MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC IN NATO:
WILL IT WORK?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The collapse of the Berlin Wall and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union has significantly altered the way the United States and its NATO Allies will conduct military operations in the future. All members of the Alliance have downsized their armed forces, while at the same time they have expanded their missions to include out of area operations. Logistics, which traditionally has been exclusively a national responsibility, can no longer be executed in the traditional manner. Resources in manpower and material require the Alliance to re-think 40 years of Cold War habits. NATO has recently conducted studies and come up with recommendations that should help eliminate duplication of effort, while simultaneously providing the support needed by the commanders on the ground. Many of these recommendations are political compromises, but most are reasonable alternatives to past procedures. Are NATO's commanders ready to accept these measures and change the way they have traditionally supported the force? Although still early, initial indications from Bosnia-Herzegovina are not encouraging. The Alliance needs to test these methods of support now to ensure the future does not result in logistically failed missions.
INTRODUCTION

Military operations in the post Cold War era are going to be characterized by flexibility and mobility. They will range the gamut from humanitarian aid such as in Rwanda to high intensity conflict like Operation Desert Storm. Continued downsizing and ever decreasing defense spending for almost all first world countries will drive us more and more to conduct multinational operations. The NATO alliance has already established multinational force structures down to division level (and below if one includes the ACE Mobile Force Land). Multinational combat and combat support units are training for the entire spectrum of conflict and peace operations, frequently below division level. As usual, the logisticians supporting this sea change in the way NATO conducts military operations, are trying to catch up. Can the combat service support community adjust from the rather simple Cold War sustainment process to a much more complex world of uncertainty? Will NATO commanders really be given authority to distribute logistics resources from one nation to another? What type of command and control system can be structured to support, efficiently, multinational deployments? Can the movement of personnel and equipment be coordinated by one multinational organization as opposed to various uncoordinated national movement centers? Are we finally going to make some progress in dealing with that elusive, old NATO challenge, standardization? Can the members of the alliance change four decades of thinking and support the highly mobile and flexible forces of the new NATO? These questions and many others must be resolved if NATO operations in the future are to succeed. We simply cannot afford to conduct logistics support in this new multinational world in the same old way we have in the past. Solutions to these issues are essential and may be the single most important issue facing the new NATO. Unless adequate solutions are found, the future of multinational operations may be in jeopardy and ultimately the fate of the most effective peacetime alliance in history may hang in the balance.
THE PAST

In December 1992, Air Vice Marshal D.J. Saunders the Assistant Chief of Defense Staff (Logistics) in the United Kingdom provided a hint at what might be needed. He cited Martin van Creveld's *Supplying War* in identifying the three distinctive periods of logistics history. The 'magazine' system typified the 17th and 18th centuries, when small armies relied on regional support bases located in strategic locations. With the advent of Napoleon's 'predatory' warfare, use of the host nation's assets supplied the army. Supply lines were used to procure only those items which could not be foraged for. Since the late 19th century, we have relied on a continuous supply from the home country. Technological breakthroughs in modes of transportation allowed this to happen.\(^1\) Saunders' argues that this new era will require a mobile and flexible force laden with uncertainty, a combination of Napoleon's 'predatory' system and continuous supply are necessary to ensure 'victory'.\(^2\) Of course 'predatory' is replaced by an effective host nation supply program and continuous supply may no longer come from one's home nation, but rather from the nations of the alliance in the form of multinational resupply. The host nation support part of this equation was tried and tested during Desert Storm. The Saudi Arabian government and businessmen were able to provide all of the fuel, fresh food, and water and much of the transportation for our forces. However, this was the only aspect of multinational logistics tested in Southwest Asia.

