The report reflects verbatim transcripts of the Panel Hearing convened on February 23, 1996 at the National Archives building.
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, requires automatic declassification of non-exempt historical files over 25 years old. The Department of Defense (DoD) Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel (HRDAP) is established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act as a subcommittee to the Historical Advisory Panel. The HRDAP charter is to recommend information and topic areas that would be valuable to historians and the public. DoD will consider those recommendations for immediate declassification. The HRDAP is chaired by Dr. Alfred Goldberg, OSD Historian; Ms. Rene Davis-Harding, Deputy Director, Security Program Integration, serves as Executive Secretary. Six civilian historians and historians from the military services and JCS comprise the panel. The Panel will meet four times per year. The transcripts for the February 23, 1996 meeting were prepared by a contract transcription service.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

SUBJECT: Panel Minutes

Reference telephone conversation between the undersigned and Gretchen Schlag, DTIC Selections Branch.

Two copies of verbatim transcripts are forwarded for inclusion in the DTIC holdings. The transcripts are from the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel. This Panel was established by the Secretary of Defense under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA requires open hearings announced in the Federal Register and that meeting minutes be made available for public inspection.

The transcripts are unclassified with unrestricted dissemination. SF Form 298 is attached. For additional information, please contact me at (703) 695-2289.

Cynthia M. Kloss
Assistant Director
Classification Management
APPEARANCES:

CHAIRPERSON:
DR. ALFRED GOLDBERG, Historian
Office of the Secretary of Defense

RENE DAVIS–HARDING, Executive Secretary
HRDAP

PANEL MEMBERS:
BG DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History
Rm 1B707 Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318–9900

PROFESSOR ELIOT COHEN
Professor of Strategic Studies
Paul H. Nitze School of Advance International Studies
John Hopkins University
Washington, DC 20036

DR. WILLIAM DUDLEY
Director, Naval Historical Center
Building 57, Washington Navy Yard
901 M Street, SE
Washington, DC 20374

DR. SHELDON GOLDBERG
Sup. of Air Force History
Bolling AFB
Building 5681, Bolling AFB
Washington, DC 20332–6098

PROFESSOR MELVYN LEFFLER
History Department
University of Virginia
1612 Concord Drive
Charlottesville, VA 22901

PROFESSOR ERNEST MAY
Harvard University
Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy St.
Cambridge, MA 02138

COLONEL ALFRED PONNWITZ
Acting Director
Marine Corps History & Museums
Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
901 M Street, SE
Washington, DC 20374–0570

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTER'S, INC.
301–565–0064
APPEARANCES: (Continued)

DR. JEFFREY CLARKE
US Army Center of Military History
1099 14th Street, NW
Franklin Court
Washington, DC 20005-3402

PROFESSOR MARC TRACHTENBERG
Department of History
University of Pennsylvania
3401 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

DR. ROBERT WAMPLER
History Department
National Security Archives
5 Mulrany Court
Timonium, MD 21093

GERHARD WEINBERG
Professor of History
University of North Carolina
1416 Mount Willing Road
Efland, NC 27233
PARTICIPANTS: (Noted in the record)

MIKE BROWN, Navy  
C&O Information Security Oversight Team

JIM DAVIS, National Aerospace Museum

FRED GRABOSKE, Archivist, Marine Corps

ROGER HALL, Independent POW/MIA research

DR. FRANK HORTON, Principal deputy to Assistant Secretary of Defense, C31

BRIAN KINNEY, WHS

JEANNE SCHAUBLE, NARA

MS. NANCY SMITH, Presidential Libraries

ROBERT NORRIS, DOE Advisory Experience

ANTHONY PASSARELLA, DIR, OSD FOIA and Security Review
DR. GOLDBERG: I'll hold my opening remarks until after our welcoming speaker arrives, in about 15 minutes. Meanwhile, I think we will start with administrative announcements and by way of one preliminary remark, I'm hoping that this forum will be one of good temper, good humor, good ideas. Ms. Davis — administrative notes?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, I'll do those.

DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Davis-Harding.

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: My name is Rene Davis-Harding. I'm the Executive Secretary for the panel. I'd like to go — briefly go over some administrative announcements. All proceedings are going to be recorded, and if you would prefer to be identified by name in the minutes, please state your name clearly before you make your remark, otherwise, you'll be identified as an observer in the minutes.

Each panel member has a complete — or should have a complete package of information. We sent out several packages of handouts, and each member should have a complete notebook. If you do not, please get in touch with me or Cynthia Kloss on my staff, who will
make sure that you get a complete package.

Information from members or observers that
you would like to have considered for inclusion, will
be considered by the chair for inclusion in the minutes
or inclusion for being sent out to the members.

Due to limited resources, we unfortunately
cannot provide handouts to everyone, but we will
attempt to do so. Any submissions for future
committee meetings should be provided to Cynthia Kloss
from my staff, at least one week prior to the meeting,
to make sure that we're able to have those submissions
in the meeting packets.

On meeting transcripts -- the verbatim
transcripts will be available only on request, and an
executive summary will be provided to all panel
members, including the military services and the other
observers -- government observers. And any attendees
may request a copy of the executive summary through e-
mail and the e-mail address is on the bottom of the
agenda for today.

On refreshments, breaks and other items.
Coffee is provided in the rear of the room for
everyone, and we ask that you please refrain from
moving around during the formal panel deliberations.
Breaks will be strictly at the discretion of the chair
and restrooms for men and ladies --

DR. GOLDBERG: You will be permitted to leave for that purpose. You'll have to raise your hands of course.

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The mens' room is at the left, all the way at the end of the hall; and the ladies' room is to your right as you exit, all the way at the end of the hallway.

We expect lunch to arrive at approximately 11:30 to 11:45, and we're very flexible with the lunch break. It may not extend to 60 minutes -- that's going to be up to the chair.

Telephones are available in the basement of the building. You may use the elevator, and during break, the room phone will be available for outside local calls. We unfortunately, do not have the ability to take phone messages while you're here.

And finally, name tags are being provided as a courtesy to the other participants and as a way to identify everyone. That's it.

DR. GOLDBERG: We are here because we believe that the government has a special obligation to keep the public informed. It does this by publishing documents, histories, and by giving the citizens access to its records. Indeed, one doesn't even have to be a
citizen to have access to U.S. government records.

The enormous growth in government classified documents during the past six decades has confronted us with the complex problem of how to make accessible to the public a maximum number of those records with a minimum of security risk.

Ever since World War II a series of Executive Orders have sought to deal with this problem with limited success. The classifiers seem to be able to keep ahead of the declassifiers in some departments.

Let me recapitulate where we are coming from.

The 1995 Executive Order 12958 provides for automatic declassification of historically valuable records after 25 years. But there is a catch in that. It also lists nine areas for exemption from automatic declassification and provides for systematic declassification of historically valuable exempted records.

The Executive Order establishes an information security oversight office within the management -- the Office of Management and Budget -- to see to the implementation of the Order. This of course is the same office that has been in existence for many years under other agencies. I believe it is going to move into the National Archives building in the near
It also establishes -- that is the Executive Order establishes an interagency security appeals panel composed of senior level officials to decide on appeals from declassification challenges and appeals for review of mandatory classification, and to approve, deny or amend agency exemptions from automatic declassification.

There's also an information security policy advisory council of seven members, not employees of the government. Its function are to advise the President on policies, recommend changes in policies, recommend to agency heads in the specific subject areas systematic declassification review, to serve as a forum to discuss policy issues and disputes. The Director will provide support to the council.

Unfortunately these two bodies are not yet operating. The members of the council have not yet been appointed, therefore they can't get anywhere. The other body, to my knowledge, has not yet met.

But nevertheless, our panel is part of a larger government-wide apparatus to which DOD is responsible. We're an important part, because DOD has such a large percentage of government record holdings.

The last time I was aware of the amount, I think it was
something like 27-30 percent of the records in the National Archives by Department of Defense records.

In response to the Executive Order, the Department of Defense issued its overall declassification plan in October. The military services select staff at defense agencies which hold most of the records of the Department of Defense have or will issue individual declassification plans. I think some of you may have seen them already.

The Secretary of Defense has given responsibility for overseeing DOD declassification to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, known familiarly as C3I. Last winter C3I gave consideration to establishment of a departmental declassification advisory panel, that would include scholars from outside the Department of Defense. The reaction in OSD was favorable.

A further impetus to action came from the letter in July to the Assistant Secretary of Defense C3I from a group of scholars, including some of you, suggesting the creation of the liaison committee to advise on desirable priorities for the selection of the Defense Department's records for review and declassification of the new Executive Order.
The Assistant Secretary received through Emmet Page, responded with a strong affirmative and arrangements began to establish the panel that would carry out the function.

For ease of administration, always a prime consideration in a large bureaucracy — DOD is a large one — the committee was established as a panel of the Defense Historical Advisory Committee, with C3I providing the administrative apparatus, for which I am profoundly grateful.

The charter of the Defense Historical Advisory Committee has been amended to include the Defense Historical Records Advisory Panel. The planning session attended by many of you was held on November the 30th last. It helped clarify some of the problems and issues involved in the establishment and operation of the proposed panel.

This brings us to date. This is a panel established by the Department of Defense to help facilitate, we hope, the declassification of DOD records. It has two constituent elements: Chiefs of DOD historical offices and scholars from the academic community. These two represent the two most prolific groups researching defense records.

The Departmental leadership beliefs that
informed outside scholars acquainted with government records, and the declassification process, provide a public presence on the panel and can lend expert assistance to the panel's work. The Chiefs of the DOD historical offices and their staffs have authoritative knowledge about many groups of the records.

We're fortunate to have available to us also the expert advice of DOD's record managers and archivists of the National Archives and Record Administration. Moreover, we hope to draw on the specialized knowledge of other scholars who are familiar with the bodies of DOD records.

The DOD declassification plan issued by C3I calls for declassifying 15 percent of the effective records each year for five years. Estimates of DOD records involved are 500,000,000-plus pages. We emphasize the plus. The Navy and Marine Corps report about 500,000,000 pages on their own, so it's quite possible that we're talking about more than a billion pages of records to look at during the next five years and the number will undoubtedly grow.

Fifteen percent of 500,000,000 would be about 75,000,000 pages per year, and there may be release of documents by internet or other electronic means.

It seems likely that most of the records will
be subject to systematic review rather than automatic
declassification, because priority during the first
year will probably be on the low sensitivity category
documents, that is documents with a little classified
information. The panel probably opted those efforts to
the records of high and medium sensitivity, that is,
more highly classified records.

Let me remind you that in addition to the
normal systematic declassification process, which has
been functioning, there are declassification programs
in particular areas of high public and political
interest. These include the human radiation
experiments program, a huge effort across the
government in which DOD played a major part; the POW-
MIA records; the Gulf War syndrome records, a three or
four year effort by the Army; and the Kennedy
assassination records -- and there are a lot of related
DOD documents.

Let me bring to your attention the existence
also of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing
government secrecy, established by Public Law 103236 on
April 30, 1994 in the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for fiscal years 94 and 95. This 12-member
commission includes members from Congress, the
executive branch and the public.
The Commission's function is to investigate all matters in any way related to any legislation, executive order, regulation, practice or procedure relating to classified information, for granting security clearances, and to submit to Congress a final report containing recommendations on the classification of national security information and the granting of security clearances. It had broad powers, including subpoena power, a staff, and funds.

It is to make a final report two years after the date of the first meeting, which I understand was earlier this year, so we may not get the report in 1997. To the extent that it can help reduce the volume of classified materials in the future, it will ease the task of declassification.

I think that you are aware of some other road blocks that obstruct the declassification process. The problem of foreign government NATO documents will continue to limit access to bodies of records. Getting permission from all the other members of NATO to release documents is a lengthy and wearing process. Access to intelligence records, especially secret and crypto-materials will continue to be difficult, and of course there are the statutory bands on disclosure or release -- certain prisoner of war information, for
instance.

The responsibility for providing
declassification guidance to the various elements of
defense belongs to the DOD declassification management
panel composed of representatives of the major elements
of the department. The two panels, this panel and the
declassification management panel, are complementary
and should maintain a cooperative relationship. To my
knowledge, that panel has not yet met.

The prime purpose of this panel is to
determine declassification of bodies of DOD records
that would best serve the interest of the public and
the scholarly community, and I assume that the two
interests are essentially the same. Since the capacity
for declassification is limited, we will find it
necessary to try to establish some order of priority
for declassification.

As an advisory panel, we will have to present
our findings in the form of recommendations to the
Assistant Secretary C3I and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense. In the final analysis, each element of the
Department engaged in declassification will determine
its own priorities. I'm hopeful that with support of
officials from the office of the Secretary of Defense,
I believe that they intend to be supportive, our
recommendations will carry enough weight to influence priorities. I have no doubt that this panel can make some difference.

We're all aware of the frustration experienced by many of us in securing access to classified records and in securing declassification records. I have no doubt that we could spend a great deal of time venting our frustrations and prescribing procedures for speedier or large scale declassification. Instead of that, I hope -- I ask that we adhere to our prescribed function of recommending declassification priorities for which we can offer the strongest support. We will be able to make discernable progress if we stick to our task.

As you're all aware, virtually all of the documents with which this panel will be concerned are in the National Archives at its Federal Records Center here at Suitland and elsewhere around the country. We're therefore going to have to do a considerable amount of business with the National Archives and Records Administration. We are fortunate to have a liaison at the Archives for this purpose, Michael Hertz and Jeanne Schauble. Ms. Schauble is present and prepared to represent NARA in our discussions.

I'd like at this time to pause and to welcome

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTER'S, INC.
301-565-0064
our welcoming speaker this morning, Mr. Frank Horton.
I'm informed that Dr. Horton does not insist on having
long biographical details of his career before --
before presenting himself, so I would like to welcome
Mr. Horton who is representing the Assistant Secretary,
Mr. Page. He's not here yet. Beg pardon?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: He's somewhere in the
traffic.

DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw him. We will
dispense with that for the time being and move on. I
am interested in hearing from the members of the panel
here, as I say, I am hopeful that they brought good
ideas. Our goals, as I have indicated, are to, if
possible, expand the scope of the records to be
declassified, speed up the process if possible, and
provide some guidance to the declassifiers by
establishing priorities for the kinds of records we
would like to see declassified.

We're tasked to recommend priorities for
declassification, and in recommending priorities we are
also in effect bringing about an expansion of the scope
of declassification. Speeding up the process will, of
course, depend on the resources made available to the
job and this is a theme to which we will undoubtedly
return again and again during the course of this
meeting and future meetings, because whatever is going
to be done depend on the resources devoted to doing the
job.

Looking at it from a historical viewpoint,
we're all aware that many government programs, whether
enjoined by Executive Order or statute often lag behind
established target dates. This declassification is
especially vulnerable to resource allocation because it
is projected on such an enormous level -- such a high
level. It would take a lot of money and people to
carry it out. As I say, we'll probably be coming back
to this a number of times during the course of the
meeting. We can't overlook it; we have to be aware of
it and have to be aware that we can recommend, we can
propose that somebody else is going to dispose of these
recommendations.

With that I would like to open the meeting to
suggestions, comments, from the panel. Mr. Wampler.

DR. WAMPLER: Yes, -- on the agenda for
discussion which is in the blue package we received --
just this last one that puts something up and duly
shoot it down, because a sense of how the people within
the agencies would like to see the panel interact with
them. And what I'm going to put on the record for
people to look at was a model which inspired some of us
in proposing this panel in the first place, which was a similar liaison organization that was set up for the Department of Energy which worked upon a process which presented information to the outside scholars about the existing retired record groups. Those were the discrete units you were working with. We need to try to establish some way to put triage on this — what are the most important, the most interesting of those record groups to scholars that they would like to see us assign a high priority?

That to me, seems to make sense in this setting, rather than some sort of effort to devise a list of subject priorities which would lead for a search for documents amongst the hundreds of different retired record groups amongst all the different services and all the different offices and agencies that we're dealing with here.

So it seems that one way to approach this might be a two step process whereby first of all you do try to establish what are your high interest priority subject areas. That in turn can serve as the guidelines by which you then approach the issue of trying to sort through all the various retired records that the different services and offices are trying to deal with here, because that, I assume, is the method
in which they're approaching this. You've got to
return record accessions for the various services and
for DOD. You pull over boxes of those. You don't pull
over cervical cuts or files within boxes spread out
amongst many different accessions.

So we have to find some way to mesh the
subject interest of the outside community, the
scholars, the public, with the units within which the
different offices are dealing and try to come up the
ultimate mix of those. Dr. Goldberg said most of this
is probably going to be addressed towards records which
will probably fall in category 1 or category 2, which
present the most promise for you in screening these and
also in trying to meet whatever work plan targets that
you set down for yourselves.

I made the argument the last time and this
time that it seems to me that it doesn't make a great
deal of sense to try to backload the process with the
most difficult materials, thereby assuring that you're
going to not comply, but at least try to establish a
learning curve in applying the new guidelines to the
category 1 and 2 materials from the start, in some way.

And also it just seems to make sense from a
public relations point of view to try to get some of
the high interest items out there throughout the entire
process, and not have them all be waiting towards the end.

I provided my own selective list of some of the document collections that I know exist at the National Records Center for record group 330, which has some of the very high-level, high-policy document collections of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Office of the Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs, or the Assistant Secretary for Atomic Energy Affairs for late 50's into the 60's, all of which I would assume fall under the purview of the Executive Order. It would be rather replete with documents of great interest to us. It would also be rather replete with category 1 and category 2 documents, and this, I think, is what we'll probably be trying to come to an agreement on. How do we deal with these -- the very records that are most interesting, the ones that present the most difficulties.

That was my idea as far as one way to deal with this. Dr. Goldberg has already mentioned another point which I made, which is the need to have a very close coordination with NARA. I mean if these things get reviewed, declassified, NARA has to be ready to take the hand off because then there's a very large logistical problem on their end. They have to
repackage these, get pull sheets put in them, get them ready, and you want to, to the degree possible, to have the least amount of delay from the time DOD or the services are ready to hand off the records, and NARA is ready then to make them available to the public, therefore carrying out the final intent of the Executive Order.

That in gist, is what I put down in my much longer submission, and I'm just curious to see how the people who are on the other side, having to deal with this, feel about that sort of approach, adding input to their decision-making process.

DR. GOLDBERG: I'm interesting in hearing from representatives of the services or others in this matter. Yes.

