DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE US GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

THESIS

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IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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Amy M. Dayon
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Abstract

After the Cold War ended, two major changes occurred as the world began to restructure its boundaries and forms of government. First, there was a rapid increase in the number of people throughout the world which required some form of humanitarian assistance to survive. Second, technology, manpower, and money allowed for an increase in the world’s capability to respond to a humanitarian crisis. As the media increased the world’s awareness of humanitarian problems the United Nations, donor governments, and non-governmental organizations began to provide a larger quantity of relief through a more structured system.

The purpose of this thesis is to define the relationships of the three major groups responsible for providing humanitarian assistance in the world today. The methods and structure of the US government, UN and three non-governmental organizations (International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins sans Frontieres, and Catholic Relief Services) are used as examples of the international humanitarian relief system. This system is rapidly improving as experience and education in providing humanitarian assistance increases. This study is meant to show the strengths and limitations of each group and coordination problems among them. A better understanding of the international humanitarian relief system should lead to a well defined role and therefore increased utilization of the US military in providing humanitarian assistance.
DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE US GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. Introduction

Overview

A time of world peace was expected once the Cold War ended, but instead there has been an increase in national, ethnic and religious conflicts. These conflicts are spreading uncontrollably through the world's poorest and most deprived regions. The ancient prejudices and resentments are fueled by an endless cycle of poverty, hunger, despair and violence (Eliasson, 1993:308). The results of these conflicts are refugees, famine, and many forms of human rights violations.

The victims of both human and natural disaster should receive humanitarian assistance from the international community (Albright, 1993:845). The size and depth of the assistance needed throughout the world is overwhelming. There are more than one billion people suffering from poverty, 500 million are undernourished, and 50 million suffer from famine. The United Nations Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs estimates there are 17 million refugees and another 23 million people displaced within their country in the year 1992 (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1993:36). In response to the growing need for humanitarian assistance from the international community, the United Nations Security Council has published resolutions defining the legal right to humanitarian relief and the link between human rights protection and international peace and security (DeMars 1994:1).

Although the victims have a need for humanitarian relief, there is no international law to define or enforce who is specifically obligated to provide this type of assistance and
to what extent it should be rendered. Currently, many different organizations, both international and local, respond to relieve human suffering. The three major groups to respond are donor governments, the United Nations (UN), and various private organizations labeled non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The responses vary between the groups and situations, but in general, food, supplies, medical attention, and protection are provided. The three major groups consider themselves independent from each other, and this is seen in their different reasons for offering assistance, methods for providing relief, and expected outcomes. However, the magnitude of effort needed often forces the three groups to work together.

**Problem Statement**

The US government, the United Nations, and independent non-governmental organizations are currently leading the international community with their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, but the international relief system lacks the effectiveness it could obtain with good working relationships among the groups. The US military has become a major avenue of US support of humanitarian assistance because of its ability to provide protection, logistics, and trained personnel. However, the efforts of the US military are limited by the organizational relationships of the US government, the UN and NGOs. An explanation of each individual group’s requirements and expectations of the other groups is needed to better coordinate the humanitarian relief effort. This will extend the efficient use of the US military and improve the capability of the international community to respond to both natural and man-made disasters.

**Research Objectives**

This thesis describes the methods used by the US government, the UN, and several non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance for both man-made
and natural disaster outside the US. Research through literature review and interviews with members of the different groups will be used to define the relationships among the groups in their efforts to provide a international humanitarian response. An examination of these relationships along with a description of each groups limitations and strong points should show areas where improvements in coordination efforts can be applied. The research is based on the following investigative questions:

1. What are the individual goals of each of the three major groups providing humanitarian assistance?

2. What organizational structure and processes do they use to accomplish these goals?

3. What are the methods and obstacles to coordination among the three groups?

4. What are the working relationships and shared responsibilities between the three groups?

5. How will the US military benefit directly from an improved coordination of the humanitarian assistance effort?
II. Background

Introduction

The US government, the United Nations, and independent non-governmental organizations are currently leading the international community with their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However, their efforts are hindered by their relationships to one another and a lack of coordinated effort. This chapter defines humanitarian assistance and explains the background and structure of the three major participating organizations. It begins with a definition of humanitarian assistance and an explanation of the importance of a combined international effort. The US government, the UN, and the NGOs are then described in terms of their history and criteria for implementing humanitarian assistance. Finally, the strengths and limitations of each group’s individual efforts are specified to better understand the differences which make coordination difficult.

Definition of Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance is defined by Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations as:

The programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 1994:1-1)

The US government, the UN, and NGOs are the three major players in providing large scale humanitarian assistance in today’s international community. Their historic involvement in humanitarian relief missions, methods of offering assistance, and expected results sometimes differ, but their general purpose of providing relief to the suffering is the same. Although each group defends its need for independence, the three organizations are intertwined through the nature of humanitarian assistance. By coordinating each group’s
effort, humanitarian assistance can become a more effective activity that can assist more people through an efficient process.

**The United States Government**

Many foreign governments, such as Germany and France, provide humanitarian assistance, but none donates money and physical property to the same extent as the United States (Weiss 1994:153). The US is heavily tied into humanitarian efforts for three reasons. First, the US has become a major intermediary in any form of international conflict because we have the means to be influential both monetarily and physically. Since many of the man-made disasters which require humanitarian assistance are the result of some form of foreign conflict, the US is expected to take political and humanitarian action to end suffering by virtue of its strength and influence. Second, the media have increased public awareness of the suffering caused by civil war and disasters. The people of the US respond to the media by offering donations and influencing the government to take action. Finally, the US is often considered the determining factor in meaningful action taken by the UN because of its influence in the Security Council and monetary support (Weiss 1994:153).

Both man-made and natural disasters world-wide receive humanitarian assistance from the US. In a natural disaster there are few criteria for US humanitarian assistance, but in a man-made disaster there is often armed conflict or political influences that limits the ability and willingness of US participation. The following criteria are used to determine if it is plausible for the US to provide relief assistance in armed conflict environment:
Table 2-1
Principles of Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict

| **Relieving Life-Threatening Suffering** | Humanitarian action should be directed toward the relief of immediate, life-threatening suffering. |
| **Proportionality to Need** | Humanitarian action should correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs. It should affirm the view that life is as precious in one part of the globe as another. |
| **Nonpartisanship** | Humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other agendas. It should not take sides in conflicts. |
| **Independence** | In order to fulfill their mission, humanitarian organizations should be free of interference from home or host political authorities. Humanitarian space is essential for effective action. |
| **Accountability** | Humanitarian organizations should report fully on their activities to sponsors and beneficiaries. Humanitarianism should be transparent. |
| **Appropriateness** | Humanitarian action should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant, locally available resources. |
| **Contextualization** | Effective humanitarian action should encompass a comprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of interventions. Encouraging respect for human rights and addressing the underlying causes of conflicts are essential elements. |
| **Subsidiary of Sovereignty** | Where humanitarian is and sovereignty clash, sovereignty should defer to the relief of life-threatening suffering. |

(Department of the Army, 1994:28)

The US government has the option of providing donations and funding directly to the area in need of assistance, or to either of the other two groups. Besides the US ability to provide funding, it may also use the US military as a resource for providing humanitarian aid. The military services can provide immediate emergency supplies from their war reserve material, transportation of bulk shipments to remote areas, protection and manpower to distribute both humanitarian services and assistance. However, the US cannot continuously extend its efforts to every area in need of assistance, and therefore
relies on the UN and NGOs to confirm the areas in need of assistance and ensure the assistance is appropriately used. The US contracts the service of many NGOs and works closely with the UN agencies in addition to providing donations and use of the military.

For the US to respond to a humanitarian crisis, a recommendation must come from either the US ambassador to that country or the Department of State (DOS). The issue is then discussed by the National Command Authority and recommendations given to the National Security Council. At this point the US Agency for International Development (USAID) becomes the interagency coordinator for any action taken. USAID is a cabinet level authority along with DOS and the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOS responds by assigning several active offices to the humanitarian assistance effort including the regional bureau of the affected country and the Bureaus of Refugee Programs, International Organizational Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The DOD receives its requests from the USAID coordinating office, named the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Coordination with the UN or NGOs can occur at several different points of the actual humanitarian response structure, but it is always done through the OFDA (Air Land Sea Application Center, 1994:2-1,8).

As a guideline to determine if the US should intervene in a humanitarian effort the National Command Authority acts in accordance with the Foreign Disaster Act of 1961, which has been since amended to name the administrator of USAID as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance operates under the direction of USAID in general and The Guide to Field Operations for Disaster Response when operating in the humanitarian assistance environment. Because every humanitarian crisis is different, much of the work done by OFDA is ad hoc depending on the situation and political influences (Last, 1994:13). The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance sends an assessment team to determine the type of
assistance needed and if a disaster assistance readiness team (DART) should be deployed to oversee funding, stockpiles, and military assets. The DART team works for both the country Ambassador and OFDA making it a flexible resource for coordinating the efforts of all US agencies in the field, but not the sole agency responsible for doing so (Last, 1994:13).

The military can also act as a major coordinator of US efforts in humanitarian assistance depending on the length of time they are involved, the environment in which the crisis occurs and the scale of military operation needed. The DOD currently has three major legislated programs through which the US military is authorized by congress to provide humanitarian assistance. They are the Humanitarian Assistance Program, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program (also known as Title 10), and the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program (Hogberg, 1993:13). The military's regional CINCs also have the authority to direct military participation in humanitarian assistance. The CINCs are entitled to use any of their resources available, but they also must fund the effort from their own budget. When the military participation is directed by OFDA through the legislated programs, the operation is funded by OSD. The military's structure and capabilities make it an ideal resource for providing humanitarian assistance, but its mission and responsibility limit its use in other activities such as relief efforts.

When the military does participate in the relief effort, there are dozens of DOD doctrines, joint publications, and field manuals available to outline the structure for logistics, interagency coordination, security, civil assistance and many other aspects of military use in humanitarian assistance. These publications may not be ideal for the situational factors, but provide an outline for military commanders of their responsibilities and capabilities. In proportion to their other operations, humanitarian assistance is becoming a large portion of the US military operations. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the US military has become the most capable organization to carry out
independent, humanitarian relief operations world-wide (Hogberg, 1993:1). The US military logistics system allows the US to operate in areas where there is little or no infrastructure. The US military can provide rapid response through ship, aircraft and land operations even where modern ports and road systems are not available. Some of the forward deployed forces are the only units capable of reaching undeveloped areas and providing rapid humanitarian relief (Hogberg, 1993:5). These pre-positioned forces also allow for a sustained humanitarian effort. Even though the military has the structure and resources to be effective, it has little humanitarian assistance experience.

The appearance of neutrality is difficult for any military force assisting in humanitarian assistance. Although one of the principles of US humanitarian action is nonpartisanship, the US government is guilty of using the US military to provide humanitarian relief not only when the military’s capabilities can not be substituted, but also because it promotes US foreign policy and national security interests. An example would be the initial use of the military in Haiti. The military organized response could have been turned over to NGOs for the development stage, but the US was unwilling to risk its accomplishments in foreign policy by turning the program over to NGOs. By providing security in the relief environment the US military may prevent a international incident caused by the killing or kidnapping of volunteers. The US military has widened its peacekeeping mission to include protection for both the providers and the victims in humanitarian intervention missions. In the past year the ability of the US military to remain neutral and provide protection has been questionable in such areas as Haiti and Somalia. The US may have difficulty providing assistance under the structure of the principles, but the principles are still valid guidelines for the goal of providing relief to the suffering.

In response to the problem, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," was
published in May 1994 (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1994:2). It sets forth several strict guidelines to be considered before the US will participate in any peacekeeping operation. The main point of the policy is that an intervention operation must lay out clear objectives before troops or funds will be available. The objectives are designed to advance US national security interests while ensuring both US and UN involvement in peacekeeping is selective and more effective (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1994:1). Few humanitarian crises will fit all the conditions of the policy, but recent events in Haiti and Cuba show the US is still willing to respond (Weiss, 1994:153).

