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STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS
UNITY OF COMMAND

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The absence of a single command authority for logistics at the strategic and operational levels breeds chronic problems in projecting the power of the national support base into a theater of operations. This study puts forth a proposal to reengineer the DOD logistics system using Joint Pub 4-0 as the authoritative doctrinal basis for the establishment of a single command authority for logistics. The paper argues that history establishes the precedent, while the current environment provides the impetus for the establishment of a National Provider and Joint Theater Logistics Commands to serve as the nexus for strategic and operational logistics planning and execution. It is based on briefings and lectures from senior officials in the Department of Defense as well as current and traditional sources to examine how best to organize the DOD logistics system to succeed in the twenty first century.
INTRODUCTION

The analysis of past and present U.S. military campaigns consistently reveals one common thread of continuity—the necessity to designate a single command authority for logistics at the strategic and operational levels. The absence of such an authority breeds chronic problems of coordination and synchronization in projecting the power of the national support base into a theater of operations. The establishment of a single command authority for logistics at the strategic level is essential in pulling this all together. Such an authority provides a single joint logistics vision and performs the requisite management and integration functions to assure unity of effort. Similarly, a single command authority for logistics must be established at the operational level. This is essential to assuring the "integration of the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater. The position bridges the gap between the national sustaining base and the theater of operations by scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander."1 Given the continuously evolving domestic and global environment in which the U.S. military must operate, unity of command in logistics is the precondition for successfully projecting the nation's support base into a theater of operations.
During past conflicts, a combination of "enablers" such as access, time, mass, and geography permitted the U.S. to train, equip and project the requisite force to successfully execute the National Security Strategy. Today's environment minimizes the benefits derived from these enablers. Now, time is on the side of any potential adversary, while the mass that once existed has diminished commensurate with the perceived absence of a global threat. Recent world events demonstrated to potential adversaries the consequences of allowing the U.S. military access to a country's infrastructure, and the time to amass its overwhelming combat power. Additionally, the "lack of public perception of a clear and immediate threat, such as that which unified national purpose during the Cold War"² causes "defense planners to face a challenging confluence of political and budgetary pressures to accelerate defense budget reductions."³ Individual services in the Department of Defense (DOD) are responding to the challenge by downsizing, streamlining, reengineering, and leveraging technology, while concurrently implementing a plethora of cost saving logistics initiatives. In short, finding more efficient ways of doing more with less—at the expense of the other services. For example, the Air Force's Lean Logistics relies heavily upon the Army's resources dedicated to the Battlefield Distribution System (BDS), In-transit Visibility (ITV), and Velocity Management (VM) initiatives. The
Army's role in the strategies of Force Projection and Forward Presence relies on the Air Force's acquisition of C-17s (vs. NDAA -commercial aircraft) and the Navy's acquisition of Fast Sea Lift ships, RO/ROs, and causeways. Who establishes the priorities?

Who is in charge?

To put this in a broader perspective, all the Services have implemented, or are developing new strategic visions to operate and fight in the 21st century. The Navy has "Forward...From the Sea," the Marines "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," the Air Force "Global Reach," and "Lean Logistics" and the Army, "Force XXI" and "Battlefield Distribution System." These visions encompass new weapons systems, precision munitions and use of force, and information warfare/advanced C4I systems, which, when modernized, integrated, fielded and operated jointly, will, if done right, emerge and come together as a "system of systems" to greatly increase our warfighters' dominate battlefield awareness. This equates to a many-fold increase in lethality, survivability, and overall capability of our forces. A critical part of this future "system of systems" will be logistics as the nation's mobility capability must also keep pace with our lethality capability. As C-130Js, C-17s, NDAA, large medium speed RO/ROs (LMSR), fast sealift ships, more railcars, causeways, in-transit visibility, and container handling equipment, to name a few, become reality, it would be very beneficial and cost effective to have these very expensive systems fit together in the right numbers in the right sequence so they become a highly effective transportation system in the future "system of systems". The only way to ensure this integration occurs is for someone or some organization to develop a "joint logistics vision" to put all these pieces together now....If not, the most lethal force in the 21st century may lose because it cannot get to the fight fast enough."

