The Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) is the strategic wargaming center for the Army War College and a link between the College and the Army's Senior leaders, combatant commanders and other national and international agencies.

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The CSL supports wargaming, which has been part of the U.S. Army War College curriculum since its founding. Today the USAWC presents wargaming at the strategic and operational levels and uses it to help explore alternatives, provide insights, identify issues for research and analysis, generate discussion of national security matters, and practice decisionmaking under a variety of situations.
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FOREWORD

The end of the Cold War did not bring global peace. Since 1990 American military forces have been involved in a variety of military actions including a major effort in the Gulf. Our forces have also been involved in a variety of humanitarian operations which require close cooperation with United Nations agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Members of the military and the NGO communities share a commitment to service, a willingness to work abroad among the dead and dying, and also an acceptance of significant risk in their daily lives. Still, their organizations are profoundly different. As they have begun working together, work in which neither is "in charge," they have sometimes regarded each other with suspicion.

Our military has now acquired significant experience in the cooperation required in humanitarian interventions. In this volume Captain Chris Seiple, USMC, offers four case studies.

The first is Operation Provide Comfort, which provided support and resettlement for Kurdish refugees who had fled into southeastern Turkey after a rebellion launched in conjunction with the Gulf War. Even today this operation requires military protection.

The second, Operation Sea Angel, brought relief to Bangladeshis battered by a tropical cyclone, and in the process supported a fragile, newly elected government.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia presented a more complex challenge. The terrible starvation there was, in part, a weapon of inter-clan war. Conducting relief amid fighting clans was something no one knew just how to do.

In Rwanda's Operation Support Hope the military role was brief and narrowly focused. It came in the aftermath of the murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans followed by a revolution and the flight of other hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. The military provided emergency relief until NGOs were able to fulfill the mission of supporting the refugees.

For the near future our military is more likely to participate in humanitarian interventions and in peacekeeping than it is to participate in
war or in peace enforcement. In humanitarian interventions the military must work with civilians who are not only not under the same operational control, but whose field workers often claim substantial autonomy. Further, part of the military's mission is to work its way out of a job, to transfer its temporarily assumed duties to NGOs and other civilian authorities.

The mechanism which Captain Seiple sees as crucial to the relationship between the military and the NGOs is the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or its equivalent. He discusses how the function of the CMOC was fulfilled in each of the cases, and provides recommendations on how it may be planned for and fulfilled more efficiently in the future.

Captain Seiple is also quite clear that while both the military and relief NGOs think of, even pride themselves, as being apolitical, both, in fact, work within a political context. Even in Bangladesh where the disaster was natural, not man made, relief work had the potential for destabilizing a democratic government. Seiple does not advocate politicalization of the military or of NGOs. He does believe that understanding and thinking about the strategic affect of relief operations can prevent inadvertent harm to the operation and to the nation's credibility.

Captain Seiple provides detailed enough case histories that readers will be able to use his studies for the purpose of reaching conclusions of their own. On the other hand, he is quite clear about what his conclusions are, and what recommendations he would make. Still, as he has said elsewhere, "You will not agree with all the arguments of this study. And perhaps you will take strong exception to some of the recommendations. Good. We live in a transitory age and we must examine everything anew." I might add that all ages are transitory and that we must "constantly examine everything anew."

The Army's Center for Strategic Leadership is honored to publish this work by a member of a fellow service. I consider it an important contribution to the discussion of the mission of the military and of the nation itself. It is the careful work of an individual who serves, but not the official position of any institution.

Douglas Campbell, Director
Center for Strategic Leadership
Carlisle Barracks
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I also thank Paul Stockton for taking the time last April to listen to a crazy idea -- one about a graduate curriculum to study and teach about the subjects presented in this study -- and Daniel Moran, who now leads the Naval Postgraduate School’s efforts to make such a curriculum a reality.

A special thanks goes to all those whom I interviewed. Thank you for your patience, understanding, interest, time, connections, and materials sent. I am indebted. I am particularly indebted to Lauren Landis-Guzman and Elizabeth Lukasavich who introduced me to the humanitarian community. Moreover, I am deeply appreciative of the following folks, (listed in chronological order) for their invaluable comments and criticisms of various parts of this work: Robin Needham, Dr. Mary Kilgour, Dayton Maxwell, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), Kevin Kennedy, Lauren Landis-Guzman, Robert MacPherson, Anita Menghetti, Dr. Les Roberts, Dr. Michael Toole, and Margaret Ann and Robert A. Seiple.

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"But you all have to move in a square-dance."

Anita Menghetti\textsuperscript{1}
INTRODUCTION

"No one serving as a soldier gets involved in civilian affairs -- he wants to please his commanding officer."

Paul, 2nd Timothy 2:4

Paul's time immemorial advice may no longer apply. Since the end of the Cold War, the American military has been increasingly employed in engagements where traditional national security criteria have been loosely adhered to or largely ignored. A quick perusal of some recent operational titles suggests the humanitarian nature of these efforts: Provide Comfort (northern Iraq); Sea Angel (Bangladesh); Restore Hope (Somalia); and Support Hope (Rwanda). These emergencies have been so overpowering -- so sudden and so overwhelming, with the near, or actual, catastrophic loss of life -- that the traditional humanitarian response from the international civilian community has not been enough. As a result, the American military -- because of its ability to quickly provide logistics, infrastructure, and security -- has been called upon to enable the relief effort.

Within this setting the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the American military have had to work together towards a common goal. Theirs is not a natural relationship. The former are accustomed to autonomy and operating according to their own charters and core values. The latter is an instrument of a national polity and follows its orders. Yet the two have worked together, and mostly with great success.

Irrespective of personal opinions, past definitions, or formerly agreed upon boundaries, the interaction between the NGO community and the military will take place. In fact, contrary to St. Paul's advice to Timothy, the soldier will do well to get "involved in civilian affairs." While the lamb is not yet lying with the lion, each is beginning to recognize the other's intrinsic value; indeed, during these humanitarian emergencies, they need each other.

The purpose of this work is to examine the operational interface between American non-governmental organizations (NGOs)² and
the United States military during humanitarian interventions. It focuses on the infrastructure the military uses to collaborate and coordinate with the NGO community during the first thirty to sixty days of a humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it analyzes the use of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), or the variant thereof, and its effectiveness as a mechanism for facilitating collaboration and coordination between the NGO community and the U.S. military.

This volume analyzes the NGO/military interface in the following four cases:

1. *Operation Provide Comfort* (northern Iraq, April, 1991);
2. *Operation Sea Angel* (Bangladesh, May, 1991);
3. *Operation Restore Hope* (Somalia, December, 1992);

For the purposes of this work, each of the above cases is defined as a humanitarian intervention. While a uniform definition does not yet exist for the term "humanitarian intervention," all share a single, essential element: the presence of near-term or actual catastrophic loss of life within an uncertain threat environment. The need is so great that the local and international humanitarian response community cannot handle the situation by themselves. American military intervention -- *vis-à-vis* its logistics, infrastructure, and security capabilities -- is absolutely necessary to the relief effort.³

How this humanitarian intervention unfolds depends completely upon the uncertain threat and the fluid political and emergency context of the day. Importantly, the term "threat" is not always related to security. It can refer to a range of impediments, natural and (usually) man-made. The threat may be an impending cholera or measles epidemic; it may be armed belligerents; or it may be the creation of a dependency mindset among aid recipients.

It should noted that this analysis is U.S.-centric. More attention might have been given to the role of the United Nations, other international organizations, and other NGOs; it might have focused on the proper medical and/or technical approach, on cost-effectiveness, or on the critical role of the people being helped. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to focus on the ideas and actions of
U.S. participants -- government, military, and NGOs -- because the collaboration and coordination among them, although much improved, still needs considerable work. We must first understand ourselves, our role, and our impact before examining other factors. Thus, this work is merely a 1995 snapshot of the ever-evolving problem of complex humanitarian emergencies and of the role of U.S. NGOs and the U.S. military in them.

This volume hopes to make three contributions. First, by presenting four major humanitarian interventions next to each other, it will enable the reader to make comparisons and to formulate generalizations based on four quite different operations. Additionally, each case study can be viewed as an independent operation with its own lessons, which may serve as a reference point for similar future emergencies. Case studies often enable readers to “get their arms around” a complex subject.

The second goal is to create a greater awareness of how interaction between NGOs and the military actually takes place. In an age of coordination conferences, humanitarian-speak, and peacekeeping as a growth industry, acronyms and wire-diagrams are enthusiastically produced without, excuse the expression, the smell of gunsmoke. Terms like Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) can dominate a discussion without much appreciation for how the coordination process actually unfolds on the ground. This volume tries to describe and to understand the daily dynamics of NGO/military interaction: to show how collaboration, consensus, and coordination are achieved. It therefore, focuses on the development of some principles of coordination between the two communities. The book is written, as far as possible, from the point of view of those who operate at ground level, where, no matter the official positions of governments or organizations, a working policy must be developed which “works.”

Third, this analysis seeks to examine the armed forces/NGOs relationship in the context of national security. National security is many things to many people. To some it is simply the age-old criteria of nation survival and traditional vital interests. To others, it now embodies trans-national issues such as health, environment, narcotics control and care of refugees as well. Depending on one's definition of national security, expectations as to the respective roles of the
military and the NGO may vary. Still, it is clear that national security is an evolving concept. Thus, to reduce the relationship between the military and the NGOs to mere operational issues while ignoring other participants and the influence of the political and emergency context is to render the analysis artificial. Unless we grapple with the larger influences that shape and manifest themselves in the NGO/military relationship, that relationship may fail, and our nation’s security may be diminished as well.

Being aware of and acknowledging political forces challenges both the military and NGO communities, for both have had a tradition of being apolitical. Ours an age of trespassed boundaries, an age where traditional parameters and definitions are being re-examined and even discarded. Tough questions must be asked. Answers are hard to find, but in the final analysis, this work asserts that emerging U.S. military/NGO cooperation is not some happenstance of a period of transition. Rather, it is a fundamental characteristic of a new era.
CHAPTER ONE
APPROACHING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NGO/U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Understanding the relationship between NGOs and the American military requires an understanding of the complex dynamics at work. The case studies reveal that the parameters of the NGO/military relationship are most definitely formed by the political context as well as by the conditions of the emergency. The relationship is further delineated by the participants, according to the shared “moment.” Moreover, there are basic principles that govern the relationship.

The military-NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of a new era. This makes the conceptual framework with which one addresses each emergency that much more important; further, the old mindsets of both communities are rarely appropriate. The NGOs, for example, must comprehend the crying need for a comprehensive and integrated response, even if this sometimes requires subjugating their charter for the good of the overall effort. On the other hand, a linear military mindset is also insufficient. With no two crises exactly the same, the only way to address any given situation is to use a conceptual checklist only as a reference point, and to be fully prepared to throw it away if it does not work. Humanitarian intervention is not a matter of "x" amount of input, for "y" amount of days, to achieve the definable and finite "z."

It may be helpful to think of these situations as a protracted game of multi-dimensional chess. Each piece has a contribution to make, primary for a time, yet yielding appropriately to other, equally integral, components within a continuum of effort.

Coming to grips with which chess piece to play within which dimension first requires one to grasp the political context of a situation. "Political," in this sense, refers to the dynamics, in and among, the domestic (both in the U.S. and in the intervened state), international, and host region players. There is a political dynamic
and effect within every dimension of an effort that falls under the deceptively simple rubric of "humanitarianism."

The decision to intervene is political. There are short and long term domestic ramifications for the President, his administration, and the Congress. Building international support for such an effort involves sustained political will and a willingness to make trade-offs. Implicitly, any intervention involves national prestige.

The military's mission reflects the political process. Its deployment to a region/state/former state is inherently political for its presence there demonstrates that there is something which the affected state cannot, or will not, do for its own people. The mere presence of a military force is political; it cannot help but affect the daily and political life of a country. A military force -- no matter how "limited" its mission -- also represent a chance for significant change in the condition of a country. It can raise the expectations of an afflicted people simply by virtue of being the only organization that works. These expectations make for potentially divisive tensions once the situation stabilizes, or, they may actually prohibit stabilization.

Aid itself is political\(^1\). It is not always the good and right answer; aid can even exacerbate an existing crisis. In Somalia, the most complex of emergencies, food itself became the currency of political power. He who controlled the food controlled everything else. Even the distribution of food is an arena of "city politics." Who gets what and when increases/decreases the political power and prestige of local leaders.

Despite their traditionally apolitical stance, NGOs are political. They have their own agenda and their own turf. With a tradition of organizational autonomy and a liberating perspective that allows them to act when and where they want, they are not used to external direction, let alone the possibility that they could be political players. Additionally, they compete with one another for fund-raising purposes -- a process that, depending on an organization's resources, can be closely tied to media coverage of a complex humanitarian emergency.

Moreover, every actor, including the U.N. and regional actors, quite naturally has its own self-interests. Hopefully benign in their
effect, they are not unknown to have a deleterious affect on everyone involved.

What do the above observations mean to those who participate in the NGO/military relationship? In short, they are political beings and are responsible for the consequences of their actions. These case studies suggest that, even if there is a clear political strategy for a humanitarian operation (which was not true of any of these cases), the leaders in the field, through their purposeful and/or aggregate action, create and establish policy.

While an anathema to the military and the NGO alike, this political awareness must be appreciated and understood. The CMOC, as the center of civil-military collaboration and coordination, thus becomes of paramount importance. Indeed, the CMOC, or its conceptual equivalent, must be the focus of the entire military effort during a humanitarian intervention. Further, the traditional Tactical/Combat Operations Center should support the CMOC.

A CMOC as the fulcrum of an effort allows the humanitarian intent to be kept primary. Such an understanding allows the humanitarian intervention to combat the greatest threat to its success: a short-term mentality resulting from its political nature. A complex humanitarian emergency almost always demands a protracted response. If a significant difference is to be made, the emergency requires a sustained commitment. This conclusion does not mean that the American military should be responsible for long-term commitment. Even in the short-run, however, effective military action requires a long-term understanding of the situation and of the impact of short-term actions. Accordingly, the transition to a purely civilian effort should be planned from the very beginning.

In addition to the political nature of an intervention, the NGO/military relationship is shaped by the actual emergency. “Emergency” refers to how the problem is defined and addressed. No matter how complex the situation, there is always a basic and common understanding of the nature of the problem. Even in Somalia, everyone knew that it was a question of security and food distribution. The hub around which every response to a complex humanitarian emergency eventually turns is whether or not this common understanding is translated into a shared vision of how to respond to the situation. The dilemma, however, is that the translation
from a common understanding of the problem to a common sense, purposeful strategy takes time.

It takes time to determine the needs of the situation. It takes time to understand the dynamics that impede or accelerate certain actions. It takes time to understand the comparative advantages of other participants. It takes time to figure out just how one's own organization fits into the continuum of effort.

Yet, as in war, time is short. Decisive and sufficient action is urgent. It is clear from the case studies that once a common sense strategy emerges from a common understanding of the problem, the process of coordination becomes much more simple. This logic further suggests the imperative of an integrated, yet flexible strategy from the beginning.

The case studies also clearly indicate that the more complex the situation the less likely it is that a shared vision, and a common sense, integrated strategy, will result. Even assuming sustained and correct attention from the highest policy-making circles, a shared vision is extremely difficult to develop. The implications for the NGO/military relationship are enormous. First, it means that the decisions of the "on-the-ground" operators carry a good deal of weight: like it or not, they will be collectively creating policy. As a result, they must be empowered by their respective headquarters to act with wide latitude. It is only by building on their presence and their understanding of the situation that an overarching, shared vision will develop.

Lastly, if there is to be any success in the treatment of the emergency situation, there remains one fundamental prerequisite: the creation of a secure zone or area in which to conduct relief operations. Without such a zone, there will be no opportunity to develop, let alone implement, a shared vision. Without security, there is no stability. Without stability, there is no enduring humanitarian effect.

For better or for worse, the emergency situation is irrevocably linked to the political context from which it arises. Creating a security zone will always be a political as well as a military act. Moreover, creating a secure, if local, environment, will often be the initial focus of the military’s effort. It is also the starting point for cooperation between the armed forces and the NGOs. It, too, will take time.
The process of establishing security and restoring a tenuous stability in order to address humanitarian needs is therefore inherently political. To acknowledge this is to accept that there are no purely humanitarian actions during a humanitarian intervention. While a common humanitarian goal may unite all interested parties, all parties also bring their own visions and their own self-interest to the table. To take account of self-interest is not necessarily judgmental. Rather, it accepts the process for what it is: even the most altruistic individuals will conduct themselves according to their own values and interests. If one accepts the notion that the first part of wisdom is addressing something by its proper name, this awareness is paramount.

Both NGOs and the military have to "work hard at coordination, because you will never have complete agreement." This assertion highlights the notion that one need not achieve full agreement before beginning coordination. In an emergency where time is short and memoranda of understanding may not exist, it is important that operators approach the situation from the perspective of intended collaboration and consensus of action instead of organizational directives.

This work accepts as normal that organizations and the people in them act according to the way they have been trained, and that their personal values have been enhanced by their association with a particular organization or community. At the same time, unduly rigid ideas about institutional cultures and organizational behavior contribute little to our understanding of how the military and the NGOs interact in practice. In general, cultural and organizational norms that may weigh heavily at higher echelons have far less saliency for operators in the field (although the Somalia study proves something of an exception). For the operator in the field, it is about problem-solving; it is about people.

Which brings us to the most essential element of the backdrop against which these events take place: nowhere will you find more selfless, dedicated, and professional people than you will find at the operator level in the military and the humanitarian response community. The more one learns, the more respect one has for the people involved. For most, their work is not a profession, it is a calling.
The final element that shapes the parameters of the NGO/military relationship is the moment itself. At once it encompasses the polar experiences of being human: from the idyllic of humans helping humans to the reality of humans grating on humans in an environment that makes tremendous physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual demands on its participants.

There are two elements that anchor both ends of the spectrum of experience in a humanitarian emergency. The first is the undeniable Power of the Moment. Time and time again, individuals who have participated in such operations recall how meaningful their participation was. No matter their personal political orientation or the perspective of the organization they were representing at the time, most were moved by the monumental suffering of the people they were helping. All were happy that they contributed to alleviating the problem. Most recognized that they were "in it together." Thus, it cannot be forgotten that these endeavors touch the very root of what it means to be human. It is important to recall this point when one wants to dismiss certain observations as "touchy-feely."

At the other end of the experience is the Exhaustion of the Moment. The operators involved in these humanitarian events are not reflecting on some nine-to-five experience pursuant to their company's quarterly plan. Their experience entails sixteen hour days, no showers, extreme conditions, and a decision-making process that carries life-and-death consequences. It is an endeavor that one eats, drinks, and sleeps. It is an emergency and that mindset shapes the agenda. Consequently, there is an ineluctable wear-and-tear on body and soul. As in war, friction is ever present.

Given the political context, the emergency situation, the operators, and the moment, we return to the most fundamental observation of this analysis: the principle of altruistic self-interest. In order for the NGO/military relationship to work, there must be an exchange of services: the relationship must be mutually beneficial. It is in the name of humanitarianism that both communities act. Yet the manner in which individuals of each community pursue this "common" humanitarian goal depends on how he/she thinks and where he/she sits; i.e. their personal values and the core values and purposes of the organizations they represent. NGOs, by definition, are autonomous organizations and act according to their charters. The military, by definition, is an instrument of national policy, and
therefore a political actor. Superficially, one could not ask for two more disparate partners. While the case studies reveal many nuances to these descriptions, it remains true that such polar partners must develop a relationship which is based on mutual support. There must be a clear understanding that information and services operate on a two-way, transparent street. Otherwise, each acts as if the other did not exist: NGOs pursuing exclusively humanitarian purposes and the military providing its own solution according to its self-contained infrastructure.

Operating according to the principle of altruistic self-interest allows each community to more properly assume its comparative advantage. Each community has something unique to offer. NGOs bring humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the affected area, and sustained commitment. The military brings an infrastructure that provides communication, logistics, and security. In its most simple form, the equation works like this: the military’s infrastructure leverages the NGOs into collaboration while the NGOs provide the military their ticket home. In other words, NGOs are willing to participate in collaboration and eventual coordination because of the need for a comprehensive effort, not to mention that the military will sometimes move their relief supplies and personnel for free. The military, on the other hand, needs to transition to civilian agencies in order to withdraw quickly -- something to which both sides agree.\footnote{7}

Given this mutual desire, both communities need to understand each other prior to, as well as during, the crisis. Both must seek basic agreements upon which to build future, as well as emergency, cooperation.

The primary mission of the American military is not humanitarian operations. Nevertheless, the present study takes for granted that complex humanitarian emergencies will continue to happen and that the American military, when called upon, will continue to play a part in them. It is also taken for granted that American intervention in these situations will increasingly be viewed as consistent with our national interests. The need to understand and master these types of operations must be regarded as an important, even paramount, strategic priority.

While the military exists to represent and defend the nation’s interest, to include fighting and winning its wars, those wars are fewer
and farther between. In the meantime, we must come to grips with the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention. We are good enough to do both, and both are appropriate tasks. The case studies agree.

Nevertheless, we -- and the rest of the humanitarian response community -- must not lose sight of a basic truth: military operations are military operations. One of the essential contributions that armed forces can make in a complex humanitarian emergency -- the establishment of security -- often entails some degree of violent action or some other form of direct or indirect intimidation. Credible coercion prevents would-be instigators from disrupting the humanitarian effort.

To label the military's efforts as "peace" or "other-than-war" operations, however, is to create false expectations. Such a label "lowers the [acceptable] threshold of violence," to the point where these operations appear risk and casualty-free. How, the American public asks, can there be casualties in operations that are about "peace" or "humanitarianism," or are "other-than-war?"

Humanitarian intervention is not a bloodless exercise. The inherent risks in such an operation must be envisioned and acknowledged by senior American leadership and fully articulated to the American people. Policies that cannot bear the risk of casualties cannot be advanced by the armed forces. That casualties in humanitarian operations may mount to a point where an operation is no longer worth the cost is, of course, true; but it is no less true in all other forms of military action.

To lower the threshold of acceptable violence is to lower the chances of operational success. If no casualties is the paramount concern -- something subliminally reinforced by the "other-than-war" categorization -- then the rest of the effort, by definition, becomes subordinate to that single concern. Moreover, if the consequences of "failure" (taking casualties) are not adequately considered, the credibility of the nation itself can be undermined. The fact that America disengaged from Somalia in the wake of eighteen fatalities is more likely to have longer-term negative implications than any other aspect of that operation, including its humanitarian origins.

By acknowledging military operations for what they are -- military -- a second, more subtle, truth is kept in perspective:
humanitarian operations are the pursuit of policy by other means. The humanitarian need must be the driving vision, and political purpose, that unifies the entire effort. The specific military objectives are implied tasks. If the military's needs, what Clausewitz calls the "grammar" of military action, become preeminent, then the means and ends of an operation have become confused. Failure is imminent.

The most common complaint against the military, particularly in the Somalia case, is that security becomes an end in itself rather than an enabler to the broader, humanitarian goal. There is no commander alive that does not think his first priority is bringing his troops home. This mindset is one that every troop commander takes to war with him, even while recognizing that his troops will not all come back. However, if any casualties are intolerable, then the desire to bring one's troops home is amplified to the point of distortion. The humanitarian intent of the larger policy now becomes a distant second priority because the soldiers themselves have become a political chess piece instead of being political implementors.

If strategic policy-makers cling too tightly to the humanitarian label while ignoring the local political realities of humanitarian intervention and implementation, they force military personnel to develop their own tactical solutions. Instead of implementing a higher policy that accounts for on-the-ground political realities, the military operator must now make political decisions in order to simply address the humanitarian need. He is no longer a tool, but a creator, of policy.

In fact, senior policy-makers who view humanitarian operations as separate and different from traditional political concerns sever military personnel from their political purpose. With unclear direction, in an environment not their own, it becomes much easier for the military to operate according to its own needs. It becomes easy to confuse military means with humanitarian ends.

Hence, if one accepts the premise that militaries do military things (and may take casualties) in pursuit of a larger policy, then there should not be a problem. This traditional understanding does, however, demand that senior decision-makers consider humanitarian interventions with the same rigor that they would a wartime deployment of armed forces. There will be an irreconcilable problem, however, if the threshold of violence is lowered to the point where the military ceases to be a means to a political purpose. If there is not
sufficient high-level consideration of both the political reality and the on-the-ground reality in assessing the need for credible coercion, then the deployed soldier or Marine can become a target -- a possible means of forcing a United States policy change. It is at this point that the military will rightly and instinctively begin to serve its own end: force protection of the protective forces will become the overriding concern.

Moreover, a critical corollary also emerges from these case studies: that the military can never be in charge. If it is in charge, it inevitably diminishes the humanitarian effort and, ironically, prevents its own departure. However, if the military conceives of its role from the beginning as a means to a declared political end, and acts to support civilian efforts, then civilians will remain responsible for the overall strategy and for the end-state that results. If the exigencies of military action are allowed to dominate, however, one of two things will happen: 1) the military will leave too quickly (because it is afraid of getting involved in nation-building); or 2) the military will stay too long (because no one else can do it, the military will take on the task of nation-building). Ultimately, decisive socio-political results are the realm of the NGOs, other IOs, and indigenous authorities. Logically, theirs is the dominant role, and the larger responsibility.

This balance of mutually supporting comparative advantages suggests that there is a continuum of effort. In military terminology, this continuum moves from the left, "humanitarianism," to the right, "nation-building" (the latter being a mission that the post-Vietnam military has fiercely rejected). One thing that is apparent from these four case studies, however, is that they are strongly inclined to occupy the "grey-area" between humanitarianism and nation-building. It is also clear that the proper role of the military is, in fact, to help move the continuum from band-aid humanitarianism towards conditions which may allow for nation-building. It short, its job is to enable "marginal self-sufficiency."³

Once a relative stability has been achieved in the local environment, it is not the job of the military to be involved in full-time restoration and/or reconciliation -- to be involved in nation-building. But, to simply say that we only do humanitarian operations while we do not do nation-building, is to ignore the reality of the in-between and of those who will remain behind once we depart. If we recognize
that reality and its corresponding actions, then we will have a chance to make a lasting impact.

Once the military recognizes its proper place, it must adjust its concepts of "time" and "decisiveness." Even under the best of circumstances, humanitarian operations are likely to be protracted, more likely to be measured in months than in weeks. Likewise, the NGOs must accept a role for the military while they also adjust to the need for a comprehensive effort and the other-than-humanitarian impacts of their actions. In any case, there will be no single event or one day when decisive "victory" is achieved. That day will come long after the military has gone. Thus, the military must realize that it is its aggregate actions in the early stages that are most important in the long run. In the short term, success is measured according to the identification of 1) our contribution to the continuum of effort; and 2) the process by which we will transition to civilian agencies.

Both of these measures of effectiveness are determined, in part, by how well the military and the NGO communities understand each other; and, by how well they square-dance together. Unfortunately, there is no "caller" telling us how to step. The music and the dance will be made together, with neither leading.
MAPS

The following maps have been included in order to give the reader an overview of the areas discussed in the case studies, as well as a point of reference.

Map 1. Turkey and the Border Region.
Map 2. Border Camps.
Map 3. Bangladesh.
CHAPTER TWO
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

Encouraged by American radio-casts to rise up against their dictator, the Kurds of northern Iraq rebelled against a nominally defeated and certainly weakened Saddam Hussein in March of 1991. Although enjoying initial success, the rebellion was quickly and ruthlessly crushed by the Republican Guard. In the vacuum of the Kurdish military collapse between March 27th and April 2nd, over a million Kurds fled Iraq. By the end of the first week in April, there were approximately 800,000 Kurds in Iran, 300,000 in southeastern Turkey, and another 100,000 along the Turkish-Iraqi border. On April 5th, President Bush ordered the military to assist the Kurds, primarily through airdrops. As the situation grew worse, with somewhere between 500 and 1000 Kurds dying each day in 8000 foot mountain passes, it was readily apparent that something else had to be done. On April 16th President Bush, in conjunction with European allies, announced the creation of a security zone in northern Iraq. A multinational military force would stabilize the situation and work to return the Kurds to their homes in northern Iraq from the Turkish mountains. Transition to civilian agencies -- the United Nations and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the area -- would take place as quickly as possible. This effort became known as Operation Provide Comfort.\textsuperscript{6}

By May 13th, the UN had taken ceremonial control of the town of Zakho, the primary transition site in northern Iraq between the mountain refugee camps and the original homes of the Kurds. By June 1st, CARE had taken over the distribution of food. By June 4th, the population of the Turkish mountain refugee camps was almost non-existent. By June 7th, the original U.S. forces sent in support of Provide Comfort began to pull out. By July 15th, most coalition forces had been withdrawn, leaving a small contingent force behind. Operation Provide Comfort continues to this day.

Universally deemed a great and continuing success, Operation Provide Comfort hinged on the ability of coalition military forces to transition to civilian agencies, particularly the United Nations.\textsuperscript{11} One
relationship absolutely critical to this process was that between the American military and the NGOs present. Unprecedented in its scale and scope, this relationship's necessity surprised both communities.

With one community hierarchically organized for decision and the other decentralized according to both need and charter, the seemingly dichotomous organizational cultures turned out to be the basis for their mutual success. An Army Lieutenant Colonel, responsible for NGO coordination in Diyarbakir, Turkey, acknowledged that the NGO personnel in Kurdistan were "very talented" people who knew the humanitarian business: "we don't, they're the experts." This respect was reciprocated by the NGOs. The logistical capacity of the military, according to one NGO worker, was "phenomenal." Overall, the military/NGO relationship was "pretty remarkable [in] how well it worked." One NGO representative suggested that the reason why the relationship developed so well was because the military and the NGOs had something common: 'that can-do attitude.'

Given the polar purposes that drives these two communities, the resultant nature of their organizational structures, and respective cultures that derive from these structures, the above comments are truly "remarkable." Several factors allowed for the success of the NGO/military relationship. Strategically, almost by default, the humanitarian intent was kept primary throughout the entire operation. With no time to react, no doctrine to act by, and no governments able to formulate a directive policy, the political and military tasks of relief were left to be discovered by those on the spot. If an action supported the saving of lives and the return of the Kurds, it was done. Whether it was a Special Forces soldier administering direct aid or the inclusion of Dohuk in the security zone, the action took place. Ultimately, this lesson of the humanitarian intent kept primary is the most important one.

Operationally, there were five factors that contributed to success within this strategic scope. First, despite the fact that the American military was in charge of the coalition responsible for Provide Comfort, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA/U.S. Agency for International Development) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was, in effect, managing the situation and establishing strategy. Second, military commanders on the ground
recognized and used the DART expertise. Third, the Special Forces (SF) initially sent into the Turkish mountains were absolutely critical in stabilizing the situation (to include the establishment of an initial rapport with the NGOs). Fourth, the Army Civil Affairs (CA) officers responsible for NGO interaction/coordination, particularly in Zakho, were exceptional people with a clear understanding of the situation at hand. Fifth, the NGOs had the same caliber of people leading their effort.

This chapter will focus on the points of collaboration and coordination between the NGO community and the military. It will pay particular attention to the Zakho CMOC, which proved to be the pivotal point of coordination. Moreover, the narrative will demonstrate that the CMOC, in terms of NGO liaison, is not so much a military-designated place and time, but a "floating" and continuous process. Finally, as with the following case study on Operation Sea Angel, very specific attention will be given to the actual meeting of the two communities in order to witness and document the process of collaboration and consensus. The reason for this concentration on the dynamics of the relationship -- to include its stereotypes -- is twofold. First, along with Bangladesh, which happened more or less concurrently, these operations represent the first time that communities encountered one another in the post Cold War era. Neither side was prepared for the interaction. Second, the NGO/military dynamic proved to be relatively the same in the Somalia and Rwanda operations which followed. Consequently, not as much time will be spent in the latter chapters on the collaboration/coordination process or on the stereotypes that existed and had to be overcome.

As late as April 4th, the official position of the Bush Administration, was to condemn the Iraqi repression of the Kurds (vis-à-vis the U.N.) and encourage relief agencies, but basically to present a "hands-off policy in the failed anti-Saddam uprising." Despite the initiation of airdrops on April 6th, the administration was not inclined to commit U.S. troops to southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Proceeding cautiously, the administration had some acute concerns: 1) fear of an open-ended engagement; 2) affecting the regional balance of power by empowering an ethnic group that had no state; and 3) impinging on Iraqi sovereignty. On April 10th, under increasing European pressure to put humanitarian concerns
above political ones, the White House issued a warning to Iraq that it should not interfere with the relief effort of the Kurds in northern Iraq. Senior administration officials said that the warning would "rely on the presence of international emergency relief workers to deter Saddam's forces from attacking," thereby creating a de facto safe zone. White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, in a separate statement, emphasized that "we're not doing anything to violate territorial integrity. Nobody wants to establish another country inside Iraq."

The administration was very sensitive to the delicacy of Turkish desires. Turkey had been a great ally during the Gulf War. Not only had it allowed Proven Force to take place, it had shut off its oil flow, at great cost, to Iraq. This support had to be carefully balanced against traditional Turk-Kurd relations and the crisis at hand. Two significant events, however, quickly changed the nature of addressing the problem. On April 15th, Hayri Kozakcoglu, the emergency-rule governor, or "super-governor," of eastern Turkey announced that Turkey would officially support the Kurdish relief effort. This decision soon transformed the border-town of Silopi (a hajj pilgrimage way station for Muslim pilgrims) into a relief hub. Publicly inviting the UN and private relief agencies to assist in the aid effort, Kozakcoglu explained, "we do not claim that we have done the best." Because the plight of the Kurds was approaching catastrophic proportions, Turkey could not handle it alone. "Turkey should not be left alone with this problem . . . all the world is responsible."

Secondly, after consultation with European allies, President Bush announced the following plan on April 16th: 1) Due to the difficult logistical access to the remote mountain refugee camps, other refugee camps would be established in more negotiable terrain and managed by coalition military forces; 2) The UN (and the NGO community) would take over administrative control of the camps as soon as possible. Bush stressed that this action was "purely humanitarian," was not a step towards a long intervention in Iraq, and that it was in keeping with UN resolution 688. It was under these auspices, on April 19th, that Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort -- already established in Incirlik, and Silopi, Turkey, to support the airdrops -- moved its military forces into northern Iraq.
Army soldier leads a group of Kurdish men on tour of a refugee camp near Zakhu, Iraq. Photographer: PH3 James R. Klein
The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. There are estimated to be some ten million in Turkey, five million in Iran, 600,000 in Syria, and 300,000 in the former Soviet Union. They are a tribal-based and highly educated society in which clan and patriarch often take priority over any pan-Kurd ideas. Because of this proud parochialism, and the larger established states around them, the Kurds have never achieved an independent state. Due to their resulting minority status within the aforementioned states, the Kurds have often been the victims of severe oppression. Beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that there is deep enmity between the Kurds and the Turks, as well as between the Kurds and the Iraqis (who had gassed Kurd villages as recently as 1988).

The scale of the March uprising had taken the traditional Kurd guerrillas, the *Peshmerga* ("those who face death"), aback as they had no chance to direct or even channel this spontaneous outburst against long oppression. The Iraqis struck back quickly and it was soon a matter of armor and artillery against AK-47s. "All of a sudden, we found ourselves trying to be a government, an army, a police force, a judiciary and a relief organization facing a major catastrophe. We just didn't have the experience or the capability. We couldn't cope." Such was the early April analysis of Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Almost immediately, entire city populations fled with only that which they could carry. As they entered the snow-covered mountain passes, the journey began to take its toll. Elderly Kurds died and were left unburied by the roadside. As their condition weakened, Kurds quickly became susceptible to disease. Most important was the lack of potable water. Bad water inevitably means the advent of dysentery, diarrhea, and cholera. Kurds were literally defecating themselves to death. On thin roads in steep terrain, sanitation was soon as much as a problem as the lack of water. Adding injury to injury was the prevalence of land mines. Crowded, weakened, disease-ridden, and walking through their own waste and over their own bodies, the Kurds were on the brink. As one American observed, "the Kurds were in a humble, humble, situation."*23*

Given the context of this overwhelming and complex emergency, there was only one organization in the world that had the capability to comprehensively address the need. "Logistics is the name of the game. There is no institution in the world better equipped for this than
A view of a Kurdish refugee camp in the hills near Turkey's border with Iraq. 
Photographer: PHAN April Hatton
the military.”24 Echoing this common understanding was Congressman Matthew F. McHugh (NJ-D), who led a Congressional fact-finding mission to the Kurdish refugee camps on April 18th. In a remarkably prescient commentary, the members of this trip, in their hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, laid out an accurate description of the nature of complex humanitarian emergencies that result in humanitarian intervention. These points suggested by Representative McHugh, in one form or another, are the common traits of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. Quoted at length from the actual hearing, the points have been categorized by the author.

1. [Sudden and overwhelming emergency]: These numbers are not only large, but came together in just a few days. This is unprecedented, and indeed, it overwhelmed the capacity of the neighboring governments and the international and relief agencies to cope with it . . .

2. [No one else can do the job]: The simple truth is that if our military were not doing it, many more people would die . . . because these people are so remotely located, because no other agency has the capacity to reach them, it is appropriate that we respond with our military forces today.

3. [The need to incorporate the professional humanitarians]: We also believe that it’s important for the traditional international humanitarian organizations to assume responsibility for this humanitarian relief as soon as is practical . . .

4. [A common understanding of the nature of the problem]: It is also unanimously agreed that these people have to be brought down off the mountains into lower-lying areas because they cannot adequately be helped . . .
A U.S. Navy Boatswain's Mate coordinates the placement of tents near Zakhun, Iraq. Photographer: PH2 Milton R. Savage
5. [The undeniable political dimension]: But for the most part Turkey is unwilling or unable to absorb more refugees . . . And it's for that reason that the camps are going to be established in low-lying areas in northern Iraq. This, of course, poses certain political as well as technical problems. If we expect the humanitarian agencies to take over providing humanitarian refugees in Iraq, there is the question of Iraqi government consent . . . there would have to be at least informal consent by the Iraqi government before the UN agencies, working with private voluntary organizations, could take over from us this humanitarian effort. So there is the political problem . . .

6. [The fundamental building block: Security]: But perhaps more seriously in the long run, there is the question of security. Because in order to get the Kurds to come down from the mountains, to say nothing of allowing them to go home, they must be assured that they have security . . . But we do not think that the United States military should be a long-term provider of either humanitarian relief or security in Iraq. And yet the Kurds will need that kind of assurance.

7. [Transition and U.S. exit strategy]: So the question becomes, who replaces the United States and our other friends in providing the security arrangements as well as the humanitarian assistance . . .

8. [The need for strong presidential leadership]: We think this requires strong political leadership . . . if we expect the UN and other international agencies and private voluntary organizations to assume responsibility for the humanitarian assistance, for example, they will need more money . . . the President should consider the possibility of appointing a high level official within his administration to facilitate the movement of these requests and help the interagency processes move rapidly. This is an emergency, and it may be that this is one of those cases where the President should have a person with political clout acting for him to clear the traps within the bureaucracy . . .

These traits manifest themselves in each of the case studies. The politics of sovereignty, security, transition, and leadership within a
Kurdish women and children line the banks of a stream running through refugee camp near Turkey’s border with Iraq. *Photographer: PHAN April Hatton*
complex emergency problem directly affect, if not define, the context of, and the decisions made concerning, the NGO/military relationship. In southeast Turkey there was a clear and common understanding of the problem. The question remained, however, *how* was it to be translated into an effective plan, a common sense that provided guidance to all participants?

