Analysis of Combat Training Center Archive Data for Critical Leader Behaviors

Paul A. Jarrett
BDM Federal, Inc.

February 1996

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United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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NOTE: The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army
position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
The ARI-CTC Archive contains records of exercises conducted at the U.S. Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The information contained in the archive was used to examine critical leader behaviors in the art of battle command. Some factors that were found to influence the commander’s ability to see the battlefield are setting and enforcing standards of subordinate reporting and staff planning, and the commander’s ability to use and trust subordinates. The commander’s ability to focus the staff and subordinate effort is also discussed as a critical leader behavior. Trends in the use and quality of commander’s intent and mission statements are reported. Additionally, six missions were described in detail as case studies which illustrate critical leader behaviors.
Technical Report 1038

Analysis of Combat Training Center Archive Data for Critical Leader Behaviors

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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) continues a wide range of research efforts to advance the battle command initiative. The goal is to assist the Army in continuing to develop leaders with the fundamental competencies and characteristics that enable them to see and understand the battlefield, establish a vision, articulate a unifying concept, and invoke the force to impose their will.

This report contains analysis of information from the Army Research Institute-Combat Training Center (ARI-CTC) Archive and Research Center. The center contains a wealth of data from the simulated battles fought at the U.S. Army Combat Training Centers. This report is the fourth in a series of analyses of material in the ARI-CTC Archive and Research Center. It was funded by the ARI Studies and Analysis Program under Contract MDA 903-92-D-0075. Results were briefed to the Battle Command Battle Laboratory on 20 October, 1995.

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ANALYSIS OF COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ARCHIVE DATA FOR CRITICAL LEADER BEHAVIORS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

In October, 1993, the Commander of TRADOC directed ARI to undertake a research initiative to address the art of battle command. The effort had the goals of identifying and explaining the "art of battle command," and determining how battle command can be formally transmitted and taught within Army institutions. As one prong of this ARI-wide effort an investigation was made into the database of the ARI-CTC Archive and Research Center.

Procedure:

With records of hundreds of simulated battles fought at the CTCs, the research center contains a wealth of battle command information. Overall, 101 missions conducted at NTC and JRTC were randomly selected to examine critical leader behaviors that the art of battle command comprises. The search availed itself not only of the record of battle events but also relied on the notes and analyses of the observer-controllers and the conclusions of the participants as revealed in the after action reviews. Identification of the critical leader behaviors supports the continuing discussion and clarification of battle command doctrine.

Findings:

Seeing the battlefield. Visualization of the battlefield is more than the physical act of observing the battleground. It is a cognitive reconstruction of the battlefield framework that allows the commander to see enemy and friendly forces, terrain and weather, in terms of time, space, and purpose. Visualization is dynamic; the commander sees the current state, the end state, and the bridge of actions and activities that will lead from one to the other. To see the battlefield the commander must construct a mental model of the situation comprising a comprehension of the fighting forces, the means that sustain and support them, the physical world that constrains them, the goals and objectives that provide their purpose, and the range of possibilities that arise from their interactions.

There are two vital aspects to commanders developing an accurate and useful visualization. The first is the information that flows to them from their own perceptions as well as from subordinates. These are the bottom-up inputs that serve to identify the situation. The second, and perhaps even more significant aspect, is the knowledge the commanders bring to the battlefield which allow them to quickly organize the information available, to fill in missing pieces, and to project future possibilities. These knowledge structures allow commanders to develop a rich and complex mental model from a relatively few but critical pieces of information.

Examination of CTC take-home packages revealed two critical leader behaviors which, when deficient, impair the ability of the commander to see the battlefield. First, the commander must set and
enforce standards for subordinate reporting and staff planning. Numerous instances trace a commander’s inability to accurately visualize to a failure to set or enforce such standards. Common weaknesses include neglect of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process, failure of the entire staff to participate in the production of the Decision Support Template, and incomplete and inaccurate spot and Battle Damage Assessment reporting by subordinate leaders. Second, commanders must use and trust subordinates. They must listen openly and objectively judge the reliability and credibility of staff information. A typical instance is illustrated by the following OC observation.

The S2’s predictive analysis was correct; however he was shot down by Co/Tm commanders who had their own NTC ideas and faulty understanding of how the enemy fights. The S2, eventually frustrated by those with a deficit of enemy knowledge and understanding of the IPB process, unfortunately sat down and the TF commander and the Co/Tm commanders did not hear a correct appraisal of how they would die the next day.

Thus, visualization of the battlefield relies not just on the tactical proficiency of the commanders but on their full range of skills, including organizational and leadership competencies and the ability to train and discipline the unit.

Providing focus. The commander must provide focus to the staff and subordinate unit effort with clear, concise intent and guidance. Including commander’s intent as part of the order began doctrinally with the publication of the 1986 FM 100-5 Operations. Despite that, of the 40 CTC missions examined from the years 1990 and 1991, none of the orders contained a commander’s intent statement. This number rose dramatically such that, in the years 1993-1994, 92% (35 of 38) of missions contained a commander’s intent statement. The rise is probably the result of increased emphasis in both the schools and at the CTC. (Take-home packages from CTCs began including an evaluation of commander’s intent in 1992.) Nonetheless, deficiencies are still prevalent. In the 1993-1994 sample of missions, only 63% (24 of 38) have an intent statement that includes purpose and/or endstate as doctrinally prescribed and only 39% (15 of 38) are rated as clear. Those rated as unclear typically include too much concept of the operation and/or staff guidance information which obscures the intent.

Additionally, the commander must ensure continued focus throughout the effort. The sample of battles included several examples in which the commander gave clear initial guidance but failed to keep the staff focused throughout the planning process. The efforts became uncoordinated, and mission success was impaired.

Commanders must also focus their own attention on critical tasks that they can influence. They must avoid becoming so involved with one action that they allow other actions to remain unsupervised. Typically, the action that draws attention is the more glamorous activity of tactical planning; for example, course of action development, while critical factors such as obstacle emplacement, system maintenance, and company team preparation jeopardize mission success. The solution involves a combination of the critical leader behaviors, including identifying critical tasks, personal supervision, and development of a trained and disciplined unit.

Case studies. The examination into the ARI-CTC Archive included case studies in which six missions were examined in great detail. These provide excellent illustrations of the critical leader behaviors discussed before, as well as additional leader requirements. Other leader behaviors discussed in less detail in the report include:
• The use of judgment, reasoning, and calculation to make effective decisions.

• The ability to position oneself so as to see, control, and influence the battle without either becoming a target or being drawn into the direct firefight.

• The ability to use key staff and to apportion one’s own time so as to be involved in the planning process without dominating the staff.

Utilization of Findings:

The findings of this study will contribute to the resources used to train and coach battle commanders at the CTCs. The Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL) will also benefit as it continues to develop the concept of battle command and conducts battle command experiments.
# ANALYSIS OF COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ARCHIVE DATA FOR CRITICAL LEADER BEHAVIORS

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ANALYSIS OF COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ARCHIVE DATA
FOR CRITICAL LEADER BEHAVIORS

INTRODUCTION

Background

The purpose of this study is to identify Critical Leader Behaviors (CLBs) in the art of battle command at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs).

The practice of battle command in the art of war has changed little from Alexander at Issus, to Marshal Davout at Auerstadt, or to the battalion commander who won his battle at the National Training Center yesterday. The speed and power of weapons have changed, the ability to communicate has changed, but the basic skills that a commander must possess have not changed. *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, defines battle command as:

Battle command is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. [It] includes visualizing a current state and a future state, then formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. [Battle command] also includes assigning missions; prioritizing, and allocating resources; selecting the critical time and place to act; and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight (*FM 100-5, Operations*, p. Glossary-1, June 1993).

The skills that a commander uses in accomplishing battle command are the CLBs.

Since the mid-1980s, the Army has collected data from the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at the ARI-CTC Archive, Presidio of Monterey, California. These data contain comments made by observer-controllers in take home packages, battle replays, after action review (AAR) video tapes, and the orders and graphics produced by units during each rotation. This project used these data to describe the leader behaviors at the NTC and JRTC and to assess the impact of those behaviors.

The purpose of this report is:

- To determine whether CLBs can be identified in CTC data.
- To identify CLBs.
- To test how the observations of CLBs relate to the success or failure of a unit’s mission.
- To present observations of CLBs gathered from CTC Archive Data, including Take Home Packages (THPs), After Action Review (AAR) Videos, Battle Replay, and Communications Tapes.

Overview of Results

In Part I, mission statements and commanders’ intents were evaluated for quality and content, and whether they could be related to mission outcome. Over 90% of the mission statements evaluated were rated as "good". Commander intent statements showed a trend of increasing occurrence and quality beginning in 1992. Neither mission statement quality nor commander’s intent quality was significantly related to mission outcome.
In Parts II and III, data sources were reviewed to identify CLBs. A review of THPs was conducted in Part II and CLBs were inferred from the comments of observer-controllers. In Part III a review of communications tapes, battle replays, and AAR videos was made, resulting in six case studies of battles. Overall, examination of 101 missions produced 458 observations of CLBs.

The CLBs identified in this report are:

CLB 1. The Commander’s Ability to See the Battlefield and Predict Future Events.

CLB 1a.1. Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Staff Coordination.

CLB 1a.2. Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports.

CLB 1b. Trust and Subordinates.


CLB 3. The Positioning of the Commander on the Battlefield.

CLB 4. The Commander’s Use of Key Staff.

CLB 5. The Commander’s Use of Judgment, Reasoning, and Calculations.


CLB 7. The Clarity and Content of the Commander’s Intent.

An evaluation of the two methods used reveals that each method has its own strengths in displaying CLBs. The technique used in Part III produces clearer examples of CLB cause and effect than the technique used in Part II. Using the THPs in Part II, an analyst can review the comments made by observer/controllers. In these comments the observer/controllers remark on what the TF is doing wrong. Using the observer/controller comments, the analyst must attempt to connect the observations with events that occurred during the mission. Using the sources in Part III, an analyst can often observe both the cause and effect of actions.

An example is Mission N3-1. Using the data collected in Part II for CLB 1, all one would know is that the TF failed and part of the reason was the staff did not do a detailed analysis to provide the commander with all the available information. The analyst can draw the conclusion that the commander could not see the battlefield and properly deploy his TF. In Part III an analyst can gain a better understanding of how CLBs effected events and the outcome of a mission. An analyst can:

- Hear the TF scouts sending spot reports to the commander.
- Observe that the spot reports are incorrect.
- Note that there is a lack of communications with the Co/Tms.
- Watch the TF maneuver, executing the commander’s judgment on how to defeat the enemy in that situation.
- Watch the TF commander admit his mistakes caused by the incorrect reports during his AAR.

There are two major drawbacks with the techniques used in Part III. First, that is extremely
labor intensive. Most of the battles last for about two hours, so that is the minimum time necessary to listen to the communication’s tapes. AAR videos run from two to four hours in length. Battle replays can be watched in 30 minutes. Putting all the data sources together to understand what occurred will take an analyst approximately 30 hours to review a single mission. The second drawback is the scarcity of complete data sets from which to draw. This report’s random sample of rotations yielded only six percent usable missions. However, when all sources are present and complete, this method, supported by the data in the THPs, is the best way to observe CLBs.

Testing how a CLB influences the outcome of the mission has proven to be very difficult. The information collected in Part II did not demonstrate a firm cause and effect relationship between the CLB observations and mission outcome. There are cause and effect observations in Part III, but their use as the sole reason for success or failure of a mission is not creditable. During any one mission there are just too many variables of training, leadership, mistakes, and tactical errors to assign a reason for mission success or failure to CLBs.

For example, the review of mission N19-1 made a connection between CLB 1, seeing the battlefield, and the failure of the tactical mission. While this may be true, if one observes the battle replay one cannot miss the fact that the TF had also violated a principle of war, mass (CLB 5). In this mission the TF was dispersed and the OPFOR was massed. As a result, we can conclude that failure to see the battlefield probably contributed to the failure of the mission. We cannot, however, say how much of the failure was due to weakness on the CLB 1 vice failure to achieve mass.

Review of all sources indicates that all of the CLBs are associated; when a commander excludes one CLB it can have a negative effective on another. An example is CLB 2 and CLB 1. When the battle begins, if the commander has not identified the IPB as critical work and focused his staff on preparing for the mission, the lack of an IPB will affect the amount and type of information and analysis he receives on the friendly and enemy situation.

The CLBs are the skills that a commander uses in accomplishing battle command. They are not new. These skills are found in the writings of Frederick the Great, Jomini, Clausewitz, or the analysts of Napoleon. They, without a doubt, influence the outcome of events on a battlefield or at the NTC. In studying missions at the NTC, the CLBs provide an insight to what did and did not occur. When it is understood that no single reason is normally responsible for success or failure of a mission, CLBs provide a useful structure for analyzing CTC battles.

Drawing a cause and effect relationship between these CLBs and a mission outcome is not possible, for measuring which CLB (or other variable) tipped the balance between success and failure will always be conjecture on the part of an analyst. Drawing a cause and effect relationship between CLBs and events in a mission is possible in some cases. When analysts, or trainers understand the events in a mission, they can identify the strengths and weaknesses in battle command and recommend improvements. The observations of strengths and weaknesses viewed over time will give training managers the information necessary to develop and implement training programs to sustain and improve battle command within the Army’s leadership.

Selection of Missions

Ten rotations were randomly selected from the NTC data base, two rotations per fiscal year (1990 through 1994). Two combat-maneuver units were selected from each rotation for analysis. The unit selection criteria were to select an armor heavy task force (TF) and a mechanized infantry heavy TF for each rotation. In all but one case an armor heavy TF and a mechanized heavy TF
participated in the rotation. In the case where a mechanized heavy TF was not present in the rotation, a motorized infantry battalion was selected. In addition, information from one rotation at the JRTC was examined.

Reference Data

The information analyzed in this report is included in the appendices for reference. Appendix A contains a chart of the missions including the type of mission, the ratings of commander’s intent and mission statement, and the percentage of friendly and enemy forces remaining at end of mission. The actual mission statements and commander’s intent statements are contained in Appendix B. Appendix C contains the comments by Observer/Controller that pertain to CLBs. Summaries of communication tapes and battle replays are in Appendix D; battle replay graphics are in Appendix D; and CLBs drawn from after action review tapes are in Appendix F.

PART I: MISSION STATEMENTS AND COMMANDER’S INTENTS

Method

The 11 rotations yielded 101 TF missions (98 from the NTC). Using the TF THP for each rotation, the TF missions were analyzed to find the mission statement, the commander’s intent for the mission, battle statistics, and observer/controller comments on critical leader behaviors.

Mission Success. In this analysis, success or failure is based on the end-of-mission combat power of the blue force (the unit being trained, BLUFOR) compared to that of the opposing force (OPFOR). The rationale was that the BLUFOR must retain combat effectiveness (one-third or greater of its combat power) to be successful or partially successful.

Table 1. Success or Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>BLUFOR</th>
<th>OPFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>At &gt;= 1/3 Combat Power at End-of-Mission</td>
<td>At &lt; 1/3 Combat Power at End-of-Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>At &gt;= 1/3 Combat Power at End-of-Mission</td>
<td>At &gt;= 1/3 Combat Power at End-of-Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>At &lt; 1/3 Combat Power at End-of-Mission</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between partial success and success is the combat strength of the OPFOR at the end of the mission. Once the BLUFOR drops below one-third of its combat power, it is combat ineffective and its mission is a failure, regardless of the remaining strength of the OPFOR. For the NTC missions, combat power is represented by the percent of combat vehicles remaining at the end of the mission. Combat vehicles includes fire support, air defense, and, engineering vehicles in addition to tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. In the three JRTC missions, combat power is represented by the percent of personnel remaining at the end of the
mission. The rules for classifying outcomes are defined in Table 1.

**Mission Statements.** Mission statements were collected for each mission from the THPs. Mission statements were evaluated using the explanation of a mission statement from *FM 101-5: Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Final Draft)*, July 1992. The mission statement of a unit, found in its order, is a clear, concise statement of a unit’s mission. It consists of:

- **WHO** (for example, 1st platoon, 1st brigade) does
- **WHAT** (for example, attacks to secure objective GOLD, defends forward of PL BLUE),
- **WHEN** (D-day, H-hour, 00, 050200Z Jan 19__),
- **WHERE** (such as, in zone, in sector, along axis RED), and
- **WHY** (to aid passage of exploiting force, defeat enemy in zone, to destroy first-echelon regiments, and so on) (Italics and spacing added.) (*FM 101-5*, p. H-65).

Table 2. Example of a Good Mission Statement

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who</strong></td>
<td>TF Armor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What</strong></td>
<td>defends in sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Where</strong></td>
<td>from PL Winchester (NK2227 to NK1817) to PL Spencer (NK4620 to NK4310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When</strong></td>
<td>at 120600APR9_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why</strong></td>
<td>to deny penetration of PL Spencer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission statements were graded as "good" or "poor." A statement rated as "good" contained the "who, what, where, when, and how" as outlined in FM 101-5. Mission statements not containing all of these requirements were graded as "poor." The graded mission statements were compared with mission outcomes to observe the effects of good and poor mission statements on the outcome. Our hypothesis was that a mission will be more successful when the mission statement is good.

An example of a good mission statement is contained in Table 2 and an example of a poor mission statement is found in Table 3.

---

1The JRTC numbers are for personnel only. Because of this, JRTC data were not used in analyses for outcomes.

2Mission statement for the NTC defense in sector mission coded in this report as N2.
Table 3. Example of a Poor Mission Statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who</th>
<th>TF Armor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What</td>
<td>moves along Route Beige to occupy, defense in sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When</td>
<td>and execute NLT130001UJAN9_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why</td>
<td>to deny enemy penetration of PL Iceland:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When</td>
<td>on order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What</td>
<td>execute passage of lines with TF Mech moving from forward of PL Potsdam to PL Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When</td>
<td>on order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What</td>
<td>brigade reserve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This mission statement assigns more then one mission and fails to tell where the missions will take place.

**Commander's Intent.** The commander’s intent tells subordinate commanders what the BLUFOR commander wants to achieve during a mission. It is used to assist subordinates in their decision making when the BLUFOR commander is not available for consultation or further orders. The commander’s intent was evaluated using the criteria found in *Field Manual 100-5*.

The commander’s intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and must be understood two echelons below the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is not a summary of the concept of the operation. Its purpose is to focus subordinates on the desired end state. Its utility is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept of operations no longer apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end (Bold print added) (*FM 100-5: Operations, June 1993*, p. 6-6.).

Each commander’s intent was reviewed for content and analyzed for clarity and quality. The content review examined the commander’s intent to identify whether a purpose, end state, or both were included. Purpose and end state were coded separately as either "present" or "not present."

The clarity of the commander’s intent was based upon the ease in finding the purpose and/or end state’s presence. Often these statements would be buried in text consisting of concept of the operations data, sub-unit instructions, or staff guidance for planning. If the purpose, end state, or both were explicit, then the statement was coded as "clear." If the purpose, end state, or both were ambiguous or difficult to find in the text, the statement was coded as "not clear."

The quality of the commander’s intent was a combination of the review for content and

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3From mission statement for the NTC defense in sector mission coded in this report as N17.
analysis of clarity. The quality was judged to be "very good" if the statement included a clear purpose and end state. "Good" statements had either a purpose or an end state, coded as clear or not clear. "Poor" quality statements were those without a purpose or an end state.

Table 4. Quality of the Commander's Intent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating:</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criteria:</td>
<td>Both purpose and end state were present and clearly written.</td>
<td>A purpose or end state was present.</td>
<td>No purpose or end state was present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of a "very good" commander's intent is:

"The purpose of this mission is to defeat the enemy regiment in sector, retain key terrain in our sector, and protect supply lines to the east. At the end of this mission we will have allowed no larger than a battalion sized penetration of our sector with the TF positioned in BPs behind PL Sharp, scouts forward of PL Sharp, and be prepared to conduct the attack." (N2, DIS).

This commander's intent is clear and to the point.

An example of a "good" commander's intent is:

"There are three keys to our success: finding and destroying the enemy reconnaissance, verifying our situation template, and massing all four defeat mechanisms on a point of focus. During the preparation phase we must have 360 degree security. I want to place a platoon sized security force along the LD to hold us here. I have to get the scouts out early and deep to provide eyes on the objective and pinpoint his obstacles and fighting positions. Mass is the key to success. Accordingly I want to move in the TF box then pick a point of focus (scherpunkt) and mass all four defeat mechanisms. To destroy the enemy at the point while we isolate his supporting forces. I intend to task organize for a breach-in-stride and I want our fires to destroy- not suppress. Success will be achieved if we create a penetration, pass 3d Brigade, and have combat power to destroy remaining forces on the objective." (Bold type added to highlight purpose) (N7, DATK).

Most of this commander's intent is fluff, staff guidance, and concept of the operation information. The purpose of the mission is buried in the text at the end of the paragraph.

An example of a "poor" commander's intent is:

"I want to use reconnaissance assets forward to identify the enemy axis of advance. Once identified, I want to move to attack at constricted terrain to destroy by direct and indirect fires for the FD. We will mass combat power on the flanks and hold the enemy in place with the advance guard of the battalion." (N8, MTC).

This commander's intent is only a concept of the operation.