As a member of the most successful peacetime alliance in history, the United States has worked very closely with our European Allies for over 50 years. NATO's armed forces have trained and exercised together throughout the post World War II period, so multinational operations in themselves are not new. In the old General Defense Plan (GDP), the United States Army's VII Corps had operational control of the Bundeswehr's 12th Panzer Division. Although a great deal of staff coordination
and planning occurred and numerous partnership training events and interoperability exercises took place, little serious multinational training took place at Corps level and below. The logistics required to support NATO's layer cake defense of the Central Region was strictly a national responsibility. Each nation's own support system fixed, fueled and fed their troops from factory to foxhole. What was not provided by the national logistics system was coordinated and contracted for through bilateral Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements between the parties.

As early as the London Conference in 1990, it became clear that the new NATO would be looking at multinational operations not only in the traditional Central Region, but also combat, peacekeeping and enforcing, and humanitarian missions out of region and for the first time, out of area. This increase in numbers and types of missions came simultaneously as the nations of the Alliance began "downsizing" their armed forces. Lieutenant General Ruurd Reitsma, Commander of the 1st (German-Netherlands) Army Corps put the problem into perspective during his inauguration into the U.S. Army War College International Hall of Fame on 4 March 1996. He pointed out that NATO military commanders were faced with the dilemma of getting more at lower costs. The only way to make it happen was to ..."think beyond national restrictions in order to get more at lower costs".3

NATO faces serious issues if it is to adjust the way nations provide logistics to their forces. Articles have been written and studies have been produced to lay out the best options for the future of multinational logistics. We should not, however, be starting from ground zero. For over 20 years, the ACE Mobile Force (Land) (AMF[L]) has served as NATO's immediate reaction force. The AMF(L) is supposed to be a highly mobile, entirely air transportable brigade sized force capable of deploying in very short order anywhere in NATO. It was specifically designed to support the northern and southern flanks of NATO (Norway and Turkey). Support
for the individual units of the AMF(L) was and remains primarily a national responsibility, but many of the problems experienced by this organization bear looking at for possible options in supporting larger forces. AMF(L) exercises exemplify bureaucracy, national legal issues, petty rivalries, and lack of commitment.

On 2 October 1992, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was established at Bielefeld, Germany (now garrisoned at Moenchengladbach, Germany but currently serving in Sarajevo, Bosnia). The ARRC’s peacetime mission is to demonstrate NATO's resolve by reinforcing the alliance's main defense. It should be able to engage in combat at corps level as well as perform peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. There are currently 10 divisions assigned to the ARRC. These divisions are either national, framework or multinational in design. The national divisions are solely from one country; the framework divisions comprise of one lead nation and another supporting nation; and the multinational divisions consist of three or more nations with a relatively equal share of forces. The United States Army's contribution to the ARRC is a national unit, the 1st Armored Division from Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

The impact for the logistician of this increased multinationalism is clear; unfortunately the solutions are anything but clear. NATO is currently attempting to implement new principles of logistics support to meet the challenge of the new world order. Three key principles are necessary to ensure the success of multinational operations. First, the nations of the alliance will now have a collective responsibility for the support of multinational operations. This does not mean however, that nations can reduce their support for their national forces since the second principle requires that nations ultimately, still have that responsibility. Finally, and perhaps most critically, the NATO commander at the appropriate level needs to be given direct authority (COCOM) over logistics assets and resources to support his forces.
effectively. Multinational logistics offers economies of scale that never existed in the old world of the GDP and are more necessary than ever in a world of decreasing resources by all the Alliance's members. Almost every nation of the alliance cuts combat service support (CSS) units before it will reduce combat and combat support (CS) formations. In the United States Army well over 50% of its CSS units are in the Reserve Component structure. It is clear to see that sharing these precious logistics assets among the various nations of a coalition, or an alliance, would save limited resources and avoid wasteful duplication.