The mission given to the U.S. military, according to the President Bush's 16 April announcement, was threefold. The immediate objective was to stop the suffering and dying, stabilizing the refugee camps' population to as normal conditions as possible. The second objective was to move the Kurds from the refugee camps in the Turkish mountains to transition camps around Zakho, in northern Iraq. The third stage called for the return of the Kurds to their original villages and towns.26 Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili was appointed to oversee the effort. This mission statement accurately described, as in Congress, a common understanding of the nature of the problem. Importantly, it did not delineate specific military tasks, nor did it account for any political goals. The "how" would have to come out of the field according to the only guidance provided: the humanitarian intent of saving lives and returning the Kurds home.

By April 22nd, the basic structure that was to facilitate the movement of the Kurds back to northern Iraq was in place.27 The Combined Task Force headquarterd itself at Incirlik Air Force Base, Adana, Turkey. Two subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) were established to facilitate the mission. Spread throughout the mountains of southeast Turkey, JTF "Alpha" was headquarterd in Silopi and largely responsible for the first component of the mission: stop the dying and suffering while stabilizing the situation. Commanded by Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA, Alpha was composed primarily of the 10th Special Forces (SF) Group.

Sent in, at first, to coordinate drop zones and food distribution on April 6th, the Green Berets were soon involved in much more than that. With little to no initial NGO presence, they quickly became an integral part of such traditional humanitarian tasks as census taking, camp organizing, and food distribution. As NGOs (based in Diyarbakir, Turkey, just to the north of the camps) began to trickle in, the Special Forces looked to hand-off their responsibilities to them so SF troops could focus on facilitating the movement of the Kurds down to Zakho. The 10th accomplished this task by setting up
way-stations, or Humanitarian Service Support Detachments (HSSDs), along the primary routes to Zakho from the eight major refugee camps.28

The second component formed, centered on the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), was JTF "Bravo." Commanded by Major General Jay Garner, USA, Bravo's mission was to prepare Zakho for the incoming Kurds and facilitate their eventual transfer back to their homes. More specifically, Bravo was to integrate civilian agencies into the second and third elements of the military's mission statement, thereby providing for a seamless transfer. This effort took form when JTF Bravo moved its headquarters from Silopi to Zakho on April 20th, setting itself up at the old headquarters of the 44th Iraqi infantry division.29 This time period witnessed NGOs slowly coming to Zakho from Diyarbakir, and later, directly from Incirlik. It also marked the first time in the operation that NGOs and the military were formally working hand-in-hand in a loosely structured and agreed-upon format.

While Alpha's mission was imperative, Bravo was the fulcrum. Assuming the Kurds decided to come out of the mountains at all, if they were not handled properly in transit, or if they did not feel safe and secure upon arrival, the situation risked an indefinite state of affairs. Moreover, even if the preceding conditions were met, how was the military to transition to the UN and the NGOs? These tasks were easier said than done; especially when one considers that Provide Comfort was the largest and most complex humanitarian operation attempted by the military since World War II.

Finally, before discussing the humanitarian implementation of such a structure, it is extremely important not to lose sight of the dual nature of this operation. The humanitarian effort was successful only because a secure environment was created and then sustained. Bill Coops, formerly of International Rescue Committee (IRC) and now of Northwest Medical Teams, provides the most telling evidence of this logic. Coops, who is of the philosophy that true relief and development means a commitment to the community after the emergency, stayed on in northern Iraq for another two years. He unequivocally states that "everything [from relief to the continuing development effort] is made possible because of that F-15 or 16 that flies overhead" and the power that it represents. "Nothing is possible without it; all the relief on the ground is nothing without security ..
. relief work is a creative act, it is much easier to destroy: anyone who has the freedom to destroy it, will."

Within two weeks of the first U.S. troops deployed to the region, there was the skeleton of a structure to facilitate the goals of the coalition effort. Thanks to the universally acclaimed efforts of the 10th Special Forces Group, the stopping of the dying and suffering was well on its way to being accomplished, as the NGOs began to complement the military’s response in an ad hoc manner. Situated in Zakho to effect the transfer of the Kurds to their homes, JTF Bravo prepared to transition to civilian agencies -- but a problem remained. The Kurds were still in the mountains and were not going to come down until they felt it was safe to do so.

It was impossible, however, to maintain that number of people in the remote mountain passes. To begin with, the snows would soon be melting, thus removing a significant source of water. In the opinion of an OFDA expert, it just was not economically feasible to bring in water and food for 400,000 people. Additionally, the Turks, despite conducting diplomacy in the name of humanitarianism, did not want the Kurds there. Finally, as David Jones, then Deputy Director for Oxfam, UK, relates, the Kurdish condition was the result of the Gulf War and "we were morally responsible. The only option was to get them down."

But how to bring the Kurds down? The military had no doctrine on how to conduct such an operation. The NGOs had not been in place prior to the crisis; nor had they any experience in working with the military. They also did not have any collective or comprehensive experience with an emergency of this magnitude. It was a new world for both parties. It was a new world for the OFDA DART as well. Although recognized for their professionalism and emergency expertise, OFDA had almost no experience working side-by-side with the military in the field.

It was not, however, a new world for Fred Cuny, an emergency expert that OFDA had specifically contracted for this situation. With decades of experience in these matters, which included working with militaries around the world, Cuny would prove to be the center of gravity, a touchstone of vast expertise, that allowed everything to fall into place.
The OFDA DART team had arrived at Incirlik on April 11th. They had several things going for them. First, they were recognized as experts in their field and were well-known to the NGOs. Second, they commanded universal respect based on their past efforts. Third, they were comparatively small, initially only twelve people (the DART later grew to nearly thirty, the biggest team ever sent to the field by OFDA). Fourth, due to their expertise and numbers, they were able to identify the crucial nodes of coordination and establish appropriate "liaisons" in Incirlik, Diyarbakir, Zakho, and in the camps themselves. Moreover, the DART was generally self-sustaining. For example, their organic satellite communications enabled real-time information to one another and back to Washington D.C.

Finally, their credibility was immeasurably enhanced by the money behind them. By law, once a region has been declared a "disaster area" by the Department of State, the DART can spend United States government money on the spot. Importantly, they are not implementing funded programs themselves; instead, they are selecting and funding NGOs according to the area need and the expertise of the NGO. Rare is the NGO that has not taken money from OFDA. In any humanitarian emergency, the DART is a powerful force and instrumental to a successful resolution. Mao's famous dictum, revised for humanitarian consumption, is more than appropriate: "power flows out of the barrel of a checkbook." The DART would spend close to twenty-seven million dollars.

The DART was headed by Dayton Maxwell, a career foreign service officer, and assisted by Fred Cuny, the president of Intertect, a humanitarian emergency consulting firm. It was Cuny who came up with the strategy of ensuring that the Kurds came out of the mountains while Maxwell, who had the equivalent rank of Major General, approved the strategy and had the final say. As Maxwell points out, it was much more a matter of strategy than common sense or even a specified plan. The plan can change from day-to-day and the common understanding of the situation can be obvious, but if there is no over-arching strategy, or conceptual end-state to delineate daily operations, then there can be no success.

The "how" of moving the Kurds off the mountain was a delicate political issue. As mentioned before, the Turks did not want them there. The Kurd leaders, on the other hand, had publicly stated that
they were not leaving until their security in northern Iraq could be assured. If this position were allowed to become cast in bronze, there was no way the proud Kurds would come out of the mountains. As long as Saddam Hussein was in power and they were not protected from him, they were guaranteed more death below in northern Iraq than above in the untenable camps.

Before describing Cuny's actualization of the "how," the obvious should be stated: that the strategy was not premeditated, but emerged spontaneously over a few weeks; and that it had to be approved by higher authorities. But make no mistake, this strategy of operationalizing the common understanding came from Cuny. The strategy was fivefold, based on the conceptual end-state of the Kurds returned to their homes and the continuing operation being run by the UNHCR and assorted NGOs.

The first step was the placement and construction of the transit camps. As originally intended, American forces were to build the camps directly across the border in a traditional military grid. Cuny pointed out that this location was poor for two reasons. The closer the camps were to Zakho, the easier it would be to extend municipal facilities like water and electricity. Additionally, the closer the camps were to Zakho the more likely it was that actual Zakho residents returned to their former homes. This process would build immediate local stability and make further room for Kurds in the camps who were not from the Zakho area. Moreover, Cuny was the primary designer of the camp itself. The basic configuration -- an eight tent square, with two a-side, centered on a common space -- encouraged relative privacy and the strong familial ties of the Kurds.

Second, the Kurds had to want to come out of the mountains. There was only one key to this locked door: the Kurds had to feel that they would be safe back in northern Iraq. It was not enough to announce a security zone and state that it was safe; nor was it enough to build transit camps and assume that they would come. The Kurds had to be convinced. It had always been Cuny's philosophy to work with the leaders of refugee groups and utilize and invigorate their existing infrastructure. This concept was applied in two ways. Kurdish men were invited down to help construct the camps. Ostensibly to include them in the solution, the main objective was to demonstrate the safety of the area. Of the some 872 men brought
down, very few stayed to help construct the camps. Most went back to the mountains to get their families.\textsuperscript{44}

The second step towards solving this dilemma came in the form of \textit{Peshmerga} leaders approaching General Garner, seeking to establish how they could help. General Garner directed them to Cuny and Maxwell.\textsuperscript{45} Cuny invited them, and eventually other Kurd leaders, to see the camps for themselves. Soon, the military was flying Kurd leaders down from the refugee camps to visit Zakho and the transition camps. This effort had a tremendous impact. After two to three weeks of just sitting in the mountains, doing nothing, and watching other people support your own people, it was a big deal to be a part of the solution -- not to mention the prestige of being singled out as a VIP by the military and given access to the helicopters.\textsuperscript{46}

Even with the apparent safety of the transition camps, the presence of the 24th MEU, and an eastward expanding security zone, there remained the problem of the 300 Iraqi regular police who were still in Zakho. As long as they were there, the Kurds would not feel secure. Cuny's solution, based on his experience with the Kuwaiti Task Force, was simple. If the police were publicly identified, to include wearing an ID badge, then they would be accountable. This concept worked perfectly as the 300 Iraqi police soon fled the area.

The fourth measure taken to operationalize the common understanding was the inclusion of Dohuk into the security zone at the end of May. (As many as 300,000 of the refugees were originally from Dohuk). Maxwell necessarily took the lead here as the senior government official on hand. If Dohuk were not included, then a permanent, 'winterized' refugee camp of 300,000 would have to be established around Zakho (something far more costly). This possibility not only directly influenced Zakho's ability to return to normal, it also brought up political questions of how long the camp would stay there and who would administer it. Eventually, Dohuk was edged into the security zone.

Finally, Cuny would eventually be responsible for drafting the transition plan to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

No matter the organization represented, the rank held, or the contribution made, one and all had the same two words for the role played by the OFDA team: they were absolutely "pivotal" and
"integral" to the success of *Operation Provide Comfort*. It was their efforts that laid the groundwork for a successful NGO/military relationship. Cuny should be singled out. As Andrew Natsios, then director of OFDA, recalled, Cuny was "the mind behind it ... he [was] the premier master strategist in complex humanitarian emergencies."47

Given the political context and the emergency situation, it was the above structure and, more importantly, strategy that framed the relationship between the NGOs and the U.S. military. Again, it should be emphasized that the communities had no previous experience working with the other or with an emergency of this overwhelming nature. As Lieutenant Colonel Hess remarked, "I didn't know what a NGO or DART was -- never heard of them before."48 The NGOs certainly had no idea about the military either.

When the military and the first NGOs arrived, the death rate was somewhere between 500 and 1000 deaths a day. The Special Forces (SF) companies were assigned refugee camps and instructed to stop the dying and suffering.

The SF deployment evolved into what was, essentially, a four-phase program. The Assessment phase lasted about five days as Operation Detachment Alphas (ODAs) deployed to figure out just what was going on in the forty-three different refugee sites. The second phase witnessed the creation of infrastructure support such as communications, security, and landing/drop zones (LZs/DZs) for supplies. This phase was approximately two weeks in length. The sustainment and support phase included working with the Kurds, getting to know the clan structure and its various leaders, as well as integrating the NGOs. It also meant the development of technician teams, engineers or medics, in support of the humanitarian effort. (Often, NGOs would simply attach themselves to these teams and nominally become a part of the infrastructure). The final stage was the relocation stage as the Kurds were escorted off the mountains.49

Simply by their presence, the Green Berets provided reassurance and an instant infrastructure through which to alleviate the suffering. This presence was imperative to the effort's success. The SF cultural training, particularly their understanding of peoples, and reputation did much to diffuse tensions between and among the Kurds, and between the Kurds and the Turks.50 By addressing basic health
concerns and working intimately with the local leaders, the SF were able to ascertain needs and prioritize them as food and medical supplies were airlifted into the camps.

As the NGOs began to trickle in, two different types of people and organizations came into contact for the first time in the post-Cold War era. NGOs, according to their charter, interests, expertise, and personalities essentially set up wherever they wanted. The military's first impression was not a positive one. SF officers trying to administer would inform NGOs that they were in their "sector." The NGO response would be: "What sector? Who are you? So what?" And thus, the military was introduced to the greatest strength and greatest weakness of the NGO community: the ability to go anywhere anytime with no one's approval, linked to an initial inability to come to grips with the crying need for coordination in the face of such an overwhelming situation.

Military personnel tell of NGOs "just appearing," wanting to help. Human rights inspectors would show up, seeking to examine the SF methods. A typical uniformed response was "Who are these freaks? I'm an American trying to do my job." Moreover, these "disaster junkies/groupies" all seemed to know each other from some place, some other crisis. There was also the feeling that the NGOs needed to go where the media was and that this need sometimes drove where and how they set up instead of the refugees themselves. Military officers found it ironic that these altruistic organizations were very much aware of the politics of raising money back home (hence the pursuit of the media) and the development of their own "turf" ("here is what our organization is doing in the present crisis"). Humanitarian NGOs were clearly political, too.51

The NGOs had some concerns as well. There was the fear that the military would bring a "big, cumbersome bureaucracy that couldn't learn quickly." There was also the general feeling that the introduction of the military would be a "disaster." Given the generally liberal leanings of the NGO community, stereotyping of the military was inevitable. For example, one NGO representative described himself as a "child of the '60s and '70s." He had been in college during Kent State and his resulting impressions of the military were "extremely negative." A generation that had come of age after the TET offensive now made up "a lot of the NGO community. Negative impressions were inevitable.
These mutual stereotypes were overcome the same way other stereotypes are overcome: one-on-one interaction. While there may have been some initial tension, it was dispelled in the face of the task at hand. The worker-bees of each community had to work together. It was the individuals at the lowest level who had a common enemy, organizational red tape, and a common purpose: stop the suffering. As Lieutenant Colonel Jim Powers, USA, observed, life-saving is still a basic skill of soldiering.52

The coordination involved in this common purpose was extremely decentralized. To illustrate this process, it is useful to consider the camp at Isikveren, where Captain David Elmo was the Civil Affairs officer who helped in the NGO coordination.53 As the NGOs came in, the SF interfaced with them according to the people they met in their sector. After a few days, it was established that all concerned were welcome to attend a meeting to be held at 1000 every morning.54 There was no name for this meeting nor a structure into which it was tied. The meeting was convened under the auspices of the UNHCR (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees). At best, this meeting was an exchange of introductory and location information. "Hi, my name is so-and-so, and I'm with . . . We're located up there." (It should also be noted that these meetings were not just for civilian agencies. Captain Elmo also interfaced with other military units unfamiliar with the various civilian processes in order to facilitate their efforts).

All meetings were completely voluntary. In the first weeks, there were always new faces as the various NGOs began to come in. Different organizations would send different people or they would not send anyone at all after their first meeting. Consequently, there could be no structure to the 1000 meeting in camp number one at Isikveren. Each meeting was a free-for-all, in which the conversation worked its way around the meeting, ensuring that everyone present had the opportunity to participate. Captain Elmo relates that this type of thing was "personality driven. It has nothing to do with rank, organization, or position."

This basic process took place throughout the camps. Slowly but surely, the individual "comfort zone" of the two communities began to increase. Dague Clark of Save the Children found the SF to be "much less military than I thought."55 He was particularly impressed with SF cultural sensitivities like drinking tea with the clan leaders
before talking business. Dr. Michael Toole, a long time disaster assistance expert for the Center for Disease Control (which is a part of the U.S. government), remarked that in Yekmal "I was impressed by the willingness of field people to listen, take advice on prioritizing public health, and then get on with the job with the extra enthusiasm, discipline, and muscle that comes with military culture." Or, as Henryka Manes, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) put it: the military was "reliable, on time, [they] report... [they] do it all." The military had an awareness and appreciation for the NGOs as well. "As the chaos normalized and people got to know one another," relationships improved. Indeed, Colonel Stanley Florer, who made it a point to pursue NGO integration from the very first day, recollects that the "NGOs were wonderful;" their only problem was logistics and communications, something the military could provide.

Eventually, as attitudes changed and the situation normalized, a pseudo-structure began to emerge. This emergence was closely tied to the SF ability to produce accurate risk assessments of the population. Because the NGOs did not have the assets or personnel to be everywhere, the SF reports provided a comprehensive account of the situation and its progress. The SF information would then be compared to the NGO information. The synthesized information allowed everyone to track what was needed (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) to stabilize the situation. The result then was a prioritization-of sorts in which coordination manifested itself in the following manner: "OK, here's the greatest need, this is the job, who can do it?" According to need, interest, expertise, location, etc., an NGO would then take the job.

It is in this simple description that the leading and most fundamental tenet of NGO/military first appears: coordination requires that something be exchanged. NGOs will not come to a meeting unless there is something to gain (i.e. logistical support or information). The converse is also true: the military hopes to gain efficiency and economy of effort from the NGOs.

While information was the general currency of exchange, the real asset that the Special Forces had to offer the NGOs was the mobility and logistics of the military aircraft (and, later, trucks). These aircraft -- from H-60 Blackhawks to C-130 Hercules -- provided free pick-up
and delivery of NGO supplies to a degree that no NGO could hope to match. Thus, if the NGO was willing to be associated with the military, it gained immediate credibility with the refugees for delivering aid rapidly, and long term credibility with donors as their projects materialized overnight. In return for information and logistical support the NGOs would come to the "table," (the tent, really) with their own information and de facto accept the infrastructure of the military. The military had no problems with this exchange since NGOs doing the humanitarian job faster meant the military going home sooner.

Thus, friends were friends even if the relationship was based, at least initially, on self-interest. While the two communities did not always warmly welcome each other, relationships emerged once each community recognized the comparative advantage offered by the other.60

Diyarbakir, Turkey, was a natural center of activity for the various players involved in the relief effort. The closest town to the refugee camps, it was also the provincial capital, accompanied by a military base and an all-important airstrip. The NGOs positioned themselves there to help stabilize the refugee camps in the mountains to the south. By the end of the second week, the chaos of the situation was beginning to settle: UNHCR was in town and the NGOs were taking count of their interactions with the Turkish government as they simultaneously began to figure out the coalition military forces.61

It was about this time (April 17th) that Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Jean Ronsick, USAF, were assigned to Diyarbakir to liaison with civilian agencies. They were to assist in the stabilizing of the refugee camps by working with the regional Turkish government and interfacing with the NGOs. LTC Ronsick assumed the more traditional role of civil-military relations with the Turkish governor. In this role, he functioned as a "two-way window."62 LTC Petrella assumed the non-traditional role of NGO collaboration and coordination. Both civil-military "tracks" contributed significantly to the coordination effort.63

When Petrella arrived, there were no coordination meetings taking place other than very informal NGO meetings in the downtown hotels. It was in this arena that Petrella would act as a "one-man CMOC."64
Petrella, according to his understanding of his new job, had one mission: "to put myself out of business." This awareness indicates a second tenet of the NGO/military relationship: that it was "OK" not to be in charge, as the military is accustomed and trained to do. In short, it was Petrella's job to facilitate the humanitarian expertise of the NGOs with the logistics and infrastructure of the military. Consequently, he established himself with the American embassy team in Diyarbakir as the military point of contact for the NGOs.

The Turkish government had granted the American team a run-down office building in downtown Diyarbakir. It was here that all interested participants were invited to attend. As in the refugee camps, this meeting was voluntary and open to anyone who wanted to come. Regular attendees included UN organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF), as well as the most involved NGOs (CARE, IRC (International Rescue Committee), Save the Children, MSF, etc.). Speaking to a full-house every night, the head of the embassy team orchestrated the meeting. The structure of the meeting amounted to going around the room, listening to the various reports/observations, as a current situation was developed by the group for that morning. The multiple sources of information indicated where the greatest need was. This process resulted in group agreement on prioritization and how to maximize resources. Once completed, the comparative advantages of the NGOs and the military were matched with the needs in the field.

Petrella would never sit at the head of the table nor would he ever lead the discussion. "You have to be very diplomatic and aware of the political implications -- never create the impression that you're in charge . . . in essence, we were, but you can never give that impression." Petrella's success hinged on the proper demeanor and personality he put forth (being user-friendly) and the assets he was able to bring to the table.

While this particular meeting may be termed the unofficial CMOC, or, more properly, as NGO access to the Civil-Military Operations Cell within the embassy team, the need for collaboration and coordination did not take place only there. For example, Petrella made it a point to stay "very close" to the Red Crescent Society and the projects on which they were working. He also spent time down at the tarmac, where Ronsick operated when not with the super-governor (he had set up a tent in order to stay abreast of as
much information as possible). By staying here during the day, Petrella was able to stay current on any "news" while simultaneously having a feel for exactly what materials were being flown in. In the meantime, he and Ronsick would cross-coordinate between their two civil-military tracks.

Finally, there was also interaction with other military units. For example, Petrella had to have a very good relationship with the SF Blackhawk pilots in order to produce at the nightly coordination meetings. While there was some initial ambivalence, they soon bought the Petrella logic: "We need to get the NGOs downrange to let them do their thing; otherwise, we will continue to do our thing." This coordination circuit suggests the obvious: that there is no one single point of coordination in a system that, by definition, has no structure except for the one the military artificially, and temporarily, supplies. Because money, food, and related supplies are literally coming in from all over the world, there can be no comprehensive response structure. As a result, there can be no single point of contact through which all coordination is done. Some of the best coordination done, for instance, was when Petrella and Ronsick had dinner at the local hotel where all the NGOs were staying.68

The successful CMOC then, is inherently a "floating" concept. While there may be a designated spot, the process naturally occurs according to the moment and the personalities. If this is the case, particularly in an initially fluid environment, a pre-conceived wire-diagram will hinder coordination before it begins.

The overall coordination network established in Diyarbakir and the mountain refugee camps proved most conducive to the common purpose of stopping the dying and the suffering. But, a purely humanitarian effort could not go on indefinitely. The continuing NGO/military relationship would reflect the political dynamics of bringing the Kurds out of the mountains.

On April 18th, at 1800, General Shalikashvili had met with Iraqi generals to inform them of the coalition's intent to move into northern Iraq, according to UN Resolution 688, and that they should not interfere. On that same day, UN Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan signed an agreement with the Iraqi government permitting the UN to provide humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq.69 On April 19th, JTF Bravo moved into Zakho (with Iraqi forces still in
the surrounding hills). The next day, to demonstrate their humanitarian intent, the Marines began building the first temporary refugee camp. By late April, the security zone was pushing eastward in order to accommodate the returning Kurds.

If the Kurds had not been initially ready to go to Zakho, neither were the NGOs. "It was clear from the beginning that non-governmental organizations were reluctant to work in the operation. They especially feared being made pawns in American political policy and were fearful of the consequences of too close an association with the Coalition process." 70 NGO credibility rests on the ability to act independently. This independence is integral to the NGO identity and cannot be ignored. To be identified with the American or European governments, let alone their militaries, immediately brings to mind questions of motivation and purpose for the host government and its people, as well as an association with past imperialism.

Moreover, by mid-May, a well-established system of immediate relief had taken root in the mountain camps. Many of the NGOs felt that the refugee population was not medically or psychologically ready for movement. 71 "Where the military and NGO cultures may have clashed most was when the political decision was made afar to move the refugees back to northern Iraq. The military put all or most of their efforts into that task, whereas the NGOs were still, quite rightly, concerned with the actual situation in the mountain camps." 72 The NGOs also had concerns about their own safety. Indeed, as the original JTF Bravo Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Colonel John O. Easton, recalled, "it was difficult to blame the NGOs for not coming down from Diyarbakir earlier." 73

On the other hand, according to several military observers, the Kurds were becoming more "picky" about the type and amount of aid given, particularly food stuffs. 74 Open to argument, what such an interpretation suggests is that the suffering and dying had been neutralized and that in order to prevent dependency, it was time to move the Kurds.

Ultimately, and to their credit, what brought the NGOs out of the mountains was the continuing need of the Kurds once they began returning to Zakho. This process was initiated by OFDA. As memories have already begun to blur regarding the specifics of time
and words used, on or about May 2nd, and maybe over two to three visits, the DART's Ron Libby, Fred Cuny, and LTC Mike Hess went up to Diyarbakir to talk to the NGOs at the Majestic and Touristic Hotels. The strategy applied was one of Libby and Cuny doing most of the talking as they tried to persuade the NGOs to come to Zakho. (They were tough to ignore; Libby was a senior USG representative and Cuny was already internationally respected for his handling of previous emergencies). Second, and of equal importance, they were civilians trying to convince fellow civilians. Hess, as uniformed personnel, remained in the background.\textsuperscript{75}

This psychology was reinforced by a powerful reality: OFDA's checkbook and the military's logistics. OFDA, according to section 491 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, is authorized to spend money on the spot to help alleviate a disaster. In short, with no regard for who gets the accolades, OFDA funds NGOs of their choosing in order to save lives in a cost-effective manner.\textsuperscript{76} The military, on the other hand, offered the capacity to transport the relief supplies and build the transition camps for free.\textsuperscript{77} Working with OFDA and the military could have its advantages.

For the American government and its military, the money was a small price to pay for a quick transition to civilian agencies and the exit of American military forces. The relationship, therefore, remained mutually beneficial to both the NGOs and the military. Thus the concept that Elmo had witnessed in Isikveren, the lesson that Petrella had learned in Diyarbakir, was also true in getting the NGOs to Zakho: leveraging the NGOs into the coordination game involved a subdued military presence as the money of OFDA, DOD, and the military's logistics and infrastructure presented its own additional logic through the personalities of key leaders.

It was in Zakho that a unique phenomenon in the NGO/military relationship occurred: the NGOs established their own internal coordinating committee (to which Cuny and Hess were invited as observers). This congregation of NGOs was officially established on May 8th and became known as the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI). The first chairman of the NCCNI was elected by vote (Mark Gorman of IRC).\textsuperscript{78}

IRC, in keeping with the NGO stereotype, had come into the Kurdish mountains of its own accord during the third week of April.
IRC was somewhat unique in that because it deals specifically with refugee issues, its knowledge base is not limited to one specialty (as is the case with some other NGOs). Their command of such issues as camp administration, water purification, and sanitation earned immediate respect with the military. Moreover, IRC was unique because, contrary to all military stereotypes of NGOs, it provided a tactical capacity for NGO coordination. This development was of the utmost importance because it was at the NCCNI that NGO/military coordination actually took place.79

When the plight of the Kurds first made the international headlines, Mark Gorman was in Thailand. He was IRC's representative to the refugee situation along the Cambodian border. He also happened to be the Chairman of the Coordination Committee of Displaced Persons (CCDP).80 Given this experience, Gorman called IRC's headquarters in New York and volunteered his services at the end of April. By May 3rd he was in Zakho and by the 8th, the NCCNI had been established under the auspices of the UNHCR.81

Because of its unprecedented use by American military forces, it is important to quote some of the NCCNI by-laws:

- **NCCNI Goal**: To ensure that returning refugees and displaced persons are provided coordinated and appropriate services until that time that indigenous systems can assume primary responsibility.

- **NCCNI Objectives**:

  1. Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, International Military Forces, Embassies, and the Host Country Government to ensure that the level of services are appropriate and coordinated.

  2. Provide a mechanism which evaluates assistance needs and makes recommendations as to how those needs can most appropriately be met.

  3. Foster an environment which encourages collaboration rather than competition between the implementing agencies.
4. Establish a system which agencies wanting to become operational in Iraq can interface in order to capitalize on resources and avoid duplication of services.82

The NCCNI also established basic by-laws for meetings, chairmanship, and the processes by which decisions were reached. Essentially, issues were decided by votes with the NCCNI Executive Committee resolving any particularly contentious issue.

The conceptual and tactical importance of the NCCNI, then and now, cannot be emphasized enough. This mechanism allowed for a single NGO voice with which the military could coordinate. It is in the NCCNI and the resulting collaboration and coordination that a model for the future presents itself.

The NCCNI was successful for several reasons. First and foremost, it was located in Camp Number One, not at the JTF headquarters. Additionally, the material support for the NCCNI, as well as the NGO personnel who lived in the camp, came from the military.83 Absolutely critical to the collaboration process was the fact that Hess and Cuny lived in the camp itself. In fact, they shared the same tent next to the NCCNI. In so doing, the people responsible for coordinating could not help but get to know one another outside the professional responsibilities they represented at the coordination meetings. For example, all interviewed remember shaving at the "water bull," fighting for cold water in the morning, and standing in the mess lines together. While there was inevitable tension as everyone grew accustomed to each other's living habits, the stereotype walls quickly came down.

Gorman, for instance, had had a previously negative impression of all militaries. Based on his extensive experience in the third world, he associated military personnel with oppression. "Militaries," he observed, "are usually party to creating refugees."84 By the end of his month-long experience of living with the military he had the following impression: "If they hadn't have been there, it would have been much different. They provide horsepower and efficiency... [The relationship was] a real honest partnership [and I have] a profound respect for the military."85 On the other hand, Hess reflects that the NGOs are "dedicated, caring, unselfish, and very giving."86
It was during the meetings of the NCCNI that this emerging mutual respect further delineated itself.

Meetings were held every night at 2000. Much like the other NGO meetings described, it was voluntary and any participant was welcome to comment. Gorman, as the first chairman, acted as orchestrator in an action-oriented atmosphere. The various NGOs presented reports, unmet needs were decided upon, and surfacing problems/potential issues were discussed. Hess also provided situational reports to the NCCNI. This information proved important because it presented the bigger picture and a certain continuity and connectivity to the rest of the emergency effort. The two sets of assessments were compared for veracity.

Based on the synthesized information, priorities became apparent. Then it was simply a matter of assignment: "Who would like to provide food/water distribution for Camp Number Two? Who can do sanitation for Camp Number Three?" Within this framework, another phenomenon took place: NGOs developed "joint" support teams according to the need. For instance, sanitation experts from different NGOs would combine to maximize their efforts. A very unique act for the NGOs, it was welcomed by the military as essential to a comprehensive effort.

However, the evolution of the NCCNI, the sharing of information, the prioritizing of needs, and the "jointness" of the NGOs were encouraged by two final factors, both equally human. First, the NGOs were driven together out of necessity. As Gorman notes, the UNHCR was very weak and did not take any lead role in organizing the NGOs. Consequently, the NGOs were the only ones there: the common sense of a need for a comprehensive effort could not be ignored. Complementing this fact was a simple shortage of NGOs. Because the need was so great, they did not have time to worry about inter-NGO rivalries or the development of turf.

Finally, a weak UNHCR and lack of NGO competition aside, all participants were brought together by the power of the moment. Realizing the precarious precipice that the Kurds had been on, it was nothing short of miraculous to witness them come out of the mountains. One and all remember the feeling of watching the Kurds coming home. This feeling in and of itself was enough to make for a
cohesive coordination effort. The significance of these efforts are indicated in the following statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mountain Camp</th>
<th>20-25 April Population</th>
<th>23 May Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isikveren</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzumlu</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaskopru</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cukurca</td>
<td>60-100,000</td>
<td>56,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirincken</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yesilova</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semdilli</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karasu</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayadibi</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silopi</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>394,434,000</td>
<td>69,500(^9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the end of May, CARE had set up in the actual CMOC in Zakho as they prepared to take over all food distribution on June 1st.\(^{90}\) In the camps, the Civil Affairs personnel were turning over the administration of the transition camps to the NGOs. On June 4th, the CMOC shut down. *Operation Provide Comfort*, now in stage III, continues today.

CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS

What can we learn from this first case study of the CMOC and of NGO/military relations? The lessons learned, like the above story told, are a matter of placing the collaboration and coordination of the NGOs and the military within the proper political and emergency context. Only by understanding the impact of military and NGO presence within a continuum of humanitarian effort can one truly grasp the strategic, operational, and tactical lessons of bilateral collaboration and coordination between the NGO community and the military.

Security and humanitarian efforts will inevitably encourage a people, creating various expectations. How these expectations manifest themselves depends on the people being helped. For example, Jalal Talabani, the leader of one of the largest Kurdish factions, stated that "We are closer than ever to autonomy, this is the
best chance [for autonomy] that we've had this century. This opinion was exactly what Turkey and the United States feared most. Talabani's statement materialized in Dohuk where the Peshmerga were emboldened to take military action against the Iraqis at the end of May.

Also, remember again the general SF perception of the NGOs in the mountains: that the outside aid was beginning to encourage complacency and dependency. In every humanitarian intervention, the overall effort creates different expectations among the helped as well as those helping. It can sometimes be a world of unintended consequences. At a minimum, the NGOs and the military have a responsibility to repeatedly state the limits of their efforts to each other and to those they help. False expectations are easily created, and dangerous, if not confronted daily with the simple basic truth.

The example of CARE illustrates this positive awareness. "Establishment of clear objectives and unacceptable risks was a key element of CARE's strategy. By fixing such a framework early on, the project, paradoxically, had great flexibility for being linked to goals and circumscribed by some parameters." CARE defined its mission and refused to be involved in anything else. "The following conditions will require that CARE close down its Food Management Operations:

1. Lack of security for CARE's staff.
2. Lack of security of Stocks.
3. Inability to support North Iraq operation through Turkey.
4. CARE is able to accept its current lack of legal status for itself as an organization and for its staff, provided it is able to support its staff and operation in North Iraq through Turkey and that UNHCR continues its presence.

The specifications of risks which CARE cannot accept will guide field operations and help CARE ensure the safety of its staff. CARE is conscious of its role as a "human shield" for the security of Northern Iraq. This role has definite limits. By clearly stating its objectives and its awareness of the larger picture, CARE protected its own self-interests while simultaneously making it easier to incorporate CARE into the comprehensive transition (everyone knew where
CARE stood). CARE's actions reflect a keen awareness of its responsibilities, to itself and within a multidimensional effort.

The SF training and ethos also recognized its proper role. Due to a distinct lack of NGO presence, the military, particularly in the mountain camps and also in Zakho, was responsible for addressing the immediate needs of the refugees. De facto, the military was handling the security and relief. In many ways, the SF were an instantaneous continuum encompassing the role of the U.N., OFDA, NGO, and military security.94

In part, this effort was handled so well because this phase of the emergency -- life-saving -- is intrinsic to soldiering. It was also "pure humanitarian" and, therefore, in keeping with the directives of the National Command Authority (NCA) for Provide Comfort.95 This "purely humanitarian" understanding of the situation, however, begs the most difficult question of humanitarian relief: What to do when the emergency has been stabilized? What does a military force and a humanitarian community provide to a population that is politically emboldened and possibly humanitarian dependent?

The "military didn't know what to do. It had been tasked to provide assistance, but didn't know what that meant."96 How would the military have acted if there had been no OFDA DART or Fred Cuny? Could a transition to civilian authorities have taken place so smoothly with the transit camps built right on the border as originally intended in tight military grids? Could the military have come up with the necessary carrots and sticks to motivate the civilian agencies and the refugees to come down off the mountains? These are serious questions and ones to which the answer is: "probably not."

This answer is not an indictment of the U.S. military. There are so many factors and components to a complex humanitarian emergency that no single organization could possibly account for them all. However, to not be aware of these other factors -- to not realize one's place in a continuum of effort -- is to not understand the inherent socio-economic-political-civil dimensions of such an emergency.

"They still don't get what they did right; they talk in terms of logistics: the number of tents put up, the number of latrines built . . . the military thinks the goal is feeding people, giving medical attention . . . that's wrong, they must change the course of conflict in a way that
saves lives." While the military may have understood the immediate answer to the situation, it, as a whole, did not quite comprehend how it should fit itself into the overall continuum of an effort that had to be a building block towards a lasting solution.

The rebuttal to this supposition is that the military does not need to understand this continuum, if it exists, because it is an instrument of the government. True, theoretically speaking. However, recall that while there was a common understanding of the nature of the emergency, there was no strategic end-state coming from Washington. In fact, Washington, although playing catch-up with the situation, viewed the situation much differently than those on the ground.

At a time when the major objective was getting people [U.S. Troops] home, actions that could have accelerated the repatriation and reintegration process, such as economic incentives, assistance with harvest, etc., were often restricted or discouraged from Washington. In extraordinary operations, extraordinary flexibility needs to be granted. What appears to be "reconstruction" to Washington may be practical or operational necessity at the field level.

Substitute "nation-building" for "reconstruction" and the potential for a significant problem begins to emerge. With the perception that a short troop commitment was the key to success, the primary purpose of the troops and the duration of their stay now becomes political -- they must come home, soon. As a result, any "reconstruction" (nation-building) impedes that possibility. "No quagmires" thinks the Washington policy-maker. With such a position, the military's humanitarian purpose becomes secondary because its primary political purpose is to get out soon. Fortunately, this logic did not have a chance to manifest itself as, with no time to waste, the military and humanitarian operator on the ground was forced to solve the problem according to the humanitarian need.

Yet, while the NGO community or the military may or may not be driving the policy, as Can did, each has the responsibility to be aware of a conceptual end-state. Dayton Maxwell suggests what all military commanders would recognize in a "military" situation: that "strategic planning is absolutely necessary. There must be a conceptual end-state. This end-state will dictate the day-to-day operations. That definition may and likely will change as the realities
of a situation evolve, but that definition is essential to determining actions to be taken.\textsuperscript{100} The military and NGO must both recognize this need as they seek each other out pursuant to a mutually understood definition of exactly where and what the end-state is. In order to do so, they must also appreciate the other’s role. “It is also clear that the military is most effective in the earlier stages than in the intermediate and longer term activities. By coincidence, the NGOs tended to be less effective in the earlier stages and more effective in the later period.”\textsuperscript{101}

Regarding the military, specifically, it must be aware of the other factors beyond the simple and relatively short stage of "pure humanitarian" work. If it is not aware of the total civil dimension -- socio-economic-civil-municipal-and political -- and the various bridges that must be maintained in order to reestablish these facets of the total civil dimension (if for no other reason than to turn these links back over to the NGOs, UN, or host nation), it may negate the overall continuum of effort before it begins. If nothing else, the military will potentially hurt its own endeavors once the humanitarian situation stabilizes as the expectations and thoughts of the afflicted people return to other than life-threatening matters. This conceptual end-state awareness should be provided by the Executive Branch. As discussed above, this awareness may not always be the case.\textsuperscript{102} If there is no end-state awareness, then the military must work to create it in conjunction with the indigenous and other humanitarian authorities at the operational level.

