STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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With the end of the Cold War, the United States is experiencing an expanded role in the conduct of peace operations. This study traces the evolution and development of American strategy, doctrine, and terminology for peace operations, and identifies challenges within this framework for responding to and supporting peace operations in the post Cold War era. The paper examines the legal norms relating to the use of force, beginning with the formal study of war, followed by the evolution of United States peace operations strategy and doctrine in two distinct periods, the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It then describes challenges to American policy makers and strategists in this expanding area of military operations. Extensive endnotes and a Glossary are included for clarity and reference.
I. Introduction

Beginning with the end of the Cold War in 1989, the world has witnessed four significant events: the liberation of 100 million people in Eastern Europe, the defeat of Iraqi aggression in February of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and the overall failure of socialism and the mass movement to capitalism throughout this period. These changes in the international environment have had an impact on the entire world community, especially the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the more probable threats to American national security now include ethnic conflict, rogue states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, and the massive spread of famine and deadly diseases.¹

With the breakup of the Soviet Union and its demise as a cohesive military threat, the conditions for the application of United States military force in this decade are markedly different from those experienced during the past half century. The American military is now experiencing an expanded role in defense of United States important interests. Since Operation DESERT STORM, the United States has conducted in excess of thirty overseas military operations in the category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), ten of those in the category currently defined as peace operations.² Peace operations embody peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or nonmilitary operations taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process.³

Normally, safeguarding of strategic or vital interests are the obvious determinants for the use of military force. Additionally, current Christian religious teachings and international law clearly give nations the right, if not the obligation, of defending against aggressive behavior. On the international scene, sophisticated sets of rules and precedents embodying the Just War
Theory and International Law have combined to govern armed conflict in the safeguarding of interests.

The decision criteria for committing military forces to safeguard important national interests and intervene in internal conflicts and civil wars are much more vague. In regard to intrastate conflict, the most common target of peace operations today, the international community often lacks consensus on legitimacy. Only Common Law III, an extension of the 1949 Geneva Convention, addresses this area. And even then, this extension simply applies a limited set of rules for protection of participants while avoiding the issue of involvement by international organizations. The very target of most peace operations, regardless of the intent, has no recognized place in the established laws of war. As a result, most multinational interventions in internal matters or intrastate conflicts often are ones of consensus, agreement, and convenience.4

With warfare continuing as a staple ingredient between peoples, religions, and nations, the problems facing the United States as the preeminent world power in this new era are twofold. First is defining American strategies and principles for intervening in this new environment. Second and even more difficult, is describing the actions when the United States does intervene. With success based upon the ability to match the use of military force with the political objectives, appropriate definition of American actions is essential. The absence of agreed upon international terminology and framework for peace operations poses problems for policy makers, military leaders, and civilians as a whole. This, coupled with voids and discrepancies in American strategy and doctrine, further compounds the problems.
How did this come about even as America has emerged as the world’s only super power? And what is there in the current transition period to prevent the United States from effectively dealing with the complex subject of peace operations? The answer lies in the Cold War and the current post-Cold War eras, two distinct periods in which the spectrum of activities included in the current definition of peace operations can be addressed. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution and development of United States strategy, doctrine, and terminology for peace operations during these periods, and identify challenges to current strategy and doctrine for responding to and supporting United States peace operations in the post-Cold War era.

II. Historical Overview

No examination of peace operations strategy and doctrine would be complete without an overview dealing with the legal norms relating to the use of force. They have developed in both religious and nonreligious stands, and are now seen in international law, national strategies, and military doctrine. In reviewing the history of law relating to the use of force, six historical periods have been identified: Just War, Positivist, League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact, United Nations Charter, and Post-United Nations Charter. Four of those occurred prior to the post-Cold War era.

The formal study of war began during the fifth century before Christ with the Just War period. The period was further defined in a series of phases: classical, Christian, and secular. During the classical phase, the cause and effect of wars were usually recorded by early historians and poets of heroic works such as Homer and Hesoid. This, however, contributed little to the legitimacy of applying military force. Later in the period, Aristotle examined the recourse to the
use of force. His focus was on the morally just use of force versus the lawful application. The classical philosopher Cicero advanced this theory, but held there were two just causes for war, redressing an injury and driving out an invader. Following the death of Christ and for the remainder of the classical phase, the Gospels guided the Christians through three centuries of religious pacifism, with emphasis on nonresistance and forgiveness. Church leaders even went as far as to condemn military service.⁶

The Christian phase had its beginning when the Roman Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in 337 AD, and is best known for the first Just War theory enunciated by St. Augustine of Hippo. He defined the aim of a Just War as peace, regardless of how it was achieved, the first demonstration of what would form the basis for peace operations after 1945. This is the first linkage to Cold and post-Cold War peace operations. His teachings withstood scrutiny for nearly nine centuries, until they were elaborated upon by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas published his theory of Just War in "Summa Theologiae" in the thirteenth century. In it, he established three pillars for legitimizing war: proper authority, just cause, and proper intention. These tenets became the core of the Christian doctrine for righteous wars.