Ratings of the quality of intent statements were related to mission outcomes to observe the effects of commander's intent on the outcome. Our hypothesis is that a mission will tend to be
more successful when the commander's intent is very good.

Results

Mission Statements. Of the 101 mission statements, 92 were rated as "good" and nine as "poor." A crosstabulation of the mission statement by mission outcome was done to observe the effects of "good" and "poor" mission statements on the outcome. A Chi-Square was done to test the hypothesis of dependence, see Table 5. The Chi-Square test of the relationship between the quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mission Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Mission Statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DF: 2; Chi-Square, Pearson: .5308; Likelihood of Ratio: .5400. N=94  Note: Does not include the three JRTC missions nor four NTC missions without outcomes.

of a mission statement and the mission outcome was not statistically significant, .5308, so the research hypothesis that these variables are related is rejected. The imbalance between good and poor mission statements makes detecting a relationship difficult. The relationship is in the predicted direction, but is not strong enough to be declared statistically significant given the imbalance of cases and their number.

Commander's Intent. Of the 101 missions analyzed, only 64 contained a commander's intent. Of those 64 missions, only 35 (55%) contained a purpose, end state, or both. A total of 23 missions had both purpose and end state (36%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CI's Clarity, No. of Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI with both Purpose and End State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI with End State only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI with Purpose only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIs without Purpose or End State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Missions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Content Frequency for the Commander's Intent (CI)
An examination of commander's intents was conducted to determine clarity. The examination revealed that 23 were rated as "clear" and 12 as "not clear." It is interesting that 18 of the 23 (78%) missions that contained both a purpose and end state were also rated as clear. The majority of those 18 missions (13), belonged to only four units and were not distributed throughout the data base. Table 6 contains the observation frequency for the contents of the commander's intent statements.

Table 7. Number of Commander's Intents by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Missions with a Commander's Intent</th>
<th>Number with Purpose and/or End State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of missions containing a commander's intent has increased over the period observed, see Table 7. In 1990, 52% of the missions had a commander's intent, but none of those missions contained a purpose or end state. In 1994, 94% of the missions had a commander's intent and 72% of them had a purpose and/or end state. There are two possible reasons for the sudden increase. First, the inclusion of a commander's intent in a unit's order began with the publishing of Operations: FM 100-5, 1986. The rising number of commander's intents could be attributed to units complying with the published doctrine. The delay was caused by the time required for Army schools to teach the doctrine, and for the graduates of the schools to begin using the doctrine in units. Second, the NTC began including commander's intents in the THPs in 1992, when the percentage jumps.

Table 8. Mission Outcome by Commander's Intent Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mission Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Commander's Intent</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DF: 4; Chi-Square, Pearson: .9632; Likelihood of Ratio: .9622. N=60 Note: Does not include the three JRTC missions nor one NTC mission without an outcome.
Content and clarity data were combined into a variable of "intent quality" to examine the
effect that they had on mission outcome. A crosstabulation and Chi-Square analysis was performed
to test the hypothesis that the mission outcome variable was dependent on the intent quality variable
(see Table 8). This hypothesis was rejected. Crosstabulations and Chi-Squares of the individual
parts of the intent's quality (clarity, presence of a purpose, and presence of an end state) by mission
outcome, also failed to produce any evidence of an association. As with the mission statements, the
relationship between the quality of the intent and outcome was in the predicted direction, but the
magnitude of the relationship is not large enough to be declared statistically significant.

PART II: REVIEW OF THPs FOR OBSERVER/CONTROLLER COMMENTS ON CLBs

Method

Thirteen CTC rotation THPs were reviewed for comments by JRTC and NTC
observer/controllers on CLBs or evidence of CLBs. Each THP was reviewed focusing on the
following sections: Executive Summary, Intelligence, Maneuver, and Command and Control (in later
THPs this section is named Battle Command). In addition, for the three JRTC missions, the after
action review (AAR) video tapes were reviewed.

The comments were evaluated to identify CLBs. For this study, a CLB is the action a
commander takes in accomplishing his military mission. The analyst sought to determine CLBs
through recurring observer/controller comments found in the THPs.

Results

CLB 1: The Commander’s Ability To See the Battlefield and Predict Future Events

Seeing the battlefield (or visualization) is more than the physical act of observing the
battleground. It is a cognitive construction of the battlefield framework that allows the commander
to see enemy and friendly forces, terrain and weather, in terms of time, space, and purpose.
Dynamic in the sense that the commander sees the current state, the end state, and the bridge of
actions and activities that will lead from one to the other. Subordinate commanders and staff
accomplish actions that assist the commander in understanding the situation. These actions are
crucial in facilitating the commander’s ability to see the battlefield.

The staff and subordinate commanders assist the commander in seeing the battlefield
throughout the sequence of planning, preparing, and executing a mission. They give the commander
the information necessary to construct an understanding of the battlefield. Necessary information is
reported to the commander through estimates, decision support aids, graphic aids, courses of action
(enemy and friendly) briefings, status reports, and verbal reports. Without these reports and
products, the commander must rely on his own knowledge and what he can gather for himself to
understand the situation. To receive the necessary information, commanders must instruct their staff
and subordinate commanders on what information they want and when it is needed.

Most (90%) THP comments categorized as "the commander seeing the battlefield" involved
three areas: quality and quantity of intelligence products by the S2 (intelligence officer and section);
spot and battle damage assessment reports by the subordinate commanders, and planning and
coordination by the staff. These all facilitate the commander developing the "cognitive construction
of the battlefield." Their presence does not mean the commander can do this well - only that he has
the information he needs.

Two connected CLBs were suggested by the comments categorized as commander sees the battlefield. They are: CLB 1a, the commander sets and enforces standards, and CLB 1b, the commander trusts and uses his subordinates. The CLB 1a "the commander sets and enforces standards" is further categorized as: CLB 1a.1, the commander sets and enforces standards for staff coordination and products, and CLB 1a.2, the commander sets and enforces standards for subordinate elements sending spot and battle damage assessment reports.

**CLB 1a.1 Standards for staff coordination.** Ample evidence (125 comments) of staffs not providing the quality and quantity of products necessary for the commander to see the battlefield exists (see Appendix C). The problem, noted mostly in the Intelligence BOS, is that the staff had not completed a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Three examples are:

[Poor TF IPB] providing inadequate focus for maneuver planning. [A] faulty IPB resulted in the TF’s inability to see the enemy or friendly forces during the battle (N9, Intel).

The S2 had yet to produce a TF level situational template, an event template, and an R&S plan of any sort. He had yet to produce these products because he had yet to follow the five-step IPB process to arrive at a logical understanding of the enemy on which to base his product (N14, Intel).

Since only one COA was explored, the S2 was not prepared to provide an analysis to the commander as events unfolded on the battlefield (N14, Intel).

Along with the S2s not producing the proper IPB products, the staff coordination in producing a plan and a decision support template was often faulty. The entire staff should work together planning, sharing information, and helping the commander. The comments below demonstrate some problems found in the THPs.

IPB must drive the planning process. Development of the DST is a joint staff responsibility (N17, Operating System/Lessons Learned).

Poor passing of intelligence among the staff (Paraphrased from N15, Intel).

The staff did not do a detailed analysis to provide the commander all available information. No friendly force inventory, the TF commander could not accurately see the status of the TF. CCIR [Commander’s Critical Information Requirements] for the preparation phase was not tracked (Paraphrased from N3, MTC).

**CLB 1a.2 Standards for subordinate element reports.** As with the staff production of planning products, the companies and staff must communicate information among themselves and with the commander for the commander to see the battlefield. This includes company commanders talking to each other on the command radio network (cross talk), spot reports being sent to the commander and staff, and BDA assessments being sent to the S2. Three example comments are below.

Internal cross talk and accurate/timely spot reporting enhance battle tracking, timely decision making, and TF synchronization (N17, Operating Systems/Lessons Learned).

The TF failed to achieve the unity of effort or concentrate combat power, resulting in a
piecemeal battle from PL BLACK to PL BLUE. The main cause of the piecemeal attack was the TF’s failure to see the battlefield. The SPOTREPs from subordinate units were inaccurate and never assisted Team C and the TOC in depicting the true position of the delaying enemy. The TF commander and the S3 lost commo with key leaders and could not coherently and quickly FRAGO Co/Tms [company/teams] to unplanned Bps and EAs (N12, BOS Lessons Learned).

[The TF’s] inability to track/assess the enemy during battles [was] due to lack of SPOTREPs and BDA from units in contact (N17, Executive Summary and Trends).

CLB 1b Trust and subordinates. Once the commander and the staff receive reports and intelligence products they must be used in planning and execution to be effective. The second CLB identified is that the TF commander must use and trust his subordinates; he must take their information and determine the reliability and credibility of it and not dismiss it out-of-hand. In the examples below the commander failed to use the products of the S2. Two of the seven comments found are included below.

Since the TF commander does not use intelligence products to develop the scheme of maneuver, time distance analysis, . . . , is not used. . . . The TF commander could not see the battlefield and failed to develop the situation (N7, BDE MTC).

[Situational template was not used for mission planning.] The S2’s predictive analysis was correct; however, he was shot down by Co/Tm commanders who had their own NTC ideas and faulty understanding of how the enemy fights. The S2, eventually frustrated by those with a deficit of enemy knowledge and understanding of the IPB process, unfortunately sat down and the TF commander and the Co/Tm commanders did not hear a correct appraisal of how they would die the next day (N5, DIS).

CLB 2: Focus: The Commander’s Identification of Critical Work in All Phases of the Battle

Comments found indicate that commanders must focus their TFs on completing the tasks that lead to a successful mission. This includes focusing the staff to the mission and coordinating their work; focusing the line elements to the individual tasks that support the overall mission; and focusing the commander’s attention on the tasks which must be completed for the mission to be successful.

Focusing the staff. The TF staff receives its planning focus for the TF’s mission through mission analysis of the higher headquarters’ order, the commander’s intent, and the commander’s guidance. Once focused, a trained staff should be capable of producing a well coordinated and workable plan. However, the commander must ensure that the staff remains focused and working collectively throughout the battle.

After the staff and commander have conducted mission analysis, the TF commander restates the mission and issues his guidance and intent. The staff then takes this information and begins to prepare courses of action (COA). Without the TF commander’s information, the staff will not be focused on the mission.

Rotation N17 contains a series of comments that exemplify the commander focusing his staff.

The commander’s guidance normally followed mission analysis and had sufficient detail to
focus the staff planning effort; however, guidance was sometimes not issued in terms of effect. The commander did provide guidance for each operating system though it sometimes lacked detail (N17, Executive Summary and Trends).

. . . [The commander] explained how his intent fit within the intent of the higher commander (N17, Executive Summary and Trends).

The entire staff was normally not present during the planning process, forcing staff officers to develop their portions of the plan without coordinating their efforts (N17, Executive Summary and Trends).

The commander gave his guidance and explained his intent, focusing the staff on the mission to be planned, but the TF commander failed to keep the staff focused throughout the planning process and the staff failed to coordinate their efforts. Of this TF’s six missions, two were failures and four were partial successes.

**Focusing subordinate units.** The commander must also focus his Co/Tms and his combat support. Here is where the TF’s combat power lies. These elements receive their focus from the TF’s order, the commander’s intent, briefings, and direct input from the TF commander. The comments below are from NTC Rotation N16 and illustrate a commander not focusing his Co/Tms.

If the commander’s intent had specifically addressed the purpose of this attack it may have made some of their [Co/Tm commander’s] decisions easier and more correct (N16, Maneuver).

By changing, modifying, and adjusting the plan numerous ways during the rehearsal, the [Co/Tm] commanders did not get a clear picture of the fight (N16, Maneuver).

The rehearsal did not emphasize the commander’s intent and may have caused confusion (N16, C2).

In this case the TF commander was not successful in focusing his Co/Tms to the mission. His intent and the TF rehearsal failed to communicate what the commander wanted done; in this case the TF mission was rated a failure.

**The Commander’s focus.** The TF commander must focus his attention on the critical tasks that he can influence. Throughout the plan, prepare, and execute phases, he must not only provide focus for his subordinates but also focus himself on the critical actions of the TF and the battle. He must not become so involved with one action (e.g., preparing a COA) that he allows other actions to remain unsupervised (e.g., emplacement of obstacles, preparation of the Co/Tms, etc.).

The commander’s intent failed to address TF specific concerns. Mission execution was often dependent upon a series of directives issued over the command net. The command group spent too much time in the TOC rather than supervising Co/Tm implementation during the preparation phase. The commander and S3 failed to give focus for reconnaissance (Paraphrased from N2, EXSUM).

The TF commander, XO, and S3 served primarily as planners and did little to supervise the actual execution of any events. [The TF lacked a tactical focus;] Co/Tm commanders had to ask for clarification from the TF commander during the conduct of the battle because they were so unsure of what was expected of their units (N2, EXSUM).
The battalion commander needs to do his own concept of the operation and intent. He needs to get in front of his staff and say "this is what I want done." This will help to eliminate confusion with the subordinate leaders and what their missions are (Paraphrased from J3, TF AAR Tape, Time: 30:08).

In the case of N2, the TF had "very good" intent quality ratings for three of its four missions, so the TF commander was successful in that portion of his focusing of the TF. However, the commander did not focus himself on supervision tasks; all four of TF's missions were partial successes.

CLB 3: The Positioning of the Commander on the Battlefield

Comments indicate that observer/controllers believe that the position of the commander is important. "The TF commander must be in a position where he can see, control, and influence the TF." (N18, Operating Systems/Lessons Learned). While important to be in position to see, the commander must remember that his personal security is important. Commanders should plan their position on the battlefield to be present at the critical point, yet remain in a position where they are not influenced by enemy direct and indirect fires.

A commander in position to see the battlefield can influence the battlefield by making timely decisions; however, such positions also exposed commanders to direct and indirect fire (N13, Maneuver).

The TF commander was in position to see the battlefield, but was exposed and killed (Paraphrased from N16, C2).

The commander must give thought during the planning phase to where the battle will be, so he can position himself to see, communicate, and yet not become a target on the battlefield (N13, Maneuver).

The battalion commander has to be free from the fight... He cannot be ducking bullets; he has got to get to a position where he can command and control and communicate... The battalion commander has to be where he can influence the battle and not where he will be influenced by the enemy (Quote from the Battalion Commander, J2, AAR Tape 1 of 2).

CLB 4: The Commander's Use of Key Staff

The commander's use of key staff and the commander's use of time were related to the commander's involvement in the planning process. There is a fine line between a commander being involved and being "too involved." At times a commander had little involvement with the planning process.

The rehearsal for the deliberate attack... was more of a war-gaming session. Its primary function was to ensure that the TF commander understood how the TF was going to execute its mission. After the rehearsal, the [Co/Tm] commanders got together with the TF commander to figure out how they were actually going to execute certain phases of the operation (N10, C2).

While it is a problem when the commander is not involved, the commander may be too involved. The comments below refer to the commander's involvement to the exclusion of the staff.
The commander's techniques for developing the plan eliminated valuable input from the staff. His failure to involve his staff in the planning process limited his ability to develop a plan that had been analyzed through war gaming; comparing of COAs and staff estimates (N13, DATK).

The TF commander does not involve his staff during the planning process. The commander conducted mission analysis without staff input and developed the COA without using a SITEMAP. The commander totally disregarded the staff-planning process (N7, DATK).

The first mission (N13) was rated a partial success, and the second (N7) was rated as a failure.

PART III: REVIEW OF AAR VIDEOS, COMMUNICATIONS TAPES, AND BATTLE REPLAYS FOR COMMENTS, AND EVIDENCE OF CLBs

Method

All 101 missions were evaluated to determine the availability of AAR videos, communications tapes, and battle replays. Missions that had all sources available were selected for further review. Six missions met the selection requirements. Case studies were conducted to identify CLBs, both new and those discussed above. CLBs identified by this method were CLB 5, The Commander's Judgment, Reasoning, and Calculations; CLB 6, The Timing and Form of Orders; and CLB 7, The Clarity and Content of the Commander's Intent.

The AAR videos were reviewed to capture comments by the training participants and observer controllers. Communications tapes were searched for the TF command communications to gather comments and observations. Battle replays were examined in conjunction with the communications tapes to observe the effects of CLBs on mission events.

The Results section is divided into the six mission case studies, one for each studied (A through F). Each mission case study contains:

- Review of Action, a vignette of what happened.
- Identification of CLBs in the Mission, significant events presented in context of the battle that have been identified as CLBs. The identified CLBs are also related to their effect on the battle where it could be shown. Statements identified as examples of CLBs are followed by a notation in italics that identifies the CLB.
- Summary, an evaluation of how the CLBs influenced the outcome of the mission.

Summaries of observations from the communications tapes and battle replays for each mission

4 Complete packages of AAR videos, communication tapes, and battle replays for missions are rare (six percent for this study). For the 101 selected missions: 48% had battle replays, 20% had AAR videos, and 15% had communications tapes. Of the six missions that had all these sources, two had communications tapes that began close to "Change-of-Mission." On another mission's communications tape, the battalion communications could not be identified. One mission's battle replay ended prior to the start of the battle (direct fire contact between the OPFOR's and the BLUFOR's main bodies). Two missions were complete.
Case Study Results

A. Mission Number: N3-1

Review of action. TF Mech was conducting a movement to contact (MTC) in the central corridor with an advanced guard and a main body. The advance guard consisted of one mech heavy team and the TF improved TOW vehicle (ITV) company. The TF main body was comprised of three Co/Tms. The leading Co/Tm of the advance guard made contact with the OPFOR forward security element (FSE) north of the Peanut and was destroyed. (See graphic maps in Appendix E.) The ITV company made contact with the lead elements of the OPFOR main body and was destroyed just east of Chad Hill. The TF main body maneuvered to stop the enemy main body that was believed to be maneuvering through Hidden Valley. The TF main body was rendered combat ineffective by the OPFOR main body in the vicinity of Hill 780.

Identification of CLBs in the mission. The mission commenced at approximately 0600 hours with an advance guard moving ahead of the TF main body. The TF command received three reports of the size, location, and direction of the OPFOR FSE and main body between 0639 and 0648 (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Subordinate Element Reports) (N3-1 Summary 0639, 0646, 0648). The reports were accurate except for location of the OPFOR, which was slightly off. An attempt by the S3 to bring artillery fire to bear on the OPFOR reported was unsuccessful because the TF's direct support artillery was out of range. This was an obvious error made by the staff; they had selected a position for scouts to observe the OPFOR but had not planned to have artillery within range to attack the enemy located by the TF's scouts (CLB 1a.1, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Staff Coordination).

The three reports confirmed the TF commander's belief that the OPFOR would be coming in the south of the sector (N3-1 Summary, 0626). The commander, however, failed to give any direction to the TF to change the plan to reflect the situation (CLB 5, CDR's Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations). The commander allowed the TF to continue to execute the MTC as planned with an OPFOR that was at least as large as the TF. The TF commander admitted during the AAR that the TF was caught up in getting into position. He had a "good read on the enemy" but did not make a good decision (CLB 5, CDR's Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations) (N3-1 Video, 1:01:00).

The lead Co/Tm, advance guard, made contact with the OPFOR FSE at approximately 0710. This contact lead to a fight that left the lead Co/Tm combat ineffective. There was only one partial report monitored on the command channel of the Co/Tm making contact with the OPFOR FSE (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports) (N3-1 Summary, 0714). Without accurate reports from the lead company, the second company in the advance guard continued to maneuver forward and made contact with the lead elements of the OPFOR main body. The fight left the second company combat ineffective. There are no further Co/Tm situation reports on the command channel (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports).

At 0709 the TF scouts sent the first of four reports that misrepresented the location and

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5Number refers to the mission numbers in Appendix A. In this case N3-1 refers to the first mission of NTC rotation N-3.
direction of the OPFOR main body. Each of the four reports had the OPFOR’s main body further to the south than it actually was (see N3-1 Battle Replay Graphics 0709 and 0714). The report at 0709 gave the OPFOR location in the Colorado Wadi. The scout’s report included a grid coordinate, the correct method to send a spot report (N3-1 Summary, 0709). The scout’s next report was "enemy is heading east out of the Colorado Wadi" (N3-1 Summary, 0710). At 0714 the TF scout reported the enemy was "definitely going to Hidden Valley" (N3-1 Summary, 0714). This report was again sent at 0715 (N3-1 Summary, 0715). The last three reports referred only to place names, in this case wrongly identified, and not to the standard grid coordinates required in spot reports (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports). Had the scouts sent grid coordinates, it is possible that the TF commander could have drawn the correct conclusion that the OPFOR main body was maneuvering between the Peanut and Chad Hill.

The TF commander expected to make contact with the OPFOR main body west of the Peanut. The reports of the OPFOR moving into Hidden Valley confused the TF commander. He did not question the report nor did the TF commander act on the information (CLB 1b, Trust and Subordinates). The TF commander did warn his S3 not to "overreact" to the spot reports (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations) (N3-1 Summary, 0717). Adding to the confusion was a further report at 0716 that correctly located the OPFOR main body moving between the Peanut and Chad Hill. Whether this report was heard is unknown; there was no response to it from either the TF commander or the S3 (N3-1 Summary, 0716). Comments in the AAR video refer to the confusion caused by the reports of the OPFOR in Hidden Valley (Video N3-1 0:56:40). Even with these spot reports, the TF commander did not direct any changes to the plan.

