PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
Is There A Need for Mechanized Forces as Part of the Peacekeeping Team?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT


This monograph examines whether or not mechanized forces should be included in today's peacekeeping operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations (pre-1988) called for a force structure requiring large numbers of light infantry augmented by thin-skinned vehicles for added mobility. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the Soviet Union in 1991 came a new security environment marked by national, religious and/or ethnic differences. These differences, combined with the ready availability of modern weapons, have led to a peacekeeping environment that bears the characteristics of a civil war or insurgency rather than that of a contained and suppressed environment typical of the Cold War years. Therefore, mechanized forces with their increased survivability, sustainability, mobility and versatility may be a needed addition to the traditional peacekeeping force structure. The capabilities that mechanized forces bring with them would provide the peacekeeping commander with an added level of flexibility. This added flexibility may help ensure success of the peacekeeping mission while adding a level of force protection that appears to be required in today's peacekeeping operation.

This monograph is divided into six sections. Section one, the introduction, provides background information and establishes the purpose of the study. Section two describes how the security environment has changed from one of violence and stability to one characterized by violence and volatility. Historical examples are used to highlight this change. Section three illustrates the peacekeeping doctrinal differences between the US and other leading nations and organizations, and what can happen as a result of these differences in today's new environment. Section four establishes a likely future security environment and develops probable characteristics of future peacekeeping operations. Using section four as a basis, section five demonstrates how mechanized forces can be used in today's peacekeeping operations. Additionally, this section develops decision criteria for decision makers to use when trying to determine whether mechanized forces should be included in a particular peacekeeping operation. The final section, section six, provides conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions of this study indicate that mechanized forces do have a role in today's peacekeeping operations. The role, within the parameters of a careful mission analysis, is to provide the commander the flexibility to accomplish his mission while protecting the force and its credibility. However, to reach this goal the US Army must broaden its doctrinal understanding of "contemporary peacekeeping," bring its doctrine more in line with its significant allies and develop a methodology that looks at all its resources for "contemporary peacekeeping," not just light infantry. One of these key resources is the mechanized force.
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I. Introduction

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the Soviet Union in 1991 came the unleashing of national, religious and/or ethnic differences within former sovereign states. These differences, combined with the ready availability of modern weapons, have led to a security environment that bears the characteristics of a civil war or insurgency rather than that of a contained and suppressed environment typical of the Cold War years. As a result, there has been a substantial increase in United Nations (UN) activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. One such activity is peacekeeping.

As the UN attempts to strengthen its capability to establish conditions for the resolution of breakdowns in international peace and security, the importance and number of peacekeeping operations continue to increase. Additionally, the activities associated with these operations also increase. These new or non-traditional peacekeeping activities range from conflict prevention and humanitarian relief to guarantee and denial of movement operations. Tasks associated with this range of activities may include conducting interposition patrols, providing convoy security, and establishing roadblocks, to name only a few.

The United States, a likely participant in future UN or multinational peacekeeping operations, is not new to such operations. Peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and Pakistan, both dating back to 1948 and 1949 respectively, are just two examples of the United States' long-term participation in traditional peacekeeping operations. However events, such as those witnessed in Somalia and currently unfolding in the former
Yugoslavia, have caused the US to re-assess its participation in today's peacekeeping operations. This is evidenced by Presidential Decision Directive 25 in which the US strongly affirms that its involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective. To be selective, the US must ensure future peacekeeping operations support national security interests. To be more effective, however, requires the US, in particular the US Army, to re-look at how it tailors forces for today's peacekeeping operations.

The US tends to base its force structure on traditional peacekeeping operations which required large numbers of light infantry augmented by thin-skinned vehicles for added mobility. Today's peacekeeping operation, in its more volatile environment and with its increased and more complex activities, may call for a more combined arms approach. Furthermore, the forces should be tailored in such a way that force protection is maximized and the necessity for an early resort to force is minimized.

Mechanized forces (in the form of a mechanized task force, for example) with their increased survivability, sustainability, mobility and versatility, may be a needed addition to the traditional peacekeeping force structure. The capabilities that mechanized forces bring with them would provide the peacekeeping commander with an added level of flexibility. This added flexibility may help ensure success of the peacekeeping mission while adding a level of force protection that appears to be required in today's peacekeeping operations.

This paper focuses on determining how the US Army can use the capabilities of its mechanized forces in today's peacekeeping operations while providing adequate force protection. Of course, this decision to employ mechanized forces as part of a
peacekeeping force structure would be situation dependent and based on the analysis of selected criteria. Therefore, a secondary focus of this paper is to develop a set of criteria that will assist the decision maker in making sound peacekeeping force structure decisions.

Accordingly, this paper is structured in the following manner. Chapter II describes how the security environment has changed from that characterized by the Cold War years (violent but stable) to that which is present today (violent but volatile). Historical examples are used to highlight this difference in peacekeeping environments and characteristics.

Chapter III's focus is to show how the United States' doctrinal perception of peacekeeping operations differs in meaning and scope from other nations' and the United Nations'. This chapter goes on to show how these differences in perception can lead not only to doctrinal ambiguity but to unanticipated outcomes in today's peacekeeping operations.

Using the historical and doctrinal analyses, combined with some future possibilities, Chapter IV establishes a likely future security environment and develops probable characteristics of future peacekeeping operations.

Using Chapter IV as a basis, Chapter V demonstrates how mechanized forces can be used in today's peacekeeping operations. Additionally, this chapter develops decision criteria for decision makers to use when trying to determine whether mechanized forces should be included in a particular peacekeeping operation.

Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommendations.
II. Changed Security Environment and Peacekeeping Operations Characteristics

This chapter illustrates how the strategic security environment has evolved. That evolution requires a change in peacekeeping doctrine, specifically in scope, force structure and the increased emphasis on consent, impartiality, and appropriate use of force. Historical examples point out that unless the US Army is willing to make evolutionary changes to its peacekeeping doctrine, it will fail to understand the complexities of this unique environment.

Cold War Era

Although the statistics for the Cold War era show a devastating 30 million people killed in more than 80 wars and conflicts, a relatively high degree of stability did exist throughout the world because of the competitive interests of the prevailing superpowers. These competitive interests frequently served as a mechanism to help contain and suppress nationalist and inter-ethnic violence, thus making peacekeeping a narrowly constrained activity.1 Specifically, "unless the zone of conflict under consideration met with the stringent preconditions [referring to preconditions established so as not to impinge on the superpower zero-sum game] for their use, UN forces could not be deployed."2 As a result, up to the end of 1987 there were only a total of 13 UN peacekeeping operations conducted.

The focus of these UN peacekeeping operations was on inter-state conflict. Of the 13 UN peacekeeping operations, all but one were concerned with conflicts that had arisen following European decolonization.3 Most had developed into regional conflicts that
seemed likely to cause superpower confrontation, and were thus de-escalated by UN peacekeeping operations. As a result, pre-1988 peacekeeping operations served as "a safety net and an alternative to active confrontation between East and West." More specifically, pre-1988 peacekeeping operations aimed at the containment or management of conflict.

Because of the bipolar security environment discussed above, traditional (pre-1988) peacekeeping operations were subject to certain conditions: the confidence and full support of the Security Council, consent of the parties to the conflict, an attitude of complete impartiality towards the belligerents, the minimum use of force, nonintervention by permanent members of the Security Council (only provided strategic movement and logistic support), and the existence of an ongoing political peace process. Of these, the most important precondition for success was the universal consent of all parties involved. This consent in large part was effected by superpower involvement and interaction. However, belligerent leaders involved in negotiations, for the most part, exercised an effective control over their constituency.

Under these conditions, the traditional peacekeeping force evolved. Being lightly armed and defensively oriented, the traditional peacekeeping force observed and reported on the belligerents' adherence to the cease-fire while negotiations for peace occurred. Traditional peacekeeping activities such as monitoring and enforcing cease-fires, observing frontier lines, and interposing between belligerents were designed to provide a buffer or confidence building mechanism between belligerents that had agreed to a cease-fire or truce. Because a traditional peacekeeper was operating in an atmosphere of
violence, but not volatility, he became "a stereotype who did not seriously expect to be involved in a situation in which force, or forceful persuasion, would be used to meet challenges on the ground." As a result, traditional peacekeeping relied largely on a "token" UN presence and the consent of the belligerent forces rather than on any effective military capability. In 1988, the security environment began to change.

**Post-Cold War Era**

The end of the Cold War brought an end to superpower competition. The removal of US-Soviet Bloc interests and ideological pressures has allowed new conflicts to emerge. A trend in these conflicts has been the fragmentation of former sovereign states once held together by superpower influence. These new conflicts are often based on deeply rooted national, religious and/or ethnic differences and are fuelled by the ready availability of large quantities of modern weaponry. This combination has produced an extremely volatile environment prone to alarming escalations in violence.

As a result of this new environment, contemporary peacekeeping operations have frequently been involved in facilitating the resolution of *intrastate* conflicts. These conflicts have stemmed either from ethnically-based disputes, internal political struggle or the collapse of state institutions. In fact, of the 21 peacekeeping operations established since 1988, only eight have been related to *interstate* conflicts, whereas, the other 13 (62 percent) have been related to intrastate conflicts. Of the 11 peacekeeping operations established since January 1992, all but two (82 percent) have been related to intrastate conflicts.
Emerging characteristics of this new intrastate conflict environment include:
numerous parties to the conflict; undisciplined factions (lacking restraint and barely
accountable to any central or recognized authority); an ineffective cease-fire; absence of
law and order; sporadic outbreaks of violence and risk of local armed opposition; the
presence and involvement of numerous civilians, including refugees and displaced
persons; collapse of civil infrastructure; undefined areas of operation; random atrocity
and large-scale human suffering; anarchy; and widespread unmarked mines and residual
ordnance.  

