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PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE GRAY ZONE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper attempts to analyze the validity of peace enforcement operations in Bosnia. It discusses three key questions: (1) Has the U.S. delineated clear military objectives? (2) Is there a danger of the U.S. military failing to establish conditions necessary for economic and political success? (3) Can the U.S. sustain the will of its citizens in its support for this mission?
INTRODUCTION

On occasion, US forces may be directed to participate in peace enforcement operations or other operations which stand in the gray zone between peace and war.

The above policy statement is taken from the 1995 National Military Strategy. In this document, the United States' military strategy is succinctly divided into three components: (1) peacetime engagement, (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, and (3) fighting and winning the Nation's wars. This paper is concerned with addressing the validity of committing U.S. forces in this peace enforcement role as it applies to the on-going U.S. mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

This paper attempts to analyze the validity of this gray zone situation in three ways: (1) Has the U.S. delineated clear military objectives? (2) Is there a danger of the military failing to establish conditions necessary for economic and political success? (3) Can the U.S. sustain the will of its citizens in its support for this mission? There are many documents which attempt to spell out U.S. commitment in the Bosnia problem. Figure 1 shows a relationship found in three planning documents: U.S. peacekeeping manual, our National Military Strategy, and President Clinton's National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. In particular is the criticality of the linkage between U.S. national policy and the use of our military force to help solve the difficult political problems in Bosnia. What the model in figure 1 points toward is the comparison of U.S. strategic objectives with the military's operational objectives to determine if the use of military intervention is correct or ill-conceived.

The discussion begins with the use of term gray zone. This term attempts to describe U.S. national strategic objectives as they relate to the use of military force in conflicts short of declared war. What we have seen over the last two years is that the use of US forces into a region, such as Bosnia, presents some unique challenges. Heretofore, the military has had the luxury of viewing battlefield successes as absolutes. Operating in a gray zone environment changes the motives and results of military action. Future success means a political "Quid Pro Quo" in which the military acts as either a deterrent, or as a limited actor which selectively uses violence to achieve a specific condition that allows the political dynamics to succeed.

This use of military force to set conditions necessary to achieve "limited" political solutions, is a new phenomenon. Unfortunately, what Bosnia is showing the U.S. policy of peace enforcement, is a failed military component strategy that will not effectively encourage political and economic solutions.
The Peace Enforcement Model (figure 1)

Goals for Success in Bosnia
1. Achieve political settlement preserving Bosnian integrity.
2. Prevent spread of fighting
3. Stop flow of refugees
4. Halt slaughter of innocents
5. Support NATO role in Europe

Political Pressure & Influence
Economic Restrictions & Incentives

IFOR Peace Enforcement Tasks
1. Protect the IFOR
2. Enforce withdrawal of belligerents
3. Establish a zone of separation
4. Enforce cessation of hostilities
5. Set conditions of security for implementation of civil peace

National Military Strategy

Peace Keeping Doctrine

Peace Engagement Guidelines
1. Commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives
2. Achieve the objectives decisively
3. Reassess and adjust the size, composition, & disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives

National Security Strategy of Engagement & Enlargement
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Ethnic identity is sine qua non to individuals in the Balkans, especially to the participants in the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia—so important that many are willing to kill or die for it. From William T. Johnson’s monograph entitled Deciphering The Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy.

Bosnia presents a complex peace problem. Our National Military Strategy has stated that our military ends or objectives involve the stabilization of the peace in a region through the use of force, if required. "Such actions are undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to respond to acts of aggression." ²

This statement reads well, but when applied to Bosnia, defining the end state is difficult. This difficulty is due to the complexity of the different factions that have lived in this region for centuries. But a key to establishing definable political objectives is found in the complex history of the region.

Before April 1992, the region of Bosnia-Hercegovina had never existed as an independent state. By the seventh century, the Slavs and Croats had settled the region. The Serbs, with their Orthodox religion were in conflict with the Roman Catholic Croats. By the fifteenth century, the Turks had conquered
the Serbs and Croats and brought Islam into the region. They would rule, unchallenged, through most of the nineteenth century.

In the mid nineteenth century, a Christian peasants revolt took place against the Ottoman Turks. Serbia, assisted by Russian troops crushed the Ottoman army in the region. Other European powers, however, feared an imbalance of power caused by the Russian assisted victory and "placed Bosnia-Hercegovina under ...the Austro-Hungarian empire, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878." Increased nationalism among both Serbs and Croats in the late 19th century continued to gain momentum. Although this region was eventually managed by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the desire for independence never left the Serbs, Croats, or Muslim people.

