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OBJECTIVES AND SUCCESS - LINKING NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS

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ABSTRACT

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Clearly defined political objectives enable commanders to focus military strategic objectives to attain success. To better understand this relationship between national policy goals and the successful application of military power to achieve them, this study examines U.S. operations in Korea, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf. In each case, the paper identifies the link between clear objectives and success, or explores the correlation between ambiguous and/or changing objectives and failure. The paper concludes that political leaders must develop and articulate clear, attainable, consistent objectives. Commanders must define military objectives that achieve the political goals. This may involve developing parameters that narrow and provide focus to broad political objectives. Finally, military and political leaders must constantly discuss and coordinate their objectives.
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"No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Clausewitz' words describe the very essence of warfare: what does a nation expect to accomplish and how does it plan to do so? What a country "intends to achieve" defines the political objectives and policies of a state. How a nation "intends to conduct it" outlines options that set the strategic and operational objectives. In order to link military strategy to national policy, the latter must establish and maintain clear, attainable objectives. Political objectives determine military objectives; strategic objectives drive operational objectives. These objectives focus the efforts of military leaders, and provide the basis for and definition of success. Conversely, failure to clearly define objectives, or changing objectives during a campaign, causes confusion, lack of focus, and frequently a lack of success.

Both Clausewitz and Jomini emphasize the importance of objectives. Throughout *On War*, Clausewitz argues that political objectives and policies must determine military action. He links the two by stating "Political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it."¹ He describes the concept of the political objective focusing the military effort when he writes, "War plans...must have a single ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled."² Jomini echoes this idea,
declaring that to prosecute a war one must prepare "a system of operations in reference to a prescribed aim ... The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the war."³ Clearly defined political objectives enable the military commander to develop plans to achieve them.

With the emphasis on objective by Clausewitz and Jomini, it is not surprising that U.S. military doctrine stresses its importance as well. The capstone document for U.S. Army operational doctrine, FM 100-5, "Operations," lists objective as a principle of both war and operations other than war, and instructs the reader to "direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."⁴ Joint doctrine also emphasizes objective as the principle that drives operations, defines success and failure, and specifies conditions for termination of mission or conflict.⁵

Since 1984, the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) have reinforced the importance of clearly defined, achievable objectives. In a speech in November of that year, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger outlined the criteria for commitment of U.S. military forces, including

- Have clearly defined political and military objectives.
- Know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.
- The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed - their size, composition, and disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.⁶

Known as the Weinberger Doctrine, these criteria generally have
guided U.S. policy since 1984. Inherent in this guidance is the initial identification of policy objectives to focus strategic objectives and efforts. Also, the requirement to maintain consistent objectives is evident in the guidance.

Ambiguous or changing objectives dilute the focus of effort, prevent the formation of a coherent strategy, and make success difficult to attain. Without clear policy objectives, military leaders cannot establish strategic and operational objectives, focus effort, nor define success. To better understand the complex relationship between policy objectives and military success this paper examines U.S. operations in Korea, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf. In each case, the paper identifies the link between clear objectives and success, or explores the correlation between ambiguous and/or changing objectives and a resulting lack of success. The final section uses these examples to discern insights concerning the relationship between national policy objectives, military strategic objectives, and success.

**KOREA**

Prior to the 25 June 1950 North Korean (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea-DPRK) invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States had committed itself to the containment of communism. The United States viewed the Soviet Union as the leader of all communist movements, and recently had resisted Soviet sponsored aggression in Greece and Berlin. When DPRK forces crossed the 38th parallel, the United States perceived the attack as another Soviet backed attempt at communist expansion.
and requested action from the United Nations (U.N.). The initial U.N. Security Council resolution (25 June) called for North Korea to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops to the 38th parallel, and for member nations "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution."\(^9\)

When North Korea continued its attack, the U.N. Security Council again met to discuss the situation, subsequently resolving on 27 June to request members furnish such assistance as necessary to the ROK "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."\(^10\) While the Security Council debated this resolution, the United States ordered its air and naval forces to provide cover and support to ROK troops.\(^11\)

At this point, the U.N. objectives were fairly clear: repel the North Korean attack and restore the Korean peninsula to its pre-invasion status. Although the United States had not clearly stated its objectives, its intent was to resist communist aggression in Korea without expanding the war. President Harry S. Truman did not want to take any actions that would provoke a war with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) or the Soviet Union.\(^12\) Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) felt the United States should oppose "communist aggression without provoking unnecessarily a total war."\(^13\) Initial instructions to General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. Far East Commander, reflected this policy by stipulating that U.S. air and naval forces supporting South Korea could operate only south of the 38th
parallel. This concern for limiting the conflict indicated U.S. objectives were the same as U.N. objectives: to restore the situation ante bellum.