In this new environment, what was the most important precondition for success in
pre-1988 peacekeeping operations, universal consent, has now been altered. Because the
UN no longer deals with the relatively accountable parties of the past, the quality of
consent has declined, particularly at the local level. This is not to say that consent is no
longer important. Rather, success in today's peacekeeping operations may mean no more
than maintaining a sufficient level of security and protection for negotiators, relief
agencies and civil administrations to continue unimpeded.  

The result is that the environment for peacekeeping is no longer benign. UN
mandates may include protecting humanitarian relief efforts or restoring law and order
rather than simply aiming to manage or contain the conflict. As today's peacekeeping
operations aim to prevent or establish the conditions for the resolution of conflicts,
peacekeepers will "increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict,
sometimes where there are no defined borders or cease-fire lines and no guarantee of
respect for their safety or role." The historical examples that follow demonstrate how
peacekeeping aims have changed from management or containment to prevention or resolution because of the changing and increasingly complex security environment. Further, the examples show how those changing aims have increased the need for peacekeeping nations to closely reexamine the issues of scope, force structure, and extremely complex variables of consent, impartiality and use of force.

**UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

Britain's imperial withdrawal from Cyprus in 1960 was an example of European decolonization -- a familiar pattern for the initiation of 12 of the 13 pre-1988 peacekeeping operations. Britain's withdrawal was accompanied by the Treaty of Guarantee, a treaty whose aim was to ensure that the constitutional rights and freedom of the two main communities (the Greek and Turkish Cypriots) were fully protected. In the event of a breach of the provisions of the treaty, Greece, Turkey, and Britain (the three Guarantor Powers) reserved the right under the treaty to take any measure aimed at restoring the status quo. It was the Treaty of Guarantee that engaged the two Cypriot communities in conflict -- a conflict precipitated by Turkey and Greece as they expressed the determination to protect the interests of their Turkish and Greek kin, respectively.¹⁵

It was only three years after having been granted independence from Britain that tension between the Greek and Turk Cypriots mounted steadily. As Turkey appeared to be preparing for an invasion of Cyprus, the Greek government expressed support for a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Therefore, the conflict is characterized as an intrastate conflict, although Greek and Turkey (interstate rivalries) influenced the main participants (Greek and Turkish Cypriots). This support by interstate rivalries became blatantly
obvious when Turkey invaded northern Cyprus in 1974. It was against this background that the UN created UNFICYP in March 1964, a peacekeeping force that remained in Cyprus even after the Turkish invasion of the northern half in 1974.\textsuperscript{16}

Initially, military forces from the three Guarantor Powers under British command established and executed the peacekeeping mission. However, once the three powers agreed to present the conflict in Cyprus to the UN Security Council, the peacekeeping operation took on several traditional peacekeeping characteristics. They were: confidence and full support of the Security Council, consent of the parties to the conflict, an attitude of complete impartiality towards the belligerents, minimum use of force for force protection and implementation of the mandate, and no superpower intervention. The last characteristic is of interest here because not only did the belligerents not want superpower intervention but they also did not want any permanent members of the Security Council [read Britain] in the peacekeeping force either. Subsequently, Britain’s 3,000 man contingent was scaled down considerably, resulting in a force comprised of peacekeepers from Canada, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Austria.\textsuperscript{17}

UNFICYP operations in Cyprus can be divided into two phases: Phase I lasted from 1964 to 1974 -- peacekeeping activities during this phase included supervising cease-fire lines and restoring law and order. Phase II has lasted from 1974 to the present where activities include supervising cease-fire lines and maintaining a buffer zone.\textsuperscript{18} During Phase I, there were only two major encounters in which the peacekeeping forces had to contain conflict, at Kokkina in 1964 and at Ayios Theodoros in 1967. In both instances, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots ignored UNFICYP's plea for restraint and initiated
fighting between them. In the fighting at Kokkina, the peacekeeping force could not influence the battle and withdrew from its defensive lines to a safer area. At Ayios Thedoros, the force stayed in position until the fighting was over.19

Phase II started after the Turkish invasion in 1974. Although inter-communal conflicts continued, the major focus of the peacekeeping forces has been on maintaining an effective buffer (Green Line) between the two Cypriot communities.20

The peacekeeping forces for UNFICYP have been supplied by nine different countries, with a maximum strength occurring during 1964 (6,411) and a present strength of 1,221.21 The forces have consisted primarily of light infantry soldiers armed with personal weapons and machine guns and augmented with wheeled vehicles and armored cars for mobility.

Although UNFICYP has not fully prevented local clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it has maintained an effective buffer between the two communities, preventing the spread of hostilities to other outside areas. Therefore, while UNFICYP has not established the conditions for resolution of conflict in Cyprus, it has effectively managed or controlled any escalations in violence in the region. The next historical example, involving the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), reveals that UNEF II had many of the same characteristics as UNFICYP; however, the conflict in which UNEF II had to contain had far greater implications, namely the eruption of a larger conflict between the US and Soviet Union.
Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)

UNEF II, a UN response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, started against the backdrop of two previous UN peacekeeping operations in the Sinai, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). UNTSO assisted the Mediator and Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce on three of the four disputed Arab-Israeli borders. UNEF I, created to defuse the Suez crisis of 1956, replaced UNTSO on the Egyptian-Israeli border in 1957. UNEF I successfully contained conflict between Egypt and Israel until its abrupt and controversial end in 1967. In both cases, the aims of the peacekeeping operations were to keep a potentially dangerous dispute quiet, presumably in the further hope that time and diplomacy would defuse the situation.\textsuperscript{22} UNEF II would follow the same pattern.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a war fought between two well-established governments fighting for two different political aims. Israel's basic political aim was national survival which was enhanced by the defensible border and buffer zone offered by the Sinai Peninsula.\textsuperscript{23} Egypt's primary political aim, on the other hand, was simply to break the political stalemate to gain superpower influence in negotiations with Israel to regain the Sinai.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, the conflict is characterized as a conventional interstate war between two nations with well-established governments and political aims.

In this pre-1988 peacekeeping operation, not only did the peacekeeping force have to understand the aims of the belligerent nations but also the aims of the superpowers. It was the aims shared by both superpowers that caused them to cooperate to stop the fighting. They were: ensuring the survival of Israel (though for different reasons),
gaining influence with the Arabs, and wanting to maintain detente. It was this interaction in aims by the US and Soviet Union that enabled the Security Council to pass a cease-fire resolution on 21 October 1973. The superpowers, concerned for the continuation of the cease-fire, worked through the United Nations to establish UNEF II to supervise the cease-fire and initial disengagement of Egyptian-Israeli forces.

This operation, like that in Cyprus, possessed many of the traditional peacekeeping characteristics. In fact, the Secretary-General's guidelines for the effective functioning of UNEF II came closest to a formal codification of the governing principles of peacekeeping. These were: continuous support of the Security Council, strict adherence to the principle of consent, the non-use of force except in self-defense -- extended to the protection of the mandate, complete impartiality towards the belligerents, and non-intervention by permanent members of the Security Council (although they could provide strategic movement and logistic support). It is important to note that, initially, consent only existed at the strategic level. Specifically, since Israel did not give its consent willingly, but rather under pressure from the US, consent at the operational and tactical level did not exist until approximately three days after both sides accepted the cease-fire resolution. By doing this, Israel avoided the political cost of withholding consent but retained the ability to continue fighting to achieve strategic aims -- in this case the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army.

Military peacekeeping tasks included in UNEF II's mandate included: relief convoys to the encircled Egyptian Third Army, separation of the belligerents and establishment of a buffer zone, and creation of static observation posts and checkpoints for control of the
ground lines of operation. It was only after significant US political pressure on Israel that the peacekeeping force could accomplish the first activity. It took the signing of a Disengagement Agreement by both sides to end the violence and allow for the implementation of the remainder of the UN mandate.

Because the urgency of the 1973 Middle East crisis was heightened by the threat of Soviet intervention and the alert of the United States' nuclear forces, initial peacekeeping forces were taken out of UNFICYP and augmented with headquarters personnel from UNTSO. In total, the peacekeeping forces for UNEF II came from 13 different countries, with a maximum strength reaching 6,973 in 1974. The forces consisted primarily of light infantry soldiers armed with personal weapons, machine guns, and recoilless weapons. The peacekeeping force was augmented with trucks and 4WD vehicles for mobility.

UNEF II, like UNTSO and UNEF I resolved nothing between Israel and Egypt, but it did successfully prevent further conflicts between two bitter enemies until its end in 1979. The reasons why are discussed above, but are worth recapping. They are: the conflict was between two well-established governments with well-established aims, the superpowers interacted to produce a cease-fire, the superpowers highly influenced the belligerents, a high degree of consent eventually developed among the belligerents, the peacekeeping environment was violent but not volatile, and the peacekeeping forces displayed a high degree of impartiality toward the belligerents. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the Soviet Union in 1991, several of these factors disappeared over night, resulting in a new environment in which peacekeepers would
now have to operate. The next two historical examples highlight the changes in the security environment and show how those changes influenced the traditional peacekeeping force, its activities and its approach to consent, impartiality and use of force.

