provided by the Nordic Battalion proved valuable to the US units.

During the six months the 6th Battalion occupied a sector along the Serbian border there were no incidents between US and Serbian patrols. Crediting the post deployment training for the few problems they experienced, soldiers and leaders in Macedonia recognized the worth of special PKO training. A post deployment survey conducted by the Army Research Institute showed that 71% of the infantry soldiers interviewed believed that soldiers required additional skills for the PKO and further some 68% of the soldiers agreed that PKO training was necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. In addition, the survey found that there was a relatively high satisfaction with training and support provided by the UN, but low satisfaction with unit training. The soldiers' belief that peacekeeping training was important, is even more remarkable in light of the relatively benign environment in Macedonia. In the absence of overt hostilities along the border, the majority of the soldiers did not feel threatened. Summarizing the importance of PKO training for US units, an officer in the unique position to witness UN peacekeeping forces side by side for several months observed,

"Without overstating the issue there is clearly a difference in conduct between veteran Nordic peace keepers and American infantry soldiers training for peace keeping operations. The difference has nothing to do with discipline and competency. Nordic soldiers understand and more importantly accept the UN
doctrine of minimum force. In contrast U.S. leaders are trained in overwhelming application of fire power.\textsuperscript{114}

Based upon their experiences in Macedonia and training from the Nordic Battalion, 6-502nd Infantry became responsible for training their replacement unit, the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry replaced the 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry in January 1994. Whereas the UN required 6-502 Infantry to undergo training in Macedonia, 1-6 Infantry's goal was to complete PKO training prior to their departure form their home station in Germany.\textsuperscript{115} Recognizing the need for special PKO training, 1-6 Infantry arranged for a mobile training team from 6-502 Infantry in order to train their leaders. Acknowledging the prudence of special PKO predeployment training a CALL observer with 1-6 Infantry stated, "Training is not a problem; basic infantry skills are basis infantry skills; however, there is a requirement to train on specific OOTW tasks to supplement basic skills."\textsuperscript{116} Faced with the problem of developing a training plan without small unit peacekeeping MTPs or drill manuals, the mobile training team had to create training standards and performance measures to prepare 1-6 Infantry for their mission.

The mobile training team provided 1-6 Infantry the peacekeeping tactics, techniques and procedures that Army training doctrine does not address. In the absence of doctrinal training methods for PKO the mobile training team developed sixteen training vignettes along with corresponding standards and performance measures.\textsuperscript{117} Emphasizing the unique requirements of peacekeeping patrolling the training also included nine different types of peacekeeping patrols in their training plan.\textsuperscript{118} The training provided by the mobile training team proved valuable in Macedonia. An officer in 1-6 Infantry, citing the over 100 patrols that they conducted without incident, reflected that "the predeployment training paid big dividends for the TF [1-6 Infantry] along the FYROM [Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia] Serbian Border." The special PKO predeployment
training provided by the mobile training team had prepared 1-6 Infantry for Operation Able Sentry, rather than conventional war fighting training.

Units preparing for Operation Able Sentry replaced traditional combat skills and responses with the special skills needed for peacekeeping. The need for impartiality, visibility, and restraint, in PKO made the traditional combat methods of surprise and overwhelming force inappropriate. Special PKO training formed the basis for units success in Macedonia. As a result the PKO training provided by the Nordic Battalion, and latter by the mobile training team, focused on the skills required for PKO which doctrine did not provide: negotiating skills, impartiality, patience, and visibility.

Abrogating the responsibility of providing peacekeeping training and doctrine for the small unit level, the Army relied upon the expertise of foreign armies to prepare US forces or left the matter to the unit's own improvisation and initiative. Reliance on mobile training teams and foreign armies for expertise is not an adequate replacement to providing units the time, resources, and doctrine necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. Even before the Army had time to analyze and publish the lessons from Operation Able Sentry, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, were deploying from Ft Drum New York to the small Caribbean Island nation of Haiti for yet another peace operation.

