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TITLE XI: AN UNDERFUNDED INITIATIVE

BY

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TITLE XI: AN UNDERFUNDED INITIATIVE

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ABSTRACT

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The perceived military threats to U.S. National Security have significantly decreased with the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union. In response, Congress reduced the defense budget and mandated increased reliance on reserve forces in the military force mix. This study traces the origin and implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI). It argues that successful implementation of Title XI requires increased funding commitments from Congress and/or OSD.
Introduction

Military threats facing the United States have changed dramatically over the last decade. In 1989 the Berlin wall came down, marking the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe. In 1990 we led the Desert Shield/Storm coalition force to victory, widely regarded as the last battle of the Cold War. In 1991 a failed Soviet coup marked the beginning of the end for the other military superpower, the Soviet Union.

Since World War II our National Military Strategy -- consisting of weapons development, tactics, doctrine, force development and defense budget -- had been shaped by the Soviet threat and the on-going Cold War. The Cold War now over, the American people are looking for a ‘peace dividend’ -- tax reductions, more investment in economic development and/or social programs and less defense spending.

The U.S. force structure mix, the size of our Total Force, and defense budgets are designed to counter threats to our National Security. Since the current threat is less well-defined, our defense budget will continue to decline. Thus the Total Force will get smaller and the ratio of our force mix, Active Component (AC) to Reserve Component (RC), will change. Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) have studied the issue of what mix of AC and RC forces will provide the most efficient and effective combat force for the defense budget dollar. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has mandated that our military strategy will rely more heavily on selected reserves, because: the reserve forces cost less (reserve ground combat units operate at roughly one-quarter the cost of an active unit); and sufficient warning time will be available for mobilization, training, and deploying large numbers of reserves.

This paper traces the genesis of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (commonly referred to as Title XI.). It examines the Congressional intent of Title
XI, in comparison with the Army’s implementation of the Act. And finally, it looks at funding levels required for effective implementation.

**Background**

Reserve forces (references to reserves or reserve forces in this paper include National Guard and USAR soldiers) have fought proudly and with distinction alongside the active component in our nation’s wars dating back to 1636.\(^2\) The most recent chapter in the history of the reserve and active force-mix began in August of 1970. Then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ordered “reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.” He proposed that a new “Total Force Concept...be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employment of Guard and Reserve Forces.”\(^3\)

This Total Force Policy consisted of three tenets: (1) reserve forces are the primary augmentation for the active forces, (2) all available personnel--active, reserve, civilian, and allied--are integrated in planning force structures:

It is DoD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployment or sea duty, training requirements, and to support the rotation base. Above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a *cost effective* basis.\(^4\)

(3) “The Army, in particular, should be structured to make active and reserve units so interdependent that a president could not send military forces to combat without activating the
reserves." Developed by General Abrams, this final tenet is a lesson learned from the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{5} The Total Force Policy is central to the current down-sizing debate over the appropriate force-mix ratio. But if we are going to weight our forces in favor of the RC, they will have to be available and combat-ready.

The U.S. Total Force Policy of 1990 was developed during the Cold War period and was designed to defeat the Soviet threat. Now the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War has emerged as the prototype conflict against which the Total Force Policy is evaluated. It is also the standard for future regional conflicts, on the basis of which we will develop our force structure for the 21st century.

The RC mobilization for Desert Shield/Storm was, by virtually all accounts, a great success. General Powell affirmed the RC contribution with the candid observation that "the U.S. military could not have achieved its mission in the Gulf War without the National Guard and Reserve."\textsuperscript{6} Over 140,000 members of the reserve forces were called up; they performed crucial missions during all phases of the war, from mobilization to redeployment of forces. Approximately 74,000 of these soldiers were in theater, while the others were used for backfill of active duty forces deployed to the Gulf. The vast majority of these reserve units were combat service and combat service support.

Yet mobilization of the RC for Desert Shield/Storm generated considerable controversy. Late mobilization, post-mobilization training requirements, and failure to deploy the three roundout Army National Guard combat maneuver brigades created a great deal of controversy among the AC, RC, and Congress. These issues called into question the validity of the entire roundout concept and raised questions about the active Army's relationship with
the RC. Many DoD studies, Congressional reports, and Congressional hearings then focused on force-mix issues, and AC to RC training requirements.