There are, however, many difficulties to overcome. The fixed defense of the Central Region during the Cold War led to some habits that unintentionally limited our creativity in logistics support. GDP "Battle Books" not only detailed fighting positions and operational plans, but also listed every possible resource available to the defender. Since we had a thorough knowledge of the geography of Germany, logistics planners had all medical facilities; water and power sources, and road and rail networks identified. They knew the routes to the forward defense areas; they knew where all classes of supply and maintenance were and walked the ground so often that most could do it in their sleep. Log planning was very detailed, but it was rather simple and it did not require a lot of planning for the unanticipated. Because of our decades long focus on the old GDP, some ARRC officers have professed concern "that NATO has 'lost the art of logistics planning.'" Our forces lack shared standing operating procedures. Many of these procedures, laid out in a host of STANAGs, are routinely used by our Allies, but seldom looked at or understood by American units. Common procedures are essential to the success of multinational operations.

THE FUTURE

How then should NATO address these problems? There probably is no
"school solution" since the variety of operations facing the alliance provides a myriad of best solutions. Four different methods of support have been discussed to meet the challenges facing the alliance. Purely national logistics will remain the best option when any single nation provides the entire force to an operation. This is the way we have operated since the birth of our nation and is the way we supported throughout the period of the Cold War. However, single nation operations could be the exception rather than the rule in the complex operations our Armed Forces will be tasked to accomplish in the future. The "lead nation principle" requires one nation to provide the bulk of the support unit, with the other nations providing specialized support functions. For example, the British might have the command and control function as well as the largest share of logistics support for the mission while other nations only support their national forces. "Role specialization" is another frequently suggested option. In this type of operation, individual nations will provide specific categories of support. For example, a German unit might provide all of the fuel; an American transportation company distributes it; and a Dutch company provides all medical evacuation. "Role specialization" requires strong command and control authority for the operational commander to ensure that all multinational forces are provided the necessary support. Finally, multinational support units could be formed under the command and control of NATO commanders. This type of support unit would have a multinational staff and most likely a rotating command position. Again, authority over logistics soldiers and resources is a prerequisite for this to work. This option provides the best opportunity for avoidance of duplication of national support and lines of communications.8

The Alliance continues to look at the best options. The revised NATO logistics manual, MC 319, 27 May 1994, approved new principles and policies. MC 319 is the Bible for multinational logistics. In this new version, NATO has
recognized that logistics is no longer solely a national responsibility, and that members of the alliance have a collective responsibility for logistics support. Nations must ensure, individually or by cooperative arrangement to support their forces, including the provision for strategic mobility and transportation of forces. Finally, NATO commanders have the authority to coordinate logistics support within their areas of responsibility. All the nations of the Alliance, except France, have endorsed the new MC.319. National acceptance for these principles of collective responsibility was essential for this change to work. NATO Principle Subordinate Commanders (PSC) technically now have the wartime authority "...to redistribute national logistics resources to overcome unanticipated deficiencies; redistribution is not intended to redress national stockpile shortages". 

Exactly what can the commander redistribute? According to MC.319, commanders can redistribute those resources considered to be essential for the accomplishment of the mission and have a high degree of standardization. Some items which are either interchangeable or interoperable could include, common user items (i.e., food, ammunition, fuel, medical supplies, some repair parts etc.). Services like supply, transportation, maintenance recovery and repair could also be redistributed. There are some prohibitions. Major weapons systems, personnel replacements and "logistics resources governed by other agreements/arrangements" may not be redistributed without national approval. The latter is, of course, a major problem. With sixteen nations currently in NATO (and more likely to join in the near future), there are countless agreements and more critically, national laws which restrict what the national military authority may or may not do. The real quandary, however, is paragraph 3.c.(2) of the MC which makes an exception to the entire process. "Prior to or upon transfer of authority (TOA) of forces to the NATO Commanders, nations may further designate specific logistics resources which are not
available for redistribution.\textsuperscript{13} In effect, the fifteen NATO nations which concurred with the new MC 319 still can veto any redistribution of assets if they so desire. Assuming that there is no predesignated national restriction, the NATO commander must advise the national authority in charge that a transfer will occur. Ideally, and if the situation permits, the commander will notify the giving nation ahead of time. If time does not permit, he must notify that national authority as soon as practical. He will then direct the appropriate national commander to effect the redistribution of resources. As soon as time and resources permit, the receiving nation is required to replace the resource being provided or reimburse the giving nation.\textsuperscript{14} It should be clear by now that there are many challenges to the concept of multinational logistics. Even though sharing of resources should in the end save money, nations are not readily willing to give them up.