V. Operation Restore Democracy
Haiti

The chain of events leading to the intervention of US forces in Haiti on 19 September 1994, was rooted in Haiti's long and turbulent political past. The political history of Haiti has been a bloody one, characterized by military coups and populous street violence, where political murders and mob violence are common place occurrences. The twenty-
nine year dictatorship of Jaun-Cluade Duvalier ended in 1986 when he was forced to flee his country in the face of massive popular protests. Following his removal, the country established a democratic constitution by national referendum; but democracy was considered a threat by Haiti's military leaders. To reassert the military's control, Lieutenant General Henri Namph, in the following year, overthrew Haiti's first democratically elected government. A series of military coups ensued. Popular unrest and protests succeeded in removing the military dictatorship of Lieutenant General Prosper Aviril and established conditions for what was reputed to be the first fair election in Haiti's history. Winning 68% of the popular vote, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti on 12 December 1990. Yet another military coup temporarily suspended Haiti's fledgling democracy and ultimately led to the US military's intervention in Haiti.119

Haiti's democratic government was cut short by General Raul Cedras, who overthrew Aristide in a military coup. Exiled, Aristide eventually made his way to the US and began appealing to the Clinton administration and the UN for help. In response to his appeals and the increasing reports of the Cedras regime's brutal suppression of the population, the UN passed Resolution 46/7 which demanded Aristide's immediate return to power. Unresponsive to UN demands, the international community, to include the US, placed severe economic sanctions on Haiti.120

Initially the sanctions appeared to succeed as General Cedras signed the so-called Governors Island Agreement in July 1993. The agreement outlined ten steps, which when complied with, would restore Aristide to power. The UN lifted the economic sanctions after the signing of the agreement, but Cedras failed to fully comply with the ten steps and the UN reimposed sanctions in October of 1993. Reimposition of sanctions failed to influence the Cedras regime and prompted the UN to look to other solutions.121

Instead of forcing Cedras to step down, the economic sanctions placed on Haiti only seemed to inflict more suffering on Haiti's already poverty stricken masses, who were
already leaving the country by the thousands in small boats bound for the Florida coast.

Determining that "the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace in the region" the UN approved Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994 under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution authorized the US to use "all necessary means" to reestablish democracy in Haiti. In September President Clinton announced his intention to remove Cedras by military force if he did not step down.122

Military preparations for the forcible removal of Cedras began immediately following the President's announcement. Operation Restore Democracy planned for US forces to assault Haiti by air, followed by the neutralization of the Haitian army, and removal of Cedras from office. But at the last minute, even as combat units of the 82nd Airborne Division were in the air flying toward their objectives in Haiti, a diplomatic team sent to Haiti by President Clinton, lead by former President Jimmy Carter, secured the peaceful removal of General Cedras and the return of Aristide to power. Planes carrying the assault elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were ordered back to their bases in the US. Not all the US combat forces, however, were order back to the US. In order to assist in the peaceful transition of power, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division and a battalion of Marines landed in Haiti on 19 September 1994. Anticipating a forced entry into Haiti, units of the 10th Mountain Division had prepared for combat, however when they arrived in Haiti the units were required to conduct peace operations.123

The occupation of Haiti by US forces was unopposed by the Haitian Army. As a result soldiers of the 10th Division faced no conventional threats. Given the mission of establishing a secure environment for the peaceful transition of power, the primary threat to soldiers of the 10th Division was not an enemy army, but civil disorder. Civil disorder and lawlessness took on many forms. The civilian population, anxious to seek retribution for their suffering, attacked officials and supporters of the Cedras regime. Loyal supporters of Aristide, brutally suppressed under the Cedras government, took to the streets seeking revenge. Not to be outdone, Haitian police attempted to brutally squash
any civilian uprisings. During the first days of the operation the concern that pockets of Cedras supporters in the Haitian military would resist the US presence added to the chaos. Despite the engagement on 24 September between US Marines and Haitian soldiers, in which ten Haitian soldiers were killed, resistance by the Haitian military or police was rare.\textsuperscript{124} Faced with the problems of civil unrest, the missions conducted by units of the 10th Division were not traditional combat tasks.\textsuperscript{125}