**Second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)**

UNOSOM II was third in a succession of peacekeeping operations initiated in Somalia, starting with UNOSOM I in April 1992. UNOSOM I provided a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease-fire between warring factions. Fifty unarmed observers were sent to Somalia in July 1992 to carry out this mandate. In August 1992, the UN expanded its mandate to the protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. To implement this expansion in the mandate, the Security Council approved an increase in the strength of UNOSOM I to four 750-man security units. Neither mandate was successfully implemented as battles between clans continued and relief supplies were regularly diverted away from distribution centers.\(^2\) Overall, the security situation grew worse. UNITAF started in response to this and the growing threat of starvation. UNITAF, ultimately consisting of some 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations (including 28,000 Americans), was to "bridge the gap until the situation stabilized enough for it to be turned over to a permanent UN peacekeeping force."\(^3\) Its UN mandate called for providing humanitarian assistance to the Somali people and restoring order in Southern Somalia. UNITAF succeeded in implementing its mandate, resulting in a stabilization of the security environment and the removal of the threat of starvation in
several areas of Somalia.\textsuperscript{34} After some delay, UNITAF handed off its functions to the permanent peacekeeping force, UNOSOM II.

UNOSOM II performed peacekeeping activities amid a conflict uncommon before its time -- a conflict characterized by multifactional civil war and anarchy as opposed to war between two well-established nations or ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{35} Existing with these chaotic political conditions were other unique characteristics of this new security environment: large-scale famine brought about by civil war and drought conditions, an abundance of individual and heavy weapons spread across several undisciplined factions, absence of law and order, a destroyed infrastructure, widespread unmarked mines, an unpredictable escalation in violence, and undefined areas of operation.\textsuperscript{36} With these conditions extant, Somalia became dependent on external aid to survive.

Because of this new security environment, the only traditional peacekeeping conditions found to exist before UNOSOM II's introduction into the region were: the full support of the Security Council, an agreed upon UN-sponsored cease-fire by the two primary warring clan leaders, an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents, and the existence of an ongoing political peace process. The most important precondition for success in traditional peacekeeping operations, universal consent, was absent. Although UNITAF operations established legitimacy for UN operations in Somalia, thus gaining the consent of the local populace, consent was not universally present among all the clansmen and sub-clansmen in the areas of operation. Because the Security Council included requirements in the mandate that called for the disarmament of the Somali clans, Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the UN Charter would now direct the
peacekeeping operation. This, in itself, called into question the condition of minimum use of force for self-defense. More importantly, superpower non-intervention in peacekeeping operations was now a thing of the past as evidenced by the United States' heavy involvement in UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

Because the situation in Somalia was characteristic of intrastate rather than interstate conflict, the activities to be performed by UNOSOM II were qualitatively different than those performed in a traditional peacekeeping environment. UNOSOM II's military peacekeeping activities included: establishing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance operations, disarming factions, and establishing law and order. These activities, directed by the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the UN Charter but conducted under the auspices of peacekeeping, were quite different from Chapter VI activities performed in traditional (interstate) peacekeeping environments. In fact, the increasing difficulty of performing Chapter VII activities in a peacekeeping operation showed itself as the actions of UNOSOM II crossed over the line into peace enforcement operations. This occurred when UNOSOM II forces conducted raids and attacks on Mohammed Farah Aideed's headquarters in response to the attack of his forces on 24 UN Pakistani soldiers a month prior.

Peacekeeping forces for UNOSOM II numbered 28,000 from 33 countries. They consisted mostly of lightly armed soldiers supported by some Coalition mechanized forces (Pakistan and Malaysia) and a US-equipped Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The QRF consisted primarily of one light infantry battalion and one mixed attack-lift aviation battalion and operated under a command and control structure (OPCON to CENTCOM).
different from the remainder of the Coalition forces. After the 3 October 1993 firefight between UN US troops (US Army Rangers and the QRF) and members of Aideed's clan, another light infantry battalion, a heavy battalion task force, an artillery battalion, and two engineer battalions augmented the UN peacekeeping force.\footnote{41} It was with this force that the US Army would protect its forces as it began its withdrawal from Somalia on 1 December 1993.\footnote{42} Starting with UNOSOM I, the following is a discussion of some important lessons concerning force structure and the variables of consent, impartiality, and use of force learned from the three peacekeeping forces' operations in Somalia.

UNOSOM I monitored the cease-fire in Mogadishu, and subsequently, with an increase in manpower, was given an additional task to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. UNOSOM I failed to implement either mandate because it made use of a traditional peacekeeping force (noncredible force) in an environment for which it was not suited. UNITAF, on the other hand, was successful in implementing its mandate of providing humanitarian assistance and restoring order in southern Somalia. A primary reason for its success was its rapid introduction of massive military force. This not only showed a strong presence but also provided more than adequate resources for force protection. When this initial impression weakened and factions began to test UNITAF's resolve, the response was restrained and impartial but strong. As a result, UNITAF maintained its legitimacy through consent of the local population and carried out its mandate with very few casualties.\footnote{43} It was with these conditions that UNOSOM II began.
Although UNOSOM II initially began to implement the UN's mandate, certain events occurred over time to escalate the operation from one of peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The result was a full withdrawal of UN forces and an end to peace operations in Somalia. The following paragraphs discuss those events that led to this unanticipated ending.

The first event was the UN response to the attack by Aideed's militia on UN Pakistani forces that killed 24 UN Pakistani troops. Although there was definite justification for some reaction, the actions that followed were neither restrained nor impartial. Responding to an arrest order for Mohammed Farah Aideed issued on 17 June 1993, US AC-130 Spectre gunships attacked a Mogadishu residential compound that Aideed was using as a command bunker. A month later, US Army Cobra helicopter gunships fired sixteen antitank missiles into a house in which Aideed and his top aides were meeting. Neither attack succeeded in arresting Aideed, but rather killed 73 Somalis and caused considerable collateral damage to medical and other civilian structures. Among the dead were influential religious leaders and elders of Aideed's Habr Gedir subclan. Although more of the same continued, these initial responses (showing no restraint or impartiality) were enough to erode consent at both the local (tactical) and operational level. As a result, legitimacy for UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia deteriorated and the UN now crossed the line into peace enforcement operations. Here, consent was absent, impartiality was lost and use of force was needed not to implement the mandate but to protect the force -- a force now inadequate for the type of peace operation it was trying to conduct.
Arguments by coalition forces over the use of force became the second event which led to the loss of legitimacy -- this time, international legitimacy. Because there are differences in nations' peacekeeping doctrine (to be shown in Chapter III), there was not full cooperation among coalition forces in terms of use of force. Because several coalition members saw the United States' use of force as exceeding the mandate, their support dropped sharply. This not only degraded the accomplishment of the peacekeeping mandate but also the perception of international legitimacy as seen by the Somali people and clans. This, in turn, allowed local factions to exploit this weakness, thus adding to the friction between coalition forces and hastening their eventual withdrawal.

A final event that led to the eventual withdrawal of peacekeeping forces was the inadequacy of the peacekeeping force's quick reaction force (QRF) or reserve. The QRF, consisting primarily of one light infantry battalion and one mixed attack-lift aviation battalion, was inadequate to deal with the escalation of violence that followed a 3-October 1993 raid by US Army Rangers on Aideed's clan. The raid led to a heavy firefight between the two forces, during which time the QRF was unable to reach the surrounded US force because of its inadequate firepower and protection capability. The violence finally ended, after a night of fighting, when the QRF and mechanized coalition forces, both operating under a different command and control structure, were able to break through and relieve the US Rangers. The inadequacy of the QRF, among other factors, resulted in 12 US killed and 78 wounded. As a result of the QRF's inability to control this escalation in violence, their credibility among the Somali clans (in particular,
Aideed's clan) was permanently lost. In fact, in order to provide adequate security and force protection for the UN peacekeeping force, the US had to deploy additional forces consisting of a light infantry battalion, a heavy battalion task force, an artillery battalion, and two engineer battalions to augment the force already on the ground. The purpose of this force was not to implement the UN mandate but to provide security and protection for the UN peacekeeping force until all forces were withdrawn from Somalia in March 1994.

The final historical example, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, reveals a similar peacekeeping security environment. This example also demonstrates how a lack of resources, in terms of peacekeepers and armament, leads to a peacekeeping force's inability to carry out its mandate. However, because the force has achieved sufficient levels of consent and impartiality and has used force in a restrained and impartial manner, the peacekeeping operations have maintained their legitimacy among the different factions and the international community as a whole.

**United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)**

In January 1992 Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, negotiated a cease-fire (15th one overall) for the war in Croatia, "which called for the deployment of peacekeeping forces to stabilize the situation, while a political settlement was negotiated under European auspices." On 21 February 1992, the UN Security Council established UNPROFOR and commenced its deployment to Croatia in March 1992. The number of commands and their mandates grew as the conflict spread throughout the former Yugoslavia. Today UNPROFOR, with its HQ in Zagreb (the
capital of Croatia), has three major commands: Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia Commands.\textsuperscript{47}

The conflict is characterized as a civil war between three ethnic groups: Serbians, Croatians and Muslims. The causes of the conflict stemmed primarily from cleavages in nationalism and economics, two cleavages contained by Marshall Tito. Not long after Tito's death in 1980, the nationalism and economic fissures erupted, resulting in a civil war that has continued to spread throughout the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{48} Like Somalia, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is of the type held in check during the Cold War, a type marked by volatility and intense escalations in violence.

