FORGING A 'NEW' ARMY

THE END OF THE DRAFT AND THE TRANSITION TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

Martin J. Holland
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THE END OF THE DRAFT AND THE TRANSITION
TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

by

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MARTIN J. HOLLAND. Forging a 'New' Army: The End of the Draft and the Transition to an All-Volunteer Force. (Under the direction of Richard H. Kohn.)

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the effect that the end of the draft and the advent of an all-volunteer force had on the U. S. Army. The need to attract and retain large numbers of young men and women during the final stages of the nation's most unpopular war, in an era of political turbulence, forced the Army to reexamine its most basic practices and policies. The transition to an all-volunteer force fostered important changes in the Army's leadership philosophy, training methods, and soldiers' day-to-day life. The cumulative results of these changes forged a 'new' all-volunteer Army that became significantly different from its draft-era predecessor.
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States depended upon volunteers to fill the ranks of its regular armed forces in peacetime. Even during periods of war, increased calls for volunteers and nationalized volunteer units were the norm. During the American Civil War and World War I conscription was introduced strictly as a wartime measure and was jettisoned as soon as the conflicts ended. In the summer of 1940, the United States enacted the first peacetime draft in its history as an anxious response to German aggression in Europe.¹ Subsequently, the United States relied upon the Selective Service System as the primary mechanism for procuring military manpower for over three decades from the eve of World War II in 1940 until 1973 (except for a brief period during 1947-1948 when draft authority lapsed). During this period over 30 million young men were drafted into the armed forces and countless others were 'draft-motivated' volunteers.²


²For an authoritative discussion of the modern Selective Service System see George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1993).
The Army's was the service that most depended on the draft as a source of manpower and the expiration of the draft on July 1, 1973 effectively ended over thirty years of a guaranteed supply of fresh inductees.\(^3\) Therefore, the development of the all-volunteer force affected the Army more immediately and more profoundly than the other services. The end of the draft and the return to a reliance upon volunteers embodied more than just a change in military manpower procurement policies. The increased size of the Army following World War II and the break with the recent thirty-year tradition of conscription signified a fundamental shift in American military policy.

Historian Russell F. Weigley observed in 1967 that "the historic preoccupation of the Army's thought in peacetime has been the manpower question: how, in an unmilitary nation, to muster adequate numbers of capable soldiers. . ."\(^4\) The curtailment of the United States' involvement in Vietnam coupled with the end of the draft forced the Army to attack the 'manpower question' head-on even while it continued to withdraw from Vietnam and maintained a large cold war force structure of approximately one million soldiers. The Army's paramount challenge was to redefine its image in the eyes of the American public, especially with the young men and women who comprised the pool of perspective volunteers needed to sustain the Army's ranks. The Army's effort to rebuild


its image, however, involved much more than a mere public relations campaign and, in fact, required the Army to initiate fundamental changes in order to remain viable as an all-volunteer force.

The necessity of attracting and retaining previously unprecedented numbers of volunteers challenged the Army in a number of ways. General William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff who had previously been the senior military commander in Vietnam, admitted in 1970 that the Army had been "spoiled by the draft" and that the draft had "shaped our practices; it has influenced our attitudes." The transition to an all-volunteer force compelled the Army to reexamine many of its traditional policies and practices and fostered dramatic changes in the daily life, leadership philosophy, and training practices of the U.S. Army.

This paper examines some of the most significant issues which confronted the Army during its transition to an all-volunteer force as well as the Army's process of change in response to those challenges. The paper begins by briefly reviewing the policy decisions that ended the draft and created the all-volunteer force. The paper then examines the Army's plans and programs for implementing the all-volunteer force. The very essence of an army is captured by the way it treats its soldiers, its leadership, and its training. By focusing on the basic changes in the soldier's daily life, the evolution of the Army's

*William C. Westmoreland, address to Army Commanders' Conference, Washington, DC, 30 November 1970, in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', Historical Records Collection, U. S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC (Hereafter cited as HRC, CMH).*
leadership philosophy, and the development of a reinvigorated training program this paper demonstrates the impact of the transition to the all-volunteer force upon the Army from its newest recruits to its senior commanders. The cumulative results of these changes forged a 'new' all-volunteer Army that was dramatically different from its draft-era predecessor.
Chapter I

THE END OF THE DRAFT

The war in Vietnam dramatically increased military manpower requirements and generated public protests throughout the United States. Increasingly, these protests focused upon the draft while categorizing conscription as an inequitable and unjust policy of selective service. Opponents charged that the draft was inequitable because of the system of deferments which allowed some young men to avoid military service while others were forced to serve. Furthermore, the system was judged to be unjust because those individuals who were selected to serve bore a much heavier burden, in both financial and personal terms, than those who did not serve. The central dilemma confronted by the Selective Service System was how to determine who should serve when not everyone was required to serve. Several advisory and legislative committees beginning in the mid-1960s recommended improvements in the Selective Service System, but very little reform had been accomplished prior to the 1968 presidential election.⁶

During the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard M. Nixon, the Republican candidate, pledged to end the draft and to establish an All-Volunteer Force. In an October 1968 speech broadcast on the CBS radio network, Nixon declared, "I have looked into this question very carefully. And this is my belief: once our involvement in the Vietnam war is behind us, we [should] move toward an all-volunteer armed force." Nixon characterizing the draft as inherently unfair, asserted the necessity of improving incentives to make military service more attractive. He also emphasized that the draft could only be phased out gradually and must be maintained on a stand-by status in case of national emergency. He concluded his address with an appeal to the nation's youth; "it's time we looked to our consciences. Let's show our commitment to freedom by preparing to assure our young people theirs."

Nixon's pledge to end the draft appealed to the public's growing dismay with the war in Vietnam and the increased draft calls it caused. The idea of ending the draft was attractive to many voters who saw the draft as a domestic manifestation of the war's troubled policies. Nixon's campaign promise to end the draft effectively neutralized one of the major rallying cries of campus protesters. Furthermore, Nixon's pledges to end the war in Vietnam as well as the draft turned these politically charged issues to his favor, because the Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, was largely viewed as the heir of the Johnson administration's Vietnam policies. Political opponents charged Nixon with naked electioneering, but several of his closest advisers emphasized

\footnote{The text of Nixon's speech appears in Chambers, Draftees or Volunteers, 572-578.}
that ending the draft was also in accordance with the Republican ideology of reducing the
government's role in Americans' daily lives. After the election, these advisers, most
notably economists Arthur Burns and Martin Anderson, encouraged Nixon to fulfill this
campaign promise. Indeed, in his memoirs Nixon declared that "I always gave great
weight to Burn's opinions because of my respect for his superior intellect and because he
always followed the practice he once described to me of 'telling the President what he
needs to hear, not just what he wants to hear'."

Quickly upon assuming office, President Nixon began investigating the means of
carrying out this pledge. On January 29, 1969 (just nine days after he took office) Nixon
told Melvin R. Laird, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, that "we must establish
an all-volunteer armed force after the expenditures for Vietnam are substantially reduced,
and ...we must begin now to move in that direction." The President also asked for
Laird's advice on creating a special commission to develop a plan for ending the draft.

Significantly, Nixon did not ask for the Defense Secretary's, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff's,
military opinion regarding the advisability of pursuing this policy. From the outset the
decision to end the draft was a political decision made by the President.

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1Arthur Burns and Martin Anderson's critical roles in exhorting
Nixon to follow through on his pledge to end the draft and Nixon's
commitment to this goal are discussed in Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Parker,
Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force (Alexandria, VA:
Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), 1977), 37-38; and Robert
K. Griffith, Jr., Today's Army Wants to Join You: The U. S. Army's
Transition from the Draft to an All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974

2Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:
Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 519-20, emphasis in original.

3Memo, Nixon to Laird, 29 January 1969, in file 327.02, 'All-
Volunteer Army', HRC, CMH.
President Nixon created the 'Commission on an All-Volunteer Force' on March 27, 1969 and appointed Thomas S. Gates, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense, as chairman. He directed the 'Gates Commission' to "develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving towards an all-volunteer force." The commission forwarded its report to the President on 20 February 1970 and proclaimed, "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by a standby draft" and that "...steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction." The commission's recommendations were largely a foregone conclusion, given the President's instructions, but the report provided the political justification for the Nixon administration's decision to ask Congress to end the draft and to institute an All-Volunteer Force.

The Gates Commission offered primarily an economic analysis for terminating the draft and concluded that by substantially raising direct military compensation, the armed services could attract the required number of recruits to make an all-volunteer force possible. Accordingly, the commission recommended that "the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces." The Commission's other major recommendations included retaining the Selective Service System on a 'standby' basis, expanding recruiting efforts, and improving

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12The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, iii.

13Ibid., 6.
the "conditions of service." The Report, however, lacked any specific guidance for the services other than recommending a higher military pay scale. On the topic of improving the conditions of service, the Report merely implied that "the entire military 'atmosphere' --the approach to training, discipline, and treatment of individuals-- must be re-examined."14 Finally, the Commission also recommended termination of the draft on June 30, 1971 when the current Selective Service legislation expired.15

Soon after the appointment of the Gates Commission, Secretary of Defense Laird began a separate study within the Department of Defense, the Project Volunteer Committee, to develop plans for achieving an all-volunteer force.16 The Defense Department's study did not deal with the major social, economic, or political arguments for or against an all-volunteer force, as the Gates Committee had done, but rather focused on actions required to implement such a force. The Project Volunteer Committee worked throughout 1969 and completed its work in February 1970 just as the Gates Commission Report was published. By mutual agreement between Laird and former Secretary Gates, the Defense Department did not release its report, "Plans and Actions to Move Toward an

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14Ibid., 138.

15Ibid., 8.

16For a comprehensive examination of the Department of Defense's role in planning and implementing the all-volunteer force see: Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force. One of the authors, Gus C. Lee, served on the Defense Department's Project Volunteer Committee.
All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the Department used the Project Volunteer Committee's work as the basis for preparing its response to the Gates Report.

The Gates Report and the Project Volunteer Committee Report both agreed that the draft could be ended. The major difference between the two reports was the target date for ending conscription. In fact, Gus C. Lee (a member of the Project Volunteer Committee) and Geoffrey Parker assert that "the Project Volunteer Committee viewed the [Gates] commission's recommendation to end the draft on July 1, 1971, as impractical, if not irresponsible. The Project Volunteer Committee recommended renewal of the draft for at least two years." The Department of Defense argued for extending the draft in order to reduce the armed forces' reliance on the draft gradually and to test programs for the successful implementation of an effective volunteer force. Furthermore, "virtually everyone in the Department who had worked on the problem thought that the [Gates] commission had underestimated the difficulties of achieving a volunteer force." The Department of Defense was necessarily concerned with the intricacies of developing a detailed blueprint for successfully achieving the all-volunteer force, whereas the Gates Commission only considered its overall feasibility.

