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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT UNITS FOR MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS: PERCEPTION OR REALITY?

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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This paper attempts to clear the air on the effectiveness of Army National Guard (ARNG) combat units to mobilize for major regional conflicts (MRCs) so that senior Army leaders in all components can make sound decisions on the basis of reality and not perceptions... how else in this budget-tightening climate can the Total Army prepare and be ready to fight and win our Nation's wars in the 21st Century? Perceptions of ARNG combat units held by active Army senior officers were obtained by surveying resident students of the U.S. Army War College, Class of 1996. Opinions about the effectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize for MRCs, factors hindering effective mobilization, and the optimum employment of ARNG combat units in the post-Cold War period were surveyed. Finally, their recommended changes to ARNG combat units were solicited. Future perspectives and recommendations on an optimum AC/RC mix are included.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The end of the Cold War is requiring a fundamental and ongoing reassessment of defense planning. The historical cycle of defense planning is beginning anew on basic issues affecting the character and size of our military capabilities. These issues not only address the classic question of "How much is enough?" but also query about objectives; the range of capabilities we might require given the revolutions in warfare and changing nature of transnational threats and potential adversaries; and, more importantly, how best to use funds for defense in an intense arena of national security versus domestic priorities.

These are challenging times because planning for defense now will translate to capabilities for the first decade of the 21st century, yet who can forecast what conflicts we will be facing then. It is conceivable, for example, that U.S. military concerns will continue to revolve around major regional conflicts (MRCs) with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Territorial disputes and sovereignty issues abound in the various geographic regions of the world, notably China/Taiwan reunification, the India/Pakistan struggle for control of Kashmir, and the ongoing claims for the Spratly Islands in the South China Seas by China, Taiwan, and selected ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia, and are not likely to disappear. Instead, the world could witness an approximation of the New World Order, a series of "Bosnias" and numerous states disintegrating into chaos, a Russia failing to cope with democratic and free market movements in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), emergence of new military powers like China or Japan, or certainly a mix of these scenarios.

A series of basic questions come to mind when visualizing the future international climate:

- What grand strategy should the Nation adopt for the variety of scenarios anticipated in the next century, and how should it affect defense planning?

- Would our Nation need to continue with deterrence of aggression against weak states in whose security it has no vital interests?

- What special requirements do peace operations pose?

- What kinds of reengineering should DOD consider?

- Because of the revolutions in the changing world, defense budget reductions, military affairs, and jointness, shouldn’t DOD continue to substantially reconfigure its forces and rework doctrine; but, how low can the defense budget go?

- Finally, how should we think about tradeoffs between active and reserve forces, between force structure and modernization, between combat forces and support structure, and between variable-cost items like force structure and "fixed cost" items like infrastructure?

It is from the last question which the purpose of this paper is drawn. It is to explore the hypothesis that ARNG combat unit effectiveness for MRCs is a reality or perception. Clearly, current and future senior civilian and military leaders in the highest levels of government will have to make hard decisions on
the balance and structure of reserve forces and standing combat forces. Their crucial decisions ought to be based on an understanding of the effectiveness of ARNG combat units for MRCs, and not mere perceptions, which in the case of active component officers, can stem from a lack of understanding of the history and dual-purpose of the National Guard.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There is not a common understanding amongst members of the active Armed Forces of the United States that the existence of today's National Guard is embedded in the Constitution. Basically, Congress has the plenary authority under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to provide for the common defense by raising and supporting armies, making rules for the governance of the Armed Forces, and enacting necessary and proper laws for such purposes. Likewise, under this section, Congress is empowered to organize, arm, discipline and call forth the militia of the several states who, in turn, have the reserve authority to appoint officers of the military and to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the national government should be responsible for and control the armed forces of the United States. In 1792 Congress passed a militia statute which required the enrollment of every able-bodied male between the ages of 18 and 45 in the militia, but compliance with this statute was haphazard and virtually ignored
by the States for over a century. President Roosevelt, in 1901, proclaimed the 1792 Militia Law was obsolete and worthless, and convinced Congress, under the Militia Clauses of the Constitution, to repeal it in favor of the so-called Dick Act which divided the militia into two parts: the "organized militia" and the "reserve militia," the former of which is now referred to as the National Guard. The Dick Act further provided for a structure for the National Guard, federal funds, and Regular Army instructors for training purposes and limited the use of Guard forces to the continental United States. Interestingly enough, this last restriction proved inconvenient, and in 1908 the Act was revised to permit use either within or outside United States Territory.

In a subsequent key development, the 1908 provision had to be further broadened in 1916 because of the situation in Mexico and the widening conflict in Europe to allow "federalization" of the Guard. Thereafter, Guardsmen took a dual oath to both the state from which they came, and to the federal authorities. For the first time, Congress also defined the Army to include regular, Reserve, and federalized National Guard units. It is interesting to note that the 1916 Act had been cited by the Supreme Court in several cases as a material alteration of the previous status of the states’ militia, but ultimately concluded that the National Guard is the modern equivalent of the militia established by the Constitution.

After WWI, Congress made further changes to the Guard and
Reserve. The Guard, however, while not in federal service, was not by law a component of the Army until 1933. In that year, Congress provided that the Guard at all times was a Reserve component of the Army, but the manner of its use was dependent on whether it had been federalized. This provision had the effect of administering the Guard under the Army Clause, rather than under the Militia Clauses. Consistent with this change, even the word "militia" was eliminated in the 1933 Act, under which the new supervisory agency for the militia became the National Guard Bureau (NGB). By virtue of the National Defense Act of 1934, no state was permitted to maintain troops in time of peace except in accordance with the organization prescribed in the Act and this remains current law. In other words, such rights as the states have with respect to the Guard forces are those permitted by Congress; generally, this is to preserve peace, order, and public safety within each state's borders.