Adding to and sometimes causing this volatility and violence are other characteristics present in the peacekeeping environment in the former Yugoslavia. They include: absence of law and order, numerous refugees and displaced persons, ethnic cleansing, violent attacks on noncombatants, terrorism, a destroyed infrastructure, widespread unmarked mines and heavily armed forces.\textsuperscript{49} What has made the violence here even more intense than that in Somalia is the greater sophistication and military potential of the society combined with long-term repressed ethnic hatreds. The most virulent example of this is the policy of ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{50}

Because of the volatility of the environment in the former Yugoslavia, the conditions under which UNPROFOR was to be employed changed between the time it was established and the time it was deployed. Therefore, instead of deploying under the conditions that existed before deployment, which were: (1) the full support of the Security Council, (2) an agreed upon cease-fire by the belligerents, (3) consent of the
parties to the conflict, (4) an ongoing political peace process, (5) impartiality, and (6) the minimum use of force, UNPROFOR hit the ground in Croatia with only conditions one, five and six in place. Furthermore, because of the lack of forces and armament deployed to Croatia to implement the UN mandate, the warring parties severely challenged conditions five (impartiality) and six (minimum use of force). To make the situation worse, Security Council resolutions clearly directed against the Serbs in Croatia put into question the peacekeeping force's impartiality. These conditions, combined with an already complex mandate, have severely challenged the under-resourced UNPROFOR.

The changes in UNPROFOR's mandate are reflected in the seemingly endless list of activities being performed throughout the three commands in the former Yugoslavia. They include: demilitarizing UN Protected Areas (UNPAs); protecting the civilian population within the UNPAs; protecting "Safe Areas" (besieged cities and towns); protecting key facilities (such as the Sarajevo airport); protecting humanitarian aid convoys and released civilian detainees throughout the region; restoring law and order; protecting and facilitating the return of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs; preventive deployment for the purpose of preventing a cross-border conflict; verifying and monitoring the withdrawal and concentration of weapon systems and ground forces in-and-around key facilities and UNPAs; controlling the entry of civilians into UNPAs; and monitoring compliance with the ban of all military flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Comparing this list of activities to that for UNFICYP or UNEF II, or even UNOSOM II, demonstrates how the scope of peacekeeping operations has continued to expand as a result of this new security environment.
To perform these peacekeeping activities, UNPROFOR has approximately 36,500 soldiers from 35 different countries. They are broken up as follows: 16,000 primarily light infantry in Croatia; 19,000 mainly mechanized infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and 1,500 light infantry in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, approximately half of UNPROFOR is characteristic of the traditional peacekeeping force -- light infantrymen armed with personal weapons and machine guns, augmented with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles for mobility. Below is a discussion of the impact of employing these traditional peacekeeping forces in this new security environment.

Although peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia cannot be categorized as a complete failure, successes are very few. A primary reason, although definitely not the sole reason, for UNPROFOR's failure to fully implement its mandate has been a lack of resources, namely adequate numbers of appropriately armed peacekeepers. In Croatia, 16,000 lightly armed soldiers were deployed to conduct disarmament and protection operations within UNPAs where previously 150,000 heavily armed combatants had been operating and where a heavily armed Serb "police" force of 40,000 continued to operate.\textsuperscript{55} Naturally, UNPROFOR was powerless to enforce the disarmament within the UNPAs or provide adequate protection for the noncombatants within them. In Bosnia, the same situation exists in that 19,000 medium armed peacekeepers are operating in an area where approximately 200,000 heavily armed soldiers from numerous factions exist.\textsuperscript{56} In both instances, the peacekeeping forces are not seen as credible forces, and thus have been challenged several times by the warring factions. This has led to more than 100
peacekeeper fatalities and the inability of the peacekeeping force to fully carry out its mandate. 57

Although UNPROFOR has not been able to fully implement its mandate, its actions have helped maintain the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. While it has been necessary on occasion for UNPROFOR to use high levels of force in pursuit of its mandate and for self-defense, its use of force has remained restrained and impartial. The actions of the Nordic Battalion (NORDBAT) on the night of 29 April 1994 is one example of this restrained and impartial use of force. Responding to a call from a UN observation post being shot at by Bosnian Serb forces, seven Danish Leopard main battle tanks came under fire. They had run into an ambush set up by Bosnian Serbs who were using antitank missiles, artillery and tanks. Using a highly disciplined application of force, the Danish tank crews only shot at the Serb weapon systems that had fired at them, leaving several Serb weapon systems intact. 58 Because force was used against an already targeted faction, impartiality was temporarily lost. However, because UNPROFOR was able to demonstrate to the Bosnian Serbs that the use of force was restrained and in self-defense, and because legitimacy for the operation was already intact, impartiality was restored. 59 Therefore, conditions in the former Yugoslavia exist today in such a way that consent at the local level varies from area to area, but because of tactical level responses as described above, consent at the operational level still exists. More importantly, legitimacy for the overall peacekeeping mission has been maintained.
The historical examples discussed above are only a few of the many peacekeeping operations conducted since the start of the Cold War. However, the characteristics of these operations and the security environment in which they occurred provide us with some insight into the changing nature of both. Although there has been a substantial growth in the number of peacekeeping operations being performed by the UN since the end of the Cold War, the more dramatic change in peacekeeping operations has been qualitative. Specifically, the replacement of interstate with intrastate conflicts has resulted in a changed security environment. To confront this changed security environment, nations of the world community are developing new peacekeeping doctrine that adapts to the changing conditions. The changes in peacekeeping doctrine are based on experiences from post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. Because there is no coordinating body responsible for defining the unfolding doctrine, there are fundamental differences in peacekeeping doctrine among international peacekeeping nations. The next chapter examines these differences.

III. Difference in Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine

The differences in peacekeeping operations doctrine exist primarily between the US Army on one hand, and the main European and Australian armies on the other. This chapter addresses the difference in peacekeeping operations doctrine specifically between the US, Britain, Australia and the United Nations (UN).60
The UN has developed a range of instruments to help control and resolve a variety of international conflicts. Those recognized by both the UN and US are: peacemaking, peace building, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It is among these instruments that the difference in doctrine exists. More specifically, the fundamental difference in doctrine concerns the instruments peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the peace operations activities performed under the auspices of each. The difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement starkly highlights three critical components: consent, impartiality, and use of force. Specifically, peacekeeping operations require a higher degree of consent and impartiality and less use of force than do peace enforcement operations. The consequences of multiple nations performing the same peace operations activity under the auspices of different instruments, specifically peacekeeping and peace enforcement, could present a problem in a traditional peacekeeping environment. However, in this new security environment, the same situation could prove to be disastrous as evidenced by the abrupt end to UNOSOM II's peace operations in Somalia. Appendix 1 contains doctrinal definitions and activities illustrating how the United States' perception of peacekeeping operations differs in meaning (as seen by the definitions) and scope (as seen by the activities associated with each form of peacekeeping) from other nations', to include the United Nations'.

The table in Appendix 1 suggests that the primary difference in peacekeeping doctrine between the US and other nations is the scope of US peacekeeping operations. Specifically, the types and numbers of activities performed in US peacekeeping operations is much more limited than that of the other nations listed. Although this may
not be evident by the activities listed, when one considers the range and intensity of
tactical level missions encompassed by activities such as military assistance and
demobilization operations (portrayed in Appendix 2), this difference in scope becomes
quite evident. Even with the addition of "aggravated peacekeeping," the scope of US
peacekeeping operations remains limited, while the use of force to implement the
mandate is over emphasized. Although not shown in Table 1, the other nations' list of
peacekeeping activities are not ignored by the US but rather categorized as peace
enforcement activities. The following paragraphs examine why there is a difference
between the United States' peacekeeping operations scope and that of other nations or
organizations.

Impact of Consent, Impartiality and Use of Force on Scope of Peacekeeping

Operations

What divides peacekeeping from peace enforcement is not the activity to be
performed or the level of violence expected to be encountered, but rather the degree of
consent. This statement is the basis for the difference in categorization of peace
operations activities between the US Army and other nations' armies. The US Army
views consent in a "black and white" fashion. If consent is clear than peacekeeping is the
operation of choice, but if consent is anything but absolute the activities are performed
under the auspices of peace enforcement. An international perspective is that "... consent to peacekeeping activities is likely to be anything but absolute... it is unlikely
ever to be more than partial and could amount to nothing more than tolerance of
presence." As denoted in the historical examples, the conditions exhibited in Somalia
and the former Yugoslavia support this perspective. Using this perspective of consent as a basis, most international peacekeeping nations have taken note of this changed consensual environment, thus recognizing the need to broaden the scope of peacekeeping operations rather than perform the activities under the auspices of peace enforcement. Looking at two variables that sustain consent, impartiality and the use of force, further explains this difference in categorization of peace operations activities.

According to US peace operations doctrine, peacekeeping operations always require an impartial, evenhanded approach; whereas, impartiality in peace enforcement may change over time and with the nature of operations. International thought concerning impartiality in peacekeeping operations is that, "... impartiality should not be regarded as too exact or absolute a commodity. Just as consent is likely to be incomplete, so the concept of impartiality is likely to prove inexact and fragmentary in practice." If legitimacy is intact, however, the appearance of impartiality can be restored. UNPROFOR's temporary loss of impartiality (because of the Danish response to a Bosnian Serb ambush) and its subsequent reestablishment are testimony to this changing degree of impartiality in peacekeeping operations. Knowing this phenomenon exists has reinforced in the minds of most international peacekeeping nations the notion of broadening the scope of peacekeeping operations as opposed to emphasizing peace enforcement operations.

A final factor essential to explaining this difference in peacekeeping operation's scope is use of force. The United States' peace operations doctrine states that in peacekeeping, force may be used in self-defense or defense of a mandate; whereas, in peace
enforcement, force is used to compel or coerce. Because most world peacekeeping nations align themselves with the view that the nature of today's conflicts requires resolution by conciliation rather than termination by force, peace enforcement operations are the exception and not the norm. This is not so within the US where most peace operations activities being performed are conducted under the auspices of peace enforcement. Although peace enforcement operations might be well-suited for conditions similar to those exhibited in Korea prior to the Korean War and in Kuwait prior to Desert Shield/Storm, they are not the prescription for a majority of today's conflicts. This disconnect in categorization of peace operations activities among possible contingents in a UN multinational peace operation could prove to be disastrous in this new security environment. Specifically, nothing will erode consent or impartiality faster than one element of a peacekeeping force acting more aggressively than the remainder of the force, thus destabilizing peacekeeping operations and causing an uncontrolled, violent and unexpected transition to peace enforcement operations.