As this brief historical synopsis shows, what was true then is true now. The roots of today's conflict can be traced back to deep cultural, religious, and nationalistic differences by three distinct groups of people who, historically, have relied on open warfare as the only real solution to resolving the problems of autonomy. Frankly, the past four years of war in the region has taught the belligerents to rely on aggression:

The Croats and Slovenes will never forget that they are independent today not because the West wanted them to be, but because they withstood the Serbian onslaught with success for more than six months. And the Bosnian Muslims will always remember that their original republic has disappeared only because they lost a similar war. And the conclusion: the use of force pays every single time, precisely the opposite outcome from that the Community wished to stress.
ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

The Serbs and the Croats were, as regards race and language, originally one people, the two names having merely geographical signification...Were it not originally for religion, there would be little basis for Serb-Croat enmity.

On April 7, 1992, the independent Balkan Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was formally recognized, although somewhat reluctantly, by the European Community (EC). The leader of this new republic is Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, who had a dream of establishing a multiethnic nation of 4.3 million people with 44 percent of its Muslim citizens taking the helm of this new nation. Unfortunately, two other ethnic peoples did not share in Izetbegovic’s dream. Both the Serbs, which made up 33 percent of the population, and the Croats, comprising 19 percent, had other ideas.

Immediately, upon the heels of the EC’s recognition of Izetbegovic’s new government, the Serbs living in Bosnia "proclaimed an independent ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina’ and began to set up administrative structures and an army commanded by ...General Ratko Mladic."
There were similar tensions with the Croats, although less overt. Croatian actions and rhetoric sent mixed signals to the Bosnian Muslims. "Moderate Croats in the republic favored a united Bosnia-Hercegovina. More nationalist ones desired the creation of a Croatian canton with wide-ranging autonomy from the Bosnia-Hercegovina government and close links with Croatia." As a practical matter, President Izetbegovic felt the necessity to align his political future with the Croats. This was due primarily to the Bosnian Serbs success on the battlefield. The better equipped Serbs had retained much of the artillery pieces, tanks, some helicopters, and fighters left when the Yugoslavian army had split apart. The Serbs numbered "50,000 armed and trained soldiers...and probably another 50,000 or so 'militiamen'.... [their] main advantage was...heavy weapons and plenty of ammunition...as well as trained gunners and other technicians." By 1994, with this relatively well trained army, the Bosnian Serbs were able to control roughly two thirds of Bosnia.

By comparison, the Bosnian Muslims were not as well outfitted, composed primarily from a light infantry manpower base with the associated light infantry weapons. "In all the Bosnian government probably had about 200,000 armed men...handicapped by a lack of heavy arms, aircraft, a sound military framework, military command and good logistic support." These soldiers were an amalgam of former Yugoslavian professionals, militia, and police. In total, this group was called the Territorial Defense
Force (TDF).

Adding to this proliferation of men and arms was the Croatia Defense Council (HVO),...with 40,000 men, mainly Croats from the TDF."11 Although on the surface, these soldiers were controlled by the Bosnian government, there were concerns that their true loyalties belonged to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Izetbegovic had real concerns as to the true reasons for Tudjman's reluctant support. "There have...been persistent reports that Tudjman held secret meetings with Milosevic before the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina started in which he discussed the partition of the republic with the Serbian leader."12

The present situation finds a new and internationally recognized country called Bosnia-Hercegovina. The legally elected government, led by Izetbegovic, is in the untenable position of having to rely on the European Community, the United Nations, NATO, and world opinion to maintain its legitimacy, when in fact, the government only recently has begun to establish control within its borders.

The sad reality is that there still are three armed groups that currently are jockeying for political advantage even after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. And in the midst of all this, the U.S. has deployed 20,000 soldiers, as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), into this gray zone of armed belligerents.