In October 1991 the Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report entitled “The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War.” This report recommended three major reforms: First, there must be more realistic expectations between the AC and RC regarding what roundout units can do. Second, there must be more and better training, especially in leadership and command and control, for roundout brigade personnel. Third, pre-mobilization training requirements must be integrated with post-mobilization performance expectations.

The Army thus developed a training strategy called BOLD SHIFT for high priority RC units in response to the controversy surrounding the ARNG roundout brigades mobilized for the Gulf War. This strategy incorporated the recommendations of the 1991 CRS report:

♦ Roundout brigades were given 90 days of post-mobilization training.
♦ Training programs were jointly planned by AC and RC units.
♦ 2000 AC soldiers were assigned to high priority ARNG units as full-time trainers.
♦ Operational readiness evaluations (OREs) were designed to evaluate and standardize combat readiness of reserve and active units.
♦ Training focused mainly on leader, unit, and soldier training.

This year-round program was designed to improve Total Army combat readiness. Many of the Bold Shift initiatives have since been incorporated into Title XI, the Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative.
FORCE MIX STUDIES

By 1991 the Bush Administration recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union had ushered in a new era of national security threats, with shifting nation-state alliances and relationships. A reassessment of U.S. national security strategy and military force structure was accomplished; it was designated the "Base Force Strategy". This new strategy called for reduction of overall U.S. force levels from 2.1 million to approximately 1.6 million AC personnel. Accordingly, funding for defense declined more than 35 percent in real, inflation-adjusted dollars.⁸

The Bush Administration FY92 defense budget attempted to reduce the impact of budgetary reductions on the AC by reducing the RC end strength by 187,000 soldiers more than Congress had authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 (82 percent of this difference was in the Army). The Congressional response to the additional reserve reductions was predominantly negative. Rather than approve the Base Force Strategy, Congress authorized and funded a much higher reserve Manning level than DoD had requested. Congress also called for a Total Force Policy study.

This 1992 study was conducted by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI); it was titled “Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense."⁹ This comprehensive and systematic study allowed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the “mix or mixes of reserve and active forces...that are considered acceptable to carry out expected future military operations.” This Rand report concluded with several recommendations:
A smaller Total Force will require RC combat forces be called up as soon as AC units are deployed to a combat theater; any delay would force the U.S. to respond with less than fully prepared soldiers.

- AC units should be charged with supporting RC training during peacetime and mobilization; the AC should constitute mobilization training units to bring RC brigades rapidly up to wartime proficiency.

- Opportunities are available to build a larger and more capable Total Force by capitalizing on the lower sustaining cost for RC units. The closer integration of AC and RC units will require Congress to change some rules (such as total-force-duty payback periods rather than active-duty payback periods) for officers who receive their college education at government expense.

- Readiness can be improved by increasing the numbers of RC soldiers who have extended periods of prior active duty military experience.

- Innovative concepts, such as the associate concept, need to be expanded.

The study concluded with the observation that “In the future, the role of the reserves will increase in importance, particularly as a critical element in deterring potential enemies who might try to take advantage of a situation when we are engaged in a major regional contingency. If deterrence fails, the reserves must provide the forces that will enable us to fight and win.”

Our U.S. military force structure and military strategy are currently designed in accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 1994-1999, which was derived from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The BUR analyzed four broad
categories of threats: weapons of mass destruction proliferation; regional dangers, such as large scale aggression by major regional powers, ethnic strife, and religious fundamentalism; dangers to democracy and reforms in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and threats to free market enterprise and our economy. The force structure has since been modeled to defend the nation's interests in the following four threat scenarios:

⇒ Option 1: Win one MRC.
⇒ Option 2: Win one MRC and hold in second.
⇒ Option 3: Win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.
⇒ Option 4: Win two nearly simultaneous MRCs while conducting smaller operations.

The BUR cited Option 3 as the worst case scenario for developing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and sizing our military force structure. Even so, this scenario requires far fewer military forces than the Cold War scenario of a world war fought against the Soviet Union and her allies. The BUR also increased the role of the RC in our military strategy because of declining defense budgets and the lower sustainment costs for RC units.¹¹

This new policy has become a hotly debated and contentious issue within the Defense Department. Some contend that AC force requirements have decreased; thus reliance on reserves can and should be increased because of the smaller forces required to handle regional contingencies. But detractors counter that while the current threat allows for force reduction, it also requires relatively increased reliance on AC units because regional contingencies require the rapid-response capability organic only to the active Army.

