HOW CAN WE BEST TRAIN OUR ARMY LOGISTICS LEADERS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN A JOINT/MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT?

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How Can We Best Train Our Army Logistics Leaders To Operate Effectively in A Joint/Multinational Environment

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ABSTRACT

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Joint operations and joint logistics are clearly the waves of the future. All indications are that doctrine, requirements, recent lessons learned as well as future logistical organizations will reflect more of a joint orientation. This paper focuses on this emerging trend in joint logistics and specifically targets military logistical professional development education as being a major facilitating force in developing joint logistical leaders and influencing future joint doctrine. The author demonstrates how current primary military education for military logistical leaders has not kept pace with changing joint trends, and makes recommendations for improvement.
ONE TEAM!
ONE MISSION!

"THERE ARE NO ABSOLUTE ANSWERS IN LOGISTICS... IT IS THE
ARTFUL APPLICATION OF RESOURCES AGAINST EVENTS THAT
EVOLVE EITHER
INCREMENTALLY,

EPISODICALLY,

OR HYSTERICALY."

Introduction

The above quote is not attributed and sits in the form of a sign above the headquarters entrance to the Joint Commander for Support for the NATO Implementation Forces in Bosnia.¹ This message not only conveys the complex nature of military logistics but also the increasing recognition that it is now very much a joint/multinational discipline. In addition to full U.S. armed forces participation, the Joint Commander for Support, Bosnia has over 400 personnel on his staff from 13 different countries.² All of these personnel are performing functions in joint logistics that previously were national or service unique responsibilities.

We have come a long way in our attitudes and our accomplishments in developing a joint culture and a process for developing joint doctrine. In the
operational and strategic levels of war, we have made some strides in improving joint military education largely due to The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act which directed all the services to identify and educate joint specialist officers in the capabilities and doctrines of the other services.³

Although improving in recent years, joint doctrine still has a long way to go, because for much of the last half century, the U.S. armed forces have placed relatively little emphasis on joint doctrine.⁴ This has been particularly true in the whole area of logistics.

In this paper I will examine the current process for developing joint doctrine, particularly logistics doctrine, and how we educate and train our officers in U.S. Army logistics to function effectively in the increasing joint and multinational environment. In education, we have focused our efforts on developing a system of joint schooling, primarily at the intermediate and senior levels (Major through Colonel) to improve the ability of the services to work together. We have not concentrated on the junior officer level at all.⁵

Since doctrine causes military forces to function together, and education is the mechanism for ensuring the ideas are understood and implemented, I will deal with the two areas in parallel as they pertain to Army logistical leaders.⁶ My hypothesis is that, although we have clear evidence of moving into more of a joint environment in military logistics with an increased level of joint tasks, joint
lessons learned and more joint organizations, until we take a more joint approach in logistics education, unit training and doctrine development, we will never achieve true jointness. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’, General John M. Shalikashvili’s recent quote best sums up the current joint training situation: “... When you look at joint training... it’s an embarrassment to me. I have gone to more joint exercises and walked away from them more embarrassed than anything else.”

Legislative Background

In a general sense, there has been much recent discussion on joint doctrine and training. We can probably go back to The National Security Act of 1947 which provided for the operation of the Armed Forces under unified control and “for their integration into an efficient team of land, air, and naval forces” to find the genesis in law for our overarching joint initiatives. Later, The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 gave the Unified Commanders (CINCs) not only authority over the forces assigned to their commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics, but also assigned responsibility for developing doctrine for joint employment of those armed forces to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Although joint operations were certainly in evidence in World War II as epitomized by the multi-service task forces assembled for the major landings at Normandy in the European Theater and Okinawa in the Pacific, Goldwater-
Nichols really serves as the cornerstone for establishing new service attitudes toward joint operations. This was certainly evident during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm which was commanded by a unified commander and featured a high degree of integration among the service components.

Clearly, however, in addition to all the national operational justifications, jointness has been influenced by fiscal realities and a down-sized U. S. military which demands minimal duplication and requires cooperative effort. The recently completed Report of The Commission On Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces has both efficiency as well as effectiveness as its guiding principles. The Commission recommends strengthening joint doctrine and revising the joint doctrine development process. It recommends one joint agency as the leader for “capstone” doctrine in conceptualizing, developing and assessing current and future joint doctrine.\(^\text{10}\)

In terms of joint training, the Commission recognized that maintaining service core competencies was important, but joint training is critical to the success of unified military operations. They recommended increasing joint training activities which should be fully funded; giving the CINCs more authority; extending joint evaluations to the unit level; and creating a Functional Unified Command responsible for joint training and integration of forces based in the continental United States.\(^\text{11}\) The report became very prescriptive in developing mechanisms for “lessons learned” and other tools in evaluating and conducting
joint training. The key point emphasized in the need for joint training was the requirement for flexibility in deploying units to any CINC's area of responsibility.