Small unit missions conducted in Haiti had little resemblance to conventional infantry tasks. Cordon and searches, civil disturbance, fixed site security, and so called presence patrols were the most frequently conducted missions in Haiti.\textsuperscript{126} Traditional combat operations were practically non-existent. As the operation continued the missions increasingly resembled law enforcement operations including traffic control, weapons confiscation programs, and escorting US as well as Haiti dignitaries.\textsuperscript{127} Despite the lack of combat operations both the CALL reports on Haiti concluded that "training units for war produced units fully capable of conducting OOTW."\textsuperscript{128} An examination of the 10th Mountain Division's predeployment training, however, shows that the aspects of the units training focusing on OOTW skills was the critical ingredient in preparing the units for PKO in Haiti, not the traditional combat training.

The CALL report conclusion is based in part on the observation that the 10th Division predeployment training focused on traditional combat operations, such as raids, in preparation for the forcible entry into Haiti as originally planned.\textsuperscript{129} In addition to the training on conventional infantry operations, the predeployment training at Ft Drum also included training on skills needed for OOTW. Units conducted civil disturbance training and incorporated ROE into their exercises.\textsuperscript{130} Recognizing the need for restraint, the culminating brigade exercise to the predeployment training included civilian and media role players in the exercise scenario.\textsuperscript{131} All the role players wore MILES to measure the ability of their soldiers and units to exercise the ROE and minimize civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{132} In addition to the brigade exercise, platoons and squads conducted situational training
exercises to prepare soldiers for tasks such as establishing road blocks, controlling refugees, escorting convoys, and controlling civil uprising. Using their previous experiences in Somalia as a model, units incorporated nonlethal tactics and techniques into their training scenarios. In retrospect, the inclusion of OOTW skills into predeployment training was fortuitous, given the absence of traditional combat missions in Haiti. Once in Haiti the OOTW training proved useful.

Operating among the civilian population, traditional combat responses of overwhelming force were inappropriate. Soldiers relied upon the ROE training to accomplish their mission and minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. For example, a platoon conducting a night patrol in the vicinity of a Port-au-Prince police station happened upon an armed guard. Startled by the US platoon the guard raised his weapon. The platoon leader immediately employed his interpreter and used hand jesters to calm the guard and avert unnecessary loss of life. Although the use of deadly force would have been authorized in this case, the platoon leader, fully understanding the intent of the ROE, prevented unnecessary loss of life by using an alternative to deadly force. An understanding of the principle of restraint was not limited to a few officers. Entire units demonstrated their understanding of not only the written ROE, but more importantly the principle of restraint.

Casting aside traditional combat solutions, units in the 10th Division used a variety of nonlethal and proportional response techniques during missions in Haiti. Using force as a last resort, units employed interpreters and public address systems to urge cooperation during civil disturbances and cordon and searches. In one incident a platoon conducting a cordon and search faced a well armed Haitian who was barricaded in a house and refused to surrender. As a large crowd of civilians gathered around the house, the platoon leader, rather than risk the incidental shooting of an innocent bystander, negotiated with the individual through an interpreter and convinced the armed man to surrender. In this and other situations the soldiers and units of the 10th Division demonstrated that the use of
ROE in their training had provided them a mature understanding of the principle of restraint beyond the mere memorization of the ROE.\textsuperscript{137}

A thorough assimilation of the concept of using the minimum force necessary in all situations was instrumental to soldiers in Haiti due to the rapidly changing and confusing ROE. The ROE changed three separate times during the course of the operation and some units failed to receive the changes for as long as three days after the new rules were placed into effect. Dispersion of units throughout Haiti, limited printing capability, and the large quantities of ROE cards needed, resulted in distribution delays. In addition, soldiers found the cards difficult to understand and criticized them for having too much information and being filled with legal jargon. For example, the ROE cards stipulated that soldiers could use minimal force, up to and including deadly force, to stop a robbery or aggravated assault, however, soldiers were instructed to use only nonlethal force to stop burglary or larceny.\textsuperscript{138} Soldiers, most of whom are not lawyers, found the ROE cards confusing. The ROE cards were of little practical value and as a result soldiers based their actions on their ROE training.