Strategically, NGOs and the military must ensure that their senior decision-makers are not only talking, but that they are encouraging their stateside counterparts to be talking. There is no evidence that NGOs or the DOD was making an effort to coordinate with one another. The only effort of this kind was made by OFDA.\textsuperscript{103}

Secondly, there can be no solutions without security. The reader is reminded that while this chapter's argument focuses on the humanitarian track of the military's relationship with NGOs, the security mission existed simultaneously throughout the effort. The Kurds would not come out of the mountains until they were assured their security. The same went for the NGOs. Security is a critical necessity for any U.S. military/NGO relationship in an operation with potential for a significant armed threat.
The final strategic lesson need not be belabored: the common understanding of the problem was self-evident. The ability to actualize the "how" and turn it into a strategic vision that is politically acceptable is the difference. The NGO/military personnel can contribute to this process by actively participating in their own "chains-of-command," pressuring their stateside leaders to advocate for a certain policy, and by seeking each other out at the operational level.

Operationally NGO/military personnel must realize that collaboration/coordination is taking place everywhere within an affected area between and among the people implementing the various policies of the participants. Implied herein is the assumption that there is no structure. Food, money, organizations all come into an emergency situation from all over the world. The military can present a nominal infrastructure, but there are too many moving parts for it to be coordinated from one spot, at least initially. Therefore, there must be an extraordinary effort at redundant communication (which does not mean micro-management) and the development of a 'network' that can comprehend the overall emergency and response. The Civil Affairs and OFDA personnel personify this understanding best.

At every significant contact point -- in the mountains, at Incirlik and Diyarbakir, and in Zakho -- the Civil Affairs multi-layered presence did much for the coordination process. Partly the result of infrastructure, partly the result of foresight, the CA connectivity was essential to understanding the overall situation. Of course, this type of fusion is precisely what they are designed for: "CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent for Civil-Military operations." It should be recognized, however, that the mere presence of Civil Affairs officers did not guarantee the CA success. A liaison does not constitute a relationship. They were also both personable and aggressive in their effort. Largely because these men and women hold civilian jobs (making them a natural bridge to other civilians) and have been trained to think about other than military considerations in a military environment, they will always make a considerable contribution to the success of a humanitarian operation. To ignore these organic skills, is to considerably lessen the Department of Defense's opportunity for success.
OFDA, due to its humanitarian expertise, remains the quintessential example. Because they had a relatively large team, they were able to "plug" in at almost every fusion point. Their greatest strength, however, was to stay "plugged" in while "floating." With their finger ever on the pulse of the situation, and acting as a "mobile comptroller," they were able to anticipate problems and develop a strategy. "If the role of DOD is to arrive first with the best capability, the role of OFDA is to expedite the transition from a unilateral government response to a multilateral international one." All together, the DART was the "floating glue" that transcended the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of play and interaction. They are imperative. Both the CA and OFDA efforts serve as a prototype for how to form an information network in response to such a spread-out emergency.

A second operational lesson is that the military cannot be in charge. It must work with the NGOs in order to alleviate the suffering and quicken the military's departure. "There is no structure; if you tell the NGOs what to do, they say piss on you and then you've lost them; and that is the worst thing that can happen." It is in a spirit of accommodation and collaboration that coordination takes place. For example, the acknowledged success in Diyarbakir occurred because "we [the military] didn't come on like gangbusters . . . we facilitated, swapped information, and let them [the NGOs] know what we could do for them." It is this physically subdued and attitudinally supportive presence that ensured success in Provide Comfort.

This type of attitude and support sometimes invites the military snicker about those doing NGO coordination that "they've gone native." The response of every Civil Affairs officer, for example, was the same: NGOs are the ticket home. Or as Major General Campbell said, "they [the NGOs and the other civilian agencies] were the only thing that made sense." While this type of interaction with the NGOs may seem "touchy-feely" to the warfighters of the military, this interaction is also a calculating rationale. In short, the military needs the NGOs to exit. To exit, the military cannot assume, assert, or act in control. Moreover, the military needs to be aware that its very nature may present a self-defeating byproduct: being "in charge" actually contributes to mission creep. Four examples will suffice.
1. "The amount of money spent by the military on latrine in the Zakho camps was more than the entire amount spent by UNHCR for sanitation last year [1990] in its world-wide operations."\(^\text{113}\)

2. In Zakho, military surgeons wanted to bring in three MASH units to administer aid. There were already three Kurd hospitals in Zakho.\(^\text{114}\)

3. After initial points of contact had been established between and among the various players in early April -- to a point that was comfortable to OFDA and the NGOs -- the military embarked on what Dayton Maxwell calls the "stacking phenomenon." Essentially, despite a comfortable and appropriate number of coordination people in early April, the military came in and built its stovepipe, layering or stacking the levels of bureaucracy. Each new unit or layer had its own definition of "humanitarian aid," had a tendency to start from scratch, and ignored prior planning while coordination was inevitably hindered. These units, in his opinion, "would charge forth from this perspective," making it very hard to coordinate them with the original players who already understood the situation.\(^\text{115}\)

4. When some superior officers visited LTC Petrella in Diyarbakir, they asked, "Lieutenant Colonel, why isn't this outfit better organized?" (implying that there needed to be a neat, military structure with the appropriate wire-diagram). Petrella's response: "My job is not to take this thing over."\(^\text{116}\)

These examples reflect a conventional mindset that sought to develop a familiar construct; one in which everything had its proper place and role. It also reflects a mentality that will apply the tools available just because they are in the tool chest -- as opposed to applying them because they are appropriate.

The military complains about "mission creep," but its very nature encourages it. Why build one of the best refugee latrine systems in the world when your admitted end-state is to transfer the refugees back home? Why bring in MASH units and administer health problems with imported doctors when there was no immediate emergency? If there is a minimal infrastructure in place that is working, why add to it? Why organize a pristine flow chart if your
desire is to be there for as little a time as possible? Even General Garner admits that, if he had to do it over again, he would have kept the 24th MEU staff as his primary staff and not have brought in his own.\textsuperscript{117}

Ronald Libby drives the conceptual point home: "Don't try and do other people's jobs . . . Help those who are doing the job." Imperatively, he notes, "If you [the military] take charge, you can't leave. If you take charge, you lose."\textsuperscript{118} As Fred Cuny repeatedly told Michael Hess, the military "does infrastructure. No programs."\textsuperscript{119}

Humanitarian intervention is a people intensive process. For example, the successful role of OFDA and CA is not about institutional structure. OFDA, CA, and the overall effort succeed because of the people involved. In short, the personalities of key billet holders make an essential difference throughout the relief effort. Although no news flash to those accustomed to leadership, this point is an important one to make given the unique circumstances of the situation. Thus, we should take some time to grasp the full impact of military leadership in this type of environment.

This adaptive leadership style started at the top. General Shalikashvili's guidance in the face of an unencountered phenomenon was simple: do the right thing.\textsuperscript{120} The right thing was a supportive style of leadership recognizing that transition to civilian agencies was the key to the military's exit strategy. No one better personified this than Major General Jay Garner. Ron Libby notes that Garner repeatedly stated purpose was: "tell us how we can support you."\textsuperscript{121} According to Captain Lawrence Naab, Garner "gave general guidance and didn't get into specifics [i.e., micro-manage]; he let the experts handle what they knew."\textsuperscript{122} This attitude permeated the entire structure of the response. Kevin Henry of CARE, who arrived in northern Iraq in early May, recalls that "every time support was requested it was there. There was no, 'I'll get to it or that is not in keeping with the regulations;' [they] made it happen."\textsuperscript{123} Simply, if Garner had had an "I'm in charge attitude, we'd still be there."\textsuperscript{124}

In one sense, the situation demanded this type of personality from the military's commanders. As Colonel Robert Beahm matter-of-factly observed of General Shalikashvili's guidance, it was the right guidance because he "didn't know what to do either . . . They don't teach you at war college what to do when a 1/2 million people
are dying.\textsuperscript{125} The situation, however, did not necessarily dictate the above type of personality with everyone. General Potter, for example, seemed to fit the humanitarian stereotype of the military. According to several reports, he did not care about Civil Affairs, nor did he hold the NGOs in high regard. There was also the general feeling that all he wanted to do was shut down the mountain camps and get out of there. If all of the military's leadership, rightly or wrongly, had been perceived as such, the end-result of NGO/military coordination might have been quite different.\textsuperscript{126}

An additional tactical extrapolation results from this discussion of personality and perception. Because personality has such a large role to play in a situation for which there is no blueprint, the wire-diagram of coordination relationship is a reference point, at best. In JTF Alpha, for example, there was no time, or sufficient CA personnel, to set up even unofficial CMOCs. There were simply meetings because necessity called for it. In JTF Bravo, the CMOC existed, but the place where it had been set up was not the primary site to realize the transition to civilian agencies. LTC Hess had taken the CMOC to the NGOs.

In doing so, Hess vitalized the "O" in CMOC. By attending the NCCNI meetings with Cuny and living with the NGOs, Hess created a conducive atmosphere through which to meet the needs of the NGOs. This simple point cannot be overemphasized. If a traditional officer had waited at the CMOC 1.5 miles away, he would still be there waiting. Hess' proactive example of taking the coordination to the field while simultaneously establishing a working rapport with the NGOs is the proper conceptual model for all contingencies.

These points beg two questions: 1) Does Kurdistan succeed because of a decided lack of doctrine; and/or 2) Does the development of doctrine up to 1995 prohibit the likelihood of such a response in the future, \textit{i.e.}, does it encourage the military mindset of checklists over proactive personalities?

Although the purpose is not to answer these questions, some general thoughts should be noted. On the one hand, due to the suddenness of the mission and the deployment of SF first, one has to wonder whether or not the conventional military, despite the "stacking phenomenon," was stripped of the opportunity to behave according to its organizational self: taking charge. With no precedent
and no chance to develop any checklists, did the circumstances of the situation force the conventional military to be more receptive to the humanitarian concerns?

Additionally, from the NGO perspective, did the circumstances strip them of the opportunity to behave traditionally? Because there was no NGO presence prior to the emergency and that there were only nine NGOs in Zakhlo on April 26th, were they not forced to work together because the need was so great (instead of competing for "turf")? Because the UNHCR provided no infrastructure, did not the NGOs have to come to grips with the situation themselves, even before the CMOC suggestion? Has the NGO community, like the military, even attempted to codify some of their experiences, at least within their own organizations, if not community-wide? As we will see in Operation Support Hope (Rwanda), both the military and the NGOs welcomed the chance to be their traditional selves.

While it is useful to raise these issues for future discussion, it is perhaps more important to note the final two tactical, and most important overall, lessons of coordination. First, there is the principle of "altruistic self-interest." This principle suggests that there is indeed an "invisible hand" to the humanitarian effort. As the reader will recall, each time the NGOs and the military coordinated, each side had something to offer the other. The NGOs offered expertise and transition; the military offered security, an instant infrastructure to address the situation, and the logistics to enable the response. Implicitly, the military also offered, like OFDA, a lot of money up front to make the mission happen.

In return, the NGOs received help, in a supportive and conducive manner, that they never could have developed or harnessed according to their corporate community. Moreover, not only were they helped, but they were empowered to remain and sustain. The military received a ticket home. By using their comparative advantages of security, infrastructure and logistics, they leveraged the NGOs into a comprehensive effort that is generally anomalous to their condition. The way this exchange of services was achieved was at the meeting table, tent, or area. Again, it was not achieved simply because both sides completely trusted the other. It was achieved because the presence of the various players at the coordination meeting meant one thing: transparency. Because there were so many methods of receiving information -- OFDA, the various NGOs, the SF
assessment reports, the conventional military reports, and, later, UNHCR -- a clear picture could not help but emerge. And even if it was not clear, someone pushing an agenda too hard would be. By seeking to be all-inclusive and to invite the participation of all the agencies that had something to offer, truth emerged at the coordination meeting. Although speaking about the NGO/military effort in Zakho during May, Kevin Henry’s summation is a fitting description of the entire initial stage of the emergency:

All the parts fell into place. All had their own reason to cooperate -- personal, institutional, or altruistic -- and it fit together perfectly. (Unlike Somalia). Hess was atypical military, not meeting any stereotypes; the NGOs had good people; and OFDA, an important part of the success formula, also had the authority on the ground to spend money. 127

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
COLLABORATION/COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

1. The military should not be in charge. Given a decided misunderstanding of how it fit into the overall continuum of effort and its political role; its own desire to "stack" layers of bureaucracy; and its desire to exit quickly, the military must seek to help the helper as it works to ensure that its relatively quick departure enables the overall humanitarian effort.

2. There actually may be things in common: professionalism, can-do attitude, respect for life, unity of effort in the face of the overwhelming power of the moment, etc. These elements need to be carefully examined as building blocks between two different types of organizations. Interestingly, both organizations pride themselves on their sensitivity to the cultures of the world, yet they did not initially apply this type of sensitivity towards each other. In the end, success resulted because individuals were able to shed old mindsets as the situation itself stripped both organizations of a chance to be themselves.
3. The CMOC, or the idea of coordination, is a floating concept that may even manifest itself individually (witness the Petrelia scenario in Diyarbakir). While ultimately manifested at a particular place and time, this place and time may not necessarily be where military doctrine appoints it to be.

4. The selection of the NGO/military interface personnel is critical. The selection of the military commander is equally important. Although this work has attempted to describe the key personalities in such a way that specific lessons can be taken away and institutionalized, the intangible of personality is undeniably a central factor.

5. The coordination structure is one of descending decentralization. The CMOC in Incirlik had overheads and daily briefings; the CMOC in Zakho actually coordinated with the NGOs in the refugee camps; in the mountain refugee camps, the coordination with NGOs took place in a catch-as-catch-can manner before it evolved into a regular meeting time.

6. In particular, the Zakho NGO/Military coordination succeeded because there was a secure environment and the coordination structure (i.e., Hess) was trusted by higher authority to collocate and collaborate with the NGOs.

7. Not to be expected, a viable NGO coordination center is extremely helpful to the overall comprehensive effort. The idea of the NCCNI is a powerful one that needs further examination from the NGO community.128

8. A relief/dependency mindset must not be encouraged at any cost. Encourage self-reliance and be careful of creating dependency. Odd measures of effectiveness become important. Refugees bickering with the relief and military personnel over the food delivered, for instance, could be a sign that they are ready to move.
9. Call it what you may, but the cornerstone of NGO/military interaction is "altruistic self-interest." There is a common goal for different purposes and ends. There is nothing wrong with this observation, in fact, it is perfectly human. Each side must walk away from the coordination process with something in hand.

10. Transparency is the only way to guarantee that altruistic self-interest is practiced. Truth will only emerge in the presence of multiple surveyors of the same reality.
CHAPTER THREE

OPERATION SEA ANGEL

As the first Kurds began to trickle into Zakho, Tropical Cyclone 02B, "Marian," battered the coast of Bangladesh from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar. For eight hours during the night and morning of April 29th-30th, 140 mph winds created and drove a twenty-foot tidal surge into a coast that is barely above sea level. In a country possessing 2000 people per square mile, with thousands living on chars (literally sand banks that are at sea level during high-tide), the devastation was immediate and overwhelming. The final death toll was somewhere between 139,000 and 152,000 people.

In the face of this catastrophic loss -- to include infrastructure, particularly communications and washed out roads -- the newly elected Bangladeshi government and its military struggled to meet the needs of its people. Equally affected were the national and international NGOs, primarily based in the capital of Dhaka, who could not get their supplies and foodstuffs to the coast, the outer shore islands, and the hundreds of chars. On May 6th, American Ambassador to Bangladesh, William B. Milam, officially inquired of Pacific Command in Hawaii about the possibility of military support for the relief effort. On May 11th, President Bush announced that a joint task force (JTF) would be sent to Bangladesh to aid in the relief effort.

On May 12th, Major General Henry Stackpole, commander of III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, Japan), landed with an advance party in Dhaka, where they established a JTF headquarters. Already en route back from the Gulf War, the 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) arrived off the coast of Chittagong on May 15th. The force, ultimately under the guidance of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, but directed by General Stackpole, quickly liaised with the coordination center in Chittagong established by the JTF forward command element. This center became the focal point for the relief effort. By May 29th, 5th MEB had sailed for home. On June 7th, the JTF forward element shut down operations in Chittagong. On June 13th, the
emergency over with, and the Bangladeshi government fully enabled to address the remaining problems, the last American JTF personnel redeployed.

The NGO/military relationship would again prove pivotal in this humanitarian relief effort. Despite little or no knowledge of each other prior to their mutual effort, this relationship, like the one in northern Iraq, resulted in new-found respect. "The NGOs proved to be highly efficient organizations, adept at identifying needs and procuring needed supplies." Indeed, "one of the greatest lessons to come out of Sea Angel was the efficacy of [the NGOs]." Overall, according to one senior NGO representative, the coordination between the two communities was "very successful."%

*Operation Sea Angel* was almost the exact opposite of *Operation Provide Comfort.* In many ways, *Sea Angel* was a classic civil-military operation in which the American military supported a sovereign state pursuant to its humanitarian needs. As a result, there was an established national structure with clear command and control relationships to support the relief process. Additionally, there was an American embassy that provided guidance to the Joint Task Force commander.

Although not nearly as complex as the situation in northern Iraq, to view *Sea Angel* as just a logistics operation is misleading. Indeed, the great success of this operation has, perhaps, nullified its own study, reducing it to just a "simple" logistics operation. While definitely not a complex humanitarian emergency, the subtle complexities of this humanitarian intervention should not be ignored, particularly in discussing the NGO/military relationship.

This chapter argues that there were several underlying tensions that could quite possibly have been exacerbated by the intervention of U.S. forces. The fact that they were not is a testimony to the leadership of General Stackpole. By communicating a clear, simple, and repeated intent for the Joint Task Force, everyone -- from his own men to the Bangladeshi government to the NGOs -- understood the purpose and scope of the American action. His diplomatic methods, primarily his consistent effort to subordinate himself to the American Ambassador and to Prime Minister Zia, was integral to isolating the relief effort in Chittagong from political considerations. Moreover, at the coordination level, it was the overwhelming logistical leverage
that the Americans brought to the emergency that also reduced these political complexities to an inconsequential role.

Relatively isolated from these underlying tensions, the coordination effort witnessed the convergence of the two civil affairs "tracks" discussed in the previous chapter: 1) the traditional civil-military relations with the established government; and 2) the non-traditional civil-military relations with the NGOs. Both tracks took place simultaneously in the same room every morning in both Dhaka and Chittagong. Under the lead of the Bangladeshi government, as manifested in government or military officials, both the NGOs and the American military worked together to address the problem.

So far [the] international effort has yet to materialize on anything close to the scale western aid experts believe is necessary to avert another calamity. Aid has come in dribs and drabs -- the United States, for instance, has provided $125,000 worth of water purification tablets and medicines. Meanwhile, a few international relief agencies, such as CARE, World Vision, and Oxfam are struggling to assist cyclone victims . . . [said one Bangladeshi official] what the country really needs is the means of getting that food to the people in the hardest hit areas.\textsuperscript{134}

This May 6th assessment in The Boston Globe provides several initial indicators of the situation the U.S. military would encounter in Bangladesh. The first and most obvious is that the relief effort began without the United States military. It was a full two weeks before the military joined the relief effort. As a result, there would be NGO concerns that the military would come in with a "take-charge" attitude while not being sensitive to the hard work already in progress.\textsuperscript{135}

Second, and equally obvious, was the limited response of the international community, particularly the United States. When compared to the immediate financial and military support made available to the Kurdish refugees, help for Bangladesh was initially infinitesimal. There was even the feeling in Bangladesh that the United States would not send any help, beyond some money, because it did not have confidence in the new government.\textsuperscript{136} The U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) mission director, Dr. Mary Kilgour, recalls the relative embarrassment of small European countries being able to contribute more to the effort faster than the United States.\textsuperscript{137}
The Boston Globe story also reveals the missing ingredient necessary to resolve the emergency: "the means of getting that [stockpiled] food to the people in the hardest hit areas." It was not a question of supplies or organization, it was a matter of logistical infrastructure. The article also quotes a Bangladeshi military officer who states, "Just a few heavy lift helicopters could mean the difference between life and death for thousands and thousands of people. We are able to throw only a few pebbles into an ocean of need because of lack of transport." Given this sense of common understanding, a solution could not therefore be operationalized without the necessary air and sea transport. Without appropriate transport, the Bangladeshi government would have to wait until the water completely receded. This patience, however, would be useless for the thousands of people living on the islands and sand bars off the coast. Helicopters and sea transport were the answer and it would take a decision by other states to help Bangladesh in this way and magnitude.

The excerpt finally suggests that the NGOs were "struggling" to meet the need. In fact, everyone was struggling to meet the aftermath of the tidal surge. Although the cyclone had been devastating, the "struggle" to address the problem was made worse by several underlying tensions that pre-dated the arrival of the storm. To begin with, there were tensions in the Bangladeshi government itself. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia had been elected just thirty-nine days prior to the storm. Zia was the first elected President since the end of the military dictatorship of General Ussain Muhammad Ershad, who had ruled the country since the assassination of Zia's husband, General Ziaur Rahman, in 1981. This relief effort was the first real test of the newly elected government.

Consequently, "there was no effective tradition of intergovernmental cooperation in the country as yet."\textsuperscript{138} Three months after the cyclone, at a conference in Honolulu, Brigadier General Ibrahim of the Bangladeshi Army, commented on the relationship between the new government and its army. In his paper for the conference, he suggested that there had been "inadequate political guidance" and that both the Bangladeshi military and the government "must understand each other and work jointly to reduce the sufferings of affected people. In the recent cyclone, the civil
administration and armed forces worked together but there is enough room for improvement and understanding.\textsuperscript{139}

Additionally, the Bangladeshi public could not help but compare this disaster with the one in 1988, when the military, under General Ershad was in control. Whereas, in 1988, the death rate was low (it was a gradually rising floodwater) and prices had been controlled, the 1991 disaster witnessed sudden and catastrophic death coupled with a 30\% price increase (in the affected areas). Collectively the tension between the military and its newly emplaced democratic government (not to mention the complete breakdown in the national communication system and continuing bad weather) resulted in the following ineffectiveness:

No Bangladeshi official has been given authority to coordinate and command relief efforts. No substantive assessment of damages has been made. No evacuation of stranded people have been attempted \ldots No comprehensive list of needs and priorities had been distributed to embassies and international organizations.\textsuperscript{140}

Another macro-level tension was the Gulf War. During the war, there had been protests against America. A mob had even broken into the American Club (near the embassy) in January of 1991.\textsuperscript{141} Moreover, once the American force arrived, certain political parties raised the issue, on the parliamentary floor, of American forces trying to establish a permanent base in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{142} This perception was one more tension that would dictate a delicate American presence.

At the operational level there were more underlying tensions. As is often the case in the third world, the Bangladeshi government/NGO relationship (to include national and particularly, international NGOs) was one mired in mutual suspicion. A NGO, by definition, represents something mostly beyond the control of the government. In a country like Bangladesh, where seven of the ten deadliest tropical storms in history have struck, NGOs also represent a considerable cash flow into the country. (CARE's annual budget, for instance, was $40 million dollars). Consequently, the "control issue" looms larger in Bangladesh where each disaster beyond the normal state-of-affairs brings an influx of millions of dollars. The influx of hard NGO cash makes for more tension at the local level, particularly during emergencies. In this sense, "it's not so much [endemic of] the third world, but more like Chicago: it's city politics."\textsuperscript{143} The distribution
of humanitarian aid will lend credibility to the local, provincial, or governmental politician who seeks it. In this manner, politics is no different in third world than it is in the United States. Someone will claim credit for the good being done in his/her area.

Also, in the eyes of the more traditional members of the Bangladeshi government, another element to be controlled was the perception that NGOs came to Bangladesh to proselytize the population or empower the women. Hence, NGOs were often perceived as a threat to cultural norms.

There were additional tensions between A.I.D. and the NGOs. Much like the "control issue" for the national government, these tensions were inevitable and not unique to Bangladesh. Because it has the power of the purse, A.I.D. factored significantly in many NGO budgets. (CARE's budget, for example, was 50% A.I.D. money in Bangladesh). Inevitably, there was the perception, rightly or wrongly, among the NGOs that A.I.D. had its favorites. Moreover, according to its mandate, the A.I.D. program (and mentality) was focused on development instead of relief. As a result, it was, in general, very conscious of spending tomorrow's development on today's relief. Moreover, when the cyclone hit, the A.I.D. mission was extremely limited in what money it could offer. It was unable to redirect monies that had already been allocated to existing development programs. New funds were needed from Washington for the disaster.

At the implementation/tactical level, there was also the underlying tension of NGO competition. Due to the inherent possibility of disaster and the chance to raise more money, there existed a competition, mostly healthy, among the NGOs. Gerald Whitehouse, then country director for Adventists Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), confirms that the "politics is there -- it is the most competitive relief situation around." Whitehouse also rightly notes that this fact-of-the-matter is not necessarily detrimental, but that it does have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of a response.

Finally, despite the past disasters, there was no comprehensive plan for responding to such an emergency. The Association for Developmental Agencies of Bangladesh (ADAB, an umbrella NGO for national and international NGOs) had tried to formulate a plan,
but with little result. Although great efforts to improve the disaster response had been made since a 1970 cyclone (in which an estimated 500,000 people died), and despite early warning issued by the government as to the severity of the storm, the Bangladeshi government was simply overwhelmed. Even if a comprehensive plan had existed, it would have been nearly impossible to implement. Inevitably, there was some consternation among the Bangladeshi people with its government. Mohammed Yunus -- known world-wide for his bank program to empower entrepeneurs of the poorest background -- demanded that the government take control: "To those who say NGOs are the only way out, I say this is opting out, the government is supposed to do all these things. If the government cannot serve the people -- if we say let's forget about the government and call the NGOs and let them do this -- then why do we have to have a government?" 146

The political perceptions and underlying tensions aside, the magnitude of the disaster remained. A full two weeks later, the initial survey of the scene made an indelible impression upon General Stackpole: "I have seen combat, but I have never seen greater carnage." 147 Approximately 139,000 people were dead. Adding insult to injury was the inability to bury the dead. The land itself, as long as it was immersed, was not ready for the dead. Moreover, there were ten million affected by a flood zone spread over the four coastal districts of Bholo, Noakhali, Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar. The survivors were coping with numerous problems, the most important of which was the water supply. Most local wells and water sources had been contaminated by the saline surge that had only stopped after moving three miles inland. Included in the tidal surge was the oil from a tanker that had sunk in the storm. As in the mountains of southeastern Turkey, cholera was rearing its ugly head. The tidal surge had an enormous impact on the crops as well, damaging 3.5 million acres.

With little to no food, the stranded people became more and more susceptible to disease. Their ability to provide shelter for themselves was practically non-existent. When a population expands to build on the sandbars that result from the 45 million tons of silt that the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Magma rivers dump into the delta that is Bangladesh's coastline, the construction methods and available material will never be enough to withstand any significant storm. On
one such island, only 37 houses were left standing of the original 700. Apart from the basics of food, water, and shelter, clothing was also an issue. If everything that they owned had not been swept away by the tidal surge, many had, quite literally, had their clothes blown off their bodies. It was a very difficult environment in which to have basic human dignity. By the time General Stackpole arrived on May 12th, the conditions were almost overwhelming:

Water supplies . . . were completely polluted by this point in time. The toxicity of the bodies, now bloated, was a serious problem for us. People were dying of cholera. They were dying of a variety of other diseases. Simple scratches had become infected; amputations were legend. We had many, many problems to solve.148

In no way does this assessment imply that the American military arrived with the solution to a problem that no one was addressing. What the military did arrive with, which still did not exist two weeks after storm, was infrastructure. "If the road and ferry infrastructure had not been destroyed, CARE and the Red Crescent would have been largely capable of handling relief efforts with organic and contract assets as they had built up adequate supplies of emergency food and relief supplies for just such an eventuality."149 (These previously stored foods were provided by A.I.D. before and during the first week of the cyclone aftermath).

But the infrastructure was not there. The government had lost eight ships and 60% of its helicopters. Roads had been completely washed out. Chittagong’s port was clogged with sunken vessels. The city’s airport was initially under six-feet of water. The power supply system was non-operable. Perhaps most important, communications were down. There was no way to assess the damage as there was no way to get there and no way to hear about it. It was five days before the Ambassador or A.I.D. Director could fly down to the coast to inspect the area from the air. International communications were wiped out as well.

Combined with the aforementioned tensions, to include the absence of a comprehensive response plan and a lack of funds, the destruction of the infrastructure and communications system made for a response effort that could only be, at best, sporadic.

Before discussing the Bangladeshi response structure and how the American military and various NGOs "plugged into" it, it is very
important to emphasize the sovereignty of Bangladesh. It is all too easy, particularly within the context of humanitarian intervention, to forget about the government of the people being helped. Indeed, all too often, the host government and its military are perceived as a hindrance. It is equally easy to assume away the government from the point of view of the United States military. With its internal hierarchy and self-sustaining capacity, it is almost a natural thing for the military to take charge.

Thus it is that much more imperative to note that the Americans -- under the guidance of the ambassador and joint task force commander -- quite consciously made every effort to empower Bangladeshi leadership. By insisting on deference to the Bangladeshi government at every level, the American forces presented the official position that it was just a tool of a Bangladeshi comprehensive effort. What would result was an American advisory role to the Bangladeshi leadership in Dhaka as the joint task force implemented Dhaka's guidance through its forward command element in Chittagong. (The JTF forward was also subordinated to a local Bangladeshi official).\textsuperscript{150}

The Bangladeshi response effort was coordinated at two levels in Dhaka. At the highest level, there was the National Coordination Committee (NCC). This committee met at the cabinet level and included such ministries as Health and Family Welfare, Food, Agriculture, and Women's Affairs. An American equivalent to this committee might be a National Security Council, of sorts, dedicated solely to relief efforts (a Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] with greater clout due to the frequency of disasters in a much smaller country).

Directly beneath the National Coordination Committee was a standing cell known as the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). "This cell centrally headquarters all activities with all ministries, services headquarters and all other civil agencies."\textsuperscript{151} Essentially, in the American analogy, it was a standing interagency subcommittee to the NSC. General Shaffat headed the RACMC and was the liaison back to the NCC. The RACMC was located in the Presidential Secretariat at Zia International Airport. This cell implemented its decisions through the various organizations represented at the council.
Besides the national ministries and other governmental organizations represented in Dhaka and Chittagong, two other key players were represented. The first participant, was the NGO community. Although any NGO was welcomed, the NGO participants, largely due to size, numbered only three. ADAB, a nominal representative of the NGO community was there, as well as the Red Crescent Society. The Red Crescent Society was a quasi-government organization, enjoying a status analogous to American Red Cross's relationship with the American government and military. The third NGO represented was CARE. CARE, with its $40 million dollar budget and 1400 employees, was sure to be an integral part of any relief effort. Finally, A.I.D. had a liaison desk officer present at the meetings.

It was according to this coordination structure that the Bangladeshi government, largely without a plan and certainly without an infrastructure, struggled to meet the overwhelming need of "Marian's" aftermath.

On May 3rd, President Bush had sent his condolences to Prime Minister Zia. In the meantime, pressure mounted for some sort of reaction. Most compelling was the universal understanding of the nature of the problem: the supplies were already there, it was just a matter of distribution. That same day, Renny Nancholas, head of the British Red Cross international aid department, stated the plain fact: "no organization apart from the military has enough transport available." \(^{152}\) Hamed Essafi, the coordinator for the UN Relief Organization, stated at the time, "it is quite impossible for the [Bangladeshi] government to carry the burden alone." The same article continues, "Bangladesh has enough food to feed the millions who lost their entire crops, most farm animals, their homes, clothing and household utensils. But it lacks transport and medicine." \(^{153}\) On May 11th, President Bush ordered the Department of Defense to respond.

In less than a month, the Armed Forces of the United States were again acting in the name of humanitarianism. "What is now changing, in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, is sending the military to provide some relief directly. When the military gets a mission, it's awesome. They have orders, command, resources, planes. Others wouldn't do it as fast." \(^{154}\) The military was deployed so quickly that General Stackpole, attending a conference in Manila, was in Dhaka with his
advance party assessment team, via Okinawa, within 24 hours. As the assessment team flew in, they quickly realized that there was little in the way of doctrine for relief humanitarian operations. They took the available information on *Operation Provide Comfort* in northern Iraq, but found that it was not too applicable.\textsuperscript{155}

General Stackpole was essentially given one command: help them. "My orders were clear. I was to report to the U.S. Ambassador and provide humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, period. Nobody told me how to do it; no one gave any additional instructions. As a matter of fact, the lack of real-time intelligence was such that they really didn't know what we were standing into."\textsuperscript{156} Immediately after touching down in Dhaka, on May 13th, Stackpole's plan began to emerge according to the simple humanitarian intent he had been given. The advance party soon began to establish liaisons with the Bangladeshi government, the American embassy team, and the NGOs. After his initial survey of the disaster area, Stackpole decided upon a three-step plan, centered on the logistics of distribution, phased over a period of 30 days.

1. Immediate efforts to stabilize life-threatening situation (about one week)

2. Make limited efforts to restore infrastructure in manner that allowed for the Bangladeshi government to take full control of effort (about two weeks)

3. Prepare for U.S. withdrawal and actual assumption of responsibility by Bangladeshi government (about one week)

There were five essential elements to operationalizing this common understanding into an approach that provided all participants with a common sense. First and foremost, there was the clearly understood emphasis that the Bangladeshi government had to be in charge.

Because of the fragility of the existing government, Ambassador Milam and I talked . . . and decided . . . that we would continue to provide our technical expertise under the control of the sovereign nation of Bangladesh for this endeavor. We would support them, give them advice, and encourage them, but the final decisions would be theirs.\textsuperscript{157}
This deferential mindset respected the sovereign responsibility of Bangladesh, emboldened a newly elected government, and kept the military's mission limited to providing support to the humanitarian effort. (To be discussed later, such a purposeful and continuous effort inevitably set a democratic example of a military's relationship with its elected leaders). Stackpole, in light of Bangladesh's fragile democracy, even limited the presence of this humanitarian support. Never were there more than 500 American military personnel ashore each night. (Even the ships, for the most part, were kept over the horizon). This point cannot be overemphasized. The consequences of an application of "overwhelming force" in this situation could have been quite de-stabilizing.

The second element was continuum awareness. "The JTF commander realized that the three phases of the campaign were being culminated at different times. It was not possible to characterize the entire operation exactly into any given time." This point is a rather remarkable recognition when one considers that the military generally enjoys having standard templates and rules that can be applied across the board. In allowing for this type of awareness, Stackpole essentially said, 'I will provide the guidance, but it is up to you on the ground to determine what phase your particular sector is in.' In establishing this precedent, the military operator on the ground necessarily did not define his mission according to "so many bags of rice delivered" but according to the needs of his sector. Thus, from the military's own point of view, there were multiple continuums of effort in the country that could not possibly be gauged by one standard.

The next means by which this strategy was operationalized was to split the command between Dhaka, the capital, and Chittagong, the coastal city at the center of the damage. This strategy allowed the establishment of policy and general coordination at the national level, while allowing the implementors to do the final coordination in Chittagong. By May 17th, the JTF was headquartered at the old international airport, about a mile away from the Presidential Secretariat (the location of the Relief Activities and Coordination Monitoring Cell).

The fourth element of General Stackpole's guidance was to encourage the NGOs. "You must bring aid-giving agencies on board early. You must update them and anticipate future requests. There is
a natural distrust of the military because, in most countries where they operate, these aid-giving [NGOs] have been burned repeatedly by people in uniforms."\textsuperscript{160} This supportive attitude permeated the JTF. As Lieutenant Colonel Bill Norton, the deputy operations officer in Chittagong, remembers, "General Stackpole clearly stated that we were there to support the Bangladeshi government and NGOs in the relief effort."\textsuperscript{161}

The fifth aspect of Stackpole's plan was how the Americans handled and implemented themselves in the name of Bangladeshi directives. Perhaps the most delicate of matters, given the multiple and underlying tensions between and among all the agencies party to the relief effort, the de facto coordination leverage and power that the American military represented was obvious. Nothing was going to happen, Bangladeshi government officials in charge or not, without the accommodation and acceptance of the JTF. As one American officer declared "it was the logistics that provided the impetus for everyone to show up."\textsuperscript{162} Because the American military effort represented an outside force capable of solutions with no political ties to anyone, they quickly became the honest broker that could suggest impartial priorities. As Brigadier General Peter Rowe, 5th MEB commander states, the American infrastructure provided the "forum" and the "mediator."\textsuperscript{163}

This methodology of subdued presence and appropriate advice echoes the personality of the commander. Everyone agrees that Stackpole's presence was an essential ingredient to the mission's success. Robin Needham of CARE makes the tactical point that Stackpole was never "locked up behind his sentries," but rather, he was out and about "on the shop floor" with the men; something that made an impression on the more rigid Bangladeshi Army.\textsuperscript{164} At the operational level, Lieutenant Colonel Norton remembers clearly that Stackpole "ran things with a light touch," always providing enough guidance and minimal control. "Problems were not always solved the way you wanted them, but they were solved" in a supportive manner.\textsuperscript{165} Admiral Stephen Clary, commander of the amphibious task force carrying the 5th MEB, makes the strategic point that Stackpole "always felt it was not his objective to take over the place," as he avoided the "easy trap of self-aggrandizement."\textsuperscript{166} In short, he was engaged, understood the actual implementation, but he did not micro-manage.
These are important lessons for any JTF commander. As Ambassador Milam put it, Stackpole was the "epitome of the best officer to have in this type of situation." Or, as Mary Kilgour put it: a major reason for the success of the operation was the "high quality of Stackpole’s leadership; he was a sophisticated and subtle leader who was a good listener;' his style anticipated and removed antagonisms. When one recalls the multiple and overlapping complexities that existed prior to the JTF’s entrance onto the scene, and that the JTF did exactly what President Bush had told it to do in less than thirty days, it is hard to disagree.

Despite the plan put forth by the JTF commander in support of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, there remained the potential for conflict between the NGOs and the American military at the coordination level. This was not to be the case, in part because both parties accepted the logic and comparative value of the other.

On the part of the NGOs, CARE recognized that despite its size, it and other NGOs sometimes have an "inflated sense of our own logistic importance." Gerald Whitehouse of ADRA, too, recognized the need of the logistics, particularly the military's, because of the implied prioritization process inherent in a lift/transport scenario. The military is "impartial, because of the rational logistics component." In sum, "the military brings a little leadership and brokering. The NGOs will never have the organizational structure, command and control, the delivery, that we do."

Likewise, the military almost immediately recognized the innate strengths of the NGOs. Colonel Gary Anderson describes this awareness best in his observations seven months after the operation.

