4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   Federal Research Division
   Library of Congress
   Washington, DC 20540-4840

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   N/A

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
   Prepared under an Interagency Agreement

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
   Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
   This study examines Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies and focuses on the period since 1982. The section on nuclear weapons policies and capabilities discusses China's land, sea, and airborne deterrent forces, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclear doctrine and policy. The section on arms control policy describes Beijing's stance on disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control talks, the United States-Soviet space race, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. The conclusion examines the military and political objectives of nuclear weapons and arms control policies in China's independent foreign policy.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
   China
   Nuclear weapons
   Nuclear proliferation

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
   UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
   UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
   UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   SAR

NSN 7540-01-290-5500

19960426 068
CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES


December 1985

Author: Roxane D.V. Sismanidis

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PREFACE

This study, based on open-source material, examines Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies and focuses on the period since 1982. The section on nuclear weapons policies and capabilities discusses China's land-, sea-, and airborne deterrent forces, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclear doctrine and policy. The section on arms control policy describes Beijing's stance on disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control talks, the US-Soviet space race, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. The conclusion examines the military and political objectives of nuclear weapons and arms control policies in China's independent foreign policy.
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# Glossary

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<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Atomic Demolition Munition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAIU</td>
<td>Chinese Association for International Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAPD</td>
<td>Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPLA</td>
<td>Chinese People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hongqi</td>
<td>Red Flag (Beijing)</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>INF</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>Jiefangjun Huabao</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>PNTBT</td>
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<td>SALT</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
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<td>SLBM</td>
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<td>SSBN</td>
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<td>SSN</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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SUMMARY

Since 1978 and especially since 1982, China has attained a new prominence both as a nuclear power and as an active participant in international arms control fora. It has developed a full range of nuclear forces, including medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and has acquired an incipient second-strike capability. The CPLA appears to be moving toward the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Chinese defense strategy has reassigned strategic and tactical nuclear weapons a larger role, separately and in conjunction with conventional forces, in actual combat as well as in deterrence.

China's policy on proliferation is contradictory. Beijing declares that it neither favors nor engages in nuclear proliferation, yet declines to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Though China has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and agreed to abide by IAEA safeguards, reports of Chinese aid to potential nuclear states appear often enough to cast doubt on Beijing's sincerity on nonproliferation.

China has dropped its former rejection of arms control, attended a variety of disarmament conclaves, and even offered to participate, albeit conditionally, in certain arms control negotiations. Its disarmament proposals cover nuclear, conventional, chemical, and outer space weapons, and stress that the United States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in sharply reducing their nuclear arsenals and halting the arms race in outer space. China has moved to a more positive assessment of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate in earnest to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to prohibit outer space weapons. Beijing also has called for an end to the arms race in outer space and opposes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Nuclear weapons and arms control policies serve military and political objectives in China's independent foreign policy. Nuclear weapons enhance Chinese prestige internationally, serve to offset Soviet threats to Chinese security, remind the United States of the residual distrust between the two countries, and enhance China's role as an Asian power. Nuclear weapons also deter strategic and conventional attacks and represent China's retaliatory capability.

China's arms control policy serves to underscore its role as an independent actor in international affairs, strengthen its image as a genuine advocate of peace and disarmament, and preserve its flexibility in foreign policy. Chinese arms control policy also focuses attention on US and Soviet arms control policies and helps China position itself for future participation in arms control negotiations. In addition, Beijing's arms control policy deflects attention from its nuclear policies as China attempts to improve its military position vis-a-vis the superpowers, guarantee unrestricted nuclear weapons development, and prevent arms control agreements detrimental to its security interests.
1. INTRODUCTION

Since 1978 and, above all, since 1982, China has become widely known as a nuclear weapons power and has actively participated in international arms control fora. China has developed a full range of nuclear forces and has acquired an incipient second-strike capability. Beijing has also eschewed its previous rejection of arms control, joined in a variety of disarmament activities, and conditionally offered to participate in certain arms control negotiations. This new status stems from the steady development of China's nuclear weapons program, and the evolution of its arms control policy in conjunction with its independent foreign policy. After years of isolation, China's successful reentry into the international system has been marked by its participation in international institutions and the manipulation of these organizations for its own purposes.

Similarly, China used Western terms in international politics and manipulated them for its own purposes. The Chinese terms for deterrence (weishe, literally, to frighten into submission through force) and arms control (caijun, literally, to cut the military or disarmament), however, have different connotations in Chinese than they do in Western languages. Indeed, China does not use weishe in referring to its strategic nuclear forces, but instead uses this pejorative term only when referring to the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese terms for deterrence and arms control suggest different conceptions of nuclear power and arms control, and different objectives for Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies.

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES

a. Historical Overview (1949-81)

(1) 1949-59

Despite Mao Zedong's denigration of nuclear weapons ("the atom bomb is a paper tiger") in the late 1940s, the newly founded People's Republic of China took an early interest in developing nuclear weapons. By 1955, China had begun a nuclear research program and had signed scientific and technological cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. In 1956 Mao Zedong in his speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," came out strongly in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons and recommended the shifting of economic and military priorities to permit nuclear weapons development. In 1957, China and the Soviet Union signed another cooperation agreement for defense technology, furthering China's nascent nuclear industry in its development of missiles and nuclear weapons. In June 1959, cooling Sino-Soviet relations led the Soviet Union to withhold plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogate the agreement on transferring defense technology, and begin withdrawing Soviet advisors from China.

(2) 1960-69

The withdrawal of Soviet assistance put China's leaders in a quandary. Coming at a time of hardship marked by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders realized that proceeding with a nuclear weapons program would entail great financial, scientific, and military efforts.
Nevertheless, most of the Chinese leadership felt that without nuclear weapons "to get rid of imperialist bullying," China's security would be threatened, and its prestige and options limited in the international arena. Thus, even with the withdrawal of Soviet aid, China committed itself to develop nuclear weapons and missiles.

The Chinese nuclear program showed remarkable success in the 1960s. In a period of 32 months China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (16 October 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (25 October 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (14 June 1967). It also deployed the conventional-warhead DONGFANG-1 (DF-1) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in the 1960s, tested the DF-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in 1966 probably deploying it in the late 1960s, and tested the DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 1969.

By the end of the 1960s, however, China's nuclear weapons program began to feel the effects of the Cultural Revolution. The nuclear weapons program was much less disrupted than other scientific and educational sectors as Chinese leaders managed to shield some parts of the strategic weapons program from turmoil. However, scientists in some research institutes were persecuted, resulting in a slowdown in nuclear weapons development in the 1970s.

(3) 1970-81

From 1970 to 1981, China's strategic weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM capabilities and marked the beginning of a minimum deterrent force. The DF-2 (CSS-1) MRBM was the first strategic missile to be deployed, probably in the late 1960s and continuing into the early 1970s. The DF-2, with a range of 1,200 kilometers and a payload of 15 kilotons, uses a liquid propellant. Deployment of the DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM began in 1972; it has a range of about 3,000 kilometers, a 1 to 3 megaton payload, and a storable liquid propellant.

In 1970, China tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)--the DF-4 (CSS-3). The DF-4, probably a two-stage version of the DF-3, has a range of about 7,000 kilometers, a 1 to 3 megaton payload, and a storable liquid propellant. Deployment of this missile began in the mid-1970s. In 1980, China tested its second ICBM, the DF-5 (CSS-4), which has a range of about 15,000 kilometers, a 4 to 5 megaton payload, and probably a solid fuel propellant. The two test launches of the DF-5 received considerable Chinese publicity after their successful flights to the South Pacific. Whereas previous Chinese missiles are capable only of hitting targets in the Eurasian land mass, the DF-5, with its 15,000 kilometer range, can reach the United States.