Considering the rapidly changing ROE and problems with dissemination and comprehension, the incorporation of ROE and other OOTW specific training into the predeployment training was essential.\textsuperscript{139} In a statement validating the worth of ROE and alternate methods to deadly force a CALL report stated:

"The training of our leaders and soldiers not to over-react and to quickly analyze the situation was key to protecting the force, preventing unnecessary loss of life and the success of the mission."\textsuperscript{140}

Recognizing the inadequacy of traditional war fighting methods in Haiti the US units which replaced the 10th Mountain Division changed their training focus from traditional war fighting to peacekeeping.

Prior to relieving other US forces in Haiti, soldiers of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) and two infantry companies from the 82nd Airborne Division
conducted predeployment peacekeeping training at Ft Polk. The training included civil disturbance training, application of ROE, fixed site security, cordon and searches, and traffic control exercises.\footnote{141} Without peacekeeping MTPs or drill manual to aid them in their preparations the units used situational training vignettes provided by CALL.\footnote{142} The special peacekeeping training provided the 2nd ACR the basis for operations in Haiti.

The leaders of the units agreed that the peacekeeping training prepared them well for their mission in Haiti.\footnote{143} An infantry platoon leader concluded that the predeployment peacekeeping training gave his troops a "thorough grounding of what they could expect in Haiti."\footnote{144} The belief that special training was necessary to successfully accomplish PKO was shared by other leaders as well. Corroborating the platoon leader's assessment, a Command Sergeant Major commented that the peacekeeping training was "essential to accomplishing the mission in Haiti."\footnote{145} The adoption of specialized PKO training by units deploying to Haiti accents the inability of traditional training to fully meet the requirements of PKO.

Specialized peacekeeping training conducted by the 10th Mountain Division and later by the 2nd ACR produced units capable of conducting peacekeeping operations in Haiti. The majority of operations in Haiti were not traditional war fighting missions, but rather tasks not found in MTPs and drill manuals. Applying ROE and using alternatives to deadly force are among the critical tasks absent from traditional training. The mission of establishing a stable environment, however, required a thorough understanding of restraint and ROE. Incorporating ROE training and other OOTW tasks into the predeployment training was essential to success of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. In the absence of Army training plans for OOTW, units looked to their own previous experiences and nondoctrinal training publications to assist their preparation. As in previous PKO special training on peacekeeping skills, such as applying ROE, was essential to the success of peacekeeping operations in Haiti.
VI. Conclusions

Infantry small units require specialized training beyond that of traditional combat training in order to effectively conduct OOTW. The monograph's examination of OOTW from 1989 to 1995 shows that war fighting skills and OOTW tasks may not be directly transferable. Although there are shared tasks between war and OOTW, the need for restraint fundamentally changes the way small units operate and the means they need to achieve their objectives. Tasks conducted in OOTW include skills not normally associated with infantry combat operations. Although many of the OOTW tasks appear similar in name, they are performed differently due to the need for restraint. The purposes of OOTW are different from war and require special training.

Objectives in war focus on destruction of the enemy force, but in OOTW the objectives require soldiers to use minimum force. Soldiers wedded to traditional tactics based upon overwhelming force must change their tactics and attitudes to accomplish their missions while minimizing casualties and collateral damage. Units and leaders conducting OOTW in Panama, Somalia, Macedonia, and Haiti who looked to their infantry MTPs and drill manuals found no alternatives to deadly force, and were forced to develop methods that traditional training did not provide. With the failure of conventional training to fully prepare units for OOTW, units relied on their own innovations, mobile training teams, and the expertise of experienced foreign units.