The US military commanders and planners have based the US military response on the following principles. These principles are designed to minimize the crisis, improve efficiency, and improve coordination between agencies.
Table 2-2

Principles to Maximize the Effectiveness of US Force Employment to Provide Humanitarian Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Every military operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>US military commanders will seek unity of effort toward every objective through the following: 1) Support, cooperate with, and take direction from US civil governmental authorities, 2) Establish clear lines of authority from humanitarian assistance forces, 3) Appreciate political/diplomatic factors affecting chain of command, and 4) Anticipate problems with focusing unity of command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perseverance</td>
<td>Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities to support strategic aims. This involves attaining quick objectives in a manner which also leads to the accomplishment of long term objectives in terms of resources and humanitarian assistance goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. To ensure security US commanders should: 1) Provide force protection against virtually any person, element or group, 2) Know that success is proportional to the secure environment of the operation, and 3) Not underestimate the security risks to the force in either permissive or hostile environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint</td>
<td>Apply appropriate military capability prudently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Promote the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group of agency to make and carry out decisions.</td>
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(Air Land Sea Application Center, 1994:1-12,13)

Strengths and Limitations. The accepted role of the military in the humanitarian environment is to protect relief workers and ensure delivery of supplies (Burton, 1994:81). The US military also has the advantage of training, which can greatly improve the response to a chaotic environment (Natsios, 1995:80). The US government, through OFDA, is the only humanitarian relief group that has successfully called meetings, gotten quarreling groups to work together, and drafted useable strategic plans on a regular basis. This is because OFDA’s organization and influence have gained the respect of the other groups (Natsios, 1994:79). Coordination and cooperation are improving as necessity and
experience force the issue. The quality of leadership has been influential in accomplishing this task.

Many of the problems of the international response system can also be found in the internal response of the US, because OFDA and the US military also operate under a different set of rules. Although OFDA is the clear decision maker in any US humanitarian response, the structure of OFDA is much different from that of the military. Unlike the military, OFDA has a continuous working relationship with NGOs. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance distributes 60% of its budget or $120 million to NGOs (Burton, 1994:21). By working contiguously with NGOs, OFDA has a better understanding of how NGOs operate and the importance of their independence in the field. The military only comes into contact with NGOs in the field environment. The military tends to rely on the experience of OFDA to provide advisory and interface assistance with NGOs (Burton, 1994:22). The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, under the President’s authority, has the ability to bring the military and NGOs together through contracts, money, and experience.

Because OFDA is one of the few organizations capable of organizing the humanitarian response, it is also one of the few organizations that is respected by the other groups. Even with OFDA’s success in coordinating the US humanitarian effort, it has failed to develop a joint operations doctrine with the military. The recommendation to develop such a doctrine came from an after action report from Operation Provide Comfort, where the military and OFDA had several misunderstandings of the other group’s mandates and capabilities. In operations such as Provide Comfort it is necessary for the military to take charge since they are the first organization in place, but in general the military must learn to tone down its natural tendency to take charge and allow OFDA to represent the US in efforts to coordinate (Burton, 1994:29).
Other problems in providing humanitarian assistance are blamed on the US military’s failure to understand the humanitarian environment. For example, the military action taken during Desert Storm created many refugees throughout the region and as well as damages to economies and personal property. There was little consideration or preparation for the humanitarian crisis this would create. The military response to a humanitarian crisis can also be poorly planned if they only consider the emergency needs and not the long-term recovery in areas such as health care and market stability. If the military objectives are not well coordinated with the other more experienced agencies military actions may do permanent damage by making the refugees dependent on an economy that is not self sustaining (Burton, 1994:45).

Another example of the US lack of understanding is the principle of peacekeeping in the humanitarian environment. Members of the UN argue that peacekeeping would be more effective without the US because the US military is designed to use force and secrecy against an identified enemy, which does not combine with the UN doctrine to provide peacekeeping through impartiality and dissemination of information (United Nations Peacekeeping, 1994:20). The military’s humanitarian response is structured on these principles but their training and doctrine for war-time are much different. The military needs more training in a peacekeeping environment to operate under its defined principles and coordinate more closely with diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving conflicts (Lukasavich, 1995).

The inexperience of the US military in knowing what to expect when they enter a humanitarian crisis has hampered its ability to respond. In Operation Restore Hope, the military wasted money, space and man-hours moving combat related materials into the region (over 1,000 pieces), which could have been avoided if prior coordination with NGOs was used to determine the type of equipment needed. The only part of the military force structure prepared by doctrine, training, experience, and personnel recruitment
policy to deal with these organizations is the civil affairs branch of the Army. Unfortunately, military planners usually include the civil affairs function as an afterthought. Both NGO and UN officials have cited that working with civil affairs officers was easier than combat commanders (Natsios, 1995:79).

Other coordination problems for the US humanitarian assistance system include timeliness of grant approval, confused lines of authority, and inconsistencies between policies of AID offices overseas and those in Washington (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:2). These are problems that all donor governments struggle with, but given the magnitude of the US efforts, these errors could cost many lives in misunderstandings of US capabilities and the time spent to rectify them. Overall, the US still remains the strongest single government providing humanitarian assistance, but they have been slow to learn from its mistakes, improve coordination, and take advantage of the international respect of OFDA (Lukasavich, 1995).

There is no other group or organization with the capabilities or resources of the US government, and especially the US military, to provide humanitarian assistance; however even these resources are limited by their weaknesses. Some of the problems are inherent in the US response structure and others come from a lack of education in relief operations.

**The United Nations**

The UN is an organization of countries working together towards world peace. It is often at the center of relief for both man-made and natural disasters because it combines the efforts of peace-keeping, peace-making, and humanitarian action (Eliasson, 1994:9). In order to be effective the UN must stand for the principles of the UN charter, in international and humanitarian law, which are based on the fundamental requirements of human decency (Eliasson, 1994:11). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the UN on 10 December 1948, proclaims "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." (United Nations, 1989:144). This Universal Declaration of Human Rights led to several other international declarations defining human rights and is used as a justification for humanitarian intervention by the UN. In 1991 resolution 46/182 was passed proclaiming UN humanitarian assistance be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality (Eliasson, 1993:310).

The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. Chapter VI of the UN charter outlines specific means while chapter VII specifies the use of coercive means or force. These chapters justify the use UN peace-keeping forces and other resources to create an environment safe for the providers of humanitarian assistance and to bring a peaceful solution to the crisis. The charter also constitutes an independent framework for humanitarian assistance that is separate from the use of politics or force outlined in chapters VI and VII and under the General Assembly.

The four UN agencies designed specifically to address humanitarian assistance are United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO). The legal responsibilities of these agencies to the UN are partially outlined in several sources including the UN Charter, Geneva Conventions, and charters of the individual agencies. The agencies basic responsibility is to provide food, medical care, and shelter to the suffering in both man-made and natural disasters.

The UN also contracts the service of NGOs and uses its international influence to obtain large quantities of donations. Although the peace-keeping forces, contracted NGOs, and UN agencies have different objectives in the relief effort, they must coordinate their efforts to reach UN objectives. In 1992 the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was established. This office is the current focal point for all humanitarian assistance related operations offered by the UN. The Department of Humanitarian
Assistance is responsible for improving the information flow and coordination between both external and internal agencies of the UN to work towards the following objectives:

Table 2-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Objectives for Providing Humanitarian Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-To keep the emergency from happening, or when an emergency threatens, to mitigate its effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To minimize human casualties and destruction of property. Ensure the survival of the maximum number of victims through effective relief actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To reestablish self-sufficiency and essential services as soon as possible for all affected populations, with special attention to the most vulnerable segments, i.e., children, disabled and the elderly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To ensure that relief action promotes and does not impede rehabilitation and longer term development goal and reduces vulnerability to any future recurrence of potentially damaging man-made or natural hazards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To protect the main effort, humanitarian relief implementers, through judicious use of the security component of the triad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To find durable solutions, as quickly as possible, with special attention to displaced and affected populations, while assuring protection and assistance to these populations in the process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Air Land and Sea Application Center, 1994:2-11)

To promote the coordination effort, the General Assembly gave the DHA some unique latitude, such as a mandate to negotiate with rebel forces for humanitarian access, a revolving fund of $50 million for providing immediate relief, and the ability to prioritize and respond to appeals (DeMars, 1994:16). In 1991 the UN developed a process for consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals. This process allows for the UN and other agencies to combine efforts from the point of initial assessment through strategic objectives to prioritize the needs and efforts in a humanitarian assistance environment (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994:15). Up to this point in time, the ability of the DHA to combine the efforts of the UN agencies and forces has been limited in the field. Although capable of being the coordinating forum between UN and humanitarian agencies, the almost 20 current UN operations, have overextended the DHA to the point
of crisis management, and limited its ability to create an effective use of the Inter-Agency Appeals process (Weiss 1994:139).

The DHA has been able to develop the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which combines the previously mentioned agencies with the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and the InterAction and Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. This committee is chaired by the Under Secretary General of DHA, and is designed to coordinate the overall UN policy of humanitarian assistance. Any time there is a lack of clarity in the mandate to address a specific humanitarian issue the IASC will investigate and produce guidelines for each of the member agencies. Besides the combined objectives and issues covered in the IASC reports, each UN agency still works independently within a humanitarian assistance effort, even to the point of working individually with NGOs and the US government.

As a global organization, the UN is usually made aware of the need for humanitarian assistance by the government of the area in crisis or by warning reports from the UN agency concerned. The secretary-general then decides which office or agency should respond to the disaster. Many of the humanitarian assistance agencies are in place prior to an actual disaster fulfilling their mandates. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is designed to provide international protection to refugees and seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. The United Nations Children's Fund assists governments to implement programs concerned with children's health,
nutrition, education, training and social services. The World Food Program is the largest multilateral food aid organization in the world and helps poor people by combating hunger and poverty in developing countries or a crisis environment. Finally, WHO coordinates the international response to emergencies and natural disasters in the health field (UNHCR, 1994:55). Once operating at full strength, the DHA will coordinate these efforts.

Because UN involvement in humanitarian assistance includes political, military, and humanitarian efforts, it is important that all UN actions abide by the same humanitarian principles to ensure the efforts do not conflict. The following humanitarian principles are the basis for any UN action related to humanitarian assistance:

Table 2-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Humanitarian Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human suffering should be relieved wherever it is found. The inherent dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartiality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance should be provided without discrimination. Relief must address the needs of all individuals and groups who are suffering, without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex or ethnicity. Needs assessments and relief activities should be geared toward priority for the most urgent cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutrality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian relief should be provided without bias toward or against one or more of the parties to the political, military, religious, ideological or ethnic controversy which has given rise to the suffering. Humanitarian actors must not allow themselves to become allied with a party or conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNHCR, 1994:11)

The UN also has a limited budget for humanitarian assistance which must divided among all the participating UN organizations and NGO contracts. Besides the DHA
budget, the majority of the agencies are funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and private or national donations. The former two are limited by mandates committing their funds to projects of the developmental nature. Because of the limited funds available to the UN, many UN agencies work with NGOs in the hopes that future funding will allow for UN contracts to support the NGOs continued work after the NGOs original resources are gone. However, the UN has repeatedly fallen short of the funds needed for UN Inter-agency appeals, as shown in the following table:

Table 2-5

UN Inter-Agency Funding Shortfall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding Requirements (US $Millions)</th>
<th>Funding Received (US $Millions)</th>
<th>Shortfall (US $Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd half '92</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half '93</td>
<td>1,908</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half '93</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half '94</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994:8)

These shortfalls lead to a problem when the UN develops much needed, but unfunded contracts, between itself and NGOs.

There are many limits to UN operations besides funding. A major limitation is the time needed to gain and transport donations. The General Assembly and the Security Council directly affect the efficiency of a humanitarian mission through their ability to provide donations or donors from the member governments. However, their most active role is in ensuring the safe delivery of donations to the area of crisis (Eliasson, 1993:314).
The General Assembly and Security Council determine what level of military support will be provided to the assistance effort and any UN limitations in the operation.