MR. DAVIS: Jim Davis from Aerospace museum. I agree to the approach that you've suggested, and that is to identify key offices and advisory groups and organizations within DOD for 47-aught (ph) — and regardless of where the records are, simply devote the authority of the declassification effort to those particular records. So for example, within RG-330, the Secretary of Defense, deputy or under secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Atomic Energy Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs and probably Defense Director of Research and Engineering -- and then along with that, the various RG advisory bodies starting with the research and development. And then moving over to different DOD components, for example, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, a couple of key assistant secretaries of the Air Force, and perhaps scientific advisory bodies and so on and so forth. You simply do that in chronological order.

DR. GOLDBERG: You didn't mention the C3I. Speaking of C3I, our speaker has arrived, and I'd like to introduce to you Dr. Frank Horton, principal deputy, Assistant Secretary of C3I. I'll skip the biographical details.

DR. HORTON: Thank you, sir. Dr. Goldberg, members of the Board, many of whom I've known in other capacities these past years, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for attending the first formal session of the Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel meeting. Pleased to be able to join you on behalf of Assistant Secretary Page, who is out of town, unfortunately, or else he would have been here, and Secretary Perry.

This is indeed a time of change for those of us who work in National Security. Balancing the
challenges of the next century with fewer resources forces us in the Department of Defense, to reevaluate how we conduct our business. A vital aspect of that business is protecting our nation's secrets and with respect to this panel, balancing that with supporting the public's right to know.

Today's forum is one step towards security (inaudible) this important endeavor. You're here today because of new guidance issued by President Clinton. Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information, directs us to establish a comprehensive declassification program. The Order states, and I quote, "Within five years from the date of this Order, all classified information contained in records (1) more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value, shall be automatically declassified, whether or not the records have been reviewed."

This is our motivation, and in his September 5, 1995 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, established this distinguished advisory panel. Our charter is to develop a listing of comparable areas, that from a historical and public perspective, the Department will consider for declassification immediately. The Department of Defense

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTER'S, INC.
301-565-0064
The declassification plan also emphasizes the role of this panel. Make no mistake, the Secretary of Defense is committed to making the declassification program a reality.

Approximately 18 months ago, I spoke to the National Classification Management Society during their annual training seminar. Part of my speech was to challenge the security community to work from a states-bound in the previous classification management system. For instance, 1982, a system was established to let original classifiers do what he or she had to do to protect information security at all costs. Something went wrong with that system.

The declassification provisions for the then Executive Order never did work as intended. Information did not complete a natural evolution cycle of classification, implementation, declassification, and release to the public.

Clearer, distinctive guidance directed at those individuals who classify information to identify the date or event that would serve as the declassification benchmark. I have yet to see and I'm sure you have yet to see a document labeled "declassify on cessation of the Cold War."

OADR or Originating Agency Determination
Required was designated to be the exception to the declassification rule. In retrospect, OADR became the norm or the rule. It appeared that everything was being classified indefinitely.

Compare that environment with today's.

Declassification is a reality. We no longer authorize the use of OADR, eliminating what some would say is the easy way out. Classifiers are held accountable for the full life cycle of the information they generate.

Cradle to grave decisions on classification and safeguards will be a part of the solution for future generations involved with National Security and historical research.

However, today's reality is that there is a monumental vacuum that must be filled in the area of declassification. Many of you on the panel have already found the time to review the Department of Defense's declassification plans. With approximately 700,000,000 pages of documents, potentially declassifiable, we do not lack for work. You're exploring technological solutions to assist declassification programs, but in the end, it will be people using their best judgement that will make the difference on how we view information protection.

On behalf of Secretaries Page and Perry, I
challenge this panel to collectively identify those areas that will produce the largest return for the time and resources invested. The Department of Defense will declassify materials, but the speed and focus of their efforts are open to your recommendations.

Finally, some acknowledgements. When Professor Trachtenberg first approached Assistant Secretary Page, my boss, with his offer to establish a liaison committee between Defense and academia, we found a perfect combination of factors to help us turn the tide on the declassification planning process.

I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and those above me, to Dr. Trachtenberg for his initiative and those of the remaining scholars on the panel. I would also wish on my own and their behalf, to thank Dr. Goldberg, the Secretary of Defense Historian for agreeing to chair this panel. Dr. Goldberg has been instrumental in assisting us with the many details required in establishing the panel.

My staff stands ready to assist all of you in any way possible, to gather the information needed to achieve our mutual objective. In addition to the work of this panel, I am aware that many of you serve on advisory committees for other government agencies. This synergism of activity indicates to me just how
aggressive the government is in achieving our
collective goal of openness.

Some of these recommendations may be
difficult to accomplish because of legitimate national
security concerns, however, I assure you that all of
your recommendations will receive full consideration by
the Senior leadership of the Department. Good luck
today in your formal session. Thank you, sir.

DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. We've had some
interesting proposals presented by Misters Wampler and
Davis, which I think are moving in the right direction.
The question that remains, of course, is how fast can
we move in that direction given the usual problems of
declassifying, of priorities, et cetera. We must bear
in mind that the services and other entities in the
Department also have their priorities, and in effect,
we are going to be competing with them. If they have
dedicated themselves to declassifying 15 percent of
hundreds of millions of pages of documents, and they
genuinely intend to do so, then I think it likely that
they are going to start with those that will be easiest
to declassify and permit them to reach their goals.

So what I am suggesting is that we can go
ahead and make these recommendations, but we probably
should not expect that they will be carried out
expeditiously. It may take time, it probably will take
time to do the sort of thing we want done because
declassifying highly classified records can take much
longer than declassifying the lower level records. I
think it's practical considerations of this kind -- and
we're dealing with a very pragmatic situation here --
not only a matter of money and resources, it's a matter
of a lot of different entities within Defense -- OSD,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the four services, three
departments, 15 agencies -- all of which have their own
programs, their own priorities and varying resources
and goals.

So we're operating within something of a maze
and the problem is going to be, as far as possible, to
make our way out of that and get some people in
authority to make decisions. I think we will get that,
but I don't expect it to be done overnight, and I hope
that you won't either. Yes, Mr. Leffler.

PROF. LEFFLER: My observation is that there
is a great deal of emphasis on -- on openness, but the
initial effort, as I see it in almost all the agencies,
has been to specify all the records that were exempt
from order of declassification, and I'm sure that this
is an understandable first move.

But I would put on the table and follow up on
(inaudible) by saying it would be desirable if we could
agree to ask for services to identify perhaps for our
next meeting three months from now, the top ten
priorities that they would suggest to us for
declassification amongst the categories enumerated for
systematic declassification. That would sort of move
us forward to sort of getting into an actual give and
take about what — what's to be the priorities — those
records that we all submit to be of greatest value.

DR. GOLDBERG: I think that can be done. We
have every right to ask for information, and I trust
that we will get it. Colonel Ponnwitz?

COL. PONNWITZ: I'd like to make one comment
on Professor Wampler's memo of 19 February. In your
second paragraph you asked about FOIA's information.
Now, our service is personnel oriented, so the charge
of our FOIA requests are for verification of medical
claims that go before the VA and legal issues against
— individual services. So in this light, you wouldn't
get the kind of information out of that that you might
expect.

However, there is on matters that don't apply
to those two categories, this may be another approach
that we could certainly look at.

DR. WAMPLER: Well, it was just an effort to
try to find at least a paper trail that is the first cut at public interest, and also a first cut in which returned records have been pulled most often in response to those requests as a way of getting to set some of these priorities. The sense I get after looking at the work plans -- that these are sort of like (inaudible) plans -- talk about requirements, and we're coming at this from two different approaches. And how we mesh these two is going to part of what we may butt heads on.

Now, what I would like to get down to, as Mel said, is particulars, to get a sense of how the people who are dealing with this -- what use do they see for this panel? Are we just muddying the waters for them? Are we actually helping them in any way? How can our advice be structured to be of most use to them? I mean, we're trying to mesh some ongoing traffic here, and give some direction to it. Well how do we do that?

And I know he doesn't want to jump into this, he's got documents that I want from him, he might get back at me eventually, but Brian -- do our things on Record Group 330, I mean, do the ideas I'm putting forth in any way make sense for what you're trying to do in terms of your review, or do we just create headaches for you if we try to do this?
DR. GOLDBERG: That's an appropriate question.

MR. KINNEY: (inaudible) if you come up with -- makes sense to me, anyhow -- interested in --

DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me that following up your remarks, Al, that these plans which have been submitted really give you a handle to start with. They list records that they want to exempt and these presumably -- not presumably -- it seems to me are the kind that you are very much interested in, and they actually give you then listings of the kinds of things you might want to ask for, and give priority to. Did that occur to you?

PROF. LEFFLER: Well, it occurs to me -- that's what we got into discussion about, right now it's simply an enumerated list of those documents that are going to be automatically declassified. Sure, I mean, but most of these of subject oriented categories, which would create impossible barriers for orderly declassification. You need, as Bob Wampler said, you need to do it by accession groups in order to make it reasonable. So you need to identify the accession groups. I think Bob has put it in a very reasonable way, within the category of the OCRG-230 -- that perhaps we can agree on certain categories of that
sort, depending on Air Force and Army et cetera as well.

DR. GOLDBERG: You mean specific accessions within the record groups?

PROF. LEFFLER: Yes.

DR. GOLDBERG: Not the record groups as such?

PROF. LEFFLER: Right.

MR. DAVIS: What -- as it stands now -- are the parameters in category 3 of the various DOD components? And what sort of effort required to review those to see if they would be automatically declassified? The reason I ask this question is for example, if category 3 records of the Department of the Navy include let's say, bureau of medicine and surgery records in RG-52, it would seem to me that it would be more constructive to spend or to devote the reviewer's time to let's say, reviewing C&O records or ECNO records or something along those lines.

This of course, lowers the potential numbers of records that would be automatically declassified, but as I understand it, there's such limited resources in the declassification area, I think (inaudible).

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'd like to make some comments about the general problem. The first point is that I don't think the historians on the panel should
be viewed as simply the advocates of opening up as much sensitive material as possible. I think our fundamental approach is adversarial in that sense. We all have a common problem here — that's the problem of striking a balance. What's the balance between the need to have a rational declassification system — because the present system, I believe everybody agrees doesn't serve anybody's interest — and the need which I think, historians by and large recognize, to make sure that certain kinds of material are innocuous.

What can we do? We could offer advice, but in order for that advice to be effective, it has to be targeted on real issues. It's up to the agencies to come to us in a more specific way and say, where should we allocate our priorities? Here's the list of different possibilities. Here are the different series. This is what's inside such and such a series. Where do you think the emphasis should be placed? This is — this is — this means that we have to move eventually to getting a list of holdings that are being — you know, they're excepted from automatic declassification — but they're being declassification — so that we can have some meaningful input.

Until that's done, what can we do? What
should we talk about today? Well, there are certain principles of a general nature that we could, I think, agree upon, that should possibly guide the -- the people who are actually doing the declassification work in their efforts. And the principle that occurred to me -- and I think most of the academic historians would agree with this -- is that there is a basic cluster of issues that we are very interested in, and which we do not believe would seriously, or in any significant way, compromise legitimate national security interests.

What are these issues? Not things like weapon design or any kinds of nuts and bolts things -- you know, details of intelligence gathering or anything like that. We're interested at the top of the policy process. High policy. High strategy. Fundamental issues that bear on the core of the story. Issues of medicine; issues of what are you going to do if you have a particular problem like -- you know, Soviets' cutting off access to Berlin to take a particular case that a lot of us are interested in? How does this relate to fundamental strategy for the defense of Europe? How much independent authority do military commanders have? What can we say about the strategy making process? To what extent do parochial service interest bear on the final decisions that are made?
Issues relating to the control of nuclear weapons, to the sharing nuclear weapons with allies.

All those kinds of issues of a conceptual nature. There's no reason to keep those things a secret. And that's where the efforts should be targeted, in my view. Not -- not all these kinds of technical things which do not bear on questions of hard policy.

How does this relate to the whole question of how should the declassifiers allocate their efforts? There's a fundamental tension, it seems to me, between the requirements of the Executive Order and what the historians are interested in. The Executive Order says you've got to declassify X percent of documents by such and such a date -- and that means that there's an incentive for the declassifier as to concentrate on the documents that are of least interest, frankly. The things that are least sensitive and nobody cares about -- this is the stuff that they're going to be releasing first.

To my surprise and delight, a number of the agencies said that they were going to concentrate on the most sensitive stuff -- not that this is going to be released first, but that this is where their efforts were going to be allocated.
Now, we all know that's bureaucratic process to a certain degree and the requirements of the Executive Order have to be respected, but in terms of the internal allocation of efforts within the agencies, it would make sense, I think, to say that a certain percentage of time, a certain percentage of that effort, should be devoted to the areas of greatest interest, not the sorts of things that are going to compromise, you know, the legitimate national security interests, but the sorts of things that historians in the public as a whole, I believe, would be interested in, and will give us insight into what was going on in that period.

One final point. It was mentioned that we have to worry about foreign governments about the NATO documents and so on. When we think about the whole issue, how can historians help, just here in an advisory capacity? We can only do what people ask us to do.

How can we help? One of the ways we can help is a number of us have worked in foreign archives. We know what the British are releasing — and the declassifiers should come to us and say, well, we're a little leery about releasing these kinds of sensitive documents that bear on NATO strategy in the 50's, but
what do you get on this stuff from European sources?

And I can say, well, I saw such and such in the British
archives, French archives they're releasing this and
that, NATO itself has been declassifying documents just
very, very recently through MC14 Section 3 -- NATO's
documents have been coming out. It's that sort of give
and take interaction, based on the sense that we're
involved in a common process. And we're here to help
each other -- that I think should form our basic
approach to these issues.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I am gratified that the
panel members -- the academic members of this panel --
have given as much thought to this problem as they have
and I hope you will continue in the future. I hope the
kind of interaction that you were talking about -- can
it really take place? I know that you're all very busy
people. There's always the question, how much time can
you devote -- how much time will you devote to this
sort of thing. This is the practical problem; it's
another one of the pragmatic considerations which seems
to me may be overriding in the whole process. Ernest?

PROF. MAY: I just wanted to ask a question
on this. Suppose that we were to recommend that
Assistant Secretary Page that -- agrees to an order of
priority based on Bob Wampler's list. Suppose that he
said that one of the -- the NFC files should have top priority. Then what happens? What's the actual procedure by which -- suppose that Secretary Page agreed to this and then what?

DR. GOLDBERG: That's a good question. It's a question of how much attention the services and others will pay to what Secretary Page says. He cannot -- he can tell them what he would like to see done; he cannot enforce the doing of it. They have their own priorities; they have their own resources; they have their own plans. And as you heard and you well know, orders coming from (inaudible) are not always observed -- sometimes in the breach. So we don't really know.

On the other hand, we can certainly make the recommendations; we can urge OSD to put out a request or establish a priority, and then if we can do some policing thereafter, fine, but I wouldn't guarantee it.

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: If I could add to that. I could maybe go over the mechanical process that we envision, using the listing as an example. Once the panel here comes to an agreement on the priorities on that listing, we would then formally shoot it out to the DOD declassification management panel members who are comprised of all of the services and DOD agencies,
for comment, and give them maybe 30 days to coordinate
that within their agencies and get us an official
position on whether they feel that all or some or none
of those topical areas or records should be
declassified.

At that point, once we get the responses back
from all of the agencies, then we would consolidate
that information and come up with any issues where
individual agencies non-concur in release of
information, and then we would go through a process of
raising the issue to the senior leadership within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to make sure that
the senior leadership makes a DOD-wide decision on
whether something should be released.

For example, if -- to pick on the Navy -- if
the Navy said nonconcur in release of a particular
topic and the DOD leadership felt that it was in the
best interest of the Department to release that
information, then the senior leadership within the
department would override the Navy decision.

So the process would be a -- a process that
would take into account all of the comments from all
the DOD agencies on each one of the topical areas
suggested, and then we would, through that process, get
the -- get a decision from senior leadership. And we
could also envision at some point maybe calling in some
of the historians or/and some of the dissenting
agencies to justify why the information should not be
declassified.

DR. GOLDBERG: This should give you some
notion as to why it takes a long time to get things
done. Dr. Horton?

DR. HORTON: If I could just something before
I have to depart for another activity -- what Renee is
describing, I would characterize as an attempt to
develop a consensus from those who ultimately, as the
doctor indicated, have the power to accept or reject
that -- our recommendations. We are coming to what I
might characterize as the first mid-term, and whatever
the outcomes of the election, those who are in the
permanent government have a tendency, as we all know,
to sometimes treat those who are at the end of a term
as lame ducks.

So if you really want this to be done and
carried on into the next four years and beyond, what
you've got to do is get involvement of players and
their concurrence -- their buy-in, so the method that
we create here now carries on to the end of this
century and beyond. So that's what we're about -- once
we get these recommendations is to get that consensus,
get that buy-in, get that commitment of all players throughout the bureaucracy. Thanks again to the panel for a green search. Good to see all of you.

PROF. LEFFLER: Could I just make one observation before you leave? It might be very difficult, as you say, a very cumbersome bureaucratic process to get all the agencies to agree, and as Dr. Goldberg said, to actually get them to comply. But I would suggest that it would be a wonderful thing for OSD itself to set an example with its own records, because if you're talking about those that are of greatest historical interest in terms of foreign policy, people in OSD have the opportunity to set a model for everybody, and I would encourage you to do so.

DR. HORTON: That's a fair challenge. I think we'll get arrested if (inaudible)

(laughter)

DR. GOLDBERG: Better stick around for four more years.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just make a comment? In terms of the procedure. It seems to me that what we should do -- and I'm curious to get other people's reaction to this -- is ask the different agencies to come in with their -- you know, their fair
descriptions of what their holdings are, what the 
contents of their holdings are so that we can give this 
kind of input. We can ask them for presentations and 
then we could make our comments. 

In the plans that went out, there was a great 
variation, you know, in terms of what was said — of 
how the holdings were described. If you look at the 
Air Force plan, it's like — their description of their 
files there that are except from immediate 
declassification or automatic declassification — like 
whole record groups. Or they can't even give that, 
they just give the numbers. You can't give any input 
when that's all you're getting. You have to get it in 
so that there's some content to it, not file by file, 
but series. 

DR. GOLDBERG: That's a preliminary step that 
could take a very long time though. 

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well then — then what 
are we supposed to do? 

PROF. LEFFLER: We could at least identify 
ten priorities that we think are really important; come 
in describe them and just talk about them. I think 
trying to describe everything is too much, but to 
identify a few and to come in and talk and make some 
decisions is perfectly possible.
PROF. TRACHTENBERG: They knew what our general priorities are and on the basis of our general priorities, let them operationalize it in terms of plan for which specific files they're going to work on.