In 1981, China launched three satellites into space orbit from a single FENGBAO-1 (FB-1) (CFL-2) booster. This feat indicated that China might have the technology to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
b. **Trends and Developments Since 1982**

Since 1982, China has developed a credible minimum deterrent force with land, sea, and air elements. There also have been reports that China is developing tactical nuclear weapons.

(1) **Land-Based Strategic Force**

China now has from 225 to 300 nuclear warheads, most of which are deployed on land. It has deployed 50 DF-2 (CSS-1) MRBMs, 60 DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBMs, 4 DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBMs, and 2 DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs.² Most DF-2s and DF-3s are mobile and deployed at scattered sites throughout China. In addition to its missile deployments, China has tried to enhance its land-based strategic deterrent force by developing solid-fuel propellants for increased launch readiness and by hardening missile sites to ensure survivability. Since the 1981 satellite launch, there has been no indication of a developing MIRV capability, although Chinese press reports have mentioned "three-warhead missiles."

(2) **Sea-Based Strategic Force**

China began working on developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent force in the mid-1960s. By the 1970s China modified the HAN Class nuclear-powered, attack submarine (SSN) to act as a missile launching platform. The HAN Class SSN was augmented by the launch of the XIA Class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in 1981. On 16 October 1982, China conducted its first successful underwater test launch of an SLBM, using the CSS-NX-3 SLBM, a version of the DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM with a range of about 2,800 kilometers, a 1 to 2 megaton warhead, and a solid fuel propellant. Two 12-tube XIA Class SSBN are now operational. Four more are under construction, and some are reported to have 16 launch tubes. Three 6-tube HAN Class SSN are operational and are said to carry 1,600 kilometer cruise missiles.³

In September 1985, Xinhua announced that China would launch a carrier rocket at sea near Lushun, Liaoning Province, between 28 September and 18 October 1985. Xinhua later reported the completion of the test launch, but did not mention whether it succeeded.⁴ Kyodo cited Chinese sources stating that China successfully launched a missile from a submarine.⁵ The pro-Beijing Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) reported that the test launch was very likely "a test of something similar to a cruise missile launched from a nuclear submarine. This kind of missile can carry a number of warheads."⁶ The lack of additional information as to the success of the launch or type of missile tested makes it difficult to predict how this test affects the further development of China's sea-based strategic force.

(3) **Strategic Air Force**

China's obsolescent aircraft are the weak link in China's strategic delivery force. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) Air Force has some 120 B-6 BADGERS with a 3,000 kilometer combat radius, available to deliver nuclear bombs, but the BADGERS very likely would be unable to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers such as the Soviet Union. The CPLA Air Force probably will not be assigned a strategic
nuclear delivery mission, although fighter aircraft probably can be used for tactical nuclear strikes.7

(4) Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In June 1982, the CPLA conducted its first exercise in the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ningxia Province. Since that time, Jiefangjun Huabao (Beijing) has published a few articles on exercises in response to enemy nuclear strikes.8 Other Chinese press reports have mentioned "antinuclear" or "nuclear counterattack" exercises in discussions of improved CPLA training.9 Some Western analysts have asserted that the CPLA appears to be moving toward the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Xiandai Junshi has reported, based on US Defense Department sources, that China is developing atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), but so far authoritative publications such as The Military Balance have not confirmed the existence of tactical nuclear weapons.10

c. Policy

(1) Evolution of Strategy and People's War Doctrine

For decades China's defense strategy was guided by the doctrine of people's war, with its emphasis on mass mobilization, the superiority of men over materiel, and "luring in deep" in a defensive, protracted war. The acquisition of nuclear weapons did not appreciably alter this doctrine until the 1970s when Chinese military leaders began talking about "people's war under modern conditions." This doctrine still assigns mass mobilization and the superiority of men over materiel a role in the defense of China, but has permitted the evolution of Chinese strategy in several areas. First, Chinese strategists now place more emphasis on an active, forward defense of Chinese borders to prevent an attack from reaching critical military, industrial, and population centers in the initial stages of a war. Second, the military has taken into account some of the changes that modern weapons have brought to warfare, enabling the CPLA to move toward the development of a combined arms capability. China expects to use its combined arms forces in an active, forward defense of its borders. Third, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are assigned a larger role, separately and in conjunction with conventional forces, in actual combat as well as deterrence. In the event of an enemy tactical or strategic nuclear strike during a conventional attack, China would retaliate with its own nuclear forces.

(2) Deterrence Theory

China lacks a clearly stated theory of deterrence and does not use weishe [deterrence] to refer to its own nuclear forces. Despite the theoretical ambiguity, China has a theory of minimum deterrence whereby its few strategic nuclear weapons are seen as sufficient to deter a strategic nuclear attack. China's conventional forces, including its militia, complemented this minimum deterrent by deterring a conventional attack. China now appears to be moving away from a minimum deterrence theory as it strives to develop a full range of nuclear capabilities. The continual upgrading of the strategic triad, the inclusion of "nuclear counterattack" forces in combined arms exercises, and the growing importance attached to tactical
nuclear weapons suggest that China seeks to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks by a combination of nuclear and conventional forces. Although it remains unclear whether China has acquired tactical nuclear weapons, China clearly aims to use its nuclear and conventional forces to deter the use of tactical nuclear weapons, or by counterattack to deny the enemy victory.

To make its nuclear deterrent credible, China has attempted to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces. Mobile MRBMs and IRBMs are deployed in scattered sites all over China, often in rugged terrain to escape detection. Measures such as the hardening of missile silos also enhance survivability. If China's small nuclear forces are to retaliate, survivability would be crucial to the credibility of Beijing's deterrent.

The existence of a full range of nuclear forces and a credible nuclear counterattack capability based on survivability has given China an incipient second strike capability. The further development of ICBMs and SLBMs will improve China's second strike capability, which in turn will play a larger role in the evolution of both Chinese defense strategy and deterrence theory.

(3) No First Use and Counterattack Doctrine

Since its first atomic bomb test in 1964, China has pledged repeatedly never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Given the quantitative and qualitative differences between China's nuclear forces and those of the United States and the Soviet Union, discretion alone might guarantee this pledge. However, promises of nuclear counterattack almost always accompany the no-first use pledge in China's statements on its nuclear policies or capabilities. China envisions retaliation against strategic and tactical nuclear attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response-time might further limit the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets.

(4) New Prominence for the Nuclear Weapons Program

Since 1984 China has assigned its nuclear weapons program a new prominence. In a June 1984 interview, Deputy Chief of General Staff Han Huaizhi revealed that the CPLA had established a strategic missile force. To the contrary, China has long had such a force—the 2d Artillery Corps. However, Han did not equate the "newly" established strategic missile force with the 2d Artillery. Beijing's announcement heralded subsequent publicity which served to increase China's prestige as a nuclear weapons power.

In a 17 September 1984 Zhongguo Xinwen She interview, Minister of Nuclear Industry Jiang Xinxiang stated that there is a continuous increase in the quantity and quality of China's nuclear weapons. The military parade honoring the 35th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1984 prominently featured China's strategic missiles—the DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM, the DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM, the DF-2 (CSS-1) MRBM, and the CSS-NX-3 SLBM and was the first public display of China's missile might.
After the 20th anniversary of China's first atomic bomb test on 16 October 1984, articles on Chinese nuclear weapons development and capabilities began appearing regularly in the Chinese press. Most prominent of these were a Zhongguo Xinwen She interview with Defense Minister Zhang Aiping on the decision to develop the atomic bomb and excerpts from the Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen on the development of China's nuclear program.12 Both articles pointed with pride to the accomplishments of China's "self-reliant" nuclear weapons program. Other articles stressed China's nuclear counterattack capability, the development of nuclear weapons, strategic missiles, and nuclear submarines. In November 1985, China celebrated the 30th anniversary of the founding of its nuclear industry with a series of articles on various aspects of military and civilian nuclear development.