U.S. military personnel must learn to draw on these organizations as assets; we should not be too proud to request their advice and assistance. In Bangladesh, a synergistic relationship [emphasis added] developed in which both the military forces and the NGOs provided the talents they were each best suited to bring to the table. The NGOs had the advantage of a sound day-to-day knowledge of the area of operations, the trust of the locals at the village level, and years of experience in disaster relief operations; all of this can be invaluable in the initial assessment process as well as in actual operations.
The above points are made prior to the discussion of NGO/military interaction for two fundamental reasons. First, the research indicates that these generally reciprocal feelings were felt and recognized from the outset. And while some make note of competing "agendas" -- between and among the JTF, the NGOs, A.I.D., and the Bangladeshi government -- they were relatively benign in the face of the emergency. This second point, seemingly obvious, occasionally needs reiteration. One can never forget the "power of the moment," and the subliminal and unifying sense that everybody was "in it together." "Sure, people came with baggage, but we soon moved to mutual respect instead of being protective and defensive -- got beyond that in a hurry."¹⁷³

The NGO/U.S. military relationship that resulted in Dhaka was centered on the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). The Americans interfaced with the RACMC vis-à-vis a JTF and Embassy representative. The J-3, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Anderson, was usually the JTF representative at the RACMC meeting. The Embassy representative was an A.I.D. officer along with Lieutenant Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, a Civil Affairs officer.¹⁷⁴

Weck was the JTF liaison officer to the A.I.D. NGO coordination cell at the embassy (about five miles from Zia International Airport). This cell's basic function was to track information and to gather NGOs requests. These requests were then taken over by Colonel Weck to the Presidential Secretariat every morning, where they were prioritized. In some ways, this cell functioned as a strategic-CMOC in support of the RACMC. The cell kept track of all the relief efforts going on and served as a liaison to the decision-making body of the RACMC. The charts kept at the cell are indicative of the types of information they were tracking:¹⁷⁵

1. Deployment of Armed Forces
2. Stock, at a glance
3. Stock Position
4. Market Price of Food Grains
5. Map: storing place and ports
6. Shipping Schedule
7. Position of Ships

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8. Unloading Details
9. Food Movement Program
10. Internal Procurement
11. Map: situation map of affected areas
12. Relief Activities
13. Cash Allocated
14. Damage Report
15. Foreign Relief Arrivals

Yet, this cell was also fulfilling a normal function for A.I.D., whether or not the American military was there or not. Thus, to apply a hindsight label to its function is somewhat misleading. Suffice it to say, that the A.I.D. cell acted as a support mechanism for the RACMC as it forwarded NGO logistics requests for transport to Chittagong.

The RACMC, consisting of representatives from the senior agencies and organizations involved in the relief effort, met every morning at 0900. After some tea, General Shaffat would bring the meeting to order and discuss the prepared agenda. Essentially, General Shaffat, with the advice of those present, would decide on the priorities of need and then develop a general plan to meet those needs. The priorities were determined according to the various assessments presented -- from Bangladeshi, NGO, and American Special Forces sources.176 Emerging from this collective information was a comprehensive picture, as much as possible anyway, of the emergency situation and where the greatest needs were. These needs were then "married up" with the available transport.

A few examples from Colonel Jon Weck's personal notebook illustrate the various topics of these meetings.177

Friday, 17 May:  
NGO delivery of supplies to Zia Airport for transportation to Chittagong  
1) Who can authorize entry into Zia International Airport?  
2) What are the procedures?

Sunday, 19 May:  
ADAB will hire and organize labor force at hangar

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Wednesday, 22 May: 20 tons from government need to go out;
- CARE needs nine tons, 6 kilos x 2000 cartons delivered; will bring to gate 8 between 1200-1600
- 6 C-130 sorties to Chittagong today
- Bangladeshi Army identifies ponds to be pumped; CARE asked to give pond information in Chittagong area

These are the issues of humanitarian coordination. It was a process of identifying needs/problems and developing the solution/mechanism to solve it. Importantly, as will soon be discussed, the RACMC represented strategic awareness of the overall situation and a tactical discussion of how to move the assorted supplies to Chittagong. The RACMC did not provide directive guidance to the Chittagong effort because that effort was being run by the JTF forward command element.

The face of humanitarian coordination proved to be amicable. Robin Needham, the primary CARE representative as assistant country director, recalls that all parties "tried hard to be transparent." This effort is evident in the relationship between Needham and Anderson, the primary NGO/military interface at the Dhaka level.

Anderson, admittedly, came into the operation with a "U.S. in charge attitude." However, according to Stackpole's guidance, he quickly realized the delicate political situation, to include the tensions between the NGOs and the Bangladeshi government. In this sense, the U.S. had a definite role to play as "honest broker." Yet, this role did not mutually exclude the U.S. need to learn. Specifically, CARE provided Anderson, and therefore the JTF, with several pieces of advice.

The most important piece of advice concerned the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs). Wanting to help, and thinking it had the appropriate answers, the military wanted very much to bring these ROWPUs to bear on the emergency. The problem was threefold: 1) What happens when the military has to
take its ROWPUs back? 2) While the ROWPUs were running, did they not create dependency upon a system alien to the culture? 3) Even if the ROWPUs were left behind, was the technology appropriate to the people and long-term sustainment? Essentially, the ROWPU was a good idea but in the wrong context. Deployed in large numbers, the ROWPUs had the potential to soon exacerbate the situation. (Indeed, they might have even meant a longer U.S. military presence). Although a few were deployed, they were mostly kept out of the effort.

CARE also advised the JTF not to get involved in the burial of dead Bangladeshis. While the number of bodies was a health issue, it was first and foremost a cultural one that the Bangladeshis had to solve for themselves. Another lesson learned from CARE was its practice of making the healthy Bangladeshis work for food. This process encouraged an already disciplined people to move towards self-reliance.

Perhaps the most interesting advice that CARE provided was the role their protein power bars played as a measure of effectiveness. In a crisis such as the aftermath of "Marian," food is not as important as clean water and shelter. Consequently, the food-bridge to the time when regular staples can be distributed is the high protein power bar. When these protein bars began to show up on the black market as well as being used as a means to barter, CARE recognized that the first stage of the crisis was over. If the people could physically afford not to eat the bar and thus trade it, they were no longer in a life-threatening situation. It is measures of effectiveness like this one that signaled the end of Phase One and the transition to Phase Two.¹⁸¹

The type of relationship exhibited by Needham and Anderson demonstrates several emerging themes. First, as Colonel Robert Schoenhaus has stated, "NGOs are the most critical source of information. They tell you if you're meeting the mandate."¹⁸² Second, it is not "the rule of law, but the rule of personality." Moreover, it is at the common table that these personalities are brought together "eyeball to eyeball" as issues/events/problems are thrown out "right in front of God and everybody."¹⁸³ Thus, irrespective of members trying hard to be "transparent," transparency is guaranteed by multiple perspectives with their multiple information sources. While there will always be political sensitivities to an organization,
personality, or government, in this type of environment, a clear picture inevitably emerges as to the true state of things.

Finally, one point must be made clear regarding the CARE/J-3 illustration used: contrary to the common perception held by those in the military now, CARE did not represent, nor did it coordinate, the international NGOs in Bangladesh. "We didn't seek a coordinating role for CARE precisely because we were the biggest; if I had been a smaller player I would have resented [our] coordinating role... we didn't look for a coordinating role, we only sought to encourage, facilitate the coordination." 184

It is equally important to recognize why CARE came to be viewed as the coordinating NGO. First, Phil Johnson, the President of CARE, happened to be in country at the time and was present at General Stackpole's first meeting with the NGOs. His presence, as CEO of a globally recognized NGO like CARE, might have helped create the impression that the other NGOs would be coordinated by CARE. 185 Additionally, the American military found a distant cousin in CARE. Almost quasi-military, CARE has hardship tours, an established structure, and is used to bureaucracy. Because it is the most institutionalized of the NGOs, it was only natural that American military personnel viewed CARE as a kindred spirit. In the end, CARE was "primus inter pares" 186 because it was "only natural for CARE to take the leading part. CARE was the most cooperative of any NGO, and with their reputation, many of the smaller NGOs followed their example." 187

"The real coordination took place in Chittagong." 188 The relief effort in Chittagong was headed up by the forward command element of the JTF. "Plugging in" to this element were representatives from the Bangladeshi government, the 5th MEB coordination cell (collocated at the airport), the NGOs (national and international), and the various international helicopter components (the British, Pakistanis, and Japanese all contributed helicopters to the effort; the Army Blackhawks worked for the JTF). It was the JTF element's responsibility to coordinate the response.

Although people remember this coordination cell with different titles, the one that seems to work best is the Military Coordination Center (MCC). It was from the MCC that supplies were transported to Distribution Points (DPs) throughout the affected area. Linking the
DPs with the MCC and the various NGO/government warehouses were seventeen Marine communications teams that were primarily collocated at CARE sites.\(^{189}\)

In general, this structure performed as follows. Dhaka pushed the supplies down to Chittagong. Anywhere between six and eight C-130s came down daily with so many tons of the assorted supplies (mainly grain and rice). Once at Chittagong, these supplies were distributed according to the priorities that emerged from the MCC. Dhaka had no say in how this process was configured nor where the relief stuffs went. Dhaka only came into the picture to pass on pertinent information (i.e., "we heard about village "x" that still needs "y" amount of "z."). Dhaka also played the pivotal role of isolating Chittagong from the politics. If governor "a" of province "b" had a problem with the distribution system, it was handled at Dhaka. Isolated from the politics of relief, Chittagong was able to focus solely on the humanitarian intent of coordination and implementation.

The operations officer (J-3) of the JTF forward command, ran the all-important coordination meetings at the Patenga Airport Recruit Training School facility. Located at the Chittagong airport, this building had two floors. The first floor was used as a workplace for all the interested parties. The second floor was where the MCC meeting took place every morning at 0900. Captain Edward Anglim, USN (J-3), Lieutenant Colonel William Norton USMC (Deputy J-3), and Major Don Bloom, USA (Assistant Deputy J-3), were the men responsible for running this JTF meeting. (To be sure, there was a Bangladeshi representative, usually an Army major, at these meetings).\(^{190}\) Anglim, as the J-3 ran the meeting about 50% of the time; Norton about 40% and Bloom about 10%.\(^{191}\) Additionally, Anglim or Norton would run the meetings/watch during the day while Bloom was primarily responsible for the night watch.

The meetings were run according to one basic criteria: where was the dying? The highest mortality rates drove the priorities to be delivered. The reason behind a high mortality rate -- cholera, disease, or starvation -- therefore decided how much of what was delivered where and how fast. Each meeting began by examining that day's priorities, adjusting to what ever issue/problem had arisen since the last meeting. Next, the group looked to the upcoming two days as it tried to set up a tentative schedule according to the transportation
assets available (the helicopters, Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned (LCACs), and trucks all had mechanical problems at one time or another). During this process, the MCC was as flexible as possible, always adjusting to continually meet the top priorities. There was only one inflexible rule: if you were not on time for the helicopters, you were "bumped." The "birds" were too precious and expensive an asset to wait on someone.

This common sense approach, which resulted in a general agreement on priorities worked about 90-95% of the time. The question of course, and the test of the MCC's effectiveness, was how the remaining 5-10%, "open to debate" issues were resolved. Which brings us to the issue of personality, particularly the J-3's. "Anybody can look at the numbers, but that doesn't tell the story of what happened."" What happened," was that the two men most responsible for NGO coordination understood the conceptual and day-to-day approach to coordinating NGOs.

In dealing with the NGOs, Captain Anglim makes two fundamental conceptual observations. First, given the political context of a fledgling democracy (the Bangladeshis had to be making the decisions) and the context of several NGOs (all nominally deserving equal access to the U.S. infrastructure), the U.S. military leaders "did not want to appear in charge." Second, as a coordinator/consensus builder, one had to recognize that "every NGO was his own personality . . . [that] you must prove yourself to them individually . . . we saw them as individual customers." Norton complemented this attitude with his understanding of the "proving" process: "[1] if it made sense, we'd do it . . . [2] what I've done for the past twenty years may not be the right way . . . [3] you must try to persuade [the NGOs], recognizing that you have absolutely no control; that it's common sense, not because I tell you" . . . [4] make everyone happy, use common sense, no hard and fast rules." Norton was in this manner that Anglim, Norton, and Broom dealt with those grey areas where the common sense was not so readily recognized by all. When a problem arose -- say a mullah wanting to send out pots and pans or a NGO wanting to distribute its supplies -- the J-3 would reiterate the group's agreed on common sense. The next step was to consider the unofficial score of "close calls" (kept intuitively by the J-3). This procedure implicitly recognized the natural and competing agendas of the various NGOs. If the decision
as to which NGO got the last priority was a "toss-up" the J-3 would remember two facts: 1) which NGO had "won" the last "close call;" and 2) which NGO needed to "show;" i.e. who had to show their immediate or international headquarters that they were getting "their" stuff out.\(^\text{196}\)

This process was complemented by two key factors. First, there was the additional awareness of altruistic self-interest. "The NGO will work with whomever makes its job easiest; that is, you have to satisfy their self interest."\(^\text{197}\) If the military was not user-friendly, the NGOs would simply go out and do it on their own. But, it was also in the military's self interest to be user-friendly. The more NGOs leveraged into coordination by its logistical capability, the less duplication, the more coordinated and comprehensive the effort, the quicker the military went home.

Second, the atmosphere surrounding the meeting and the interaction between and among the NGOs and the military was very informal. The NGOs were essentially in the heart of the military's operations center and found it comfortable. Importantly, they were not interfacing with a liaison that took requests somewhere up the faceless "chain-of-command" and then came back with a "yes" or "no." The person telling the NGO "yes" or "no" was the same person that they were around all day, drinking coffee or sharing lunch, and had proven that the military could be user-friendly.\(^\text{198}\) It is much harder to develop animosity when the common sense logic of the prioritization process is recognized by all and coming from someone that people respect. "I know it sounds like a love-in, but no one was saying I'm more important than you."\(^\text{199}\)

It was this type of environment, at the last point of coordination before implementation that ensured the success of *Operation Sea Angel*.

**CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS**

The primary issue in *Operation Sea Angel* was sovereignty. While there were political tensions, most Bangladeshis realized that the U.S. military was just there to help. Yet, the manner in which the help was presented was absolutely critical. This appropriate methodology was the essential contribution of Stackpole. Taking a
step back, consider the backdrop of a newly elected Bangladeshi government which was not faring well in its attempt to deal with the aftermath of "Marian." In comes an outside military force that was going to provide something that the host nation could not provide for its own people. Throughout the administering of aid, the military commander makes explicitly clear his subordination to his ambassador and to the leader of the host nation. All in the face of an obvious fact: it was the American military that enabled the relief effort.

Colonel Anderson makes a very interesting analogy:

The point here is that the management of humanitarian relief operations is very similar to counterinsurgency operations in that they require that the host nation be the leading actor if they are expected to truly assist the national government in achieving the short term objective of treating the symptom. In both cases, the ultimate objective is to reinforce the confidence of the host nation population in the ability of the national leadership to govern effectively. In so doing, U.S. forces must walk a fine line between mission accomplishment and the danger of creating unrealistic expectations among the local population. The reminder of the Hippocratic Oath "to do no harm" is operable here.

This logic suggests several key ideas. First that the center of gravity were the people themselves. Second, that the immediate disaster is a symptom and that reinforcing a functioning government is the first step towards the stabilization of the larger issues/problems behind the crisis at hand. Third, given the short duration of the American military deployment, a conscious effort must be made to recognize the continuum of effort: to help but not to create dependency and false expectations. And fourth, that given this continuum, the most basic goal, must be to do no harm. These ideas will resurface in the following case studies.

This type of effort and understanding, however, had to have had an impact on the Bangladeshi military and government. The world's mightiest army returning from its greatest triumph in over forty years and it was bending over backwards to be subordinate in a country that arguably had little to nothing to do with its national security. As Brigadier General West summed up, "it was a classic swords into plowshares operation."
But, perhaps, it did have something to do with national security. General Rowe remarks that the greatest contribution the JTF made was the example it set for the newly elected government and its people. Every day "we showed them how you can sit around with different people with different agendas and how it can work."\(^{202}\) Given the previous tensions, the different agendas -- or the perception of such -- were obvious to those who lived in Bangladesh. Yet, everything was discussed right there in front of everyone as a decision was reached. In setting an example that was consciously subordinate while seeking to include all in the coordination process, the intangible impact of the U.S. example grows. When combined with the acute effort to have such a small physical impact, the genius of Stackpole's operationalizing a common understanding of the problem at hand into an effective response shines bright. It is hard to argue that such an example does not contribute to the United States' national security.\(^{203}\)

The second point is that the U.S. military was not in charge. It supported and enabled the effort. It never assumed, nor wanted, leadership. Moreover, it only did reconstruction of infrastructure in support of its limited mission.\(^{204}\) "We never had any intent to restore the infrastructure; that is not a task for the military. It is something for the international community to do."\(^{205}\)

The support mindset was always present in such a way that it did not have the military operating outside its expertise; thus, continuum awareness emerges as the next point. Stackpole kept his force focused, always supporting, but never crossing the line into long-term infrastructure projects. His means of achieving this conceptual end-state was rather basic: he repeated it again and again and again. "We didn't create false expectations, as happens all too often in operations of this nature. We clearly stated what we intended to do and kept stating it over and over again. Therefore, they were prepared, as much as possible, to take over upon our departure."\(^{206}\)

This point warrants further discussion. It is only by clearly delineating the parameters of one's effort that, paradoxically, one is enabled to achieve one's goals. (CARE's example in northern Iraq comes to mind). If every interested party acutely understands the limits of the other participants, a working framework will present itself. Of course, there are two caveats. First, that each member must consistently repeat its mission to the other participants. Moreover, there is the assumption that the limits each party assumes is in
response to a common understanding of the nature of the problem and that their limits are appropriate. The point remains, however, that it is better to be consistently clear and wrong, than to be ambiguous, create false expectations, and to still be wrong.

The first strategic observation concerns the absence of traditional humanitarian emergency players. The UN was not involved in any form apart from UNICEF's decontamination of water supplies. OFDA was not involved either. Similarly, because the scope of the disaster could be addressed from essentially two places, Dhaka and Chittagong (Chittagong supported the Cox's Bazar effort), the response was more easily controlled and coordinated between and among the Bangladeshi government, the U.S. forces, and the NGOs. The simple conclusion is that the fewer players and locations, the more likely effective coordination is.

Another strategic lesson is the hidden third member of humanitarian emergencies: the people being helped. This observation is not so much about the government as it is about the people themselves. Most interviewed talk of the "resilience" and "self-discipline" of the Bangladeshi people. Throughout the effort, there was never "a breakdown of order" or any security threat whatsoever. When working in an environment of desolation with a people who hold their head high, the response effort inevitably draws energy from their example. Mutual respect becomes the modus operandi. This point assumes great importance. If the provider/enabler does not feel appreciated, nor does he respect the people he is helping, the cohesion of the overall effort cannot help but be affected. General West, who spent most of his days flying and thus had the most interaction with the Bangladeshis and Marines helping them, said simply, "the Marines wanted to be there; they saw the situation -- you would have to have a tremendously cold heart not to want to help." While refraining from a "people are people" argument, the power of the moment can be overwhelming; even more so when helper and helped appreciate one another.

It is this type of intangible that directly affects the cohesion of an effort. In many ways, it is the strongest force multiplier there is. If the people being helped, feel appreciated in a non-patronizing way and actively seek to engage and support their helpers, the synergy that results is a powerful momentum. Importantly, if this mutual appreciation continues, the more likely the population being helped
is to contribute to the effort. Dependency is less likely when the rapport between helped and helper is one of respect.

At the operational level, the issue of comparative advantage again makes its case. "Each key actor brought a critical element to the table. A summary of these follows:

- The elected civil government had the legitimacy and had to be seen as the primary agent in the operation from the Bangladeshi perspective.
- The Bangladesh Army had the ability to provide civil order at the distribution sites.
- The civil bureaucracy controlled the surplus grain in government granaries.
- The NGOs had the majority of relief supplies, to include the ubiquitous CARE packages, needed to stabilize the immediate situation. They also had personnel with years of experience in dealing with such disasters."

It was the U.S. military's job to enable the tools already in place. By focusing on the logistics of distribution, while being aware of the above comparative advantages but not becoming intimately involved in them, the American force satisfied all participants, including itself. The help was provided with a genuinely supportive and subordinate attitude as it remained explicitly clear that the JTF would be leaving as soon as its enabling effort was complete.

Regarding the NGO relationship, Colonel Anderson's point of developing and nurturing a "synergistic relationship" remains imperative. Certainly, it is the U.S. logistics that make the response possible. But if it had been in a way that was not supportive, not user-friendly, it is almost guaranteed that the NGOs would have walked away and gone about their business as if the military was not even there. "The bottom line is we had the transports and they didn't. But, we leave out the NGOs at our own peril -- they will be there whether we like it or not, and we must deal with them positively."

One other operational point needs mentioning. Every day, the helicopters and LCACs (Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned) would come ashore from the ships to help. Every day, they would return back to
the ships. The ability to daily install an infrastructure and then to remove it as to reduce its impact on the very fragile local infrastructure is a unique ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This "sea-based" notion of support, furthermore, did not exacerbate any of the existing political tensions ashore. Thus the physical capacity to do so, plus the political utility of such a methodology, ensured that neither the local infrastructure or fragile democracy was burdened by the "overwhelming force" of the United States military. There is no doubt that this concept will be used again in support of a humanitarian operation.

At the tactical level, several basic lessons of coordination are clear. First, we are again confronted with two cultural organizations stripped of the chance to be themselves. In the face of a catastrophic disaster, both the military and the NGO could not have behaved according to their organizational culture, even if they had wanted to. On the one hand, the military was deployed literally overnight. There was no time to gather the "right" people or build a team; III MEF took the team it had and worked from there. Once in-country, Stackpole, keeping the physical and political "footprint" small while ensuring that the mission stay focused. The military had no chance to build its stovepipes, to include such institutional roles as the CMOC.

As a result, the military's appointed means for civilian interface, Civil Affairs and their coordination point, the CMOC, did not play a significant role. When they were deployed, they were deployed almost haphazardly, in two ten day stints (although some stayed for the entire five weeks of the operation). In an effort of short duration, there must be continuity, otherwise such a deployment prevents cohesion and becomes disconnecting. Thus, conceptually and tactically misapplied, the Civil Affairs skills "did not have a chance to manifest themselves."212 Although making significant contributions individually, the Civil Affairs personnel were just staff officers.

Additionally, the CMOC, as a designated title, did not occur. When one reviews the facts however, the Military Coordination Center in Chittagong emerges as a sister to the Provide Comfort CMOC: a true operations center whereby the military and NGO worked side-by-side. Indeed, the NGOs as an integral part of the "Ops" center may be necessary in some cases.213
On the other hand, the NGOs did not behave according to their organizational stereotype either. Recognizing the common sense of the logistics, not to mention that they had no transport themselves to the outer-islands, the NGOs joined the response willingly and cordially. As long as there was a user-friendly face to the coordination process, the NGOs were game. Besides, why pay for or develop transport when someone is going to do it for free? (Particularly when there were limited funds coming in from the U.S. and the international community). The organizational autonomy and insular mindset was mostly abandoned in order to meet the need.

This discussion of uncharacteristic behavior reflects three more basic coordination lessons from Bangladesh. The principle of altruistic self-interest rings loud and clear. In both Dhaka and Chittagong, members of both communities were receiving something in exchange for their services. The military offered infrastructure and logistics and asked for expertise and coordination in return. The NGOs offered their knowledge, expertise, and supplies and asked for transport in return. Thus, there was an explicit understanding between the two communities, even if such a recognition were left implicit as Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guided the exchange of humanitarian goods.

Furthermore, the "invisible hand" derived its diaphanous state from the transparency of the meetings. Because there were so many sources of information presented before all the participating parties, it was relatively easy to arrive at a common sense agenda for the next day or so. Thus, if a representative was inclined to push his/her agenda, the group would recognize that process for what it was.

This transparency, of course, was also the direct result of the personalities involved. Needham, Norton, Anglim, and Anderson, for example, all made sincere efforts to encourage impartiality while accepting the existence of different agendas as natural.

Individual service members must also be prepared to be extremely flexible in dealing with individual NGO workers. Perhaps by definition, the individuals who gravitate to that profession are more likely to be people more prone to the Peace Corps than the Marine Corps. [This observation based on a long-time A.I.D. official to Anderson]. They will generally be more prone to seek consensus than the average military man or woman, and they will not understand military institutional cultural norms any more easily than service members will understand theirs. This can lead to
friction unless both sides make a determined attempt to overcome such prejudices in order to help save lives. The *SEA ANGEL* operation worked well in this context because both sides realized the gravity of the situation and placed considerable emphasis on harmonious relationships.\textsuperscript{214}

What this insightful observation suggests is that it is people who make up emergency responses, not organizations or cultures. It is people who are living in a powerful moment as they spend a great deal of time with one another. Importantly, it is people not necessarily worried about credit.\textsuperscript{215}

The standard for military and NGO alike at the level of implementation is Ambassador Milam's description of Colonel Anderson's contribution: "he was very effective -- he made himself invisible."\textsuperscript{216} It would seem that for an operation to be successful, the invisible hand of altruistic self interest must not only demand transparency at the group coordination level, but from the individual as well.

**OPERATION SEA ANGEL**

**COLLABORATION/COORDINATION PRINCIPLES**

1. The military cannot be in charge. It would have been very easy for the JTF commander as the expert on the deployment of his forces to run roughshod, in a manner of speaking, over the ambassador and host nation. After all, they generally will not know about the capacities of a JTF. By going out of his way to clearly subordinate himself to civilian authority, Stackpole accomplished three things.

   a. A democratic example was set for the Bangladeshi army and government. These types of operations are therefore in the national interest.

   b. By keeping the "footprint" to an absolute minimum, pursuant to the political sensitivities of the young government, the military had no opportunity to build its stovepipe.
c. By operating within an established infrastructure, the force was free to leave once its goals had been met. If the military had been in charge, a democratic example would not have been set; an appropriate infrastructure would not have been established; and departure would predicated have been upon the complete resolution of the disaster.

2. Repeat your intentions over and over again. Do everything possible to prevent false expectations. By clearly stating his limited objective again and again -- based on humanitarian need -- Stackpole paradoxically increased his maneuver room. Because everyone understood exactly what the U.S. force was there to accomplish, there were no false expectations as to the duration or purpose of the JTF. By definition, this clear statement of the JTF, as the most influential component in the relief effort, allowed the other components to gauge their own contributions in a sustained effort that would continue after the departure of the JTF.

3. Even in such a seemingly "simple" operation, there will be a political dimension. Remember that it was Stackpole who created and defined this mission/policy on-the-ground (not anyone higher or Washington). He was also savvy enough to realize the political dimension and address it in Dhaka, isolating it from the humanitarian effort in Chittagong.

4. The humanitarian intent remained primary and drove the operation. Once isolated from the political dimension, the MCC determined its priorities according to where the most dying was.

5. The fewer players involved the better (in this case, it was three: the Bangladeshi government, the U.S. military, and the NGO community). An obvious statement, the lesson hinted at here is that the more players, the harder it will be to arrive at a common understanding of the nature of the problem and then translate it into a common sense approach that permeates the effort.
6. There must be an awareness of comparative advantage within the continuum of effort. The military is good for instantaneous infrastructure and the coordination leverage inherent therein. NGOs provide knowledge, expertise, and the transition. They were there before the military, they will resume again after the military leaves. While the two are in each other's presence, both sides, particularly the individuals at the coordination and implementation levels, must encourage and foster a "synergistic relationship." Indeed, it could very well be that this synergy results from a situation that inherently prevents both communities from behaving as they would in "normal" circumstances.

7. The invisible intangibles of interaction, or, perhaps, the holy trinity of humanitarian coordination between the military and the NGOs is also apparent.

a. Altruistic self-interest. The "invisible hand" of self-interest ensures that both parties are rewarded in the coordination process. While various agencies and organizations come together for the same nominal purpose, each comes with different motivations and interests. In the name of the common purpose, there are trade-offs between and among the interests represented. The relationship between the U.S. military and the NGOs must be mutually beneficial.

b. Transparency. Coordination meetings must be conducted with as many surveyors of the same reality as possible. This prevents "agendas," no matter how benign, from taking priority over the common sense of the response effort. Participants should work to encourage it.
c. Invisible personalities. For the most part, the people responsible for representing their institution/organization must work to keep themselves "behind-the-scenes." It is only in this manner that true coordination can take place. Importantly, this style implies that those coordinating cannot be looking for credit. The credit must go to whomever assumes overall responsibility once the military leaves. In so doing, both the military and NGO are allowed to return to the purposes for which they were designed.

8. Finally, the primary structural interface was a military operations center. There was no liaison to a faceless higher headquarters: problems were solved there between those responsible for the effort. This collocation decisively increased the cohesion of the effort. Not only were decisions made in front of everyone, they were agreed to by people who, after spending so much time together, knew each other as people -- not as designated positions of an institutional infrastructure.
CHAPTER FOUR
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Somalia. The very word remains a touchstone of emotion for those who participated in the United Nations sponsored humanitarian intervention that took place there from December, 1992, to March, 1995. Because the overall intervention -- to include its various stages -- was so much longer than the relatively short duration of the other case studies, it is impossible to isolate the events of the first thirty days from the rest of the experience. Whereas it is possible to soon envision the end of U.S. military involvement after the first thirty to sixty days of the previous interventions, that is not the case in Somalia. Consequently, this account takes a somewhat different and thematic approach, focusing only on the UNITAF period (December, 1992-May, 1993). First, due to the sheer complexity of the situation, much more attention is given to the political context and the emergency situation. Moreover, the discussion will focus purely on the HOC/CMOC in Mogadishu itself. It is here that there was the most consternation between the two communities and therefore where there are the most lessons to be learned. Finally, this chapter will discuss three basic concepts in its attempt to understand the NGO/military relationship in Mogadishu. These three areas -- the tangible/intangible distance between the HOC/CMOC and UNITAF; security and disarmament; and the lack of a humanitarian strategy -- were all evident from the very beginning of the intervention.

In response to an increasing American and international public opinion that demanded reaction to the man-made Somali famine, the United States, with United Nations blessing, took action. On December 9, 1992, the United States Marines -- the initial instrument chosen to conduct the policy of intervention -- came ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia. Quickly moving to establish an expeditionary infrastructure that would facilitate security and the delivery of food to starving Somalis, the Marines established a Civil Military Operations Center on December 11th. Collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center, the U.N.'s humanitarian coordination cell, the CMOC would be the national focal point of NGO/U.S. military coordination.
While the actual impact of the intervention is very hard to judge systematically, the following statistics have been suggested for the period 1991-1993 (March). Of a Somali population of 5.1 million during this time, approximately four million lived in "famine-afflicted regions," mostly in the south. Of the four million, 330,000 were at imminent risk of death; of these people, 110,000 deaths were averted due to "health, food, and other interventions" over this two year period. "Of the 202-238,000 famine related deaths that did occur in 1992, at least 70 percent (154,000) could have been prevented, had proven primary health strategies been implemented earlier and more widely."

According to this analysis it is, therefore, hard to ascertain exactly how many lives the military intervention itself saved. Also according to this analysis, however, it is impossible to say how many more would have died had the intervention not taken place. Suffice it to say that the military intervention, under the political leadership of Presidential Envoy Robert B. Oakley, was a humanitarian success. Indeed, every participant interviewed did not hesitate to state that Operation Restore Hope was a humanitarian success.

This study characterizes the UNITAF experience as an impressive short-term success. It is an impressive success in that it achieved its basic aims despite the dynamics of the political context and the emergency situation in which it was conducted. It is a short-term success, however, because the political complexity of Somalia was not acknowledged at the strategic policy level. (This absence of political resolve would reap grim results during the second phase, UNOSOM II). As a result, the unrealistically limited U.S. mandate of "humanitarianism" prevented all intervenors from taking the steps necessary to create the condition for longer term Somali rehabilitation and restoration. The fact that so many political issues were addressed is a tribute to all the operators in Somalia -- from Oakley down. In many ways, those in Somalia were not only hamstrung by the mandate, they were left hanging without the imperative political resolve and resources to address the issues that demanded attention.

It is this failure to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation at the highest policy levels that permeates the entire effort, to include the NGO/military relationship and its more contentious conversations. First and foremost, this failure manifested itself in the
U.S. soldiers deliver relief supplies provided by Australia in Somalia.

*Department of Defense, Joint Camera Center.*
disarmament issue. The disarmament issue would remain intractable as long as there was an absence of stateside political will.

Also related to a lack of senior political decisiveness is the ultimate irony of Somalia: that a humanitarian intervention did not have a humanitarian strategy. While various ideas and strategies existed, none was accepted by everyone as a common or shared approach to the situation. There was no concept at the HOC as to where the humanitarian community wanted Somalia to be in three or six months. Of course, this is, in part, the direct result of the fact that the Somalis themselves could not present a united strategy because they were so factionalized. Also, Somalis were sometimes not allowed to participate because the interests of the warlords were served by continued anarchy. Ultimately, however, a truly comprehensive humanitarian strategy would have to be integrated among the other socio-economic plans that must be a part of stabilizing a society: something inherently political.

Without a political will that acknowledged the existence of these necessary strategies and their need to be integrated, under the broad umbrella of a political vision, the entire effort was reduced to one of ad hoc, tactical attempts to treat symptoms of deeper-rooted problems. As Ambassador Oakley himself has stated, "we were reduced to trying locally." 219

Finally, the overall UNITAF effort ultimately must be viewed from the following perspective: nothing had ever been attempted on that scale in a political and emergency environment so complex. Most were thrown into the endeavor with little knowledge or personal experience with past humanitarian interventions. Everyone was dealing with a situation whose sheer size and complexity still boggles the mind. Although short-term in its impact, the effort nonetheless remains impressive.

On January 5, 1991, U.S. Marines evacuated the American embassy in Somalia. As the helicopters pulled away, leaving behind a recently renovated $35 million dollar embassy, their passengers also included the Soviet ambassador and his staff.

In telling symbolism that the Cold War was over, Americans and Soviets together left behind a country that, at one time or another, they had both supported against the other. No longer in need of this proxy state, both superpowers left it to its own devices.
Somalia police assisted by international military personnel provide security at a food distribution site. *U.S. Army Military History Institute.*
Armed to the teeth after nineteen years of military support by the United States and the Soviet Union, Somalia would not fair well. The state had begun to disintegrate in 1988 when all American aid had been withdrawn. Previously empowered by a constant flow of military aid, Siad Barre, who had ruled Somalia since his coup in 1969, no longer had the means to maintain his support base. In fact, his policy of keeping the various clans divided against each other finally came home to roost as insurgents in the north established bases inside Somalia itself in 1988. It was Siad Barre's brutal campaign against these northern bases that caused the U.S. to renounce its aid as the Cold War waned.

Overthrown by the insurgents in January 1991, Siad Barre fled to the Kenya border as Somalia descended into anarchy. Most of the fighting between and among the various clan alliances took place between the Shebelle River and the Juba River (roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayu to the south) during the first six months of 1991. (Sporadic fighting continues to the present day). This fighting, exacerbated by a continuing drought, created the famine that would not become familiar to the West until a year later. With continuous warfare for six months, the entire agricultural system was destroyed: from the fields themselves to the production, distribution, and market systems. Also, as many as a million people were displaced during this period, seeking refuge in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia's major cities. Moreover, the capital itself, Mogadishu, became separated between the forces of Ali Mahdi Mohamed (a former Somali businessman) in the north and the forces of General Mohamed Farah Aidid in the southern portion of the city.

With the growth of the famine, whoever had food had power. With no economy to speak of and an environment where one had to carry a gun for both survival and income, the looting and/or extortion of NGO shipments of food became routine. "Stealing had become a way of life with an entire economic system built around it."221

In the meantime, NGOs, professional humanitarians, had hired Somali gunmen to protect them and the delivery of food. It was very much a moral dilemma: accept 50% food losses and the fact that the food itself, if not the hiring of gunmen, was exacerbating the situation or continue to feed the needy. As one senior NGO official stated, NGOs were "damned if they didn't [hire guards] and damned if they didn't [provide food]."222
Pakistaní troops rush a stricken Somalia to medical care. *U.S. Army Military Institute.*
It was in response to this environment, and heavy media-play in the West, that the U.S. first responded in August, 1992, with an airlift out of Mombasa, Kenya. As attention of the press continued and with the acknowledgment that the airlift was probably providing only 10% of the necessary aid (and that the aid given could not be fully monitored to the end-user, *i.e.*, to Somali families or warlords), the calls for some sort of intervention began to get louder. These cries culminated in the month of November -- just after the Presidential election. By late November, President Bush, a lame-duck, had decided to intervene. Importantly, his decision was based, in part, on a letter from Interaction, an umbrella organization for humanitarian NGOs, with a number of member signatures calling for assistance in response to the desperate security situation. Never before had NGOs had this type of impact at the national policy level.

Recognizing the overall situation for what it was, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell sought a civilian leader to complement the military operation's commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnson. Soon, former Ambassador to Somalia Robert B. Oakley was appointed as the President's Special Envoy.

In sum, Somalia had been stricken with a man-made famine and was racked by clan rivalry and random banditry. Food had become the source of power, and, as a result, was not getting to the people who needed it most. The NGOs, caught in a moral quandary, had chosen to accept 50% food loss, hire armed guards, and, for the most part, called for some type of intervention. Despite General Powell's advocacy and the appointment of a political leader in a complex humanitarian situation, Oakley would still be forced to act within the narrow mandate of a humanitarian operation. In the meantime, the Executive Branch was about to go into a lengthy transition as a domestically focused Clinton Administration occupied the White House.

If there was any general understanding of the nature of the emergency in Somalia, it was that the famine required safely delivered food to Mogadishu and Baidoa. This understanding did not, however, reflect the complexities of the situation. The result was the misidentification of the problem and therefore the solution.
At the same time that they are supporting humanitarian relief efforts, the military often has other assigned tasks, for instance, inspecting impounded weapons.

*U.S. Military Institute*
The confusion and/or complexity begins with the debate on whether or not the famine truly existed at the time of the intervention. Although different end-points are offered, most humanitarians agree that the famine had broken by September/October of 1992. There is also debate regarding the measures applied to the famine and its related problems. In the Refugee Policy Group's analysis, the "third wave" of the famine came between July and mid-October, 1992. This wave witnessed measles, diarrhea, and malaria sweeping through the already malnourished. What this analysis suggests is that it was not so much food that was needed, but a systematic and basic public health plan. If action is to be taken in the name of humanitarianism, the humanitarian solution itself must be examined carefully -- it is not always as simple as "food."

These issues also reflect the power of the Western media. Pictures do not lie; there were starving thousands. These pictures, however, inadvertently contributed to the understanding that the solution was simply a matter of food. It was this perceived solution that seemingly dominated the highest levels as the need for a sophisticated and comprehensive response was largely ignored. Indeed, the humanitarian experts themselves were not included in the senior decision-making meetings about Somalia. The nature of the problem thus became understood as not enough food and not enough security to deliver the food. Yet there were those who recognized Somalia's complexity from the beginning and offered a nuanced response as well.

Andrew Natsios, more than anyone else -- as director of OFDA and then as the Assistant A.I.D. Administrator for the Food and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau and as President Bush's Emergency Coordinator for Somalia -- brought the Somali famine to the attention of Washington D.C. and the American public. At an August 18th State Department Briefing, in conjunction with announcing the U.S. military's airlift into southern Somalia, Natsios laid out a pragmatic and sophisticated approach that was not simply a "do something" crusade.

I should note that no relief strategy will be successful in ending hunger-related deaths in Somalia unless fundamental security problems are addressed. Elements of the United States government's humanitarian strategy can contribute to reducing tensions. However, Somali leaders themselves are ultimately responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands
of their fellow Somalis... [he goes on to stress the three goals of a humanitarian strategy to be pursued by the DART team that would soon be working in Somalia]

1. A large-scale monetization of food to drive down and stabilize prices;

2. Decentralization of the relief effort to move people out of insecure and unstable cities to more secure areas;

3. Development of programs funded with the local currency generated from the sale of food to accelerate rehabilitation activities, particularly in livestock and the agricultural sectors, which are critical to long-term food security.230

Seemingly, here was the framework of a plan. Security was fundamental, and ultimately the responsibility of the Somali leaders. Moreover, there was no denying the need for a comprehensive approach. Unfortunately, this plan would increasingly be ignored as DOD and the NSC reduced the problem to not enough food and not enough security for food delivery, and as more international players became involved who would not subject themselves to such a strategy.