The readiness debates prompted by the BUR have led to a cooperative initiative between the active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves, called the “Offsite
Agreement”. The BUR and Offsite Agreement call for stabilizing the RC forces at 575,000 (367,000 Army Guard and 208,000 Army Reserve) and the active Army’s end strength at 495,000 by the end of FY96. It also transferred functions between the Army Reserves and the Army Guard. The Army Reserve will concentrate on providing the combat service support mission during wartime, while the Army Guard will concentrate on a wartime combat mission and a peacetime domestic emergency mission. (Note: Recent developments through the State Adjutant Generals Association may increase the Army Guard’s combat service support mission. The proposal will convert some of the eight Army Guard combat divisions to combat support and combat service support units.)

Title XI—Army Guard Combat Reform Act of 1992

Title XI, the Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative, is one of many programs implemented by the Army and Army National Guard to improve the overall readiness of Guard combat units. Both the Active and Reserve components’ recognition of the need for a more integrated total force contributed greatly to the success of Desert Storm/Shield.

In 1989 the Reserve Component’s Training Development Action Plan was implemented by the Chief of Staff of the Army. This plan identified 39 critical training issues in the areas of soldier training, leader development, unit training, and training management. Many of these programs are now supported in Title XI.

In 1991 The National Guard Bureau’s Standard Bearer program resourced the high priority Contingency Force Pool and Round Out and Round Up units to a higher level in an attempt to meet their increased optempo and readiness requirements. The Standard Bearer program also cross leveled National Guard assets to achieve and sustain fully manned and
equipped Contingency Force Pool units; further, it provided members of high priority units first priority to attend military schools.

In 1992 Forces Command implemented Bold Shift an initiative to standardize total Army integration. Significantly Bold Shift assigned 2000 active duty soldiers officers and NCOs to Guard Round Out and Round Up units and other early deploying reserve units in the Contingency Force Pool. Likewise, Operational Readiness Evaluations were incorporated to standardize and evaluate training. Finally, command and staff leadership training from company through division was implemented through the Active Army’s Battle Command Training Program, the Guard’s Brigade Command Battle Staff Training Program, and the Army Reserve’s Link Up Program.15

These initiatives are only a few examples of the many programs implemented by the Total Army to increase readiness and integration of the reserve components. By 1993 Congress was convinced by a series of Congressional and DoD sponsored studies and the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm that it was time to mandate deployability enhancements, National Guard assessment criteria, and Guard and Active Army compatibility and integration requirements.

Implementation of Title XI

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has been charged with implementing Title XI. A Title XI task force has been assembled, with representation from the Army Staff, the Secretary of the Army, Forces Command, Council of Colonels and General Officer Steering Committee. Special working groups include the National Guard Bureau and
Chief of the Army Reserve; they are developing the specialized programmatic solutions for the functional areas addressed by the various sections of the law.

William D. Clark, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, clearly expressed the Army’s view on implementation of Title XI in testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee, on April 22, 1993:

The Army views Title XI as highly supportive to the total Army integration. The Act reinforces our efforts to accomplish the integration and Reserve component readiness objectives the Army initiated in the mid 1980s. The Army leadership has broken the mold for business as usual thinking. We have achieved or are well on the way to achieving full implementation of 11 of the 18 initiatives. The remaining seven are considerably more difficult, incur substantial costs or may have significant impact and require more work on our part in developing programmatic solutions. In conclusion we would like to leave you with these five points:
1. The Army is committed to making Title XI work.
2. Many of these provisions must apply equally to the Army Reserve as well as to the National Guard.
3. Title XI coupled with other Army initiatives will bring Reserve component readiness and total Army integration to where we want them to be.
4. There are some significant costs and impacts that we need to quantify and weigh.
5. The Army will need flexibility with implementation dates and resources to ensure we maintain a balanced force that is capable and ready to deploy, fight, and win.¹⁶

Eleven of the nineteen Title XI sections had been implemented by mid 1993. This proved to be a relatively fast and simple process because these sections were not new concepts, but rather part of ongoing RC and AC training initiatives such as the Bold Shift and Standard Bearer programs initiated before the law was passed in 1993. By 20 March 1996
sixteen Title XI sections were implemented with three sections (1111, 1117, and 1118) designated for legislative change. Title XI was fully implemented on 10 February 1996 when the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY96 was signed into law.17

The 19 sections of Title XI can be divided into four functional categories: (A) Eleven sections provide deployability enhancements which focus on leader qualification, medical readiness, and premobilization collective training levels. (B) Five sections provide compatibility enhancements designed to improve interoperability between the AC and RC. (C) Two sections expand the Active Army’s authority to inspect and assess Guard enhanced brigades, FSP units, and Division RO units. (D) The 19th section directs DoD to study the feasibility of applying Title XI initiatives to all reserve components. How are these categories of Title XI being implemented?