Prior to 1952, Congress had statutorily restricted its power to order National Guard units to federal service for periods of national emergencies. But in that year, with passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, it expanded their authority to include active duty and active duty for training even in the absence of an emergency, but only with the consent of governors. Unquestionably by the 1960's, however, the "dual status" of the Guard was statutorily well established, with the Guard serving as a state defense force under the command of state governors and as a Reserve component of the federal armed forces. Not surprisingly,
challenges to the federalization concept continued but were rejected by the courts. In rejecting these challenges, the courts noted that the expressed purpose of the dual status was to avoid the limitations of the Militia Clause and to organize the Guard under the broad Congressional authority to raise and support armies.

The 1970s and 1980s found federalized Guard units under the "total force" concept an essential part of the Nation's defense planning and readiness, yet there were still challenges raised by certain governors objecting to out-of-country federal training. The gubernatorial veto was abolished in 1987 with passage of the so-called Montgomery Amendment to that year's National Defense Authorization Act, which provided that no governor could withhold consent "...because of any objection to the location, purpose, type or schedule of federal active duty." Despite subsequent challenges to the Montgomery Amendment, the court has unanimously ruled that Congress, not the states, is constitutionally supreme with respect to the militia under the Militia Clauses and the raising of armies under the Army Clause.

While not intended to be a long discourse on the history of the National Guard, this historical background is intended to give the reader a synopsis of National Guard development in the 20th century and a clear basis for its existence in the Armed Forces of this Nation. As the reader progresses through this paper, the following points should be kept in mind:

1. The National Guard is the successor of the militia.
2. The Guard had important non-federal roles like the maintenance of order, recovery from disasters, etc. in each state.

3. The evolution of the Guard is a result of the exercise of Congress’ constitutional power to shape the Nation’s armed forces so they "provide for the common defense."

It is to this end, that the key question of this paper is posed: "Are Army National Guard combat units effective for major regional conflicts to provide for the common defense?"

C. THE TRINITY

While the Constitution provides a role for the National Guard in the common defense, is it logically sufficient to conclude that it should remain a part of the military force mix? After all, could the framers of the Constitution have predicted today's environment of changing international threats and declining defense resources? There is another concept to be considered in the realization of roles that National Guard units play in the common defense of this country.

Clausewitz contributes much to military affairs in his concept of the "Trinity." In today's terms, the significance of the trinity is best described by General Abrams, the Army's post-Vietnam Chief of Staff, who built a 16-division force that was dependent on the Reserves to the extent that they could not be deployed without a Reserve call-up. Retired Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. also wrote, "The post-Vietnam Army General Abrams sought to create was designed deliberately to form an interrelated structure that could not be committed to sustained
combat without mobilizing the Reserve... General Abrams hoped
this...would correct one of the major deficiencies of the
American involvement in the Vietnam War, the commitment of the
Army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the
American people.\textsuperscript{1}

II. KEY CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

A. TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Ever since the United States committed to an all-volunteer
army in 1973, the Pentagon has relied more and more heavily on
reservists, part of what is referred to as Total Force Policy.
The Total Force Policy was designed to integrate Reserve and
active forces, and to ensure a more capable and balanced overall
force structure. The reasons are primarily budgetary since ARNG
combat units cost 23 to 37 percent of active Army units and can
achieve levels of proficiency in peacetime of 70 to 80 percent of
that achieved by active units.\textsuperscript{2} Not surprisingly, these budgetary
implications enter into decisions on force structure and mix.

Force mix is the balance between heavy, light, and special
operations forces; however, this balance must also include the
right force mix of active, ARNG, and USAR units. An optimal mix
would be one that provides forces of the appropriate size,
structure and availability to counter likely threats. But this
must be a force that is affordable. The significance of a proper
force mix lies in the phenomenon that if the mission requires
substantial forward deployed forces or rapid deployment of CONUS-
based forces, the mission and force structure obviously belong to the active component. The challenge is in situations where there is uncertainty about the size of the required force and where rapid deployment of some portion of the force is necessary, and later deployment of reinforcements is anticipated. Then, the mission must be assigned to both components, proportionate to the need, hence, the need for a total Army force.

Unity of purpose between the Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve components is an imperative if the Total Force policy is to achieve its full potential; yet, there are critics who argue that the U.S. military maintains too large a combat contingent within the Army National Guard; questions abound about the need to achieve a more optimum total force mix consistent with our domestic priorities. But at the end of the day, this Nation can not decisively engage in an international conflict without the Reserves because certain skills simply don’t exist in the active force.

For example, the Reserve component contributes more than 120 crucial capabilities to the active force, 21 of which represent 100 percent of that capability in the Total Force. Some examples of these crucial capabilities are listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Guard and Army Reserve</th>
<th>Naval Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 Civil Affairs Units</td>
<td>15 Cargo Handling BNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Medical Brigades</td>
<td>12 Mobile Construction BNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Combat Heavy Engineer BNs</td>
<td>6 Fleet Hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Attack Helicopter BNs</td>
<td>1 Carrier Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Special Forces Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maritime Patrol Squadrons

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
5,069 Aeromedical Evacuation Crewmembers
250 Tactical Airlift Aircraft
627 Tactical Fighters
15 Special Operations Aircraft
36 Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft
6 Airborne Warning & Control (AWACS) Crewmembers

Marine Corps Reserve
2 Tank BNs
1 Light Armored Infantry Bn
5 Artillery BNs
2 Light Attack Helicopter SQNs
4 Fighter Attack SQNs
2 Attack SQNs

Coast Guard
351 Deployable Port Security Unit Personnel

Many active component members are not aware that a substantial number of men and women in the Reserve component volunteer to serve on active duty every day in the country and overseas and are veterans of the active component. For these reasons, DOD will likely continue to leverage the cost-effective contributions of the Reserve component to offset a smaller Total Force. Unfortunately today, the wisdom of the Total Force Policy remains under fire, but the real question is what mix of regular and backup forces the U.S. needs for the challenges of the post-Cold War era. For the purposes of this study, the question begs itself: does the mix have to be adjusted to re-incorporate roundup and roundout units?