In contrast to northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the military's mission statement was not left to a simple humanitarian intent. Instead, the mission statement slowly evolved from a humanitarian effort supported by military forces to something that came fourth after three military concerns. Indeed, what had been initially implied as a mutually supporting use of comparative advantage became an artificially delineated separation between military and humanitarian efforts. The unintended result was that a mission statement narrowly defined in the interest of a clear and achievable end-state ultimately confused everyone, including the military.

On December 3rd, U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 authorized the U.S. led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible."

On December 6th, Secretary of Defense Cheney said on Meet the Press that "our mission is to restore conditions so that the humanitarian effort can go forward, and then to turn over responsibility for securing the country to UN forces."231
On December 17th, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen stated that the "United States is leading a coalition of forces under UN auspices to establish a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia. Our mission is clear, it is defined, and it is doable . . ."\(^{232}\)

At that same testimony, James Woods, the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for African Affairs defined the American mission as follows:

\[\ldots\] to conduct joint and combine military operations in Somalia under UN auspices to secure major air and sea ports, ground routes, and major relief centers; to provide a secure environment; to disarm as necessary forces which interfere with humanitarian relief operations, and to protect and assist UN and non-governmental humanitarian relief operations . . . U.S. forces will remain until they fulfill their mission: the establishment of a secure environment so that [the] peacekeeping operation can sustain the humanitarian effort. Meanwhile, private voluntary organizations will continue distributing humanitarian aid. The purpose of our coalition efforts is to permit them to operate in a more secure and safe environment.\(^{233}\)

On January 1, 1993, in Baidoa, Somalia, President Bush articulated the American mission to those present at the orphanage he was visiting.

So I think in the new administration you'll find people who are understanding of and appreciative of the mission here. And beyond that, I cannot really go, because you know our mission is limited. It's not to stay forever, and it is not to totally disarm this country. So we've spelled it out, in accordance with the U.N. -- in accordance with the U.N. resolutions, and we will do exactly what I said -- told the American people we'd do. We'd come in, we'd make -- we'd make the peace, we'd get the humanitarian aid flowing, and then our people go home.\(^{234}\)

As one progresses through the various enunciations of the American mission, from prepared statements to conversational responses, the connection between security and its humanitarian purpose begins to fade. President Bush's statement is very ambiguous. It suggests that the presence of U.S. troops would make the peace. After that, the humanitarian flow would result. There does not seem to be a conceptual bridge between the two ideas.
Indeed, the military's actual mission seems remote from the U.N. mandate and Secretary Cheney's description of the U.S. purpose. According to the Department of Defense, the military's mission/objectives were to:

1. secure major air and sea ports;

2. to provide open and free passage of relief supplies;

3. to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations; and

4. to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.\(^{235}\)

Moreover, the fourth element was added as a permissive objective for the JTF commander so that he could assist as he thought appropriate.\(^{236}\)

As Jonathan Dworken has argued, this mission statement reflected the JTF's perspective on an "ideal division of labor:"

The [military] would create a secure environment in which to deliver supplies by protecting the HRO [Humanitarian Relief Organization] distribution system, from the ports and airfields where the supplies entered the country, to the road networks over which the supplies moved to distribution points. The [NGOs] would get the supplies in country, transport them overland, and distribute them.\(^{237}\)

This well-articulated thought begins to point to an almost imperceptible fault line in the NGO/military relationship: 1) that security is necessarily the only condition for humanitarian work; 2) that, in this particular situation, the labor of security can, or should, be divided away from the labor of relief. In short, that there was a military job to do and that the humanitarian stuff would take care of itself.

Of course, the first three points of the military's mission statement are implicitly in support of the entire humanitarian relief effort. There is nothing in the statement, however, that indicates a guiding humanitarian intent or strategy that is supported by the military. By comparison, the mission statements of the first two case studies may have been much more simple but they left no doubt that the overarching goal was humanitarian.
Finally, some have argued that this mission statement as such conveyed the true political mission of the military: take as few casualties as possible and do something humanitarian in the meantime. Indeed, Dr. Ken Menkhaus has argued that despite the rhetoric of good intentions the "main consideration was minimizing casualties," as evidenced by Ambassador Oakley's political interaction, primarily with Aideed. Menkhaus suggests that while Oakley may never have been given the orders, it was this concern that drove U.S. actions.²³⁸

Thus, the mission statement and its wording is important, and is capable of several interpretations. What is evident is that even before the intervention began, there was already a gap between humanitarian end and military means.

Before considering the response structure that finally developed after December 9th, we must examine some additional considerations that could have made the intervention a smoother process. To begin with, there were the lessons of Operation Provide Relief. This effort was an airlift of relief supplies into southern Somalia that began in mid-August and continued until mid-December. Run out of Mombasa, Kenya, it involved the close collaboration of the DART and the American military.

Commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, USMC, the American contingent worked in direct support of the humanitarian intent: getting the food to the airstrips. Cognizant of his supportive role, Libutti pointed out at the time that issues of food distribution were "outside my foxhole."

²³⁹ Indeed, the military "did not try to overstep the bounds of its mandate," essentially acting as a "flying firm" in a logistics operation.²⁴⁰ What resulted was a mutual understanding of comparative advantage.

Every morning at 0800, the DART met to discuss the technicalities of what needed to be lifted, review NGO information received since the last meeting, and consider any other issues. Later that afternoon, a DART representative would attend Libutti's staff meeting. Although not called a CMOC (or anything other than a staff meeting), this meeting, for all intents and purposes, was the CMOC. Recognizing that they did not have the "skills to evaluate and validate and prioritize distribution,"²⁴¹ the military determined their mission
according to the input of the DART. This relationship proved to be very healthy. It is worth noting some indicators of success.

First, there was a clearly delineated intent: get food to the Somali airstrips. As a result, each community -- represented solely by the DART on one side and the military staff on the other -- operated according to their comparative advantage. The military stuck to logistics in support of the humanitarian intent, the DART provided the necessary expertise to prioritize the air missions. NGOs operating in Somalia were represented by radio-sent information to the DART in Mombasa. This information provided humanitarian "intel" on the situation as well as airfield conditions and capacity reports.²⁴²

Second, humanitarian decisions were made cooperatively, at the same table. As in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the coordination of the two communities took place at one focal point. General Libutti's staff meeting was very much an operations center whereby the DART, as a clearinghouse for NGO information, provided the ends as the military provided the means. Working hand-in-hand meant a true understanding of comparative advantage.

Prior to all the media attention in the summer of 1992, just a few NGOs had remained in Somalia through the very worst of the anarchy. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Doctors Without Borders/France (MSF), the International Medical Corps (IMC), World Concern, Save the Children (UK), and SOS (an Austrian NGO) were among the very brave few (the U.N. had left). As a result, these stout-hearted humanitarians were not just the only Western source of information on Somalia, they also represented the most up-to-date information on the overall humanitarian emergency. They were not in any way utilized prior to the intervention.²⁴³

"During the planning phase for the deployment, there was no contact at the operational level [the First Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit around which the JTF was established] with representatives of the humanitarian organizations working in Somalia."²⁴⁴ The actual Marines who came ashore on December 9th, were merely given a list of NGOs in the area.²⁴⁵ Their first priority, in any case, would be establishing a secure area. For an operation defined as humanitarian, and in support of those who knew the situation best, the NGOs were conspicuously left out of the equation.
By the end of January, 1991, the Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for Somalia (INCS) had been formed in Nairobi, Kenya. On February 5, 1991, it agreed upon the following statement of purpose:

1. To establish open, clear and effective communication between Somali authorities and NGOs;

2. To coordinate resources and programs of agencies working in the same areas of relief, to assure maximum effectiveness thereby eliminating conflicts of efforts and duplication of capital assets;

3. To establish a forum through which all NGOs interested in involvement in Somalia can gain and share knowledge of existing and planned programs; and

4. To promote donor confidence in a coordinated NGO effort toward Somalia through effective communication to attract maximum donor funding.  

There was thus a well established forum through which to contact NGOs operating in Somalia, not to mention the contact made during the Provide Relief operation. Moreover, OFDA's Special Relief Coordinator for Somalia, Jan Westcott, had been operating, and continued to operate, in Somalia since November of 1990. As it turned out, Ms. Westcott was eventually contacted by the military in a ship-to-shore phone call in early December.  

Another seemingly inexplicable missing component from the intervention preparation was the lack of Army Civil Affairs units involved or eventually sent. Given their stellar performance in Operation Provide Comfort, it appears unusual that they would not be fully utilized. While Charlie Company of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (the Army's only active duty Civil Affairs unit) was sent to Somalia, the reserves, despite receiving call-up orders, were never activated. One suggested reason for this conspicuous absence is that the Marines thought they did not need them. Moreover, the call-up of such units generally implies the longer-term commitment of nation-building, something that was clearly not part of the mission statement. The Marines, as a short-term expeditionary unit, fit the political climate of Washington D.C.
It was against this backdrop of lessons mis-learned and opportunities lost that the Marines came ashore to an established U.N. structure amidst the anarchy of multi-clan warfare. Designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator for the U.N., Dr. Philip Johnson, an American and President and CEO of CARE, had been the Director of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) since October, 1992. A supporter of military intervention, Johnson was ready to work with the JTF. Southern Somalia was soon divided into eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS), with a sectoral HOC established in each one (to include a CMOC that represented the local military forces). This sectoral HOC worked directly with the forces in that HRS. Importantly, the Mogadishu HRS HOC also served as the national HOC. As a result, this HOC would work directly with the UNITAF staff, according to its national charter, but it would not work specifically with the military forces assigned to Mogadishu (First Marine Division).

The HOC was to provide for the following conceptual needs:

1. serve as a focal point for the humanitarian relief organizations;

2. increase the efficiency of humanitarian operations through planning and coordination;

3. gather and disseminate information among all humanitarian relief organizations;

4. provide the link for the humanitarian community to UNITAF and UNISOM military forces.250

In short, the HOC was responsible for developing and implementing humanitarian strategy and for coordinating logistical and security support for the relief organizations.

Once ashore, the Marines established their command center at the former U.S. embassy compound. This decision, a natural one given the compound's security attributes as well as its central location in southern Mogadishu, meant a ten minute separation (by vehicle) from the location of the already established HOC. Hence, a means was needed to establish a permanent liaison with the HOC and the U.N. itself.
On December 11th, the UNITAF CMOC was collocated with the HOC. Colonel Kevin Kennedy, of I MEF's G-3 shop (operations) was its Director. He would focus largely on NGO/UN relations. Colonel Bob MacPherson, a chance fill, would focus on the CMOC's relationship with UNITAF. The CMOC operated according to four "principal missions:"

1. serve as the UNITAF liaison to the humanitarian community and UNOSOM headquarters;

2. validate and coordinate requests for military support;

3. function as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office;

4. Monitor military support in the Regional HOCs. 251

The collocation of the CMOC with the HOC ameliorated a number of critical concerns. First, the physical presence of the CMOC at the HOC was viewed as the military's "reaching out" to the humanitarian community 252 -- an important first perception because the NGOs did not know quite what to expect from the military (not having met or talked with the military until December 9th). Second, the resulting coordination proved to be "tremendously effective" as there was "no other means of getting security information" to the NGOs. 253 (Security was the issue around which all coordination was centered). Third, the collocation provided a fulcrum through which the DART could input its expertise. As in northern Iraq, the DART members -- due to their many trips to the field, their own previous experience, and their checkbook -- were able to keep their finger on the pulse of the effort and help effect coordination.

Finally, the HOC needed to be separate from the UNITAF operations center. The UNITAF compound was the center of the American command element (with all the security accouterments of barbed-wire, bunkers, and machine-guns). By definition, information and meetings there were not meant for anyone but Americans, and access was accordingly restricted to those who had a need for entry. The HOC, on the other hand, had to be completely accessible to everyone. Anybody with any humanitarian concern was welcome to attend the meetings and share information.

The actual structure of the HOC reflected the different players involved. As the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Phil Johnson was the HOC Director. He had two Deputy Directors, one civilian, one
military. The civilian Deputy Director was the DART leader (first Bill Garvelink, then Kate Farnsworth) while the military Deputy Director was Colonel Kennedy. Theoretical subordinates, the Deputy Directors' first responsibility was back to their respective organizations. It was these people who ran the daily HOC meetings.

Before considering the HOC meetings, it should first be noted that there was a pre-existing forum for NGO coordination called the NGO consortium. The Consortium had originated as the natural gathering point of the NGOs which had remained behind in Somalia when everyone else had left, including the U.N. With the advent of the CMOC, this informal meeting assumed a more official role as the major NGOs pitched in to hire a person who was responsible for their collective issues.

It was here that NGOs, big and small, had a chance to centralize their voice about other related issues. Like the military's staff meeting in the UNITAF compound, it was also a place where they determined the agenda and could talk among themselves. Occasionally, Kennedy and MacPherson would be invited to attend as observers. According to Joelle Tanguy of Doctors Without Borders, this meeting proved to be a "fundamental coordination mechanism" because it took the burden off of the HOC/CMOC staff to address every single NGO. In this manner, the HOC could refer smaller NGOs to the Consortium and, when various issues arose, could themselves ask to speak to the Consortium.

The actual HOC coordination meetings were held at the U.N. headquarters (on the 2nd floor of a rented house in southern Mogadishu). Given its big, open space, the 2nd floor was a natural place to host meetings that generally included between eighty and one-hundred participants. Typically opened by Kennedy or Kate Farnsworth of the DART, the meeting would start out with some basic military reports (weather, security) from G-3 representatives. In exchange, the NGOs would offer their information. General discussion followed. According to topic, sector, or relevant organization, the conversation worked itself around the room, giving everyone the opportunity to speak.

As a general consensus emerged on what had to be done and in what order, the meeting broke down into smaller meetings whereby further coordination was done relevant to specific tasks. It was during
this process that the DART earned its money. For example, as one NGO representative noted of Lauren Landis-Guzman, she was a "floating broker" who set up quick meetings and made appropriate coordination changes with a sense to the overall planning process. From these meetings came the actual NGO Requests For Action (RFAs) that were taken back to UNITAF for approval or disapproval. (Most of these requests were for convoy security).

All participants agree that both forums were "congenial" and very "healthy." Of course, in reference to the CMOC, "some NGOs just didn't want the military there at all and went out of their way to make it difficult as possible." But these folks proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there was probably even a hidden blessing among those NGOs perceived as outspoken. Carl Harris of World Concern described one of his peers as "irreverent, profane, yet searching and honest." He found these particular NGO representatives to be a "catalytic influence that brought out the best in people." Importantly, Harris points out that at "no time was there a loss of respect" for the CMOC staff because there remained the feeling that "we were all in this together."

Which brings us to the atmosphere in which these meetings were conducted. While everyone was equal, the military obviously assumed a *primus inter pares* place at the table by virtue of its ability to provide security. Yet, the people most responsible for the military's representation, Kevin Kennedy and Bob MacPherson, did not act in a condescending or arrogant manner.

Instead of giving orders, they asked questions. Instead of taking over, they took inventory of all the people and supplies they could use to help create solutions ... We also shared a concern that the humanitarian community, while it numbered in the hundreds, might feel overwhelmed by a force of 30,000 soldiers, sailors and Marines. The first time the issue was raised, Kevin didn't hesitate to speak up. "The military should be in the background. We want the humanitarian community to know that we're responsive to their needs, that we're here to cooperate. If we can be open and candid with each other about our needs and expectations, I think we make this a team effort."

By all accounts, the CMOC did everything possible to collaborate and contribute to a cooperative atmosphere. Besides an obvious respect for the NGOs and personalities conducive to consensus building, Kennedy and his team brought one further element to the
table: a forthright and transparent honesty. One-and-all appreciated the CMOC staff for their blunt honesty: "we can do that, I'll get back to you on that, we will never do that . . . " If Kennedy said it could happen, it would. 260

Bob MacPherson further emphasizes that sometimes what one has to offer in exchange for NGO collaboration and coordination is simply sincerity of effort. It is not always a "matter of ability, but a willingness" to listen and cooperate. 261 The NGOs responded in kind to this effort.

This overall interface worked well. Carl Harris, a retired State Department officer who had worked refugee problems and NGO coordination for twenty years in Vietnam, Biafra (Nigeria), and Cambodia, stated that Somalia was the best NGO/military interface he had ever seen. 262 Kate Farnsworth, who has extensive experience throughout Africa on this matter, reflected that "more was done there [Somalia] to build the NGO/military relationship than any other place." 263

Despite these efforts, however, the NGO/military relationship was plagued by persistent parochial perceptions. There was the feeling among the NGOs that the information sharing was a one-way street, with the military's penchant for secretiveness preventing a reciprocal flow. There was also the perception that the military simply did not want to be bothered with the NGOs. As William Berquist recalled, there was eventually the sense that "either the CMOC was lying, or that Johnson [the UNITAF commander] was lying to the CMOC, or that the chain-of-command" did not work. 264

On the military's side, there was the feeling that the NGOs simply had no concept of how the military operated. There was also the sense that the NGOs generally kept their distance but called upon the military only when they needed them. Moreover, there was a general difference of opinion among the UNITAF officers as to what their exact relationship with the NGOs was: direct or indirect support? Or both?

Thus, two views on the nature of the mission emerged. One view held that the mission was only to provide security; this would allow the HRs [Humanitarian Relief Organizations] to provide relief . . . Those holding this view pointed to the focus on security in the mission statement as a whole. They also noted that there was no other discussion of helping
HROs anywhere in the OPLAN [operations plan]. Another view held that the military was there to help the HROs -- both directly and indirectly . . . They also said that helping the HROs was so obviously underlying the reason for being in Somalia that of course the military should assist the HROs in any possible manner. Most of the officers on the CMOC staff held the second view. Other officers -- especially on the MARFOR staff [Marine force] -- held the first view.265

These competing interpretations were the direct result of a mission statement that did not provide any humanitarian guidance.

Finally, if one accepts the simple logic that even the best people will have trouble dealing with a completely unprecedented situation, then the coordination process is necessarily exacerbated by what the Mogadishu CMOC had conceptually become. For the first time, the CMOC was no longer a CMOC. It was not an operations center where people solved problems at the same table. Instead, it had become a CM--L--C: Civil-Military Liaison Center. Despite the best of intentions and personnel, the Mogadishu HOC/CMOC was twice removed from reality. Not only did the CMOC have to coordinate with the local Marine forces in Mogadishu through the UNITAF staff; decisions made about NGO security were removed away from the NGOs to a faceless chain-of-command.266

The cohesion that results from decisions made in conjunction with one another at the same table -- as in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Somalia Airlift -- necessarily fades once the liaison process becomes the primary means of communication. With no significant face-to-face interaction as fellow problem-solvers in a difficult situation, negative stereotypes soon emerged as organizational behavior permeated to the operational level for the first time in our study.

We now examine three general areas, already evident in the first thirty days, in an attempt to flesh out the NGO/military relationship: 1) the tangible/intangible isolation of the HOC/CMOC from UNITAF; 2) security/disarmament; 3) the lack of a humanitarian strategy.

The ten-minute drive from the HOC/CMOC to UNITAF was symbolic of the increasing cultural chasm between the NGOs and the military in Mogadishu after the first month. This tangible and intangible separation came to taint every military/NGO discussion.
The essence of this separation was that there was no permanent humanitarian representative at the operations shop in UNITAF. Consequently, Kevin Kennedy and, primarily, Bob MacPherson became the single point of contact between the military and the NGOs. Once narrowed to this extent, the overwhelming lesson of past CMOCs is negated: that there must be multiple surveyors of reality, making decisions, at the same table, in order to ensure that everyone stays on the same wavelength.

As Jim Kunder put it, the general impression was that "discussions with Kevin Kennedy were discussions with the military." Kennedy and MacPherson may have thus done their job too well. Because of their honesty, their fair brokerage, and their work ethic, it may have become quite easy for the NGOs to simply accept them as "the military." With such a mindset, it would be easy to assume that the UNITAF folks all thought and acted like Kennedy and MacPherson.

A second, related, observation is that the HOC/CMOC became the only point of planning and input for the NGOs. It did not generally occur to the NGOs -- until they felt that Kennedy and MacPherson themselves were having problems communicating to UNITAF -- that there might be another separate and distinct military operations center. Additionally, this separation is accentuated by the fact that the HOC was the highest institutional access the NGOs had to UNITAF. The U.N. for example could apply pressure on UNITAF vis-à-vis its New York office and its official relations with a member state. Other than going to the press, the NGOs had no recourse.

The rebuttal to this line of argument is that while the official liaison was limited to one or two people, there was plenty of unofficial communication to ensure that the humanitarian/NGO perspective was represented. Indeed, OFDA personnel, particularly Kate Farnsworth and Lauren Landis-Guzman, had the ear of Ambassador Oakley whenever they wanted. Certainly the DART knew the humanitarian pulse and the military listened to Oakley. Moreover, as Ambassador Oakley points out, besides the regular staff meetings that he held nightly (at which there was OFDA representation), he also invariably had Farnsworth or Garvelink, along with UNITAF officers, over for breakfast to discuss issues: "there was plenty of dialogue."
The final counterpoint, however, is: how well did anybody, apart from Kennedy and MacPherson, know the Marines? This thought is certainly not disparaging of Oakley, the DART, or the Marine Corps. But the question remains: what was the influence of the Marine warfighting mentality on the overall understanding of the situation and the communication between the military and the NGOs?

Mark Biser, an infantry officer himself, sheds light on this subject, setting up a typical Marine perspective of the CMOC.271

CMOC? What's that? Who knows? Who cares? Those guys are over there living under UN rules with air-conditioning. They're skating [getting off easy]. Who wants to be in a CMOC? Nobody wants to be in a CMOC. That's like asking ten brand-new Second Lieutenant infantry officers just out of The Basic School [where all Marines officers learn to become infantry officers first] if they want to be the adjutant [an administrative position with little command opportunity]. Ten out of ten would say no. They are warfighters and they want to practice their craft.

Biser is quick to point out the irony of this perspective (something not common to Marines only) in a humanitarian situation. "What is least important at D+10 [ten days after the landing, with security still very much an issue] emerges as the most important later on . . . it [the CMOC] must eventually become the FOME [focus of main effort]."

MacPherson, a combat veteran with twenty-four years experience as an infantry officer at the time, suggests similar observations about the warfighting nature of the Marines. "Nobody really wanted to embrace the CMOC . . . at best it is still a couple of dirtbag Colonels, at worst it is just another box in the schematic set-up."272

MacPherson points out, however, that, despite this general mindset, he essentially had unlimited access to the JTF commander and the Director of Operations, Brigadier General Anthony Zinni. He also notes that he was clearly empowered to support the NGOs as best he could. But, MacPherson still described his job of UNITAF/CMOC liaison as trying "to keep peace in the family."

Although malicious UNITAF intent can generally be discounted, the point remains that it was not the institutional nature of the Marine Corps -- or of any military personnel trained as warfighters -- to elevate the CMOC to the priority of Focus of Main Effort. As one Marine officer wondered: "does the Marine culture prevent the right questions from being asked?"273
The communication argument is therefore again narrowed back to the two person liaison theory because only a Marine would truly comprehend this mindset. Again, credit goes to the two Colonels for being so effective as translators to both communities. They understood and spoke for the NGOs. Eventually, however, all they could do was present UNITAF policy. Inevitably, according to their professionalism, theirs must have been a deep and silent frustration.

The third lens through which to view the figurative and literal space between UNITAF and the HOC is NGO expectations. For example, with the announcement of the intervention and Boutros-Boutros Ghali calling for disarmament, many of the NGOs assumed "security" would be both corporate and personal. How could 30,000 troops not be enough to accomplish that mission?

There was also the initial feeling that Restore Hope would be like Provide Comfort. While very few NGO personnel had actually been in northern Iraq, word had spread as to what an unexpected and great experience it had been working with the military. Not the least of this experience was the fact that the U.S. military provided everything from tents and cots to food and water for the NGOs. Although it was not quite a "free ride" mentality that pervaded the NGOs, there certainly was the expectation that they would be more appreciated.

Charles Petrie, a senior DHA official in Somalia at the time, provides a telling perspective on these optimistic expectations. Provide Comfort, in his opinion, was a situation where the military basically sub-contracted the NGOs to do the humanitarian work. Indeed, with no NGOs present prior to the emergency, the military was the first on the scene. Everyone recognized and accepted the military's role as a necessary leader and facilitator. The Somali situation was almost the exact opposite. This time, the military was coming into a situation where the humanitarian operation was well-established. For better or for worse, because the situation was completely different than northern Iraq, the working relationship would not be replicated.

A final approach to understanding and/or preventing the cultural gap was to collocate the HOC/CMOC with the UNITAF compound, thereby allowing for a constant humanitarian presence in the military's planning cell. As indicated earlier, there are problems with
this proposal. First, the HOC was already established and the only suitable building for the UNITAF headquarters was the embassy. Second, there were legitimate security concerns about who came and went out of the military's command post. Third, the UNITAF staff meeting was no place for a consensus type meeting. Staff meetings are action-oriented towards military means, not necessarily about information sharing, and end according to the senior officer present. Simply, because of its inherent nature and purpose as UNITAF’s own coordination cell, the staff meeting was the wrong place for an additional 80-100 people. The entire First Marine Division, for example, had only two representatives at that morning meeting. Fourth, the NGO community as a whole would have objected to being that closely associated with the military.

Thus, the coordination framework between the two communities was not the most conducive one for daily planning and the consideration of overall strategy. With essentially two different operations centers, no matter how good the liaison, there inevitably had to be a divergence between the two planning processes. The victim would be the primacy of the humanitarian mission. Unfortunately, while the next two issues -- security and humanitarian strategy -- were somewhat beyond the control of the NGOs and the military, the coordination process had been theirs alone to understand and control.

The issue of security and its immediate offspring, disarmament, was the major point of contention between the NGO community and the military in Mogadishu. The establishment of security for the forces coming in and their follow-on logistics is, and will always be, primary. Like adults who are instructed to first put their oxygen masks on before helping their children, so it is with an armed force in pursuit of a mission. The mission can only take place once the force is prepared to take it on. Having said that, the question becomes: how long does this process take and how should it be accomplished? These concerns quickly became points of contention, largely resulting from different perceptions of "security" and the expectations that these perceptions create.

The military was stepping into an uncertain situation -- the military threat was relatively unknown. Accordingly, the Marines took a worst-case approach, displaying overwhelming force in everything they did, from the amphibious landing to convoy
protection. The NGOs had a different perspective because they knew the ground, the people, and that, in general, the Somalis were looking forward to the intervention. Although not military experts, the NGOs understood that in a situation where most Somalis supported the intervention, the armed clans and bandits would probably take a wait-and-see approach. More importantly, however, they felt that the very presence of military forces would prevent violence and allow them to address the compelling humanitarian needs of the moment.

The Baidoa example is illustrative. Baidoa is 142 miles west of Mogadishu. Hundreds of children were dying there daily. But there were also eleven technicals in town. NGOs who had recently returned from Kenya, thought that, given the need and the threat, Baidoa would be occupied in the same fell swoop as Mogadishu. Unfortunately, what was Phase I to the military, lasting for a week or so, meant the simultaneous occupation of Baidoa to the NGOs.

U.S. forces landed in Mogadishu on the 9th, but it was not until the 15th that they arrived in Baidoa. These six days were an eternity according to NGO expectations. With the Marines ashore, the "technicals" in Baidoa took a final opportunity to loot the rest of the supplies in town, knowing that once U.S. troops arrived, they would not have another chance. From the humanitarian perspective, the Marines were moving at a glacial pace. From the military perspective, however, the Marines were "smokin.'" For a landing force to be that far inland within six days, under uncertain threat conditions, was a considerable feat. And thus the most fundamental question: how do you define military security in a humanitarian intervention?

Joelle Tanguy of MSF suggests the following frame of reference for the military and NGO. The military's security is about "protection by arms, a practical security which must be put into place." The NGO, on the other hand, defines its security "in terms of the larger context: what is the situation developing around us and what is driving the relationships around us?" To an NGO, security is based on having both an acute situational awareness and the legitimacy that results from acting in a humanitarian manner appropriate to the overall situation.

The significance of these divergent points of view can be seen in the eventual withdrawal of MSF. By May of 1993, everything that MSF did was contingent upon the military. The physical threat was
so bad that they consistently needed military protection, even with basic training programs for Somalis. Protection was driven by military logistics and logistics were decided by operations. In short, MSF was completely associated with, and dependent upon, the military. For a group that originally viewed attending the HOC/CMOC meetings as a compromise to their independence, this position was unacceptable. MSF/France pulled out of Somalia in May of 1993.

The NGO conceptual approach to security suggests that the military needs to understand just how divergent definitions of security can be and how important it is to create a dialogue with the NGOs to eliminate false expectations and, hopefully, create common understandings. Similarly, however, the NGOs must understand the vulnerability of a force not yet built-up. Jim Kunder, director of OFDA at the time and a former Marine himself, notes that while the psychological impact of overwhelming force is obviously at its zenith during the first hours, days, and weeks, it is also the time at which a military force is at its most vulnerable. Thus while there is great opportunity for decisive action -- political, humanitarian, or military -- it is also a time of weakness because there may not yet be sufficient security for the armed forces. Consequently, there must be a certain amount of caution.280

For example, if a platoon had been parachuted into Baidoa and, for whatever reason, they had been wiped out, then what? How do you immediately redress the military and political implications of such a turn of events? Or, what if a few well-placed snipers had kept the landing process at bay for a few hours/days? Simply, the military must have sufficient security to protect itself. It is these concerns that will always be in the forefront of every commander's mind.

Craig Anderson of World Concern sums up this seeming dichotomy of perceptions: the military "established themselves in military format; but, they couldn't have done it any way else." Yet, the NGOs still felt that "they [the military] took their understanding of security and applied their own solution . . . there was no brainstorming about 'what kind of security.'"281 It would seem that to answer the most difficult question of a humanitarian intervention -- how do you define security in a way that enables the humanitarian effort but also protects the force? -- should begin with this mutual
brainstorming. It would further seem that such a dialogue should begin prior to the intervention itself.

No one issue exemplifies this different perception of security more than the policy/non-policy of disarmament. Above all else, this problem was a political issue, something which the NGOs occasionally lost sight of when they blamed the military alone for inaction. Disarmament was not a part of the U.S. mandate. Viewed as related to nation-building, there was soon a public dispute between the Secretary-General and the President. Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for disarmament while President Bush declared that disarmament was not implied in the Security Council’s resolution to use “all available means” to create a secure environment. Eventually, though, even the policy-makers in Washington could not avoid acknowledging that there had to be some sort of disarmament.

While all agreed and welcomed the attempt, the dreaded "D" word was soon much more than a thorn in the side of NGO/military relations. This "constant, festering, unending sore of the weapons business" manifested itself most conspicuously in the problem of identifying those who needed to be disarmed, particularly those Somali guards hired by the NGOs. As Colonel Gregson states, "who is the bad guy when everyone has guns?"

Prior to the intervention, the NGOs had hired Somali guards from local warlords in order to get their relief shipments through (not to mention to secure a measure of personal security). Everywhere was "Indian country." The problem, however, was that these same "guards" were sometimes using extortion to get their job if not moonlighting as bandits at night. As Carl Harris recalls of World Concern's guards, "they were pretty basic, crude thugs... it was nuts to fire them with their weapons [i.e. they would be used against World Concern], and we needed them." Besides, even with the guards' nebulous background, were the NGOs "going to turn on those guards with whom they would have to live afterwards [after the military's departure]?

Even prior to the debate over the weapons of NGO guards, there was disagreement concerning the general security issue. American forces focused on securing certain areas -- such as general NGO areas and food distribution sites. The military thought that the NGOs should consolidate to make their protection easier. Initially logical,
this fire-base approach did not account for the military's eventual departure; presented a possibly bigger target; and stood to separate the NGOs from the very population they were seeking to serve (an imperative component of a successful helper/helped relationship).

The larger issue, however, was that no matter how the security situation was approached, there would be "more secure" and "less secure" areas with a decided need for protection when moving between these zones (Mogadishu was too big and there were not enough troops). Even if relations were 100% perfect between the military and the NGOs, the NGOs would need personal guards.

Given the overall political backdrop and an inexplicably slow approach by UNITAF, the disarmament policy painfully evolved from January to May. The first attempt to identify the "good guys with guns," those Somalis working/driving for the NGOs, involved the issue of pink identification cards by the CMOC. These cards, without a photo-ID, were easily counterfeited.

The second attempt, in February, involved a blue photo-ID card. This policy allowed Marines and soldiers to confiscate any "visible" weapon. This concept soon became disputed as "visible" was not clearly explained and open to interpretation by the military personnel manning the checkpoints. For example, did "visible" mean from outside the vehicle or once one looked in the cab, seeing a weapon on a guard's lap? A third policy resulted in April whereby a weapons policy card, simple and with pictures, was used in conjunction with the blue photo-ID card. At this point, things were more clear, but UNITAF was on its way out.

Several factors added insult to injury. First, the NGOs and their guards were inevitably caught in the disarmament net. During one week in March, for instance, 84 weapons were seized of which 54 belonged to NGOs.286 This process soon turned the CMOC into the tragic-comedy of 'Guns "R" Us' as humanitarians left the meeting with AK-47s strapped over their backs.287 At the same time, Marines on the streets of Mogadishu -- who had spent a hard day's work fulfilling their assigned mission, and protecting themselves, by disarming those whom they had been told to disarm -- saw the CMOC's return of the weapons as directly contrary to their efforts.

Furthermore, even with a clear policy for Mogadishu, the rules would change from HRS to HRS (Humanitarian Relief Sector)
according to the security threat and the international force present. Thus what finally worked in Mogadishu might not have been applicable in Baidoa or Bardera. Finally, as Colonel Kennedy points out, the administrative support for an ID card system requiring thousands of cards -- so crucial to an effective, or at least consistent policy -- was just two UNITAF clerks.

The inability to reach a successful resolution despite numerous efforts at the most senior levels and the generally compliant nature of the humanitarian organizations, leads to the conclusion that the sustained confrontation represented more than just a vigorous application of weapons policies but a fundamental antagonism towards humanitarian organizations from some elements of UNITAF.\textsuperscript{288}

As Ambassador Oakley later reflected about this process, "demobilization and disarmament were screwed up, no doubt about it."\textsuperscript{289}

Because there was no higher political resolve behind the intervention, no humanitarian strategy ever emerged. Certainly, strategies existed. Since the very beginning, AID/OFDA, in the form of Andrew Natsios, had a plan for Somalia that comprehensively addressed issues beyond immediate relief, such as livestock, agriculture, and monetization. This American plan, however, was not clearly understood or even adopted by the Americans themselves. This is not to say that the plan was articulated poorly. Natsios, in fact, had been a broken record from the summer of 1992 through the intervention promulgating the need for a nuanced and comprehensive response.

Rather, it suggests that policy-makers thought that just getting food over to Somalia would take it off the 'skyline;' and that was good enough. Moreover, it suggests again that once the Department of Defense became a part of the planning, the humanitarian intent was diminished as military concerns began to dominate. Thus, there was not too much of an appreciation for the actual situation and the crying need for a comprehensive, integrated, and synergistic approach. Although it was obvious from the beginning that Somalia demanded much more than just a food solution, that is exactly what it got.

This misunderstanding of the nature of the problem was exacerbated early on by NGO and military alike at the operational level. Charles Petrie observes that relief agencies themselves did not
appreciate the relief-to-development continuum as they "operated in Somalia as if there was no tomorrow." Likewise, the military, unfamiliar with humanitarian issues and forced to deal with political ones because they had been ignored at higher levels, contributed to "relief issues [becoming] operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues . . . military and diplomatic strategy in complex emergencies needs to follow, not direct or be separated from, relief strategies." 

The American plan was not adopted by the international community either. Natsios admits that he made a mistake in not attempting to better sell the plan to the European Community. Even had he done so, however, it still remained for the implementors to 1) accept the broad guidance of such a strategy; and 2) to mold an operational manifestation of it. Even if all the donor countries were to agree, it would still come down to the expert in the field.

The other strategy that existed was the U.N.'s "100 day" plan for Somalia. This piece of paper received absolutely no legitimization from the international community. Charles Petrie states unequivocally that the plan was "written by a group of nice people with a do-good mentality" but was not hard-nosed enough about the reality of the Somali problems; as a result, the plan "didn't really address anything." With no international consensus, no accepted plan, no political resolve, a short-sighted NGO vision, and a sometimes contentious NGO relationship with those whose mission it was to provide security, an overarching humanitarian strategy never stood a chance.

Furthermore, no one who worked in the HOC recalled ever having the feeling of a uniting strategy. Not only was there no sense of what the humanitarian community wanted to accomplish in the first month(s), there was no general sense of cohesion or purpose. Kate Farnsworth states that it was "not very clear what we were supposed to be doing." Carl Harris "didn't sense anything was coordinated towards a long-term goal." Lauren Landis-Guzman recalls the HOC/CMOC atmosphere as "reactive." Kevin Kennedy states that there was "no strategy in the beginning [during UNITAF]." Jim Kunder states that there was "no sense on anyone's part that this was anything more than dumping food."
Given this strategic vacuum, how does the military incorporate the humanitarian priority into its daily taskings (assuming they were receptive to begin with)? The CMOC staff did keep estimates of what was done. For example, "on average, UNITAF conducted 70 escorts, used 700 vehicles, and moved 9,000 metric tons of supplies each month." Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick confirms that UNITAF was tracking this information as well. But what was done is no indicator of where each action leads. While the military needs to keep track of this information, that is not their primary job nor should they be the only one doing it. Moreover, these numbers, in and of themselves, mean nothing, if the goal was to understand whether or not the original intent was being accomplished.

Two conclusions follow. First, even the best humanitarians are less effective without a comprehensive plan which has no political resolve behind it. This lack of political resolve strongly indicates that the humanitarian/NGO community and the military have a common enemy: an inattentive and ill-informed civilian leadership (irrespective of country) and, as a result, a wishy-washy public mandate. Andrew Natsios was the Special Coordinator for the President of the United States of America, and even he could not get his plan through.

Second, if there is an identifiable common enemy, then implementors need to seek one another out. Bill Berquist suggests that the NGOs must have the opportunity for serious input prior to an intervention. "We didn't know what to expect... it would have been great to bring the [NGO] leaders out and sit down with [General] Johnson and spend some time strategizing." (These words are akin to Craig Anderson's suggestion that there needed to be "security brainstorming" between the NGOs and the military).

This idea bears some consideration, particularly in light of the political context in which these events occur. In order for both sides to know "what to expect," there should be a meeting prior to intervention, if possible, between the commanding general and the NGO leaders (along with the DART). Even if they only recognize that they are speaking different languages, such a meeting represents a significant start. It also needs to be an on-going process.
Moreover, extending this logic, there needs to be a humanitarian presence with the commanding general (this idea will find fruition in Rwanda when a DART member serves as the JTF commander’s advisor). It is only through concerted and situation-appropriate efforts like these that the military and the NGOs have a chance of understanding each other.

CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS

This chapter has focused on the Mogadishu CMOC because that is where there was the most difficulty between NGOs and the military. It should not be forgotten, however, that a significant humanitarian difference was made -- the food did get through -- and that there was much mutual respect between the NGO community and the military. This respect was particularly true among the regional HOC/CMOCs, where coordinators lived and worked together, and during the implementation process itself.

It should further be remembered that "there was such a big learning curve . . . at the time, nobody knew how to do any of this stuff."\textsuperscript{302} Mark Biser states, "they [the military] didn't have any idea of what to do and they [the NGOs] didn't know what to ask them to do."\textsuperscript{303} While there are some obvious parallels with Bangladesh and northern Iraq, the size and complexity of the Somalia intervention remains unequaled. Given this enormous novelty and the extent to which success was achieved, it is fair to conclude that NGO/military relations were "good enough."\textsuperscript{304}

Having said that, one need not accept "good enough" for the next time. Consequently, let us consider the following: 1) the issue of created expectations and the political will to address them; 2) the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis; and 3) as in previous chapters, the boiled down NGO/military principles of collaboration/coordination.