Although the Report does discuss joint training in detail, the emphasis is on unit training and not on professional military education or professional development or entry level training. In a section which deals with streamlining central logistics support, and the need for outsourcing commercial type support activities, the report does recognize the need to reduce the large in-house DOD education infrastructure that conducts training in unique military skills. It recommends outsourcing some specialized functions and consolidating others.\textsuperscript{12}

Although formal joint military education is not dealt with at length, there is much discussion on the need to streamline processes, particularly logistical support processes and organizations which would require service unique educational systems. The report makes a strong point that the current joint wholesale logistical command within DOD, The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), does a far better job at applying modern integrated product/process methods that produce lower total costs than do the service unique logistical agencies. The service agencies currently account for almost five times more acquisitions than does DLA.\textsuperscript{13} The operative message here is we need to move more in the direction of a consolidated, central approach under DLA which has had greater success in achieving industry performance benchmarks. Such a movement would in turn force a more joint approach to logistical military education.
Another key document in developing our current attitudes and structures in military education is The Report of the Panel on Military Education of The One Hundredth Congress, better known as the Skelton Report of 1989, named for its author, Congressman Ike Skelton. This report lays out a detailed blueprint for improving joint education throughout all the services, and it recognizes that joint doctrine is an essential element to joint education and a joint curriculum. It states that “although students should be introduced to joint matters at pre-commissioning and primary-level schools (basic and advanced courses), it is at the intermediate schools (staff college) that substantial joint education should begin.”14 The key here is that the report does recognize the importance of jointness in the basic and advanced courses and does state that “if joint education is delayed until senior professional military education (war college level), many officers may be too rigid and set in their ways.”15

A final document instrumental in the development of joint military education is the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) 1993 from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This publication gives a background and history of recent initiatives in Professional Military Education, but again like the Skelton Report before it, it emphasizes joint education at the intermediate/staff college, senior service college and general/flag officer levels. It does, however, like the Skelton Report, recognize the importance of some joint education at the primary/advanced course level of training. At this level, it discusses the
importance of relating “the contribution of each Service to the overall military
effort with an understanding of how each Service supports the missions of the
others...”

We have very little information available on joint history. What history we
have pertains to the functioning of joint staffs, but most history of operations, to
include logistical operations, remains the province of the services. What we do
have, however, in addition to the documented requirements in training and
document mandated by Congress and DOD, are many recent examples where joint
training and joint doctrine were required along with a need for truly joint
organizations. Logistically, in many recent joint operations, we had to improvise
with ad hoc organizations, ad hoc doctrine and with leaders, particularly junior
leaders, who were unschooled and insensitive to the procedures of other services
and joint requirements.

Joint Force Training

Joint force training poses many challenges. Recent Joint Task Force
operations such as Provide Comfort which provided humanitarian support to the
Kurds after Desert Storm in April '91 clearly demonstrate the complexity of tasks
and the teamwork required. Operation Provide Comfort was distinctive,
“incorporating an unforeseen situation and mission, a heavily multinational force
composition and effort, and a deep involvement of civilian and international
agencies critical to mission accomplishment.” From the standpoint of logistics,
then LTG John M. Shalikashvili, the Joint Task Force Commander appointed BG Harold Burch who was the Army Component Commander as the Combined Support Commander as well. He told him to manage a mix of U. S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps logistic units to support the operations of the full multinational task force.\textsuperscript{18} Although it was reported that service and national contingents then “fell to with a will,” there were numerous challenges that could have been reduced by more extensive joint experience, unit training, and professional military education.\textsuperscript{19}

There have been numerous examples of such joint task forces being formed since Provide Comfort. According to a recent article about joint forces training in United States European Command, “a versatile mix of capabilities is essential to accomplish nearly every conceivable mission. Rarely will a single component be capable enough to do it alone.”\textsuperscript{20} According to the USEUCOM experience, there are three important tasks:

1.) Assemble the mix of capabilities best suited to do the job regardless of service or national origin;

2.) Establish a common structure appropriate to the force and mission; and

3.) Transfer control and authority for the operation from the CINC’s Headquarters to the Joint Task Force as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{21}

The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), fulfilling its joint
functional training mission recommended by the Commission on Roles and Missions, focuses its joint training on the operational level of war with its training of joint task forces during the “Unified Endeavor” series of exercises. It emphasizes academic training seminars with role playing in joint doctrine; operations order development with planning procedures and application of joint doctrine; and simulations of operations order execution.\textsuperscript{22} The end state desired of such training is for commanders and staff to be capable of planning and directing joint operations.

**Joint/Multinational Logistics Lessons Learned**

Our recent experiences with joint task force development and the USEUCOM and USACOM training initiatives have most definitely produced a series of “lessons learned” in developing and executing joint/multinational operations, and most particularly, logistical operations. In the multinational arena, NATO, our largest multinational alliance, has moved from a logistics policy where logistics was purely a national responsibility to one where there is “collective responsibility for logistic support of NATO’s multinational operations.”\textsuperscript{23} According to then LTG Franks, Commander of the U. S. VII Corps in 1992, the problem was stated very clearly:

“Since allied units arrive in the corps sector with a host of unique needs, dismissing the problem with the catch phrase, ‘logistics is a national responsibility,’ poorly serves the needs of a multinational corps. Relegating logistics to a national responsibility will clearly not survive wartime demands and will too easily create animosities
between allied formations when a cooperative effort is critical."24

Under the old logistic structure where units had the luxury of large defense budgets, the strategy could survive with logistics as basically a national responsibility. The inefficiency of treating logistics as purely a national responsibility is no longer affordable.25

Bilateral host nation support agreements are a key factor in assuring that reinforcing nations will not have to transport all required combat service support, thus freeing precious lift for combat forces. Common funding to offset cargo airlift shortfalls, procurement of communications equipment, participation in refueling programs, and the successful infrastructure program in NATO are good examples of how NATO funding can be used progressively instead of depending on unilaterally provided national resources.

USACOM, within its joint functional training mission, has recently developed a lengthy list of logistical lessons learned which, in some cases, beg for joint remedial action. However in all cases, the lessons highlight some critical joint skills that must be addressed in our various professional development training forums for all our logistical leaders, particularly our junior leaders. I will briefly consolidate nine of these observations from a listing of over seventy five that could prove to have the most significant impact on how we train our Army logistical leaders and more importantly, what our training emphasis will be.26
1.) Receipt, storage and issue of supplies during Hurricane Andrew... lack of any coordinated joint doctrine among the services.

2.) Since the military can expect to be the initial response force following any U. S. catastrophic disaster, The Department of Defense initial response requirements need to be incorporated into the Federal Response Plan.

3.) There needs to be closer coordination and knowledge among the services as to all the various support provided by the Defense Logistics Agency during disaster relief operations.

4.) During all joint operations there needs to be closer coordination on all contracting/procurement requirements.

5.) During training exercises further training indoctrination is required on all the services’ related administration procedures/points of contact for requesting logistics support into forward sites.

6.) There are major service disconnects in the planning and execution of the Logistics Contractor Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). This program did provide the bulk of support for Haiti and is currently doing the same in Bosnia.

7.) Current logistical doctrine, particularly, in organizations, is inadequate as it pertains to force projection operations. Force structure is inconsistent with doctrine.

8.) It is recommended that engineering headquarters, construction
contracting, and real estate elements be scheduled to enter the theater as early as possible.

9.) The sourcing of logistic requirements was a recurring problem during the deliberate planning of many exercises. Logistics sourcing is a complicated process that requires a tremendous amount of attention to coordination between the many players. Exact procedures must be discussed, understood, agreed upon, and guidance passed to all the various staffs.

Although all of these observations deal with very specific circumstances, there is a common thread of lack of coordination and knowledge in joint procedures, or as a worst case, a total lack of any joint procedures at all.

**Joint Logistics Requirements**

At the heart of joint logistics requirements are two major documents, *The Universal Joint Task Listing* and *The Executive Agency Agreement Listing*. These documents outline both common and joint tasks that can be performed by all the services and designated tasks that are assigned to a specific service based upon executive agency agreement or Title 10 United States Code law.