The AMF(L) provides an interesting study of the difficulties in supporting multinational operations. Although it is only a brigade size organization, the problems associated with supporting it are a mirror image, albeit on a smaller scale, of the issues facing the ARRC and other multinational organizations. As commander of two support companies for the AMF(L), I experienced the problem of conflicting national priorities time and time again. My two units, the headquarters company of the AMF(L) and the United States National Support Element (USNSE) were assigned to my battalion in garrison, but came under tactical command of the AMF(L) commander once they arrived in the area of operations. The remaining United States contribution to the AMF(L) consisted of an Airborne Infantry Battalion; a combat engineer company; an air defense platoon; and several other smaller elements. The command of the AMF(L) rotates between member nations and is currently held by a United States Army Major General.

The mission of the AMF(L) is to deploy its key combat units and headquarters
company in 48 hours and begin deploying its remaining support units in 6 days.
National support for AMF(L) units vary, but the United States example is the one I am
most familiar with. All of the member countries have National Support Elements
NSE) which plug into a Logistics Support Battalion headquarters. This battalion is
especially a "framework" organization, with the United Kingdom providing the
commander and staff. Each NSE supports their national forces through the
coordination of the Log Support Battalion commander. After transfer of authority
(TOA), the Commander of the AMF(L) assumes Tactical Command of all of the
NSEs. However, the Log Support Battalion Commander can only ask for "obligatory
cooperation" among the NSEs if he feels a need to redistribute assets. The term,
'obligatory cooperation' is defined as follows: "Commanders or military leaders
between whom no institutional status of subordination exists and who are to
cooperate in a special way are specifically directed by order to cooperate.
Cooperation includes the obligation to inform, advise and support each other in all
matters where joint execution is required by military necessity". Needless to say,
this arrangement leaves the senior logistician with little leverage and a real inability
to weight the operational desires of the commander with required support. He is at
the mercy of national support to the force, which varies dramatically from nation to
country. The Germans and the British provide a very robust support base for their
NSEs, but other nations, including the United States, fall far short of even the basics.

The USNSE is an Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 8 organization in
personnel with ALO 1 equipment. The company is required 234 soldiers, but only
authorized 78. The company is, however, authorized its full complement of
equipment. Obviously, this is a difficult situation for any unit, but especially for one
that is the immediate reaction force for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR). Augmentees from other units in United States Army Europe
(USAREUR) fill the company during deployments. These augmentees are never the same soldiers for any two of these deployments. This poses specific problems for training and safety. Since the AMF(L) deploys anywhere in the region, extreme cold weather (Norway) and desert (Turkey) training are required. Although painful, for exercises, this specialty training can be accomplished; for actual deployments, this training would be impossible to accomplish. Even in exercises, augmentation is only provided at the minimum level to support for the period of the deployment.

The United States is not the only country limiting its support. Britain, which had provided a robust Log Support Battalion until April 1995, has dramatically reduced its forces as well. In the past, the British picked up other nation's shortfalls in transportation, fuel distribution and in logistics management. Now they can no longer do it because their national authority has reduced its support for the AMF(L). There was no consultation with the other nations; it simply was done. In conferences since this decision was announced by the UK's Ministry of Defence in 1992, attempts have been made to have other nations assist in making up shortfalls. Proposals were laid out before representatives of the respective armed forces in April 1994 at Salisbury, England, but no nation wanted to increase their support for the force. Thus the combat and combat support forces for NATO's immediate reaction force are provided with support that is anything but immediate and requires heavy augmentation to make it work. If the alliance cannot find sufficient common ground to make multinational logistics work at brigade level, how can it possibly work at Corps level?

