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NATO ENLARGEMENT
(NOW IS NOT THE ANSWER)

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARTH T. BLOXHAM
United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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(Now is Not the Answer)

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Lieutenant Colonel Garth T. Bloxham
United States Army

Professor William T. Johnsen
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

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The world has changed. The cold war is over. Nonetheless, U.S. national interests require the United States to help shape the emerging concepts of European security. NATO, as the guardian of European democracy, a force of European stability, and the vehicle consistently used by the United States for involvement in European security, stands at the heart of those interests. The United States and NATO have committed to enlargement. Despite NATO's acceptance of the "Study on NATO Enlargement" (December 1995), questions linger about NATO expansion. Should NATO expand? Not now. The reason is Russia. Within this context, this project reviews NATO's evolutionary policy process from the end of the cold war through the December 1995 Summit, examines countries with potential for NATO membership, addresses the question of "Why expand NATO?", and identifies Russia as the crux of the issue.
List of Illustrations

Figure 1: Countries with Potential for NATO Membership
If we think of NATO as an organization for the defense of the territory of its members, it is indeed hard to see how, in an era of reduced military forces, NATO could move its borders and extend a nuclear guarantee hundreds of miles to the east. If, however, we think of NATO instead as a tool for promoting a secure, free, democratic, and prosperous unified Europe seeking to overcome the legacies that create insecurity, enlargement is the right policy.¹

NATO’s Changing World

Between 1989 and 1991, the world changed: the Berlin Wall fell, Germany reunited, the Soviet Union dissolved, and the former Warsaw Pact struggled toward democracy. Today’s risks are “local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return of historical grievances.”² In this changing world, however, America has maintained a strong presence in Europe. Despite dramatic changes, U.S. national interests remain consistent and require the United States to maintain a leadership role in shaping the emerging concept of European security.

To protect its interests, the U.S. must still ensure:

- A continent free from dominion by any power or combination of powers hostile to the United States;
- Prosperous partners open to American ideas, goods, investments;
- A community of shared values, extending across as much of Europe as possible, cooperating with the United States on numerous global issues;
- A continent that is not so wrecked by strife that it drains inordinate resources from the United States or the rest of the world.³

NATO, as the guardian of European democracy, a force of European stability, and the American vehicle of choice for involvement in European security, stands at the heart of these interests.⁴ But, like the world, NATO is changing. On one hand, the end of the cold war was a testament to NATO’s resounding success. With the demise of the Soviet threat, a peace dividend could be reaped, defense budgets could be scaled back, and NATO countries could devote their energies to pressing domestic issues. On the other hand, the disintegration of the Soviet empire
left a power vacuum across Central and Eastern Europe. The former Warsaw Pact countries face tremendous challenges as they struggle to manage transition to market economies, democracy, and independence. Ethnic disputes held dormant by the reign of communism resurfaced.

Confronted with the problems created by its own success, NATO began an evolutionary process that continues today. Rather than remaining stagnant and risking irrelevancy in a dynamically changed world, NATO embarked on a series of changes to meet the emerging world order and to establish its position in the post-cold war period. This transformation was reflected in The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (November 1991.) This powerful document set in motion the ideas that would shape both NATO and the new European security order. NATO's evolutionary path was set: dialogue and cooperation (NACC), real partnership (Partnership for Peace), and eventually enlargement (Study on NATO Enlargement). Within this on-going evolutionary process are the base answers to fundamental questions concerning NATO enlargement: "How should NATO enlarge?, "Who should be offered membership?, "When should enlargement take place?, "Why should NATO expand?, and "What about Russia?". Collectively, these questions define not only the future architecture of European security, but how the United States plans to achieve its national interests in Europe.

NATO's Evolution

The Beginning

In 1989, against a background of an U.S. national debate asking, "Why NATO?"; the Alliance found itself in an identity crisis. Without an easily identifiable treat, NATO's relevancy and its role in the new order were seriously questioned, not only by those historically opposed to U.S. involvement in NATO, but by the harmonic voices of isolationism and the need to address domestic issues. With the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact, NATO was pressured to prove its
relevancy or give way to the reaping of the peace dividend.\textsuperscript{5} As a result, at the NATO Summit held in May 1989, NATO formally recognized the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and established a new pattern of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{6}

The following year, at the London NATO Summit (July 1990), this concept of a new security environment continued to evolve. Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were offered diplomatic liaison with NATO. Also at this summit, NATO cashed in the peace dividend by formally announcing the fielding of smaller, restructured forces (designed more for rapid deployment and regional contingencies) and an overall reduction in readiness.\textsuperscript{7}

In June 1991, NATO declared, "Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free," an objective that has "guided NATO’s policies ever since."\textsuperscript{8} The path of evolution set, NATO set out to develop an overarching strategy to shape its continued evolution and establish the new European security architecture.