Centuries later in a more focused effort, Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez examined the "justness" of war as it applied to their government's policies in the New World. The conclusions they reached were that the decision to commit to warfare must be made by wise men because the consequences were so severe. Both men believed that war in defense of life, property, or an unjustly attacked third party was always legitimate. The major Just War concepts of just ad bellum (justification of force or recourse to war) which includes just cause, legitimate authority, just intentions, public declaration, proportionality, last resort,
and reasonable hope of success, and *jus in bello* (limits of force or conduct in war) which includes discrimination and proportionality, can also be attributed to these two theologians. These concepts are both implied and stated in numerous United States legislations, strategies, and doctrine published in the Cold and post-Cold War eras.⁷

Toward the end of the medieval period, the religious input into the use of force took on less emphasis. This marked the beginning of the secular phase, where the natural law approach to war was detailed. The most notable contribution of the period was 17th century Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius' treatise "On the Law of War and Peace". His vision included an impartial legal system where laws of peace and war were separated. He maintained it was permissible to use force in preservation of life and property, while further allowing preemptive strikes in self-defense. This foundation of modern international law was to remain unchanged for nearly two centuries.⁸

During the Positivist Period, 1700-1919, the legal foundations established during the initial Just War period were initially disregarded. Changes in Roman Catholic doctrine and the role of the Pope coupled with the rising tide of nationalistic fervor led to the rejection of the Just War concept in international law. As a result, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, war became an increasingly accepted fact of life against the backdrop of nation-state growth and the lack of a higher authority to interpret justness. States were now judged to have a sovereign right to go to war. To declare war was the only requirement for legitimacy. Even the United States in its relative infancy accepted this framework, the most noticeable example being the adoption of the Army's General Order No. 100, which recognized war as the mechanism to obtain great ends of state.⁹
The destruction resulting from World War I did little to overturn this view of war. Post war investigations and trials conducted by the Paris Peace Conference's "Commission on Responsibilities" concluded the war was a result of accidental causes and not the aggressive intent by any single nation. The stage was set for the evolution of American strategy and doctrine concerning peace operations.\textsuperscript{10}

The most significant event during the Positivist period applicable to peace operations was the establishment of a framework for the use of force short of war, the environment now described as MOOTW. Typical use of force included reprisals and self-defense actions in quick military actions not involving the major commitment of forces.

Following World War I, international law attempted to recover the Just War theory largely disregarded during the Positivist period. During the third period, known as the League of Nations (1919-1929), attempts were made to limit states’ rights to go to war and clarify and refine \textit{jus ad bellum}. Like many earlier attempts to restrict the recourse to war, the League was compromised by the limited number of signatories (the United States was not among them), the failure to address the use of force short of war, and the signatories’ general unwillingness or inability to enforce the pact. Subsequent treaties and protocols sought to address situations short of war, but all failed to gain sufficient acceptance among members of the League.\textsuperscript{11}

The Kellogg-Briand Pact period, 1928-1939, was another attempt to regulate the right of states to go to war. Although both the Soviet Union and the United States were signatories of the Pact, it suffered many of the same shortcomings as the League of Nations Covenant. The resort to war as an instrument of national policy was explicitly outlawed, but no restrictions were
imposed on military operations short of war, the environment in which today’s peace operations occur.

During these last two periods, United States military forces usually conducted operations under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Military forces were deployed throughout the Americas to suppress lawlessness, establish political stability and develop the foundations for long term nation building. Military operations in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua were examples of this strategy. “Small wars” was the term most frequently used to describe American actions in this era.

This is the setting that the United States found itself in prior to World War II. Policy makers and military leaders, were without the benefit of published National and Military Security Strategies, and joint MOOTW doctrine to guide actions in this environment. In fact, though every existing Service participated in these operations, significant developments in published doctrine, tactics, techniques, or procedures for this new environment did not occur until 1940. The Marine Corps, which participated in the majority of the operations, led the way with its 1940 “USMC Small Wars Manual.” In the United States Army, the current doctrinal term of peace operations and the associated activities of diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement were neither recognized in concept nor application. In fact, the 1941 edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, contained no reference to such operations.¹²
III. Peace Operations in the Cold War Era

Following World War II, the determination of justness and right to intervene focused largely on whether a nation or nations were initially the aggressor or defenders. Despite the economic, political, religious, or moral reasons for the aggression, aggressive warfare was declared a crime against peace, and therefore a crime under international law.

With this backdrop, Cold War peace operations were conceived and developed as a mechanism by which the United Nations could pursue a conflict management role in selected crises. They trace their origin to the 1947 UN Special Committee on the Balkans, with classical peacekeeping having its roots in the 1948 Jerusalem based United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Peace enforcement was addressed in the United Nations Charter phase, which fully legitimized the right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51. Unfortunately the vagueness of the majority of the Articles contained in the Charter's Chapters VI and VII, dealing with disputes and threats to peace, led to wide interpretation in the application and enforcement of international law. Ambiguity coupled with varying national interests made the consistent commitment of military force to the support of peace operations impossible.¹³

Most important, there was the bipolar standoff. The Soviets, in particular, were intent upon promoting regional instability opportunities as a means to expand their influence. On the other hand, United States security strategy was primarily one of containment. In this environment, the threat of nuclear or superpower intervention acted as the determinant on peace operation decisions and execution strategy during this period. The fear of setting off World War III and a strong reluctance to trigger a direct Soviet/Chinese combat intervention often
constrained America's decisions to conduct peace operations. "In Third World conflicts or crises in which the U.S.S.R. was perceived to have vital interests, the United States . . . held its military responses well below the threshold that might provoke direct military conflict with the U.S.S.R."14

Given these circumstances, the vast majority conducted during this period were traditional peacekeeping, a form of peace operations that occupied a position somewhere between the pacific settlement of Chapter VI and the peace enforcement of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From 1948 through 1978, fourteen peacekeeping operations were conducted, mostly because they could avoid a direct conflict between the two super powers. The United States role in these operations was usually one of financial and airlift support.15 There were also three notable cases of peace enforcement. These operations were legitimized by the United Nations through various resolutions: the Korean War in 1950, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.16 Even these operations, conducted with an international consensus, were accused by some of interfering in the sovereign rights of nations.17 Once again, the vagueness of the United Nations Chapters VI and VII was apparent.