Therein lies one of the most critical aspects of NATO's New Strategic Concept. The great paradox facing us today is that the very nature of our new strategy makes it much more resource intensive to support, while the world's political condition that drove us to the strategy, has driven us to secure a "peace dividend". In a time of declining defense spending, reducing duplication of effort would seem
to be the logical right step to support the new NATO direction. Unfortunately, national reluctance to give up control of assets makes it nearly impossible to execute multinational support missions.

CR-CAST STUDY

Findings

NATO has attempted to address these problems. In September 1993, the Central Region's Chiefs of Army Staff Talks (CR-CAST) tasked COMLANDCENT to examine the organization of logistics responsibilities and authority of multinational forces. Special emphasis was to be placed on the deployment of multinational forces in and out of region or in support of out of area missions. Officers from 8 NATO headquarters and 10 national organizations reviewed logistics issues in detail and participated in the study. The study focused on multinational logistics reporting, common supply items, and elements of logistics support, which due to lack of standardization must remain primarily a national responsibility. The group specifically examined command and control, movement control and transportation, sustainment and training, and standardization. The study looked in detail at the following areas:

- Theater Level Command and Control
- Corps Level Command and Control
- Movement Control and Transportation
- Sustainment and Medical Services
- Multinational Reporting
- Host Nation Support
- Funding and Contracting
- Training and Standardization

The study group presented their findings in May, 1994. They agreed that NATO
logistical command and control organizations were necessary to implement multinational logistics at both theater and corps level. They determined that current national movement control operations into and within a theater of operations were confusing and inefficient. To reduce confusion, a theater Movement Deployment Agency (MDA) and a theater Movement Control Center (MCC) were recommended. Many supply, services, and medical operations were determined to be areas in which multinational logistics could best be employed. A new refined logistics reporting system was called for which would link directly with national logistics systems through a core database. Interestingly, HNS provisions in the new MC 319 were determined to be adequate, but there was concern about their slow implementation by the nations and NATO headquarters. Current methods of funding and contracting were found to be non-responsive. Training and standardization remains a problem hindering multinational logistics. Logistics training needs to be emphasized and a minimum level of standardization needs to be established.¹⁸

**Validation**

Following the presentation of the findings, CINCENT directed that a validation phase be conducted with the work being done by AFCENT and the Central Region's Principle Subordinate Commanders. The intent was "...to trial, evaluate, and expand the findings and recommendations of the CR CAST Logistics Study using consultation, exercises and seminars, with a view to incorporating the results in the appropriate NATO and national documents."¹⁹ The scope of the validation process was limited to the following:

- C2 Logistics Structure
- Mechanism for Visibility of Logistics Assets
- Movement Control
Concept for Provision and Coordination of Supply and Services on a multinational basis

HNS Authority and Responsibility

Validation of Log Concepts and Procedures through Exercises

Publication of Logistics Directives and SOPs

As part of the process of validation, nations of the Alliance were asked to provide feedback on the initial findings of the CR CAST study.

The responses of the nations reflect the wide range of opinion that exists in the Alliance. Only Belgium supported the concept of a Theater Level Logistics Command and Control Structure. Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were opposed; they were worried about increasing the number of headquarters and felt that logistics should be "embedded" in the functional headquarters. They recommended strengthening the J4 operations of the theater level staff. The same concerns were expressed with regards to a Multinational Deployment Agency at theater level, although the experience of Central Region nations during Exercise ATLANTIC RESOLVE, in Grafenwoehr, Germany in October 1994 did demonstrate the advantages of centralized movements planning.20

The nations had significant differences of opinion on medical support. Different national peacetime standards make harmonizing medical concepts extraordinarily difficult. There was widespread concern over the quality of medical service vice the cost of the services. Strong and differing views were presented on the supply of blood and blood products and whose responsibility it should be to ensure its safety.21