**Dialogue and Cooperation**

At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO adopted the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. While it did not replace NATO’s fundamental purposes of collective defense and mutual assistance, the Strategic Concept was based on a broad approach to security. The foundation of this approach was "dialogue and cooperation." Recognizing the new security architecture would be built on a framework of interlocking institutions (such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and the European Union (EU)), the Strategic Concept reestablished NATO’s function in peace (dialogue and cooperation), crises (enhanced flexibility, rapid reaction, and mobility) and war (restore peace).\textsuperscript{9} Complementing the Strategic Concept, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation extended actual invitations to enhance dialogue and
cooperation, efforts which laid the foundation later that year for the formal creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). While the Rome Summit of 1991 was a watershed event in NATO’s evolution, not all issues were resolved. As discussed below, concerns among European Allies and in the United States lingered as to the role of the United States and its continued involvement on the European continent.

The Transatlantic Link and The Clinton Administration

Like Europe, the United States was reacting to the end of the Cold War. Like many Europeans, U.S. analysts questioned NATO’s relevancy and America’s role in NATO. In reaction, U.S. policy toward NATO evolved through a series of interagency compromises, but eventually concluded that a national interest of the United States is to remain engaged in Europe. This policy was reflected in June 1992, when NATO Foreign Ministers formally recognized the importance and vitality of the transatlantic link.

Following the election of President Clinton, an important shift in policy occurred: the fundamental focus of the United States emphasized the engagement of Central and Eastern Europe in order to expand democracy and develop strong market economies open to American products. Important for this discussion, with this change in policy, the Clinton Administration became the driving force behind NATO enlargement. More than any other country, the United States shaped NATO’s evolution and did so through three concrete proposals: (1) Partnership for Peace (first articulated in October 1993), (2) the commitment to enlarge (NATO Summit, January 1994), and (3) The Study on NATO Enlargement (December 1995).
Partnership for Peace

To address mounting domestic pressure for action and the growing concerns of the Central and Eastern countries that the progress to date was all "talk" (i.e., dialogue and cooperation), the Clinton Administration developed Partnership for Peace (PFP), subsequently offered at the NATO Summit in January 1994. PFP goals are:

- To facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes
- To ensure democratic control of defense forces
- To maintain the capability / readiness to contribute to operations under the UN or OSCE
- To contribute to operations under the authority of the UN
- To develop cooperative military relations with NATO
- To develop forces better able to operate with members of NATO

Designed to go beyond the "dialogue and cooperation" established in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and already underway in the NACC, PFP is a "real partnership" opened to all countries in the NACC and OSCE. Currently, twenty-seven nations (including Russia) have joined PFP. Since its creation in January 1994, PFP has exceeded all expectations. In 1994, three successful exercises were held between NATO and Partnership countries. In 1995, ten partnership exercises, including fourteen partners, were conducted. Also, in 1995 the United States committed $30 million to help PFP nations participate in these combined exercises. President Clinton requested an additional $100 million for additional PFP exercise support and equipment required by partnership countries to operate with NATO forces in the field.

The Commitment to Enlarge

As a result of U.S. leadership, on 11 January 1994, NATO formally endorsed Partnership for Peace and reaffirmed being open to membership of other European countries. Despite originally being proposed as a military cooperation program without any defense commitment, the
Clinton Administration soon linked Partnership for Peace to enlargement. In a speech to the Visegrad states on 12 January 1994, President Clinton said, "The partnership sets in motion a process that will lead to the enlargement of NATO’s membership . . . Now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how we will do so."

Four days later, he went on to say, "For some countries, the partnership will be the path to full NATO membership."

The Enlargement Study

Prompted by the United States, NATO initiated a study to develop the rationale (the "why") and the process (the "how") for NATO expansion. The Study on NATO Enlargement was subsequently released on 28 September 1995. Incorporating many of the themes initially established in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, the Study described enlargement as a "gradual, deliberate and transparent process" that "will occur as one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation and security currently underway."