(A.) DEPLOYABILITY ENHANCEMENTS:

Section 1111--Minimum Percentage of Prior Active-Duty Personnel.

This section was modified by the FY96 NDAA. The original language required that 65% of officers and 50% of enlisted NG members have two years of prior active duty service. Both the AC and RC viewed this requirement as too stringent. As the AC draws down, it would have been even more difficult to meet this active service requirement. The revision allows officers who graduate from service academies and distinguished ROTC graduates with between two and three years of service to complete their service obligation in the NG. The goal is to assign 150 officers who meet this criteria to the ARNG each year. Enlisted soldiers leaving active-duty are encouraged to transfer into the ARNG. The goal is to increase the number of prior active duty enlisted soldiers in the NG by 1000 per year. A NG fully
automated unit vacancy system is still under development (section 1133), but NGB has established a bulletin board system that allows separating AC enlisted members to view all NG vacancies nationwide.

**Section 1114—Noncommissioned Officer Education Requirements.**

This section has been fully implemented through the Total Army School System (TASS). There is only one military education standard for AC and ARNG enlisted promotions. The Active Army has assumed the responsibility for making sufficient training positions available to meet NG promotion requirements. The NG has implemented the Army leader development methodology of Select School Promote, which apportions training quotas to the most qualified soldiers and the high priority units.

**Section 1115—Initial Entry Training and Nondeployable Personnel Account.**

This section has been fully implemented. The NG has created a personnel accounting category for members who have not completed the minimum training requirement for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. Soldiers in this account cannot fill positions in NG units, and the unit positions intended for that soldier will be carried on the unit roster as vacant. SIDPERS tracks soldiers in this account. The non-deployable personnel account should increase visibility of non-deployable soldiers. Leaders no longer have to wonder whether their soldiers are deployable.

**Section 1116—Minimum Physical Deployability Standards.**
This section has been fully implemented. ARNG soldiers that don’t meet physical profile standards required for deployment are transferred to the Nondeployable Personnel Account established by Section 1115. Transfers are made within 90 days of such determination.

Section 1117/1118--Annual Medical and Dental Screening/Dental Readiness.
Language for these two sections was modified because of the implementation costs. Now only soldiers assigned to high priority units deploying within 75 days of mobilization will be required to have annual medical and dental screening. Also, soldiers over 40 in high priority units must undergo a full physical examination every two years. All dental problems identified during screening will be referred to military or private dentists for treatment.

Section 1119--Combat Unit Training.
This section has been implemented through the FORSCOM Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) program. GFRE is designed to minimize post-mobilization training required for NG combat units. Individual soldier qualification and training at the crew, squad, and platoon level will be emphasized during pre-mobilization training. This program also provides combat training for command and staff leadership positions.

Section 1121--Deployability Rating System.
This section has been fully implemented. The ARNG unit readiness rating system--AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (USR)--was modified to accurately assess the readiness of each unit to deploy. USR identifies specific shortfalls: (1) Personnel readiness reflects the percentage of manning, personnel deployability, MOSQ, and the commander’s statement on the fill of key personnel. (2) Equipment readiness assessment documents all equipment required for
deployment, measured against equipment directly possessed by the unit; (3) Training readiness reports the percent of the unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) to which the unit has trained to standard.

Section 1131--Active Component Training Responsibilities.
This section requires that each Army National Guard combat unit is associated with an active-duty combat unit. FORSCOM commander is the HQ Dept. of the Army executive and coordinating authority. AC Commanders at brigade or higher, along with associated RC units must (1) approve the RC unit training program; (2) review readiness reports; (3) assess manpower, equipment, and training resource requirement; and (4) validate, at least annually, compatibility of the RC unit with AC forces they are assigned to support.

