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NATO ENLARGEMENT:
THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FUTURE POLICY

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ABSTRACT

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The concept of NATO enlargement has become the first major stumbling block between a newly democratic Russia and the United States/NATO. This study explores the issue, from the views of all concerned, while focusing on the Russian perspective to better understand their opposition to the expansion of NATO. The paper reviews the political, military and social ramifications of the proposed enlargement on the democratic evolution of Russia. In conclusion, the paper recommends some potential policy alternatives to reap the advantages of NATO enlargement while not putting additional pressures upon Russia during their transition period.
NATO ENLARGEMENT:
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INTRODUCTION

As the Cold War ended with the cataclysmic events which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the future prospects for the security of Europe seemed bright. After all, there was the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact, democratic movements were taking place in all the countries of the former Soviet Union (to include Russia), and there was a downsizing of military forces with prospects for peace dividends. These events were coupled with calls from both sides of the Atlantic to dissolve NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as it "was established primarily to protect the Western democracies from an expansionist Soviet Union that seemed determined to spread its influence through subversion, political intimidation and the threat of military force."¹ The argument became, as the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has dissolved, the rationale for the existence of NATO is no longer valid.

NATO, however, has not dissolved, nor are there plans for it to do so in the near future. The European landscape is more 'security uncertain' now than it has been since the formation of NATO in 1949, with NATO as one of the few European institutions of stability. The current situation in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example of how NATO can be a constructive force in the continued evolution of a peaceful European continent. The role NATO is undertaking in the former Yugoslavia exemplifies its
post-Cold War strategy (formalized at the November 1991 summit meeting in Rome) which "defines the main security tasks of the alliance as preventing a situation in which any country could coerce or intimidate any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force and to preserve the strategic balance in Europe."² This philosophical shift is one of a transition to a collective security posture, rather than the Cold War strategy of collective defense. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is one whereby NATO is undertaking a peacekeeping mission in an effort to guarantee the collective security of the European nations.

As NATO’s security strategy was refined, the issue of enlargement of NATO, allowing some of the former Warsaw Pact member countries to join, came to light. The issue arose "since many Eastern European countries are clamoring to enter NATO - and be protected by its security umbrella - largely because they fear Russia may flex its expansionist muscles someday."³ A major effort to lessen these concerns was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which was launched in January 1994 to provide stability and security to the Central and Eastern European states. The program was well received and rapidly joined, but the clamor of the Central and Eastern European states to join NATO did not subside. As the pressure to allow for the enlargement of NATO grew, so did the resistance of Russian to the idea. The issue of possible NATO enlargement became the first major stumbling block for US-Russia and NATO-Russia relations,
and is having an impact on Russia’s foreign policy and its internal domestic politics. This paper will examine the issue of NATO enlargement, initially providing some background on the U.S., NATO and Central and Eastern European (C&EE) countries views, and then focusing on the current Russian situation and its reasons for opposition to the proposed enlargement. In summary, the paper will review the critical issues for the concerned countries and discuss possible policy alternatives to diffuse the tension surrounding NATO enlargement.

This paper will not address the potential for Russia becoming a part of NATO via the enlargement process. While this issue has generated some discussion, I feel that due to the difficulties that Russia is currently undergoing, this possibility is not feasible in the near term. Additionally, should Russia become a part of the alliance, one could seriously question the rationale for the continued existence of NATO. These issues would significantly expand the scope of this paper, hence their omission.

THE CASE FOR ENLARGEMENT

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has been responsible for guaranteeing a peaceful European continent. There were initially three geopolitical purposes for NATO: "to ensure an American military presence in Europe, as a counterweight to Russian power, and as an ultimate reassurance of Germany’s benign place in the Western security system." While NATO struggled to redefine its
purpose after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it can be argued that the geopolitical purposes for its survival have not varied greatly. The original geopolitical purposes remain in some form, with an additional purpose of insuring the unpressured evolution of new democracies on the European continent. In fact, there exists a great deal more uncertainty in Europe today than there was ten years ago, in large measure due to the turmoil existent within the 'young democracies' which are forming in the Central and Eastern European (C&EE) countries. The turmoil, and fears, of the C&EE countries that Russia would once again exert its hegemonic tendencies, thereby restricting their democratic evolution, led to the advent of the enlargement issue which has been strongly supported by the United States.