**Strengths and Limitations.** The UN as an international decision making body lacks the power to effectively maintain peace in the world, but they do have the resources and structure to provide effective humanitarian assistance. They have the ability to delegate to any or all of the agencies which are capable of providing relief in a crisis area. The UN has a specific structure designed to coordinate the entire humanitarian assistance effort and any related action taken by the UN. Although the DHA has not yet reached its full potential, based on its structure, the DHA can be expected to coordinate the political, peace-keeping, and humanitarian efforts in the future.

The UN also has one of the largest bodies of experience in the many different forms of field work because each of the agencies works independently. This experience is pooled together and combined with outside experience, and the UN has been able to organize research committees and conferences to improve and educate people in humanitarian assistance. The UN has been able to form a large pool of potential donors from its member nations. Finally, the UN is the only group with the policy and capability to enact preventive measures when the need for relief assistance is inevitable.

The UN structure and method of response to a humanitarian crisis is complex and includes many different agencies and departments. The UN weaknesses are both its organization or coordination, and its capability to respond quickly and with the strength of its mandates. The ability of the UN agencies to work individually with the other groups has relieved the Secretary General and the Security Council from some of the structural obligations. However, these officials are still slow to empower these agencies initially and produce the funding and donations needed.
A leading coordinator for the NGO Oxfam said, "The UN system as a whole lacks the necessary mechanisms and donor support to provide coordination and leadership in a fast moving situation." (Lord Judd, 1992:2). Political will becomes a major issue when dealing with the UN, and it may hinder the UN ability to provide humanitarian assistance. There must be political will by the donor government to provide substantial amounts of food aid and to ensure its immediate delivery. There must also be political will by the governments represented in the Security Council to organize a response of all the UN capabilities and political will by those involved in conflict to allow access to the suffering (Lord Judd, 1992:2). The UN has consistently failed to act decisively with the full weight of its mandates and policies. The failure of the UN to fulfill its responsibilities in the international relief system can delay and impede the response of the other groups.

This occurred in Operation Provide Comfort when the UN arrived well after the operation had begun and then failed to immediately take over the task of peacekeeping. When the UN did arrive, its efforts were clouded by procedural problems and overlapping mandates (Burton 1994:35). The UN failed to maintain the appearance of neutrality because of sanctions and resolutions which hurt Iraq and Jordan. Thus it became difficult to separate the UN humanitarian agencies from the UN political agencies (Burton, 1994:43). This led to other coordination problems in the operation which endangered the lives of NGO workers and slowed the process of the US military turning over the operation to the UN.

The UN lack of follow through occurred again in Operation Restore Hope. The UN Security Council authorized the use of UN peacekeeping troops to ensure the security of the aid supplies, but the peacekeeping troops were insufficient to provide protection because of their size and their being limited to using force as a means of self-protection (Burton, 1994:49). The UN showed that it was not prepared or willing to take charge of the operation.
The UN agencies are generally more successful in providing immediate response because they have been able to remain politically separate. However, this separation has hurt the agency’s ability to coordinate the overall UN response. The peacekeeping and humanitarian response have conflicted in some situations, with the UN agencies siding with the NGOs against the peacekeeping efforts when the presence of military is detrimental. There have also been problems where the UN was providing humanitarian assistance to areas of open war, and UN agencies were competing with UN-blessed military forces for development assistance funding (Weiss, 1994:150). There is a need for communication and consistency between the organizations in the UN.

There are some general problems in the UN response that make it difficult to coordinate within a humanitarian assistance effort. First, the UN has demonstrated a structural bias toward the government side in civil wars, with donor governments and NGOs doing little to correct the imbalance (Minear, 1994:3). Next, the UN will not support cross-border programs without the consent of the government, even when one of the governments has lost complete control over part of its territory (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:2). Finally, the specialized agencies of the UN are not always willing to take the risks of NGOs. Even when the agencies have the necessary donations and programs the UN is unwilling to put people on the ground (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:2). The 1992 development of the DHA was expected to overcome some of these problems, but the office is working under crisis management and has not been able to redesign an improved UN response.

The UN, along with NGOs, has been too weak in confronting the perpetrators of human rights abuses and war crimes (Weiss, 1994:146). Francis Deng, the special representative of the UN secretary general charged with studying the problems of internally displaced persons has written the following on UN efforts, “action has been ad hoc and has tended to emphasize assistance. Protecting human rights has been a
subsidiary consideration.” (Weiss, 1994:147). One of the difficulties of humanitarian missions for the UN is the ability to measure success and failures. For example, are the relief efforts in former Yugoslavia considered a success because they saved lives and avoided further conflict or a failure because the international community did not stand up to aggression and human rights violators (Weiss, 1994:143)?

The UN civil and humanitarian side has been characterized by a lack of coordination between components and an inability to make the most of limited resources. Coordination with the UN is difficult not only within the humanitarian agencies, but also between the UN methods of response. One disaster could include military, civil administration, and humanitarian activities (Weiss, 1994:149). The UN performance in providing humanitarian relief has not matched its mandate; until it does, the UN cannot assume leadership in the international humanitarian relief system (Natsios, 1995:80).

Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs, also known as Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), are both national and international organizations considered separate from the government under which they were founded. NGOs are formally defined by WHO official, Dr. Yves Beigbeder, as:

...non-governmental, autonomous, non-profit organizations, initiated by private citizens for a stated international relief assistance purpose, supported mainly by voluntary contributions in cash and kind from private purposes. (Beigbeder, 1991:80)

They range from multi-million dollar organizations which respond to most disaster areas to small temporary organizations formed to help one particular disaster area (Air Land Sea Application Center, 1994:2-16). Collectively, NGOs spend an estimated $9-10 billion annually to reach more then 250 million people living in poverty and in need of humanitarian assistance (Beigbeder, 1994:30).
Because there are 400-500 NGOs, almost every form of humanitarian assistance is provided by more than one of the organizations in existence. Most NGOs provide one or more of the basic necessities such as health care, nutrition, food, logistics, community services, water, or education. However, some NGOs branch out into areas such as income generation, sanitation, domestic needs, legal assistance, fire fighting or migration (UNHCR, 1994:57). Most NGO field operations are on a small scale but they communicate other needs in the area to the larger relief operation or to other NGOs. Because of their small size, they often provide the most rapid response and tend to work well with local agencies. NGOs make an effort to remain unattached to any political interests, and therefore they often stay in the relief area longer and work towards rehabilitation more than any other group (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:13).

NGOs are funded through private donations and contracts with foreign governments and the UN. The contracts can cover everything from providing humanitarian relief for victims of a natural disaster to fire fighting in a war zone. Even though NGOs are non-profit organizations, they are forced to compete for the funding available. The design and effectiveness of their field programs affects the amount of funding they receive along with their representation in NGO circles. Associations such as InterAction and NGO Standing Committees can have a big impact on the donor governments, who use these associations for recommendations on NGO’s capabilities and accomplishments. The private donations are heavily weighted on the type of public exposure an NGO receives, especially the credit given NGOs in government public affairs announcements.

The characteristics, mission, and ability of NGOs to respond differ among each organization. As a group, NGOs are recognized for operating in areas of high risk, providing the bulk of humanitarian assistance at the grassroots level, and working in the disaster area long after the other UN and government organizations have left (Air Land
Sea Application Center, 1994:2-17). The UN’s humanitarian law gives value to the NGO effort, but because the organizations are independent they are under no obligation to legally provide humanitarian assistance (Burton, 1994:9). In return for their contracts, both the UN and US governments rely on the NGO’s quick response and grassroots approach for valuable information on the types of humanitarian assistance needed.

The following three NGOs are given as examples of the similarities and differences among NGOs. Technically International Committee of the Red Cross is listed as an NGO, but it differs in its organization and limitations. Yet, it is grouped with NGOs in this instance because of its similar capabilities and structure in the field. Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) is an example of a organization with a very specific mission which operates with its own logistical system. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is the third NGO chosen because of its large size and record of remaining in the relief area after the majority of other groups and organizations have left. The differences among the three popular NGOs listed is only a small portion of the differences among NGOs in the field.

**ICRC.** The International Committee of the Red Cross has a legal obligation to provide humanitarian assistance through a mandate of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (UNHCR, 1995:8). The ICRC was created in 1863 as the first organization to provide international relief and to promote humanitarian law. The ICRC is now part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which also consists of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Each member of the movement is considered independent of the movement, but they all follow the same fundamental principles (Beigbeder, 1991:61-63). The following table lists those principles:
Table 2-6

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

| **Humanity** | The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples. |
| **Impartiality** | It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. |
| **Neutrality** | In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. |
| **Independence** | The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement. |
| **Voluntary Service** | It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain. |
| **Unity** | There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Movement in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory. |
| **Universality** | The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. |

(Beigbeder, 1991:63)

The ICRC mission is “to monitor the application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims” (Beigbeder, 1991:64). The National Red Cross and the National Red Crescent Societies support public authorities as autonomous national organizations which provide emergency assistance on a national and international basis. The League of Red
Cross Red Crescent Societies convenes in Geneva as an international NGO and the information center for the Red Cross. The League coordinates at the international level for the National Societies and assists the ICRC in development of humanitarian law (Beigbeder, 1991:71-73). All three components work together, but the ICRC is highlighted because of its legal obligations under the humanitarian law defined in the Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC has legal access to areas none of the other parties involved in humanitarian assistance can reach, especially when there are prisoners-of-war involved. The ICRC mandate extends to situations not covered by international humanitarian law, such as internal disturbances and tensions (UNHCR, 1995:8). Aside from the food and medical assistance the ICRC provides they also specialize in the areas of family tracing, visiting prisoners, and assuring that humanitarian law is respected (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:13).

To increase its effectiveness, the ICRC works with both the UN and other NGOs when providing humanitarian assistance. In the field ICRC works with each of the UN humanitarian agencies individually. Most of the communication with the other NGOs happens through the Steering Committee. The “Licross/Volags Steering Committee” is a policy-making body of the chief executives of five large NGOs. A sub-committee of the Steering Committee meets monthly with relief operations officers to discuss disaster situations and exchange information (Beigbeder 1991:79). The ICRC works willingly with the other groups providing humanitarian assistance to an area, but are always limited in the amount of interactions by their mandates to remain neutral and uphold humanitarian law. Although humanitarian law may sometimes limit the capability of ICRC, it also strengthens it, because ICRC has the legal authority to take action.

**MSF.** Because of the ICRC limitations, the Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) was formed in 1971 by a group of doctors who thought they could accomplish more as an
independent NGO then as a member of the ICRC. The doctors were frustrated by the political conditions attached to the aid operations. Also known as Doctors without Borders, MSF is a leader in providing private emergency medical assistance and is the world's largest independent organization for emergency medical aid (Jean, 1992:161). It has an annual budget of $187 million and employs 2,000 people in the field each year. These volunteers consist of doctors, nurses and other health care specialists from 45 different nations. In 1994 they supported 150 missions in 70 countries.

The work done by MSF in the field is, for the most part, independent because it handles its own logistics. Besides medical care, MSF also provides humanitarian assistance in the form of food, domestic needs, water, sanitation, nutrition, shelter, community services, and food production (UNHCR, 1995:59). It must rely on other groups for security when working in a hostile environment, but in extreme situation such as the crisis in Sarejevo it has removed workers when it felt the security being provided was inadequate.

MSF operates under very simple and direct principles: 1) MSF does not discriminate based on race, creed, color, gender or national origin and has no political or religious affiliations; 2) MSF's goal is to intervene with speed and efficiency in critical emergency situations (Doctors Without Borders USA, 1994:1). The recruiting literature and information available on MSF does not list specific criteria such as humanity and neutrality, which are criteria for the other organizations. However, MSF traditionally operates under the same basic principles but does not limit itself to them.

It is financially supported by 1.6 million donors world wide including finances from the UN, US government, and European Economic Community (EEC) (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1993:203). There are independent sections of MSF located in seven different European countries and delegate offices in the US, Japan and Canada. It is
through these offices and their work with the US and UN that MSF is able to identify those areas which require its medical services.

**CRS.** The third example of an NGO is Catholic Relief Services. This organization was developed 50 years ago, by the Catholic Bishops of the US, in response to the humanitarian crisis of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. Its guideline for humanitarian assistance operations is to elevate the needs of people at risk above considerations of national sovereignty, nonpartisanship, and independence. CRS assistance is provided on the basis of need, not creed, race or nationality (Catholic Relief Services, 1994:1). The basic policies and programs of the organization express the teachings of the Catholic Church, but do not limit the regions in which it is willing to provide humanitarian assistance.