"Joint Logistics Vision," Mobility Times 5, (Oct 95)
LOGISTICS

Joint National Provider

Logistics systems integration and the development of an all encompassing "joint logistics vision" are functions germane to a single logistics command authority. At the strategic level call it a National Provider or call it a Unified Logistics Command (i.e., LOGCOM). Regardless of its name, its primary mission is to provide an over-arching logistics management and integration function from "factory to foxhole, ship, or airplane". The breadth of responsibilities of such a command warrants the designation of a functional CINC (i.e., CINCLOG), responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the executive agent of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The CINCLOG will be responsible for force sustainment, which includes acquiring and sustaining equipment, maintaining and sustaining operations, acquiring and sustaining facilities, installation management, as well as force generation and force projection which entails the tailoring, mobilization, and projection of power.

This is not a new concept, but an expansion upon "the idea entertained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Director of Logistics (J4's) proposal to create and organize a unified Logistics Command (LOGCOM) that is the logistics materiel and services equivalent to USTRANSCOM. Under the J4 concept, the
CINCLOG would provisionally command all service component logistics commands, currently nine, and later reorganize along functional lines of joint maintenance, materiel, and weapons systems management. Key factors that led the J4 to consider forming a LOGCOM were fiscal constraints in downsizing, simplifying management, and adhering to the recent roles and missions study produced by Defense Management Review Directive 902. Projecting the nation's support base into a theater of operation requires the coordination and synchronization of the nation's provisioning and transportation systems. The inclusion of USTRANSCOM as a subunified command of the National Provider will facilitate this process.

In his article, "Case for a Unified Logistics Command", (Army Logistician Mar-Apr 95), LTC Christopher Paperone used a synthesized list of 12 logistics criteria as a basis for analyzing, comparing, and presenting a compelling argument for the establishment of such an organization. Joint Pub 4-0 provides the doctrinal basis for the designation of a single logistics command authority as it identifies the logistics considerations of: command and control of logistics; industrial base requirements; logistics as a factor in determining operational reach; and deployment information flow.
Command and Control of Logistics

The most significant aspect of the notion of a National Provider is that it establishes a single command authority at the national (strategic) level which provides command and control of logistics. This command and control promotes unity of command, which "is essential to coordinate national and theater logistics operations." The CINCLOG will be the single commander who owns and operates the entire supply pipeline from "factory to foxhole, ship or airplane". "With clear lines of command over joint weapon systems, joint depot maintenance, joint materiel management [and transportation], the organizational vision, objectives and goals are bound to be clearer under a unified logistics command. A CINCLOG ensures "unity of command" for National Command Authorities (NCA)-directed operations in support of theater warfighters. In addition, LOGCOM would further close and realign CONUS logistics base operations to support operational deployment requirements of USACOM and unified combatant commanders, and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission." In an era of diminishing resources, the unity of effort achieved by a CINCLOG facilitates the over-arching management and integration needed to avoid piecemeal and disjointed approaches to strategic logistic issues and service peculiar systems competing against one another for limited resources.
Industrial Base Requirements

"Planners must identify the items that must come directly from industrial base vice existing stocks. Contractors may require time to restart production lines, acquire raw materials, and retrain their labor force." Each service performs their own assessments, but are these assessments integrated, presented in a unified manner and acted upon? Who is the advocate who presents industrial base issues in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Joint Materiel Readiness Review (JMRR) processes? CINCLOG could serve as the "Industrial Base Advocate who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. As the Industrial Base Advocate, CINCLOG will be responsible for identifying industrial capabilities that are essential to the Defense Department, realigning the acquisition process to rely more heavily on commercial technologies, attaining the appropriate balance of public and private sector industrial base capabilities, and clarifying the role of foreign military sales and export controls." In this capacity, CINCLOG serves as a conduit for industrial base issues affecting each service to reach the under secretary level and provides the means by which industrial base issues are introduced into the powerful and resource allocating Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.
(JWCA), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Joint Materiel Readiness Review (JMRR) processes.

