This study is an analysis of thirty-five peace operations conducted by the United Nations from 1948 to mid-1995. Each chapter discusses the initial crisis, the U.N. response, the adoption of the U.N. resolution, the deployment of forces, and the current (1995) situation. Each chapter also includes a chronology of key events and an analysis of the mission's effectiveness.
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:

LESSONS LEARNED

A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement
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PREFACE

This study was undertaken to support the work of the Politico-Military Assessment Branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating lessons from United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations for current and future applications. The project consists of a series of chapters, one chapter per operation, providing a concise compilation of facts, background, and analysis for the selected U.N. peacekeeping operations, in addition to two non-U.N. peacekeeping operations in the cases of Northern Ireland and Liberia. A three-part format is used to structure each chapter: the predeployment of forces (the initial crisis, the U.N. response, and the adoption of the U.N. resolution); the deployment of forces (the military and political goals, rules of engagement, composition of forces, equipment, tactics, training, costs, and the operational assessment of the mission); and the current situation (the mission's status quo). Each chapter is introduced by a selected chronology. A concluding section examines the particular mission's effectiveness at meeting its political and military goals. The study's concluding chapter assesses the overall nature of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including proposals for new roles and missions as well as possible deployments in new trouble spots.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to assess the overall effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions by examining the performance of these operations on a case-by-case basis. After describing the initial crisis that gave rise to a U.N. response in each situation, the study goes on to examine the circumstances of the deployment, political and military goals, rules of engagement, composition of forces, equipment, training, tactics, and cost of these missions. It then considers the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations in achieving the U.N.'s objectives. Altogether, the study analyzes 24 U.N. operations, beginning with the first peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, in 1948. For comparison purposes, two other cases of non-U.N. peacekeeping or counterinsurgency operations are also examined: the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG) and the British counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland.

Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is mandated to determine when a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression has occurred in a given situation and to authorize the appropriate U.N. response. Chapter VII of the charter provides that the Security Council can order the use of armed forces, but it requires the unanimous agreement of all members of the council, a condition that has not been met during most of the
U.N.'s history. As conflicts arose in various parts of the world and ways had to be found to respond to these conflicts, the U.N. developed the practice of employing peacekeeping operations, which evolved on an ad-hoc basis, primarily as holding actions.

Peacekeeping operations have been used to supervise and maintain cease-fires, to provide a buffer between opposing forces, to prevent the presence of arms in an area, or to maintain and patrol a border. Peacekeeping operations never have a purely military function, but also include political or administrative roles. In certain cases, they even perform humanitarian assistance functions or supervise elections. In each specific case, the Security Council sets forth the function in its resolution creating the mission.¹

There are two kinds of U.N. peacekeeping operations: observer missions, of the type created in the 1940s, and peacekeeping forces. The first mission officially defined as "peacekeeping" was established in 1956, following the Suez crisis. The U.N. General Assembly authorized the first force-level operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. Whereas observer missions are unarmed, requiring little equipment and staff, peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and are larger in terms of personnel, equipment, and cost. As of September 1993, a total of 28 U.N. peacekeeping operations had been established. Of these 18 were still continuing as of October 1993.²

U.N. peacekeeping missions have been based on a broad degree
of consensus on several basic principles. First, the consent of
the host government or governments is obtained before the
establishment of a mission. Such consent involves an agreement on
the way in which the U.N. mission proposes to carry out its
mandate. Second, the parties involved are consulted on the
countries that are designated to contribute troops to the
operation. Permanent members of the Security Council (China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) do not
usually provide military components, although there have been
important exceptions.

A third, key principle has been the principle of
impartiality, which is seen as fundamental for the success of a
U.N. mission. The participants in an operation should avoid
actions that favor one party against the other and must not
interfere in the internal affairs of host countries. They should
also avoid the use of armed force to carry out their mandate.
Traditionally, troops in peacekeeping operations (aside from
observer missions) are provided with weapons of a defensive
character only and should not use these weapons except in self-
defense. For their part, the parties to the conflict should allow
the mission unrestricted access and freedom of movement within
the countries of operation.

Until recently, these principles have usually been adhered
to by the U.N. and the host countries. With the ongoing U.N.
mission to Somalia, however, the U.N. broke with past practice.
Not only has the peacekeeping mission used armed force, but it
has also taken sides in the political conflict within Somalia. As for the Somalis, their armed tribes have attacked U.N. forces in the country with increasing ferocity. A key question, then, is whether missions like the one in Somalia can achieve peacekeeping objectives efficiently and effectively, or whether developments there represent a change to the detriment of the overall goals and purpose of the U.N.³

During the years of the Cold War, East-West relations dominated international military affairs, relegating the U.N. to the periphery. U.N. involvement was limited to special situations in which U.N. peacekeeping troops were called in to monitor cease-fires (in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, for example) or to help preserve law and order (in the Congo, in 1960-64, and in Cyprus, until 1974, for example). The dramatic changes that have taken place in the world over the past few years have caused the peacekeeping role of the U.N. to become more prominent. Although the prospect of a global war has declined, regional conflicts have escalated tremendously, and, in response, the U.N. has become involved in a wide array of peacekeeping operations. Significantly, 13 U.N. missions were begun between 1988 and 1992, which is equal to the number undertaken in the previous 40 years of the U.N.'s existence.⁴

In contrast with missions in the past, these new operations typically have more ambitious mandates. Whereas peacekeeping operations used to be limited to conflict containment using third-party troops and observers, such operations may no longer
be sufficient to achieve peacekeeping goals. The growing number of regional conflicts resulting from ethnic and religious rivalries have created new demands for U.N. peace missions. As the *New York Times* put it: "Deterrence kept the peace in Europe and transferred the burdens of hostility onto third-country proxies . . . . Now the United Nations is expected to cope with the legacies of all these conflicts, plus new ones popping in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."°

Increasingly the U.N. has acted as the "midwife of political transitions," with nine of the missions undertaken since 1988 involved in resolving internal political conflicts and establishing democratic regimes.° Now, in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. is deeply entangled in conflicts over territory and politics. This fact has created pressure on the U.N. to move beyond peacekeeping and into the much more active intervention of "peace enforcement."

A key question that arises is that of financing the growing number of U.N. operations. Financing for U.N. peacekeeping comes out of a special UN budget, to which each member state contributes, according to a special assessment based on gross national product. The United States currently pays 31.7 percent of the U.N.'s annual peacekeeping expenses.° Peacekeeping operations, some of which have been going on for decades, have become a source of soaring costs. Lack of oversight and budgetary control--resulting in waste, mismanagement, and even corruption--have contributed greatly to the problem. Finding sufficient funds
will be a growing problem for worldwide peacekeeping operations. If the U.N. expands its regular role from that of peacekeeping to peace enforcement, a vast rise in costs will result. Will enough member states be willing to pay for such operations?

Although the U.N. will probably remain the world's leading choice for conducting peacekeeping operations in the future, it is not clear that the U.N. can handle this growing load. The escalating number of U.N. peacekeeping operations has pushed U.N. financial and personnel resources to the limit. In light of these financial problems and the increasing pressure on the U.N. to expand its peacekeeping missions to include a greater military role, it will be essential for the U.N. to devise a long-term strategy, based on broad consensus and workable principles. Part of this strategy, one would hope, will be based on the lessons learned from peacekeeping missions in the past.
Endnotes


Bibliography


United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Selected Chronology

1955

The Greek Cypriots began a guerrilla-type rebellion against British rule in Cyprus.

1959

Agreements were signed by representatives of Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities for an independent Republic of Cyprus. Britain, Greece, and Turkey were granted certain intervention rights in the republic's affairs.

1960

The Republic of Cyprus was officially established on August 16. The country was governed by a constitution that divided power between the majority Greek Cypriot and the minority Turkish Cypriot communities, and established an elaborate system of safeguards to protect the rights of the minority community.

1963

In December, intercommunal violence erupted between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

1964

The year began with frequent incidents of intercommunal violence. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention was proposed, but was rejected by Cypriot President Makarios. United Nations (UN) intervention was accepted and the first United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) troops arrived in March. Invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces was averted in June by U.S. diplomacy. By fall, peace was restored and UNFICYP began peacekeeping operations on the island.

1967

In November, intercommunal clashes left several dozen people dead, almost all of whom were Turkish Cypriots. Turkish pressure forced Greece to withdraw most of its troops from the island. U.S. diplomacy was instrumental in restoring peace.

1968
After the violence of late 1967, a long period of peace began, with the UNFICYP defusing many threatening incidents. A long series of intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders commenced.

1970

An assassination attempt against President Makarios by Greek and Greek Cypriot extremists failed.

1974

A coup d'état staged by Greek Cypriot extremists and backed by the military junta in Athens deposed President Makarios on July 15. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus on July 20-22 with a force of 40,000 troops. A short truce was followed by a second Turkish campaign on August 14-16, that gave Turkey possession of about 37 percent of Cyprus. UNFICYP began the second stage of its Cypriot tour by patrolling the buffer area between the Turkish-held territory in the north and the Greek Cypriot-controlled south.

1975

Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish-controlled territory of Cyprus to be the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC).

1977-79

A number of agreements between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders were reached.

1983

In November, Turkish Cypriots established an independent state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As of October 1993, only Turkey had recognized the TRNC.

1992

In November, after the failure of yet another round of U.N.-sponsored talks between the leaders of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued a public reproof of the Turkish Cypriots for their intransigence. Denmark began the withdrawal of its troops from UNFICYP in December.

1993

In June, Canada began the withdrawal of its troops from UNFICYP.
INTRODUCTION

Intercommunal violence erupted in Cyprus in December 1963 after several years of mounting political tension. The tension grew out of disputes between the majority Greek Cypriot and the minority Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities about how the country was to be governed. At the time, the Greek Cypriots numbered approximately 80 percent of the population and the Turkish Cypriots 18 percent.¹ Violence quickly escalated, and after rejecting proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, the government of the Republic of Cyprus requested the detachment of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping troops. The first members of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) arrived in March 1964. This force eventually totalled some 6,400 troops and consisted of military and police personnel from nearly a dozen nations. The principal mission of UNFICYP was to prevent incidents of intercommunal violence on Cyprus. Because Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities were scattered throughout Cyprus, UNFICYP needed to patrol the entire island.

UNFICYP’s task was altered greatly in mid-1974 when Turkish forces invaded the island and succeeded in occupying 37 percent of it. As of October 1993, this territory was still under Turkish control. Since the beginning of this occupation, UNFICYP has been mainly concerned with patrolling a buffer zone that separates the area controlled by the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus from the Turkish-held area. As of October 1993, UNFICYP consisted of just under 1,000 soldiers.
This case study examines the situation in Cyprus that led to intercommunal violence in December 1963, the deployment of UNFICYP to help prevent further violence, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation in light of the mission's initial goals.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

**The Initial Crisis**

The initial crisis that precipitated the deployment of UNFICYP to Cyprus in March 1964 grew out of the long-standing frustration of the Greek Cypriot community with the terms of the constitution of 1960 that established the independent Republic of Cyprus. In November 1963, the republic's president, the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III, published a list of proposed amendments to the constitution that would have reduced the disproportionate political powers it granted to the small Turkish Cypriot community (approximately 18 percent of the island's population). These powers protected the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, but prevented the much larger Greek Cypriot community (80 percent of the island's population) from governing Cyprus as it desired. Makarios's proposed constitutional amendments were quickly rejected by Turkish authorities and subsequently by leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The failed Greek Cypriot attempt to gain political dominance on the island intensified tensions that were already high after several years of frustrating efforts on the part of the two communities to work together within the constitutional framework.
In the view of some Greek Cypriots, not only the constitution but also the republic itself was at fault and both were to be discarded at the first opportunity. Radical Greek Cypriot elements--armed and organized--sought to realize the long-cherished dream held by many Greek Cypriots of uniting Cyprus with Greece. Turkish Cypriot resistance to this unification (enosis, in Greek) was to be crushed. The Turkish Cypriot community was aware of these sentiments and had armed itself.

Greek and Turkish political and military meddling in Cypriot affairs contributed to tensions on the island. Both countries sought to protect the well-being of their Greek- or Turkish-speaking cousins on Cyprus. The agreements they had signed in 1959 to establish the Republic of Cyprus gave them the right to intervene, and even to maintain troops on the island. Britain was also involved in the affairs of its former colony and had two substantial military bases there. All three countries had the right to restore by force the republic established in 1960 if they saw it being destroyed, together if possible, unilaterally if not.

Given the accumulated tension in Cyprus in December 1963, once intercommunal violence began on December 21 it escalated quickly. Within days, atrocities were committed by both sides, and at least 500 people were killed. British authorities soon declared that the British peackeeping force on the island was insufficient to restore order. A U.S. proposal that a NATO force be sent to Cyprus was rejected by Makarios, who insisted that the
U.N. deal with the situation.³

The U.N. Response

On December 27, 1963, the U.N. Security Council convened to discuss ways of dealing with the outbreak of violence. Following a request by the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and Britain for the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General to observe the British peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani, of India, went to Cyprus in mid-January to report on the mission’s performance.⁴ He reported that the situation was deteriorating, hostages were being killed, normal government rule was disappearing, and that there were fears that Greece and Turkey might invade the island to restore order.⁵ After a request, on February 15, by British and Cypriot representatives for Security Council action, the Secretary-General appealed to all sides to exercise restraint, while continuing his efforts to form a U.N. peackeeping force.⁶

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

After receiving Lieutenant General Gyani’s reports, on March 4, 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186 (1964), declaring that intercommunal violence on Cyprus threatened international peace and recommending the creation of the UNFICYP, with the Cypriot government’s consent.⁷ According to the terms of the resolution, the UNFICYP was to prevent the recurrence of violence, maintain and restore law and order, and bring about a return to "normal conditions."⁸ The resolution called on U.N. members, the Government of Cyprus, and the local
communities to refrain from exacerbating the situation.\textsuperscript{9} The resolution called on the Secretary-General, following consultation with representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, to determine UNFICYP's composition, size, leadership, function, duration, and budget.\textsuperscript{10} The UNFICYP was to be an impartial military and police force with no responsibility for arranging a political solution to the crisis.\textsuperscript{11} In addition to creating a peacekeeping force, the resolution mandated the appointment of a U.N. mediator to work for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem.\textsuperscript{12}

Once the force became operational, its mandate was to run for three months. Until mid-1966 this mandate was extended by the Security Council for three-month periods. Since then, UNFICYP's existence has been extended for six-month periods, most recently in June 1993.

\textbf{DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES}

On March 6, 1964, the Secretary-General appointed General Gyani as commander of the UNFICYP. The first components of the force, a Canadian contingent, arrived in Cyprus on March 13, 1964. By March 27, a sufficient number of troops had arrived for the force to be declared operational. Swedish, Irish, and Finnish contingents arrived in April. As these contingents arrived, elements of the British troops, who had been involved in peacekeeping since December, withdrew from the U.N. effort. About 200 civilian police personnel from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden also arrived in these months. An Austrian
field hospital unit arrived in May, and by early June UNFICYP's personnel amounted to 6,411.13

UNFICYP's main headquarters was established in Nicosia. The two British bases located on the island provided the main logistical support. Communication systems were established that enabled quick contact from the smallest patrol units up to U.N. headquarters in New York when needed. The sectors in which the various national contingents operated coincided with the existing administrative districts of the Republic of Cyprus. The Danes were located in the center of the island, the Swedes in the east and northeast, the British in the southwest, the Irish in the west, the Canadians in Nicosia and the northwest, and the Finns in the north center. Within these districts, troops were deployed near the armed camps of the two ethnic communities so that they could quickly intercede if trouble threatened. Troops were also located at a number of fixed points along cease-fire lines, in areas that appeared vulnerable, and near U.N. facilities.14

 Political and Military Goals

The UNFICYP's initial political and military goals were modified during the course of its operation as a result of changing circumstances in Cyprus, particularly the events in 1974 that led to the Turkish invasion of the island. Thus the initial goals of supervising the 1964 cease-fire; reducing military tensions between the two sides by maintaining the status quo, particularly the preservation of the Turkish Cypriot community's status as guaranteed by the 1960 Constitution; and restoring the
rule of law and order were modified by the addition of the task of providing humanitarian and relief assistance to the inhabitants on both sides affected by the 1974 partition of the island.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, throughout its existence, UNFICYP’s main political goal was to promote peaceful conditions that would lead to a "just and lasting settlement" of the Cyprus problem.\textsuperscript{16}

**Rules of Engagement**

The UNFICYP was in Cyprus as a peacekeeping, rather than peace-making or peace-enforcing force. UNFICYP troops were required to be in uniform when outside their living areas. They carried small arms to be used only for purposes of self-defense. Self-defense included the defense of U.N. personnel, positions, and vehicles coming under armed attack. Attempts to disarm UNFICYP could also be met with force. The minimum of force was to be used, and only after all other means of persuasion had been tried. The commander on the spot decided when armed force was needed.\textsuperscript{17}

**Composition of Forces**

The UNFICYP reached its maximum strength in mid-1964, when it consisted of nearly 6,500 persons. Military contingents were supplied by Austria, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) consisted of about 200 civilian police who came from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden.\textsuperscript{18} The size of the force varied according to conditions on Cyprus. By early 1974, the force was down to 2,200 personnel; by mid-August it had doubled in size
because of the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios by Greek Cypriot extremists in mid-July and the Turkish invasion a week later. The UNFICYP's personnel were gradually reduced as intercommunal violence declined. As of June 1991, the force amounted to 2,151 personnel. By that date, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden had withdrawn their troops.\textsuperscript{19} By July 1993, the UNFICYP amounted to just under 1,000 troops after Denmark and Canada had begun withdrawing their troops in December 1992 and June 1993 respectively. The withdrawals left British and Austrian troop contingents and about three dozen civilian police from Australia and Sweden to carry out the U.N. peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{20}

**Equipment**

The UNFICYP is lightly armed in accordance with its peacekeeping mandate. Because much of the force's work involves observation, its personnel are furnished with advanced night-vision equipment and binoculars. Although the UNFICYP has some armored personnel carriers at its disposal, they have been little used in recent years. For general transportation needs, vehicles such as Landrovers and Ferret Scout Cars are used (supplied to it by British forces). Bicycles are used for some patrols. Alouette and Wessex helicopters are also available and are especially valuable for transport in mountainous areas.\textsuperscript{21}

**Training**

UNFICYP troops received varying amounts of training before they arrived in Cyprus. Some countries, such as Canada, Denmark, and Sweden, provided their personnel with training beforehand in
crowd control, roadblocks, mine-detection, and other techniques. The supplier of the largest number of troops, Britain, made no effort to prepare its troops for peacekeeping duties because it was expected they would learn to manage their duties on site. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., an observer of the UNFICYP in the mid-1970s, found that national contingents differed little in performance of duties, even though some had received prior training (most notably Canada), some consisted largely of reservists with a degree of training (Denmark and Sweden), and some were made up of professional soldiers (Britain, Ireland, and Canada).  

In order to become proficient at peacekeeping duties, UNFICYP troops had to unlearn some of what they had been taught. In a typical combat situation, for example, patrols have to be as invisible as possible. In Cyprus patrols had to be highly visible if they were to accomplish their peacekeeping mission. Much self-control and tact, sometimes even under severe provocation, were also essential. Peacekeeping duty was so unlike regular military duty that one Canadian officer, experienced in both, wrote that although peacekeeping is no job for a soldier, it is a job that only a soldier can do.

As of September 1993, the UNFICYP had been in place for almost thirty years. This fact meant that the nations supplying troops during much or all of this period had acquired considerable experience in peacekeeping duties. Enlisted personnel served only six-month tours in Cyprus, but some
returned for additional tours. Officers often served for longer periods. In some armies, Canada's for example, most army officers had served at least one tour in Cyprus, and some had served several. The extensive experience gained through these numerous tours provided UNFICYP with veteran peacekeepers.

**Tactics**

The U.N. created the UNFICYP in 1964 to prevent the recurrence of violence between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities. This was to be accomplished without recourse to armed force. Within weeks of their arrival, UNFICYP troops were deployed throughout the island near encampments of the rival communal forces and near other points where violence might erupt. Static posts housing mobile patrols were soon established. Elements were quickly sent to defuse potentially violent incidents or to quell violence that had already erupted. UNFICYP troops were to interpose themselves between rival factions. They were also to protect civilian populations from the numerous armed militias that roamed the island. If possible they were to persuade armed groups and fortified encampments to move away from hostile forces. To perform these tasks, the UNFICYP was granted almost unlimited access to all areas of the island. The force also strove to be completely impartial and on good terms with the military and civilian authorities in both communities. Effective means of communication were essential for these tasks; the UNFICYP needed quick access to higher authorities when threatening incidents occurred.
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974 by about 40,000 troops radically changed the methods and techniques used by the UNFICYP to fulfill its mandate. Because Turkish forces now occupied the northern third of the island, and the UNFICYP no longer had to prevent violence from erupting all through the island, the force focused its attention instead on the buffer zone that separated Turkish Cypriot territory from the Greek Cypriot-controlled territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The buffer zone was the area that lay between opposing forces' front lines when the cease-fire of August 16, 1974 went into effect and ended the second Turkish campaign on Cyprus. Up to 7 kilometers wide in some areas and as narrow as 4 meters wide in Nicosia, the buffer zone ran for about 180 kilometers across the island from the western to the eastern coasts and accounted for about 3 percent of its area.

UNFICYP troops established about 150 observations posts in and along the buffer zone, using a variety of existing and newly constructed structures. About 50 of these posts were occupied on a continuous basis; most were occupied from time to time. The line was divided into a number of sectors, each patrolled by a different national contingent. The aim of the UNFICYP in these new circumstances was to prevent any violence in or along the buffer zone. The force accomplished this goal by constant observation and mobile patrols. Any change in the fortifications of opposing forces, even the most minor, was observed and dealt with. Any incidents of violence, or possible signs of violence,
such as the sound of a random gunshot, were investigated. Throughout the mission, the UNFICYP forces remained strictly impartial, maintained close contact with the opposing forces, and avoided the use of force except in self-defense.

In addition to transforming UNFICYP's peacekeeping duties, the de facto partition of the island in mid-1974 added a sizeable humanitarian component to its tasks. The force came to serve as a key link between the two communities that were now officially separated. The UNFICYP also supervised mail deliveries between the communities. It visited and brought supplies to the estimated 1,000 Greek Cypriots living in the Turkish-controlled territory and the 100 or so Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus. It arranged the transfers of members of these two groups back to their communities and coordinated visits by relatives. The UNFICYP also supervised farming in the buffer zone. It did so to ensure that valuable land would remain fertile. Because both communities farmed in the buffer zone, the UNFICYP was especially vigilant to prevent potentially violent incidents from occurring.

Cost

According to U.N. estimates, the cost of the UNFICYP from its beginning in March 1964 until mid-December 1990 was $635.7 million. Much of the mandate's expenses had been absorbed by the nations that provided the mission's troops, however. If the U.N. had had to pay for all of the UNFICYP's expenses, according to one estimate, $2 billion would have been required by 1990.

Until late May 1993, the UNFICYP's costs were met in a way
unlike that of any other U.N. exercise: the nations contributing troops to it absorbed much of its costs and, in addition, voluntary contributions were received from other U.N. members. As of July 31, 1991, 78 countries had contributed $450.8 million to the fund. The United States was the largest contributor with $212.6 million, followed by Britain with $86.3 million. Because of this method of financing, the UNFICYP cost the U.N. $19 million annually, as of late 1992. Voluntary contributions were never adequate to meet the UNFICYP’s costs, however, and the mandate’s overall deficit amounted to about $200 million as of mid-1993. To improve the mission’s finances, Secretary-General Boutos-Ghali directed in May 1993 that the UNFICYP be financed by annual assessments on U.N. members. The financial burden imposed on the nations providing troops to UNFICYP had forced some of them, for example Sweden, to withdraw their contingents.

Operational Assessment

Although the UNFICYP was generally considered successful in accomplishing its military objectives, in some respects it did not fulfill its mandate.

First, the UNFICYP was unable to prevent a recurrence of violence between the two communities in August 1964 and in November 1967. In 1964, the UNFICYP’s limited forces and the reliance on nonviolent measures had no effect on conflict in the Kokkina area of western Cyprus. It was only the intervention by Turkish air force fighter jets against Greek Cypriot ground
forces that saved besieged Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Threats by
President Makarios to kill Turkish Cypriots throughout the island
brought fighting to an end and the acceptance of a U.N.-sponsored
cease-fire.\textsuperscript{32} Similarly, the mission's nonviolent measures were
unable to prevent the incidents at the villages of Ayios
Theodoros and Kophinou in south central Cyprus in November 1967
that cost the lives of about two dozen Turkish Cypriots. Only
Turkey's threat to invade Cyprus and U.S. diplomatic pressure
stopped the killing and led to the departure of thousands of
Greek troops from Cyprus.\textsuperscript{33}

Second, UNFICYP's mandate dealt with curbing intercommunal
violence, not with international force. Thus, in 1974 the UNFICYP
was unable to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus with a force of
40,000 troops. Although the UNFICYP presence prevented the
killing of some civilians and wider war crimes, Turkish forces
continued fighting in Cyprus until Ankara attained its goals.\textsuperscript{34}
UNFICYP's occupation of the Nicosia International Airport saved
it from destruction, but at the cost of several dozen UNFICYP
fatalities.

