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PEACE ENFORCEMENT: SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

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ABSTRACT

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International peace and security are "ends" to our National Security Strategy. Peace enforcement operations are the "ways" of achieving these ends. The "means", unlike other peace operations, is predominantly, although not exclusively, the military. Our military operations other than war doctrine erroneously includes peace enforcement. It is clearly a warfighting task. This study analyzes peace enforcement in relation to our doctrinal intent, the propensity to confuse peace enforcement with peacekeeping, and the principles of war and peace operations. The paper also highlights contradictions in our National and Military Strategies and provides a U.S. cultural perspective on control of these operations. The range of military operations, definitions of war, and some thoughts on new models round out the argument. The study's intent is to generate the debate necessary for doctrinal change.
Introduction

The "peace dividend" expected at the end of the cold war was spent prematurely. The dissolution of the bipolar arrangement between the United States and the former Soviet Union ushered in a new era of potential regional instability. Ethnic rivalries, religious conflicts, and intense economic competition contribute to the problem. Stability in regions where we have vital and important interests is paramount. Consequently, the quest for international peace continues and America's involvement in peace operations is increasing.

One type of peace operation is particularly ominous; it is peace enforcement. If we consider international peace and security as an end to our National Security Strategy, then peace enforcement is one way of achieving this end. The means, unlike other peace operations, is predominantly, although not exclusively, the military.

Joint Publication 3-0 classifies peace enforcement as a military operation other than war (MOOTW).¹ This MOOTW classification entangles peace enforcement with peacekeeping and causes confusion. Furthermore, the distinct separation of war from peace enforcement results in a cultural mind-set that fosters improper planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This obfuscates the true risk that peace enforcement entails.
Our military operations other than war doctrine should not include peace enforcement. It is clearly a warfighting task. I will analyze peace enforcement in relation to our doctrinal intent, the propensity to confuse peace enforcement with peacekeeping, and the principles of war and peace operations. This paper will also highlight contradictions in our National and Military Strategies and provide a U.S. cultural perspective on control of these operations. The range of military operations, definitions of war, and some thoughts on new models round out my argument. My intent is to generate the debate necessary for doctrinal change.

**Doctrinal Mistake**

Doctrine is our institutional body of knowledge that defines how we intend to conduct war and operations other than war.² It is the light that enables us to see through the "fog" of war. Doctrine drives our planning, training, and procurement efforts. It is more effective when it accurately reflects experience and presages the nature of future operations. Unfortunately, our operations other than war doctrine, including peace enforcement, does not provide this clarity.

General Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, wrote that the categories of war and operations other than war provide important conceptual and political distinctions.
Later, in the same article he stated:

Categorizing "war" as separate from all other uses of military force may mislead the strategist, causing him to believe that the conditions required for success in the employment of military force when one is conducting "war" differ from use of military force in "operations other than war."³

Misled strategists are the banes of operational and tactical planners. General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, underscored the vagueness of MOOTW in his speech, "The Mandate for American Involvement Abroad." When citing aspects of the cold war he commented, "very rarely, for example, did we ever become involved in such things as peacekeeping, or in 'operations other than war,' if we even understand that term."⁴ The Chairman's uncertainty is compounded at lower levels.

The range of military operations spans from war to operations other than war.⁵ Military operations other than war are "an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace."⁶ Operations other than war require the military to accomplish national objectives in operations "other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war."⁷ Military operations other than war encompass a myriad of tasks involving the use or threat of force. They also include tasks that do not.⁸ Peace enforcement, by definition, falls into the former category. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping are examples included in the latter category. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping, two of the most misunderstood peace operations, are clearly distinguishable.

Peace enforcement emanates from Article 42, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN).⁹ The UN defines it as "using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression."¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN, deftly avoids the word force in his description of peace enforcement. He refers to it as military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. This action occurs in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.¹¹ The Joint Warfighting Center adds more military precision by defining it as the:

Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹²

Although the UN Secretary does not use the term force, the definitions have a common theme. The armed forces act in the face of a threat or use varying levels of force to ensure peace. Since the definition includes both force or the threat of force to compel the desired end (peace), combat is not absolute. However, the forcible interposition of the military between recalcitrant parties for enforcing peace makes one wonder how the term peace and enforcement ever became linked. The UN recognizes the use of force and
yet our doctrine places peace enforcement in the MOOTW category for convenience, second and third order effects aside. Part of the problem lies in the tendency to confuse peace enforcement with peacekeeping. They are two very different tasks.

**Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement**

Although the topic of this paper is peace enforcement, it is important that we delineate the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This is necessary because references to these two operations during recent press conferences with National Command Authorities reflect confusion. The President called the Bosnia deployment a peacekeeping mission, whereas the Secretary of Defense labeled it peace enforcement. Many publications interchange the terms and contribute to the misunderstanding.

Peacekeeping operations originate from Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. This chapter describes the methodology for the peaceful settlement of disputes but does not articulate a concept for peacekeeping. The focus is on negotiation, arbitration, and judicial means.\(^\text{13}\) Peacekeeping evolved into its present form as the UN attempted to accomplish its peace mandate.

Three operational variables help us discriminate between peacekeeping and peace enforcement: consent, force, and impartiality.\(^\text{14}\) The military and/or civilian agencies conduct peacekeeping missions with the consent of the
previously disputing parties. A peacekeeping contingent helps supervise a cease fire and prevent the renewal of hostilities. Combat units are supposedly not the means of choice.\textsuperscript{15} Peace enforcement operations are military operations oriented against at least one party which does not want peace. This puts the peace enforcer in the unenviable position of taking sides in a peace operation that is theoretically impartial. The use of force in peacekeeping is defensive. Troop protection is the priority. Conversely, offensive force (or the threat of offensive force) typifies peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{16} Impartiality is the key to successful peacekeeping; favoring one side or the other will exacerbate a tenuous situation and possibly cause failure. Fortunately, impartiality is easier to accomplish during peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, impartiality is extremely difficult to achieve during peace enforcement operations. There is a tendency to side with the party that wants peace, thus causing friction among other parties who may not be ready to abandon war aims. The perception of partiality can unhinge the noblest peace goals. Any decision to commit us to peace enforcement operations means that we are deciding to go to war; this is not true of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{17}

The "peacekeeping" attempt in Bosnia is an example of how these significantly different operations become misconstrued. The United States deployed a predominantly
military force to the Balkans. The agreement between The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska provided the basis for the operation. On the surface, the signed agreement seems to satisfy the high level of consent appropriate to a peacekeeping mission. In reality, the consent of all parties may be only "skin deep." The accord was secured because of the threat of force by NATO forces (a peace enforcement means). There is little evidence that all parties have abandoned their previous goals. The true support of the people is unknown and the historic rivalry in that region portends future conflict. Our political exit strategy is based on time, not clearly defined objectives. The aggrieved parties may wait for our forces to leave and resume hostilities. Consent may be fleeting. The commitment of combat troops suggests that our leaders believe that force or the threat of force is ultimately necessary to maintain peace. The task organization of this "peacekeeping" force is primarily the military and it can conduct offensive operations on a larger scale. Our Secretary of Defense publicly said that we are prepared to use offensive force if attacked. These are not the actions or statements normally associated with doctrinal peacekeeping missions. Finally, this operation will strain or discredit the perception of our impartiality; the Serbs already believe that we are partial to the opposing forces.
Our initiatives to arm and train the Muslims lend credence to this perception.

**Principles of War Versus Principles of Peace Operations**

Peace operations doctrine provides a set of six principles for MOOTW. The principles of objective, unity of effort and security are extracts from our warfighting principles of war. The principles of offense, simplicity, mass, economy of force, maneuver, and surprise are not considered applicable to MOOTW. Three additional principles were added: restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Apparently, the new principles reflect the political versus military dominance inherent in peace operations. For some reason, our doctrine touts the political primacy of these operations because of the strategic consequences of our actions. The real time influence of the mass media such as CNN also bolsters political ascendancy. Clausewitz would argue that war also has political dominance and that war termination also has significant strategic consequences. I would also argue that perseverance is a quality, not a principle, and that both war and MOOTW require some form of legitimacy (real or perceived). It is beyond the scope of this paper to expand on these issues.