The obvious question is have we, the US, violated its own doctrine by the commitment of US troops? U.S. military doctrine

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demands clear objectives before the commitment of troops. "A clearly defined and attainable objective—with a precise understanding of what constitutes success—is critical when the U.S. is involved in peace operations."\(^{13}\)

An attempt at coming to terms at defining success or the end state was offered in the details of the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on 22 November, 1995. This plan was "intended to stop the creeping creation of a Greater Serbia, to discourage any thoughts of a Greater Serbia, and to demonstrate that neither would be tolerated."\(^{14}\)

This theme of stopping the Serbian aggression and consolidation of Bosnian territory was, in large measure, the center-piece of the final peace agreement, the 1995, Dayton Peace Agreement. In this final agreement, the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians have agreed to specific terms that include:

1. The NATO military Implementation Force terms
2. Regional stabilization stipulations
3. Inter-entity boundary demarcation stipulations
4. Election a conditions
5. Arbitration
6. Human rights
7. Refugees and displaced persons
8. Civilian implementation
9. International Police Task Force\(^{15}\)

This then, is the peace umbrella U.S. soldiers are operating under. However, the military objectives remain tenuous because
there is the apparent beginnings of the unraveling of this
fragile consensus between the three ethnic parties. This places
the insertion of NATO troops in a precarious position. Our
doctrine recognizes and warns against this possibility as stated
in FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low
Intensity Conflict:

Unless the peacemaking force has the
necessary power, both military and
political, to compel a lasting settlement,
it may find itself attempting to govern
in the face of opposition from both parties.
Extrication from such a situation may be
difficult and the force may leave the area
having made the situation worse than it
was before it intervened.16

To avoid what our doctrine warns in the above statement,
its important to review what the U.S. National Military Strategy
delineates as the guidelines for committing US forces in a peace
enforcement scenario:

1. Commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly
defined objectives,
2. Achieve the objectives decisively,
3. Reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size,
   composition, and disposition of our forces to
   achieve our objectives.17

Unfortunately, in pursuing this complex peace enforcement
strategy, there are three significant problems emerging that
counter these guidelines: (1) vague military objectives, (2) potential for military forces failing to set necessary conditions to achieve political success, and (3) lack of will by the American people to sustain the Bosnian peace enforcement mission.

The danger that concerns all the experts is that failure to solve these three problems will potentially render the political and economic pieces of the Dayton Peace Plan useless. These problems present tremendous risks for both the United States and its NATO allies. But the significant risk is firmly in the lap of the United States. The problem is magnified by the view, that if you concede that NATO is only as strong as the US commitment, then failure to find a lasting solution in Bosnia results in failure of both NATO as an alliance and the United States as the single world leader. This logic fuels the requirement for the U.S. to send soldiers into Bosnia, and is the primary cause for the apparent disconnect between IFOR operational requirements for using military forces and the political strategic goals.

1.

Vague Military Objectives

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The aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy....If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make.

Clausewitz, On War, 1832
Since the devastating results of the Vietnam War and the overwhelming success of the Gulf War, the American public has viewed the commitment of US forces with one over-riding principle; when you send troops, go to win and then get out!

This philosophy has been reinforced by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, who has underscored the country's reluctance to send American troops into harms way without a vision of complete victory as the end state. "We have repeatedly gotten in trouble thinking that the use of military force is for the purpose of being seen as having done something. You should use military force for achieving a specific military purpose that is linked to the achievement of a specific political purpose and goal."\(^{18}\)

The same vision of setting conditions resulting from specific military purposes are not clear when reviewing the military mission for the IFOR. As a result of the Dayton Agreement, five tasks have been prescribed to be fulfilled in one year:

1. Protect the force and ensure freedom of movement for IFOR.
2. Enforce required withdrawal of forces to respective territories.
3. Establish and man zone of separation.
4. Enforce the cessation of hostilities.
5. Provide a secure environment which permits conduct of civil peace implementation functions.\(^{19}\)
Interestingly, since December 1995, the IFOR has conducted a superb military operation surpassing all expectations. With little intervention from the belligerents, the IFOR has been able to establish control over the entire Bosnian region. The U.S. forces, in particular, have had little challenges to their authority.

The result of this four month occupation has produced success in force protection for NATO troops, the consolidation of ethnic boundaries, and a withdrawal of the warring factions to their respective agreed upon territories. Although, the IFOR mission tasks have seen successful, there remains much to be done. Further, the concern by many experts is that what NATO may be experiencing is only an interlude to the hostilities that will reignite after the IFOR troops have left in eight months.

The interlude, however, is meant for peace-building. The danger is that without much more considered and detailed attention by the outside world, it will be at worst, not done or, at best, inadequately done, and then a return to war becomes more likely.