Closer to home, United States peace operations in the Western Hemisphere were characterized by distrust of the UN as an impartial body and a belief that American security interests were threatened. As the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the region, many operations were conducted unilaterally and often without an international consensus, continuing to use the Monroe Doctrine as the grounds for legitimacy. Operations in the Dominican Republic are but one example. Although some operations later were transferred to other nations
in the hemisphere or included regional forces, the United States military umbrella was ever present. 18

Even in the Western Hemisphere, the Cold War for various reasons, kept the United States involvement in peace operations limited. Because of the perceived superpower threat during much of that period, the primary focus of American military doctrine was on warfighting. Peace operations were conspicuously absent from United States tactical and strategic doctrine. It wasn’t until the 1962 version of FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, for example, that the first recognition by the United States Army of MOOTW was addressed and defined as “Situations Short of War”, “those specific circumstances and incidents of Cold War in which military force is moved to an area directly and is employed to attain national objectives in operations not involving formal open hostilities between nations.” 19 Types of missions described in this new tactical environment were show of force, truce enforcement, international police actions, and legal occupation. Conspicuously absent was any reference to the current definition of peacekeeping. Instead, the Army’s doctrine focused on the military’s role in war and small wars. By 1968, situations short of war in Army doctrine became known as Cold War operations. An additional category labeled stability operations dealt primarily with internal defense and development, however, the general lack of focus and theme for MOOTW remained the same as the previous edition. 20

During the next revision, the 1976 version of FM 100-5 deleted all reference to situations short of war or cold war operations. It reverted back to the 1940 and 1950 versions, concentrating on operations in special environments, and focusing on highly specialized combat
operations such as actions at river lines. It wasn’t until the May 1986 version of FM 100-5 that some variant of MOOTW again was addressed in the form of low and mid-intensity operations.21

The other Services also neglected peace operations doctrine. Until late 1989, the Air Force focused almost exclusively on nuclear deterrence and a massive bombing campaign of Europe and the Soviet Union. United States peace operations were treated as aberrations from the true course of strategic air power. In 1961, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General LeMay testified before Congress that Air Force doctrine written in 1935 was still valid. During the same period, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson required that information emerging from the Pentagon be screened for policy and propriety prior to publication in professional journals or official documents. The combination of the two actions effectively stifled the evolution of Air Force doctrine to support peace operations. Even the Vietnam experience would not force a reassessment of the long standing doctrine. The manual for Air Force tactical air operations, AFM 2-1, was not revised from 1969 through 1989.22

As for the Navy and the Marine Corps, the majority of their doctrine also remained focused on the Soviet threat. As has been demonstrated, the most notable exception was the Marine Corps’ 1940 “Small Wars Manual.” It defined small wars as a variety of military operations combining military force and diplomatic pressure to uphold the foreign policy of the United States in situations ranging from military assistance to intervention operations against second-class powers. It further recognized that the majority of operations would be conducted under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine to suppress lawlessness or insurrection in the Western Hemisphere. In a 1987 reprint of the manual, it was recognized as one of the best books on military operations in peacekeeping.23
Above the Services at the national strategic level, three significant actions ultimately molded America's participation in peace operations during the Cold War. Congress, overriding President Nixon's veto, passed the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) in 1973, which asserted Congressional prerogatives in questions of force interventions in war and peace. The three basic requirements levied on the President were to consult whenever possible before introducing United States forces into hostilities, report within forty-eight hours on the circumstances and scope of the operation, and unless given an extension, terminate/withdraw those forces within 60 days. Although the courts were reluctant to address and decide on discretionary issues, to this date the War Powers Resolution still influences the policy decisions, strategy, and conduct of peace operations.24

In November 1984, the Weinberger Doctrine was published as a reaction to the United States participation in the Vietnam war. It proposed several tests that were to be applied when the United States considered committing forces to future combat operations. Since its publication, the tests included in the doctrine have often been used as decision criteria for the commitment of American forces to peace operations. Many, if not all, of the provisions can be traced to the Just War period concepts of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Just cause was determined to be in defense of vital interests. Reasonable hope translated to clear intention of winning, while right intention became clearly definable objectives. Proportionality was the correlation between the objective and the forces committed, and right authority was the support of Congress and the public. Last resort was interpreted to mean when all other actions had failed. The teachings of de Vitoria and Suarez from the Just War period had been adapted to the changing world environment.
Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, required the President to submit a National Security Strategy. The Act and subsequent amendments also elevated the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and contributed immeasurably to streamlining Service cooperation, command, and control. The real contribution these measures made to peace operations was that they directed the development of a grand strategy, promoted unity of effort between the individual services, established support relationships, fixed responsibility with geographic combatant commanders, and fostered the development of joint doctrine. The true impact of these measures on peace operations would not be realized until after the Cold War.