The United States recognizes its role in the stability of Europe and has expressed its objectives for Europe in its current National Security Strategy (NSS). In the NSS, the U.S. envisions "NATO playing an increasingly important role in our strategy of European integration, extending the scope of our security cooperation to the new democracies of Europe"; to promote the growth of the new European democracies; and to have increased cooperation with Russia, "ensuring Russia is engaged as a vital participant in European security affairs." The United States is committed to the growth of the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe and is ready to guarantee their security during the democratic evolution process, initially through their participation in PfP, ultimately by their
incorporation into NATO, via NATO enlargement.

The U.S. has led the NATO enlargement movement, and has sought ways to reduce the perceived pressures upon Russia while at the same time increasing the sense of security and stability within Europe. The Partnership for Peace, proposed by President Clinton in October 1993, and formally launched at the January 1994 summit, "has built a stunning record in broadening the reach of NATO-led security far beyond its previous confines." PfP also allows for Partner countries to achieve a permanent relationship with NATO, and recognizes the potential for the transition of a nation from Partner status to become a full member of the Alliance; hence, enlargement of the Alliance. NATO completed their formal "Study on NATO Enlargement" in September 1995 as part of their continuing assessment of the security situation in Europe and is committed to continue the enlargement process as a method to extend the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, while deliberately leaving the issue of which countries would be invited to join, and when, undefined. The study attempts to put at rest any apprehensions from Russia, stating that "inviting new members into the alliance will enhance security for the whole of Europe, including Russia."

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made their desire to join NATO evident from the very beginning of their democratic movements. Recently freed from the hegemonic control of Russia, the C&EE countries desire to remain stable and free from the unwanted influences of Russia as their young democracies
take hold, and the C&EE countries see their only guarantee to achieve this being NATO. "To the East Europeans [and the Central Europeans], NATO represents a desperately needed security shield to protect them from Russian domination - and possibly future German domination as well." The C&EE countries seek the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, providing them with the security protection required to allow them to complete their democratic evolution. "They fear that their newly-won sovereignty will be short lived unless they rapidly secure membership in Western institutions" and "also see only a limited 'window of opportunity' in which they can join ... they fear that after a certain amount of time, Russia will recover enough that it will be able to block their integration." Simply put, the C&EE countries desire to quickly become members of NATO to protect them from the possibility of future Russian coercion or aggression, which they feel is inevitable. While PfP provides for consultation with NATO should a Partner perceive a threat, for the C&EE countries it does not meet the need. PfP is merely a prerequisite along the path to full membership within NATO, which is the C&EE states desired end state.

THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

As the U.S. and NATO security objectives for the C&EE countries seem genuine and nonconfrontational toward Russia, it seems surprising that Russia has so strongly opposed the idea of NATO enlargement. To grasp a fuller understanding, it is helpful
to review Russia’s current political, military and social situation and how these issues influence the current Russian national security views.

The end of the Cold War was dramatic for Russia, and "many Russians, who saw their country as the center of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), grieve over the loss of their role in Europe and the world as well as their self-image. There is a widespread feeling of deep humiliation." Humiliation combined with mistrust. Remember, Russia fought two major wars against Germany and other western countries in this century and while accurate figures are unavailable, it is estimated that Russia lost over 50 million lives. Also, Russia lost the Cold War to NATO, and this loss predicated the unbelievable transitions that Russia has experienced in the past six years. Russia’s entire geopolitical environment has changed, dramatically, and Russia had no apparent control over the manner in which it changed.

