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PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN FAILED STATES:
THE EMERGING CONCEPT OF PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Peace Operations in Failed States: The Emerging Concept of Peace Implementation

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 April 1996 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

With the increased potential for involvement in peace operations in failed states, it is critical that definitions are developed which adequately address those types of nations. This paper focuses on the two forms of peace operations most likely to require commitment of military forces, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, examines current definitions and determines if they adequately address peace operations as they apply to failed states. In addition, this paper, using selected internationally accepted principles for peacekeeping, examines two historical studies of peacekeeping in failed states, the Congo and Somalia, to determine applicability and sufficiency of those principles for the current operation in BH. The paper determines that a new definition, peace implementation, is required to adequately describe peace operations in failed states. It also determines three required principles for successful peace implementation missions: consent both at the operational and tactical level, clear and feasible mandates, and use of necessary force to implement peace agreements.
INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the US military trained and developed doctrine for a Central European battle against large mechanized infantry and armored forces. But, since 1990, the US has been involved in conflicts of a very different nature in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, and is currently in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH). Simultaneously the UN is involved in 16 peace operations. There is little doubt that the US will remain extensively involved in such peace operations.¹

Those operations as they evolved after 1945 were originally viewed in conjunction with nation states and developed with inter-state conflicts in mind. In the post-Cold War era, however, the more likely scenario has been intra-state disputes ranging from civil wars to racial and ethnic conflicts. This involvement with what has become known as “failed states” makes the understanding and defining of the various peace operations all the more important. Unfortunately, the US experience in the last five years has been that each organization in the international arena has different definitions.² Also peace terminology is used loosely, particularly in the political arena, confusing public opinion.

This lack of rigor in definitions was highlighted during the recent operation in Somalia with the deaths of several US soldiers ostensibly involved in peacekeeping, but really committed to peace enforcement operations. With the increased potential for involvement in peace operations in failed states, it is critical that definitions are developed which adequately address those types of nations. Therefore, this paper will focus on the two forms of peace operations most likely to require commitment of military forces, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, to examine current definitions and
determine if they adequately address peace operations as they apply to failed states. In addition, this paper will then, using selected internationally accepted principles for peacekeeping, examine two historical studies of peace operations in failed states to determine applicability and sufficiency of those principles for the current operation in BH.

DEFINITIONS

Peacekeeping, a relatively new term, came into favor in the 1960s. International definitions vary slightly, but for the purposes of this paper, peacekeeping is defined as, “...an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict.” Peacekeeping developed as a “holding action” meant to supplement voluntary settlements of disputes as per Chapter VI of the UN charter and enforcement action as per Chapter VII of the UN charter. A prerequisite for peacekeeping to occur is that the former combatants have agreed to peace and desire that atmosphere to persist. The warring parties consent to the presence of peacekeepers. The peacekeepers monitor and observe the agreed-to cease-fire. If the combatants decide to renew their grievances and war becomes the accepted state, the roles of the peacekeepers disappear and their reason for existence ends. Peacekeepers are strictly impartial when dealing with warring factions. Peacekeepers are normally small, lightly armed forces capable of only defensive operations. By their very nature peacekeepers should be inexpensive to operate and maintain; a force favored by the underfunded UN. When considering committing US troops to peacekeeping operations, the public and congress envision lightly armed, blue beret-clad soldiers welcomed by the host country and not expected to fight.
In 1956, Sir Brian Urquhart, later UN Under Secretary General, developed these characteristics into six principles for peacekeeping: (1) consent of all factions to the peacekeeping operation to include mandates, force composition and commanding officers; (2) clear and feasible mandates; (3) use of force only as a last resort in self-defense, to include use against factions preventing peacekeepers from conducting duties; (4) availability of trained troops from countries willing to participate and accept risks; (5) availability of financial and logistical support; (6) continued support by the Security Council (mandating authority). These principles have been accepted by the international community as the minimum required for success in peacekeeping operations.