Obviously, MOOTW principles are inadequate for peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is a military operation against hostile forces. Restraint and the failure to apply the other principles of war will lead to flawed planning,
decision-making, and execution at all levels. Our "politically correct" and self-deluding terminology will haunt us when the casualties begin to come home. General Morris Boyd wrote that we have two lists of principles to enhance understanding, but that commanders really have 15 principles to choose from.\textsuperscript{22} I believe that two lists are confusing and that the principles of war are more applicable to enforcement operations. The recent failure in Somalia highlights what happens when a force tailored and trained for MOOTW becomes embroiled in escalating missions. Assigned tasks were more closely related to enforcement than humanitarian or peacekeeping.

**National and Military Security Strategies**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) adds further confusion to peace operations when comparing the words with the deeds. The NSS says that our military forces must be prepared to conduct peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. The NSS says that "U.S. combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations."\textsuperscript{23} However, "in some cases their use will be desirable and justified by U.S. national interests."\textsuperscript{24} This statement is particularly intriguing when one considers the type forces we deployed to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Obviously, our military is the primary means to conduct both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The NSS further defines three categories of national
interests that could lead to the use of military forces: threats to America's vital interests; important interests that do not affect our survival, but influence "our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live"\textsuperscript{23}; and humanitarian interests. These broad categories give the President much latitude in committing forces worldwide. We are just as likely to be committed to peripheral interests as we are to vital ones.

It is interesting that the NSS also says that no outside force can create a stable environment for another society.\textsuperscript{26} This comment suggests that peace enforcement operations cannot succeed unless the estranged parties want peace. Therefore, peace enforcement operations seem futile.

Donald Snow contends that peace enforcement operations will violate most of the Weinberger Tenets. He believes that these operations will not be vital to our interests and that winning will be elusive. Additionally, political and military objectives will not be clear and the support of the American people will quickly dissipate. Furthermore, he contends that General Powell's idea of overwhelming force will give way to political realities.\textsuperscript{27} Snow's prophecy is now truth. The National Security Strategy abandons these principles and reflects the current political and economic realities.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides guidelines for committing troops to peace enforcement
operations. The NMS says we will deploy sufficient forces to meet clearly defined objectives; plans will enable us to achieve those objectives decisively. It further cites Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti as a model peace enforcement operation. The original plan for Uphold Democracy involved a sizeable joint force and included special operations forces direct action and an airborne assault forcible entry. The operation followed the principles of war and the guidelines discussed above. Planning, rehearsals, and near execution of the combat plan were textbook applications of warfighting. The term MOOTW did not apply in the minds of the commanders and soldiers charged with prosecuting the mission.

The National Military Strategy suggests that peace enforcement is a means to achieve national military objectives through deterrence and conflict prevention. Clearly, these operations involve the use of force against a determined opponent. Linking peace enforcement to deterrence and conflict prevention is questionable. This link is only appropriate if the threat of force succeeds.

**UN and US Ends, Ways, Means**

Since peace enforcement operations may be necessary to ensure regional stability and prevent global wars, it is important to examine the ends, ways, and means of conducting these operations. American interests may be at stake.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali views the ways and means through the idealistic view of a United Nations' controlled collective security arrangement. This idea transcends traditional views of sovereignty and nation-state interests. It is also arguable that President Clinton was looking through the same lens before the unfortunate circumstances in Somalia. The President's views have changed and the U.S. ways and means do not coincide with those of the Secretary General. It is through a comparison of the UN and US approaches that I will further examine the issue of peace enforcement.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali believes that we are entering a new era favorable for transforming the UN into a true world governing, collective security body. He heralds the end of the self-interest view embodied in the bipolar arrangement predominant during the cold war. He embraces the opportunity to create an organization that fosters consensus and cooperation. The Secretary General believes this collective approach is essential because the global environment has changed and the traditional definition of sovereignty has gravitated from absolute to universal sovereignty. Boutros Boutros-Ghali clearly believes that nation-states are still the basic entities of international relationships, but that they cannot solve today's problems alone. He says the UN is the only organization that can solve these complex issues.