At 0721, the S3 sent a recommendation to the TF commander on positioning a Co/Tm from the TF main body (N3-1 Summary, 0721). There is no reply heard from the TF commander (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations). At 0729, the S3 ordered one Co/Tm to occupy a support by fire position (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders). There are no other radio calls of importance heard from 0729 to 0749 (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports). At 0749 the radio traffic was dominated by warnings of OPFOR elements closing on the command group’s location. TF command and control was completely lost at this point.

Summary. The outcome of this mission was a failure for the TF based on the criteria outlined in Part I. The general reason for the failure was a misjudgment of the enemy’s location, direction of movement, and speed. The TF commander failed to rapidly maneuver his TF to meet the situation reported to him.

The TF initially received good spot reports, although the OPFOR location was not accurate, during the first 50 minutes of the operation. Even though the spot reports did not give an accurate location, they identified a single avenue of approach that the OPFOR was using. This initially gave the TF commander a good view of the battlefield. The TF commander, however, did not react to these reports and continued to drive the TF forward to the planned positions (in the vicinity of the Peanut and Chad Hill). This error was further exacerbated when the TF scouts later reported the OPFOR main body was moving into Hidden Valley.

The spot report of the OPFOR moving into Hidden Valley confused the TF commander and hindered the his ability to see the battlefield. The report that the OPFOR was moving into Hidden

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5See Table 1 on Page 3.
Valley meant that the OPFOR was using another avenue of approach which would require the TF orient to the southwest (toward Hidden Valley) rather than to the west (toward the Peanut and Chad Hill). The TF commander warned his S3 not to overreact to the reports, yet he failed to act decisively to prepare the TF for an approach by the OPFOR from either the west or the southwest. The TF main body did not begin to deploy until direct fire contact had been made with the OPFOR main body.

The TF’s poor position in regard to the OPFOR main body was caused by several factors. First, the TF commander committed an error in judging the speed of the OPFOR’s main body (believing that the TF could reach its planned positions in time to attack the OPFOR). Second, faulty spot reports were received by the TF concerning the OPFOR entering into Hidden Valley, and lastly, there was a lack of reporting by the Co/Tms. These events helped lead the TF commander and S3 to their errors in positioning the TF late and in the wrong place.

B. Mission Number: N5-1

Review of action. The TF executed a MTC that commenced at approximately 0600 hours. The TF moved with one company as an advance guard and four companies in the main body. The OPFOR was divided into combat reconnaissance patrols (CRPs), a FSE, and a main body. The TF made contact with the CRPs and then the FSE near Hill 780. The TF deployed on a north-south line of three Co/Tms and began to develop the situation against the OPFOR FSE. While the TF was occupied with the FSE the OPFOR main body maneuvered north toward the Iron Triangle and broke through a single Co/Tm, penetrating into the TF’s rear.

Identification of CLBs in the mission. The first report of OPFOR contact was at 0615, when a station, probably the TF scouts, radioed a report of enemy contact (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports) (N5-1 Summary, 0615). The TF continued its movement to the east in the central valley with the advance guard Co/Tm reaching the Peanut at 0620.

At 0625 a report was received that the OPFOR was at the 54 grid line being attacked by BLUFOR close air support (probably a report from brigade assets). The first report of the OPFOR FSE was at 0636 when Uniform 01 reported a company sized element at the 49 grid line (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports) (N5-1 Summary, 0636). At the same time Co/Tms began to ask where the TF commander wanted them to move (CLB 7, Clarity & Content of the CDR’s Intent) (N5-1 Summary, 0636 and 0638). The commander ordered one Co/Tm to occupy a firing position to attack the enemy in an engagement area: "Bring into firing position to engage Slant 6301" (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders) (N5-1 Summary, 0638).

At 0640 the OPFOR FSE was just northwest of Hill 760 moving toward Hill 780. The TF’s advance guard was at Hill 780, and the main body was splitting with one Co/Tm moving northeast toward the Iron Triangle and the remaining portion moving east toward the Peanut (N5-1 Summary, 0640). It appeared that the TF was sending one Co/Tm to secure the northern flank near the Iron

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7The task organization of the TF is four Co/Tms with a platoon of ITVs. The level of detail of the battle replay makes it difficult to detect more than three Co/Tms. Two of the Co/Tms are close enough to each other to appear as one Co/Tm in the battle replay.

8Understanding the communications tape was difficult for this mission due to distortion. This could have been caused by the OPFOR actively jamming the TF’s signals or distortion in the reception of signals at the recording site.
Triangle and the remainder of the TF was maneuvering to attack the reported OPFOR FSE near Hill 780 (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations).

At 0642 the TF commander requested that someone come and get him, his vehicle was killed by the OPFOR. The TF commander was forward with the main body (CLB 3, CDR’s Position on the Battlefield) (N5-1 Summary, 0442). At this time the Echo element reported the location of the OPFOR main body and its direction of movement, "definitely going north" (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports) (N5-1 Summary, 0642; also see Battle Replay Graphic N5-1 0645). Echo is questioned if it really is the main body or the advance guard (CLB 1b, Trust and Subordinates).

The TF command continued to receive good spot reports on the OPFOR, at 0650 an element reported that the OPFOR main body was at the Race Track heading north (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports) (N5-1 Summary, 0650). The TF commander then ordered one Co/Tm (assumed to be the northern Co/Tm) to move to position "one echo three" (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders) (N5-1 Summary, 0650). The TF commander then ordered another element to cover the Hidden Valley Gap to the south, away from the OPFOR FSE and main body (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations, and CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders) (N5-1 Summary, 0653).

Communications after 0654 began to break down. There were no significant reports. Until Uniform 25 asked for situation/status reports from the companies, none were heard (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports). Between 0700 and 0720 the TF continued its maneuver with one Co/Tm still at Hill 780 in contact with the OPFOR FSE, another one or two Co/Tms just north of Hill 780 also in contact with the OPFOR FSE, and one Co/Tm in the north near the Iron Triangle in contact with the OPFOR main body. An ITV platoon was moving north toward the Iron Triangle to support the northern Co/Tm or to become a blocking force (Battle Replay Graphics N5-1 0700 and 0800).

At 0744, the TF commander ordered one of the Co/Tms north of Hill 780 to attack north and engage the OPFOR main body (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders) (N5-1 Summary, 0744). The TF commander received a further report at 0752 that the OPFOR main body was moving along the northern wall (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Subordinate Element Reports). The location shows that the OPFOR main body had begun to bypass the northern Co/Tm. The order for a Co/Tm to move north and attack came too late.

**Summary.** Using the criteria set in Part I, the mission was a success. However, judging the mission using the commander’s intent, the mission was a failure. The TF intended to deny the OPFOR the passes in the TF’s rear and have a combat strength of 70% at the end of the mission. The penetration of the TF’s position allowed the OPFOR to possibly occupy the passes and the TF was at 39% at the end of the mission.

The TF commander received good reports on the location and direction of the OPFOR and was in position to accurately see the situation. However, there was a lack of crosstalk between the Co/Tm commanders, and between the scouts and the Co/Tm commanders. The lack of crosstalk limited commander’s ability to see the situation of his own forces and restricted his view of the battlefield (Video N5-1, 05:20:05 and 1:35:16).

There was some confusion in the maneuver plan that left the Co/Tm commanders questioning the TF commander about where they were to go. This was probably caused by a lack of planning
and an uncertain knowledge of the commander's intent. The TF commander began to develop the situation against the OPFOR FSE using two or three Co/Tms in the center of the maneuver area. This left only one Co/Tm in the north to guard the TF's right flank. The TF commander, miscalculating the speed of the OPFOR main body, allowed the OPFOR the opportunity to mass against one Co/Tm and penetrate the TF's position. However, only 11% of the OPFOR remained combat effective at the change-of-mission.

C. Mission Number: N8-1

Review of action. The TF consisted of four Co/Tms conducting a MTC. The night prior to the mission, the TF placed scouts to observe the Whale Gap and pushed a Co/Tm forward to a position west of Red Pass in Siberia. This Co/Tm held a central position that the three other Co/Tms would maneuver around. The centrally located Co/Tm would become the TF's advance guard when the TF began maneuvering. Its precise mission was to hold the OPFOR while the other Co/Tms maneuvered to the OPFOR's flanks. The TF maneuvered the three remaining Co/Tms into Siberia, toward Whale Gap. One Co/Tm came from the northwest, one from the northeast, and one from Red Pass. The Co/Tms did not have mutual support. The OPFOR approached from Whale Gap with CRPs, a FSE, and a main body. The OPFOR maneuvered through Siberia and destroyed most of the three Co/Tms in Siberia. The main body then continued toward Hill 720 in the Central Corridor. The remaining TF Co/Tm gave chase.

Identification of CLBs in the mission. The OPFOR FSE, followed by the main body, moved from the Whale Gap north toward Hill 720 from 0600 to 0654. As the OPFOR FSE maneuvered north, it destroyed the TF advance guard. The OPFOR FSE joined the OPFOR main body, near the destroyed TF advanced guard. The OPFOR FSE and main body continued to move north and destroyed the two southerly moving Co/Tms (See Battle Replay Graphics N8-1 0600 to 0640). No CLBs were observed.9

The TF's remaining Co/Tm approached through Red Pass and engaged the tail end of the main body. At 0713 the brigade commander directed the TF commander to send remaining Co/Tm north to Hill 720, chasing the OPFOR: "Your Bravo Company is approaching Red Pass moving northeast. You need to action him through there as hard as you can and action him into Hill 720. Do you understand?" The OPFOR was moving in the direction of Hill 720 and was located between the Co/Tm and Hill 720. The Co/Tm would not be capable of catching the OPFOR unless the OPFOR turned to offer battle, nor could the Co/Tm prevent the OPFOR from occupying the area around Hill 720 (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders, and CLB 5, CDR's Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations).

Summary. The mission was a partial success based on Part I criteria. The mission was a tactical failure according to the TF's mission statement. The TF's mission was to clear the zone of enemy forces. Thirty-nine percent of the enemy force remained at the end-of-mission and penetrated the TF's sector.

The TF commander planned to mass his TF against the OPFOR, but his maneuver plan dispersed his force for a considerable time. The TF commander's miscalculation of the speed of the OPFOR allowed the TF to be destroyed before it could mass. The OPFOR maintained his mass

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9No communications were available for this portion of the mission. This mission’s communications tape begins at 0653.
during his maneuver and destroyed the TF piecemeal. The brigade commander’s desperate order to chase the OPFOR toward Hill 720 was with too little force and came too late to be of any assistance.

D. Mission Number: N6-3

Review of action. TF Armor conducted a deliberate attack in the vicinity of Brown and Debnan Passes. The TF pushed forward reconnaissance forces in the vicinity of Brown Pass over a two day period. The morning of the attack TF scouts with engineers moved into the Brown Pass area to identify and clear enemy obstacles. The TF attacked with an advance guard and a main body of four Co/Tms. The TF moved into the Brown/Debnan Pass area and encountered a minefield of scatterable mines that inhibited their progress. Whether the TF reached its tactical objectives is unclear because the battle replay ended at 0620 before the main battle began.

Identification of CLBs in the mission. Review of the battle replay has the TF beginning its attack at 0610 with reconnaissance and engineers in the vicinity of Brown Pass. The TF advance guard and main body are spread between Hill 876 and Hill 780 moving west toward Brown Pass (Battle Replay Graphic N6-3 0610).

Initial radio calls (radio communications were difficult to understand by the analyst because of distortion) concerned a TF element moving too fast to the south, out of the TF’s sector. The TF commander (Sierra 66) directed Papa 43 (S3?) to bring the unit back into sector (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders). "Papa 43, Sierra 66, over. Going too far to south . . . into 3d brigade sector. You’ve gotta pull them in. Pull them in" (N6-3 Summary, 0707).

Between 0713 and 0733 two situation reports were sent (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Subordinate Element Reports). At 0713 Sierra 43 called Whiskey 04 and asked for a situation report. Whiskey 04 answered, "Roger, at this time Slam 0007, break. Our unit is attempting a reconstitution, break. Orient attack-by-fire position, over." (N6-3 Summary, 0713). This was followed by a report at 0733 that would consume the TF’s attention for the next hour. At 0733 Delta 66 reported that the breaching unit had run into a scatterable mine obstacle (N6-3 Summary, 0733). The TF commander ordered P43 to attempt to bypass the scatterable mine obstacle (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders). "Papa 43, Sierra 66, go for a bypass on this FASCAM" (N6-3 Summary, 0744).

There is a lack of cross talk on the radio, and the TF commander had to ask his subordinates for situation reports to gain information on the enemy and friendly situation (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Subordinate Element Reports). The requests are made at 0748 and 0832 (N6-3 Summary, 0748 and 0832)

Summary. According to the criteria in Part I, the mission was a partial success. Whether the TF achieved its commander’s intent or assigned mission is unknown. Any outcome of the battle is difficult to determine because of the lack of a battle replay and the poor quality of communications. Apparently, the TF’s lack of communications affected the TF commander’s ability to see the battlefield. Based on the communications, the TF commander appeared to be synthesizing the reports he was receiving and giving orders to direct the TF. What effects this had on the mission outcome is unknown. Data collected from the AAR video show that the TF received good information from the scouts during the planning phase, but this information was not used in the TF plan. The S2 did a poor job in his threat analysis and battle tracking (CLB 1a.1, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Staff Coordination) (Video N6-3 0:08:59 and 2:12:31).
E. Mission Number: N7-3

Review of action. TF Mech conducted a MTC with four Co/Tms and an ITV company. The OPFOR was in a defense that ran from the southern wall of the central corridor, past the western edge of Hill 760, to the Race Track, and to the northern wall. Three OPFOR companies and an AT reserve were located in the southern half of the zone, between the race track and the southern wall. The TF was moving in a box formation, with the advance guard indistinguishable from the main body. The TF start point was near Brown Pass. The TF moved eastward to north of Hill 876, then turned southeast and went south of Hill 780. The TF concentrated their attack on the southernmost OPFOR company. The place where the TF attacked appeared to deny the OPFOR the ability to concentrate fires. The OPFOR was unable to bring the majority of its combat power to bear on the TF.

Identification of CLBs in the mission. No CLBs were observed in the battle replay and communications tape. The mission commenced at 0530 and the communications tape began at 0643. While the commander was apparently successful in directing his TF against one OPFOR company, it is not clear that he had a clear picture of the battlefield. Comments during the AAR tend to reflect that the staff was not providing all of the information that the commander needed to make good decisions. The S2 did not receive the reports necessary to make his analysis (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Subordinate Element Reports) (Video N7-3 0:56:40). The staff made basic mistakes collecting and posting information in the main command post. Only the S2 was plotting and reporting information. However, neither the S2 nor S3 were maintaining staff journals. The S3 said they had not been logging any useful information in the journals, so they decided to streamline operations by not maintaining staff journals (CLB 1a.1, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for the Staff Coordination) (Video N7-3 0:59:24).

Summary. The TF penetrated the enemy position and met part of the TF commander’s intent; however, it did not have enough combat power remaining to complete its mission or the commander’s intent. Using the Part I criteria the mission was a failure. Apparently the TF commander was successful in seeing the situation clearly enough to mass his TF against one OPFOR company and avoid the center of the OPFOR’s kill sack. While the TF appeared not to go through the middle of the OPFOR’s kill sack, it does appear to have attacked into the OPFOR’s strength (the southern sector). How much the commander knew of the OPFOR’s dispositions is unknown.

F. Mission Number: N19-1

Review of action. TF Armor relieved another unit in place and was in the defense. It had three Co/Tms in position, defending from east of the Iron Triangle southwest to west of the Peanut. A TF reconnaissance element was east of Hill 780. The OPFOR attacked with a FSE and a main body. The FSE attacked toward the TF’s center Co/Tm while the OPFOR main body moved north and quickly penetrated the northern Co/Tm.

Identification of the CLBs in the mission. At 0600 the TF was in position and preparing its defense. Outlaw reported to Cobra Seven there was no reconnaissance in front of the TF to provide early warning (CLB 1a.1, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Staff Coordination).\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10}TF command communications could not be identified on the communications tape. The communications used are those of the senior observer/controller and his team.
"Bottom line is nothing on Texas and we really don't have a screen forward" (N19-1 Summary, 0618). At 0622 Tarantula 18 reported that a Co/Tm has been ordered to move to a new position and orient east and west (CLB 6, Timing and Form of Orders) (N19-1 Summary, 0622).

The observer/controllers commented that the brigade S2 was tracking the enemy well (N19-1 Summary, 0632). However, the information did not seem to get to the TF (CLB 1a.1, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Staff Coordination). The TF was not showing any urgency in preparing for the OPFOR (CLB 2, Focus: CDR’s Identification of Critical Work) (N19-1 Summary, 0632). Yet at the same time the OPFOR FSE was within four kilometers of the center Co/Tm (Battle Replay Graphic N19-1 0630). The OPFOR FSE was creating a dust cloud that the TF believed was their own scouts (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations).

By 0641 the TF was considering repositioning forces (CLB 5, CDR’s Judgment, Reasoning, & Calculations) (N19-1 Summary, 0641). At the same time the OPFOR main body was closing on the northern Co/Tm (Battle Replay Graphic N19-1 0645). While the TF considered repositioning and the OPFOR closed on the TF’s positions, communications between TF elements revealed that parts of the TF still believed that enemy contact had not yet been made (CLB 1a.2, Setting and Enforcing Standards: Standards for Subordinate Element Reports) (N19-1 Summary, 0652). At 0721 the brigade commander reported to division that the TF had been overrun and was unable to do anything further (N19-1 Summary, 0721). The observer/controllers called for change-of-mission.

Summary. Based on Part I criteria, the mission was a partial success. Tactically, the mission was a failure: the OPFOR penetrated the TF’s rear area with greater than three-quarters of its combat power. The TF commander could not see the battlefield and therefore could not make the decisions necessary to destroy the OPFOR. The TF failed to ensure that proper reconnaissance was forward to find the OPFOR main body. Reports by the brigade S2 or S3 were not heard by the TF. The brigade commander said that the biggest problem was communications and monitoring what was going on during the battle. The TF command and control elements needed to eavesdrop on the brigade intelligence and operations networks to gather information on the battle (Video N19-1 0:19:53).

The position of the commander on the battlefield was also a problem. During the battle an observer/controller commented that the brigade commander was in his tactical operations center reading maps and listening to the radios. He could have better understood the battle by stepping outside and watching it (N19-1 Summary, 0652). The best reason that the TF failed to stop the OPFOR is that the commander could not judge the situation and make timely decisions. Senior observer/controller summed it up during the AAR.

"All of that [ensuring you have reconnaissance forward and your units are alert and observing] is seeing the battlefield. The reporting we talked about has to do with seeing the battlefield. We get into the mindset that seeing the battlefield is commanders looking down range. It ain’t necessarily so. Because seeing the battlefield is visualizing what is going on, understanding what is going on, analyzing what is going on. All of which comes through lateral coordination with guys on your flanks. It comes through proper spot reports coming up . . . within companies, it comes from contact reports within companies . . . being passed to the TF. All of that goes together to help you to collectively see the battlefield." (Video N19-1 0:28:58).
REFERENCES


Appendix A

Analysis of Commander’s Intent
and
Mission Statements

Key to Abbreviations

ROTATION:

N- NTC
J- JRTC

The CTC Archive restricts the identification of rotations and units. Rotation and unit identification may not be published. Researchers wishing to find the specific rotation for further research should contact the Fort Leavenworth Field Unit of the Army Research Institute (ARI).

Mission Number (MSN No.): Assigned reference number.

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COMMANDER’S INTENT RATING (INT):

QUALITY/ CONTENT/ CLARITY

QUALITY/ VG- VERY GOOD, G- GOOD, PR- POOR

CONTENT/ ES- END STATE PRESENT, P- PURPOSE PRESENT
CO- CONTAINS CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION MATERIAL,
SG- CONTAINS STAFF PLANNING GUIDANCE

CLARITY OF END STATE AND PURPOSE STATEMENT/ C- CLEAR, NC- NOT CLEAR

A-1
### MISSION STATEMENT (MSN STATE):

G- GOOD  
P- POOR

### PERCENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES REMAINING AT END OF MISSION (PCT FR EOM).

### PERCENT OF ENEMY FORCES REMAINING AT END OF MISSION (PCT EN EOM).

NA: NOT AVAILABLE

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Appendix B

Mission Statements
and
Commander's Intent

The mission statements and commander's intents below are organized by rotation and mission. A key to rotation and mission identification are below.

Rotation Number: CTC/Rotation ID

CTC: J= RTC  N= NTC

Rotation Number: 1 to 20

The CTC Archive restricts the identification of rotations and units. Rotation and unit identification may not be published. Researchers wishing to find the specific rotation for further research should contact the Fort Leavenworth Field Unit of the Army Research Institute (ARI).

Mission Number: Missions identified by the type of mission.

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Unit designations have been removed and replaced by Armor or Mech identifications. Dates in mission have been modified to preclude identification of the month and year. Months have been replaced by \textit{M\textit{N}\textit{T}\textit{H}}, and the year by ___.

J1

\textit{Mission}. TF conducts air assault 260515\textit{M\textit{N}\textit{T}\textit{H}}__, to secure OBJ Grant (COLE FLS, UK 886043) and establish a lodgement in order to allow for follow-on AirLand operations. On order, conduct search and attack in assigned sectors to locate and destroy enemy forces in order to prevent enemy access to Fort Smith and Fort Chaffee.