"Role Specialization" and "Lead Nation" concepts needed further studying. The Germans felt strongly that role specialization would work well toward
economizing efforts, but that it would have to be used on a case by case basis. They also wanted to ensure that expectations of role specialization did not lead to an assumption that national force structures might become role specialized. The British argued similarly that role specialization might be best suited for certain missions and lead nation in others. They urged caution with lead nation since the tendency might exist to continually use the same nation as a lead. This would be easier based on experience, but in the long run would weaken the collective responsibility of all the nations of the Alliance. The study's recommendation of a case-by-case basis determination seems to be in agreement with the consensus of opinion expressed by the nations.22

One of the most controversial issues the study faced was that of the multinational commander obligating national funds. Of course, this happens to be one of the most urgent problems needing resolution. The funding issue is very complex and deals with a wide variety of legal and budget issues. Nations have different laws concerning funding of multinational forces and also have vastly different contracting requirements. For example, SHAPE routinely offered to coordinate the shipping for American AMF(L) forces on exercises. They wanted to load German and American or Dutch and American equipment on the same ship to save money and reduce the complexity of deployments to Norway and Turkey. American law however, requires the American Armed Forces to contract with U.S. flag carriers. This bureaucracy of course failed to recognize that the size of our force was so small that few legitimate carriers were interested in bidding until the last possible day. In our ARROW EXCHANGE Exercise to Turkey in September 1994, the lowest bid contracted ship broke down at sea. The Army was facing a very embarrassing situation until a first lieutenant, scouring the port of Rotterdam, found a brand new Russian Roll On/Roll Off ship looking for cargo. USAREUR approved
contracting it on sight as an emergency and we loaded a ship that could have carried
a force three times our size. Still, our American force arrived in Turkey two days
late, negatively impacting on the exercise and costing multiple times more than had
we been allowed the opportunity to ship with the Germans. Similar problems
occurred on other deployments with returning air passengers. At the conclusion of
NATO exercise STRONG RESOLVE, conducted in south central Norway in March
1995, the American contracted commercial aircraft to return our soldiers and the
multinational AMF(L) staff fell apart. Our contracted air carrier canceled its flight to
redeploy the troops, so again we resorted to a lieutenant on the ground, this time in
Trondheim, Norway. Working with Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) to contract
air shipment for over 400 soldiers and the AMF(L) staff, the young officer succeeded.
USAREUR finally gave approval as an emergency, but then American law prevented
the United States from contracting for the transportation of non-US military
personnel. The U.S. Air Force had scheduled a flight to redeploy the multinational
staff, but they too canceled their flight. Thus the AMF(L) staff, which was supposed
to be transported by the United States in accordance with memorandums of
agreement, was in danger of being left behind in Norway.23 The AMF(L) staff was so
angry, that they threatened to hold the American force in place until USAREUR could
fix the problem. Eventually another emergency action was coordinated
between USAREUR and SHAPE for reimbursement and the issue was resolved.
National legal issues like these may prove to be the most difficult challenge facing the
prospect of successful multinational missions. Working through issues like these, but
on a much larger scale and multiplied at least sixteen times will be enormously
challenging to the Alliance.

The other major issue is the one of command and control. Until this issue is
solved, multinational logistics only remains a dream. No issue was more contentious among the nations. It is a critical operational issue and not simply a "logistics" one. The opinions gathered ranged the gamut from Operational Command (OPCOM) or as a minimal Operational Control (OPCON) as proposed by the British, to the typically vague AMF(L) terminology of "obligatory cooperation" mentioned earlier and preferred by the Dutch and Germans. The French even proposed a "coordination relationship", which could be fulfilled through a cell at theater level. It is doubtful if this issue will ever be fully resolved. Each nation will likely arrange the details of their command relationship between the NATO and National Commanders in the Transfer of Authority agreements.\(^\text{24}\) This of course would mean different, and more importantly, unequal command relationships for each nation's forces.

In addition to national feedback, NATO established a General Officer Steering Group which looked at a series of planned exercises taking place in 1994 and 1995, which could contribute to the study and help derive recommendations. Exercise ATLANTIC RESOLVE was the major test bed for multinational deployments, multinational movement control, logistics command and control for a multinational theater and logistics control for a multinational corps.\(^\text{25}\) Other exercises studied included ARCADE FUSION, BROKEN BODY 95, COUNTER GUARD, and CHINESE EYE.