Acceptance of the Study at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 December 1995 was the third major success of the Clinton Administration in shaping the United States’ role in NATO’s evolution. The Study not only committed NATO to enlargement, but established the "why", "how", "who" and "when" of the enlargement process. Broad based, nonspecific, and void of time lines; the Study provides flexibility to balance political realities while simultaneously encouraging reform in potential members. Key points of the study include:

- No list of fixed criteria for invitation for membership
- Each nation will be considered individually
- The process will be transparent
- Expansion must strengthen the security of the entire region
- There is no timetable
- There is no list of nations
- The decision of membership will be made by consensus of all the members
- New members will not be allowed to "close the door" for future members.
- Partnership for Peace will play an important role in obtaining NATO membership.\textsuperscript{25}

For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, however, the Study did not go far enough and lacked the specificity (i.e. prioritized list of countries and timetables) they had hoped would guide their efforts to join NATO. As described below, during the year it took NATO to develop and approve the Study, potential members watched as momentum for rapid expansion in the United States and Europe ebbed. Concurrently, Central and Eastern European countries began to realize membership into NATO could take years.

**Potential Members**

Spurred by the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, the post-cold war security vacuum, and the failed Soviet coup; the Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) appealed for full membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{26} Coinciding with building domestic pressure, this request was met favorably in the United States and Germany, but less favorably in France and Britain. Consequently, the Visegard Four’s appeal did not lead to membership.

If the purpose of NATO’s enlargement is to promote democracy and market economies, then Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary with their Western outlook remain strong candidates for membership. Slovakia despite its geographical location between NATO’s current boundaries and Hungary, is less likely to become a member given its current instability and lack of reforms. In the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor,
It is certainly possible, given effective and focused leadership, to complete the political phase of the admissions process by the years 1996-98, at least for Poland and the Czech Republic and perhaps for Hungary and Slovakia as well -- and in any case for all four by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{27}

Poland has a strong desire to join NATO. In fact, the majority of Poles (more than 70%) declare NATO membership as a key security objective for Poland. In their Partnership Plan with NATO, Poland officially stated that it "is committed to seek full membership of the alliance and that the ultimate aim of the participation of Polish armed forces in the partnership program is the eventual inclusion of the Polish operational forces into NATO's integrated military structure."\textsuperscript{28} Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkeiwicz added, "The key reason we want to be in NATO is to secure our own democracies. We need to keep down in our country the very same kind of nationalists Yeltsin's contending with, the same kind that destroyed Yugoslavia."\textsuperscript{29} But Polish desire and rhetoric aside, membership may be harder for the Poles than they initially thought. Civilian control of the military is currently in jeopardy and overall advances questioned with the appointment of Marian Zacharski, a cold war super-spy, to head the Polish intelligence services.\textsuperscript{30}

The Czechs are just as determined as the Poles. The Czech government has been very aggressive in reforming the military and talks of joining NATO within a few years. Several major hurdles remain, however. In the area of interoperability, the Czech Republic will have difficulty in funding the equipment upgrade from Warsaw Pact to NATO standards. Currently, 2.5% of their GDP is being used for defense. Current expenditures focus on acquiring NATO compatible command and control systems. Current plans call for only one unit (recently formed) to be a professional, NATO style, rapid-deployment, professional force.\textsuperscript{31}
Beyond the Visegrad Four, few nations are candidates for rapid membership. In many Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the FSU republics; political, economic, and military reforms have been challenged by hostility and halfhearted efforts. Democracy and market economies have been laid on top of existing and continuing organizations and structures. Worst of all, independence within the former Soviet empire is starting to give way to economic and political links back to Russia.\(^{32}\) Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus have too many problems to currently be considered for membership. In particular, Ukraine (given its location, size, economy, and nuclear capability) is a potential flashpoint between NATO and Russian relations. Albanian armed forces do not even have uniforms.\(^{33}\) And, the Baltic States are normally considered as "assuming too great a reach", given their geographic location, for current membership.\(^{34}\) (See Figure 1.)

The Year Ahead (1996)

I believe that the definitive requirements will not be known even in the coming year. On the part of NATO, the entire issue is left in a certain, not altogether specific stage of assessment, apparently because of the relations between NATO and Russia. I believe that this situation is here to stay for a while, as the presidential elections in both Russian and the United States are fast approaching.