The Secretary General believes the means is to
"expand, adapt, and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations." He says that peacekeeping is the most prominent UN activity and that UN expansion is essential to meeting peacekeeping and peace enforcement needs. In his view, this evolution will require an organizational culture change to effect the shift from self-interest to consensus building. Boutros Boutros-Ghali also envisions a rapid response capability with standby forces necessary to meet threats to peace. He concedes that the UN is currently incapable of deploying, commanding and controlling enforcement actions due to organizational and resource constraints. Mr. Boutros-Ghali believes it is desirable in the long term. His vision of the future is important because there will be an attempt from the UN leadership and other member states to ultimately accomplish this agenda.

Empowerment of the UN according to the Secretary General’s vision is not in the interests of the U.S. The following arguments suggest that we should not support the UN vision of collective security.

First, the United States is unique in its view of the individual and collective rights of its citizens. Our interests are paramount to the preservation of our democracy. This idea is clearly articulated in The National Security Strategy of the United States. Thus, we predicate our actions and the commitment of forces on our interests, not necessarily on a world view of collective security.
Second, our governmental system of checks and balances already makes it difficult for us to achieve consensus on committing U.S. forces. We will not allow a world body to commit us to operations that are not in our interests, nor will we allow it to control operations when they are. Economic considerations dictate that we expend resources only when they serve the interests of our nation.

Third, the support of the American people is absolutely critical to the conduct of peace enforcement. They are not likely to commit their sons and daughters to a conflict or potential conflict based on the direction of the UN. They will not concede to the “purist” view of collective security. Furthermore, American values and culture preclude subservience to a “greater good” outside our interests.

Finally, the UN underutilizes Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This chapter states that regional security arrangements or agencies can conduct enforcement actions. Regional solutions are particularly valuable when contemplated enforcement actions do not affect our national interests.

The UN is a viable organization necessary for fostering cooperation among the states. It plays an important role in pacific solutions and in authorizing enforcement actions. However, the conduct of peace enforcement operations must be under our control and according to our doctrine. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's ways and means are simply not compatible
with ours. Clausewitz would agree in light of his concept of the remarkable trinity. The UN Secretary General's agenda is to gain more power in controlling world events; we cannot allow his agenda to prevail.

Command and control of peace enforcement operations are also nettlesome. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, highlights that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. He does, however, have the authority to place U.S. Forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when it is in our security interests. This broad authority is not particularly desirable for peacekeeping and it is tantamount to a crime for peace enforcement. When committing troops to potential combat it is imperative we keep them under commanders who understand and apply our principles of warfighting. To do less is unacceptable.

The Range of Military Operations

Army Field Manual 100-5 describes the three categories incorporated in the range of military operations. They are war, conflict, and peacetime. Wars are large scale combat operations that involve the use of force in combat operations. Conflicts are hostilities to secure strategic objectives and include peace enforcement and peacekeeping in both combat and noncombat environments. Peacetime includes disaster relief and other missions that do not involve
combat. Collectively, conflict and peacetime are operations other than war. These doctrinal categories differ from joint doctrine.

Inclusion of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement into the same conflict category is particularly troublesome. As I discussed earlier, they are significantly different and their proximity in Army doctrine dilutes the true warfighting nature of peace enforcement. The distinction between peace enforcement and war is scale. Scale is irrelevant to the soldier in combat. Again the "waters are muddied."

What is War?

We know that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not the same and that enforcement operations thrust us into an environment mirroring war more than peace. Consequently, one must ask, "Is peace enforcement really war?"

The opinions vary. Many argue that peace enforcement is along the continuum of peacekeeping, whereas others argue that it is not part of a continuum. Others believe it is a lower form of war (i.e., limited). Some argue that Desert Storm, although large in scale, was a peace enforcement operation. This argument is based primarily on the UN's authorization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It is also arguable that the actions after Desert Storm are truly peace enforcement operations. Historical literature recognizes earlier small scale foreign entanglements as
interventions. So the debate rages and strategic thinkers agree to disagree.