Third, the UNFICYP failed to achieve the last aim listed by
Resolution 186 that "normal conditions" were to be restored in
Cyprus. Although violent incidents were drastically reduced for
long periods through the presence and activities of the UNFICYP,
the island's central government ceased to function again
according to the terms of the 1960 constitution. Nor was there
extensive intermingling of the two ethnic communities in ordinary
day-to-day activities as had been the case before December 1963. Many Turkish Cypriots retreated into their armed enclaves, and the two communities viewed each other with fear and suspicion. Restoring "normal conditions" thus remained beyond the mission's capability.

The mission's single success was its role in preventing recurrences of intercommunal violence during nearly all of the last thirty years. Except for the few months after its arrival, and the two periods of November 1967 and July-August 1974, the UNFICYP has kept Cyprus almost completely free of intercommunal violence. Thousands of potentially threatening incidents were defused by the quick and patient action of the UNFICYP. In times of tension, perhaps 50 of these incidents were recorded each month. At other times, there were far fewer. Some incidents involved only minor misunderstandings. Other incidents were more serious, but were contained by the UNFICYP. Actual intercommunal violence remained at a minimum and rarely resulted in fatalities, a stark contrast to the thousands killed during the periods of intense crisis.

CURRENT SITUATION

As of October 1993, the UNFICYP remained in place in Cyprus. Its mandate was renewed for an additional six-month term in June 1993, and was likely to be renewed again in December 1993. The UNFICYP continues to patrol the buffer zone between the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus and the area controlled by Turkey and occupied by the island's Turkish Cypriot community.
Despite repeated diplomatic efforts by the U.N. and the United States, a negotiated settlement that would reunite the island under one central government appears highly unlikely.

The Turkish Cypriot state unilaterally declared in November 1983 received no international recognition except by Turkey. However, the existence of this secessionist state indicates to some that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is satisfied with the island’s de facto partition, enjoys having its own state to govern, and feels secure because of the military protection provided by the 30,000 troops Turkey maintains on the island. The Greek Cypriot leadership appears to seek an agreement, but is unable or unwilling to offer the necessary concessions for a lasting settlement. The international community has viewed this stalemate with bewilderment over the years.

As of October 1993, UNFICYP numbered less than 1,000 soldiers. Denmark began to withdraw its troops from the force in December 1992, with Canada following suit in June 1993. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has judged the existing 1,000-person force as insufficient for its task. He believes that three 350-personnel units, including an armored unit, are needed by the UNFICYP to fulfill its mandate. Units from Hungary and Argentina are reportedly possible replacements for the departing units from Denmark and Canada.

CONCLUSION

The UNFICYP has not brought long-term peace to Cyprus, but it has generally served to maintain a semblance of peaceful
coexistence on the island. Peace was ultimately brought to Cyprus by Turkish military might and Greek military weakness. International agreements in 1959 established the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The fragile power-sharing arrangements contained in the Cypriot constitution of 1960 were undermined by the widespread desire of the Greek Cypriot majority community for the union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot minority opposed enosis as a threat to its survival.

The attempt of Greek Cypriot extremists to bring about enosis through a coup d'état was thwarted by Turkey when it occupied the northern third of Cyprus. Thereafter, Ankara was content to allow the southern two-thirds of the island to survive and flourish as a wholly Greek Cypriot nation. As a result, the fragile and sometimes broken peace of the years between 1963 and 1974 was replaced by a solid peace growing out of a military stalemate.

The UNFICYP was generally successful in preventing intercommunal violence between 1964 and 1974. When violence erupted on a large scale, however, outside influences were needed to restore peace. Because of its size, UNFICYP functioned as an observer. With skill, tact, and impartiality, it has prevented minor incidents from escalating into full-fledged wars. Until the balance of power on the island or in the region changes, UNFICYP's mission of preventing a recurrence of intercommunal warfare on Cyprus makes its presence on Cyprus both valuable and
essential.
Endnotes


3. The Blue Helmets, 284.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 284-95.

6. Ibid., 285.

7. Ibid., 285.

8. Ibid., 285-86.

9. Ibid., 285.

10. Ibid., 285-86.

11. Ibid., 287.

12. Ibid., 286.

13. Ibid., 287.


17. Ibid., 291.

18. Ibid., 287.


27. Mary Anne Weaver, "Report from Cyprus," *New Yorker*, 66, August 6, 1990, 68.


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United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

Selected Chronology

1991

On June 25, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Yugoslavian federation. On June 26, hostilities began, with intervention by the Serbian-controlled Republic's Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The Slovenian militia repulsed the YPA's invasion.

On July 7, Slovenia and the Yugoslav federal government agreed to terms of a cease-fire brokered by the European Community (E.C.) Council of Ministers.

On July 18, the Yugoslav Federal State Presidency decided to withdraw the YPA from Slovenia, ending the war in that newly established republic. At the same time, the armed conflict intensified in Croatia between the YPA and Croatian military forces.

On September 8, Macedonia voted overwhelmingly to become an independent republic.

On September 25, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council imposed an embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment bound to the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was appointed on October 8 as the U.N. Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia.

On November 23, in Geneva, both the Serbian and Croatian governments requested the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation, although they failed to maintain the cease-fire between their respective forces.

In December, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina asked for E.C. and U.N. recognition as independent states.

On December 11, the U.N. Secretary-General proposed to establish U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA's) in the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia. On December 15, the Security Council in Resolution 724 approved the formation of a peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia.

On December 19, a small advance team of U.N. military, police, and civilian officials arrived in Belgrade.
1992

On January 2, Special Envoy Vance negotiated a cease-fire agreement, based on agreements signed in Geneva on November 23, 1991.

On January 8, the Security Council ordered the dispatch to Yugoslavia of up to 50 military liaison officers to help monitor the cease-fire.

On February 21, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 743, establishing UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in the former Yugoslavia for an initial 12-month period.

On February 29-March 2, Bosnia and Hercegovina held a referendum on independence, boycotted by the local Serbs, in which 99.4 percent of the voters favored secession.

In March, the YPA pulled out of Macedonia.

In April, Bosnia and Hercegovina declared independence. Serbian militiamen began military operations throughout the newly independent country. On April 7, the Security Council authorized the full deployment of UNPROFOR to the five republics of the former Yugoslavia.

On April 7, the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed an independent "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

On April 8, Macedonia was admitted to the U.N. under the name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," along with Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina.

On April 27, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On June 5, the U.N. negotiated the opening of Sarajevo Airport for relief supplies.

On September 6, Special Envoy Vance and Lord David Owen, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, issued an unconditional demand to the Bosnian Serbs to surrender to U.N. control by September 12 all heavy weapons around Sarajevo and other cities. Radovan Kardzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, agreed.

On September 17, the Bosnian Serbs resumed heavy shelling of Sarajevo, ignoring the demand to surrender heavy weapons as promised.

On September 22, the U.N. General Assembly voted to deny the rump Yugoslavia the U.N. seat held by the former Yugoslav
federation.

On October 9, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 781 banning military flights by other than U.N.-approved aircraft over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On November 6, a violent clash occurred between the police and ethnic Albanians in Skopje, Macedonia. The President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, requested the deployment of U.N. observers in the republic on November 11.

On December 11, the Security Council passed Resolution 795 authorizing the deployment of UNPROFOR in Macedonia as a preventive deployment operation.

1993

On January 6, the UNPROFOR contingent arrived in Macedonia.

In January, the Bosnian Croats approved the Vance-Owen plan to divide the country into 10 semi-autonomous provinces.

In March, the Bosnian Muslims approved the Vance-Owen Plan.

On April 2, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan.

On June 10, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States would send ground troops to join UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In July and August, a new plan was developed by Owen and Stoltenberg in the U.N./E.C. negotiations for the tripartite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Serb side getting 53 percent of the territory, the Bosnian Muslims 30 percent, and the Bosnian Croats 17 percent.

On September 12, U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin indicated in Brussels that the U.S. might be willing to supply up to half of the 50,000 peacekeepers needed in Bosnia if the tripartite plan was accepted.

In mid-September, the civil war in Croatia escalated.

In the U.N./E.C. negotiations on tripartite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslims demanded an outlet to the sea, and the Bosnian Serbs and Croats insisted on holding a referendum to decide on the question of the areas they hold to be annexed to Serbia and Croatia, respectively.
INTRODUCTION

The raging ethnic strife in the former socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia led in February 1992 to the establishment of the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR). It is the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation ever deployed, with more than 22,000 troops stationed in Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Macedonia by the end of 1993. Nevertheless, in order to fully carry out UNPROFOR's mandate it is estimated that tens of thousands of additional U.N. peacekeeping troops are required in the former Yugoslavia sector. In September 1993, for example, U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin estimated that 50,000 additional peacekeeping troops were required in Bosnia and Hercegovina alone. He indicated that half of this force might have to be provided by the United States. The urgency of such a force stems from the fact that UNPROFOR has been one of the most dismal failures of all U.N. peacekeeping operations to date. It has operated under a confused and constantly shifting mandate, under rules of engagement that call for a peacekeeping force to be deployed in a region in the midst of violent internecine war. One of the primary reasons for UNPROFOR's failure was the U.N.'s and the international community's costly delay in mounting an effective military response to the aggression by Serbian regular and irregular forces against the newly independent republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The first signs of breakdown in the former communist Yugoslav regime occurred in 1980, following President Tito's
death, when the nine-member collective presidency was unable to maintain internal cohesion.

A second development was the rise to power in Serbia, in the late 1980's, of current Prime Minister Slobodan Milosevic, a former communist functionary, who advocated the establishment of a "Greater Serbia." His seizure of control of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which was accompanied by Serbian violations of human rights, particularly those of Albanians in Kosovo, frightened the other nationalities and led to the strengthening of Slovenian, Croatian, and Muslim secessionist movements. The Serbs, for their part, were alarmed by the links between the Croatian nationalist movement and the former pro-Nazi Ustache, especially the use of Ustache ultranationalist symbols and slogans.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
The Initial Crisis

On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia, two of the component republics of the former Yugoslavia, declared their independence from the Serb-dominated central government. The Yugoslav army immediately moved to crush the secession. The conflict involved three former republics: Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Slovenia

The initial conflict began with the secession of Slovenia, where the YPA suffered major reverses and was defeated by Slovene irregulars.
Croatia

The conflict then shifted to Croatia, where fighting initiated by Croatian Serb irregulars with full support of the YPA broke out in July 1991, and continued unabated through January 1992. The Croatian forces suffered heavy casualties and lost ground to the YPA and the Serbian irregulars, until a quarter of Croatia was occupied by Serbian forces.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The third phase of the conflict began when Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in April 1992, following a referendum held in March that was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs. In that referendum, independence was approved by 99.4 percent of the voting electorate, with a turnout of 63.4 percent despite the Serbian boycott. Prior to the independence declaration, the Serbian militia, supported by the YPA, launched attacks throughout the country.

Macedonia

On November 6, 1992, a violent clash occurred between the police and ethnic Albanian demonstrators in Skopje, Macedonia, resulting in four killed and 36 wounded. Ethnic Albanians comprise 21 percent of the population of Macedonia, and Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia, made an urgent request for the deployment of U.N. troops to prevent a possible conflict in Kosovo, where the population is 90 percent Albanian, from spilling over into Macedonia. The likelihood of such a spillover is increased by the fact that Macedonia provides the only usable
road between Albania and Kosovo that armed groups from Albania
could use to aid ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{6}

The U.N. Response

**Slovenia**

The Slovenian phase of the conflict was handled essentially
without U.N. involvement. The European Community (E.C.) first
opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia, but after fighting started the
E.C. Foreign Ministers’ Conference mediated a cease-fire
agreement in July 1991 that resolved the conflict. The easy
resolution came about because both parties in the conflict agreed
on the accords. The principal consideration here was the fact
that the Serbs decided not to pursue the conflict in Slovenia in
order to concentrate on seizing territory in Croatia.

**Croatia**

In September 1991, the E.C. established the "Conference on
Yugoslavia" in The Hague, chaired by Lord Carrington, former
Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(N.A.T.O.), which has since been replaced by the joint U.N./E.C.
body. However, the group’s attempt to mediate the conflict in
Croatia was stymied by the Serbian tactic (copied later by the
other combatants) of agreeing to abide by cease-fires while
ignoring them on the ground. The 15th cease-fire on January 2,
however, held long enough to allow the deployment of UNPROFOR
troops in Croatia.

**Bosnia and Hercegovina**

On April 24, 1992, the U.N. Security Council demanded an end
to "outside interference" in Bosnia. In May of that year, the Serbs claimed to be withdrawing the YPA from Bosnia, but in reality renamed a large part of the force, designating it as the local Bosnian Serb militia. Bosnian Croats then began to seize land in the largely Croatian areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina and turned against their Muslim allies. This action, in turn, led the Bosnian Muslims to undertake their own "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs and Croats living in areas under their control.

Macedonia

The U.N. response in Macedonia was preemptive, unlike its response in other cases. In this instance, only a token force was deployed, beginning with a 34-person reconnaissance party on December 29, 1992, with the first armed troops arriving on January 6, 1993. The deployment of about 1,000 troops was authorized in response to a Macedonian request for assistance in preventing expansion of the conflict to Macedonia and Kosovo. The principal mandate of the troops was to monitor activity along the borders with Albania and with the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and to interpose themselves between potential combatants if imminent conflict were possible.?

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

On September 25, 1991, the U.N. attempted to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia through Security Council Resolution 713. The resolution imposed a complete embargo on sales and deliveries of weapons to all the republics of the former Yugoslavia.?
On November 27, the Security Council in Resolution 721 approved the results of the November 23 Geneva convention.9

On December 15, 1991, in Resolution 724, the Security Council proposed the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in the three U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA’s) in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina.10 Slavonia and Krajina are regions of Croatia now under Serb control as the self-declared Serb Republic of Krajina.

On February 15, 1992, the Secretary-General issued a recommendation to the Security Council for the establishment of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).11

On February 21, 1992, UNPROFOR was established by Security Council Resolution 743. It authorized a force of 14,000 personnel to help monitor the cease-fire in Croatia.12

On April 7, 1992, Security Council Resolution 749 authorized the full deployment of UNPROFOR by mid-May.13

In June 1992, the UNPROFOR mandate was enlarged by Security Council Resolution 762 to include the monitoring of other Serb-populated areas in Croatia, called "pink zones."14

In August 1992, Security Council Resolution 769 empowered UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPA’s and to provide immigration and customs functions for the UNPA’s at their international frontiers.15

On May 30, 1992, the Security Council, in Resolution 757, imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (the rump "Yugoslavia") as additional pressure to force a peaceful solution
to the conflict.16

On September 14, 1992, the Security Council approved Resolution 776, authorizing an additional 6,000 troops to operate humanitarian relief convoys in Bosnia and Hercegovina outside of Sarajevo. The troops were to be financed, supplied, and maintained by the participating national contingents.17

In October 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 781, banning military flights in regions of conflict (the "no-fly" zone) by other than U.N.-approved aircraft.18

On November 10, 1992, Security Council Resolution 781 authorized an additional 75 military observers for UNPROFOR to monitor airfields in the whole region, in connection with the "no-fly" zone enforcement.19

On December 11, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 795 mandating the deployment of UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops to Macedonia.20

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

U.N. Forces were deployed in the former Yugoslavian republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Macedonia. The UNPROFOR contingents were preceded by advance mission personnel, and their operations have been conducted conjointly or in coordination with humanitarian operations, such as those of the UNHCR.

Slovenia

The conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established.

Croatia
On December 19, 1991, the first U.N. advance team for the mission in Croatia arrived in Belgrade. The full force of 14,000 was deployed in Croatia by the end of May 1992.

**Bosnia and Hercegovina**

On June 29, 1992, following negotiated agreements between the U.N. and Serbian forces, a Canadian contingent of UNPROFOR secured the Sarajevo Airport for delivery of humanitarian supplies to the besieged city.

By July 3, 1992, U.N. observers and troops were deployed at the Sarajevo Airport, despite continued fighting in the area.

**Macedonia**

On December 3, 1992, an exploratory mission from the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb traveled to Macedonia. After U.N. Resolution 795 was passed on December 11, a reconnaissance party from UNPROFOR went to Macedonia. The first contingent of UNPROFOR troops was deployed on January 6, 1993.

**Political and Military Goals**

The political and military goals of the U.N. peacekeepers and negotiators have shifted with the tide of the conflict.

**Slovenia**

In Slovenia the initial goal of the U.N. was for Slovenia to remain in Yugoslavia, but with the defeat of the YPA in Slovenia, the U.N. shifted course and recognized Slovenia as an independent state.

**Croatia**

UNPROFOR's Croatian operation was to implement the
demobilization of regions occupied largely by Serbs, in order to prevent resumption of the conflict. The final settlement of the future of the regions was not considered at the time. UNPA's were established with heavy weapons to be held in safekeeping by the U.N., and the U.N. forces were to interpose themselves between combatants as necessary to prevent the resumption of conflict. The establishment of local civilian police authority was also a priority. The return of the displaced non-Serb residents forcibly evicted by the local Serbs was also contemplated, but for a later phase, to be designed by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.)

**Macedonia**

The goal of the preventive deployment of UNPROFOR troops in Macedonia was to delay or prevent war in Kosovo between the minority ethnic Serbs, who had historical claims to the region, and the vast majority of ethnic Albanians residing there.

**Rules of Engagement**

The UNPROFOR mandate was defined by the U.N. Secretary-General, as follows: the troops were to be under the command of the Secretary-General, they were not permitted to receive operational orders from their national authorities, they were to be impartial, and they were to use minimum force when required in self-defense or under other emergency situations.

On February 19, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 807, providing for "all appropriate measures" to be taken to ensure UNPROFOR's security, although the mandate did not specify
exact rules of engagement on the ground.\textsuperscript{23}

**Composition of Forces**

As of March 1993, a year after the initial deployment, the total strength of UNPROFOR was 23,000 military and civilian personnel.\textsuperscript{24} The countries of origin were Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic/the Slovak Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{25}

**Slovenia**

The Slovenia conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established.

**Croatia**

UNPROFOR in Croatia was deployed in three UNPA’s divided into four sectors:\textsuperscript{26} Sector East, with 1,550 military personnel (688 from Belgium/Luxembourg, 863 from Russia), 13 mixed military observers, and 200 civilian police and other personnel; Sector West, with 3,768 military personnel (895 from Argentina, 1,090 from Canada, 884 from Jordan, 900 from Nepal), 24 mixed military observers, and 100 civilian police and other personnel; Sector North, with 2,620 military personnel (866 from Denmark, 886 from Nigeria, 868 from Poland), 50 mixed military observers, and 250 civilian police and other personnel; Sector South, with 2,344 military (957 from France, 485 from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and 902 from Kenya), 50 mixed military observers, and
290 civilian police and personnel.

In addition, logistics and engineering battalions serving in the four sectors comprised an additional 3,000 personnel, and the United States deployed a field hospital in Zagreb, with 343 personnel.\textsuperscript{27}

**Bosnia and Hercegovina**

The Bosnia and Hercegovina UNPROFOR command, under General Briquemont of Belgium, contained the following components: 1) United Kingdom - one infantry battalion HQ deployed in Vitez, one logistics battalion in Durno, one logistics battalion in Divulje, one infantry company in Kladanj, one infantry company in Gornj Vakuf, and one helicopter company in Divulje, comprising a total of 2,626 personnel; 2) France - two infantry battalions in Sarajevo, three infantry battalions in Velika Kladuša, comprising a total of 2,509 personnel; 3) Canada - one infantry battalion of 1,300 personnel in Pakrac (Croatia); 4) Spain - one infantry battalion in Jablanica and Medzhugorje, and one helicopter company in Medzhugorje, comprising a total of 750 personnel; 5) Netherlands - one transport company in Busovač and one transport company in Metković, comprising a total of 500 personnel; 6) Egypt - one infantry battalion of 400 personnel in Sarajevo; 7) Ukraine - one infantry battalion of 400 personnel in Sarajevo; 8) Denmark - one HQ company of 200 personnel in Kiselak; 9) Belgium - one transport company of 130 personnel in Busovac; 10) Norway - one platoon of 40 personnel.\textsuperscript{28}

In addition, approximately 7,500 troops were pledged but had
not yet been deployed by France, Jordan, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, and Pakistan. Their mission will be to protect the
U.N.-declared "safe havens."

**Macedonia**

In Macedonia, 300 U.S. troops joined a U.N. battalion of 700
from Norway. The U.S. troops came from the 502d Infantry
Regiment, based in Berlin.29

**Equipment**

UNPROFOR’s equipment was either U.N.-owned, leased, or
remained the property of the national contingents deployed in the
operation. This equipment consisted of light and heavy transport
vehicles, such as trucks, jeeps, and armored personnel carriers
(APC’s) (including spare parts); mine clearing equipment;
communications gear; binoculars; fixed-wing aircraft for
transport and reconnaissance; general-purpose helicopters; light
arms; and medical supplies. The origin, type, and technological
level of equipment used depended on the particular national
contingents involved. In Macedonia, for instance, Finnish Sisu
wheeled APC’s have been deployed. C-130 transport aircraft
equipped with AWADs (Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery) radar, have
been used in airdrops. The missions have deployed three to four
aircraft at a time, each carrying eight to ten bundles of MRE’s
(Meals, Ready-to-eat) with 800 rations per bundle.30 Sixty
fighter and ground attack aircraft and 20 support aircraft were
stationed on the aircraft carrier **USS Roosevelt** off the Bosnian
coast.31
Training

The national contingents detached to UNPROFOR have undergone a variety of training exercises in preparation for the peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia.

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have provided unique training for a variety of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, such as tactics developed by the U.S. forces for humanitarian airdrop procedures under difficult conditions. Since the initial U.S. effort, French and German aircraft have joined in the airdrop operations, providing opportunities for multinational joint training exercises.

The imposition of "no-fly" zones, the enforcement of the air and sea embargo, and the recently completed set of complex exercises preparing for possible air strikes against ground positions around Sarajevo have also provided extensive training opportunities.

Tactics

The tactics employed by the U.N. forces have involved cease-fire negotiations, sea, air and land embargo enforcement, as well as delivery of humanitarian aid and evacuation of wounded.

Slovenia

The conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established.

Croatia

In Croatia, the U.N. established UNPA’s (United Nations Protected Areas) and monitored "pink regions" (regions with significant armed conflict.)
Tactical operations have involved securing heavy weapons storage, monitoring of human rights, interposition of U.N. forces between combatants to stop fighting, and minesweeping operations.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the principal tactical operations involve humanitarian aid delivery by vehicle convoy.

**Macedonia**

The principal activity of UNPROFOR in Macedonia is to establish and monitor various border observation posts.

**Cost**

In 1993 UNPROFOR’s annual cost was approximately $1.02 billion. The mission’s budget was financed through a Special Account. As of April 1993, approximately $325 million of the mission’s financing was in arrears, as a result of outstanding contributions from member states.

**Operational Assessment**

The successful accomplishments of UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping operations have included the following:

First, the negotiations brokered by the U.N. on Slovenia’s future resulted in the withdrawal of the YPA and a cessation of armed conflict.

Second, the presence of UNPROFOR troops in the parts of Croatia captured by Serbian forces has resulted in a drastic reduction, if not temporary cessation, of armed conflict in those regions.

Third, the airport in Sarajevo was opened to U.N.
peacekeeping forces to carry out humanitarian relief operations, and the massive starvation of Sarajevo's population in the winter of 1992/93 was averted.

Fourth, some areas in Bosnia and Hercegovina have been provided with medical and food relief by U.N. truck convoys and by airdrops from U.S. aircraft. Even the slowly tightening implementation of the U.N.-imposed embargo might be considered a partial success.\(^{34}\)

Fifth, the airdrop missions have been successful, with most airdrops delivered over intended areas.

Sixth, a Canadian contingent was successful in carrying out limited minesweeping operations in Krajina and in instructing the local military in such operations. A massive mine-clearing operation, however, remains to be undertaken.

Finally, the preventive deployment of a small U.N. peacekeeping contingent in Macedonia, including troops from the U.S., ensured that conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians would not erupt. However, the size of this peacekeeping contingent is considered too small to intervene effectively should internecine fighting erupt.

The U.N.-sponsored negotiations have benefited the parties in different ways.

First, the Serbs have been able to delay or prevent any military actions (such as air strikes against Serbian targets) on the part of the U.N./N.A.T.O. forces.