Laird summarized the Defense Department's support for an all-volunteer force as well as its reservations about the Gates Commission's target date for ending the draft. Recruiting enough volunteers in such a short period was the Secretary of Defense's

17 The mutual agreement between Laird and Gates is discussed in Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 54.

18 Ibid., 65.

19 Ibid., 67.
primary concern. Laird argued that the continuing war in Vietnam and national security interests required that the draft be phased out gradually while the armed services worked towards ending all draft calls. Therefore, he wanted a two year extension of the draft beyond June 30, 1971, rather than the customary four year extension, in order to demonstrate the administration's commitment to ending the draft while also allowing the armed services enough time to formulate plans for the new policy. During the interim, the Defense Department would implement programs to expand recruiting and increase service attractiveness.20 Ironically, this proposal coincided nicely with Laird's personal agenda of serving only a four year stint as Secretary of Defense while accomplishing the dual goals of ending the draft and ending the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.21

The President accepted the inherent logic of the Department of Defense's position and put this more cautious approach into his April 23, 1970 message to Congress. Nixon endorsed the Gates Commission's recommendation for ending the draft, but concluded that the draft could not be ended on June 30, 1971. Since the existing Selective Service legislation did not expire until June 1970, still over a year away, the President did not seek an immediate extension of the legislation, but stated that "I expect that it will be necessary for the next Congress to extend this authority." The second part of Nixon's message addressed reforms of the existing draft law. By executive order, the President ended

20Ibid., 68-74.

21Information regarding Secretary Laird's personal agenda is found in Griffith, Today's Army Wants to Join You: The U. S. Army's Transition from the Draft to an All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974, 41-42; (based upon Griffith's interviews with Laird), and Joan Hoff-Wilson, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 164.
occupational and paternity deferments and, in his message, asked Congress to give him the authority to end student deferments and to institute a national draft lottery. With this policy pronouncement, Nixon formally committed his administration to ending the draft and achieving an all-volunteer force, but the exact date for ending the draft still depended upon future Congressional action. \(^{22}\) Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge to end the draft moved incrementally toward political fruition, but the extended time line for ending the draft reflected the realization that the armed services faced significant obstacles in making the change.

The next important step occurred on January 28, 1971 when Nixon asked Congress for additional reforms and eventual termination of the draft. The President reviewed reforms begun by his April 1970 message and outlined his proposals and budget for the future of the volunteer force program. The President wanted Selective Service legislation extended for two years until July 1, 1973 and pledged that "we shall make every endeavor to reduce draft calls to zero by that time, carefully and continually reexamining our position as we proceed toward that goal."\(^{23}\) After extensive debate, the

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\(^{22}\) Text of Nixon's 23 April 1970 message to Congress and Executive Order 11527 also dated 23 April 1970 are found in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents vol. 6 no. 17, (Monday, April 27, 1970): 571-575. An excerpt of this document is located in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', HRC, CMH.

\(^{23}\) The text of Nixon's 28 April 1971 message to Congress is found in Department of the Army, Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program [unpublished draft] (Washington, DC, 17 March 1971): Appendix J; in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', HRC, CMH.
92nd Congress approved and the President signed this legislation into law on September 28, 1971.²⁴

The deadline thus set the timetable for the draft's termination and provided an impetus for developing and implementing programs that would enable the armed forces to cope without a guaranteed source of conscripted manpower. Laird broadly outlined many of these initiatives and their goals in his Report to the President and the Chairmen of Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives: Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force in August 1972. Laird cited the legislation of higher pay, increased funding for recruiting activities, and improvements in the overall quality of life on military installations as the primary factors that contributed to a large reduction in the number of draftees required in fiscal year 1972. The Secretary of Defense also predicted success in eliminating the draft by the expiration date of the current draft law.²⁵ In fact, within the Department of Defense, Laird established the informal goal of ending draft calls by December 31, 1972 in order to give the services a six month 'grace period' to determine whether manpower goals could be met without the draft.²⁶

²⁴Department of Defense, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC: 1972), 6-8; Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, Chapter 3: "Legislative Debate and Decision", 93-147; and Griffith, Today's Army, 154-156.

²⁵Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, 7-9.

²⁶Department of the Army, Building A Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution (Washington, DC: 1975), 48 (Hereafter cited as the Fort Ord Contribution); and Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program, 8.
Draft calls remained low throughout fiscal year 1972 and the early months of fiscal year 1973. On January 25, 1973, the final U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam were announced and two days later, January 27, 1973, the Vietnam peace accords were signed in Paris. The final troop withdrawals eliminated the necessity for any additional draftees for the remainder of fiscal year 1973, thus allowing Laird to announce, also on January 27, 1973 - his final day in office, that "the Armed Forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. The use of the draft has ended." Three days later, Elliot L. Richardson succeeded Laird as Secretary of Defense. 27

The all-volunteer force which began as a campaign promise during the 1968 presidential election thus became a reality in January 1973. Although the Selective Service legislation remained in effect until June 30, 1973, the Pentagon issued no draft calls after December 1972. While the decision to end the draft and create an all-volunteer force was an extremely interesting story in American politics and government, it has been covered thoroughly in such scholarly works as George Q. Flynn's *The Draft* and Lee and Parkers' *Ending the Draft— The Story of the All-Volunteer Force*. What is equally important, however, was the process of self-examination and reform experienced by the U.S. Army as it worked toward becoming an all-volunteer Army. The Army, as both the largest and the most draft-dependent of the armed services, faced the most significant challenges and in many respects the development of an all-volunteer force represented nothing short of the creation of a 'new' Army. The changes required to attract and retain

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enough volunteers to maintain the Army's strength levels and meet national security requirements forced the Army to enhance its appeal to the nation's youth by improving the day-to-day life of the soldier, revamping its leadership philosophy, and developing new training practices.
Chapter II

ARMY PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The Army moved rapidly to explore the impact of the all-volunteer force upon Army policies and to investigate ways that the Army could expedite the transition. In fact, growing public dissent over increased draft calls and the expansion of the war in Vietnam pushed the Army into considering the possibility of an all-volunteer force as early as September 1967, when Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-12, *Digest of Military Personnel Policies*, stated a goal "to rely on volunteers to meet the Army's needs insofar as possible . . ." and "to induce high caliber personnel, in sufficient numbers, to voluntarily pursue the military profession as a career." In the context of the increased manpower demands created by the expansion of the war in Vietnam, these lofty personnel goals seemed well beyond the Army's reach. Furthermore, as long as the Selective Service System continued to supply a ready source of conscripted manpower, there was very little incentive for the Army to move toward these goals.

Nixon's promise and the controversy over the draft during the presidential election campaign of 1968 heightened political interest in reforming the Selective Service System and began to raise the real possibility of ending the draft entirely and implementing an all-volunteer force. In anticipation of these possibilities, the Army Chief of Staff, General

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William C. Westmoreland, appointed a Department of the Army level study group on September 3, 1968 to examine the affects that ending the draft would have on the Army and to reexamine the Army's position on this subject. Interestingly, it should be noted that this action preceded candidate Nixon's major campaign speech on the all-volunteer force by more than a month and was seven months in advance of the Gates Commission's appointment and the formation of the Defense Department's Project Volunteer Committee.29 The Army's early action reveals the critical importance of the Army's dependence on the draft as well as the necessity for careful planning and evaluation of programs oriented towards achieving an all-volunteer force.

The Personnel Studies and Research Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel conducted the study under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Butler. The group presented its report to the Chief of Staff in December 1968. The "Career Force Study" focused on four broad issues: quantity, quality, cost, and social implications. The study verified that the Army's dependency on the draft had grown during the war in Vietnam and predicted that the size of the Army would decline after the war and would stabilize at about 500,000. The study reported that quality would also drop in an all-volunteer Army, but calculated that higher pay and improved educational

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benefits could offset most of the qualitative decline. Perhaps $3 billion a year in additional expenditures would be required to fund pay increases, recruiting, and advertising. Finally, the "Career Force Study" questioned the social implications of abandoning the draft and feared that an all-volunteer force would sever the tie between the American people and their Army. Based on their analysis the study group concluded that an all-volunteer active Army of 950,000 and a reserve force of 700,000 (based on pre-Vietnam strength levels) "could be attracted and sustained with additional efforts, benefits, and incentives at an estimated annual cost in excess of $3 billion."\textsuperscript{30}

The Career Force Study of September-December 1968 was significant in three respects. First, although the senior leadership of the Army favored the draft (because it provided a guaranteed source of manpower and tied the Army directly to the people) and realized the Army's utter dependance upon conscripted manpower, the study demonstrated a willingness by the Army to consider the contingency of an all-volunteer force long before such a force was mandated. The Army recognized that the ultimate decision to end the draft would be made by the civilian leadership and the service's task would be to implement that decision. Second, the study identified many of the critical problems regarding the quantity, quality, and cost of the all-volunteer force which would confront the Army and formulated potential solutions for the transition. Finally, the study provided

\textsuperscript{30}PROVIDE II, 1-1--1-2.
the Army with a core organization for future examination of this subject which enabled the Army to act quickly once a decision was made.31

President Nixon's January 29, 1969 letter to Secretary of Defense Laird started of the Army's next phase of planning for a volunteer force.32 On February 3, 1969 General Westmoreland ordered a second Army level review to build upon the preliminary work of the Career Force Study and directed the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to "conduct an indepth study of the all-volunteer Army." Subsequently, on March 17, 1969 this study was expanded and formalized under the name PROVIDE: "Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation". The mission of the PROVIDE group was to "determine how the Army can meet its manpower requirements under alternative force levels and conditions short of total war by means of an all-volunteer Army." The Chief of Staff also instructed the PROVIDE group to act as the Army's source of information for both the Department of Defense's Project Volunteer Committee and the presidential Gates Commission.33 The PROVIDE group submitted its preliminary report in June 1969 and, after a complete review by the Army staff, the PROVIDE group briefed their report to General Westmoreland in October 1969.


32 Griffith maintains that General Westmoreland received a bootleg copy of this letter and immediately began to review the Army's position on an all-volunteer force. See Today's Army, 21; and "About Face," 124.