Urquhart’s fundamental of consent has recently been open to debate and noticeably absent in some definitions. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali appeared to deviate from the consent requirement when he defined peacekeeping as: "...the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well." The word, "hitherto," led many to believe that the Secretary General no longer considered consent necessary in peacekeeping operations. In a supplement to the 1992 document written after a fiasco in Somalia, however, Boutros-Ghali reinforced the importance of consent prior to undertaking peacekeeping operations: "three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense."

Consent is still the primary requirement for any peacekeeping operation to succeed. It can be applied at both the operational and tactical level. At the operational
level, consent stems from formal agreements and treaties. At the tactical level consent comes from the local population and events that influence their perceptions of the peacekeepers. Consent at the tactical level is volatile and unpredictable. It is possible to lose consent at the tactical level but still maintain it at the operational level. If consent is lost at the operational level, the operation will become, by definition, peace enforcement.

The difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is germane to this lack of consent. Because of the absence of consent, peace enforcement normally involves the use of combat forces in a potential combat role. The warring parties have not come to an agreement and probably do not want assistance. If one of the combatants favors assistance it is very likely at a political or military disadvantage. By the very nature of peace enforcement, units engaged in such operations must be large, heavily armed and capable of combat operations. They may be accused of violating a state’s sovereignty, and will most probably incur casualties. Without the fundamental prerequisite of operational consent, these units will have to force their will on one or more of the combatants. Finally, peace enforcement units are much more expensive to maintain than peacekeeping units. When the public and congress commit US troops to peace enforcement operations, there is no doubt that these units are committed to combat in an area where consent of the warring factions is not guaranteed.

The UN, NATO and US Army have similar definitions of peace enforcement: with common principles. Peace enforcement is defined here as:

...the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
These definitions explicitly include restoring peace which makes peace enforcement a misnomer since peace has disappeared. For instance, operations in Korea, Kuwait and Somalia were all termed peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{11}

If all peace operations were placed on a continuum with small, low intensity operations at one end and larger, high intensity operations at the other, peacekeeping would be placed towards the lower end and peace enforcement would be at the high intensity end of the continuum.\textsuperscript{12} There is a large area along the continuum, between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, in failed states involved in civil wars, which is not adequately addressed by current definitions.\textsuperscript{13} The post-Dayton Accord situation in BH falls in this area. Given this situation, peacekeepers by definition should be sent to BH. But since the peace is so fragile, something more is required. The political leadership believes US forces will face disorganized resistance and thus must be capable of more than peacekeeping, but not as much as peace enforcement.

Unfortunately most peace operations in intra-state conflicts do not fit into neat definitions of either peacekeeping or peace enforcement. These definitions are not fully germane to the realities of today’s world and are thus insufficient when attempting to “sell” an intra-state operation to the US public or congress. Both desire clear, precise, easily understandable categories or definitions. In this regard, the British use the term “wider peacekeeping” to describe those operations that do not fit exactly into the definition of peacekeeping because they are “...carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.”\textsuperscript{14} The US must
face the reality that most peacekeeping operations in failed states do not fit neatly into either peacekeeping or peace enforcement and that a term is required to fill the void.

A new term, peace implementation, has emerged in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accord concerning BH. In fact, the force in BH has been dubbed the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). This term has no officially sanctioned definition, but it assists in explaining one common situation in that vast undefined area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The IFOR has the mission to oversee and enforce the implementation of the peace agreement. This is different from peacekeeping because the mission involves enforcement. It is also different from peace enforcement because all sides have consented to the IFOR's presence. Enforcement operations should therefore be limited to rebels at the tactical level who resist their own leadership.