Second, Bosnian Muslims present an image of "victims who are
also very cooperative," setting the stage for eventual military support (such as air strikes and the lifting of the embargo on arms purchases).

Third, Croats are able to delay consideration of their aggressive actions against the Bosnian Muslims while they attempt to return Krajina to their republic.

The U.N. peacekeeping mission, nevertheless, has failed to fulfill its mission effectively in a number of areas. The most crucial are the many problems that UNPROFOR has experienced in implementing its political and military goals because of poor mission design, unrealistic expectations of immediate success, a vague mandate that kept changing to meet new and more militarily debilitating situations, and rules of engagement that proved grossly inadequate to maintain cease-fire agreements that were repeatedly violated, making it very difficult even to deliver humanitarian aid to suffering populations.

First, despite UNPROFOR's presence, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a U.N.-recognized entity, which at the outset of the conflict was a multicultural society (an estimated 40 percent of the population was Muslim, 30 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croatian) has been carved up into "ethnically cleansed" areas by the warring factions.

Second, UNPROFOR has not lived up to its mission as a "Protection Force." For example, General Lewis W. McKenzie of Canada, the commander of the Sarajevo sector of UNPROFOR, whose contingent opened the airport at Sarajevo for its first
humanitarian relief supply, has complained that the words "Protection Force" in UNPROFOR have led the citizens of Sarajevo to expect protection from Serb attack; in actuality, little evidence of this protective capability has been demonstrated on the ground.36

Third, the rules of engagement, as interpreted by the commanders on the ground, have frequently reduced UNPROFOR to inaction. Any relief convoy can be stopped with impunity by local militias to obtain extortion payments, confiscate part of the convoy’s supplies and equipment, and even drag out of vehicles and execute on the spot Bosnian government officials traveling on U.N.-approved official business under the protection of armed U.N. soldiers. The lack of respect given to the U.N. peacekeeping force by the combatants is epitomized by an act of a Serbian soldier, who climbed on top of an armored personnel carrier at a Serbian roadblock, opened the hatch, and urinated into the vehicle.37

Fourth, despite the fact that the peacekeeping force was destined for Croatia, UNPROFOR’s headquarters was initially located in Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo, because it was relatively free from conflict and to discourage the Serbs from attacking secessionists in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Serbs, however, still attacked the Bosnian Muslims, forcing UNPROFOR to move its headquarters to Zagreb, Croatia, by which time the fighting in Croatia had already cost 10,000 lives and left 600,000 homeless.38
Fifth, UNPROFOR has been unable to deter aggression by Serbia’s army and the local Serbian militia (armed by Milošević) against the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians. The aggression was accompanied by the open practice of "ethnic cleansing" and many well-documented atrocities.

Sixth, the inability of the U.N. peacekeeping force to deter aggression has led Croatian irregulars to seize Bosnian land and to commit atrocities against their Muslim allies. Similar ethnic cleansing practices have also been adopted by Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs and Croats in their midst. Such actions have taken place under the purview of UNPROFOR’s command, deployed on the ground, and the U.N.H.C.R.’s humanitarian operation based in Sarajevo.

Seventh, the Vance-Owen plan to create ten loosely connected, ethnically based cantons has proven unsuccessful. It failed because of widespread genocide and "ethnic cleansing," which led the populations to resist major changes in their boundaries, and because the expelled populations insisted on returning to their homes.

Eighth, the deployment of UNPROFOR in Macedonia, although a positive step toward peace, has indirectly served to reward the Serbs by solidifying their hold on Kosovo. This is similar to earlier placement of UNPROFOR’s headquarters in Sarajevo in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Ninth, in terms of the humanitarian aspects of the operation, the U.N. has shown itself to be singularly helpless
even in situations over which it has clear control. The evacuations of the wounded, particularly children, have received a great deal of media attention, although only a very small percentage of the wounded has been evacuated. Some of the difficulties have resulted from cumbersome U.N. procedures. The evacuation of wounded children from Sarajevo, for instance, was bogged down by lengthy internal U.N. approval requirements. Similarly, college students admitted to programs in the United States have been prevented from leaving Sarajevo because the U.N. has claimed that allowing the students to leave might cause political difficulties (although the small student group contained a balanced membership from all ethnic groups involved in the struggle.) Artists and performance groups have faced similar travel restrictions.

Tenth, inadequacies and incompatibilities in equipment have resulted in communications problems and in reducing operational capability. The Egyptian contingent, for example, was inadequately clothed for the region’s cold climate.

Eleventh, the various embargoes have not deterred the Serbian authorities from pursuing their expansionist aims despite the damage caused to the Serbian economy. The weapons embargo also denied the Bosnians a means for defending themselves by procuring heavy weaponry. Furthermore, the embargo also proved to be ineffective because of lax enforcement. It was violated by Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Greek, and other traders dependent on commerce with Belgrade. The Croatian forces also managed to
rearm themselves during the "embargo," and the Bosnians obtained some covert aid from Islamic countries.  

**CURRENT SITUATION**

Throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia there has been a great disparity between the ongoing U.N.-sponsored negotiations and the military situation on the ground, with doubts that signed peace agreements can actually resolve the conflict. The latest plan, devised by David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg in Geneva, is to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts, with Muslims getting 30 percent of the territory, the Bosnian Serbs 53 percent, and the Croats 17 percent. In the negotiations that resumed in Geneva on August 31, 1993, the Serbs and Croats accepted the proposal, whereas the Bosnian Muslims asked for more territory, an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, and substantial military guarantees of enforcement of the peace plan. The talks, however, broke down the next day because of Serb and Croat rejection of the Bosnian Muslim demands. The U.S. voiced support for the Bosnian Muslim demands and initially agreed to participate in the 50,000-strong peace enforcement contingent envisaged by the U.N. planners, but later emphasized that participation would be contingent on full acceptance of the plan by all concerned and with N.A.T.O. playing a leading role in the implementation.

The U.S. has been directly involved in some aspects of the operation, including monitoring of the embargo against republics of the former Yugoslavia and monitoring of the "no-fly" zones and
humanitarian air drops. However, no U.S. ground forces have been deployed, except for a small contingent of 300 U.S. ground troops in Macedonia. The latter were intended to serve as a "tripwire" to prevent expansion of the war to the province of Kosovo.

The possibility of U.N.-mandated tactical air strikes by N.A.T.O. forces against Serbian artillery positions around Sarajevo if the Serbian shelling of the city continued was raised again. There was no reason for the Serbs to believe that the plan was serious enough to require them to respond with more than temporary changes as long as they continued their participation in the negotiations and agreed to what the U.N./E.C. negotiators proposed. Furthermore, the absence of a practical exit strategy for the UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia places U.N. troops and civilians in great danger should the Serbian militias react to the air strikes by a massive attack on U.N. forces.

The September 1993 round of negotiations illustrates some of the problems of the peace process. The presidents of Croatia and Bosnia, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovich, respectively, signed a cease-fire to take effect on September 18, 1993, ending the hostilities between the Muslim and Croatian fighters in Bosnia. The cease-fire was followed, however, by escalation in the fighting, with Bosnian Muslim forces advancing along a new front about 20 miles northwest of Mostar. Reports indicated that Bosnian forces conducted a massacre of as many as 38 Croats (mostly civilians) in the village of Uzdol, near the Jablanica-Gornji Vakuf road. The Bosnian government later said it would
investigate the event and punish those responsible. On September 16, 1993, the Bosnian Serbs signed a similar agreement with the Bosnian Muslims, agreeing to the same cease-fire conditions to take place on September 19, 1993. The conditions involved cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the unconditional disbanding of all detainee camps, release of prisoners, and the creation of conditions guaranteeing the free and unhindered passage of all relief convoys.42

Unless the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia sign a binding peace accord allowing the UNPROFOR II humanitarian effort to proceed unimpeded, the future is likely to produce great hardship for Bosnian civilian populations, particularly the Muslims.

The principal conflict in the region, however, is between the Serbs and the Croats, the two most powerful republics. Their conflict is likely to persist after the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina is resolved, because of the deep rooted historical enmity between the Serbs and Croats.

CONCLUSION

Serbia was the initial aggressor in the conflict, but with little international response, all parties, including the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, have followed the Serb lead in committing "ethnic cleansing" atrocities to consolidate as much territory as possible.

The previous situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in which Muslims, Serbs, and Croats lived together in relative harmony,
had the potential to produce a multinational state in the region that would serve as a harmonizing buffer between Serbia and Croatia. This potential is an important counterweight to the argument that because an independent State of Bosnia and Herzegovina has never previously existed, it does not deserve statehood.

Discrimination against the 12 percent Serb minority in an independent Croatia was plausible, but not to the degree that the Milošević government tried to project, and it could well have been controlled through E.C.-based or U.N.-based venues. The Serbs would have had international legitimacy if the discrimination was of a nature that justified intervention. The large Serb minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina (31 percent of the prewar population) could have exerted a dominant influence, especially because, according to Vance and Owen, the Serbs controlled 60 percent of the land.43

The war was tragically unnecessary, even from a Serbian nationalist perspective. Serbia should have permitted the secession of the other former Yugoslav republics as Russia did of its borderline republics. Doing so would have avoided massive bloodshed, yet Serbia would still have been the dominant power in the region with enormous influence in the other republics.

After the initial settlement of the Slovenian secession, there was a window of opportunity for the United States, Western Europe, and the U.N. to intervene effectively. For instance, during the naval bombardment of Dubrovnik, the U.N. could have
issued an ultimatum to Milošević either to demobilize his naval fleet or have it sunk by a certain date, should the YPA disengage and withdraw behind Serbian national boundaries. Similar demands could have been issued with regard to the Yugoslav air forces. Faced with the prospect of significant military threat, Milošević would not have embarked on the Bosnian campaign, settling instead for consolidation of his gains in Krajina and negotiated compromise in Bosnia.

The negotiations in Croatia and in Bosnia have always concentrated on interim solutions without much consideration of the resolution of territorial issues. The present tripartite proposal for Bosnia and Hercegovina is much more viable because it has shorter frontiers to defend. If accepted by the parties involved, no such defense would be necessary, but it is difficult to predict such an outcome.

A number of strategic and tactical lessons can be derived from UNPROFOR's experience in the former Yugoslavia. These lessons must include awareness of the danger in allowing the aggressors to: 1) manipulate negotiations (agree to everything, do nothing), offering excuses for failing to implement agreements (local commanders did not get the word); 2) convert local authorities into instant pseudo-independent states, legitimizing these states by overwhelming referendum results with only the supporters participating (others discouraged, or even expelled from the region); 3) pose as "perpetrators-turned-statesmen" who then complain about "intransigent locals" in their puppet
operations, promise to try to persuade them into other courses of action and agree to stop supplying them, but refuse any inspection of shipments because this would "violate national sovereignty"; 4) make extravagant promises with impunity, such as the Serbian offer to place all heavy weapons under U.N. control, with the subsequent explanation that "control" meant that U.N. observers could, when permitted, watch the heavy artillery shell the opposition.
Endnotes


3. On December 7, 1992, as reported by The Guardian, the U.N. commanding officer in Sarajevo, Egyptian General Adnan Abdelrazek, called the U.N. mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina a failure and asked the U.N. to intervene by military force.


7. Ibid., 366.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 38.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 40.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 42.


22. Ibid., 180.


25. Ibid. 43.


27. Ibid.


31. Ibid., 7.


33. Ibid.


Bibliography


United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

By Joshua Sinai

Selected Chronology

1947

In April, the British mandatory authority referred the question of the future of Palestine to the United Nations (U.N.), after Britain had failed to reconcile Arab and Jewish claims to the area.

On November 29, the U.N. General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with an international trusteeship for Jerusalem. The Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs rejected the partition resolution, while the Palestinian Jewish community accepted it. The General Assembly also established a Truce Commission to implement the partition resolution and to establish a truce between the warring Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine.

1948

On May 14, as the British mandate for Palestine expired, the Provisional Government of Israel immediately proclaimed independence. The Arab states invaded Palestine, leading to a full-fledged war.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the U.N. Security Council called for a four-week cease-fire. Following a formal request by the Truce Commission on May 21, the Security Council on May 29 passed Resolution 50 (1948) to establish a military observer mission, known as the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), to supervise the four-week cessation of fighting between Israel and the Arab states.

On June 11 as the truce agreement went into effect, Ralph J. Bunche, the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative, arranged for a group of military observers to be deployed in newly independent Israel and neighboring Arab countries.

On August 1, the first contingent of UNTSO personnel arrived in the mission area.

On September 17, U.N. Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte, of Sweden, was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of the Stern Gang, a Jewish rightwing terrorist group. Ralph Bunche assumed the mediator’s duties and was appointing Acting Mediator.

On October 19, the Security Council called for a cease-fire
in the Negev.

On November 4, the Security Council called on the concerned governments to withdraw their troops to their October 14 positions and establish truce lines and neutral or demilitarized zones. On November 16, the Security Council requested the parties to establish an armistice.

On December 29, the Security Council adopted Resolution 66 (1948) calling on the concerned governments to order an immediate cease-fire and facilitate the supervision of the truce by the UNTSO.

1949

On May 25, UNTSO’s headquarters were transferred from Haifa to Government House in Jerusalem.

On August 11, the Security Council assigned UNTSO new functions. The Mediator’s role was ended, and the Truce Commission became inactive. UNTSO became an autonomous operation under the Security Council, and its function changed to assist in supervising the General Armistice Agreements.

1954

In June, UNTSO mediated an exchange of prisoners of war between Israel and Jordan.

1955

On February 28, Israel carried out a large-scale reprisal raid against military targets in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.

1956

In October, following the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, sabotage incursions into Israel, and the encirclement of Israel by large troop concentrations, war broke out as Israeli forces conquered Egyptian strongholds in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Several days later, in conjunction with the Israeli operation, British and French forces intervened in Egypt. The Sinai Peninsula was occupied by Israeli forces. As part of the conditions for Israeli withdrawal, it was agreed that a new U.N. peacekeeping force would fill the power vacuum left by withdrawing troops and that this force would place itself between Egypt and Israel. The agreement resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, also known as UNEF I). UNTSO continued to operate along the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian borders with Israel.
After denouncing the Armistice Agreement with Egypt, Israel refused to take part in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC).

1960

A detachment of UNTSO personnel set up the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC).

1963

UNTSO personnel were detached to set up the U.N. Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM).

1967

On June 7, following UNEF’s removal from the Sinai Peninsula amid heightening tensions between Israel and Egypt, Israel carried out a preemptive air strike against Egyptian and Syrian forces, shattering their armies within six days.

Following the 1967 War, UNTSO’s functions increased when it was given responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal area.

On November 22, the Security Council passed Resolution 242 to promote Arab-Israeli peace.

1972

UNTSO set up a cease-fire observation operation in southern Lebanon.

1973

On October 6, war broke out when Egyptian and Syrian armies, in a simultaneous operation, attacked outposts along the Israeli-controlled Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights, respectively, with the aim of recapturing territories lost in the 1967 War. The war was halted by an October 22 U.N. cease-fire.

On October 25 when the Security Council passed Resolution 340, UNEF II was established to interpose between Israel and Egypt.

On December 21, the Geneva Peace Conference was convened under U.N. auspices with the participation of Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, but not Syria.
Following the October War, several UNTSO observers were dispatched to the new U.N. peacekeeping force, the United Nations Disengagement Observed Force (UNDOF), established on May 31 and deployed on the Golan Heights. Other UNTSO personnel were assigned to the newly-established Observer Group Golan (OGG) peacekeeping operation. The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD) became a separate UNTSO unit in Syria, providing support functions for OGG. In Egypt, UNTSO observers were organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE).

1978

Some UNTSO observers were detached to the newly established United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while another segment formed Observer Group Lebanon (OGL).

1988

UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).

1991

UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

1992

UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

1993

In September, the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) announced a draft treaty for mutual recognition, setting the stage—subject to a five-year interim period—for autonomy and eventual statehood for major portions of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Arab states of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon were also expected to reach peace terms with Israel.
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is the first United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation ever formed and its longest-running mission. Since its early days in 1948, there have been five wars directly connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to numerous border clashes. Five U.N. peacekeeping operations have been established to supervise truce agreements in the region. In 1993, three of these operations continued to be deployed.

UNTSO's duties have ranged from observation of the 1949 truce and subsequent armistice agreements to general observation in the entire Middle Eastern region, with specific roles assigned to it after the Arab-Israeli wars of October 1956, June 1967, October 1973, and September 1982, as well as the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

Unlike other missions, UNTSO has an indefinite mandate arising from the political necessity of having a U.N. peacekeeping observation mission as a constant presence in one of the world's most volatile regions.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNTSO's mandate arose indirectly from the May 1948 Security Council decision, embodied in Resolution 48, to establish a Truce Commission to negotiate and supervise a truce between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

The Initial Crisis

The Arab-Israeli conflict arose from the conflicting claims
of Jews and Arabs to the territory of Palestine. Following more than 400 years of rule by the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was placed under a League of Nations mandate with Great Britain as the mandatory power, after the Ottomans were defeated in World War I. The purpose of the mandate was to prepare the area for eventual self-government in their respective spheres by Palestine's Arab and Jewish communities.\(^1\) Finding itself unable to reconcile the differences between the Arab and Jewish communities and facing mounting hostilities between the paramilitary forces of the two sides, the British government brought the problem of Palestine before the U.N. on April 2, 1947. Since then the question of the future of the territory known as historical Palestine has continuously been brought to various U.N. bodies for deliberation in order to establish cease-fire and truce arrangements, peace observation, emergency forces, fact-finding missions, and short- and long-term conflict resolution.

**The U.N. Response**

The U.N. involvement in the area known as historical Palestine can be divided into five periods. The first period lasted from April 2, 1947 to July 20, 1949. On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly, acting on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with an international trusteeship for Jerusalem. A Palestine Commission was established in December to implement the General Assembly's
recommendations. However, problems arose when the Arab Higher Committee, the leadership body of the Palestinian Arabs, vehemently rejected the recommendations of the General Assembly, terming it tantamount to a "declaration of war"; the Jewish Agency, the governing body of the Jewish community in Palestine, accepted the partition resolution. The U.N. Security Council then passed a resolution calling for a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities, and established a Truce Commission to negotiate and supervise such a cease-fire. UNTSO grew out of the team employed by the Truce Commission to observe and supervise the cease-fire and truce.² In addition, the General Assembly appointed a U.N. Mediator, with functions overlapping those of the Truce Commission, to promote a peaceful settlement of the situation.

The British mandate for Palestine expired on May 15, 1948, and the Provisional Government of Israel immediately proclaimed independence. Hostilities broke out when armed forces from the neighboring Arab states attacked the new Israeli state. The Security Council obtained a four-week cease-fire and enlarged the authority of the U.N. Mediator to supervise its observance.

When hostilities resumed following expiration of the cease-fire, the Security Council on July 15, 1948 ordered the parties involved to desist from further military action. Nevertheless, sporadic military action continued, including the assassination of the U.N. Mediator, Count Bernadotte, by an extremist right-wing Jewish terrorist group. On November 16, the Security Council
passed a resolution to seek agreement by the parties to the conflict, leading to an immediate armistice, including the delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines.

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly established a Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to assume mediation functions formerly assigned to the Mediator and the Truce Commission. The mediation resulted in four separate General Armistice Agreements (GAA) in 1949: Egypt-Israel, February 24; Lebanon-Israel, March 23; Jordan-Israel, April 3; and Syria-Israel, July 20. Each agreement provided for a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) to supervise the truce, to define the demarcation lines, to provide for withdrawal and reduction of forces, and to consider complaints of breaches of the armistice agreements. The agreements made reference to UNTSO’s function of observing the armistice lines; that function was formally recognized by Security Council Resolution 72 (1949). Each of the four MAC’s was composed of an equal number of members from the parties, and the Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO, or his representative, was designated as chairman responsible to the Security Council.

1949-1956

The second period, lasting from July 20, 1949 until November 7, 1956, represented the institutionalization of the U.N.’s peacekeeping observation mandate to monitor the four armistice agreements. With the attainment of the armistice, the Security Council on August 11, 1949 terminated the functions of the Mediator, and requested the Secretary-General to arrange for the
continued service of UNTSO personnel to observe and maintain the cease-fire and perform the functions assigned by the four MAC's. The Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO was also given liaison functions with the U.N. and the PCC. However, the PCC played a minor role in peace observation because it was primarily assigned as a mediator seeking a long-term peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states.5

1956-1967

The third period was marked by a reduction in UNTSO's effectiveness as a peacekeeping observation mission as a result of an escalation in hostilities along the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli armistice boundaries, which led to two full-fledged wars. The most difficult problems arose along the Egypt-Israel Armistice lines. In 1948 Egypt imposed a blockade on Israeli-bound shipping along the Suez Canal, as well as a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, which leads to the southern Israeli port of Eilat. The blockades were followed in the early 1950s by continuous Egyptian-supported Palestinian guerrilla sabotage raids across the Egyptian Armistice lines, along with an encirclement of Israel by large Egyptian and Syrian troop concentrations. Israel perceived these actions as amounting to an abrogation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, and the October 1956 War broke out as Israeli forces conquered Egyptian strongholds in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Several days later, in conjunction with the Israeli operation, British and French forces intervened in Egypt. The Sinai Peninsula was occupied by Israeli
forces. As part of the conditions for Israeli withdrawal, it was agreed that a new U.N. peacekeeping force would fill the power vacuum left by withdrawing troops and that this force would place itself between Egypt and Israel. The agreement resulted in the decision by the General Assembly on November 4, 1956 to establish the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, also known as UNEF I—see next section), which was deployed along the borders in March 1957.

Because of the events that led to the 1956 War, Israel denounced the Armistice Agreement with Egypt and refused to take part in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC). UNTSO now operated along the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian borders with Israel, although it could patrol only along the Egyptian side of the armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and the MAC lost much of its influence because it now only had U.N. and Egyptian members. Even under these circumstances, there was a reduction in the number of violations along the Egyptian-Israeli border until early 1967. The situation differed along the Israel-Syria border where a MAC still functioned, although it lacked the resources to investigate the large volume of complaints about border incidents lodged by Syria and Israel. Along the Jordan-Israel Armistice lines, there were frequent border clashes caused by Palestinian guerrilla acts of sabotage followed by Israeli retaliation. There were also problems in implementing the terms of the armistice agreements concerning the final status of Jerusalem.
1967-1973

Mounting hostilities in the mid-1960s, particularly along the borders between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel, led to the outbreak of the June 1967 War. Israeli villages were shelled by Syrian positions on the Golan Heights. In mid-May 1967, Egypt requested the immediate withdrawal of UNEF forces from their positions along the Egypt-Israel border, the Straits of Tiran, and the Sinai Peninsula, to be effective during the period of May 16-18. Secretary-General U Thant immediately complied with Egypt’s request. On May 20-21, Egypt reimposed the blockade on the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli-bound shipping; Israel regarded the blockade as a casus belli.

On June 7, amid these heightening tensions between Israel and Egypt, Israel carried out a preemptive air strike against Egyptian and Syrian forces, shattering their armies within six days. Following Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, UNTSO’s function changed to observing cease-fire lines, as opposed to armistice lines. Its functions increased when it was given responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area, in place of the departed UNEF, and on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. This responsibility lasted until October 1973.

A further development during this period was the passage on November 22, 1967, of Security Council Resolution 242, which called on Israel to exchange territory captured during the 1967
War in return for peace with neighboring Arab states.

From 1967 to 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict remained stalemated, with Israel remaining in control of all the territories captured in the June 1967 War.

1973–Present

Two major military conflicts, the October 1973 War and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978, as well as the signing of the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty, resulted in the seconding of UNTSO’s personnel to form three new peacekeeping forces. UNTSO missions in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon were also reorganized.

On October 6, 1973, war broke out on the Arab-Israeli front when Egyptian and Syrian armies, in a simultaneous operation, attacked outposts along the Israeli-controlled Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights, respectively, with the aim of recapturing territories lost in the 1967 War. The war was halted by an October 22 U.N. cease-fire. On October 25, the Security Council passed Resolution 340 to establish UNEF II to interpose between Israel and Egypt. This action was followed by the signing of a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel on January 18, 1974. When UNEF II’s mandate expired in 1979 as a result of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, UNTSO’s observers remained in the Sinai Peninsula, but were reorganized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE). Following a three-stage withdrawal process under the terms of the 1979 peace treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula on April 25, 1982, and a non-U.N. Multinational Force
and Observers (MFO) mission was deployed in the eastern portion of the Sinai Peninsula.

Under the terms of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Israel also agreed on a framework for resolving the Palestinian issue through the provision of eventual autonomy for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

A disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, signed on May 30, 1974, resulted in the detachment of some UNTSO observers to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established on May 31 and deployed on the Golan Heights. UNTSO in the Syrian-Israeli sector was reorganized as the Observer Group Golan (OGG) peacekeeping operation. The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD) became a separate UNTSO unit in Syria, providing support functions for OGG.