Similarly, CINCLOG, armed with visibility of industrial base capabilities and total asset visibility of the operational forces, is in a unique position to formulate strategic reconstitution policy. "There is no one organization or official responsible for reconstitution policy within the Department of Defense."¹⁰ Reconstitution policy is addressed in the Defense Planning Guidance and the Joint Military Assessment prepared by the Joint Staff, with the services providing some degree of input to reconstitution policy formulation. Recognizably, "reconstitution is a low priority when compared to modernization and sustainment of the current force. However, resources can drive thought on a subject; to the extent that reconstitution resources diminish, and reconstitution plans and concepts, which can only be rendered coherent by some sort of central authority, may become more, rather than less important."¹¹

**Logistics Determines Operational Reach**

"Strategically, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the National Command Authorities, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or combatant commanders."¹² "Under the current structure, determining the capabilities requires the consultation of ten
organizational entities\textsuperscript{13} to synthesize the truth. The CINCLOG is able to answer the question more directly and cleanly, for his position establishes command responsibility for ensuring sufficient sustainment capability or defining the risk to strategic goals if logistics readiness is inadequate.\textsuperscript{14} CINCLOG would be ideally postured to provide the NCA and combatant commanders a holistic perspective of the national sustaining base. This is a unique capability that facilitates the identification of strategic level logistics culminating points thereby defining the limits of the U.S. military's operational reach. Additionally, CINCLOG's input to the Joint Strategic Planning System will result in a more refined, capability-based National Military Strategy.

**Deployment Information Flow**

"Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to logistics planning, coordinating unit movements and sustainment operations. It is almost as important to know where units and supplies are, as it is, to have them physically present."\textsuperscript{15} History is replete with examples of how the lack of asset visibility adversely affected every node in the logistics hierarchy. "The lack of movement visibility frustrates customers at all levels. While the Global Transportation Network (GTN) is making major progress in this area, the absence of a comprehensive DOD strategy for
total asset visibility diminishes customer confidence in our delivery systems. The loss of confidence relates directly to supply discipline issues; mission oriented organizations will find ways to get the job done, sometimes, despite the Defense Transportation System. The resultant submission of duplicate requirements creates additional stress on the strategic lift system. It also hinders theater efforts to program delivery times and sequence reception and onward movement activities."\(^{16}\)

The Army's Velocity Management, Battlefield Distribution System and Intransit-Visibility initiatives, coupled with the Air Force's Lean Logistics initiatives, are quantum leaps in the asset visibility arena; however, they are Service versus DOD initiatives. There is some degree of cooperation between these two Services only because their initiatives are dependent upon each other's resources. What about the Navy and Marine Corps? Total asset visibility will never be achieved, nor will its impact be felt at the national and combatant command levels until all the Service initiatives are integrated into a seamless system. "The CINCLOG would provide an integrating headquarters; systems would be less stovepiped and management levels reduced. The warfighting CINCs would have a single logistics pipeline manager."\(^{17}\)
Historical Perspective: W.W.II

General Sommerrvell, who commanded the Services of Supply during World War II emphatically supported the requirement for a single logistics authority.

It is obvious that, when operations must be carried on at sea, in the air, and on the ground, logistics planning must be organized to provide the correlated requirements for the three combat forces and to integrate the means of getting them to the scene of action. These activities must be so controlled that each force is provided with what it needs without waste or shortage, in a word, with the utmost efficiency. A single head can guide and direct such planning more efficiently than any kind of committee action.18

Recommendation

"CINCLOG is a "one stop shopping approach" to supporting the CINCs, this is as close to a seamless organizational structure as imaginable."19 Its establishment as a National Provider is suitable due to DOD's continued downsizing and acceptable as evidenced by its mention in the "Army's Materiel Command's (AMC) Functional Area Assessment (FAA) of Title 10 Functions of "Equip", "Supply", and "Maintain"20 and its "discussion among the Joint Staff to be included the Chairman's Vision 2010."21 Creating such an organization may not be feasible in the near term. Unifying the entire wholesale logistics structure has severe Title 10 implications and would require overcoming tremendous Service parochialisms. In his "Open Letter on a Unified Command" featured in the September-October 1995 issue of Army Logistician, GEN Salomon,
then commander of the Army Materiel Command, made it quite clear that attempts to centralize now would not succeed because it "would create a situation where the services are attempting to reengineer their processes—a necessary action to cope with downsizing pressures, enhance support, and become more efficient—while concurrent actions from outside the services are being taken to centralize the organizations that implement the processes." However, this does not obviate the need for a person or organization to provide an over-arching management and integration function to pull all the pieces, all the initiatives together. The logistics system requires top to bottom reengineering of its organizations and internal processes to succeed in the twenty-first century.