As the North Korean invasion advanced, the United States authorized air strikes north of the 38th parallel, a naval blockade of North Korea, and the employment of U.S. ground forces. Despite increased military operations, U.S. objectives remained constant. In a 29 June statement, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said the purpose of U.S. operations was to restore the ROK to its pre-invasion status and to reestablish peace. President Truman noted after a discussion with the National Security Council (NSC) that "our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border." The Department of Defense and the JCS concurred. Instructions to General MacArthur reflected these objectives, and he acknowledged on 30 June that his mission was to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.

In accordance with the U.S. and U.N. objectives, U.N. forces fought throughout the summer. With the return of the Soviet Union, and its veto, to the U.N. Security Council, no further guidance or delineation of objectives were forthcoming from that organization, nor did the United States clearly identify objectives necessary for ending the war. On 13 July, General MacArthur told Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins that he intended to destroy the North Korean forces, not just push them back to the 38th parallel, and indicated that occupation of
North Korea might be necessary.\textsuperscript{19} Despite MacArthur's divergence from stated political goals, Collins did not provide specific guidance to him to modify his military objectives.

MacArthur’s objective to destroy DPRK forces went beyond the goals outlined by the NCA and JCS, and was an expansion of U.S. objectives by the military commander. The Truman Administration was concentrating on repelling the invasion,\textsuperscript{20} and was wary of pursuing objectives that might broaden the conflict. This divergence of political and military objectives compounded the confusion caused by the absence of a carefully crafted political endstate, and was indicative of the growing failure to communicate between the NCA and the military commander.

In early September 1950, the President and his advisors began discussing U.S. actions once U.N. forces pushed the North Koreans across the 38th parallel. General Collins and Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg agreed with MacArthur’s focus on destroying the DPRK forces.\textsuperscript{21} Their recommendation, approved by the Secretary of Defense, was to focus on destroying DPRK forces, and to cross the 38th parallel \textit{if necessary} (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{22} The JCS stated the 38th parallel meant nothing politically or militarily, and Secretary of State Acheson did not object to crossing it.\textsuperscript{23} The Truman Administration determined that the destruction of North Korean armed forces was required "to restore international peace and security in the area" as stipulated in the U.N. Security Council resolution of 27 June.\textsuperscript{24} Merely restoring the 38th parallel would allow formidable DPRK
military forces to continue to threaten regional stability.

Despite the decision to destroy DPRK forces, Truman's advisors urged caution to prevent expansion of the war. The JCS preferred to destroy the enemy south of the 38th parallel, and recommended ROK units conduct ground operations north of it if required. A National Security Council paper recommended U.N. operations north of the parallel only absent the threat of Soviet or PRC intervention. Both the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed with Truman that the United States should "fight a limited engagement" in Korea.

On 15 September, the JCS sent a message to General MacArthur agreeing with his objective of destroying DPRK forces, authorizing him to cross the 38th parallel if necessary to ensure that destruction, and recommending the use of non-U.S. forces north of the parallel. A 27 September JCS directive formally defined the objective as destruction of DPRK forces, authorized ground operations in the north, and told MacArthur to use non-U.S. troops near the borders with the Soviet Union and PRC. Both the message and directive authorized such operations only on the condition of no Soviet or Chinese intervention.

At this point, the definition and articulation of U.S. and U.N. objectives were ambiguous at best. The U.N. resolution of 27 June 1950 called for repelling the DPRK attack and restoring "peace and security." Repelling the attack implied restoring the 38th parallel, but restoring peace and security was not defined. In order to restore peace and security, the U.S. political
leadership, on the recommendation of the military commander, determined the objective of destroying DPRK forces. However, the NCA guidance for accomplishing this objective was open to interpretation. The JCS told MacArthur to submit plans for the occupation of North Korea. They intended this to be a contingency plan, but the wording of the message allowed MacArthur to interpret it as a mission. Similarly, directing the use of non-U.S. troops near the northern borders was meant as a restriction to prevent the expansion of the war, but it also implied consent to operate that far north. This NCA guidance for accomplishing the objective of destroying DPRK forces was ambiguous enough that the military commander could change objectives by his interpretation of them.