The early political and economic upheavals in the newly democratic Russia resulted in a lack of coherent policies for dealing with the West. Russia was in the act of reformation, ridding itself of the former communist system and beginning its integration into the international community. The changes internal to Russia came fast. The rapidity and enormity of the transition process being undertaken within Russia was a sociological shock to the entire society. This ‘shocking’ of the country to become more pro-western kept Russia’s orientation
inward. "Russia’s geopolitical interests were virtually absent from Yeltsin’s early foreign policy doctrine; the alliance [NATO] was not seen as a potential threat."\textsuperscript{11} Russia was in a conciliatory mood with the West, and was optimistic regarding international funding to assist them in their democratic and free market transition. The post-communist reform movement undertaken by the government however was slow in achieving their optimistic goals. Inflation reached 2,500% in 1992 and 840% in 1993 as the government operated without a budget.\textsuperscript{12} The painful transformation saw a corresponding shift in the popular support for the reform as the 1993 Duma elections resulted in 145 seats (almost one-third) being won by anti-reformists. The domestic situation in Russia was fragile with popular support for the reform movement beginning to falter. Suddenly, the proposal of NATO enlargement to further enhance the security of C\&EE countries was announced - and the reaction could have been predicted. While the U.S. and the current NATO members saw the enlargement as the way to guarantee European security, Russia saw it as a direct threat. Furthermore, enlargement of NATO was a method to insure their further decline - it was the final defeat and humiliation of the Cold War.

"No matter what arguments are made by the supporters of NATO’s expansion, for the bulk of the Russian population, the gist of it is rather simple: The West has reacted to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the downfall of the USSR and its eastern machinery not with a real reduction in and retargeting of its military might but, on the contrary, with a consolidation of that might and a primitive grab at Russia’s former allies. In thousands of Russian cities and villages, the reaction of the Russian people will be the same: We have been betrayed."\textsuperscript{13}
Russian reaction was that it had been isolated from the decision process on how to best ensure collective security for Europe. The decision had been made unilaterally by NATO and the end result would be the incorporation of many of Russia’s former allies in NATO. Russian memory of NATO as a military alliance, and former adversary, was intact. Considering NATO’s self stated goal was one of collective defense, Russia’s question was defense against who? Russia could only feel that once again it was cast as NATO’s enemy and was being manipulated by the West.

"To push Moscow in the desired direction, the West is using two familiar instruments: a carrot and a stick...The carrot is financial assistance (or promises thereof)...The stick is NATO, which has a number of options to use in case Russia goes in the wrong direction."14

From the Russian perspective, it was viewed that NATO and the West were trying to squeeze them out of Europe. The objectives were: use the stick (NATO) to reduce the former Warsaw Pact members reliance on Moscow and the corresponding decrease of Russia’s ability to influence European/international affairs; and use the carrot (promised financial assistance) to increase western control/influence over internal Russian affairs (not to mention increasing the C&EE countries dependence on the West). Russia’s survival was being threatened by the expansion of the NATO borders, and it was being isolated from the rest of Europe.

"Needless to say, [Russia] does not have veto power over the admission of any sovereign state to NATO. However, an expansion of the alliance is contrary to Russia’s vital interests. It could lead, sooner or later, to a feeling of Russian military and political isolation, to a stronger anti-Western sentiment in our country and to a revival of militarist thinking."15
The concept of NATO enlargement met with strong resistance within Russia. "From the Western side, it is a policy of double containment aimed at cementing the disintegration of the Soviet Union, decreasing Russian influence, and making Russia but another state on the world map." In reaction to the NATO enlargement movement, President Yeltsin defined a new and tough foreign policy, termed the "Yeltsin Doctrine" in which he specified the areas which are consistent with the Russian national interests. These interests include:

"* A strong Russia is the most effective guarantee of stability over the entire territory of the former Soviet Union;  
* Russia should assume the role of peacemaker in the post-Soviet political space;...  
* In defending her legitimate state interests Russia has the right, if necessary, to act firmly and toughly;  
  * Russia is obliged to protect the interests of Russians living in the near abroad. If their interests are violated, this is not only an internal matter for their country of residence, but also a Russian state matter;  
* Russia is against the expansion of NATO through the membership of additional European states, unless Russia itself becomes a member of NATO."  