UNTSO underwent further reorganization along the Israeli-Lebanese frontier. In 1972 five UNTSO outposts were established in Lebanon along the Lebanon-Israel armistice lines. When the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was formed following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and an Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon was established, UNTSO's functions were suspended and it was reorganized to form Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) in order to assist UNIFIL. UNTSO's Lebanon contingent was reorganized again in August 1982 when Observer Group Beirut (OGB) was created following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. In addition to the U.N. peacekeeping observer presence, a non-U.N. Multinational Force (MNF) was
established to maintain order in Beirut and monitor Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The first phase of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon took place in February 1985. Although Israel announced the completion of its withdrawal from Lebanon on June 10, 1985, it continued to retain a "security zone" along the border inside Lebanon, policed by the Israeli-sponsored South Lebanon Army (SLA) and supported by smaller numbers of Israeli troops. The "security zone" was a constant source of friction with the U.N. peacekeeping contingent in Lebanon.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

During the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, UNTSO has been deployed in a variety of peacekeeping missions in the sector’s frontiers, with several of its units reconfigured to meet changing circumstances and requirements. UNTSO was first deployed in the Palestine sector following the passage of Security Council Resolution of April 23, 1948. The first contingent of U.N. observers dispatched to Palestine arrived in mid-June 1948, and numbered 93. By September 1948, 572 observers were deployed; their number was reduced to between 30 and 140 once the General Armistice Agreements were concluded in 1949, and remained at that strength for the next two decades.

In the Egyptian-Israeli sector, after the October 1956 War UNTSO observers were deployed only on the Egyptian side of the armistice line of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, as a result of Israel’s denunciation of the Armistice Agreement with Egypt and refusal to participate in EIMAC’s proceedings. Actual
peacekeeping functions were henceforth performed by UNEF I, although in cooperation with UNTSO. In May 1967, when UNEF I forces were withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government, UNTSO observers undertook limited patrols along the armistice demarcation line; their numbers were increased from six to 20 as additional UNTSO observers from Jerusalem were sent to Gaza to supplement that force. Following the June 1967 War, UNTSO observers were redeployed to patrol along the Suez Canal area. In 1979, UNTSO observers remained in the Sinai Peninsula, forming Observer Group Egypt (OGE). OGE numbered 55 observers (June 1990) and operated six observation outposts in the Sinai Peninsula, one at Ismailia, with a headquarters in Cairo. However, with the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty and the establishment in 1982 of the non-U.N. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to patrol the Sinai, OGE observers saw their peacekeeping role reduced substantially. There was a possibility that in the future they might substitute for the MFO, should Egypt and Israel "mutually agree to phase out that force."

In the Syrian-Israeli sector, on the Golan Heights, UNTSO observers staffed observation posts on both the Syrian and Israeli sides. On the Golan Heights, some UNTSO observers were seconded to UNDOF in May 1974 as Observer Group Golan (OGG), coming under UNDOF’s operational command. Because of the prohibition against the participation in UNDOF of UNTSO observers from the Security Council’s five permanent members, a separate unit known as Observation Detachment Damascus (ODD) was
established and charged with providing OGG with various support functions. As of June 1990, 138 UNTSO military observers were deployed in the Syria-Israel sector, with 96 seconded to OGG, 35 to ODD, and seven holding staff positions at UNDOF's headquarters in Damascus.

In the Jordanian-Israeli sector, no cease-fire observation posts have ever been established along that common border because of the reluctance of both countries to accept a deployment of U.N. observers in the Jordan Valley. Nevertheless, an Israel-Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission was based in Amman, Jordan, with two UNTSO military observers staffing the liaison office.

In the Lebanese-Israeli sector, UNTSO personnel established five observation posts on the Lebanese side of the armistice demarcation line after 1970. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO's functions ceased in that country. UNTSO observers then were either seconded directly to the newly formed UNIFIL or were reconstituted as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). In 1990, OGL had 65 military observers. In August 1982, following Israel's second invasion of Lebanon, UNTSO personnel were seconded to the newly created Observer Group Beirut (OGB); eight observers remained by late 1990.

UNTSO observers have also been detached or seconded to other peacekeeping operations, such as the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (1984-88), the U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Angola Verification Mission.
Political and Military Goals

UNTSO's political and military mandate has been radically altered by the various armed conflagrations since 1948. It was initially deployed to supervise the May 1948 truce, but in 1949 it was assigned to supervise the work of the four MAC's, which were set up to provide a forum of authorized U.N. representatives to hear specific complaints from the Arab and Israeli parties about alleged violations of the cease-fire. The MAC's then forwarded the complaints in written reports and recommendations to the U.N. The MAC's, however, lacked the power to impose sanctions against cease-fire violators. As they became increasingly overwhelmed by complaints from both sides, which made it difficult for them to function effectively, their role declined over the years; none remained functional after 1967.25 UNTSO then became the primary U.N. agency to observe, investigate, and report on border incidents in the region, and it reported on these incidents directly to the Security Council and the Secretary-General.26

UNTSO's primary military goal is to serve as a deterrent to aggression by either side because of its presence as neutral observer and its role in assessing cease-fire violations.27 To ensure their status as neutral observers, UNTSO troops are unarmed. Thus their primary function is to "observe, report, and investigate" border incidents while using no force or enforcement powers to resolve these violations.

Rules of Engagement
UNTSO’s mission in the Arab-Israeli sector is essentially to observe, investigate, and report on border incidents in the Israeli-Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese sectors, in cooperation with other U.N. peacekeeping forces in the region. It observes the implementation of cease-fires and reports complaints submitted by the parties concerned to the Secretary-General. It conducts inspections of areas where armaments and forces are limited by disengagement agreements. UNTSO personnel are unarmed and therefore not in a position to prevent the outbreak of war.

**Composition of Forces**

By 1993, nineteen countries provided UNTSO with military observers and other personnel. The participation in UNTSO by officers from the Soviet Union and the United States began only in 1973. However, because the Soviets were not accepted by the Israelis and the Syrians refused to accept the Americans, neither group could be deployed at observation posts along the Syrian-Israeli frontier. They did, however, constitute the majority of the OGE observer contingent.

UNTSO’s maximum strength was 572 personnel in 1948; on June 30, 1990, it numbered 291 military observers. Throughout UNTSO’s existence, its observers have been designated or seconded into groups and assigned to the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli sectors.

Members of UNTSO are rotated during their tour of duty in order to expose them to a variety of environments, ranging from peaceful to highly volatile and dangerous.
Equipment

UNTSO’s equipment ranged from ground transport vehicles such as trucks and jeeps (with U.N. markings), to light aircraft and helicopters; high frequency VHF radio and other communications equipment; binoculars; light arms; and medical supplies.

Training

As the U.N.’s first and longest-running peacekeeping operation, UNTSO’s training procedures have evolved over the years to meet changing requirements, and in the process its personnel gained increasing experience in peacekeeping duties. It thereby gained a role as a training ground and a source of potential reserves, frequently in rapid deployment situations, for the establishment of new peacekeeping operations.  

Tactics

UNTSO observers monitor border situations by staffing observation posts and by conducting mobile reconnaissance patrols in marked U.N. jeeps.

Cost

Since its inception, UNTSO’s expenditures have been financed by the U.N.‘s regular budget. From May 1948 until December 31, 1989, UNTSO’s expenditures totaled $310,521,300; by 1991 its expenditure had reached $356 million. UNTSO’s annual operating costs are approximately $31 million.

Operational Assessment

UNTSO’s successes and failures are measured in terms of the fulfillment of its mandated functions to observe, investigate,
and report on border incidents, and to serve as a neutral body in
detering aggression across borders by the parties to the
conflict.

Successes have included the following:

First, UNTSO representatives have provided an indispensable
function as mediators between Israel and the neighboring Arab
states because most of the parties have been in a state of war
with each other and have no formal diplomatic relations. This
mediation function has included exchanges of prisoners of war.

Second, UNTSO has fulfilled an important function in
impartially and objectively documenting facts concerning
violations of the cease-fire and acts of aggression. This
function was essential during periods of heightened hostility and
tension. For example, upon the outbreak of the October 1973 War,
the U.N. Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that
Egypt had attacked first, which Egypt subsequently denied. But
the accuracy of the Secretary-General’s report forced the
Egyptian government to reverse its denial.37

UNTSO observers have also provided an important source of
reporting in highly volatile areas where objective information
was scarce. The 1982 UNTSO detachment to Lebanon, known as
Observer Group in Beirut (OGB), was considered a success because
it reported on the effectiveness of the multinational force, the
progress of Israeli withdrawal, and the conditions in the refugee
camps.38

Third, UNTSO’s long-term experience and training as
peacekeeper in the Arab-Israeli sector have enabled it to rapidly deploy its detachments to newly formed peacekeeping missions in other regions; its presence on the ground has served as an initial deterrent to renewed hostilities.39

Failures have included the following:

First, despite the initial U.N. intention that the 1949 armistice lines would be only temporary arrangements and would be followed by peace treaties between the contending parties, by 1993 most of the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict remained either unresolved or in the process of resolution. This situation was not caused by a deficiency in UNTSO's role or function; rather, it points to the basic limitation of its peacekeeping mission. It is only through agreements by the local parties that conflicts are ultimately resolved, as demonstrated by the Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement of September 1993. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a series of national security policies by the local parties exacerbated the situation from the very beginning. In 1949, for example, Transjordan, with Israeli acquiescence, took over the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, while Egypt assumed control of the Gaza Strip—the areas allotted to the Palestinians by the 1947 U.N. partition resolution. The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the June 1967 War resulted in the Israeli takeover of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, and together with a hardening of positions by all sides resulted in the further postponement of the resolution of the future of the Palestinian people.
Second, UNTSO was vulnerable on a number of occasions to unilateral eviction by a party to the conflict. This fact was demonstrated in May 1967 when Egypt demanded the immediate withdrawal of UNTSO (and UNEF I) from its territory.

Third, UNTSO’s effectiveness was repeatedly compromised by the conflicting approaches to the Arab-Israeli dispute taken by the U.N.’s General Assembly and Security Council, particularly in addressing the Palestinian issue. Annual resolutions passed by the General Assembly tended to exceed and question the decisions of the Security Council, thus undermining the U.N.’s impartiality in settling the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, a special U.N. body, has been criticized for being heavily biased against Israel, resulting in the refusal of Western countries to participate in its deliberations.\textsuperscript{41}

Fourth, despite the initial hope when the U.N. was founded that soldiers detached to peacekeeping forces would transfer their national allegiance to the U.N., military personnel seconded to UNTSO have tended to function as representatives of their own countries, serving their countries’ national interest or security.\textsuperscript{42}

Fifth, the seconding of unarmed military personnel to peacekeeping missions located in highly volatile regions has at times resulted in risking their lives. This fact was underscored in February 1988 by the kidnapping and execution by Lebanese extremists of Lieutenant Colonel (USMC) William Higgins, who was
serving as UNTSO’s commander in southern Lebanon.43

CURRENT SITUATION

In 1993, UNTSO continued to deploy observer groups in Egypt (particularly in the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon (especially Beirut), Syria (on the Golan Heights and in Damascus), Jordan (with a liaison office in Amman), and Israel (where it maintained its headquarters), with some of its personnel detailed to UNIFIL and UNDOF.

The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty paved the way for UNTSO’s replacement in the Sinai Peninsula by the non-U.N. Multinational Force (MNF).

In December 1987, the Palestinian intifada (uprising) broke out in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, continuing until the Israeli-PLO rapprochement in late 1993. It served to transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by bringing it into Israel itself, with UNTSO playing no peacekeeping role in the two territories.

In February 1988, following a number of diplomatic initiatives in the 1980s, United States Secretary of State George Schultz outlined a plan bearing his name to provide a framework for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. This plan ultimately led to a number of major diplomatic breakthroughs. On December 13, 1988, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, which had relocated to Geneva, offered an historic concession by explicitly recognizing Israel and
rejecting "terrorism." This statement, as well as other diplomatic moves initiated by the United States, inaugurated a new phase in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking.

In the early 1990s, there was substantive progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the future of the Palestinian issue. Under United States leadership, a peace process was convened involving a series of bilateral Arab-Israeli talks under the mantle of an international conference, with the U.N. having observer status. On October 30, 1991, the first Arab-Israeli peace conference was held in Madrid, under United States, Soviet Union (later the Russian Republic), and U.N. auspices. Further peace conferences were held in Washington and Moscow. For the first time, the participants included Israel, a Palestinian delegation, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Alongside these bilateral and multilateral meetings, Israel and the PLO began to meet secretly, under Norwegian auspices, culminating in the September 1993 rapprochement between the two sides.

CONCLUSION

The fate of UNTSO and its various peacekeeping detachments has always depended on the actions of the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, although UNTSO's presence generally contributed to the maintenance of relative peace along the armistice and cease-fire boundaries between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on several occasions it was unable to prevent the outbreak of hostilities once the local parties had decided to launch preemptive strikes against each other. This
resulted from UNTSO’s limited mandate and lack of enforcement capability. Second, the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was always recognized to be beyond UNTSO’s mandate. In fact, even the U.N. played no role in bringing about the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict because the General Assembly resolutions over the years tended to be highly partisan and were not constructive in terms of conflict resolution.

Nevertheless, tremendous progress was achieved in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1990’s because of the diplomatic efforts of the United States, various European nations, and Russia. These efforts ultimately led to the historic September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian treaty of mutual recognition, which provided a five-year transitional framework for Palestinian self-rule beginning in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, on the West Bank, and accompanied by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from those areas. This treaty was likely to lead to yet another transformation in UNTSO’s peacekeeping mission. The final fate of UNTSO: to be reconstituted along new international Arab/Palestinian-Israeli frontiers or to be replaced by a non-U.N. peacekeeping organization similar to the MNF in the Sinai Peninsula, depended on the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian/Arab negotiations.
Endnotes


4. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation, 244.

5. Ibid., 245.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 97.

10. Ibid., 97.

11. Ibid., 93.

12. Ibid., 94.


15. Ibid., 37.


21. The Blue Helmets, 38.

22. Ibid., 39.


24. The Blue Helmets, 41-2.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


31. The Blue Helmets, 419.


33. Ibid., 100.

34. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 37.


38. Ibid.


41. Ibid.

42. Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 38.

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Bibliography


United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)

Selected Chronology

1956

War broke out in October when, following a period of heightened tension, Israeli, British, and French forces initiated military action against Egypt. In November, the U.N. General Assembly voted to establish UNEF (also known as UNEF I).

1957

In March, UNEF I was deployed along the border between Egypt and Israel.

1967

In mid-May, Egypt requested UNEF I’s immediate withdrawal from its positions along the Egypt-Israel border, the Straits of Tiran, and the Sinai Peninsula. UNEF I was withdrawn on May 16-18. On June 7, the Six-Day War broke out as Israeli forces shattered the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Following the conclusion of the war, UNTSO personnel were given responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire, in place of the departed UNEF.
INTRODUCTION

United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF; also known as UNEF I) was established following the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly's decision on November 5, 1956 "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities" that had resulted from the October 1956 Egypt-Israel War (also known as the Sinai Campaign). Following the war and the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French troops from Egyptian territory, Egypt agreed to the deployment of the UNEF in Egypt and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip; Israel, however, refused to permit the force to be stationed on its territory. During the Egyptian-Israeli crisis of May 1967 and Egypt's unilateral demand for its evacuation, UNEF (and United Nations Truce Supervisor Organization--UNTSO) forces were withdrawn from their positions along the border and replaced by Egyptian troops. UNEF's mandate was terminated following the outbreak of the June 1967 War, when it was replaced by UNEF II.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

Growing tensions in 1955-56 along the Egypt-Israel border, as well as British and French opposition to Egyptian nationalization measures, resulted in the outbreak of the October 1956 War. Israel felt threatened by a number of developments that it regarded as abrogating the 1949 Armistice Agreements. These developments included an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in 1955 that Israel viewed as upsetting the military balance; an Egyptian blockade of the port of Eilat and
the Gulf of Aqaba, imposed since 1954; continuous sabotage raids from their bases in Gaza, across the Egyptian armistice lines, by Palestinian guerrilla forces (fedaiyin), supported by the Egyptian government; and public statements by Egyptian officials threatening Israel's destruction. In addition, in October 1956, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan established a Unified Military Command of their forces.

A number of factors caused France and Britain to join forces with Israel against Egypt. France, which had colonial interests in the Middle East and was Israel's main arms supplier, and Britain, which had been the colonial ruler of Egypt, had both become alarmed at Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and its growing ties with the Soviet Union. Following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the French and British governments requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss Cairo's unilateral action. Egypt, however, responded that the Security Council should instead consider the French and British actions "which constitute a danger to international peace and security...." The Security Council met on September 26, 1956, to consider this issue, and the Secretary-General proposed six principles to resolve the crisis, which were incorporated in Security Council Resolution 118 (1956) of October 13. Full-scale fighting, nevertheless, broke out at the end of the month.

Because of these developments, on October 29 Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, in coordination with British
and French forces. In the fighting, the Israeli forces routed the Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula (stopping 10 miles east of the Suez Canal) and the Gaza Strip, which it proceeded to occupy. On October 31, the Anglo-French forces invaded the Suez Canal Zone. The other Arab countries, however, took no part in the fighting, despite their mutual defense treaties with Egypt.

The U.N. Response

The Security Council was initially paralyzed in responding to the outbreak of fighting because Britain and France, two of its permanent members, had veto rights over any decision. Thus, for example, a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on October 30 calling for Israeli withdrawal was vetoed by Britain and France.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

To overcome a British or French veto, a special emergency session of the General Assembly was held on November 1-2, 1956. With United States and Soviet support, the General Assembly passed Resolution 997 (ES-I) calling for Israel’s immediate withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines. This action was followed on November 5 by the General Assembly’s vote in Resolution 1000 (ES-I) to establish UNEF to replace the withdrawing Israeli, British, and French forces.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNEF’s initial deployment began on November 12, 1956, when a UNTSO detachment of military observers arrived in Cairo to establish temporary headquarters. It became fully operational
in mid-November upon the establishment of the cease-fire. UNEF's initial tasking was to replace the withdrawing forces of the three occupying states and to temporarily administer the Gaza Strip. Under a "good faith agreement" between the U.N. Secretary-General and the Egyptian government, UNEF detachments were stationed in Egypt and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip. They also were stationed at Sharm ash-Shaykh on the Straits of Tiran to ensure the free passage of shipping in the straits. Israel refused to have UNEF troops deployed on its territory.

UNEF continued to carry out its peacekeeping mission until the crisis of May 1967, when Egypt requested the withdrawal of its (and UNTSO's) contingents from its territory, including Sharm ash-Shaykh. Egyptian forces then took up positions along the border with Israel.

Political and Military Goals

UNEF's mandate and goals were derived from resolutions 997, 998, 999, and 1000 passed by the General Assembly in November 1956. These resolutions called on the UNEF force to secure a cease-fire, to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops, and to observe and patrol the armistice lines. The military goal of the UNEF mission was to prevent clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces by its presence, rather than by any enforcement action.

Rules of Engagement

From 1956, until it was withdrawn in May 1967, UNEF I performed peacekeeping functions along the Egypt-Israel frontier.
However, unlike UNTSO, which was strictly an observer operation, UNEF I was a peacekeeping mission that served as a lightly armed barrier between Egypt and Israel. The mission involved supervising the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel; observing, investigating, and reporting on border incidents; and acting as an "informal buffer" between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the international frontier and the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). Until Egyptian authority was reestablished in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in March 1957, UNEF I temporarily performed civil affairs functions, including security, in those inhabited areas. Other functions included the use of force, although "only in self-defense"; arranging for the implementation of prisoner of war exchanges between Egypt and Israel; providing protection to mine-clearing ships deployed by Britain and France in the Suez Canal, as well as participating in some of the minefield clearing operations on land; and repairing some roads and tracks in the peninsula.

Composition of Forces

UNEF's size at the initial deployment in 1956 was more than 6,000 personnel; by May 1967 it had been reduced to 3,378. The U.N. force was composed of contingents from 10 countries, with the national contingents kept separate and intact, although under the U.N.'s operational control. Thus, for example, each national contingent was led by its own commander, and each had exclusive responsibility for administering criminal and military law to its troops. Yugoslavia provided an entire reconnaissance
battalion, Canada supplied a light-armored squadron, as well as transportation, engineering, ordnance, and medical units; and the Indian contingent was responsible for the supply depot and other services.²³

Equipment

UNEF’s equipment consisted of Caribou C-119 light transport aircraft; supply aircraft; a helicopter; British and American-made patrol vehicles; supply trucks; wrecker and tow trucks, logistical and communications equipment; light firearms, including rifles and automatic weapons; mine-clearing equipment; water supplies; and various electrical equipment.²⁴

Training

Many of the initial UNEF I forces had been seconded from the UNTSO mission already deployed along the Israel-Arab boundaries; hence they were already experienced in peacekeeping operations. The later UNEF I forces consisted of other national contingents, with each providing a particular specialty. Their experience had been obtained during national military training.

Tactics

UNEF troops carried out mobile ground patrols and manned observation posts along the Egyptian side of the frontier because of Israel’s refusal to permit U.N. troops on its side of the boundaries. The U.N. peacekeepers also conducted air patrols, with some units providing air reconnaissance support. The troops carried weapons and engaged in self-defense.

Cost
From its inception in November 1956 until June 1967, UNEF I’s expenditures totalled $214,249,000. The countries providing contingents of peacekeepers and other staff absorbed some of the expenses incurred by the operation, thus reducing the financial cost to the U.N.

UNEF’s financing came from a special U.N. budget raised by member states. The force encountered difficulties, particularly over the refusal of the Soviet bloc to pay its share, despite an advisory opinion of the International Court in 1962 that declared the contribution of U.N. members to the force’s financing to be obligatory.

Operational Assessment

UNEF I’s record of accomplishment was mixed. It succeeded in maintaining relative peace along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier for a decade, despite its ad hoc and improvised beginnings and Israel’s refusal to allow the force to be stationed on its side of the cease-fire line. Thus, the number of infiltrations across the Egypt-Israel frontier, particularly by Palestinian guerrillas, was "markedly reduced" by UNEF’s presence.

Nevertheless, UNEF was involved in several significant failures that had long-term repercussions for peacekeeping operations generally. First, the decision by U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to comply with the unilateral Egyptian request to withdraw UNEF troops from its territory during a period of high tension in the region aroused great controversy and marred the reputation of the U.N. as an instrument for conflict resolution.
Israel, in particular, considered UNEF’s removal at Egypt’s insistence, without approval by the Security Council, to be unjustified and incompatible with assurances it had received in 1957 when the peacekeeping force was originally deployed. This action reinforced Israel’s "basic lack of confidence" in the U.N. as an impartial peacekeeping organization.

Second, UNEF I’s organizational structure was criticized for being "scattered." Its headquarters was situated in the Gaza Strip, while most of the troops were deployed a great distance away along the Egypt-Israel armistice line.

Third, UNEF I’s command and control structure was considered to be "large" and "unwieldy."

Fourth, the mixture of equipment deployed by the various national contingent forces created logistical difficulties. These difficulties were exacerbated by the variety of languages spoken by the different forces.

Fifth, UNEF I lacked adequate intelligence-gathering resources. No units responsible for intelligence gathering and dissemination were attached to the force.

CURRENT SITUATION

Following UNEF’s withdrawal from the Egyptian frontier on May 18, 1967, Secretary-General U Thant decided to increase the number of UNTSO observers along the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel. This increase was intended to provide for a U.N. presence, if only symbolic, along the frontier, which was gearing up for war. Although U Thant had arranged to arrive
in Cairo on May 22 to discuss new security arrangements with the Egyptian government, the tensions between Israel and Egypt quickly escalated prior to his arrival when President Gamal Abdel Nasser on May 21-22 reimposed a blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba, thus closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli-bound shipping.\textsuperscript{36}

Full-fledged war broke out on June 5, 1967 when, in a preemptive action, the Israeli Air Force attacked Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian positions. After routing the Arab forces in the Six-Day War, Israel was left in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. UNTSO, the U.N.'s umbrella peacekeeping mission in the Arab-Israeli sector, then assumed the peacekeeping duties formerly assigned to UNEF along the Egyptian-Israeli border.

CONCLUSION

The withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian pressure in May 1967 was not responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in June. Even if the force had remained in place, it would not have deterred either side from initiating war because it is up to the parties to the conflict to initiate and end hostilities.
Endnotes


5. *The Blue Helmets*, 44.

6. *Ibid.*.


10. *Ibid.*.

11. *Ibid.*.


22. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 42.

23. The Blue Helmets, 56.

24. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 46-56.

25. The Blue Helmets, 421.

26. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 73.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. The Blue Helmets, 78.