DR. GOLDBERG: So you would make as a first step establishment of general priorities, rather than specific ones and ask the services to come back and if possible, particularize what might be made available.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So that we can discuss it.

PROF. LEFFLER: Actually, I think the type of thing that Bob did for the OSD papers is what I'd like to see done for some of the other agencies -- to enumerate some of that. I mean that gives you some concrete notion of what we're talking about. So for to be too general is a way for us to sort of eviscerate our ability to do anything. So I would focus on getting some real enumeration of high priority files, record groups, within the general category, and to describe them for us and then let us -- let us have the input so that we can make our recommendations.

DR. GOLDBERG: Start with a single agency.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just ask Bob how he got that RG-30 list?

DR. WAMPLER: Okay.
PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Because how do we know those are the most important things.

DR. WAMPLER: I said that these are illustrative of a much longer list, and this is my first selfish opinion of some things I think are important. Suitland, the National Records Center -- you've got files and files and files of these things called From 135s, which are turned over to Suitland whenever an agency retires records there for storage, pending either destruction or transfer to the National Archives.

OSD, DOD, has got some very detailed inventories of these. Also they've got a pretty good data base, computerized. You should be able to give them, let's say a time frame, and they can turn out for you, at least line item entries with accession numbers and the number of boxes that are say, in record group 330 -- and also for some of the other services.

Now anything you've kept within your own storage, I would imagine the JCS records at Ft. Ritchel or elsewhere -- they don't have any information on those yet because you haven't really transferred them, have you?

OBSERVER: Some.

DR. WAMPLER: But you can get a first cut, at
least, at the size of the problem, and you can get a listing that gives you the title, the dates, and how many boxes, and probably the location. And you can work from that and that would be the sort of information DOE had to work with. I mean, I just spent days going through the records out there, taking notes on what was available as part of other projects I'm working on, and I just culled this from a much, much longer list of everything that at least chronologically would fall in the purview of the Executive Order.

Now, the question I have -- you were talking about mechanics here -- logistics and resource allocation. Now you can fiddle around with your work plant on the basis of what we put forth in terms of our interests. I wonder how much wiggle room you're going to have, in terms of shifting your work plan, and then how much leeway do you think you've got in terms of the guidelines that are being developed by the new Executive Order for declassification?

I think we need more of a dialogue here than we can in an open session, over -- you know, when you get down to the nuts and bolts of really doing this, you know, how much leeway do you really feel you have? I mean if we kick in something on an issue where you feel that under the law, under the guidelines, you're
just going to look at it and say no, no, no, no, no.

We need to know that. We need to feel if we're kicking something at you that you really have no flexibility on it at all, in order to make this process work.

DR. GOLDBERG: Brian Kinney handles declassification for OSD. How do you respond to that, Brian? What would happen if you had to -- somebody had to go through all the accessions?

MR. KINNEY: Well, I don't quite understand the question, but as I said before, I think you all have a good approach here and for Brian Kinney -- and I'm the one who does the declassification for OSD, and I've prepared a statement which I'd like to read at this point.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, and after you finish we'll take a break.

MR. KINNEY: But it will give you a feel for what's involved here. I feel very responsible for OSD records and I have a list -- I'm going to read this because I don't want to leave anything out.

DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is appropriate in view of the turn the discussion has taken.

MR. KINNEY: I have but a small staff of four personnel that has been performing systematic declassification review for the Office of the Secretary
of Defense since 1980. They've gone through most boxes of records from what accessions were at the Suitland Record Center for the years 1947-63. We're working on the 60-63 time frame when the new Executive Order came out.

Of those records we have declassified much and have extended a portion of them — I'm not quite sure what the percentage — maybe ten percent we extended. Our effort during the life of the office has always had to conform to the strictures of records management procedures and live with the fact that there's a significant percentage of other agency material interfiled with OSD records.

Often people get OSD mixed up with DOD and I want to make it clear that we're responsible for the Office of the Secretary of Defense records, not the DOD records.

We began operating under the rules of the new Executive Order on October 14, 1995 in an effort to (1) make forward progress during the transition, and (2) to see how the new rules would affect our review. We began this work despite slowly, evolving implementing guidance that is still not in place, despite the fact that Secretary Perry on behalf of the entire DOD asked for and was granted a six month extension to name the
files he proposed for exemption, despite the fact that
there was obviously no immediate recommendations from
the Herdal — this committee — or the information
security policy advisory council mandated by the
Executive Order.

Our experience during the last several months
has been that we've had to make numerous changes to our
procedures, and with assistance still evolving, we know
we still need to be flexible to respond to future
changes and further changes.

We eagerly await the implementing guidance
most affecting us and to see what we will ultimately be
reviewing when things sort out. So that in a nutshell
is where I am and I hope it partially answers the
question. We — we're ready to do whatever and you all
come up with priorities that you want to see worked on,
we'll be happy to respond and try to do it.

However, I do have a small staff, as I
emphasized, and if somebody comes up with something —
 a bunch of war planning information or whatever that
they want to see declassified, we'll have to prioritize
things because there are certain things that I know
that I can't declassify and there's certain things that
will bog me down to a standstill. And I want to go
forward and review as much as I can. So — that's
about all I had to say on it.

DR. GOLDBERG: So at the very least, you
would be prepared to respond --

MR. KINNEY: Sure.

DR. GOLDBERG: -- to any list of priorities
that this panel submitted to you and give us some
explanation of what's involved in reviewing.

MR. KINNEY: Right.

MR. NORRIS: I'm Robert Norris. I'm a
participant in the DOE advisory experience, and I'd
just like to relate a concrete way of approaching this.
This is where Bob Wampler started with with his model
of doing things. And also Professor Trachtenberg, he
makes the point that we can't do anything unless we
know what's there and need a concrete list of things,
which is what happened int the DOE experience.

A small group, maybe 15 or 20 people who
participated, were given I think about 30 record
groups, dates and what they contained, and basically we
were told and voted on and after collating those
different votes, a certain half dozen or eight rose to
the top as the ones that this group decided were the
ones that should be attacked first, and they were
attacked first, and that is the way we're proceeding
right now. But we wouldn't have known what was there
without the presentation of the documents.

Now, DOD is much larger situation, and it's OSD and the services and on and on and on. But I think for the mechanics, the logistics of the thing, it is going to have to be a presentation from the different offices of what's available before you can proceed to identify as a panel here what should go first.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, suppose we take a ten minute break now.

(Whereupon, a brief period off the record ensued.)

DR. GOLDBERG: In order to better record the proceedings of this meeting, will those of you in the audience please stand when you are speaking, it will be easier to get your remarks and make certain that they can appear in the transcript? Ponnwitz?

COL. PONNWITZ: Yes, I'd like to make one comment -- an observation, really. You know, as the only uniformed representative here from a service, I'm pretty familiar with the kind of records we hold -- and we have our chief archivist Fred Graboske here who's going to make a comment after I do.

What -- when we look at Dr. Wampler's list, we don't really hold, as a service, a lot of these policy decision matters. We hold contingency plans; we
hold operational records; we hold the kinds of things that are derived from these policy decisions. Our fifteen percent, then, can focus to certain operations that were derivatives of these policy decisions that may help, but they're not going to answer the questions you want.

The priorities you have here really take the fifteen percent and dump the majority of that fifteen percent to OSD, the higher levels of the Department of Defense, where if you want that information from them on these policy matters, they have to do the majority of the work first. Unfortunately, that's not the way the system is structured with resources to support this effort. We all have our own archivist; we all have our own archival records; we all have our own fifteen percent of the resource that we can contribute -- and it's going to be at our level because we can only declassify the records that we originated. We can't declassify a record that OSD has originated.

So there's a little bit of a conflict here between the way the priorities are going to be structured, and the way the resources are allocated. In the Persian Gulf Syndrome declassification effort, there was sufficient resources allocated to change the structure. We got money to do that. With this effort,
we don't. We can only use the resources that are currently available to us now.

Now Fred Graboske, our chief archivist, would like to add a suggestion, and I would ask him to do that at this time.

MR. GRABOSKE: Well, first let me kind of put things in perspective for you -- and that calls for both the Executive Order implementation and the Gulf War. The Department of Defense is spending, I would guess, $10,000,000 this year on the declassification of about 20,000,000 pages. There is not one penny budgeted for the billion pages we have to declassify under the Executive Order. So we really have a resource problem. And so I'd like to comment on the suggestions I've heard about us providing a list of what we consider the priorities to be declassified.

If you ask us to do that, you're taking our time away from declassification. Let me kind of turn the tables on you and suggest that you do some research. Go to the National Archives or the National Records Center, get copies of the 0-1 reports, the computer printouts from every record group held in classified stacks -- stacks one, two, and three. They're done by record group and it was every accession in those record groups. If you see something that
strikes your interest, go on out to the record center and look at the Standard From 135 that lists all the folder titles in every box in that particular accession. Then come back to us and say, hey, you know RG-127, which is the Marine Corps records, and this particular accession 65-8599, boxes 42 through 49 look like they're really interesting. Could you focus on those?

And if you tell us that, you're more than likely to get a positive response, because we're making our plans to five years, and if you tell us right up front what you're interested in, specifically by accession and boxes, then maybe we can devote our resources to those particular boxes and get them to you quickly.

I see Cuban Missile Crisis is one of your particular interests. Okay, those records have been declassified — all our records from the Cuban Missile Crisis have already been declassified. We're waiting to ship them to the Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board which has demanded them. That's one of the problems — demands for our resources. So as soon as we finish that, we'll retire the records to the National Archives and you can go look at them there.

But you know, that's my suggestions.
DR. GOLDBERG: How extensive are your accession list? How long would it take to go through an accession list for the Marine Corps. It may be even longer for the other services, but how about the Marine Corps?

MR. GRABOSKE: Our accession lists comprise 13 binders -- that's about 4,000,000 pages, several hundred accessions. It covers materials from World War II through mid-eighties. It would take you a little bit of time, but if you would just start with the 0-1 reports, computer generated by the records center -- which by record 127 -- look at RG-127, look at the list of accessions, some you're not going to be interested in. Files in general (inaudible) 1950-52 you're probably not much interested in.

But the operation records, the war diaries, the command diaries that were generated back three, four years from World War II through 1964 when the series changed -- those are in the record center. You can find those in several different accessions. If you're interested in them, go to the SF-135 or come to my archive and look at the SF-135s, and we can get stuff declassified for you.

DR. GOLDBERG: Do you think it would be useful to have representatives of the major elements of
the services, OSD and JCS give us here, perhaps at our
next meeting, a notion of what you have. People here
have been asking for inventories, for lists, et cetera.
I know that is a near-impossibility, but would it be
possible to get the essence of the sort of thing you
have, especially at the levels in which people here are
interested in this information?

MR. GRABOSKE: I would suggest the National
Archives could do that. This is a joint effort between
us and the National Archives. The 0-1 reports are
generated by the Washington National Records Center.

DR. GOLDBERG: MS. Schauble?

MS. SCHAUBLE: Yes, I'd like to make a
comment on that. The Washington National Records
Center holds a majority, I guess, of the records that
are still in the agency custody. These 0-1 reports are
going to be very extensive, not only that, but not all
the records that will be in the records center are yet
scheduled as to whether they are permanent or not. And
of course we could only be focusing on permanent
records for the purposes of this Executive Order.

I produced a list of all the classified
series that have been accessioned in the National
Archives, and that comes out to something like four
inches of paper -- and I don't think that's as much as
are actually in the records center.

DR. GOLDBERG: How did you get it down to four inches?

MS. SCHAUBLE: Small print. I would be happy to work with you in -- as a liaison with the records center. I'm not sure that the center is really set up to provide access to the committee members to their records of 135s and so on. I would also say that as part of our moving to our new building, a lot of those records that are in the records center that had been scheduled for accessioning by the archives through 1995 and the accessioning had been postponed for various reasons, are being moved into the archives now.

As a matter of fact, as we speak, we are in the process of bringing some of those records in. That creates a bit of a problem for this group because they're going off the record center rolls and onto mine, so to speak, and there's going to be a period of transition while I get them into my database and get figured out as to what exactly we have.

So, I would suggest that in terms of -- in those terms, you might want to work with me as a liaison with the records center.

DR. GOLDBERG: How close to date is that accessioning now? In general?
MS. SCHAUBLE: We are going to still be moving records probably through about the middle of April, and at that point we would have brought in everything that the agencies have agreed for us to bring in at this time.

DR. GOLDBERG: How far is that going to make you set beyond?

MS. SCHAUBLE: Some of it -- most of it probably is within the time period of this Executive Order. Some of it may go a bit beyond. Whether it would cover everything in the center that is subject to the Order, I don't know, because as I say, it's only what the agencies have actually agreed for us to take at this point.

DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. Ms. Smith? We are hearing now here from the Presidential Libraries, an area, I think that most scholars are very much interested in, and one which certainly holds high level policy materials. Would you stand, please?

MS. SMITH: Yes. I don't want to feel like I'm beating a dead horse with this group, but in November, I went over the fact that the Presidential Libraries do hold a small group of high level policy papers -- that we come under the Executive Order. The archivist is entrusted with the declassification of
those materials, and we would really like this group to
cconsider some way of attacking the 7,000,000-plus
classified materials in the Presidential Libraries.

In December, the archivist sent out a plan to
each one of the intelligence groups for proposing
250,000 items at three libraries dealing with Viet-Nam
and Eastern Europe -- they're from the National
Security files, so they sort of go with Dr. Wampler's
idea, but they also -- they're from a file, but they
also deal with the subject. They would be easy to
declassify; they're extremely high policy level. As
yet we really have not gotten any feed-back from you
all in terms of how you want to respond to that plan.

The archivist said that we're more than
willing to listen to something else. If you want to
attack the 80,000 at Truman -- the 80,000 classified
items at Truman, the 250,000 at Eisenhower and do a
whole Presidential collection, we can go that way, but
we really -- really want this group in some way to
attack the high policy level materials at the
Presidential Libraries have and in some way address
those so that the archivist can comply with the
Executive Order and get something declassified in the
first year dealing with Presidential papers.

Of course, they have multiple equities,
involve coordination. NARA, the Presidential Libraries
will have to coordinate multiple decisions, but we are
interested in working with you all in any way we can to
address this. We have sent each one of the
intelligence agencies specific planning aids -- they're
much larger than the four inches that Jeanne is talking
about -- we couldn't get it down in as small a print.
But I think we can give this group any more specific
knowledge that they want, if there are other ways they
want to go, but we'd just like to be part of your
consideration.

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: That was sent to the
intelligence community? Did you send it to --

MS. SMITH: Pardon?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The listing -- your
listing -- your recommended listing?

MS. SMITH: Who did we send it to?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: Yes.

MS. SMITH: Well, I'd have the copies because
it seems -- it's one interesting thing to me is that
every intelligence meeting I've been to, the agencies
keep telling me I haven't sent it to them, but I sent
it to Dave Whitman at OSD -- you want me to go through
all the different names?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, that name's in my
office.

MS. SMITH: My office is right next door and I have each different person in the military that I sent it to -- Rich Warshot (ph), CIA -- you want me to keep going?

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No --

MS. SMITH: So that plan has gone out.

PROF. LEFFLER: Have you had any responses?

MS. SMITH: The one response that we have, and I was telling Dr. Trachtenberg about it, is that CIA is proposing to the various intelligence communities a way of dealing with presidential papers, and this is a proposal which is to scan presidential papers, put them on an optical disk -- the agency would bring them back, and then we would -- they would be involved in transferring equities to other agencies and the libraries would coordinate the declassification decisions. And that plan would involve the other intelligence agencies buying into it.

We've had several meetings on it. It is still at the talking stage. NARA's feeling on that plan is we're more than willing to listen. We have preservation concerns of that screening, but certainly the agency has indicated to us that they're more than willing to cooperate with that. And several of the
agencies have indicated interest because it's working out cheaper to do that sort of plan and buy into that, than it would be to do onsite review.

I really don't care. We just want to see something declassified, and if the plan works and the preservation of the documents is good -- and I think CIA is willing to work with that -- with us on that -- we will be more than cooperative.

We believed onsite review of the Presidential Libraries was the way to go and we've had a few situations with onsite reviews that worked extremely well. Iran Contra sat over at the OJ and amazingly enough, the reviewers from the different agencies were given the authority to make a review decision on Iran Contra documents, so we know it can work.

But if it's too expensive to go to Presidential Libraries, then this other proposal is a real option. What we have proposed is that they do the 250,000 or small number of items the first year so that we can see if the technology is really working, and they have come back and said maybe one library would be better than three different libraries because we proposed collections in Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford. So we said, okay, we'll up it at Johnson which has the largest amount we're proposing for the first year and a
larger staff, in this particular case, to deal with it.

So that is now the only real discussion

that's going on right now -- that I've been involved in

in terms of some response on this issue. And I've also

heard a lot of we know you're out there -- Presidential

papers contain multiple equities, you're too expensive
to visit, and we'll deal with you at four and a half

years.

DR. GOLDBERG: As an aside if we observe that

all of you will speak up as well as Ms. Smith does, you

won't have to stand.

MS. SMITH: That's why I did not stand.

DR. GOLDBERG: You did very well. Are the

Presidential Libraries willing and capable of doing

this?

MS. SMITH: We really want to do this. We do

not have large staffs, but it is extremely expensive to

maintain the classification on our documents which are

over 25 years old, and we believe that what we proposed

are 80-85 percent documents that you all will

declassify, and that will make researchers happy, like

Professor Trachtenberg. So, yes.

You know, are we going to have problems in

terms of our resources in coordinating four --
sometimes four different decisions which as no surprise
to you all, may not match up at all? Well, we've been
doing it for years. It's on a much larger scale.
There will be some time lag from the time we get the
documents back to coordinating it, but we will make our
best effort.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it seems to me that this
panel would certainly welcome what you propose and
support it and perhaps help provide some guidance.
Is -- we probably couldn't get to any high level of
policy, and if we could relate it to OSD, perhaps JCS,
I think we certainly would have the highest levels and
perhaps we ought to think in terms of some kind of a
pilot project, initially, which you give us some notion
of what is possible and what is not possible to be
done. I'd like to hear some reactions.