Section 1135--Deployment Planning Reform.
The Unit Deployment Designator System (UDDS) has been integrated into the Army war planning process. It provides (1) the post-mobilization training days allocated to a RC unit before deployment; (2) grouping of reserve component units according to the timing of deployment after mobilization; (3) the Unit Deployment Designator system, which links to the process by which resources are provided for NG units. Early deploying units will receive increased funding to promote readiness.

Section 1136--Qualification for Prior-Service Enlistment Bonus.
The enlisted bonus system has been authorized, but it is not currently used.

(B.) COMPATIBILITY ENHANCEMENTS:

Section 1112--Service in Selected Reserve in Lieu of Active-Duty Service.
Academy graduates and distinguished ROTC graduates are now offered reduced active-duty time in return for serving remaining portion of their obligation in the Selected Reserves. Likewise, ROTC graduates can now complete two years of their obligation on AD and the remainder of their obligation in the National Guard.

Section 1113--Review of Officer Promotions by Commander of Associated Active-Duty Unit. Recommended promotions to grades above first lieutenant will be reviewed by the Senior Army Adviser in each State or Territory. The Senior Army Adviser, an active-duty officer acting for the Secretary of the Army and the associated Army commander, will review the recommended promotion and provide his recommendation to the promoting authority.

Section 1120--Use of Combat Simulators.
The Army has aggressively expanded combat simulators and simulation to the RC through the Total Army Training Study. All Bradley and M1 armor Guard units have been equipped with the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer (MCOFT), a precision gunnery simulator. Other fielded simulators include the Weaponeer and Guard Fist I and II. The ARNG currently uses virtual simulation training (SIMNET/CCTT) for training maneuver and command and control tasks and constructive simulations like JANUS. One-third of the Army’s annual acquisitions of simulators will go to the RC. Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulation (TADSS) provide the means to train while minimizing costs. They also reduce the environmental impact and cost of training. Use of simulators and simulations has been a huge success in the ARNG: A study by the Institute for Defense Analyses indicates maximum utilization of simulator
technology in training RC units will clearly increase readiness, and it may reduce the required post-mobilization train-up time of a NG enhanced armor brigades from 90 days to 64 days. ¹⁸

Section 1133 / 1134--Systems Compatibility / Equipment Compatibility.

Both of these sections have been approved for long-term implementation. Systems compatibility is designed to field personnel, maintenance management, supply, and finance systems that are compatible across the AC and RC. The Army is achieving systems compatibility through adoption of Open Systems Environment (OSE) standards. All new systems and all major revisions of existing systems must meet the OSE standard. However, equipment incompatibility remains a problem within all components of the Army resulting from budgetary restraints on modernizing all equipment at the same time. Current plans call for managing equipment procurement and redistribution so that high priority ARNG units will have compatible equipment with their associated AC unit. However, Congress recognizes the current funding limitations and has extended compliance requirements for sections 1133 and 1134 through the year 2003.

(C.) ARMY INSPECTION AND ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY:

Section 1122--Inspections.

This section requires the AC to determine whether ARNG combat arms units meet deployability standards and requirements for deployment. This is accomplished through the Operational Readiness Evaluation Program (ORE), a three phase program consisting of the compliance phase (personnel, maintenance, supply, and operational records), training phase (soldier, leader and collective task proficiency), and the report phase (summary evaluation of units capability to accomplish its wartime mission and resource needs). The report is then
given to the unit commander and the senior leadership in the chain of command. Part of a triad assessment system, the ORE is linked to the Training Assessment Model (TAM) and the USR as a means of determining the deployability status of RC units. It is being implemented through the GFRE program.

Section 1132--Training Compatibility.

This provision dedicates 5000 AC soldiers as trainers for high priority RC units. 2000 AC soldiers will remain assigned to RC units as Rear Detachment Trainers, and 3000 additional AC soldiers will be assigned into GFRE units.

(D.) DoD FEASIBILITY STUDY:

Section 1137--Study of Implementation for All Reserve Components.

The DoD study is complete: (1) It found that sections 1111, 1112, 1117, 1119, 1131, and 1132 were not appropriate for implementation in the USAR. (2) It found that policies already exist within the USAR for Sections 1113, 1114, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1133, and 1134. (3) It found that DoD chose to implement Sections 1115, 1116, 1118, and 1135 by policy, not legislation. (4) It finally found that the Army’s intent is to fully implement policy provisions of Title XI in the ARNG and the USAR.