In particular, there is concern when the IFOR departs that there will not have been ample time to permit the required infrastructure and economic aid necessary for continued regional peace. If civil peace cannot be maintained and war breaks out, the IFOR must deal with the potential of full-fledged combat.

U.S. policy has identified this problem and has stated "NATO and US forces will enforce a peace, not fight a war." In the
U.S. attempt to prevent a serious confrontation, our words have signaled to all of the Bosnian players that there are limits to our commitment to achieving a peaceful solution. It is this type of confusing guidance that sets up 20,000 US troops for failure.

The confusion is exacerbated by the additional task of searching for and arresting suspected war criminals. This has been very sensitive politically. In initial agreement, the IFOR did not intend to focus on chasing after war criminals.

The reality is that all three belligerents have a history of brutality and there is ample blame in all three camps. This was a fight that the IFOR leadership did not want. "NATO Commander Admiral Leighton Smith has insisted that the mission of his forces does not extend to seeking out war criminals in order to arrest them. Indeed, to attempt this now probably would cost lives."

Because of international pressure, however, NATO forces have been forced to take a more active interest in finding, arresting, and controlling suspected war criminals. This could become a significant mission that would divert time and resources from the already negotiated five directed tasks.

To compound the problem, the directed policy for IFOR commanders is for any suspected war criminals that have been detained, to be turned over to the Bosnian Government. In particular, to Bosnia police which make up a large contingent of observers and trainers described as the International Police Force. Presently, this police force is a meager group needing
additional policeman and training.

Three months after it began sending international civilian police monitors and trainers to Bosnia, the United Nations has been able to field fewer than half the 1,721 officers it was asked to recruit... The United States, which promised 200 police officers, is one of the primary defaulters. Only 33 Americans have reached the Balkans.... 21

The combination of strong ethnic hatred and a weak civilian law enforcement structure, forces the IFOR to fill the vacuum. Unfortunately, this places an additional burden on the NATO force to enforce civil law as an add-on to their original charter. Further, it is dangerous to impose a foreign military force on a people who have shown violence as a method of problem solving. "It is extremely difficult to maintain law and order in a country that's not your own." 24

2.

Military Failure to Set Conditions

The probable character and general shape of any war should mainly be assessed in the light of political factors and conditions.

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

A bosnian Muslim woman in her fifties was interviewed by ABC Evening News on 14 December in Tuzla. She was filmed leaving the town cemetery where her son was buried. When the reporter
asked her if she thought peace would come about with the introduction of the US forces, her answer was both startling and poignant. She turned to the reporter and said, "My only son was killed by Serb soldiers, I don't care if the war goes on for twenty years." We must believe that there are hundreds of Muslim, Serb, and Croat mothers with similar feelings. Therefore, do we dare hope that hostilities can be stopped, using the IFOR, given the face of this sort of vengeful hate among the players?

In his 19 March, New York Times article "Fiery Farewell in Bosnian Land Transfer", Chris Hedges captures the depth of this ethnic distrust and hate when he quotes the Mayor of a small Serbian community near Sarajevo "People are burning their houses because they are bitter and angry....They don't want to leave their houses for the Muslims to inhabit."25

It is this cultural chasm between the Muslims and the Serbs and Croats that keeps the cessation of hostilities from advancing toward the next goal of rebuilding the regions infrastructure.

Clearly, the IFOR can only give leverage to what must ultimately be a political solution. In precise terms "the military...mission of IFOR is to create a stable environment for the civil aspects to proceed."26 This underscores the primary purpose of the military presence is Bosnia which is to set conditions for the implementation of the peace plan.

Again referring to the National Military Strategy, the means or resources that are planned for the execution of this peace
enforcement policy "are characterized by the use of force or the threat of the use of force, and are interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts, often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations."\(^{27}\)

Obviously, the commitment of ground troops is not the center-piece to the peace plan, but rather it must be the impact of political and economic infrastructure pressures and incentives that must eventually solve the Bosnia problem. These include the recently concluded arms embargo to Bosnia, the declaration of a no-fly zone over selected safe areas, and active patrolling of the Adriatic Sea by NATO vessels.

When reviewed in total, however, the diplomatic and economic measures have had mixed results. It is true that prior to the introduction of the IFOR, the EC and U.S. had succeeded in orchestrating tremendous pressure against Serbia in an attempt to reduce the early military victories of the Bosnian Serbs. "Nearly four years of international isolation has crippled the Yugoslav economy, by depriving factories of raw materials."\(^{28}\)

But, there have also been unforeseen negative results to the embargoes in the region that have hurt those not intended and even stimulated solidarity to some of the belligerants.