While Beijing has given prominence to its nuclear weapons program, it also has begun to shift the nuclear industry toward more civilian production. The shift to civilian production reflects China's ambitious plans for nuclear power generation without necessarily indicating a slowdown in China's nuclear weapons program. In an 8 January 1985 speech to a Ministry of Nuclear Industry work conference, Vice Premier Li Peng stated:

A few years ago we required the Ministry of Nuclear Industry to shift more efforts to civilian production while ensuring military production and increasing the output of civilian products. Viewed from today's situation, we should affirm the correctness of this principle. However, today's situation has required the Ministry of Nuclear Industry and other defense industry and research departments to shift more of their strength to civilian production as their main tasks.13

Li also discussed the development of nuclear energy, which figures prominently in Beijing's economic development plans. In May 1985, a spokesman for China's Atomic Energy Industrial Company said that in the past military production accounted for over 80 percent of nuclear industry output, but that civilian production will account for 80 percent of output in the future.14

(5) Proliferation

From 1982 through 1985, China continued its long-standing opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while consistently advocating nonproliferation. While declining to accede to the NPT, China nevertheless took steps to improve its image on nonproliferation. Despite joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and numerous official statements to the contrary, persistent reports of Chinese aid to potential nuclear weapons states surfaced.

China's criticism of the NPT stems from its position that the treaty is discriminatory. Beijing sees three discriminatory aspects in the NPT. First, nonproliferation should consist of horizontal and vertical nonproliferation. This means that nonnuclear states should remain nonnuclear while nuclear states should neither increase nor improve their nuclear weapons. The NPT prohibits nonnuclear signatories from obtaining nuclear weapons, but does not restrict nuclear states from expanding and ameliorating their nuclear arsenals. Second, under the Treaty, the obligations of
nonnuclear signatories are concrete and strict, while the obligations of nuclear signatories are general and nonbinding. Third, the NPT aims to "guarantee the security of each country and people." However,

[s]ince non-nuclear signatories in order to reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war "have undertaken the obligation to renounce the right to nuclear weapons," then, the nuclear signatories should commit themselves to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, to guarantee the security of non-nuclear states. But the treaty does not touch on this question. The treaty is an expedient for the superpowers to maintain and strengthen their position of nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail. It does not truly avoid the danger of nuclear war nor "guarantee the security of each country and people," especially the security of non-nuclear countries.15

Therefore, China sees the NPT as unfair to nonnuclear states, because it does not address their security concerns and overlooks the vertical proliferation of the superpowers.

In matters concerning horizontal proliferation, Beijing says it respects the desire of nonnuclear states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and to establish nuclear free zones on a "voluntary basis,"--without the threat of the superpowers. China maintains that it neither favors nor engages in proliferation by helping other countries develop nuclear weapons. In the matter of peaceful nuclear cooperation, China holds that IAEA safeguards must be met before it will export nuclear materials and facilities. Similarly, Chinese imports will be used for peaceful purposes only.16 Chinese representatives, however, have criticized "irrational restrictions on peaceful nuclear cooperation under the guise of 'preventing nuclear proliferation'"17 and view these unspecified restrictions as hindering nuclear cooperation, implying that superpower nonproliferation efforts are a screen for restraining economic development in the Third World.

Since 1983 Beijing has made several moves to improve its credibility on nonproliferation. China applied for membership in the IAEA in September 1983, was admitted in October 1983, and became a full member in January 1984. While China initially focused on defending its stance against the NPT at IAEA fora, it soon also began to stress its commitment to nonproliferation and its adherence to IAEA safeguards. On 4 November 1983, China's Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session to discuss the IAEA report that China accepts the IAEA statute and will fulfill its obligations under that statute.18 In his 15 May 1984 government work report to the Second Session of the Sixth NPC, Premier Zhao Ziyang stated China's oft-repeated guarantee on nonproliferation:

China is critical of the discriminatory "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and has declined to accede to it. But we by no means favor nuclear proliferation, nor do we engage in such proliferation by helping other countries develop nuclear weapons.19
On 24 September 1984, Minister of Nuclear Industry Jiang Xinxiong told the 28th regular session of the IAEA General Conference that although China understood the significance of nuclear nonproliferation and the importance of taking measures to that end, it opposed irrational restrictions on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Jiang quoted Premier Zhao's May 1984 statement on the NPT and nonproliferation, then proceeded to promise that:

"... China will, in exporting its nuclear materials and equipment, request the recipient countries to accept the safeguards in line with the principle established in the agency's [IAEA] statute. Likewise, while importing any nuclear material and equipment, China will also make sure that it is used for peaceful purposes." 20

In September 1985 at the 29th IAEA meeting, Vice Minister of Nuclear Industry Zhou Ping announced China's "voluntary" offer to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards "at an appropriate time." 21 China's offer, which would allow IAEA inspectors to check that civilian nuclear material is not diverted for military use, represented a qualitative step in Beijing's efforts to improve its credibility on nonproliferation.

Despite Chinese protestations to the contrary, reports of Chinese aid and sales of nuclear materials to potential nuclear states have appeared persistently since 1982. In an August 1982 Nucleons Week interview, US Assistant Secretary of State James Malone said that China had supplied Pakistan with material other than fuel-related items. In November 1982, unidentified US officials told Far Eastern Economic Review that China sold enriched uranium to South Africa and heavy water to Argentina, discussed providing heavy water to India, and supplied Pakistan with material other than fuel-related items, perhaps to aid in enriching uranium. 22 In 1982 and early 1983, China denied these allegations.

The most persistent allegations concerned Sino-Pakistani nuclear ties and came primarily from US or Indian sources. Some of the Indian reports came from official Indian sources and were subsequently denied after China protested. The Indian reports stem mainly from India's fears that Pakistan is developing nuclear weapons and represent India's efforts to warn Pakistan not to continue its nuclear weapons program.

The US allegations stem primarily from disclosures from US intelligence reports and Congressional testimony since the United States and China initiated the April 1984 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The US-China accord ran afoul of Congressional nonproliferation proponents for its lack of adequate Chinese assurances on nonproliferation and a commitment to the standards of US nonproliferation law. On 17 July 1984, Financial Times cited US intelligence sources which stated that Pakistan had traded its expertise in centrifuge enrichment technology for China's assistance in building a nuclear bomb. 23 These reports, combined with Congressional criticism, prompted the United States to seek additional assurances on nonproliferation from China. The agreement was "re-negotiated" and signed on 23 July 1985. Despite Reagan administration statements to Congress on unwritten Chinese assurances on nonproliferation policies, Congressional critics again attacked the agreement.
In the fall of 1985, allegations of China's aid to Pakistan and other potential nuclear states resurfaced in disclosures of CIA reports by columnists Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, and US Senator Alan Cranston. Senator Cranston accused China of engaging in negotiations with or continuing nuclear exports to the five "nuclear outlaw" states—Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa—even after discussions with US officials about curbing such exports. China dismissed Anderson and Van Atta's column as "sheer fabrication" and Senator Cranston's charges as "groundless," denying cooperation with Iran or South Africa and terming its nuclear energy cooperation as "serv[ing] only peaceful purposes." However, Senator Cranston's remarks put China on the defensive again about nonproliferation. In a UNGA speech, Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong reiterated China's nonproliferation pledge and denied Chinese-South African nuclear cooperation. Qian stated that:

... in its cooperation with other countries, the Chinese Government has always taken measures to guard against possible diversion of items under peaceful cooperation agreements to military purposes... This stand of ours is firm and unswerving. It is utterly futile for anyone to make arbitrary accusations against China on this issue.

On 13 November 1985, a Foreign Ministry spokesman again denied Senator Cranston's allegations as "entirely groundless" and repeated China's position on nonproliferation. China undermined its credibility on nonproliferation when, in a 7 November 1985 press conference in Buenos Aires, Premier Zhao Ziyang admitted that China had sold heavy water to Argentina. Zhao noted that China and Argentina had signed an agreement on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation but could not recall when the agreement was signed [May 1984] nor the date and amount of the heavy water sale.