There has never been a greater need to interweave the expectations created by a foreign presence and the need for a continuum of effort.\textsuperscript{305} Because the U.S. military mission was somewhat nebulous -- the ironic result of an attempt to narrowly define the military's role in support of a seemingly simple humanitarian mandate -- there were many and different expectations
among the participants, particularly among the Somalis. Dr. Ken Menkhaus writes that "evidence suggests that in the first phase of the intervention there was widespread popular Somali support for, and the expectation of, a move to marginalize the militias, provided it was done even-handedly so as not to expose one clan to attack by another." On December 9, 1992, Dr. Said Samatar stated that "there seems to be high expectations among the people that with the coming of the Americans, good days are here again. I fear that if the economic situation does not improve, there might be a feeling of letdown." 

Like it or not, the arrival of the world's mightiest army was going to create economic and political expectations. To think that it was possible to isolate the humanitarian effort from these concerns was a mistake, especially in a failed state like Somalia, where everything was political. Every Somali and their every expectation was a separate political entity because they had no means by which to voice their concerns. As a result, the political significance of an organized action takes on greater meaning because it is the only thing that works.

Thus, there must be a plan; a continuum of effort that takes these expectations into account.

... everyone, both inside and out of the U.S. government, understood that military protection of humanitarian relief supplies to famine zones represented little more than a temporary palliative. All were aware that a long-term solution to the Somali crisis would entail a commitment to fostering national reconciliation and supporting the resuscitation of the collapsed Somali state. These tasks, though later derided by critics as "nation-building," were essential if the anarchy and armed banditry which triggered the famine were to be eliminated.

Jeffrey Clark presented the answer in 1993: "What is required is a phased and linked national process that addresses humanitarian, military, political, and economic components, and that has the support of an international coalition of donors prepared to facilitate reconstruction programs." (Of course, such an endeavor would seek the full participation and eventual leadership of the Somalis themselves).

What Clark recognized, Lieutenant Colonel Tom O'Leary, the commander of the first Marine Battalion to land in Somalia, knew back in December of 1992. The intervention represented an
"immediate change for their lives; they will have the highest expectations; if they are not met, the relationship [between helper and helped] will become disenchanted and then it will go sour . . . you can provide security and food, but how long will they be satisfied?" It is mindful of these words that we discuss the strategic NGO/military lessons learned from this case study.

Humanitarian intervention is a political process. This process shapes every dimension of the effort, to include the NGO/military relationship. Despite a mandate not to be political, the military, and the NGOs, were very much political in their actions, albeit in an ad hoc manner. A permeating plan was needed and that plan should have been of U.N. origin with international donor support. The HOC should have been recognized by the international donor community and participants on the ground as the U.N. sanctioned center of humanitarian activity. Recognized as such, the humanitarian imperative would remain primary. All other tasks -- political and military -- would be developed in support of the HOC. Moreover, the HOC would be the focus of the overall U.S. effort. By extension, the CMOC would be the focus of UNITAF.

The HOC, however, was not capable of supporting such a focus because it did not have a plan that was realistic or supported by the international community. Yet to blame the U.N. is, to some extent, to blame ourselves. There is considerable merit to the argument that the U.S. was the U.N. throughout the entire Somalia intervention, particularly during UNITAF. Indeed, as Liz Lukasavich described the HOC, "the only thing U.N. about it was that we called it U.N." This perspective reveals the underlying tension arising from the fact that the U.S. will almost never allow its military personnel to work directly for the U.N. Yet, the aegis of U.N. legitimacy was imperative to the whole operation. Hence, U.S. action required a U.N. cloak (thus the UNITAF concept). But when things go wrong, no matter who is to blame, politics dictate that the U.S. blame the U.N. This relationship must be better understood and we must "quit using the U.N. as a whipping boy." Only if this relationship is appreciated and worked at by both communities can the HOC, or its conceptual equivalent, be supported as the true center of a humanitarian intervention. If understood as such, there will be no misunderstanding as to roles and relationships between the NGO community and the
military. On the other hand, if there is no acknowledged center of effort, then all the other relationships will be confused.

Particularly in the absence of higher political resolve, the military and NGO communities must understand and accept the need for such an operational center. The first step to creating this center, however, is not a wire-diagram but the mutual understanding that there must be a unity of effort. The mechanism for realizing this unity of effort must be the HOC. If together they can create a central role for the HOC, or its conceptual equivalent, then perhaps the NGOs and the military will have a greater chance of success.

The second strategic implication recognizes that, in such crises, the implementor will engage in what are called nation-building activities in order to properly address the humanitarian need. Better understood as the enabling of "marginal self-sufficiency" by the military and as moving from relief to rehabilitation and restoration by the NGOs, these political-socio-economic-civic dimensions will take place. They are the ingredients of problem-solving in a complex humanitarian emergency like Somalia. The suggestion that Somalia did not have such "broader objectives" and thus did not "require an assessment of progress in the areas of politics, economics, health, agriculture, and welfare" is dead wrong. "Did we get into nation-building? Absolutely," The Marines were involved in everything from Councils of Elders to engineer support to food distribution. The problem, or the "big mistake," was that "nation-building was never acknowledged."

While politics may dictate that nation-building will not be directly acknowledged, the nature of humanitarian intervention demands a clear humanitarian intent. It is very clear that the Somalia mission statement delivered to the U.S. military men and women in the field was ambiguous and created differences of opinion as to how to relate to the NGOs. The mission statement must remain broad, allowing for operational latitude and guidance, while leaving no doubt as to what the humanitarian purpose is that it serves.

Finally, even if there had been a crystal-clear mission statement that allowed for a total understanding between the two communities based on the HOC and its humanitarian intent as the center of the effort, one has to wonder about the effect of one of UNITAF's implicit missions: few casualties. Again, this does not imply that the Marines
acted in an overly-cautious manner; their aggressive patrolling and community interaction stand out. But, it is relatively safe to infer that this method was OK as long as there were no casualties. As the Somalis increasingly tested the Americans, however, there was the general understanding that the Americans were reluctant to use force, that casualties were a great concern to stateside decision-makers.

A common retort suggests that it is public opinion that drives the no-casualties concern. That notion is too simple. The no-casualties agenda results from the American public’s inability to tie casualties to any larger goal. There is no larger goal because the mission has not been politically articulated by the White House, and a self-fulfilling prophecy is the result: “we cannot have casualties because the public will not stand for it; and they will not stand for it because we will not articulate our objective except in purely humanitarian terms.” Implicit herein is the reminder that the military is an instrument of policy, an extension of politics by other means. If it has no political purpose, how can it function properly? Sending troops as a humanitarian curative -- doing something -- will never work. There must be a political purpose for the troops, the NGOs with whom they will work, and the public.

This [absence of a political understanding] sums up the complete ambiguity of this type of operation: action for action’s sake . . . designed to soothe public opinion by ‘doing something.’ But the decision to move into the humanitarian field is the result of a cruel lack of a political perspective. Protecting humanitarian aid-workers becomes an aim in itself, replacing the age-old need for soldiers to have a political purpose when going to war. This new paradox of protection can be summed up as follows: humanitarian aid permits intervention by armed forces yet gives them no precise political program.317

The consequences of this disconnect between political purpose and a soldier’s use are enormous. First, a cautious mindset may result if the troops in the field do not connect their presence to any larger goal. Why be bold and innovative about a situation that no one seems to understand? A cautious mindset, coupled with an unspoken “no casualties” mandate, could figuratively and literally bleed over into a real warfighting scenario if the small unit leader is not encouraged to act decisively with judgement during humanitarian interventions. The best way to ensure this type of action is for the small unit leaders to clearly understand their political purpose. Moreover, a military
presence not connected to a clear policy enhances the possibility that the military force will adopt a no casualties/force protection policy. Such a policy, implicit or otherwise, actually endangers the soldier/Marine on the ground. Any potential belligerent recognizes that the U.S. is leery of casualties, which in turn makes the soldier/Marine a high-value target. Because his death can change the course of a government, his humanitarian purpose is dwarfed by the perceived political ramifications of his death.

Ironically, it would seem, a strong political purpose from the international community and the governments of those sending troops allows the NGO and the military to assume their traditional garb: purely humanitarian and purely a tool of a higher policy. Without that definition and resolve, they are as political as anyone else, with as great a chance of dying as someone in the warring factions.

The most important operational conclusion is that the NGO/military dialogue must begin as soon as possible, ideally stateside. It should be actively and aggressively sought by both communities. This process is imperative for three reasons. First, if the emergency situation is to stabilize, there must be some sort of coordination. Second, such a dialogue ensures that the humanitarian intent remains primary. If by hearing the other community's interpretation of the humanitarian intent is the only accomplishment, it is a significant one. Third, a candid and continuous dialogue keeps the military and NGO united against a common enemy: the absence of political resolve. While one can inform higher headquarters and hope that senior policy-makers truly understand a phenomenon that has recently come to the forefront of foreign policy, the implementors will certainly drive, if not create, the eventual policy of the international community. As Ambassador Oakley has stated, "Somalia equaled ad hoc." If so, then the operators must be in unison. They know the turf better than anyone and they must be in accord if they are to achieve any degree of success.

Such a dialogue demands one further operational conclusion. In a humanitarian intervention, the CMOC must become the military’s focus of main effort from the very beginning. Whether it becomes the conceptual equivalent of the HOC or is a subordinate component of the HOC itself, the CMOC represents the military’s only
institutional chance for accurate feedback on whether or not the humanitarian intent is being met.

The CMOC must therefore be elevated in status and legitimacy within the military culture. The very best people must be assigned to it and it must be fully empowered by the JTF commander. To think of the CMOC as another place for "pogues" (non-warfighters) is a fundamental mistake. If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC must become the priority because it represents -- through close coordination with the NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community -- the military's best chance to design and control its exit strategy.

The direct result of a need for a continuing and mutually reinforcing dialogue is the greatest lesson learned of all: the HOC and the military operations center must be co-accessible. This phrase is defined as "within secure walking distance of the other." Some have suggested that the two be collocated. While this possibility satisfies the operational need, it does not satisfy basic living and security requirements. The military needs a secure space where it can talk and analyze as the military force that it is. Very few need access to this space. Additionally, there is the obvious need to create the most secure area possible. Thus, the military operations center will always be "in the wire."

In contrast, the HOC/CMOC must be completely accessible to anyone willing to participate. It must also be frequented daily by the military leaders, particularly from operations. While it will be situation and terrain-dependent, the HOC/CMOC should be made secure by whatever means are appropriate. This recommendation does not suggest sandbagging, bunkers, or armed guards. Rather, in whatever surreptitious and subdued manner is available -- from a second, exterior "wire" to hidden snipers or a rapid reaction unit of some sort -- the HOC must be secure enough to allow for the unimpeded and ready access of both NGOs and military to meet there, or for NGO/humanitarian leaders to go over to the military operations center.

Additionally, co-accessibility demands that the NGOs develop accepted mechanisms by which they speak with a collective voice. They cannot expect to send eighty people to a military staff meeting. The NGO Consortium, for example, can only become effective if one
or two people can speak for it in an emergency. These mechanisms must be understood by the military prior to an intervention. Against their most cherished values of organizational autonomy, it is a change that NGOs must endure, at least during crises of this magnitude.

Finally, there remains the question of the HOC structure itself. A military perspective would suggest that coordination and unity of effort are inherently impossible. With a Director responsible to the U.N., and two Deputy Directors responsible to OFDA and UNITAF each, it is a system built for inefficiency, if not failure. However, like the American government, it is the best system possible. These various players within the HOC impose a system of checks and balances to the humanitarian process. While it may not always be the most efficient structure, everyone is at the same table and truth is generally the result. That is as good as it gets.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
COLLABORATION/COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

1. A liaison/collaboration must be established as soon as possible, preferably before the intervention itself. Such a process is continuing and dynamic as it reflects the changing nature of the emergency problem.

2. This liaison/collaboration process should be attended by the most senior leaders from both communities. Not only does better communication result, but the humanitarian element of the mission is elevated to a higher status by the joint task force commander's presence. This elevation is imperative, not only for the sake of the humanitarian community, but for the JTF commander's subordinate commands as well. His presence indicates what is important and what he expects from his junior leaders and men and women.

3. The military needs to incorporate Civil Affairs personnel into its planning process from the very beginning. Civil Affairs personnel are responsible for the military's doctrinal interface with civilian agencies.
4. NGOs have to establish their own form of doctrinal interface. They must be able to speak with some sort of corporate voice. If they cannot, they may exacerbate the situation, and will be left behind by those who do coordinate.

5. The HOC/CMOC must be co-accessible with the military's command element (or vice-versa depending upon the situation). The mandate must be continually re-visited by humanitarian (to include NGO) and military leaders alike.

6. The CMOC must be elevated within military culture. Not a "leader of men" environment, the CMOC, in a humanitarian emergency, will be the focus of main effort. The entire force must know the importance of the CMOC -- if only for the reason that it represents the ticket home -- and support its efforts anyway it can.

7. The CMOC Director must have unlimited access to the JTF commander. The Director represents the JTF commander's official military feedback on whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met.

8. The military's mission must be explicit. Clarity, however, does not mean defining a mission so narrowly that its components are reduced to simple "go/no go" criteria (e.g. seize airfield). There must be an overarching and simple humanitarian intent that provides guidance as to what goal the military mission is working in support of. This humanitarian goal, if kept paramount, will provide the implicit and specific military tasks at hand.

9. If there is no political resolve from the leading country, in this case, the United States, and there is no humanitarian strategy universally supported by the international donor community, the military and NGOs must seek each other out for they have been reduced to trying locally. Left as such, they are the only ones who stand any chance of making the overall effort work. If there is enmity between them, then their potential contribution is significantly reduced.
CHAPTER FIVE
OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE

On July 4, 1994, Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, fell to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). With the sudden fall of the northwestern town of Ruhengeri on July 13th, thousands of Hutus thought themselves trapped. Hutus, fearful of a genocide equal to or worse than the one-half million deaths that they had recently visited upon the Tutsis, began to flee. They believed their only means of survival was to flee west to Zaire or to the French safe-zone in the south-western part of Rwanda or south to Burundi. Thus began the single-largest exodus in modern history.

Most fled toward Goma, Zaire, along the northwestern border of Rwanda. "It's a river of people bleeding out of Rwanda!" stated Panos Moumtzis, spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Kate Crawford, there with the DART, called it a "human tidal wave" that was "unprecedented in the history of refugee relief." By nightfall of the 15th, just forty-eight hours after the exodus had begun, the refugee camps in Goma numbered nearly a million people. Statistically staggering to imagine, somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000 Hutus had crossed the border per hour into Zaire. In Burundi, to the south, the refugee population had increased from 83,000 to 200,000 in the same amount of time. In the southwest, 6000 people an hour had crossed into the French safe-zone on July 14th.

The worst situation was in Goma, Zaire. With a non-existent relief infrastructure and a volcanic soil, Goma was ready to explode. "It is impossible to find enough camps for one million people," Moumtzis said at the time, "we can't drill for water. What are we going to do about latrines? It is an absolute nightmare. I don't know how we are going to deal with it." With so many refugees and a shortage of water, it was only a matter of time before cholera broke out. By July 17th, it was estimated that one refugee was dying per minute due to cholera, dehydration, and exposure. Clean water was needed fast.

By July 24th, American military personnel had been deployed to Goma, Zaire, Kigali, Rwanda, and Entebbe, Uganda, setting up the
necessary infrastructure to complement and support the humanitarian response community. By the end of July, a CMOC had been established in Goma and Entebbe. By the end of the first week in August, a CMOC had been established in Kigali. Working hand-in-hand with OFDA, UNHCR, DHA, and the NGOs already present, the American military helped to create an atmosphere of collaboration and coordination as the major problems of the humanitarian emergency were quickly addressed.

Given its limited mandate, the American military did a splendid job. It maintained a small "footprint," was subdued in achieving its goals, did everything possible to support UN leadership and credibility, and was "out" in sixty days. The JTF recognized that it was not in charge and that it was there to support according to its comparative advantage of logistics and infrastructure.

Indeed, the NGO/military relationship is officially a non-story. Because the U.N. was in charge, with the American military as just another supporting element, NGOs had to go through the U.N. infrastructure in order to obtain American logistical support. The U.N. prioritized the needs, utilizing the military's logistics through a single point-of-contact: the CMOC. There was no official interface between NGOs and the American military.

In purely operational terms, the cooperation and coordination among the various participants will stand out for a long time to come. And that collaboration will be the focus of this chapter. Yet, while the immediate humanitarian abrasion of refugees had to be treated, no small task in itself, the much deeper political gash of genocide would remain unattended. The wrong solution, albeit an almost perfect one, had been applied.

It is this consciously ignored backdrop that shapes the context of the U.S. response and, consequently, the military's relationship with the NGOs. Given Rwanda's strategic insignificance and haunted by the lingering doubts of Somalia, the rationale behind U.S. policy and actions was to get out as quickly as possible with no casualties. There would be no more Somalias. Accordingly, the U.S. did what it took -- to include submitting itself to the U.N. -- to achieve this overriding interest. To have recognized the situation for what it was would have raised complex political issues with which no one wanted to be bothered.
The U.S. government was not alone in this approach. The NGO community, with the preemptive and notable exception of Doctors Without Borders, thought that their humanitarian actions could occur without political effect. What resulted was not just an end to the refugee crisis, but the sustainment and de facto legitimization of those who had committed genocide, the former government of Rwanda (including their army and their militia, the Interahamwe, "united attackers").

No other event so embodies the moral quandary of intervention and the fading distinction between humanitarian and political. Rwanda was a political problem par excellence. But we, the West, treated it as a humanitarian one. In the end, there is every reason to believe that this particular treatment of symptoms and not causes will bring us all back.

Rwanda and its cousin Burundi to the south share a history of enflamed ethnic conflict. In this region, the Tutsi minority has traditionally subjugated the Hutu majority. This ethnic division was reinforced under German and Belgian colonial rule. With Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962, the Hutus officially threw off the Tutsi yoke, killing thousands of Tutsis and sending thousands more into Zaire and Uganda. In 1973, the Tutsi-dominated Burundi army killed thousands of Burundi Hutus which set off the further killing of Rwandan Tutsis by the Rwandan Hutus. In 1993, a Tutsi-dominated army coup in Burundi, set off more killings of Burundi Hutus by Burundi Tutsis. This sustained ethnic hatred set the stage for the Rwandan genocide in April of 1994.

On April 6th, a plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda (a moderate Hutu) and President Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi (a moderate Hutu) was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. While no one has ever been implicated, the results of this dual assassination are more than clear. Almost as if on signal, the killing of Tutsis and of moderate Hutu political leaders within Rwanda began. Radio des Mille Collines (Radio of 1,000 hills, which originally operated out of Des Mille Hotel) was soon announcing "The grave is still only half full, who will help us to fill it?" Monique Mujawamariya, a Rwandan human rights activist who escaped, reported the following.
In my neighborhood there were six militiamen who in three hours killed 200 people. They had automatic weapons, they had a map, and they knew exactly where they were going. They had total impunity. They were paid, and they would get bonuses for the scope of the massacre. 328

There is no doubt that the killing of the Tutsis was premeditated and systematic. 329 Genocide had been committed.

As multiple reports indicate, this crime was known at the time, particularly in America. Upon returning from the region, Representative Tony Hall (Ohio-D) wrote an open letter to Ambassador Madeleine Albright on June 9th, which combined realpolitik and idealism. "The fundamental concern must be to take swift action before other members of the global community begin to duplicate acts of Genocide . . . It is imperative for the United Nations to strengthen itself by holding its member states accountable." 330

But the knowledge of the event was ignored. To begin with, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not take any action. Generally speaking, a Cold War collection of dictators, acting against their own citizens under the guise of sovereignty, the OAU is used to looking away in the name of stability. 331 "When they look at a Rwanda, it makes them all nervous. Because it's either happening or could happen to them." 332 The OAU was not going to take any action -- it was not in their heritage or their interest.

That left the West, whose reaction was naturally shaped by its collective strategic indifference to central Africa. Yet, genocide is still genocide. Moreover, human rights in Africa had been recently rewoven into the fabric of American diplomacy. In an address before the 23rd African-American Institute Conference in Reston, Virginia, Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out the parameters of America's policy toward the African continent:

The Clinton Administration will make Africa a high priority and give it the attention it deserves . . . And we will help Africa build its capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution so that the people of that continent can live free of the terror of war. At the heart of our new relationship will be an enduring commitment to democracy and human rights . . . I want to make clear that the United States will take human rights into account as we determine how to allocate our scarce resources for foreign assistance. 333
Despite this policy, there would be no action, in part because the Department of Defense saw another Somalia in Rwanda. Concerned with casualties and open-ended entanglements, there was no seeming rationale for U.S. military involvement. Though it was a political situation from the beginning, there was no political will to address the essence of the problem.

With a full-fledged cholera/dysentery epidemic -- one person dying a minute -- the world mobilized according to a definition with which it was more comfortable. As one observer noted:

The miraculous and unheralded arrival of dysentery gave the world a born-again virgin purity. Genocide took a back seat to a humanitarian disaster. The drama of the rescue could now begin, and the curtain of good intentions allowed to fall on the mass graves. The moral and political question mark created by the world's passive acquiescence to the annihilation of the Tutsis was erased by the monumental logistical problems of dealing with the epidemic.  

On July 22nd, President Clinton called the situation the "world's worst humanitarian crisis in a generation . . ." From the beginning of this tragedy, the United States has been in the forefront of the international community's response. Defined as such, the American response was a matter of addressing immediate humanitarian needs.

While there were significant refugee populations almost everywhere, the focus of the international media, and the U.S. response, would be Goma, where almost one million refugees were spread throughout three major camps. If the epidemic were to last, hundreds of thousands could easily die. While enormous, this situation was now a matter of organization. With DHA designated as the lead agency in Rwanda and UNHCR designated as the lead agency in Goma, Tanzania, and Entebbe, the infrastructure was soon in place to handle the situation.

The common understanding of the humanitarian problem was apparent. The first priority was clean water and then it was a matter of organizing the camps and establishing distribution systems for food stuffs and other necessities. Although unprecedented in its size, a refugee problem is something with which the humanitarian community is quite familiar. Moreover, given the right tools, stopping cholera is somewhat academic. With a clear humanitarian
mandate, this common understanding almost automatically equated to a permeating common sense in the field. The introduction of U.S. logistical support expedited a process that would have happened anyway. The stabilization of the emergency took place by mid-August.

Before focusing on the humanitarian solution, however, it should be noted that there was a wide-spread feeling from the beginning that feeding the leaders of genocide, their army, and their militia, would have unpleasant consequences. Alain Destexhe, Secretary-General of Doctors Without Borders, wrote a letter to The Economist, published in the last week of July. He warned that just as the Khmer refugee camps on the Thai border had kept alive the Khmer Rouge, so would Rwandan refugee camps keep the former Hutu government alive. Using the same logic as Congressman Hall's June 9th letter to Ambassador Albright, Destexhe predicted that if the perpetrators were not punished, this fact would be "borne in mind by other potential tyrants."336

Of much greater stature, at least in America, was Ambassador Robert Oakley's prescient article in The Washington Post on July 27, 1994. Oakley warned from the beginning that this emergency needed a multi-faceted response. First and foremost, Oakley emphasized that the solution would be protracted and political. At the politically strategic level, the OAU had to become the primary player in solving the problem (in conjunction with the UN and NGOs). Tactically, the OAU and regional African governments must accept the responsibility for dealing with the numerous armed and ruthless Hutus from the former regime who have moved to Zaire. In the short term they must be prevented from terrorizing the refugees and disrupting relief and return activities. In the longer term they must be prevented from organizing to return and seize power by force. Also the threat they pose to international civilian and military humanitarian workers cannot be ignored. Nor can the possibility of casualties. If casualties among humanitarian workers should occur, the American people need to recognize that the cause is worth the price. But to minimize the threat, an early start must be made on disarmament.337

What was warned about is now true.338 What was prescribed was never attempted because the situation had been categorized as a humanitarian one. Reflecting on his article, Oakley notes that it was "not too terribly prescient -- just common sense at the time."339
Indeed, he later emphasized that "everyone knew [about the political impact of feeding the perpetrators] from the beginning."\textsuperscript{340}

It was against this backdrop that U.S. forces deployed to Uganda, Zaire, and Rwanda at the end of July. They would have only one concern -- the humanitarian need.

On July 22nd, White House and Pentagon officials defined the military's mission according to the following tasks:

- Provide air traffic and communications control for the necessary airfields.
- Provide military security at the airfields.
- Provide surveillance aircraft to track refugees.
- Deploy loading/unloading equipment.
- Establish a purified water system.\textsuperscript{341}

Despite these specifics, there was a primary humanitarian intent. Designated JTF \textit{Support Hope} by European Command, \textit{Support Hope}'s mission was "to provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations in theater to alleviate the immediate suffering of Rwandan refugees (summarized verbally by USCINCEUR [the commander-in-chief of European Command] as "stop the dying").\textsuperscript{342}

This mission statement left no doubt as to what humanitarian end-state the military should work towards. The mission statement was further enhanced, however, by the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder. Schroeder took the somewhat unusual and additional step of examining every single speech and statement by senior policy-makers on \textit{Operation Support Hope}. From these, he developed an intent of facilitating, not of doing. This approach would keep the mission sharply defined, allow other participants to find their comparative niche, and prevent dependency upon U.S. resources. Importantly, such an intent was possible only because the political dimension was completely ignored by the Executive Branch.

The international community was already reacting to the crisis. With a nominal airhead in Entebbe and a presence in Kigali and Goma, the U.N. had determined the lead agencies which would head
the responses. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs was designated as the lead agency in Rwanda itself. UNHCR was designated the lead in Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. There would be some problems with this set-up as HCR-Zaire and HCR-Uganda were not in the habit of talking to each other directly, instead choosing to go upstream to their international headquarters in Geneva. Although these types of problems caused consternation with the U.S. effort, the U.N. infrastructure was sufficient to deal with the crisis at hand. Indeed, the U.N. effort, in general, was commendable.

With the U.N. already in place and long-time NGOs continuing their work there, the U.S., according to its mission and its desire to have a very subdued role, was just one among many participants. Whereas in the previous case studies, the U.S. had a central, if not leading, role to play, the U.S. was not involved in any direct humanitarian action or decision-making. At every turn, its role was facilitation and support. Crucial to the success of this type of mission was the person chosen to be responsible for civil-military operations.

In 1993, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan had established the Peace-Keeping Institute (PKI) in recognition that peacekeeping and its related endeavors would be a significant part of the future. Chosen to become the first Director was Colonel Karl Farris, an Army armor officer who had recently returned from working in Cambodia with the U.N. With a year under his belt working within the discipline and among the other players in the humanitarian community (to include OFDA and several NGOs), Farris was a natural person to head the civil-military operations in Rwanda.

On July 23rd, General Sullivan gave Farris a Saturday morning call and told him to get in touch with the NGOs: what was the situation over there and what were their needs? Farris soon called Lauren Landis-Guzman (formerly of the Somalia DART and now working with Interaction) and Joelle Tanguy (formerly of MSF/ France in Somalia and now the Executive Director of MSF/USA). Although Farris left for Europe the next day, both women got back to him in time and provided the appropriate information. For the first time, if ever so briefly, the military had sought out NGO expertise stateside before deploying. By July 28th, Farris was in Entebbe. His plan called for a CMOC in Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali.
Bringing water to a meeting with local officials; negotiations and planning with local officials are an everyday part of humanitarian operations. U.S. Army Military History Institute.
Entebbe had been chosen by the JTF commander as a stop-gap until Kigali International Airport opened up. (Although military planes could, and did, land there, commercial planes did not because the airport was not certified for safety, driving insurance rates sky-high). In the meantime, Entebbe would serve as the airhead through which supplies to both Rwanda and Zaire moved. The JTF headquarters were located on the fourth floor of the Entebbe airport terminal.

The CMOC in Entebbe was stood up on July 28th and was initially under the direction of Farris and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Schillare, USA. When Farris went to Kigali to stand-up the Kigali CMOC in early August, Colonel Steven Riley, USA, took over as Director of the Entebbe CMOC (Schillare continued as the Deputy Director).

The CMOC was collocated with the JTF headquarters at the Entebbe Airport air terminal. Located on the fourth floor of the terminal as well, the CMOC was directly across from the J-3 shop (operations). While there would still be some slight conceptual problems between the J-3 and the CMOC, this set-up would prove ideal. The goal of the CMOC was to be in the wholesale business of expediting transport to the retailer, the NGO, who dealt directly with the customer, the refugee. The best manner in which to accomplish this task was to "create an atmosphere to support, not to lead."

Although successful in this goal, both Schillare and Riley were a bit ambivalent about their non-traditional assignment. Riley, a logistician, had never heard of a CMOC -- "I couldn't spell it" -- and Schillare, an armor officer, greeted the news as though he had just "tested positive for HIV." Yet, both quickly grasped the central role of the CMOC and found themselves working directly with UNHCR and the varied and transient NGOs who were on their way to and from Rwanda and Zaire.

The CMOC met every morning at 0800 on the fourth floor. Schillare or Riley initially ran the meetings as UNHCR did not have the office space or furniture to conduct meetings. (Later, after HCR took an office space on the first floor of the terminal, the meetings were held there). Again, in a familiar format, specific coordination events for that day and the next forty-eight hours were analyzed and a common sense prioritization emerged from the discussion.
C-141 Starlifter provides global reach by rapidly bringing large quantities of relief supplies to those in need.

*Department of Defense, Joint Combat Camera Center.*
Essentially, the humanitarian needs of Goma drove the process. If there were any disputes, Eva Demant, the senior UNHCR representative had the final say.

The representatives at the meeting varied, especially among the NGOs. NGOs showed up according to the need to move their "stuff" or themselves into or out-of theater. Hence, the NGOs were not so much a permanent, same person representative as they were a permanent, collective presence. Given their transient nature and the fact that Entebbe was a stop-gap measure waiting on Kigali International, there was no real need for NGOs to even attend the CMOC meetings.

The information they had, however, either about shipments coming in or about events/needs as they left Rwanda, was very important to the CMOC and its ability to monitor the entire situation. Per the principle of altruistic self-interest, the CMOC came up with two "hooks," or valuable goods, to exchange for the NGO information. Because commercial air was not flying into an uninsured Kigali airport, military air was the fastest theater entrance (the other possibility was a long truck drive). This asset was self-evident and the CMOC developed a process by which the NGO presented a flying "chit" to the Combined Logistics Cell (to be discussed shortly) and were accommodated accordingly.

The second "hook" was as novel as it was brilliant. The CMOC posted a bulletin board outside their office on which NGO personnel could tack their business cards. NGOs would want to find out who else was "in town." One look at the board, a discussion with CMOC operators, and an NGO worker, in search of expertise and/or assessments, could track a trusted colleague within a day or two. In the meantime, once at the CMOC, the NGO representative would be asked the pertinent questions of the day.

Although not dealing with the same NGOs on a daily basis, this was the most official direct contact the military would experience with the NGO community. This NGO interface proved successful for five main reasons.

First, Riley and Schillare clearly understood, according to Schroeder's intent, that their job was to facilitate and support.
Military tractor trailer transports water to a variety of distribution points in the camps around Goma.

Department of Defense, Joint Combat Camera Center.
Next, along with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Lindsey, USA, Schilliere had developed the idea of the Combined Logistics Center (CLC). The CLC acted as the mechanism by which the CMOC coordination process was enacted. With Lindsey and two U.N. workers from Croatia, the CLC did the actual tarmac movement of relief supplies and implemented all of the coordination decisions agreed upon at the CMOC meeting.\textsuperscript{347} For instance, once a flying "chit" was approved at the CMOC meeting, the NGO person would take the "chit" to the CLC where it was recorded and prioritized according to the CMOC's intent. The CLC, as the first stage of implementing CMOC coordination, was an instrumental tool for making things happen.

The CLC also represented the first step taken by the CMOC in an effort to transition to the U.N. Developed in conjunction with U.N. workers, the CLC was the first mechanism of coordination to be fully assumed by the U.N., as Lieutenant Colonel Lindsey eased himself out of the picture. Moreover, while the CMOC itself remained on the fourth floor, its coordination meetings were soon transferred to the U.N.'s office space on the first floor. This transition not only meant less of a walk, it also symbolized that the U.N. was taking control of the effort.

The CMOC's constant awareness and encouragement of the necessity for U.N. control was critical in establishing U.N. leadership, and thus responsibility, for the overall logistics effort out of Entebbe. With the U.N. as the primary player, the U.S. could begin to assume a less-pronounced role while simultaneously creating an environment in which NGO personnel were more comfortable: on with the U.N. facilitating the response. Also, the sooner the U.N. was in charge, the faster the Americans would go home.

Fourth, the NGO interface was a success because of the attention given to the CMOC by General Schroeder. Not only did the CMOC Director or Deputy-Director attend the JTF staff meetings but Schroeder also took the time to go and spend time in the CMOC itself. Schroeder went so far as to use a secondary entrance to the air terminal that had him pass first through the CMOC before entering the rest of his staff's office space. As a result, Riley and Schilliere had unlimited access to the JTF commander. Both Riley and Schilliere confirm that Schroeder was very concerned with the CMOC and its impact on civilian relations.\textsuperscript{348}
Digging a mass grave. At the height of the cholera epidemic there were 6,000 refugee deaths a day, principally from cholera. *Department of Defense, Joint Combat Camera Center.*
Finally, Tom Frye of the DART had been seconded to General Schroeder as a humanitarian advisor. Frye traveled everywhere with the General and provided "humanitarian" input for all the decisions made by Schroeder. Thus, not only was the CMOC collocated with the JTF (it was really an extension of it), when the JTF commander was away, he always had humanitarian expertise on-call. (An important point as Kigali and Goma had different humanitarian needs. Moreover, Frye could tap into the DART presence in both towns).

While all worked out very well, there were some initial problems that are worth noting. When Dr. Brent Burkholder of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) flew to Rwanda on July 24th, he waited in Entebbe for three days. Granted, the military was just setting up and figuring themselves out, but it was apparent that the military's first concern was providing for itself. This perception was probably not due to any particular intent, but rather a manifestation of a traditional military mindset (something evidenced by Riley and Schillare's initial reactions to being assigned to the CMOC).

Schillare reflects, however, that "his biggest frustration in Entebbe" was a mindset more concerned with a wire-diagram schematic and its infrastructure than with the humanitarian purpose it was facilitating. For example, such a mindset created a backlog of humanitarian supplies in Entebbe during the first few days. The root cause of such problems, though, was the following question: on which mechanism should the JTF staff focus to accomplish its mission? It soon became a matter of convincing the J-3 and the rest of the joint staff that "in a humanitarian JTF, the CMOC is the focus." Schillare went to great lengths to make this point. At the staff meetings, he would bring over a big can of maize or a box of high-energy biscuits and state: "this is why we're here." As Colonel Riley points out, "who are you there to support: yourself, or the humanitarian effort?"

This insight is noteworthy because it suggests that even with a clearly humanitarian intent, a supportive JTF commander, and the collocation of the CMOC and the J-3, a traditional mindset will present itself. Not because it is malicious or purposeful, but because it is human nature to fall back into something known and comfortable -- i.e., the way one is trained -- particularly when confronted with the unknown.
With the influx of trucks with a forty metric-ton payload (compared to a C-130 thirteen metric-ton payload) and, later, the opening of Kigali airport in mid-September, the Entebbe airhead died a natural death and CMOC Entebbe became secondary in importance to the CMOC in Kigali. Before considering this effort, however, it is necessary to examine the nature of CMOC Goma and its importance during the first weeks of August.

Goma, Zaire, was the focus of the crisis. At the end of July there were over 800,000 refugees in three camps and they were dying at a rate of 6500 a day. The area was blanketed from above by the haze of thousands of fires and from below by human feces. It was absolutely unprecedented.

UNHCR was reeling. Philippe O'Grendi of UNHCR had to find a way to address the myriad of problems. Among the most pressing needs were the distribution and storage of clean water and the burial of the dead. Other concerns included the rapid influx of NGOs with varying degrees of skills and previous experience, the utter chaos of the situation, and the potential for violence.

The organization of a response to such an overwhelming problem necessitated a central location in which all agencies could meet. O'Grendi established his coordination center (there was no real title) at a bank in downtown Goma. Accordingly, O'Grendi would have large NGO meetings once or twice a week (where over 100 would participate). The real money-maker, however, were the sectoral meetings which addressed specific areas (i.e. sanitation, water, seeds and tools, etc.) and how to best coordinate the available assets. This central yet diffused effort, based on consensus-building, proved very effective.

By July 30th, CMOC Goma had been established at the airfield on the northern edge of town. (The U.S. focused its support efforts on water purification, delivery, and storage as well as some basic engineering help). The term "CMOC" is actually a misnomer. It was more like a MOC, a military operations center that facilitated U.N. requests vis-à-vis its liaison with O'Grendi's coordination center at the bank. The "CMOC" had no interface with NGOs, or any other civilian agencies. The actual military headquarters -- enclosed for security reasons out at the airfield -- served to facilitate U.N. requests and take care of its own infrastructure. There was no civil dimension
to it as an operations center. One DART member described it as a "separate support activity." This assessment is a fair one as the "CMOC" at the eye of the hurricane ironically had no coordination contact with the NGOs (although there was obviously contact at the point of implementation between troops and NGOs).

The liaison was primarily one person: Major Richard Hooker, USA. Hooker's job was to liaison in support of UNHCR in accordance with his commander's intent (facilitate, don't do). It was a relatively simple process. Hooker would attend the general and sectoral meetings, which were conducted in French and English, as one more player within the humanitarian response. He would collect and track requests that had been validated by UNHCR only. (Sometimes these requests would be left in a drop-box in the basement of the bank where the DART was collocated). Once done, and working in conjunction with OFDA's expertise, Hooker would report back to Brigadier General Nix, USA, the "CMOC" commander for final approval. By all accounts, this methodology worked reasonably well.

Crucial to this success was the NGOs' understanding of the American military's role and Hooker himself. It was self-evident that the Americans were not there to implement, coordinate, or otherwise take charge. One-and-all recognized that the U.S. force would abide by Philippe O'Greendi and UNHCR's decisions on prioritization. Hooker was essentially understood as a messenger. Given the context of the U.S. mission and the role of Hooker, there would be no attempt at an end-run by the NGOs to speak directly with the Americans. Besides, there was just too much to do.

This common understanding of the U.S. purpose and role forced the NGOs, vis-à-vis UNHCR, to use the military for exactly what it said it would do. Also, it forced the UNHCR and the NGOs to come up with alternative methods and means of their own to solve situations that the U.S. could conceivably address, but would not.

The issue of transition was the only noteworthy problem of this nominal interaction. According to Greg Garbinsky, the American force had promised to leave certain gear and equipment behind and then vacillated. While the DART could have pushed harder for a transition plan, it was probably anticipating more than the four-day notice the American forces had provided. Also, the gear issue was
important because its absence/presence determined just how self-sufficient the UNHCR effort would become. Both issues were resolved as the gear and equipment stayed and the departure was postponed for a week.

By mid-August, the death rate was down to "just" 500 a day as the situation began to resemble something with which UNHCR and the rest of the humanitarian community could cope. On August 28th, "CMOC" Goma shut down.