B. ROUNDUP VS. ROUNDOUT

Roundout units bring an active component division up to full
strength, where roundup units give an active division more than its normal complement of troops. In response to the Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review, however, the Army discarded the roundout/roundup brigade concept. As part of a major functional realignment involving the Guard and Army Reserve components, the Army is gradually shifting its combat units to the National Guard, and concentrating its combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units in the Army Reserve component. Instead of 7 roundup brigades, the Guard now has 15 "enhanced brigades," including the 7 former roundup units.

C. THE "ENHANCED" BRIGADE

Today, the principal RC ground component maneuver forces consist of the seven heavy and seven light "enhanced" brigades and the one ACR. These brigades are enhanced with increased resources, manning priorities, and improved pre-mobilization training strategies. In sum, these enhanced brigades are doctrinally employable, C3I compatible, logistically supportable by any Corps or Division and resourced to be ready to deploy at C-1 within 90 days after call-up to accomplish the following missions:

- Provide strategic hedge against two nearly simultaneous MRCs
- Reinforce or augment AC forces deployed to a MRC
- Backfill AC OCONUS presence or peace operations when AC forces committed out of theater
- Potential force for lesser regional conflict
- Capable of rotational missions when protracted AC deployment to an MRC requires relief of committed forces
- Gives strategic depth to forces

11
The intent was to increase the training, equipment, and combat readiness of the enhanced brigades to enable them to reinforce our deployed forces quickly in the second of two regional conflicts. Again, the planning assumption is that they can be "combat ready" within 90 days.

D. EFFECTIVENESS DEFINED

From the writer's perspective, the issue of effectiveness actually translates to availability in the case of ARNG combat units. Clausewitz stated the purpose of peacetime armies when he said, "The whole of military activity must relate to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained is simply that he should fight at the right place and at the right time." Therefore, the critical concern about ARNG combat units, especially in the eyes of the active duty member, is not whether they will perform satisfactorily on the battlefield, but whether they can mobilize and deploy to the right place at the right time. For this reason, once the National Command Authority (NCA) decides to react to a conflict with military force, the time required for mobilization, deployment, and employment in theater must be factored into the decision before it can be determined if Reserve forces are suitable for the mission. In the case of an enhanced brigade, it is effective to the extent that it can mobilize and deploy to the theater within 90 days.
III. RELEVANCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR

A. SURVEY DESIGN

To help define what perceptions senior U.S. military officers have of ARNG combat units, a survey consisting of fourteen (14) questions was distributed to a sample of American officers of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1996.

There are a total of twenty (20) seminars, each comprised of sixteen students of the Class of 1996. In each seminar there are two international fellows, two representatives of the reserve components, one Marine, Naval, or Air Force officer, and a federal civil servant; leaving ten officers from various branches of the Regular Army. Ten seminars were randomly selected for this survey, yielding a population size of about 120 U.S. active duty officers. Since the survey was designed to uncover perceptions within the active component, only active-duty U.S. officers regardless of service, were included in the survey.

B. SURVEY RESULTS

A total of sixty-nine (69) respondents consisting of 62 Army, 1 Navy, 4 Air Force, and 2 Marine Corps active component officers provided the results discussed below.

SISTER SERVICE OFFICERS

A review of comments from the 7 non-Army respondents revealed two had only book knowledge of ARNG combat units and the remaining five had neither experience nor book knowledge of them. Regarding their opinions about how effectively ARNG combat units
had mobilized for WWI, Korea, and Desert Storm, all but two indicated they did not know. Of the two who shared an opinion, one (the sole Navy respondent) stated ARNG combat units were ineffective based on media accounts, professional publications, and USAWC seminar discussion, the other (an Air Force respondent) indicated they were effective on the basis of media accounts.5

On the crucial question of "how effectively ARNG combat divisions can mobilize for MRCs?" all but two of the non-Army respondents reported they didn’t know. On the basis of their input, it was clear that most non-Army senior officers have little formal knowledge and exposure to ARNG combat units, and that their contributions would, at best, be limited. Hence, the remainder of this section focuses on the input from the other sixty-two (62) active component Army officers who will, henceforth, in this section be referred to as the "Group."

**ACTIVE COMPONENT ARMY OFFICERS**

In gauging the Group’s experience with the ARNG, results of the survey indicate few active Army officers have experience from either advising or serving with ARNG combat units. Interestingly, 21% of the Group indicated their level of experience with ARNG combat units was based on knowledge gained through books, professional publications, and the media. A much larger number/percentage of the Group report their experiences were gained from evaluating ARNG units (79%).

Regarding perceptions of effectiveness of ARNG combat units in the three latest major regional conflicts, the Group submitted
that ARNG combat units were effective in the WWII and Korean conflicts, 78% and 69%, respectively. It was the opinion of 75% of the Group, however, that ARNG combat units were not effective in Desert Storm. This finding compares favorably with results from a similar study conducted in 1992 which revealed almost half of respondents believed rapid mobilization of ARNG roundout brigades has proven to be impossible in light of the Desert Storm experience. As only 13% of the Group had deployed to Desert Storm, presumably the opinion of 75% of the Group who maintained that ARNG combat units were not effective was based on indirect sources (i.e. media accounts, professional publications, other third-party sources).