36. The Blue Helmets, 78; Shimoni and Levine, Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century, 353.
Bibliography


United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)

Selected Chronology

1973

The October War broke out on the Arab-Israeli front when Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked outposts along the Israeli-controlled Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights, respectively. On October 25, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 340 to establish UNEF II to interpose between Israel and Egypt.

1979

UNEF II's mandate expired as a result of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.
INTRODUCTION

United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was established following the cease-fire agreement that terminated the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom Kippur War and War of Ramadan), when the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council voted to dispatch a new peacekeeping mission to the Israeli-Egyptian sector. When it was proposed that the UNEF II provide a similar function for the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement, a detachment of UNEF was deployed on the Golan Heights on May 31, 1974 and renamed United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF). UNEF II’s mandate was terminated in July 1979 when the non-U.N. Multinational Force was established in the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

Following a seven-year political stalemate between Israel and the Arab states over the future of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights captured in the June 1967 War, Egypt and Syria decided to break the stalemate by initiating a war to recapture these territories. The October 1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War and Ramadan War) broke out on October 6 when, in a surprise move, the Syrian and Egyptian armies carried out a simultaneous attack against Israel. On the northern front, the war began with Syrian air attacks and heavy artillery bombardment of Israeli positions on the Golan.
Heights. On the southern front, Egyptian infantry divisions (consisting of 70,000 troops) crossed the Suez Canal, where only some 500 Israeli soldiers were deployed to protect Israel's main line of defense (the Bar-Lev Defense Line).¹

The fighting terminated on the northern front on October 22, as the Syrian forces retreated deep into Syrian territory. On the southern front, fighting ceased on October 24, with the 20,000-man Egyptian Third Army maintaining two bridgeheads along the east bank of the Suez Canal and the Israeli forces occupying a large territory inside Egypt.²

The military losses by both sides in the war were heavy, with an estimated 3,500 Syrians, 15,000 Egyptians, and 2,700 Israelis killed. More than 1,000 Egyptian and 1,100 Syrian tanks in addition to massive quantities of other material were destroyed.³

The U.N. Response

On October 22, 1973, the Security Council, at the initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union, passed Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire to end the war. Passage of the resolution was followed by the implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 (of June 1967), which called for establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This action was followed on October 23 by Security Council Resolution 339, which called for the return of all forces to the positions held when the cease-fire came into force, as well as the deployment to the cease-fire area of a contingent of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO), the U.N.'s primary peacekeeping mission in the region.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

On October 25, the Security Council passed Resolution 340, which called for observance of the cease-fire, increased the number of UNTSO's observers, and established a new United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) for the region.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Immediately following the cease-fire agreement of October 22, 1973, UNEF II established observation posts on both sides of the Suez Canal and along the Cairo-Suez road. The mission's headquarters was initially established in Cairo; in August 1974 it was moved to Ismailia, Egypt. In May 1974, UNEF II's detachment along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line was renamed United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF).

Political and Military Goals

During its six-year existence, UNEF II's political and military goals were revised on several occasions to reflect changing conditions. Its original goals, as approved by the Security Council on October 27, 1973, were to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire agreement as embodied in Resolution 340 and to provide humanitarian relief to the besieged Egyptian Third Army. During the second phase of the operation, UNEF II's assignment shifted to supervising the implementation of the January 1974 and September 1975 disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel. UNEF II was responsible for supervising
the redeployment of the Egyptian and Israeli armies, and manning and controlling the buffer zones established east of the Suez Canal set up by those agreements. The military goals also included checking the "fixed levels of troops and weapons" deployed by Egypt and Israel in the restricted zone established on both sides of the buffer zone. UNEF II’s goals were again revised during its final phase, although it was not given the opportunity to implement them. Thus, although the April 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty requested UNEF II to "supervise the implementation of the security arrangements," the mission’s mandate was terminated because of opposition to the treaty by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Arab states, and the Soviet Union.

Rules of Engagement

UNEF II’s rules of engagement provided for "freedom of movement" necessary to perform its assigned tasks. The mission’s military troops and supporting civilian personnel were granted "all relevant privileges and immunities" provided by the appropriate U.N. diplomatic conventions. The peacekeeping troops were instructed to use force only in self-defense, which included "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Security Council’s mandate." The force was to "act with complete impartiality" and "avoid actions" that would "prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned."

Composition of Forces
UNEF II’s size varied during the course of its existence. The Secretary-General’s report of October 25, 1973, recommended an authorized level of 7,000 troops, to be composed of contingents from countries based on "the principle of geographical representation." The first contingents were drawn from countries that could deploy their peacekeeping troops at short notice. Canada supplied the initial logistics and aviation components, and Poland provided additional logistics support in the form of a road transport unit, as well as a medical unit. The Canadian contingent had an estimated strength of 1,000 (for the first time, the Canadian contingent included female members); the Polish contingent had 800 personnel. By February 20, 1974, UNEF II reached its maximum authorized strength of 6,973 personnel, with a supporting staff of international civilians at headquarters numbering 160. UNEF II was also assisted by 120 UNTSO military observers. Twelve countries contributed contingents to the force, including 604 personnel from Austria, 1,097 from Canada, 637 from Finland, 499 from Ghana, 550 from Indonesia, 271 from Ireland, 571 from Nepal, 406 from Panama, 497 from Peru, 822 from Poland, 399 from Senegal, and 620 from Sweden.

In June 1974, following the establishment of UNDOF, UNEF II’s strength dropped to 5,079 personnel, but with the arrival in July of additional personnel from Canada and Poland its size increased to 5,527. In 1976, the mission’s size was reduced to about 4,174 personnel, and it remained at that force level for
the next three years.\textsuperscript{21} When UNEF II's mandate was terminated in July 1979, it had 4,031 personnel.\textsuperscript{22}

**Equipment**

During UNEF II's initial deployment, vehicles, stores, and equipment were provided by United Nations Peace-Keeper Force in Cyprus and UNTSO on a temporary basis until its regular supplies arrived.\textsuperscript{23} UNEF II's troops were provided with defensive weapons.\textsuperscript{24} For its air and ground patrols, the mission employed reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, and jeeps of North American, West European, and East European origins.\textsuperscript{25} An air-conditioned bus was purchased from West Germany, the logistics operations were provided with communications equipment, and drinking water was provided by reservoirs and pipelines.

**Training**

UNEF II's initial contingent was drawn from experienced UNTSO personnel who were already deployed in the region. Some of the national contingents deployed later in the operation had had prior peacekeeping experience.

**Tactics**

UNEF II's tactics consisted of establishing a system of checkpoints and observation posts, conducting air and ground patrols, and supervising the use of, as well as providing escorts, in agreed-upon "common road sections" to and from watch and surveillance stations.\textsuperscript{26} It also supervised the biweekly inspections of force limitations and armament in specified areas.\textsuperscript{27} To guard against intruders, the peacekeeping mission
established a security zone around camp perimeters. Barbed wire fences were installed, and infantry troops conducted regular night-time foot patrols.\textsuperscript{28}

**Cost**

The total cost of the six-year UNEF II mission was $446.487 million.\textsuperscript{29} The mission was financed through assessments from a U.N. Special Account.

**Operational Assessment**

UNEF II has proven to be one of the U.N.'s most successful peacekeeping operations, although it was initially deployed following the cessation of fighting and not in the midst of a wartime situation. Unlike UNEF I, which was established by the General Assembly following the threat of veto by France and Britain, UNEF II was established by the Security Council, with the approval of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and thus had greater international legitimacy. Its operational successes and failures (although of a limited nature) provide valuable lessons for U.N. peacekeeping planners and the various national contingents that participated in its mission.

First, UNEF II's greatest success was its distinction of being terminated by a peace treaty between two long-time belligerent nations.

Second, the mission was instrumental in reopening the Suez Canal in 1975, following eight years of idleness as a result of the June 1967 War.

Third, UNEF II personnel, unlike UNEF I, were permitted to
travel to Israel with relative ease because of Israel’s cooperation with the peacekeeping mission, a factor that was absent during UNEF I’s tenure.

Fifth, the security of the mission’s camps against night-time intruders was greatly enhanced upon the arrival of the Gurkha troops, who were assigned primary responsibility for security.30

Among the most notable failures were the following: First, as recognized by the Canadian contingent, it is operationally inadvisable during the initial deployment phase to deploy units whose troops have had little prior experience interacting with each other.31 Thus, one of the problems facing the Canadian contingent upon initial deployment was to establish a unified peacekeeping force out of personnel who had never "functioned together" in a comparable undertaking.32

Second, during the force’s initial deployment only certain national contingents were properly supplied, a fact that resulted in resentment by the other nationalities.33

Third, there was a shortage of some essential equipment, particularly kerosene heaters, chemical toilets, and mosquito netting, during the mission’s initial phase.34 Problems persisted in this area; the Secretary-General reported in October 1978 that the "supply of goods and services to UNEF continues to be handicapped by the long procurement lead times."35

CURRENT SITUATION

Following the initial U.N.-mediated cease-fire and
disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, several additional agreements were signed between the two countries. These agreements led eventually to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In September 1974, the mediation efforts by United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led to a further disengagement agreement for an enlarged buffer zone further to the east between Egypt and Israel that was completed in February 1976. The United States then provided personnel and electronic surveillance equipment for the non-U.N. Multinational Force deployed west of the Mitla Pass.

UNEF II’s mandate was terminated upon the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. Given a likely veto of its renewal by the Soviet Union, which opposed the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Security Council allowed UNEF II’s mandate to expire on July 24, 1979.

CONCLUSION

UNEF II was the only U.N. peacekeeping mission assigned to the Middle East to be terminated when the warring countries signed a peace treaty. Also, in contrast to other missions, its mandate terminated under favorable conditions for long-term peace, with both Israel and Egypt over the years continuing to make substantial progress in this direction. Its replacement by the non-U.N. Multinational Force proved to be highly successful in maintaining a peaceful border between Egypt and Israel. UNEF II may serve as a model for future reorientation of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Arab-Israeli sector when peace
treaties are signed between Israel and the neighboring Arab nations, including the envisioned future Palestinian state.
Endnotes


2. Ibid., 509.

3. Ibid., 505-9.


5. Ibid., 88.


7. The Blue Helmets, 97.

8. Ibid., 81.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 82-3.

13. Ibid., 85.

14. Ibid.


16. The Blue Helmets, 84.

17. Ibid, 84-5.

18. Ibid., 86.

19. Ibid., 84.

20. Ibid., 85.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 423.
23. Ibid., 84.
24. Ibid., 82.
27. Ibid., 97.
28. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 118.
29. The Blue Helmets, 423.
30. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 118.
31. Ibid., 134.
32. Ibid., 134-5.
33. Ibid., 135.
34. Ibid.
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Selected Chronology

1962

On September 19, Imam Ahmad, North Yemen’s dynastic ruler, died. On September 26-27, a military coup overthrew his son and successor, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). A guerrilla-style civil war began between royalist and republican forces, each backed by external patrons.

1963

In an April 29 report, United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General U Thant requested Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to undertake a fact-finding mission to Egypt and Yemen.

In a May 27 report, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of U.N. observers in Yemen.

The Secretary-General reported on June 7 that Saudi Arabia and Egypt had agreed to subsidize the costs of a U.N. operation in Yemen. On June 11, Security Council Resolution 179 (1963) authorized the Secretary-General to establish an observation operation in Yemen (UNYOM).

1964

On September 4, UNYOM terminated its activities and withdrew its personnel and equipment from the YAR.

1965

In August, Saudi Arabia’s king Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud and Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser met in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, and reached an agreement on a cease-fire, which was not implemented.

In November-December, representatives of republican and royalist forces met at Harad, Saudi Arabia. No agreement was reached, and the civil war continued.

1967

In the June War, Israel defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
In October, the last Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the YAR.

In November, the Abd Allah al-Sallal government was deposed in the YAR and replaced by Republican Council under Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani.

In December, royalist forces began the siege of Sanaa.

1970

In March, the Jiddah peace conference produced agreement to end the YAR civil war.

In May, royalists were added to the cabinet as part of the YAR reconciliation.

In December, the YAR implemented a permanent constitution.
INTRODUCTION

The Yemeni civil war broke out following the overthrow of Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the dynastic ruler, in a coup d'état on September 26-27, 1962. In June 1963, a United Nations Observation Mission (UNYOM) was dispatched to North Yemen (then known as the Yemen Arab Republic, later the unified country of Yemen) to implement the terms of a cease-fire disengagement agreement between republican and royalist forces and their external backers, Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic), and Saudi Arabia, which maintained a military presence in the country. After its task was made impossible by the refusal of both sides to abide by the terms of the agreement, on September 4, 1964, UNYOM's activities terminated and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn from the country. Although government forces, backed by Egyptian troops, proved superior to the insurgents, the fighting continued for several years until a formal reconciliation was reached in 1970.

This case study examines the initial crisis in Yemen, the factors leading to the detachment of UNYOM, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation in the country in light of the mission's initial goals.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The initial crisis that precipitated the detachment of UNYOM was the death of Imam Ahmad, the Yemeni dynastic ruler, on September 18, 1962 and the inability of his son and successor,
Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr, to prevent the overthrow of the Hamid al-Din Imamate (dynasty) by a military coup on September 26-27 of that year. The military coup was led by Colonel (later Field Marshal) Abd Allah al-Sallal, commander of the Royal Guard, who immediately formed the Revolutionary Command Council and announced the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). However, the Imam managed to escape to the mountainous north, the stronghold of the pro-royalist tribes, where he succeeded in rallying royalist forces in a guerrilla-style counterrevolution to regain his throne. The royalists set up their counter-government in Saudi Arabia and were also assisted by Britain, which controlled the Federation of South Arabia and the Aden colony (South Yemen). The new military government, with al-Sallal appointed president, gained control of the cities and towns in North Yemen's central, southern, and western sea coast areas, but the royalist forces controlled the northwest and southeast mountains and the deserts in the eastern part of the country.

Although Egyptian forces may have been deployed already in anticipation of the coup, Egypt quickly dispatched military aid in the form of troops (some 28,000 in 1963), arms, and supplies to assist in consolidating the new Yemeni regime. Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser was motivated by a number of factors, including his interest in extending the influence of the Egypt-dominated Pan Arab movement over the oil-rich and strategically important region of the Arabian Peninsula, which was ruled by traditional monarchs. By 1964 Egypt had deployed
some 40,000 troops in the YAR; in 1966 this figure increased to 50,000.

Saudi Arabia viewed the new republic as a threat to the interests of the Saudi royal family, a fear that increased when al-Sallal spoke of creating a Republic of the Arabian Peninsula to replace the existing monarchies. Saudi Arabia and Jordan, another potentially threatened monarchy, supported the royalist forces with arms and other military supplies.

The first phase of the civil war began in October 1962, when royalist troops mounted an offensive that was counterattacked by the republicans and their allies in March 1963.

The U.N. Response

As the fighting intensified in early 1963, both United States President John F. Kennedy and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant became alarmed at the escalating crisis in the YAR. Their concern resulted in separate fact-finding missions in late February 1963 by Ralph Bunche, the U.N. Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, and by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, President Kennedy’s emissary. After several weeks of separate negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the YAR, Bunche and Bunker reported to the Secretary-General about their findings, which were incorporated in U Thant’s report of April 30, announcing that the three governments had accepted identical terms of disengagement from the YAR. Saudi Arabia agreed to end all forms of support to the royalist forces, whereas Egypt undertook to withdraw gradually its troops and terminate its
military activities in the YAR. A demilitarized zone extending to twenty kilometers (approximately twelve miles) on each side of the YAR-Saudi Arabian border was established, with U.N. observers stationed to verify compliance of the disengagement terms.²

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

After considering the Secretary-General’s reports, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 179 (1963) on June 11, 1963 to authorize the UNYOM operation. The Security Council vote was 10 to 0, with the Soviet Union abstaining. Major General Carl von Horn, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, was appointed Commander of UNYOM. He had earlier carried out a fact-finding mission on behalf of the Secretary-General to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the YAR.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

A UNYOM advance party, led by General von Horn, arrived in the YAR on June 13, 1963, and set up headquarters in Sanaa, the capital. The headquarters staff consisted of some 28 civilians attached to the U.N. and 20 members who were locally recruited.³ A liaison office was established in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) liaison office in Cairo provided assistance in maintaining contact with the Egyptian government. UNYOM’s operations began on July 4 with the deployment of reconnaissance and air units in their assigned areas.

Political and Military Goals

UNYOM was initially assigned the military goals of "checking
and certifying" that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were fulfilling the terms of the disengagement agreement. The operation was not tasked with any peacekeeping or investigative functions; rather, it was to observe and verify the intentions of Saudi Arabia to cease its activities in support of the royalist insurgents and of Egypt to withdraw its forces from Yemen.\(^4\) UNYOM had no political functions of providing mediation or conciliation to the parties involved; it had no authority or military power to compel compliance to the disengagement terms; and it exercised no role in the YAR's internal affairs, external relations, or bordering territories.\(^5\) When Pier P. Spinelli, the Under-Secretary and Director of the U.N.'s European Office, was appointed by the Secretary-General on November 4, 1963 to head UNYOM, the mission’s military mandate was supplemented to include exploratory discussions with the concerned parties about resolving the conflict.\(^6\)

**Rules of Engagement**

UNYOM’s rules of engagement entailed ground patrolling in the demilitarized zone and surrounding areas, and air patrolling in the mountainous central part of the buffer zone, where land patrolling was difficult.\(^7\) The military observers stationed in Sanaa were to observe and certify the withdrawal of troops.\(^8\) UNYOM was not authorized to issue orders or directives and could not initiate or engage in combat.\(^9\)

**Composition of Forces**

At maximum strength, UNYOM consisted of 189 personnel from
11 nations, including 25 military observers, a Yugoslav reconnaissance unit of 114 officers and other enlisted personnel serving with UNEF, and a Royal Canadian Air Force unit of 50 officers and other enlisted personnel.\(^{10}\)

In November 1963, a reappraisal of UNYOM’s requirements resulted in a decision to progressively withdraw the Yugoslav military contingent in the demilitarized zone, with the number of military observers there increased to 25.\(^{11}\) The number of Canadian personnel was also reduced, and their assignment during the third mandate shifted from air patrolling to providing logistic support.\(^{12}\)

**Equipment**

Because it was an observer mission, the majority of UNYOM’s officers were unarmed. Logistical equipment was used by the reconnaissance units. Ground transportation included light vehicles. UNYOM had eight aircraft, consisting of Caribou aircraft for logistics, liaison flights, and reconnaissance, and Otter aircraft for daily patrolling.\(^{13}\) Because the Otters were considered inadequate for the Yemeni environment, Caribous replaced them during the mission’s third mandate.

**Training**

Units participating in UNYOM’s mission were seconded from other U.N. peacekeeping deployments, with the majority having gained training and other experience in the Congo and Sinai operations. The limited mandate of UNYOM did not require additional training.
Tactics

Tactics consisted of establishing checkpoints and air and ground patrols to cover all main roads and tracks leading into Yemen and the demilitarized zone. During UNYOM's third mandate, the tactics of the military observers changed. For the Canadian contingent, the assignment shifted from air patrolling to providing logistic support.14

Cost

The estimated cost of the initial four-month Yemeni operation was authorized at $1 million, but the U.N. incurred no financial obligations because Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to divide the costs for two months at a time until the termination of the mission in September 1964.15 The total cost for the fourteen-month operation was $1,840,450.16

Operational Assessment

Although the observer mission was ineffectual in accomplishing its political and military objectives, it achieved several limited successes. These successes included the following:

First, during its 14-month deployment in the YAR, UNYOM had a restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. There was a reduction in Saudi arms shipments across Saudi borders to the Yemeni royalists, and Egypt ceased bombing Saudi towns and supply trains and depots intended for royalist forces.17

Second, a gradual rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt began to occur in early 1964, following the Cairo
conference of Arab heads of state, leading to the resolution of a number of outstanding issues between them.

Third, despite several incidents the mission incurred no fatalities.\(^{18}\)

UNYOM was ineffectual for the following reasons:

First, solution of the problem was beyond the scope of UNYOM's original mandate. UNYOM could at best serve only as an intermediary because full and final responsibility for implementing the disengagement agreement rested with the YAR government, the royalist forces, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Progress could be achieved only through bilateral negotiations between the Egyptians and the Saudis.

Second, the size of the U.N. force was inadequate for its task.\(^{19}\)

Third, UNYOM's air and ground patrolling was ineffective. Many potential military cargoes on the ground were unchecked because most observation by ground and air patrols of land traffic occurred during daylight hours, whereas most traffic actually took place at night because the harsh desert climate necessitated travel during the cooler hours.\(^{20}\)

Fourth, during the period of UNYOM's mandate, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia violated the terms of the disengagement agreement by continuing to send large quantities of arms, ammunition, and funds, and to either mount or tolerate offensive actions by their respective client forces.

Fifth, UNYOM was limited by its mandate only to observe and
report on the implementation of the disengagement agreement in the demilitarized zone; its responsibilities did not extend to the undefined portion of the Saudi Arabian-YAR border or the border between the YAR and the (South Yemen) British-controlled South Arabian Federation.21

Sixth, the initial phase of the operation was disorganized, with shortages of gasoline, spare parts, and food.22 UNEF I in Egypt provided insufficient air and logistical assistance; the U.N. headquarters in New York offered inadequate administrative support; UNYOM personnel often complained of inadequate provision for leave; and medical facilities were in short supply.23 The Otter aircraft were inadequate for the Yemeni environment because they lacked oxygen equipment for high altitude flying and required extensive maintenance.24 Security for the aircraft was inadequate, and accommodation and living conditions for the mission's personnel, particularly in terms of hygiene, health, and food, also were inadequate.25

Seventh, on several occasions there was uncertainty about the duration of UNYOM's mission because Egypt and Saudi Arabia had agreed to finance the cost of the operation only at two-month intervals. There was some demoralization among the forces involved when cost agreements were delayed upon the expiration of a two-month period.26

CURRENT SITUATION

UNYOM's mission to the YAR ended on September 4, 1964. At the time of its withdrawal, UNYOM's personnel consisted of 25
military observers and the Canadian supporting air unit. A number of initiatives were undertaken by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to resolve the civil war. Among these was the October 1964 conference at Erkowit in Sudan between moderate republican and moderate royalist factions, at which a temporary cease-fire was proclaimed. There were also several abortive efforts by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to negotiate an end to the conflict during the next several years. However, these efforts failed, and fighting continued, with neither side making much headway.

CONCLUSION

UNYOM faced many obstacles during its 14-month existence: in particular, the harsh Yemeni terrain, uncertain financial provisions, inadequate size, limited political and military goals, and actions by partners to the conflict that ran contrary to the terms of the disengagement agreement that the U.N. mission was established to supervise.

However, whereas the UNYOM operation may be considered a failure, it succeeded indirectly in paving the way for a gradual series of agreements between the Egyptian and Saudi backers of the Yemeni parties to the conflict. Following a six-year stalemate in fighting after the departure of UNYOM, these agreements culminated in the holding of a peace conference in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in March 1970, which produced an agreement to end the civil war. In May of that year, royalists were added to the YAR-expanded Republican Council and cabinet, as part of the country's reconciliation. A permanent constitution was agreed
to in December.

Following the resolution of the Yemeni civil war in 1970, the YAR's attention turned to the conflict with its southern neighbor, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen), which was created in 1967, following British withdrawal. However, after twenty years of intermittent fighting between the two southern Arabian nations, this conflict was resolved when both countries united to form the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990.
Endnotes


6. Ibid., 431.

7. Ibid., 427.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


12. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 83.

13. Ibid., 78, 82.

14. Ibid., 83.

15. In 1963-64 the U.N. experienced financial difficulty as a result of the Congo operation's high costs and Soviet refusal to pay its assessed share for the Congo and UNEF I. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 282, and The Blue Helmets (1985), 191-2.

16. The Blue Helmets (1990), 433.


18. The Blue Helmets (1990), 433.

19. Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 78.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

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22. Ibid., 81.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid, 82.
25. Ibid., 83.
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The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

Selected Chronology

1973

War broke out on the Arab-Israeli front on October 6 when Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked Israeli outposts in the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights areas, respectively.

1974

On May 30, Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement. On May 31, UNDOF was established by the U.N. Security Council and was deployed in the Golan Heights on June 3.

1992-93

Israel and Syria engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations to determine the future of the Golan Heights.
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established on the Golan Heights (also known as Golan) as a result of the May 31, 1974 separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel. In June of that year, UNDOF became operational and continues to supervise the disengagement of forces on the Golan to the present day. It has been one of the U.N.’s most successful peacekeeping operations, as demonstrated by the small number of incidents that have occurred in its sector and the renewal of its mandate, with both parties’ agreement, every six months for the past 19 years.1

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The Golan Heights is a volcanic plateau at the southern foot of Mount Hermon, adjacent to the Sea of Galilee. Its total area is 714 square miles, with a width of 18 miles. Prior to 1967, the Golan was part of the Syrian provinces of Al Qunaytirah and Fig. It has been occupied by Israel since the June 1967 War, when Israel conquered the territory following intense fighting against Syrian forces. In the October 1973 War, the Syrian army initially overran part of the Golan, but was repulsed by Israeli forces during the second stage of fighting, with the Israelis expanding the area under their control to ten miles into Syrian territory.