\textit{Commander's Intent}. It is my intent to initially focus on securing and clearing COLE FLS to allow for the buildup of follow-on forces NLT H+10. Success during the initial phase is denial of direct fire on COLE FLS NLT H+10. At the end of the lodgement phase, I want to have OBJs Mars, Pluto, Venus, and Earth secured, and extend operations to Air Head Line Vick. We will then be poised to rapidly
strike out into AO Bear to find, fix, capture or destroy enemy cache sites, C2 Nodes and ultimately destroy enemy forces in AO Bear. The safety of non-combatants and preservation of private property is paramount to maintaining cooperation and respect of the local populace. We cannot turn the host nation populace against us and win the war.

J2

**Mission.** TF conducts an air assault 042030Mnth to seize OBJ Blue vicinity UK888012, OBJ White vicinity UK885018, and contain OBJ Red vicinity UK884024 to destroy enemy forces on Blue and White and prevent reinforcement from Red. On order conduct search and attack operations in zones West Virginia, Texas, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Indiana, Connecticut, and Ohio.

**Commander’s Intent.** I will initially focus on seizure of Hill 218 vicinity UK889939 emphasis on the destruction of AD and IDF weapon systems. I will then focus on destruction of enemy forces on OBJs Blue and White with accurate observed fire prior to ground attack. We must contain force within Carins Village. To be successful, we must utilize all operating systems to quickly locate and destroy enemy cache sites, AD systems, mortars, and C2 nodes. Success is destruction of 75% of known enemy forces.

J3

**Mission.** TF attacks 132030Mnth to secure OBJ Sheridan (UJ957960) and blocks enemy approach from south to protect division flank.


Support convoys.

M/CM/S: Breach obstacles for attack teams. Fix enemy armor in Panther.

N1

**MTC.**

**Mission.** TF Mech conducts a Movement to contact 160630Mnth between PL Springfield and PL Bayonet to destroy up to an FD sized element in order to prevent the damaging of the USJTF logistical buildup, on order, defends in sector.

**Commander’s Intent.** The purpose of this operation is to destroy up to an FD sized element of the MRD in order to protect the USJTF logistical buildup. On order ME [(main effort)] destroys the FD main body to facilitate the brigade retaining control of key terrain in our AO. Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to destroy the FD of the 51st MRD (enemy oriented operation). End State: The enemy FD destroyed and the TF prepared to defend in sector.

**DIS**

**Mission.** TF Mech Defend in sector NLT 180600Mnth from PL Browning to PL Sherman to deny access to key terrain and destroy up to an MRR sized force. On order attack.

**Commander’s Intent.** The purpose of this operation is to retain key terrain between PL Browning and PL Sherman. Purpose: Destroy MRR to preclude the USJTF logistical build up form being destroyed. End State: I will consider this operation a success if we complete the destruction of the MRR with not penetration of PL Springfield and a majority of our combat power prepared to resume the attack.
BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech serves as brigade reserve 200600MNTH__, prepared to destroy enemy forces on OBJ Mets, Jays, and Manchu in the north and OBJs Yanks, and Peanut in the south to disrupt the 51st MRD’s defensive preparation. On order, attacks to seize OBJ Crash.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this operation is to disrupt the lead MRD’s defensive preparation. As the brigade reserve, we will accomplish this organized in a TF deliberate breach organization, prepared to seize objectives in the brigade’s southern or northern sector. End State: At the conclusion of this operation the TF will occupy SBF positions prepared to continue the attack to seize OBJ Crash.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech on order attacks OBJ Guard (NK3415) and OBJ Manchu (NK3014) to destroy enemy CSEPs in order to discover and test enemy disposition, composition, and strength of his main effort. On order seizes OBJ Crash (NK2521). On order attacks to destroy 2d echelon defenses and seize OBJ Gator (NK2125).

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this operation is to discover and test enemy disposition, composition, and strength of his main defensive effort. This in turn will facilitate TF Armor’s ability to defeat elements of the 1st echelon MRB in zone. Decisive to this operation is our ability to destroy the enemy on OBJ Manchu with dismounts. Breach a passage lane followed by the massing of our mechanized and tank systems on the enemy CSOP vicinity OBJ Guard.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech Infantry attacks in zone from PL Patriot to PL stealth 230600MNTH__ to destroy enemy forces in order to protect the left flank of TF Mech. On order seize OBJ Gators.

Commander’s Intent. None.

N2

MTC

Mission. TF Armor Movement to contact at 100700MNTH__ from NK4308 to NK4618 to NK1030 to NK0820, to destroy the advance guard battalion of the 211th MRR. On order defend in sector to retain the key terrain in the vicinity of Brown/Debnam Pass (NK3517/NK3015); defeat one MRR in sector and allow no penetration of PL Spencer (NK4618/NK4308).

Commander’s Intent. To destroy an advance guard or FD sized element and seize key terrain in sector. The end state is destruction of the AG/FD battalion in our sector and seizure of key terrain, postured to defend that key terrain with four combat effective Co/Tms.

DIS

Mission. TF Armor defends in sector from PL Winchester (NK2227 to NK1817) to PL Spencer (NK4620 to NK4310) at 120600MNTH__ to deny penetration of PL Spencer.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this mission is to defeat the enemy regiment in sector, retain key terrain in our sector, and protect supply lines to the east. At the end of this mission we will have allowed no larger than a battalion sized penetration of our sector with the TF positioned in BPs behind PL Sharp, scouts forward of PL Sharp, and be prepared to conduct the attack.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Armor attacks at 200600MNTH__ to provide supporting fires to brigade deliberate breach in the vicinity of OBJ Yanks (NK445108) and assault to seize OBJ Peanut (NK413115): on order, pass TF Mech Infantry to OBJ Triangle (NK4213) to disrupt lead MRR’s defensive preparation.
**Commander’s Intent.** To assist in defeat of enemy security zone and seizure of OBJ Triangle. The end state is 2.5 Co/Tms set in our portion of OBJ Triangle (03 to 08 hours) postured to continue the attack done by executing an aggressive reconnaissance plan to determine the exact disposition of the enemy. Use of dismounted infantry during the hours of limited visibility to search and destroy/collapse CSOPs, sniper vehicles, and AT-5 positioned along our Axis of advance, provide a high volume of fire support from support by fire position to eliminate the elements that are able to. Provide fires on the breach site. Rapidly assault through the breach lanes once the obstacle has been reduced. Secure the key terrain west of the breach site to facilitate the passage of the remainder of the brigade through the obstacle.

**BDE ATK**

*Mission.* TF Armor attacks along Axis Bob; on order, 22 MNTM to provide supporting fires to brigade deliberate breach in the vicinity of OBJ Ruse (NK3220) and OBJ Victoria (NK2525), and assault to seize OBJ Crash (NK2521).

**Commander’s Intent.** Assist in the defeat of the enemy’s 1st and 2d echelon defenses. End State: will be the equivalent of 2.5 Co/Tms set in our position of OBJS Crash or Gator (03 to 08) and postured to repel the counterattack. Execute an aggressive reconnaissance plan to determine exact disposition of enemy vehicles and obstacles. Use dismounted infantry during hours of reduced visibility to destroy enemy dismounts and AT-5s on the high ground north of Debnam Pass. Provide a high volume of fire from support by fire positions to eliminate the elements that cover the obstacles. Rapidly assault through the breach and secure intermediate objectives and continue the attack west along the North Wall of the corridor.

**N3**

**MTC**

*Mission.* TF Mech conducts movement to contact 060630MNTM from PL Mandrake to PL Turgidson to destroy enemy MRB in sector, on order defend in sector

**Commander’s Intent.** I want to conduct a rapid controlled movement until we make contact with the enemy—then deliberately, destroy him. We must get our reconnaissance out early and deep to ensure we identify his echelons and his avenues of approach. We will air most dismounts on key terrain that supports our scheme of maneuver on his. The TF diamond will facilitate this with E Co. on a flank. Mortar fires will support our AG and target likely enemy LZs and dismount locations while artillery fires will be reserved for the enemy main body. We must retain the initiative and make the enemy react to us. Success is defined as destruction of the enemy MRB with sufficient combat power remaining to defend in sector

**DIS**

*Mission.* TF Mech defends in sector from PL Bad to PL Mandrake (NFL) NLT 080530MNTM to destroy an enemy MRR and protect continued US build up.

**Commander’s Intent.** I want to defend using the depth of our sector. We’ll do this by establishing a counterreconnaissance force in our security zone to detect and kill enemy reconnaissance. Additionally MBA forces must do the same against those reconnaissance elements that penetrate our security zone. In the MBA, I will accept some risk in the south but array strength by the sue of obstacles, deception positions, and the movement of fores. My intent is to coax the enemy into our strength in the north. Fires will be used to destroy reconnaissance in each EA. We will be successful if we destroy the MRR forward of PL Mandrake.
DATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks on order to destroy enemy MRB sized penetration in sector in order to provide continued protection of US build up.

Commander's Intent. We must be prepared to conduct offensive operations down to distinct movement corridors against both an enemy advance guard (north corridor) or an FD (south corridor). It is important that we get our scouts out early and deep in both corridors. With the limited until I expect to receive, we will plan a Movement to contact/meeting engagement using the TF diamond formation. The key to our planning and rehearsals is to remain flexible as to possible Axis of advance and multiply projected locations where we could come into contact with the enemy. We have recently conducted a Movement to contact in the north corridor so we will concentrate our planning efforts in the south. In both options, fires will be used initially on identified enemy reconnaissance and then to assist our AG in fixing the FSE, shifting to destroy the main body. We will be successful if we destroy any penetration through TF Armor and remain combat effective.

Con Plan Whale: It is my intent to conduct a rapid, controlled movement to a probable line of deployment, then controlled fire and maneuver at the crew, platoon, company level to destroy him. We must get the scouts out early and deep to provide information on the enemy. We will use the TF advance guard formation. Our AG must fix his FSE to allow freedom of maneuver for the main body. Fires will be used on enemy reconnaissance initially then the FSE but will be massed to destroy his main body. A strike package will be employed to deny the enemy key terrain. It is essential that we fight the enemy on our terms and protect the force. Use the terrain-use fire and maneuver use our weapons' stand-off. Success is defined as destroying an MRB with 70% combat power remaining.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech follows and assumes TF Armor attack at 180700MNTH to OBJ Chicago and OBJ Quebec to destroy 2d echelon MRB vicinity OBJ Utah to force enemy withdrawal in sector.

Commander's Intent. The purpose of this operation is to destroy a first or second echelon MRB to force the enemy to withdraw in sector. We will follow TF Armor in the TF box, prepared to assume the main effort to either 1) penetrate a first echelon battalion reverse slope defense vicinity Chicago or Quebec, or 2) pass through a successful TF Armor penetrate and continue the attack to penetrate and destroy a second echelon MRB vicinity of OBJ Utah. I intend to isolate the southern most MRC with artillery, mortars, and Co. E fires, to avoid his fires by bypassing or breaking his obstacles in the south, destroy the southern MRC by fire and mounted assault. Orient the fires of the TF on the MRB(-) and complete its destruction by fire, mounted and dismounted assault. My intent for support fires is to isolate the northern 5 platoons with smoke, suppress the northern and central MRCs and destroy the southern MRC. End state is a destroyed MRB and TF Mech in position with combat power to hold in zone.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech counterattacks 190530MNTH to penetrate 2d echelon of MRR defense to assist brigade destruction of 2d echelon MRB and force enemy withdrawal to the west.

Commander's Intent. Use dismounts to pinpoint the southern MRC and facilitate TF maneuver 2) move rapidly along Axis Cindy 3) Action against the southern MRC while majority of the TF continues to advance 4) penetrate the MRB in the south quickly reorient on the MRB(-) control MRC or CAR and destroy by direct and indirect fire.

N4
MTC
Mission. TF Armor conducts movement to contact at 060630MNTT from PL Mandrake (LD) (NK556099 to NK560018) to PL Turgidson (NK235094 to NJ221963) oriented on OBJ Quebec (NK2300) to destroy an MRB(+), on order conduct defense in sector from PL Turgidson (LOA) to PL Mandrake (NPL) to destroy MRR sized unit.
Commander’s Intent. The TF moves to contact to destroy an MRB (FD) in zone east of PL Turgidson. I want to move to contact in charger movement to contact formation with scouts and brigade assents looking deep to determine the enemy’s COA, and a strong advance guard team (10 Km) in advance of the main body. The advance guard Tm must move quickly to kill the enemy FSE and allow our main body to maneuver to kill the enemy. The deep fight is focused on separating and attriting the main body with artillery and brigade - directed CAS. The close fight is the combination attack by fire/maneuver to kill the FSE and main body. The real fight is initially counter-air assault and local security, then protection of our MSR as we attack west. We will accept some risk in the west by weighing or effort to the enemy’s most likely avenue in the south. End State: The destruction of the MRB in zone without TF prepared to transition to a defense in sector between PL Turgidson and PL Mandrake.

HDEF
Mission. On order TF Armor conducts a defense in sector NLT 080700MNTT from PL Ripper to PL Mandrake to destroy an MRR sized unit.
Commander’s Intent. Shape two EAs. Strong counterreconnaissance force. Precise positioning of obstacles. Use CAS and FS deep. Flexible defense to cover enemy options. Accept risk in the west. End State: destroy MRR.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks 090730MNTT to penetrate an MRB in the vicinity of OBJ Beavis to disrupt enemy defensive preparations.
Commander’s Intent. Protect the force with rapid, controlled movement to contact, then break through enemy defense with deliberate, controlled maneuver in the attack at the point of penetration. Our reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance fight must find and destroy his security zone eyes. Key to success are massed FA, fires, and smoke. End state is penetration of MRB with combat power to defend penetration or continue to attack.

Mission. TF Armor passes Mech forward and attacks in zone at 180700MNTT to penetrate enemy 1st echelon MRB and passes TF Infantry forward to continue the attack. On order TF Armor attacks to destroy 2d echelon MRB in the vicinity of PL Turgidson to force enemy withdrawal in zone.
End State: is penetration of 1st echelon MRB, passage of TF Infantry, our TF poised for future operations.

N5

MTC/HATK
Mission. TF Mech conducts a movement to contact 100600MNTT to locate and destroy forces in zone out to PL Mardi to gain terrain for the defense and protection of the Granite/Tieford Mountains approach.
Commander’s Intent. Purpose: To prevent enemy seizure of key passes and terrain wets of PL Ann. Defeat Mechanism: Identify FSE early and maneuver advance guard company to destroy FSE in designated EA, when OPFOR main body attempts to by pass, maneuver remainder of the TF to EA that blocks his movement, mass fires and CAS on his main body and destroy him. End State: TF destroys FWD detachment, prevents its seizure of key terrain west of PL Ann and is postured at 70% strength to defend vicinity the Iron Triangle/Peanut/Chad Complex.

DIS
Mission. TF Mech defends in sector NLT 120500MNSTH__ from PL Warrior to PL Pam to destroy the lead MRR of the 36th MRD to assist the 1st BDE in protecting 53d ID northern flank. Commander’s Intent. Purpose: To support 1st BDE in prevention lead MRR of the lead MRD from penetrating the northern flank the 53d ID. End State: TF destroys MRR forward of PL Pam. Retains 70% of its combat power and is postured to defend on PL Pam. Defeat Mechanism: Block enemy in south (EAs Zeus and Mars) and destroy him with massed direct and indirect fires as he attempts to breach obstacles in the 876-Chad-Peanut Passes. Turn enemy in north (EA Thor) into center of EA where 2 Co/Tms mass their direct fires with indirect fires. Reserve destroys any penetrations of reward positions.

DATK
Mission. TF Mech conducts a deliberate attack 140530MNSTH to penetrate an MRB of the 36th MRDs security zone and cause his defense to collapse and protect the northern flank of the 52d ID. Commander’s Intent. Purpose: To force collapse of enemy security zone main force into its division’s MBA. End State: TF has cleared enemy in zone, secured OBJ Iron and is postured on OBJ Iron to continue the attack to the east. Defeat Mechanism: Penetrate the northern flank of the northern most MRC, rapidly envelope southern MRC and destroy it in zone, vicinity OBJ Sal before he can fight.

BDE DATK
Mission. TF Mech attacks 160530MNSTH__ to destroy enemy MRC on OBJ Aspen (vicinity of NK366155) to force the northern MRB’s withdrawal to the east and to allow follow on forces unopposed passage through the pass located vicinity NK1735. On order continues to attack to clear remaining enemy in zone to ensure complete collapse of the security zone.
Commander’s Intent. Purpose: To force collapse of the security zone MRB in zone to collapse from his current positions into the main defensive belt. End State: TF has created a breach on OBJ Albany for 1st Brigade, secured the northern half of OBJ Manassas and is postured with sufficient combat power to conduct subsequent operations. Defeat Mechanisms: Initially-envelope enemy MRB on OBJ Aspen from the north while simultaneously breaching obstacle in Brown Gap. The complete obscurer of our move to OBJ Aspen and our deliberate breach through the gap is critical to our success, accurate, observed, and massed artillery fires on known enemy northern positions is also vital. Once the breach is completed, our rapid movement to the east to deny the enemy a chance to set up a viable defense is critical to causing his collapse into his main defensive belt.

BDE DATK
Mission. TF Mech attacks 170500MNSTH__ to destroy enemy MRC on OBJ Irwin (NK482168) to ensure the complete collapse of the enemy security zone.
Commander’s Intent. Destroy enemy on OBJ Irwin, we will accomplish this with A Co., as the main effort, destroying the northern MRC vicinity 485167 to force the collapse of the security zone defense Co/Tm B breaches vicinity NK470176 to open two lanes in order to pass the main effort.
MTC

Mission. TF Armor (brigade main effort) attacks in zone along Axis Maggie NLT 040500MNTTH to destroy enemy forces in zone out to PL Texas; on order defends along PL Ohio to deny penetration of PL Florida.

Commander's Intent. Conduct aggressive reconnaissance to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Conduct rapid movement to seize key terrain in the vicinity of PL Texas. Retain the flexibility of conducting fire and maneuver to destroy enemy FSE and main body forces. Conduct link-up operations with TF 1-14IN to assist in MEDEVAC operations. Retain sufficient combat power (70%) to continue offensive and defensive operations.

DIS

Mission. TF Armor(-) conducts counterreconnaissance operations between PL Texas and PL Idaho from 051800MNTTH to 060300MNTTH to prevent enemy division and regimental reconnaissance from penetrating PL Idaho. TF Armor(-) defends in sector 060400MNTTH to initially mass fires in EA1 to destroy an MRR and allow no penetration of PL Florida.

Commander's Intent. I intend to fight in 3 phases. Phase 1, the counterreconnaissance forces will focus on destroying all enemy reconnaissance elements. We will deny him observation of our preparation. Phase 1 ends with the withdrawal of counterreconnaissance elements from the zone. The end state is the destruction of all enemy reconnaissance elements entering into the TF’s sector. Phase 2, focuses on one BCT deep battle between PL Texas and Utah. Phase 2 requires that we assist the one BCT with call for fire on deep targets. The desired end state of Phase 2 is the completed destruction of enemy in EA 1. Ensure all obstacles provide weapon systems standoff for forces. Plan in depth throughout the TF sector. I want to use chemical smoke assets to obscure our displacement to subsequent fighting positions. I want 360 degree ADA coverage during all phases in this operation. The end state of Phase 3 will be complete destruction of the MRR while retaining sufficient combat power to continue operations and deny the enemy penetration of PL Florida.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor conducts counterreconnaissance and local DRT sweeps to identify enemy obstacles and destroy enemy DRTs in zone. TF Armor (brigade main effort) attacks along Axis Sheila 080600MNTTH to destroy enemy forces in the vicinity of OBJ Denver, Vail, and Aspen to protect the northern flank of the 3d BCT (division main effort); on order BP2 in an HDEF to defeat all 2d echelon forces.

Commander’s Intent. Deny enemy forces observation of our force composition and disposition. Infiltrate scouts to confirm or deny enemy defensive positions and obstacles emplacement. Conduct rapid movement. Be prepared to conduct breaching operations and mass direct fire systems on platoon-sized forces. Use smoke to obscure enemy observations of breaching operations and to isolate MRP to deny the enemy’s ability to mass MRC fires.

Mission. TF Armor conducts counterreconnaissance NLT 141700MNTTH and attacks at 160600MNTTH through TF Mech to PL Oak; on order attacks to OBJ Albany and Dallas to destroy enemy forces in zone, to collapse enemy security zone and penetrate the 1st echelon defensive belt.

Commander’s Intent. To destroy enemy forces in zone. Massing our fires forward and focusing our effort on isolated forces to eliminate platoons. Conduct fires and maneuver on selected enemy forces while suppressing selected enemy forces with both direct and indirect fires. Attack each designated enemy positions with volume fires. Utilize weapon system stand-off to maximize force penetrations. The end state of the attack is to destroy enemy forces in zone through PL Oak while
retaining sufficient combat power to continue offensive operation east of OBJ Manassas, or on order establish hasty defensive positions along PL Oak to defeat enemy counterattack forces.