33 PROVIDE II, 1–2; and Chief of Staff Memorandum [hereafter cited as CSM] 69–113, 17 March 1969, Subject: Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE), in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', HRC, CMH.
One of the most alarming discoveries of the PROVIDE study was the extent to which the Army's public image had declined. The study analyzed the results of several recent surveys, conducted by both the Army and by civilian research organizations, which revealed that the Army was "third in service preference [behind the Air Force and Navy, respectively, but slightly ahead of the Marine Corps] among veterans and fourth among the general population and educators." Furthermore, fully 70 percent of Army veterans recommended others to join either the Air Force or the Navy. The study also found that older veterans were much more likely to be favorably inclined toward Army service than younger veterans. Finally, the study reported that "many junior officers and enlisted men are dissatisfied with Army life." Among the primary causes for their dissatisfaction were: low pay, which often placed military incomes (especially for young soldiers with families) below the federal poverty level, inadequate post facilities, such as housing and recreation areas that suffered from lack of maintenance; family separation and frequent moves, which were exacerbated in part by the policy of twelve month rotations to Vietnam; mismanagement of skills, which placed soldiers in duty positions other than the one they were trained for; and poor leadership, by senior leaders who seemed more concerned with advancing their own careers than seeing to the welfare of their subordinates. The study concluded that "reforms will be essential to the creation of an Army image that will attract volunteers who will remain with the Army or boost it when they leave." 34

34 PROVIDE 1, 8. For further analysis see Griffith, Today's Army, 22; and Griffith, "About Face," 125.
The PROVIDE report submitted three general recommendations to the Chief of Staff; first, to "support a peacetime all-volunteer concept in principle;" second, to support the retention of draft legislation in case of national emergency; and last, "to accomplish the transition to an all-volunteer force in three phases." Phase I included a series of inexpensive programs and policies designed to improve service attractiveness and reduce reliance on the draft without requiring legislative or budgetary approval. Examples of Phase I recommendations included: offering recruits an increased choice of enlistment options; reducing the military work week to five days; expanding the role of women in the Army; and stabilizing personnel assignments so that soldiers moved less often and remained in duties for which they were trained and suited. Phase II involved programs and policies outside of existing budgetary and/or legislative constraints that were deemed critical for the rapid advancement of the all-volunteer force. Examples of Phase II recommendations included: substantially increasing the recruiting budget; doubling the size of the Women's Army Corps (WAC); improving family medical and dental care; and hiring civilians to replace soldiers for Kitchen Police (KP) duty. Phase III comprised longer range programs and also called for a reexamination of deferred actions from Phases I and II. In addition to prioritizing deferred actions, Phase III recommendations included: adjusting the pay of medical officers to approach civilian levels; increasing the use of host nation civilians to support U.S. units in overseas areas; and improving educational and retirement benefits for the reserves. All together, the study listed over 60 specific actions for the Chief of Staff's consideration ranging from relatively easy steps with immediate potential, such as eliminating service irritants, to major policy decisions with long term
implications, like increasing the size of the Women's Army Corps, and using more civilian host nation support.35

The critical importance of the PROVIDE studies cannot be over-emphasized in analyzing the Army's transition to an all-volunteer force. Historian Robert K. Griffith observed that although just a year passed between the creation of the Career Force Study group and Westmoreland's consideration of the final Project PROVIDE report, "much occurred that indirectly linked PROVIDE to broader trends affecting the Army."

Furthermore, "as they reviewed the findings of the PROVIDE study and reports of growing undiscipline, drug abuse, racial incidents, and malfeasance, Westmoreland and his colleagues became increasingly convinced that the professional fabric of the institution was unravelling."36

The PROVIDE report came at a crisis point in the history of the Vietnam-era Army. With widespread drug abuse, increasing racial incidents, rising AWOL (Absent Without Leave) and desertion rates, and reported incidents of 'fragging' in Vietnam starting to rise sharply in 1968 it seemed that discipline was breaking down. Initially, the Army's senior leadership claimed that these problems were imported from American society at large, but gradually it became apparent that internal Army programs and policies were partly responsible. The rapid expansion of the Army's combat role in Vietnam and


the subsequent dramatic increase of draft calls made the Army the focus of much of the domestic anti-war rhetoric. Revelations of corruption and fraud in the management of the military club system implicated two general officers and the Sergeant Major of the Army, the Army's highest ranking enlisted soldier, and further undermined the image and self-confidence of the Army. Finally, charges of battlefield misconduct and a subsequent coverup surrounding the murder of Vietnamese civilians near the village of My Lai by American soldiers rocked the nation and the Army in 1969. The senior leaders of the Army did not necessarily embrace the idea of an all-volunteer force, but they began to associate reduced reliance on the draft in a smaller, post-Vietnam Army with a return to high standards of military professionalism and a revitalized institution.37

The Project PROVIDE reports became the Army's intellectual foundation for the transition to an all-volunteer force. Additionally, the Project PROVIDE group significantly influenced the Defense Department's Project Volunteer Committee whose chairman observed that "the Army's submission was the best of the Service studies" which "anticipated subsequent plans and programs with unusual accuracy."38 On November 3, 1969, Westmoreland transformed the PROVIDE Study Group into a permanent organization and redesignated it as "Task Group PROVIDE," with the mission of "planning, coordination, and phased implementation of the study group's


38Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 53.
recommendations." Griffith observed that "No completion date was given. Indeed, the President's Commission on an All-volunteer Armed Force had not yet rendered its report." The Army's senior leaders realized that the draft was ultimately doomed and, at the same time, they witnessed the overall decline of the Army. Therefore, they embarked on a program to prepare the Army to become an all-volunteer force while also improving the quality of the Army.

The Project PROVIDE Task Group functioned as the Army Staff's primary planning and coordination agency for the all-volunteer force throughout the remainder of 1969 and early 1970. In May 1970, following President Nixon's April 1970 message to Congress, which committed his administration to achieving an all-volunteer force, the Task Group was redesignated as the All-Volunteer Task Group and directed to "concentrate on activities appropriate to the enhancement of the all-volunteer Army concept." On August 12, 1970, Westmoreland abolished the All-Volunteer Task Group and replaced it with the All-Volunteer Army Division within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in order "to affirm the high priority of actions to reduce reliance on the draft." Throughout this period, the Army progressively increased the

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39 Griffith, Today's Army, 26; and CSM 69-473, 3 November 1969, Subject: Task Group Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE), file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', HRC, CMH.

40 Griffith, Today's Army, 26; and The Benning Experiment, 7.

41 Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971, (Washington, DC: 1971), 160-162. HRC, CMH.

42 CSM 70-289, 12 August 1970, Subject: All-Volunteer Army Division, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.
level of authority and visibility it invested in its efforts to move toward an all-volunteer force to reflect the growing commitment of the President and the Department of Defense to achieving such a force.

On October 12, 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird increased the Defense Department's commitment to ending the draft by establishing the goal of zero draft calls by July 1, 1973. Laird based this goal on the assumption that Congress would renew the current draft legislation for two years past its expiration on July 1, 1971 and that there would be time enough in the interim to implement programs to end reliance on the draft.43 The following day, October 13, 1970, Westmoreland delivered a speech to the Association of the United States Army and declared that "today the Army is committed to an all-out effort in working toward a zero draft -- a volunteer force." The Chief of Staff then outlined four areas which required special emphasis for a successful transition to an all-volunteer force: first, the support of commanders at all levels of the Army; second, the elimination of unnecessary irritants and unattractive features of Army life; third, the continued support of the Congress to provide sufficient funds to finance all-volunteer programs; and finally, the commitment of the American people to support the all-volunteer program and the costs associated with implementing the policy. Westmoreland vowed to "leave no stone unturned" and declared that "we are willing to part from past practices

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43Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 12 October 1970, Subject: Zero Draft Calls by July 1, 1973, in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.
where such practices no longer serve a productive and useful end . . . nothing is considered sacrosanct except where military order and discipline . . . are jeopardized." 

Westmoreland then demonstrated his commitment by appointing Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe as the Chief of Staff's Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA). Forsythe was first to establish conditions that improved the Army's effectiveness while reducing reliance on the draft and then to raise the quantity and quality of voluntary enlistments and reenlistments. He was also to increase service attractiveness for both enlisted soldiers and officers, and make provisions for a standby draft. The Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army assumed the responsibility for Army-wide implementation of volunteer programs, previously delegated to the All-Volunteer Army Division, and in recognition of the program's urgency and importance, Forsythe reported directly to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. 

The Office of the SAMVA provided centralized management of the Army's Modern Volunteer Army Program until June 30, 1972 when the program was once again placed under the auspices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The SAMVA staff

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"The text of Westmoreland's AUSA speech is found in Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program, Annex I. For further discussion of this speech see The Benning Experiment, 7-8.

"The appointment and charter of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army are found in Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program, Annex H and 8-10; and Department of the Army, Center of Military History, Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington, DC: 1973), 33-35. (Hereafter referred to as DAHSM, Fiscal Year 1971.) Also refer to James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 131-143; for a discussion of LTG Forsythe and CPT (now General) Barry McCaffreys' work in the SAMVA office."
played a critical role in the development and implementation of programs and policies that enabled the Army to become an all-volunteer force and, concurrently, fundamentally changed the Army. On June 30, 1973, the final day of the draft, the Army ended the centralized management of the Modern Volunteer Army and simultaneously discontinued the use of the term 'Modern Volunteer Army'.

The Army's plans and programs for implementing the all-volunteer force began in earnest in September 1968 and pre-dated both the Gates Commission and the Defense Department's Project Volunteer Committee. The Army's dependence upon the draft imparted a sense of urgency to its efforts and forced the Army to perform a critical self-evaluation of its condition and future. Westmoreland summarized this observation in his final Report as Chief of Staff, "the effort to create a Modern Volunteer Army led to the reevaluation of virtually every existing policy, procedure, and priority. Spurred on by the volunteer concept, innovators took many steps toward improving an Army that many thought to be mired in the status quo." Clearly, as Westmoreland and the Army's senior leaders realized, unless the Army made significant changes, it would never attract and retain enough men and women to survive the end of the draft.

"DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1973, 61.

"Report of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 82."
Chapter III

CHANGES IN THE ARMY'S DAY-TO-DAY LIFE

The largest, most immediate task the Army faced in its quest to reduce its reliance on the draft was to attract and retain 150,000 - 200,000 new volunteers, annually, to fill its ranks. In order to accomplish this task the Army had to make itself appealing and at the same time had to improve its public image. This meant first and foremost recruiting new volunteers and changing to make service life more attractive --in business terms, increasing 'sales' while also improving the 'product'. The Army translated this metaphor by expanding its recruiting program (sales) and taking major steps towards making Army life (the product) more enticing to soldiers and perspective soldiers (the customers).  

In the fall of 1970, Westmoreland approved the implementation of forty-two of the proposals submitted by the Project PROVIDE study and its successor organizations to strengthen the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). First, recruiter's assignments were extended to 36 months in order maintain the recruiting force at full strength and to capitalize on the experience and expertise of veteran recruiters. Second, the Recruiting Command was beefed up with over 125 additional administrative positions.

"In fact, Griffith credits Assistant Secretary of the Army William K. Brehm with formulating this analogy in July 1969. See: Griffith, Today's Army, 32.