The U.N. Response

With the fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces on the verge of escalating, on October 22, 1973, at the urging of both
the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security Council passed Resolution 338 (1973) calling for a cease-fire between Syria and Israel. Syria and Israel agreed to the cease-fire, although the Israeli consent resulted from U.S. pressure. At this point, Israeli forces were deployed beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines, where they occupied a salient ten miles into Syrian territory on the Quineitra-Damascus road. The Security Council then authorized the deployment of a contingent of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) II military observers at temporary observation posts around that salient, thus resuming the cease-fire observation operation in the Syrian-Israeli sector.  
Nevertheless, the situation remained highly unstable during the period of March-May 1974, with many cease-fire violations committed by both parties. This volatile situation led U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to undertake a diplomatic mission to the Middle East, which resulted in the Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement in May 1974, and laid the foundation for UNDOF’s establishment.

UNDOF was formally established by Security Council Resolution 350, of May 31, 1974.  
Its mandate, like other U.N. peacekeeping missions, was to be renewed periodically every six months.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

On June 3, 1974, UNDOF’s initial contingent arrived in Syria, where it established a provisional (later to become
permanent) headquarters in Damascus, in a building occupied by the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The force initially consisted of 90 UNTSO observers who had been detailed to the new mission and Austrian and Peruvian advance teams; it was commanded on an interim basis by the commander of the northern brigade of UNEF II, Brigadier General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos, of Peru. Later, these forces were joined by the remaining Austrian and Peruvian contingents, as well as by logistics units from Canada and Poland. On June 16, when UNDOF’s strength was brought to its authorized level of 1,250 personnel two of the contingents were located in Israel and two in Syria.

Political and Military Goals

UNDOF’s initial political and military goals were to take control of the territory ten miles into Syriad that was being evacuated by Israeli forces in stages. According to the provisions of the disengagement agreement, it was to hand over this territory to Syrian authorities and to establish the separation of forces area on the Golan Heights. The mission’s permanent goals were to maintain, observe, and supervise the Syrian-Israel cease-fire as contained in the disengagement agreement and protocol, which specified the two forces’ areas of separation and limitation on their activities. UNDOF also was to perform certain humanitarian assistance functions, such as arranging the transfer of released prisoners of war and bodies of war dead between Israel and Syria, providing medical treatment to local inhabitants, and facilitating the delivery of parcels and
mail, as well as persons, across the area of separation.⁸

Rules of Engagement

In fulfilling the terms of its mission, UNDOF’s rules of engagement called for complying with "generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations," including noninterference with the "functioning of local civil administration."⁹ UNDOF was provided with the necessary "freedom of movement and communication" to perform its mission and provided with weapons "to be used only in self-defence."¹⁰

Composition of Forces

UNDOF’s authorized strength was 1,250 personnel.¹¹ The national contingents were selected from U.N. member states, excluding Security Council permanent members.¹² In May 1985, UNDOF’s size was increased to 1,331.¹³ In May 1993, UNDOF’s strength was 1,130 troops, with additional assistance by approximately 96 military observers from UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan.¹⁴

UNDOF’s national contingents come from Austria, Canada, Finland, and Poland.¹⁵ As an illustration of the mission’s composition, the Canadian contingent comprises about one-sixth of the force, with thousands of Canadians serving on the force since its inception.¹⁶ The average tour of duty for members of the Canadian contingent is six months, after which they are rotated to make way for replacements.¹⁷

Equipment

UNDOF’s equipment consists of observation towers,
binoculars, jeeps for ground patrols, light arms and medical supplies. The mission’s logistics units are supplied with transport trucks, mine-clearing equipment, communications equipment, and other essential items.

Training

Many UNDOF forces had prior peacekeeping experience either with UNTSO or UNEF II. The Canadian and Polish logistic contingents, for example, were transferred from peacekeeping duties in UNEF II. Other national contingents were experienced in infantry maneuvers.

Tactics

UNDOF forces are deployed in static observation posts and conduct daily mobile patrols at irregular intervals along predetermined routes to ensure that neither Syrian nor Israeli forces are in the U.N. area of separation (AOS).18 Observers, assisted by liaison officers provided by the two host countries, carry out fortnightly inspections of the Israeli and Syrian areas of limitation of armaments and forces (AOL).19

Cost

UNDOF’s budget was initially financed from a special account set up for UNEF II, but UNDOF assumed control of the account upon UNEF II’s termination in July 1979.20 From UNDOF’s inception in June 1974 until November 30, 1990, the mission’s budget totaled $452.4 million.21 Its annual cost is approximately $36 million.22 The mission’s budgetary deficit, resulting from unpaid contributions by member states, totaled $33 million as of January
Operational Assessment

UNDOF is generally considered to be one of the U.N.'s most effective peacekeeping operations. UNDOF's greatest success results from its physical presence on the Golan Heights and its role in separating Syrian and Israeli forces, which has prevented the two parties from initiating a war against each other despite the continuation of the dispute over the Israeli occupation of the Golan and the absence of a final peace settlement between Israel and Syria. Thus, while escalation leading to armed conflict was a distinct possibility on numerous occasions, the peace held. Syria and Israel, for example, did not go to war when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and June 1982.

On the less positive side: Although UNDOF succeeded in preventing the escalation into full-fledged war, its peacekeeping presence on the Golan Heights may have encouraged Israel and Syria to be satisfied with the status quo and a political stalemate in their dispute with each other, as opposed to immediately embarking on new initiatives for a peace settlement.24

A second problem facing UNDOF is the restrictions on the freedom of movement in certain areas. These restrictions have prevented UNDOF from carrying out its mission of Syrian and Israeli armament and of ensuring the limitation forces in those avenues.25 This situation led to numerous protests by UNDOF's Commander.
CURRENT SITUATION

A number of developments have taken place since June 1967 in the Golan Heights that have served both to complicate and facilitate resolution of the occupied territory’s future. First, Israel has established 17 settlements in the Golan since 1967, and Israeli law and administration were applied to the territory in December 1981. Both of these actions represent a de facto act of annexation not recognized by the international community.26

Second, the prospect for resolving the Golan’s future is today better than ever before, despite the previously mentioned Israeli actions in the territory. This optimism results from the current engagement of Israel and Syria in bilateral talks as part of the multilateral round of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, sponsored by the United States, Russia, and the U.N., with both countries demonstrating new flexibility on the future of the Golan. For example, Israel is prepared to offer substantial territorial concessions in the Golan in exchange for a peace treaty with Syria, and Syria is promising "total peace" in exchange for total Israeli withdrawal, although more progress is required in precisely defining the terms "peace" or "withdrawal."

CONCLUSION

Substantial progress in the direction of peace has been made in the Syrian-Israeli sector, facilitated by UNDOF’s effective presence in maintaining relative calm along the Golan Heights frontier. In October 1993, a number of steps still needed to be taken for long-term peace between Syria and Israel to be
achieved. First, although a peace treaty between Syria and Israel would satisfy many of Israel's security concerns, any territorial compromise over the Golan Heights would have to provide Israel with firmly established, secure, and defensible borders. Second, it is likely that new security arrangements along the Syrian-Israeli border would still provide for the deployment of a peacekeeping force, with UNDOF either remaining as the frontier's peacekeeping force or being replaced by a non-U.N. peacekeeping mission.
Endnotes


3. Ibid., 101.

4. Ibid.


7. The Blue Helmets, 100.

8. Ibid., 6.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 100-1.

11. Ibid., 101.

12. Ibid.


15. The Blue Helmets, 105.


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.

21. The Blue Helmets, 425.


23. Ibid.


25. The Blue Helmets, 110.

26. Ibid., 109.
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United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Selected Chronology

1958

In June, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established. Soon afterward, the United States stationed troops in Lebanon in the wake of a coup in the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, but withdrew them as soon as UNOGIL was expanded to take over the peacekeeping duties.

In September, as relations with Syria were normalized, Lebanon requested that UNOGIL forces be withdrawn.¹

1975

Civil war broke out in Lebanon.

1976

Syria invaded Lebanon in an effort to manage the civil conflict.

1978

On March 11, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility for a commando raid near Tel Aviv, Israel.

On March 14-15, Israel occupied southern Lebanon in retaliation against the PLO.


On March 19, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for an initial period of six months.

On March 21, the Secretary-General assigned UNIFIL's initial troops.

On June 13, the last Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon.

1981-1982

The cease-fire held from July 1981 to April 1982.²

1982

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On June 6, Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time.

1985

In June, Israel completed withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon, but retained a nine-mile-wide strip along the border as a "security zone."

1993

In July, Israeli forces and Hizballah guerrillas exchanged heavy fire as a large stream of civilian refugees headed north to Beirut.

On September 13, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles Between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
INTRODUCTION

Lebanon, a country with a mosaic of religious sects and ethnic-based clans, many with foreign ties, has been the setting for the transformation of domestic conflicts into regional and international crises. Religious differences between Muslims and Christians, as well as within these communities, pitting Maronites, Shia, Sunnis, Druze, Palestinians, and others against each other, have spilled over into domestic politics and across borders as these groups have sought regional and international backing to their causes.

After the June 1967 War, Israel increasingly became the target of cross-border attacks by Palestinian guerrilla groups based in Lebanon. Israel responded by providing support to its allies in the Maronite community, such as arming their militias, in order to assist them in maintaining their hold on power, particularly the presidency, and thus to prevent Lebanon from becoming a base for hostile activity against Israel. Israel also launched military actions against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) bases in Lebanon.3

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The Lebanese civil war broke out because by 1975 the distribution of political power between Christians (mostly Maronites) and Muslims (particularly the disenfranchised Shia plurality), established by the National Pact of 1943, no longer reflected the religious makeup of the country. The underlying
cause of the civil war was the Maronite president’s attempt to change the law to allow himself a second term; the immediate cause was an assassination attempt on a Maronite chieftain, followed by Maronite retaliation against Palestinians. Fighting escalated quickly in the following months, involving not only Lebanese groups, but also foreign governments and the PLO. The PLO (together with non-PLO organizations), Syria, and Israel became the main players in the civil war, which gradually wound down in all but the southern part of the country, where Israeli-Palestinian fighting intensified.

After Syria’s invasion of Lebanon in 1976, the League of Arab States (Arab League) sent a peacekeeping force (consisting of a large Syrian contingent, with token representation from Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia) to supervise a cease-fire. The mandate was weak, however, because the Arab League lacked the will and manpower to solve Lebanon’s political problems, and soon only Syrian troops remained.4

By 1977 Lebanon had been divided into three sections: the north, controlled by Syria; a coastal section, controlled by the Maronites; and the south, controlled by Maronite militias (supported and supplied by Israel) and Palestinian elements.5

In December 1975, the Lebanese government repeatedly complained to the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council about Israeli attacks on its soil; it was only after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in March 1978 that Lebanon submitted a formal protest to the Security Council, calling for immediate action. Four days
later, on March 19, the Security Council adopted a U.S.-initiated resolution to create the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was intended to help restore order.\textsuperscript{6}

The U.N. Response

The four days it took the Security Council to pass Resolution 425 (1978) calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force was a remarkably short period by U.N. standards.\textsuperscript{7} After the Lebanese government sent a letter to the Security Council on March 15 strongly protesting the invasion, the U.S. and Lebanese delegations succeeded in persuading Security Council members to either support or agree not to veto the proposal to establish the peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{8}

The U.S., which sought to contain the crisis so as not to endanger the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations under way, saw a peacekeeping force as a way to provide Israel with a channel to retreat from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{9} Other nations, however, were more skeptical of such an outcome because Israel, the PLO, and Syria had not explicitly supported establishing such a force during the Council’s debate. Various countries also were apprehensive that UNIFIL’s mandate would not be as temporary as originally intended. There were other problems as well: Arab states wanted a resolution that condemned the Israeli action in stronger language, and the Soviet Union, which doubted that Lebanese government authority could be asserted in southern Lebanon, refused to pay its share of the UNIFIL assessment. Another
complicating factor was the need to obtain PLO cooperation in setting up UNIFIL. This cooperation was achieved a week after UNIFIL’s deployment.

Finally, the U.N. Secretariat was unsure whether UNIFIL would be able to carry out its task, given the lack of political support by states such as Israel and Syria. Together with the Security Council, it questioned whether Israel was truly committed to withdrawing its troops from southern Lebanon, how UNIFIL was to deal with all the different armed militias in its area of operation, and whether the Lebanese government’s authority could be reestablished in the south.¹⁰

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

On March 20, 1978, General Emmanuel A. Erskine, Force Commander of UNIFIL, established the Force’s temporary headquarters at Naqurah. Plans were made to deploy the troops directly south of the Litani River and to assume control of the three main crossing-points into southern Lebanon. However, objections were immediately raised by both Maronite and PLO forces, foreshadowing UNIFIL’s ongoing problems in carrying out its mandate.¹¹

Political and Military Goals

UNIFIL’s original six-month mandate called for it to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, assist in asserting the Lebanese government’s authority in southern Lebanon, and establish and maintain an area of operation in which no hostile activities would be allowed. The Force was to be
assisted by a detachment from the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which would continue to be
deployed along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) after
UNIFIL’s mandate ended.\textsuperscript{12}

On June 14, 1979, when UNIFIL’s mandate was extended again,
the Secretary-General added the goal of reactivating the Israel-
Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in accordance with the
1949 agreement.\textsuperscript{13}

Over the years, the function of providing humanitarian
assistance to the local population was added unofficially to the
Force’s duties, especially after the second Israeli invasion in
1982 when conditions deteriorated in the countryside.

Rules of Engagement

In his report to the Security Council on implementing
Resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL’s
rules of engagement would be based on the operational guidelines
used by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). This meant that the
force was to be supplied with light weapons for use only in self-
defense (including any armed attempts to prevent it from
discharging its duties), and it was prohibited from taking over
any responsibilities exercised by the Lebanese government.

In addition, UNIFIL was granted "all relevant privileges and
immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations."\textsuperscript{14}

Some of UNIFIL’s operating procedures were developed over
the course of its deployment. For example, confiscated weapons were returned to their owners after a certain period of time in order to prevent retaliation; a special U.N. security detachment was established to protect UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah; Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) was established to assist UNIFIL and provide the necessary continuity and expertise; and captured arms-carrying individuals were turned over to their parent organizations.\textsuperscript{15}

Composition of Forces

Although UNIFIL's original mandate called for a total strength of 4,000 troops of all ranks, the number of troops changed often, increasing to a maximum of approximately 7,000 in early 1982,\textsuperscript{16} then decreasing to 5,250 in 1993.\textsuperscript{17}

UNIFIL's initial contingent was drawn from the military personnel of two peacekeeping forces already deployed in the Middle East: one reinforced company from the Iranian contingent of UNDOF; a similar detachment from the Swedish contingent of UNEF II; and Canadian logistics, movement control, and signal detachments from UNEF II.\textsuperscript{18} These troops were joined by 45 military observers already stationed at Naqurah, with another 19 UNTSO observers added. Forty-two of the observers were organized as OGL, under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL.\textsuperscript{19}

The national composition of the troops changed frequently. In 1993 the countries contributing troops were Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.
UNIFIL was supported by some 155 international staff members from the U.N. Secretariat and 369 local Lebanese staff. OGL consisted of 65 UNTSO military observers. UNIFIL was often assisted by Lebanese gendarmes.

Training

UNIFIL’s initial contingent was composed of troops with prior peacekeeping experience in UNDOF, UNEF, and UNTSO.

Equipment

After July 1979, UNIFIL’s troops were deployed along the perimeter of its area to control infiltration, and surveillance and detection capability was improved by using strong searchlights, sophisticated ground surveillance radar, and more night-vision binoculars. UNIFIL also used helicopters, although their use was controlled by the Christian militias who insisted on preapproving flights over their territory.

Tactics

UNIFIL had 45 checkpoints along main roads and 95 observation posts both on and off roads; there were also 29 combination checkpoints/observation posts. In addition, foot and motorized patrols were conducted day and night along key highways, in villages, and in remote ravines, and random night-time listening posts were established at certain localities to detect unauthorized armed movement. UNIFIL also disposed of mines and roadside bombs, as well as arms caches.

UNIFIL’s humanitarian tasks included providing harassed civilians with medical supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity,
engineering work, and U.N. escorts for farmers going to and from their fields.

Costs

Although UNIFIL’s annual costs of approximately $146 million\textsuperscript{24} were to be borne by U.N. member states as apportioned by the General Assembly, many refused to pay, causing UNIFIL’s Special Account to run at a deficit. Consequently, the U.N. fell behind in reimbursing governments for costs incurred in contributing troops, equipment, and supplies. In December 1979, the General Assembly supplemented UNIFIL’s Special Account with a Suspense Account, which was to be financed by voluntary contributions from governments, international organizations, and private sources, and was to be used solely for reimbursing governments contributing troops to UNIFIL.

As of January 31, 1993, UNIFIL’s total financial shortfall was approximately $210 million.\textsuperscript{25}

Operational Assessment

UNIFIL’s first success was in verifying the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon after the 1978 invasion. Four years later, however, Israeli troops again invaded Lebanon, treating UNIFIL as an enemy. The Israelis demanded UNIFIL’s withdrawal with half an hour’s notice, and then removed and bulldozed the force’s roadblocks, sometimes at gunpoint.\textsuperscript{26}

When Israeli troops left Lebanon after their second invasion, UNIFIL again faced a major problem. When the troops left, they did not turn over their positions to UNIFIL, as called
for by the initial resolution, but to the Maronite-controlled South Lebanon Army (SLA), with whom UNIFIL could not deal officially. This situation allowed the SLA to harass UNIFIL in numerous ways, including limiting its freedom of movement and setting up additional positions in the force's area of operation.27

Other problems also existed. For example, because anyone dressed in civilian clothes who had an identification card and was not carrying a weapon was allowed into UNIFIL's area, PLO fighters could enter in disguise, obtain arms from hidden caches, and then get assistance from sympathizers inside the area.28

UNIFIL's hands were tied when it came to maintaining an official area of operation. Resolution 425 (1978) did not define such an area, leaving it instead to be agreed upon by all the parties. Because each party had a different understanding of UNIFIL's mission, such an area was never explicitly defined, and the framework of the operation was never established officially.

UNIFIL's failure to assert the Lebanese government's authority in southern Lebanon was caused mainly by the presence of the Israelis and the SLA, the most powerful forces in the area, but also by the weakness of the Lebanese government and its inability to control the area. In addition, the SLA was determined to prevent UNIFIL from changing the status quo, which favored its position.29 The UNIFIL, however, managed to transfer responsibility for part of the Ghanaian battalion sector to the Lebanese Army in April 1992.

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To a limited degree, UNIFIL succeeded in part of its mission. It provided a buffer zone between the Israeli-backed SLA and the PLO, reducing the number and intensity of clashes between them.\textsuperscript{30} It also succeeded in reducing infiltration by armed elements into its area of operation.

UNIFIL’s greatest success was in providing humanitarian assistance to the local populace. Food, water, medicine, and material and supplies for medical facilities and schools were among the items provided to civilians by the countries sending troops.\textsuperscript{31}

CURRENT SITUATION

Although Israel officially completed its withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985, it maintained a military presence, both directly and through the SLA, in a nine-mile-wide "security zone" along the border. In January 1990, Israeli forces and the SLA maintained 70 positions in this area.\textsuperscript{32} Israel stated that it was merely doing what the Lebanese government could not: preventing Palestinian guerrilla groups (including such radical groups as the Iranian-backed Hizballah) from attacking Israel. As a result, not only has Israel prevented UNIFIL from moving into the territory adjacent to the border (as it was originally mandated), but it has also controlled part of UNIFIL’s area of operation.

After Israel’s withdrawal in 1985, there was little change in the security situation in southern Lebanon. The Palestinian and Hizballah guerrilla groups continued their battle against Israeli and Israeli-backed forces, as well as against UNIFIL; the
Israelis continued to maintain their actual and proxy presence; the SLA continued to fight both the Palestinian forces and UNIFIL; and UNIFIL was largely limited to providing humanitarian aid and to protecting itself.

Since 1986, UNIFIL's area of operation has been divided into four sections: the northwestern area, around Tyre; the central area, bordering the northwestern area and the Israeli-controlled area; the Israeli-controlled area; and the Norbatt sector, which has been separated from the other sections and behind Israeli lines since 1982.33

In July 1993, Israel launched a major missile attack on southern Lebanon to avenge the killing of seven Israeli soldiers by the Hizballah Shia group. In the course of the battle, Israeli aircraft bombed the headquarters of UNIFIL's Nepalese soldiers and destroyed or damaged twenty U.N. buildings.34

As of 1993, UNIFIL had suffered 190 fatalities over the course of its deployment.35

CONCLUSION

In its haste to respond to the Lebanese crisis by deploying UNIFIL, the U.N. paid little attention to diplomatic support of the mission. No high-level talks were initiated with either the superpowers or the parties to the conflict, and the political problems at the root of the crisis were mainly ignored. The weak Lebanese government was unable to resolve the problems in the south, yet no solid efforts were made to strengthen the government. The major foreign powers held no discussions on
Lebanon’s future, including their involvement in the country.

The situation in Lebanon improved dramatically in 1993 when the civil war ended. First, the Lebanese government, under Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, began to embark on a program of national reconstruction that was intended to rehabilitate a country torn by civil war. Second, in September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed a treaty of mutual recognition, paving the way for a five-year transitional period leading to Palestinian independence in portions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be determined during the course of negotiations. This treaty had major ramifications for Lebanon, especially in potentially easing its Palestinian problem, whose future was linked to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Third, the prospects markedly improved for Lebanon, like its neighbors Syria and Jordan, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, thereby resolving the conflict along its southern border. Thus, UNIFIL’s future depended on the outcome of these peace negotiations.

In late 1993, future options for UNIFIL included being replaced by a non-U.N. multinational peacekeeping force, receiving a restructured mandate, or maintaining the status quo.\(^6\) Leaving Lebanon was unlikely because UNIFIL provides the local population with some measure of security, stability, and humanitarian aid. Replacing UNIFIL with a non-U.N. peacekeeping force was also unlikely. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and former Warsaw Pact troops (if there should even be interest on the part of these troops) was unlikely to be approved.
by Syria, Lebanon’s chief patron, and no other national contingents were envisioned.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, a redefinition of UNIFIL’s mandate (to include formally recognizing its humanitarian activities), although frequently suggested, has been rejected by the U.N.\textsuperscript{38}

The current situation of violence and retaliation, with UNIFIL unable to enforce compliance, was likely to continue unless the U.N. is able to convince all the parties to the conflict to respect UNIFIL’s mission until a regional political solution is devised.\textsuperscript{39}

Although in late 1993, substantial progress had been made in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would probably be some time before Lebanon and UNIFIL were directly affected by Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
Endnotes


2. Ibid., 125.


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United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)

Selected Chronology

1979

In February, the revolutionary Islamic regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini assumed power, following the overthrow of the Shah’s monarchy.

1980

On September 17, Iraq abrogated the March 1975 Algiers Treaty with Iran, which specified terms for settling the border dispute between the two countries.

On September 22, following an intensification of the border conflict, the Iraqi army crossed the Iranian frontier and launched a full-scale war with Iran.

On September 23, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim brought the issue of the Iraq-Iran fighting to the Security Council’s attention.

On September 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution 479, urging Iraq and Iran to cease armed hostilities and to use peaceful means to settle their dispute.

1983

The Security Council passed Resolution 540 calling for an Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the possible deployment of U.N. observers to monitor the cease-fire. The resolution was accepted by Iraq, but rejected by Iran.

1984

In June, following agreement by Iran and Iraq to refrain from attacking each other’s population centers and to abide by a truce, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that two inspection teams would be deployed to Baghdad and Tehran, respectively.

1987

On July 20, the Security Council passed Resolution 598 calling for an immediate stop to hostilities, the withdrawal of the two forces to their internationally recognized boundaries, the repatriation of war prisoners, and the dispatch of a U.N. observer team to "verify, confirm and supervise" the cease-fire accord, including the force withdrawals.
1988

On July 17, Iran formally accepted Resolution 598, followed by the Iraqi consent on August 6.


1990

On August 2, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.