--Slovakian Defense Minister Jan Sitek, January 1996.\(^{35}\)

Currently, the Clinton Administration is "pursuing a comprehensive strategy for European security based on America’s continuing commitment to remain engaged on the continent."\(^{36}\) This strategy has five key elements:

- Adapting and enlarging NATO
- Strengthening the OSCE
- Supporting Europe’s integration and EU enlargement
- Enhancing a European security and defense identity complementary to NATO
- Engaging Russia in Europe’s security structures.\(^{37}\)
This strategy complements NATO's continuing evolution as laid out at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 December 1995, where NATO committed to build on the approval of the Study on NATO Enlargement and continue its steady, measured, and transparent progress toward eventual enlargement. During the next year, enlargement will consist of intensified dialogue, enhanced Partnership for Peace activities, and consideration of internal adaptations to ensure enlargement preserves NATO's effectiveness. Given the nebulous goals NATO has set for itself in the upcoming year, however, it may be years before the first Central or Eastern European country is invited for membership into NATO. Indeed, as David Haglund has remarked, "NATO enlargement will take place with a velocity approaching the glacial" and is "unlikely in the next five years."^39

Why Should NATO Expand Now?

NATO's announced position is that the question of enlargement is not whether, but when and how. Somehow I have missed any logical explanation of WHY.
--Senator Sam Nunn, June 1995^40

In November 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated, "... our challenge is to extend the zone of security and stability that the Alliance has provided --to extend it across the continent to the east ... the United States is firmly committed to a steady, transparent, and deliberate process for NATO expansion."^41 But, why should NATO expand now?

Study On NATO Enlargement

The Study on NATO Enlargement addresses this question head on. Enlargement is a step towards "the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of a broad European security architecture."^42 Not only will enlargement protect the democratic reforms of new members, but, by integrating more countries
into the European community of values and organizations, "enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its members."\textsuperscript{43} Specifically, according to the Study, NATO enlargement will:

- Support democratic reforms to include civilian control of the military
- Foster patterns of cooperation and consensus
- Promote good-neighborly relations
- Emphasize common defense and transparency in defense planning and budgets
- Encourage integration and cooperation in Europe through shared democratic values
- Strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to security through peacekeeping activities
- Strengthen and broaden the Trans-Atlantic partnership\textsuperscript{44}

As suggested above, the strategic foundation for NATO’s enlargement is built on a dichotomy of conflicting bases: NATO should expand to strengthen NATO’s strategic position and NATO should expand to achieve peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Expand While Russia is Weak}

Despite current Russian objections, Moscow is in no position to prevent NATO enlargement. Russia is currently consumed with its own internal problems: democratic, economic, and military reforms; internal instability; Islamic radicalism; Chechnya; peacekeeping operations in Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia; and border concerns in the East. Also, the threat of Russian countermeasures if NATO should expand should not be the central issue: Russian compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe (CFE) is unlikely anyway and START-2 is already in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{46} If the Russian phoenix arises, there is no guarantee that a "new" Russia will be democratic or cooperative toward the West. The shift towards nationalism in the Duma (resulting from the 1993 and 1995 elections) and the possibility of a communist victory in the June 1996 presidential elections suggest a substantial shift away from further reform and the potential emergence of the old Russian empire mentality.\textsuperscript{47}
Therefore, the time to move into the power vacuum is now and create a Central and Eastern Europe free of Russian dominance.

**Expand To Promote Democracy and Free Markets**

The second basis to expand NATO is to promote democracy and free markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Highly idealistic, this position is reflected in President Clinton's policy that, "Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests," particularly through the "promotion of democracy abroad."\(^{48}\) The strength of this argument resides in the belief that democracies tend to settle disputes short of war.\(^{49}\)

**The Study Lacks Substance**

While the arguments to expand NATO in order to strengthen NATO's strategic position at a time when Russia is unable to stop it and to promote democracy and free markets hold merit, the arguments against expansion also have validity. For example, while the *Study On NATO Enlargement* provides the fundamental rationale for NATO enlargement, most of the benefits articulated in the Study can be obtained by other means than enlargement. For example, transparency in defense planning and budgets is currently being obtained through the Partnership for Peace program. The current peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia are proof of the Alliance's ability to contribute to international security. Finally, on-going efforts to strengthen and possibly enlarge other European organizations (such as the OSCE, EU, and WEU) could foster patterns of cooperation and consensus as well as support democratic and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. These and other efforts are on-going today, without expanding NATO and without risking NATO's relationship with Russia.
Let Europe Take Care of Itself