**BDE DATK**

*Mission.* On order TF Armor follows TF Mech and on order assumes brigade main effort and attacks along Axis Betsy to seize OBJ Dallas.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**N7**

**MTC**

*Mission.* TF Mech conducts a movement to contact 070630 M2NTH__ to clear enemy forces in zone from PL Iowa (NK193120 to NK346208) to PL Vermont (NK937053 to NK467182). On order TF Mech defends in sector 080001 M2NTH__ allowing no penetration of PL Iowa.

*Commander’s Intent.* My intent is to move very rapidly from the LD to PL Kansas. We must secure PL Kansas prior to the enemy crossing PL Utah to help do this, I want to ensure our dismounts to secure the high ground vicinity Brown/Debnam Pass. I want the scouts out early and deep to alternate eyes on own NAIs. My intent is to use Axis Top however, be prepared to use Axis bottom. We must also conduct a successful link-up with elements of the brigade security force on OBJ Quebec. The main body will move in the TF diamond. I want our advance guard to fix and destroy him - massing direct and indirect fires. We must retain the initiative and make the enemy react to us. We will be successful if we destroy his lead MRB in zone forward of PL Kansas.

**DIS**

*Mission.* TF Mech defends NLT 090001 M2NTH__ from NK2830 to NK340072 to defeat enemy forces in sector and not allow penetration of PL Iowa (NK197120 to NK249207) and retain the Granite-Tiefert mountain approach to the Panamint Valley.

*Commander’s Intent.* I intend to defend using the depth of our sector making the enemy pay for every kilometer. I want to develop and execute a reconnaissance and security plan that detects and kills the enemy reconnaissance both in the security zone and the main battle area. Establish a Co/Tm sized counterreconnaissance force whose task it is to destroy the enemy reconnaissance between PL Kansas and PL Utah while at the same time deceiving him as to our own FLOT and causing him to deploy early from his march column. I am willing to take risk in the north. Our obstacles must be planned to disrupt the enemy in our EAs. We will be successful if we allow no penetration of PL Iowa while retaining 70% combat power.

**DATK**

*Mission.* TF Mech attacks 110530 M2NTH__ in zone to penetrate enemy defenses vicinity OBJ Blue (C/M NK4812) and assist the forward passage of the 3d Brigade.

*Commander’s Intent.* There are three keys to our success; finding and destroying the enemy reconnaissance, verifying our situation template, and massing all four defeat mechanisms on a point of focus. During the preparation phase we must have 360 degree security. I want to place a platoon sized security force along the LD to hold us here. I have to get the scouts out early and deep to provide eyes on the objective and pinpoint his obstacles and fighting positions. Mass is key to success. Accordingly I want to move in the TF box then pick a point of focus (schwerpunkt) and mass all four defeat mechanisms. To destroy the enemy at the point while we isolate his supporting forces. I intend to task organize for a breach-in-stride and I want our fires to destroy - not suppress. Success will be achieved if we create a penetration, pass 3d Brigade, and have combat power to destroy remaining forces on the objective.
BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech conducts a movement to contact along Axis Crystal 190600MNT/H__ to destroy enemy MRR advance guard battalion and allow TF Armor, 1st Brigade main effort, the freedom to maneuver to destroy the MRR main body.

Commander's Intent. Get the scouts out early and deep to provide eyes on the advancing MRR. Our success is a rapid movement to the Brown Debnam Pass area to ensure we control this key terrain to deny the enemy. We will do this by using the TF diamond formation. Our advance guard team will infiltrate and destroy the enemy advance guard allowing me to maneuver the main body to destroy his main body. We must be able to mass our combat power, both direct and indirect, into his main body. We must retain the initiative. Success will be defined as destruction of his lead MRB while retaining the key Brown/Debnam Pass complex with sufficient combat power remaining to continue our attack on the MRR.

BDE ATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks 200500MNT/H__ along Axis Carla and destroys enemy forces to create a penetration, then assists the forward passage of TF Armor in zone.

Commander's Intent. There are 3 keys to our success; finding and killing his reconnaissance; verifying our enemy template; and massing our combat power on the focal point we choose to penetrate. I want to get the scouts out early and deep to locate the enemy and his obstacles. I intent to move in the TF box to the point where it is advantageous to transition our lead company/teams on line probably short of the obstacles. I want to pick a focal point to mass our combat power on to achieve a penetration. Ensure the engineers are task organized to breach-in-stride. Success is defined as creating a penetration through their MRB, allowing Armor to pass, and retaining sufficient combat power to continue the attack on order.

N8

MTC

Mission. TF Armor conducts a movement to contact in zone at 130600MNT/H__ to clear enemy forces in zone to PL St. Louis; on order, be prepared to transition to the defense.

Commander's Intent. I want to use reconnaissance assets forward to identify the enemy axis of advance. Once identified, I want to move to attack at constricted terrain to destroy by direct and indirect fires for the FD. We will mass combat power on the flanks and hold the enemy in place with the advance guard of the battalion.

DIS

Mission. TF Armor defend in sector from NK8056 to 537981 NLT 150001MNT/H__ to defeat the 44th MRR allowing no penetration of PL Dallas; on order conducts offensive operations.

Commander's Intent. I intend to defeat the enemy by accepting risk in the east and swiftly identifying opposing forces so I can reposition focus to apply combat power at the decisive point and time. I want to use hide positions to ensure that maximum combat power is achieved through surprise and deception. Attack on the flanks if possible to maximize the use of TOWs and blunt with tank direct fire.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor attacks 170530MNT/H__ to seize OBJ Hood (NJ3938) and destroys MRB(-).

Be prepared to conduct future operations.

Commander's Intent. I intend to move swiftly in the diamond formation to protect the force and focus combat power. We will attack the enemy based on knowledge of his weakest point and focus
all available combat power at that point. I want to push the fight throughout the objective and sequentially destroy platoon-sized BPs.

**BDE HATK**

*Mission.* TF Armor attacks 190600UTC to seize OBJ Killeen (NK170245) in order to secure the Nelson Lake approach into Parumph Province.

*Commander’s Intent.* I intend to follow the lead TF in a box formation allowing me to quickly concentrate fires and move forces to predetermined positions. We will fix the enemy and strike at an exposed flank to support the initial attack of the forward teams. Destruction will be facilitated by maneuver Co/Tms.

**BDE HATK**

*Mission.* TF Armor continues to attack 200500UTC to seize OBJ Killeen (NK170245) in order to secure the Nelson Lake approach to Parumph Province.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**N9**

**MTC**

*Mission.* TF Mech counterattacks in either 1st or 2nd Brigades’ sector to destroy penetrations of PL Maple to allow forward brigades to continue defense against 2d echelon forces.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**DIS**

*Mission.* TF Mech defends 210400UTC to destroy one MRR forward of PL Wheeling to allow USJTF to prepare for offensive operations.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**DATK**

*Mission.* TF Mech attacks 240430UTC along Axis Jab to secure OBJ Frank and to protect the left flank of 3d Brigade as it continues the attack to OBJ Axe; on order attacks to secure OBJ Axe 4 to complete the 3d Brigade securing of OBJ Axe.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**DATK**

*Mission.* TF Mech attacks 250450UTC to seize OBJ Crash NLT 250600UTC to support TF Armor’s attack against OBJ Axe 1. On order attacks to secure OBJ Axe 3 to complete the destruction of enemy forces in the vicinity of OBJ Axe.

*Commander’s Intent.* None.

**N10**

**MTC/HATK**

*Mission.* TF Armor secures LD in zone and NLT 120500UTC conducts movement to contact oriented on OBJ Silver (NK545085) to fix and destroy enemy in zone. On order defends, vicinity of OBJ Silver.

*Commander’s Intent.* Object: Conduct a movement to contact, locate enemy in zone, destroy him. Purpose: Destroy forward detachment forward of PL Green. End state: Occupy BPs that secure OBJ Silver and Big Sandy Wash. Retain at least 50% combat power (2 Co/Tms)
DIS
Mission. TF Armor defend in sector NLT 140500MNTN from NK378033 to NJ496941 to destroy enemy MRR forward of PL Cod.
Commander’s Intent. Object: Mass fires of two or more teams on the 18th MRR to destroy it and prevent penetration of PL Cod. Purpose: To facilitate future offensive operations by the 52dID.
End state: Retain terrain forward of PL Cod; destroy forces in sector, 50% combat power; continue to defend in sector.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks 160500MNTN to seize OBJ Tiger, conduct linkup with TF Mech at link-up point 7, on order continue to attack north to OBJ Second, Third, and Explorer to force enemy to withdraw in zone.
Commander’s Intent. Object: Turn enemy defense. Purpose: To force enemy to withdraw. End state: Link up with TF Airborne in central corridor.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks NLT 170500MNTN to seize OBJ Colorado to penetrate enemy positions and exploit to OBJ explorer.
Commander’s Intent. None.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks 240430MNTN along Axis Thrust to SBF 1, on order follows TF Mech along Axis Jab to secure OBJ Frank 2, on order attacks as brigade main effort to secure OBJ Axe 1, 2, 3 in order to destroy enemy forces.
Commander’s Intent. Object: Attack as part of 3d BCT, initially in support to destroy 3 CSOPs vicinity Holly-Debnam Passes, the follow and support TF Mech to Frank 2. Then secure OBJ Axe 1, 2, 3, consolidate on Axe 2, orient north. Purpose: To facilitate 3BCT defeat of 2 MRRs. End state: Defending OBJ Axe 2 oriented northwest with 50% combat power.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor continues to attack 250430MNTN to secure OBJ Axe 1, 2, 3.
Commander’s Intent. None.

N11

HATK
Mission. TF Motorized conducts a movement to contact at 080600MNTN from PL England to PL France to destroy enemy in zone. On order, screens the brigade front between PL Black and PL France.
Commander’s Intent. The commander intents for the attack to creep forward and for the unit to move methodically to avoid moving into direct fire range of the enemy.

DIS
Mission. TF Motorized defends in sector NLT 100530MNTN from PL Silver to PL Opal and allows no penetration of PL Opal.
Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is to defend the Whale Gap and deny the enemy the use of the Whale by forcing the enemy into the Whale Gap.
CATK

Mission. TF Motorized occupies TAA Horse NLT 102000 MTH and acts as division reserve. On order moves along Axis Slash, Cut, and Stab to occupy blocking positions vicinity BPs 33, 22, or 44 to deny enemy penetration of Avawatz Pass into 1st Brigade’s rear area. On order reverts to 199th SIB control.

Commander’s Intent. To move rapidly into any one of the three BPs and react quickly to any enemy move.

BDE MTC

Mission. TF Motorized attacks in sector 140600 MTH to guard the brigade northern flank and seize BPs 1A and 2A. On order attacks to seize OBJ Omaha. On order attacks to support by fire the seizure of OBJ Leyte.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this mission is to guard the brigade’s northern flank and destroy the enemy in sector. Success is defined as seizure of OBJ Omaha and maintaining 70% combat power to support follow-on operations.

BDE HATK

Mission. TF Motorized attacks 140530 MTH along POA Sledge to clear enemy in zone and set attack by fire positions in support of the main attack. On order, follow and support TF Armor. On order, attack by fire OBJ Leyte.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this mission is to move deep to establish attack by fire positions to support the brigade’s main attack. Success is occupying the attack by fire positions with 90% of the TF’s combat power to effectively support the brigade’s main effort.

BDE FLK GRD

Mission. TF Motorized guards in sector NLT 151800 MTH from PL Quartz to PL Bronze to force the enemy south.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of this mission is for the TF is to guard the brigade’s western flank and force the enemy into using the Colorado Wadi or Debnam Pass. Success is defined as no penetration of PL Bronze.

N12

MTC

Mission. TF Armor conducts a tactical road march commencing at 021345 MTH to occupy attack position 1-33. Conduct movement to contact along Axis Chisel, then Axis Drill boundary; on order establish defensive positions along PL Hamm.

Commander’s Intent. None.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor attacks NLT 050600 MTH to penetrate the enemy defensive belts in order to facilitate the TF; on order seize PL Flounder.

Commander’s Intent. None.

DELAY

Mission. TF Armor delays on 070500 MTH from PL Bone to PL London in order to block enemy penetration of PL London; on order occupy attack position Hawk and prepare to counterattack to establish hasty defense position on PL France.

Commander’s Intent. None.
MTC/HATK

Mission. TF Armor conducts a movement to contact in zone NLT 140615 MOUTH__ in order to support TF Mech (main effort) seizure of OBJ Maine; on order attack to OBJ Leyte in order to support TF Mech’s (main effort) seizure of OBJ Bulge.
Commander’s Intent. None.

FLK GRD

Mission. TF Armor defends in sector NLT 151800 MOUTH__ from PL Bronze to PL Marble establishing a blocking position at Granite Pass in order to prevent penetration of PL Elm and allowing the 23AD to attack west.
Commander’s Intent. None.

N13

HATK

Mission. TF Mech conducts a coordinated hasty attack on 190530 MOUTH__ to seize OBJ Blue (vicinity NK35075) to facilitate the brigade’s seizure of OBJ Slam.
Commander’s Intent. None.

DIS

Mission. TF Mech defends in sector from KN249254 to NK377198 to NK325129 to NK210001 MOUTH__ to destroy the remaining elements of the lead regiment and prevent penetration of PL Bismarck.
Commander’s Intent. I intend to force the enemy into EA 32 by using an aggressive deception plan and a series of turning obstacles. Once in EA 32, I intend to complete his destruction by massing fires at TRP 1.

DATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks on 230900 MOUTH__ to seize OBJ Newark (vicinity NK433143). Be prepared to conduct a hasty defence on OBJ Newark. On order, conduct the forward passage of TF Armor along Axis Red. Be prepared to conduct the attack to seize OBJ Tacoma.
Commander’s Intent. I intend to seize OBJ Newark through the use of coordinated attacks by both mounted and dismounted elements. A company-sized dismounted elements will unhinge the northern positions of OBJ Newark while the TF(-) attacks form vicinity of Hill 876. The TF will consolidate into a hasty defensive position on OBJ Newark oriented east and will conduct a forward passage of lines with TF Armor on order. On order I intend to attack to seize OBJ Tacoma to support TF Infantry’s attack to seize OBJs Ranger and Tom.

HATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks on Axis Blue on 240500 MOUTH__ to seize OBJ Tacoma. On order continue the attack north to seize OBJ Bangor.
Commander’s Intent. None.

HATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks in zone on 251800 MOUTH__ to seize OBJ Orem (NK440983) to facilitate TF Armor seizure of OBJ Hood. On order, continues to attack to seize OBJ Dallas (NJ360962).
Commander’s Intent. I intend to attack on 211800 MOUTH__ to seize OBJ Orem. Accomplish by conducting a five-phased operations. Phase 1, move from current TFF to BP 1; Phase 2, move along Axis Warrior in TF column to seize OBJ Miami by force; Phase 3, on order, attacks along Axis Infantry and occupy a dismount point in the vicinity of OBJ Dismount. Move in a battalion
wedge to assault position in vicinity of NK4409__ NLT 252300MNTTH__. Attack dismounted, to seize OBJ Orem. Phase 4, orient fires east/southeast to prevent a dismounted counterattack from the Whale; Phase 5, pass TF 3-68 through OBJ Orem to attack to OBJ Hood. On order attack to seize OBJ Dallas.

HATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks on 270915MNTTH__ to destroy enemy forces in zone.
Commander's Intent. TF Mech attacks on 270900MNTTH__ to destroy enemy forces in zone. We have a follow and support mission with a be prepared mission to assume the lead. TF Mech departs present location on 290820MNTTH__ in a TF diamond. We will move to attack position Bob and LD at PL Dakota or 290915MNTTH__. We will move behind TF Infantry and 5 kilometers behind TF Armor, the lead element. On order, the mission of lead element.

N14

MTC

Mission. TF Armor conducts a movement to contact on 140530MNTTH__ to destroy enemy in sector, on order, attacks to seize OBJ Bench (NK5905).
Commander's Intent. None.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor attacks in zone at 160515MNTTH__ to destroy enemy forces in zone and seize OBJ Bench (NK5612).
Commander's Intent. None.

DIS

Mission. TF Armor defends in sector NLT 180500MNTTH__ from NK420098 to NK432180 to destroy the lead regiment forward of PL Sioux and allowing no penetration of PL Indian.
Commander's Intent. None.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor air attacks, attacks in zone on order NLT 231200MNTTH__ to seize OBJ Newark (NK4315); on order, continues to attack to seize OBJ Bangor (NK5715). On order destroy enemy forces in zone.
Commander's Intent. None.

HATK

Mission. TF Armor, air attack, attacks in zone or NLT 260500MNTTH__ to clear by passed enemy forces as the brigade supporting attack. On order, continues to attack through OBJ Orem (NK4498) to seize OBJ Hook (NK3497) to destroy enemy forces in zone.
Commander's Intent. None.

N15

FPOL/HATK

Mission. TF Mech conducts a forward passage of lines through TF 2-77 NLT 130520MNTTH__ and attacks along Axis King to seize OBJ Donna; on order attacks along Axis Killer to seize OBJ Mary; on order attacks along Axis Davis to seize OBJ Marilyn. Be prepared to establish a hasty defense along PL Grouch.

B-15
Commander's Intent. None.

DATK/HDEF

Mission. TF Mech establishes a hasty defense in sector along PL Harpo and prepares to continue the attack at 150800MNTH to seize OBJ Marilyn.

Commander's Intent. None.

DIS

Mission. TF Mech defends in sector NLT 170530MNTH in order to destroy 1st echelon forces and prevent penetration of PL Greenville.

Commander's Intent. None.

HATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks at 180600MNTH in zone to destroy enemy forces in the vicinity of PL Stuart and to seize PL Chamberlain; on order, continues the attack to seize OBJs Sheridan and Bullrun.

Commander's Intent. None.

DATK

Mission. TF Mech attacks at 200600MNTH to seize OBJ Mead; on order continues to OBJ Gettysburg.

Commander's Intent. None.

N16

DATK/MTC

Mission. TF Armor conducts a movement to contact NLT 080545MNTH to seize OBJS along PL Betty in order to destroy the enemy in zone; on order, continue to attack to seize OBJ Sumter to destroy enemy forces and fix enemy reserves. Be prepared to conduct a hasty defense in place in the vicinity of OBJ Sumter.

Commander's Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor attacks along Axis Eagle to destroy enemy in vicinity of OBJ Sumter NLT 100520MNTH; on order, assume a hasty defense in vicinity of OBJ Sumter.

Commander's Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DIS

Mission. TF Armor defends in sector to defeat enemy attacks NLT 120600MNTH.

Commander's Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DATK

Mission. TF Armor conducts security operations along PL Johnson to protect the 3d BCT until 200600MNTH. TF Armor conducts probes of enemy fortifications in the vicinity of OBJ Meade to gain intelligence. TF Armor attacks at 200600MNTH along Axis Alabama to provide supporting fires for the 3d BCT's main breach in the south. Concurrently, TF Armor conducts a feint along Axis Virginia to deceive the enemy; on order, TF Armor attacks through the breach to secure the far side of the obstacles, and on order continues the attack to secure OBJ Gettysburg. If attack is not successful on 20 MNTH, TF will attack again on the 21st MNTH.

Commander's Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.
DIS
Mission. TF Thunderbolt moves along Route Beige to occupy, defense in sector, and execute NLT130001UMNTH__ to deny enemy penetration of PL Iceland; on order, execute passage of lines with TF Mech moving from forward of PL Potsdam to PL Iceland; on order, brigade reserve. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

MTC
Mission. TF Thunderbolt occupies Attack Position Crab and attacks at 140630MNTTH__ to seize OBJ Bear and OBJ Bobcat; on order, attacks to seize OBJS Yogi, Yellowstone, Brown, Yosemite, and Tiger, and on order, conducts a hasty defense to protect the division’s north flank, occupies AA Bison, and counterattacks to destroy enemy battalion sized or larger forces that penetrate PL Walleye. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DATK
Mission. TF Thunderbolt attacks at 160600MNTTH__ to penetrate the enemy defense, hold the shoulders open, and pass forces through to seize OBJ Tiger; on order, seize OBJS Yellowstone, Yogi, Brown, or Yosemite; on order, conduct a hasty defense; on order, occupy Attack Position Bison to counterattack and destroy enemy penetration of PL Walleye. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DIS
Mission. TF Thunderbolt defends in sector from PL Alaska to PL Barrow NLT180001UMNTH__ to destroy attacking enemy 1st echelon MRR and prevent penetration of PL Barrow; on order, establish security forces along PL Billings; be prepared to reconstitute and reconsolidate defense in sector to destroy enemy 2d echelon forces. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DATK
Mission. TF Thunderbolt attacks at 200600UMNTH__ along Axis Bishop to seize OBJ Bun or along Axis York to seize OBJ Boy; on order, OBJ Boxer 2; on order, pass TF Mech (Infantry) through on OBJ Bun; on order, follow TF Mech (Infantry) on Axis Collie or support on Axis Beagle; on order, pass through TF Mech (Infantry). Lead on Axis Buddha to seize OBJ Bulldog 2; on order defend. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

DATK
Mission. TF Thunderbolt executes a limited objective attack at 201630MNTTH__ to seize OBJ Boy and secure passage lanes through the objective. At 210500MNTTH__, continue attack to pass through OBJ Boy and seize OBJ Boxer 1 through maneuver along Axis Beagle. Establish passage lanes and pass TF Mech through OBJ Boxer. Follow TF Mech. Be prepared to attack OBJ Bulldog 2. Commander’s Intent. None, only a concept of the operation.