"The Benning Experiment, 7."
allowing recruiters to devote their full attention to enlisting new volunteers.\textsuperscript{50} In 1970, about 3,000 recruiters staffed some 950 offices scattered throughout the United States, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.\textsuperscript{51} In 1971 and 1972 USAREC added 3,047 recruiters and administrative assistants, opened 537 new recruiting stations, and expanded 548 others.\textsuperscript{52} A 'Recruiter Assistant Program', which returned exemplary recent basic training graduates back to their hometown to appeal to their friends and contemporaries on the Army's behalf, began. This program (later known as the Hometown Recruiter Program) succeeded so well that by 1972 the Army was returning almost 100 soldiers a week back to their hometown for four weeks of temporary recruiting duty.\textsuperscript{53} Additionally, divisions and brigades organized their own teams of canvassers to help attract volunteers where the units were stationed.\textsuperscript{54}

The Army's revitalized recruiting program also featured new enlistment options and incentive packages, particularly to make enlisting in the combat arms branches of Infantry, Artillery, and Armor more enticing. The 'Unit of Choice'/'Assignment of Choice' options allowed volunteers to enlist for a guaranteed duty assignment with a specific unit.

\textsuperscript{50}Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Memorandum, 12 October 1970, Subject: Improvements in the Army's Recruiting Posture, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army', CMH, HRC.

\textsuperscript{51}Griffith, Today's Army, 109.

\textsuperscript{52}DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 52-58 and 75-78.

\textsuperscript{53}Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 170; and Griffith, Today's Army, 119.

or geographical region. By 1972, these programs included virtually every unit in the Army and qualified applicants could select from over 300 different assignments. Even these efforts, however, failed to attract enough volunteers into the demanding, and more dangerous, combat arms branches. Therefore, in June of 1972 the Army began to offer a $1,500 enlistment bonus to volunteers who agreed to sign up for four years in the combat arms rather than the standard term of three years. This bonus was raised to $2,500 in May 1973 for combat arms and other critical skills, but was limited to high school graduates who scored in the highest mental categories on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (Categories I and II). The combination of enlistment options and bonus payments for critical skills allowed the Army to meet all of its enlistment objectives for fiscal year 1974 (July 1, 1973 - June 30, 1974).

Finally, the Army undertook an intense advertising campaign aimed at improving the Army's public image. Previously, the armed services relied solely upon free public service announcements as their only source of radio and TV advertising. In January 1971, the Army devoted $10.6 million to an experimental advertising and recruiting campaign using paid radio and television commercials. The theme of the campaign, developed and supervised by the N. W. Ayer advertising agency, was 'Today's Army Wants To Join You;' starting in March 1971, twenty-two different commercials aired on 581 television stations and over 2,200 radio stations throughout the country. The advertising campaign

55DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 76; and Griffith, Today's Army, 119.
56DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 57; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1973, 65.
57DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1974, 1 and 51; and Griffith Today's Army, 233-237.
inspired increased recruiting and higher levels of favorable public opinion. Important members of Congress and excluded members of the electronic media, however, opposed the experiment in paid advertising because they objected to the Army's selection of stations within major markets and favored the use of free public service announcements. Therefore, the paid TV and radio advertising campaign ended after its test period expired in July 1971. In fact, paid radio and television advertising for the armed services did not resume until the very end of the decade.\textsuperscript{58}

The Army, however, realized the essential role of continued advertising to its recruiting efforts and public image campaign and redoubled its efforts in print media, billboards, public service messages, direct mailings, and news releases. Advertising budgets rose successively from $3.1 million in fiscal year 1970 to $18.6 million in 1971; $22.9 million in 1972; $26.7 million in 1973; and $38.2 million in 1974.\textsuperscript{59} In mid-1973 the Army abandoned the advertising motto of 'Today's Army Wants To Join You,' which had never been a favorite of most career service members because it connotated 'permissiveness' -- the image of the Army as overly compassionate, indulgent, and undisciplined as opposed to tough and demanding. Instead, the Army created the 'Today's


\textsuperscript{59}DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 76; DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1973, 62; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1974, 52.
Army' theme, which highlighted the wide range of challenges and opportunities available to individual recruits.60

Dramatic increases in pay and allowances also made the Army more appealing. The Military Pay Act of 1971 increased military pay by an average of 40 percent and more than doubled the base pay of first term enlisted personnel (from $149 to $321 per month between November 1971 and January 1972). Significantly, higher military pay on a comparable level with civilian earnings was one of the few points that the PROVIDE study, the Defense Department's Project Volunteer Committee, and the Gates Commission all agreed upon.61

The second element of the Army's drive to attract and keep volunteers was to remove unnecessary irritants and improve the conditions of Army life overall. Once again the ideas and proposals of the PROVIDE study group permitted the Army to move quickly following Secretary Laird's October 1970 announcement that the draft would end. On November 2, 1970, General Forsythe, the newly appointed Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, announced a field test to raise recruitment and retention by improving the professionalism, life style, and quality of life at selected installations during the remainder of fiscal year 1971 and throughout fiscal year 1972.62 Forsythe selected

60For a typical reaction by senior Army leaders to the 'Today's Army Wants To Join You' theme see Griffith, Today's Army, 136, citing General Bruce Palmer, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, for remembering "God, I just wanted to vomit." For the Army's rational in modifying the advertising theme see The All-Volunteer Army One Year Later, V-4.

61Report of the Chief of Staff, 83-84; Griffith, Today's Army, 143; and Report on Progress In Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, 8-9.

62Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program, B-1.
three posts as a cross section of the Army's diverse activities as the initial sites for the Volunteer Army Project (VOLAR): Fort Benning, GA, the home of the U. S. Army Infantry School; Fort Ord, CA, the site of a major Army Training Center; and Fort Carson, CO, the home of a mechanized infantry division. Forsythe emphasized the urgency which the Army placed on this field experiment and gave the post commanders short notice to prepare their plans. Because the Department of Defense's programmed funds for all-volunteer force initiatives would not be available until the beginning of fiscal year 1972 (July 1, 1971) and the Army believed it was critical to begin the VOLAR tests immediately, more than $22 million was diverted from other activities to begin the testing and evaluation immediately.⁶³

In the interim between Forsythe's announcement and the beginning of Project VOLAR, Westmoreland announced a series of 'High Impact Actions Toward Achieving A Modern Volunteer Army' designed to immediately reduce unnecessary irritants and improve the soldier's daily life. These ideas came mostly from the PROVIDE reports. Westmoreland promised to end morning reveille formations, liberalize pass policies (including the elimination of signing in and out of the barracks and nightly bed checks), and to allow 3.2 beer in barracks and mess halls. He ordered the Army Staff to revise inspection policies, update and simplify Army Regulations, and review and eliminate all mandatory training requirements which were nonessential or repetitive. "It is a time for bold moves, not cautious advances," Westmoreland told the Army's senior commanders in

⁶³The Fort Ord Contribution, 52; Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 154-157; and Griffith, Today’s Army, 81-91.
announcing the changes at the November 30, 1970 Army Commanders' Conference.

Achieving the Modern Volunteer Army was "perhaps the toughest objective the Army has faced short of the challenge of the battlefield." Indeed, one senior general declared that "the priority placed on actions to move toward a zero-draft is to be considered no less than on a par with support of our mission in Vietnam".65

"Project VOLAR" began on January 1, 1971. Each post had maximum independence and could consider almost anything to improve their soldiers' lot. Those new initiatives that succeeded during fiscal years 1971 and 1972 could be implemented Army-wide in fiscal year 1973. Forsythe and his staff oversaw and coordinated the posts' activities to facilitate sharing information and ideas among the VOLAR posts and the Army staff. The SAMVA then consolidated the separate posts' recommended policy changes at the Department of the Army level for final approval.66

The results were interesting and imaginative. Many of the innovations seemed elementary, but nonetheless proved effective. One eliminated the requirement to wear uniform hats in automobiles; another modified haircut regulations to permit more individual choice; and a third increased the recreational options available to soldiers on post. Commercially bottled soft drinks and 'short order' menus appeared in unit dining facilities and soldiers could eat at hours more to their own choosing on the weekends.

"The text of General Westmoreland's address to the Army Commanders' Conference, 30 November 1970, is found in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH. For additional analysis see Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 152-153; and Griffith, Today's Army, 69-74.

"Walton, Tarnished Shield, 185.

"The Benning Experiment, 10-27; The Fort Ord Contribution, 50-52; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1971, 33-34.
Post services and facilities expanded in order to give the soldier and his family greater access to existing military benefits. Exchanges and Commissaries opened earlier and stayed open longer to better serve their military clientele. Medical and dental care facilities were improved and opened to dependents by appointment rather than on a 'first come, first serve' basis, thus eliminating the annoyance of long waits. New commercial bus services assisted travel to and from distant parts of military installations and to common destinations in the local civilian communities, such as airports, shopping centers, and bus depots.

Project VOLAR also introduced a number of big changes that required more money. Shortening the duty week to five days and abandoning Saturday morning inspections gave the soldiers more free time for on-post recreational activities or expanded pass privileges off base. Only field exercises and essential duties, such as guard, required weekend duty, and compensatory time was granted for weekend training. Civilian labor in the dining facilities --something truly revolutionary-- eliminated the hated task of 'kitchen police' (KP). Civilian employees also assumed responsibility for many of the day-to-day installation maintenance tasks like grass cutting, 'post police' (litter collection), and general custodial services.

Even more revolutionary, VOLAR led to a massive barracks renovation program to replace open bay style barracks with partitioned rooms similar to contemporary college dormitories. The Army purchased new beds and other items to furnish these remodeled barracks. Along with the increased privacy came greater personal freedom in furnishing and decorating the rooms. An increase in construction and renovation of on-post housing
paralleled this barracks improvement program. The entire effort was geared towards the junior enlisted ranks where the Army most needed to improve its image and its quality of life.\textsuperscript{67}

During 1971 and 1972, Project VOLAR expanded to include thirteen installations within the continental United States and three overseas locations and on June 30, 1972, as scheduled, the successful programs were implemented Army-wide. The cumulative effect changed the daily life of the soldier from the time he awoke in the morning (no more reveille), to the type of food he ate, to the privacy and freedom he enjoyed (barracks improvements and the five day work week). Even after Project VOLAR ended, the Army continued to push improving the quality and attractiveness of military life in other equally significant ways.

The media, both military and civilian publications, portrayed the changes in a mostly positive light which undoubtedly contributed to improving the Army's public image.\textsuperscript{68} Opinion surveys revealed that public confidence in the military rose from a low of twenty-seven percent in 1971 to forty percent during 1973 and 1974. In fact, by 1973, the military trailed only medicine and education as the most respected public institutions.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67}The Benning Experiment, 32-78; and The Fort Ord Contribution, 48-92.