DR. CLARKE: I'd like to -- the Marine
archivist pointed out that as soon as you get into
scanning redaction -- declassification right on a
scanning document, that gets extremely expensive. Do
you really have money to --

MS. SMITH: Let me make it very clear. NARA
is not the one who is proposing this scanning proposal.
The CIA is the one who is proposing and has come to
NARA and put this on the table, and they are the ones
who seem to have the money to implement this proposal.
What we are saying as an agency is we're more than willing to work with you and listen to a possible alternative. And they feel they have the -- when you look at going out and doing onsite review, and the fact that DOD wants to look at every presidential paper that is security classified, if you're doing that -- if you can't implement the Executive Order without looking at every one of our 7,000,000 pages, then probably scanning is the less expensive proposition than doing onsite interagency --

DR. CLARKE: The CIA would establish a scanning center, say --

MS. SMITH: Yes.

DR. CLARKE: -- at the presidential library that other agencies could --

MS. SMITH: They would go to the libraries to scan, come back here, and then what we were talking about at the last group meeting was that agencies could either -- if they buy into this -- and I am not the CIA spokesperson here, I'm just telling you of a plan -- you could either go out to where the redaction center is or they would give you diskettes that would have, say, all the Truman classified presidential papers on that diskette. It is still in the talking stage, but --
BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me -- I'm Dave Armstrong, I'm a Historian. I am not an archivist, and I think, quite honestly, that's one of the problems this group is having. Because if we're talking about archival matters, it takes an archivist to talk knowledgeably about the nuts and bolts of doing things in an archive.

It seems to me that what the historical -- the academic historical community wants and what the archival bureaucracy -- the people who have to do the declassification -- are capable of producing is -- we're not making connection between what Professor Leffler wants and what the Marine Corps is saying. And I would suggest that that connection can only be made if the academic community -- Dr. Wampler, whoever -- the individuals in it who are interested in the particular set of records, whether they're OSD, JCS or some service records, contact the archival people responsible for those sets of records and find out what is the nature of the general descriptive listings that those people keep, and then work from there to specify amongst those listings, what particularly they would like to see first in the queue for declassification.

I'm emphasizing archivists, as they've repeatedly said, they have a problem. They have a 15 percent mandate to do. Period. And they have to do
that. And so what you're asking for which is perfectly reasonable from my point of view as a historian, has to be matched up with this mandate -- and they have workloads to juggle and so forth.

I'm very serious about suggesting to the historical community -- what has to be done is a lot of work, quite frankly, on the part of the historians who are interested in access to particular records. This is like telling a graduate student and go out, like Bill Holly did to me 30 years ago, threw me in the archives and basically said, you know, go in there and find where this information is. And until you do that, I don't think you're going to be able to make a connection between what you want in terms of getting your interests first in the declassification queue and what the people charged with doing the work are capable of doing.

Now, I would be perfectly happy to get the Joint Staffs people, the documents people, here next time to talk to you about JCS records. They have gone through systematic declassification up through '63, and I believe they are now accession -- those records are available or at least positioned in the National Archives.

Since that time the records sit out at Fort
Ritchie. Now, those records, there is a degree of specificity about what's in those files. The JCS files up to 1986 or so were very carefully organized because of the idiosyncrasies of the organization. And we can get you that kind of information, I think.

But I would simply try to emphasize to you that as historians, you're used to dealing with the specific, and the problems you face here are specific, and they're idiosyncratic to each organizational set of records, and I really do think that trying to get this group to establish sort of general priorities -- I don't think you're going to make the connection between what you want and the people who actually do the work.

DR. DUDLEY: Now if -- I would endorse what Dr. Armstrong is saying, and my concern as representing the Naval History Center and Naval history in general, is that the impact of a different set of priorities on top of our capabilities -- our capabilities are very strained, very limited in terms of declassification. The initial burden of Desert Storm declassification program, which is immediate, and which is dealing with events that only three -- four or five years ago -- is going to consume us for a while, at least at the center and with regards to some other particular locations.

The Navy system for declassification is
decentralized. Each location has a very limited number of people who can work this problem, so I see that there's a potential tension here, existing tension, which may be relaxed — and I'm certainly willing to listen to priorities coming from the academic side.

In order to be a little more specific, though, I'd like to ask Mike Brown from the C&O's Information Security Oversight Team, to make a statement.

DR. GOLDBERG: Will you also ask him to stand up, please?

DR. DUDLEY: I will do that.

MR. BROWN: I am in a position of making a security profession here. I am neither a historian or an archivist by profession. But I've dealt with declassification as an issue for many years. We submitted our declassification plan and we got the requisite blessing on it — they said we did very well — good plan. That's what we were striving for.

We have a plan. We haven't finished that plan. We haven't identified a series of exempt records yet. We have begun a process, and this process has been ongoing, well, since June. In taking this decentralized process and trying to bring those records in together and determine how they're going to achieve
their part of the 15 percent -- and that's the goal.
That's the goal that they're striving for. And this is the kind of information that you're probably not interested in, because we're going to have the people in NAFC (ph) looking at what they can declassify in 1950's technology -- on weapons systems.

Similarly, for the people who do aircraft. They're going to be looking at the technology of aircraft. They're not looking at political decisions. They're not looking at procurement decisions. Those are by and large declassified by now, anyway.

So they're approaching this thing in a -- in a very narrow focus, which is the only way that they can do it -- they can't start looking at broader spectrum -- they have to concentrate on their area of responsibility.

Resources, Desert Storm, POW-MIA and the other directed efforts. We have a dilemma here, in our need to do, to comply with the Executive Order requirement. And we also have some directed actions come down from the Secretary of Defense that said, we'll concentrate on doing this and okay, we'll have to bring all our resources if we start concentrating on those efforts. We still have some other things to do.

I think that our plan that we put together
was a pretty good plan. At a meeting we held yesterday that Dr. Dudley attended — mechanic went over all these things. Ray Schmidt who had been probably described in very great detail what's contained in records or what's not identified. I asked the group at large (1), has the declassification factory turned out anything yet. And the answer is no. Not a single product has rolled off the assembly line. (2) Can you target a subject if we give you a subject to go after? The overall response was no.

Now, again, I'm not a historian. I'm not an archivist. So I'm not that familiar with the precision, the specificity, that the records are identified by means of the 135 and other depictions. But what I have seen is that they are very, very generalized kinds of things, so all you can do is focus on the records of an activity, for a time point, and not target a subject.

DR. GOLDBERG: I think that what you indicated is that this panel would probably not be interested initially in giving priority to some of the things that you mentioned.

MR. BROWN: Exactly.

DR. GOLDBERG: That said of the agencies, would you imagine this panel would be interested in the
Navy and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that's different. This is where policy is made, and this is where the focus of this panel will probably be in establishing priorities. Did you want to say something?

PROF. LEFFLER: Did I want to say something?

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

PROF. LEFFLER: Not right now, thanks.

DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw you — yes.

MR. DAVIS: I accept the invitation to review planning aides in 105 at the National Archives and 135s in the record center. But there's a gap here, and that is there's very little information available to the public on holdings still in the physical custody of DOD components. For example, the Army Intelligence and Security Commands, per its handouts last November -- listed about 7000 feet of records, but to the best of my knowledge, there's no information publicly available on the dates of these records, classification status, types of records and so on and so forth.

And that's, I think, something that needs to be addressed, because at this point the public, for the most part, can determine what's in the National Archive system, what's in the record center system, but cannot
determine what records are still in physical custody of these various DOD components.

And I think if the panel can identify in specific offices and organizations' records that are of interest, that will greatly assist in the identification of specific collections -- let's take for example, two or three entries in the record group in the National Archives of 100 or 125 accessions in some record group at the record center. But without that focus, it's -- I wouldn't say an impossible task, but an overwhelming task.

So, for example, if the focus wants to be -- focuses on the outset on OSD records, that greatly narrows the search.

DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is probably the disposition of the panel, to focus on particular offices and organizations. It seems to me that the nub of all of this is how do we start here? Do we want to explore first and find out more about what is there? What are the things that we're interested in that we find out about? And then do something about it. Or do we want to start with some kind of a pilot project and say these are subjects that we would like to see looked at, given priority in the records of: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTER'S, INC.
301-565-0064
especially the Presidential Libraries? These are the kinds of decisions you have to make.

Today, do we want to make up a list of recommendations and in priority order, and say this is what we would like to see done, and then forward it up the line and wait to hear from it? Or do we want to find out more about what is there and what the procedures are and what the possibilities are? This involves having some knowledge of where our recommendations go and what might happen to them.

I, personally, think it would be a good idea for some of us to establish direct relations with some of the offices and organizations that we'd like to see declassifying specific areas that we might prescribe or ask for, would be more accurate. I'd like your reaction to this. Are we prepared to make some specific recommendations at this point or do we want to make some further preparations and explorations so that we may have a much better informed proposal to make at the next meeting or at the one after that? Yes.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well I like the idea of a pilot project because first of all, it enables us to focus in on the issues that are at least the crowning concerns of the historians, plus also, in the process of working out a pilot project, we'd be able to come to
grips with all kinds of general problems that are going
to be faced throughout the whole effort. And the whole
idea on focusing on OSD, Presidential Libraries, JCS,
makes sense for obvious reasons.

The other thing I was going to say is I think
it's great to hear from archivists saying, you know,
come talk with us and tell us what your priorities are,
something very easy that we can do along those lines.
I think, get the names, addresses and phone numbers of
the relevant contact people that can be disseminated to
practicing historians because we -- in terms of our own
work -- are a very small proportion of a very large
profession, and it would be very nice to kind of get
this information out so that people can go through the
process that you outlined and speak with you. Because
you know, it's a very big bureaucracy; it's very hard
to kind of target the right people, and people get
frustrated.

And I can say also that there is a certain
variation in terms of how receptive different
archivists are. Your attitude, I thought, was
wonderful, but I can tell you that that's not what we
encounter on a uniform basis. Sometimes it's quite
frustrating. So just going through the process of
identifying people who are receptive would be of
enormous value. So that's on the one hand.

The other hand is proceeding with a pilot project of the sort of thing Al Goldberg just described. Here the question is how to proceed?

DR. GOLDBERG: That's what I wrote down.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: And there are at least two basic choices, you know. Who is going to take the lead? We can go your route -- historians can go and get these forms and so on and say this is where we think priority emphasis should be placed.

My own preference would be to kind of go the other way and have a presentation, kind of giving a general description of the holdings, and then a general philosophy of where efforts are going to be concentrated, and then -- and then open issues. These are the specifics where we would like you to give us advice. Here is some typical problems of a concrete nature. Tell us -- tell us -- you know, give us some sort of feedback. This is our inclination, or this is an open issue -- but the -- but instead of asking the historians to kind of go and do this work, I think it would be much more efficient to have the main thinking going on among the archivists who then would have specific problems in mind that they could just come to us with, and then our advice would fall on prepared
ears.

COL. PONNWITZ: Just remember we're still plodding along with our fifteen percent, and each day we do another percentage of that 15 percent, whether we get guidance or not. To come -- any time that we have to pull the archivist off his task to come up with these problems and everything else to educate the panel, is part of that 15 percent that doesn't get done. And we're not going to be -- our compliance with the Executive Order says do 15 percent.

Now we hope that eventually we'll get the right 15 percent, but for the services, from what I'm hearing here, anything we tell you is not going to satisfy what you want anyway because we just don't have it.

Now the other agencies perhaps do, and maybe if you focus on the prime agencies first that you want information from in that order, the higher level government agencies, and certainly the suggestion that the CIA has for the Presidential Libraries is excellent for that kind of policy, we cannot scan all the information we have, nor would we want to because it's not economically possible for us, nor would it help you get any data that you particularly need.

But I think if we set the priorities in
certain categories and don't burden everybody with the
same priority determination, we'll get to the thing,
the conclusion, you want a lot quicker, a lot more
efficiently.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I don't want to burden
people. I think that these -- people who have been
working with this problem -- they know what the
problems are. They can come in with scarcely any
preparation at all and give a presentation just the way
any of us can on the basis of what our current work is,
and then -- then it would provide a framework for
interaction.

The -- and that's why focusing on OSD, JCS
makes sense.

DR. GOLDBERG: You are aware that marines
carry out orders better than anybody else.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: We don't give orders.

DR. GOLDBERG: I'm not talking about our
orders, the ones they already have.

PROF. LEFFLER: I want to endorse what Mark
Trachtenberg said. I think that we should focus on
three things: First, carrying out a plan for the
Presidential Libraries and underscoring the importance
of grappling with those materials because they're
clearly the ones that least -- ostensibly relate to
high policy.

And secondly, focusing on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think that's a very good beginning.

And these allusions to you know, making a preparation for us and taking away from 15 percent, don't strike me as terribly persuasive because what we're asking for is a presentation that should take somebody sort of two hours to prepare. We want a sort of -- some type of survey of what you, who deal with the records, think are the most important record groups that deal with high policy making and what are the particular problems that might inhere in the declassification of those documents.

To those of you who have spent years and years working with these records, it doesn't seem to me that this should be a voluminous assignment. It's something that we want to hear your best judgement on so you can inform us so that you can then go ahead and declassify these very records that you are most interested in.

So I think that's a very good way to proceed.

DR. GOLDBERG: It depends on whose most interesting -- your most interest does not necessarily mean that the declassifier's are. But on the subject
of Presidential Libraries, would you be interested in visiting some of them?

PROF. LEFFLER: No, I have been to almost all of them. I don't need to go back to them.

DR. GOLDBERG: No, for this purpose, to find out what it is that ought to be declassified.

PROF. LEFFLER: Well --

DR. GOLDBERG: Or any other panel members interested in such visits?

MS. SMITH: Well, I mean we're more than willing to have onsite visits, but I think that we have -- we can provide this group with very good knowledge if I know what you all want. We have provided what we think is the most sensible plan which deals with VietNam and Eastern Europe and national security files of the Kennedy, Johnson and Ford libraries. I can give you the breakdowns for Truman, Eisenhower. I can tell you what they have. We can write back to you -- if you wanted this at one of the libraries, that's great too.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: About the -- the general philosophy of how to do this. It doesn't make sense to start with the oldest stuff first and then just kind of move forward -- the oldest stuff systematically so we get the sense of an inexorable tide sweeping its way through the --
MS. SMITH: Well, there was a method to our madness. We sort of thought that too. In our plan, by the way, we have the Hoover library which is 22,000 classified materials and also contains a bunch of Louis Straus's files — he was chair of the Atomic Energy Commission — and those materials would largely be exempt from declassification.

But basically, we picked the three libraries we did and the sublibraries we did because the Eisenhower library have some duplicative material that the National Archives has, that we are hopeful will get declassified and so were trying to prevent the agencies from doing duplicative declassification efforts. So we were staggering the Eisenhower library, hoping that the declassification effort would be done in the office of the National Archives material and then we would do Eisenhower the second year.

The Truman library we could start out at the Truman library; the Johnson library, one reason we picked the Johnson library, it has 150,000 items held out for VietNam and Eastern Europe. They're already segregated; they're very ready for review and we have had huge research interest in VietNam, Soviet Europe and Eastern European countries. So then the Ford library said, well, we're very ready and the Kennedy
library said we're very ready on this issue, and it was sort of like we were getting feedback to respond to Dr. Goldberg in terms of how we could best serve the declassifiers to be sure that their time was wisely used.

But we can go — if you want to go with the older libraries, we can do Eisenhower and Truman. I mean we're very flexible. We too, have a resource component, so we were figuring that into our plan too as to where we would be most ready.

DR. GOLDBERG: You have already proposed a plan. Now what can this panel do to complement that, to support it, to add to it, perhaps?

MS. SMITH: Well, I think that maybe someone from the panel should be involved in this group that Ray and several of the other of us in the room are involved in with the CIA in terms of optical scanning. I think that might be interesting to see if — if that is the way to go. That would be one thing I would suggest.

Another thing is that the group endorse the plan, if you agree with the plan, and try to put resources in terms of doing the plan in those three libraries. I think that DOD has already indicated its agreement with the CIA scanning proposal. I don't know
DR. GOLDBERG: Can we add subjects and establish priorities?

MS. SMITH: Yes, you can add subjects. You can -- but all I'm saying is I don't think it takes a visit to a Presidential Library, because you tell me the subjects and I can go out to the libraries and get you the information back. I can get you detailed lists, searches, whatever.

You can have libraries, if you -- or some one wanted to go older, we could go older. We were just holding it out for certain reasons.

DR. WAMPLER: Essentially your work plan is based on their data base and DOD equity documents that have been pulled from the accession records in each of the libraries?

MS. SMITH: These were very, very ready materials and we -- we proposed for several different reasons -- research interest, readiness, and the likelihood that most of the stuff would be declassified, wouldn't be exempt from declassification.

So that was why we pulled these areas -- Eastern Europe, it's changed; VietNam, it's changed. We know from what we're sending in on inventory review that we're getting a high rate of declassification on these
areas, and we have tremendous amount of research interest. But we're more than flexible. If this group wants to go some other way, you all just need to tell me what you want me to give you lists on and I can pretty much give you the list.

DR. WAMPLER: Is it organized according to the way it is in the libraries? I mean --

MS. SMITH: Yes.

DR. WAMPLER: -- you know, DDL you would have wide read files, or you would have the staff files --

DOD --

MS. SMITH: No, the wide read files, the Presidential files are organized somewhat differently, because they really reflect the Office of the President.

DR. WAMPLER: That's what I mean. They're organized on those --

MS. SMITH: Most of what we're proposing are national security files that deal with countries --
national security country file for VietNam at all three libraries, then the key national security staffers that dealt with those issues and Eastern Europe. So that's what we're proposing from those.

DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to you then, would --
MS. SMITH: Pardon?

DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to you is if we accept the chronological progression would be to see whether we want to endorse or play around with the priorities you set within each library for dealing with the files or records. That could be done pretty easily on the basis of what you have here, I would say.

MS. SMITH: It doesn't -- it's not very helpful for my review to say you're interested in DOD materials because they're all intermixed. But if the libraries you tell us you want materials dealing with the Mid-East war of '67, then we'll give you a search of where all that material is. The USS Liberty, we know where that material is. VietNam, we know where that material is, so the library files are somewhat more organized around subject, although we're pulling from different places.

DR. WAMPLER: All I'm saying is that it makes more sense to make recommendations based on the way in which the stuff is already organized, not try to pull --

MS. SMITH: Right.

DR. WAMPLER: -- that apart and reassemble it.
MS. SMITH: Yes.

DR. WAMPLER: Yes.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Before we take these questions, I just have one specific follow-up. You said you wanted to avoid these competing declassification efforts at the Eisenhower library. I think one of our concerns should be, again, to get a sense of what these efforts are so that we can think in terms of a coordinated plan. Could you talk a little bit more about why, from the DOD, it's being done in that area, the Eisenhower library?

MS. SMITH: At the Eisenhower library?

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes.