While the NCA were developing and transmitting objectives and guidance, U.S. forces conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon (15 September). Designed to envelop and destroy DPRK forces, the operation had driven the enemy north of the 38th parallel by the end of September and placed U.N. forces at the pre-invasion border. On 29 September, the JCS approved MacArthur’s plan for operations in North Korea, although they downplayed the crossing of the 38th parallel to avoid increasing tensions with the Soviets or Chinese. The recent military success caused General MacArthur and the NCA to believe the war was essentially over. Although the PRC had hinted at intervention, President Truman authorized operations in North Korea. On 1 October, ROK forces crossed the 38th parallel,
followed by major U.N. operations (with U.S. troops) on 7 October to destroy DPRK forces. The United Nations debated the implications of crossing the parallel, but provided no concrete guidance.

The day after U.S forces crossed into North Korea, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution recommending action "to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea," the restoration of peace, and the holding of elections.\textsuperscript{35} Again, these objectives were ambiguous, and could easily be interpreted as calling for the military unification of Korea, a significant change from the objectives of restoring the border or destroying DPRK forces. The United States thought ensuring stability "throughout Korea" reinforced the U.S. interpretation of the 27 June resolution as authorization to cross the 38th parallel. The Indian ambassador to the United Nations also thought this latest resolution authorized operations in North Korea, and stated that it created the potential for expansion of the war.\textsuperscript{36} A JCS directive on 9 October instructed MacArthur to continue operations in the event of PRC intervention as long as he had a reasonable chance of success.\textsuperscript{37} Still concerned about expanding the war, Truman flew to Wake Island to meet with MacArthur on 15 October. MacArthur stated he did not think the Chinese would intervene, and that U.N. forces could defeat them if they did.\textsuperscript{38} None of the President's political or military advisors disagreed with this assessment. As they were meeting, PRC forces were moving into North Korea.\textsuperscript{39}
U.N. forces continued to attack north successfully, and by 20 October MacArthur felt North Korea was defeated.\textsuperscript{40} MacArthur believed that unifying Korea was the right thing to do,\textsuperscript{41} and Truman gave tacit approval to this concept in a 17 October speech stating U.N. forces would restore peace to the whole of Korea.\textsuperscript{42} The momentum of military operations, coupled with MacArthur's objective of unification, ambiguous U.N. resolutions, and a lack of clear U.S. objectives allowed the United States to drift from the stated objective of destroying DPRK forces to the implied objective of Korean unification. It was in this atmosphere of confusing guidance and ambiguous objectives that MacArthur ordered \textit{U.S.} units (emphasis added) to advance toward the northern border, an operation that triggered massive Chinese attacks and another thirty-two months of fighting.

The initial U.S. and U.N. objective in Korea was to repel the North Korean invasion. To achieve this end, military actions were focused on destroying DPRK forces. Although this objective potentially could necessitate operations north of the 38th parallel, the JCS and MacArthur believed that it would not require major actions in North Korea.\textsuperscript{43} The United Nations provided ambiguous guidance and objectives, and the U.S. NCA did not refine or narrow them, nor clearly articulate U.S. objectives. This placed MacArthur in a position to interpret the orders and directives he received. The unexpected military success and ambiguous guidance allowed MacArthur's personal perspective to change U.S. objectives from destruction of DPRK
forces to Korean unification. As the United States drifted through this change of objectives, neither the JCS, U.S. NCA, nor the United Nations clearly defined or stated its objectives. The result was a Chinese intervention and a three-year war which left Korea divided generally along the 38th parallel.

Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall later testified that U.N. forces were not in Korea to unify the country, nor did they intend for MacArthur to occupy the northern part of North Korea. However, their guidance to MacArthur did not clearly rule out either unification or occupation as objectives. U. N. resolutions and President Truman’s statements mentioned a united Korea. Although these statements could imply unification via political vice military means, they were ambiguous enough for a liberal interpretation. General MacArthur interpreted this ambiguous guidance to support his objective of unification through military means.

In Korea the lack of clearly defined objectives by the U.N., coupled with ambiguous U.S. NCA guidance to a commander with a strong personality and opinions, produced a subtle change of objectives from the achievable destruction of DPRK-forces to the more difficult unification of the country. The result was a lack of focus and direction which resulted in a three-year war that basically reestablished the original border.