Others opposed the new policies and several articles criticized the Army's efforts.\textsuperscript{70} These authors, some of them career soldiers, blamed the Modern Volunteer Army program for a more permissive Army. The large pay raises for first term soldiers reinforced this attitude by reducing the earning differential between recruits and career soldiers.\textsuperscript{71} Nonetheless, the Army leadership pressed forward, because as Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway observed, "We are not looking for alternatives to the volunteer Army; indeed, there is no alternative, except failure -- and the Army does not intend to fail."\textsuperscript{72}

Along with the changes to everyday life, the very demographic character of the Army also changed, to make the institution different from the mixed draftee/volunteer force of earlier years. First, the Army was smaller. From a peak of over one and a half million soldiers during 1968 and 1969, the Army numbered less than 784,000 by 1975, almost 200,000 smaller than the Army before the Vietnam expansion. In fact, the new volunteer force was smaller by several thousand soldiers than the Army had been at any time since 1940.\textsuperscript{73}


\textsuperscript{72}The Volunteer Army One Year Later, V-1.

\textsuperscript{73}For Army strength levels see Appendix B Size of the Army, 1960-1985; for a complete review of Army strength levels see Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, 1988 (Washington, DC: May 1989), 62-69.
Two programs reduced volunteer manpower needs. First, many logistical and administrative duties were performed by civilians, as many as 10,000 in such areas as food service and installation maintenance alone. The second program dramatically increased the number of enlisted Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) and officer positions available to women and swelled the number of female soldiers. Although the number of women in the Army had increased steadily since the early 1960s, the all-volunteer policy caused a three-fold increase in their number between 1972 and 1976, a change even more significant proportionately when considered against the reduction in the size of the Army overall. 74

A series of legal decisions and government actions also expanded women's role in the Army. In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that women with dependents (either spouses or children) were entitled to the same benefits and allowances as male service members. The Court followed this ruling with a 1975 decision that modified the armed services' enlistment requirements for women and made them more equitable with male standards. Also in 1975, the Army allowed pregnant soldiers to remain in the service and authorized maternity leave. Now, over ninety percent of the duty assignments were opened to women, including flight training, excluding only direct combatant positions. Women joined Army ROTC for the first time in 1972, and in 1976, the number of ROTC

74The Army's plans for 'civilianization' and the increased role of women appear in The All-Volunteer Army One Year Later, V-3. For specific annual strength levels of women in the Army see Appendix C, Women in the Army, 1960-1985.
scholarships available to women jumped, and in that year the first women entered both the Officer Candidate School and the United States Military Academy.\textsuperscript{75}

The racial mix of the Army also changed during this period and this fact, too, helped the Army to meet its personnel requirements. The percentage of blacks rose during the 1960s, but black participation in the all-volunteer force nearly doubled the pre-Vietnam levels of 1964-1965. Although the percentage of black officers remained much lower than the percentage of black enlisted soldiers, the relative rate of growth for officers matched that of the enlisted force. The Gates Commission forecast an increase in the percentage of black soldiers, but by 1976 the Army exceeded those modest predictions.\textsuperscript{76}

A number of analysts examined the causes and implications of black participation in numbers above their percentage, about thirteen percent, of the population at large. Economist Richard V. L. Cooper believed the increase was unrelated to the all-volunteer force, but was more a function of improved educational opportunities for blacks and a subsequent increase in the number of blacks in the highest mental qualification categories. Cooper also noted that the level of unemployment for black youths tended to range about ten percent above that of whites and in 1974 was 18 percent greater.\textsuperscript{77} Martin Binkin agreed and emphasized the economic stability and social opportunities that the military

\textsuperscript{75}DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1973, 34; DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1975, 47-48 and 132; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1976, 20-22.

\textsuperscript{76}President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, Report of the Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, 143-148. For annual percentages of black participation in the Army see Appendix D, Blacks in the Army, 1964-1983.

\textsuperscript{77}Cooper, "The All-Volunteer Force: Five Years Later," 107-110.
afforded black enlistees. Sociologists Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos reflected these same findings and stressed that a higher percentage of black volunteers entered the Army with a high school diploma and higher scores on qualification tests than their white counterparts.

The overall quality of the enlisted force was difficult to judge or quantify. Mental aptitude and educational achievement offered empirical data to evaluate people's suitability to contribute to a more productive, capable, and better motivated force. The two most accepted measures of individual abilities were performance on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and the attainment of a high school diploma. The AFQT was a standardized test to measure mental aptitude which ranked individuals into mental 'Categories.' Categories I and II indicated above average ability, Category III was average, Category IV was below average, and Category V was below average and unacceptable for enlistment.

During the early years of the all-volunteer force recruit performance on the AFQT compared favorably with both pre-Vietnam and Vietnam era scores. There was a slight reduction in the percentage of volunteers scoring in the two highest categories, but this reduction was offset by an increase in the number of volunteers with average (Category III) scores. The percentage of volunteers scoring in the lowest acceptable category, Category IV, remained approximately equal to the draft era.

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The percentage of volunteers with college degrees or some college experience decreased significantly from the draft era. More important, however, was the dramatic decline in the percentage of volunteers who attained a high school diploma. Just slightly more than half of the volunteers (55 percent) were high school graduates. In 1964, 70 percent of the draftees boasted high school diplomas and as late as 1972 at least 60 percent of the new recruits were high school graduates. These two measurements portrayed a volunteer cohort of comparable mental abilities, but lower educational achievements.80

To the Army, the ability to complete high school successfully demonstrated a level of personal commitment, discipline, and ability on the part of the individual to achieve an external goal. The Army statistically correlated a high school diploma with completing an enlistment. In fact, high school graduates were almost twice as likely to successfully complete their tour of duty as non-graduates.81 Therefore, the decrease in the percentage of high school graduates among volunteers partially explained the increased attrition rate of first term enlistees during the early years of the all-volunteer Army—nearly 40 percent by 1976.82

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80See Appendix E, Aptitude and Education of Army Recruits, 1960-1983.


Two other factors also contributed to the steep increase in first term attrition rates. First, in September 1973, the Army began a 'Trainee Discharge Program' designed to expel individuals who demonstrated a lack of motivation, discipline or aptitude for Army life. This program allowed commanders to throw individuals out of the Army with an honorable discharge within the first six months of their enlistment. The Army also expanded the 'Expeditious Discharge Program' which authorized commanders to get rid of lazy, troublesome, or substandard soldiers considered unsuitable for further service without convening a board of officers. This program applied to soldiers with between six and 36 months of service. Both of these programs empowered commanders to maintain the caliber of the enlisted force with a degree of authority not permitted under draft conditions. The all-volunteer Army was no longer obliged to keep soldiers who failed to perform their duties satisfactorily. The Army demonstrated its confidence in maintaining a high quality volunteer enlisted force by offering an early release to any remaining draftees and on November 22, 1974 the Army became an exclusively volunteer force. At that time, all service members were either volunteers or draftees who had voluntarily reenlisted to extend their service.

Increasing the reenlistment rates was another important goal of the Army's plan for the all-volunteer force. More reenlistments meant decreased demand for new volunteers and less need for new training, while at the same time increasing the efficiency of the

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force. The Army kept its experienced people, and saved on training, which would offset
the reduced size of the force. The reenlistment rates for the early years of the all-
volunteer Army revealed several general trends. Reenlistment rates among first term
soldiers for 1973-1975 averaged over 30 percent, significantly higher than the 1965 rate
(25.7 percent) and triple the 1972 rate of 10.2 percent. The Army expected this trend to
support a volunteer force with greater longevity. The reenlistment rate for career soldiers
also rose between 1973 and 1975 — not to the 1965 level, but comparable to the Vietnam
era percentages. The career force represented the backbone of the Army's non-
commissioned officers corps and the ability to retain these individuals was a critical
measure of the all-volunteer Army's success.85

The transition to an all-volunteer force affected almost every aspect of Army life.
From the volunteer's first contact with a recruiter to a permanent assignment and the daily
routine in their units and their decision to reenlist, the all-volunteer Army was decidedly
different from the force of a just few years earlier. The original work of the Project
PROVIDE study group supplied the conceptual basis for the all-volunteer Army and many
of the innovations and initiatives traced their genesis back to the 1969 PROVIDE reports.
The Modern Volunteer Army program, particularly Project VOLAR, showed the Army's
commitment to achieving the all-volunteer force and attracted the attention of both service
members and the public to the new departures that the Army embarked upon. One Army

Colonel observed that "the Army's reaction to this problem [the need to attract and retain true volunteers] has been remarkable for an institution popularly regarded as dominating rather than accommodating its younger members."86

86Hauser, America's Army in Crisis, 158.
Chapter IV

PROFESSIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP

While the Army labored in every way possible to attract and keep soldiers, it also confronted an internal crisis which threatened the bedrock values of the institution. The PROVIDE report identified poor leadership as one of the Army's major problems and recommended improving leadership programs by adopting an overall more humanistic approach. Furthermore, many officers appeared to place their personal career ambitions ahead of their professional responsibilities, thus creating an atmosphere of self-serving 'careerism' within the Army. Allegations of misconduct and corruption combined with dramatically increased instances of indiscipline (drug use, violent crimes, racial incidents, and rising AWOL and desertion rates) further eroded the Army's self-confidence as well as the public's image of the military. Finally, several major scandals and incidents within the Army, particularly the renewed investigation into the murder of Vietnamese civilians near the village of My Lai on March 16, 1968 and accusations of a subsequent cover-up, seemed to corroborate the PROVIDE findings. One Army officer summarized the existing situation by observing that "the officer corps of the Army was deeply troubled, not only by

"PROVIDE II, Chapter 2, "Image of the Army," passim."
the bad image created by all of these events, but also by a sense that something was
fundamentally amiss."

In April 1969, under intense national pressure the Army appointed Lieutenant
cited a serious decline in the moral, ethical, and professional climate of the officer corps as
one of the major causes of the tragedy. Officers throughout the Army felt pressured to
achieve the statistical goals established for them by higher commands and hesitated to
forward anything but positive reports to their superiors. As a result, Westmoreland asked
the Army War College to study the professional climate of the officer corps. The Army
War College report, titled Study on Military Professionalism, concluded that "officers of
all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or
operative values of the Officer Corps." Furthermore, "the present situation is not self-
correcting, and because of the nature and extent of the problem, changes must be credibly
instituted and enforced by the Army's top leadership." Consequently, correcting the
Army's leadership problems became another critical element in improving the Army's
image and its behavior as it changed into an all-volunteer force.

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88Hauser, America's Army in Crisis, 176.

89The link between LTG Peers' investigation into the events
surrounding the My Lai incident and the subsequent Army War College
Study on Military Professionalism was reported in Loory, Defeated:
Inside America's Military Machine, 27-30 and 90-91; and Hauser,
America's Army in Crisis, 163-169.

90U. S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism
(Carilisle Barracks, PA: 30 June 1973), iii.