The stringencies of the UN embargo raised Milosevic’s [Serbian President] popularity ratings instead of reducing them.... The embargo may not have produced the desired political result....hospitals became short of medicines and supplies for medical operations and treatment, children began to show signs of malnutrition...."\(^{29}\)
Even the EC sanctioned sea embargo has been inconclusive. Both NATO and the Western European Union vessels have, beginning in July 1992, patrolled the Adriatic Sea "but lacked the authority to stop or divert shipping or search for contraband....in November [UN] gave them the power to stop and search ships and allowed monitoring ships to 'fire warning shots, but not to destroy vessels', a dilemma in itself if suspect ships refused to stop."\textsuperscript{30}

As of 27 February, 1996, the United Nations filially lifted economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. The UN council concluded that "the Bosnian Serbs had fulfilled the conditions for lifting sanctions by withdrawing from the zones of separation between feuding ethnic groups...."\textsuperscript{31} The obvious question is did the embargo help or hinder the present peace effort.

The answer may be the March 19th official statement, from LTG Patrick Hughes, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency who offered this critical comment to the senate subcommittee on Bosnia: "prospects for the existence of a viable, unitary Bosnia beyond the life of the NATO deployment are dim without a large international program to revive Bosnia's war-shattered economy."\textsuperscript{32}

The heart of the problem centers around Europe and the United States providing billions of dollars for rebuilding infrastructure during the time-frame in which NATO troops still hold the security edge over the three belligerents.
Responding to this goal, the U.S. House of Representatives "agreed to ...fund the Clinton administration's $200 million request for civilian reconstruction and other non-defense efforts there."  

But the amount of money needed to rebuild this war-torn country is literally in the billions of dollars. The money must come from many countries and come quickly if is to have the impact expected. The man given the responsibility to manage the rebuilding effort is the former prime minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt. Bildt's concern is that, to date, there are few countries coming forward with sufficient funds to assist in the reconstruction plans. Many have pledged support but few have actually sent funds. The British government announced recently that it would approve a "17 million pound repair programme [sic] for electricity, water, transport and public services in Bosnia-Hercegovina."  

But Bildt is not impressed. The amount of money necessary to begin real economic rebuilding is not forthcoming and he is faced with a U.S. imposed one year IFOR deadline. Unfortunately, it's the IFOR which provides the only stabilizing force that can set the conditions for the necessary economic improvements. "Bildt has complained repeatedly...that foreign governments have been slow to make available the billions of dollars needed for civilian reconstruction-everything from building bridges, to printing election ballots-and that the political component of the peace effort is lagging far behind its military component."
3.

Gaining the Will of the American People

For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC

Every major poll in the United States has shown that Americans feel there is no vital interest to the U.S. in Bosnia, and hence places U.S. soldiers needlessly at risk. The administration argues that failure to support the NATO alliance by sending a proportionate share of ground troops into Bosnia will destroy the alliance and possibly set conditions for the future destabilization of Europe. I believe this reasoning to be sound. However, our recent history has taught us that a prolonged conflict without the support of the American people results in disaster for the military as an organization, as well as, for US prestige. This is an important history lesson.

The U.S. brokered Dayton Peace Agreement had a two-fold purpose when it used the military IFOR: (1) as a statement of NATO resolve in the region and (2) to quickly stop open hostilities and allow the rebuilding process to begin. The NATO political leadership, especially President Clinton, balanced a one year deadline for the commitment of the 1st Armored Division
against a continuing U.S. presence in the form of civilian contractor-trainers and billions of dollars for rebuilding the economy.

To date, these balances have not materialized. Many experts are concerned that when the IFOR pulls out without any substantial improvements in either the economy or civil peace that war will surface once again.

The U.S. has led a singular effort to bring in civilian trainers whose function is to equip and train the Bosnian Muslim army to achieve parity prior to the IFOR departure.