N18
CATK
Mission. TF Mech, Infantry, conducts a movement to contact to destroy the enemy along Axis
Power of Axis Keg; on order, continue the attack. Be prepared to conduct hasty defense operations; on order, on order, engage the enemy on the most defendable terrain.

Commander's Intent. None.

DIS
Mission. TF Mech defends in sector to destroy one enemy 2d Echelon regiment NLT 092200MNTTH__. Be prepared to assist in the passage of lines of elements of 1st Brigade through our sector.

Commander's Intent. None.

DATK
Mission. TF Mech, Infantry, conducts a deliberate attack on 120230MNTTH__; on order, to seize OBJ Borneo and OBJ Soifan; on order, defend in sector and be prepared to conduct covering force operations along PL Malta.

Commander's Intent. None.

CATK
Mission. TF Mech, Infantry, conducts a counterattack along either Axis Barstow, Axis Calcais, or Axis Dance NET 132000MNTTH__; on order, screen PL Tehran and establish a hasty defense. Be prepared to destroy penetration of 4th Brigade or 1st Brigade.

Commander's Intent. None.

DATK
Mission. TF Mech attacks 200630MNTTH__ to seize OBJ Boxer; on order, continues the attack to the west to seize OBJ Bulldog. Be prepared to conduct a hasty defense on either OBJ Boxer or OBJ Bulldog.

Commander's Intent. None.

DATK
Mission. TF Mech attacks 210600MNTTH__ to penetrate enemy 1st Echelon defenses on OBJ Boxer; on order, continues the attack to seize OBJ Bulldog.

Commander's Intent. None.

N19

DIS
Mission. TF Armor completes a relief in place of TF Mech NLT 020500MNTTH__ and defends in sector to destroy enemy forces attacking in zone.

Commander's Intent. TF Armor intends to defend using TF Mech's plan with team D in BP Condor oriented on EA Buick, Team C in BP Buffalo oriented on EA Olds, Team A in BP Panther oriented on EA Chevy, Team B in RP Rock and Team E initially screening along PL Texas; on order Team E will collapse the screen and withdraw to the rear of BP Rock.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks at 040700MNTTH__ to penetrate 1st echelon defensive line at OBJ Ohio, then seizes and holds OBJ Florida to support the division's main attack.

Commander's Intent. None, only a scheme of maneuver.
DIS
Mission. TF Armor defends in sector NLT060001MNTH__ to destroy enemy 1st echelon MRR forward of PL Illinois; on order, reposition to destroy enemy forces in Team B/TF Armor's sector. 
Commander's Intent. None, only a scheme of maneuver.

HATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks at 070600MNTH__ to seize OBJ Kansas to prevent its use by enemy counterattacks; on order, seizes OBJ Boxer. 
Commander's Intent. None, only a scheme of maneuver.

NATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks at 082200MNTH__ to destroy security zone forces at OBJ Ohio to penetrate the security zone; on order follows and supports TF Mech to penetrate the 1st echelon defensive belt at OBJ Ram. 
Commander's Intent. None, only a scheme of maneuver.

DATK
Mission. TF Armor attacks at 100400MNTH__ to seize OBJ Utah and York; on order, assists forward passage of TF Mech; on order, attacks to seize OBJ Ram. 
Commander's Intent. None, only a scheme of maneuver.

N20

DIS
Mission. TF Mech Infantry, defends in sector forward NLT 280001MNTH__ from NK454180 to NK4550__ to destroy the attacking 1st echelon regiment in sector to prevent any enemy penetration of PL Nevada and to prevent the bypass or prevent envelopment of the 4th Brigade to the south. 
Commander's Intent. None.

HATK
Mission. TF Mech conducts a hasty attack at 010530MNTH__ to seize OBJ Pump in the vicinity of NK583160 to disrupt the enemy's preparation for offensive operations, and protect the northern flank of the division's main attack. 
Commander's Intent. None.

RELIEF
Mission. TF Mech Infantry conducts a relief in place commencing on 011200MNTH__; on order, continues a defensive in sector. The relief in place will be complete NLT 020500MNTH__. 
Commander's Intent. None.

BDE ATK
Mission. TF Mech Infantry attacks in zone to OBJ Ohio in support of the brigade main effort NET 082200MNTH__; on order pass through and assume brigade main effort to seize OBJ Ram. Be prepared to seize OBJ Ohio, Nevada, or establish hasty defense. 
Commander's Intent. None.

BDE DATK
Mission. TF Mech Infantry follows and supports the brigade main attack along Axis Tennessee; LDs on order behind TF Armor. Be prepared to assume the brigade main attack. 
Commander's Intent. None.

B-19
# Appendix C

## Observer/Controller Comments on Critical Leader Behaviors

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CLB 01: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the commander’s ability to see the battlefield and predict future events.

CLB 1a. Commander sets and enforces standards.

1) Comments on staff coordination and products.

N17
- "Failure to integrate the enemy estimate into plans; lack of detail in recon, surveillance, and counter-recon plans; . . . ."
- Staff never developed DST
- No wargaming during COA development
- TF main CP "invariably unable" to track enemy.
- Good IPBs when S2 completed threat integration.
- Accurate SITEMPs
- "When developed, the DST was put together in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver. It was not completely integrated with staff sections other than S2/S3 during development and its use and distribution were limited."
- S2 attempted to track enemy into and through the TF sector. Scouts provided a 15 min. Warning, but this could not be explained due to a lack of developed TAIAs and DPs.
- "Limited adjacent unit coordination was conducted during the prep. The main CP did not actively track/monitor the defensive prep."
- "IPB must drive the planning process. Development of the DST is a joint staff responsibility."
- "Adjacent unit coordination is key to synchronization of the higher commander’s effort. LNOs sent to conduct coordination must know what items of information are needed by the commander from the adjacent unit beforehand."

N18
- Lessons Learned: "Improve company reporting to provide BDA and provide times for accurate S2 analysis."
- "The S2 . . . did not situational template how the enemy would fight/deploy against the TF."
- "The enemy situational template was not continually adjusted in a timely manner."
- "He [the S2] provided an accurate assessment of obstacles, combat security outposts, and main BPs."
- "He [the S2] provided the TF commander and staff with a viable recommendation to move to and attack the security zone and main belt defense. He had a recommendation for their northern and southern axis of advance. His recommendations were based on his doctrinal knowledge of the threat and his terrain analysis which considered the advantages and disadvantages of the terrain for both friendly and enemy forces."
- This was an attack on the same area as the day before. The S2 did not update intelligence from the previous mission with observations from debriefings. The "situation template was not updated/revised on a continual basis."
- "An R&S plan was not developed. Nor were PIR/IR developed to focus the scout platoon and one OP team under the TF’s control. This led to no eyes on their objectives especially at the mouth of Debnam Pass."
- "Graphics for this operation did not provide the TF the control measures to be agile."
- "The commander was unable to see the battlefield and keep track of TF combat power."
- "The battle staff was correct in its analysis that the enemy was going north, but did little to clarify the battalion or brigade outlook. The TOC’s tracking of combat power was inadequate due to poor reporting and the TF XO’s work overload." p. III-G-3
N19
• Has an IPB but did not continue to refine the product. Could not track the battle.
• Intelligence products were coordinated w/other staff but estimate was not integrated into the plan. S2 could not track the battle.
• Accurate intelligence estimate. Used in planning but no TAs, DPs or as DST produced. S2 provided accurate intelligence report.
• Complete IPB. CDR and staff used IPB to plan, no DST.
• No DST. S2 did not influence the battle, little reporting from Co/Tms.

N20
• Inadequate terrain analysis, poor continuous update of IPB.
• Initial IPB lacked detail to support planning, it could not support the battle.
• Made SITEMP and used it in planning. A new BDE SITEMP arrived that made the TF SITEMP obsolete. The plan was not revised to reflect the new enemy situation.
• No intelligence products.
• Had SITEMP for planning. Did not update SITEMP with new data form division.
• Poor SITEMP, failed to properly recon.

N15
• The S2 did not analyze the entire area of operations.
• Poor passing of intelligence among the staff.
• S2 improved the situational template during the preparation phase by updating his intelligence.
• The S2 section provided analysis to the TF commander.

N14
• IPB was timely, accurate, but incomplete.
• S2 did not refine the IPB.
• "Since only one COA was explored, the S2 was not prepared to provide an analysis to the commander as events unfolded on the battlefield."
• Poor intelligence preparation by the S2.
• S2 provided no analysis of the battle.
• The enemy events nor an R&S plan were prepared, "the TF did not know where and when to focus on the enemy."
• "The S2 had yet to produce a TF level situational template, an event template, and a R&S plan of any sort. He had yet to produce these products because he had yet to follow the five-step IPB process to arrive at a logical understanding of the enemy on which to base his product."
• TF used only one enemy COA with an incomplete enemy preparation of the battlefield.
• TOC did not track the preparation.
• TOC could not continuously track the battle.
• The IPB was a superficial analysis of multiple enemy COAs.
• The main CP analyzed information and made timely recommendations to the TF commander.

N13
• There was no DST.
• No DST.
• S2 did not provide a picture of the battlefield to the TF commander during execution.
• The TOC failed to monitor the preparation of the TF.
• The TOC recorded all messages but failed to analyze and report to the TF commander.

N12
• "If the TF commander was not forward to see the OPFOR as they deploy, then the scouts should paint a picture for him. In clear and concise terms, the scouts should describe the enemy in enough detail that the TF can make adjustments."
• "The TF rarely knows the intent and position of adjacent units."
N10
• Weak IPB. There was no situational or event template.
• "Staff integration was nonexistent." No DST produced.
• Plan lacked staff integration. The brigade IPB not included in the plan.
• No event template.
• Complete IPB and situational template.
• The TOC did not have a clear picture of the battle flow. "The commander needs to receive pertinent information from the staff (situational updates) prior to developing COAs and issuing out planning guidance."
• The TOC was having a difficult time painting a clear picture of the TF dispositions and compositions.

N9
• All plans were developed without the most up-to-date intelligence.
• Poor TF IPB, "Providing inadequate focus for maneuver planning." A "faulty IPB resulted in the TF's inability to see the enemy or friendly forces during the battle."
• No situation template prepared, S2 could not analyze the enemy or give recommendations to the TF commander.
• There was not an adequate terrain analysis accomplished. Poor IPB.
• The plan was developed with out a situational template.

N8
• IPB sufficient for planning. There was not a DST for COA development. S2 tracked enemy but did not give a productive analysis.
• IPB not effectively used to develop COA.
• There was no IPB refinement.
• Planning failed to consider terrain in direct fire planning.
• There was no rehearsal at the TF level.
• Poor IPB, terrain analysis only on enemy COAs. S2 updated and refined IPB during preparation. S2 was unable to provide additional intelligence during execution.
• No COA was war-gamed or developed by the TF; the TF used the COA provided by the brigade.
• TOC improved in its tracking of the battle.

N7
• "... the efforts and expertise of the TF ... S2 section are wasted because the TF commander excludes their products during maneuver planning and does not suspend [?] nor desire development of secondary IPB products which support continuation of maneuver planning and synchronization of combat multipliers."
• Not systematic, failed to provide adequate focus for mission. Could not provide predictive analysis.
• Plan disregarded the terrain and enemy situation. Plan failed to assign a clear-concise mission (task/purpose) to each Co/Tm, no main effort. Staff failed to complete mission analysis. Commander could not see himself. "The TF commander was unable to see the battlefield, making it impossible for him to anticipate the enemy commander’s actions.
• Incomplete intelligence products.
• Adequate IPB. No predictive analysis.
• Inadequate IPB. Poor reporting lead to poor battle tracking.

N6
• Maneuverability corridors not effectively analyzed. Enemy situation not accurately depicted.
• Did not use enemy in COA development. "TF commander provided a vague intent for the conduct of the mission and juxtaposed operational terms to the degree that it became unclear how to develop a scheme of maneuver." The plan did not have decision points to select
maneuver after contact. TF failed to plan thoroughly. TF commander did not know location of where the TF was.

- Co/Tms did not provide the TOC or commander with enough spot reports, that allowed them to see the battlefield.
- Incomplete IPB, analysis and templating were ineffective. S2 was effective in tracking the enemy. S2 could not provide predictive analysis.
- Only had one course of action. Recon was successful in supporting the TF intelligence requirements. S2 did not effectively record, analyze, or disseminate information.
- TF had problems with dissemination of information.
- Poor IPB for planning. Dissemination of intelligence was late and ineffective.
- IPB lacked detail, and was late. "TF was unaware of the enemy situation facing the lead TF." S2 failed to provide analysis during the battle.

N5

- IPB was not used to focus maneuver planning. Poor threat analysis, terrain analysis. IPB was not refined as more information arrived. Good flow of information during the battle.
- There was no clear scheme of maneuver. Did not use IPB in developing COAs. Did not wargame plan. TF rehearsal refined the plan. TF commander could see the battlefield in regard to terrain, enemy, but not the friendly forces.
- IPB was timely and conclusive.
- Good initial IPB. Poor refinement. S2 provided predictive analysis of enemy actions in a timely manner.
- The staff collected spot reports but did not provide critical information to the commander.
- The lack of a collection plan kept the TF form seeing the battlefield.
- The TF did not have a full understanding of the terrain, enemy, and the friendly situation.

N4

- Detailed and sound SITEMAP.
- TF did a full rehearsal that gave them an appreciation of the time/distance factors.
- TF did not have a DST.
- SITEMAP not detailed enough. S2 reports and analysis of battle were accurate. Good battle tracking by the TOC and continuously sent combat multipliers forwarded to the TF commander.
- A detailed IPB.
- A full rehearsal

N3

- Staff did not do a detailed analysis to provide the commander all available information. No friendly force inventory, the TF commander could not accurately see the status of the TF. CCIR for the prep was not tracked.
- Insufficiently detailed SITEMAP to focus maneuver planning. Did not continuously refined IPB.
- The mission analysis conducted by the staff failed to allow the commander to see himself, the enemy, or the terrain. The commander developed the scheme of maneuver before the staff briefed the mission analysis.
- TF commander and S3 developed COA before mission analysis and the S2 had briefed the enemy situation. Battle tracking was good, the commander was kept informed.
- Inadequate IPB and IPB not refined.
- Event template not made, could not track enemy activity. Only one COA for the most likely enemy COA, no graphics for "what ifs". The mission and purpose for the Co/Tms was not adequate.
- SITEMAP was produced and available for mission planning. Produced an event template. S2 provided timely predictive analysis.
• Good wargaming and COA development. Did not track CCIR for the commander during the prep.

N2
• Did not fully analyze and identify all avenues of approach. Not enough detail in intelligence to depict the enemy. TF commander did not get an accurate picture of the Enemy. COA’s proposed were not developed in line w/the initial planning guidance given by the TF commander.
• Staff did not allow BICC to develop a clear picture of what the commander wanted. SITEMP not detailed.
• TF failed to defeat enemy recon. TOC did not have a clear picture of the battlefield.
• S2 picture of the enemy during rehearsal was not adequate causing an unrealistic vision of enemy actions. During execution, S2 had a fairly clear picture of the developing battle, but did not analyze it to provide predictions of what would happen next. The TOC had a clear picture of the battle.
• Poor templating causes difficulty in seeing the battlefield. No continuous JP. "The TOC, as a whole, had a serious problem as to how it wants to track the battle and integrate the staff."
• Poor mission analysis, staff not identifying specified and implied tasks. "TF commander and S3 routinely select to by pass difficult operational issues [sic]." No synchronization matrix or DST were developed. No execution matrix. Orders lacked details. "TF lost command and control early in the operation." Co/TM commanders entered the battle w/o a complete understanding of the plan.

N1
• Incomplete analysis, did not refine template, S2 provided TF CDR accurate estimate of events during the battle.
• The companies lacked a clear task and purpose. The TF commander should use aid such as models or sketches to assist in visualizing the operations and to give his vision to subordinates. TF commander did not conduct a briefback from his subordinates. Inadequate rehearsal, they only had a walk-through for the Co/TM commanders. TF unable to mass combat power, "The scheme of maneuver must be developed after conducting a thorough mission analysis that allows the TF commander to see the terrain, the enemy, and himself."
• The mission brief to the commander was not focused and did not provide a clear picture to allow the commander to see the mission. The commander did not receive critical information to monitor the TF’s prep.
• Incomplete SITEMP, terrain analysis, identification of defensible terrain, enemy avenues of approach.
• Inadequate mission analysis did not allow the commander to see himself, the enemy, or the terrain. Commander developed scheme of maneuver before staff briefed the mission analysis. TF did not rehearse.
• Inadequate threat integration, lack of detail.
• S2 provided timely analysis to the TF commander.
• Commander received a "fairly" accurate picture of the enemy terrain and unit from staff.
• R&S plan and effort did not confirm intelligence products.

J2
• "IPB was weak which lead to extremely poor targeting, failure to mass infantry, and a high causality [sic] count."

2) Subordinate Element Reports.

N17
• "... inability to track/assess the enemy during battles due to lack of SPOTREPs and BDA from units in contact."
Once contact was made, the lack of SPOTREPs hampered the S2’s assessment process.

"Limited cross talk and spot reporting hampered the ability of the main CP to track the battle"

"Internal cross talk and accurate/timely spot reporting enhances battle tracking, timely decision making, and TF synchronization." "Limited cross talk between subordinate leaders was limited [sic] hampered the ability of the TF to achieve synchronization during the mission."

"The tracking of the adjacent TF was hampered by limited commo with the TF LNO."

"Limited cross talk between subordinate leaders was limited and hampered TF synchronization."

N18

Lessons Learned: "Improve commo for scouts to report critical information during the battle. Ensure that information is being reported on time to effect the commander’s operation."

"The TF was unable to track the battle which contributed to the TF commander being unable to see the battlefield along with poor spot reporting."

"The TOC was out of commo with most of the TF for much of the battle due to distance/terrain. The TOC could not effectively assist the commander with command and control or provide battle analysis, largely because of commo and inadequate SPOTREPs."

"Because of marginal commo and constant movement, the TOC was unable to provide the commander with assistance in command and control and battle analysis."

N19

Received few SALUTE and BDA reports from Co/Tms.

N20

TF lacked synchronization. "The TF commander was not able to accurately see the battlefield" due to commo, poor intel, poor spot reports, and map reading error.

N15

Meaningful recommendations to the TF commander are the result of accurate spot reports and thorough staff analysis.

N12

"The TF failed to achieve the unity of effort or concentrate combat power, resulting in a piecemeal battle from PL BLACK to PL Blue. The main cause of the piecemeal attack was the TF’s failure to see the battlefield. The SPOTREPs from subordinate units were inaccurate and never assisted Team C and the TOC in depicting the true positioning of the delaying enemy. The TF commander and S3 lost commo with key leaders and could not coherently and quickly FRAGCO Co/Tms to unplanned BPs and EAs."

"The TF commander could see the battlefield. He received excellent SPOTREPs from the CSC commander (controlling the scout platoons) and accurate and timely assessments from the S2."

"Poor positioning of the main CP, combined with poor reporting from subordinate units, resulted in inadequate analysis of events during the battle."

"The battalion main CP was unable to provide the commander an analysis of enemy actions during the movement to contact operation. . . Processing of SPOTREPs from subordinate, higher, and adjacent units were not being collated into meaningful information. For the hasty attack operation, improved positioning of the main CP contributed to improved analysis of events during the battle."

"The main CP effectively tracked the friendly and enemy situation during the battle. Combining personal observations and SPOTREPs, the S2 accurately tracked the CRP, FSE, and the main body into EA SWORDFISH.

N10

Spot reports were poor.

The S2’s tracking of the battle was hampered by poor communications and reporting.

Little cross talk on the command net.

N9
• Little cross talk on the command net; The TF could not see the battlefield.

• Poor spot reports caused confusion during the battle.

• Good spot reports.
• No cross talk or spot reports led to inadequate knowledge of the situation.

CLB 1b: Trust and Subordinates.

• TF plan ignored the enemy COA which the S2 believed to be the most likely.

• The probable enemy COA briefed by the S2 had no impact on the planning or execution of the TF defense.

• Improved IPB, defensive plan was not based on the most likely enemy COA. There was a lack of staff coordination.

• "Since the TF commander does not use intelligence products to develop the scheme of maneuver, time distance analysis, . . . , is not used." "The TF commander could not see the battlefield and failed to develop the situation."

• IPB products were late for mission planning. SITEMAP not used for mission planning. "The S2's predictive analysis was correct; however, he was shot down by Co/Tm commanders who had their own NTC ideas and faulty understanding of how the enemy fights. The S2, eventually frustrated by those with a deficit of enemy knowledge and understanding of the IPB process, unfortunately sat down and the TF commander and Co/Tm commanders did not hear a correct appraisal of how they would die the next day."

• Developed maneuver w/o IPB, developed maneuver on commander's reconnaissance, not the enemy or friendly situation. TF commander was never able to anticipate the enemy's commander's decisions.

• "Little thought was given to determining if such plans [positioning of the commander and S3] would place the TF commander on the best secure terrain to control the battle. As the battle developed, it became apparent that the TF commander was not properly positioned, was not responding to the estimates of his subordinates on enemy activity, and could not get a precise feel on the actions of the battlefield."

c. General comments on TF commander's vision and staff errors.