Title XI is implemented through the FORSCOM collective training structure, Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) plan. This concept outlines a training partnership between the AC and RC designed to improve pre-mobilization training and provide a new structure for post-mobilization collective training consistent with the intent of Congress. The GFRE structure provides training assistance and evaluation to RC, giving priority to FSP
units, divisional roundout units, and enhanced brigades (and includes all AH-64 Apache
Attack Bns). Training will be provided for lower priority RC units only after GFRE has met
all requirements of the high priority units.

GFRE establishes Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) AC elements (Regional
Training Brigades (RTB) and Field Training Groups (FTG), under the command and control
of the CONUSA) and augments Army Reserve training units (Divisions[Exercise] [Div(E)])
with Field Exercise Brigades (FEB) and Battle Command and Staff Training Brigades
(BCST), both commanded by the USARC and missioned by the CONUSA.

GFRE is expected to be fully implemented by 1 Oct. 97. It will augment the training
currently provided by AC associated units, Readiness Groups, Regional Training Teams
(RTTs) and Regional Training Detachments (RTDs). The training requirement for high-
priority and early-deploying RC units is designed only as a minimum requirement or base
line. Higher frequency and/or level training may be provided when coordinated with the
supported units and the CONUSA. The GFRE baseline training program requirement for RC
units outlined below:

FSP units

The training level base line is at the company/battery level; lane training will be
conducted at least once annually during IDT and once annually during AT; gunnery
training as required; one BCST (command and staff training) exercise will be
conducted annually for each Bde and Bn level headquarters; evaluation results on each
task/drill for lane and simulation training exercises will be provided to the unit
commander to update the Training Assessment Model (TAM); the formal TAM will be conducted during AT by the AC TAM team; ORE conducted every 24 months.

**Div RO units**

Same as FSP units.

**Enhanced brigades**

The training level base line is platoon level; lane training will be conducted once annually during IDT and once annually during AT (as coordinated with the CONUSA and the AC associated unit); fully trained and proficient weapons system crews through gunnery qualification table VIII at minimum; command and staff training, one BCST (Div(E)) exercise conducted annually for each Bde and Bn level HQs, BCBST (Leavenworth) and BCTP (AC associated unit) will be conducted on alternating years; TAM input same as FSP units.

**Command and Staff Training for all other RC units**

One BCST exercise will be conducted biennially for each Bde and Bn level HQs; BCBST for combat divisions and strategic Bdes conducted every three to five years.

GFRE is thus the overarching program that implements Title XI, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. It adds 3000 additional AC spaces into RC support and directs the formation of AC units dedicated to RC training. The new structure relieves AC combat units of many training support requirements and allows them to concentrate on their own METL and battlefield synchronization.
ISSUES / CONCERNS

Resources:

Our rising federal debt and domestic spending priorities have resulted in inadequate defense budgets, leaving a significant gap between our current force plans and the resources available to implement them. The GFRE program (Title XI) is currently grossly under-funded. If this is not corrected in the near term, GFRE will be perceived as a drain on resources. Then the program will fail. Resource requirements to implement the GFRE program for Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 96 - 01 are in a special visibility (VTXI) Management Decision Evaluation Program (MDEP). Annual estimated costs in constant (FY96) dollars including a yearly 3% inflation rate are FY97--$51.52M, FY98--$61.6M, FY99--$62.8M, FY00--$63.7M, and FY01--$65.9M. These unfunded requirements do not include $23M in annual POM 94 - 99 costs for prototype programs managed under Bold Shift, such as lanes training, OREs, RTDs, and RTTs (the original 2K soldiers assigned to NG units for AC to RC training) sustainment.20

Program Analysis and Evaluation referred all VTXI MDEP programs to the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) as unfunded. OSD increased FY96 Army Total Obligations Authority (TOA) by $79M for sections 1111, 1119, and 1132, leaving a $304.9M POM Unfinanced Requirement (UFR) for FY 97 - 01.21

GFRE is resource intensive. If Congress and/or OSD does not fund the $304M UFR then the Army, ARNG, and USAR will have to ‘take out of hide’ the resources required for this program. Once funding becomes a contentious issue between the AC and RC, GFRE, like many other well intentioned training programs of the past, will fail. This will significantly
reduce the overall effectiveness of RC training, and thus jeopardize the readiness of the Total Army.