Units in the 7th Infantry Division, preparing for Operation Just Cause, recognized the inadequacy of traditional tactics to meet the demands of the ROE. Units changed their training focus from combat responses of overwhelming force to tactics of minimum force. Trainers relied on trial and error, and a few leaders experienced in OOTW, to develop nonlethal MOUT techniques which they later called "passive room clearing." Three years later in Somalia units in the 10th Mountain Division encountered similar problems.
Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia, lacking nonlethal weapons or tactics, armed themselves with sticks and tent pegs to fend off antagonists. To address the need for nonlethal tactics, units in Somalia developed training programs and sought mobile training teams to address the need for nonlethal tactics which their focus on traditional war fighting did not accommodate. With the lessons of Somalia still fresh in their minds, the 10th Mountain Division included ROE and other special OOTW skills into their predeployment training plans in preparation for Operation Restore Democracy. In other more permissive peacekeeping environments, such as Macedonia, the need for special training proved equally important.

Soldiers of the Berlin Brigade, on a peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, relied upon the expertise of foreign units to provide the tactics techniques and procedures necessary to accomplish their mission. The US battalion that relieved the Berlin troops, rather than depend upon UN training, arranged for a mobile training team from the Berlin Brigade to provide peacekeeping training. The mobile training team provided the expertise which small unit training doctrine did not address. Based upon recent history and the continuation of ethnic and regional unrest around the world, it is unlikely that the need for special OOTW training will disappear.

Both the National Strategy and Army doctrinal publications acknowledge that OOTW will continue to dominate military operations in the future. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command admits that "most conflicts involving future war will be OOTW."146 Yet, the Army remains committed to the belief that training must continue to focus primarily on preparing units for conventional war, adapting for OOTW only when directed.147 The absence of small unit MTPs and drill manuals for peacekeeping and other OOTW missions underscores the Army's unwillingness to prepare units and soldiers specifically for OOTW. Adopting this philosophy, the Army has not eliminated the need for specialized OOTW training, but rather abrogated its responsibility of training and preparing the force to the small unit level and the individual soldiers themselves. Without
the doctrine, equipment, training, and techniques to support units conducting OOTW, the Army will continue to entrust the nation's interests to small unit innovation, initiative, and luck.\textsuperscript{148} To more effectively accomplish OOTW the Army should provide small unit OOTW training doctrine, nonlethal weapons, and adjust training doctrine to allow units to incorporate OOTW tasks into their METLs.

The Army must re-evaluate the relevance of the current battle focused training process. The battle focused training concept is a process that derives training from the unit's war time mission. This concept was created before the dissolution of the Soviet Union when the Army was able to focus its efforts on one clearly defined threat and mission. Training concepts developed to satisfy the needs of the Cold War era may not apply to missions and threats facing the Army today. Today the Army is faced with diverse and ambiguous threats. The Army's mission is not only to fight and win wars, but also conduct OOTW. Nevertheless, based upon the battle focused training doctrine, units continue to train for conventional war against Soviet modeled threats, rather than the actual operations they are regularly called upon to perform. Training concepts based upon the Cold War paradigm have little relevance in view of today's diverse threats. The Army should redefine its training process to prepare units for OOTW.

Army training in the future should meet the current requirements of the Army established in the National Strategy which includes conducting OOTW. In the future, mission focused training concepts should replace the concept of battle focused training. Mission focused training reflects the tasks units must perform in order to accomplish their missions which may include peacekeeping and other OOTW. In order to successfully conduct the Army's mission of preparing for OOTW, units should train on the tasks that are critical to the accomplishment of that mission, such as applying ROE and controlling civil unrest. The Army should not wait until a crisis has erupted before directing units to conduct OOTW specific training. In the future, units reacting to a crisis may not have the opportunity to prepare.
In the past units did not always have sufficient time to conduct specialized training prior to deployment on a peace operation. For example, the initial units of the 10th Division deployed to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope within two weeks of notification for the mission. In addition, the mission in Haiti changed from a combat operation to a peace operation just hours before execution. The possibility of no-notice peace operations illustrates the need for a common understanding of OOTW skills within the Army.