IV. Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era

The post-United Nations Charter period begins the final period of the history of law related to the use of force. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has played a greatly expanded role in peace operations through a consensus, but still has not developed a universally acceptable Chapter or Article for permissible involvement in peace operations. Toward this goal, several proposals for strengthening the UN and advancing the organization’s ability to deal with international conflict have been advanced. However, no universal framework to meet the changing conditions of this new era has been adopted.25

There are four changes in the post-Cold War era that are particularly significant in terms of peace operations. All of these have influenced America’s views and have had an impact on the decisions regarding the conduct and execution of peace operations. First, America’s core concepts of democracy and market economies are more broadly accepted now than ever.
Technology and the breakdown of political barriers are promoting the advancement of both concepts. A global economy fostered by technology now exists, which further promotes the values of democracy. As more nations subscribe to these concepts, the conditions for participating and supporting peace operations become more closely aligned with American values.

Next, the United States is the dominant global power. As such, many of the traditional restrictions or concerns for committing military forces to peace operations have been greatly reduced. The United States now recognizes the tremendous responsibilities associated with being the sole super power and the expectations of the world community. Accordingly, American participation in peace operations is often a sign of the seriousness of the threat to world order, not necessarily the vital interests of the United States.

Equally important, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to a tremendous explosion of religious, ethnic, and territorial conflicts. Intrastate conflict has replaced interstate conflict on the world scene. Associated with this phenomenon is an expanded escalation in scope and violence. Moreover, intrastate conflicts normally result from long standing territorial, religious and ideological disputes, and are much more difficult to control and punish. American participation in Somalia and Bosnia-Hercegovina are examples of the complexity of peace operations in this environment.

Finally, the pulse of the planet has accelerated dramatically. Change is occurring at an ever increasing and often uncontrollable pace. The easing or breakdown of national barriers, large transfers of high technology and weapons, disintegration of long term alliances and treaties, and the wholesale movements of large sections of the population have all contributed to
this change and to a significant increase in transnational dangers. This turmoil places significant challenges on the development and evolution of America’s strategies and doctrine.\textsuperscript{26}

With the decline and eventual collapse of Soviet power as well as these four significant changes, the United States dramatically increased the employment of American military forces in peace operations. Among these were: the Panamanian pre-invasion operations NIMROD DANCER, PURPLE STORM, and SAND FLEAS conducted in 1989; Operations DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991 (UN Resolution 678); Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991 (UN Resolution 688); Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in 1992 (UN Resolution 771); Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1993 (UN Resolutions 751, 794, and 837); the Operations in Haiti in 1994 (UN Resolution 867); and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. Many of these operations, thanks to the modern telecommunications, were viewed live in homes around the world.\textsuperscript{27}

The common threads in these operations were that all possessed international legitimacy or authority and reinforced the early post-Cold War American enthusiasm for multilateral operations. The Panamanian operations used the enforcement of a legitimate treaty as the grounds for intervention, while the remainder all had the backing of the United Nations. Some were even coordinated and managed by the UN or NATO.\textsuperscript{28}

A. The Strategic Documents.

In the post-Cold War era, these facts coupled with American experiences have caused the evolution of a more mature process for the commitment to and execution of peace
operations. The development and publication of numerous directives strategies, assessments, and doctrine are ample evidence of United States efforts in this area.

Most importantly in this regard, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25), “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” on May 3, 1994. This document contains six policy directives and provides the first comprehensive outline for the conduct of peace operations in support of the operational spectrum now known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It creates a framework to guide American support and involvement in peace operations, by establishing factors for supporting and participating in peace operations, even when operations are likely to involve combat. At the same time, the document defines the United States departmental role in peace operations. The Department of Defense was designated the lead agency for managing and funding operations involving, or likely to involve, combat forces. The State Department was given the lead for peace operations involving non-combat units.  

Not only does PDD-25 establish how and when United States military forces will be employed in support of peace operations, it also acknowledges the importance of domestic support. Historically, the American public has demonstrated strong views and proprietary interests in United States military involvements. When the President decides to commit military force, he usually must first convince the American people that it is in their best interests. The mustering of public support for peace operations is more difficult, since United States vital interests are rarely threatened. The Directive acknowledges the pivotal role the American people as well as Congress play in the decision to commit military forces to peace operations and recognizes the importance of their understanding and acceptance.
The 1995 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS), is the second key document in the evolution of a more mature American approach to peace operations. With this document, President Clinton fulfilled the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act annual requirement and expanded on the 1994 peacekeeping directive by further clarifying when and how military force will be used. The three basic categories outlined in the NSS for the use of force are cases involving the defense of America's vital interests (warfighting), the responses when important United States interests are threatened (peace operations), and selective support to humanitarian interests. In the subchapter on peace operations, there is clear reference to the guiding principles contained in PDD-25. United States security interests are defined as increasing global stability, strengthening international organizations, and relieving large-scale human suffering. Considerations for involvement are based upon threat or breach of international peace/security, humanitarian disaster within a violent conflict, interruption of an established democratic system, or a gross violation of human rights within a violent conflict.32

Once again, American public and congressional support are recognized as essential, if not critical, elements of this strategy. "Our engagement abroad requires the active, sustained bipartisan support of the American people and the U.S. Congress. Of all the elements contained in this strategy, none is more important than this . . . ".33

Complementing the NSS, the National Military Strategy (NMS) of selective and flexible engagement also contains a sizeable focus on peace operations by defining the new international environment in three states: Peacetime Engagement and Deterrence, Conflict Resolution, and War (Fight and Win). Peace operations are conducted in the first two. As the gray area between war and peace, these operations are " . . . often different from traditional military
operations... and characterized by the use of force or the threat of the use of force, and are interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts, often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Such actions may be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to respond to acts of aggression.”