MS. SMITH: It's specific -- Jeanne, maybe you can help me out here. The archivist that deals with mandatory review there felt that we had some record groups that were coming out that were fairly duplicative of some materials he has.

DR. GOLDBERG: Could you stand please?

MS. SCHAUBLE: The Eisenhower library has a microfilm of some of the records that we have in paper that deal with World War II. Most of the microfilm actually should be declassified except for individual items on each reel that have been withheld. So we have to then review those items that have been withheld to
see if they can now be declassified and released. If we can release those items, they will be able to release the entire microfilm. So it doesn't make a lot of sense to go out there and try to start from scratch and review the whole microfilm.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: This is the World War II stuff?

MS. SMITH: Yes, but one thing you all may not realize is that presidential papers were the only papers that were exempt from the (inaudible) dealing with declassification of World War II materials.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: But nobody's working on a competing declassification effort on presidential materials in the Eisenhower library. Right? So if we -- so that whole argument for not focusing in on the presidential materials in the Eisenhower library because there's a competing declassification effort doesn't carry any weight.

MS. SMITH: I guess we're not being clear. Jeanne has some stuff that has been declassified that we have microfilm out at the Eisenhower library. We need to do the work to pare it out, to get that collection taken care of so that people aren't going out to the Eisenhower library and doing duplicative work that we can take care of. And we have not -- NARA
has not done that work. We want to make sure that the agency that because it's declassified one place and it exists at another place that we're not having the few resources that there are, spend their time on a duplicative situation.

So I'm sorry if I'm not being clear. We could do Eisenhower library, but our priority was that it should go with the second year and we should address this one situation internally to the agency and not waste anybody's resources.

DR. GOLDBERG: Tony?

MR. PASSARELLA: OSD (inaudible) office --

DR. GOLDBERG: Would you stand please?

MR. PASSARELLA: I'm neither a records holder nor a historian.

DR. GOLDBERG: Your voice is not quite as good as Ms. Smith's.

MR. PASSARELLA: Okay. I just would like one clarification. All of these components are working very hard to make plans to declassify all the records that are 25 years old over the next five years. I still haven't heard what is the urgency to rearrange all these hard efforts that are going on. Why is it -- I mean we're talking about 25 year old records. Why is it that we have to rush some when everyone has to have
them finished by five years? I mean is there a valid
reason for the urgency?

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. It's a question of what
will happen to the exempted records which contain, I
think, most of the material that people here are
interested in.

MR. PASSARELLA: As I read the Executive
Order and your employing a systematic review apply.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but the question is when
will they get around to a systematic review of the
exempted records at the higher levels?

MR. PASSARELLA: Well I guess my question --

DR. GOLDBERG: Without -- without some kind --

MR. PASSARELLA: -- here (inaudible) --

automatic declassification, you're still going to have
to review the records, and you've got all these people
working damn hard to do the requirements of the
Executive Order for the next five years, and now we're
going to force down their throat -- when they're going
to have to review them anyhow over five years -- in a
different direction. That's what I guess I don't
understand.

MS. SMITH: Well, there is one requirement
under the Executive Order that the archivists in the
United States declassify 15 -- some percentage of the papers of the former presidents in the first year. So, what NARA is asking is how are we going to declassify that? We did not pick 15 percent. We picked a small sample -- sort of a pilot project to see if it would work. So that's the one requirement.

MR. PASSARELLA: Well, I'm not worried about -- I'm wondering from the historian's standpoint what their urgency is on certain areas?

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I can answer that by actual -- giving you a specific reference, because the answer is there's certain skepticism about whether this project of total review in five years is going to be successful. Alright? An example is the plan for the Defense Nuclear Agency. It says in their section on compliance methodology, that they propose to review 20 cubic feet per month for the next four and a half years. You do the arithmetic, that gives you 1080 cubic feet.

It turns out that the material that they're going to have to review adds up to 12,900 cubic feet. So -- so the realities of the limited budget are such that there is no way, in spite of what they say, that in this period they're going to be going through 100 percent of their material.
MR. PASSARELLA: I'm not representing anyone here.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'm just saying -- I'm saying on the basis of information that we were given, there is certain grounds for skepticism, alright? And it's simply a budgetary reality.

MR. PASSARELLA: That's my point --

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So given that, this budgetary reality, that means that it makes sense to talk about priorities. Let's not waste time on junk when we could be focusing on real things. Let's be realistic about this whole problem. That's the answer to your question.

MR. PASSARELLA: Okay.

DR. GOLDBERG: Not only that but most of the plans call for 75 percent within five years, at least not -- which leaves 25 percent, which could very well be the kinds of things that people here are most interested in. This is another reason for the priorities. Yes.

MR. NORRIS: Robert Norris again. Just a quick point of information about how would this get implemented? Who would give the order to set you -- or upon recommendation perhaps of the panel here to make this the pilot project. What are the mechanics for
ordering you to attack those particular files?

    MS. SMITH: Well, NARA's problem is -- for
the whole of the National Archives, we have very little
original declassification so any in this material will
have to get, because of the multiple equities, will
have to get reviewed by the different agencies, so if
this group endorses the plan and perhaps gets involved
with the CIA optical scanning plan, someone will be
reviewing the materials and getting the archives back
the declassification authority, so we can coordinate
those and get those available to the public.

    But without people doing -- attacking the
libraries in some sort of systematic way, all that
we're faced with is sending in our individual mandatory
review requests which we've been doing for years and
years and years, but it is not going to address the
Executive Order.

    DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest?

    PROF. MAY: I wanted to ask -- first off,
make a proposal which is, that we ask Ms. Smith to
provide this plan to this panel and to the extent that
she can do it, to give us some hint as to what works,
some alternatives to be thought about, other categories
and things that you might have considered --

    MS. SMITH: Oh, well -- I think in this other
group they were asking if we could do one library.

Yes, we can do one library; we can -- someone on this

group asked can we do one older library. Yes, because

if it's an older library we can up the figures that say

the library that had the most of what we were

proposing, which was Johnson, and try and get more like

200,000 classified items there. We can go two

libraries. All we need is the input as to where you

want to go. What we were trying to do was do it where

we felt we were the most ready. But we are more than

going to try to shift. I mean --

PROF. MAY: I just thought it would be useful

to us if we could look at some alternative conditions

that if you thought --

MS. SMITH: Well, you can do middle Eastern

policy; you can do national security files; or you can

do a whole collection, like all of the Eisenhower or

Truman libraries' classified materials.

PROF. MAY: The second part, I have a

question for you. You said that it's expensive to

review many of these classified documents. How

expensive?

MS. SMITH: It's extremely expensive because

we have classified storage facilities at each

presidential library, and I can give the figures that
we gave to Moynihan's Commission -- see, I don't have them with me, but we have to maintain them there. When we ship them back for review, if they are at certain level -- Top Secret -- or they contain departmental information, they have to go a set way. Often that involves a trip of 90 miles, one way, to get it there. So there's a huge amount of cost in the mandatory review program is extremely costly, both from National Archives standpoint and the agency's standpoint, because you're dealing with one document, transporting it back and forth and getting multiple agencies to look at our stuff, because most of our stuff will have more than one equity in it. So it's very expensive.

Now we too have extremely limited resources, and that was one reason why we tried to do something that we feel we might be able to handle.

PROF. MAY: Did you write some thing about this for the Moynihan Commission?

MS. SMITH: The archivist made a presentation to the Moynihan Commission with some recommendations. And certainly I can get a copy of that. I don't know if it's specifically went into the storage costs at the presidential libraries. I don't -- it didn't. Yes. But certainly, you know, we would have to work those figures up. Storage of classified materials for all of
the National Archives is extremely costly. The thing is it's costly through the whole federal records. It's not just the National Archives.

DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a recommendation to review or a recommendation to release?

MS. SMITH: I'm sorry.

DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a recommendation to review or a recommendation to release? Are you making a positive assertion in your work plan that you think these are records that not only should be reviewed, but should be released. I mean --

MS. SMITH: That should be released, yes.

DR. WAMPLER: -- did you make that kind of assessment?

MS. SMITH: We are saying that in the presidential libraries, some of you are aware, they're donated historical materials. There's a donor gift provision. What I'm saying is that these are records that have been screened for that release, and if they're declassified, once we can do the coordination of the library, and there will be a time lag, the majority of these materials will be released. They will not be withheld for a donor deed of gift reason.
They've already been screened for that.

DR. WAMPLER: And if you come up with a non-concurrence, does it then get booted up to the higher interagency panel which has been established on the Executive Order?

DR. GOLDBERG: I presume appeals can be made, yes.

DR. WAMPLER: But -- you can -- you can bargain. You can try to negotiate on this if an agency says no, you can go back to them and can the panel help you in that regard?

MS. SMITH: Yes, and as I said, the CIA plan is still in the talking stage, and it's not clear to me if it's like a CIA letterhead document or they feel it's their equity. They may do that too. This is the part of the plan that is unclear to me as to how much coordination NARA will be doing and what they will be doing.

DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest, did you have anything further?

PROF. MAY: No, thank you.

DR. GOLDBERG: Let me remind you that the Moynihan Commission is the commission of protecting, reducing government security established by statute and has a two year life after its first meeting.
Lunch has been brought in and I suggest that we stop at this time for perhaps 45 minutes to an hour for lunch and then resume.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 12:45 p.m., this same day, Friday, February 23, 1996.)
DR. GOLDBERG: Earlier this morning I mentioned some areas of records that -- from which access is excluded by statute. One of those areas is prisoner of war -- some prisoner of war records. We have with us today a gentleman who is engaged in doing research in prisoner of war records who would like to make a few remarks on this subject. Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Thank you Dr. Goldberg. I am an independent POW-MIA researcher. I do research for a number of families, a number of missing relatives that were very possibly captured and not returned. The intelligence records that I'm speaking about are those such as the 500 (inaudible) records that were first said to have been destroyed, now find that they have been held at Arlington Hall and transported to INSCOM (ph), but INSCOM can't locate them.

The same is true of the Air Force 7602nd records that were previously held at Kelly Air Force Base. They disappeared too.

Now these are two organizational records that appropriately disappeared from any record group. And I found some 500 MI group records out in the National
Record Center, but they don't — they aren't the war
time records. They contain POW information and me
seeking a lot of the records through the FOIA, the DPMO
(ph) and OASD cannot identify these records as
existing. They have identified some customer copies at
the Library of Congress, but these don't come from the
original records section.

These are probably just an indication of
other records that may be missing too. There are a
group of records called the SAA (ph) daily summaries
that disappeared. They were known to exist. They
can't be FOIA'd; they can't be found; they can't be
located.

So if you're going to pursue research for
recent declassification of records, you can't exclude
those records that the DOD components haven't properly
identified and I believe you have to inquire the
components to seek these out, because if nobody's
concerned about an intelligence records group for a ten
year period of time, and these are still classified
secret and above, there's really an issue of — I'm
really concerned about intelligence records, first of
all, and what happens to the POW records when they
pertain to possibly living persons. The fact that they
are alive now doesn't matter because the records were
missing this year.

So I believe this has to be addressed before you can really continue any further in considering all the records that are now becoming declassified, you can't continue without considering those records that should exist and haven't been destroyed -- there's no record of destruction; they just can't be found. And intelligence records, I consider, as somewhat important, and I hope you do something to have DOD do a more serious search for these records.

DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. This is not the first instance in which records have turned up missing, and there are other -- have been other occasions when other records -- although I don't know of any on this scale -- in the past -- this large number -- a whole record group or a large portion of a record group missing.

I'd like to lend some more focus to this discussion and point out that one of the things that should come out of this meeting is the report on the meeting and whatever conclusions or recommendations or suggestions we have to make to higher authority.

And I'd like us to address our remarks then to what is it that we should include in this -- what are we prepared to include in a report at this time?
As a result of this meeting? What do we have to tell the Assistant Secretary for C3I, who presumably will then pass this report on up the line and also, presumably, out to other agencies of the Department of Defense? What are the things that you believe ought to be included in this report?

Now, perhaps one thing we might discuss initially and certainly within our purview is our reaction to the declassification plans as a beginning point. Do we want to say anything about some people are obviously dissatisfied with these plans, that they are not adequate, they don't answer the mail. What can and should we say on this subject, if anything?

PROF. LEFFLER: Oh, I think one of the things we should express is our concern that efforts are being primarily directed at achieving a 15 percent goal, rather than identifying and declassifying records that are generally regarded as highly important. And I would like to see some directive handed down that would instruct the agencies to focus some attention on the declassification of high level materials.

I also think that it would be desirable to -- to emphasize the need for the Secretary of Defense or somebody to allocate some additional resources to help implement the declassification of what articles -- what
we've heard here is that there's really no prospect of this being realistically implemented unless some resources are earmarked specifically for this purpose.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That's a good start.

Elliot.

PROF. COHEN: It just strikes me, looking at -- browsing through these -- some of them are not really plans at all, and some clearly have been more effort to get somebody else off their backs -- and I think it would be worthwhile to call attention to that fact, or to the kind of problems Mark identified, where, even if you do the arithmetic, people can't possibly achieve their goals.

And the problem I have with the 15 percent is that it's clear they're not going to get to 15 percent, and I think to the extent that we can force people to fact that and maybe light a fire under some of the -- or at least make uncomfortable some of the people who are drafting plans which are perfunctory, that would be a useful thing to do.

DR. GOLDBERG: They may get to 15 percent, it may not be the 15 percent you would like to see, but it is possible --

PROF. COHEN: Well, I mean if it really -- if they really do 15 percent a year for however long it
takes --

DR. GOLDBERG: The first year anyhow.

OBSERVER: The first year.

PROF. COHEN: Well, but I mean if they should be that successful --

DR. GOLDBERG: Jim Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Again, I'm concerned about what they can -- what the records are that (inaudible) declassification and how many resources are being devoted to automatic declassification effort? And in that regard, I would like some discussion or proposals simply to automatically declassify confidential records that include confidential history, thereby achieving these goals over the next five years with little or no declassification review effort.

DR. GOLDBERG: Reaction to that? Yes.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: Well, there is a problem with that. There's two kinds of confidential material. One kind is the stuff that was classified confidential when it was originated and that stuff is pretty much low risk stuff, maybe a candidate for bulk declassifying. But the other kind of confidential material is stuff that under the original group marking system was group 3, and downrated in 12 year intervals from top secret and is laying there in confidential
now. And there's very important stuff in there and that is probably not a candidate for bulk declassification by anybody. That's probably higher level stuff. You shouldn't assume it's going to be bulk

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's downgraded in intervals with -- couldn't it be declassified after that?

MR. S. GOLDBERG: No, that's group 4. Group 4 was automatically -- the next category is group 3, not automatically declassified, which means, at the end of at least 36 years or so, it needs to be looked at. It's not automatically. So you can't assume that everything that's confidential is junk.

MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval propulsion information -- you may remember that the bulk of the information --

DR. GOLDBERG: Beg your pardon?

MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval nuclear propulsion information is at (inaudible). Not subject to declassification.

MR. DAVIS: What I'm talking about is --

DR. GOLDBERG: It's exempted?

MR. BROWN: Yes.

MR. DAVIS: -- you're throwing out, for
example, the National Archives, utilizing the finding aids, if necessary a 135 as the keys of the archivist, identifying confidential entries in various record groups, and at the same time going out to the records center and reviewing the 135s and identifying confidential accessions. And then with respect to official histories, identifying those that are classified as confidential. Simply automatically declassifying them, and — and I don't say for example, in the records center you're going to find an accession that's classified as confidential that is the result of downgrading over the years. You might, you might not. But I think it would be a simple task to determine that versus going through whatever the records are that are currently in category 3 and what I imagine use an enormous number of resources required to do that sort of thing. This would simply free up the very limited resources available for the declassification review to focus in on records of greater interest.

DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Schauble.

MS. SCHAUBLE: That is kind of what we're doing right now in this year. The problem with that is that even in confidential files we are finding a lot of restricted data. You can't just say that because it's confidential you can let it go without looking at it.
I wish you could.

DR. GOLDBERG: Colonel.

COL. PONNWITZ: One comment on these plans --

I think we're going to have to be very careful if you're going to go back to the agency that originated it, to teak (ph) their plan without asking them specific questions regarding each plan that you're having difficulty with. Quantification of these numbers real or no, from the very offset, are based on estimates of the volume of material that's out there. We don't even have a number in DOD that's anywhere close to what we think the requirement is going to be.

As we go through our plans we will develop a better feel for the quantity of materials that are out there. So if it's quantity and numbers that we're hung up on, I don't think that now is the appropriate time to say that that's not right. If it's process and procedures, yes, let's critique that and say hey, you really haven't told us in the sense -- but I think it would -- should go plan by plan by plan, not just a generality to the superiors that says, hey, all these plans are no good, because there's not enough of an understanding of what is in these plans. There was no guidance given as to how these plans should be organized or what they should say in them. It was just
here's the Executive Order, tell us how you're going to implement it and how are you going to meet these targets. And I think that's what was attempted in each of these documents.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, this — yes, Bob.

DR. WAMPLER: One item that's already been kicked around is endorsing or in some way commenting upon the Presidential declassification plan. It seems like everyone was agreed that this is one good first cut as a possible test case for working through this.

DR. GOLDBERG: The Presidential Libraries?

DR. WAMPLER: The Presidential Libraries, yes.

DR. GOLDBERG: We've all agree on that.

DR. WAMPLER: From talking, during the lunch, I get the sense that there is a certain consensus perhaps among the historians that a lot of high level material they are very interested in are these record group 330, and that moving into them is going to have an impact on everybody else in this room, because of all the coordination problems involved.

DR. GOLDBERG: Eventually.

DR. WAMPLER: Eventually — well, but I mean in some way, whereas within each service there may be relatively much less high level policy information of
the type that we initially are interested in.

So the question is as a body, should we focus first
upon trying to develop priorities within record group
330, as that's in a way the most encompassing record
group, one which creates the most coordination
problems, and the one in which perhaps as a test case
we would get a very good sense immediately in terms of
feedback say, from the relevant agencies, and from
Frank in his office, of what are the real concrete
problems involved? If we say we would like to have
these -- say the list I put in, that list
chronologically, would be our first cut as an idea of
what a good sense of priorities would be. What does
this do to you, and try to get down to specifics to
deal with that. This is a learning curve, that's back
to this.

DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, I'd like to hold that to
a little bit later -- I'd like to get to that, that's
important, perhaps the core of what we're talking
about, reporting on, but I'd like to go through the
other items that we really should consider for a
possible report. And I'd like to dispose of them if
possible -- but what order.