**Universal Joint Task List**

Common tasks are compiled in a recently developed document called the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The Joint Task Listing does not address “how a task is performed” or for that matter “who performs the task.” That kind of detail is found either in joint doctrine or in the concept of operations of a specific
operations plan. The Joint Task List does identify "what" is to be performed in
terms common to multiple combatant commands and joint force components.
Joint tasks describe in broad terms "the capabilities of our Armed Forces." Joint
tasks are those assigned by joint force commanders to be performed by
integrated service components. All joint tasks are categorized as major tasks or
sub-tasks and are further broken down into the strategic national, strategic
theater, operational and tactical levels of war. I will briefly summarize the major
joint logistical tasks common to all the services:

1.) Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment. Focus here
is on intertheater movement of forces and resources.

2.) Provide Sustainment. The focus here is on providing,
maintaining, transporting, or assisting/coordinating those levels of force, material,
and consumables necessary to support the national and/or multinational military
strategy.

3.) Conduct Intratheater Strategic Deployment, Concentration, And
Maneuver of Forces. The focus here is to place and dispose assigned and
apportioned U. S. forces, as well as forces of other friendly nations or groups
within a theater.
4.) **Sustain Theater Forces.** Here the focus is on performing those logistic and other support activities required to sustain the force in the education of theater strategy, campaigns, and joint operations.

5.) **Conduct Operational Movement And Maneuver Of Logistics Forces.** This activity includes moving or deploying logistics forces for operational advantage within a theater of operations or a joint operations area.

6.) **Provide Operational Support.** Here the focus is on providing logistic and other support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within a theater of operations.

7.) **Perform Combat Service Support.** Here the emphasis is on sustaining forces in the combat zone by arming, fueling, fixing equipment, moving, supplying, manning, and by providing personnel and health services.

**Executive Agency Responsibilities**

In addition to the joint tasks outlined above, the U. S. Army is already the executive agent for planning and providing much common logistics support to joint forces. These requirements are either outlined as a result of mutually agreed executive agency memorandums of understanding or mandated by Title 10 United States Code law. The following is a summary listing of U. S. Army logistical support requirements as Executive Agent.⁴⁹
• Conventional Ammunition
• Chemical Munitions
• Transportation Engineering for Highway Movements
• Common User Land Transportation - In Theater
• Internodal Container Movement
• Overseas Port Clearance and Discharge
• Land Based Water Resources and Inland Petroleum Distribution
• Military Customs Inspections
• Wartime Graves Registration
• Wartime Food Support in Theater Receipt, Store and Issue
• All inland Logistics Support to the United States Marine Corps
• Operation of Common User Ocean Terminals
• Military Troop Construction
• Airdrop Equipment and Systems
• Military Postal Service
• DOD Enemy POW and Detainee Program
• Blood support for the U. S. Air Force
• Military Veterinary Support
• Medical Evacuation On The Battlefield
• Controlled Disposal of Waste Explosives and Munitions

According to MG Robert K. Guest, the current Quartermaster General of the United States Army and Commandant of the U. S. Army Quartermaster School in a recently conducted personal interview, the problem with “a lot of the Army’s Executive Agency responsibilities is that many folks at the operational and tactical level were not aware of them... they didn’t prepare... they didn’t plan.” MG Guest did agree that logistical leaders at the strategic level were aware of joint responsibilities for support, but at the operational level with “transportation, fuel, water” and other logistical support, “there is still much work to do.” MG Guest was convinced that with this knowledge, planning and preparation at the operational and tactical levels... at the Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel levels... “that this would be our hook to get into the Joint Requirements Process
and ultimately in the Army's Total Analysis Process" which justifies and allocates personnel resources. MG Guest went on further to give two recent examples where lack of knowledge in joint service logistics caused some concern. According to MG Guest, in Somalia after the Marines left, the Army had to struggle with Marine Corps petroleum equipment, and in Haiti, if the Army had understood the Navy's commissary system, things could have been "much simpler."

**Joint Logistics Doctrine**

Joint requirements should logically produce joint doctrine and a simple process for producing joint doctrine. According to Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, U.S.A. (Retired), in his 1992 book, "Moving Mountains," on his experiences and lessons learned as the theater logistical commander during Desert Shield/Storm, "joint doctrine is an area that definitely needs to be fixed." Since LTG Pagonis published his book, much has been done to improve joint logistical doctrine and a firm, coordinated process for developing it. There are still, however, voids in its application and training at our various logistical schoolhouses, which I will discuss later.