Army training institutions should educate leaders, soldiers, and staffs in the application of nonlethal and minimal force techniques. Institutional education could establish a common understanding of, and approach to, OOTW. Education could help the Army by teaching leaders and soldiers to recognize the differences between war and OOTW. The Army should incorporate nonlethal and graduated response techniques and negotiation skills, which are essential to the accomplishment of peace operations, into the institutional education base.

In addition to adapting education and unit training to reflect the Army's OOTW role, the Army should consider structural solutions to determine the best method of accomplishing both its war time and OOTW missions. Developing units specially trained, organized, and equipped for OOTW contingencies is one possible solution to better prepare the Army to effectively conduct OOTW. Other solutions include establishing an OOTW contingency force which rotates among units in the Army, or requiring all units to periodically conduct recurrent training on common OOTW tasks such as applying ROE. Although determining the best of these or other solutions is beyond the scope of this monograph, they show there are alternatives to merely entrusting in the initiative and innovation of the individual soldier and small units.
APPENDIX 1: FM 100-5 Operations, OOTW "Activities"

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Arms Control
Support to Domestic Civil Authorities
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Security Assistance
Security Assistance
Nation Assistance
Support to Counter Drug Operations
Combating Terrorism
Peacekeeping Operations
Peace Enforcement
Show of Force
Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Attacks and Raids
END NOTES

1 Center for Army Lessons Learned CALL, Operation Able Sentry Preliminary Report (Draft) (Ft Leavenworth KS.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Unpublished Draft, 1994) 3-1. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, is an element of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command responsible for collecting and publishing lessons from training exercises and actual operations. CALL dispatches observation teams on all contingency operations. The teams observe, analyze, and report finds for publications as well as collect historical data, such as unit logs and after action reviews.

2 BG Tellefsen, as quoted in, Memorandum for Chief of Analysis Division from Cpt John Hort, CALL, 7 June 1994, Operation Able Sentry, Macedonia, page 47.

3 For definitions see US Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1994) 111-112 and Chapter 1. Peacekeeping is defined as "military operations with the consent of all belligerent parties to monitor or facilitate implementation of existing truce." Peace enforcement is the "application of military force to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions." Operations other than War are defined as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."


6 US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, 86.


10 CALL, Peace Operations Volume IV, V-1.

11 See FM100-23, Peace Operations, iv-v.


13 National Strategy, 13. "In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution."

14 FM 100-23, Peace Operations, iv.


16 Ibid., 13-0. See appendix 1, for list of peace keeping tasks.

17 Ibid., 13-4

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., G-6 Definition of ROE: "Directives issued by a competant military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force will initiate and or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces."

21 Ibid., 13-4.


24  FM 25-100, 4-4. The phrase "small unit" refers to the company, platoon and squad levels.


26 The "Dignity Battalions" were irregular, loosely organized, paramilitary groups composed of Noriega supporters. Noriega created and armed these organizations which were virtually void of training and leadership. For more information on the Dignity Battalions see Donnelly, Operation Just Cause.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid chapter 5-6.


30 For background information on Operation Just Cause see Donnaly.

31 For detailed account of amphibious assault and securing of Colon see Donnaly, chapter 14.

32 Briggs, 2-5 and 27. and CALL, "Just Cause Lessons Learned," vol II, II-6 to II-7.

33 Us Army, ARTEP 7-8-Drill, Battle Drills For The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, Dec 93) 5-53 to 5-55. The 1988 version of this manual has the same performance measures with no reference to ROE. The phrase "cooked off grenades" refers to the technique of arming a fragmentation grenade and holding it for two to three seconds before throwing it. The grenade has a five second fuse. This method allows no time for the occupant of the room to seek cover from the blast and precludes the occupant from picking up the grenade and throwing it to a safe place or back at the soldier who employed it.