The NMS goes on to list eight principles exclusively for the employment of United States forces in war; yet it neglects to apply any principles to the two components of the strategy where peace operations occur. Based on recent experiences in areas as diverse as Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the benefit and application of clear objectives, decisive power, joint and combined operations, mobilization of critical reserves, and the other principles have applicability to all components of our military strategy.

Out of all this emerges a military strategy for conducting peace operations. Based upon existing definitions, the limited military objective (end) for peace operations can be described as support of a diplomatic peacemaking process, and the forcing of hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions as broadly defined by the international community. The concept (way) of how the United States will conduct peace operations is initially through deterrence based on multi- and unilateral security agreements, the overseas presence of American forces, and the ability to rapidly project power. If these options fail to coerce the hostile factions, one must assume the principles in the NMS governing the employment of military forces will take effect.
B. The Doctrine.

With the end of the Cold War, United States strategy and doctrine long stagnant due to the nature of the bipolar world, rapidly advanced to meet the significant challenges and the changes to the new world order. Although war fighting and protection of America's vital interests continue to be the priority, the focus of the United States national strategies on support to the more likely peace operations has caused an explosion in doctrinal development.

The development, publication, and continuous refinement of these directives and strategies are intended to provide focus to the Department of Defense and individual Services during peace and war. They further articulate, either exclusively or in conjunction with the other elements of national power, how the military will be employed to serve national objectives.

As recognized in the NSS and NMS, the military is one of the four elements of national power that can be applied to support or conduct peace operations. In that context, not all the Services have kept pace with the doctrinal changes mandated by specific military requirements contained in the NSS and NMS. Currently the joint doctrine hierarchy contains two overarching sources of operations doctrine. Seven additional volumes contain joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. JCS Pub 3 “Doctrine for Joint Operations” and JCS Pub 3-07 “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War” provide fundamental principles and doctrine for joint and multinational war and MOOTW operations, to include peace operations.35

Unlike the NMS, Pub 3.0 does not address states of the environment. Rather, it divides the range of military operations into war and MOOTW. It recognizes eight types of operations in the MOOTW category. One of these is peace operations, which embodies peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
JCS Pub 3-07 "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War", begun in the late 1980's and published in 1995, recognizes the increasing focus on MOOTW and expands on Pub 3. It elaborates on peace operations, and includes two additional operations in that subset: preventive diplomacy and peace building. The focus of these new operations is on the prevention of predictable crisis and restoration of the status quo to prevent relapses into conflict. Like Pub 3, Pub 3-07 recognizes only two ranges of military operations, war and MOOTW.

The principles contained in these two publications for joint operations in MOOTW are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Unlike the nine principles of war guiding warfighting, joint doctrine fails to consider that the principles applicable to MOOTW may be beyond the span of control of the military leader. For instance, although military leaders can have an impact on legitimacy and perseverance during the operation, these principles are more prerequisites for the commitment decision instead of the actual execution, a fact recognized by Secretary Weinberger when he published his 1984 doctrine.

The Army has gone into even greater doctrinal detail on peace operations. Three overarching manuals coupled with numerous products ranging from White Papers and locally produced tactics, techniques, and procedure training manuals, to summaries of lessons learned and sophisticated articles appearing in professional periodicals, put the Army on the leading edge in terms of doctrinal preparation and conduct of peace operations. The June 1993 version of FM 100-5 "Operations", the Army's keystone manual, places peace operations under the umbrella concept of support for operations other than war (OOTW), with clearly articulated principles and tenets applicable to this new operational environment. The FM contains a
doctrinal framework and authoritative guide for conducting peace operations, specifically addressing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Noticeably absent is any reference to peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, or peace building.

Expanding on FM 100-5, FM 100-7 "Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations" recognizes operations in peacetime are as important as combat roles. It further elaborates on the OOTW identified in FM 100-5, but refers to it as MOOTW. Peace operations are divided between two categories, operations in peace and operations in conflict.

Finally, FM 100-23 "Peace Operations" was produced in 1994 to capture the United States Army's expertise in conducting missions on land and to provide guidelines for peace operations in support of the NSS, NMS, and other policy directives. It contains principles, tenets, and operations consistent with joint doctrine and FM 100-5. FM 100-23 is the first FM to focus exclusively on peace operations.36

In the other Services, however, some voids still exist. The 1992 "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force", recognizes selected peace operations in a section entitled "Military Activities Short of War". Thirty-four examples of these activities are listed. Noticeably absent, however, is how air power will be applied in support of these operations. This is not to say Air Force strategists and leaders have been idle. Other facets have been incorporated into peace operations: organizational changes, fielding of new equipment and training systems, and development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures, to include the use of certain types of operations such as jamming and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) to influence governments and civilian populations. Nevertheless, there is still no published Air Force overarching doctrine acknowledging those changes.
The Marine Corps, like the Air Force, has made significant strides at the tactical level incorporating new tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the demands of peace operations. Unfortunately, the overall Marine doctrine remains extremely dated, despite the Corps’ participation in several post Cold War peace operations, ranging from Iraq and Somalia, to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1-1, “WARFIGHTING”, recognizes low intensity conflict, but remains focused on the basic Marine Corps philosophy of warfighting at the operational level.