The previous discussion has shown there is a difference in peacekeeping doctrine, primarily between the US Army on one hand and the main European and Australian armies on the other. The primary difference is how peace operations activities are categorized -- under the auspices of peacekeeping or peace enforcement. To adapt to this post-Cold War environment and address these complex issues of consent, impartiality, and use of force, most peacekeeping nations have adopted new doctrinal terms. They categorize this new peace operation as falling between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Such terms include: wider peacekeeping, muscular peacekeeping, and
second generation peacekeeping, to name a few. The term "contemporary peacekeeping" is a better label for the peace operations conducted in this post-Cold War security environment, and one used throughout the remainder of this paper. The US Army has recently adopted the term "aggravated peacekeeping," which appears to be an attempt to address this "middle ground" operation, although it falls short. "Aggravated peacekeeping" reveals an over emphasis on the use of force as opposed to considerations concerning consent, impartiality and the appropriate use of force. Furthermore, the activities associated with this operation are only slightly different than those performed in a traditional peacekeeping operation, thus the majority of peace operations activities still remain under the auspices of peace enforcement. Although it appears the US Army has recognized the existence of a new security environment and the associated peace operations activities, it does not appear the US Army fully understands how the variables of consent, impartiality and use of force interact within this new environment. This has led to an inconsistency in peacekeeping doctrinal terminology with that of other leading peacekeeping nations' armies. This inconsistency in doctrine may seem trivial when the US is operating unilaterally; however, when the US is operating as part of a multinational force, this inconsistency may lead to disagreements between coalition forces, a failure to implement the mandate, an uncontrolled and unexpected escalation in violence, and most damaging -- the death of multinational peacekeepers. History has shown that all can occur.

Although it is impossible to predict the characteristics of the future security environment, and thus the nature of future peacekeeping operations, it is possible to
speculate on the future characteristics of both based on a synthesis of historical trends, current doctrine and future thoughts. Chapter IV considers some likely future security environments and their implications.

**IV. Future Security Environment and Peacekeeping Operations Characteristics**

**Future Environment**

Although not as discernible during the Cold War years, ethnic tensions have been and will likely continue to be among the most frequent causes of conflict. Some 33 ethnic conflicts existed during the Cold War years, but because of the freeze put on these tensions by the two superpowers, most of these conflicts never reached fruition. These same conflicts exist today; however, the damping factor of superpower competing interests has faded leaving no conflict regulation measure in place. As a result, of the 32 currently active ethnic conflicts, hardly any show signs of resolution in the foreseeable future, and several have a high potential for escalating. Furthermore, there is significant likelihood that new ethnic conflicts will occur in the near future. Of the possible venues, the former Soviet Union is the most dangerous.\(^7\)

These ethnic conflicts may exist at different levels of violence and in several different forms which include terrorism, public disorder, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, mid-intensity conventional warfare or different combinations of each. Such conflicts can escalate, de-escalate and change form several times over. Principal players in these conflicts are nonstate actors -- participants who usually exist in some form of fragmented
ground force and whose fundamental objectives are the unequivocal physical domination of territory and people. They do not have bureaucratic decision-making institutions and normally have no other interests beyond the outcome of the conflict at hand. Therefore, most nonstate actors will not respond to our policies in ways we regard as rational and reasonable. Such characteristics make it difficult to bargain with or apply military pressure to these types of participants. Examples of nonstate actors include the various Somali warlords and their clans and the Serbian militias.71

A final factor projected to be predominant in this future security environment is the proliferation of weapons. Although proliferation problems run the full spectrum from light arms to nuclear weapons, it is the modern light arms (and sometimes heavier weapon systems such as tanks), which have made these ethnic/intrastate conflicts more lethal and disastrous. In fact, it is the relatively unsophisticated light arms, that are more widely available to all participants in intrastate conflicts, which have caused the majority of casualties in these ethnic-related conflicts. As Somalia proved, the impact of this broader access to modern light arms on peacekeeping forces is enormous. In terms of advanced military technology (such as tanks), it is often assumed that such technology will only be in the hands of government forces; however, as events in Bosnia have shown, external sources can supply anti-government forces with such sophisticated equipment. Therefore, the potential exists for all factions in an intrastate conflict to not only possess modern light arms but also weapon systems considered to be in the form of advanced military technology.72
Combining these factors of ethnicity, nonstate actors and weapons proliferation "promises to create an explosive combination of regions of great tension and immense destructive potential."\textsuperscript{73} How this environment will affect future peacekeeping operations is the subject of the next few paragraphs.

**Future Peacekeeping Operations Characteristics**

This new conflict environment is marked by massive failures such as: humanitarian emergencies, collapsed governments, breakdowns in law and order, and destroyed infrastructures. As a result, future peacekeeping objectives will likely emphasize prevention (as in Macedonia) or establishing the conditions for resolution (as in the former Yugoslavia). This is in contrast to the objective of Cold War peacekeeping operations that leaned more towards containment (as in the Middle East - UNEF II) or management of conflict (as in Cyprus - UNFICYP).

Although tainted by the events in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and those unfolding in the former Yugoslavia, the United States' involvement (politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily) in peacekeeping operations is highly likely because of its interests in regional stability. Even though the US strongly affirms that its involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective, it does not rule out involvement in future peacekeeping operations. The United States' imminent involvement in a multinational peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia attests to this fact. Therefore, future peacekeeping operations will most likely continue to see US involvement.
Although the traditional conditions for committing peacekeeping forces to a conflict are still sought, the new security environment often erodes these initial conditions quickly. This occurred in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. In fact, the only precondition that has lasted throughout all peacekeeping operations has been the full support of the Security Council. The post-Cold War historical examples have shown that the condition of consent will probably never be absolute. However, through the restrained and impartial use of force, consent at the operational level can remain intact, thus maintaining overall legitimacy for the peacekeeping operation. Success in future peacekeeping operations may mean no more than maintaining legitimacy for peacekeeping operations until peace negotiators, relief agencies and civil administrations come to closure on some type of national reconciliation and reestablishment of effective government. The conditions of consent, impartiality, and appropriate use of force will be vital to the success of the total peacekeeping operation.

Having established a likely future security environment and developed characteristics of future peacekeeping operations, it is now possible to develop decision criteria that may help decision makers determine the type of force structure needed for these future peacekeeping operations. However, before doing this it may be helpful to recap some of the key points brought out in the historical examples concerning future implications on force structure.

**Key Points from Historical Examples Concerning Peacekeeping Force Structure**

UNFICYP and UNEF II demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping forces can be successful in containing or managing a conflict in a certain region, where resolution is
neither sought nor gained. This is represented by peacekeeping operations such as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and UNFICYP.\textsuperscript{74}

UNOSOM I (Somalia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) showed that placing a traditional peacekeeping force in this new peacekeeping environment does not allow for the accomplishment of UN mandates. This occurs primarily because traditional forces do not have the inherent capability to create or improve the conditions for their success. In contrast, UNITAF (Somalia) demonstrated how effective and credible a well-resourced peacekeeping force can be when it places heavy emphasis on consent, impartiality, and strong but restrained use of force. UNOSOM II (Somalia) showed the opposite. Additionally, UNOSOM II proved the importance of a properly-resourced reserve in today’s peacekeeping environment.

It is unlikely that the new peacekeeping environment and characteristics described above will be the basis for all future peacekeeping operations. However, until equilibria are reached in regards to this form of intrastate conflict, the US Army must address the issues surrounding these particular types of peacekeeping operations. As the historical examples point out, a key issue concerns the force structure (specifically, combat forces) required for these new type peacekeeping operations. This is the focus of the next chapter.
V. Development of Force Structure Decision Criteria for Peacekeeping Operations

As the historical examples and doctrine discussion have pointed out, UN forces face an expanded range of tasks in this new peacekeeping environment. Although some tasks resemble traditional peacekeeping tasks, there is an important distinction in the degree of local consent. Therefore, the peacekeeping force must take much more rigorous steps to achieve a standard of military effectiveness that ensures their own protection as well as achieve the conditions required in the mandate. To perform these seemingly traditional tasks, combined with those that fall between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, will dictate the need for a more credible military capability than that employed in the past. This chapter develops decision criteria that assist in determining when mechanized forces should be included in the force structure for "contemporary peacekeeping" operations.

The chapter will start with a representative listing of likely military tasks to be performed in this new peacekeeping environment. Placed over this will be a listing of combat tasks performed by tank and mechanized infantry task forces and company teams. Developed from this alignment of tasks will be a consolidated list of possible roles for mechanized forces in relation to "contemporary peacekeeping" operations. However, this is only one criterion to be considered in determining whether mechanized forces should be part of the "contemporary peacekeeping" force structure. The remainder of the chapter will look at other decision criteria important to this determination of force structure.
Alignment of Tasks

There are five categories of military peacekeeping tasks. They are: (1) conflict prevention, (2) demobilization operations, (3) military assistance, (4) humanitarian relief, and (5) guarantee and denial of movement. Subordinate to these operational level activities are tactical level missions and tasks. A table illustrating these activities, missions and associated tasks can be found in Appendix 2.