In the past three years, CRS has worked in over 75 different countries providing humanitarian assistance. It has an annual income of over $296 million, of which 75% comes in several different forms of donations and support from the US government (Catholic Relief Services, 1994:24). CRS provides humanitarian assistance in the form of food, domestic needs, health, nutrition, sanitation, education, and income generation. Because of its religious affiliation, CRS is not always welcomed the regions in need of assistance, but its objectives do not include Catholic education or missionary work. The principles listed in table 2-7 allow CRS to work in areas without the receiving government’s approval or request.

CRS uses these principles to determine what situations or geographical areas require humanitarian assistance. There are three conditions necessary for CRS to respond to conflict situations. First, CRS conducts a analysis of the background and causes of the conflict in terms of politics, economics, and social, religious, and cultural issues. Second, CRS determines the capabilities of any counterparts, other organizations and the target populations to determine the possibilities of a joint response. Finally, CRS projects the
impact of a response to ensure that neither the providers of the source will increase the 
conflict of jeopardize the target population. Included in the final analysis is a
determination of CRS “value added”, or areas where CRS can contribute that other 
organizations are not (CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations, 
1992:2).

Table 2-7

The Fundamental Principles of Catholic Relief Services

| Common Good | CRS believes that although the common good is the first responsibility of government, it is likewise a
|             | social responsibility falling on all persons and groups. When political authorities, either domestic or
|             | international, fail to protect the common good (understood as the safeguarding and protection of civil,
|             | political, economic, and social human rights), it falls to others, including social institutions such as CRS,
|             | to act on behalf of the rights of a deprived population, when that population is unable to protect itself. |
| Human Dignity | CRS’s response in conflict situations is to alleviate human suffering, promote human development, and
|              | foster a culture of peace, respect and dignity. |
| Impartiality | CRS’s response in conflict situation is impartial with respect to race, creed, political orientation, and
|              | ethnicity, but is partial to the poor, suffering, and the marginalized. CRS only assists civilian victims in
|              | conflict situations. CRS only assists civilian victims in conflict situations. CRS prefers to assist victims
|              | on both sides of the conflict unless needs on one side are met by other groups or unless operations
|              | consideration preclude working on both sides. |
| Non-partisanship | CRS is non-partisan in its approach to humanitarian assistance in conflict situation in the sense that CRS
|                 | neither takes sides nor supports partisan causes in the hostilities. Consistent with our mandate, CRS
|                 | stands in solidarity with the victims of the conflict. |
| Independence | CRS’s humanitarian action requires operational freedom to function with our political or other
|               | interference. CRS, and/or our partners, must be free to operate without arbitrary detention of staff, seizure
|               | of relief equipment or diversion of relief supplies. Without this independence humanitarian action is
|               | impossible. |

(CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations, 1992:2)

CRS is willing to coordinate with the US government, UN, and other NGOs as
long as those organizations are providing humanitarian assistance that meet the CRS
principles and conditions of responses. The field offices are responsible for the majority of 
coordination both locally and internationally, although CRS headquarters does replicate
the coordination at higher levels. CRS believes a coordinated effort is useful when, "all members of the at risk population are included in overall planning and the relief assistance is distributed equitably within targeted areas." (CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations, 1992:8) Human resources and materials are shared with other NGOs when it is determined a more effective method of distribution. CRS has taken an active approach to coordination by instituting it as part of its response structure.

**Strengths and Limitations.** NGOs are specifically effective in providing rapid response, linking relief to rehabilitation programs, building on existing local capacities, and pressuring donor governments and the UN to act more responsively (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:14). They are not subject to governmental or intergovernmental agencies' policies, rules, or regulations. Most NGOs are able to negotiate with any parties needed to provide aid without endangering their principles of neutrality. The light administrative structure of an NGO and its focus on limiting non-operational costs, make NGOs more cost effective than the other parties. NGO personnel are often more interested in the spirit of humanitarian assistance and need less monetary or other forms of motivation (Beigbeder, 1991:93-94).

However, their weakness lies in their lack of overall professionalism. In efforts to remain independent, they lack accountability or standardization. NGOs must spend a large amount of time and effort in finding donations and others forms of funding. For example, in order for the an NGO to remain eligible to receive donations from USAID it must, by law, receive 20% of its total income from private sources (Natsios, 1995:69). The need for funding often leads to competitiveness among NGOs. For the most part the NGOs quarrel quietly among themselves for the resources needed. A united effort could place the priorities on moving the resources to the relief environment while saving the NGOs the time and money involved in lobbying for them.
NGOs can also underestimate the usefulness of the US military based on the military's limited commitment to any humanitarian operation (Burton, 1994:75). NGOs also have difficulty working with the military because NGOs lack the professionalism which the military responds well to. The NGOs involved in Operation Provide Comfort generally had difficulty adjusting to the military structure and decision making process. There was a problem with some agencies assuming the military would provide protection for individual agendas and a lack of flexibility on the part of the NGOs to adjust to the military-run operation. Some NGOs have specific mandates which forbid them to interact with military operations (Burton, 1994:32). This can lead to security problems when the US military or UN peace-keepers are involved and the NGOs will not allow them to provide security.

NGOs tend to see their role to relieve suffering as a microcosm and can avoid confronting the cause of suffering or over-ride the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality to provide relief. When this happens NGOs can damage the overall humanitarian effort. Blatant disregard for principles such as neutrality can lead to NGO workers becoming unsuspected targets or hostages. In general, NGOs must learn to see beyond their field work to the other areas were relief of the suffering can be improved, especially in the area of development. If NGOs concentrated more on long term goals and self-sufficiency under the principles of humanitarian assistance they would strengthen the long term effectiveness of humanitarian assistance (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:14).

It is important to remember that NGOs is a very broad term covering a wide variety of organizations. Besides the general strengths and limitation, each organization also has specific characteristics that will affect its ability to participate in a larger coordination effort. Of the examples given, the ICRC has several important limitations affecting its ability to coordinate. ICRC is limited because it must remain neutral by
mandate, can only intervene with the approval of the country in need, cannot publicly
denounce any ethnic genocide, and cannot be associated with armed action for
humanitarian purposes (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:29). MSF is limited in
its coordinating experience, because of its efforts to be self-sustaining, while other
organizations have been forced to work together for budget or logistical reasons. CRS is
limited in its cultural awareness by its US dominated influences. The individuality found
among NGOs is the characteristic that gives them strength in visibility and weakness in
efficiency.

Summary

Each of the three major players in humanitarian assistance, US government, UN,
and NGOs, plays a significant role in providing programs to relieve or reduce the results
of disasters or privation that might threaten life (Burton, 1994:3). Each party’s reasoning
for participating in the effort differs, as do their guidelines for taking action. The US
government is able to provide military assistance, funding, and is a major source for
donations. The UN has an obligation, through its mandates, to make an international
effort in both humanitarian assistance and security for its providers. To meet this
obligation the UN has many agencies which work independently and under the guise of the
DHA. Finally, the NGOs are able to specialize into small types of aid and reach the
victims at a grassroots level. However, all three groups work together to combine their
efforts and relieve human suffering.

Although somewhat specialized, the efforts of each party tend to overlap in
emergency situations where prior coordination is surpassed in an effort to respond quickly.
All of the parties are tied together through the contracted work of NGOs and the
gathering, transporting, and distributing of donations. Coordination among the parties is
difficult because each has a different process for determining what types of humanitarian
assistance will be supplied to any particular area. No one party is willing to take on the
responsibility of planning a coordinated effort, nor are the parties willing to fall under the
organization of another party (except for contract work). These conditions make a
combined and coordinated effort difficult, but the benefits of utilizing the available
resources would improve the effectiveness of any humanitarian assistance effort.
III. Methodology

Introduction

The current international relief system is not functioning with the efficiency and effectiveness it is capable of producing (Minear, 1994:1). In an effort to develop theories which will resolve or lessen the effects of problems in the relief system, a descriptive study of the current relationships will be done. The goal of the descriptive study is to understand the organizational climate which led to the current structure of shared efforts in providing humanitarian assistance (Schmitt, 1991:153). The shared efforts involve three major groups (foreign governments, UN, and NGOs), but to limit research the US government is used as an example foreign government and three representative NGOs were chosen to represent the hundreds of NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance. The different divisions on the UN, involved in humanitarian assistance operations, were also researched.

The research portion consists of the three major groups and their procedures for handling a humanitarian assistance effort. The procedures vary both among the group's organizations and the individual humanitarian operations. Several applications of these procedures are examined to find routine problem areas in communication and coordination among the groups. A qualitative study of the humanitarian assistance system is expected to define the relationships among the three groups and show key areas where coordination can improve the system.

The methods of providing humanitarian assistance will vary between the three organizations, by nature of their individual structure. The organizations are grouped by their method of participation in the relief system. First, the US government was chosen to represent the donor governments involved in the system because the US government
currently donates the largest net quantity of funds and supplies to the international relief system. They are also the expected direct beneficiaries of this research. Second, the UN and its agencies are researched because they have a unique structure and international obligation to address humanitarian issues. Finally, several of the non-governmental organizations will be used as a sample of NGOs because they receive funding through donations and unlike the other two groups. NGOs are not tied to any form of government or military.

The three NGOs chosen for research, Catholic Relief Services, Medicins sans Frontieres, and the ICRC, were chosen because they are relatively large NGOs, active in all of the major humanitarian assistance efforts, and accessible in the US. The ICRC is technically not an NGO but an international organization, but because its response is structured similar to NGOs it is being grouped with the NGOs for the purpose of this study. These groups are represented as the three major forms of organization which provide humanitarian assistance. The differently structured organizations are examined to produce a valid picture of the international relief system. This type of qualitative research is designed to deal with elements that are distributed systematically but uneven across time and then create a model to characterize the system (Van Maanen, 1982:37).

Data Sources

The methods for researching this qualitative study will be telephone interviews, recently published books, journal articles, conference papers, documentation and pamphlets published by the organizations and several DTIC and thesis papers. Because the assistance efforts being studied occur internationally, an on-site observation is not possible. Instead, people with first hand experience in the field will be used to verify the information found in the research. The interviews will be structured around the investigative questions given in the introduction. The interviews will be open-ended to
allow for in-depth explanations. All three groups have many different levels of participation and written regulations concerning their involvement in humanitarian assistance operations. When compared to the opinion of experts in the field, the secondary data written after the Cold War should produce valid results explaining how the humanitarian system operates and its limitations (Cooper, 1994:118).

Because this is a qualitative descriptive study, it is by nature a search, examination, and study of any current and relevant information available on the topic of the international effort to provide humanitarian assistance and the methods used by the individual groups to coordinate. Although all of the groups and their agencies are researched, there is a bias towards the US military response in the interest of making the synthesis of information useful. A more in-depth study would be necessary to find optimal solutions and apply advanced technology for communication purposes. This study simply highlights the problems in the current system found through an examination of structures, research materials and the opinions of experts who have participated in field level coordination.

Structure

The investigative questions listed in the introduction will be used as an outline for the literature review, research and conclusion chapters. The literature review is used to explain each group’s structure and process for providing humanitarian assistance. The research chapter is an explanation of the international humanitarian response system. It begins with an explanation of the relief environment, followed by the coordination structures used to integrate the efforts of the groups both in and outside of the field environment, and finally the possible situational and political factors which would affect coordination are discussed. The conclusion highlights the overlaps found in coordination.
among groups providing humanitarian assistance and areas where each group could improve the system.