SOMALIA

In response to the suffering and starvation caused by the Somali civil war, the U.N. created the United Nations Operation
in Somalia (UNOSOM) in April 1992. The United States initially supported UNOSOM with food and funding. In August 1992, the U.S. Air Force began flying transport missions in support of UNOSOM. Despite U.N. efforts, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. Somali clans and bandits prevented aid workers from delivering supplies, and starvation became more prevalent.

To resolve this problem, the United States offered to lead a multinational force to secure the distribution of food and aid in Somalia. The U.N. Security Council responded by passing a 3 December 1992 resolution authorizing member states "to use all necessary means to establish ... a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations." This U.N. resolution clearly defined its objectives. The United States also stated clear, achievable goals. President Bush and State Department officials repeatedly articulated U.S. objectives:

- Create a secure environment for distribution of humanitarian aid
- Hand over the mission to U.N. forces and redeploy as soon as the environment is secure

These clear political objectives enabled the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to develop military objectives and determine the forces required to accomplish them. To achieve the political objectives, CENTCOM determined military forces must secure food distribution centers and air and sea ports, secure convoys, and establish secure conditions for relief operations. The United States and other nations deployed military forces to Somalia in December 1992 to achieve these United Task Force (UNITAF)
objectives. Initial operations were highly successful. The 31,000 troops of UNITAF (21,000 were American)\textsuperscript{50} provided the overwhelming combat power required to secure relief operations. Despite U.N. urging to expand the mission to include securing all of Somalia and disarming the clans, the United States remained focused on its stated objectives.\textsuperscript{51}

By February 1993, UNITAF operations had significantly improved aid distribution and greatly reduced starvation. The United States prepared to hand off the mission to the United Nations. Largely because the United States had clearly defined its political objectives and resisted changing them, military operations were successful, of limited duration, and suffered few casualties.

Unfortunately, the United States did not define objectives for follow on operations (UNOSOM II) as clearly as it had for UNITAF. The final UNITAF objective was to withdraw U.S. forces as quickly as possible. U.S. leaders allowed this goal (a popular one with Congress and the American public) to overshadow careful planning for UNOSOM II.

Although the United States supported (and helped determine) U.N. objectives for UNOSOM II, it did so without carefully analyzing them. The U.N. Security Council resolution of 26 March 1993 expanded the objectives to include:

- Expanding and maintaining a secure environment throughout Somalia
- Disarming the clans
- Rehabilitating the political and economic institutions of Somalia\textsuperscript{52}
These objectives were quite broad, as evidenced by U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, describing the mission as rebuilding the country. The U.S. objectives were to provide logistical support, a quick reaction force (QRF), and to draw down U.S. forces in Somalia. These divergent U.S. and U.N. objectives made it difficult for U.S. military commanders to define clear, achievable objectives. Executing this expanded and more difficult mission with fewer forces (20,000 vice 30,000) and significantly fewer U.S. troops (4000 vice 21,000) compounded the problem for the UNOSOM II Commander.

UNOSOM II operations did not enjoy the same success as UNITAF missions. Fewer forces executing a larger mission encouraged Somali clans to be more aggressive in their opposition to UNOSOM II. Increasing violence led to a Somali attack that killed more than twenty U.N. soldiers on 5 June. The U.N. Security Council reacted by passing, with U.S. support, a resolution calling for action against those responsible and identifying the United Somali Congress, headed by Mohamed Farah Aideed, as an obstacle to UNOSOM II operations. This again expanded UNOSOM II’s mission, and effectively removed its neutrality by focusing U.N. operations against only one of the numerous factions in Somalia.

This changed objective caused UNOSOM II forces to increase military actions against Aideed, and focus less on the nation building objectives of their charter. The increased violence
resulted in the commitment of U.S. forces more often and to expanding missions. The United States focused on the objective of capturing Aideed,57 and deployed more combat forces for this purpose in August. UNOSOM II and U.S. forces continued to pursue Aideed until a major fight on 3-4 October resulted in numerous U.S. and Somali casualties.