**CAN ARNG COMBAT UNITS BE UTILIZED IN MRCs?**

Other perceptions from the Group became evident. The slim majority (52%) responded they could be effective; however, 48% believe ARNG combat units can not effectively be mobilized for MRCs. There was one other angle worth exploring and that was whether members of the Group who had evaluator experience had similar or different opinions about the effectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize for Desert Storm. Of the sixty-two (62) members of the Group, 44 had experience with ARNG combat units as evaluators. Of all the evaluators, 76% and 64% believed ARNG combat units were effective in WWII and Korea. 74%, however, maintain they were not effective in mobilizing for Desert Storm. Unfortunately, only 8 of the 44 with experience as evaluators had deployed to the Gulf indicating their opinion was based largely
on indirect sources. 55% of this sub-group have the opinion that ARNG combat units cannot effectively be mobilized for MRCs.

Theoretically, individuals with experience as evaluators would have a good handle on which factors hinder the effectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize. To understand this dynamic better, they were asked to identify all the factors that hindered the effectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize for MRCs. They confirm that "limited training resources" and "political interferences" are perceived as the two factors which most adversely influence effective mobilization of ARNG combat units. The data are shown in the table below in two separate columns: the first for the Group as a whole, the second only for the group with experience with ARNG units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Experience as evaluators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited training resources</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interference</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate roles &amp; missions</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor use of training resources</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of leadership &amp; management</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to recruit</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- While 46% believed ARNG combat units could suitably be employed in either MRCs or OOTW, 10% and 18% maintain MRCs and OOTW, respectively, are the best employments.

- Regarding the time required for mobilization of ARNG combat units to be considered effective, 35% and 29% of the Group indicated 90 and 180 days, respectively.
- 49% believe the current distribution of C, CS, & CSS units in the Total Army should be maintained; in this regard, 25% take the view that all combat forces should be consolidated in the active component and that reserve forces be assigned strictly CS and CSS missions.

It is interesting to note the various responses to the last question of the survey, "What changes in the ARNG combat divisions (structure, force mix, mission, training, mobilization, etc.) would you make to better ensure our country is able to secure its interests in the post-Cold war period at optimum cost?" These narrative responses have been categorized for ease of communication and each response is annotated to show its relative frequency (e.g. 7x = 7 times repeated), as follows:

**STRUCTURE**
- Reorganize more combat units to CS/CSS units (7x)
- Maximize number of battalions; combat missions too complex for brigade-sized units and larger (6x)
- Reduce combat divisions to 2 or 3 (3x)
- Eliminate divisions; too large for available training time (2x)
- Establish more brigades as optimum (2x)
- Eliminate light(mech/armor) combat units (1x)

**FORCE MIX**
- Maintain AC/RC balance (2x)
- Maintain combat forces (1x)
- Place most of combat capability in AC (1x)
- Reduce RC Infantry and armor divisions (1x)
- Maximize combat battalions (1x)

**MISSION**
- Focus combat units on OOTW (2x)
- Use OCONUS in emergencies only (1x)
- Use as backfill forces (1x)
- Convert light infantry units to OOTW/Follow-on MRC missions (1x)

**TRAINING**
- Require more collective training time (6x)
- Involve AC more (2x)
- Train with AC more (1x)
- Train commanders and staff more (1x)

**MOBILIZATION**
- Reduce mobilization time (3x)
- Acquire flexibility in number of call-ups (1x)

**EQUIPMENT**
- Upgrade equipment (2x)

**GENERAL**
- Remove "politics" from call-ups (1x)
- Beware of OOTW which may not require RC mobilization creating shortages in CS/CSS functions (1x)
- Maintain only combat units that can be equipped with modern systems (1x)

As an additional point of reference the data were further disaggregated and analyzed by combat, combat support, and combat service support sub-groups. At least 70% of all three sub-groups believe ARNG combat units were not effective in Desert Storm, and combat officers (80%) even more tended to rate them ineffective. In contrast to this finding, percentages of each of the sub-groups deploying to the Gulf (i.e. 12% CA, 8% CS, & 17% CSS) reflected their opinions, for the most part, were again based on indirect sources. Especially noteworthy in the sub-groups, combat officers (56%) tended to believe ARNG combat units can effectively mobilize for MRCs. In short, both the Group as a whole and the three sub-groups are consistent in their opinions that ARNG combat units did not effectively mobilize for Desert Storm.

In the final analysis, the results of the survey point to several common perceptions regardless of whether the respondents are viewed as a whole or disaggregated into CA, CS, & CSS officers or with those having experience as evaluators vs. no experience with the ARNG:

1. While ARNG combat units were viewed as effective in
mobilizing for WWII and Korea, they were not for Desert Storm.

2. The opinion that ARNG combat units were not effective for mobilizing for Desert Storm, for the most part, was based on indirect sources like the media, professional publications, and other third-party sources.

3. Despite the findings in items 1 and 2 above, the majority believes that ARNG combat units can effectively mobilize for MRCs.

4. Of all the factors hindering ARNG combat unit mobilization, "limited training resources" and "political interferences" were most frequently cited.

5. 90 days is considered the optimum time required for ARNG combat units to mobilize for MRCs to be considered effective.