The interviews, literature explaining each organization's response structure, and case examples should produce enough related information to outline each organization's process with confidence. Once the processes are clear, the areas of overlapping effort can be highlighted and recommended for future coordination. The variance found in situational responses may affect the validity of the conclusion, because some areas will overlap in one situation and not in others. There is also the danger of biased views produced by the interviews because each of the experts is attached to an organization and may be biased against the other organizations. Finally, the individual and international humanitarian response system is in a state of flux and the structures and methods of coordination were being questioned by all three groups when this research was accomplished. All of these factors considered, there is enough information available to produce a descriptive study to, "come to grips with the essence of the culture" (Schmitt, 1991:152) and show the organizational climate in light of how it can be improved.
IV. Research

Introduction

The international humanitarian relief system is not a well defined body of law, principles, or norms. Instead, the relief system is based on a set of informal arrangements among a diverse group of organizations performing humanitarian assistance (Minear, 1994:2). The diversity in structure and response methods among groups in the humanitarian relief system can be considered both positive and negative to the overall effectiveness of relieving human suffering. This chapter is designed to show the different methods of coordination found in the humanitarian assistance system. These coordination problems were found in research of current written material and interviews with field workers.

This chapter begins with a description of some of the more recent humanitarian assistance operations to show examples of the humanitarian assistance environment and some of the situational factors which affect coordination. Next the framework for coordination in the field is outlined, followed by an explanation of some of the coordination efforts made outside of the field. The areas of shared responsibility are outlined to show where coordination is the most advantageous. Finally, some of the key situational and political factors which affect coordination are highlighted.
Coordination Process

Each of the three major groups providing humanitarian assistance brings lifesaving donations and efforts to the area of crisis, but each has its own methods and priorities for providing this type of assistance. The different structures and general strengths were listed in chapter two. This chapter is a closer examination of the responsibilities and limitations of the three different groups that can be found in their coordination efforts. This section explains several different humanitarian assistance environments and the framework used for coordination in these environments.

Relief Environment. The US military has come to a new appreciation and understanding for all the players involved in a humanitarian assistance operation within the past few years. As the military has increased the number and type of humanitarian operations it participates in, it has been forced to coordinate in several different organizational environments. In each of the following operations, Sea Angel (OSA), Provide Comfort (OPC), and Restore Hope (ORH), the military played an important but different role.

OSA was a humanitarian assistance effort to provide relief for victims of a cyclone in Bangladesh. When the military arrived at OSA they saw the NGOs were already in place and had their own system of coordination that did not require military leadership to improve the situation (Burton, 1994: 29). The NGOs and donor governments had already gathered a large store of supplies, but the roads had been destroyed by the flood and the military was needed for transporting supplies by air, water, and road. There were over 50 NGOs present within days of the initial disaster, and some had been working in
Bangladesh for years. The military soon had difficulty dealing with such a diverse group of organizations (Burton, 1994:29). The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance stepped in to help the military deal with the NGOs and proved to be an excellent resource in dealing with people.

The biggest problem was a lack of faith in the government of Bangladesh. All of the groups agreed that the Bangladesh government was responsible for orchestration of the relief effort, but the newly elected democratic government had only been active for 39 days and both the people of Bangladesh and outside organizations had little faith in their abilities. The military along with the other groups had difficulty entrusting the young government with the power of coordinating their resources (Burton, 1994:31). The biggest success of OSA, outside of the lives saved by the humanitarian assistance, was its success as a relief effort where every party involved was entrusted with the tasks they performed best and were experienced in accomplishing.

Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was initiated by President Bush in 1991 to relieve the suffering of Kurdish refugees who had fled from their homes in Iraq and been forced to live in the mountains on the Turkish border. Since the Operation was US initiated, the US military was expected to orchestrate the multinational humanitarian assistance effort. The UN sanctioned the operation, but was slow to mobilize and dependent on the US to build the operation's response structure. The large number of Kurdish refugees located in the mountains was a relatively new crisis, so there were no NGOs in place when the military initially responded. In contrast to OSA, this operation required the military to provide more than logistics. Their leadership, organization, and
training were also tasked. The military performed the initial assessment of what was needed in the area, provided emergency medical care, and distributed the supplies, while OFDA found the needed resources of donations and funding.

Although inexperienced, the military was successful in providing crisis relief and creating a system where NGOs and the UN could eventually step into their roles and relieve the US military. However, this success did not happen without the military learning some valuable lessons from the NGOs on how to provide the type of assistance most needed by the refugees. The NGOs shared their knowledge in areas of health care and feeding. One such lesson was in health care, where the military medical corps learned that rehydration and sanitation save more lives initially than vaccination and treatment (Burton, 1994:37). Eventually, each group took over their area of expertise thanks to the efforts of over 50 NGOs and 12 donor countries who were willing to help the refugees. The UN agencies were eventually successful in returning 480,000 refugees to their homes or in the care of international relief agencies.

The third example of a humanitarian assistance operation, Operation Restore Hope (ORH) took place in an area where clans had been clashing for decades. In ORH the roles of each relief group were more clearly defined because humanitarian relief has been provided to that area of the world for almost a decade. In early 1991 the UN Security Council authorized the use of UN peacekeeping troops to ensure the security of aid workers and supplies providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia, but the troop strength provided by the UN was insufficient. In November 1992, the US military became involved in ORH, and the UN stepped back to allow the US to take over the Unified Task Force.
(UNITAF). This decision was made because of the take charge attitude of the US military and the indecisive efforts of the UN (Burton, 1994:49). Up to this point the NGOs had been relatively successful by hiring guards or paying extortion money to ensure that humanitarian assistance could be provided to those who needed it most (Burton, 1994:66).

While some of the NGOs refused to work with the military during ORH, others learned the value of the military to protect relief workers and ensure delivery of supplies (Burton, 1994:81). The US military, once again, had difficulty accommodating the individualistic behavior of the different NGOs when each tried to coordinate their own security and logistics (Burton, 1994:72). The military did realize another value of NGOs during ORH. The military was able to use the field experience of the NGOs to help interpret the threat of violence in the relief area (Burton, 1994:74). Unfortunately, like many of the lessons learned in ORH, the military learned how to better coordinate and plan with the other agencies only from making mistakes initially.

These three operations, OSA, OPC, and ORH, were successes in terms of the relief they provided for the suffering, but they were also a sign that the international relief system has many weaknesses. These are areas where better interactions within a group and between the groups could improve the capability of the international community to end human suffering and help the crisis area become self-sufficient in the long-run. It is not a matter of responding to a humanitarian crisis, but a matter of providing an organized response that allows each of the groups to perform its expected tasks in a manner that is
both timely and proportional. The modern humanitarian relief system does not allow such a response.

**Coordination Framework.** There is no single coordination structure which is applied to every relief environment. Up to this point the somewhat random activity has been successful in saving millions of lives, but with further organization or coordination of humanitarian assistance could be much more efficient and effective. The research shows that there are many opinions of how the humanitarian relief system could be improved. This section outlines the framework currently used for coordination both in the field and outside of the field environment. It concludes with the challenges to the current system developed by Larry Minear, a co-director and principle researcher of the Humanitarian and War Project.

Not everyone believes that a single leading organization or a combined coordination effort is the solution to coordination problems in the field of the international relief effort. Coordination may involve significant opportunity costs, prevent quick response, centralize functions that are better left decentralized, or worst of all it may politicize aid (Minear, 1994:5). The idea of an agreed-upon single leading organization in the field could also be counter-productive if the organization does not have the will or respect of others, the other agencies are not willing to follow, or the leading organization has different priorities in its method of response which would exclude some groups. Minear believes “coordination is the hobby horse of politicians and theoreticians; the real issue is effectiveness” (Minear, 1994:3). However, most of the research shows the
humanitarian relief system could use a better form of coordination than the current ad hoc system.

The following figure shows the coordination needed both in and out of the field to perform effective humanitarian assistance (Last, 1994:2).

![Framework for Interagency Cooperation](image)

**Figure 4-1 Framework for Interagency Cooperation**

This figure shows how the response to any conflict is surrounded by military, political, economic and humanitarian influences. These three areas are then influenced by smaller agencies and organizations of the UN, donor governments, and individual NGOs. These influences and overlaps, such as national influences in all three of the primary responses make the coordination or distribution of information difficult. However, these
relationships can not be avoided so the solution is to improve the efforts to exchange information among groups.

Field Level. The three groups need a clearer institutional division of labor, common rules and procedures, and greater accountability. These are not easy tasks for the size and structure of the groups. There are several different forms of coordination centers which were used in one or more of the three examples of humanitarian assistance operations. In general, the field coordination is different in every operation depending on the number and type of organizations involved, their objectives, the types of relief most needed, and any available infrastructure. The two most common factors in preventing effective coordination are separate “chains of command” and “information stovepipes” (Last, 1994:10).

Currently there are many different types of command centers which attempt to overcome these factors but no structure or criteria to determine which ones will be used for specific types of humanitarian assistance. They are the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). The US military is responsible for the CMOC which can serve as the primary interface between organizations in the field, but it more often serves as the coordination center for day to day operations to meet the objectives laid out by a more central and decision making command center. The following figure is an example of composition of a military run CMOC (Joint Warfighting Center, 1995:23).
When linking all three of the major groups in a humanitarian effort for decision making, OFDA frequently becomes the coordinator because it has the resources (money and donations) as well as the logistical control of the military. The OFDA run coordination center is known as the Humanitarian Assistance Control Center (HACC). The HACC has the same basic structure of CMOC but is organized by the US government instead of the military and directed by the Disaster Area Response Team. The US government relief effort is run out of one or the other coordination centers in the field.
depending on if it is a military directed relief effort such as provide comfort or if the military is taking task level instructions form the government as in OSA. During ORH, both coordination centers were operating, but the CMOC existed within a UN run coordination center while the HACC was kept separate. These overlaps in coordination make for excess work in dissemination of information to all the levels of each group.

The UN also has two different forms of coordination centers that can be operated in the field. The Humanitarian Operations Center is loosely organized under the UN and was the coordination center used for decision making during ORH. When the military was involved in ORH the CMOC and Humanitarian Operations Center were co-located with UN coordination run out of the Humanitarian Operations Center and military coordination with NGOs run out of the CMOC (Burton, 1994:56). The redundancy of two coordination centers co-located is obvious, especially considering they had the same basic purpose, except one was run by the military and one by the UN. The only advantage in this situation is the military was to return the coordination effort back over to the Humanitarian Operations Center, when they left Somalia, with no difficulty.

The UN-run OSOCC is a more technically designed version of the HOC. The OSOCC is established by the UN lead agency. It is a forum for coordination between UN representatives, USAID, OFDA, members of the DART, US military, effected country representatives, and NGOs. According to its design, the CMOC is a cell within the OSOCC for military coordination. Under this design the CMOC does only task related coordination. The control center itself consists of a large meeting area, a situation room with updated maps and bulletin boards, office space for liaison teams, communication
facilities, and vehicles when feasible (Last, 1994:11). The lead UN agency chairs a weekly coordination meeting at the OSOCC and the rest of the time the control center is used by working groups in specific areas such as medical or develop requirements in the crisis area. This is the only coordination center which uses structure to incorporate the needs of other agencies and the over-all goals of the relief effort.

The advantage of the OSOCC is that it is an organized attempt at coordination and not tied to donor government or single NGO. There is some doubt in the application of OSOCC because it is considered idealistic to find a location for such a command center in a crisis environment. A building or room large enough to accommodate this structure may not be possible. Instead the coordination may be done in a central communications center which slows down the information flow based on physical capacity. It is also doubtful that the UN lead agency will take the time and effort to organize it. However, the OSOCC was established in Rwanda and relatively successful, but the time and effort to establish the ideal command center was available which is not possible in every humanitarian assistance operation. At one point in ORH three command centers, the HACC, HOC, and CMOC, were operating to coordinate different parts of the assistance effort.

Two different types of command centers were used in OPC. The military created a Civil Agency Relief Element (CARE) to coordinate and exchange information with DOS, OFDA, UN agencies and NGOs. CARE was a basis to exchange information at the highest operational levels for the education of the military decision makers in OPC. The second command center formed by the military was a Civilian Agencies Task Force (CATF) to support key agencies for the UN and NGOs in the field (Burton, 1994:43).
As the UN stepped in to take over OPC the UN lead agency then formed a different coordination center to work with NGOs.

Besides the group efforts to coordinate there are many dual relationships between the organizations for coordination purposes. These relationships are important and may save time by avoiding the command center. Information flow is the most important purpose of any form of command center. It is also important that all efforts are recorded for future use, at all levels of coordination. However, when possible coordination at the command center should be used because it is often the most efficient use of resources and capable of pooling the resources and then utilizing them where they can be most effective in the relief effort.