The decision to provide weapons and training to Bosnian forces was one of the most important incentives held out to the Bosnian Government to secure its agreement with the peace plan drawn up last fall. Bosnian and American officials argued that they must strengthen the Bosnian Army so it will be capable of defending itself against the Bosnian Serbs...after NATO peacekeepers pull out at the end of 1996.36

The reality of this matter, however, is that both money and trainers are not forthcoming. The proposal anticipated an $800 million dollar bill, of which the U.S. would provide $100 million. Unfortunately, no other countries have stepped up to offer funding for this project. "An American sponsored donor conference...in Ankara failed to attract any significant extra pledges, apart from a promise by Turkey to carry out some training."37

The Bosnian Government considers this aspect of the agreement as crucial. They are realistic is their expectation that once the IFOR departs, only the perception of military strength will deter the Serbs. If the Americans cannot make good
on their rearming commitment, then the Bosnian Government will look elsewhere.

Elsewhere is Iran. According to Seyed Mohsen Rasidouleslami, a senior Iranian diplomat in Sarejevo, "If America is unable to keep its promise to the Bosnians and equip and train the Bosnian Army we will continue with our policy of supporting the Bosnian Government and military....we are ready to provide anything the Government requests us to provide."³⁸

The increasing influence of Iran in Bosnia would threaten U.S. regional influence and exacerbate the hostility toward a greater Muslim presence in Europe. The Europeans, predominantly Christians, have always been concerned with the presence of Muslims in middle Europe. Attempting to achieve parity in weapons and munitions by the Muslims increases this fear. "From the beginning, European allies have criticized the American plan as short-sighted, arguing that the influence of weapons into the region will increase instability."³⁹

Presently, the U.S. has the initiative. With the help of Turkey, small arms weapons, armored personnel carriers, some battle tanks and anti-tank weapons have been provided along with the appropriate training is taking place. It will be a race to next December to see how effective this rearming plan will work.

Still, the most significant problem effecting the peace plan is lack of sufficient funds to restart and rebuild a country that has been at war for four years. Roads, bridges, factories, and housing are lacking for all the people in the region. What is
left, if not improved, will be the cause for a rebirth to armed conflict among all three ethnic groups.

Michael Steiner, deputy to Carl Bildt, was quoted as saying:

"Foreign governments must be willing to immediately begin paying the costs of rebuilding the shattered country.... Compared with the military peacekeeping efforts, the economic and political rebuilding efforts in Bosnia have serious shortcomings.... We don't have yet, so far, the money that we were promised in the beginning.... The whole of Bosnia has not yet enough confidence in the peace."

President Clinton has publically pledged to bring the troops home December 1996. The international community has not come forward with the needed funds to allow civil peace to prosper and expand. The ethnic hatreds and vendettas that, for the moment, have subsided, could reemerge after the IFOR pulls out. "Planners acknowledge that televised pictures of U.S. soldiers tramping back across the Sava this summer could be politically destabilizing."

CONCLUSION

| If you finally decide you have to commit military force, you've got to be as massive and decisive as possible. Decide your target, decide your objective, and try to overwhelm it. From Colin Powell's book In His Own Words. |
As Colin Powell eludes in the above quote, the U.S. military is designed to be committed quickly and then overwhelm its opponent decisively. This philosophy is in contradiction to our National Military Strategy.

Rather, this strategy describes a gray zone in which "Quid Pro Quo" is the only outcome. This new environment demands that U.S. military forces will execute critical peace enforcement tasks that have specific aims that very seldom include defeating an enemy in open combat. Bosnia fits this gray zone future. But, this use of the U.S. military in the gray zone is both dangerous and wrong.

Frankly, problems have emerged, when attempting to design specific military tasks that compliment the broader political and economic picture of rebuilding Bosnia. These political problems in Bosnia cannot be achieved through the use of overwhelming military force.

The complex peace enforcement tasks, given to the IFOR to accomplish, are not linked to President Clinton’s strategic objectives. The President recognized the need to maintain U.S. leadership in Europe and realize that only troops in the region would send the proper signal to U.S. allies.

It was also important for the United States to demonstrate support for the NATO initiative. Therefore, including U.S. troops in the NATO troop list was an absolute. This philosophy was articulated by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
responding to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 and 18 October, 1995, "a peace settlement in Bosnia is now within reach that will allow us to avoid the dangerous spread of the conflict. But the settlement will not take place without a NATO implementation force. And NATO cannot undertake this role without U.S. leadership."

But, as this paper has discussed, there is no lasting cause and effect between the deployment of troops and the rebuilding of a nation, especially when the President places a one year deadline on U.S. troop operations.