**Joint Theater Logistics Command**

While establishing a single command authority for logistics at the national level is being debated, history demonstrates the need and recent U.S. military deployments provide the impetus for the establishment of a Joint Theater Logistics Command. Problems encountered during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, while at opposite ends of the "spectrum of conflict", demonstrate that the U.S. military has not made much
progress in defining nor establishing logistics unity of command since operations conducted during World Wars I and II.

Historical Perspective: W.W.I

During his discourse with the War Department in 1918, GEN Pershing made the following comment:

...the system includes transportation up to the trenches and is intimately interwoven with our whole organization. The whole must remain absolutely under one head. Any division of responsibility or coordinate control in any sense would be fatal. The man who fights the armies must control their supply through subordinates responsible to him alone. The responsibility is then fixed and the possibility of conflicting authority avoided. This military principle is vital and cannot be violated without inviting failure.\textsuperscript{23}

The issue involved a proposal to detach GEN Pershing's logistics assets under direct control of the War Department. Allegedly, the origin of the proposal was a result of Washington's frustration with congestion at the ports of debarkation and the slow turn-around of critical strategic shipping assets. "Nearly everyone has agreed that there should be unity of command for logistics, but there has been no general agreement about what it means. In the first place, how far should a commander's control extend to the rear?"\textsuperscript{24} In this instance, control of logistics at the national or operational levels could have been justified in the name of unity of command.

"In any case, the incident was a turning point in the Army's system for control of logistics. Pershing's reaction, and Baker's (Secretary of War) acceptance of his view set the
precedent for allowing overseas commanders to control their lines of communications." What eventually evolved was an Army theater logistics command empowered to coordinate directly with the War Department to modulate the movement of supplies in the logistics pipeline. The significance of this exchange is that it was a step toward establishing a theater level single command authority for logistics empowered to "integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander." 

**Historical Perspective: W.W.II**

"A second aspect of unity of command has to do with inter-service control." The task of supporting combat forces in the Pacific involved extended sea lines of communications, competition for limited shipping and an inadequate infrastructure to support the establishment of a large theater sustaining base. Given this environment, coupled with the close and continuous contact of Army, Navy and Marine Corps, the situation clearly warranted the integration of logistics for the support of joint operations. "In the South Pacific theater, where Army and Navy forces were inextricably intermingled, the two services operated parallel supply lines; there were joint arrangements only for the exploitation of local resources, and a rule of thumb division of
responsibility for the provision of certain types of supplies....Separate supply lines for two services inevitably caused waste and duplication of effort in an area where facilities and resources were scarce." The problems caused by the operation of separate supply lines in an area of operations with limited infrastructure became evident at the port of Noumea--the principal focal point for receipt and transhipment of supplies to Guadalcanal. "Though the lack of facilities and personnel lay at the root of the congestion at Noumea, the relative immaturity of both Army and Navy logistical agencies and lack of co-ordination between them made it far more difficult to manage....On arrival at Noumea, the ships were unloaded by the services separately, with no effective coordination of discharge activities or control of harbor traffic. There was an inevitable tendency by both the Army and the Navy to unload supplies only as needed....Lack of any overall plan for construction of facilities led to duplication both in shipments of material from the United States and in the use of resources available in theater.""29

Throughout the duration of the war, the services continued to wrestle with the concept of unified logistics. While the concept was more advanced in the Central Pacific, service parochialisms prevented the establishment of a joint logistics command from coming to fruition. This issue remained dormant until Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
Historical Perspective: Desert Shield/Desert Storm

"The Gulf War was a remarkable distillation of the factors that argue for a single point of contact in logistics— in fact, it was an extreme case."30 "Soon after their arrival in Saudi Arabia, Generals Schwartzkopf and Yeosock came to the shared conclusion that the only way they could hope to operate successfully in the theater would be to establish a single point of contact for all logistics needs. MG Pagonis was designated Deputy Commanding General for Logistics, responsible for providing all services with fuel, water, food, ammunition, all classes of supply (except equipment repair parts for the Marines and Air Force), as well as items common to all the services."31