C. THE CASE OF THE 48TH

Many claim the three ARNG combat brigades could not mobilize, train-up, and deploy to the Persian Gulf to make a difference in the fight, and on this basis argue they are not effective for MRCs. Let’s review an account of the situation, then, by General Schwarzkopf, and determine why the 48th Mech Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, the first of three ARNG combat brigades and the designated ARNG roundout brigade for the 24th Mech Division, was not ultimately deployed to the Gulf. A brief chronology and summary of key events will help set the stage:

2 Aug 90  Iraq invades Kuwait; within hours of decision to move U.S. forces to the region, Air Guard
strategic airlifters were airborne

7 Aug 90 President Bush obtains UN approval of resolution condemning invasion of Kuwait and demanding unconditional surrender. DOD also obtains approval from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emigrates to deploy forces to the area.

President signs declaration of national emergency which gave DOD authority to implement a partial mobilization permitting the call-up of up to 1 million members of the reserve components for up to two years.

Note 1: This authority was not used until late November because its significance was not realized at the time.

Note 2: Ironically, DOD declined to authorize the call-up of RC combat troops later in August because it thought the limit under partial mobilization was 180 days when the restriction was up to two years.

First elements of 18th Airborne Corps (i.e. 82nd and 101st which are normally airlifted) arrived that week to set up blocking positions.

24th Mech ordered to prepare and load its M1 tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting vehicles on Navy surge sealift vessels with troops to be flown on chartered aircraft.

Note 1: Final elements of 24th Mech did not close on Dhrahan Harbor until November; it takes this long to deliver heavy equipment on limited shipping.

Note 2: Had the 48th been mobilized on 24 Aug, it would have had 75 days of post-mobilization training by the time the 24th closed in on the Gulf and the division "fully stood-up."

Note 3: The President has the authority to call up to 200,000 members of the Reserves initially for 90 days, but with a 90-day extension totalling 180 days. The 48th was not alerted
nor given any indication when it might deploy, if ever. Instead, the Army detailed the 197th Mech Brigade to be the roundout brigade which had to convert to M1s and M2s after its arrival in the Gulf.

22 Aug 90 President signed the 200k callup order, but on August 24th, DOD permitted the Army to call up only CS and CSS units. Navy, Marines, and Air Force were not put under similar restrictions.

First Air Guard units called to duty 24 Aug, the first Army CS and CSS on the 27th. No Army combat units called up despite Gen Vhuolo’s assurance that the 48th callup would be announced the next day. It was not to occur for more than three months.

Early Sep 90 When asked by Congress why the 48th was not called up, SECDEF stated that the 180 days available was not long enough to call up, train, and deploy ARNG combat units.

1st Calvary Division began arriving in Saudi Arabia with the 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division as their roundout brigade instead of the 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard.

8 Nov 90 DOD announces the near-doubling of U.S. forces in the Gulf and the call-up of the three ARNG roundout brigades.

30 Nov 90 48th and 256th brigades report to mobilization stations at Fort Stewart and Polk, respectively, with the 155th reporting to Camp Shelby on 8 Dec.

By this time, the 155th is assigned to roundout the 4th Inf Division instead of its assigned roundout brigade, the 163rd Armored Brigade, Idaho Army National Guard.

Note 1: -All three brigades deemed "not combat-ready" at mobilization stations, although rated "combat ready" by their parent units before 2 Aug, because new Army combat readiness standards had to be implemented:

-All three brigades were required
to be C1-certified when previously C3 was minimum accepted for "combat ready" status.

-Other tasks for certification were added:
  -Counter-reconnaissance
  -Advanced Guard
  -Repositioning
  -Breaching/assaulting Iraqi defensive positions

-Units required to convert to new maintenance software prior to recertification

-NCOs suddenly required to be fully qualified at the grade level assigned rather than generically MOS-qualified, the Army standard for reporting combat readiness.

Note 2: None of the active duty units had been certified for the additional tasks when they left home station.

Dec 90 CENTCOM Deputy Commander claims U.S. forces not ready for combat against Iraq

7 Jan 91 48th moves to Ft. Erwin and spends a week drawing equipment

SubJECTED to "crawl, walk, run" training; could not be credited for tank gunnery training performed at last Annual Training. All gunnery had to be redone, but at Ft. Stewart because the NTC did not have standard tank tables.

16 Jan 91 The air war begins

15 Feb 91 MG Funk declares his 3rd Armored Division is still not ready for combat which was about the same complaint registered against the 48th a month earlier.

21 Feb 91 Three ARNG Field Artillery brigades arrived and moved to the western Saudi Arabian Desert

23 Feb 91 Ground war begins two days after the ARNG Field Artillery units arrived in country with the Oklahomans achieving the highest fire rate in Third Army.
28 Feb 91 Commander, 2nd Army declares 48th "combat ready" and prepared for deployment 51 days after its arrival at Ft. Irwin.

Ground war ends the same day with cease fire announced by the President

11 Mar 91 DOD decides to demobilize the 48th and return it to home station

23 Mar 91 48th Brigade units move to home armories

Between 30 Nov 90 and 28 Feb 91, a period of 91 days, the 48th was able to complete post-mobilization training given the last-minute changes to post-mob training requirements. Clearly, had the ARNG combat brigades been mobilized in August 90, they would have been available for the fight.

Despite this chronology, however, numerous media accounts describe the failure of the three ARNG brigades as related to their lack of readiness. For example, according to a New York Times article the three brigades took longer to prepare than had been expected mainly because their troops had rarely drilled in units as large as brigade size. Various other media accounts paint a different picture explaining why the three brigades couldn’t mobilize in time. According to a GAO article in The Wilson Quarterly, "the Guard units were not even called-up because federal law restricted reservists to a maximum of 180 days of active duty. In November and December 1990, after that law was lifted, three Guard brigades—each with about 4,000 soldiers—were activated." The truth was, as the reader may recall, the President’s declaration of national emergency in early August 1990 gave DOD the authority to implement a partial
mobilization allowing the call-up of up to one million members of the reserve components for up to two years. There was no law to be lifted as *The Wilson Quarterly* article stated. DOD simply did not use its authority until late November.