**Strategic Level.** Aside from the coordination effort in the field, there are several methods of humanitarian assistance coordination done outside of the field but effective in improving the relief effort. These coordination efforts may be operation specific, such as a coordination center run by the DHA in Geneva to coordinate between agencies and donor governments to solicit specific donations needed in the crisis area. There are also ongoing efforts to improve coordination. These include work done by humanitarian exercises, conferences, standing committees, and private organizations.

Multi-agency training in crisis response efforts is a relatively new practice initiated by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in 1992. The first exercise combined the efforts of the Joint Readiness Training Center, OFDA, InterAction, and DOS representatives. Several exercises a year have followed along with seminars, planning sessions and problem focused workshops (Last, 1994:19). The US has also
hosted several exercises focused on the US military’s ability to combine efforts with non-military organizations. This type of training is very important for members of the US military whose high turnover rate in the field often leads to continuous training and inexperience in the troops responding to the relief effort (Lukasavich, 1995). The DHA sponsored Exercise ‘93, which was the first large scale operation to demonstrate the UN capabilities in a natural disaster (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994:74). This was a major step towards the DHA’s capability to organize the total UN response.

Exercise ‘93 occurred in Austria, and simulated a severe earthquake that devastated a densely populated industrial area. Fourteen international search and rescue teams combined efforts and equipment while 150 observers from military and civilian disaster response organizations observed their efforts. An OSOCC was used to coordinate under the direction of a lead agency and officials from the “affected country”. The purpose of the exercise was to promote better contacts among organizations and improving the current international disaster response capability (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994:74).

The consolidated inter-agency appeal is another mechanism to combine efforts between organizations. It is a system to allow all agencies working for and with the UN to determine within one week the nature of the crisis and the numbers and requirements of the affected population, prioritize the needs for each segment of the effected population, and reflect the extent to agency’s willingness to integrate their efforts (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994: 15). Since the program was initiated in 1991,
several improvements have been made to make the consolidated appeals approach both a vehicle for emergency needs and development plans. The inter-agency appeal provides an opportunity for all the groups involved to develop a common set of goals for providing humanitarian assistance to the area and an early warning to donors of the relief needed for sustainability after the initial crisis (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994:16). The program still needs improvements, but as the field operations improve coordination so will the effectiveness of the inter-agency appeals approach.

Two examples of private organizations designed to improve coordination outside of the field operations are InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). InterAction is an organization with approximately 158 NGO members. InterAction represents these agencies at the national level, specifically to the UN and OFDA (Last, 1994:10). Each agency’s criteria and capabilities are used to make recommendations for the most effective use of donations and which NGOs should be used for specific types of tasks. ICVA is meant to serve the same purpose at the international level. A Standing Committee on Humanitarian Responses is run by ICVA and meant to be a warning system for probable NGO requirements. These organizations work closely with the UN’s inter-agency Standing Committee to inform and coordinate with NGOs (Last, 1994:10).

The key to coordination both inside and outside of the field is a clear definition of each group’s capabilities, responsibilities, and intentions. The rules and procedures for an improved relief system will require flexibility as each crisis unfolds in a new manner and the different organizations respond. As the need for humanitarian relief increases so does
the experience level in providing it, and this repetition is leading to a natural set of rules and procedures that only need to be clarified and institutionalized. It will not be enough to reconfigure the current system; instead a new regime should be built (Minear, 1994:5).

This new regime can be based on an organizational structure instead of a single organization. There are many international regimes that are designed to share information for improvements in the fields of technology, science, and medicine. Some regimes have one organizational leader while others rotate the responsibility. The humanitarian assistance groups are capable of forming this type of regime where political and structural differences are overcome for the sake of improving the field. In the words of Minear, “the primary obstacle to a more effective humanitarian system is not a lack of resources but a lack of resourcefulness. What the system lacks is not energy but vision, not good will but discipline.” (Minear, 1994:13).

One idea under consideration is to build civilian humanitarian assistance teams modeled on the US peacekeeping forces that would allow humanitarian relief by civilian agencies including the ability to provide emergency logistics (Minear, 1991:19). This would be a massive undertaking in both funding and training, but the most difficult step would be to get the groups to agree to this type of single organization and surrender some of their sovereignty. The benefits would be the relief, logistics and peacekeeping all tied together for better communication and a single goal. The danger would be the loss in diversity and flexibility gained through the different structures which allow them to approach crises differently. If it were possible to create a single international humanitarian response team OFDA would be the ideal source to model because of there
ability to coordinate donations, contract NGOs and task the military efforts in security and logistics. There should also be a single agreed upon method for reporting cost effectiveness items such as expenditures, resources, and mobilization capabilities (Minear, 1994:6). This would help to standardize the information being passed at the command center and improve the accuracy of the records for education and historic purposes.

If each of the groups were to specify in advance its stipulations and priorities for a humanitarian assistance operation, it would be helpful in measuring success or failure (Weiss, 1994:155). A group could be expected to participate in a relief effort when its criteria for participation applied to the crisis and the would also be expected to stay in humanitarian operation until the criteria no longer applied. The US government did this in PDD-25 as a way to justify to the public US involvement in a humanitarian assistance effort. It has not been successful up to this point because the US has since provided relief assistance to crises that have not met the criteria where the public felt it unnecessary to allow human suffering because their situation did not meet the criteria. If the idea of participation through criteria were implemented properly the criteria could be used by decision makers to justify UN forces located in civil war areas to protect the providers and force governments to commit resources, both humanitarian and military, to relief efforts which meet their criteria. Besides using criteria to clarify which groups should be involved, there is also a need for better training of military, civilian administrators to improve success of the groups that participate in unique and multifaceted operations (Weiss, 1994:155).
A string of humanitarian assistance efforts which have eased the suffering but done nothing to stop the violence have led to a condition known as “compassion fatigue”. This can be defined as compassion confusion or a weariness in assisting those in need because there is such widespread anguish on how to do so. One example was the US military sent to Somalia to provide relief, but while trying to unload trucks and distribute supplies they were shot at by member of the clan they were assisting (Minear, 1994:10). Rather than succumb to compassion fatigue and risk losing funds and donations, a new or renewed emphasis needs to be placed on humanitarian development instead of emphasizing the relief of suffering in the initial response.

Increased emphasis on development also improves the potential for self-sufficiency. UN Ambassador Kofi N. Awoonor of Ghana has noted that, “Development is the only instrument that will remove the stigma of charity that accompanies all humanitarian relief efforts.” (Minear, 1994:10) It is also important to include local civilians in the humanitarian relief effort, because it changes victims into participants (Minear, 1994:12). This element of appropriateness could improve the ability humanitarian relief to transition from relief of the suffering to development which is one of the most serious problems in humanitarian assistance.

The final recommendation for improvement of the international humanitarian relief as a whole is to harness the power of the media. The media can have both a negative and positive effect on the humanitarian effort. In the assistance provided to Somalia the media was at first effective in influencing the US to participate in the humanitarian operation. Then later the media coverage became detrimental to the overall effort. More aid workers
were killed during the presence of UNITAF then the previous year because the attention brought on by the media made them targets. The media was also influential in the early termination of US military support to the area (Weiss, 1994:152). The media can just as easily have a positive role in humanitarian assistance by informing the public of the violations in humanitarian law and the situational needs for donations and funding. If the appropriate steps are taken to improve the humanitarian relief system the media can be used to justify efforts rather than exploit failures.

**Relations and Responsibilities.** Each of the three groups has based its responses on flexibility, because the humanitarian assistance needed is situational. There are many areas, such as peace keeping where both the UN and the US military are capable of providing the troops necessary. To avoid an overlap in efforts there must be working relations and shared responsibilities between each of the groups, especially in the areas of logistics, security for NGOs, and civil assistance. These are the areas where the US military is most likely to participate.

**Logistics.** The US military is the single most capable agency of providing a mass effort of emergency logistics. It has the experience, equipment, and training to move large quantities of relief donations over large distances to undeveloped areas with little warning. In an emergency such as a national disaster, the military is ideal for the initial response needed to save lives. In other areas of humanitarian crisis where the situation is a long term deterioration many NGOs have developed logistics systems over time. Convoys or use of railways are common examples of NGO initiated logistics systems. They are also capable of purchasing vehicles locally when needed. The UN also purchases
the needed vehicles, depending on the situation, but like NGOs they do not have a built-in logistics system such as the US military. Good working relations and coordination will allow for utilization of the military's logistics system when needed, but development and utilization of other resources whenever possible.

**Security.** As mentioned previously security can be provided by both the US military and UN peace keepers. Security in operations such as Bangladesh is limited to protection from the common thief and violence within the relief environment. It is more difficult to provide security in areas of man-made disasters where war may happening around the humanitarian environment. Here security is needed for the supplies, workers, and civilians receiving assistance. NGOs have been known to hire security guards from the local population in some situations. This can be a very dangerous practice because it raises the issue of neutrality and impartiality. At one point in ORH both the NGOs and HOC (UN run command center) were blackmailed by the local security guards to continue paying the guards for security even though the US military had entered the relief effort.

In all of the security efforts, for both the convoys and distribution points, many problems develop from limited communication capabilities. The UN also has many limitations on the type of security it can provide. The Security council may authorize peace keeping under either chapter six or chapter seven of the UN charter. Only when the UN authorizes chapter seven use of peace keeping forces are the peace-keepers authorized to take aggressive efforts to protect the UN authorized agencies providing humanitarian assistance. Under chapter six protection efforts by the UN are through the presence of UN peace-keeping forces. The level of force used by the US military is also determined by
regulations, but the process is much less bureaucratic because the field commanders are also influential. The military’s presence versus their ability to take military action is dependent on the situational environment.

**Civic Assistance.** Civic assistance is the third area where the lines of US military’s capabilities and responsibilities are clouded. The military is often asked to perform civic assistance such as building roads, bridges, and water or communication systems in a relief environment. This occurs when the military is already in the relief area performing the function of logistics or security. They are then approached by the national government or an NGO to perform civic duties based on their knowledge and resources in these areas. Civic assistance is difficult to fund under the humanitarian entitlements of the military, but can be justified through limited O&M funding or guidelines permitting activities to protect forces. Civic assistance is not the purpose of this funding, but can be loosely justified by making the need, such as a communication system, applicable to the needs of the US military. Besides being outside the military mission and unfunded, the civic assistance efforts frequently lack quality because they are approached in an ad hoc manner and built with whatever supplies are available (Dworken, 1993:27).

The actual act of civic assistance is often soldier initiated and rarely part of the military’s mission. The soldiers are struck by the crisis and may have the time to assist and thus become involved in assisting the NGOs and UN agencies by use of their manpower. However, the military does not discourage these efforts in development. In ORH outside projects were listed in the daily situation report. The capabilities of the military’s Army Corps of Engineers and Civil Assistance Officers could be utilized in almost every humanitarian assistance effort with more efficiency than the current military efforts, but the cost is high and unappropriated. Long term developments are the responsibility of
specific NGOs and UN agencies and even though the military is capable it is unwilling to take the responsibility.

The three areas covered in this section are specific to the military and those areas where working relations are an important part of shared responsibilities. Coordination in these areas is the key to efficient operations towards shared goals. There are many more areas such as medical care and food distribution where there is an overlap not only within groups but also between groups. The same principles of coordination apply for the most effective humanitarian effort. It is not possible to clearly divide the responsibilities between such a diverse and influential group of organizations, but an understanding of capabilities will improve relations in those areas where groups and organizations share responsibilities.

**Situational and Political Factors.** There are also many situational and political influences which affect the ability of groups to coordinate their efforts. Some of the situational factors have already been mentioned in the different types of operations the military has participated in. The political influences are inescapable in any humanitarian assistance effort. A well-coordinated and efficient operation can use politics to its advantage to gain more donations or funding, or politics can work in the opposite direction. For example, politics can prevent the delivery of donations or keep NGOs from taking advantage of the security offered by the military. There are limitless examples of situational and political effects on humanitarian assistance, but those which affect coordination can be the most damaging.