3. ARMS CONTROL POLICY

a. Historical Overview (1949-81)

(1) 1949-64

Although the newly founded People's Republic of China took an early interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, Beijing did not have an arms control policy until the early 1960s. China's interest in arms control was derivative, stemming not from its own initiative, but rather from the negotiations in 1962 and 1963 on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PNTBT) among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. Beijing supported Moscow's initial refusal to consider the treaty, denounced the document as blackmail, and then reluctantly supported the Soviet position to endorse the agreement. As long as it was under the Soviet defense and nuclear umbrella, China did not have an urgent need for nuclear weapons. China had long maintained that socialist countries needed nuclear weapons to resist "imperialist nuclear blackmail." As the Sino-Soviet split widened, Beijing realized it would have to face the US nuclear threat alone and consequently saw nuclear weapons as necessary to its security.
In July 1963, when the Soviet Union began actual negotiations in Moscow with the United States and the United Kingdom, Beijing broke with the USSR. When the PNTBT was signed in August 1963, China condemned both the Treaty and its signatories. China saw the treaty as "an extremely dangerous fraud" and considered it an attempt to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons. The PNTBT prohibited all but underground nuclear tests, thereby effectively preserving the supremacy of the nuclear powers, who alone had the technology to conduct underground tests. The treaty also preserved the backwardness of the nonnuclear states, including China, because it prohibited them from acquiring the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. 29

China made its first arms control proposal in 1963:

1. Total prohibition of nuclear weapons, elimination of all nuclear weapons and means of delivery, disbandment of all nuclear weapons research, testing, and production facilities;

2. Implementation of the following measures: disbandment of all overseas military bases and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from abroad; establishment of a nuclear free zone in Asia and the Pacific; prohibition of the import and export of nuclear weapons or blueprints for nuclear weapons, cessation of all types of nuclear tests; and

3. Convocation of a conference of all government heads to discuss a total ban on and a thorough elimination of nuclear weapons. 30

This proposal and China's position on the PNTBT contained some of the basic elements of China's subsequent arms control policy:

1. Proposals which allow continued development of China's nuclear weapons program;

2. Proposal of a total ban on and destruction of nuclear weapons;

3. Proposal of nuclear free zones and other measures to remove nuclear threats against nonnuclear states;

4. A qualified nonproliferation stance; and

5. Condemnation of superpower efforts to control the nuclear policies of other states.

This position also reflects China's long-term and basic concerns with sovereignty and security.

(2) 1964-81

When China detonated its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, Beijing justified this step as necessary to break the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers, especially the United States who, in China's view, sought to use nuclear weapons to further achieve its goal of world hegemony. Acclaiming its own nuclear weapons program as defensive and a force for peace, China pledged
never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Beijing also called for a world summit conference to discuss a total ban on, and thorough elimination of all nuclear weapons, and to reach an agreement between nuclear countries and potential nuclear countries on the use of nuclear weapons against any country or any zone. In all its statements and proposals on arms control since 1964, China has renewed its pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and has challenged other nuclear powers to do the same.

Furthermore, China declared that it would not assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons, although it continued to defend the rights of nonnuclear states to acquire nuclear arms. In line with this stand, China refused to sign the NPT in 1968. The NPT, like the PNTBT, was seen as a deceptive trap by the superpowers designed to restrict both civilian and military nuclear development by nonnuclear states, while preserving their own prerogatives.

Chinese opposition to the NPT, the PNTBT, and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 stemmed largely from its opposition to superpower-sponsored arms control measures. China asserted that US and Soviet pronouncements on nuclear disarmament were merely "camouflage for monopolizing nuclear arms and conducting nuclear blackmail" and refused to be linked with the arms control efforts of the superpowers. In 1971, Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua told the United Nations that China would never betray the nonnuclear nations by joining nuclear disarmament negotiations at which the big nuclear powers presided.

In spite of its opposition to US and Soviet arms control measures, China consistently and vigorously advocated disarmament, especially total nuclear disarmament, in its public pronouncements. At the United Nations, Chinese representatives routinely denounced the superpowers on disarmament but supported arms control proposals sponsored by the Third World. In 1971, 1973, and 1974, China voted for UN resolutions for nuclear free zones in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Latin America. Beijing supported nuclear free zones as a necessary measure by Third World countries to oppose US and Soviet nuclear blackmail and noted the superpowers passive opposition.

China also signed Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) in August 1973 and ratified it in April 1974. Protocol II called on all nuclear powers to refrain from taking any action in contravention of the treaty, or using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the signatory states. Although China noted that signing the protocol did not alter its stance against the NPT and the PNTBT, China's accession to Protocol II represented a major milestone in Beijing's arms control policy since it was the first arms control accord signed by China.

Beginning in 1978, China's arms control policy changed incrementally. Beijing began participating more actively in international disarmament fora attended by both the United States and the Soviet Union. China participated in the UN General Assembly First Special Session on Disarmament from 23 May to 30 June 1978, attended the first session of the newly established UN Disarmament Commission in May 1979, and in 1980 joined
both the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.36

In these and subsequent meetings, Beijing presented comprehensive
arms control proposals while continuing previous Chinese rhetoric attacking
the superpowers arms race. China's 1979 disarmament proposal considered
nuclear and conventional disarmament to be of equal importance and placed the
onus for arms reductions on "the two states with the largest nuclear and
conventional arsenals." While urging complete prohibition and total
destruction of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, China called on the
United States and the Soviet Union immediately to begin reducing and
destroying their nuclear weapons by stages. After substantial progress toward
this objective, the other nuclear states would join in negotiations for the
total destruction of nuclear weapons. Similarly, after the superpowers made
significant progress in conventional disarmament, "other militarily
significant states" would join in reductions "according to reasonable ratios."
China's 1979 proposal also called for a larger UN role in disarmament
activities, "democratization of disarmament," and "strict measures of
international control" of disarmament agreements that do not "prejudice the
sovereignty and security of any state."37

Chinese rhetoric against the US-Soviet nuclear arms race continued
unabated during this time. The 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)
agreement, like the 1972 SALT I accord, was derided as "start[ing] another
round in the nuclear arms race under a new set of rules" by shifting the focus
from quantity to quality. These "agreements written on a scrap of paper" were
termed "disgraceful maneuvers" to "undermine the militancy of the people of
the world in opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace."38 Chinese
criticism of SALT II also focused on Soviet military expansionism. The Soviet
Union needed the new agreement, China contended, to maintain the myth of
"detente" and cover up Soviet arms expansion and war preparations. However,
nothing in SALT II would make the USSR restrain its nuclear weapons
development.39

b. Trends and Developments Since 1982

(1) Disarmament

The incremental changes in Chinese arms control policies which
were begun during the 1978-81 period have intensified since 1982. In May-June
1982, Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua headed the Chinese delegation to
the UN General Assembly Second Special Session on Disarmament and presented
China's position on disarmament. China held that disarmament should be guided
by six basic principles:

- Efforts for disarmament should be integrated with efforts for
  maintaining international peace and security;
- States possessing the largest arsenals should take the lead in
  reducing their arsenals;
- Conventional weapons reduction should be carried out in
  conjunction with nuclear weapons reduction to lessen the
danger of war;
Disarmament measures should be carried out without prejudice or threat to the independence, sovereignty, or security of any state;

Disarmament agreements should provide for strict and effective measures of international verification; and

All states are entitled to participate on an equal footing in the deliberations, negotiations, and settlement of disarmament issues.

Based on these six principles, China advocated the four "inter-related" measures:

All nuclear states should reach an agreement not to use nuclear weapons. Pending such an accord, the nuclear states should each undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear weapon free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other at any time or under any circumstances.