The US and UN should adopt peace implementation as a viable mission. Peace implementation can be defined as: military operations undertaken to oversee and implement an agreed to cease fire or peace treaty. The implementation force has the authority to use necessary force to implement the terms of the agreement. Such a force would be large (not as large as a peace enforcement force), well armed and capable of limited offensive operations. Although combat is not its major focus, the force is prepared to conduct combat operations against rogue groups or individuals. The operation could slide back to peacekeeping or escalate towards peace enforcement. As the situation and thus mandates change, reassessments by leaders would dictate a force structure change.
HISTORICAL STUDIES

History is replete with examples of peace operations to assist future peacekeepers. The Congo and Somalia are important because they were peace operations conducted in failed states. In the case of the Congo, civil war began after the peacekeepers arrived, but in Somalia brutal civil war was ongoing as peacekeepers arrived. These studies also highlight two operations which moved over time along the continuum from peacekeeping towards peace enforcement. This section will examine the operations with emphasis on the applicability of Urquhart’s principles of consent, clear and feasible mandates, and use of force and determine if following the principles would have made the operations more successful.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations au Congo or ONUC) was conducted July 1960 through June 1964. At its peak, the UN committed nearly 20,000 military and civilian personnel to the operation. It is a prime example of the danger that occurs when mandates change and the force does not change. Initial ONUC objectives were to assist the Congo government to restore law and order and to aid in the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo. Additionally, ONUC forces were to remain impartial, not become involved in internal conflicts, and preserve international peace and security.\textsuperscript{16} Remaining impartial and staying out of internal conflicts were impossible requirements given the objective to restore law and order.

From the very beginning, the peacekeeper’s mission was flawed; once the ONUC sided with the government, it was not viewed as impartial. In September 1960 a
constitutional crisis began with the dissolution of the central government. This began an eleven month period where no legal government existed with whom ONUC could work; any consent which did exist was now lost at the operational level. To make matters worse, four major factions developed. The UN took great pains to remain impartial; unfortunately each faction accused the ONUC of supporting the other. This perception of favoritism caused the ONUC much trouble and demonstrated that being impartial is not enough; opposing factions must also believe in that impartiality. The resultant lack of consent extended down to the population; support was thus lost at the tactical level.

Lack of understanding and information increased distrust and non-cooperation among the general population. This lack of consent made small, widely dispersed units vulnerable to poorly trained, poorly armed irregular forces. Even when the units were not in danger, lack of cooperation from the local population made task accomplishment a problem. With the high literacy rate in the Congo, an aggressive public relation and information program could have solved this problem. When consent disappears at both the tactical and operational levels, peacekeeping moves along the continuum to peace enforcement. It is time for the peacekeepers to either change missions or depart the theater. The ONUC did not depart, was slow to react and paid for it with peacekeeper’s blood.

The Security Council generally supported the actions of the ONUC and agreed that a united Congo with its own government was the best solution. As operations progressed and violence increased, mandates from the Security Council expanded to coercive operations giving the ONUC more authority but making their missions more
dangerous. The first Security Council mandate sent ONUC in as peacekeepers but directed them to provide military assistance to the Congo government until Congolese forces were in a position to handle tasks. The mandate was vague, authorized the use of force in self-defense only, and did not define which tasks the Congolese forces should eventually be able to handle. It fulfilled Urquhart’s principle for use of force. But as has demonstrated, it was an unrealistic mandate for a peacekeeping force. By providing assistance to the Congo government and attempting to restore law and order, the ONUC was forced to take sides, thus violating the principle of consent and thereby impartiality for traditional peacekeeping. The Security Council then enlarged ONUC’s mandate by calling for the immediate evacuation of all foreign mercenaries and advisors, and by authorizing ONUC to use force as a last resort to prevent escalation of the civil war. The mandate expanded again in November 1961 when the Security Council passed a resolution which authorized the use of force to apprehend foreign mercenaries. These changing mandates, which liberalized the use of force, further prevented the operational consent necessary if the ONUC were to perform as a peacekeeping force.

The Congo demonstrates the dilemma in dealing with failed states enmeshed in civil wars. The ONUC, which supported the Congo government from the onset of the operation, never had the operational consent of the other factions. The changing mandates directed the peacekeepers to accomplish tasks not associated with peacekeeping missions, and the liberalized use of force placed the peacekeepers in a more aggressive role. All this placed the peacekeepers in the untenable position of appearing partial to one side or the other, and contributed directly to the lack of operational consent. Once
the UN violated Urquhart’s principles, peacekeeping moved along the continuum to peace enforcement.