Clausewitz said that "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."\textsuperscript{36} A comparison of this definition with that of peace enforcement reveals significant commonality. Peace enforcement uses force to compel belligerents to stop fighting (our will for peace). The term "enemy" poses an intellectual problem since it would violate the impartiality required by our peace operations doctrine to refer to other warring factions as our enemy. However, Clausewitz's definition of war is applicable to peace enforcement. The term enemy is valid for reflecting the friction between two forces (one for peace, the other opposed to peace). The imposition of one force between two warring factions is essentially war against both. Another viewpoint is that peace enforcement can be a war to end war!

Clausewitz also commented on the force aspect of war by saying that "there is no logical limit to the application of that force."\textsuperscript{37} This seemingly contradicts our doctrine of restraint when executing peace operations. However, Clausewitz recognized that many variables affect the amount of resources we will commit to war. National will and political considerations are powerful influences. His conceptual theories of absolute and real war\textsuperscript{38} help us understand that logic does not always prevail. Army
doctrine reminds us that the principle of restraint does not necessarily mean that we cannot use overwhelming force when necessary.\textsuperscript{39}

Preston and Wise define war as "any conflict between rival groups, by force of arms or other means, which has claims to be recognized as a legal conflict."\textsuperscript{40} This idea of war may not involve actual armed conflict. It could encompass economic war, information war, or even the struggle among different ethnic and religious groups. The cold war also falls into this category. The threat of force aspect of peace enforcement is also part of this view of war because it reflects a struggle between peace and war advocates.

Joint Publication 3-0 maintains that war is a large-scale, sustained combat operation.\textsuperscript{41} Peace enforcement is therefore not considered war because it does not always meet the large-scale or combat operation criteria.

Ralph Peters believes that future wars will include regional and niche warfare. The operational setting may pit us against organized groups as opposed to large armies. He is concerned that we are prepared to fight conventionally against a similar type force, but that we are ill-prepared to face future enemies. He says we will face threats in an urbanized world where diminishing nation-states, criminal elements, and ethnic and religious strife prevail.\textsuperscript{42}

Henry Kissinger believes three types of emerging states
that lack traditional nation-state characteristics will affect the future. They include ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires (former Soviet Union); post-colonial nations fighting the established boundaries imposed by occupying powers; and continental-type states that unite a myriad of languages, religions, and nationalities.\(^\text{43}\)

John Keegan challenges Clausewitz's assertion that war is a political instrument and postulates that war can be cultural. Revenge not policy may be the genesis of war. Our western view of war may not be relevant worldwide.\(^\text{44}\) The proliferation and unconventional use of chemical and biological agents will also alter the future face of war. Thus, future war may be on a smaller scale; peace enforcement operations may be our wars of the future.

The National Military Strategy places peace enforcement in "the gray zone between peace and war."\(^\text{45}\) Michael Hoffman contends that the law of war does not apply to peace enforcement operations because they are internationally authorized commitments.\(^\text{46}\) Intent is also a factor in describing the differences between war and peace enforcement. Theoretically we engage in war to secure our vital interests. Conversely, peace enforcement ensures the stability of others. This argument is weak because stability in certain regions is in our vital interests. Our doctrine is wrong to treat enforcement operations in a MOOTW context if peace enforcement truly straddles the peace-war
"fence."

The idea of peace enforcement involves the use of force more often than not. Peace terminology creates the delusion that we are planning for something other than combat and dilutes the anticipation of violence. We run the risk of developing a bad plan in the name of peace and/or political correctness. The doctrinal dilemma is understandable if we get bogged down in the "threat of force" or noncombat aspects of these operations. However, flexible deterrent options are available to display threats of force. These options transcend MOOTW, including peace enforcement.

Therefore, any operation involving force needs to be considered in a warfighting context (not necessarily war) with the idea of "winning" the peace. The resultant stability enables diplomats to pursue further peace objectives. We cannot enter an enforcement operation with a peacekeeping mentality and all of its associated constraints; the commitment of the wrong force to accomplish the wrong mission carries tremendous consequences.