So I still would like to get a sense of what
we ought to say with reference to the declassification
plans. I do think we ought to be careful in what we do say, obviously. A certain amount of effort was put into them, by the people who made the reports. They may not be all that they ought to be and we might undoubtedly want more, and this is what leads to, I think, the second point here, this need for more information which most of us, I think, have expressed at some time or other. That we want to know to a greater extent than we already know, what is there -- it's somewhere. We're not going to get any great detail, not in any reasonable period of time, but we can get a better notion of the essence of what is there and this could help us, I think, in determining priorities eventually.

So I think perhaps we ought to consider these things together -- we're talking about the declassification plans and the need for more information. Yes.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest that it seems to me that what the academic historical community are primarily interested in are papers in Presidential Libraries, OSD papers as they pertain to the Secretary of Defense's and his principal assistants, policy-making activities, and those Joint Staff -- JCS papers that have a similar focus.
It would seem -- first of all, I'm very uncomfortable with signing up to any criticism of anybody's declassification plan until the person who wrote that plan or who owns it comes and explains it. That's not -- speaking as a bureaucrat, I just don't do those things.

So I would think that it would be reasonable for this body to request that the people responsible for implementing the declassification plans for OSD papers, and the Joint Staff papers, come in next time and brief those plans as they -- as they exist, as they're implementing them. And to the degree that they can, be prepared to answer more detailed questions from particularly, the academic historians as to how -- if not the details of what are in the archives that they're talking about, at least the kinds of descriptive materials that would be available to the historian who had particular interests in those archives to pursue.

Once again -- I -- really -- I understand the academic historians concern, but I really am uncomfortable with an approach -- Professor Leffler, I think, has best characterized this approach that basically goes back to the archivist and says, sort of tell us in these important areas what you have. I
think if the historical profession really wants to know, then they're going to have to do part of the work, and that work is going to be involved -- and I think they have a right to expect the archivist to come and explain his collection as best he can, and how to get further information. But then if you want to get information to the degree that Bob Wampler has put it out here on the table, that involves some work by historians.

And that's just sort of my view of the way the world works. And I think it's sort of the official historian point of view of the way the world works. I hesitate to speak for my colleagues, but I think that's right.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I find that all the things that I've jotted down, talked about, form a seamless fabric here -- all related to each other because the next point I had was the need for liaison with the archivist, the declassifiers. It's going to help a great deal to know them and for them to know us when we want what they have and what they can do, and having perhaps come in and give a briefing to this panel would serve to establish a relationship which might be more difficult to get otherwise. How does that strike you?
PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Perfect.

DR. GOLDBERG: I like that. Any other reactions to that? From the panel? Yes.

MR. DAVIS: When you speak of archivists (inaudible), are you thinking of the archivists focus in on the records, still physically in their custody in the other DOD components? Again, with considerable effort, depending on the size of the records, you can get a fairly good idea of what the National Archives holds, much — generally a much more detailed idea of what's at the record center or record centers.

With respect to collections in the physical custody of DOD components, for the most part, the public has no information.

DR. GOLDBERG: Do you have any notion how extensive those are for the period prior to 1970?

MR. DAVIS: No, I don't. No I don't but — for example, in the Army declassification plan under the Army Intelligence and Security Command, holdings of approximately 7,000 feet are listed at some repository in Virginia, and no further information is given on the dates of those records, classification status, types of records. Are they all paper clipped — no, obviously not. What kind of records are there?

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, we're going to have to
take this step by step, aren't we?

MR. DAVIS: It's just -- I mean that -- for example, the repository, the public can't visit them -- I'm not talking about reviewing the records, but simply going out there and talking with a records manager -- something along those lines.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think we're going to have to start with the very large bodies which are already in the National Archives and in the federal records center, because I think that's the bulk of it all. If you're correct, there are some collections which are still held by agencies of DOD, most of them I would guess, are highly exempted records, and that's why they're being held, and it would take a lot of time, a lot of effort to get anything on them. I think it's some thing we should keep in mind and eventually get around to, but initially, I think we'll have our hands full if we deal with what's in our National Archives and record centers.

MR. DAVIS: For example, to inquire of what Office of the Secretary of Defense record before 1970, are still physically in the custody of OSD, where would somebody go?

DR. GOLDBERG: I don't think --

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: This is precisely the
sort of issue that we would want to talk with whoever is in charge of the OSD declassification effort. This is not anything we have to bring up in our report, but we simply want to talk with people in an unadversarial way about what their thinking is about how they're tackling the problem and -- and the issues that you raise will be brought up at that time.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

DR. DUDLEY: I would hesitate to accept the statement that seems to indict all the plans that are offered here as being inadequate, as Professor Cohen did.

PROF. COHEN: Excuse me, that's not what I said. I said some of these are perfunctory.

DR. DUDLEY: Well, then --

PROF. COHEN: I said some of them are very clearly not perfunctory.

DR. DUDLEY: Well, good, would you be willing to name the plans you consider to be perfunctory?

PROF. COHEN: I looked at this -- that paper -- but I'm sorry if I was misunderstood. I would be in favor of asking people from those organizations to come and talk to us about what they're planning on doing. We should ask them questions and I agree with Mr. Trachtenberg's -- a cordial conversation. But some
of them really just don't tell you anything except that we're going to declassify 20 percent a year, and that's highly implausible.

DR. DUDLEY: Okay, well, I just think if you have a list of things you consider to be perfunctory or inadequate, that should be passed to Mr. Goldberg. Then people can respond to it. Otherwise, you're going to have everybody come in here and explain their plan. Now, if that's what you want, if that's what everybody wants, fine. But I mean -- you simply made an allegation.

PROF. COHEN: I'm sorry if I was unclear but I believe you misunderstood me.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I don't think there is any necessity for us to pass judgement in a report of these plans. We may want to make some general remarks, and in particular we may want to say we would like to know more from some plans, or perhaps all of the plans, and we would like to establish some kind of relationship with these people, have them come before us, visit us, tell us what's there and find out how they can help us and what we would like to ask of them. I think that's reasonable in a report of this kind. I'm not looking to make criticism of individual plans.

DR. WAMPLER: Oh, yes, in terms of request
for information, if you're going to assume that these 15 or 20 percent tranches (ph) include not only category 3, but two and one, you want to know how they're planning on doing it over the next five years. You may find some things that we say we don't want to mess with this. You're getting to some of the things you want to look at perhaps in this material, but we want to get behind the numbers as Mel and Mark and others say, to find out, okay, what are you really planning on looking at in each year as part of an effort to get to this level of attainment within the plan.

DR. GOLDBERG: You should --

DR. WAMPLER: That's the sort of information we're talking about.

DR. GOLDBERG: You should feel at liberty to ask that. It's perfectly all right, although don't tell them there's some things you don't want them to mess with. You won't get a good reaction to that.

Tony?

MR. PASSARELLA: From what I'm hearing from everybody here, I think from everybody here, I think one of the most important things that you can put forward in your report here, evaluation scheme, is concern that enough resources have been allocated to
executing these plans. These can be wonderful plans, but if you don't have anybody to do it, then it's a waste of time.

I think that's probably one of the biggest keys to be successful in this declassification project, is having the people and the resources to do it.

DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me we have heard that theme somewhere before.

MR. PASSARELLA: It's probably the only major issue at this point.

DR. GOLDBERG: That's been brought home, I think, by others also. Yes.

OBSERVER: If I may just remark on one thing that Professor Leffler said and Professor Cohen added to it -- the first remarks out of the chute here this afternoon -- those comments, suggestions, recommendations, are addressed to the President of the United States. Nobody else can change what you suggest be changed.

DR. GOLDBERG: I'm just afraid I don't understand what you're --

OBSERVER: The problem is you can't change the 15 percent because that's in the Executive Order.

DR. GOLDBERG: We're not proposing to change it.
OBSERVER: But that's what his recommendation is.

PROF. LEFFLER: No, no. My concern is that -- that we try to declassify some of the important materials amongst that 15 percent, and that I think we should explicitly express our feelings on this committee that if we proceed or things proceed as they seem to be proceeding that high level material will not be declassified.

BG. ARMSTRONG: That's your conclusion. I don't think that conclusion -- I don't share that conclusion.

PROF. LEFFLER: Well, that's -- we can discuss whether the bulk of this committee shares that concern. I personally feel that.

COL. PONNWITZ: Right now we're doing an organized random declassification -- that's what I would call it. We have to abide by that 15 percent and we start -- we ask our archivist, you know, how are you going to do it? And they suggest they proceed in a certain way to get to the 15 percent. Obviously OSD's 15 percent will include more high level information than our 15 percent will.

The problem is -- and the difficulty is when you start trying to put that in a non-random order, in
a specific order, if you're not willing to dedicate the
resources that can alleviate the time it's going to take
or interruption to the process we've already
established, we're going to spend a lot of time talking
about it, but we're still going to have to continue on
meeting the requirements of the Executive Order.

So somehow we have to decide if there is a
need to focus our efforts in a certain way, if we can
do it in the least disruptive manner possible — you
can get with the archivist and tell them if you can do
this, do it in this order. If we can't do that, or
they come back and say I can't, this is the way I have
to do it, and you're not willing to put resources in to
give them aid in their efforts, then you're going to
have to be satisfied with their plans and the way
they're going to proceed.

Because as we found out with the Persian Gulf
War declassification effort, until considerable
resources were dedicated to that effort, to fulfill the
way DOD wanted to do it, none of us could comply with
the sense of urgency that it had.

And that's the same case here. We will
comply with our 15 percent, but if they're not
satisfied with the way we're going to do it, then find
a way to give us resources to change our approach.
DR. GOLDBERG: What will be the penalty if you don't achieve 15 percent?

COL. PONNWITZ: Well, there are no counting placement. If I tell you I have 4,000,000 records, I could have 10,000,000 records. You don't know that. If I tell you at the end of this year that I've achieved my 15 percent, you're not going to know that. Nobody is. And that's -- you know, the only time you're going to know that is at the end of the process if there's a lot of records still in a pile and everybody's saying hey, we met the requirement -- and I don't know if that's going to happen or not.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the question is if that happens, what is the consequences? I understand in the Executive Order you review or release but isn't there another option, like to totally exempt this review process for the records that are left over by the year 2000? I mean that's your out that people worry about as well. And then the services are going to have policy materials that are going to end up buried, backlogged with a lot of high sensitive material -- need to say, okay, we can't do it and there's a loophole in the Executive Order which lets us take it off the table. It may (inaudible), but it's an out in the Executive Order.
MR. HALL: In considering these 15 percent that you've declassified, any POW records were ordered declassified under the existing Executive Order 12810DDM (ph) so any records, groups found, or organizational records found that are POW records would have to be put into this priority. The deadline of November 1993 has been reached and the records haven't been declassified; they still fall under the urgency of that deadline. So if you resume your classification, I request that these records be considered in that first 15 percent as soon as they're located.

DR. GOLDBERG: So much for deadlines. We all know that a lot of these orders are much more observed in breach. Just because it's an Executive Order or a law does not mean that all the provisions are actually carried out on time. They may over time, but most programs fall behind, and I suspect that there's a fair chance that this one's going to fall behind too. Not the first year, perhaps later on. It's a very difficult undertaking -- an enormous undertaking, and if it does fall behind, I for one, will not be surprised. At the end of five years a very large quantity of classified documents have not been reviewed -- as I say, I will not be surprised.

On the other hand, I would hope that they
would not be the documents that we would like to see declassified. We don't know. It's going to be a mixed bag. It's going to vary from service to service, organization to organization. They all have their own priorities, their own limited resources and we have to expect a very varied result. Yes.

DR. WAMPLER: In terms of the recommendation on the resource issue, other than a pious exhortation to make more money available, what would the services and agencies like to see come out of here in terms of a recommendation for something that would come out of Perry's office, say? Is there anything that he could, if he could be persuaded, that would unleash resources that we could recommend?

DR. GOLDBERG: Well is that the $64,000 question?

DR. WAMPLER: Yes, what can we do in essence, to make a recommendation —

DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, what are some specifics? Let's recommend one thing that was discussed at lunch time as a possibility of using reserve officers and become active duty and help. This has been done before for a variety of purposes. These are not just — various periods of time; they would have to get up to speed; they would have to learn what it was all about
so that — to have them come in for two week periods
would not help very much. They would probably have to
come in for at least six months or more at a stretch.
But that's a possibility and I see no reason why we
shouldn't make that kind of suggestion. Here is one
way, perhaps, of stretching the resources. Now are
there others?

COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, it's beyond just
bringing more people on active duty. If we look at the
model that's been done for the Persian Gulf War
declassification, you have an executive agent assigned,
you have a facility that was developed, you had
resources, computers and people and reserve officers.
So depending on the magnitude of the problem and the
way you want to handle it, it almost requires —
particularly for the OSD records and the records that
are of the highest policy — that's where you need the
augmentation of personnel and equipment and a facility
dedicated to this process, and civilian personnel hired
too who are experts in this, to help you through that
queue faster.

For the rest of us, I don't know that we can
come up and say that we need X, Y, and Z and that you
would process it for us because we pretty much have our
plans established. I think we can meet them. But the
higher levels I think is where you need to focus the resources.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, Marines may be able to do it, but I don't doubt that the other services would be very glad to have some further assistance. Am I correct? I think the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force too for that matter. Yes?

MR. GRABOSKE: Well, in answer to Bob Wampler's comment let me suggest that Secretary Perry be asked to provide resources equivalent to what had been provided to the Gulf War declassification effort this year, which is roughly, I think, $10,000,000 — just this year. This is a much bigger program and many, many more agencies involved.

DR. WAMPLER: Well, would you want to clarify in some way right back to this program and say if you're going to do this program on a scale equivalent to what was provided to the Gulf War, it would come out to this figure and then try to shoot for something —

MR. GRABOSKE: Well, I never —

DR. WAMPLER: If it's reasonable.

MR. GRABOSKE: (inaudible) let's just say equivalent to Gulf War declassification which is $10,000,000 more than we have now, and we'll worry about Secretary Perry — I'll get those resources where
it's most appropriate.

DR. GOLDBERG: Clearly that's a first cut.

DR. DUDLEY: Yes, but if I could comment on comment on that.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

DR. DUDLEY: The $10,000,000 went somewhere, Fred, but it didn't come down to the services -- and if you're going to be specific about it -- the services had had to take that Gulf War declassification money out of hide, and so if you want this to be really effective, it has to be specifically appropriated for the services -- the agencies which are going to take part in this program, not an upper level board which absorbs all the money which is going to be appropriated to it. So that perhaps specific legislation has to be considered.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, perhaps we can agree and force the complaints of the services which are legitimate and make a recommendation that the resources currently allowed for the purpose are inadequate and that they should be substantially augmented, and that we recommend that this be brought to the attention of the OMB, White House, the Congress, that if they want the job done, the resources will have to be made available. Otherwise it will take a much longer time
probably, than already committed. Yes.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: Perhaps not only is this effort not being funded, but current contingency operations is reducing the budgets that are already funded, and a lot of these -- people told me -- they're only getting 60 percent of what they asked for this year because of contingency operations of Bosnia. So --

DR. GOLDBERG: So the special declassification projects are detracting from the overall one.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, just general DOD operations.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: It's operational. Yes.

Contingency operations in general.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes. Let me get back to something Bob said a little bit earlier that I wasn't aware of the concern that he expressed and that was a concern, particularly with the tough nuts, the Sec staff papers, the really tough declassification issues, if those things are shoved out to the end of the time period and then fall over the edge and by some trap door basically be beyond reach of this particular activity. It would seem to me that if that is a valid concern, which I assume it is, that it would be useful
to express that to — that this panel express that
care concern — that there ought to be some priority given
within these efforts to those particular kinds of
papers and it — Once again I think you
academic historians can do a fair job — Bob's done, I
think a fair job — with part of that in identifying
the kinds of papers and issues — the kinds of files
and issues that you're concerned about and that these
be raised to the Secretary of Defense and some
expressions be made that these be given priority
consideration within the declassification efforts of
each agency, and that each agency be asked to come back
and tell — or give an estimate of the consequences of
that.

Because it's entirely — it seems fair to me
that if you want particular things done and those
things are going to impact on how a particular agency,
whether it's OSD, the Joint Staffs or somebody else,
goes about implementing this Executive Order, that it's
fair to ask them to come back and tell you what the
cost is. And the cost may be that you only get 60
percent of the total job done. There is no free lunch
in this business. There just isn't.

And these guys — Bill Dudley and several
others have been more than eloquent and forthright in
what they're currently faced with and the resource
problems they have.

And I think, from a historian's point of
view, it's perfectly right to say this is the -- we
like this effort, but within this body of information,
this is what we really want. And then to have the
people who have do the work get it, come back and say
fine, if that's what you really want, this is going to
be the consequence for what you asked us to do by the
Executive Order.

DR. CLARKE: Can I comment on that? Not
being a historian, I'm really more interested in
records keeping -- in its existence and
declassification. So I have a security clearance and I
know that records are being dumped -- but I'm kind of
overloaded and I don't like to waste my time here and
your time. I'd like to see something more specific
come out of the meeting here and the whole committee.

I think what you need is -- to give to Dr.
Goldberg -- not now, but pretty shortly -- is what I
call an ice breaker or three icebreakers. You need to
give focus and legitimacy to our efforts, and you need
to get a little bit more narrow than that Dave, and
really get tight records groups and files within those
records groups, perhaps some exempted ones, that with
your expertise you really think are valuable and can
highlight those and say this is exactly -- there it is.
This is where it is. Just as a start, a foot in the
door. But something really concrete.

Now I have an advisory committee too and I've
got most of my academics -- academic historians. And I
do send them out over the country, voluntarily, of
course, and they lecture at West Point and they go down
(inaudible) to talk to reserves in Leavenworth; they go
out to MHI and talk to the war colleges -- those sorts
of things.

Now I know you've all been to the
Presidential Libraries and the National Archives,
haven't we all, but if you go there sometimes, even to
just drink a cup of coffee with the fellow who's there
as an official member of the committee -- now that kind
of rings a bell bureaucratically, and my report or my
committee report to the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief, when he sees -- he's actually beginning to see
that these guys are not guys that just come to
Washington, they've actually been there in their
official capacity to Carlisle -- I've been to Carlisle
unofficially many times to look at the records -- but --
and they talk to my people -- and they talk Army in
this case, but you can talk DOD or talk the records.
They talk the language and they justify these small things.

And yes, take a look at their suggestions, you know, a little bit more seriously than if they would maybe come to Washington for a couple days and have a little lunch — that does little work and my expense for me. And they pointed out, you know, a few things that really I should — maybe my people should concentrate on. They're not five percent, they're just maybe half of one percent of our total effort.