**IV. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES**

There are countless revolutions taking place in this fast changing, international environment with regards to defense planning at both the strategic and operational levels. From a strictly military perspective, we can not do any operation without being combined. The Army for one is getting too small. If this is true, the corollary to that would be to have a force design and doctrine that will still allow us to execute in a combined environment with coalition partners. Operationally, Force XXI methodology is being used to develop an improved division design, but is this the path we want to follow? There is the alternative of fine tuning a functional structure we already have. As we look to the future, it could be useful to review the status of selected DOD initiatives aimed at improving our national military defense posture.

One such example are some key comments raised at the recent Force XXI Division Design Brief to Army 4-Stars by TRADOC in March 1996. Although the details of the Force XXI Experimental Division Design are not covered, the feedback from participating 4-Stars gives the reader a good feel for the direction the new
ground force is taking. In fact, our original concerns about the effectiveness of mobilizing ARNG combat units for MRCs in this study pale in comparison with the basic concern about whether Force XXI methodology to an improved division design is the right path to follow. Here is a summary of key comments from our Army leaders which have higher order implications for future RC force structure/mix:

- General acceptance of the Division Design, except all believed the division should be a heavy/light construct

- Mixed reactions on engineers; Gen Peay says could use less organic to division so long as capability at corps

- All stated concerns over low ALO CSS elements. Each stated we are not able to support ourselves now; reducing CSS strength in divisions will not solve that problem

- Regarding dropping light brigade from heavy division; Bosnia is showing the goodness of heavy/light combinations internal to the division. Gen Crouch was disappointed we went away from the heavy/light construct

- Gen Crouch: I am a great fan of CSS enablers and precision logistics, but ALO 2 units can’t refuel now. If we reduce trucks it will only get worse.

- BG Lust: If you can’t refuel entire battalion at once, CSS will dictate when you can attack, not tactics

- This CSS concept will not work in stability operations. Distance and infrastructure will defeat us. ALO 2 units will fail

- MG Benton: Must remember a lot of tonnage now goes by contract carrier. If we have even less trucks it will increase the reliance on HNS

- Summary of GEN Joulwan (SACEUR) feedback:

  - What is the strategic relevance of the force?
  - Army is the dominant force for stability operations. To retain strength, we must take charge of future strategy.
  - How you project power may be the decisive operation. How we projected to Bosnia got us compliance.
  - Must have multi-national logistics. How do you integrate logistics with a lead nation concept?
- Consolidate CSS at brigade level and let Bn Cdr focus on warfighting
- Logistics are combat power; need to organize around logistics. Led with CSS in Rwanda and Bosnia

- Summary of GEN Luck (CINC USFK):
  - We must avoid the trap of developing a great division that is primarily tailored for one environment, that is so expensive it can't be fielded throughout our Army, and that is so technologically advanced that it cannot effectively operate with other U.S. Army, U.S. Joint, or coalition partners.
  - Beyond our air assault and airborne divisions, a standard division design including a heavy light mix would be preferable to the heavy design we are going to test.
  - Today's design for the heavy division is not right because it does not include light infantry. 2ID is a heavy/light mix of 2 tank, 2 mech, and 2 air assault infantry and it works.
  - We need further review of combat and combat support assets. We have never properly structured and resourced our combat supporters; our support structure does not support our combat structure.
  - Make sure we know what we gain by taking medical, maintenance, and support elements out of maneuver battalions.

- Summary of GEN Solomon (AMC) feedback:
  - We have to be honest with ourselves and state what we are really trying to do. Build a better division or save spaces.
  - Combining the Corps Support Group and the DISCOM may have some merit.

- Summary of GEN Shelton (CINC, SOCOM) comments:
  - Digitization is no good if we don't have an equivalent system that can be carried by dismounts/light forces.
  - If there is a capability you need to have for the division to fight, don’t move it to corps. You only end up bringing it back.

- Summary of GEN Peay feedback (CINC, CENTCOM):
  - Think about what to do with the light divisions; sometimes they need more mobility; may want to look at a medium force.
  - ALO 1 for CSS elements is not a valid assumption.
  - Believe our CSS concept frees up the warfighter to fight better.
Contrast these remarks to Congressman Aspin’s view on the future division of combat forces among active, Guard, and Reserve: 10

"First is a quick-response force of four active Army divisions without roundout; but, this contingency package will have Guard and Reserve CS and CSS units.

-A second deployable corps would have four active Army divisions, each with an ARNG roundout brigade.

-Guard divisions would be in 'rotation packages'."

Recently, in remarks presented to the Air National Guard Senior Commanders Forum, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff, commented that "despite the fact that demobilization is taking the Air Force from 608,000 to 385,000 active-duty people we have been able to meet the tasking of the National Command Authorities through better use of our Guardsmen and Reservists."

Today, the trend appears to be increasing the role of the National Guard and Reserve with the overall downsizing of the Total Force so the operational burdens of the active force can be reduced. We have to consider for the future that at the very time that we are returning to our traditional reliance on Guardsmen and Reservists in a peacetime environment, our OPTEMPO has increased drastically. Therefore, DOD has had to turn increasingly to the Guard and Reserve to assist in performing contingency operations as well as day-to-day operations. But should reserve forces be on call for every conflict involving active duty forces? While there is national value in more fully utilizing reserve forces, future solutions must be implemented that do not unnecessarily disrupt the lives
of Reservists, their families, and the employers of Reservists in the private sector. Consistent with the concept of the Trinity described earlier in this report, it makes more sense for reserve forces to be mobilized only when our Nation is threatened and called to duty by Congress as prescribed by the U.S. Constitution.