On 7 October, President Clinton announced America’s new objectives for Somalia. They focused on protecting U.S. forces, securing aid distribution, and providing a secure environment for the reestablishment of Somalia’s government. He stated the United States was reinforcing units in Somalia, and all U.S. forces would withdraw by 31 March 1994.58 The narrowed focus and increased forces enabled military commanders to better define and accomplish military objectives. The United Nations and UNOSOM II stopped pursuing Aideed, and concentrated on the nation building objectives they had defined originally. U.S. forces left Somalia in March 1994, and UNOSOM II departed a year later. After the departure of U.S. forces, Somali clans rearmed and violence increased. Although U.S. and U.N. operations greatly reduced starvation in Somalia, the country is still characterized by anarchy and violence.59

Initial U.S. operations in Somalia stemmed from clear, achievable political objectives. These objectives narrowed the focus for military commanders, and enabled them to develop objectives and define forces to attain them. By resisting pressure to change objectives, the United States created a
consistent environment for UNITAF commanders to accomplish their missions. Political objectives drove military missions, and produced success.

The United States, however, did not clearly define its political objectives for UNOSOM II operations. Thus it did little to develop clear, attainable goals for the United Nations. The resulting U.N. objectives were broad, poorly defined, and not achievable with allocated forces (as U.N. objectives expanded, forces actually dwindled). This lack of clear guidance made it difficult for military commanders to define objectives and develop realistic plans, and prevented UNOSOM II from accomplishing its mission.

Somalia provides an excellent example of how to and how not to conduct military operations. UNITAF operations resulted from well-defined, attainable political and military objectives. Military and political goals were synchronized, and defined a clear endstate, providing the continuity that discouraged changing objectives. Political leaders were receptive to military requests, and commanders possessed adequate forces to accomplish the goals.

Because the United States did not define its national objectives for UNOSOM II, U.S. military commanders did not have a clear endstate or achievable objectives. This caused objectives to change as the situation changed. With changing and poorly defined objectives, it was difficult to define or achieve success. The lack of synchronization between military and
political objectives made it difficult for commanders to articulate force requirements to political leaders. Resulting military operations failed to accomplish political goals.

**PERSIAN GULF**

In contrast to Korea and Somalia, the United States articulated its objectives for the Persian Gulf and did not change them. These objectives allowed the military commander to define strategic and operational objectives, and develop plans to attain them. This, in turn, produced a focused effort, resulting in a successful military campaign that achieved the stated political objectives.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the U.N. Security Council immediately passed Resolution 660, demanding Iraq withdraw its forces to their pre-invasion locations. On 6 August, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for the end of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, restoring Kuwait’s territorial integrity, and imposing economic sanctions on Iraq to achieve these objectives. A 9 August resolution added the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government as a goal.

President George Bush outlined U.S. objectives on 5 August:

- Withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait
- Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government
- Security and stability of the Persian Gulf
- Protection of U.S. citizens

He reiterated these objectives in an address to the nation three days later. Although "security and stability" was somewhat ambiguous, the other objectives were clearly defined, and
provided consistent guidance for planning and executing military operations.  

Arab countries also stated their objectives. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministerial Council demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait on 3 and 9 August, respectively.  

Saudi Arabia's King Fahd called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the return of Kuwait's ruling family on the 9th.  

Throughout the autumn of 1990, U.N., U.S., and Arab objectives remained the same: withdrawal of Iraqi forces, restoration of Kuwait's government, and regional stability. By 16 August, U.S. and U.K. forces were enroute to the Persian Gulf to enforce U.N. economic sanctions and to assist Saudi Arabia in its defense. On 25 August, the Security Council passed a resolution calling on member states to enforce economic sanctions and provide assistance to Kuwait.  

During September and October, U.S. and coalition forces continued deployment to the Persian Gulf to enforce sanctions and defend Saudi Arabia.  

While establishing the defense of Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM, commanded by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, began planning offensive operations to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Schwarzkopf's planning discussions with the Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, and Arab leaders focused on forcing Iraqi units from Kuwait, and Schwarzkopf directed CENTCOM planners to concentrate on this objective.  

Arab leaders also began discussing the elimination of Iraq's capability to threaten neighboring
countries as a means to enhance regional stability.\textsuperscript{70}

On 29 October, the U.N. Security Council again called for Iraq’s withdrawal and the return of Kuwait’s government, and threatened further action if Iraq did not comply.\textsuperscript{71} Saudi leaders began to discuss liberating Kuwait by force.\textsuperscript{72} On November 29th, a Security Council resolution gave Iraq "one final opportunity" to comply with previous resolutions, and established a 15 January 1991 deadline. The resolution also authorized nations "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."\textsuperscript{73} Iraq did not withdraw, and in fact increased the severity of its rhetoric and threats. Arab and U.S. leaders refined the definition of regional stability to include the destruction of Iraq’s war making capability, particularly its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).\textsuperscript{74}