CMOC Kigali was formed on August 5th by Karl Farris as a sub-component of UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office). Farris directed the CMOC and reported to General Schroeder in Entebbe. During the third week in August, Farris and his Deputy Director, Lieutenant Colonel John Crary, USA, returned home. They were replaced by Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR, and Colonel Fred Jones, USAR, both Civil Affairs officers. CMOC Kigali shut down on September 28th.

In order to coordinate the relief efforts in Rwanda, the U.N. had established DHA as the lead agency. DHA, according to its coordination mandate, set up the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in the UNDP building (U.N. Developmental Program) in downtown Kigali. The OSOCC was run by the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Arturo Hein. In reality, however, it was run by his Deputy, Charles Petrie (the same official who had worked in the Somalia HOC). The OSOCC had three objectives:

1. to provide a framework for the coordination of operational activities undertaken by humanitarian organizations responding to the Rwanda emergency;

2. to act as a focal point for the collection analysis and dissemination of information relating to developments in the emergency and the international relief activities; and

3. to facilitate the access to and sharing of resources for the timely and efficient delivery of humanitarian relief.354

The four essential components of this operation were represented within the OSOCC. There was UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office) itself which handled the actual coordination; UNAMIR (U.N. Assistance Mission In Rwanda) the peacekeeping mission; ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Organizations) which funded a
tent outside of the UNDP building to work in concert with UNREO, handling NGO liaison; and the CMOC, which handled airlift and relief support.\textsuperscript{355}

Not unlike UNHCR's coordination center in Goma, the OSOCC had large weekly meetings (as many as 100 people) every Tuesday and Friday night in which everyone had the opportunity to speak. Petrie, speaking from a table at the front, would open the meeting up with words of praise for various organizations and then ask for a general concurrence to that meeting's agenda. Then, according to emergency priority, sector, or region, the relevant representatives would speak their piece as a picture emerged from the different reports. Later sector-specific meetings would discuss the details of their responsibilities (i.e., sanitation). This consensus-building and diffused approach won high-marks from all involved.

It is extremely important to note the role of Petrie. While Petrie obviously was an outstanding leader in this potentially leaderless environment, it is more important to reflect on what the following comments indicate: that the U.N., as it was in Goma, can be very capable. Karl Farris remarked that Petrie was "the right person to pull a loose community together."\textsuperscript{356} Quentin Schillare from the CMOC in Entebbe noted that "Petrie is one of the heroes . . . if they didn't have him there, the plan [the military's] would have fallen apart."\textsuperscript{357} Paul Monacelli states that Petrie "was the key to success . . . he had the ability through his personality to get people to work together . . . If there had been no Charles Petrie, we may have had to have played a more active role."\textsuperscript{358} These comments, all from military officers with over twenty years experience, reveal the true scope of an operation well-done. For the first time in our study, the U.N. had been up to the task and had managed to satisfy its hardest customer, the American military.

Thus, it was with a very comfortable subordinancy that the CMOC operated in Kigali. Some might rush to point out that the wire-diagram called for Farris/Monacelli to report to the JTF in Entebbe. Of course, this point is true. Yet, let there be no doubt, "we were working in support of the U.N. effort."\textsuperscript{359} As uncomfortable as that may seem to some, it is also the reason for the operation's success. Not only did this attitude make for more cohesive coordination, it also allowed the U.S. to write its exit strategy.
Like Goma, the official coordination between NGOs and American military is a non-story. With DHA having the last word on prioritization, the CMOC was removed from that decision-making process and its inherent responsibilities. Unlike Goma, however, and because the CMOC was collocated with the OSOCC, there were unique opportunities to encourage the coordination process and thus accelerate the exit strategy.

Truly regarded as just another component of the overall effort, the CMOC's position was first strengthened by its widely-acknowledged mandate -- to facilitate, not do. As in Goma, this position prevented an end-run by NGOs to take the path of least resistance; i.e., to use the military simply because it was there. Consequently, the NGOs respected the OSOCC structure and operated according to its parameters: submitting requests and awaiting adjudication and assignment by DHA. In this sense, the CMOC remained distinctly in the background.

In accordance with the military's mandate, this type of presence was more than appropriate. Yet, upon further inspection, it was nominally negative to the overall purpose. Accepted as part of the OSOCC structure and as not responsible for how resources were allocated, the CMOC inherently risked the chance of becoming a passive player, with absolutely no control over events. It could easily have assumed the mantle of somebody else's tool.

This potential was not realized for four reasons. First, as discussed briefly, the CMOC accepted and encouraged its subordination to UNREO. Colonel Farris recognized from the beginning that "it's OK not to be in charge . . . it's best that you not be in charge."360 Out of sync with traditional military training -- "when in charge, take charge" -- this awareness indicates the open-mindedness with which one must approach these situations. Farris further notes that there can be no "presumed formula based on a warfighting [doctrinal] mindset." This unencumbered and atypical military intent permeated the entire CMOC Kigali effort as the humanitarians were more receptive to the CMOC staff.

Second, there was an aggressive liaison effort. Farris was constantly out and about the city and countryside. As he checked on the implementation of coordinated efforts, Farris did not hesitate to let NGOs know of the CMOC's capabilities. It was through unofficial
contact like this that NGOs became aware of the CMOC and what it could do for them. This theme was continued by Monacelli. Adding to the "C" themes of Collaboration, Consensus, and Coordination, Monacelli stressed that there must be a "Courting" process as well. This unofficial contact was essential in a wire-diagram that did not reflect such interaction. Monacelli suggests that "the more structured you become, the less effective you are in coordinating with the humanitarian community." Thus, the informal, yet aggressive, courting process becomes the primary conduit of mission accomplishment.

Next, the CMOC did not become a passive instrument of the U.N. infrastructure because they were able to demonstrate their value-added nature. According to the principle of altruistic self-interest, the sooner the NGOs and the humanitarian community accessed the military's logistics, the sooner stabilization would result, the sooner the military could return home. The obvious "hook" was the logistic capability. For example, the CMOC brought down a Movement/Control team down from European Command to coordinate the burgeoning fleet of U.N. trucks in Rwanda (eventually over 400 trucks).

But there were also more subtle enticements that made the NGOs want to check in with the CMOC when they stopped by UNREO. For instance, the new government of Rwanda had posted a map of known land-mines in the Kigali area. Fred Jones managed to get a copy of it, posting it outside the CMOC office. Initially ignored, it received a great deal of attention when a mine was set off just a few days later. Another example involves the use of the military's aerial photography. At one point, the rumor-mill had produced a near catastrophe of almost 100,000 refugees congregating near one particular bridge. The military was able to produce some photo-imagery that suggested that the actual numbers were significantly less. It was these types of innovative approaches that made NGOs seek out CMOC personnel when they stopped by UNREO.

Finally, the manner in which military interaction was presented made the official and unofficial interface with NGOs "user-friendly." Monacelli points out that they "made a conscious decision not to sit at the front table; we instead sat in the first row of chairs." In this manner, a proper example of "coordination and facilitation with no
unrealistic expectations" was set. As the emergency stabilized, and with obvious symbolism, the CMOC officers slowly moved towards the back of the room. By the time the CMOC shut down at the end of September, the CMOC was represented by an Air Force Second Lieutenant intelligence officer who stood in the back.

Thus, it was always very clear that the military would transition out sooner, rather than later. While they were there, however, it was also clearly understood that they would do everything within their mandate to facilitate the humanitarian effort. It was this well-balanced approach, coupled with the interpersonal skills of the CMOC officers, that made the CMOC most effective.

These four points were only possible because the CMOC was collocated with the OSOCC. Importantly, these points, due to the manner in which they were implemented, did not encourage the CMOC to be viewed as a passive appendage of the U.N. infrastructure. Moreover, they also directly contributed to an information sharing atmosphere that was so important to Petrie's leadership style. If sharing was the accepted name of the game, the above elements of the CMOC strategy eventually contributed to the snowball of cohesion that Petrie was pushing downhill.

This atmosphere of information sharing was reinforced by one final intriguing element of the OSOCC, located in a tent outside the UNDP building: the NGO Liaison Unit (NLU). Just as the CMOC did not officially interface with NGOs, the NGO Liaison did not coordinate the NGO effort. Yet, Anita Menghetti, the NGO Liaison, had very good relations with all the CMOC officers and was equally appreciated by them. This only official NGO relationship of the CMOC made for smoother coordination and cohesion within UNREO. Her contribution to the NGOs -- "to be nothing to everybody and everything to everybody." reflects just how far the NGOs have come in acknowledging the need for integration; while also demonstrating just how very far they have to go.

Anita Menghetti's employment process, in and of itself, reveals the complex nature of the NGOs and their cherished tradition of organizational autonomy. Menghetti had been working for ICVA in Geneva. ICVA, like Interaction in the United States, is an umbrella NGO for over a 100 European and American NGOs. Also like Interaction, the NGO membership uses ICVA for very general
purposes that serves everyone's interest. ICVA, too, serves no coordination or operational role in emergencies.

Thus, the NGO community in the greater Rwandan area did not ask for a NGO Liaison Unit. But Rudy von Bernuth, the Vice President of ICVA's Executive Committee (and also Vice President of Save the Children/U.S.) thought that they should have one anyway. Consequently, he had Save the Children fund ICVA's position and placed it under UNREO. Menghetti was thus seconded to the U.N. by Save to work in the ICVA funded unit. NGO liaison, let alone coordination, does not come easy.

In so many words, Menghetti was the "welcome-wagon" in Kigali to all the arriving NGOs. She registered NGOs (eventually building a computer database of who was doing what, where); she gave them all the necessary information (cost of renting, maps, how much to pay interpreters, drivers, etc.); and she served as a reference point for any NGO which had questions regarding UNREO. (She even developed a library, by sector, for the NGOs). All of this was done single-handedly until November, when two interns arrived to help her out.

Although the NLU was an absolutely invaluable service, the NGO community did not want to: 1) take it over; 2) expand it into a working group that could express its collective voice at the UNREO meetings. As Rudy Von Bernuth relates, the NGOs "accepted it [the NLU], but didn't invest in it."

And why invest in it? The NGOs had an accomplished fellow NGO of whom they could ask questions when they wanted. Importantly, they did not have to listen to anything she said. In the meantime, they could attend UNREO meetings, contribute as they saw fit, and continue on with their humanitarian charter.

In many ways, at least initially, the Rwandan emergency was like a long-lost friend to the NGO community. The military was kept in its place, was accessible as needed *vis-à-vis* the U.N., and, in the meantime, they were able to act as they wanted, as they have always done. They were free to go about being purely humanitarian.

In many ways, the Rwandan intervention was also greeted as a long-lost friend by the rest of the American forces deployed to the region. While the CMOCs displayed a nuanced understanding of the
situation, the rest of the American contingent behaved according to its cherished charter. With the CMOC handling the humanitarian coordination, the much valued and coveted single point-of-contact had reasserted itself. The enclaved deployment of military personnel ensured that the interaction between American forces and NGOs, let alone the refugees themselves, would be very limited. A dynamic, multi-dimensional chessboard had been reduced to a two-dimensional wire-diagram, something with which the military was infinitely more comfortable.

Worrisome, however, is the overriding imperative of the deployment: no casualties. Indeed, Dr. Burkholder distinctly remembers being in the Goma "CMOC" and seeing the Army's posted number one goal: no casualties. With Somalia as a cognitive map, this feeling saturated the forces and was evident in everything they did. For example, the Americans built up the airstrips in Goma and Kigali into veritable fire-bases. When they moved, they had HUMVEE's with mounted .50 caliber machine-guns at the front and rear of the convoy. No matter the context, they always wore their flak jacket and helmet.

A first response might be, "well, that's what militaries do; besides, you can't argue with results (no casualties)." Indeed, this point is well-taken. There is a very strong argument that such a presentation of no-nonsense and overwhelming force set the proper tone for the deployment and, as a result, there were no problems. Such an employment, if necessary, further makes for an easier transition to a real warfighting scenario. These points are very true and seemingly persuasive.

But when women were driving throughout the countryside, alone, as were the rest of the NGO personnel, one begins to wonder whether or not this particular application of "security" is appropriate. Many recall the curious juxtaposition between unarmed NGOs going anywhere they wanted and the armed-to-the-teeth military having to be in before dark while not being allowed in the refugee camps at all. Greg Garbinsky notes that once the Americans left, convoys around Goma increased by one or two runs a day because there was no security to slow it down.

In both communities, then, the Rwandan intervention was welcomed home like a long-lost brother. The NGOs, eventually over
a hundred in the region, were able to access military support while simultaneously keeping it at arm's length. The military was able to do something humanitarian, in a military manner, while keeping the humanitarians at arm's length.

This acceptance of traditional roles was possible for one reason: the political reality was ignored. Fortunately for the military, this ignorance was part of their mandate. The ghost of Somalia dictated no casualties, a small footprint, a short duration, and an overwhelming conventional power. From the beginning, as political instruments, they were intentionally isolated from the political situation by the senior policy-makers. There would be no political impact from their presence and no expectations created because it was understood from the beginning what the military's role would be.

In this sense, lessons had been learned from past humanitarian interventions. There was no way the military means would be confused with the humanitarian end. As a result, the military was much more effective. That the political situation was ignored, that "we had postponed death in that part of the world until another bloodbath" and that "we really didn't solve a problem" was beside the point. In fact, the case can be made that Rwanda was the ultimate continuum of effort: the military knew and kept its place, according to its mandate, as it enabled the humanitarian effort.

The NGOs, on the other hand, used their own charters to isolate themselves from the political reality. Despite having a significant and immediate humanitarian impact, very few NGOs were willing to acknowledge, let alone consider, the long-term ramifications of their actions. That, in fact, they were feeding the perpetrators of genocide and specifically enabling the former Rwandan government, whose sole intent was to begin the war again (something the U.S. government was obviously party to with its financial support of the NGOs). As Rudy Von Bernuth states so clearly, "we'd better fess up to the fact that we can't do anything that's apolitical." Anita Menghetti takes it one step further: "There never was such a thing as an apolitical NGO."

What was nominally the purest of humanitarian missions, and was conducted as such by the NGOs and the military, ultimately was operating in the purest of political environments.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS

Above all else, this "emergency" was rooted in genocide. No matter how one presents the case, this one irrefutable fact glares through the humanitarian mist. The entire world had stood by and watched.

Only when the "humanitarian" label had been attached did the world take action. This last slap-in-the-face to the one-half million dead will forever remain one of the most tragic ironies of our lifetime. And thus the international community of nations must ask itself: what is the purpose of armies and what is the purpose of humanitarian organizations if not to prevent this great evil? Ultimately, this question may be the only one worth asking. For now, however, it is important to examine some other philosophical ramifications of this ignored political reality.

Rwanda, as an extension of the Somalia experience, raises some very fundamental questions about national interest and the use of force in a humanitarian intervention and its eventual effect on the CMOC. The single most important manifestation of these concerns is the enclave deployment of U.S. personnel. Irrespective of force protection, mission statement, and the end-result, the following observations, at the least, have to be considered before the next such intervention.

"Many attempts to have NGOs and the military become more familiar with each other have been made in the U.S., but those meetings and exercises mainly involve the higher level managers of NGOs and the upper ranks of the military. The real familiarization has to be made among field people. Since Somalia and the loss of U.S. lives there, the understandable emphasis on security has distanced U.S. military personnel even more from their NGO counterparts. This was obvious in Goma, Zaire, where there was almost no social mixing of the two groups. Without the personal relationships, such as were possible in northern Iraq, the organizational relationships will never work. In a field of human endeavor so stressful and emotional, the personal linkages are even more important. [emphasis added] In Goma, while sometimes sitting in the back of a pickup truck on the way to the camps, we would pass a military convoy escorting several U.S. military water technicians: as I said, an understandable concern for the well being of soldiers,
but not available to civilians who were taking far more risks. This situation sends very mixed messages to NGOs and makes it difficult for them to identify with the mission of the military.\textsuperscript{372}

This statement by a world-respected doctor who has served extensively in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda is disconcerting. Anita Menghetti synopsizes these ideas about the military's separation from the relief effort more directly: "duty only goes so far . . . you have to see the effect of what you're doing."\textsuperscript{373} And Dr. Les Roberts suggests that like Mao's guerrillas, all helpers must swim in the sea of the helped.\textsuperscript{374} The above thoughts have three potential consequences.

Essentially, the paramount question that needs asking is: does such a deployment separate the American soldier from the very values that he espouses and joined to defend? What are the ramifications (psychological or otherwise) to an American force that, regardless of its mandate, ignores the reality around it?\textsuperscript{375}

Second, as the Bangladesh and northern Iraq case studies indicate (and to some extent Somalia), success comes from the power of an intangible cohesion that results from the mixing between the humanitarian community and the military, and then, more importantly, between the helpers and the helped. That type of cohesion was an impossibility from the beginning in Rwanda. Granted, the CMOC worked extremely well. But there was nothing like the cohesion witnessed in northern Iraq and Bangladesh where everyone was intermingled in a common, uniting effort. If the political aspects had been acknowledged in Rwanda, the CMOC effort would have failed. As a liaison within such a politically-charged environment, the necessary cohesion between the two communities would never have resulted. The Mogadishu CMOC, despite the best efforts of those involved, would have been replicated.

Third, as discussed in the Somalia chapter, does such a cautious and enclaved deployment -- primarily focused on no casualties -- not eventually effect the mindset of the warfighter? If, at every level, the troop commander's basic worry is no casualties, is not risk-taking and boldness inevitably eroded? Will this cautious mindset not figuratively and literally bleed over into a warfighting scenario? As Dick Vennigone of World Vision observed about Rwanda: "How can
you be a world leader and expect to use your military power without anybody getting hurt? These questions are left at the rhetorical level. Humanitarian operations must be conducted as military operations pursuant to a political purpose. Only then will military personnel be unfettered to act, \textit{and interact}, as the situation demands.

A strategic concern, based on the above implications, is that the CMOC, as a liaison between the communities, is an unwitting abettor to the problem. Granted, the CMOC in this case did everything unofficially possible to interact with the NGOs and understand the larger issues. But as an institutional interface, it remained a liaison tool. Both communities -- because of their desire to ignore, or have ignored for them, the political context -- did not mind this artificial separation. As a result, the CMOC as a liaison worked relatively well. If the political context had been remotely addressed by either community, the CMOCs would have failed. Such an environment demands that decisions be made at the same table in conjunction with the other political and military concerns. Therefore, we must be careful not to suggest that the interface of the two communities has been finally figured out. It worked for one, and only one, reason: it was a humanitarian effort that did not seek to address the larger political issues.

Once this last notion is accepted, it is possible to focus on the positive coordination lessons learned. First and foremost, although it was just another player, the U.S. obviously could have taken on a larger role, even after it deployed. By defining its mission and assiduously pursuing and maintaining it, the American force made very clear what it would do to its fullest extent, and what it would not even consider. In so doing, the other parties were able to more easily define their own role within the continuum of effort.

Such a clearly defined mission also prevents other parties from accessing the military for resources simply because it is the path of least resistance. Fully aware of what they would not get from the military, even though the military could theoretically provide it, the NGOs were forced to come up with their own alternatives. This avoidance of military dependence ultimately rested on the accepted role of the U.N. as lead agency. All parties recognized that the U.N. would have the final word on prioritization. There must be a center of effort. The U.N. proved capable.
This logic additionally implies that *vis-à-vis* the U.N., the comparative advantage of both communities were successfully employed. While there was not an extensive intermingling, so as to provide further cohesion to the overall effort, there is no doubt that both communities did extremely well within their respective sectors. Moreover, the military was willing to accept its subordinate role. Colonel Farris' words come back to mind: "it's OK not to be in charge." Clearly reminiscent of the Bangladesh and northern Iraq coordination processes, this atypical military mindset is a critical element upon which the military/NGO relationship must be founded.

There is also the operational issue of transition, best illustrated in the Goma example. Without a clear idea of what the military was going to do, the humanitarian community could not project what resources were needed and when. Not a significant event in light of the overall impact, this glitch does point to an idea that will make the next humanitarian intervention better: "joint" assessment/transition teams.

To a large degree, the arrival of the military imposes a false time line on the continuum of a humanitarian emergency. The NGOs and those being helped have usually been there long before and will remain long after an American intervention. In this sense, the highly sought after end-state of the military is artificial. In order to be sensitive to this fact and its operational implications, the CMOC must "plug into" or have as its own, an element fully dedicated to assessment/transition.

Hopefully, such an element could tap into a parent element within the conceptual HOC/OSOCC. If not, the continuum nature of a complex emergency demands that the military think about its short-term actions, to include withdrawal, and their long-term implications. Thus, this element of at least the CMOC, should include people with operational experience who can also conceptually relate to the humanitarian response. It would be their only job to work jointly with the humanitarian experts as they simultaneously assess the immediate situation while relating it to the mandate's end-state. The CMOC Director, and the JTF commander, should use them as an impartial reality check on the effect of the overall military effort. If done properly, in conjunction with the humanitarians, there will be no surprises, such as the Goma withdrawal, as everyone stays attuned to each other. Ultimately, such a process enhances the possibility that
the military's artificial end-state will encourage the overall continuum of effort.

Finally, there is the role of Army Civil Affairs. Although there should be further discussion as to when and how to bring the Reserves into an emergency situation, it goes without saying that they are critical to a successful effort. In this particular case, the effort worked perfectly as the Civil Affairs officers maintained and increased the excellent momentum that the regular officers had created. The question remains, however, what if the conventional folks applied had not been Farris, Riley, Schillare, or Crary? (Which is to say, what if General Sullivan himself had not taken a direct interest in the matter?) What if those responsible for the sandbagging of the airports had been instead given the mission of working with the NGOs? The forces chosen, to include their specialties and their individual personalities, are absolutely critical to the success of a mission.

There are two noteworthy tactical implications. First, in this case, collocation worked. Importantly, it worked because the OSOCC was recognized by the U.S. military and the NGOs as the center of the entire effort. Once collocated, the CMOC came to be truly viewed as the support mechanism that it was. This perception was largely due to an energetic and aggressive CMOC staff that not only clearly defined its mandate, but pursued it with vigor.

It was also due to the unifying lesson of all the case-studies: the principle of altruistic self-interest. On the military's side, it recognized that it had to "court" and provide the "hook" to engender NGO participation and the exchange of information. The exchange of services was again mutually beneficial.

**OPERATION RESTORE HOPE**
**COLLABORATION/COORDINATION PRINCIPLES**

1. For the best type of cohesion to develop among the response participants, there must be an intermingling between military and humanitarians, and between the entire international response and those being helped. This cohesion, rightly or wrongly, did not develop in Rwanda due to the enclaved deployment of American forces.
2. Once isolated from the political dimension of the emergency, both the military and the NGO perform admirably according to their traditional mandates and comparative advantages.

3. Once the U.N. is isolated from the complex political issues of an emergency, it works relatively well. If isolated -- kept to traditional refugee or Chapter Six scenarios -- the U.N. can prioritize needs and effectively employ the comparative advantages of the military and the NGOs.

4. It is OK for the military not to be in charge.

5. A broad humanitarian mandate allows for the military to stick to its comparative advantage in support of the humanitarian goal. Once defined, other components, particularly the NGOs, can define their own effort and not seek out the military as the path of least resistance to solve problems outside of the military's mandate.

6. The CMOC must be the focus of effort in a humanitarian intervention. Any other military focus runs the risk of the military means becoming confused with the humanitarian end.

7. The CMOC Director must have direct and unlimited access to the JTF commander.

8. A predetermined joint assessment/transition team whose sole job is to relate the immediate situation to the mandate while working in conjunction with the humanitarians, would do much to smooth the eventual military withdrawal.

9. Collocation works when there is a recognized center of effort.

10. The principle of altruistic self-interest remains self-evident.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

Locusts have no king, yet they advance together in ranks . . .

Proverbs 30:27

As we have seen, there are many dimensions to the relationship between the NGO community and the American military during times of humanitarian intervention. Given the unfolding nature of this relationship, tidy conclusions are out of the question. If there was to be one lesson from these experiences, however, it would be that there are no comprehensive models. None of these cases will ever be repeated; none should be cast in bronze nor held up as holy writ. There remains, however, some conceptual linkages among these studies, as well as some known facts and indicators, that are worth remembering. Like the other chapters, the conclusion examines the NGO/military relationship and the effectiveness of the CMOC from the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives. It will also present other conceptual lessons learned.

The most important lesson of this study is the importance of recognizing that humanitarian operations are implicitly political. Specifically, it is the handling of the political dimension by the highest levels, to include the President, that determines the NGO/military relationship. Other strategic lessons involve understanding the national security implications of a successful NGO/military relationship; the role of the U.N.; and the importance of initiating the NGO/military relationship as soon as possible.

The effectiveness of the CMOC and its NGO/military relationship is determined by how the political dimension of an intervention is handled. In northern Iraq, the political problem of 400,000 refugees from an ethnic group without a state was addressed as an extension of the Gulf War. There was a residual responsibility and resolve to see the matter through. There were also in-theater forces with which to do it. Although articulated as "purely humanitarian," the United Nations turned the traditional notion of sovereignty on its head as it eventually occupied the northern section
of Iraq. Without Resolution 688 of the Security Council, the situation could not have been addressed.

Moreover, a rapidly unfolding situation in the field prevented higher echelons of government from getting involved, let alone identifying a policy. As Major General James Jones notes, the only reason Operation Provide Comfort worked so well was because it was "all done without a piece of paper being signed; the situation grew up so quickly that it outstripped the governments' ability to be bureaucratic." Consequently, policy-makers had to rely on those in the field. Fortunately, the political situation, as a means of enabling the humanitarian intent, was consistently and correctly assessed by Fred Cuny and OFDA (among others). From convincing the Kurds to come out of the mountains, to the camp site selection, to the identification of the Iraqi police in Zakho, to the inclusion of Dohuk within the security zone, the political dimension was not ignored. Once committed, Washington eventually served the purpose of rubber-stamping the necessary and correct decisions -- those based on a humanitarian intent -- of the operators in the field. As a result, however, the right course of action was pursued and supported by Washington.

With a primary humanitarian intent that provided de facto political guidance for higher echelons trying to keep up with the situation, and a secure zone in which to operate, the NGO/military relationship was truly isolated to just traditional humanitarian concerns. Because the military understood the overall humanitarian intent, it consciously worked to support and enable the NGOs. Indeed, because the military was there first, with no prior NGO presence, it was very clear that the NGOs and the U.N. had to take over the effort. In this sense, the Zakho CMOC's one mission was to support and facilitate that transition. Something accomplished by Michael Hess, who took the CMOC to the NGOs.

In Bangladesh, a more traditional humanitarian intervention took place whereby one state aided another. Yet there were political complexities to this situation as well. There was a thirty-nine day old democracy still trying to figure out how its institutions related to one another. There were tensions between the Bangladeshi government and its army. There were tensions between the government and the NGOs. There were the claims of the Bangladeshi political left that the Americans were there to establish a permanent base. Not
acknowledged by Washington, these political realities were addressed at the operational level by the JTF commander.

With the creation of a split command, the Dhaka command element worked directly with the government about all issues related to the relief effort. Additionally, the strong but subordinate role played by the JTF commander in relation to his Ambassador and the Prime Minister had an undeniable calming effect on the underlying tensions. These two factors kept the politics in the capital.

Because of these factors, the JTF forward command element in Chittagong, the center of the disaster area, was allowed to focus on the coordination and implementation of the relief effort. Although not called a CMOC, the NGO coordination function performed by the Military Coordination Center at Chittagong airport -- where NGOs worked hand-in-hand with the military -- was essentially the same as in northern Iraq.

In Somalia, the political dimension was never acknowledged by Washington D.C. (In fact, it was only the recommendation of General Powell that allowed for there to be a political overseer at the operational level). Consequently, the military's mission, although seemingly clear and limited, became confused. Without addressing the multiple and overlapping problems that were present in Somalia, such as disarmament, the military stood no chance of creating a secure zone. Yes, the food got through and the immediate starvation was averted; but what next? Stabilization meant political expectations among the humanitarian community and the afflicted population -- and those expectations could not be met by the local force without a higher and clearer political resolve. There was none.

As a result, the CMOC became many things to many people, resulting in problems of separation and communication. (Among other reasons, these problems resulted from the CMOC operating as a liaison, instead of an operations, center). And there were problems within the military as to exactly what their mission was in relation to the NGOs. In the end, the CMOC was not only attempting coordination in a very confused environment, it was also addressing policy concerns such as disarmament and weapons retrieval. Comparatively, the strategic ignorance of the political dimension had the biggest impact on the Mogadishu CMOC, as it ultimately had to address both relief and specific political problems.
In Rwanda, we see the return of a "traditional" solution, like a long-lost friend. The political dimension is ignored at every level. This traditional solution focused on the unprecedented humanitarian scope of the refugee crisis, while totally ignoring the genocide that preceded it. Thus, despite an official American policy of human rights and the unquestioned veracity of the genocide reports at the time, the United States and the world did nothing. For the American government in particular, which only saw a repetition of Somalia, there was no desire to think about the political complexities of a central African country with no strategic value.

The ignoring of the genocide allowed the humanitarian dimension to be isolated. Consequently, the relief effort worked quite well. The CMOCs established in Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali were able to liaison directly with the U.N. agency responsible for overall coordination. (The liaison did not officially take place with the NGOs.) With a clear mandate and another agency in charge, the military's relationship to the humanitarian effort, to include the transition, went relatively smoothly.

What are the lessons? "Anybody who tells you that politics has nothing to do with humanitarian aid is way off the wall." Humanitarian intervention is a political process. Even if the political dimension is addressed at the highest levels, the actual relief effort must still be aware of the local political impact of its decisions and the strategic accumulation of its actions. If these impacts are not consciously addressed, then those actions will contribute, perhaps inadvertently, to the formation of a de facto policy. Moreover, it would seem that even with an awareness of the political impact of their decisions and actions, the attempt must be made to operationally isolate those involved in coordinating the NGO/military relationship from the specific political issues of the moment. This was in fact the case in Bangladesh and northern Iraq, benignly, and in Rwanda, malignantly. If the NGO/military relationship is not isolated from specific political issues -- like the disarmament policy in Somalia -- then the chance for confusion is markedly greater.

**Presidential Leadership**

Ultimately, the political discussion requires Presidential leadership. Congressman McHugh's words after his return from the
Kurd refugee camps ring loud: "We think this requires strong political leadership . . . the President should consider the possibility of appointing a high level official within his administration to facilitate the movement of these requests and help the interagency processes move rapidly." By law, this person exists; he or she is the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. Irrespective of legal appointments, however, it is only a sustained presidential gaze that will provide political resolve and dissipate interagency differences.

Moreover, it is only the President that can continually articulate the link between the humanitarian need and the deployment of military forces. Only he can explain what political purpose the military forces serve. Only he can tell the American public that the humanitarian goal is in the national interest and that casualties may result. If he does not, then military means and humanitarian ends stand a much greater chance of being confused and the possibility of failure increases exponentially.

Obviously, given the other domestic and international issues of the day, the President cannot always focus on a particular humanitarian intervention. He needs a ready pool of advisors who understand the multiple dimensions of humanitarian intervention. In short, the long-standing call of Andrew Natsios for a permanent humanitarian emergency sub-committee to the National Security Council should be implemented. Such a committee would be solely responsible for tracking these events and planning contingencies. Importantly, it would ensure that the humanitarian intent was kept primary at the highest level. The head of this sub-committee, during times of crisis, would have direct access to the President.

The National Interest and Happenstance

A third strategic observation is that from realpolitik to diplomatic windows of opportunity to goodwill, the consequences of successful humanitarian intervention make a considerable and compelling case for the national interest. But, one has to ask, would the two most successful interventions have taken place if the American forces had not already been in the area? If the Proven Force infrastructure had not already been in Turkey and the Civil Affairs personnel had not been in theater; or, if the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade had not
already been en route returning from the Persian Gulf, would the interventions have taken place?

That the results of these two successful interventions are in the interest of the nation is beyond doubt. For example, in northern Iraq, a potentially explosive regional issue that has been a matter of great significance to Turkey, our NATO ally, was settled within a matter of months. In Bangladesh, a country which provided troops to Desert Storm, the U.S. proved itself a reliable ally while simultaneously setting an example of democracy during the implementation process.

Moreover, humanitarian interventions provide the opportunity to interact with other nations in a unique way that would not otherwise take place. In northern Iraq, French NGOs and the French military worked hand-in-hand with their U.S. counterparts. In Bangladesh, there were Japanese, Pakistani, and Chinese helicopter contingents. All of these interactions, no matter how small, are conducive to building good relations with other states. All represent social/economic/diplomatic windows of opportunity.

Finally, these endeavors, because of their purpose, created tremendous goodwill. The area around Zakho is still remembered as "happy valley." The Kurdish deaf sign for President George Bush is the cross. In Bangladesh, people still speak highly of the American military and the manner in which it handled itself. This kind of goodwill is the kind that endures.

It should further be noted that this goodwill is not the monopoly of those helped. Time and again, the press reports on these interventions reflect American servicemen and women truly thankful for the opportunity to help and to give. Given their primary mission -- to be prepared to kill and die for the national interest -- these experiences unmistakably remind them of the values they joined to defend.

The Role of the United Nations

The U.N. is capable of handling the role of helping refugees and of classic peacekeeping. Although late in northern Iraq, the U.N. eventually took over the effort and still runs it today. In Rwanda, the U.N. did a very good job in coordinating the various "subordinate" agencies, to include NGOs and the American military. Once it is
A British supplied 20 ton water truck is dwarfed by its C-5A Globemaster transport U.S. Army Military History Institute.
involved in military/political affairs that entail a significant security threat (i.e., a Chapter Seven case), however, the U.N. structure simply does not work, significantly affecting all of the relationships under its mandate. In the most ambiguous of humanitarian interventions, a secure environment must be created by a great-power lead coalition under the general aegis of the U.N. Only after real stability has been achieved should the U.N. take over.

**NGO/Military Coordination**

Collaboration and coordination between the NGOs and the military should take place prior to the intervention. If not, it should take place during the intervention. The NGOs need to develop a stateside mechanism through which they "plug into" the interagency planning process. Against their nature, this change must be endured in the name of a comprehensive response. Such a process allows for a continuing dialogue. The existence of the dialogue is ultimately more important than what is actually said. While true coordination of effort cannot always be the expected result, the expression of how each community understands the others expectations and needs is imperative. Also, how each community interprets the term "security" is of paramount importance. An agreed on dialogue -- perhaps sponsored by a humanitarian sub-committee of the NSC -- would significantly reduce misunderstanding and duplication of effort.

The operational observations are, perhaps, the most important. Given the general lack of political resolve, those at the operator level must be aware of what their aggregate actions encompass and determine. More often than not, the actions of the operators create or significantly influence a policy. As one senior military official said "those guys were creating policy down there." (The official then retracted that statement and said that "they were creating the relationship to achieve broader policy goals." )

Moreover, it is in the best interest of the operators -- the military because it seeks a quick exit, and the NGOs because they seek the primacy of the humanitarian need -- to work together against a common enemy: a potentially inattentive stateside political apparatus. Pursuant to this common need is to correctly understand that there is a continuum of effort in which all parties have a proper role to play.
Security is always a consideration even in humanitarian operations. *U.S. Army Military History Institute.*
As Colonel Gary Anderson noted about the NGO/military relationship in Bangladesh, there must be a "synergistic relationship." The essence of realizing this synergy is the strategic acknowledgment that the humanitarian intent is primary. Once recognized, the NGO and the military work, according to their comparative advantage, to support the intent as they complement the other. Importantly, how "success" is defined must always reside with the NGO, and other humanitarian and indigenous authorities, who are there for the long haul. The military must recognize that its success results from placing itself properly within the overall continuum of effort. Its end-state is an artificial one whose sole purpose must be to effectively transition the overall effort to the next phase of recovery. The military's mission is to enable marginal self-sufficiency.

Three basic precepts follow. First, the military cannot be in charge. If it is in charge, there is the strong potential for it to provide its own solutions with its own means. Colonel Steve Riley's admonition must be the basic question of every military activity: "who are you there to support, yourself or the humanitarian effort?"

If the answer is yourself, two problems result. First, the "structure to support the structure" becomes more important. How much to how many for how long will dominate the discussion as the military worries more about proving mission accomplishment -- via briefing exercises to senior Pentagon officials -- than about considering the affect of its efforts to advance the original humanitarian intent. The second consequence is the implicit encouragement of mission creep. Cultural and technological concerns aside, the provision of military solutions inevitably creates a dependency upon the military infrastructure. If that particular stage of the effort is dependent upon the military, no matter the political pressure to withdraw, the political fallout from leaving the situation will be much worse. At all costs, the military must not provide solutions that inherently rely on military hardware and infrastructure.

The second precept is to help the helper, specifically the NGOs. They are usually culturally aware and sensitive to the situational needs of that particular emergency. This awareness generally provides the right information to the military and prevents military infrastructure-based solutions. In the end, it is the NGO's war to win or lose. The military can only help with one of the more severe battles of the humanitarian continuum.
UN military observers from many nations must work effectively together. At least eight different nationalities appear in this photograph. U.S. Army Military History Institute.
The third precept is that the CMOC must be the military’s operational focus of effort within a humanitarian intervention. It must maintain its title as an operations center. Humanitarian intervention is about joint civil-military efforts. If it becomes a liaison center, then it becomes divorced from reality. Military operators must be empowered to solve coordination problems at the same table, person to person, with the NGOs and other humanitarian personnel. It is absolutely critical that this process take place. If it does not, then different solutions and plans will arise from the inevitably competing centers of operations to whom the liaisons report.

The military’s Tactical/Combat Operations Center should work in support of the CMOC. (The TOC/COC would be concerned only with coordination internal to the military). This proposed relationship further implies that the military headquarters be co-accessible to the center of the humanitarian effort. The overwhelming and compelling need for them to be thinking alike demands that they be mutually accessible (defined as within secure walking distance of the other).

Finally, the CMOC must be elevated within the military culture. Once recognized as the operational center of effort, the military should work to support it just as they would support the operations center of any regular military operation. Moreover, it should be duly established that service in a CMOC during a humanitarian intervention is noteworthy. By virtue of its humanitarian feedback function, the CMOC is the first indicator of changing phases within the continuum of effort. Working hand-in-hand with the NGOs and the other humanitarian professionals, CMOC personnel must trace and plan the transition process to complete military withdrawal. The transition process should be planned for from the day the CMOC is established. As Colonel Paul Monacelli states about the Rwandan effort, "whenever we set up something, we knew when it was coming down." It is with this prudent mindset that the humanitarian intent must be pursued.

**Continuum Roles**

Within the military, the role of the Civil Affairs community takes on an increased importance. The Civil Affairs contingent has two tracks to pursue in support of the JTF commander. The first track is the traditional function of liaison with established authorities within
In a departure ceremony UNHCR representative thanks U.S. Brigadier General Jack Nix for military support of the humanitarian relief effort Goma. U.S. Army Military History Institute.
the host nation/region, if there are any. The second, non-traditional, track is to coordinate with all international organizations and, particularly, with non-governmental organizations. These tracks are their institutional responsibility. In an age where humanitarian/peacekeeping operations are rising in importance, everyone seems to be redefining themselves according to these two buzz words. The Civil Affairs community, to include the Marine Corps', needs to claim its institutional mantle better. If it does not, it may find itself unneeded.

The role of the NGO community is of paramount importance. They must participate, they must advise, and they must do it in a manner conducive to a comprehensive effort. The best NGO example of collective connectivity remains the NGO Coordination Committee of Northern Iraq whereby the NGOs had a coordinated voice (which also, incidentally, was listened to by the military). Unfortunately, given the independent nature of NGOs, this role has been hard to codify. Against their most cherished and liberating traditions, the NGO community must find a way to endure and succeed in the coordination of their advice and efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies.