FMFM 1-2, “The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense”, dated 1991, lists as its aim “... to explain, both within and outside the Marine Corps, why the nation requires a Marine Corps; where and when Marines must be prepared to fight; and how the Marine Corps performs assigned combatant functions.” A one page summary in the appendix on the strategic environment and use of military force subsumes the concept of peace operations in the term “military action short of war”. As has been noted, in 1987 the Marine Corps reprinted the 1940 “USMC Small Wars Manual”. Although advanced for its time in the coverage of such topics as relationships with the State Department, military-civil relationships, responsibilities of military government, and withdrawal from theaters of operations, the manual also demonstrates its age by addressing such subjects as how to pack various animals.

Lastly, there is the Navy’s effort in support of peace operations. Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, the Navy has focused almost exclusively on operations in the littoral regions, with tactics, techniques, and procedures keeping pace with this significant operational change. The Navy’s strategic concept, "Forward... from the Sea", recognizes situations short of
war and lists a single premise for the Navy's role in this environment: engage in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling the sea.39

In addition, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, "NAVAL WARFARE", is the first in a new series of six capstone documents for naval forces. It addresses naval support to operations other than war in a broad discussion of the overall employment of naval forces. In a brief three page summary of operations other than war, the fact that naval operations may be required to participate in peace operations is recognized. Unfortunately, these operations are viewed as a minor extension of the application of wartime capabilities.40

Since the end of the Cold War, American political and military leaders have put forth considerable effort to guide United States participation and conduct in peace operations. The current strategies and doctrine are recognition that peace operations will be a critical element of future United States policy and military operations.

V. Challenges Facing the U. S.

One of the greatest challenges facing the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War is how to use military force to protect America's interests and sustain world order. The expectations of the United States as the sole remaining super power are high, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The changes in the global community described earlier demonstrate that the world community looks to America to provide unilateral and multilateral leadership, economic growth, and assistance, all of which may lead to enhanced quality of life and world stability. The application of military force in support of peace operations is one of the numerous elements of United States power available to meet these demands.
As America looks forward to its role in the era, it cannot afford to neglect the history of law relating to the use of force, as well as lessons learned from past military operations in developing strategy and doctrine. Deciding when the United States must initiate or contribute to peace operations will be a continuous trial for political leaders. The difficulty will be striking a balance between these moral, ethical, and legal obligations developed over time, and our national interests and resources.

The United States military may be the best force for peace operations because it is the most capable; however, lack of international approval can call American motives into question, thus placing United States world leadership and alliances in jeopardy. In light of recent experiences, a key element is overlooked in addressing the conditions for conducting peace operations in the execution of United States national strategies: The United Nations has emerged as the central organization for granting legitimacy to peace operations, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

The international community is in general agreement that peace operations have international license to support the diplomatic peacemaking process as defined by that license. This support can include dealing with an interstate conflict or with internal conflict to meet some humanitarians need or where state institutions have largely collapsed. Though both the United States NSS and NMS recognize the role of the international community in peace operations, neither document addresses the international license as a critical ingredient for action nor legitimacy. As United States experiences in Korea, Haiti, Iraq, and elsewhere have demonstrated, international authorization is key to maintaining American credibility, leadership, and alliances. United States Joint and Service doctrine have captured the importance of this
license; however, doctrine cannot compensate for political oversight concerning this license. American political and military leaders will need to recognize and address the significance of this authorization. When the decision is made to act without this authorization, its legitimacy and impartiality are called into question.

The need for strategic entrepreneurship to guide our nation in this period of global transition is essential. The NSS and NMS are the nearest things to strategic doctrine. United States Service doctrine recognizes the requirement for national security policies to establish strategic goals and objectives for specific situations, to include peace operations. Developing, coordinating, refining, and publishing these documents, regional security strategies, and strategic assessments in a timely manner to meet the realities of the rapidly changing world will continue to place demands on current and future administrations.

In all these efforts, however, peace operations must be kept in perspective. As stated in both the NSS and NMS, the primary mission of the armed forces remains deterrence, and if necessary, to fight and win the nation's wars. With the elimination of major threats to United States vital interests, the reordering of budget priorities, and the tendency to conduct more military operations in the spectrum identified as MOOTW, there is the risk that peace and other MOOTW operations may become the determinant of military force structures, training strategies, and focus of doctrine. The budgeting and force structure pressures to let these operations have priority over those concerned with warfighting doctrine will be enormous. History has often demonstrated that doctrine cannot compensate for flawed strategy. The challenge will be not to lose sight of the military's requirements for the defense and security of the nation.
Finally, there are several major discrepancies and voids in existing United States doctrine. To begin with, that doctrine tends to embody MOOTW principles over which the military has little or no control. As has been noted in one example, the addition of “perseverance” and “legitimacy” as operational principles place a responsibility on the military commander that rightly belongs with the political leadership. These are issues that should be addressed and resolved prior to the commitment of military force. Equally important, the numerous differences in peace operations terminology and voids in Joint and Service doctrine indicate a significant emphasis is required in this area. All Services have an active role in these operations. What organization should have the lead in the development, refinement, and coordination of peace operations doctrine will have to be resolved. Given the current level of their doctrinal advancement, the Army and Marine Corps are the primary candidates.