After all, peace enforcement operations will involve immediate combat or a transition to combat from a threat of force posture. We learned from the Somalia experience that a transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is not a desirable option. These scenarios require a credible combat force that is available and ready.

Interestingly, Army doctrine treats peace enforcement
as a military operation other than war and yet specifies that training for peace enforcement operations should include the following tasks: meeting engagements, movements to contact, search and attacks, air assaults, raids, attacks, and defense. The separation of warring factions is an additional task. The peace operations manual specifically says that the transition to combat action requires the successful application of combat skills.\textsuperscript{47}

Finally, for those who still believe that enforcement operations are not equivalent to war or will not involve combat, another thought from Clausewitz is appropriate. He wrote: "the impulse to resist springs from the same source as the will to compel—fighting or war will result. When involving ourselves in affairs that compel others to do our bidding, we must expect a reaction."\textsuperscript{48}

**New Models**

Clearly, our joint doctrine needs to change. Randall G. Bowdish, in his article "The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth Generation," discusses the spectrum of conflict. This spectrum consists of three parts: Short of War, Conventional War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Peace enforcement is on the line between Short of War and Conventional War.\textsuperscript{49}

Lieutenant Colonel Ann E. Story and Major Aryea Gottlieb recognized this and proposed a new model in the Autumn edition of Joint Force Quarterly.\textsuperscript{50} They discard the
war and MOOTW categories and replace them with combat and noncombat nomenclature. They added an intersecting area to list operations that could move from noncombat to combat and vice versa. Story and Gottlieb also changed the name of peace enforcement to operations to restore order (contending that peace enforcement is a misnomer); truce-keeping replaced peacekeeping. Although I do not necessarily agree to the name changes, this common sense approach eliminates the war versus not war controversy. The classification combat places enforcement operations in its most likely environment. Obviously, this model contradicts our current aspect of doctrine that suggests that peace enforcement may not always involve combat. The authors do not recognize the threat of force aspect of peace enforcement, however. Additionally, they do not wholly capture the roles and missions of each service and the relation of these missions to the combat/noncombat model. Nevertheless, their article is a great first step in the continuing development of joint doctrine. The placement of some tasks is questionable. For example, their chart shows humanitarian assistance as a noncombat operation. A short review of the Somalia relief operation shows that the operational environment may involve combat. Therefore, humanitarian assistance may be an intersecting operation. There is a growing body of thought that rejects the idea that enforcement operations are truly peace operations and that MOOTW is a viable concept.
When there is no clear answer to blurry issues it is more reasonable to categorize it in its most likely form. As demonstrated in the Haiti operation, it is better to plan for combat and develop a noncombat contingency than to attempt the reverse as in Somalia.

Conclusion

Doctrine is useless without clear understanding and correct application. If the U.S. subscribes to peace enforcement as outlined in Article 42, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, then the National and Military Strategies must clearly articulate the significant differences between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. These documents must make it understood that we will not confuse the two and that we view peace enforcement as a combat mission requiring U.S. command and control. Doctrine must change to reflect the forceful military aspect of enforcement operations and revise principles of peace operations to reflect more warfighting and less of the political aspects.

Our current doctrine is inadequate and the embedding of peace enforcement in military operations other than war does not give it the preeminence it deserves. The "gray area" of peace enforcement is not as gray as doctrine states. Peace enforcement is clearly warfighting. The UN debacles in Somalia and Bosnia show the flaws in sending a peacekeeping force into a peace enforcement environment. The haunting
voices of our deceased Rangers in Somalia beg us to heed these valuable lessons. We owe it to them.
ENDNOTES


6Ibid.

7Ibid., V-1.

8Ibid., I-2 - I-3.


20 Department of the Army, Peace Operations, 1.


23 Clinton, 16.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 12.

26 Ibid., iii.

27 Snow, 32.


29 Ibid., 4.


Clausewitz, 89.


Department of the Army, Operations, 2-1.


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Ibid., 77.

Ibid., 579-81.

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