91Ibid., 32.
Even before the War College officially released the *Study on Military Professionalism*, Westmoreland ordered Army commanders throughout the world to reexamine "our approach to our mission and to our people, to our regulations and procedures, and to our attitudes across the board." In his November 1970 speech to the Army Commanders' Conference, he alluded to the War College study and acknowledged that "without question, the integrity of the Officer Corps has declined." Westmoreland then named the prerequisites for successful leaders: a leader "must be able, he must be humane, he must be outgoing, and he must be adaptable. He should rely less on authoritarianism, seeking instead to engage the imagination and enthusiasm of the men in support of the unit's efforts." The Army needed to fix this problem not only to attract and keep volunteers, but also to preserve itself as a viable professional military force.

Fort Benning, GA, home of the Infantry School which trained non-commissioned officers (NCOs), officer candidates, and company grade officers of the Army's largest branch, had included as one of its first 'no-cost actions' in Project VOLAR a new course on enlightened leadership techniques and contemporary leadership problems. All officers and NCOs permanently assigned to Fort Benning received this instruction and the course was quickly incorporated into the school's leadership curriculum. The seven hour period of instruction did not present new material, but reviewed the Army's eleven inviolable

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92CSM, 5 May 1970, Subject: Leadership, Management, and Morale: Putting First Things First, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.

93Text of General Westmoreland's speech to the Army Commanders' Conference, 30 November 1970, is in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.

94*The Benning Experiment*, 27.
'Principles of Leadership' and re-emphasized their importance and applicability in the Modern Volunteer Army program. Additionally, the Infantry School also expanded its curriculum to include instruction on race relations, drug abuse, and AWOL prevention. Fort Benning shared these programs with the other VOLAR installations and these posts duplicated the program of revised leadership instruction.

In April 1971, the Chief of Staff directed the Continental Army Command to establish a 'Leadership Board' to review the Army's leadership programs, develop a standard leadership seminar, and prepare an outline for improving leadership instruction throughout the Army. The Leadership Board sent eight 3-man teams to visit Army units throughout the world and worked closely with the Infantry School to develop an eight hour seminar, entitled "Enlightened Leadership" (later renamed "Leadership for Professionals"). The seminar materials replicated the leadership instruction being presented at Fort Benning and briefing teams presented the "Leadership for Professionals" seminar to leaders Army-wide. The Leadership Board highlighted the importance and relevance of incorporating the principles and techniques of the behavioral sciences into the

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95These 'Principles of Leadership' were developed in a 1948 leadership study and became part of the Army's leadership doctrine in 1951. These tenets remain a part of the Army's current leadership manual; see FM 22-100, Military Leadership, July 1990, 5-8. The principles are: Know yourself and seek self-improvement; Be technically and tactically proficient; Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions; Make sound and timely decisions; Set the example; Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being; Keep your subordinates informed; Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates; Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished; Build the team; and Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.

96The Benning Experiment, 37.

97Ibid., 59-62.

98Ibid., 59 and 65; and The Fort Ord Contribution, 98 and 108-109.
Army's leadership instruction. In conjunction with the Leadership Board's findings, Westmoreland also asked the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army to form a study group "to investigate the possibilities of a greater use of behavioral science to improve organizational effectiveness."

Resistance to some of these innovations compounded the problem. Some career officers and NCOs felt the Modern Volunteer Army program was permissive and overly concerned with life-style issues rather than substantive improvements in the Army. Accordingly, the SAMVA staff refocused their efforts to emphasize increased professionalism and reflected this new approach in the revamped "Master Program" for the Modern Volunteer Army published in August 1971.

Indeed, in some respects the quest for increased 'professionalism' almost overshadowed the drive to achieve the all-volunteer force. In a cover letter to The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program For Professionals, Westmoreland wrote that "it is called the Modern Volunteer Army Program, but as professional men and leaders of the American soldier, we would want to pursue each of these objectives regardless of our commitment to the goal of reducing reliance upon the draft." The reforms and changes directed towards 'professionalism' were intrinsically related to the creation of the all-


100Report of the Chief of Staff, 111.

101The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program For Professionals, cover letter.
volunteer force, but their repackaging made them more palatable to career service members. As historian Robert K. Griffith explained, "When the focus of the Modern Volunteer Army Program and its field experiment [Project VOLAR] changed to emphasize professionalism, latent opposition declined; nobody could be opposed to professionalism, which was the Army's equivalent of motherhood."\textsuperscript{102}

The contents of \textit{The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program For Professionals} outlined the Army's new approach to leadership; "The effort to build a better, more challenging and rewarding Army hinges ultimately upon the quality of Army leadership."\textsuperscript{103} The 'Leadership for Professionals' program reflected the findings of the Army War College's \textit{Study on Professionalism} and the Leadership Board as well as the Project VOLAR field experiments at Fort Benning. Command assignments stabilized, keeping officers in command positions for twenty-four to thirty-six months rather than the 'revolving door' policy of six to twelve months, which had allowed officers to progress rapidly while units suffered from constant turnover. Modified personnel management procedures placed soldiers in duty positions appropriate to their training and experience, standardized promotion criteria throughout the Army, and centralized the selection of battalion and brigade commanders. Improved and updated leadership instruction, modeled on the 'Enlightened Leadership' course, entered the curriculum of Army service schools for Officers and NCOs. Finally, a NCO professional education system, which mirrored the career-long officer program, was developed to ensure that sergeants received

\textsuperscript{102}Griffith, \textit{Today's Army}, 106.

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program for Professionals}, 24.
periodic formal instruction in such important areas as training, doctrine, human behavior, and leadership. The publication of *The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program For Professionals* gave the entire Army a clear statement of the rationale and goals of the Modern Volunteer Army program and emphasized increasing the professionalism of the force.

The revision of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army's charter in January 1972 also demonstrated the Army's shift toward the professionalism aspects of the Modern Volunteer Army program. The new charter specifically directed the SAMVA to "increase emphasis on considerations of military professionalism which will enhance the Army's effectiveness." The SAMVA's mandate was clear and for the remainder of his tenure Forsythe and his staff concentrated on professionalism measures which at the same time transformed the Army into an all-volunteer force. A second change in the SAMVA charter directed that "the SAMVA should continue to phase out of activities whenever he is confident that desirable new initiatives are fully set as lasting Army practices", thus foreshadowing the eventual termination of the SAMVA's office on June 30, 1972.

The Modern Volunteer Army's 'Leadership for Professionals' program generated significant changes in the Army's leadership philosophy and its approach to leadership training. Many Army units and installations organized "Enlisted Soldiers' Councils" and in some cases "Junior Officers' Councils" to increase communication up and down the formal

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105 The SAMVA Charter, 3 January 1972, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army, HRC, CMH. Also of related interest to this subject is CSM, 15 January 1972, Subject: Guidance for the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.
chain-of-command. These councils originated at VOLAR posts, most notably Fort Carson, but soon spread throughout the Army. The councils gave junior service members a chance to air their concerns and voice their ideas while also providing leaders with the opportunity to respond directly to their subordinates. These councils marked a radical departure away from traditional authoritarian leadership practices towards a more participative leadership style.\textsuperscript{106} The Army's efforts to attract and retain volunteers encouraged leaders to develop genuine concern and interest in the opinions and ideas of their subordinates, while also demonstrating that soldiers were no longer ignored or taken for granted.

The Army also instituted a series of 'Human Resource' programs aimed at improving the social environment within the Army. During the late 1960s, the Army began experiencing frequent instances of racial conflict.\textsuperscript{107} The Army's 'Race Relations and Equal Opportunity Program' was designed to promote positive communications and to foster racial harmony. The Army incorporated 'Race Relations' training, developed at Fort Benning under Project VOLAR, into the curriculum of all its service schools in 1971. Localized 'Race Relations Councils' functioned similarly to 'Enlisted Soldiers Councils' by providing an open format for discussion and another means of communication between the


\textsuperscript{107}For specific examples of major racial incidents within the Army, see: Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine, 145-167; and Walton, The Tarnished Shield: A Report on Today's Military, 61-68.
soldiers and their leaders. The Army required units to conduct continuing race relations education and ordered units to send their own instructors to the Defense Race Relations Institute for training and instructional materials. The training program educated soldiers in race relations and fostered a spirit of racial tolerance within the Army, by 1973 the number of race related incidents decreased dramatically. The Army acknowledged the diversity of its members and worked earnestly towards establishing an environment where each soldier could reach their full potential.

A second 'Human Resource' program introduced by the Army addressed the growing problem of drug and alcohol abuse within the service. Soldiers' use of hard drugs, particularly heroin, had emerged as a major problem during the Vietnam war and plagued Army units throughout the world. As an indication of the seriousness of the drug problem in the Army, the Secretary of the Army reported that eleven soldiers had died from drug overdoses during 1969, while the number jumped to twenty-five during the first ten months of 1970. The Army's 'Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program' began in 1971 and embodied measures for the prevention, identification, evaluation, treatment, and rehabilitation of soldiers with drug or alcohol problems. The goal of the program was to identify abusers early, provide them with proper medical attention, counselling, and therapy so that they could return to full duty. A comprehensive urinalysis program was an important element of the program and also provided a measure of its success. 1.8% of the soldiers tested positive for drug use in July 1972, by May 1974

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DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1971, 66; DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 60 and 82-84; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1974, 60-61.

Hauser, America's Army in Crisis, 114-115.
that rate declined to just 0.7% of the soldiers tested. The Army also offered extended
counselling and resident rehabilitation centers to assist soldiers in overcoming their drug
and alcohol addictions. The Army's 'Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Program' demonstrated the Army's renewed commitment and care for the soldier as an
individual and to the continued improvement of the Army's social environment. The
success of the program also contributed to improving discipline, performance, and morale.

The Army rewrote its premier leadership manual, FM 22-100, Military
Leadership, to institute these changes in philosophy. The Infantry School produced a new
edition that reflected the strong influences of the War College's Study on Professionalism,
the Continental Army's Leadership Board, the Modern Volunteer Army Program, and Fort
Benning's first hand experience with Project Volar initiatives. Earlier editions of FM
22-100 contained little more than dry 'laundry lists' of traditional leadership topics such as,
Principles of Leadership, Characteristics of Leadership, Leadership Traits, and Indications
of Leadership. The June 1973 edition did not entirely ignore these time-honored subjects,
but rather updated them using a behavioral science approach that stressed the necessity of
understanding individual motivations and applied them to contemporary needs.

Although the principles of leadership remained the same, applying them required
updated techniques to reflect basic changes in American society. The Army placed a new
emphasis on studying human behavior and motivation in order to understand individual
actions and group dynamics. In other words, 'the led' now emerged as an important

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110 DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1972, 86-88; DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1974, 62-
63; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1975, 47.