The table in Appendix 2 illustrates how the scope and intensity of "contemporary peacekeeping" operations have expanded from that of traditional peacekeeping missions. Specifically, traditional peacekeeping tasks such as surveillance, monitoring and patrolling (Chapter VI tasks) make up only a small portion of the many tasks performed in "contemporary peacekeeping" operations -- operations containing several Chapter VII enforcement tasks. More importantly, the table reveals that although there are five distinct operational level activities, the peacekeeping tasks performed in each are similar from activity to activity. This implies that, with enough flexibility built into the force structure, a peacekeeping force could perform all the activities listed without changing its initial force structure.

Next is a listing of combat tasks performed by tank and mechanized infantry task forces and company teams. The purpose of this list is to depict the range of tasks performed by mechanized forces at both the task force and company team level. Appendix 3 contains a listing of these combat tasks.

The table in Appendix 3 illustrates the amount of tactical flexibility that tank and mechanized infantry forces can bring to any type of operation. From conducting
reconnaissance to breaching obstacles to performing air assault operations, mechanized forces can perform a wide range of tasks at both the task force and company team level. Furthermore, a closer look at the tasks contained in the table reveals that there are several direct similarities among "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks and combat tasks performed by mechanized forces. Specifically, tasks such as performing reconnaissance, guard operations, reserve operations, and emplacing and breaching obstacles are tasks common to both. Such similarities warrant a closer comparison of "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks with combat tasks. The table in Appendix 4 depicts this comparison of combat tasks with "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks.

The appendix reveals that the combat tasks performed by mechanized forces, whether a battalion task force or company team, coincide with several peacekeeping tasks conducted in today's "contemporary peacekeeping" operations. Many peacekeeping tasks are not standard METL tasks, however, they are tasks executed in support of tactical missions at the individual crew and section level whose standards are found in vehicle operator or gunnery manuals (Example: Establish Roadblock is a peacekeeping task whose corresponding combat task is a combination of Occupy a Tank Position and Security Operations that are both crew and section level tasks). Additionally, there are other tasks conducted by armor and mechanized infantry units with other combat arms, but their conditions and standards are found in other than armor/mechanized infantry doctrine (Example: MOUT).

The table in Appendix 4 also illustrates that there are some peacekeeping tasks not well suited for mechanized forces. Examples include: static checkpoint observation and
monitoring, cordon and search operations, collection of weapons from combatants, and site security. To perform these tasks requires, among other things, several soldiers. This is a resource that light infantry units can better supply. Therefore, the table seems to imply that a combined arms force could best conduct "contemporary peacekeeping" operations. The proportion of light and mechanized forces would be dependent on the security environment, amount and type of tasks, and other criteria developed in the next section of this chapter.

Although mechanized forces can perform several "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks (most likely in a combined arms fashion), this is only one among several criteria needed to determine whether mechanized forces should be part of the "contemporary peacekeeping" force structure.

Listing all criteria pertinent to determining the need for mechanized forces in a specific "contemporary peacekeeping" force structure is beyond the scope of this paper, if indeed it were even possible. The purpose here is to develop a list of possible criteria that will assist the decision maker in making sound peacekeeping force structure decisions. Appendix 5 contains this list. Although deciding which are pertinent to a given peacekeeping scenario will always be situationally dependent, there are some which should be considered each time. They are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Other Decision Criteria**

**Parties to the Conflict**: This assessment needs to include military, paramilitary and civilian groups and will require careful analysis of their motives, organizations, strength, weapons, equipment, doctrine, leadership, training, discipline and general attitudes and
stability. This analysis should lead to an overall assessment of each of the party's strengths, weaknesses and likely intentions and activities. Additionally, knowing the short and long term military objectives of each party and their record of honoring agreements and cease-fires are very important to determining the need for mechanized forces in the peacekeeping force structure.\textsuperscript{76}

**Operational Environment:** This assessment needs to encompass topography (including lines of communication), climate, ethnic distribution, national infrastructure of the area, and potential influence of neighboring regions. Intangible elements need to include the indigenous population's attitude and public perceptions of the conflict (both locally and worldwide), the potential for sudden and unexpected escalations in violence, and the level of conflict. Additionally, the impact of local and international media is a major consideration\textsuperscript{77}

**Force Protection:** A "contemporary peacekeeping" operation can fail despite the political pressures exerted by the international community, for purely practical reasons that usually hinge on force protection.\textsuperscript{78} "Protection of the force is one of the highest priorities for peacekeeping commanders."\textsuperscript{79} In this new environment, the primary threat is from landmines, snipers, small arms fire, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and sometimes, antitank guided missiles.

**Flexibility:** "Contemporary Peacekeeping" operations cover a wide range of activities, each of which the peacekeeping force must be capable of performing along the intensity (violence) spectrum. The peacekeeping force should be able to move from one activity to the other at short notice and with minimum outside assistance. This requirement calls for
a force structure balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment, self-defense and logistics. Furthermore, as "contemporary peacekeeping" operations fail to obtain universal consent, tactical flexibility becomes essential. The speedy availability of a powerful mobile reserve is essential to obtaining the appropriate level of tactical flexibility.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Reserve Forces:} Included in the commander's assessment will be that of providing a contingency reserve to control unexpected developments including sudden escalations in violence. Reserve forces should be mobile and of sufficient strength to represent a credible reaction force.

\textbf{Capabilities:} The ROE will always authorize the self-defense of those conducting operations. This has been extended, often, to defense of mandated activities (for example the delivery of humanitarian aid). Specifically, "if a small and unrepresentative local force unlawfully challenges the writ of the UN, the integrity of the mandate should not be eroded by compromise."\textsuperscript{81} Therefore, peacekeeping forces must have at a minimum the capabilities in personnel and equipment to react to both. As discussed in the credibility criteria, the peacekeeping force must have the capabilities to conduct a wide range of sophisticated military responses to escalating and de-escalating levels of violence. Furthermore, the specific peacekeeping operation may call for certain capabilities such as mobile night vision capabilities, armored mobility and protection, armored reconnaissance, and/or day/night all climate and terrain capabilities. The "parties to the conflict" and "operational environment" assessments will be essential to deciding operational and tactical level needs.\textsuperscript{82}
Correct Force Structure at the Outset: Changing the force structure after it has been deployed, in particular increasing its strength in terms of personnel and equipment, is extremely risky. It carries with it significant domestic and international political ramifications as well as military costs. Therefore, it is essential to select the correct force structure at the outset.  

The list of criteria will naturally be long because of the complexity of this new security environment and the need to weigh several factors before committing to a force structure that needs to be correct the first time. Figure 1, below, is a simplified illustration of the decision criteria discussed above, showing how they interact in this complex environment.

Figure 1. Decision Criteria Illustration
The diagram illustrates the need for decision makers to correctly assess the security environment and parties to the conflict before determining the appropriate peace operation and force structure. In Somalia for example, the environment and parties were assessed fairly accurately (except for possibly enemy weapons capabilities); however, the force structure chosen did not correspond to this assessment. Therefore, a delta developed between a line indicating an adequate force (one able to perform its mandate and protect its forces) and a line representing the actual force chosen. Risk filled this delta or void. The risk, in this case, was not calculated risk, but rather, unintended risk that led to the death of US soldiers and ultimately to mission failure.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The evidence in this paper suggests that mechanized forces do have a role in "contemporary peacekeeping" operations. The role, within the parameters of a careful mission analysis, is to provide the commander the flexibility to accomplish his mission while protecting the force and its credibility. However, to reach this goal the US Army must broaden its doctrinal understanding of "contemporary peacekeeping," bring its doctrine more into line with its significant allies and develop a methodology that looks at all its resources for "contemporary peacekeeping," not just light infantry. One of these key resources is the mechanized force.

Besides providing the appropriate level of force protection required in today's peacekeeping security environment, mechanized forces conduct several combat tasks that
align directly or indirectly with "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks. However, there are
tasks that light infantry forces can more easily perform. Therefore, these findings suggest
that a combined arms force could best conduct "contemporary peacekeeping" operations.

To determine the correct role for mechanized forces requires an analysis of selected
criteria. Deciding which criteria are pertinent to a given peacekeeping scenario will
always be situational dependent; however, there are some which should be considered
each time. They are: parties to a conflict, operational environment, force protection,
flexibility, reserve forces, capabilities, and selecting the correct force structure at the
outset. A thorough analysis beginning with these criteria at the outset of a conflict will
most likely lead to an accurate assessment of the security environment. Once the
environment has been correctly assessed, decision makers can than select the appropriate
peace operation and force structure.

Using the above as a basis, I recommend the US Army introduce a peacekeeping
model to help decision makers decide the correct force structure for future "contemporary
peacekeeping" operations. Besides incorporating the ideas above, two other lessons
brought out in this paper should also be included in the model's development. One such
lesson concerns the US Army's slow recognition of a "middle ground" between
traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. By introducing the term
"aggravated peacekeeping" into its peace operation's doctrine, the US Army has
attempted to address this "middle ground" operation. However, because of the terms over
emphasis on the use of force and its lack of scope in terms of peacekeeping activities, the
US Army's view of peace operations remains unrealistically black and white. Therefore,
the US Army should continue to explore this evolutionary change in peacekeeping by examining the experiences of itself and others, in order to develop a functional model.

A second lesson learned concerns the variables: consent, impartiality and use of force. Findings show that although the US Army recognizes the existence of the three variables, it fails to understand how the three interact and their relationship to the desired outcome for today's conflicts. The US Army demonstrates this failure to understand by categorizing most of its peace operations activities under the auspices of peace enforcement and not peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations emphasize the attainment of high degrees of consent and impartiality and a strong but restrained use of force. Peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, do not rely on consent and impartiality and use overwhelming force coercively. Therefore, the US Army needs to re-look at how it categorizes peace operations activities. It must keep in mind the interaction of consent, impartiality and use of force and how these variables affect the desired outcome of today's conflicts. Not only would this be important for model development but also for decreasing the confusion that exists between the US Army and other armies in terms of peacekeeping doctrinal terminology. Furthermore, it would decrease the confusion where it most counts -- on the ground.