And when we do that also something else happens — some of these records are really — I hesitate to mention this — but they're really badly organized — and — especially at the upper levels and the Lord knows exactly what records groups some of them end up in. That effort — that focus can sometimes get the record management activity also in gear, because when you're organizing records for declassification, you often have to organize them for archival purposes too, and questions begin to be asked so there's more benefit than just declassification when you target, say, a small group of efforts — this office, and DOD, and this time period or this office and JCS — or these minutes at JCS.

And again, sometimes you have to — it helps
to have an archivist come in and give you a
presentation. But sometimes they get nervous and they
don't know who they're presenting to, especially if
there are other high officials there. And sometimes
if you can meet with them ahead of time just to call
them up on the phone and say hey, how you doing? My
name's Joe, I teach this, that and the other thing, and
I'm working on this and here's what I think some of the
guys are really interested in having you address when
you come to see us.

Then he can tell his boss or her boss, that
here, this is what they really want, you know, and I'll
try the official briefing and I'll (inaudible) -- and
you get a lot more valuable information that way
sometimes. It involves -- I dealt with the people I
work with -- it involves Ira or John Shire (ph) or some
of the people from Michigan and Pennsylvania and
actually getting out there and talking to the guys.
Even just a phone call sometimes -- or a visit if it's
close by, and that face to face type thing, and it
really does make a difference even though it may be a
pain in the ass to get there many times. But sometimes
when you go there as an official visitor, it just does
something. It helps out a lot.

And so what I'm saying now is I think we
should say that -- listen to these recommendations the committee's giving. We've all recommended that we ourselves come up ASAP with some really specific hard nosed suggestions that are really high priority, high visibility, but they're doable but aereal (ph), and perhaps someone could be even in the excepted categories in order to break some of those open -- not nuclear weapons, but some things that could be broken open a little bit anyhow.

But that involves actually, your doing a little bit of legwork and going out after the archives and talking to somebody about this -- sometimes that's -- you've got teaching; you've got meetings; you've got this, you've got that. You've got a lot of things to do.

DR. GOLDBERG: So you want to frighten all these members on the panel?

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think we're all on the same wavelength. I'm hearing the same sorts of things being said in all kinds of different ways. Maybe we could come back to your initial question which is how should the report be drafted, and I --

DR. GOLDBERG: I'm pleased that you're playing the role of mediator here. We need one.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes, how can all these
different things that we've been saying be pulled
together and pitched in a report? And I think
everybody has said start out with the resources
problem. The example of the Defense Nuclear Agency
report that I cited before can be cited because the
figures are so compelling, but not in the way that's
critical of the people who put it together. Because --
I liked it because I think these people being office.
The line we should take is these people have
been asked to square the circle, and what are they
supposed to do? They can't say this. But we can say
it. We're outsiders. Ideally the solution would be to
allocate many resources, but we have to be realistic,
and if in fact resources are going to be constrained,
this is our concern.
Our concern is that a rigid cap system, 15
percent a year, is going to lead people, for totally
understandable bureaucratic reasons, to focus on the
materials that are of least interest, to historians and
to the public as a whole. We understand that they're
constrained by the mandates of the Executive Order, but
we'd like that fact to be counter-balanced by a certain
amount of effort going into the high priority areas
that we've identified.
And then, kind of lay out what we propose to
do as a committee, in terms of talking to people in as informal a basis as possible, as cooperative basis as possible, getting a sense for the philosophy underlying the declassification programs, getting people to open up with us and discuss their problems with us in such a way that we can have some meaningful input into a solution here, and then stress the point about a pilot project, the -- focusing on the OSD, possibly taking Bob's suggestions -- have specific files. I think that would basically do the trick.

DR. GOLDBERG: It's a good, sympathetic approach. What we need, I think will need. I'd like to now have us address ourselves to two related elements which require prioritizing, namely, the organizations that we would like to put emphasis on -- and we've already mentioned some, the Presidential Libraries, OSD, JCS, because that's where most of the high policy materials are; and second, the subject areas related to those elements that we would like to see addressed by OSD, Presidential Libraries, et cetera.

One other thought occurred to me in this connection, then, is that perhaps if we are going to place priorities on these particular elements of DOD, we should also perhaps point out that they ought to be
given priority for resources also, if we're going to demand more of them than perhaps the other elements, at least for the time being, I would think for the first year or two possibly, and it could well take that long if not more. And their agencies are going to need the additional assistance to begin with.

The others may well need it later on, because presumably we will want to get similar subject areas allocated to the Offices of the Secretary of the Services, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps -- at least one office in the Marine Corps is concerned with policy. That sort of thing. They could come after, but if we are going to establish priorities by organization, then I think it's up to us to say this is what we would like to see done; we think that can be done if they are given some additional help.

I'd like you to address yourselves to that now. Are we pretty well agreed on the actual organizations to which we'd like to give priority? Yes.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: I was just going to say if you prioritize these organizations and just give them the additional resources, you know we've said that these organizations, these materials are going to take
the most coordination to get reviewed. And if the
services don't get additional resources that are going
to have to do the coordination on these materials, then
there's a little mismatch there. I think everybody
who's going to have to coordinate on these DOD
documents is going to need additional resources to get
that done, or you're just going to drain out what we
have to do on our own.

DR. GOLDBERG: Tony?

MR. PASSARELLA: Let me try to help you put
in perspective the resources issue. Last calendar
year, '95, the Department of Defense processed and
completed over 103,000 feet of information at request,
at a cost of possibly over $33,000,000. We're talking
here about a tremendously amount more of work than that
-- that 103,000. That's my great concern, because
we're going to fall on our faces here if we're not
emphasizing we've got to put the resources behind these
people who are working so hard to do this. If we
don't, it's not going to succeed, no matter how many
lists you give people, no matter how many plans are
prepared or whatever.

And we're talking, you know, $10,000,000 for
the Gulf War thing; another $33,000,000 for the Emquoia
(ph). I don't know even have the costs in for NPRs
I mean we're spending a lot of money declassifying information. This is so much bigger than anything we've ever done.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Tony, was that the entire Department of Defense -- 103,000?

MR. PASSARELLA: That's the entire Department of Defense.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay.

MR. PASSARELLA: That's just FOIA.

DR. WAMPLER: How does that break down between search and review? I mean what component of that --

MR. PASSARELLA: That's complete cost.

DR. WAMPLER: Yes, but what -- you're comparing it a little bit (inaudible) but research is --

MR. PASSARELLA: Not much is research. The most expensive is in review. The search problem is -- you come down here and you couldn't find it -- and that's --

DR. WAMPLER: Okay.

MR. BROWN: Another aspect to keep in mind -- we're talking DOD and the military departments of DOD agencies right now, but soon this will require coordination outside of the Department of Defense so
we've got to make sure that their priorities are the same priorities that we have, otherwise ours will impact on their staff.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Well it goes -- they go into a FOIA queue, which is a chronological queue.

OBSERVER: But there is no assurance that it would go into a FOIA-like queue. I mean there are no procedures for inter-agency coordination established at this point, and that's what Nancy Smith and I attended a meeting on a week ago -- this capture program. There's no procedure yet to assure that, you know, my stuff is really important, so it's going to go to the top of the pile, and I'm CIA.

BG. ARMSTRONG: There is a procedure but the procedure is it goes to the bottom of the queue. My stuff -- my history --

MR. PASSARELLA: With FOIA --

BG. ARMSTRONG: For FOIA, yes.

OBSERVER: I'm not talking about FOIA though -- this is an automatic inter-agency --

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, therefore we do want an effort about --

MR. S. GOLDBERG: They're also reviewing their records, so they're going to do their materials first before your coordination.
MR. PASSARELLA: So there needs to be a
government-wide procedure for processing the inter-
agency coordination.

DR. WAMPLER: I thought well, the inter-
agency commissions set up by the Executive Order is
supposed to try to facilitate that alignment of
priorities.

MR. PASSARELLA: As far as an issue, though,
if it isn't done well, you can end up with stalemate
because you're not getting things back.

OBSERVER: So that people outside the
government cannot establish priorities within 26 --

DR. WAMPLER: No, that's the real high one;
but I thought there was another lower one -- the one
that has each agency rep on it.

DR. GOLDBERG: Appeals -- that's an appeals --
- it's an appeals panel.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, they'll not get
involved with tying to establish --

DR. GOLDBERG: No, the other one -- council --
is the one that would be concerned with the means,
procedures. It's not in existence yet.

DR. WAMPLER: Well then, should we, as part
of our recommendations, point out the need to try to
address this on --
DR. GOLDBERG: On a broader scale --
government-wide.

DR. WAMPLER: Because it's going to affect
not just DOD but everyone. You kick theirs to the
bottom of the list because they're kicking yours to the
bottom of the list. Everybody slows down.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, of course you know, we
don't have to wait. I mean we might have to wait a
long time to the coordination. I've sometimes waited a
year or two to get the history cleared by NFC or State
or CIA. But there are many DOD records that can be
cleared, presumably, leaving those from outside
agencies to be done later. It complicates things, but
I mean if you already want to get anything out, that's
what you may have to do. Instead of waiting for
everybody, including everything. If you take a set of
files or a group, you may have to do it piece meal.
And I admit that's difficult, and it's complicated.

DR. CLARKE: If we don't get started, it
won't get done.

DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?

DR. CLARKE: If we don't start, it won't get
done.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, true. So I think
something we're going to have to face up to is that
this is going to be a long and involved and difficult
process. I think we can help. I think we get -- more
may get done as a result of what we do here during the
next few years that would have gotten done otherwise.
So to that extent, what we are doing can be useful, and
I'd like to see us continue.

Yes, we're going to have to make some very
general recommendations, but what I'm trying to talk
about now is the more specific ones. I think we're
agreed that we could report that we would like to see
emphasis placed on Presidential Libraries, OSD and JCS.
The question is do we want to suggest any subject areas
or clusters of subject areas. And I say suggest,
knowing we don't know a lot more than that at this
point. Do we want to be specific in that regard?
We've had a number of suggestions already made here
today. Do we want to say some thing concrete on this
subject and say we would like to see these particular
areas in particular looked at? Or given top priority
within OSD, Presidential Libraries, and so forth?

I think they would have to be linked to --
mention subject areas, you'd have to link them to
specific organizations, because I don't think you can
do it all the way across the board immediately.

PROF. MAY: Are you speaking of specific
subjects as the Presidential Libraries spoke of Eastern
Europe and --

DR. GOLDBERG: Even more specific, if

possible, yes. Correct.

PROF. MAY: How much more specific?

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, nuclear weapons

planning, well for instance.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest what the Java
tank for how she was going to do the Joint Chiefs of
Staff files. She has listed in there the files series
exemptions. And I realize that some of these things
are pretty general, but on the other hand, some of them
aren't. Here's a file thing: "Evaluation of plans for
the strategic air offensive". Now Elliot, that's your
bag. Do you want that kind of stuff?

PROF. COHEN: Sure.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay, fine. The historians
have to tell us that you know. That -- some other of
this stuff you probably don't care about. So --

PROF. COHEN: Well -- you're right, I guess.

The import of that, I think, for the panel is that you
do have to dig fairly deeply into each of these areas
before you can say anything that's meaningful. That's
why I trust a certain amount of frustration with some
of these plans because there isn't even that level of
detail. But I think -- you know, one advantage in
having a self-serving discussion with the Joint Staff
about what is in these files and what do the files look
like.

But I think the problem that poses for the
panel is that it means you do go through this piece
meal, but I don't really see how there's -- frankly,
there's that much that's general that we could say --
aside from everybody seems to agree that all of this is
under-resourced.

BG. ARMSTRONG: But -- Al had suggested
that -- and I agree with him -- I think that your
interest, at least initially, primarily focuses on high
policy. This tends to be found in three sets of
organizational records plus certain additional
positional records that reside in each of the services
record groups, and that taking some time to listen to
and having the people come in to you and tell you or
deputying someone like Bob to come and listen over
there where you can actually get into a holding area
and set down with the person who has the knowledge, go
through at this. It's some thing that I think is going
to be required. It's not required, you don't have to
do the same level for the Army, the Navy, the Marines
and the Air Force.
And I think that you also — when you're talking about going to the Secretary and talking about resources — I think that Al's suggestion that if you're going to focus initially on these kinds of records — initially, Mr. Secretary, we believe that the — while we acknowledge that every effort is under-resourced and under-funded, basically it's unfunded is another way of saying it because there's no additional funds — we believe that your priority if you choose to put in additional resources, which is what we recommend, should go to supporting these areas.

I understand the coordination problem, but I'll tell you, if you try to salami-slice out each of the — what is going to be a small pot of money, you may end up getting nothing. And I know — everybody would like to have money out of this, and it's a cinch I'm not going to get any money out of it. I know that.

COL. PONNWITZ: One area I'd like to comment on — I concur wholeheartedly with the priorities established through the organizations. The topics or subjects you pick are really going to have to be thought out well, because the product is not going to be a perfectly organized, catalogued, indexed, under classification product. When we get done, even though you may have searched your files and pulled out a
particular subject, references to that subject are buried everywhere, and in the end, you're going to have a whole lot of unclassified documents that aren't organized particularly well.

And that is where the challenge is going to be to the user, to make sense of all this and put it together in some meaningful way that you can derive conclusions and interact things that aren't interacted right now and won't be when you get the product.

So I think we have to be very careful when we say we want specific information focused to this subject, realize you're not going to get all of it; you're going to get some of it and be patient for the rest because we won't know where it is until we're all done through the declassification process, if then.

DR. GOLDBERG: The rule is that with the exception of JCS, the higher the level, the more poorly organized the files -- and I speak quite seriously in saying this from personal experience. The higher the level, the more difficult it really will be to use the files and get the information for this purpose of declassification -- the more diffused they are.

But it's another one of the problems -- there are very many -- that we face in attacking this problem, and I think we do have to attack it.
The question still remains, do we want to specify any particular subject areas in connection with the top level organizations that we've identified, and I think agreed on. I believe there's a consensus on the organizations that ought to receive emphasis initially. Now do we want to go beyond that and see if we would like -- we suggest, we recommend that priority be given to -- for example, like the pilot project -- to these particular areas?

DR. WAMPLER: Well, I think that would have to be gauged in terms of this list that Dave Armstrong pointed to, otherwise you're telling the archivist to go search your stuff.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's a question of how much --

DR. WAMPLER: Well we also don't know how many boxes or files --

DR. GOLDBERG: No, I'm not talking about the amount of files -- how many items we want to include in our request? I mean we can -- this is an initial effort. This is the first time. We don't want to overwhelm anybody. What we're really, I think, ought to be doing is giving an indication of the things that we'll probably be interested in.

DR. WAMPLER: Okay, then I would state it in
terms of saying -- if we want to buy the list like that
-- saying this is our sense of our top ten issues, and
we will be guided by this general sense of priorities
in making further recommendations about individual
accessions and files -- to indicate that that's sort of
the map or the guidelines we're following. I -- I
don't see any point beyond that in developing a list of
subjects to turn in.

BG. ARMSTRONG: The problem with that --
Walter you're the guy who knows the files I would worry
about. If you list an issue, and you're talking about
the JCS files, that may or may not cut across whole
sets of files, and you really have to say guys, --
specificity is just required here, and specificity
means work, and it means specific work.

DR. GOLDBERG: But is it required --

OBSERVER: -- definitely, very definitely
have to key it into the wording of the JCS files --
there's no other way to do it.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but we don't have to do
it in this report. We can do it directly with the
organizations involved, it's the way it ought to be
done. We give them to top-level general items. And
then we specify to them, and not necessarily in this
report.
DR. WAMPLER: Okay, so you say you want nuclear weapons, strategic plans and operations, Korean War, Viet Nam War, NEDRNE (ph) -- and you know, alliance relations -- I mean, you know, you kick them off and you say these are the things that really interest us.

DR. GOLDBERG: That's right, -- and we will --

DR. WAMPLER: Pursue this sense of priorities in making your further decisions.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I sense that this is not an issue. We don't have to put it in the report, if you want to have something just very general, go ahead and do it. It doesn't mean anything. We -- it's been clear enough from our discussion today the general sorts of issues that we place -- we consider to be most important. There have been representatives from OSD, JCS who are actually going to be doing this work, heard this. If they want to fine tune their understanding of our thinking, you do this in the process of conversation. It just emerges naturally.

DR. WAMPLER: No, what I'm thinking -- correct me if I'm wrong Dr. Goldberg, but you want to give these people a sense that not only are we making recommendations, we have a rationale for our recommendations.
DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, of course.

DR. WAMPLER: I mean that we're not just picking these things out of thin air and saying we'd like to see this, we'd like to see this and we'd like to see this. But we chose these with priorities in mind.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Is there any doubt?

DR. WAMPLER: Well, there might be. Might be.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, then, let the people who have the doubts express them. But -- but the important thing is that the people doing the actual declassification work and to the extent that they're interested in our thinking can ask what our thinking is to factor into their own work process.

MR. HALL: Can I request again the POW information be requested and put on that list because as it stands all wars, including the Korean War, up to and including the present -- so it isn't listed -- isn't limited to any one record. And I'm speaking not just for myself but for different organizations, the National Alliance of Families and a number of family members -- they would very much like to have you consider this a priority. It's more than a few individual interests. It's a large (inaudible)
MS. SCHAUBLE: I would like to say from the point of view of efficiency and process, you really have to work the way the records are organized. If you try to get too specific on topics, people are going to jump from one place to another in the records and you're never really going to get anything done as a whole. I have to work on a series -- a record series basis in order to work efficiently.

JCS records may be organized differently so that it makes sense there to work on a topical basis. But you're going to have to look at the way each organization's records are organized in order to decide what is the most efficient way to tackle those records, because I'm sure we don't want to make recommendations to an organization that's actually in a way that's going to impede their efforts as opposed to expediting it.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the Executive Order -- the clients do talk in topical areas, but I've been skeptical of that also. I don't think we will or we should give very specific lists in this kind of report. If we're going to do that, we would do it directly in dealing with the agencies involved. Here, I think, what to do is to give the people whom we send this
report the notion of what we consider the important
things that we would like to see addressed, and we can
list some of those. This is the sort of thing we think
ought to be emphasized. In dealing with agencies
directly we will -- we will specify more precisely what
it is we're interested in. I think that would serve
the purpose.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: This is a quarterly panel
meeting. The next meeting is scheduled for May. I
think -- I don't see why you have to bite off too much
at this first meeting. I think talking about the
resource problem, the coordination problem, trying to
emphasize a higher level OSD, JCS, Presidential thing,
is enough. I don't see where you really need to get
into the details of specific documents first. Let's
crush on these issues first --

DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about
specific — MR. S. GOLDBERG: -- for two or
three months.

DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about
specific documents, obviously.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: This discussion --
DR. GOLDBERG: We're talking in general
areas. Ernest?

PROF. MAY: Well, it seems to me you can take
three topics. You can take the two that were
identified for the Presidential Libraries because they
have already set aside documents in those areas and
they're represented what the problems are for us --
endorse their effort -- they've taken the lead in. The
Assistant Secretary at the Department has asked to
further that effort, assist in that effort -- you urge
that they do so -- that seems to me to make sense.

Then, there's an argument for choosing one
other subject and I think you in fact nailed it --
subject familiar to us, the U.S./Soviet Strategic
Nuclear Competition, because -- for a different reason.
Not because it's been identified and because they're
well on the way, but because it provides, I think as
good a test as you can get of the exempted categories.
Every one of these except the one for the protection of
the president and the vice president.

And that seems to me -- and I've had a
disturbing sense throughout our discussion that part of
what we ought to be about has been neglected, because
we have been tending to think about this in terms of
what scholars want in their queue of interest, but if I
understand the intent of the Executive Order, it is to
serve that interest, but over a period -- not
immediately, but over the five year period, but with an
outcome, if it works, in which the number of exempted
documents at the end of the five year period is reduced
to its minimum. And it is defensible in these terms,
in terms of -- with most of these being conditioned up,
think seriously and demonstrably -- those modifiers are
there.

So it seems to me to be important at this
stage to find out how hard it is to identify those
things that you want to have exempt at the end and to
try to ease the process that everything else looks --
so you know how to identify and find the things that
need to be kept classified.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think that using
Presidential Libraries' plan would be a good handle for
moving into OSD and JCS. They do specify the areas.
We could add another one. We might be well advised to
confine ourselves to a limited number of that sort --
and say this is just a beginning; these are examples or
instances of the direction in which we should be going.
We will have some more to recommend in the future.

COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, I'd like to add one
comment, if I may. I concur whole heartedly with
Professor May's comment. I would ask that you put one
caveat in there to you know, satisfy the concerns
regarding the POWs that since this POW issue is so
significant, and since obviously some records have been
missing over time, that in your declassification search
if you find any reference to POWs that it be
highlighted and segregated so that those leads can be
followed. Not necessarily focus the search to POWs,
but as you do your declassification if you find
material that obviously might have been missing or was
neglected before that it be highlighted.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That may be
possible.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: That sort of effort is
happening within the DOD at all times. The CPMO people
are coming at all of us asking do you have any more --
have you found any more POW stuff, and you know, when
we find it we tell them and it proceeds through --

COL. PONNWITZ: And all I'm asking is that --
that you reemphasize that here in this report.

BG. ARMSTRONG: One thing I think might -- I
think should be done and that is, you're going to
address the issue of resources, and you're also going
to address the fact that the historical community has
certain interests that it wishes to highlight and it
wishes to have influence the declassification efforts
of the agencies. I think you ought to also acknowledge
that the degree to which those interests change the
declassification efforts that have originally been planned, they may in fact, without additional resources -- they will influence how the declassification process goes and they may well either delay it or result in additional costs. Because every time -- every time you change something or make it more specific, you make it more effective for the historian, but you may well make it less efficient for the declassifier.

PROF. MAY: What I was suggesting actually was not -- that that not be done. You have the two topics which have been chosen by the Presidential Libraries. They already --

BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

PROF. MAY: -- but that's a -- it's not our desire to have Viet Nam, Eastern Europe --

BG. ARMSTRONG: I thought you were going to extend those into OSD and JCS records.

PROF. MAY: I would start with the Presidential Libraries.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Oh, okay.

PROF. MAY: The records are OSD. That's part of their problem is getting the coordination and I suggested that you add one other, not for the historian interest in it, but to pass a test of how you apply the exemptions and how you -- that seems to me to be the
hardest thing is to figure out how you determine what needs to be -- remain classified at the end of five years. And we ought to suggest what we can to help that. And I think if we take something hard and help test how much it would cost.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, if you take something hard, you're going to expend a lot of effort doing that, and that's going to have costs for how you execute the overall program. That's the point I'm trying to make.

DR. WAMPLER: But I think it's important. Say you take nuclear -- or the nuclear competition, and one of the things we ask for in terms of briefing and liaison is say, under your existing plans, how do your plans address the review of these issues? Okay. That gives you your baseline. If you want to fiddle with it, then you start feeling out the increased costs that you're concerned about, but in some way you're just trying to get some idea of the contours.

I mean I'm assuming that under whatever plan you've got, in each yearly tranche, that is further disaggregated down into category 1, 2, and 3 -- and maybe 3's finally getting smaller and the other two groups growing in size as a portion of the overall part. How is that happening? How are our priorities
being reflected in your existing plans and how do we evaluate that so that we have a sense of what it costs for the recommendations that we've made? Because we're making them just in a vacuum.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that's right, but that's going to require agencies to come and tell you --

DR. WAMPLER: Or -- I think we should have some ongoing connection between now and May, not just have this stop and then pick up again three months from now.

PROF. LEFFLER: I worry about the emphasis on the nuclear competition issue. If you recall, Nancy specifically said that they had identified things that they believe could be easily declassified, and that was one of their benchmark criteria. She also said that she would be equally happy with a different approach and just go to one or two libraries and just try to cover those libraries completely for all issues.

My sense is that focusing on an issue like the strategic nuclear competition is going to absorb so many resources because they're the most sensitive issues of all, that there's going to be a huge part of the academic community which is not interested in that, but interested in all sorts of other policy issues which will get nothing, while tremendous amounts of
resources are focused on this very specific issue.

Keeping in mind also that this committee is really weighted very heavily amongst the academic people, the people that are particularly interested in the strategic issue, and it may -- we may be regarded very negatively for us to focus specifically on that issue which is clearly the interest of most of the people on this committee, and not the larger interest, speaking of the whole academic area.

DR. GOLDBERG: But there are other subjects you were going to propose that incur in your interest also and that will also take --

PROF. LEFFLER: No, I -- I --

DR. GOLDBERG: -- a lot of time.

PROF. LEFFLER: I don't believe frankly, -- my own view is that we should not identify specific subjects at this time. Having used enormous amounts of resources, I very much share the view that the easiest way to go through and really get things accomplished is by taking categories of records, perhaps just the way you enumerated them Bob, on your list for example. If you really want to get something accomplished quickly, you identify the categories of high level, like you did for the OSD records, and have them go through those systematically for all the issues that may fall within
Now, if your own interests -- and most of our interests are in atomic and strategic things -- are immediately covered when you say RG330, Assistant Secretary for Atomic Affairs. You're going to get a lot of stuff in that and it will be done very systematically. You go through ISA, you're going to get a lot of other things.

So I would say -- my suggestion is we even try not to do too much today -- I agree with you, Sheldon, very -- that we have identified high level things that we want to regard, and that we begin next time with a specific focus on OSD, RG330 and in discussing it in some detail, we make a decision. Do we want to go through it -- through these file numbers like you identified? Or do we alternatively want to go through it by identifying certain subjects?

But I also think that focusing or putting a statement in about the Presidential Libraries, like you said, Ernie, is extremely on target. That they've done the work -- and we all know it's high level -- let them go ahead and try to do that and begin to allocate resources for them.

DR. WAMPLER: But I think what we were discussing was not making suggestion that they focus,
but saying, these are our primary interests. If you're going to arrange briefings, that gives them a way to focus their briefings. To come in and say, okay, these are the real hard nuts to crack, that you indicate an interest in; these are the problems involved; these are the costs involved -- which gives us some more data upon which we can then make our recommendations.

We know more about the universe we're working in other than our own scholarly interests, more about what it means on the other side, and if you pick the hardest one -- nuclear, if you want to go into intelligence, it may even be harder in some ways -- you've got to figure that other things are going to be less difficult than that and you can then factor back from that by using your worse case to get a sense of just what the problems are. And you're just using that as a way of structuring the briefings in your initial communication with these people, not as just a way of saying this is what we think you should focus on.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Why not leave the structure of the briefings up to them? Because you're saying this is what we're interested in, you're saying, speak to this specifically and it's distorting the structure of the briefing. Just let -- let them -- they're the ones that have to do this whole
declassification project. Let's let them do the -- lay out what their thinking is, their whole philosophy of approaching it. If they have problems --

DR. WAMPLER: But shouldn't we lay out questions we'd like to have answered, rather than have them come here to air a briefing and then discover that they're not prepared to answer the questions we're interested in.

PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think maybe the people who actually do this can answer this. What do you want from us? What do you want from us? Do you want specific questions that we -- you do? What -- questions of what nature?

MR. BROWN: We have submitted plans for declassification --

DR. GOLDBERG: Can you speak up, please?

MR. BROWN: -- following guidelines that were laid out by Steve Garfinkle when he gave us guidelines for agency declassification. And we followed them. And that's what we reported in our plan. And those plans were then approved by Steve Garfinkle, which was the requirement, that Steve Garfinkle approve those plans. He did.

Now if there's a problem with those plans, or we need to put something else in those plans, I don't
want to keep coming in and taking an essay test and
getting an F. I want to know what it is you want to
know.

PROF. COHEN: Then isn't the solution then
that we ask to be briefed on declassification plans?

DR. GOLDBERG: That's one of the things we're
talking about, yes.

PROF. COHEN: And then you have -- I don't
think people are disagreeing as much as it may sound.
If you have a briefing on the declassification plans,
then you have a conversation basis.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, in asking for a
briefing, I think it probably would be desirable to ask
for some thing conditional that may not be there, to
give us more of an idea of the kinds of things that
they have that we might get at, and even in terms of
some specifics. What sort of things do you have on
this subject? Or this subject?

PROF. COHEN: Well, I don't think --

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, some may be prepared on
their own and others may not be --

PROF. COHEN: Well, if you asked to be
briefed on the declassification plan, they wouldn't
submit, you know, here's a list of the major -- certain
files that we have --
DR. GOLDBERG: Not necessarily, no. Some might and others might not, that's why you want to give them some guidance at least, but I sense from this discussion that perhaps we need to give some more thought and some more attention to whether we do want to specify any areas, any topics, subjects, whatever.

We might be well advised for the time being, to confine ourselves to saying that we think that emphasis ought to be placed on these particular offices -- the Presidential Libraries, OSD, JCS. We think that in order for this to be done, because these are the places where the most important and many of the most sensitive materials are, in order for this to be accomplished additional resources are needed. Now we think that the most serious consideration ought to be given at the highest levels to provide additional resources to these agencies in order to do this.

We would like, in the future, perhaps in the near future, to provide some further thoughts on the subject of how they might go about this. The particular areas of greatest interest and importance to the public perhaps ought to be addressed in some order of priority. We're going to give it some more thought, and in the future, we would like to provide this kind of material information.
Does that strike you as a reasonable approach?

DR. WAMPLER: As a way of being even more concrete, say on the basis of the Fowler series exceptions on the JCS --

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

DR. WAMPLER: Can they very quickly give you a little mark to the side saying second year, third year, fourth year? When they get at these? I mean that at least would --

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, can't we get that directly from them instead --

DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to answer.

DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?

DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to answer.

DR. GOLDBERG: Sure and that's --

DR. WAMPLER: That's -- I would tell you --

DR. GOLDBERG: That's what we would have to do with them directly. It would not be part of this report.

DR. WAMPLER: No.

DR. GOLDBERG: Part of this report we would say, we look forward to having briefings, of having
direct connections with all of these organizations or
working with them to achieve the goals which we had in
mind.

BG. ARMSTRONG: I think it would be fair, if
you want a JCS briefing, if before you get that
briefing, you go through their plan and you tick off --
first of all, you tick off questions like Bob has --
when are you going to get to this stuff? The second
thing you tick off is okay, looking at all these pages
of things, I'm interested in -- and maybe each
scholar's interested in this general subject area could
list four or five of these that he particularly wants
to know what's in there.

You're not going to get him to come in and
tell you what's in -- in any sort of detail -- in every
one of these exemptions. But if you have a particular
interest in how Joe Stalin was going to go up in a
mushroom cloud in 1952, then you go in there, you find
where that is or is likely to be in these exemptions,
and you ask them to talk about it as best they can,
defining aids that define that particular file.

But you've got to ask them in advance. You
don't -- you're not going to get a GS-13 over here --
you might get a 15 that could tell you that, but you're
never going to get a 13, and the 15 works for
Passarelli, he doesn't want --

PROF. COHEN: You can do that on the basis of the information of the Joint Chiefs --

BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

PROF. COHEN: Some of these --

BG. ARMSTRONG: Sure.

PROF. COHEN: -- you don't have enough information to do that.

BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, you know SAC -- I mean Curtis Lemay.

DR. GOLDBERG: Would it be useful to have members of the panel specialize in one declassification plan or another so that somebody has some responsibility in some special interests in a particular area, JCS, OSD policy or some of the others, and would be prepared to interact with the representatives of that agency in a knowledgeable way? Otherwise we might well diffuse our efforts and talk around the subject instead of getting to the heart of it? Perhaps we can work that out with you individually to see which particular declassification plans you would be prepared to undertake.

MR. DAVIS: Talking about a few of the category 1 or 2 records, what is everybody thinking of with respect to the type of ordinary, systematic review
without redaction or some sort of declassification review with redaction? Of course that impacts greatly on the resource question.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

MR. GRABOSKE: This is to be a non-redaction review. It's up or down -- you're going to look at it. A document's going to be up or down; a series is going to be up or down -- not (inaudible) shakedown. There's no time or resources for that.

MR. DAVIS: That I think is -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- but I think that will save greatly on the amount of time (inaudible) document. I would ask that whenever a document is pulled, because this has been a problem, that some sort of adequate description of the document be placed on a pull card and the pull card is inserted in the files. And that may appear at a first glance to be very technical matter, but if information, for example, the author of the document, the date of the document, the recipients of the document, an unclassified subject line -- if information of that nature isn't on a pull card, you folks who work in the declassification area often get a lot of unnecessary FOIAs and NPRs.

DR. GOLDBERG: That means you have to ask for still additional resources.
DR. WAMPLER: But NARA does that when they process these --

MR. DAVIS: That's standard procedure.

DR. WAMPLER: Yes.

DR. GOLDBERG: Alright.

DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes there's information, for example, on the contents of the document on the pull card, and sometimes there's not.

MR. DAVIS: Well sometimes they classify the title.

DR. WAMPLER: Pardon?

MR. DAVIS: Sometimes they classify the title.

DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes it's a classified subject in these documents, but oftentimes -- even though it's a TRSD (ph) document, it's an unclassified subject.

MR. S. GOLDBERG: Sometimes it's not.

MR. DAVIS: Sometimes it's not, but when it's not, all I'm asking is that -- as an example that unclassified subject line be placed on the pull card. So the people in subsequent years can make an informed decision on whether they're going to include it in the FOIA or the NPR.

MS. SCHAUBLE: It's mostly the documents we
get are not portion marked, we can't always tell how much information we can put on these withdrawal cards without going over into unclassified areas.

MR. DAVIS: Well, at a minimum we could ask that if there's an unclassified subject line on the document that please place it on the pull card.

PROF. MAY: We could endorse that. We would also endorse the principle of the specific basis for the exemption being there -- not the general, but it is one of the exempt categories.

DR. GOLDBERG: Which of the specific?

PROF. MAY: For example, there certainly is some form of restrictive data that low classification that (inaudible) by; but there is on the other hand, top secret restrictive data that is known to every physicist in the world.

DR. GOLDBERG: Such as how to make a bomb.

PROF. MAY: There's a lot of stuff and if we know that, then it's possible -- you're not going to know that or probably the people who are making the choices and block the matter out, but there might be some way in which the laboratory or other committee that reviews this stuff -- I don't know which things they ought to look at -- label that this is exempted -- exempted under the nuclear weapons provision.
DR. GOLDBERG: Well, this is the kind of subject that we should deal with when we have representatives of the agencies and offices up here to talk with us. With reference to our report, I think we've got a pretty fair idea of what we're going to include in it and what we should not include. I suggest that the probably procedure ought to be to draft such a report and send it out to members of the panel for their review and comment. On the basis of that, prepare a final report of which you'll also receive a copy and submit that to Secretary Page.

I think we have a long way to go here before we can make more specific suggestions that I think have been agreed on for inclusion in this report — this first report. This is a first report. It seems to me that it ought to be in general terms. I think we have highlighted the specific instances or specific items that we think ought to be included in it, namely the need for more resources to see to it that something effective comes out of all this; the desire of the panel for more information to be gotten initially directly from representatives of the services and some of the agencies appearing here at our next meeting perhaps and giving us this kind of information; the — where we'd like to see the emphasis placed, the
particularly offices which we've already mentioned several times that ought to have priority.

I think that would probably be sufficient for our first -- that in the future we would like to go beyond this; take some additional steps; to specify areas that we think ought to be given priority for declassification. And beyond that, perhaps specify particular files, series, that ought to be given priority if we -- if and how we can determine it from the declassification plans.

Now, what more would you like to see included in this report? Sounds good. If that satisfies you, if you think that's enough for an initial step, then that's how we will proceed. We'll draft a report, see that you get a copy of it. Make your comments into consideration and send out the final. We will -- I'll try to homogenize it to everybody's satisfaction -- possibility, of course, but I will try, and I hope that you will give me your best thoughts on the subject.

Language can sometimes be important in a report of this kind and you can help improve both language and the thought, it would be very much appreciated.

Is there anything else anyone would like to bring up?

MR. BROWN: (inaudible) member of the panel
in the meeting here to come over to the Navy Yard and
sit down and talk to us, give you some insight to the
Navy declassification plan. Sit down and talk with us
about elements of the plan.

DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think something we can
do for the panel members is probably give you a list of
the people in the services and the other agencies who
are concerned, who are responsible for the
declassification security. That might help if you want
to make any further connections with them. I think we
can do that, can't we? Yes. Alright, if there's
nothing else, we stand adjourned. Thank you.

(whereupon, at 3:00 p.m. the meeting in the
above captioned matter was concluded.)
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before: DEPT. OF DEFENSE

In the Matter of: ADVISORY PANEL
DOD HISTORICAL RECORDS
DECLASSIFICATION

were held as herein appears and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Department, Commission, Administrative Law Judge or the Agency.

Official Reporter.

Dated: FEBRUARY 23, 1996

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS
(301) 565-0064