### Recommendations

AFCENT presented their recommendations in December 1995, following 18 months of testing. These findings were scrubbed at NATO headquarters and various National Headquarters. The authors claim to have "...focused attention on the essence of multinational logistics for future NATO operations in a pragmatic and responsible manner."\(^\text{26}\)

The study group concedes that many NATO operations can be conducted
without the need for multinational means. In fact, it argues that only when "...agreed upon by nations, should a multinational approach be used." Permanent lead nation, role specializing and multinational units have been dismissed and recommended for use only as the case warrants. This clearly demonstrates the difficulty of getting the Alliance's consent for any single policy, but also reflects the enormous complexity involved in trying to mesh so many varied national systems.

The issue of command relationship was also resolved by compromise. The term "coordinating authority" was determined sufficient when dealing with other nation's logistics assets and OPCON only needed when nations are expected to perform some form of multinational logistic support. Coordinating authority is defined as:

"The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority".

That certainly is pragmatic, but whether or not it is responsible is yet to be seen. Logistics command and control at the component and corps levels will be tailored to the resources and force structure of the contributing nations.

It is recommended that a Combined Logistics Center (CLC) be established at Principle Subordinate Commander level for Central Region operations and that it be considered an option for operations out of region/area (i.e., Bosnia). These CLCs are advisory in nature and are not command and control organizations like an American Corps Support Command (COSCOM). They would have representatives from the
various nations and be tasked with supporting the G4 cells with "advice, background information and national experience to the NATO staff." The CLC needs to have standardized SOPs which are coordinated with the various nations through Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Memoranda of Agreement (MOA). The CLC is a good idea that will give the operational commander much better visibility over his logistics assets.

A COSCOM at Multinational Corps level was not seen as necessary and the recommendation was that it not be provided. Instead, integrated logistics staffs at the Corps Headquarters were recommended. The Corps Commander's authority as granted by MC 319 was determined to be sufficient when assisted by his logistics staff. Of course, if most operations are going to retain a national logistics concept, the need for a multinational C2 organization is lessened. Another main reason for deciding against such a control cell was the strong desire not to increase the number of headquarters.

Most classes of supply and services were determined to be national in function, but there were some exceptions. Class I (less combat rations), Class III (Bulk), Class IV, transportation, recovery and laundry and bath were generally considered as multinational areas. Other commodities, like ammunition could become multinational assets if they are interoperable with another nation's weapons systems. Generally, however, Class V is considered a national asset. These are logical recommendations and are no real change from what we have experienced in the past.

Movement Control was certainly one of the most important items on the agenda. If there is one area in which multinational cooperation is needed, this is it. The Working Group decided that existing national movement control centers (MCC)
and corps movement control centers (CMCC) suffice for Central Region operations. and operations out of region. They support the establishment of a Theater Movement Control Center (TMCC) and a multinational CMCC for out of area missions. The TMCC would be joint and would focus on movements of forces and supplies into and out of theater. The CMCC would be responsible for land component movement within that out of area theater.\textsuperscript{32}

The Group's recommendations hit the problem areas square on the head. The CMCC for out of area missions must be multinational and assigned at theater level; have a clearly defined area of responsibility; coordinate the arrival of forces and sustainment into theater and flow them to the Corps area; coordinate movement with all other MCC agencies including host nation; coordinate use of host nation transportation assets; and coordinate the redeployment of the force out of theater.\textsuperscript{33} Clearly this is the way to go and had we established an organization of this type prior to the deployment to Bosnia in December 1995, the deployment of the IFOR might have gone much smoother.

The NATO commander now has a much greater role in Host Nation Support. He is given the authority to prioritize host nation assets for his force. Sending nations are required to provide host nation points of contact to work with the multinational commander. These should come from the sending nation's Ministry of Defense and report working negotiations and concluded agreements.\textsuperscript{34} HNS planning needs to be centralized to avoid wasteful duplication and more critically, competitive bidding among alliance members for limited resources.