It is because of these influences, not a lack of capability, that the current system falls short of the global need for humanitarian assistance. In many cases there is a form of triage being used which makes the amount of humanitarian relief given to a particular crisis dependent on factors other than need. Given the dynamics and the organizational incongruities that have developed since the humanitarian relief system began, it is in some
ways a miracle that it works as well as does (Natsios, 1995:65). Relief coverage, skewed by Cold War politics, has not been replaced by a more need-based distribution of international resources (Minear, 1994:3).

There are still many areas whose humanitarian relief is affected by the politics of the situation. In a crisis such as Bosnia, groups will not confront the disrespect for humanitarian principle and international humanitarian law because of the politics involved in making these acquisitions. This makes it difficult to do effective humanitarian work because the relief from suffering does nothing towards ending the cause of suffering. All three groups are guilty of responding to a humanitarian crisis with immediate aid and never approaching the real problem of what is causing the crisis. In ethnic wars, such as the one in Bosnia, the humanitarian aid becomes a compensation for failure to take action against the war (Minear, 1994:7).

By addressing humanitarian crises in narrow manner and failing to address the sources, the relief system also opens itself up to become a target. At times both the relief providers and the victims may all become targets, because humanitarian intervention has a political slant that is not being addressed (Minear, 1994:3). The public, media, policymakers, and program managers tend to focus on the day-to-day crisis management, but the real goal is for a full recovery to a stable environment that will allow the relief area to be self-sufficient (Minear, 1994:8). The most common mistake is an overestimation of the immediate donations needed. This floods the local economy and causes an even more difficult road to recovery. Almost all humanitarian actions rely heavily on expensive outside actions while failing to strengthen the coping capabilities of the given communities. When external institutions are over stretched it is important to utilize the strengths of the local institutions. The UN and US often have difficulties in this area (Minear, 1994:11).
Another situational problem with the humanitarian relief system is the appropriateness of the response. First, the existing organizations and structures favor refugees, who have technically been forced out of their home country, over displaced persons, who have simply been forced out of their home. Next, the individual relief operations are marred by overlaps and gaps in providing food, health care, and a feasible development plan (Minear, 1994:3). Finally, the international relief system is primarily western and Judeo-Christian in orientation, but the over 75% of the world’s refugee population is Muslim, whose culture has different eating and religious traditions (Minear, 1994:12). These are three different situations where a more flexible system would allow for a more efficient response.

Conclusion

The reality is that usually no one group is in charge in a complex humanitarian emergency. All the players must learn to step outside of their individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the help of others to provide the most effective humanitarian assistance. The parties must also participate in planning, training, exercises and application of operational lessons learned to improve the relief effort. While OFDA and the NGOs are maintaining patterns of operation and decision making the military and UN often change roles in each humanitarian environment depending on the need for peace-keepers, peace enforcers or humanitarian assistance providers (Burton 1994:89). There are currently joint initiatives to improve the responsiveness to the humanitarian structure and to limit utilization of the US military for protection. These initiatives include efforts in coordination, training exercises, shared history and doctrine (Burton, 1994:90). All of the groups must realize that any improvements in the international relief system will require the same factors required to provide humanitarian relief: flexibility, patience and persistence (Helton, 1993:30). The
Table 4-1

Challenges to Improve the International Humanitarian Relief System

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<td>To design and implement a needs-based allocations process for the division of available international resources among crises; and, toward that end, to establish objective indicators triggering review of deterioration situation by senior UN officials and by the Security Council itself.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To achieve greater coherence in international relief programs, building upon the respective comparative advantages of the various actors but allowing each the necessary humanitarian space to achieve its full potential.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To devise a mechanism for identifying and funding the most cost-effective programs among emergency response options and for making investments in the areas of prevention and development which minimized the chance of recurring emergencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To approach humanitarian challenges in their broader context, undertaking emergency action as part of a balanced package of reinforcing measures to address underlying problems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To revamp the prevailing character of the world’s humanitarian system, drawing on and strengthening local resources, promoting savings in operating costs, and producing more effective and sustainable results</td>
<td>(Minear, 1994:4-12).</td>
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V. Conclusion

Overview

The problem of interagency coordination in peace operations goes beyond merely linking military and civilian efforts. It is not enough to have a point of contact where military staff can meet periodically with civilians in the area of operations. Interagency cooperation must begin with a clear understanding of the desired end-state, or the objectives of the mission. Military organizations may become involved to control and prevent violence; humanitarian organizations may become involved to alleviate human suffering; but if the causes of violence and suffering are political, then the end-state should provide for a political settlement. Coordination to reach the desired end-state requires a delicate balance of leadership and followership by all the agencies concerned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. (Last, 1994:20)

This quote from a conference report on *Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations* sums up the principle coordination problems in the current international system of providing humanitarian assistance. It is not a matter of good will or intentions, but a matter of organizational structure.

This chapter summarizes the problem areas of humanitarian assistance that have been highlighted in the literature review and research. It begins with a look at the interdependencies which occur in a comparison of the three group’s charters, their structures and organizational cultures. Next, the chapter examines the benefits in effectiveness and efficiency for the US military if the humanitarian assistance system improves coordination and the military participates under a clear cut role. Finally, there are recommendations for how the military and other groups can improve the current system over time.
Issues

Interdependencies. There are many interdependencies which can be found in the coordination of humanitarian assistance operations. A comparison of the criteria shows that all three groups are working towards the same goal of providing relief for the suffering. However, it is the differences in their structure and organizational cultures which makes it difficult for them to work together.

There are four tables in the literature review which outline the criteria or principles for the US, UN, ICRC and CRS in responding to a humanitarian crisis. Doctors without Borders does not operate under a defined set of principles; however their actions and reputation often show the same ideals. The tables listing the other four groups’ criteria are 2-1, 2-4, 2-6, and 2-7 respectively. The three agreed upon principles in providing humanitarian assistance are humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. A international humanitarian response system based on these principles would encompass the criteria of all three groups. Excluding the UN, the other organizations also agree on the need for independence and different levels of neutrality. The US differs slightly on its opinion of neutrality. Instead of neutrality they hold to the principle of subsidiary of sovereignty. This principle states that where humanitarian aid and sovereignty clash, the US defers to the relief of suffering, and considers self-government or in some situations the appearance of neutrality as secondary. This statement gives the US justification to provide assistance even where it is unable to maintain the principle of neutrality.
The groups do have some individual principles, but none are conflicting to the point where any one group can justify not working with another. The ICRC is the only organization to hold its universality and voluntary status as criteria for its humanitarian assistance operations. The US includes three different definitions of its response process in its criteria in the areas of accountability, appropriateness, and contextualization. Finally, CRS is individual in its principle of common good which allows them to intercede for human rights on the behalf of those people who are unable to defend themselves. Although not built into each group’s own humanitarian response criteria, each group could account for the other’s criteria given its methods and goals for providing humanitarian assistance.

With similar charters and shared goals for providing relief of the suffering and security to the humanitarian effort, it would appear that a coordinated humanitarian assistance effort would be simply a matter of communication. However, evidence shows that the structures and procedures used by each of these groups to provide assistance are limiting their coordination capabilities. The UN is loosely structured around the DHA, with each individual agency, such as the UNHCR and WFP responding independently. The US government organizes its response as well as contracting NGOs and organizing the military response. The US military is based on a hierarchy of personnel trained and disciplined to provide a war-fighting response. They tend to operate under a rigid structure and US troops are culturally and often politically conservative. NGOs are generally independent, resistant to authority, politically liberal, and focused on the immediate problem. NGOs tend to be staffed with former Peace Corps workers,
religiously committed activists, and young people with graduate degrees in developmental economics and public health (Natsios, 1995:70). Both the group structures and employee backgrounds in education and training differ enough to make communication and understanding among groups difficult.

The single problem that is least likely to be corrected is the fact that all of the groups who participate in humanitarian assistance operate under a different set of rules. Although this makes coordination difficult, it is not impossible. The differences in each groups structure allow for a broader and more flexible humanitarian response, but a less structured limited international humanitarian relief system. The solution is a system which allows for a versatility in response procedures among groups but effective utilization of their resources. The problems in the current system are being addressed to some extent, but the longer they remain the less effective the international effort to relieve human suffering.

Not only are there major differences in structure between the three major response groups, there are also differences within the organizations under each group. For example, there are problems in the internal response of the US, because OFDA and the US military also operate under a different set of rules. Although OFDA is the clear decision maker in any US humanitarian response, the structure of OFDA is much different from that of the military. Unlike the military, OFDA has a continuous working relationship with NGOs. OFDA distributes 60% of its budget or $120 million to NGOs (Burton, 1994:21).

Through this relationship OFDA has a better understanding of how NGOs operate and the importance of their independence in the field. The military only comes into
contact with NGOs in the field environment. Although the military tends to rely on the experience of OFDA to provide advisory and interface assistance with NGOs (Burton, 1994:22), the military still must interact with NGOs directly. Because of the differences in the organizations used by the US for humanitarian assistance, coordination with the US may be different depending on the type of organization, which only adds to the difficulties in communication.

OFDA is one of the few organizations capable of organizing an integrated humanitarian response and is also one of the few organizations that is respected and informed by the other groups. Yet even with its success in making the US humanitarian effort effective, there are still internal communication problems. One recommendation came from an after-action report from OPC where the military and OFDA had several misunderstandings of the other organizations mandates and capabilities (Burton, 1994:29). Both organizations agreed there is a need for a joint operations doctrine between OFDA and the military to clarify their roles and methods of coordination in the field.

**Military Benefits.** Besides the internal improvements to be made in the US military response, there are also improvements in the international humanitarian assistance system that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the US military. A clear cut role for the military would allow them to train appropriately and provide the best possible response. In order to improve coordination there are necessary changes at the cultural, strategic and operational levels.

Strategically, the US military must coordinate its timing and best use of its resources. This means collocating headquarters including the HOC, CMOC, and military
operations headquarters. Operating out of a central location would increase the interactions between the military and other organizations. Using the model coordination center, OSOCC, would also be an ideal solution but the lead agency of the UN would need to head the command center and the NGOs must be willing to participate. It is also important the military representatives in the coordination center be trained in humanitarian assistance activities, preferably with experience. This will save time lost in teaching the military staff how to interact well with the unique NGOs or UN agencies.

An experienced and respected staff in the coordination center will also make the transition from the humanitarian organization’s needs to the military’s capabilities. In return, the military tasks will be clear and the military can operate based on the needs of other organizations. Using coordination to determine the best use of the military is much more effective then a military-organized effort separate from the other organizations.

The development of a better coordination system and effective use of the military will also lead to natural efficiencies in the entire relief process. Much of the military’s efficiency is based on clarity of mission. The military’s mission in a humanitarian assistance effort should be to utilize its capability to provide logistics for large quantities of humanitarian donations. Although capable of direct assistance, it is not the military’s expertise. The military is also capable of providing security for those agencies providing humanitarian assistance. The role of providing security by the US military must be carefully considered. Because of their training and authority to act, the US military is operationally more capable then UN peace keeping troops. However, US security can be seen as a negative or positive political influence in man-made crisis where there is
continuous fighting. The same may hold true for UN peace keeping, but it is a united effort of all of the members of the UN and not representative of a single country choosing sides.

A more effective coordination system would allow the military and the other groups to provide the type of assistance they are most capable of providing. Even when it is necessary for the military to provide assistance directly, the improved coordination system will allow them to efficiently turn over these responsibilities as soon as possible to the other organizations. A system which adapts the skills of several different groups in their areas of expertise will have more efficient and effective output then if each group tries to accomplish some or all of the tasks of the system on its own. Currently the humanitarian assistance system is wasting effort by not coordinating for the optimal use of each of the groups involved.