On September 17-18, 1995, Interaction sponsored an "in-house" discussion for American NGOs to begin addressing this need for common mechanisms within the community to properly "plug into" the overall humanitarian response. While the jury is still out on just how receptive the various NGOs were to such possibilities, the new era's verdict is in: coordinate or be left behind. In an age of declining foreign aid and increasing complex humanitarian emergencies, those NGOs that can coordinate appropriately with the U.S. government will not only receive the most money, they will also receive the logistical support so critical to rapid response and credibility. The NGOs must reconcile their traditional identity with the facts of a new era. To date, it has been a slow process.

The other important role to be played out within the continuum is that of OFDA. Far and away the consistent, shining star of these emergencies, it has been their responsibility to be the floating glue of these ad hoc responses. They have performed admirably. The most conversant in the various organizational cultures present during a humanitarian intervention, OFDA personnel are essential to ensuring smooth coordination. They must continue to be institutionally
supported in their "glue" role. No matter the official mission of OFDA, all parties will look to them for leadership and liaison; particularly in a transitory age whereby most parties are still unfamiliar with the other actors. OFDA must exert its leadership, not just in the specifics of humanitarian response, but also in the political leadership of the operation itself. Despite fiscal constraints, OFDA has sought to develop this very role. Beginning with assigning Tom Frye to General Schroeder in Rwanda and continuing with the current assignment of Tom Dolan to the J-3 at Pacific Command in Hawaii, OFDA remains the most visionary of the parties discussed. They must be encouraged and supported in these endeavors.

The last operational point returns to the obvious: institutions do not play roles, people do. We can promulgate all the information and education in the world, but the face-to-face coordination of two to eighty people is irreducible. This NGO/military relationship is about people. The ones controlling the operation in theater are the most important linchpins in the entire endeavor. Good people matter -- they must be selected carefully.

The following tactical observations, meant for those at the proverbial table itself, derive directly from operational or strategic points. A common enemy exists for both the military and the NGOs: the humanitarian task at hand. One needs the other to accomplish that endeavor. Nevertheless, just because both are there in the name of humanitarianism does not mean that they will see eye-to-eye. The principle of altruistic self-interest governs the relationship. In short, there must be a mutually beneficial exchange of goods for the relationship to succeed.

The relationship is also about personalities that are not necessarily concerned about ego or credit. They must be willing to accept the invisible nature of their contributions. They must additionally recognize the need for transparency. Only with an integrity based on no secrets can the trust and cohesion grow that is fundamental to a successful effort.

Finally, two military points. The CMOC Director must have unlimited access to the JTF commander. Second, there will be times when the military has to demonstrate a humanitarian intent: not for humanitarianism's sake, but out of tactical necessity. In northern Iraq, the Marines immediately began to build a camp to demonstrate to the
Iraqis in the surrounding hills that their intent was peaceful. In Somalia, the Marines were involved in food distribution. Although generally not a good idea for the military to be involved in the specific humanitarian tasks of the mission, sometimes it will be necessary. The NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community must understand this necessity.

MAKING IT BETTER

What should be done to make the NGO/military relationship better? The first step is to assume a worst-case scenario, such as Somalia. The problem in Somalia was that the humanitarian intent became separated from the military means. In order to prevent such an event while addressing the inevitable complex political issues, a civil-military network must be established.385

A network, by definition, exists at several levels. While there is one point responsible for the entire net, that same point is not responsible for every single piece of coordination and implementation. This burden is shared by the entire network. At the top of the civil-military network is the Executive Steering Group (ESG). The ESG is the senior policy group within the intervention. Sitting on it, at the least, are the Presidential envoy/political overseer (if there is one), the JTF commander, an OFDA representative, and the NGO selected representative. Such a Group keeps the political, military, and humanitarian facets of the intervention strategy integrated.

This Group's existence does not suggest that it becomes the primary organ of the response or that it supersedes a U.N. HOC/OSOCC. It simply indicates that the Americans realize the need to speak with one voice. The ESG would complement any existing infrastructure. Of even greater importance, however, the ESG would keep the politics isolated from the CMOC. Hopefully backed by a strategic political resolve, the ESG would center policy questions on itself as the CMOC was left to worry about humanitarian coordination and implementation.

The CMOC, in conjunction with a HOC/OSOCC if there is one, would be responsible for the entire relief effort. The CMOC would be supported by regional Civil-Military Operations Teams
(CMOTS). The CMOTs, assigned to area/sector commanders would be responsible for running the local CMOC, if necessary, while advising the military commander. With an ESG, CMOC, and various CMOTs, a civil-military network would be established to address the complicated issues of a complex humanitarian emergency. Such a network would spread the weight of the operation and allow for unity of effort without unity of command.

WHERE TO?

The U.S. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our present and the era into which we are entering. Its proclamation is twofold: 1) interagency/multinational coordination will only increase; and 2) the role of civilians in military operations, no matter how pure the "battlefield," will also only increase. These traits are not just about humanitarian intervention. Witness Haiti continuing and Bosnia looming. Whether it is humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, or nation-assistance, the NGOs and the military will interact. It is our -- both communities -- responsibility to understand and work at this relationship prior to its implementation in the field. Like the locusts without a king, we must advance together, or not at all.
ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Anita Menghetti, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, August 7, 1995.

2. NGOs refers to any non-governmental organization that is involved in humanitarian work. It does not include International Organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It does include private voluntary organizations (PVOs), an American term for what the rest of the world calls NGOs. The thesis avoids the term humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) because it is inclusive of IOs and does not necessarily incorporate NGOs which (also) focus on development or human rights.

3. Humanitarian interventions are often the response to a pre-existing "complex humanitarian emergency." While debate surrounds the precise definition of this term, as well, it can be reduced to the following: 1) multiple causation (i.e. economic failure, drought, etc. and usually conflict); and 2) a significant increase in population mortality. (This definition courtesy of Dr. Michael Toole, October 23, 1995 correspondence with author). With the exception of the Bangladesh case, each of the case studies below meet this basic criteria. As a result, complex humanitarian emergency and humanitarian intervention may be used interchangeably.

4. See unpublished paper, "International Assistance and Conflict: An Explanation of Negative Impacts," by Dr. Mary B. Anderson; and African Rights paper No. 5, "Humanitarianism Unbound."

5. Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), National Defense University, 9 August 1995.

6. This work does not make an attempt to analyze the actual decision-making and coordination process above the level of the operators in the field. In general, the further one is removed from the emergency at hand, the more likely individuals are to act in the sole interest of their institution.

7. "Quickly" is a relative term that will be defined according to the situation. In all cases, however, the military's primacy in a continuum of effort must be relatively short in duration.

8. Interview with Major General James L. Jones, USMC, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., 2 August 1995. General Jones was commander of the 24th MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort.

10. Provide Comfort would deal only with the Kurds that had gone into Turkey. The Kurds that fled into Iran were allowed to assimilate or develop sustainable camps there.

11. Although slow in the initial response, it has been the U.N.'s presence that today has allowed for continued stability and the withdrawal of even the NGOs.


13. Telephone interview with Mark Gorman, 16 May 1995. Mr. Gorman worked for the International Refugee Committee (IRC) at the time.


16. Particularly by the British and the French. It was Prime Minister John Major who originally made the Kurds an international issue and suggested the formation of a "safe enclave" in northern Iraq. (The British announced on 4 April 1991 that they were pledging $35 million dollars for Kurdish relief).


19. Proven Force was the operational name for the air campaign, based in Turkey, against Iraq during the Gulf War.

20. Blaine Harden, "Turkey to Move Iraqi Refugees; Effort Would Ease Harsh Living Conditions," The Washington Post, 16 April 1991, p. A1. The article also mentions that the word "Kurd" was never used in any of the official Turkish documents announcing the change in policy.


*[Note: All ranks used in the case studies are those held at the time of the operation.]*


27. U.S. forces were able to respond so quickly because the infrastructure was already there to support the Gulf War. European Command was still running Proven Force and the reservists, particularly the Civil Affairs personnel, were still activated and in southern Iraq.

28. There were a total of forty-three refugee sites in the Turkish mountains. The eight largest camps ranged in size from 5,000 to 120,000 people in one location.

29. Bravo soon moved to the grain elevator complex on the outside of town because the complex was closer to the transit camps later built 1.5 miles away; it had better and more space for the command element; and because it was more secure.


32. For instance, according to multiple sources, the Turkish government, *vis-a-vis* the Turkish Red Crescent Society, did not stop NGOs from coming, but they "certainly did nothing to facilitate" them either. Most NGOs ended up, for example, doing their banking through a private oil firm because the Turkish government insisted on everything being done in cash.

33. Telephone interview with David Jones, 10 May 1995.

34. This inexperience did not manifest itself tactically. Beyond the purpose of this paper, there were, however, strategic manifestations of this inexperience. Incirlik and European Command were not quite sure what the DART's relationship was to the command structure. There was also consternation over the relaying of information back to Washington. DART had a direct line to the Department of State. The military, by definition, had several layers of bureaucracy through which
to sift its information before it got back to the Pentagon. The resulting disparity witnessed State finding out things before the Pentagon.

35. His recent death in Russia is not only mourned by friends, but also unknowingly by future complex humanitarian emergency victims.

36. "Liaison" is a relative term because it only manifested itself as a permanent position at the most important levels, i.e. Incirlik and Zakho (and even then, as necessary). Otherwise, the team members were "floating," keeping a pulse on the situation and tapping into all the various sources of information.

37. Telephone interview with Bill Coops, 6 June 1995.

38. Telephone interview with Dayton Maxwell, 26 May 95.

39. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR, the Marine historian in northern Iraq with the 24th MEU, quotes an anonymous Kurd: "We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like pigs." [Unpublished manuscript, "With Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: U.S. Marine Security and Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991," p. 74.] Originally, the Kurds had stated that they would not come down until Hussein was removed from power.


41. This plan necessarily assumed that SF would indeed be successful in stabilizing the situation in the Turkish mountains.

42. Maxwell, 26 May 1995.

43. Natsios, 16 January 1995, Washington, D.C. This philosophy had been unknowingly complemented by the SF practice of seeking and working with village elders wherever they went.


45. This simple act of General Garner's is symbolic of his understanding of the situation. He left the refugee problems to the refugee experts. In other words, he did not attempt to provide answers to problems with which he was not experienced.

46. Telephone interview with Major David Elmo, USAR, 14 May 1995. Major Elmo, was a Civil Affairs officer working up in the refugee camps and had been there from the beginning.


49. Interview with Captain Askold Kobasa, USA, Monterey, California, 31 May 1995. Captain Kobasa was a member of Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG. These phases descriptions were terms Kobasa used to paint the conceptual picture. They are not official doctrine. They do, however, serve the purpose of describing how order is brought out of sheer chaos.

50. Libby, 19 May 1995. "Rambo movies have done wonders for the military." People all over the world, for better or for worse, watch these movies and associate them with the Green Berets -- making for an immediate impact on a situation.

51. Bill Coops notes that the "relief business is a business" and that there is "clearly a political angle" to it, something confirmed by several NGO interviews. (Telephone interview, 5 June 1995).

52. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Powers, USA, 25 May 1995. Powers was the operations officer for JTF Alpha in Silopi.

53. Elmo, 14 May 1995. In actuality, the terms "coordination" and "collaboration" may be a euphemistic description for the first week or so in the mountains. Because the situation was so fluid, it had not had a chance to settle into even a nominal structure.

54. In Cucerka, for example, the NGO meeting evolved into a weekly one, meeting on Friday to discuss the next week's events. (Kobasa, 31 May 95).

55. Telephone interview with Mr. Dague Clark, 6 June 1995.

56. Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.

57. Telephone interview with Henryka Manes, 24 May 1995. Ms. Manes is the Program Director for JDC.


59. Telephone interview with Colonel Stanley Florer, USA, 9 June 1995. Colonel Florer was the 1/10 battalion commander and the very first element into the Turkish mountains.

60. Colonel Florer tells the story that during the first week the MSF (Doctors Without Borders, a French NGO supported by the French government) doctors had absolutely nothing to do with the Green Berets. Once they witnessed the SF medics saving lives, the soldiers (cross-trained by the medics) administering to basic health needs, and some speaking French, the situation changed dramatically. By the end of the first week, the MSF doctors had invited them over for dinner.

61. The Turkish government required all NGOs to coordinate through the Turkish Red Crescent Society, an administrative challenge.
62. Telephone interview with Colonel Jean Ronsick, 2 June 1995. Ronsick worked directly with the Turkish "super-governor." Thus, the governor had a view into exactly what the coalition forces were doing in his realm. Ronsick's role also gave the U.S. military an eye into the governor's office and what they were trying to do (or not do).

63. Both men operated under the full blessing of Major General William N. Farmen, USA, the head of the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (the "JUSMAT"). Both were given full-rein to accomplish the mission.


67. Beyond representing the military's logistics, Petrella was able to occasionally bring people to the table that could help the NGOs. For example, both Cuny and Maxwell spoke at different times up in Diyarbakir (OFDA equals money). Also, Major General Farmen, the senior logistician in theater and the "JUSMAT," would also come by. Having a two star logistics general in a logistics dependent exercise at the table will always increase the credibility of the liaison officer.

68. General Farmen also worked to encourage this process. He would invite the NGO leaders over, one at a time, to encourage, convince, and exchange information. This process did much to contribute to the NGO/military coordination.

69. This higher diplomacy was necessary in order to allow UNHCR to work in northern Iraq. According to its charter, the U.N. must be invited in by the host nation. Eventually, this logic rang true for the Iraqis if for no other reason than it was preferable to have the U.N. occupy their country over the long-term instead of a full-fledged coalition force.


71. This subject remains debatable among the participating military personnel. One member of JTF Bravo distinctly remembers that JTF Alpha very much had a "push" mentality (trying to get the Kurds out of the mountains, without waiting for the "pull" (establishing the right infrastructure to facilitate the entry and eventual departure of the Kurds from the temporary transit camps). It should also be noted that international law prohibits the forced movement of refugees.

72. Dr. Toole, 8 June 1995 fax to author.


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74. These types of requests from the refugee population suggest an intangible measure of effectiveness and transition marker for such operations. If the refugees have the strength and desire to complain about how they are being helped, then, perhaps, they are no longer in an unstable position and should therefore be encouraged to move.

75. This background role becomes ironic later on because of the universal respect that Hess wins from the NGOs for being the military interface. However, in any initial interaction, stereotypes are ever present.

76. For example, OFDA gave a grant of $1,336,174 dollars to the International Refugee Committee and $821,340 dollars to CARE. "OFDA Situation Report No. 25 (Final)," July 17, 1991, p. 3. [Hereafter cited as OFDA No. 25].

77. As of July 17, 1991, DOD had spent $328,320,000 dollars on Operation Provide Comfort. "OFDA No. 25," p. 4.

78. This process was, in part, facilitated by Stefan DeMistura, the U.N.'s special coordinator.

79. Although a CMOC was established on May 4th at the JTF headquarters at the outskirts of Zakho near the granary complex, the coordination of NGOs and the military took place 1.5 miles away in refugee camp Number One (also known as Camp Jayhawk).

80. The CCDP met daily with anywhere between forty and sixty NGOs participating. It also met monthly with other civilian agencies such as the Thai government and the U.N. (Gorman, 16 May 1995).

81. Gorman's quick results were made possible because of Fred Cuny's and Mark Frohardt's (of Cuny's Intertech) initial endeavor to organize the NGOs already present in Zakho. (Gorman, 9 May 1995).


83. The NCCNI tent was later moved across the street to the UNHCR compound.


87. Initially the military assessments reflected the number and condition of the refugees still in the mountain camps; later, they were about the status of villages in the rest of the security zone and their readiness for refugee return.
88. As the Kurds came out of the mountains, Camp Number One quickly filled up (20,000 people by 10 May). Camp Two was full by 18 May. Eventually, four camps were built although the sole point of coordination remained with the NCCNI in Camp Number One.

89. 30 May 1991 Operation Provide Comfort Brief for General Colin L. Powell, Incirlik AFB. Courtesy of LTC Patrick Murphy, USAR. Murphy ran the CMOC at Incirlik. The camp at Cukurca had the most refugees and was located the furthest east. Its drawdown necessarily took a little longer.

90. Almost five years later, this seemingly insignificant event becomes very symbolic. Certainly there was a transition plan and it involved a number of fusion points. However, when Kevin Henry and Paul Barker of CARE physically move into the CMOC in late May and begin to assume the responsibilities of the military’s infrastructure, it is here that the “transition to civilian agencies” actually takes place.

91. The St. Petersburg Times, “In Iran, Politics Thwarts Efforts To Help Refugees,” 9 May 1991, p. 3A.


94. Dayton Maxwell remembers conversations with various NGOs about the superb performance of Special Forces. Not only were the NGOs impressed with their skill in basic life sustaining skills, they were surprised at the SF sensitivity to the refugees and the way they collected information for their assessments. (For example, the SF asked the mothers for information, as opposed to the men. It is the women who are instrumental to assessing the emergency health needs).

95. Powser, 25 May 1995. Also, remember President Bush’s April 16th words: the decision to go into northern Iraq was “purely humanitarian.”


98. The obvious and significant exception to this generalization is Special Forces (even though they, too, would have been hard-pressed to address the political dimension of a humanitarian continuum). Beyond the scope of this work, what if a conventional force had been asked to do the job of the 10th SFG? The only reason that 1/10 was the first group in was because they happened to already be in the area of operations (Florer, 9 June 1995).

100. Maxwell, 26 May 1995.


102. This brief discussion does not suggest that U.S. forces be engaged in "nation-building" wherever it goes. It simply suggests that the building blocks to recovery, rehabilitation, and restoration must be nurtured in the immediate response stage. If not, the effort becomes little more than a band-aid that cannot be built upon by those who replace the U.S. effort. Natsios' words come to mind: [it is the opportunity] "to change the course of the conflict." If this attitude is not adopted or at least attempted, the problem will simply resume course after U.S. departure, eventually inviting its return.

103. Maxwell was calling back to Fred Cole at the State Department to solicit further NGO help. This interaction produced positive results as CARE sent additional people directly to Zakho (Kevin Henry and Paul Barker, for example, were pulled from other areas of the world to meet the emergency need).

104. An interesting vignette is Major General Campbell's encouragement of this process (Campbell was the Civil Affairs component commander under General Shalikashvili). John Petrella and Major Ted Higgins were from the same reserve unit and knew each other well (Higgins had actually come at Petrella's request). Undoubtedly a good team, Campbell quite consciously kept them separated, knowing full well that they would talk to each other to make sure that each had the "real scoop." (Petrella, 14 May 1995).


106. Interestingly, they were almost not included in the operation. The original EUCOM plan for Provide Comfort did not enlist the CA support. Because LTC Hess called it to the attention of Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, CA was included. Zinni responded to Hess's suggestion by saying: "this is the glue that will hold it together." (Hess, 9 May 1995; Zinni, 5 October 1995).

107. In the terminology of 1995, the DART team was a "floating HOC" (the Humanitarian Operations Center, to make its debut in Somalia) that dovetailed quite nicely with the CMOC and its de facto coordination site, the NCCNI.

108. Maxwell suggested one major mistake on his part in this floating structure. There needed to be a permanent 'senior' OFDA representative at the decision making level back in Incirlik. This step would have kept the CTF headquarters better informed as to the pace of events and the strategy being devised. At the least, as Bill Garvelink has suggested, the DART team leader should have been back in Incirlik three times a week.


120. Campbell, 16 May 1995.


122. Telephone interview with Captain Lawrence Naab, USAR, 24 May 1995.

123. Henry, 17 May 1995. Henry also adds that General Campbell even gave him a ride back to Incirlik once; something he found atypical for a general. Bill Garvelink relates how, as soon as he showed up, General Garner took him out in his helicopter for almost ten hours, getting him appropriately acquainted with the emergency.


126. General Potter's stereotype is held up in purposeful juxtaposition to illustrate just how much perception is an important part of reality. To his credit, everyone agrees that he did consult Ronald Libby and Dr. Ronald Waldeman (of CDC) before making any humanitarian moves.


128. Julia Taft, President and CEO of Interaction, suggests that this concept could easily be developed into a "rapid deployment kit." (Telephone interview with Julia Taft, 11 July 1995).
129. A coordination point at Cox's Bazar was later created (19 May 1991). This study does not take into account the nine day effort there.

130. Paul A. McCarthy, "Operation Sea Angel, A Case Study," (RAND), p. 15. [Hereafter cited as OSA, McCarthy].


132. Telephone interview with Robin Needham, CARE, 8 June 1995. Mr. Needham was Acting Country Director for CARE in Bangladesh when the cyclone hit.

133. In general, most participants of these humanitarian interventions do not remember, or do not associate, Bangladesh with the other case-studies. Operation Sea Angel, because it is understudied and underestimated, commands little memory despite the important lessons it has to offer.


135. The A.I.D. mission, for example, had been working extremely hard, with a very limited budget, to get funds/grants to NGOs involved in the response.


137. Telephone interview with Dr. Mary Kilgour, 16 May 1995.

138. OSA, Anderson, p. 10.


140. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "Relief For Bangladesh Hampered; Lack of Coordination, Disease are Concerns," 5 May 1991, p. 1A.

141. Telephone interview with Ambassador Milam, 7 June 1995. Dr. Lisa Prusak, a family physician with ADRA at the time relates that while the Bangladeshi government supported the U.S. lead coalition, the people themselves
supported Iraq. In their slum neighborhood, effigies of George Bush were burned in front of their house. (Telephone interview with Dr. Lisa Prusak, 25 July 1995).

142. The Baksal Party even held a rally in Dhaka with placards proclaiming, "We Need Relief Not Foreign Soldiers." St Louis Post-Dispatch, "U.S. Speeds Relief to Bangladesh; Supplies Finally Reaching Remote Areas; Some Efforts Draw Criticisms," 19 May 1991, p. 6A.

143. Interview with Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, Mountainview, California, 3 June 1995. Colonel Weck was a member of the Civil Affairs team sent over to augment the joint staff in Dhaka.

144. According to U.S. Statute, however, A.I.D. can only work with financially responsible and operationally proven NGOs. A.I.D.'s unwillingness to work with any other type of relief agency also invited the "favoritism" complaint.


149. OSA, Anderson, p. 40.

150. Obviously, given its expertise and logistical capabilities, the American force was more than a tool of the Bangladeshi government. Everyone recognized the power and enabling presence of the Americans. Given this fact, the manner in which the Americans conducted themselves becomes that much more noteworthy and conducive to the overall effort.


154. Al Panico, American Red Cross Director of international relief and development. As quoted in, David Binder, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Bangladesh to Begin Large-Scale Relief Effort," The New York Times, 13 May 1991, p. 3.

155. OSA, Anderson, 8. Also, interview with Colonel Anderson, 14 April 1995, Camp Pendleton, California. Additionally, Admiral Clarey, the naval
commander of the Amphibious Ready Group transporting the 5th MEB, notes that they received no message traffic on current lessons learned in northern Iraq. (Telephone interview with Rear Admiral Stephen Clarey, USN (retired), 5 June 1995).


157. Ibid.

158. OSA, Anderson, p. 19.

159. There remains a minor debate among military personnel as to whether this measure should have been taken. Some feel that the split did not facilitate coordination enough; that a staff, already limited to 500 people a night, was spread too thin; that the focus should have been primarily on Chittagong. Others feel that there had to be a JTF element in Dhaka and that it insulated the relief operation from the politics of the capital. Research indicates that there had to be a staff element in Dhaka. The government, the embassy, and the lead NGOs were all there. There also had to be an element in Chittagong because that was the focus of the operation. The question remains then as to the proper balance of staffing.


162. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Frasier, USMC (retired), 3 June 1995. Frasier was the JTF liaison officer to the A.I.D. cell at the embassy.

163. Telephone interview with Brigadier General Peter Rowe, USMC (retired), 30 May 1995.

164. Needham, 8 June 1995.


166. Telephone interview with Admiral Steven Clarey, 5 June 1995.


174. The Army Civil Affairs team arrived in country about the 16th of May. They were replaced by another Civil Affairs team on the 27th of May. (They were included only because there was an Army representative at Pacific Command when the mission was assigned).

175. Colonel Jon Weck's personal operations notebook, pages unnumbered. [Hereafter cited as Weck notebook].

176. Army Special Forces from First Battalion, First Group (out of Okinawa, Japan) had been deployed in support of the JTF.

177. Weck notebook.


179. This discussion based on interview with Colonel Anderson at Camp Pendleton, California, 14 April 1995.

180. Everyone remembers the "ROWPU issue." The general impression of the research is that the American military wanted to assert its technology. This concept is directly analogous to the desire to introduce MASH units into Zakho.

181. Another point worth mentioning, and learned from the NGOs, was the concept of plastics. Plastic five gallon containers were needed to transport fresh water back to homes; plastic pipes were essential in reestablishing wells; plastic sheeting made for makeshift shelters and provided cover to relief materials on the tarmac. Telephone interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995. Colonel Blythe was part of the original Civil Affairs team sent to Bangladesh.

182. Interview with Colonel Robert Schoenhaus, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, 27 April 1995. Colonel Schoenhaus was a member of the Civil Affairs team that replaced the first one deployed.


185. Telephone interview with Sandi Tully, 12 June 1995. Ms. Tully was in Bangladesh from the end of April to the third week in May. She was then Special Assistant to Philip Johnson.

187. Major Stephen Yoshimura fax to author, 8 June 1995. Then Captain Yoshimura was part of the two-man Civil Affairs team sent to Chittagong. The other member was Major Latham Horn, USA.

188. Milam, 7 June 1995.

189. Telephone interview with Major Steven Yoshimura, 8 June 1995. Despite this innovative idea, most remember communications as, at best, consistently poor. In terms of relative expectations, that the military would be able to provide a working communications system, this comparatively poor performance was a major disappointment.

190. M. Mokammel Haque was the government secretary responsible for the disaster effort in Chittagong region. On May 16th, Haque had sent a memorandum out to the municipal relief committees, establishing how the Bangladeshis would interact with the U.S. military.


192. Rowe, 30 May 1995.


196. For example, if CARE had won the last three close calls for whatever legitimate reason, and it was about to win a fourth time simply because it was more efficient than the next competing NGO, the call went to the less efficient NGO. Given these subtle political dynamics of distribution, the overall operation was probably operating at 90-95% efficiency, on an absolute scale. On the intangible scale of cohesion and a smooth working environment where everyone felt that their needs were addressed, the coordination was operating at 100%. It was this kind of awareness that made all the difference.


198. For example, some of the national NGOs did not initially make their agreed on flight times and the helicopters took different loads to different places -- something that irritated the local NGOs. This impression changed, however, when the military offered to help pre-stage their supplies the night before on the tarmac and also provide a guard.


201. Telephone interview with Brigadier General Randall West, USMC, 9 June 1995. Then Colonel West was the wing commander of 5th MEB.


203. This observation is not to suggest that it is always in America's interest to do "good things" for other nations. Irrespective of how or why U.S. troops are committed, however, there will be an impact on national security.

Additionally, the response gave the U.S. military a chance to interact with various other nations as well. "Nations that might not otherwise consider combined military operations are more likely to cooperate in humanitarian measures, which, in turn, could lead to confidence-building ventures and possibly act as a building block toward a standing regional-stability block." [Stackpole, Proceedings, p. 116]. The geo-strategic impact of these operations is not within the scope of this study. But Stackpole's point is important to keep in mind. Also, it can be applied at the grass roots level. NGOs are made up from members of many nations as well as sponsored by many nations. The impressions made in the coordination process ineluctably make their way back, officially or unofficially, to the people and government of many nations. The military will always be an ambassador of sorts, particularly in its relations with NGOs.


206. Ibid., p. 115.

207. Andrew Natsios, then Director of OFDA, did accompany Mrs. Marilyn Quayle to Bangladesh for a visit, but that was the extent of OFDA involvement on the ground (OFDA did contribute and seek grants for the effort). OFDA was fully engaged in northern Iraq.

208. West, 9 June 1995. General West also tells the story of 5th MEB's departure. In the simple good-bye ceremony, the Bangladesh official was moved to tears as he described how Bangladeshis had served side-by-side with the Americans in the Gulf War. And then, when Bangladesh was in its hour of need, her ally had reciprocated. This experience "was very emotional" and made a tremendous impact on all present.

209. This momentum had the potential to be negated by a Dhaka control center somewhat detached from the effort. Captain Anglim notes that there was the feeling sometimes that the Dhaka JTF saw things more from an efficiency standpoint. With no operational impact, Anglim's suggested cure is "to get them out every once in a while and keep them in touch." (Anglim, 13 July 95).

211. Telephone interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995.

212. Interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, Mountain View, California, 4 June 1995.

213. Truly, a phenomenal consideration when one considers the military's penchant for secrecy and the fact that there were 122 NGOs, indigenous and international, coordinating through the MCC in Chittagong.

214. OSA, Anderson, p. 42.

215. Because there are institutions and organizations involved, of course someone is worried about credit. But at the implementor level, that does not seem to be the case. It is interesting to note that NGOs share the same animosities for their headquarters as do military operators for their higher staff and Washington DC components.


218. Although the "Lives Lost" analysis does suggest that it is "plausible that UNITAF prevented large numbers of starvation deaths," p. 32.

219. Oakley, 9 August 1995. This comment was made in reference to the disarmament policy and the lack of support from Washington. It is, however, more than applicable to the entire UNITAF period.

220. While documenting the extent of the looting is impossible, 50% of all foodstuffs seems to be as good a number as any.


223. This announcement, incidentally, was made in conjunction with the Republican Party's National Convention in Houston.


225. Beyond this discussion, one hesitates to consider what would have happened if there had been no Oakley, particularly during a change of administrations, to at least present political leadership at the operational level.


229. In general, it was felt at OFDA that once Somalia came up on the DOD/NSC scope, OFDA was marginalized from the planning process, if not excluded, thereby inevitably reducing the significance of humanitarian concerns as political and security ones dominated. "The Role of OFDA," pp. 5-6.


233. It should also be noted that A.I.D. once again presented its comprehensive plan for Somalia. Both Andrew Natsios and Lois Richards, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Food & Humanitarian Assistance, were present. Ms. Richards suggested the following six phases:

1) Provide a regular supply of cereals and supplemental foods along with medicines.

2) Purchase and distribute seeds and tools by March, 1993, in time to be planted by April rains.

3) Fully implement food modernization programs (in order to expand food base of markets).

4) Launch livestock rehabilitation programs.

5) Return refugees to their homes (once area is secure).

6) Reconstitute a Somali peace force, which can operate under UN authority and management.


238. Telephone interview with Dr. Ken Menkhaus, 24 August 1995. Menkhaus suggests that by centralizing the U.S. effort in southern Mogadishu, the U.S. had to deal with the one threat that could visit casualties upon U.S. forces: General Aideed. Consequently, Oakley met with Aideed more than any other warlord.


240. Interview with Kate Farnsworth, Washington D.C., 31 July 95. Farnsworth was a DART member.

241. Interview with Thomas Dolan, Washington D.C., 31 July 95. Dolan was the Deputy Team Leader of the DART.

242. Farnsworth, 31 July 95.


245. Interview with Major David Castellvi, 3 August 1995, Quantico, Virginia. Major Castellvi was a company commander for 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.


247. "The voice on the other end announced that he was calling from the SS Tripoli and wanted more information on the landing since a "Mr. Westcott's" name was included on his list of people involved in the advance party for the landing of the Marines." ("Westcott Report," p. 31).

248. The 452nd Civil Affairs Battalion, for example, was told that some of its elements would be going.
249. On December 11th, the Marine JTF, according to its international make-up, became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in support of UNOSOM, the U.N. Operation in Somalia.


252. Interview with James Kunder, Vice President of the Save the Children (U.S.), 7 August 1995, Westport, Connecticut. Mr. Kunder was the Director of OFDA at the time and present in Somalia for the first month.

253. Interview with Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children (U.S.), 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Landis-Guzman was a member of the DART and worked in the HOC.


255. Phil Johnson was sometimes unable to contribute as much as he liked. Diagnosed with amebic dysentery, malaria and an ulcerated intestinal tract in December, 1992, he was very sick at times in Somalia. (Somalia Diary, by Philip Johnson, Ph.D., p. 76).

256. Telephone interview with Carl Harris, 24 August 1995.

257. Interview with Elizabeth Lukasavich, 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Lukasavich was a DART member.


259. Somalia Diary, pp. 77-78.

260. As further testimony to this respected integrity, several observers recall meeting various Somalis in random places throughout the country who would cite "Colonel Kennedy's" approval for something they were doing (usually while having no idea who the man was or what he looked like).


266. For example, when an NGO called into the CMOC about a real security emergency, the "chain-of-command" (UNITAF) did not respond. The CMOC, however, responded when it could with its own personnel (sixteen times). This iteration made for stronger ties between the NGOs and the CMOC while simultaneously hurting the overall NGO/UNITAF relationship.


268. This logic is born out by the previous quote from Bill Berquist who suggested that the CMOC was being lied to.

269. Farnsworth, 31 July 1995; Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.


271. Telephone interview with Mark Biser, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (ret), 22 August 1995. Biser had served in the greater Horn region from January, 1990, to July, 1992, as a member of the Marine Embassies staff. (A process through which he got to know a number of the NGOs operating in Somalia). He returned with the JTF as a member of the Forward Support Service Group (FSSG). When asked to, Biser portrayed a typical Marine view of the CMOC and its relationship to the Marine's warfighting culture.


274. Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.

275. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, located within the Secretariat of the United Nations. DHA had been created after the emergency in northern Iraq in recognition that one agency had to be responsible for coordination. Besides the natural growing pains of a newly created organization, DHA has still not been empowered to carry out its mandate.


277. Technicals were old pick-up trucks with heavy guns mounted on them. They were the most visible symbol of power for the competing clans.


283. Interview with Colonel Wallace Gregson, The Pentagon, 2 August 1995. Gregson was the UNITAF assistant J-3.


287. Moreover, it usually took three to four days for NGOs to get their guns back (with no bullets). In the meantime, the immediate dilemma of a NGO guard/expatriate, who had just had his/her weapon confiscated, was how to get back through "Indian country."


292. The EC is important because, combined with America, they represent 90% of all donor funds in emergency responses. Thus, if the money behind an operation supports one plan, then hopefully it will be that plan that the various field agencies, which implement donor projects, follow. (Otherwise, they do not get the money). In this manner, through the power of the purse, it may be possible to permeate a response effort with one overall plan. Natsios, 23 August 1995.


301. Berquist, 21 August 1995. Given just how quickly the Somalia response unfolded, this logic cannot be applied realistically in retrospect. The logic is more than applicable to future contingencies.

302. Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.


304. Dworken, Observations From Restore Hope, p. 5.

305. The Rwandan intervention is not considered because, rightly or wrongly, the U.S.'s clear intention to be nothing more than a very short-term logistician was extremely clear to one-and-all.


310. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O'Leary, USMC, Quantico, Virginia, 3 August 1995.

311. Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.

312. Farnsworth, 31 July 95.


315. One debate not addressed in this chapter is the issue of how much humanitarian effort the military should be involved in. While humanitarian purists recoil at the thought of such endeavors, there is a place for the military taking humanitarian action, particularly in the earliest stages of an intervention. Such action is ultimately of a tactical military nature because it gives potential belligerents a reason NOT to shoot at U.S. personnel. Of perhaps greater importance, it also gives the American armed service member a chance to participate and interact with the values which he/she joined to defend.


319. This flight was actually quite systematic and organized. Wanting to maintain as much power as possible while simultaneously delegitimizing the RPF, the former Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda manipulated, and continues to, the fear of a reciprocal genocide as a means to ensuring a sustained refugee presence just outside the Rwandan borders.


* Note: All *Time* articles taken from the America OnLine directory. Accordingly, footnotes will reflect the date and time that *Time* transmitted the article onto the Internet.


322. OFDA "Rwanda Chronology," working draft, pp. 9-10. [Hereafter cited as Rwanda Chronology].


325. Doctors Without Borders, for the first time in its history, actually called for military intervention during the massacre of the Tutsis by the Hutus.

326. Many of the Tutsis in the Rwandan Patriotic Front were the offspring of the Ugandan exodus.


330. According to the December 9, 1948, Convention on Genocide, contracting parties must prevent and punish genocide. Virtually the entire world has signed the document.
331. Idi Amin, for example, was made president of the OAU despite his well-known crimes.


335. As quoted by Kathy Lewis in "U.S. to Increase Relief to Refugees; President Orders Round-The-Clock Airlift Operation," The Dallas Morning News, 23 July 1994, p. 1A.


338. Oakley's words manifested themselves as early as late October. From October 20th to November 17th, Jeff Drumtra of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) visited the refugee camps.

"In addition to physical intimidation, the regime [of the former Rwandan government] conducts "psychological warfare" in the refugee camps with an effective, systematic misinformation and propaganda campaign that exaggerates the dangers facing Hutus inside Rwanda, accentuates ethnic hatred, and has convinced many refugees that the war must continue."

Jeff Drumtra, "Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi," p. 15.


343. Interview with Colonel Karl Farris, 4 August 1995, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

344. Telephone interview with Colonel Steven Riley, 23 February 1995.


347. For example, all the relief supplies brought in by commercial air had to be re-palletized to military pallets in order to load them.


349. Telephone interview with Dr. Brent Burkholder, 6 September 1995.


351. This problem was, in part, solved by Tom Frye who pointed out to Riley that there were too many idle military planes on the tarmac. Riley and the CMOC accepted this observation and "turned it up a bit." (Riley, 5 September 1995).


353. Interview with Greg Garbinsky, Washington D.C., 31 July 1995. Garbinsky was a member of the DART in Goma.


355. This organization was known as "UNREO" or the OSOCC. Importantly, elements within the OSOCC, to include the CMOC, were not commonly thought of as independent entities. If you needed something, you went to UNREO, not, for example, to the U.S. Army's CMOC.

356. Farris, 4 August 1995.


358. Telephone interview with Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR, 1 September, 1995.

359. Farris, 4 August 1995.

360. Farris, 4 August 1995.


365. Even Richard Hooker had to get special permission to stay out past 1800. American personnel attending specific NGO water/sanitation liaison meetings had to leave before it got dark out. (Interview with Dr. Les Roberts of the Center for Disease Control, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 September 1995).


367. Warfighting skills, it should be noted, were not attrited as they were actually employed in such activities as establishing bunkers and providing security for convoys.


372. Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.


375. American forces, for example, did not take part in the burial of the refugee dead, ostensibly to protect them from the trauma of such an event.


377. The warfighting analogy would be the elevation of the S-3 Alpha (the assistant operations officer in a Marine Combat Operations Center) whose job it is to think about the battle three to four days away while tying it into the reality of the present battle.


380. This official preferred non-attribution.


382. This discussion is not inconsistent with the imperative of cohesion between military and humanitarian and helper and helped. There will be times,
particularly during implementation, that the military will be involved directly with the afflicted population. There will also be times when, according to tactical (security) necessity, the military will engage directly in humanitarian efforts (i.e., doing something humanitarian to show the various belligerents the purpose for which they are there). The general point, however, is that the military's role will usually be to support the humanitarians.

383. Additionally, the military as an institution must incorporate and encourage such specialties as those involved in a humanitarian intervention/peacekeeping/nation-assistance scenario.


385. This discussion based on the I MEF example. Telephone interview with Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, 5 October 1995.

386. The role played by SF, CA, and OFDA in Operation Provide Comfort remain the best working example of such a network.
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