Understanding very well the complexity of mechanized forces in today's peacekeeping operations, Lieutenant General Gustav Hagglund (a highly experienced Finnish peacekeeping force commander) once said, "The best weapons in peace-keeping are long-range, direct-fire weapons, . . . with pin-point accuracy to be sure to miss the target." The purpose is, of course, to persuade the threatening party to stop whatever
action it is conducting or threatening to conduct by giving it a face-saving excuse to do so. He goes on to say that, "It is not the kind of weapons but their use that must be strictly limited. Without at least some available means there is no credibility in the battle of wills that peace-keeping often entails in a war zone."\textsuperscript{85} He sums it up by saying, "The following general rule applies: maximum show of force ensures best minimum use of force."\textsuperscript{86}
### Appendix 1. Peacekeeping Definitions and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Organization</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Definition</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Peacekeeping: Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) conducted by UN authorized forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement. Aggravated Peacekeeping: Military combat operations conducted by UN authorized forces and designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement; initially begun as non-combat operations (exclusive of self-defense) and with the consent of all major belligerents, but which subsequently, due to any number of reasons, become combat operations where UN forces are authorized to use force (combat power) not only for self-defense but also for defense of their assigned missions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Peacekeeping: Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict. Wider Peacekeeping: The wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.</td>
<td>1. Observer missions. 2. Interposition. 1. Conflict prevention. 2. Demobilization operations. 3. Military assistance. 4. Humanitarian relief. 5. Guarantee and denial of movement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires.
2. Supervision of truces.
3. Humanitarian assistance within a permissive area of operation.
4. Supervision of demobilization and demilitarization measures in a permissive environment.

5. Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires.
2. Supervision of truces.
3. Supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Organization</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Definition</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td>Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping operations seek to prevent conflict or its resumption through the physical interposing of a third party. The objective of peacekeeping is to create an environment in which a peaceful solution to a conflict may be achieved through diplomacy. Peacekeeping operations emphasize restraint, patience and diplomacy in lieu of the application of force. Peacekeeping incorporates three types of peacekeeping operations: Observation and Verification: Involves the deployment of neutral observers. Containment: Containment involves the imposition of a neutral, armed military force to contain the outbreak, spread, continuation or escalation of a conflict. While containment forces are armed, this is usually for self-defense rather than to impose their will in any major way on the belligerents. Peace Restoration: Peace restoration involves the use of combat forces to restore order or peace by the threat or use of force. Usually this only involves ground force, but larger operations have used offensive air and naval support. Peace restorations can be used in both inter-state and intra-state disputes depending on the mandate of international law involved⁶³</td>
<td>1. Impartially determine disputed situations. 2. Monitor ceasefires, armistices or peace agreements. 3. Verify the conduct of fighting. 4. Provide good offices for negotiations and the exchange of PW and refugees. 1. Establish buffer zones. 2. Establish law and order. 3. Establish local security. 4. Deliver humanitarian assistance. 5. Supervise plebiscites, referenda and election campaigns. 6. Act as interim authorities during transfers of sovereignty or government. 1. Conflict prevention. 2. Demobilization operations. 3. Military assistance. 4. Humanitarian relief. 5. Guarantee and denial of movement.⁵⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations</strong></td>
<td>Peacekeeping: The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.⁶⁴</td>
<td>1. Preventive deployment. 2. Internal conflict resolution measures. 3. Military Assistance. 4. Protection of humanitarian relief operations. 5. Guarantee and Denial of Movement.⁵⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 2. "Contemporary Peacekeeping" Activities, Missions and Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Level Activities</th>
<th>Tactical Level Missions</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Prevention</strong></td>
<td>1. Surveillance</td>
<td>1. Checkpoint recon and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Establishment of demilitarized buffer zones</td>
<td>2. Checkpoint observation and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Preventive deployment</td>
<td>3. Interposition patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demobilization Operations</strong></td>
<td>1. Establish and manage a ceasefire</td>
<td>1. Interposition patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Withdrawal and assembly of belligerents</td>
<td>2. Checkpoint recon and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Disarm belligerents</td>
<td>3. Checkpoint observation and monitoring (static and mobile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Interdict supply routes from neighboring states</td>
<td>4. Cantonment site patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Assistance</strong></td>
<td>1. Election security</td>
<td>5. Collection of weapons from combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reaction to civil disturbances and riotous assemblies</td>
<td>6. Establishment of security for disarmed belligerents and local population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. React to bomb threat or car bomb (terrorism)</td>
<td>7. Collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Assist in establishment of law and order</td>
<td>8. Establishment of reserve in overwatch and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Relocation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population</td>
<td>9. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to limit movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Assist in the clearance and removal of unexploded ordnance and mines</td>
<td>11. Cordon and search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Limit the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband</td>
<td>12. Evacuation route security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Activities</td>
<td>Tactical Level Missions</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>1. Conduct route recon</td>
<td>1. Form an advance guard, main body escort and reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Defend a convoy</td>
<td>2. Post security when convoy halts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Conduct route clearance</td>
<td>3. React to an attack by unarmed mob -- show of force or intimidation effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Provide security for victim population at delivery site</td>
<td>4. React to ambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. React to minefield/obstacle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. React to indirect fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Conduct recon of delivery site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Provide security at site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Defend against raid or other armed attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Patrons and surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Provide security for evacuation of non-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Establish roadblocks to isolate evacuation area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee and Denial of Movement</td>
<td>1. Enforce movement restrictions</td>
<td>1. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to conduct surveillance of potential routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Establish stationary and mobile checkpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Establish roadblocks(^{86})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3. Combat Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Task</th>
<th>Completed by Tank and Mechanized Infantry TF</th>
<th>Completed by Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupy assembly area</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform Tactical Road March</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform Tactical Movement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform passage of lines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist passage of lines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight a meeting engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform assault position activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform actions on contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support by fire</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy objective rally point</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform attack position activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack/Counterattack by fire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform raid</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform ambush</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform air assault</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform screen operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform guard operation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw not under enemy pressure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw under enemy pressure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform relief in place</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform link up</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Task</th>
<th>Completed by Tank and Mechanized Infantry TF</th>
<th>Completed by Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perform reserve operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform rear operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltrate</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bypass enemy force</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganize</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidate</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakout from encirclement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach defended obstacles</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain operations security</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emplace an obstacle</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ fire support</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform mobility/survivability operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>React to indirect fire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4. Alignment of Tasks