The second counter against NATO expansion is "Let Europe Take Care of Itself." This position argues that the United States should no longer guarantee European security and asks, "Why should the United States continue to belong to NATO?" Transforming NATO into a new post-cold-war era role only continues U.S. global security burdens. Further, NATO expansion not only increases U.S. commitments, but extends them to through the vast plains between Germany and Russia, a historically unstable and undemocratic part of the world that the U.S. has never considered vital to national interests. The realities of the post-cold-war and the pressures of domestic issues cry, "Reap the peace dividend and look internal."

The issue of "Let Europe Take Care of Itself," however, is not that simple. Without NATO, the United States could drift toward isolationism. Also, without NATO, the United States would have no legal, practical, or structural framework for continued military cooperation in Europe. Americans have invested too much in European security by fighting two World Wars and the Cold War to just walk away. While it is easy to confuse the issue of "Why NATO?" and "Why NATO enlargement?" for the near term NATO will remain a viable, useful organization for the United States. The issue of NATO enlargement, however, is not as clear.

Russia: The Wild Card

By forcing the pace of NATO enlargement of a volatile and unpredictable moment in Russia’s history, we could be placing ourselves in the worst of all security environments: rapidly declining defense budgets, broader responsibilities, and heightened instability. We will find ourselves with increasingly difficult relations with the most important country in the world in terms of potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

-- Senator Sam Nunn, June 1995.
Michael Mandelbaum in "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion" states, "NATO expansion is about Russia." Russia's size, influence, power, and the fragility of its democratic and economic reforms argue that Russia must be given first priority in U. S. foreign policy. From the U.S. view, security interests in Central and Eastern Europe do center around Russia: prevent the re-emergence of a Russia as a military threat, encourage the growth of democracy in Russia, promote Russian economic reforms, and promote ethnic and border stability in the regions surrounding the FSU. From the Russian view, NATO is a relic of the cold war and, like the Warsaw Pact, should be dissolved. Last June, then Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev noted,

Preserving current NATO as a purely military bloc would run counter to the trends of molding a single Europe. In this case, we would need to clarify whom NATO is going to defend against. If one has Russia in mind, it is obvious that this would mean creating new dividing lines in Europe.  

By December 1994, NATO fully realized the "active participation of Russia" would be required to build a cooperative European security architecture: "We reaffirm our commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship, corresponding with Russia's size importance, and capabilities, both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace, based on mutual friendship, respect, and benefit." This importance was further reflected in the Study on NATO Enlargement which argued that, "NATO-Russia relations should reflect Russia's significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, no 'surprise' decisions by
either side. At the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1995, the Ministerial Council continued to attach "great importance" to the cooperation between NATO and Russia.

This growing concern over Russia is a direct consequence of the U. S. commitment (and NATO's subsequent endorsement) to enlarge NATO. In December 1994, Russia suspended its participation in PFP over the issue of NATO's enlargement. When Moscow resumed cooperation with PFP in June, the Russians warned that any NATO expansion would immediately end further participation. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated:

Russia's position regarding NATO expansion has remained unchanged. We continue to believe that it does not meet either the interest of Russia's national security or the interest of European security as a whole. Furthermore, the hasty resolution of the issue may threaten the establishment of truly mutually advantageous and constructive relations between Russia and NATO and the usefulness of Russia's involvement in the PFP.