The most important benefit of improved coordination would be the ability of the international relief system to reach more victims. Improved coordination means the sharing of information. This means fewer groups or organizations would have to send in teams, similar to DART, to scout out the type of relief needed. The donations could be coordinated and timed to enter the relief area when they are needed. Thus food and medical care could be followed by education and farming materials. The same logic could be applied to the type of NGOs and UN agencies in the area. Coordination would improve the transition from relief organizations to developmental organizations. By decreasing the overlapping efforts to coordinate, groups and their individual organizations should be able to provide humanitarian assistance to a wider range of relief areas.
**System Improvements.** In order for these operational changes to work there must also be some changes at the strategic level. Outside of the coordination center there is unlikely to be a unified command or a single leading organization given the control to make decisions affecting the other organizations, but a unified effort is possible (Last, 1994:22). This would mean an agreed upon vision of what the humanitarian assistance was meant to accomplish, what means would be necessary, and the expected time frame of participation. In order to accomplish this strategy for every humanitarian assistance operation each group would have to make some changes internally. These changes would give the groups a better structure in order to make the planning process consistent.

The following suggestions for feasible improvements to the UN humanitarian response were made by a group of leaders from the NGO community to the US House Select Committee on Hunger in 1992. First, by implementing the true design of the DHA, the UN should improve early warning systems, be able to carry out large scale relief programs, mobilize donor resources, focus public awareness, and negotiate political agreements for access to civilians in need. Next, the UN independent agencies need mandates which allow them to act independently and without the approval of donor governments. Third, the UN Under-Secretary General should take more responsibility in working political issues and gain access for all forms of humanitarian relief. Finally, the UN has improved its ability to coordinate with NGOs, by including NGOs in field assessments and consolidated donor appeals, but work needs to be done on combining relief and rehabilitation and on addressing the underlying causes of conflict (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:13).
Also in 1992, Lord Judd of Portsea, a retired director of Oxfam, made similar recommendations for the improvement of the UN humanitarian response.

We at Oxfam believe that the international community should improve its response to emergencies in three main ways: (a) by enhancing the coordination leadership and donor support of the UN; (b) by improving access to, and the protection of, people in need; and (c) by reexamining UN agency mandates. (Lord Judd, 1992:3)

Lord Judd also explained his requirements for a UN office with the authority to handle coordination and structure. The office he described then is very similar to the newly formed DHA. Table 5-1 on the following page lists those areas which Lord Judd thought the DHA should control. The current DHA does not handle all of these responsibilities, but it has the potential to do so.

Lord Judd also had several ideas for the improvement of the UN humanitarian response system outside of the DHA. First, he believed the international community should fully fund the UN agencies it has made responsible to fulfill its humanitarian mandate. This means voluntary contributions would only be sought for unforeseen emergency funding. Second, the international community should establish, as a basis for its relief work, that humanitarian assistance and protection constitute a fundamental human right. Third, the Secretary General should build on and develop the work of the UN to facilitate peace negotiations in conflict and emergency situations. Finally, the mandate of the UNHCR should be extended to include responsibility for displaced people; and the Deputy Secretary General should be empowered to mobilize UNHCR or other UN agencies to intervene to guarantee relief and protection (Lord Judd, 1992:7). In theory
many of Lord Judd’s ideas are already in place in the UN structure but are rarely implemented.

Table 5-1

Expected Responsibilities of DHA

| -to mobilize and trigger a rapid reaction force of experts to coordinate-ordinate relief efforts and if need be to protect life; the Deputy secretary General should have the support of emergency trigger ombudsmen whose job it would be to monitor possible emergency situations and advise the Deputy Secretary General to initiate action; |
| -to administer a standby pump priming emergency fund; |
| -to compile up-to-date information an regularly brief the media, politicians and public; corroborated information should be derived from a wide range of sources and presented in uniform manner to give it credibility with the donors; |
| -to prepare joint appeals and to lobby donors to respond; these appeals should be prepared on a consolidated basis, indicating which agency is doing what; appeals should be of a standard format, regularly updated and designed to promote donor confidence; |
| -with the services of specially appointed field coordinate of standing and repute, to ensure effective coordinate operation in the field and New York between UN agencies, donors, NGOs and host governments, to secure joint relief strategies and to ensure a clear division of labor between the different actors to prevent duplication and rivalry; |
| -to identify priority relief needs and significant shortfalls in response; |
| -to assist the Secretary General to solve political and conflict situations which affect the distribution of relief and the violation of human right and to help ensure access to those in need through establishing cross line and cross border relief operations; |
| -to prepare for disasters by establishing early warning systems, inventories of stockpiles and buffer stocks of food and relief items pre-positioned in disaster prone countries and regions; and |
| -to coordinate the specialized UN agencies in an effective program of post-disaster recovery. |

(Lord Judd, 1992:7)

The strength of the NGOs lies in their moral stamina to provide relief for the suffering. They are willing to go anywhere in the world and provide humanitarian assistance where it is needed independent of the political or military situation. They often arrive first at the crisis and remain until the development programs has made the
population self-sufficient. It is this idealistic attitude that often narrows the scope of their view and can make coordination difficult.

The NGOs must learn to broaden their scope in order to see the problems that create a humanitarian crisis, not just the effort needed to deal with it. They must also be willing to coordinate outside of their organization for the good of the relief effort. On the strategic level some of this coordination is done by InterAction and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. InterAction works to communicate the capabilities and criteria of individual NGOs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee participates in global policy making to improve the role of the individual NGO. If the NGOs were able to sacrifice limited sovereignty, they could develop a similar body with the power to make planning decisions for NGOs and define a skeleton structure. This structure would give NGOs flexibility in their methods of response, but similarity in organization for easier coordination between groups.

NGOs should also play a larger role in education and public policy reform to strengthen the international humanitarian response system (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:14). This can be difficult for a nonprofit organization, but NGOs can be very influential if the public believes in their moral efforts. They can be effective as lobbyists for policy reform with donor governments or the UN. They are also important in educating the public on what type of humanitarian crisis are occurring and why. Often they do not have the funding to produce their own educational media, but can use the press as a means to inform the public of what is happening and what needs to be done. NGOs need to broaden their view of humanitarian assistance beyond their small relief area.
This scope will improve their ability to plan and coordinate and is likely to increase the amount of assistance they receive from the other groups and private donors.

The ICRC is unique because it is not technically an NGO. Although its actual field work is the same in terms of providing, food, shelter, and health care, it has a strict mandate and acts under the authority of the Geneva Conventions. The unique situation of ICRC should be used to publicize violations of humanitarian law. In the past the ICRC has been reluctant to speak out about non-compliance of humanitarian law because there are few means to enforce the laws, but by going public they may prevent violations or make it economically costly for those who do violate humanitarian law (House Select Committee on Hunger, 1992:12).

Even though the ICRC can do very little in terms of coordination, because its mandate will not allow it to work with the military or any party who appears non-neutral, it can play a key role in communication. The ICRC can not only publicize violations but they can also let the other humanitarian groups know what type of resources are needed. By getting an inside view, ICRC can identify the sources of the problem. The ICRC is also powerful through its reputation, and able to gain funding and donations on large scale. The ICRC should continue to uphold this reputation and take advantage of its influence.

Finally, the US must also tighten its structure for providing humanitarian assistance. OFDA could not only improve the US response but also the international humanitarian response by operating under the criteria for a US response which are defined in PDD-25 and PRD-50. This would set the example for other governments participating
in humanitarian assistance. It would clarify US obligations and willingness to commit, while forcing the other groups to work in a efficient manner in order to receive US support. The DOD will then be able to better structure its response based on the criteria used by OFDA. An example of this is the DOD response to PRD-50 listed on the following page. It lists the guidelines for use of the military in foreign humanitarian operations.

The DOD should continue to improve the task organization concept, because the military possesses so many critical and unique capabilities to support humanitarian operations. It should also highlight areas that can be augmented by specialized personnel or units such as staff judge advocate, public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations and communications (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1995:4). This will ensure these personnel have been appropriately trained to assist in improving the US response to a humanitarian crisis. Without this type of organization and preparedness, the US military is underutilized, and may hamper the assistance effort while it relearns each organization's capabilities and responsibilities with each new crisis.
Table 5-2
The DOD response to PRD-50

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<th>Objectives</th>
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The limits of DOD’s mandate in a humanitarian crisis response mission should be clearly defined and communicated from the start. US military planning requirements need to be based on an explicit identification of what other actors will provide, and ensure clarity on all implied tasks. Acknowledging that missions change in dynamic situations, any such changes should be clearly enunciated. |

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<th>Termination</th>
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One of the most important elements to improve effective military support is to define criteria for an end state. Clear definition facilitates hand over. These exit criteria must address how to define when the humanitarian assistance situation is stabilized and when primary relief organizations assume responsibility. This type of planning should begin almost immediately at the outset of the crisis. |

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<tr>
<th>Exit Strategy</th>
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There must be a clearly defined exit strategy consistent with a realistic end-state for the operation. Once the exit criteria points are identified, commanders can begin planning a hand-off with local authorities, international organizations, and other US government agencies. They should view the hand over as a military operation similar in complexity to a “relief in place.” They should plan for the hand over from the beginning of the crisis, identifying the organization or authority to which the hand-off will be made prior to the commitment of US forces, and maintain ongoing coordination and communication with field agencies concerning the hand over. |

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<th>International Consensus</th>
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Whenever possible, it is important to secure the support, if not the cooperation of a number of actors at the national, subnational, and the supranational levels prior to commencing a humanitarian operation. International support will help to ensure other countries share the financial and manpower burdens. |

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<th>National Consensus</th>
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For total access of all US military capabilities as well as for welding the national will, political support is important. For example, political support is imperative in the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up process. |

(Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1995:3-4)
life-threatening emergency event. The military should not attempt to replace or dominate humanitarian organizations and only assume a leadership role when the other organizations fail to. Projects such as port or road reconstruction should be undertaken only for the military transportation needs and addressed by developmental agencies for long term improvements (Natsios, 1995:81). The US must adapt its crisis response to allow for development and/or self-sufficiency to replace its short-term efforts, so the solutions are lasting.

These are changes needed at the strategic level to create a better environment for planning, while at the cultural it is not a matter of changing, but of educating. This is important for understanding and cooperation at the lowest levels. Once the cultural differences are apparent to all the groups they will form a better team by virtue of mutual respect. The increased cross-group training and education classes will help this problem, along with seminars, workshops, and common core curriculum for teaching peace keeping to staff officers (Last, 1994:23). It is important to maintain the differences in culture, because they are what makes the international humanitarian assistance system possible, but a better understanding between groups will improve their ability to work together. Mutual respect will also be built from experience and time.

Summary

There are many problems in the organization of the international humanitarian relief system on the operational, strategical and cultural level. President Clinton spoke on this issue in PRD-50, where he named the following shortcomings in the system: slowness
to respond, weak coordination and poor internal communications among relief operators, limited large scale logistics capabilities, inequitable burden of financing, and over-reliance on the US military (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1995:1). Add to this list the structural problems of the relief system such as coverage, coherence, cost-effectiveness, correctness, and appropriateness and it would appear that the relief system is determined to make its work as difficult as possible (Minear, 1994:13). However considering the success of the relief system, given all these problems, it is still capable of providing relief to the suffering throughout the world. By making improvements at the different levels, the international humanitarian assistance system will increase its capabilities and quality of effort. By clarifying and defining the role of the US military in humanitarian assistance they can provide a more effective and efficient response through preparation and understanding.
References


REF-3
Vita

Captain Amy M. Dayon is from Sleepy Hollow, Illinois. She graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1991 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Humanities. After completing the Transportation Officers Course, Captain Dayon was assigned to the transportation squadron at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina. After one year in the operations management flight she was assigned as a duty officer to the aerial port at Rhein Main AB, Germany. Captain Dayon also served as the 362nd Group Quality Officer for six months at Rhein Main. She entered the Air Force Institute of Technology in May 1994.

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After the Cold War ended, the media increased the world's awareness of humanitarian problems. In an effort to reach more of the suffering, the United Nations, donor governments, and non-governmental organizations began to provide a larger quantity of relief through a more structured system. The purpose of this thesis is to define the relationships of the three major groups responsible for providing humanitarian assistance in the world today. The methods and structure of the US government, UN and three non-governmental organizations (International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins sans Frontieres, and Catholic Relief Services) are used as examples of the international humanitarian relief system. This system is rapidly improving as experience and education in providing humanitarian assistance increases. This study is meant to show the strengths and limitations of each group and coordination problems among them. A better understanding of the international humanitarian relief system should lead to a well defined role and therefore increased utilization of the US military in providing humanitarian assistance.