• "TF fought the enemy blindfolded."

• Recon got only as far as the forward edge of the enemy positions. The scouts provided some information, which the S2 misconstrued as confirming his templated enemy COA.

• "The commander was able to see the battlefield and recognized the opportunity to penetrate the OPFOR defense to the north. The TF moved to the north wall flanking the remaining OPFOR defense, which was being further attrited by artillery, CAS, and limited direct fire."

• "The ability of the commander to see the battlefield and modify his plan accordingly is a key factor in success. Once the advantage is gained, patience to wait for the proper time to exploit it is needed."

C-8
"...The S2 never was able to brief how the OPFOR would deploy using the terrain (situational templating of the enemy’s attack)."

"The TF attempted to develop the situation, but was unable to achieve unity of effort or mass combat power against an enemy FD. The TF commander was unable to see the whole battlefield; he was unable to track the enemy force."

Lessons Learned: "The TF commander must be in a position where he can see, control, and influence the TF."

"The TF had the benefit of being able to see much of the sector from its AA. Unfortunately, there was not attempt to take advantage of this opportunity."

The scouts were not effective. "Their failure left the TF commander blind and unable to choose an attack based on enemy intelligence."

Commander poorly situated, he could not see the battlefield.

After contact, the commander lost the ability to see the battlefield.

"Compounding the S2’s ineffectiveness was that he, the commander, and the S3 sat north of Hill 760 thinking they were north of Hill 780. They did not realize they were watching the enemy penetrate the TF to the south until it was pointed out to them."

"The battalion commander and S3 did routinely position themselves where they could see and influence the battlefield; however, the TOC and J-TOC were not viable contributors to seeing and tracking the battlefield because the S3/XO failed to adequately plan for its movement during the battle, which resulted in these two nodes being destroyed earlier during several missions."

"A leader’s recon is key. The JRTC has been trying to make a point about leader’s recons for a long time. Company commanders don’t do leader’s recons, battalion commanders don’t do leader’s recons. Infantry squads do, well trained squads do leader’s recons for us." Tape 1 of 2.

CLB 02: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the focus, the commander’s identification of critical work in all phases of the battle.

"The entire staff was normally not present during the planning process, forcing staff officers to develop their portions of the plan without coordinating their efforts."

"The TF attempted to develop the situation, but was unable to achieve unity of effort or mass combat power against an enemy FD. The TF commander was unable to see the whole battlefield; he was unable to track the enemy force."

"The TF commander appeared not to have thought through his scheme of maneuver to meet the brigade commander’s intent."

CDR and entire staff was involved in the IPB process. Made a DST but it was not used.

"The TF initially did not fully understand the defensive plan." (CDR’s intent)

Staff provide very little analysis for the commander.
"The battle staff conducted a hasty planning process and an incomplete estimate that resulted in an inadequate plan."

By changing, modifying, and adjusting the plan numerous ways during the rehearsal, the commanders did not get a clear picture of the fight.

The TF commander gave good guidance, but the staff did not integrate their effort.

The rehearsal did not emphasize the commander's intent and may have caused confusion.

A lack of understanding of TF combat power put the TF's task organization in a constant flux.

The enemy events nor an R&S plan were prepared, "the TF did not know where and when to focus on the enemy."

"The S2 had yet to produce a TF level situational template, an event template, and a R&S plan of any sort. He had yet to produce these products because he had yet to follow the five-step IPB process to arrive at a logical understanding of the enemy on which to base his product."

"The TF failed to identify the enemy formations or to develop the situation. As a result, the TF commander failed to focus the TF or mass combat power against a moving enemy."

"The TF's initial success was negated by a failure to achieve mass, lack of command and control, and focus combat power. . . . The TF accomplished the initial mission . . . ; however, the TF was unable to fix the enemy forces, never focused on the enemy, and was subsequently destroyed."

"Neither the commander's intent nor the concept of operation clearly enunciated how the TF . . . would fight the battle."

"As a result of an unclear Task/purpose, the advance guard lost focus. . . ."

"The TF lacked focus and moved from one enemy contact to the next." The TF commander nor the S3 were in a position to see the battlefield.

TOC did not track the preparation.

Little detail existed in the plan passed the initial objectives.

Initial planning completed before the S2 did the intelligence estimate.

"Throughout the battle, all TF OPORDs lacked sufficient detail and failed to assign a task/purpose to each subordinate. The TF provided an adequate concept of what would be done, but not how the unit's fight would be conducted."

"Compounding the S2's ineffectiveness was that he, the commander, and the S3 sat north of Hill 760 thinking they were north of Hill 780. They did not realize they were watching the enemy penetrate the TF to the south until it was pointed out to them."

"Prep tasks were not directed, supervised, or supervised."

"The TF made no attempt to mass combat power in EA CARP, although this was the commander's intent, instead, Co/Tms fought separate battles in zone from the LD in the vicinity of Hill 720 to OBJ GETTYSBURG (in the vicinity of Brown Pass)."

"The TF commander was in command and control of the TF maneuver prior to contact. Once contact was made, FRAGOs were not directed at massing combat power, but piecemealing Co/Tms to attack-by-fire positions that were not in mutual support of each other."

"The TF and TF 2-1 (Infantry) had created a flank in the enemy defense, but did not exploit it."

"The plan adequately defined the decisive point on the battlefield. Definition of the decisive point must be done by the commander when he issues his planning guidance to the staff. Forces were not arrayed at the decisive point during the COA development. The main effort was not weighted at the decisive point, nor was the supporting efforts contribution to the
success of the main effort discussed. Finally, the S2 did not enumerate when and how the enemy would be arrayed at the decisive point."

N11
- "The organization’s TSOP delineates a planning process that was logical, systematic, and comprehensive; however, the organization for whatever reason, chose not to follow the process. Troop-leading procedures, the commander’s estimate, mission analysis were seldom used to advantage by the battalion. As a result, the plan/orders propagated by the battalion lacked breadth, depth, detail, simplicity, and were not based on the immutable 'principles of war.'"

N10
- Plan lacked staff integration. The brigade IPB not included in the plan. The S2’s tracking of the battle was hampered by poor communications and reporting.
- "There was no real information flow from the commander to the staff and the staff to the commander."
- "The rehearsal for the deliberate attack . . . was more of a war-gaming session. Its primary function was to ensure that the TF commander understood how the TF was going to execute its mission. After the rehearsal, the commanders got together with the TF commander to figure out how they were actually going to execute certain phases of the operation."

N9
- The S2 section’s inability "was magnified by the TF commander, S3, and XO because of their lacking understanding of the staff planning process. The commander, S3, XO did not establish standards or suspenses within the conduct of the planning process. . . ."
- " . . . . They [commanders and staff] accepted his [S2] illogical estimates and substandard products . . . ."
- Commanders and staff were unsure of the TF mission.
- The staff failed to define the mission.
- "The TF failed to identify or weigh the main effort Co/Tm; there fore no unifying task and purpose was established" for supporting Co/Tms.
- Scheme of maneuver did not meet the brigade commander’s intent.
- "The TF commander committed Co/Tms without a clear purpose and was defeated. . . ."

N8
- TF had no "clear cut decision" for a response once contact was made "a full understanding of what was expected of the TF was news achieved by the TF Staff."
- No war-gaming. TF rehearsal did not reinforce the commander’s intent. Poor battle tracking by the TOC.
- "The R&S plan was effectively focused on critical events."
- No COA was war-gamed or developed by the TF; the TF used the COA provided by the brigade.
- There was no planning for the TF’s follow and support mission.
- "Planning was limited to responding to FRAGOs"

N7
- "The TF commander never effectively provided planning guidance by battle operating system to his planning cell." There was a tendency to wait to plan unit guidance was received from two levels higher. "Preparation for tactical operations lacked detail, comprehensiveness, and supervision."
- Plan disregarded the terrain and enemy situation. Plan failed to assign a clear-concise mission (task/purpose) to each Co/Tm, no main effort. Staff failed to complete mission analysis. Commander could not see himself. "The TF commander was unable to see the battlefield, making it impossible for him to anticipate the enemy commander’s actions.
- TF scheme of maneuver was based on BDE graphics, not enemy or terrain. TF commander’s concept did not give a clear purpose to Co/Tms.
TF staff and commander did not focus their plans on the mission.
TF only planned for half of the maneuver necessary for the mission.

IPB was not used to focus maneuver planning. Poor threat analysis, terrain analysis. IPB was not refined as more information arrived. Good flow of information during the battle.
There was no clear scheme of maneuver. Did not use IPB in developing COAs. Did not wargame plan. TF rehearsal refined the plan. TF commander could see the battlefield in regard to terrain, enemy, but not the friendly forces. Good sport reports.
Poor war gaming and decision making process.

"The TF commander and S3 must develop a clear understanding of what products the S2 is to provide, the detail required, when during the planning process these are required, and how they relate to the development of the TF plan."
Difficulty assigning a clear task and purpose to Co/Tms in the mission.
Mission analysis by the staff was incomplete.
Commander and S3 failed to identify essential tasks.

Commander needs to ensure development of and approve TF time lines.
Poor mission analysis, staff not identifying specified and implied tasks. "TF commander and S3 routinely select to by pass difficult operational issued [sic]." No synchronization matrix or DST were developed. No execution matrix. Orders lacked details. "TF lost command and control early in the operation." Co/Tm commanders entered the battle w/o a complete understanding of the plan.
"The TF commander, XO, and the S3 served primarily as planners and did little to supervise the actual execution of any events." All three seemed tied to the TOC. TF lacked a tactical focus, "Co/Tm commanders had to ask for clarification from the TF commander during the conduct of the battle because they were so unsure of what was expected of their units."
Missions lacked staff coordination and analysis. COA development was normally done by the S3 battle captain. Weak battle tracking in the TOC, did not provide C2 at critical events.

The companies lacked a clear task and purpose. The TF commander should use aid such as models or sketches to assist in visualizing the operations and to give his vision to subordinates. TF commander did not conduct a briefback from his subordinates. Inadequate rehearsal, they only had a walk-through for the Co/Tm commanders. TF unable to mass combat power. "The scheme of maneuver must be developed after conducting a thorough mission analysis that allows the TF commander to see the terrain, the enemy, and himself."

"Assets and resources were not focused to support the scheme of maneuver."
"Synchronization of the scheme of maneuver did not occur. Focused, massed efforts were not planned or coordinated with the available attached elements."

Battalion commander needs to do his own concept of the operation and intent. He needs to get in front of his staff and say this is what I want done. This will help to eliminate confusion with the subordinate leaders and what their missions are. TF AAR 30:08

The commander's guidance normally followed mission analysis and had sufficient detail to focus the staff planning effort. However, guidance was sometimes not issued in terms of effect. The commander did provide guidance for each operating system though it sometimes lacked detail."
- "The TF commander issued planning guidance without the full planning staff present on most occasions."
- "The [commander's] guidance was not issued to the assembled staff."
- "The TF commander issued his planning guidance to the S3 rather than the full staff."

N16
- The TF commander gave good guidance, but the staff did not integrate their effort.

N14
- "The commander's intent and scheme of maneuver were inadequately communicated. The TF commander's plan to fight the TF was not communicated."

N13
- "The commander's guidance PIR/SIRs, NAIs, enemy situation/SITEMP, a fire plan, and a communications plan are critical items the scouts must have."

N12
- "The TF commander, in his commander's guidance must state in task/purpose terms, the main effort areas where he is willing to take risk, type and size of reserve, critical information requirements, and CSS instructions."
- "The plan adequately defined the decisive point on the battlefield. Definition of the decisive point must be done by the commander when he issues his planning guidance to the staff. Forces were not arrayed at the decisive point during the COA development. The main effort was not weighted at the decisive point, nor was the supporting efforts contribution to the success of the main effort discussed. Finally, the S2 did not enumerate when and how the enemy would be arrayed at the decisive point."

N11
- "The commander's intent for fire support or maneuver of fires was not routinely given in sufficient detail to allow the FSO to plan indirect fires that complemented the maneuver scheme."

N10
- TF commander not giving enough planning guidance to his staff.
- "No planning guidance was given by the TF commander."

N7
- "The TF commander never effectively provided planning guidance by battle operating system to his planning cell." There was a tendency to wait to plan unit guidance was received from two levels higher. "Preparation for tactical operations lacked detail, comprehensiveness, and supervision."

N6
- Commander's planning guidance lacked the specifics needed for the staff to effectively conduct planning.

J3
- Battalion commander needs to do his own concept of the operation and intent. He needs to get in front of his staff and say this is what I want done. This will help to eliminate confusion with the subordinate leaders and what their missions are.

CLB 03: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the positioning of the commander on the battlefield.

N18
- Lessons Learned: "The TF commander must be in a position where he can see, control, and influence the TF."

N20
• TF lacked synchronization. "The TF commander was not able to accurately see the battlefield" due to commo, poor intel, poor spot reports, and map reading error.

N16 • The TF commander was in position to see the battlefield, but was exposed and killed.

N15 • The TF commander was not always in position to see the battlefield.

N13 • "A commander in position to see the battlefield can influence the battlefield by making timely decisions; however, such positions also expose commanders to direct and indirect fire."
• "The commander must give thought during the planning phase to where the battle will be, so he can position himself to see, communicate, and yet not become a target on the battlefield."
• The commander positioned himself where he could see the battle.
• The command group was positioned only to command and control the initial part of the battle.
• The command group was positioned to see and control.
• Commander poorly situated, he could not see the battlefield.

N12 • "Compounding the S2's ineffectiveness was that he, the commander, and the S3 sat north of Hill 760 thinking they were north of Hill 780. They did not realize they were watching the enemy penetrate the TF to the south until it was pointed out to them."
• "The TF failed to achieve the unity of effort or concentrate combat power, resulting in a piecemeal battle from PL BLACK to PL 'Blue. The main cause of the piecemeal attack was the TF's failure to see the battlefield. The SPOTREPs from subordinate units were inaccurate and never assisted Team C and the TOC in depicting the true positioning of the delaying enemy. The TF commander and S3 lost commo with key leaders and could not coherently and quickly FRAGO Co/Tms to unplanned BPs and EAs."

N11 • "The battalion commander and S3 did routinely position themselves where they could see and influence the battlefield; however, the TOC and J-TOC were not viable contributors to seeing and tracking the battlefield because the S3/XO failed to adequately plan for its movement during the battle, which resulted in these two nodes being destroyed earlier during several missions."

N9 • "The TF commander was never in position to see the battlefield."

N6 • "Command and control was not executed to have the TF commander in the most advantages location to control the defense."
• TF commander was out of position to see the battlefield. "TF was unable to reposition forces during the battle."

N2 • "Little thought was given to determining if such plans [positioning of the commander and S3] would place the TF commander on the best secure terrain to control the battle. As the battle developed, it became apparent that the TF commander was not properly positioned, was not responding to the estimates of his subordinates on enemy activity, and could not get a precise feel on the actions of the battlefield."

J2 • Q: Are you satisfied with were you positioned yourself to command and control the battle? A: "The battalion commander has to be free from the fight. . . . He cannot be ducking bullets; he has got to get to a position where he can command and control and communicate. . . . The battalion commander has to be where he can influence the battle and not where he will be influenced by the enemy." TF AAR, DATK, Tape 1 of 2.
The TF commander went in, or tried to (aircraft got lost), with the first lift. The battalion commander said it was a trade off. He risked losing command and control if something happened to him (e.g., a hot LZ) but he shows leadership in his willingness to share the risks with his men. The O/C said that if something did happen, the TF commander could do more from outside the LZ then in the middle of the LZ dodging bullets instead of commanding and controlling. TF AAR 1:19:00

CLB 04: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the commander’s use of key staff.

"The entire staff was normally not present during the planning process, forcing staff officers to develop their portions of the plan without coordinating their efforts."
- The XO was the chief of staff and the second in command.
- "Subordinate commanders often attended both the TF and brigade rehearsals, consuming valuable daylight hours and hindering their troop leading time (in some cases over 4 hours)."

CDR and entire staff was involved in the IPB process. Made a DST but it was not used.

Staff provide very little analysis for the commander.

Planning involved only the commander, S2, and S3.

"The commander’s techniques for developing the plan eliminated valuable input from the staff."
- "His [the commander] failure to involve his staff in the planning process limited his ability to develop a plan that had been analyzed through war gaming; comparing of COAs and staff estimates."

MTC 3 Nov "The battalion main CP was not organized or positioned to assist the commander in controlling the operation."

"There was no real information flow from the commander to the staff and the staff to the commander."
- Not all of the staff participates in mission analysis.

"... the efforts and expertise of the TF ... S2 section are wasted because the TF commander excludes their products during maneuver planning and does not suspense [?] nor desire development of secondary IPB products which support continuation of maneuver planning and synchronization of combat multipliers."
- "The TF commander does not involve his staff during the planning process. The commander conducted mission analysis without staff input and developed the COA without using a STITEMP. The commander totally disregarded the staff-planning process." TOC did not track location nor preparation of the TF.
- "The TF commander does not involve his staff during the planning process. The commander conducted mission analysis without staff input and developed the COA without using a STITEMP. The commander totally disregarded the staff-planning process." TOC did not track location nor preparation of the TF.
- Adequate IPB. TF commander did not use S2 to assist in planning. "The S2 was consistently kicked off the net when attempting to provide valid information."
N4
• Good wargame with all the staff involved. Poor battle tracking.

N3
• The mission analysis conducted by the staff failed to allow the commander to see himself, the enemy, or the terrain. The commander developed the scheme of maneuver before the staff briefed the mission analysis.
• TF commander and S3 developed COA before mission analysis and the S2 had briefed the enemy situation. Battle tracking was good, the commander was kept informed.
• All staff participated in wargaming. TOC tracked CCIR during prep.

N2
• No command input in the plan. Break down in what the commander said and actions taken. The commander emphasized the massing of fires, yet the staff did not participate in planning or rehearsing. The TOC was out of the battle.

N1
• "The commander drives the majority of the planning process with very determined COAs that allow little or no initiative by the S3 or staff." Commander did not establish CCIR.

N13
• "The commander’s techniques for developing the plan eliminated valuable input from the staff."

N10
• Commander, XO, S3 not at operation order brief.

N7
• "The TF commander does not involve his staff during the planning process. The commander conducted mission analysis without staff input and developed the COA without using a SITEMAP. The commander totally disregarded the staff-planning process." TOC did not track location nor preparation of the TF.

N2
• The commander’s intent failed to address TF specific concerns. Mission execution was often dependent upon a series of directives issued over the command net. The command group spent to much time in the TOC rather than supervising Co/Tm implementation during the prep phase. The commander and S3 failed to give focus for reconnaissance.
• "The TF commander, XO, and the S3 served primarily as planners and did little to supervise the actual execution of any events." All three seemed tied to the TOC TF lacked a tactical focus, "Co/Tm commanders had to ask for clarification from the TF commander during the conduct of the battle because they were so unsure of what was expected of their units."

N1
• "The commander drives the majority of the planning process with very determined COAs that allow little or no initiative by the S3 or staff." Commander did not establish CCIR.

CLB 05: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the commander’s use of judgement, reasoning, and calculations.

N18
• "The TF commander appeared not to have thought through his scheme of maneuver to meet the brigade commander’s intent."

N13
• S2 provided a detailed intelligence update, the TF commander made no changes to the plan even though the enemy COA had changed.

CLB 06: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the timing and form of orders.
Throughout the battle, all TF OPORDs lacked sufficient detail and failed to assign a task/purpose to each subordinate. The TF provided an adequate concept of what would be done, but not how the unit’s fight would be conducted."

TF commander was not proficient in the use of FRAGOs.

CLB 07: Comments in Take Home Packages that exhibit the clarity and content of the commander’s intent.

"He [the commander] explained how his intent fit within the intent of the higher commander."
"The commander’s intent must be understood by each subordinate commander and communicated to the lowest leader."

"The TF initially did not fully understand the defensive plan." (CDR’s intent)

"If the commander’s intent had specifically addressed the purpose of this attack it may have made some of their [Co/Tm commanders] decisions easier and more correct."
The rehearsal did not emphasize the commander’s intent and may have caused confusion.

"The mission statement and the commander’s concept addressed no clearly defined task and purpose or intent."

"The commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver were inadequately communicated. The TF commander’s plan to fight the TF was not communicated."
"Neither the commander’s intent nor the concept of operation clearly enunciated how the TF . . . would fight the battle."

The TF relationship to the division and brigade commanders’ intent were unclear.

"... The commander must practice the formulation and articulation of his commander’s intent. This is a key and essential component of an OPORD and OPORD brief and was ineffective. The use of a carton or chalk talk to help subordinates visualize the flow of the battle and more importantly, the end state can provide critical specificity to the operation."
"The commander’s intent for fire support or maneuver of fires was not routinely given in sufficient detail to allow the FSO to plan indirect fires that complemented the maneuver scheme."

Only on one mission were the companies given a clearly defined purpose and task.
Scheme of maneuver did not meet the brigade commander’s intent.

"The intent of the TF commander was limited to where he wanted to fight the battle."