Implicit was the requirement to serve as the focal point for host nation support and contracting. MG Pagonis's approach to logistics as the "integration of transportation, supply, warehousing, procurement, contracting, and automation into a single function that ensures no suboptimization in any of those areas"32 reinforced his belief that what was needed was a "logistics kingpin" to facilitate the coordination and synchronization of projecting the power of the national support base into a theater of operations. For example, as in both World Wars, "our Stateside shippers made heroic efforts to stuff every Gulf-bound ship absolutely full, in part by topping off each vessel with mixed-consignee containers. Given our limited
shipping capacity, this made good sense—until those ships disgorged their cargoes in Saudi Arabia. The combination of mixed loads, unidentified containers, and missing documentation caused tremendous backlogs at the ports, problems with in-theater distribution, and a loss of confidence in the overall logistics system.

**Historical Perspective: Restore Hope**

Shortly after Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the U.S. military was committed to a series of peacekeeping operations. While the mission was relatively new, the difficulties encountered in projecting the power of the national support base into a theater of operations during the two World Wars and Desert Shield/Desert Storm were still prevalent. The lack of time, coupled with absence of a "standing" single command authority for logistics, impeded the integration of the operations and logistics plans. This was clearly the case during W.W.II at the port of Noumea, and fifty years later at the port of Mogadishu, Somalia.

Several coordination issues underlined the fact that in logistics the integration of joint and service perspectives is not always clear. One of the most basic problems was over command and control of the seaport of Mogadishu—a critical concern because the port facilities were in such disrepair that only one ship could be handled at a time. There was some confusion over whether the Navy, Marine Corps, or the Army was to be in charge of this "common user seaport" because the Army transportation unit doctrinally charged with the mission, did not arrive until well after the first pre-positioned ships were waiting outside the port. The Marines, on at least one occasion, held back some shipping in order to supply their own requirements, despite
the fact that all sealift resources were supposed to be centrally managed. And while components from within a service routinely transferred equipment from rotating to arriving units, the same arrangement did not always hold true among the services. For example, the Army at one point in the operation requested lift to ship Humvees back to its home stations—just as the Marines were requesting equally daunting lift requirements to ship their Humvees from the United States to Somalia.33

**Recommendation**

Integration of the operations and logistics plans, building the Time Phased Force Deployment List to sequence the arrival of the optimal mix of combat and combat service support forces, adjudicating competition for limited resources, port operations, providing the linkage between strategic and operational logistics, are all necessary functions that can only be performed by a single command authority for logistics. "The logistics support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority"34

Joint Pub 4-0 provides the authoritative doctrinal basis for a single command authority, responsible for logistics in a given area and for a given mission. Now, the CINCs have the authority but lack the resources to establish an organization and designate a lead Service to provide a senior logistics commander. This dilemma is compounded by the lack of operational level joint logistics doctrine. The creation of a Joint Theater Logistics Command would facilitate the development of such doctrine and
serve as the basis for planning and providing support for the combatant commanders. More importantly, the commander of such an organization would serve as the CINC's single command authority for logistics, who bridges the gap between the national sustaining base and operational logistics.

The Army is in the process of coming to grips with the issue of theater logistics command and control by creating a Theater Support Command. It envisions "A logistics pipeline ... that will extend combat service support seamlessly from the current strategic level through the operational and tactical levels.... A single commander; a senior logistician at the strategic level (National Provider) - will be responsible for the pipeline. A major subordinate command of the National Provider [under OPCON to a CINC], located forward in the theater of operations will provide in-country coordination, command, and control of all theater logistics assets. The commander, a battlespace logistician, will be fully responsible to the supported commander in chief (CINC) or his joint task force (JTF) commander for all theater-level logistics functions."35 The Army's Theater Support Command concept consists of a joint staff, task organized around a standing Army organization. This initiative is currently under review and revision to further explore the viability of a joint theater logistics command and control organization.
A Joint Theater Logistics Commander serves as the combatant commander's link to the strategic logistics base. This provides for command and control of all theater logistics assets, hence unity of effort. With total asset visibility, the commander has the ability to influence the rate of flow in the logistics pipeline. As the single point of contact for input into Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), the commander can sequence the arrival of forces and supplies entering the theater, ensuring that the appropriate balance of combat and combat service support is achieved commensurate with the CINC's requirements. Given the authority and responsibility for port management, armed with asset visibility and CINC priorities, the designation of a single command authority for logistics will mitigate some of the challenges experienced during past deployments. Above all, the creation of a Joint Theater Logistics Command establishes a clear delineation of authority within the CINC's or JTF commander's area of operation to clarify who is in charge of making things happen.
CONCLUSIONS