Russia's reaction to the planned NATO expansion into their former sphere of influence, as articulated above, once again portrayed the philosophy of Russia as a dominant regional (and potentially world) power. While Russia may have been struggling politically and economically, it was unwilling to accept decisions being made which affected its 'perceived national interests' without consultation. The reaction to the proposed NATO enlargement also forced Yeltsin's formerly "pro-western" reform government to take a more protectionist line, aligning
himself with some of the views of the nationalists and communists which he had so successfully fought in earlier years.

In September 1995, President Yeltsin codified his position concerning the near abroad in the *Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation toward CIS Member States*. "This document constituted a comprehensive plan of action for the forced reconstruction of Russian dominance within the CIS, systematizing the use of the wide array of diplomatic, military, economic, ethnic and international levers that Russia has available to it." The document went on to include continued criticism of any planned NATO enlargement, and for the first time formally stated the possibility that Russia may once again desire to regain its international stature as a global superpower. The reaction to the proposed NATO enlargement was complete; Russia perceived its very identity as threatened and the resultant loss of its global influence.

Russia entered the communism reformation period seeking assistance and guidance from the Western countries and initially received the assurances of support required to complete their transition. Russia now feels that as the full weight of their requirements were realized by the West, the willingness to provide the required support declined. "The major task of these countries’ policies towards Russia lies in preventing the Russian Federation from becoming an influential force from the economic, political and military point of view and turning it into a raw materials colony of the West." From the nationalist Russian

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perspective, the very survival of the Russian state hinged on whether NATO enlargement continued to proceed. The prospects of NATO enlargement had a more severe reaction within Russia than was anticipated. NATO reacted by being very noncommittal to the C&EE countries regarding timelines for admission, in hopes of relaxing some of the Russian fears. Additionally, NATO attempted to involve Russia more in NATO related activities, such as PfP, attempting to put to rest claims that decisions were being made without seeking Russian involvement. Throughout every NATO effort to engage Russia and assuage their concerns, the 'perceived threat' remained. The expansionism movement had begun, and in the fertile ground of C&EE, NATO enlargement was viewed as essential to their survival.

From the Russian perspective, should NATO continue with the planned enlargement, the consequences for the Russian civilization, national mentality, foreign policy and strategic posture may be seen in seven areas. These areas are:

"* A deepening of the gap between Russian and Western civilizations;
  * An inward reorientation of Russia;
  * A rebirth of the Russian sphere of influence among the states of the former Soviet Union;
  * A weakening of overall European security;
  * A threat to the security structure already established after the end of the Cold War (START and CFE treaties);
  * An unwelcome influence on internal Russian politics in favor of anti-Western circles;
  * The promotion to key positions those in the Russian military who favor a strong military posture for Russia."\(^{20}\)

The final potential outgrowth of the proposed NATO expansion is Russia’s unstated, but worst, fear: should the enlargement of
NATO include the Baltics or the CIS states, it would result in Russia's total demise as a regional power. This inability to control its destiny could result in a further disintegration of the Russian Federation (which is composed of 89 regions, 29 which are ethnically defined). In simplistic terms, a series of Russian civil wars with internal states seeking their independence, similar to what is seen in Chechnya today.

REVIEW OF CRITICAL CONCERNS

The entire issue of NATO enlargement is so complex that it is helpful to identify the critical positions of the key players before discussing potential policy alternatives. What are the real goals to be achieved through the enlargement process, or in Russia's case, prevention of NATO enlargement?

For the United States and the current NATO countries, their ultimate objective is a more secure Europe, which they hope to achieve through enlargement. Implicit in this strategy is the reassurance to the C&EE countries that their democratization process will be able to proceed freely, without threat of undue influence or coercion (initially through the PfP consultation commitment and ultimately through NATO's Article 5 guarantees). NATO has a corresponding goal of the prevention of Russia from reemerging as a regional hegemonic influence, while including it in the "inclusive and comprehensive security strategy"21 for Europe.

For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who desire
to become NATO members, the stated primary goal is to continue their democratic evolution free from the fear that Russia may one day exert influence over them. To guarantee this protection from unwanted Russian influence the C&EE countries want to become part of NATO, now. But, have the C&EE countries really chosen to be part of the West (and can they afford the corresponding costs associated with NATO membership) or is it that they want to finalize their divorce from Russia, leave the old behind forever? Either way, what is critical to them is their ability to transition in an orderly fashion, free from external pressures.