The current joint doctrine hierarchy of publications is coordinated and produced out of the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The Joint Warfighting Center is a newly consolidated center made from the previous Doctrine and Warfighting Simulations Centers at Norfolk, Virginia and Hurlbert.
Field, Florida. The new Joint Warfighting Center operates as a field operating agency of the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. The Joint Warfighting Center not only publishes and distributes all joint doctrine but also produces a newsletter and operates The Joint Electronic Library (JEL). According to LTC Dean Seitz, the current coordinator for all joint logistical doctrine coming out of The Center, General Shalikashvili, CJCS, wants to keep the joint doctrine process simple and responsive to the needs of the CINCs. Currently about two thirds of the publications are approved, and about one third are under development in a process that culminates with the approval of the Chairman himself. In the logistical area, about half of the publications have been approved. The joint doctrine process has been streamlined to produce documents that are ready for the field in less than two years.

Distribution of joint doctrine has been a problem in the past, and there is little or no interplay between The Joint Warfighting Center and major joint training and education centers such as U.S. Atlantic Command and The Armed Forces Staff College. This appears to be unfortunate in that one of the key lessons of the Army's experience is that the writing of doctrine cannot be completely separated from the teaching of doctrine; a symbiotic relationship must exist between the two.

Current joint logistics doctrine, although up to date with 1995 publishing dates, appears to be concentrated primarily in the areas of transportation and
health services. Quartermaster joint logistic support is limited to water terminal
operations, petroleum, and mortuary affairs. A key point in all of this is that some
joint logistics doctrine is being developed and used; and there is a solid process
in place to continue developing it.

Joint Logistics Organizations

There are currently no established joint logistical operating organizations
provided for in doctrine and allocated resources that provide support to joint
operations. All joint logistical operating commands currently in place are
essentially ad hoc in nature... They have been tailored to meet the needs of a
specific contingency. As I've already discussed in executive agency
responsibility, this leads the CINC to assign specific logistical functions to
individual Services based on the dominant user concept or other valid reasons.\textsuperscript{37}

In an effort to consolidate a number of logistical functions at the
Department of Defense level, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was created
as a Combat Support Agency under the direction and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Production).\textsuperscript{38} A key point here, however, is that DLA is
not a retail supply activity. It is a wholesale procurement activity that does not
provide support on the ground to operating forces.

According to LTG Pagonis in \textit{Moving Mountains} there is still a glaring need
within a theater of operations for one joint, overarching logistical organization.\textsuperscript{39}
LTG Pagonis, who himself established an ad hoc overarching logistical command states, "I think our experience demonstrated the clear advantages inherent in having a single point of contact for all resource management and contracting, especially in a host nation where certain resources are limited... This first job of the logistician will be to 'capture' the host-nation infrastructure... Only an organization with that kind of theater-wide vision can determine whether the requested item can be obtained locally, or is sitting on a prepo ship or is already in a nearby warehouse." LTG Pagonis sums up the logistical situation during Desert Storm by concluding that, "What was needed to resolve that conflict and avoid sub-optimization was a logistical 'Kingpin' - someone who could assess the imperatives of each functional area and decide upon a solution that best supported the mission."  

The Army is currently designing a legitimate Theater Support Command Organization similar to but even more robust than that of LTG Pagonis during the Gulf War. The organizational planning is still in the conceptual stage and will probably not complete all the approval and resourcing hurdles for at least two years. According to Mr. Jim Emery, project officer for the concept at the U. S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) at Ft. Lee, Virginia, "This is an Army organizational concept... However, the objective organization will provide a significant amount of support to other services through various executive agency directives/agreements." The draft concept states, "To
facilitate this executive agency support, other service staffing will be identified for insertion as required. This other service staffing will be in the form of liaison positions provided from the major organizations being supported by the objective organization such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC), or Army Material Command (AMC).44

This new concept for joint logistical command and control is well grounded with its doctrinal basis in Joint Pub. 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. Joint Pub. 4-0, which is authoritative and will be followed, states “For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics.”45

The bottom line is that joint logistical organizations in support of contingency operations and joint task forces are most definitely the wave of the future. Whether they be fully joint or jointly staffed is still to be determined. The fact of the matter is that they will have a joint focus and will provide joint support. With them, as with any organization legitimately grounded in doctrine, will come a need for jointly focused and jointly trained logisticians who have hopefully been developed with a joint logistics perspective.