The Soviet Union and the United States should cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of any kind of nuclear weapons, and reduce by 50 percent their existing nuclear arsenals. . . . Thereafter, all nuclear states should undertake to cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of their nuclear weapons, and reduce their respective nuclear weapons and means of delivery according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed upon.

All states should solemnly undertake not to use conventional forces to commit armed intervention or aggression against or military occupation of any other state. As a first step towards conventional disarmament, all foreign occupation troops must be withdrawn without delay. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and the United States should proceed to substantially reduce their heavy and new-type conventional weapons and equipment, especially those for offensive purposes. Thereafter, the other militarily significant states should join them in reducing their respective conventional armaments according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed on.

Chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited.

The Chinese proposal also suggested that an international verification mechanism consisting of representatives from all nuclear and nonnuclear states be established to verify the implementation of disarmament measures. This
verification mechanism should submit reports to the UN General Assembly annually and whenever necessary.40

Huang further said that:

. . . if the superpowers take the lead in halting the testing, improving, or manufacture of nuclear weapons and in reducing their weapons by 50 percent, the Chinese Government is ready to join all other nuclear states in undertaking to stop the development and production of nuclear weapons and to further reduce and ultimately destroy them altogether.41

The 1982 Chinese disarmament proposal contained four new elements:

° linking conventional and nuclear weapons reductions and maintaining that both should occur simultaneously;

° setting a target for superpower disarmament by calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent;

° committing itself, albeit conditionally, to join the other nuclear powers, including the two superpowers, in arms control measures; and

° ascribing to the United Nations a concrete role in the verification of disarmament efforts.

Chinese delegation head Tian Jin discussed China's opposition to the arms race in outer space in a 5 August 1982 presentation to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. Tian called for:

° the superpowers to undertake the responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

° the prohibition of all outer space weapons, including antisatellite weapons; and

° negotiation of a comprehensive treaty banning outer space weapons.42

Although China had previously expressed itself on this issue, Tian set the tone for future disarmament pronouncements, which increasingly emphasized Beijing's stance opposing the superpowers' arms race in outer space.

Typical of such disarmament pronouncements was a 1 May 1983 Hongqi article by Si Chu entitled "The International Struggle Over Disarmament and China's Stand." Si's discussion of the US-USSR arms race characterized US and Soviet efforts to develop outer space weapons as "represent[ing] a prominent new field of the arms race." Before reiterating China's position set at the 1982 UNGA Second Special Session on Disarmament, Si justified China's participation in international disarmament activities since 1978. Whereas in the 1950s and the 1960s the organizations for international disarmament
negotiations were manipulated by the superpowers, the 1970s saw the emergence of Third World and nonaligned nations on the international scene. The "struggle for disarmament thus became a major link in the international anti-hegemonist struggle as a whole," allowing China "a necessary premise" for participating in disarmament activities.

Si Chu's article represented a change from the previous condemnation of the antinuclear "peace movements" of North America and Western Europe, to regarding the peace movement in a favorable light, acknowledging that "they have created great influence that brooks no neglect," and that the peace movements were seen as "reflect[ing] the people's just desire for peace and their resentment against war." Si approvingly noted that the peace movement directed its main efforts against the superpowers and that these movements "are continuing to develop." Following this positive reappraisal, China sent five observers to the August 1983 World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki for the first time in 18 years.

In addition, in the summer of 1983, Chinese representatives attended a session of the Geneva Disarmament Commission and the first UN regional conference on disarmament in New Delhi. At these conclaves, China repeated its own disarmament proposals while attacking the Soviet Union and the United States for their lack of progress toward disarmament.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian's fall 1983 address to the UNGA continued previous Chinese condemnations of the superpowers' arms race. Wu stated that the US-Soviet arms race has extended into outer space and that despite previous arms control negotiations, the superpowers' arms race continued to intensify. Given this situation, Wu said that, "it is only natural" to ask the superpowers to be the first to cut their nuclear arsenals. Wu asserted that China was "for genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament" and enumerated Chinese efforts to promote genuine disarmament. He repeated China's 1982 proposal on the reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear states after the superpowers cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent and proceeded to make a "new" proposal:

... after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken practical action to stop testing, improving, and manufacturing nuclear weapons and agreed on reducing by half their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, a widely representative conference should be convened with the participation of all nuclear weapons states to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapons states. Wu's speech underscored China's efforts to present itself as a sincere participant in international disarmament activities, making practical proposals in contrast to the "sham" arms control activities of the two superpowers.

When President Reagan first announced the US decision to begin work on a space-based ballistic missile defense system in the spring of 1983, China was quick to denounce it as "a new step forward" in the US-Soviet arms race that would aggravate US-Soviet tensions. China again addressed this issue in a 1 November 1983 UNGA Session when Disarmament Ambassador Qian
Jiadong pointed out that space has already become an important new realm of the US-Soviet arms race and that "Star Wars' is no longer fiction, but is fast becoming a reality." Qian called on the two superpowers to halt their arms race in space and use space for peaceful purposes only. He reaffirmed China's support for a ban on the arms race in outer space and the "demilitarization of outer space" and suggested that a ban on antisatellite weapons be negotiated as a first step in prohibiting all outer space weapons. Qian also stated that in principle both outer space weapons and military satellites should be prohibited or restricted, but noted that since military satellites could also play a role in giving advance warning against surprise attack and monitoring disarmament agreements, this issue was rather complicated.47

In late spring 1984 China began to intensify its disarmament activities and further refine its position on arms control. First, at all disarmament symposia, Beijing increased its condemnations of the arms race in outer space. Second, while attacking the superpowers' arms race, China began to take a more positive attitude to US-Soviet arms control talks.

Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong spoke to the UN Disarmament Commission on 9 May 1984, repeating Wu Xueqian's 1983 proposal on disarmament. Qian attributed the stagnation of disarmament negotiations to the superpowers' arms race and called on the United States and Soviet Union to resume bilateral negotiations.48

Premier Zhao Ziyang's 15 May 1984 government work report to the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress also touched on disarmament. Zhao affirmed China's stance "for disarmament and against the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race," for a total ban on and complete destruction of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and space weapons, as well as for substantial reductions of conventional weapons. Zhao reiterated China's no-first-use pledge on nuclear weapons, its opposition to the nuclear NPT, and its call for a representative conference of all nuclear states after the superpowers take the lead in nuclear arms reductions. Zhao also attempted to widen support for China's disarmament position by offering China's backing for "any practical proposal for disarmament which is in keeping with the fundamental principle that the two superpowers take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons."49 Subsequently, on 28 June 1984, Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong, commenting on a joint declaration on nuclear weapons issued by Argentina, Greece, and four other countries, expressed China's appreciation for their efforts and stated that the objective of the declaration was identical with China's position on disarmament. Qian then noted China's difference with the declaration, namely, that the superpowers should act first, and then the other nuclear states, including China, would follow. In addition, Qian called on the superpowers to negotiate "in earnest" for nuclear weapons reductions.50

Foreign Minister Wu also conveyed Chinese concern over the lack of US-Soviet arms control talks during the July 1984 China visit of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth L. Adelman. During their talks, Wu called on the United States and the Soviet Union to stop testing, manufacturing, and improving nuclear weapons.51
By the summer of 1984 China completed its positive reassessment of the peace movement and made its first moves to "rejoin that movement." In a *Renmin Ribao* article entitled "It Must Not Be Despised," "World Affairs" columnist Xiao Xi set the tone for China's new attitude by examining the "mass antinuclear peace movement." Xiao stated implicitly that China shared most of the goals of the peace movement, which was directed mainly against the arms race between the superpowers. The peace movement, according to Xiao, "... reflect[s] the strong desire and firm determination of various peoples to safeguard peace and oppose the threat of nuclear war" and is "in the ascendant." Xiao went on to note that, "The people constitute a motivating force in history, and this force must not be despised," thereby casting the peace movement in an ideological light to enhance its prestige.\(^{52}\)

In late July 1984, the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAIU) held a Forum in Defense of World Peace in Beijing. In a speech to the forum, CAIU President Li Yimang discussed China's positions on peace, the superpowers' arms race, disarmament, and the peace movement and expressed the desire of the CAIU and other Chinese mass organizations to strengthen ties and cooperation with peace activists and peace movements of other countries. Li noted that in the past, many Chinese people's organizations had actively participated in various international peace movements, but the Cultural Revolution had suspended such activities. While acknowledging differing viewpoints, Li nevertheless urged the peace movement to strengthen ties among various groups and to direct its efforts to restrain the arms race of the superpowers.\(^{53}\) Li's speech suggested the resurgence of China's own peace movement, and the participation of five Chinese observers at the 1984 World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs seemed to confirm this. Chinese attendance at this conference has now become a feature of China's peace movement's disarmament activities, which complement China's official disarmament efforts.