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consideration in leadership philosophy. To reflect this phenomenon, the manual now included specific chapters on Human Needs, Motivation, Communication, and Counselling. The new manual discussed these topics, described the leader's critical role in applying these new concepts, and provided realistic examples to assist him (or her) in relating the information in the manual to some of the common challenges they faced. The manual also addressed contemporary leadership problems such as ethics, drug abuse, race relations and AWOL prevention.

The new leadership manual, encouraging a more participative style of leadership, declared, "the concept of leadership for the United States Army is based on accomplishing the organizational mission while preserving the dignity of the soldier." Volunteer soldiers could not be treated with draconian leadership techniques if the Army expected to attract and retain enough soldiers to make the all-volunteer force a success. The authors warned against authoritarian attitudes and practices and observed that, "The soldier of today is not the same as the soldier of yesterday."111

The transition to an all-volunteer force witnessed a basic change in the Army's approach to leadership. The Army recovered from the brink of despair in 1969 and 1970 by emphasizing a rejuvenated leadership education program and a less authoritarian style of leadership. The Modern Volunteer Army program and Project VOLAR provided a perfect opportunity for the development of new leadership policies and practices, by creating an atmosphere receptive to new ideas and innovations. The full effect of these

111 Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership, June 1973 edition, (Washington, DC: 1973), i-viii. The two preceding editions of FM 22-100, Military Leadership, November 1965 and June 1961; respectively, were used as the basis for comparison.
changes would require several years to take root throughout the Army. The Army's efforts to update and improve its leadership climate culminated in the publication of a new leadership manual in June 1973. The 1973 edition of Military Leadership embodied a marked change from earlier versions and served as the Army's primary leadership document for the next decade.
Chapter V

TRAINING

Reforms in training practices constituted a third major area of transformation within the Army growing out of the move to an all-volunteer force. The changes in the Army's training program were inherently related to both the efforts to increase the attractiveness of military service and the drive to improve the Army's leadership climate. The PROVIDE reports identified deficiencies in unit training and management among the major contributing causes of dissatisfaction within the service. Soldiers disdained redundant, non-productive tasks that were unrelated to the performance of their war time mission. 'Make work' activities such as painting rocks, picking-up cigarette butts, and frequent inspections reduced soldiers' job satisfaction and made daily life boring and repetitious. Therefore, by improving its training program the Army hoped simultaneously to increase the morale of its soldiers and the quality and effectiveness of the military forces. There was a direct link between leadership and training because the Army correlated better leadership with improved training. As the draft and the war in Vietnam ended, the Army prepared itself to once again become a peacetime Army focused on training, while it also became an all-volunteer force. The combination of these two

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112 PROVIDE I, 8; and PROVIDE II, 2-9.

113 CSM, 12 October 1971, Subject: Special Trust and Confidence file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.
objectives made changes in training another element of the Army's transition to an all-volunteer force.

Once the Army identified the need to improve its training, the development of a reformed training program paralleled the course of the changes and innovations in the Army's approach to leadership. The Army's senior leaders decided upon a course of action, issued guidance to their subordinates, and provided the intellectual and material resources required to achieve the intended goal. The Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army's original charter directed him to "establish conditions which contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the Army as a fighting force" and this guidance made improving training one of the early priorities of the transition to an all-volunteer force.\(^{114}\)

Once again, the move towards achieving an all-volunteer Army created an atmosphere that fostered innovation within the Army, in turn providing an ideal environment for reform of the Army's training program. Westmoreland outlined the Army's training improvement strategy during his November 1970 speech. He urged all commanders to follow the Department of the Army's lead in reviewing and eliminating nonessential and repetitive training requirements. To improve training satisfaction within troop units (and thus recruiting and retention as well), he demanded improvement in the Army's basic training course and increased use of a new system of performance-oriented training techniques. The design of these proposals was to improve the soldier's, and perspective soldier's, initial

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\(^{114}\) The SAMVA's original charter is found in the Modern Volunteer Army: Master Program, Annex H.
impression of the Army.\textsuperscript{115} Once again, the Modern Volunteer Army program and Project VOLAR would be the vehicles used to implement these initiatives.

From the end of World War I through the 1960s, the Army Training Program (ATP), centrally controlled at the departmental level, had guided training throughout the institution by setting specific unit training requirements. A rigid system with a fixed annual curriculum, it "dictated the subjects to be taught and the number of hours a soldier had to be exposed to training. It did not prescribe the meeting of any specific standards or levels of performance."\textsuperscript{116} Units devised their training plans to satisfy the demands of the ATP regardless of their level of individual or collective proficiency on any specific task. Furthermore, successive levels of headquarters piled on their own additional requirements to subordinate units' training programs.

The deficiencies in this system were exacerbated by the fact that training inspections became increasingly oriented towards determining how well the unit satisfied the mandatory training requirements rather than individual or unit performance criteria. The result was a stagnated system with units routinely over-trained in some subjects while vastly under-trained in others. Local commanders and the NCO leadership possessed little flexibility in designing their own training despite the fact that they were in the best position to determine the unit’s needs and capabilities.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115}Westmoreland, Speech to Army Commanders' Conference, 30 November 1970, in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.


\textsuperscript{117}For brief but informative descriptions of the Army Training Program (ATP) and its shortcomings see: Chapman, The Army's Training Revolution, 1-7; Paul F. Gorman, The Secret of Future Victories (Fort
These factors, combined with the continuing demands of the Vietnam war, rapid turnover of personnel, and the decline in the over-all leadership climate of the Army, created a training environment that many senior Army leaders described as 'the Vietnam strait jacket.' Under the pressure to prepare units and individual soldiers for deployment to Vietnam, the Army had narrowed the focus of its training program towards the unique requirements of guerilla warfare in a jungle environment, rather than across the broad range of contingencies which the Army might face elsewhere in the world. In fact, because of the extended duration of the Vietnam war, some leaders feared that a large portion of the officer corps was unprepared by schooling or experience to plan and conduct sound tactical training.\footnote{The term 'Vietnam strait jacket' was used by Brigadier General Robert M. Montague, the Deputy Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, in "Building A 'New' Army: Results Begin to Show," \textit{U. S. News and World Report} 72 (6 March 1972): 49 and was attributed to General Westmoreland in \textit{Report of the Board for Dynamic Training} (Washington, DC: 17 December 1971), 1.}

To break out of the 'Vietnam strait jacket' the SAMVA introduced the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program as part of its Project VOLAR field experiment in January 1971. Fort Ord, CA was the home of an Army Training Center with the responsibility of providing basic combat training and advanced individual training to thousands of new soldiers each year. The SAMVA staff worked with the leaders at Fort Ord and analysts from the Human Resources Research Organization, a federally

funded research center specializing in organizational dynamics, to systematically revise the conventional instructional and testing structure of the Fort Ord training program.\textsuperscript{119}

The experimental program altered the traditional training format of lecture-demonstration-practice by incorporating six learning principles developed by the Human Resources Research Organization. "Performance Based Instruction" translated each training task into specific skills and capabilities that the soldier was to acquire. Second, "Absolute Criterion" established a standard to evaluate performance. There was no 'partial success', a soldier either mastered the skill or received additional training until proficient. Third, "Functional Context" enabled the soldier to grasp the skill's practical application to realistic field situations. Fourth, "Individualization" allowed the soldier the opportunity to practice, repeat, and review the skill to the extent necessary for each to learn; fast learners demonstrated their mastery of a given skill, then acted as peer instructors to assist slower learners. Fifth, "Feedback" provided the soldier with an immediate opportunity to practice the skill and receive an evaluation of his or her performance. Sixth, "Quality Control" gathered data on soldiers' performance so that the strengths and weaknesses of the entire training system could be identified. The change in instruction eliminated long blocks of lecture, provided a succinct demonstration of the skill by an instructor, and permitted the soldiers to practice until they demonstrated mastery of the skill. This training concept was known as 'performance-oriented' training.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{119}The Fort Ord Contribution, 52-56.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid, 56-57.
The new method worked. Because performance-oriented training was self-paced, it permitted greater individualism and compensated for the wide variation in aptitude among trainees; it trained and tested soldiers to perform military skills under realistic field conditions rather than in a passive classroom environment. When the Infantry School at Fort Benning compared a control group at Fort Jackson, SC with those at Fort Ord, the latter performed better in twelve out of sixteen areas and equally in the other four.¹²¹

Because the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program taught more material in less time, new subjects could be added to the training program without expanding the length of the course or lowering performance standards, making the training better and compensating for any decrease in abilities among first-term soldiers. Fort Ord also applied the performance-oriented training methodology to its combat support training programs (i.e. cooks, vehicle drivers, and clerk/typists) with great success. As a result, the Army adopted performance-oriented training at every training center and by 1973 the new technique was standard throughout all Army training programs.¹²²

Other steps improved training for troop units throughout the service. Freed from KP and installation maintenance, more soldiers could train with their units, increasing motivation, morale, and performance. In June 1971, Westmoreland decentralized the Army Training Program (ATP) by giving battalion and separate company commanders responsibility for developing and implementing their own training programs. Commanders


¹²²The Fort Ord Contribution, 101-105 and 81; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1971, 33-34.
above the battalion level were no longer allowed to regard unit training records as official
documents subject to audit or inspection. Furthermore, intermediate headquarters,
(echelons between the battalion level and the Department of the Army), were instructed to
issue their training guidance in mission type instructions (i.e. following the same format as
standard field orders by dictating desired outcomes and letting subordinate commanders
chose appropriate methods) rather than as specific mandatory training requirements,
ending the rigidity and revitalizing training at the small unit level.¹²³

As a follow-on to decentralization, the Chief of Staff established a 'Board for
Dynamic Training' under the leadership of Brigadier General Paul F. Gorman at Fort
Benning, GA in August 1971. The purpose of the Board for Dynamic Training was to
help tactical commanders develop and conduct meaningful and exciting training for their
units. The Board for Dynamic Training used the organization and procedures of the
previously established 'Leadership Board' as a model, reviewing training throughout the
Army and issuing a report in December 1971 that recommended several measures to
continue the revitalization of Army training, including: an emphasis on 'hands-on' rather
than lecture-style training, increased use of 'performance-oriented' training methods, and
the revision of Army training literature. The Board also recommended establishing a
permanent organization to supervise and coordinate improved training initiatives.
Subsequently, the Board for Dynamic Training became a permanent organization,

¹²³The Report of the Board for Dynamic Training, 4. The text of
General Westmoreland's 30 June 1971 message is also included as part of
redesignated as the 'Combat Arms Training Board,' to integrate and distribute ideas and innovations for training programs at the individual unit level.\textsuperscript{124}

One of the most important improvements in the Army's training system was the introduction of specific performance tests to evaluate unit training, rather than calculating the number of hours of instruction to which a soldier or unit was exposed. This innovation applied the techniques of performance-oriented training to tactical missions, thus revitalizing small unit training. No longer did soldiers feel that they were simply training 'for the sake of training,' but instead could work toward a known, often quantified, standard. Once a unit achieved proficiency on a given skill, it could focus on other tasks that required renewed training to achieve or maintain competence.