The following table presents the alignment of combat tasks, performed by tank and mechanized infantry battalion task forces and company teams, with "contemporary peacekeeping" tasks. The corresponding combat task and subtasks are annotated to the right of the peacekeeping task under the column headings "Combat Task" and "Combat Subtasks."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Level Activities</th>
<th>Tactical Level Missions</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Tasks</th>
<th>Combat Tasks</th>
<th>Combat Subtasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>1. Checkpoint recon</td>
<td>1. Recon</td>
<td>1. Area, zone, and route recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of demilitarized buffer zones</td>
<td>2. Checkpoint security</td>
<td>2. Defend</td>
<td>2. Organize and maintain security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Interposition patrols</td>
<td>4. Defend</td>
<td>4. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Activities</td>
<td>Tactical Level Missions</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Subtasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization Operations</td>
<td>Establish and manage a ceasefire</td>
<td>1. Interposition patrols</td>
<td>1. Defend</td>
<td>1. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal and assembly of belligerents</td>
<td>2. Checkpoint recon</td>
<td>2. Recon</td>
<td>2. Area, zone, and route recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interdict supply routes from neighboring states</td>
<td>4. Checkpoint observation and monitoring (static and mobile)</td>
<td>4. Defend</td>
<td>4. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems, emplace obstacles, and report enemy activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Cantonment site patrols</td>
<td>5. Defend</td>
<td>5. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Establishment of security for disarmed belligerents and local population</td>
<td>7. Occupy an assembly area</td>
<td>Transport captured materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches</td>
<td>8. Consolidate on the objective</td>
<td>7. Organize and maintain security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to limit movement</td>
<td>10. Defend</td>
<td>Transport captured materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Establishment of roadblocks</td>
<td>11. Defend</td>
<td>9. Reserve in position and prepared to block, CATK, attack, react or reinforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Cordon and Search</td>
<td>12. Limited dismount capability</td>
<td>10. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems and establish fields of fire, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Limited dismount capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Activities</td>
<td>Tactical Level Missions</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Subtasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>Election security</td>
<td>1. Establishment of reserve in overwatch and support</td>
<td>1. Perform reserve operations</td>
<td>1. Reserve in position and prepared to block, CATK, attack, react or reinforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reaction to civil disturbances and riotous assemblies</td>
<td>2. Conduct recon of sites, facilities, routes, etc.</td>
<td>2. Recon</td>
<td>2. Area, zone, and route recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>React to bomb threat or car bomb (terrorism)</td>
<td>3. Site security</td>
<td>3. Defend</td>
<td>3. Organize and maintain security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in establishment of law and order</td>
<td>4. Conduct patrols and visible mobile checkpoints</td>
<td>4. Defend</td>
<td>4. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relocation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population</td>
<td>5. Establish roadblocks, barricades or barriers</td>
<td>5. Defend</td>
<td>5. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems and establish fields of fire, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safeguard individuals, communities and installations</td>
<td>6. Establish security for civilian movement</td>
<td>6. Perform tactical road march</td>
<td>6. Provide security to include all-around security and air guard coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limit the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband</td>
<td>8. Clear traditional routes blocked by mines and obstacles</td>
<td>8. Breach an obstacle</td>
<td>8. Breach obstacle and clear a lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Defend against raids or other armed attack</td>
<td>10. Defend</td>
<td>10. Emplace OPs and air guards, position weapons systems and establish fields of fire, have covered and concealed positions, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Evacuation route security</td>
<td>12. Perform tactical road march</td>
<td>12. Provide security to include all-around security and air guard coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Activities</td>
<td>Tactical Level Missions</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Subtasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>Conduct route recon</td>
<td>1. Form an advance guard, main body escort and reserve</td>
<td>1. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>1. Security elements (front, rear and flanks) are designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defend a convoy</td>
<td>2. Post security when convoy halts</td>
<td>2. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>2. Security is maintained at the halt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct route clearance</td>
<td>3. React to an attack by unarmed mob – show of force or intimidation effect</td>
<td>3. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>3. Perform actions on enemy contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide security for victim population at delivery site</td>
<td>4. React to ambush</td>
<td>4. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>4. Perform action on enemy contact (ambush)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. React to minefield/obstacle</td>
<td>5. Breach an obstacle</td>
<td>5. Breach an obstacle and clear a lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. React to indirect fire</td>
<td>6. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>6. Perform action on enemy contact (indirect fire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Conduct recon of delivery site</td>
<td>7. Recon</td>
<td>7. Area, zone, and route recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Defend against raid or other armed attack</td>
<td>9. Defend</td>
<td>9. Emplace OPs and air guards, position weapons systems and establish fields of fire, have covered and concealed positions, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Patrols and surveillance</td>
<td>10. Defend</td>
<td>10. Patrol areas that cannot be observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Provide security for evacuation of non-combatants</td>
<td>11. Perform tactical roadmarch</td>
<td>11. Provide security to include all-around security and air guard coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Establish roadblocks to isolate evacuation area</td>
<td>12. Defend</td>
<td>12. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems and establish fields of fire, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Activities</td>
<td>Tactical Level Missions</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Tasks</td>
<td>Combat Subtask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee and Denial of Movement</td>
<td>1. Enforce movement restrictions</td>
<td>1. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to conduct surveillance of potential routes 2. Establish stationary and mobile checkpoints 3. Establish roadblocks</td>
<td>1. Defend 2. Defend 3. Defend</td>
<td>1. Patrol areas that cannot be observed 2. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems, emplace obstacles, and report enemy activity 3. Emplace OPs, position weapon systems and establish fields of fire, and emplace obstacles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 5. Other Decision Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties to the Conflict</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Forces</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct Force Structure at the</td>
<td>See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Size/Make-up of</td>
<td>Political considerations have a major impact on the military’s conduct of peacekeeping operations. The Mandate (which creates the force), the SOFA (which defines the legal status of the force), the TOR (which govern the implementation of the force), and the Rules of Engagement are heavily influenced by political considerations.\textsuperscript{90}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restated Mission</td>
<td>Because of the strategic implications involved with tactical level actions in today’s peacekeeping operations, the commander (in his mission analysis) needs to ensure that all plans are consistent in the immediate and long term with future intentions and the overall strategic requirements.\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, the force structure used to implement these plans at the tactical level must be weighed in the strategic context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability of the Force</td>
<td>The decision maker must take into account the availability of local resources and host nation support in addition to our own deployable support structure. Bottom line -- Can a support structure between the two be built to support the introduction of mechanized forces into the area of operation.\textsuperscript{101}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\textsuperscript{90} See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)

\textsuperscript{100} See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)

\textsuperscript{101} See Chapter 5 (Decision Criteria)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Credibility is a key psychological element of success. Peacekeeping forces attempt to lower the level of violence of all the belligerents by simply presenting a credible military threat. At the tactical level this will derive from three elements: resources, concept of operations and execution. In terms of resources, credibility will demand a force structure that can escalate or de-escalate their activities as required. In a volatile environment, this will require the appropriate force structure capable of performing a more sophisticated range of military responses. Only when credibility has been achieved, will those concerned (including the belligerents) have confidence in the force's activities.¹⁰²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Use of Force      | Although it is certainly warranted to use high levels of force (restrained and impartial) in "contemporary peacekeeping" operations, impartiality and local consent will invariably lessen, although temporarily, as a result. The requirement to use force may be lessened through deterrence, protection, and timeliness.  
   a. Deterrence: The presence of a credible force at the scene of a potential incident will tend to diminish the confidence of a would-be aggressor and allow the peacekeeping force a wider selection of options to counter an incident. An insufficient force at the scene of a crisis is more likely to require a resort to a harmful use of force.¹⁰³  
   b. Protection: Effective protection will reduce the opportunities open to would-be aggressors to mount attacks on peacekeeping forces, and if attacked, will reduce the necessity of an early resort to force.¹⁰⁴  
   c. Timeliness: Responding quickly to a potential crises is usually essential in containing it and limiting escalation.¹⁰⁵ |
| Concentration of Force | A maximum presence of forces on the ground will often be desirable for deterrence, credibility and information-gathering. However, this need for a visible and confident presence should be balanced against the possibility of such presence being perceived as provocative or escalatory. To prevent this from happening, the peacekeeping force should have adequate mobility required to concentrate forces quickly at sites of potential incidents.¹⁰⁶ |

The criteria above are only a few of the possible criteria to focus on when considering the inclusion of mechanized forces in the "contemporary peacekeeping" force structure. Others may include interoperability with other peacekeeping forces, availability of strategic lift assets, time, level of consent, perceived impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and legitimacy for peacekeeping operations.
ENDNOTES


5. This is a combined list of traditional peacekeeping operations' conditions taken from the British Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, p. 1-7 and Mackinlay and Chopra, p. 114.


7. Roberts, p. 94.


14. Evans, p. 106.


16. Ibid., pp. 93-4.

19. Demsa, pp. 102-3. This example points out that traditional peacekeeping forces do rely on consent of the belligerents and not on any effective military capability to meet challenges on the ground.

20. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - History, Resources, Missions, and Components," p. 122. The two Cypriot communities are represented by the Cyprus National Guard on one side and the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot forces on the other.

21. Ibid. Contributors to UNFICYP have been Australia, Austria, Canada (1964-1992), Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand (1964-1967), Sweden, and the United Kingdom.


24. Ibid., p. 315.


29. Stjernfelt, p. 16.

30. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - History, Resources, Missions, and Components," p. 125. The countries that provided peacekeepers for UNEF II were: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden.


34. Ibid.


40. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - History, Resources, Missions, and Components," p. 124. Nations contributing forces to UNOSOM II were: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


42. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

43. Hunter, p. 4.

44. Ibid., p. 8, A-7.


47. Ibid.


50. Wilson, p. 111. Ethnic cleansing has been demonstrated most publicly by the Serbs primarily because of their deeply rooted belief that as a persecuted race they have to defend themselves against the rest of the world, especially against the Croats and Muslims.

51. Ibid., pp. 112-14.

52. Wilson, "Observations on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Former Yugoslavia," p. 188. The complex mandate has emerged from over 40 resolutions and more than ten major changes.


54. Ibid. Peacekeeping force numbers and structure compiled from both sources.


56. Ibid.


60. These nations or organizations were chosen because of their close relationship with the US in terms of peace operations. Additionally, the UN was chosen because its doctrine represents that of several smaller nations in terms of peace operations.

62. Mackinlay, p. 158.


67. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 12.


69. The term "contemporary peacekeeping" would be better because peacekeeping doctrine, like any other doctrine, must be able to accept evolutionary changes; otherwise, it serves no useful purpose. External and internal factors cause doctrine to change. In this case, the external factor of a changing security environment is one such factor causing peacekeeping doctrine to accept evolutionary changes. If we can accept that absolutes along this continuum of peacekeeping operations are traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement (i.e. Chapter VI and VII, respectively), then "contemporary peacekeeping" (Chapter VI and VII) must fall in between.


71. Ibid., pp. 38-40.


73. Ibid., p. 77.

74. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - History, Resources, Missions, and Components," p. 122. These traditional peacekeeping operations are still operational today. UNTSO, UNMOGIP and UNFICYP have lasted 47, 46, and 31 years, respectively.


76. Ibid., p. 6-4.

77. Ibid.
78. Mackinlay, p. 170.


81. Mackinlay and Chopra, p. 120.

82. U.S. Marine Corps, *MCCDC Collection and Lessons Learned Project, Operation Restore Hope Project Report*. (Quantico, VA, 1993), pp. 2-C-2 to 2-C-3. In Somalia, the Marines (UNITAF) found the capabilities of armored forces extremely useful in several incidences to include: MOUT operations; at key sites (important intersections, roadblocks, and near large security outposts) because of their protection against small arms fire; as a deterrent against potential trouble-makers; on patrols and roving checkpoints because of their mobility and protection capability; as a reserve because of their flexibility; and for observation because of their excellent night vision capabilities.

83. Mackinlay, p. 158.


85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.


91. Ibid., p. 1-3.

93. Ibid. The peacekeeping activities for Observation and Verification and Containment were taken out of cited source. Those activities for Peace Restoration implied based on definition.

94. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, p. 45.


98. Combat tasks and subtasks taken from *ARTEP Manual 71-1 MTP*, pp. 5-2 to 5-195 and *ARTEP Manual 71-2 MTP*, pp. 5-4 to 5-163.


101. Ibid., p. 6-5.

102. Ibid., p. 4-9.

103. Ibid., p.4-5. Additional discussions on deterrence are in *MCCDC Collection and Lessons Learned Project, Operation Restore Hope Project Report*, pp. 2-C-2 to 2-C-3.


105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p. 4-12.
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