The quick cessation of hostilities and separation of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims took four months. This piece of the plan can be judged as a military success, but not so, for the strategic goals:

1. achieving political settlement preserving Bosnian integrity,
2. preventing the spread of the fighting,
3. stopping the flow of refugees,
4. halting slaughter of innocent civilians, and
5. supporting NATO's role in Europe.

The conditions necessary for the political and economic work to be accomplished cannot be maintained by the IFOR. As figure 1 shows, pulling the military foundation out from under the political and economic incentives will only cause progress to cease and old wounds to reopen. This situation exists now in
Bosnia.

If it appears that the parties will return to war the minute NATO leaves, NATO will probably have to remain. The Europeans are already signaling that they might be willing to stay past December, provided the U.S. doesn’t arm the Muslims with anything more than light weapons. The Europeans don’t want the Muslims to be strong enough to upset any partition. Washington may have to choose between arming the Muslims or having the Europeans stay in Bosnia after U.S. troops pull out.43

In preparing for this operation, the U.S. knew that historically the Balkans has never known lasting peace between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The U.S. also knew that this region was coming out of a four year civil war in which there was still is tremendous hatred among the belligerents, a growing distrust of a Bosnian Muslim state surrounded by Catholic countries, documented cases of war crimes, and meddling by foreign muslim freedom fighters.

All these negatives were infecting the region. Add to this complex situation the fact that large amounts of money were promised to begin the rebuilding process.

...on the civilian side, work has barely begun on the hardest tasks—organizing elections, rebuilding shattered homes, roads, and power lines, and overseeing the return of 2.2 million refugees. And unless there are signs of success soon, Mr. Bildt and others warned of the danger of resumed fighting after the NATO force leave....44

Time has proven to be the great inhibitor! Reports indicate that the five directed military tasks of the IFOR have succeeded in stabilizing the region. However, "the World Bank and other international agencies estimated ...that $5.1 billion in foreign
aid would be needed over the next three to four years to get the recovery started....But...donor countries have actually contributed only about $358 million...for emergency recovery projects."45

Further, world opinion has now forced the IFOR to refocus its efforts toward the arresting of suspected war criminals—a task that seems to have no resolution and offers great dangers for NATO troops.

Additionally, the training and rearming of the Bosnian Muslim Army is also proving difficult. There are not enough trainer-contractors and insufficient funds to pay for the operation. Again, only the U.S. has offered $200 million dollars to this training effort which will take considerably more money.

Eight months remain before the IFOR will depart. The political and economic rebuilding problems will take much longer than eight months to resolve. Without eliminating the time factor, the small gains made will evaporate.

The strategy that appears to be the motive for the use of NATO forces for only one year is allow Bosnia to have a chance to fix itself. The IFOR gives this region the chance to stop and determine its future. President Clinton has stated this strategy in his comments to the media at the Dayton Agreement signing when he stated "We will give the Bosnians a chance in this next year to begin the process. If they fail to cease hostilities, then they have had their chance and we will pull our military out."

This statement shows the short-sidedness of U.S. policy, a
lack of understanding of the deep-rooted regional problems in Bosnia, and a misapplication of the use of military force to assist in finding a political solution.

However, the U.S. has brokered the peace in the Balkans, arm-twisted the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement with the belligerents, and has become the underpinning for military forces and money for the Bosnia recovery operation. To pick up and leave in eight months puts everything at risk.

With the amount of uncertainty presently in the region, the withdrawal of a significant portion of the IFOR, namely the U.S. 1st Armored Division, would, almost certainly, result in renewed open warfare between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Most probably, the U.S. can avoid complete disaster, by relocating its ground contingent to Hungary. This would provide sufficient overwatch and rapid reaction capability to the NATO forces left in Bosnia. Further, the U.S. could continue air and logistics support to NATO forces in country, thus maintaining its influence in the peace keeping policies in the region.

Finally, it must be realized that the U.S. has blindly entered this gray zone as described in the National Military Strategy. Although misguided in its application of military force, the U.S. has no choice, now, but to see it through.

...this is Bosnia, a place of death and ethnic cleansing, especially for Muslims. Others cannot in good faith abandon them to new perils and deny them a fair chance to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{46}
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid, 12.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., CRS-5.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


20. Jonathan Power, "Imposing Peace in Bosnia was easy; building it is the challenge", Boston Globe, 3 March, 1996, p. 75.


24. Ibid.


29. O'Ballance, 249.


37. Ibid, 1/3.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.


45. Ibid.

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