The mission of the DOD Logistics System is: "To provide responsive support to ensure sustainability for the Total Force in both peace and war."\textsuperscript{16}

With the end of the Cold War, the DOD logistics systems must adjust to support a smaller, highly mobile, high technology force. DOD cannot afford to solve future logistics challenges as it often has in the past through sheer mass. The pressure of fiscal limits, combined with the demands of regional conflicts, humanitarian support, and other non-traditional missions all put a premium on logistics performance and flexibility....Recent conflicts involving U.S. forces deployed abroad all underline the importance of gaining control over the logistics pipeline.\textsuperscript{37}

History establishes the precedent while the current environment provides the impetus for the establishment of a National Provider (Logistics Command--LOGCOM) to serve as the nexus for strategic logistics planning and execution. "The absence of such an authority impedes the progress toward achieving the "Department of Defense Logistics System Vision of: providing reliable, flexible, cost-effective and prompt logistics support, information, and services while achieving a lean infrastructure."\textsuperscript{38} The mounting reductions in military structures and resources, coupled with National Security and Military Strategies requiring ever increasing military involvement, are forcing the services to independently pursue numerous initiatives to operate more efficiently and effectively. Such a piecemealed and disjointed approach will never result in the attainment of a logistics "system of systems" capable of
projecting and sustaining the most modern, lethal, and well equipped force in the world. In order to pull this all together, a single command authority for logistics must be established at the strategic level to provide a single joint logistics vision, and the requisite management and integration functions to ensure unity of effort.

The linkage between strategic and operational logistics has long been complex and difficult but it is paramount to ensuring the synchronization of national logistics assets in support of a campaign. The proposal put forth is a Joint Theater Logistics Command as a "major subordinate command of the National Provider [under OPCON to a CINC], located forward in the theater of operations, providing in-country coordination, command and control of all theater logistics assets and bridging the gap between the strategic and operational sustaining bases. The commander, a battlespace logisticiam, will be fully responsible to the supported commander in chief (CINC) or his joint task force (JTF) commander for all theater-level logistics functions."39

The establishment of a Joint National Logistics Activity, organized with Joint Theater Logistics Commands (one per CINC) as its operational major subordinate commands, "epitomizes Henry Eccles' equivalent relationship between strategy and logistics. As our strategy becomes more defined, we could implement it
through a single chain of command rather than through the current ten loosely tied organizations. Before we move toward establishing a LOGCOM, the services must recognize the need to abandon their "organizational essence." The parochial wisdom of "What is good for the service is good for the Nation" must be reversed to "What's good for the Nation is good for the services".40

The concepts of a National Provider and a Joint Theater Logistics Command usurp certain responsibilities of the services under Title 10, U.S. Code. It is these responsibilities that promote service parochialisms. Actions such as empowering the JROC to overrule service parochialisms to effectively leverage joint Service and Defense agency capabilities, indicates that the trend is already moving in this direction. To maintain the momentum, the law must be rewritten to codify the process and incorporate the recommended proposals. In so doing, the U.S. military will attain a truly joint warfighting capability, trained and equipped to execute the National Military Strategy.
Endnotes


3 Ibid., 3.


11 Ibid., 16.


Endnotes

Air Systems Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and USTRANSCOM.


21 Deputy Director for Logistics Readiness and Requirements J-4, Joint Staff, "Strategic Logistics," briefing presented to students of the United States Army War College, Carlisle PA, 1 March 1996.


24 Ibid., 665.

25 Ibid., 364.

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29 Ibid., 399.


31 Ibid., 97-98.

32 Ibid., 214-215.


37 Ibid.


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