**Personnel:**

During the recent downsizing of the Army, it was relatively painless to provide 2000 AC soldiers (RTDs) to assist the ARNG in training high priority units. Now the Army has been drawn down to 495,000 (many project further reduction to 475,000 soldiers); at the same time, the number of AC soldiers assigned to train the RC has increased to over 5000. There is a very real danger that the Army force structure is reaching critical mass. At some point below 495,000 soldiers, the Army will not be able to support our current strategy of global engagement and enlargement, peacekeeping, and drug interdiction commitments while training the RC, without a degradation of its own readiness. This is truly a double-edged sword, because without a trained and ready RC the current BUR force structure is invalid and cannot support the current two MRC strategy.

**Roundout:**

The implementation of GFRE also marks the end of the “roundout” program. The roundout concept directed that one of the three brigades of specified active Army divisions be an RC brigade, not an AC brigade. This concept was effected during Desert Shield/Storm for the three ARNG brigades that were mobilized but never used.

Many believe that we should have fixed some of the post-mobilization problems identified in the Gulf War. They maintain that the RC will fare worse because of less active Army resourcing and that we will have a less credible and capable force due to the higher cost of maintaining active Army brigades.\(^{22}\)
Additionally, some contend that reinstating roundout would benefit the active Army by allowing more division headquarters to be maintained with commensurate opportunities for more senior officers to develop high-level command and staff expertise. These supporters point out that roundout provides the crucial link of trust between AC and RC soldiers required for a successful total force mobilization; and roundout encourages the active Army to become more involved in at least some ARNG combat brigades to increase their readiness. These arguments were fully articulated at a workshop chaired by Mr. Joel Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs (Strategic Plans and Analysis). The group perceived that GFRE was a hindrance to integration because it tended to distance the AC units from the ARNG enhanced brigades, instead of providing a link: “We [the AC] don’t own you, so we’ll only do the minimum to ensure you’re well trained.”

CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Soviet Empire and communism greatly reduced the perceived national security in the minds of most Americans. As a result, most dialogue on important military issues has been removed from the national political debate. The political leadership of this country has now focused mostly on economic and trade issues. The domestic agenda is full; the American people are demanding answers to such important issues as health care, welfare reform, tax reform, and the downsizing of federal government. Our foreign policy is concerned with the promotion of democracy and free market economies. But if we do not fund military training and modernization programs, the United States could find itself in a situation where it is perceived as something less than a global superpower and dominant force
in world affairs. If this should happen, the U.S. will have difficulty enforcing its national security interests.

In 1991, as the Soviet Union foundered, the Bush Administration reassessed our national security strategy and force structure requirements. The Base Force was born, then the U.S. military was reduced from 2.1 million to around 1.6 million active duty personnel. Defense budgets were chopped by more than 35%. In 1993 the Clinton Administration initiated the Bottom Up Review (BUR), an analyses of the military force structure and national security strategy. We have since witnessed a continuation of reduced defense budgets and significant force structure reductions.

Defense budget reductions are projected to continue their downward trend, inexorably leading to additional force structure reductions. The current active Army end-strength is approximately 495,000 soldiers; many project that it will soon drop to 475,000. Reduction of the AC is an economic decision. Since the RC is a considerably less expensive force to maintain, the U.S. will become more reliant on the RC to provide the strategic hedge in the Defense Planning Guidance to support the two MRC strategy and other capabilities that can no longer be supported by the AC.

The mobilization and subsequent failure to deploy the three ARNG roundout brigades during Operation DS/DS became a contentious issue among the AC, RC, and Congress. This led to implementation of the Bold Shift and Standard Bearer programs, both of which were designed to prioritize training and resources to high priority ARNG units. However, Congress did not believe these programs went far enough or fast enough to ensure that the ARNG was trained and ready to accomplish their wartime combat mission. Therefore, they mandated that
the AC provide training to the ARNG to enhance deployability, compatibility and readiness through passage of the 1992 Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative as Title XI of the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act. It was fully implemented when the FY96 NDAA was signed into law.

With proper resourcing, Title XI (GFRE) can provide the necessary pre-mobilization and post-mobilization framework for enhancing the combat proficiency of high-priority units in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. However, the current $304M Title XI UFR through FY01 will force a trade-off between RC training and other Total Army requirements (AC readiness requirements, force modernization, quality of life issues, etc.). This is a formula for failure.


Ibid., 80.


19 Department of the Army G3 James T. Hill, “Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) Implementation Plan” memorandum for

20 NGB-ARZ-G, 1

21 Ibid.

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