China's increasing concern with the arms race in outer space characterized most Chinese statements on disarmament in the fall of 1984. In his address to the UNGA, Wu Xueqian called on the United States and the Soviet Union to stop the nuclear arms race, resume nuclear arms reduction negotiations, and immediately stop extending the arms race into outer space. Wu further refined China's opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by calling for an early conclusion of a treaty banning the arms race in outer space and the prohibition of research, testing, development, manufacture, deployment, and use of all space weapons, as well as the destruction of existing space weapons systems. He also mentioned China's decision to enter the convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. Wu said China would join other countries to combat all acts that violate the convention and would work hard for its further improvement to advance the disarmament process.\(^{54}\)

China's disarmament statements at the UNGA for the remainder of 1984 dealt primarily with the arms race in outer space. Wu Xueqian's call for a treaty banning research, testing, development, manufacture, deployment, and use of space weapons was incorporated into subsequent Chinese pronouncements and formed the basis of China's draft resolution on peaceful uses of outer space submitted to the UNGA. The resolution also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to begin serious bilateral negotiations on space weapons.\(^{55}\)
This draft resolution, along with three other resolutions sponsored by nonaligned countries, Western nations, and the Soviet Union, formed the basis for a resolution adopted on 27 November 1984. 56

The trend toward greater emphasis on the arms race in outer space and a more positive attitude to US-Soviet arms control talks continued in 1985. In addition, Chinese peace movement activities related to disarmament accelerated, and China further indicated its willingness to participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. In a speech by Qian Jiadong at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 19 February 1985, Qian urged the conference to set up "subsidiary bodies" to work on nuclear issues. He noted that heretofore China had not participated in a subsidiary body for a nuclear test ban and announced that "... if such a subsidiary body is established this year, the Chinese delegation would be willing to reconsider its position." Qian's address also touched on the March 1985 US-Soviet arms control talks ("a positive development") and the "de-weaponization of outer space." 57 China's position was further clarified by a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, who said that the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference "... is ready to take part in discussions on complete prohibition of nuclear tests." 58 This offer represented a step away from China's previous complete rejection of partial or total nuclear test ban negotiations contained in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

On 26 March 1985, China submitted a resolution similar to its UN proposal to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In its working document China proposed the prohibition of development, testing, producing, deploying, and using space weapons and the destruction of all existing space weapons. China further proposed that "all states having space capabilities" refrain from developing, testing, or deploying space weapons. 59 Although this proposal appears to reflect China's firm opposition to SDI, it represented a slight retreat. By dropping "research" from its list of proposed banned activities, Beijing assumed a position tacitly more sympathetic to the US stance on SDI, while maintaining anti-SDI rhetoric. Since then, the word "research" has never reappeared in Chinese statements on banning space weapons.

Chinese officials representing government, party, and mass organizations presented China's position on disarmament more frequently and in more diverse arenas in 1985. Chinese delegation head Fu Hao's addressed the 73rd International Parliamentary Conference in Lome, Togo and reiterated China's position on disarmament. 60 Xinhua and Beijing Review both published excerpts from a Li Xiannian letter of reply to the Argentine group, "Appeal of the 100 for Survival," presenting China's disarmament stance. 61 During his April 1985 trip to Oceania, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang reiterated the Chinese disarmament position and Chinese support for a South Pacific nuclear free zone and announced a one million troop cut for the CPLA. 62 China appeared to favor New Zealand in its dispute with the United States over nuclear ship visits, thus strengthening its image as a supporter of nuclear disarmament. Wu Xueqian repeated China's position on disarmament in an interview with Xinhua correspondents at the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. 63
Chinese peace movement activities intensified in the summer of 1985. On 1 June 1985, the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), a nongovernmental organization of various mass organizations and prominent public figures, was established in Beijing. Immediately following the founding of the CPAPD, the Chinese Association for International Understanding convened the Beijing Forum for Safeguarding World Peace, the first international peace forum sponsored by nongovernmental Chinese organizations. In the summer and fall of 1985, Chinese representatives attended six disarmament and peace-related conferences.

In addition to "people-to-people" diplomacy, China continued to discuss disarmament in bilateral talks and multilateral fora. Beijing reciprocated the July 1984 visit to China by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth L. Adelman sending a Chinese disarmament delegation to Washington, D.C. in June 1985. The Chinese delegation, led by Ambassador to the United States Han Xu and Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong, held talks with Adelman and other officials. China gave great publicity to the late July 1985 Australian visit of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen. Qian held arms control and disarmament talks with Australian Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary A.D. Campbell on the South Pacific nuclear free zone, nuclear nonproliferation, the NPT, the NPT review conference in Geneva in September 1985, and US-Soviet arms control talks. Afterwards, an Australian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Australia was in the business of "active cooperation with China in the disarmament and arms control area," and that both countries had "a number of shared perspectives both globally and regionally." China also received UN Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jan Martenson, who met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian on 10 August 1985.

China expressed its intensifying concern with an arms race in outer space by involving Deng Xiaoping on the issue. In talks with various foreign dignitaries, Deng criticized the US position on SDI and the development of space weapons by any superpower. In early August 1985 Deng told British publisher Robert Maxwell that the "Star Wars" plan must not be carried out because it would change qualitatively the superpowers' arms race. Deng repeated his criticism in a meeting with former US President Richard Nixon and in a discussion with West German Christian Socialist Union Chairman Franz-Joseph Strauss.

Both Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and disarmament spokesmen dealt with a full spectrum of disarmament issues in the summer and fall of 1985. During the summer session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Qian Jiadong reiterated the Chinese position on the superpowers taking the lead in nuclear disarmament and China's call for "de-weaponization of space." In addition, Qian expressed China's desire that the summit between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev "make [a] contribution to the relaxation of tension and promotion of disarmament."

Wu Xueqian's speech to the UNGA also welcomed the upcoming US-Soviet summit and the resumption of US-Soviet arms control talks. Wu said China hoped that through serious negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union would reach "a practical and effective agreement without prejudice to third countries," but noted that it would be "unrealistic" to
place hopes for peace only on these talks. Wu then set forth China's four point proposal on disarmament:

Nuclear Disarmament: All nuclear states, the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear free zones. Proceeding from such a basis, an international conference prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded with the participation of all nuclear states.

Conventional Disarmament: NATO and the Warsaw Pact should reach an agreement as early as possible on the drastic reduction of their conventional armaments in order to prevent the possible escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear war in areas with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: The United States and the Soviet Union should immediately stop all forms of the arms race in outer space. All countries with space capability should refrain from developing, testing, or deploying outer space weaponry. An international agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of outer space weaponry should be concluded as soon as possible.

Chemical Weapons: The Geneva Disarmament Conference should complete its negotiations at an early date and conclude a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Pending this, all countries capable of manufacturing and producing chemical weapons should stop testing, producing, transferring, and deploying chemical weapons and pledge themselves against the use of such weapons.

China's proposal placed nuclear, chemical, space, and conventional disarmament on an equal basis for the first time, but with the exception of the proposal for NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional disarmament, no new ground was broken in China's disarmament stance.