1991

In late February, UNIIMOG’s mandate was terminated following the launching of the U.N.-authorized allied war against Iraq.
INTRODUCTION

The eight-year Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980, following an intensification of the border conflict between the two countries. Although the United Nations (U.N.) made several attempts to arrange a cease-fire between the two belligerents, it was only in June 1984 that a small U.N. inspection team was deployed in the region, following the conclusion of a temporary truce. This U.N. achievement at peacekeeping was followed in July 1987 by the establishment of UNIIMOG to observe the cease-fire between the two parties. Although Iraq was far more cooperative than Iran in facilitating UNIIMOG’s peacekeeping operation, the mission’s mandate was terminated in February 1991 because of the U.N.-authorized allied launching of full-scale war against Iraq later that month, following Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The conflict between Iran and Iraq, although rooted in historical geopolitical rivalries between the two nations, was exacerbated by the coming to power of the revolutionary Islamic regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. A series of border incidents in April 1980 provided the Iraqi government under Saddam Husayn with an opportunity on September 17 to abrogate the 1975 Algiers Treaty. Iraq was dissatisfied with the treaty, which it had reached with the former Shah of Iran, because it had given Iran half of the Shatt al-Arab, thereby limiting Iraq’s access to
the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{4} Thus, on September 22, Iraqi forces launched a full-scale war against Iran in a simultaneous action involving a border crossing by six Iraqi army divisions and an attack by Iraq's fighter aircraft against ten Iranian air bases.\textsuperscript{5} By November 1980, Iraqi forces had gained some Iranian territory, but at a high price, incurring approximately 6,000 Iraqi casualties and larger losses for Iran.\textsuperscript{6} However, after November 1980, Iran counterattacked by launching a series of major offensives against Iraq. In one of the war's turning points, in March 1982, Iranian forces inflicted heavy casualties on three Iraqi divisions; Iran subsequently regained some territory in May, leading to the withdrawal of Iraqi units from Iranian territory.\textsuperscript{7} A "war of attrition" followed in 1983-84, resulting in a military stalemate between the two sides. After 1984, Iran made some military gains against Iraq, capturing some Iraqi territory, although at a heavy loss of life for both sides. The war, which took a series of turns in 1986-87, included a "tanker war" that provoked great concern among the oil-producing Persian Gulf states, the United States, the West European nations, and Japan.

The U.N. Response

The U.N. initially became involved in the Iran-Iraq War on September 23, 1980, when Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim brought to the Security Council's attention the threat that the war posed to international stability. On September 28 of that year, the Security Council, in Resolution 479, called upon Iran and Iraq to
refrain from further use of force and use peaceful means to settle their dispute. In June 1984, at the height of the conflict's "war of the cities" phase, with the agreement by Iran and Iraq the U.N. dispatched one inspection team each to Baghdad and Tehran to investigate attacks by both sides on each others' populated areas. 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

The major U.N. diplomatic initiative to reach an Iran-Iraq settlement began in January 1987, after almost seven years of continuous warfare. At the Secretary-General's initiative, following intensive negotiations with the Iranian and Iraqi governments, the Security Council adopted Resolution 598, which called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the two forces to their internationally recognized boundaries, and an exchange of war prisoners. Resolution 598 also requested the Secretary-General to dispatch a U.N. observer team to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the two forces to their respective boundaries. On July 17, 1988, Iran formally accepted Resolution 598, which Iraq reaffirmed the following day.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Once the formal agreement by Iran and Iraq to establish a cease-fire was imminent, a U.N. technical mission was dispatched during the period of July 25 to August 2, 1988 to Tehran and Baghdad to prepare the ground for UNIIMOG's deployment. UNIIMOG’s deployment was expedited by the presence in Tehran and
Baghdad of the U.N. military inspection teams, first stationed in the two capitals in June 1984.

**Political and Military Goals**

UNIIMOG’s political and military goals were to "verify, confirm and supervise" compliance by Iran and Iraq of the specifications in the cease-fire and withdrawal agreement embodied in Resolution 598. Other goals included conducting an impartial inquiry, as requested by Iran, into responsibility for initiating the conflict; studying reconstruction issues brought on by the war’s destructiveness; and examining steps needed to enhance the region’s stability. Finally, the military observers were charged with providing humanitarian assistance to both sides, including exchanging war dead or prisoners of war.

**Rules of Engagement**

The mission’s rules of engagement specified that UNIIMOG’s actions would be completely impartial, and that Iran and Iraq would fully comply with the Security Council decisions so as to give UNIIMOG "freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks." UNIIMOG’s observers were granted the privileges and immunities embodied in the U.N.’s charter to enable them to "function independently." When cease-fire violations occurred, the observers were empowered to negotiate with the local Iranian or Iraqi commanders about a return to status quo ante positions.

**Composition of Forces**
UNIIMOG’s force strength was 399 personnel as of June 30, 1990. Some 26 countries contributed military observers to the mission, with none coming from Middle Eastern countries because of their support either for Iran or for Iraq. The specialized force units included an air unit provided by New Zealand, a military police unit staffed by Ireland, a signals unit provided by Canada, and Austrian medical orderlies. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, UNIIMOG’s observer force and supporting staff were reduced, with 60 observers remaining in Iran and 56 in Iraq by late 1990. When the U.N.-authorized allied coalition began to strike Iraq on January 16, 1991, most of UNIIMOG’s forces were moved from Baghdad to Iran; only three (which were part of the U.N. Offices of the Secretary-General in Iran and Iraq—UNOSGII) remained in Baghdad.

Equipment

UNIIMOG’s equipment consisted of three fixed-wing transport and communications aircraft, a Jetstream 31 aircraft used as an air ambulance, 12 helicopters, two marine patrol vessels, large-dish satellite communications equipment, intra-theater ultra high frequency radio net, and small-dish International Marine Satellite Organization terminals. Some of this equipment was not always deployed because of resistance by one side or the other.

Training

Some of the mission’s military units had received prior training while serving in UNTSO in the Arab-Israeli sector. Other
units had received training as part of their military service in their countries of origin.

Tactics

UNIIMOG military observers conducted an average of 64 mobile patrols on a daily basis, using mostly vehicles, helicopters, and boats.26 In difficult mountain terrain, mules and skis were used to conduct mobile patrols, in addition to foot patrols.27 The patrols were charged with checking cease-fire compliance, as well as verifying complaints, by means of observation on a regular basis of "forward defended localities."28

Cost

UNIIMOG’s costs were borne by the U.N. member states, in accordance with an assessment credited to the mission’s special account.29 The mission’s cost from its inception on August 9, 1988 until its termination on March 31, 1991 totaled $235 million.30

Operational Assessment

Throughout its operation, UNIIMOG’s effectiveness depended on the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as the full support of the Security Council, including manageable tasks; the full cooperation of Iran and Iraq in carrying out the terms of its mission; and adequate coverage of its costs.31

In terms of the first condition, the Security Council provided UNIIMOG with complete support throughout its operation. This support was essential to the fulfilment of the mission’s
objectives because it counteracted Iran’s continuous attempts to undermine the mission’s effectiveness.

However, UNIIMOG’s mandate specified certain tasks that the mission was unable to carry out, such as restoring the status quo ante situation following violations of the terms of the cease-fire by Iran and Iraq. In addition, although the mission was able to work out with Iran and Iraq procedures for the settlement of disputes, it failed to establish settlement criteria acceptable to the two sides.

Second, UNIIMOG did not receive the full cooperation of Iran and Iraq in carrying out its mandate. Although Iran reluctantly accepted Resolution 598, it was much more uncooperative than Iraq in facilitating the resolution’s implementation, and was highly suspicious of the mission’s presence. For example, Iran initially prevented the deployment of UNIIMOG’s radio-equipped vehicles, making it difficult to communicate with the mission’s mobile units; eventually these vehicles were permitted to be deployed. Although both parties restricted the movements of U.N. observers to certain areas on their side of the cease-fire lines, Iran was especially constraining in limiting the deployment of some of the mission’s ground patrol vehicles and helicopters in its part of the cease-fire zone. This lack of cooperation by Iran contributed to severely limiting the effectiveness of UNIIMOG’s operations in Iranian territory.

Although Iraq was more supportive of the U.N. resolutions and accepted the U.N.’s mediating role in the conflict, it
violated some of the terms of UNIIMOG’s mandate by continuing to launch military operations against Iran. These operations included the use of illegal chemical weapons as part of its campaign to expand the territory under its control.  

Furthermore, Iraq held several hundred Iranian prisoners for some two years, despite its acceptance of UNIIMOG’s mandate to facilitate the exchange of war prisoners. Finally, in August 1990, Iraq completely disregarded the U.N.’s conciliatory presence in its midst by launching its aggressive invasion of Kuwait.

Third, UNIIMOG’s costs were adequately covered by the assessments levied on U.N. member states. Although an estimated 5 to 15 percent of the mission’s assessments were not paid by the member states, no deficit was incurred because of savings generated by personnel reductions that were requested by the Iranians, as well as the cancellation or nondeployment of certain maritime and helicopter patrols.

Finally, despite certain problem areas, for much of its existence in the late 1980s war did not break out between Iran and Iraq; UNIIMOG’s presence exerted a restraining influence on both sides. Nevertheless, UNIIMOG’s presence did not deter Iraq from its decision to invade Kuwait in August 1990.

CURRENT SITUATION

The eight-year Iran-Iraq War ended on August 20, 1988, upon the signing of the cease-fire and the deployment of UNIIMOG along the common border between the two countries. UNIIMOG’s mandate
was officially terminated by the Security Council on February 28, 1991, following the start of the U.N.-authorized allied war against Iraq on January 16. On February 20, 1991, as Operation Desert Storm was escalating, UNIIMOG had verified and confirmed the withdrawal of Iranian and Iraqi forces to the internationally recognized borders. While Iraq was engaged in the war against the U.S.-led coalition, Iran and Iraq began a series of confidence-building measures to reduce the levels of military forces and equipment along their common borders. However, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated when Iraqi Shia in the southern and central parts of the country rebelled against Saddam Husayn's regime in the aftermath of Iraq's military defeat by the multinational coalition in March 1991. Although at the height of the Shia uprising Iran officially committed itself to the territorial integrity of Iraq, Baghdad accused Tehran of providing material assistance to the Shia rebels and, in turn, resumed its support of the militant Iranian dissident group, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, as well as the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Nevertheless, despite the continuation of disputes between Iran and Iraq, following the 1991 Persian Gulf War Iran began cooperating with Iraq by violating the U.N.-imposed economic blockade on Baghdad. The 906-mile-long Iranian-Iraqi border has become the scene of the smuggling of contraband goods into Iraq, and Iran has served as a market for a variety of Iraqi exports.

CONCLUSION
Although the military hostilities between Iran and Iraq provisionally ended in August 1988, the problems and differences that had originally caused the Iran-Iraq War have remained basically unresolved. By late 1993, the terms of Resolution 598 were not fully implemented. Most of the territory conquered by Iraq had been returned to Iran, and the U.N. had fulfilled some of the terms of Resolution 598 by establishing a commission to investigate culpability for initiating the Iran-Iraq War, and, in accordance with Iran's initial demands, in August 1991 published a report assessing the damage caused by the fighting. Nevertheless, both countries still held thousands of each other's war prisoners, and a comprehensive peace settlement between the two countries had yet to be achieved.
Endnotes


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United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

Selected Chronology

1990

In May, Iraq’s President, Saddam Husayn, convened an Arab summit conference in Baghdad, where he issued a warning to the Amir of Kuwait concerning Kuwait’s oil policies.

By the end of July, Husayn had deployed 30,000 Iraqi troops along the Kuwait border.

On August 2, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and took control of the city of Kuwait.


1991

On January 16, the U.N.-authorized United States-led coalition forces launched a series of air and artillery attacks against Iraq.

On February 24, the coalition began a ground offensive against Iraq.

On February 27, the coalition halted the war.

On April 9, the Security Council established the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

On April 13, UNIKOM’s advance party arrived in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait.

On November 24, the Security Council declared that Iraq had not complied with its obligations under the U.N.’s cease-fire resolutions.

1992

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carried out a series of inspections of Iraq’s military industries.

1993

On January 13, following a series of Iraqi incursions into the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ, United States and British forces carried out a series of strikes against Iraq’s military targets.
INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait was caused by Iraqi president Saddam Husayn’s claim that the two nations were part of a single historical entity and that Kuwaiti oil policies were damaging Iraq’s economy. The situation led Iraq to launch an invasion against Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United Nations (U.N.) responded to this act of aggression by authorizing in Resolution 678 a United States-led multinational force to take military action against Iraq. After a warning period of some five months, the U.S.-led force launched a series of air strikes against Iraq on January 16, 1991, accompanied by ground attacks on February 24, in what became known as Operation Desert Storm or the Gulf War. Upon Iraq’s military defeat, the U.N. Security Council on April 9, 1991, passed Resolutions 687 and 689, which mandated the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The 1991 Gulf War was caused by Saddam Husayn’s territorial ambitions on Kuwait, which he claimed was part of the Iraqi historical entity. In July 1990, the Iraqi president accused the Amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah, of cooperating with the United States in a conspiracy to undermine Iraq. The accusation involved Kuwait’s alleged role in causing fluctuation in the price of oil on the international markets by flouting its
oil production quotas. Saddam claimed that Kuwait's ignoring of the quotas was adversely affecting Iraq by keeping the price of oil at $14 a barrel, a price too low to support Iraq's economic needs. Saddam also claimed Iraqi rights to oil resources worth $2.4 billion within Kuwaiti frontiers. In July, Saddam convened an Arab summit conference in Baghdad, where he warned the Kuwaiti ruler about his country's oil policies. Saddam then deployed some 30,000 troops along the border with Kuwait. A mediation meeting between Iraq and Kuwait was held in Saudi Arabia on July 31. However, the talks collapsed on August 1, despite Kuwait's willingness to write off Iraq's war debt incurred in its war with Iran and to give Iraq the Warbah Island in the Persian Gulf (instead of the Bubiyan Island demanded by Iraq). On August 2, Iraq invaded Kuwait, sweeping across the border in tanks and in helicopters. Iraq claimed that it had entered the country at the invitation of insurgents who had overthrown the country's monarchy.

The U.N. Response

On August 2, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by or before January 15, 1991. The resolution also called for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. On August 6, the Security Council passed Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. On August 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 662, which nullified Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and
urged member states not to recognize Iraq's establishment of the Provisional Free Government there.

The U.N. also supported the dispatch of United States troops to Saudi Arabia, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. By January 1991, a U.N.-authorized multinational force was deployed in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, with the U.S. contributing an estimated 500,000 military personnel.\(^4\) Other members of the multinational force included contingents from Britain, France, and the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and the Persian Gulf principalities.

After a series of diplomatic efforts had failed to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 on November 29, authorizing the use of force against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. On January 16, 1991, in accordance with Resolution 660, Operation Desert Storm was launched against Iraq to liberate Kuwait.

Adoption of U. N. Resolution

On April 3, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687, stipulating the terms of a cease-fire. The resolution was accepted by Iraq on April 5. On April 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 689, which created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) on both sides of the Iraq-Kuwait border to be monitored by the newly established U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNIKOM's advance party arrived in the region on April 13, 1991, and was fully deployed on May 6. When the withdrawal of
Iraqi and coalition armed forces was completed on May 9, the DMZ came into effect; UNIKOM assumed observation responsibilities in the DMZ.

Political and Military Goals

UNIKOM was established as an observation mission and lacks the "authority" or the "means" to enforce Security Council resolutions. Its mandate is open-ended, to be reviewed every six months. The mission's political and military objectives are to monitor the 25-mile-long Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and the 125-mile-long DMZ; to deter boundary violations in the DMZ; and to observe "hostile" action undertaken by either party. UNIKOM is not assigned "civil administrative or humanitarian functions"; these services remain the responsibility of Iraq and Kuwait.

Rules of Engagement

UNIKOM's military observers are unarmed; the U.N. police are permitted to carry only sidearms in the DMZ. Although the mission was given "full freedom of movement" in the DMZ, it was not empowered to use physical force to prevent military personnel or equipment from entering the DMZ. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments retain the responsibility for maintaining law and order in their sectors of the zone.

Composition of Forces

UNIKOM had an initial authorized deployment of 300 military observers. During its initial phase (until they were withdrawn in late June 1991), UNIKOM was supported by five infantry
companies (680 officers and enlisted personnel) that were
seconded from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). The mission’s support staff included 90 international
and 96 local civilian personnel.

**Equipment**

Administrative and logistic support included tents,
generators, communications gear, helicopters, and aircraft, mine-
clearing equipment, air-conditioned trailers, binoculars and
passive night vision devices. In addition, engineering, medical,
and civilian services were provided.

**Training**

Most of the UNIKOM units had participated in other
peacekeeping operations and thus were adequately trained for the
initial deployment.

**Tactics**

UNIKOM’s tactics consist of ground and air (helicopter and
fixed-wing aircraft) patrols, manning the 18 observation posts,
and investigating cease-fire violations throughout the DMZ.

**Cost**

UNIKOM’s annual cost is estimated at $67 million. As of
January 31, 1993, approximately $37 million of the total assessed
contributions to the mission’s special account were
outstanding. Additional costs are foreseen if UNIKOM is to be
strengthened, with $112 million required for the first six-month
period, and an additional $12 million per month.
Operational Assessment

UNIKOM’s peacekeeping operation so far has encountered a number of problems. First, its capability to deter border violations in the DMZ has been limited because of its small size, limited mandate, and shortage of adequate equipment.18 For example, during its initial deployment many Iraqis entered the DMZ to steal weapons and land mines, which they sold to the Baghdad government.19 In addition, during the first two months of its deployment, allied aircraft repeatedly overflew the DMZ in contravention of the cease-fire agreement, apparently regarding UNIKOM as an instrument in their operations against Iraq.20

Second, UNIKOM lacked the necessary sophisticated equipment to perform its observation function effectively.21 Its observation equipment was of the most basic variety (binoculars and passive night vision devices), rather than thermal imaging equipment and ground surveillance radars that are more effective in daylight and at night in the harsh desert environment.22

Third, during its initial deployment the mission was disorganized because of inefficient planning at U.N. headquarters.23 Thus, many of the mission’s operational plans had to be hastily formulated in field, rather than planned in advance.

Fourth, the mission’s supply system was outmoded, with inadequate reserves and stockpiles.24 Procedures for expenditure requirements were cumbersome; committee approval was necessary for any amounts above $40,000.25

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Fifth, UNIKOM’s rules of engagement calling for an unarmed observer force weakened the mission’s effectiveness as a peacekeeping enforcer. This was particularly true in a situation where there was sufficient support for it to be deployed as an armed force following the defeat of a declared aggressor.26

Sixth, UNIKOM’s effectiveness has been constrained by Iraq’s deliberate policy of noncompliance with applicable U.N. resolutions. For example, Iraqi forces have made many incursions into the demilitarized zone, which Iraq is forbidden to do under Resolution 687. Furthermore, Iraqi forces have fired at Saudi border guards along the Iraq-Saudi border in violation of Resolution 686, which forbids Iraq to undertake hostile acts against other states.27

Seventh, although not directly involving UNIKOM, Iraq has been extremely selective in complying with Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715, which call on Iraq to cooperate with the U.N. in identifying, destroying, and monitoring its weapons of mass destruction and their production sites.28

Finally, Iraq has not fully complied with the U.N. resolutions calling on it to return the property it appropriated from Kuwait during its occupation between August 1990 and February 1991.

CURRENT SITUATION

In 1993 Iraqi forces engaged in a series of cease-fire violations, including illegal incursions into the demilitarized zone and cross-border shootings against Saudi border guards.
These hostile actions resulted in several new U.N. decisions. First, on February 5, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 806 proposing the gradual expansion of UNIKOM by up to 3,600 additional troops, with a battalion of 750 soldiers replacing the mission’s lightly armed military observers. This new proposed battalion, however, had still not been established in October 1993 because the U.N. was overcommitted with regard to maintaining peacekeeping operations in other regions. Second, under the terms of Resolution 687 Iraq is liable for financial losses and other damages incurred as a result of its aggression against Kuwait. However, as with other Security Council resolutions, Iraq so far has offered no compensation to any governments, nationals, or corporations that suffered losses resulting from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Third, although not directly related to UNIKOM, Iraq has repeatedly harassed the teams of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors on its territory, making their U.N.-authorized mandate to monitor Iraqi weapons facilities extremely difficult to exercise. Finally, additional Iraqi violations of the cease-fire agreement have led to several allied airstrikes on Iraqi air defense and weapons facilities. An attempt sponsored by Iraqi operatives to assassinate former president George Bush during his visit to Kuwait on April 15-16, 1993, led to a United States retaliatory strike involving Tomahawk cruise missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s headquarters in Baghdad.

CONCLUSION
As an observer mission, UNIKOM's mandate and function are relatively limited. During the concluding phase of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, however, in order for UNIKOM to become a more effective peacekeeping operation, its mandate must be strengthened by the deployment of additional well-armed U.N. soldiers operating under rules of engagement that permit greater enforcement powers. Strengthening the force should not pose a dilemma for the U.N. because UNIKOM is a peacekeeping operation that is sanctioned by the international community against a declared aggressor state.
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United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC)

Selected Chronology

1960
On June 30, the Belgian colony of the Congo became an independent republic, with Joseph Kasavubu as president and Patrice Lumumba as prime minister.

On July 4, workers in Conquilhatville went on strike.

On July 6, the Congolese soldiers of the Belgian-officered Force Publique rioted.

On July 10-11, Belgian troops landed in the Congo.

On July 11, Moise Tshombe, president of the province of Katanga, proclaimed independence.


On July 14, the Security Council authorized the creation of the U.N. Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo—ONUC).

1961
On February 21, the Security Council authorized ONUC to use force and increased its size to 18,000.

On September 17, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, was killed in a plane crash while negotiating a cease-fire.

On October 13, a peace protocol was signed between ONUC and the Katanga forces.

On December 21, Cyrille Adoula and Moise Tshombe signed a declaration establishing the authority of the central government over the entire Congo and ending the secession of Katanga.

1962
In August, Adoula and Tshombe signed the Plan of Reconciliation.

1963
On January 14, Tshombe announced the end of the Katanga secession and requested amnesty.

On January 21, ONUC established complete control of Katanga.
On October 18, the General Assembly decided to terminate ONUC’s operation on June 30, 1964.

1964
On June 30, ONUC withdrew from the Congo.
INTRODUCTION

The paternalist Belgian colonial administration had not prepared the Republic of the Congo for the independence that it achieved on June 30, 1960. It lacked trained black civil administrators, engineers, lawyers, and army officers. The country had no experience with democracy to help it make a smooth transition from colonial status to independence. Not surprisingly, the two rival dominant Congolese leaders who had been elected by the new legislature—President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba—had a serious problem maintaining law and order.1

The problem was compounded by an economic recession in the late 1950s that carried over from colonial rule into the early days of the new republic. Pinched economically, workers in Conquilhatville, capital of Equator province, took advantage of the hesitancy in the new government and went on strike on July 4, 1960. The ensuing riots were crushed by the military arm of the government, the Public Force (Force Publique). However, on July 6 the Congolese soldiers of the Force Publique refused to obey their Belgian officers, and a rebellion rapidly spread throughout the country.

On July 14, 1960, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) was established at the request of the Congolese Central Government for the purpose of maintaining internal order in the country. ONUC, which terminated in June 1964, was the largest peacekeeping operation
ever established by the U.N. in terms of size and responsibilities up to that date. This study examines the factors that led to the mission, the deployment, and the outcome.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

The Initial Crisis

The initial crisis in the Congo arose because of the inability of Lumumba and Kasavubu, two of the top leaders of the Congolese Central Government, to quell the military mutiny by disaffected troops of the Force Publique. In an attempt to gain the support of the mutineering force’s soldiers, Lumumba and Kasavubu agreed to their soldiers demands and dismissed the its Belgian officers. Lumumba’s uncle, Victor Lundula, was appointed commander in chief, and Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, chief of staff. The name of the Force Publique was changed to National Congolese Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise—ANC).²

As the rebellion continued, thousands of Belgians fled the country. On July 10, Belgian paratroopers who had been stationed in the Congo by a June 29, 1960 treaty between Belgium and the Congo acted to crush the mutiny. On July 11, the Belgian government airlifted metropolitan troops to the Congo to assist the resident paratroopers in restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals. Lumumba initially countenanced the intervention, provided that the troops were restricted to the protection of persons and property.³ The Belgians quickly exceeded this restriction. The Belgian navy bombarded the port of Matadi, killing 19 Congolese. Rather than restoring order, the

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Belgian intervention greatly intensified the military rebellion. The situation deteriorated still further on July 11, when the province of Katanga, which provided more than half of the country's revenues, announced that it was seceding and forming an independent state. Belgian troops, who had arrived in Katanga without the permission of the Congolese government, directly supported the secession. Reportedly, the secession was masterminded by the Belgian General Company (Société Générale de Belgique--SG), which controlled the rich copper and cobalt mines of the province.4

On July 12, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent a joint telegram to U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold requesting military assistance. They viewed the "unsolicited Belgian action" as "an act of aggression" against the new Republic of the Congo.5 At the same time, three other government ministers had cabled Washington to request the deployment of United States troops to help maintain internal order, but the request was turned over to the U.N.6

The U.N. Response

On July 13, 1960, Hammarskjold invoked the U.N. Charter's Article 99, which empowers the Secretary-General to convene the Security Council, to request the Security Council's urgent consideration of the situation in the Congo. When the Council met that evening, Hammarskjold recommended the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force to assist the Congolese government in maintaining law and order until, with technical assistance from
the U.N., the Congolese national security forces were able fully to meet their tasks. He assumed that the U.N. action would lead the Belgian government to withdraw its forces from the Congo.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

On July 13-14, the Security Council responded to Hammarskjold's recommendation by adopting Resolution 143. It urged Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese government with military assistance until its forces were able to restore order and stability.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Following adoption of Resolution 143, Ralph J. Bunche was appointed to head the mission as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo. Lt.-General Carl C. von Horn, of Sweden, was appointed Supreme Commander of ONUC. A small contingent of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) officers was detached to ONUC to assist Lt.-Gen. von Horn in the initial stages of the operation. ONUC's advance party arrived in Leopoldville on July 15-18, and established the mission's headquarters at the airport. By July 1961, at its peak, ONUC's forces totalled 19,828 personnel.