CENTCOM continued to strengthen the coalition of nations opposed to Iraq, and to plan to eject Iraq from Kuwait. In November 1990, additional U.S. forces began deploying to Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf focused on achieving the objectives outlined by the U.S. NCA and United Nations. He identified the destruction of the Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) as a military center of gravity.\textsuperscript{75} General Powell agreed that the key to success centered on significantly reducing Iraq’s ground forces.\textsuperscript{76} CENTCOM planners focused on liberating Kuwait, destroying WMD, and destroying Iraq’s
offensive capability. They wrote a mission statement that included:

- Neutralize Iraqi C2
- Eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait
- Destroy Republican Guard
- Destroy NBC and ballistic missile capability
- Assist restoration of Kuwait’s government

These military objectives directly supported the political objectives outlined by the United Nations and President Bush. Military leaders developed the objectives of destroying the Republican Guard and WMD as parameters to narrowly define the broad political goal of restoring regional stability and security. Once approved by the NCA, these objectives provided a clearly defined focus for military commanders to develop plans to restore stability in the Persian Gulf.

Military air operations against Iraq began 16 January 1991. The United States submitted a letter to the U.N. Security Council stating the coalition had initiated military action to liberate Kuwait, restore its government, and restore peace and security in the region IAW Security Council resolutions. On 24 February, British, French, and U.S. ground forces attacked into Iraq, while Arab and U.S. forces crossed into Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf stated the objective of the ground campaign was to free Kuwait City, destroy the Republican Guard, and block Iraqi escape routes. Ground operations were highly successful, and early on 26 February CENTCOM intercepted an Iraqi radio transmission ordering forces out of Kuwait. Later that morning, Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf discussed the possibility that the Iraqi
withdrawal might lead to the end of the war. Schwarzkopf stated he wanted to destroy the Republican Guard before they moved too far into Iraq.\textsuperscript{82}

On 27 February, Iraq sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council stating it was withdrawing its forces from Kuwait and would comply with U.N. resolutions.\textsuperscript{83} British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd told President Bush the war should probably end in the next two days.\textsuperscript{84} U.S. and French political leaders also were considering ending the war. Powell called Schwarzkopf that morning and said the end of the war was approaching. Schwarzkopf asked for one more day to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard,\textsuperscript{85} since this would enhance regional stability.

Later on the 27th, Powell again called Schwarzkopf and asked if CENTCOM could end the war immediately. CENTCOM's intelligence estimate for the previous day indicated thirty-three of forty-two Iraqi divisions in the KTO had been destroyed, overrun, or rendered combat ineffective, including one of three Republican Guard Divisions.\textsuperscript{86} Although U.S. division commanders knew they had not destroyed the Republican Guard completely, the U.S. Third Army Commander, LTG John Yeosock, did not try to persuade Schwarzkopf to continue the war.\textsuperscript{87} Schwarzkopf told Powell the coalition had accomplished its objectives and the war could end.\textsuperscript{88} The President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor agreed.\textsuperscript{89} With the exception of the USAF Chief of Staff, the Chairman and the service chiefs also concurred.\textsuperscript{90} Although Schwarzkopf, Powell, and the NCA
realized some Iraqi forces would escape, they agreed the war had accomplished its objectives of freeing Kuwait and restoring stability to the region.\textsuperscript{91} Arab leaders concurred, as summarized by the Commander of Arab Forces, Saudi General Khaled Bin Sultan, "We had no interest in the wholesale slaughter of our brothers in Iraq."\textsuperscript{92}

Military operations in the Persian Gulf accomplished the U.S. and U.N. political objectives of liberating Kuwait, reinstating its government, and restoring peace and stability in the region. Five years after the war, Kuwait remains free, and the region is relatively secure and stable. The war and the resulting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.N. inspections have significantly reduced Iraq's conventional and nuclear threat to the region.

Because the political goals were well defined and did not change, commanders were able to derive military objectives, and prepare and execute plans to achieve them. The only ambiguous objective was "restore regional peace and stability." General Schwarzkopf and Arab leaders determined that the destruction of WMD, the Republican Guard, and other Iraqi forces in the KTO would deprive Iraq of its offensive capability and improve regional stability. The U.N., President Bush, and Arab leaders, however, did not expand this objective to include removal of Saddam Hussein or the complete destruction of the Iraqi armed forces. President Bush specifically stated at a 25 January 1991 news conference that removing Saddam from power was not one of
the coalition's objectives. General Khaled wrote that attacking to Baghdad "was out of the question for the Arab members of the Coalition," and no Arab forces operated in Iraq during the war. Schwarzkopf never considered going to Baghdad. The discussion between military and political leaders clarified this ambiguous objective, thus enabling commanders to define achievable objectives.