On 16 October 1985, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that the Chinese Government respects and supports the common aspirations of the South Pacific countries to establish the South Pacific nuclear free zone. Accordingly, the Chinese Government, after studying the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, would give positive consideration to the obligations to be undertaken by nuclear countries as provided in the protocol attached to the treaty.

On 31 October 1985, China announced that it had submitted two draft resolutions on disarmament issues to the UNGA. The first resolution dealt with the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the second contained the four-point disarmament proposal enunciated by Wu Xueqian at the UNGA. In another UN speech in early November 1985, Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong
called on the United States and the Soviet Union immediately to stop the arms race in outer space and noted China's support for the principles of the "demilitarization of outer space" and the "exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes" as laid down in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.77

(2) Arms Control Talks

China maintained its critical attitude to US-Soviet arms control negotiations in 1982 and 1983. Chinese commentaries on these talks continued in the same vein as previous assessments since the 1970s, which emphasized the threat of Soviet rather than US nuclear weapons. Beginning in 1984, China has shown a more positive assessment of US-Soviet arms control discussions.

Chinese pronouncements on US-Soviet arms talks in 1982 and 1983 condemned both countries for their lack of sincerity toward disarmament and for using arms control talks to step up the arms race. Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua's speech to the UNGA Second Special Session on Disarmament accused the superpowers of starting a new round in the arms race, with each country striving to upgrade or improve its strategic and theater nuclear weapons in order to gain superiority. Huang criticized both US and Soviet arms control proposals:

Now one superpower stresses that an arms freeze should come first while the other insists on priority for arms reduction. They appear to be talking about the need to maintain a balance of arms, but in fact each side wants to attain supremacy and to strengthen its own position in the contest for world hegemony by means of a new round of the arms race.

Huang also singled out the Soviet Union, whose "posturing" on arms talks did not compare with its actions in "its hegemonic policies of nuclear arms expansion, blackmail, and war preparations."78

When the United States and the Soviet Union began a new round of negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons in the summer of 1982, a Ban Yue Tan article by journalist Shan He offered a pessimistic appraisal of the talks:

The past history of the American-Soviet negotiations on strategic weapons and the schemes proposed by both sides showed that both sides have always intended to impose restrictions on and weaken the other and to develop their own superiority in nuclear weapons. They can arrive at agreements only in those fields where both of them feel no need for development or where both of them cannot develop due to their limited economic resources. Such agreements, which can only serve to befuddle world opinion, definitely have no binding force on either of the two superpowers in the nuclear arms race.79

Shan's evaluation of US-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks echoed previous Chinese condemnations of SALT, which was seen as confusing world opinion, and not restraining either of the superpowers in their nuclear arms race.
China saw US-Soviet negotiations on limiting intermediate nuclear forces (INF) from the same view as it saw strategic arms control talks. A 7 May 1983 Renmin Ribao commentary viewed the talks as going on without any progress, because both superpowers used the negotiations as a ploy to weaken their opponents and gain military superiority. While conducting nuclear disarmament talks, a further escalation of the nuclear arms race was in the offing, increasing the danger of nuclear war. Renmin Ribao also warned against transferring Soviet SS-20 missiles from the European to the Asian theater as a result of an arms control agreement. Supporting the US position that European SS-20s should be dismantled and not transferred east, the article stressed that to do otherwise could not guarantee West European security, would complicate the international situation, and would intensify the US-Soviet arms race in Asia. When the Soviet-US INF negotiations stopped in November 1983, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman urged both countries to "carry out disarmament in real earnest, rather than use negotiations to cover up their rivalry for nuclear superiority to the detriment of the security and the interests of other countries." China viewed the suspension of the talks as an escalation in the arms race which posed a grave threat to peace, especially in Europe.

Chinese evaluations of the negative effects of the suspended US-Soviet arms control talks continued and intensified in 1984. As China stressed the threat to peace from the US-Soviet arms race, it began calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to resume arms control talks. At a 9 May 1984 meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Qian Jiadong attributed the "stagnation" of disarmament negotiations to the "fierce rivalry and intensifying arms race of the superpowers." Qian added, however, that China also supported the call of many countries that the two superpowers stop new nuclear weapons deployments and resume arms control talks as soon as possible. At the summer session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Qian reiterated China's call:

It is imperative to urge the Soviet Union and the United States to halt deployment of nuclear weapons [and] sit together to negotiate in earnest to reach agreements on substantial reductions of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing the interests of other countries.

By the summer of 1984, Beijing's view that the United States and the Soviet Union should resume negotiations to reduce their nuclear arsenals became a standard feature of its pronouncements on disarmament, the US-Soviet arms race, and US-Soviet relations. In the fall of 1984, a Renmin Ribao article by "World Affairs" columnist Qi Hua hinted at an even more positive view of US-Soviet arms control negotiations. Qi termed the expansion of the nuclear arms race and lack of disarmament talks "disappointing." Qian wrote:

Controlling nuclear arms is a relatively complicated issue, but if the United States and the Soviet Union are both sincere in the least about disarmament, and if they both hope to establish the minimum necessary mutual confidence through practical measures, it will not be impossible for them, through talks, to turn "continuous escalation" into a gradual winding down of the arms race.
This evaluation represented a change from the usual Chinese charges linking the US-Soviet arms control talks with the accelerating arms race.

The trend toward more positive assessments continued after the announcement that US-Soviet arms control talks would resume in Geneva in March 1985. In his 19 February 1985 speech to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Qian Jiadong said that China regarded the US-Soviet agreement to resume their talks as a "positive development," and he hoped that the two countries would "enter into serious negotiations and come up with results non-detrimental to the interests of other countries but really conducive to world peace." Qian also urged the superpowers to stop deploying new intermediate missiles in Europe and in Asia to facilitate arms control negotiations.85

As the arms control negotiations resumed showing little progress, Chinese commentators began offering pessimistic appraisals of the talks, while Chinese spokesmen kept up the calls for serious negotiations on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union. A 6 June 1985 Beijing Radio broadcast stated that no progress was made in the first round of US-Soviet talks in March and April 1985 and cautioned the public not to be optimistic about the second round of talks. The broadcast charged that the United States and the Soviet Union had launched a fierce propaganda and diplomatic war to win international public opinion and had stepped up the arms race. Both countries were depicted as roughly equivalent in nuclear weapons, but the United States had the lead in developing space weapons. Consequently, the US Strategic Defense Initiative was seen as the major sticking point in negotiations. The radio program concluded that, although the US-Soviet disarmament talks were welcome, so far the outcome of the talks was unsatisfactory.86

Chinese Government spokesmen, however, continued to indicate that China expected some progress from US-Soviet arms control talks. On 7 August 1985, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman expressed China's hope that the United States and the Soviet Union "would hold nuclear disarmament talks in earnest and take genuine and effective measures for nuclear disarmament so as to contribute to world peace."87 In his fall 1985 address to the UNGA, Wu Xueqian stated that China welcomed the resumption of US-Soviet arms control talks (which had adjourned) and the upcoming November Geneva summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Wu reiterated China's hope that through "serious talks," the United States and the Soviet Union would reach "practical and effective agreement without prejudice to third countries."88 On 6 November 1985, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman repeated China's hope that both countries would reach a disarmament agreement and further stated that China welcomed "whatever arms control proposal that will help achieve substantial progress in the disarmament negotiations."89

Chinese expectations of the November summit paralleled its pronouncements on arms control talks. Chinese officials repeatedly welcomed the summit, but did not expect changes in US-Soviet arms control talks. In a Time interview, Deng Xiaoping said that China did not have high expectations for the summit. Deng called the Soviet proposal to reduce missile strength by 50 percent "a rather good proposal," but declined to pass judgment on whether the two sides could reach an agreement. Deng further pointed out that even if
such a reduction took place, arms control would still be a problem, and China would remain concerned about disarmament.90

After the 19-20 November 1985 summit, China called the summit results "exaggerated." A Xinhua commentary noted no progress on such key issues as arms control and regional conflicts:

Although the two sides expressed the hope of making progress on reducing nuclear arsenals by 50 percent and reaching an interim agreement on European medium-ranged missiles at an early date, the discussion of space weapons remained deadlocked. Moscow held that the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons must be based on the abandonment of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), while Washington made it clear that the project would proceed as planned.