Russia’s primary resistance to the proposed enlargement centers on self-protection and recognition that, while it may no longer be a world superpower, it is a regional force to be acknowledged and decisions which influence events within its sphere of influence/concern should not be made without the consultation of Russia. The self-protection issue deals with having borders free from historical enemies (NATO was the enemy for almost 50 years). "For the first time in three hundred years (in peacetime) the Moscow military district has turned from the deep rear into the advanced defense line of Russia. It is not surprising that this stark fact has aroused acute feelings of vulnerability in many strategically-minded Russians."22 Additionally, Russia has strong economic ties to the states of the former Soviet Union, and these links must remain for the successful economic and political reform, both in Russia and the states of the FSU.
Russia's major internal threat during its transition period comes from the nationalist/anti-reform movement. The nationalists and anti-reformists are using the proposed NATO enlargement to demand the revival of the military and communist state, stating that the pain associated with the transition to a democratic free-market society has been too great. This anti-reform movement also paints the proposed enlargement of NATO as proof that the West does not want Russia to succeed in its transition, but instead wishes to dominate the Russian people economically and militarily.

IS NATO ENLARGEMENT THE ONLY WAY AHEAD?

Having revisited the major players critical concerns, and considered the Russian perspective, is NATO enlargement the desired way to proceed to achieve the desired end state of peace and security within Europe? If so, when? Are there alternative ways to achieve the desired security end state? Also, is the survival of the Russian state, as it exists in its evolutionary democratic form, a vital interest for NATO and the United States?

In response to the question concerning the continuation of the enlargement process, NATO must be certain to consider the secondary effects of this proposed action. "Immediate NATO expansion would be a colossal mistake. By advancing NATO to the borders of the former Soviet Union while simultaneously insisting on continued disarmament, we would revive the impression of a military threat from the West in the minds of many Russians."
Andrei Kozyrev, the former Russian Foreign Minister has stated that "NATO’s enlargement now would lead to a nightmare of renewed confrontation." It is doubtful if Russia, specifically Russia’s military and nationalists, will accept another symbolic defeat, especially when considering the current state of their political and economic affairs.

"Explaining to a humiliated Russian military establishment that an extension of NATO for the sake of stabilizing Russia’s western periphery would be a net gain for them, not another defeat, would probably exceed the ingenuity of even the most eloquent NATO expansionists." Russia has been undergoing massive changes for six years, politically, economically and militarily. As Russia has been undergoing these changes, it was her expectations that NATO would undergo large scale changes, capitalizing upon the peace dividend. Though there has been a restructuring of the military forces within NATO, there has also been the push for enlargement. From the Russian view, this is in reality an enlargement of their former military adversary. To continue to press ahead with rapid enlargement would have several undesired secondary effects.

"Russian reactionaries and nationalists would be greatly strengthened in their campaign of cursing perestroika, reviving the mentality of the besieged fortress and national humiliation, and propagating re-militarization and anti-Western paranoia... Moreover, they [the military] would decide: once NATO without any reason advances eastward, it is Russia’s duty to move its line of defense as far westward as possible." Forcing the expansion now would in fact make NATO more of an institution of instability, vice being the desired source of stability.

Opponents to the enlargement of NATO argue that there are
many other ways to guarantee the security of Europe, most being within the capabilities of the Europeans themselves. The European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU) have great potential for increasing stability and security. Since they were not formed as a military alliance to confront Russia, they would not meet with the level of resistance that greeted the proposed NATO enlargement. Similarly, existing treaties with Russia can be renewed and a formal NATO-Russian treaty developed to finally end the Cold War and set new parameters for Russian cooperation and involvement in the future of Europe. PfP also offers a starting point for continued Russian involvement in the stability of Europe, as does the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Opponents to enlargement continue to question the logic which proposes NATO enlargement as the sole method to insure European security when there are other viable, less confrontational ways available.