Military operations in the Persian Gulf achieved the objectives outlined by the United Nations and U.S. NCA. Military commanders understood the political objectives because they were well-defined, achievable, and did not change. When military operations produced unexpected success, political leaders remained focused on the original goals, and terminated military operations when those objectives were attained. Commanders understood the primary objective was to free Kuwait, and assisted the NCA in determining when to cease hostilities. The result was a successful war, strengthened alliances, and a reduced threat in the region.

**OBSERVATIONS**

An examination of these examples provides some insights concerning the relationship between national policy objectives and the successful application of military power to achieve them. The United States committed military forces to Korea without clearly defining the political objectives or endstate. Because political objectives were not clear, the military commander interpreted them as he developed military objectives.
MacArthur's broad interpretation of goals, coupled with unexpected military success, led the United States to justify expanding objectives as forces moved north. The lack of definitive national objectives produced military operations that caused the PRC to intervene, and resulted in the U.S. negotiating for an objective (restoration of the border) in July 1953 that it essentially had achieved in September 1950. Because the United States did not clearly define and pursue objectives, it accepted an objective that was forced upon it by the situation.

After initial success in Somalia, U.S. objectives changed often. With each change objectives expanded, and became less well-defined and more difficult to achieve. Because political objectives were unclear, military commanders found it difficult to define operational objectives and justify the forces required to attain them. This lack of focus placed the wrong force with a poorly defined mission in Somalia. The resulting operations, casualties, and expenditure of funds did little to reduce the anarchy and violence in the region.

In contrast to these two operations, the United States clearly defined its political objectives in the Persian Gulf. This precision enabled the commander to establish military objectives and build the forces necessary to achieve them. Despite the unexpected military success, the United States did not change its objectives. The result was a campaign that achieved the stated political objectives, minimized the time and casualties required to accomplish the mission, and left the
United States with strong allies in the region.

In all three cases, the U.S. committed forces under the auspices of the United Nations. Because the United Nations is an organization that relies on building consensus among many members, U.N. objectives tend to be broad and poorly defined. This ambiguity requires the United States to define clearly its national objectives in order to narrow and focus U.N. goals. Only by developing parameters and tasks to clarify broad objectives, can U.S. political leaders provide the clear guidance military commanders require to develop objectives and plans that accomplish U.S. goals.

Political objectives that are poorly defined, unattainable, or constantly changing do not provide the endstate required to focus and guide the development of military objectives, plans, and required forces. Efforts directed toward initial strategic objectives may not support, or may be counterproductive to, later objectives. Clearly defined endstates enable leaders to define success and determine criteria for termination of hostilities. Ambiguous objectives are subject to interpretation, which is likely to change between leaders and with the situation. This has the same effect as changing objectives. The lack of focus produced by ambiguous objectives causes success to elude political and military leaders.

Clear political objectives generally reduce the need for detailed instructions to military leaders, thus improving flexibility for planning and execution. Clear objectives also
help the commander develop objectives and plans that are linked more closely to national goals. The effort expended initially to develop and coordinate objectives and endstate is much more efficient and effective than the constant exchange required between the NCA and field commander when objectives are ambiguous or changing.

Korea, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf all demonstrate the linkage of political and military objectives with military operations. When political and/or military objectives are unclear, as in Korea and Somalia, it is difficult to define or achieve success. If political and military objectives are better defined and synchronized, as they were in the Persian Gulf, the United States is more likely to achieve its goals. Leaders can improve the probability for success a number of ways.

First, political leaders must develop and articulate clear, attainable, consistent objectives. These define and frame the endstate which serves as the overarching framework in which military commanders operate. A consistent endstate provides focus for commanders as they adjust to changing situations. Well defined objectives assist military leaders in developing plans to influence the situation, as opposed to allowing the situation to influence the objectives.

Next, commanders must define clear military objectives that achieve the political goals. If political guidance is not timely, commanders should develop political objectives and endstate, submit them as recommendations to the NCA, and use them
as planning assumptions for the development of military objectives. If political objectives are vague, commanders must define parameters that provide focus and submit them to the NCA for approval. As political goals become clear, commanders adjust military objectives to support them. Clear, attainable objectives provide the basis for developing plans, defining required forces, and articulating requirements to the NCA. Well defined objectives also allow commanders to define and measure success.