If the past six years are any indication, there will be no shortage of peace operations in the future. The tremendous explosion of intrastate, religious, and ideological conflict will continuously challenge American policy and decision makers. The publicity created by global television and other media services may falsely involve the United States in areas of less than vital importance to the nation. The precision and ease of execution often displayed by mass media can lull decision makers and the public into supporting ill-conceived operations. The greatest challenge of all will remain applying military force to the right peace operations.

In all this, the United States military establishment can and must play an important role. The basis for that role is an understanding of the history of law as it relates to the use of force and the global environment. Only by understanding the evolution of that relationship from the Just War period to the current post UN Charter era and previous American military experiences,
can the military professional comprehend the challenges to current United States strategy and doctrine concerning American peace operations in the post Cold War era.
ENDNOTES


3. For a more complete definition of peace operations and associated terms see the Glossary in Appendix.


8. Hoffman, 43. See also Arend and Beck 15.


10. Arend and Beck, 19.

11. Ibid., 21-22.

12. Hoffman, 42-43. Note: Although special operations were addressed in the May 1941 edition of FM 100-5, the first appearance of situations short of war did not appear in Army Field Manual 100-5, until the February 1962 edition. Situations short of war were defined as those specific circumstances and incidents of the cold war in which military forces were employed to attain national objectives in operations not involving formal hostilities between nations.

13. Peace operations are addressed from a holistic perspective. Examples cited are in recognition that there are distinct types of peace operations. Further examples are provided only for clarity. The various types of peace operations are adequately addressed in other sources, and not the focus of this paper. See definitions of these and other applicable items in the Glossary.


16. Thomas E. Griess, ed. The West Point Military History Series: The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War, (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987), 75. The UN Security Council met twice to decide the issue of the North Korean invasion. When it appeared that the North Koreans were going to disregard the first vote ordering them to cease hostilities, the U.S. proposed a new resolution. Soviet Ambassador Malik was absent when this second vote was taken by the Security Council. As a result, the UN provided the legal framework for the military aid to Korea. The Congo Crisis was initially a peacekeeping operation, but rapidly transitioned to peace enforcement without the UN sanctions of Chapter 7. U.S. support in the crisis was limited to airlift support of the Belgian intervention and covert U.S. support. As for Cyprus, the U.S. was willing to send troops under British command provided other NATO nations provide forces. This action was subsequently vetoed by President Makarios of Cyprus. U.S. participation was therefore limited to voluntary financial contributions to the UN. See Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis: 219-22, 322. The crucial issue of the Vietnam War was never substantively considered by the UN Security Council and thus was not included in the UN peace operations. See Hugh Smith, ed. Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 5.


19. Department of the Army, Operations Field Manual 100-5, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1962), 155-156. This FM was also the first to recognize the linkage between U.S. national objectives and strategy, and military strategy.


22. Earl H. Tilford Jr., *Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup In Vietnam* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), 185, 191, 235. Throughout the period, most Air Force support to peace operations was strategic and tactical airlift, with limited support to covert and reconnaissance operations.


24. Hosmer, 74-76.

25. Arend and Beck, 188-202. Several recent actions demonstrate a willingness of permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate and exert pressure on other members. Additionally, in 1990 the U.S. and the USSR proposed to enhance the role of the International Court of Justice, and the Soviets proposed a revitalization of the Military Staff Committee, in 1992 the Security Council provided recommendations for Charter amendments to address preventive diplomacy, and finally Boutros-Ghali elaborated upon specific measures for confidence building, fact finding, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones. All are an attempt to enhance the UN's ability to aid in peaceful settlement of international disputes.


27. Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 19 October 1992) 6-12. The distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations depends upon the source of the definition and the applicable UN resolution. This document refers to all but SOUTHERN WATCH and current operations in B-H as examples of peace enforcement operations. Also referenced were numerous newspaper and magazine articles providing the specific UN resolution number.


29. "Executive Summary: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", *War, National Policy, and Strategy* Volume I, Part B, Course 2 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, September 1995), 536. In the original document, OOTW was the term used. Liberty was taken here to use MOOTW and hopefully eliminate confusion. Also see *Strategic Assessment 1995*, 169.


33. NSS, 33.

34. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (NSS) (Washington: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995) 12. Note: To further aid policy makers, analysts, and military leaders, *Strategic Assessment 1995* focuses on U.S. interests, provides a detailed analysis of challenges facing our nation in this new era, and assesses options regarding key national security issues. A separate chapter on peace operations identifies trends, specific security interests, and key security policy issues. Significant is the section defining the circumstances under which the U.S. may intervene and the recognition of UN legitimacy. Complementing this document are two regional Security Strategies which further define U.S. interests and commitments in critical regions of the world. They are more focused efforts intended to identify problems, explain strategy, and explain how the U.S. will execute the strategy by region.