34 CALL. Operation Just Cause vol II, II-16.


38 Donnelly, 258.

39 For a more complete listing of nonlethal weapons and vehicle obstacles see F.M. Lorenzo, "Less Lethal Force in Operation United Shield," *Marine Corps Gazette* (Sep 95): 68-76. A caltrop is a star shaped device with four metal sharpened points designed to puncture tires and disable moving vehicles.

40 Major Christopher Rizzo, Interview by author, 4 Sep 1994, Ft Leavenworth KS.

41 Ibid.

42 LTC Brooks (now Colonel) served two years as an exchange officer in the British 1st Parachute Infantry Regiment. There he was exposed to British Army training techniques which prepared soldiers for fighting the Irish Republic Army in Northern Ireland. Additionally Colonel Brooks was the operations officer for a Peacekeeping mission in the Sinai Desert, enforcing the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. This information is based on the authors personal contacts with Colonel Brooks.


44 Allard, 3. *Operation Restore Hope* was authorized by UN resolution 794 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which refers to peace enforcement. Under the provisions of Chapter VII peace enforcement may contain direct military action to include disarmament of the belligerents. See also Bolger, 283. US Army defines humanitarian assistance as, "assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. See FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 107. Peace enforcement is "the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." Ibid., 111.

For background information on Operation Restore Hope see Allard, 1-3 and 13-20. See also Bolger, 282-291.


Ibid.


1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, "Task Force Mountain Warrior," *After Action Report* (Ft Drum NY.: 30 Sep 93).


Ibid., 48-49. See also Stanton,39. and Frank Hannon Maj USA, Interviewed by author, Ft Leavenworth KS, 11 Sep 95.

Lorenze,53. and Stanton, 39.

CALL, *UNISOM II Lessons Learned*, (UNISOM ROE) G-1.

Allard, 37 and Bolger, 286. The term "technicals" refers to civilian vehicles modified by crew served weapons such as machine guns. These vehicles were a common tool of warring clansmen.

For detailed account see 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, *After Action Report*.

See Falcon Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, *Quick Reaction Force After Action Report*, (Ft Drum NY.: 3 Oct 93) and 1st Battalion 22nd Infantry, *After Action Report for Operation Restore Hope*, (Ft Drum NY.: 24 Sep 93) Both after action reports give detailed accounts of attacks on militia strongholds, but acknowledge that these missions were rare and tasks such as cordon and search were far more common.

Dworken, 27.
61 Lorenze, 48.

62 Dworken, 30. and CALL, UNISOM II Lessons Learned, G-1.

63 McGowan, 24.

64 Charles P. Ferry, CPT USA, "Personal Account of a Rifle Company Executive Officer," The Battle of the Black Sea (Breakthrough to TF Ranger), (Ft Benning GA: US Army Infantry Center, Student Paper, Oct 1993) 14.

65 McGowan, 24-25.

66 Ibid., 24

67 CALL, Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, 1,3.

68 Ibid., 8.

69 Allard, 65.

70 As quoted in Allard, 64-65

71 1st Brigade, AAR.


73 CALL, UNISOM II, G-1.


75 Ibid., 24.

76 Ibid.

77 Dworken, 30.

78 McGowan, 23-25. and see also Center for Army Lessons Learned, narrative for briefing slides, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) US Army Operations in Mogadishu, Somalia (Ft Leavenworth KS.: undated).

79 McGowan, 23.

80 Falcon Brigade, AAR.

82 Ibid.

83 Lorenze, 49.


85 See 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Memorandum dated 16 Jan 93, Subject: Lessons Learned from E/87 on 15 Jan 93.