The commentary quoted Gorbachev on the necessity to slam shut the door to weapons in space, otherwise radical reductions in nuclear armaments are impossible.91 A Beijing Review article by Yi Ming took a slightly more positive view of the summit results, except in the area of arms control:

Both Reagan and Gorbachev agreed in their joint statement that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be launched, and therefore neither must seek military superiority. However, the summit did not bring forth a solution to the key problem of the limitation and reduction of arms.92

Both commentaries underscored the importance that China attaches to US-Soviet arms talks. The Xinhua commentary, however, like previous Chinese commentaries, viewed the Strategic Defense Initiative, which China opposes, as the major stumbling block in US-Soviet arms control talks.

4. CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES IN CHINA'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

a. China's Independent Foreign Policy

The Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1978 set in motion the reevaluation of domestic and foreign policy as China decided to concentrate on the Four Modernizations. China declared it was following an independent foreign policy and indicated that this new policy was predicated on two issues—peace and development. By 1981, Beijing downgraded the Soviet threat to its security and the value of its de facto alignment with the United States and upgraded the importance of its ties with Third World nations. Beijing initiated an "open door" policy to welcome foreign trade, investment, and technology to aid China's economic development. China continued to categorize itself as a developing country and supported Third World calls for a more equitable international economic system. A prerequisite for development, however, was a peaceful international environment. In striving for peace, China avoided the semblance of alignment with either the Soviet bloc or the Western alliance and attempted to improve relations with both sides. China demonstrated its new flexibility by supporting selectively the positions of either bloc or Third World countries enabling Beijing to carve
out an independent stance on issues it views as vital to its security and sovereignty.

b. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

Nuclear weapons serve both political and military objectives in China's independent foreign policy. Politically, nuclear weapons enhance Chinese prestige and remain a potent symbol of Chinese reemergence as one of the great nations of the world. As the Chinese see it, after 100 years of "imperialist" depredations which played havoc with Chinese sovereignty and security, nuclear weapons indicate, to use Mao's phrase, that "the Chinese people have stood up." China also points with pride to the scientific and technological prowess that nuclear weapons represent as the fruit of self-reliance and a harbinger of future development.

Nuclear weapons have specific military objectives in Chinese foreign policy. First, Chinese "defensive" nuclear forces serve to deter a strategic nuclear attack by either "hegemonist," as well as a more limited conventional attack by the Soviet Union. As Beijing develops its second strike capability, this deterrent force becomes more credible. Second, nuclear weapons represent China's nuclear counterattack capability, which would serve to inflict swift and certain retribution as well as to deny the enemy victory.

Thus, China's growing nuclear capabilities help China offset threats to its security from the Soviet Union. The development of ICBMs and SLBMs, which forms the basis of China's incipient second strike capability, has permitted Beijing somewhat more self-confidence in dealing with Moscow. The ICBMs also serve as a tacit reminder to Washington of the residual distrust between China and the United States which Beijing still considers hegemonistic. The combination of nuclear weapons and a growing CPLA Navy bluewater capability and sea-based missile-launching capability enhance China's role as an Asian regional power and give it leverage in backing up its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

c. Arms Control Policy in Foreign Policy

The issue of peace figures prominently in Chinese pronouncements on its independent foreign policy. China views the US-Soviet arms race as the major threat to world peace, and the issue of arms control and disarmament plays a major public role in Beijing's foreign policy pronouncements.

Chinese arms control policy has several diplomatic objectives:

- China's proposals and pronouncements underscore its role as an independent foreign policy actor. China's proposals represent an independent alternate to superpower arms control, enabling Beijing to build up its credentials among Third World nations as an independent political force.

- China's advocacy of disarmament, professed willingness to take part in arms control negotiations, and "rejoining" the peace movement aim to strengthen its international image as a genuine advocate of peace and sincere participant in the disarmament
process. Beijing also gains political advantage from its pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which, combined with its advocacy of disarmament, allows China to take a rhetorical high ground on arms control issues.

China's disarmament stance seeks to focus attention on the arms control policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Beijing's recent call for both countries to negotiate "in earnest" reflects China's efforts to exert influence (presently only moral or rhetorical) on US-Soviet arms control matters.

China's active participation in disarmament fora and commitment, albeit conditional, to engage in arms control negotiations, appears to be positioning China for the day it joins the Soviet Union and the United States at the negotiating table. Given both China's present nuclear strength and influence in US-Soviet relations, this day still appears a long way off.

China's focus on US and Soviet disarmament, nuclear and otherwise, also serves to deflect attention away from China's arms control and nuclear policies.

China's arms control policy serves to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

Beijing's nonproliferation stance typifies this flexible approach. Its adamant position that it neither favors nor engages in nuclear proliferation, coupled with its IAEA membership, aims to build Chinese credentials among nonproliferation advocates. In declining to accede to the NPT, however, China is able to maintain its critical stance of the superpowers and preserve its flexibility to engage in both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

Beijing's attitude to the arms race in outer space also reflects this flexibility. China appears adamantly opposed to arms in outer space, but further examination of Chinese calls to demilitarize space and ban space weapons, however, shows a more ambivalent attitude. By excluding "research" from its proposed ban on activities leading to the development of space weapons, China's stance against SDI becomes more problematic, as there is considerable ambiguity, not to mention controversy, in the difference between research and development of antiballistic missile systems. Thus, China appears to be opposing SDI while assuming a position tacitly sympathetic to the US position. China also has an ambivalent attitude to the prohibition of military satellites. China's plans to develop military satellites on its own may be a source of this attitude.

Chinese arms control policy has three military objectives. First, Beijing's arms control policy seeks to guarantee unrestricted development of its nuclear weapons program. Chinese proposals to join in disarmament negotiations after the United States and the Soviet Union substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals sound reasonable, but in reality entail no practical commitment or action to limit China's own nuclear forces. Second, China hopes to improve its military position vis-à-vis the superpowers. By encouraging
the US-Soviet arms control talks, China hopes to slow down the US-Soviet arms race. Although it has almost no influence in this sphere, China nonetheless realizes that a US-Soviet agreement to limit or even reduce nuclear weapons would rebound to its advantage as its own nuclear forces grow. Third, China aims to prevent arms control agreements detrimental to its security interests. Because it does not want a US-Soviet INF agreement to permit the shifting of SS-20s to Asia, Beijing insists on arms control agreements that "do not prejudice the security and sovereignty of any third country."
NOTES


3 Ibid., p. 111.


7 The Military Balance, p. 111.


16Ibid., p. 23.


23Kumar, op cit, p. 144.


30Ibid., p. 50.
31 Ibid., pp. 51-52.


33 Ibid., p. 8.

34 Yu, op. cit., p. 54.


36 Leng, op. cit., pp. 9-12.


58Beijing Xinhua, 6 March 1985, in FBIS/China, 6 March 1985, p. Al.


64Beijing Xinhua, 1 June 1985, in FBIS/China, 3 June 1985, p. Al.


75 Beijing Xinhua, 16 October 1985, in FBIS/China, 16 October 1985, p. Al.

76 Beijing Xinhua, 31 October 1985, in FBIS/China, 1 November 1985, p. Al.

77 Beijing Xinhua, 8 November 1985, in FBIS/China, 8 November 1985, p. Al.


89 Beijing Xinhua, 6 November 1985, in FBIS/China, 6 November 1985, p. Al.