The Congo also demonstrated the importance of peacemaking prior to entry into failed states. Boutros-Ghali defines peacemaking as, “... action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”21 This peacemaking can provide the required operational consent prior to initiating a peacekeeping or peace implementation operation. The UN entered the Congo so quickly that no peacemaking occurred prior to the start of ONUC operations, without peacemaking there could be no operational consent.22 The UN and US translated this lesson into peacemaking at Dayton. In BH all warring factions agreed to peace and to the presence of the IFOR prior to the deployment of forces. This agreement provides the IFOR the required operational consent and prevents movement along the continuum towards peace enforcement.

While the ONUC operation was a watershed in how the UN approached peace operations, Somalia could be considered the same for the US. Upon assuming office, President Clinton immediately changed US - UN relations by committing to the enhancement of UN peacekeeping capabilities. US Governmental agencies and departments restructured and expanded mirroring the greater emphasis given to UN interaction. The State Department established new offices and the Defense Department established the post of Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping and Democracy.23 Somalia, which cost the US $1.3 billion and 44 lives, changed President Clinton’s vision of US involvement in peacekeeping.
In January 1991, the government in Somalia was overthrown. Two major factions formed, one under General Mohammed Farah Aidid and another under Ali Mahdi Mohammed, a Somalian businessman. The civil war between these two devastated most of southern Somalia and Mogadishu. Weapons were readily available, whether left behind by government forces, moved across the Kenyan border, or moved in by ship. Warfare and banditry spread throughout the country. Food became a major weapon in the war. Warlords and their gunmen stole food before it could be distributed to the needy. Aid workers paid gunmen to protect the food stores. By early 1992, famine had killed more than 500,000 Somalis with hundreds of thousands more expected to die. With the detailed coverage of human suffering by the television news channels, international public opinion demanded something be done. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), divided into three phases, was conducted from August 15, 1992 through March 31, 1994. UNOSOM I (Aug 15-Dec 9, 1992) was a combined peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance mission. United Task Force (UNITAF, Dec 9, 1992-May 4, 1993) was a limited military action under a peace enforcement mandate combined with humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM II (May 4, 1993-Mar 31, 1994) continued the peace enforcement operation, with the objective of nation building.24

Unlike the Congo where UN presence was based upon initial consent of a central government, no such government existed in Somalia. The establishment of consent began with UN staff members traveling to Somalia in early January 1992 to attempt to end hostilities and secure permission for Non-Government Organizations (NGO) to provide humanitarian assistance to starving civilians. The two major factions and several
smaller ones agreed to UN presence, thus providing operational consent, but it was tenuous at best as demonstrated by lawlessness and continued attacks on UN personnel. As the operation grew in size, the UN continued to solicit support and consent from the various factions. The UN conducted a meeting at Addis Ababa in January 1993 that resulted in an agreement by the country’s 14 political factions to a cease-fire and to terms of disarmament. The factions also agreed to establish a committee to study national reunification.²⁵ Based upon the consent perceived to be implicit in the Addis Ababa agreements, the UN established procedures for turn-in of arms and ammunition. Those factions failing to turn-in weapons and ammunition in accordance with the terms of the agreement would have their equipment confiscated and destroyed. On 23 March 1992, all political factions once again signed an agreement to reconcile their differences and end armed conflict. This agreement reaffirmed their previous commitment to comply with the cease-fire and to turn-in all arms and ammunition.²⁶

With this operational consent, the UN should have been able to use force against outlaw organizations at the tactical level who refused to obey their leaders. Unfortunately, the UN did not truly have the consent of all factions. A few clan leaders refused to disarm and used violence to undermine UNOSOM’s authority. General Aidid’s United Somalia Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) forces were the main culprits. The situation came to a head on 5 June 1993 when attacks on Pakistani soldiers killed 25 and wounded 54. This established a chain of events which led to the deaths of several US servicemen and the withdrawal of many of the main supporters of the UN efforts. Without complete operational consent, UNOSOM was increasingly
viewed by certain clans as less than impartial and thus subject to attack at both the tactical and operational level. “As a rule,” one official commented in this regard, “states should stay clear of civil wars but, if they are drawn in, it is essential that they remain impartial. If they lean to one side or another, they risk spawning an armed alliance against themselves.”27 And in fact, some clashes with Somali factions led to claims that UN forces had killed innocent civilians. This damaged relations between the Somali people and UN forces, leading to more loss of consent at the tactical level. But it was the lack of complete consent at the operational level that was most critical. As with the Congo, Somalia demonstrated that neither peacekeeping nor peace implementation will be successful without consent from all factions at the operational level.