**Joint Logistical Education**

To quote LTG Pagonis again, “The military places a great deal of responsibility on very young people... A captain in his twenties may have
personal responsibility for hundreds of lives and millions of dollars worth of machinery, equipment and supplies.\textsuperscript{46} The fact is that we do indeed place a great deal of responsibility on all our logisticians, particularly our young junior officers who will be asked and required to function in an ever increasing joint logistical world. I believe I have established in terms of requirements, doctrine, lessons learned and new organizations that future military logistics will indeed be joint. How well we train and educate our future joint logisticians may very well determine our success to logistically support all our military operations.

The trend in Army logistics, certainly since 1984, has been toward multi-functionality. Our organizations and our personnel management system all support this conclusion. Almost all of the Army's combat service support units at and above battalion level provide a wide range of support that includes functions from all logistics branches.\textsuperscript{47}

Operation Desert Shield/Storm was the first real test of the new combat service support force structure. The consensus from units who participated in The Gulf War was that multi-functional support organizations provided responsive support which allowed the warfighters to seize the initiative and press the enemy when the opportunity presented itself.\textsuperscript{48}

To assist in the early development of our new multi-functional logistics officers, the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC), was developed and began teaching at the Army Logistics Management College in
1993. CLOAC replaced the traditional combat service support officer advanced courses conducted at the various branch schools. The trend would appear then that our professional military education initiatives in consolidating and developing multi-functional training for our junior logistics leaders was congruent with and reflected the same trends in the newly emerged multi-functional organizations and doctrine. This would all therefore beg the question...have we continued to stay current in our logistics professional military education, particularly in light of the emerging joint logistics initiatives in requirements, doctrine, and organizations? I shall examine this question in terms of currently available logistics programs of instruction (POI) and in terms of current research.

Significant research has already been conducted in the area of joint logistics education. A major study was conducted at the direction of the Joint Logistics Commanders Conference and was completed in March of 1991. The study group reviewed existing literature, curricula and conducted extensive interviews with over 180 mid-level military and civilian logisticians. The study group concluded that there is a need for a joint logistics course and based on the data collected, they proposed course modules, benefits, impediments, student population, and resource requirements. A short two week course has now been approved to train approximately 400 joint logisticians a year.

Although the study found that there were existing courses that addressed joint logistics such as the Armed Forces Staff College, they were narrow in scope
and were not courses for logisticians. For the most part, the study determined that mid-level logistics managers acquire familiarity with joint logistics through on-the-job training.

Much has happened since this study concluded its results. The Gulf War was concluded which produced a myriad of joint logistical lessons learned. There have been numerous joint task force contingency operations, with many of them having a distinct logistical support focus such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Support to the Kurds and Hurricane Andrew Support. Atlantic Command had not as yet been assigned its joint functional training mission; and much joint doctrine had not as yet been developed. A Universal Joint Task List had not as yet been developed, and there was no initiative for joint logistical organizations. Also, and fairly critical, the Combined Logistics Officers' Advanced Course with its new multi-functional focus had not been developed and executed. Although the study on joint logistics training may have correctly stated the problem, its conclusions and recommendation for a "stovepipe" joint logistics course, elective in nature, and lasting only two weeks, may not be the ultimate solution in light of current developments and trends. The course, because of its constrained time lines and limited resources, will only focus on "big picture" joint processes at the national level. It will not be able to concentrate on joint operational logistics and how the various services support each other in contingency operations.

The Combined Logistics Officers' Advanced Course (CLOAC) is a 20 week
primary level professional military education program required of all Army junior officer logisticians. Attendees are in the grade of 1st Lieutenant and Captain and normally attend the course between their 4th and 7th years of active duty. Attendees are from all the Army’s logistical branches and specialities. Attendance and successful completion of the course is a requirement for branch qualification and any further consideration for advancement in the Army.

The CLOAC is currently divided into 3 phases with the stated purpose of “advanced level training in company/troop leadership and operational planning functions to prepare officers for duties as company commanders and staff officers on multi-functional staffs.”

Phase 1 of the course includes training/instruction in Army doctrine, unit leadership, personnel functions, unit maintenance and supply, communicative skills, company and battalion training and military history. Phase II focuses on specific branch skills that an Army logistician needs to function in his/her particular branch (i.e., Quartermaster, Ordnance, Transportation). The concluding phase teaches the skills and knowledge necessary to perform duties as a staff officer on a multi-functional Army logistics staff. Concentration is on the logistics functions (fix, arm, fuel, move, sustain) and associated logistics support operations. In all phases, the focus is exclusively on Army unique operations.