86 See US Army, Battle Drills For the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, (Washington D.C.: Headquarter Department of the Army, 1993) 2-101 to 2-102. Battle Drill 10, React to Contact (Mounted) performance measures instructs soldiers to immediately return fire and "engage known or suspected enemy positions with well aimed or area fire [author's italics]."

87 For information on soldier improvisation of nonlethal weapons see Lorenze. Pepper spray is a small hand held canister that dispenses a liquid irritant spray used to debilitate an attacker without causing permanent bodily injury.

88 Allard, 66

89 For information on OOTW training in Somalia see McGowan, 25.

90 CALL, OOTW briefing narrative.8.

91 Ferry, 20. "Mobile training team" is a non doctrinal term commonly used in the Army to describe soldiers who are experts in a particular field who are temporarily grouped together for a short period in order to train units other than their own on their specialty. "Close quater battle" is a nondoctrinal term which refers to the precision engagement of targets using limited force.

92 Ferry, 17.


94 Ibid.

95 Bolger, 256. See 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry, briefing slides, "Mission".

96 For account of 5-502nd predeployment PKO training see CALL, Able Sentry.
Preliminary Report, (Draft), 3-3 to 3-5.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 3-1.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.


102 See Memorandum for Chief Analyst Div Call, 7 Jun 94, 47.

103 Ibid.47-48

104 See Volger, Training for Macedonia. and Bolger, 356.

105 Bolger, 356.

106 See ARTEP 7-8- MTP, 5-153 to 5-159. Standards for area and zone reconnaissance stipulate the platoon or squad can not be discovered by the enemy.

107 After action review comments presented in, Significant Activities Report, 20 January 1994, from Macedonia, Operation Able Sentry, for Analysis Div., CALL.

108 CALL, PKO Report, VIII-1.


110 Bolger, 356.


112 Viakus, see "Soldier Debrief Survey Conclusions".

113 Viakus, see soldier surveys on sources of stress during deployment.

114 Ibid., 3-5.

115 See Vogel. and Briefing Slides, 3rd Infantry Division, Operation Able Sentry Training Plan.
116 CALL, Daily Situation Report, from CALL observer team, Operation Able Sentry (Macedonia, 30 Mar 94). Subject: Infantry in FYROM.

117 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry, Mobile Training Team (MTT), Training Plan Task List, for 1st Battalion 6th Infantry's prdeployment training in preparation for Operation Able Sentry. See also "Practicle Exercise" numbers 1-16 prepared by 6-502 MTT.

118 Ibid.


120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 CALL, D-20 to D+150, iii, v. CALL reports cites only two engagements between US and Haitian forces.

125 CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, 113. and CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+150, 1.

126 Ibid.

127 CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+150, 1.

128 CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, iii.

129 Ibid., 1-10.

130 Ibid., 1.
MILES (Multi-Intergrated Laser Engagement System) is a commonly used training device in the US Army. The devise consist of a laser transmitter which is placed on the barrel of a weapon. When the weapon fires a blank cartridge the transmitter emits an invisible laser replicating the trajectory of an actual bullet. If the laser hits a soldier wearing a MILES sensor harness a loud ringing noise is sounded from an alarm installed in the harness indicating to the soldier that he has been hit. By employing MILES harnesses on civilian role players in an exercise, evaluators can determine the number and cause of civilian casualties in the training.

CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, 3.

Ibid.

For details of the incident see CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, 117

Ibid.

For small unit actions in Haiti see CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, chapter 5.

Ibid., 120.

For ROE issues in Haiti see CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, 119-120.

Ibid., 113.


Ibid., 16.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Durden, 14.


US Army, TRADOC PAM 525-5, 3-2. See also US Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, 1. The first sentence of this manual states, "Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units for to fight and win in combat - the Army's basic mission. and US Army, FM 100-
23. *Peace Operations*, 86. The first sentence of the chapter on training states, "Training and preparation for peace operations should not distract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat."

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