The Somalian episode is also another example of a peace operation with changing mandates. It began as a humanitarian assistance mission and ended as a failed peace enforcement mission. The initial mandate, authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), was to provide humanitarian assistance to Somalia and to assist in ending hostilities. As a result, the mandate designated 50 unarmed uniformed UN military observers to monitor the cease-fire in the capital and directed security personnel to protect UN personnel, secure equipment and supplies at seaports and airports, and escort supply convoys. As the situation deteriorated, Boutros-Ghali recommended an increase in strength and mandate. The US volunteered to organize and command UNITAF, a force to ensure delivery of relief supplies to starving Somalis. UNITAF’s task was to establish a secure environment so that humanitarian assistance would be successful and to distribute supplies to starving Somalis. Military command would revert
back to the UN once a secure environment had been established. Boutros-Ghali
determined that the new mandate required the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Once the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 794
(1992), under the auspices of Chapter VII, UNITAF operations moved from
peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

The fact that UNITAF had moved beyond traditional peacekeeping operations
was not well understood by the international community. This misconception was fueled
by the UN which continued to refer to UN forces as peacekeepers.28 The mandate also
liberalized the use of force for UNITAF when it authorized, “the use of all necessary
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia.”29 UNITAF was also authorized to use any force necessary to
confiscate mounted weapons and visible weapons carried by individuals, prevent crimes
and remove roadblocks.30 Without prior agreement of all factions, this more liberal use
of force further contributed to the movement of the peace operation along the continuum
to peace enforcement.

The Secretary General intended to make the transition back to peacekeeping after
four criteria were met: cease-fire established, factions disarmed, weapons controlled and
police force established. Until then, UNITAF was under the control of UNOSOM II,
which was also endowed with Chapter VII enforcement powers to establish a secure
Somalia. On 26 March, the Security Council adopted resolution 814 (1993) which
directed UNOSOM II to restore peace, stability, and law and order in Somalia. To this
peace enforcement mission, the Security Council added the antithetical mission of nation
or peace building, by directing UNOSOM II to assist Somalia to rebuild its country in economic, political and social areas. The UN did not change UNOSOM II’s use of force in the new mandate, but as violence increased, the UN commander authorized his units to engage certain forces “without provocation.”^31 The new directive for use of force increased tensions and prevented any type of consensual agreements, thus negating any possibility for nation building.

In a final analysis, the UN attempted peacemaking prior to deploying UNOSOM I peacekeeping forces, but did not truly have sufficient agreement by all factions, to create full operational consent. The peace enforcement mandates for UNITAF and UNOSOM II were infeasible for peacekeeping forces, and the liberal use of force only enhanced the peacekeeper’s lack of impartiality as viewed by the warring factions; weakening both operational and tactical consent. Once peacekeeping moved along the continuum to peace enforcement, the UN had no choice but to leave Somalia or deploy adequate forces for such a mission. This operation affected the way President Clinton’s administration would approach all future peace operations and more specifically how he would deal with BH.

THE FUTURE

The US-led, NATO operation in BH is similar to the Congo and Somalia, but more so to Somalia because the IFOR entered after civil war had begun and has been subsequently forced to deal with several factions. It is not peacekeeping, but has not yet entered the realm of peace enforcement. It fits instead the proposed new definition, peace implementation. The Congo and Somalia demonstrated that when the Urquhart principles,
particularly those involving clear mandates, consent, and use of force are violated, peacekeeping becomes problematic and moves to peace enforcement. In such cases, the UN has no choice but to either make the transition to the new tasks or depart. Do these Urquhart principles also apply to peace implementation or are others required? This concluding section will examine these principles and determine if they are still applicable and are being applied.