40. Although the stated purpose of Naval Doctrine Publication 1 is to form a bridge between the NMS and navy tactics, techniques, and procedures, it was published prior to the current NSS and NMS. As such, the doctrine is already dated since it neglects the requirement for conducting operations in the three environments identified in the NMS. Additionally, as the first in a set of six capstone documents, NDP1 is very generic. A follow-on publication, NDP3, "NAVAL OPERATIONS", is still in draft form, but may contain additional doctrine for support of MOOTW.

GLOSSARY

Chapter VI, UN Charter: Pacific Settlement of Disputes—Contains six Articles.

Article 33.
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34. The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35.
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36.
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37.
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute. SOURCE. Pages 68-69, Course II, Vol I.

Chapter VII, UN Charter: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression--Contains thirteen Articles (only first four and last one are listed here).

Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. SOURCE: Pages 69-70, Course II, Vol I.

Combined Doctrine--Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. SOURCE. Page 77, Joint Pub 1-02.

Contingency--An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. SOURCE. Page 88, Joint Pub 1-02.

Doctrine--Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. SOURCE. Page 120, Joint Pub 1-02.

Joint Doctrine--Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. SOURCE. Page 201, Joint Pub 1-02.

Military Intervention--The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy. SOURCE. Page 239, Joint Pub 1-02.

Military Options--A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Includes all aspects of OOTW. SOURCE. Pages 239-240, Joint Pub 1-02.

National Strategy--The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation state, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to serve national objectives. SOURCE. Page 180, Course II, Vol I.

Operations Other Than War (OOTW)--Not defined. SOURCE. Joint Pub 1-02.

Peacekeeping--Narrowly defined, is the containment, moderations and/or termination of hostilities between states, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally; using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter have traditionally involved the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the field, with the consent of the parties, including supervising demarcation lines, monitoring cease-fires and controlling buffer zones, disarming and demobilizing warring factions and supervising borders. Over the past few years, the UN has significantly expanded the type of military operations carried out under "peacekeeping," to include for example protection of humanitarian relief and refugee operations. Peacekeeping operations may also contain substantial civilian elements, usually under the command of a civilian head of mission, such as civilian police, electoral or human rights monitors. SOURCE. Advanced Course 237J, MC 327, Definitions of Peace Support Operations.
Peacekeeping—Containment, moderation, and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. SOURCE. Page A-1 NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft).

Peacekeeping (Chapter VI Peace Operations). Deployment of neutral military and/or civilian personnel with the consent of the state or states involved and, more recently, of all significant parties to the dispute in order to assist in preserving or maintaining the peace. These are traditionally noncombat operations (except for the purpose of self-defense) and are normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and is support of diplomatic effort to achieve a lasting political settlement of the dispute. SOURCE. Page A-7, White Paper, May 1994, "The Clinton Administration's Policy of Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations".

Peacekeeping—Not defined in current Joint Pub 1-02. DEFINITION APPROVED FOR INCLUSION IN NEXT EDITION OF JOINT PUB1-02: Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. SOURCE. Page GL-6, Joint Pub 3-07.3.

Peacekeeping—Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that outside forces undertake with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to a dispute. SOURCE. Page 1, The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at the Brigade and Battalion White Paper.

Peacemaking—Diplomatic actions conducted after the commencement of conflict, with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic isolation and sanctions. SOURCE. Advanced Course 237J, MC 327, Definitions of Peace Support Operations.

Peacemaking—Not defined. SOURCE. Joint Pub 1-02.

Peacemaking—The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve the issues that led to conflict. SOURCE. Page 2, FM 100-23.

Peacemaking—The process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations. SOURCE. Page 1, The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at the Brigade and Battalion White Paper.
Peacemaking--Diplomatic actions conducted after the commencement of conflict, with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic isolation and sanctions. SOURCE. Page A-1, NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft).

Peace-building--Post conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction, and may require military as well as civilian involvement. SOURCE. Advanced Course 237J, MC 327, Definitions of Peace Support Operations.

Peace-building--Post conflict diplomatic and military actions to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict. SOURCE. Page 1, The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at the Brigade and Battalion White Paper.

Peace-building--Post conflict actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict. SOURCE. Page 2, FM 100-23.

Peace-building--Post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction, and may require military as well as civilian involvement. SOURCE. Page A-1, NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft).

Peace Enforcement--Action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed. SOURCE. Advanced Course 237J, MC 327, Definitions of Peace Support Operations and Page A-1, NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft).

Peace Enforcement (Chapter VII Peace Operations)--Actions involving the user of force or the threat of the use of force, authorized by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to preserve, maintain or restore international peace and security or address breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Such operations do not require the consent of the state(s) involved or of other parties to the conflict. SOURCE. Page A-7, White Paper, May 1994, "The Clinton Administration's Policy of Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations".

Peace Enforcement--Not defined. SOURCE. Joint Pub 1-02.
Peace Enforcement--The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. SOURCE. Page 6, FM100-23.

Peace Enforcement--A form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention that, in most cases, is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions. The primary purpose of peace enforcement is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community. SOURCE. Page 2, The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at the Brigade and Battalion White Paper.

Peace Operations--The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. TERM APPROVED FOR INCLUSION IN NEXT EDITION OF JOINT PUB1-02. SOURCE. Page GL-6, Joint Pub 3-07.3.

Preventive Diplomacy--Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. SOURCE. Page 2, FM 100-23.
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