Contracting and funding issues were not resolved. Clearly, the difficulties of solving the morass of legal issues among the alliance's members was too much to reach consent on. The study group did decide that Central Region missions can pretty much rely on current policies, but that missions out of region and out of area
require more work. With improved coordination for HNS issues, contracting difficulties can be somewhat lessened, but a satisfactory solution to the issue is off the horizon.

CONCLUSIONS

The CR-CAST study and its validation process was accomplished in 27 months. It is a rather remarkable study by NATO standards in both its relatively short duration and its ability to address some tough issues. In most areas, common sense has prevailed. Logistics at the national level is extremely complex. The U S Army alone has so many different automation systems currently in use that there is little compatibility within its own ranks.

We must, however, begin to implement some of the recommendations of the study group. The complexity of multinational deployments needs to be controlled by the commander. Could a single CMCC have improved the deployment of the IFOR to Hungary and Bosnia? It is too early to know for sure, but the lessons learned from this deployment must be studied diligently. Clearly, the deployment into the region was less than satisfactory and the old national ways of executing deployments will not work in a large multinational operation. Even the AMF(L), despite its many other support problems, has a multinational MCC which does a superb job of coordinating the movement of forces into a deployment area.

Host nation support must be coordinated by the NATO commander on the ground. Nothing could be more persuasive than the initial dismal results in the Balkans and south central Europe. A recent Defense News article scorched the NATO logistics operations in Bosnia:

Despite months of advance planning, NATO countries bungled their takeover of logistics operations in Bosnia and wasted tens of millions of dollars by paying far above market prices for such standard supplies
as drinking water and barbed wire, according to alliance sources here.35

We certainly cannot afford this type of problem in the future. The deployment to Bosnia began just as the recommendations of the CR-CAST study group were being published. It may be too harsh to criticize the lack of coordination for this operation, but we simply must do better. The deployment was hardly a surprise since it was being planned for in one way or another for at least several years.

Bosnia offers the opportunity to look at multinational operations and logistics support in a manner that no exercise could possibly replicate. Clearly, logistical support is still a national responsibility for this mission. There is no combined logistics cell at NATO or even at the ARRC working the problem. The 1st Armored Division is being supported out of Hungary by an exclusive American structure of 1st TAACOM and the 3d COSCOM. Other NATO countries probably have similar support structures, although NATO is using "role specialization" in some areas. German Bundeswehr units are providing logistical support to French and British forces from their support bases in Croatia.

Now is the time to implement the findings of the CR-CAST study. Let us examine how they may or may not work in a real out of area deployment. If we miss this opportunity, we are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past. Multinational logistics will not work as originally envisioned during those heady days following the collapse of the Soviet Union; that much is clear. However, there is a real need to institute multinational principles where they will and must work. No one nation can afford not to. The study has been completed and the recommendations are disseminated. It is passed time to act; the multinational commander must have the support necessary to accomplish his mission. Until we implement the
recommendations of the CR-CAST study, logisticians will be unable to cope with the complexity of these post Cold War operations. This is a time for new thinking and new approaches to the age old problem of supporting the force. Bosnia should be the testing ground for new multinational support ideas much as Louisiana proved to be a proving ground for American operational concepts fifty years ago.
NOTES


2Ibid., 26.


5Ibid.

6Ibid.


11Ibid., 1-2.

12Ibid., 1-3.

13Ibid.

14Ibid., 1-4.

Saunders, 25.


18 Ibid., 5-6.

19 Ibid., 7.

20 Ibid., 9.

21 Ibid., 10.

22 Ibid., 11.


24 Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), 9.

25 Ibid., 13-16.

26 Ibid., 39.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid24
29 Ibid., 21.

30 Ibid., 22.


32 Ibid., 29.

33 Ibid., 30.

34 Ibid., 33.

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