Changing defense requirements in the post-Cold War period and a tight federal budget have definitely increased reliance on ARNG combat brigades and on their ability to deploy within 90 days of mobilization. A recent GAO study, however, revealed that none of the seven former roundout brigades came close to achieving the training proficiency sought by the Bold Shift strategy during 1992 through 1994. Recruiting and retention was a lingering problem and many of the personnel recruited were not adequately trained in their individual job and leadership skills. Collective training remained a problem. Furthermore, in the same study, it was discovered that the new advisor's program which was intended to improve training readiness was meeting with limited success primarily because the old "us and them" attitude still prevailed amongst the active Army advisors and the state-run Guard. Finally, on the subject of being ready to deploy in 90 days from mobilization, the study concluded that it is highly uncertain whether the Guard's mechanized infantry and armor brigades can be ready. Based on these findings, should future defense planning still factor in Guard combat brigades?

Finally, there are interesting perspectives for future
ground forces offered by Senator John McCain of the Committee on Armed Services in his paper about reshaping our national strategy and force plans to meet the challenges of the future:\(^\text{13}\)

- "As our overseas basing continues to decline, we must assess our requirement for large ground-based forces. This will require greater emphasis on allied capabilities for ground combat missions.

- We need to re-tailor both our active and reserve forces to concentrate our resources on forces we can rapidly deploy or move forward within a few months. We do not need units, bases, reserves, or large stocks of equipment that we cannot project outside the U.S. without a year or more of mobilization time.

- Future success for our soldiers on the battlefield will be highly dependent on technological advances and innovative ways of employing these technologies, particularly to enhance military communications."

All of the accounts above reflect the current mood in the highest levels of our Nation about the future of our national security strategy and military force structure. But the key question for the purposes of this study is, "how will these accounts likely impact ARNG combat units given the perceptions active component officers have of ARNG combat units as uncovered in the survey?"

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War did start a fundamental and ongoing reassessment of defense planning which will, ultimately, require major re-engineering of our armed forces. The world situation has changed significantly necessitating new force structure thinking; the decline in defense expenditures is likely continue; and
resulting declines in force structure will require a new force mix.

The perspectives gained in the TRADOC briefing on the Force XXI Experimental Division Design is only the beginning for a new mix of ground forces at the operational level. From a strategic perspective, however, there are two factors which are not likely to change with the winds of Force XXI: (1) the future international climate, and (2) Congress' determination that federalized Guard units under the "total force" concept is an essential part of the Nation's defense planning and readiness. For good or bad, the active army's position on the first factor is that in such an environment of uncertainty, a force must have the flexibility that only a large standing army could provide. Imbedded in the second factor which the reader must recall is Clausewitz's concept of the Trinity. In today's Total Force Army, our Nation will not commit to sustained combat without mobilizing the Reserves which, in effect, ensures the support of the American people.

Given the future international climate and Total Force Policy compounded by the pressures of reducing the defense budget, the force structure of the U.S. Armed Forces is not only likely to retain a force mix, but one with an increased emphasis on RC forces. The key question remains what is the optimum mix? While it is important to explore the subject of this study, "The effectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize for MRCs," it is quickly becoming more apparent that the more relevant question
is, "How do we reorganize ARNG force structure and resource ARNG maneuver units consistent with the direction Force XXI is taking?" Does it not make military sense to re-organize ARNG combat units to more optimum-sized units which can be modernized and resourced with pre-mobilization training support? One thing is clear from the feedback of the 4-Stars to the Force XXI Experimental Division Design, CS and CSS must be enhanced to support our combat structure for effective power projection. Imagine the 2nd and 3rd effects of this philosophy on RC re-structuring.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Future force structure and force mix decisions should be made in the spirit of the Total Force policy. Short of changes to the Constitution and reversals in national budget trends, ARNG roundout units will likely remain an integral component of defense planning. While the survey reveals perceptions that ARNG combat units were not effective in mobilizing for MRCs, they are based, for the most part on indirect accounts of our Desert Storm experience, and not necessarily factual. The truth is the roundout concept was not tested in Desert Storm. Reliable evidence corroborates the view that if not for the extra post-mobilization requirements placed on the three ARNG roundout brigades, they would have been declared combat ready within 90 days of call-up and could have made it to the fight had DOD mobilized them in a timely manner.
2. Selected ARNG combat units need to be re-structured into more manageable battalions/brigades in response to the cries from the active component for more CS and CSS units. The results of the survey reinforce the view that without sufficient training resources, mainly time for collective training, ARNG combat divisions simply can not effectively train and mobilize for the crisis situations anticipated in the changing international environment. Less than division-size ARNG units are more likely to fit into a new force structure that achieves our national security objectives.

3. Further re-structure the ARNG in the spirit of the Force XXI Division design wherein a primary tenet is to consolidate CSS at brigade level so maneuver commanders can focus on warfighting. ARNG and Army Reserve force structures can both be re-focused to ensure our combat support structure effectively supports our combat structure so we end up with a better combat division.
ENDNOTES


4. FM 100-5, Clausewitz quotation, p.6.

5. In a chronological summary of the events leading up to the ground war in Desert Storm provided in a subsequent section of this study, the reader will be reminded that three ARNG field artillery brigades mobilized, deployed, and employed two days prior to start of the ground war and achieved the highest fire rate in Third Army. Could the lone Air Force respondent have been privy to this knowledge, unlike the Navy respondent and this writer whose primary example of alleged ineffectiveness of ARNG combat units to mobilize for the Gulf War was based on the experience of the 48th Mech Brigade from the Georgia Army National Guard discussed in seminars?


7. GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., "The 48th Brigade-A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization," National Guard: 4-5


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MEMORANDUM FOR Active Component U.S. Officers of Selected Seminars, AY96

Subject: Survey on Army National Guard Combat Unit Effectiveness for Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs)

1. I am conducting a survey of active component U.S. officers in the USAWC Class of 1996 to ascertain if Army National Guard combat divisions are effective in mobilizing for MRCs. I am appealing for some of your time and effort to fill out the attached survey in support of my Strategic Research Paper (SRP.)

2. Some background information would help put this survey in proper perspective. Clearly, defense resources continue to decline in the post Cold War period. Significant adjustments in the size, nature, and roles & missions of our armed forces, including the reserve components, continue to be made by DOD. Because some adjustments in force mix and roles & missions could be made in the reserve components, the intent of my SRP is to examine fundamentally the effectiveness of Army National Guard combat divisions for participation in MRCs.

3. I am surveying a sample of the active component officers in this class to gain further insights into this important area. Your opinions are important because you are - and will continue to be - the senior leadership of the Army.

4. If you have any questions or would like a copy of the results, please call me, send me an e-mail, or talk to me.

5. Please help me bring clarity to this matter by completing and returning the attached survey to me, LTC Tony Quan, Box 241 by Friday, 8 December 1995.

[Signature]

ANTHONY F. QUAN
LTC, EN

Attachment
Army National Guard Combat Division Effectiveness for Major Regional Conflicts

1. Please indicate which service you belong to:
   a. Army
   b. Navy
   c. Air Force
   d. Marine Corps

2. Please indicate which of the following groups you belong to:
   a. Combat Arms, Line Officer, Aviator, or equivalent
   b. Combat Support (CS) or equivalent
   c. Combat Service Support (CSS) or equivalent
   d. Other (please specify): _______________________

3. What is your experience with any Army National Guard units?
   a. Have been an advisor to an Army National Guard unit(s)
   b. Have served with Army National Guard unit(s)
   c. Have participated in training or evaluations of Army National Guard unit(s)
   d. Have only book knowledge of Army National Guard units
   e. Have neither experience nor book knowledge

4. Specifically, what is your experience with Army National Guard combat divisions?
   a. Have been an advisor to Army National Guard divisions
   b. Have served with Army National Guard divisions
   c. Have participated in training or evaluations of Army National Guard divisions
   d. Have only book knowledge of Army National Guard divisions
   e. Have neither experience nor book knowledge
APPENDIX

(In this survey, mobilization includes call-up, through validation at the National Training Center or equivalent program, to deployment in theater.)

5. In your opinion, how effectively were Army National Guard combat divisions mobilized for World War II?
   a. Very effective
   b. Effective
   c. Ineffective
   d. Very ineffective
   e. Don’t know

6. In your opinion, how effectively were Army National Guard combat divisions mobilized for the Korean conflict?
   a. Very effective
   b. Effective
   c. Ineffective
   d. Very ineffective
   e. Don’t know

7. In your opinion, how effectively were Army National Guard combat divisions mobilized for Desert Storm?
   a. Very effective
   b. Effective
   c. Ineffective
   d. Very ineffective
   e. Don’t know

8. For Question 7, which of the following is your opinion based on? Circle all that apply.
   a. Deployed to Desert Storm (personal knowledge)
   b. Media accounts
   c. Professional publications (professional knowledge)
   d. Other reliable sources (please specify): __________________________
   e. non-applicable
APPENDIX

9. How effectively can Army National Guard combat divisions be mobilized for major regional conflicts (MRCs)?
   a. Very effective
   b. Effective
   c. Ineffective
   d. Very ineffective
   e. Don't know

10. Which of the following factors hinder the effectiveness of Army National Guard combat unit mobilization? Circle all that apply.
   a. Limited training resources
   b. Political interference
   c. Inappropriate roles & missions
   d. Poor use of training resources
   e. Lack of leadership & management
   f. Inability to recruit
   g. Other (please specify): ____________________________

11. In your opinion, which of the following employments of Army National Guard combat divisions would best serve our Nation's interest in the future given declining defense resources?
   a. In MRCs only
   b. In operations other-than-war (OOTW) only
   c. In either MRCs or OOTW
   d. Army National Guard combat divisions can not be mobilized effectively.
   e. Other: ____________________________

12. Assuming Army National Guard combat divisions are needed in the post Cold War period, what length of time should be specified for their mobilization (again, from call-up through validation to deployment) for them to be effective for MRCs?
   a. 90 day/3 months
   b. 180 days/6 months
   c. 270 days/9 months
   d. 365 days/12 months
13. From a joint perspective, which of the following do you believe is the best assignment of roles and missions for reserve combat divisions versus active component units? Circle only one.

a. Maintain current distribution of C, CS, CSS divisions in the active and reserve components.

b. Consolidate all combat forces in the active component and use reserve component forces to supplement CS and CSS operations.

c. Assign all OCONUS missions to the active component, and all CONUS missions to the reserve components.

d. Other force mix (please specify):

e. Reserve component combat divisions are not needed in the post Cold War period

14. What changes in the Army National Guard combat divisions (structure, missions, training, mobilization, etc) would you make to better ensure our country is able to secure its interests in the post Cold War period at optimum cost?

Other Comments:

Thank you for your time and efforts.

Please return this completed survey by 4 December 1995
LTC Anthony F. Quan
Box 241
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