Improved training was also a part of the Army's overall emphasis on renewed professionalism. The \textit{Modern Volunteer Army} pamphlet reiterated the Army's commitment to increased professionalism through improved training by declaring that the content and character of training were "of central importance."\textsuperscript{125} The revision of the SAMVA's charter in January 1972 stressed both the continued importance of improved training to the Modern Volunteer Army program and the SAMVA's critical role in supervising the training initiatives. The revised charter instructed the SAMVA staff to "give priority effort to the improvement of individual and unit training" within the over-all goal of increasing the Army's effectiveness as a fighting force. The revised charter also directed

\textsuperscript{124}Report of the Board for Dynamic Training, 105-112. CSM, 7 September 1971, Subject: Support for Dynamic Training, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH.

\textsuperscript{125}Modern Volunteer Army: A Program for Professionals, 15-18.
the SAMVA to guide the activities of the Combat Arms Training Board (formerly the Board for Dynamic Training) and to act as the Department of the Army level agency for coordinating the implementation of the Board's initiatives. Throughout the final six months of its tenure the SAMVA's staff supervised new innovations and programs throughout the Army's training system. The importance of the SAMVA staff's role in reforming the Army training program was attested to even after its deactivation in June 1972. On July 1, 1972, the Army designated a new Department of the Army level 'Special Assistant for Training' and incorporated the SAMVA staff into this new organization to continue their work towards reinvigorating the training system throughout the Army.\textsuperscript{126}

The all-volunteer force transformed training because the Army had to improve its effectiveness as a fighting force, adjust training methods to compensate for variances in recruit aptitude, and abolish meaningless, unnecessary, and repetitive training. 'Performance-oriented' techniques for both individual and unit training and the decentralization of the Army Training Program to the tactical unit level broke with the past and heralded the dawn of a new era in Army training. The innovations and practices originally begun under the direction of the SAMVA's staff during the early 1970s provided

\textsuperscript{126}Revised SAMVA Charter, 3 January 1972, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH. Memorandum from General Westmoreland to LTG Forsythe, 15 January 1972, Subject: Guidance for the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH. Information concerning the formation of the Office of the Special Assistant for Training is found in The MVA Field Experiment, Report Number 72-1, (Washington, DC: 1 June 1973), 1; and DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 1973, 48-49.
the sound basis for future training programs, including, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and the National Training Center (NTC), which are credited for 'revolutionizing' Army training and continue to be central to the Army's training system.
EPILOGUE: THE 'NEW' ARMY

On July 1, 1974 in a press conference at the Pentagon, Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway declared the all-volunteer Army to be a success. While Callaway's statement as measured by recruiting and reenlistment goals for fiscal year 1974 (the first full year without the draft) was correct, the long term success of the all-volunteer force was by no means assured. But between the initiation of the 'Career Force Study' in September 1968 and Secretary Callaway's pronouncement in 1974, the U. S. Army began to change dramatically. The need to attract and retain large numbers of young men and women during the final stages of the nation's most unpopular war, in an age of political turbulence, had compelled the Army to reexamine and then alter some of its most basic practices and policies.

Rather than relying on arbitrary, authoritarian techniques which demeaned the soldier, stifled innovation, and lowered morale, Army leadership philosophy now emphasized the importance of participative leadership practices, treating soldiers with dignity and respect while still accomplishing the mission, and adherence to standards of professionalism. Meaningless, repetitive, and centralized training which disregarded the differences between both individual soldiers and units, and evaluated results strictly on a

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127 Secretary Callaway's comments at the press conference are summarized in "'Volunteer Army A Success': Callaway" which appeared in The Pentagon News, 11 July 1974; a copy of this article is located in file 327.02, 'All-Volunteer Army,' HRC, CMH. For additional commentary on Secretary Callaway's remarks see Griffith, Today's Army, 237-239.
'time-trained' standard was replaced with dynamic, decentralized training programs that gave local commanders the flexibility to determine their unit's specific needs, used performance-oriented methods to compensate for variances in ability, and improved the Army's effectiveness as a fighting force. Most significantly, the day-to-day lives of the young men and women serving in the Army improved dramatically. The Spartan existence of the draft-era soldier was enhanced by the removal of service irritants ( reveille and KP), increased privacy and personal freedoms (dorm style rooms, longer hair, and liberalized pass policies), improved post facilities, and competitive pay. Some of the Army's senior leaders and career service members viewed these changes with skepticism, but generally they supported the programs as a source of increasing the 'professionalism' of the force and improving the Army as a whole.

The end of war in Vietnam represented one of the lowest points in the Army's institutional life. The move to an all-volunteer force began the Army's long march towards a full recovery, but the years immediately following Callaway's initial announcement of success, roughly 1975 - 1981, were a period of great trial for the Army. Indeed, many observers wondered if the Army could ever recover its pride and professionalism. The successes of the 1980s and especially the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War seemed to answer those concerns and at the same time provoked inquiries into just how the Army accomplished this Herculean task. Many factors contributed to the Army's rejuvenation, including vastly improved doctrine and state-of-the-art weapon systems, but at its most basic level -- attracting quality people, training them and leading them in peace and in combat -- the policies and practices introduced by the all-volunteer force provided the
necessary foundation for the 'New' Army to emerge, and in the 1980s and 1990s, to succeed well beyond the dreams of even its most optimistic architects in the period when the all-volunteer Army began.

The transition to an all-volunteer force represented a fundamental turning point in American cold war military policy. A "citizens' Army" comprised of military professionals replaced the idealized "citizens' Army" of amateur soldiers. The political and social implications of this move concerned many observers and are still not altogether clear. The years of frustration and neglect following the advent of the all-volunteer force were also a period of rebuilding. The Army continued developing programs and policies to make it a better, more effective fighting force, and to restore institutional self-esteem and professionalism. The Army of the 1980s was the beneficiary of these earlier endeavors and the successes of the 1980s and 1990s were in many ways the fulfillment of the transition to the all-volunteer Army.
APPENDIX A

ANNUAL DRAFT INDUCTIONS, 1960-1973

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<td>1972</td>
<td>27,083</td>
<td>27,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>35,678</td>
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APPENDIX B

SIZE OF THE ARMY, 1960-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL STRENGTH</th>
<th>ENLISTED STRENGTH</th>
<th>OFFICER STRENGTH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>873,078</td>
<td>770,112</td>
<td>102,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>858,622</td>
<td>756,932</td>
<td>101,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,066,404</td>
<td>948,597</td>
<td>117,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>975,916</td>
<td>865,768</td>
<td>110,148</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>973,238</td>
<td>860,514</td>
<td>112,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>969,066</td>
<td>854,929</td>
<td>114,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,199,784</td>
<td>1,079,682</td>
<td>120,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,442,498</td>
<td>1,296,603</td>
<td>145,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,570,343</td>
<td>1,401,727</td>
<td>168,616</td>
</tr>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>1,512,169</td>
<td>1,337,047</td>
<td>175,122</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,322,548</td>
<td>1,153,013</td>
<td>169,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,123,810</td>
<td>971,872</td>
<td>151,938</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>810,960</td>
<td>686,695</td>
<td>124,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>800,973</td>
<td>681,972</td>
<td>119,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>783,330</td>
<td>674,466</td>
<td>108,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>784,333</td>
<td>678,324</td>
<td>106,009</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>779,417</td>
<td>677,725</td>
<td>101,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>782,246</td>
<td>680,062</td>
<td>102,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>771,624</td>
<td>669,515</td>
<td>102,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>758,852</td>
<td>657,184</td>
<td>101,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>777,036</td>
<td>673,994</td>
<td>103,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>781,419</td>
<td>675,087</td>
<td>106,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>780,391</td>
<td>672,699</td>
<td>107,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>779,643</td>
<td>669,364</td>
<td>110,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>780,180</td>
<td>667,711</td>
<td>112,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>780,787</td>
<td>666,557</td>
<td>114,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX C

WOMEN IN THE ARMY, 1960-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>TOTAL FEMALE STRENGTH</th>
<th>FEMALE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ARMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>8,279</td>
<td>12,542</td>
<td>1.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>8,560</td>
<td>12,811</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>8,721</td>
<td>13,074</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,852</td>
<td>8,292</td>
<td>12,144</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>7,958</td>
<td>11,730</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,806</td>
<td>8,520</td>
<td>12,326</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>9,179</td>
<td>13,322</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>9,741</td>
<td>14,483</td>
<td>1.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5,096</td>
<td>10,711</td>
<td>15,807</td>
<td>1.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5,157</td>
<td>10,721</td>
<td>15,878</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,248</td>
<td>11,476</td>
<td>16,724</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,040</td>
<td>11,825</td>
<td>16,865</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,422</td>
<td>12,349</td>
<td>16,771</td>
<td>2.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>16,457</td>
<td>20,736</td>
<td>2.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>26,327</td>
<td>30,715</td>
<td>3.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,594</td>
<td>37,701</td>
<td>42,295</td>
<td>5.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,844</td>
<td>43,806</td>
<td>48,650</td>
<td>6.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5,696</td>
<td>46,094</td>
<td>51,790</td>
<td>6.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6,292</td>
<td>50,549</td>
<td>56,841</td>
<td>7.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6,866</td>
<td>55,151</td>
<td>62,017</td>
<td>8.2 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7,609</td>
<td>61,729</td>
<td>69,338</td>
<td>8.9 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8,349</td>
<td>65,304</td>
<td>73,653</td>
<td>9.4 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9,033</td>
<td>64,071</td>
<td>73,104</td>
<td>9.4 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9,490</td>
<td>66,535</td>
<td>76,025</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,230</td>
<td>67,126</td>
<td>77,356</td>
<td>9.9 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10,828</td>
<td>68,419</td>
<td>79,247</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
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## APPENDIX D

**BLACKS IN THE ARMY, 1964-1983**

**BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY, SELECTED YEARS 1964-1983**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
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APPENDIX E

APTITUDE AND EDUCATION OF ARMY RECRUITS, 1960-1983

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY RECRUITS, BY APTITUDE CATEGORY AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION, SELECTED FISCAL YEARS, 1960-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APTITUDE CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>DRAFT ERA</th>
<th>VOLUNTEER ERA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST CATEGORY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I and II (above average)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (average)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (below average)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi._h School Diploma</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Having at least a High School Diploma)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX F

ARMY 'UNADJUSTED' REENLISTMENT RATES, 1965-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FIRST TERM</th>
<th>CAREER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<td>45.5</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
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<td>18.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>37.8</td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>69.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SOURCES:


The Department of Defense defines 'unadjusted' reenlistment rates as the ratio of total reenlistments occurring in a given period to total separations eligible to reenlist in the same period, expressed as a percentage.
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