Did not use enemy in COA development. "TF commander provided a vague intent for the conduct of the mission and juxtaposed operational terms to the degree that it became unclear how to develop a scheme of maneuver." The plan did not have decision points to select maneuver after contact. TF failed to plan thoroughly. TF commander did not know location of where the TF was.
N2
- Most of the Co/Tms did not understand the concept of the operation or the commander's intent.
- No command input in the plan. Break down in what the commander said and actions taken. Commander emphasized the massing of fires, yet the staff did not participate in planning or rehearsing. TOC was out of the battle.
- The commander's intent failed to address TF specific concerns. Mission execution was often dependent upon a series of directives issued over the command net. The command group spent to much time in the TOC rather than supervising Co/Tm implementation during the prep phase. The commander and S3 failed to give focus for reconnaissance.

J2
- Maneuver slide: "A note on the commander's intent: "Orient on objective/enemy (IAW CDR's intent)"

J3
- The TF CDR listed his intent broken down into BOS. They (JRTC) had never seen this, except for FS. The battalion commander feels that he must give a strong mission statement and intent so that his subordinate commanders can accomplish the mission when they cannot communicate with him. The TF needs a focused statement of what the TF commander wants accomplished at the end of the mission. TF AAR 43:30
Appendix D
Summaries of
Communications Tapes and
Battle Replays

Time notations are placed before the recorded observations. A "BR" before the time
observation indicates that the observation is from the mission’s battle replay.

Mission: N3-1

Lancer 6 = TF commander
Lancer 3 = TF S3
Lancer 50 = TF scouts

0619: Spot report, 2 BMPs at 302215 at 0615. 1a.2

0626: Lancer 6 believes the enemy is coming in the south and will attempt to deny the TF the use
of the north wall. 2

0639: Lancer 50 to Lancer 30, "I have 30 BMPs in column, break; moving east, grid 272183,
continuing to observe, over." 1a.2

0642: The above spot report is passed to an unknown station. 1a.2

BR-0645: TF lead Co/Tm is under artillery attack vicinity Grid 4812.

0646: Fire mission called on 22 BMPs near Debnan Pass.

0646: Enemy target is out of range of the DS artillery. 1a.1

0648: Lancer 50 reports 42 BMPs heading east from Debnan Pass. 1a.2

0649: Lancer 3 asks Lancer 50 if he has "eyes" on the target. He doesn’t, Lancer 3 calls for blind
fires but the DS artillery is out of range and the request must go to DIVARTY. 1a.1

0705: TF determines the enemy is in a battle formation but not sure where the enemy is going. 2

BR-0705: Lead Co/Tm is in direct fire contact with enemy forward element. E Co is, 5km east of
the lead Co/Tm, is under artillery attack. The TF main body is 10km behind (east) of the TF lead
Co/Tm.

0707: Lancer 3 tells Lancer 24 that they need to orient on the enemy’s main body. 8

0709: Lancer 50 to Lancer 3; enemy at 325128 in the Colorado Wadi. 1a.2

0710: Lancer 50 to Lancer 3, the enemy is heading east out of the Colorado Wadi. 1a.2

D-1
BR-0710: The lead Co/Tm is in a hasty defense on the north side of Hill 876 and in contact with enemy forward elements with the enemy main body 3km away. The TF main body is 8km away.

0714: Lancer 6 receives a partial SPOTREP from lead units about FSE, radio contact is lost. 1a.2

0714: Lancer 50 to any Lancer element, reports that the enemy definitely going to Hidden Valley. 1a.2

BR-0715: Enemy main body beginning to bypass the lead Co/Tm to the south, TF main body under artillery attack.

0715: Lancer? report to 26 the enemy main body is going to Hidden Valley. 1a.2

0715: Lancer 03 asks Lancer 50 for a SITREP. Lancer 50 reports that the enemy main body is headed to Hidden Valley and requests artillery fires. 1a.2

BR-0715: Enemy main body is 4 to 5km north of the western entrance of Hidden Valley, just to the south of Hill 876. The last three SPOTREPs from Lancer 50 were incorrect.

0716: Lancer 3 asks for a SITREP from Viper 6. 1a.2

0716: Unknown station reports the correct movement direction of the enemy main body between the Peanut and Chad Hill. Probably the lead Co/Tm commander. 1a.2

0717: Lancer 6 to Lancer 3, until verified that the enemy main body is in Hidden Valley, don’t over-react. 2

BR-0720: Tentative TF CDR location is with the TF main body. Enemy is now bypassing the lead Co/Tm at Hill 876 to the north and south. TF main body now 5km from Hill 876, vicinity Grid 4512. 7

0721: Lancer 3 makes a recommendation to 06 on positioning of the Warrior element. 1a.1

0722: Lancer 6 asks about FASCAM.

0724: Lancer 50 calls for Lancer 6, no contact. Lancer 50 talks to unknown station to relay to Lancer 3 that the northern flank is in danger. 1a.2

0729: Lancer 3 orders a Co/Tm to occupy a support-by-fire position and orient west. 8

BR-0735: Enemy main body has bypassed the lead Co/Tms. TF main body is under constant artillery fires and is beginning the direct fire fight with the enemy. One Co/Tm is on the east side of Hill 780 (Grid 412), and one Co/Tm is on the west side of Hill 780 (Grid 4312).

0736: A fire mission is relayed through Lancer 3 on a small enemy element (AT-5 Battery) while the enemy main body continues its penetration of the TFs formation.

0740: Lancer 6 asks Lancer 3 for the TF’s combat power, Lancer 3 is under fire.

D-2
0742: Lancer 3 reports that Cougar has occupied a support-by-fire position. 1a.2

BR-0745: Artillery fires arrive on a target called at 0736. 1a.1

0747: Lancer 50 calls Lancer 4 about wounded, Lancer 6 tell them to "get the hell off the net." 9

0749: Radio calls change to survival warning calls, command and control of the TF ends. TF command elements become more concerned with individual survival than C2.

0802: Mortars told to move to a new position by section. 8

0805: TF is over run.

0808: Lancer 6 says he is dead, nobody is taking control.

Evaluation of 0720, commander trusts Lancer 50's reports and orients TF on Hidden Valley. 1b

There is a lack of Co/Tm reports to Lancer 3 or 6. 1a.2

Mission: N5-1

U76= TF commander.

U25= S3 (?).

BR-0600: Reconnaissance at the Peanut (Grid 4011) and along the north (Grid 4516) and south (Grid 4409) walls.

0615: Unknown station made contact- transmission broken. 1a.2

BR-0620: Co/Tm reaches Peanut (Grid 4011), main body is 5 Km behind.

0624: Unknown elements reports enemy CRP at Hill 780. 1a.2

BR-0625: Enemy CRP vicinity Hill 780 (Grid 4512).

0625: Report of enemy at 54 grid line with close air support being brought in on it. 1a.2

0636: Foxtrot called Uniform and asks where he wants him. 4

0636: Report from U01 that enemy company sized element is at the 49 grid line. 1a.2

0638: Unknown station (U76?), "Bring into firing position to engage Slant 6301." 8

0638: Unknown unit to unknown unit, "Roger, where do you want me to go over?" 8

0638: U25 to U76- destroyed 2 Bimps at 437112, I'm continuing to move. 1a.2

D-3
0639: Unknown station at 468115, killed two T-72s. 1a.2

BR-0640: One Co/Tm at Hill 780 with elements at Hill 876. TF main body is in the vic of Grid 3712 headed toward the Peanut. TF element headed toward the north wall vic of Grid 3814. Enemy FSE vic Grid 4613.

0641: Unknown station (U76?) tells unit to stand fast and not get in front of the Romeo element. 8

0642: U76 to 25, Reporting a BMP got him and asking someone to come and get him. 7

0642: Echo reports engaging FSE and believes he has located the enemy main body (reports grids). Echo reports that the enemy’s main body is "definitely going north." 1a.2

0643: Echo is asked if it really is the main body or the advance guard. 1b

0645 to 0650: Broken transmissions.

0650: Unknown unit reports enemy at the race track heading north. 1a.2

0652: U2 (U76?) tells unknown element to move to 1E3. 8

0653: Uniform to unknown unit, move to cover the Hidden Valley Gap. 8

0654: Unknown station to unknown station, recommendation to shoot PL101 (?).

0654: Dynamite, Dynamite, Dynamite.

BR-0700: TF has three Co/Tms on line from Hill 780 to the north wall. Only one Co/Tm is in direct fire range of the enemy main body.

BR-0710: Enemy main body maneuvered north to the north wall with FSE 3km south. 1 Co/Tm in a hasty defense at the north wall, 1 Co/Tm maneuvering to support.

BR-0720: Southern Co/Tm in contact with enemy FSE vic Hill 780. Center Co/Tm has continued to the east and is now to the south east of the enemy main body who is attempting to bypass the northern Co/Tm.

0723: U25 is asking units for combat power and SITREP.

0737: Broken transmissions- jamming.

0738: T77, this is U62, only have two observes, have lost the TOC. 1a.2

0739: Y25 (probably U25) is in charge?

0744: Uniform to unknown station, orders element to move to attack enemy in vicinity of the Iron Triangle, giving movement orders. 8

D-4
0745 to 0750: U25 talking, broken transmission, answering units unheard.

0752: U25 to U76, Enemy moving along north face at 421161, U25 is at Hill 696. 1a.2

0807: Commanders say's that the enemy has broken through, he believes they will go north then south to Debnan Pass. Contact has been broken and the commander does not know the enemy's strength. 2

Evaluation: 0700 to 0720, commander has wanted too long to order maneuver. 8

Mission: N6-3

S66= TF CDR  P43(?), S43(?)= S3

Other 66's= Co/Tm commanders

BR-0610: TF reconnaissance concentrated in the vicinity of Brown Pass; TF advance guard is in the vicinity of Grid 4113. The TF main body is in the vicinity of Hill 780.


0656: Unknown element to unknown element, "Getting reports that your main body is moving out of sector to the south." 8

0707: "P43, S66, over." "Going too far to south, uh, into the 3d BDE sector, you've gotta pull them in, pull them in." 8

More calls about units going south.

0713: S43, to W04: "SITREP over." "Roger, at this time Slam 0007, break. Our unit is attempting a reconstitution, break; orient attack-by-fire position, over." 1a.2

0719: Garbled transmissions, mention of the main body.

0733: From D66, there is a FASCAM minefield that the breaching unit just ran into. The minefield is covered by indirect fires. 1a.2

0741: S66 tells P43 to look for a bypass. 8

0744: "P43, S66 go for a bypass on this FASCAM." 8

0745: P43, S91 "Bypass to the left." 1a.2

0748: S66 demands enemy strength on Denver. There are 1 or 2 tanks and 7 BMPs.

0752: 66, 66J; "with the smoke we are very near the edge of the FASCAM, break; must stay very, very, close to the left wall."
0750 to 0811: Mostly messages on the FASCAM and wanting the units to bypass to the left.

0818: A dozer is cutting a path through the FASCAM. 2 IFVs are stuck in the FASCAM, covered by 2 tanks and 2 IFV. The dozer is dead, the breach is not complete. 1a.2

0832: "66, give me a SITREP, over." Believe, through the breach, occupied support by fire position (transmission was broken and unclear).

0854: Call to S66 that the TAC was lost. 1a.2

0901: "This is S43, you were cut out after, objective basically clear."

0919: From S66, TF strength is 5/3/0/0 with three Co/Tms, "no more Class V." Most of the units are stopped. 1a.2

Mission: N7-3

File not complete: communications tape starts at 0643

BR-0530: One MRC, vicinity of Grid 4809; one MRC, vicinity of Grid 4810; one MRC, vicinity Grid 4812; one MRC, vicinity of Grid 4716; and the AT reserve vicinity of Grid 5113. Enemy kill sack just to the west of Hill 760.

BR-0555: TF main body in the vicinity of Grid 3913, heading east.

BR-0600: TF main body in the vicinity of Grid 4113, under artillery attack.

BR-0605: TF main body turns south east, going south of Hill 780 toward the enemy's main defense.

BR-0620: TF main body enters the southern half of the enemy kill sack, concentrates against MRC at Grid 4809. Enemy AT reserves move.

BR-0620: TF main body penetrates enemy defense moving east south of Hill 780.

0646: Guide-on call made, not answered.

0646: Radio contact is lost with all units except the XRAY element.

There is heavy jamming of the radio.


Mission: N8-1

R32- TF commander
V32- Brigade commander

File not complete: communications tape begins at 0653.
BR-0600: TF security element in the vicinity of Grid 5305, one Co/Tm in the vicinity of 5109, one Co/Tm in the vicinity of 5309, one Co/Tm in the vicinity of 5807; enemy reconnaissance throughout zone, FSE in the vicinity of Grid 5099.

BR-0630: The TF is spread out in three groups, one Co/Tm is southwest of Red Pass; one Co/Tm in the vicinity of Grid 5205. One Co/Tm is spread out in northwest Siberia. The enemy FSE is in contact with the TF center. The enemy main body is 2km south of the FSE and following.

BR-0640: Enemy main body has penetrated the TF center and is headed north toward Hill 720, Grid 5711.

0654: "32, this is 91 over."

"32"

"You need to get 71 under control, he is sending the fighters in at 4697."

"V85 this is V91, over"

"This is 85, over. . . ."

"You get control of him and monitor every transmission that he sends. I want those fighters in there; we are working SEAD in there right now and artillery."

"This is 85, wilco."

"Is he next to you over? You monitor every transmission he sends."

0707: Element requests permission to "bug-out."

0713: "R32, V32."

"V32."

"Your Bravo company is approaching Red Pass moving north east; you need to action him through there as hard as you can and action him into Hill 720, do you understand?"

"R32, wilco."

"Get him moving, get him moving fast."

-R32 again tells V32 to get positive control on the company and move him to the north.

0735: Change of mission.

Mission: N19-1
Cobra 7= Senior observer/controller

Cobra 3= Observes TF operations officer

Tarantula= Observes light infantry

O/C Comments

0618: Outlaw to Cobra 7, "bottom line is nothing on Texas and we really don’t have a screen forward." 1a.1

- Companies were suppose to place out OPs 1 km forward of their positions, Cobra 7 didn’t believe it happened because of the late hour that the units arrived in position. 6

-Cobra 7 asks Cobra 3 if he knew if the TF had anything that could see deep. Cobra 3 did not know of anything placed out by the TF that could see deep. 1a.1

0620: One element can see deep with some restrictions. 1a.1

0622: Tarantula 18 reports that his unit has received a change-of-mission to occupy a position (Rock) and to orient east and west. 8

0632: BDE S2 is following the enemy pretty well by using REMBAS.

-The TF is not showing any sense of urgency, OC does not know if the BDE S2’s information is getting to the TF. 9, 6

0634: TF believes that movement to their front (dust cloud) is being caused by the scout platoon, it is the forward elements of the approaching enemy. 2

0641: There is talk of whether there is a plan to reposition, there was, but no preparation to move to new positions. 6

0651: TF now believes that the main effort is in the north and the south is a deception. 2

0652: Part of the TF still believe that the TF has not made contact yet, part of the TF has already been over-run. 1a.1

0652: The BDE commander is in his TAC looking at maps and listening to the radio when he could better understand the battle by stepping outside and watching it.

0721: BDE reports to Division that they have been over-run and are unable to do anything further.

- Problems:
  1. No eyes forward.
  2. No repositioning plan.
  3. Once into the battle, tried to reposition late.
Appendix E

Battle Replay Graphics
NTC Battle Replay

Eastern Central Corridor

Race Track

Hill 760

Hill 920

John Wayne Pass

Siberia
a. Reported location of OPFOR main body
b. Actual location of OPFOR main body
c. Co/Tm in contact w/ OPFOR FSE
a. Reported location of OPFOR main body.
b. Actual location of OPFOR main body.
c. OPFOR AT reserve
d. Lead Co/Tm in contact w/ FSE
e. TF AT Co.
f. TF main body
a. OPFOR main body
b. OPFOR elements
c. OPFOR AT platoon
d. Remains of TF
a. TF ITV platoon
b. Co/Tms
c. Remains of OPFOR main body
d. OPFOR main body
e. OPFOR FSE
a. Remains of Co/Tm
b. Co/Tm moves toward the Whale
c. Co/Tm ordered to Hill 720
d. OPFOR moving toward Hill 720
a. Remains of TF main body
b. OPFOR MRC
c. Remains of OPFOR MRCs
d. OPFOR AT reserve
a. Co/Tm defensive positions
b. TF reconnaissance
c. OPFOR FSE
d. OPFOR main body
Appendix F

Critical Leader Behaviors in After Action Review Videos

Mission: N8-1

MTC

1:23:19= "Did we get good spot reports today?" "No." Talked about elements of a spot report, SALUTE. "Is the time important?" 1a.2

1:43:45= Poor positioning of scouts to observe NAIs. The scout did not remain at the OP to observe NAIs (which were visible from the OP), but drove to each NAI. During the scout's driving around to the NAIs, he got lost. 1a.1

1:44:33= The commanders, staff, and scouts must not only talk on the command net but listen to it. When they hear something on the command net that they know is not right, they must inform the TF commander. 1a.2

Mission: N7-3

DATK

0:56:40= From the S2, TF needs to increase the information flow to the S2. For the S2 to provide reports and analysis of the enemy, the S2 must first receive reports on the enemy. 1a.2

0:59:24= How is information treated in the S2 section? The S2 has no tracking system other than plotting enemy locations on the map and sending information out over the radio. Neither the S2, nor the S3 are maintaining staff journals. The S3 said that they had not been logging any useful information in the journals, so they decided to streamline operations and get rid of their staff journals. 1a.1

Mission: N6-3

DATK

0:08:59= Scouts penetrated the enemy's positions and accurately reported information to the TF, but the information was not incorporated into the TF's plan. 1a.1 and 1a.2

0:46:39= The commander asks the OC to clearly explain what a commander's intent is. 4

0:47:34= How can the commander ensure that subordinates understand his intent for the mission? The commander can ensure understanding by going out and having his subordinates back-brief him on his intent. 4
0:53:00= The rehearsal lasted from 1630 to 2330, the rehearsal was a wargame of the plan, thus the plan was not finished until the rehearsal was finished. Lower echelons (platoons) did not receive the real plan until early in the morning. 6

2:12:31= BOS Slides

- S2 did not template or analyze enemy COAs. 1a.1
- S2 did not effectively record, analyze, or disseminate information. 1a.1
- There was no continuous templating. 1a.1
- Plan lacked detail and was revised at the last minute. 1a.1

2:13:19= BOS Slide
- FS plan did not support the maneuver plan. 1a.1

Mission: N5-1

MTC

0:52:05= As a Co/Tm commander approached the fight he had no idea of the situation because of the lack of cross-talk. 1a.2

1:34:33= Scouts were on the command net talking to the TF command and not the advance guard. 1a.2

1:35:16= Scouts need to guide the companies to the enemy when they can.

1:37:00= Scouts should not wait until they are asked for information; they should push information out to the people who need it. 1a.2

1:58:13= There is a significant communication problem between the maneuver elements and fire support. The plan must determine what the targets are, who is going to observe the targets, who is going to call the fires, who is to clear the fires, and who is going to fire the targets. 1a.1

Mission: N3-1

MTC

0:24:45= The TF went into battle without full combat loads of Class V (ammunition). Less than 50% of the tanks had 40 rounds (11/24), and only seven of 27 M2s had seven missiles. 6

0:54:00= Company missions were to find and fix the enemy but the companies were more concerned with terrain and fighting the plan rather than the enemy. 4

0:56:40= The report of the enemy in Hidden Valley was critical in confusing the TF commander. 2

1:01:00= TF commander: We got caught up in getting into position we had a good read on the enemy but did not make a good decision. 2
1:13:35= S2 did not receive sport reports after initial contact. 1a.2

1:14:04= Event analysis was incomplete; the S2 was in the J-TOC and separated from the rest of the staff. 1a.1

Mission: N19-1

DIS

Tape 2

0:09:00 to 0:16:00= Seeing the battlefield, the S2 made a mistake in determining the enemy’s make-up and intentions based on a faulty understanding of enemy doctrine. 1a.1

0:09:47= "Where does seeing the battlefield begin?" It starts with visualization of what the enemy was going to do. 2

0:19:53= BDE commander’s comments: The biggest problem is communications and monitoring what is going on during the battle. There were plenty of indications of what the enemy was doing because you could listen to the battle develop over the brigade O&I net. Your prime (S2 & S3) should come from monitoring the brigade network. It is imperative that the S2 and S3 eavesdrop to the brigade nets. 1a.1

0:28:30= The TF was not looking for the enemy. Because of a mistake in the relief in place the scout platoon was not out front of the TF. Also the TF units missed the dust cloud of the OPFOR (2 MRBs) moving toward the TF’s defensive positions. 6

0:28:58= "All of that (ensuring you have reconnaissance forward and your units are alert and observing) is seeing the battlefield. The reporting we talked about has to do with seeing the battlefield. . . . We get into the mindset that seeing the battlefield is . . . commanders looking down range. It ain’t necessarily so. Because seeing the battlefield is visualizing what is going on, understanding what is going on, analyzing what is going on, all of which comes through lateral coordination with guys on your flanks. It comes through proper spot reports coming up . . . within companies, it comes from contact reports within companies . . . being passed to the TF." All of that goes together to help you to collectively to see the battlefield. 2

Tape 3

0:06:10= Poor cross talk, limited spot reports and cross talk hampered the CP’s ability to track the battle. 1a.2