Urquhart's most important principle, consent, is mandatory for a peace implementation force. Without consent, the operation escalates to peace enforcement. The UN and US did not ignore lessons from past operations, and conducted extensive peacemaking negotiations with all warring factions prior to the deployment of the IFOR. Those parties consented in the November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, however much under Great Power duress, to the presence of the IFOR. That agreement provided the operational consent required prior to deploying the force. The consent is tenuous, particularly at the tactical level, due to rogue elements that the factional leadership may not be able to control. As long as consent of all principle factions is maintained at the operational level, it will mitigate some but not all temporary consensual loss at the tactical level.

UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995), subsequently provided IFOR authority to accomplish all military tasks as outlined at Dayton. The mandate also directs IFOR to: ensure the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in an impartial and fair manner, monitor and enforce the cease-fire and the separation of forces, control all airspace over BH, and create a secure environment in which international civilian
organizations can assist the population in nation building.\textsuperscript{32} It is a clear mandate that appears feasible, but only if the consent is real and all factions in BH truly desire peace.

The IFOR's mandate for the use of force is, "...to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance...and to ensure its own protection..."\textsuperscript{33} This liberal use of force is required based upon the tasks given to the IFOR, but deviates from the Urqhart principle that directs peacekeepers to use force only as a last resort in self defense. The warring factions in BH have agreed to this provision; as long as consent is maintained, it mitigates the more liberal use of force. Urqhart's principle as it applies to a peace implementation force should be revised from "force as a last resort in self defense" to \textit{use of necessary force to implement peace agreements}.

The IFOR is a multinational force of approximately 50,000 soldiers from 16 NATO countries and 10,000 soldiers from 16 non-NATO countries with four non-NATO countries anticipated to participate.\textsuperscript{34} The majority of these forces are tough and extremely well trained. Some have been training for this mission for two years. This larger force is required to implement the terms of the peace agreement, and to react to temporary loss of tactical consent. It must be larger than a traditional peacekeeping force in order to be capable of enforcement missions at the tactical level. In addition, if the UN finds that operational consent is lost and the operation moves totally along the continuum to peace enforcement, this larger force can protect itself and provide time for the UN to reassess the situation and decide if forces should be removed or reinforced to conduct peace enforcement operations.
CONCLUSION

Becoming involved in peace operations in failed states, on the brink of, or enmeshed in civil war, is a most difficult assignment for any military force. Peace operations in intra-state conflicts differ from peace operations in inter-state conflicts because of the large numbers of warring factions and the potentially intense racial and ethnic hatreds. Countries committing forces to that type of operation must truly understand the environment and the nature of the operation. The Congo and Somalia provide excellent lessons for organizations and nations undertaking peace operations in failed states.

Both the Congo and Somalia illuminate the importance of soliciting consent through peacemaking prior to deployment of military forces. This lesson was followed when the US obtained operational consent at Dayton with the BH warring factions. With this level of consent, peace forces can react to some temporary loss of tactical consent with rogue or outlaw groups. The two historical examples also highlight the importance of feasible mandates with appropriate rules for use of force that do not impel military forces designed for peacekeeping along the continuum to peace enforcement. Infeasible mandates and liberal use of force damage the perception of impartiality of the peace forces and threaten operational consent.

Finally, traditional peacekeeping is not appropriate for most situations in failed states. Consent, if it exists at all, may be tenuous at the operational level and nonexistent at the tactical level. In these situations, large peace implementation forces are appropriate. These peace implementation forces, like peacekeepers, require consent and clear and feasible mandates, but are authorized more liberal use of force. This, in turn,
may require a skillful blend of operational peacekeeping with tactical peace enforcement which is the essence of peace implementation. The use of well-trained peace implementation forces prefaced by the careful and patient negotiation of peacemaking will provide the environment for some measure of success in failed states.
END NOTES


2 Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint, Tactics Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 29 April 1994, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 20318-0001: a-1. A definition from Presidential Decision Directive 25 states, “military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.” Joint Pub 3-07.3: a-2. A definition developed by the International Peace Academy (International Peace Academy, by the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Armies) Combat Development Guide 2010, Peacekeeping Operations, dated 7 December 1990 states, “...the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.” These examples show similarities but also differences which can be very confusing at times.