A key point for emphasis is that the CLOAC is the longest, most comprehensive professional development program for Army logisticians. It is a
course that reaches every mid-grade Army logistical leader at a critical point in
his or her careers. It finds time in its 20-week curriculum for everything from
English grammar, briefing techniques, and developing a unit counseling program,
to detailed discussions on the latest policies regarding homosexuals in the
military... but it does not find one hour to devote to anything even remotely
associated with joint operations.

Conclusions

Army logistics is joint! All the signs point to that. More and more Army
logisticians are finding themselves on joint staffs and if not on a joint staff, they
are performing tactical and operational logistical functions in a joint task force
working with and supporting other services. Every data point collected over the
past few years clearly establishes that joint logistics is the wave of the future.
Our organizations, our doctrine, and our requirements are increasingly joint, and
the training and preparation of our leaders need to reflect this ever increasing
joint orientation.

Our Army professional development education of logistical leaders has not
kept pace with this evolving trend in jointness. Our most comprehensive logistics
professional development course, CLOAC, which in the case of between 50-60%
of our officers, will be their last opportunity at resident professional development
education, has no joint focus or orientation. Even MG Robert K. Guest, in his
personal interview with me, although he has always been an ardent advocate of
learning the service basics first, admits that “we must introduce jointness and do more with jointness in our advanced course.”

Jointness is now more encompassing. It is no longer a mere discussion of integrated procedures and processes designed to set “Joint” apart from everything else. Joint should be a part of every service’s operating procedures, and a good place to begin is in our logistics advanced course.

Based on the Universal Joint Task List and the current executive agency responsibilities, joint logistics doctrine needs to be expanded. Ammunition, food, airdrop systems, military postal service and POW handling are just a few areas that are ripe for joint doctrine and joint tactics techniques and procedures. One can recall MG Guest’s comments on food support in Haiti and the Army’s ignorance of the Navy commissary system, in looking at subsistence support as a major candidate for coordinated joint doctrine. The relatively new Logistics Contractor Augmentation Program which surfaced several times in ACOM’s logistics lessons learned and which accounts for a significant portion of recent logistic support, should also be dealt with in joint logistic doctrine. LOGCAP contractors will have accounted for over $1 Billion in logistic support for various operations in the last few years; and yet this program is not even mentioned in the glossary of Joint Pub. 4.0, the capstone joint logistics publication.

Recommendation

The very best way that we can manage change in our ever increasing joint
logistical world is to begin with education. The greatest opportunity we have is to influence the largest population of our logistical leadership force, those selected for attendance at the Combined Logistics Officers Advanced Course. Many of the subjects currently targeted for a short, joint logistics course should be incorporated into CLOAC. At a minimum, CLOAC should include intense instruction on national planning for logistics; service logistics and fighting responsibilities in the theater; international logistics and host nation support; and contracting and logistics planning.

There is much to be learned from our sister services in all logistics disciplines. There should be a detailed examination of similar training modules in other services' curricula for possible inclusion into the CLOAC. CLOAC could institute a faculty personnel exchange program as well as a student exchange program with other services to facilitate joint service subject matter expertise. Our ultimate long range goal should be to establish a fully joint logistics advanced course with full participation from all our services.

Significant resources are expended in maintaining a CLOAC and all our primary level educational systems. Insuring that these courses reflect the current joint state of our operations is absolutely paramount.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid. Slide #8.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


9. 10 U. S. C. 164(c).


11. Ibid. 2-8.

12. Ibid. 3-14.

13. Ibid. 3-15.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. 12.

26. Lessons Learned Feeder Reports, USACOM, 1996.


28. Ibid. 2-g to 2-112.


31. Ibid.


33. Personal Interview, LTC Dean Seitz, February 28, 1996.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


38. Ibid. 43.

40. Ibid. 207-208.

41. Ibid. 215.

42. Personal Interview, Mr. Jim Emery, February 22, 1996.

43. Ibid.


45. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, I-3 & I-4.


51. Personal Interview, LTC Peter Campisi, February 22, 1996.


53. Ibid.

54. United States Army Logistics Management College, “Program Of Instruction For Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC)”, January 1996.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

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