The quandary now facing the Clinton Administration is how to balance NATO expansion against the fear of "losing Russia." The challenge is to assure Russia of a respected position in Europe's new security structure without allowing Russia a veto in NATO affairs. According to Stanley R. Sloan, "for Russia to see that NATO is not a threat, it must become actively involved with NATO." According to the Clinton administration, this involvement must consist of three elements: active leadership in Partnership for Peace, a special relationship between NATO and Russia to discuss security outside the framework of PFP, and a bilateral U. S.-Russian security relationship. How far the Clinton Administration will go to win Russian support for its dual track strategy (NATO expansion and Russia support), however, remains to be seen.
Conclusion: Now Is Not The Answer

Currently, the United States finds itself at an important and conflicting crossroads: its sincere (but perhaps hasty) commitment to enlarge NATO and its concern for Russian reactions. This dilemma will not be easily resolved. On the one hand, the Study on NATO Enlargement lays the foundation for those who argue in favor of NATO expansion: enhanced security and stability, protection of democratic reforms, and promotion of a community of values and organizations. Further arguments hold that NATO should expand to strengthen its strategic position at a time when Russia is unable to stop it. Finally, enlargement is the way to achieve peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, opponents of enlargement argue that the Study on NATO Enlargement lacks substance. Moreover, the benefits articulated in the Study can be obtained by means other than enlargement. For example, transparency in defense can be obtained through PFP. Cooperation and consensus can be obtained through the OSCE, EU or WEU. Further, opponents argue, Russia must have first priority in U.S. foreign policy, not NATO expansion.

This latter argument apparently holds sway, for despite publication of the Study on NATO Enlargement and U.S. rhetoric, NATO currently is focused on placating Russia, and not on potential members, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. No time table exists for extending memberships and, instead of getting closer, NATO enlargement appears to be moving to the back burner, as Russian concerns occupy center stage. Simultaneous NATO enlargement and Russian engagement, therefore, do not appear compatible in today's politically turbulent environment.
While enlargement of NATO may be viable tomorrow, neither Europe nor the United States is ready to make this monumental step in today's political environment. Moreover, given the fragile nature of Russian democracy and the upcoming Russian presidential elections (June 1996), it is much too early to lose Russia by pushing the enlargement issue.