Russia’s survival as a nation-state, and the survival of its democratic movement, may not be a vital interest for the United States and NATO (most likely, the U.S. and NATO would not commit military forces to maintain a democratic form of government in Russia), but it most certainly is an important one. Russia’s ICBM capability and the control of their fissionable material makes the relationship between it and the US/NATO one of unique concern. This concern, coupled with the stated U.S. strategy of engagement and enlargement, is the reason for our support of Russia’s evolutionary democratic government. The U.S. National

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Security Strategy states:

"The core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference...Russia is a key state in this regard. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia (and the other newly independent states), we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners."27

NATO must recognize that rapid enlargement could have a detrimental impact on the survival of a democratic Russia, thereby jeopardizing the security of Europe.

GOALS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

As NATO continues to explore enlargement, it must determine what is the desired end state for the continent of Europe. I feel the major objectives are in four areas. First, NATO, through her actions must support the continued democratic movements that are ongoing within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia. Second, continue to support and reinforce the Partnership for Peace efforts that are directed at increasing the confidence and cooperative efforts among partners (which includes Russia), thereby promoting and reinforcing security. Third, provide some sort of security guarantee for the C&EE countries, that does not threaten or embarrass Russia. Fourth, NATO must continue to be the stabilizing influence on the European continent, insuring her efforts compliment those of the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations.
While these objectives do not reveal any critical new thinking, they also do not specify NATO enlargement as the only method which can provide the security necessary for stabilizing Europe. These four objectives also focus on securing a cooperative, peaceful coexistence relationship with Russia that will promote stability.

There are several areas where new or continued emphasis could dramatically assist in the attainment of these objectives. First, all NATO countries (to include the US) should designate and deliver funds to assist Russia and the C&EE countries in rebuilding of their infrastructure and modernization of manufacturing plants to assist in their democratic/free-market transition. This engagement of the NATO countries in the democratic evolution process of Russia and the C&EE countries will require a significant expenditure of political capital to insure their own constituencies understand the benefits that stability and security bring to all nations. Second, governments and international organizations (such as the European Union) need to insure private corporations who choose to invest in the Russian and C&EE markets. The insurance is not to guarantee that investing corporations make a profit, but to protect them from losing their investment should the Russian/C&EE government change and exert centralized control over all production activities (such as when Castro took control in Cuba). Third, NATO needs to encourage the IMF to issue near term loans that do not have ties to internal domestic activities (subsequent loans could be
conditional). Finally, as part of the formal NATO-Russia treaty, NATO needs to negotiate the neutrality of the C&EE countries with Russia for a set period of time (10 years) that would guarantee neither Russia’s resurging of their imperialist muscle nor the immediate enlargement of NATO. This neutrality policy, in combination with economic assistance, would guarantee the C&EE countries the protection they desire to evolve, allow them a longer time period to meet the requirements of a NATO country, and, in effect, create a zone of economic trade and growth. After the period of the treaty, the individual C&EE countries could either extend their neutrality indefinitely, petition to join NATO, or form an economic/security alliance with a country of their choosing.

The above policy alternatives offer a way ahead for the continued support of the newly democratic countries, including Russia. The neutrality treaty guarantees the C&EE countries the freedom to evolve and provides Russia with secure borders as it continues its democratic evolution. Additionally, it recognizes that Russia does have a zone of influence and concern, supports the Russian democratic government, and extinguishes some of the nationalist, anti-West rhetoric that has been growing. Failure to recognize that Russia does have a zone of influence and concern by the West would be tantamount to casting it as a third world country further inflaming the nationalist movement within Russia. Finally, NATO once again resumes the role as an institution of stability, no longer a threat to Russia, while providing the protection the C&EE countries desire.
The concept of NATO enlargement was developed as the method to insure security and stability within Europe. While it appeared to be the correct means within the emerging C&EE countries, the second and third order effects within Russia are potentially more destabilizing to the continent of Europe than envisioned. There are other means to providing the desired security to Europe that are not as volatile or disruptive within Russia. As a long term avenue to security, NATO enlargement may be viable, but in the short term it needs to be delayed and other existing security mechanisms need to be capitalized upon.
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