Finally, military and political leaders must constantly discuss and coordinate objectives to ensure military objectives support national goals, and political objectives are militarily achievable. This communication makes a synchronized effort more likely, and contributes significantly to defining and achieving political and military success. A dialogue keeps political leaders attuned to the situation on the battlefield, and updates field commanders on political realities. This communication leads to a better understanding of political and military objectives, which in turn provides a clearer focus for military operations, and increases the probability of success.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., 579.


5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995), V-2. This manual also discusses objectives as the foundation on which coalition and combined operations are based.

6. "Excerpts from Address of Weinberger," *New York Times*, 29 November 1984, sec. A, p.5. The implication of the third point is that objectives remain constant while the United States reassesses and adjusts the size, composition, and disposition of the forces necessary to achieve them.


8. Monte M. Poen, ed., *Strictly Personal and Confidential. The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1982), 50. Secretary of State Dean Acheson also felt the Soviets were behind the invasion (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 405), as did the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley, *A General’s Life*, p. 557).


10. Ibid., 5.


14. Truman, 337.


16. Truman, 341.

17. Acheson, 416.


20. Ibid., 82-83. During his 13 July 1950 conference with MacArthur, Collins discussed the U.S. objective of restoring the 38th parallel. Earlier, on 8 July, Truman had stated the U.N. mission was to repel the DPRK attack (Goodrich, 120).

21. Ibid., 144.

22. Ibid., 145-146. General Bradley confirms this JCS position in *A General’s Life*, p. 559.

23. Acheson, 445. As early as 17 July 1950, Secretary Acheson saw no reason to stop at the 38th parallel, although several State Department Soviet experts voiced dissenting opinions (Bradley, 558-559).

24. Ibid., 452-453.


27. Acheson, 416.

29. Ibid., 360.
32. Truman, 361 and Bradley, 565-566.
34. Bradley, 560.
36. Ibid., 265.
37. Truman, 362.
38. Ibid., 362-365. General Bradley, who was also at the meeting in Wake, confirms this in A General's Life, p. 575.
39. It is difficult to determine the exact date Chinese troops began crossing the border. Most sources place it in the 9-14 October 1950 timeframe. Recently declassified documents of the Soviet Foreign Ministry indicate the PRC ordered "volunteers" to support North Korea on 4 October 1950, and agreed to provide military forces on 13 October. Initial PRC units moved into North Korea between 13-25 October. See Harry G. Summers Jr., "The Korean War—A Fresh Perspective," Military History 13, no. 1 (April 1996), 23-27.
40. MacArthur, 364.
41. Ibid., 389-391, 403.
42. Truman, 368.
43. Collins, 145-146 and Bradley, 559.
44. After the success at Inchon, MacArthur’s objective became the unification of Korea. When asked to consider withdrawing south in early November 1950, he writes withdrawal "would be in contradiction to my orders and would destroy any opportunity to bring the Korean War to a successful end." (Reminiscences, 371).


53. Hirsch and Oakley, 111.


56. Ibid., 293.


61. Ibid., 528-529.

62. Ibid., 529-530.


65. Speeches, statements, press conferences, and Congressional testimony by President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker from August 1990 through February 1991, consistently state these four objectives. Selected statements and remarks are listed in the bibliography.


67. Ibid., 180.

68. Wellens, 530-531.


70. Ibid., 351-352.

71. Wellens, 537-539.


73. Wellens, 540.


77. Scales, 111.


79. Wellens, 515.

80. Schwarzkopf, 453.

81. Ibid., 461.

82. Ibid., 461-463.

83. Wellens, 516.


86. Schwarzkopf, 466-467. General Powell states his information indicated twenty-seven of forty-two Iraqi divisions were destroyed or overrun by 26 February 1991 (Powell, 518). CENTCOM's numbers included combat ineffective units; it is not clear if Powell's numbers counted these units. Different ways of counting divisions or division equivalents, different intelligence sources, and the confusion of combat reporting all could account for the discrepancy. The fact is clear however, that both Powell and Schwarzkopf considered the bulk of Iraqi forces in the KTO destroyed or neutralized when they discussed the cessation of hostilities on 27 February 1991.


88. Schwarzkopf, 469-470 and Powell, 521-522.

89. Powell, 521-522.


94. Khaled, 426.

95. Schwarzkopf, 497.
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