5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations), 1992: 11. The NATO definition also excludes the requirement for consent. NATO document MC 327: 44. It defines peacekeeping as, “...the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between states, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally; using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace.” It then goes on to elaborate about what use to be conditions for traditional peacekeeping operations, “...traditionally involved the deployment of peacekeeping force in the field, with the consent of the parties, including supervising demarcation lines, monitoring cease-fires and controlling buffer zones, disarming and demobilizing warring factions and supervising borders....”

6 Ibid., 29. However, later in the same document, he reaffirmed the necessity of consent, encompassed by the term cooperation, when he wrote: “…the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support.”


Boutros-Ghali defines peace enforcement as committing forces “to restore and maintain the cease fire.” An Agenda for Peace: 26. NATO defines it as, “action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict.” MC 327: 44. The National Military Strategy defines it as, “...operations...characterized by the use of force or the threat of the use of force....to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to respond to acts of aggression.” Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995: 12.


For an opposing view, see Dobbie’s article, “A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping.” He disagrees with the idea of attempting to place peacekeeping and peace enforcement on a single continuum because the two are so different. He believes that there is no middle ground and to attempt to link them will cause confusion and possible bloodshed. I believe that we need to establish a middle ground, if for no other reason so that Congress and the public understand the reason for deploying troops and to sensitize all to potential casualties.

Dobbie, 122.


United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 222. ONUC operations are divided into four generally accepted phases: Restoration of law and order and withdrawal of Belgian forces (July - August 1960); Constitutional crisis (September 1960 - September 1961); Termination of the secession of Katanga (September 1961 - February 1963); Consolidation of the Congolese Government (February 1963 - June 1964).

Ibid., 229. Those factions were: 1) A Council of Commissioners established by a COL Mobutu led coup in Leopoldville which supported Kasavubu; 2) A government established in Stanleyville by Antoine Gizenga, a Lumumba follower; 3) Tshombe’s government in Katanga; 4) Albert Kalonji’s government in South Kasai. The government established by Gizenga had the backing of Major General Victor Lundula who took over as the Force Republic Commander after the uprising against Belgian officers. The government also had the initial backing of the Member States, those who committed troops to the peacekeeping mission. Albert Kalonji was the leader of the Baluba in the Luluabourg area. The Baluba tribe lived in the North of Katanga and did not support Tshombe’s succession. Other Balubas lived in
Kasai, a neighboring province which provided technical services for most of the country. South Kasai announced its independence after Katanga. This established a chain of events which would cause great misery to the Balubas and dissolve the central government.  

18 Ibid., 44. During this time public information came under the term psychological warfare and was not practiced.


20 Ibid., 22. SG Hammarskjold, in a report to the Security Council in Sept 1960, listed some tasks the ONUC were performing. He never tied those back to the mandate (38).


22 Bullock, 60.


26 Ibid., 13.

27 Dobbie, 133.

28 *The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia*: 24. After the 5 June Pakistani massacre Boutros-Ghali condemned the ambush, "...peacekeepers who were on a mission of peace reconciliation and reconstruction, and urged prompt and firm action against the perpetrators of this crime

29 Ibid., 13.

30 Allard, 36.

31 Ibid., 37.


33 The military annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement can be downloaded from the internet at address: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-1%3A719%3A03Annex%20A.

34 AFsouth, IFOR Fact Sheet: General, 22 March 96, internet address: gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/yugo/iffact2203.96. The sixteen NATO countries participating are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and US. Non-NATO participants are: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden and Ukraine. The potential non-NATO participants are: Albania, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Saudi Arabia.
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