On balance, what appears feasible during the next five to ten years is the close strategic engagement of Russia with NATO and continued Alliance support for economic and democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, now is not the time for NATO expansion. Instead, time and patience are needed to allow the engagement of democratic and economic reforms to take root and allow the future to slowly and steadily unveil. Until that future is more certain, NATO enlargement is not the answer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>NACP</th>
<th>PFP</th>
<th>Interest in Joining NATO</th>
<th>Key Points and Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Poland      | Democratic state            | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Strong progress towards privatization  
■ 5.5% growth GDP & 30% inflation 1994 |
| Czech Republic | Parliamentary democracy     | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Created 1 Jan 93 w/division of Czechoslovakia  
■ Strong progress towards privatization  
■ 2% growth GDP & 10% inflation 1994 |
| Hungary     | Republic                    | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Strong progress towards privatization  
■ 3% growth GDP & 20% inflation 1994 |
| Slovakia    | Parliamentary democracy     | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Created 1 Jan 93 w/division of Czechoslovakia  
■ Weak progress towards privatization  
■ 4.3% growth GDP & 12% inflation 1994  
■ 3.1% of GDP for defense |
| Slovenia    | Emerging democracy          | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Making a solid economic recovery  
■ 4% growth GDP & 20% inflation 1994  
■ 4.5% of GDP for defense |
| Estonia     | Republic                    | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Ambitious program of market reforms and stabilization measures  
■ 4% growth GDP & 2% inflation per month in 2nd half of 1994  
■ 1.5% of GDP for defense |
| Latvia      | Republic                    | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Rapidly becoming a dynamic market economy  
■ 2% growth GDP & less than 2% inflation per month in 1994  
■ 3-5% of GDP for defense |
| Lithuania   | Republic                    | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Steady progress in developing a market economy  
■ 0% growth GDP & 3.1% inflation per month in 1994  
■ 2% of GDP for defense |
| Romania     | Republic                    | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Market reforms fully introduced  
■ 3.4% growth GDP & 60% inflation rate in 1994  
■ 3% of GDP for defense |
| Bulgaria    | Emerging democracy          | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Economy continued painful adjustment in 1994  
■ 0.2% growth GDP & 122% inflation rate in 1994 |
| Albania     | Emerging democracy          | Y    | Y   | Y                        | ■ Difficult transition to more open-market economy  
■ Extremely poor by European standards  
■ 11% National product real growth & 16% inflation rate in 1994 |
| Russia      | Federation                  | Y    | Y   |                           | ■ Experiencing formidable difficulties moving to market economy  
■ -15% National product real growth & 10% inflation rate per month in 1994  
■ About 10% of GDP for defense |
| Ukraine     | Republic                    | Y    | Y   |                           | ■ A nuclear power  
■ Potential flashpoint, boundary of Europe and Russia  
■ "Cold War" exists with Russia  
■ Widespread resistance to market reform despite great economic potential in agriculture and industry  
■ -19% National product real growth & 14% inflation rate per month in 1994  
■ Less than 4% of GDP for defense in 1993 |
| Kyrgyzstan  | Republic                    | Y    | Y   |                           | ■ Painful and slow economic restructuring in 1994  
■ -24% National product real growth & 5.4% inflation rate per month in 1994 |
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>- Steady progress on ambitious economic reform</td>
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<td>-30% National product real growth &amp; 7.5% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<td>- 2% of GDP for defense in 1994</td>
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<td>- July 92, Russian peacekeeping forces deployed to Trans-Dniester region</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>- 2nd largest of former Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>- Armed forces small, but mobile</td>
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<td>- Enormous untapped fossil-fuel reserves</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Strong agricultural potential</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- -25% Nation product real growth &amp; 24% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Attempting to move closer to Turkey while maintaining positive relations with Russia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Government continues to prop-up economy with subsidies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- -4% National product real growth &amp; 14% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Authoritarian ex-Communist regime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tribally-based social structure</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- -24% National product real growth &amp; 25% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ongoing conflict over the ethnic Armenian-dominated region on Azerbaijan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Little prospect for positive relationship with NATO due to tensions with Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Relative internal stability and cohesion</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Azerbaijan and Turkey have blockaded pipeline and railroad</td>
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<td>- Full economic recovery cannot be expected until conflict resolution</td>
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<td>- -2% National product real growth &amp; 27% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unresolved 7 year conflict with Armenian separatists</td>
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<td>- High unemployment and low standard of living</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Political instability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Very pro-Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- -22% National product real growth &amp; 28% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 10% of GDP for defense in 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethnic and civil strife since independence in 1991</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- National security threatened by separatists</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Russian peacekeeping force in place since 1992 along Abkhazia / Georgia border</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 200,000 refugees and 100,000 displaced persons</td>
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<td>- Dependent on US and EU humanitarian grain shipments</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- -30% National product real growth 1994 &amp; 40.5% inflation rate per month 2nd half of 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Least independent oriented of FSU republics</td>
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<td>- April 1994, postponed joining PFP</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Privatization of economy almost nonexistent</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic ties with Russia are critical, transport link for Russian oil</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- -20% National product real growth &amp; 29% inflation rate per month in 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- 3 changes of government since independence in 1991</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Concerns of Islamic fundamentalism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- 3rd year of civil war continues</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Russian peacekeeping soldiers deployed throughout country and along Tajik-Afghan border</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


11. An excellent discussion of the Clinton Administration’s development of this policy and the compromises made during the interagency process can be found in Michael Dobbs, "Securing the New Europe: Wider Alliance Would Increase U.S. Commitments," The Washington Post, 5 July 95, A:1.


13. This shift coincided with growing domestic pressure to rapidly expand NATO. On 27 January 1994, the Senate adopted an amendment urging rapid admission of NATO to qualifying countries. Later in the same year, the Republican "Contract With America" calling for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to be included in NATO by 1999 echoed this sentiment.


25. Ibid., Pars. 7, 34, 42-46, 63-82.


37. Ibid.


42. Study On NATO Enlargement, par. 2.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., par. 3.


47. For an excellent understanding of Duma elections and the upcoming Russian presidential elections to include a run-down on each candidate see "Russian Presidential Elections-96," an Internet home page maintained by Dmitri Gusev and Indiana University, "http://www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/dmiguse/russian/elections%2ehtml".


49. Odom, 43.


53. Sloan, 228.

54. Nunn, 585.


59. Study on NATO Enlargement, par. 27.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 229.

64. Perry, 3.
65. Ibid., 4.

66. How far the Clinton administration will go was recently questioned by Peter Rodman in a *Washington Post* editorial which stated that Russian support in Bosnia was obtained by an agreement the Clinton administration would keep NATO enlargement "on the back burner." ("Understanding With Moscow," *The Washington Post*, 16 January 1995, A:15.) The Clinton Administration vehemently denied this the following day.


25
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Johnsen, William T. and Thomas-Durell Young. Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, (15 August 1994).


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