Political and Military Goals

The two main objectives of ONUC during the initial phase were to help the Congolese government restore law and order and achieve the timely withdrawal of Belgian forces. To bring about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and deal with its
declared secession, on August 24 the government of the Congo issued an ordinance to the effect that all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serving in the Katanga forces should leave the Congolese territory forthwith. The government asked the U.N. for help in implementing the ordinance.

Armed with the ordinance, ONUC, in a sudden swoop on August 28, 1961, seized control of the radio, airports, and post offices in Katanga. ONUC forces also started apprehending foreign mercenaries.

In the ensuing months, ONUC also tried to prevent or control hostilities between the various Congolese factions. Thus, for example, it protected the Baluva tribesmen in Katanga who were opposed to the regime of the provincial president Tshombe and were being exterminated by Tshombe's gendarmes.

Rules of Engagement

The principles that governed the activities of the U.N. force in the Congo were as follows:

(a) The force was to be regarded as a temporary security force to be deployed in the Congo with the consent of the Congo government until the national security forces were able to meet fully their tasks.

(b) Although serving as an arm of the Congo government, the Force was to be under the exclusive command of the U.N. and not to become a party to any internal conflict.

(c) The U.N. military units were not to use force except in self-defense.
(d) The U.N. was to have free access to the area of operation and full freedom of movement within that area as well as all the communications and other facilities required to carry out its tasks.

On February 15, 1961, the Security Council, faced with what appeared to be an imminent civil war in the Congo, authorized ONUC to use force to prevent an outbreak of fighting, although only as a last resort. ¹²

Composition of Forces

The initial U.N. force consisted of seven battalions of 4,000 troops provided by five African nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia. ¹³ In addition to military units, ONUC had a Civilian Operations component that employed some 2,000 experts and technicians who assisted the Congo government in administrative, technical, and humanitarian areas. ¹⁴ As the responsibilities of the U.N. in the Congo expanded, the force grew until it reached 19,828 at its peak strength in July 1961. ¹⁵

Equipment

ONUC was equipped with small arms, artillery, transport and military aircraft, heavy armored vehicles, river boats, and field army radios. ¹⁶ Much of the heavy transport and military equipment was supplied by the United States.

Training

Most of the ONUC units had participated in other peacekeeping operations and thus were sufficiently trained for
the initial deployment. Additional training was obtained in the course of adapting to the African environment, including the primitive road system.

Tactics

ONUC's tactics were driven by the mission's primary task of maintaining law and order in a chaotic situation. It undertook joint patrols with the local Congolese police; it performed security functions, including police duties, when government authorities were lacking; and took other measures to provide for the protection of threatened individuals and property.\textsuperscript{17}

Cost

The total cost of the four-year ONUC operation amounted to approximately $400.13 million.\textsuperscript{18} The mission's budget was financed by assessments to a Special Account.\textsuperscript{19}

Operational Assessment

One of ONUC's main objectives was to stabilize the Congo government and provide technical assistance in the operation of essential services and economic development. However, given the vast area of the Congo, the ONUC force, even at peak strength, was barely sufficient for this task. The ANC proved to be of little help. Army troops were often away, busy subduing rebel tribes and provinces; in addition, elements of the force periodically mutinied. As a result, in Leopoldville ONUC had to police the city's main arteries to ensure the protection of essential services and when necessary had to bring unruly ANC elements under control.
Occasionally, ONUC’s activities were hampered when the government itself resorted to actions that tended to endanger law and order, or restrict human rights. In such cases, ONUC endeavored to persuade Congolese authorities to change their course of action and sometimes to protect the threatened persons. But, following orders, it refused to use force to subdue Congolese authorities or the ANC.\textsuperscript{20}

ONUC’s primary activity in the Congo was the restoration of public services and the development of the national economy. Engineers, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio operators, postal experts, physicians, and teachers were rushed into the country. In response to the central government’s appeal, the U.N. provided $5 million to finance essential government services.

ONUC helped to set up and manage the country’s fledgling economic and financial administration. In all these fields, ONUC’s efforts were designed to improve the ability of the Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities toward the population despite the precipitate departure of non-Congolese technicians and administrators.

Famine conditions in some areas and widespread unemployment led the Secretary-General to institute refugee relief and relief-work programs. In South Kasai, where it was reported that some 200 persons were dying daily from starvation, the U.N. shipped and distributed food and medical supplies for six months. The number of lives saved approximated 250,000.
U.N. training services continued as a long-range operation. Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, agricultural assistants, farm mechanics, foresters, medical assistants, labor officials, police commissioners, etc. A telecommunications training center was set up, a national pedagogical institute was established, and undergraduate medical studies were fostered. In addition, a national school of law and administration was opened and a technical college established. Fellowships for study abroad were awarded to school directors, medical students, police officers, and social workers. A program was also prepared for the reorganization and retraining of the ANC.

The ANC program was set up because the majority of the serious incidents that had occurred in the country were caused by military elements of Congolese armed forces, whether part of the ANC, the Katangese gendarmerie, or individual provincial forces. From the outset, ONUC considered it essential to help the Congolese government establish discipline in the armed forces.

In 1960 and 1961, ONUC Civilian Operations provided 600 experts and technicians to do the jobs of departing Belgian personnel. These experts and technicians, drawn from some 48 nationalities, provided the Congo with expertise in the fields of finance and economics, health, transport, agriculture, public works, postal services, and others. In addition, a large number of secondary school teachers were recruited. These assistance programs continued until 1964.
As a result of the various training programs set up by ONUC, it became possible in 1963 to replace some international personnel by qualified Congolese, particularly in the postal, meteorological, telecommunications, and civil aviation services. In 1963, 55 of the 130 medical assistants sent abroad for training in 1960-1961 returned to the Congo and were assigned to various parts of the country.\(^\text{21}\)

On December 21, 1961, Tshombe, after a meeting with Prime Minister Adoula, signed an eight-point declaration by which he recognized the authority of the central government over all parts of the Congo and agreed to a number of steps aimed at ending the secession of Katanga.

Further talks to discuss the procedure for carrying out the provisions of the declaration failed, and the agreement was not implemented owing to the procrastination and intransigence of the Katangese leader.

In August 1962, Secretary-General U Thant proposed a "Plan of National Reconciliation," which was accepted by Adoula and Tshombe. On the Katanga side, however, no substantial steps were taken to implement the plan. And the Katangese fired, without provocation, on U.N. positions.

Retaliating, the U.N. forces occupied, one by one, Kamina, Jadotville, and Kipushi. In all these areas, measures were taken to restore essential services and protect the local population.

In the meantime, Tshombe fled to Kolwezi. From there, on January 14, 1963, the Secretary-General received a message from
Tshombe announcing his readiness to end the secession of Katanga and asking for amnesty, freedom, and safety for the Katangese government. The Secretary-General welcomed Tshombe's message and confirmed the amnesty proclamation of November 1962. By January 21 the U.N. force had under its control all important centers and quickly restored law and order in Katanga. Thanks to the skill and restraint displayed by ONUC troops, the casualties incurred during the fighting were relatively light. In the 24 days of activity, 10 ONUC members were killed and 77 wounded. Katangese casualties also appeared to have been low.

Thus, the secession of Katanga had been ended; once this was accomplished an important phase of ONUC's operations had been completed.22

CURRENT SITUATION

On February 4, 1963, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the fulfillment by ONUC of the following tasks: the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo had been established; the secession of Katanga had ended; there was no direct threat to Congo's independence from external sources; assistance in maintaining law and order was continuing, and, with the vast improvements in that regard, a substantial reduction of ONUC forces was being made.

In view of these accomplishments, on June 27, 1963, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1876, which established December 31, 1963 as the terminal date for ONUC's military phase.

However, in his letter of August 22, 1963, Prime Minister
Adoula expressed a need for the continued presence of a small U.N. force of about 3,000 officers and men through the first half of 1964.

Acting on this request, the General Assembly decided, on October 18, 1963, by Resolution 1885, to continue the U.N. operation in the Congo until June 30, 1964, and authorized an expenditure of up to $18.2 million to that effect.

On June 30, 1964, the U.N. force in the Congo withdrew from that country according to plan. 23

Following ONUC's departure, public order soon deteriorated. Disturbances and rebellions broke out in Kwilu, southern Kivu, and northern Katanga. Forces in the Katanga rebellion were defeated by the ANC backed by mercenaries and Belgian paratroops. The commander of the ANC, Mobutu, asked Tshombe to become prime minister and to form a new government. Elections for the new parliament gave an overwhelming victory to Tshombe, but President Kasavubu refused to accept his administration and conflict broke out again between the president and prime minister.

In November 1965, Mobutu took over as head of state and installed his supporter, Colonel Leonard Mulamba, as prime minister. This seizure of power was reportedly assisted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 24 Thereafter, Mobutu's consolidation of power continued uninterrupted.

CONCLUSION

The crisis that overtook the newly independent Congo was so complex that it prevented ONUC from achieving an easy and obvious
success. Although the crisis was precipitated by the revolt of the ANC and the subsequent Belgian armed intervention, the roots of the problem went much deeper. The absence of an indigenous elite to provide political leadership, the lack of familiarity with the working of democratic institutions, and the deteriorating economic conditions were just a few of the Congo's troubles.

As a result of this situation, the means at the disposal of ONUC were not commensurate with the nature and magnitude of the task entrusted to it. Permitted initially to act only in self-defense, for example, the U.N. force could not maintain law and order effectively. The restriction on the U.N. mission's enforcement capability explains its inaction during the crucial period of constitutional crisis. Even after the Security Council strengthened the mandate by authorizing the use of force, the limitations were not completely removed because ONUC still had to scrupulously respect the domestic jurisdiction of the Congolese Republic.

The work of ONUC was adversely affected by the political developments in the Congo. Within less than two months after the mission began, a constitutional crisis removed one of the most important prerequisites for the success of the mission, a viable and stable government in the Congo. Internal developments, as well as constant outside interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, undermined the usefulness of the work done by ONUC.

Nonetheless, the U.N. operation in the Congo did preserve
the political independence and territorial integrity of that state. It also helped in the task of nation-building, which was geared toward making the Congo self-reliant. The work of the ONUC thus highlighted the possibilities as well as the limitations of the U.N. in its peacekeeping missions.
Endnotes


4. Ibid., 114.


7. The Blue Helmets, 219.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 222.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid, 221.

14. Ibid., 221.

15. Ibid., 222.


17. The Blue Helmets, 226-7.

18. The Blue Helmets, 435.

19. Ibid.

20. The Blue Helmets, 223-27.

21. Ibid., 227-38.

22. Ibid., 256.

Bibliography


Selected Chronology

1974

In September, the new Portuguese government, following a military coup, announced its intention to grant independence to its colonies in Africa, including Angola.

1975

In October, while the Angola was preparing for independence, South African troops invaded the country in support of its rebel allies.

On November 11, Angola attained independence from Portugal, ending a 14-year independence war. Factional fighting began among government forces of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimiento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) and the rebel troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA). The UNITA and FNLA rebels were supported by South Africa, while the Soviet Union and Cuba provided weapons and troops, respectively, to assist the MPLA, which controlled a majority of the country’s provincial capitals.

1978


1986

The U.S. resumed its military assistance to UNITA following congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment, which had forbidden such aid since 1976.

1987


1988

From January until April, MPLA and Cuban forces repelled a South African offensive against the southern Angolan city of Cuito Cuanavale.
In August, a partial cease-fire was negotiated in Geneva among Cuba, Angola, and South Africa.

In December, a tripartite agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa was signed, providing for Namibian independence in March 1990. A parallel bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola established a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The parties to both agreements requested U.N. verification.


1991
In May, the Cuban troop pullout was completed and verified by UNAVEM I.
INTRODUCTION

The Angolan civil war began in 1975, when the three most prominent guerrilla movements in the independence struggle fought over control of the new government. At the national level, the conflict pitted the armed forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers’ Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido Trabalho—MPLA-PT) against its two main rivals, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para la Independência Total de Angola—UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA).

The civil war immediately drew international intervention because the MPLA-PT received military aid and troop reinforcements from the Soviet Union and Cuba, whereas South Africa and the United States assisted UNITA and the FNLA.

The 15 year civil war claimed more than 500,000 lives and displaced an estimated 1.3 million persons. An additional 900,000 persons in southern Angola were in acute danger of starvation in 1990. Damage to the country’s infrastructure was estimated at more than $10.5 billion.

Multilateral negotiations between the parties led to an agreement in December 1988 for a United Nations (U.N.)-monitored withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, concurrent with a withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. The Cuban withdrawal from Angola was monitored by the first United Nations
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), which was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 626 (1988) on December 20, 1988.³

This study examines the original crisis in Angola, the factors leading to the deployment of UNAVEM I, the evolution of its mandate, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation and outlook in Angola in light of the mission’s initial goals.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

**The Initial Crisis**

The Angolan crisis was primarily a national civil war, driven by factional and ethnic disputes, which became progressively linked to the confrontation between the Cold War superpowers and their regionally influential intermediaries, Cuba and South Africa.

At the national level, the war entailed factional fighting between the self-declared government forces of the MPLA-PT and its rivals, UNITA and the FPLA. The war also had significant ethnic and regional dimensions. The MPLA-PT drew most of its support from the Mbundu ethnic group, which predominates in Angola’s north-central region, and UNITA garnered most of its support from the Ovimbundus of the south.

International intervention began in early 1975, following the collapse of the transitional coalition government established under the Alvor Agreement, which the departing Portuguese had negotiated among the MPLA-PT, the FNLA, and UNITA. After the
MPLA-PT reneged on its commitment to hold national elections, as mandated by the agreement, UNITA and the FNLA withdrew from the government and entered into a tacit alliance against the emerging single party socialist regime of MPLA-PT President Agostino Neto.

Seeking to bolster their military position, the parties obtained foreign military assistance and direct intervention on their behalf. In October, 1975 UNITA joined South African forces in launching the first of several incursions into Angolan territory. The South African incursions, ostensibly to strike at Namibian guerrillas belonging to the South West Africa People's Organization--SWAPO), mainly served to assist UNITA's forces under the command of Jonas Savimbi in their war against the Cuban-backed MPLA-PT. Foreign military assistance was also provided by Zaire and the United States.

To consolidate its control of the new government and help defend against the South African-UNITA offensive, the MPLA-PT, which held the capital of Luanda, accepted in November 1975 the dispatch of an initial 10,000 Cuban troops and massive amounts of Soviet military equipment. Eastern bloc military aid would eventually total 50,000 Cuban troops, hundreds of Soviet advisers, and more than $1 billion in Soviet military equipment. The FNLA and UNITA engaged in guerrilla warfare against the MPLA-PT government throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1984, the FNLA negotiated a cease-fire with the MPLA-PT, leaving UNITA as the main military threat to the government. The UNITA threat increased in the mid-1980s, as South Africa augmented its
military presence in Angola and the United States restored its military aid to Savimbi's forces following the congressional repeal of the Clark amendment, which had forbidden such aid since 1976.\(^6\)

The Angolan fighting intensified in January 1988, when a major South African incursion led to an extended battle for the strategic garrison town of Cuito Cuanavale. This battle became a turning point in the war, when 10,000 Angolan government troops, backed by the 50th Division of the Cuban army, successfully withstood an offensive by 8,000 South African troops and their UNITA allies.\(^7\)

The prolonged standoff at Cuito Cuanavale, which was considered a major setback for South Africa and UNITA, led to a year-long series of negotiations linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia. An important factor contributing to the negotiations was the emerging pattern of international cooperation between the United States and the reformist Soviet government headed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

In April 1988, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze to devise a political framework for resolving the South West African crisis. The superpowers arranged for a series of talks among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa to be chaired by the United States. UNITA and SWAPO were not parties to the talks, which at this stage involved only state actors. After three difficult rounds of negotiations during the spring and summer of 1988, a preliminary
agreement was reached in New York in mid-July, linking a Cuban withdrawal to Namibian independence. The terms of a cease-fire between the states were negotiated in Geneva in August 1988.

Further negotiations took place in Brazzaville, Congo, in fall of 1988. After the negotiating parties had failed to meet two consecutive deadlines for a resolution, the agreements finalized in Brazzaville were formally signed in New York on December 22, 1988. The Tripartite Agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa established a timetable for South African withdrawal from Namibia in 1989, leading to Namibian independence in 1990. A parallel bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba set a timetable for the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola by July 1991. The states unanimously requested U.N. verification of the parallel withdrawals from Angola and Namibia.

The U.N. Response

U.N. involvement in the Angolan crisis has historically been overshadowed by its much deeper commitments in neighboring Namibia. A direct U.N. presence in Angola was necessitated, however, by the linkage that was established between the South African withdrawal from Namibia and the Cuban withdrawal from Angola during the tripartite negotiations. The centerpiece of U.N. policy in South West Africa until 1990 was Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which called for South African withdrawal from Namibia and granting independence to that territory. In November 1987, the Security Council issued Resolution 602 (1987)
calling for the immediate withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.\textsuperscript{12} In December 1987, the Secretary-General dispatched a technical mission to Luanda to investigate South African military activities in southern Angola.\textsuperscript{13}

In response to the request by the parties to the trilateral and bilateral agreements and the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Security Council issued Resolution 626 (1988) establishing UNAVEM I on December 20, 1988.\textsuperscript{14} UNAVEM I's larger companion mission in Namibia, the United Nation's Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), was established a month later by Security Council Resolution 629 (1989).\textsuperscript{15}

**DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

UNAVEM I began its operations on January 3, 1989, when an advance team of 18 military observers deployed in Luanda to verify the withdrawal of the first 450 Cuban troops on January 10. Subsequently, the remaining 52 military observers deployed at their permanent verification posts and established two mobile inspection teams.\textsuperscript{16}

**Political and Military Goals**

UNAVEM I's mandate specified limited political and military objectives. The group of unarmed observers would "verify the redeployment of 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola, in accordance with the timetable agreed upon between the two governments."\textsuperscript{17} The main political objective was to verify Cuban compliance with the bilateral agreement of December 1988.
UAVEM I's military objective was to establish a headquarters presence in Luanda, set up regional verification posts at designated ports and airports, and conduct ad hoc inspections of suspected Cuban troops present in off-limit areas. UNAVEM I was to monitor Cuban compliance with a 27-month timetable for total withdrawal by tallying the number of Cuban military arrivals and departures from Angola, and by identifying military equipment accompanying the departed Cuban contingent.\(^{18}\)

**Rules of Engagement**

As an unarmed military observer mission, UNAVEM I had no authority or capability to confront hostile troops. UNAVEM I personnel were to avoid combat zones, with their security respected by all military forces in the area. UNAVEM I was not authorized to issue orders or directives, nor could it obstruct the activities of any forces encountered.\(^{19}\)

**Composition of Forces**

At maximum strength, UNAVEM I consisted of 70 unarmed military observers.\(^{20}\) Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and Yugoslavia each supplied seven observers; in addition there were 22 international and 15 local civilian staff.\(^{21}\) UNAVEM I was under the command of Chief Military Observer (CMO) Brigadier General Péricles Ferreira Gomes of Brazil.\(^{22}\)

**Equipment**

UAVEM I's mobile observer teams employed an unspecified number of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and light ground
transport. Aircraft and logistical support were provided by the
government of Angola.\textsuperscript{23} UNAVEM I’s communications equipment
included a portable satellite earth station, radio teletype,
mobile VHF radio, crypto-fax and text cipher machines, and a
voice encryption device donated by Switzerland.\textsuperscript{24}

Training

Little information is available on the training or previous
peacekeeping experience of the UNAVEM I observers.

Tactics

UNAVEM I’s headquarters were established in the capital of
Luanda. Teams of eight military observers were stationed
permanently at the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda, Namibe, and
the Luanda Airport, where they recorded the movement of any Cuban
military personnel or equipment. Two or three mobile inspection
teams of six observers each verified Cuban redeployments.\textsuperscript{25}

UNAVEM I was provided by the Cubans with one week’s advance
notice of any departures or rotation of troops and equipment. The
U.N. mission was also kept apprised of all Cuban redeployments
northward and of locations from which troops had been withdrawn.
Mobile inspection teams were accompanied by Cuban and Angolan
liaison officers, and verification was coordinated by a joint
commission consisting of the CMO and a senior officer from both
Cuba and Angola.\textsuperscript{26}

Cost

The total cost for the 31-month operation was initially
estimated at $20.4 million.\textsuperscript{27} The mission expended $1 million
less than anticipated in its first year. The Cuban troop withdrawal generally proceeded ahead of schedule and without significant impediments or violations. The only instance of noncompliance occurred on January 23, 1990, when Cuban forces suspended their withdrawal in response to an UNITA attack that killed four Cuban soldiers and wounded five others. The Cuban departures resumed on February 25, and the withdrawal was once again on schedule by April 25.

In a report to the Security Council issued on May 10, 1991, the Secretary-General expressed his satisfaction with UNAVEM I’s performance, stating that UNAVEM I was carrying out its tasks with "excellent cooperation" from Angola and Cuba. The final pullout of Cuban forces was completed on May 25, 1991, more than one month ahead of schedule.

UNAVEM I was a successful U.N. peace observer mission. The main reasons for UNAVEM I’s success were, first, the limited scope of its mandate, which entailed a straightforward observation of military movements; and second, the cooperation of the parties involved, whose obligations were clearly spelled out in an internationally brokered agreement.

CURRENT SITUATION

UNAVEM I’s original mandate expired in August 1991. The U.N. presence in Angola was subsequently expanded under UNAVEM II, which was deployed to monitor the cease-fire and demobilization of MPLA-PT and UNITA forces.
CONCLUSION

UNAVEM I's experience suggests that simple peace observer missions with clearly defined objectives stand a good chance of success, especially when they receive the full cooperation of the parties to the dispute. An important factor contributing to the success of the mission was the high level of international interest and pressure from the superpowers to have the troop withdrawal agreements implemented."

Although UNAVEM I facilitated the negotiation of a cease-fire and peace accords in May 1991, the Angolan civil war resumed in October 1992 after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to recognize the results of the U.N.-monitored elections. In mid-1993, Angola was once again in a state of full-scale civil war.
Endnotes


5. Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945, 350.


7. Ibid., 345.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 232.


12. Ibid, 335.

13. The Blue Helmets, 336.


15. The Blue Helmets, 350.

16. Ibid., 338.


18. Ibid.

19. The Blue Helmets, 339.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 384.
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25. Ibid., 382.
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United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)

Selected Chronology

1989

In January, Cuban and South African troops began to withdraw from Angola in accordance with the tripartite and bilateral agreements of December 1988.

In June, the leaders of the two main factions in the Angolan civil war, José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, met at a summit in Gbadolite, Zaire, to sign a cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire was almost immediately violated and was subsequently repudiated by Savimbi.

In September, fighting between dos Santos’ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers’ Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido Trabalho—MPLA-PT) and Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para la Independência Total de Angola—UNITA) intensified as Cuban and South African forces abandoned strategic positions.

1990

In April, the first of several rounds of peace talks between the MPLA-PT and UNITA were held in Lisbon, Portugal, under Portuguese mediation.

1991

In May, the MPLA-PT and UNITA signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Bicesse, Portugal. In support of the Bicesse Accords, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council issued Resolution 696 (1991), establishing UNAVEM II to verify compliance with the agreement.

1992


In September, U.N.-monitored national elections were held; the MPLA-PT defeated UNITA in both the presidential and parliamentary voting. UNAVEM II declared the elections free and fair, despite irregularities.

In October, Savimbi publicly rejected the election results, withdrawing UNITA personnel from the unified armed forces,
rearming UNITA troops, and occupying numerous towns and municipalities. Savimbi's forces subsequently launched an offensive against the capital, Luanda. In retaliation, government forces killed several UNITA leaders and launched a military counteroffensive.

1993

In January, government forces launched a major air and heavy artillery offensive against the UNITA stronghold at Huambo; approximately 10,000 persons were killed in the fighting.

In February, UNAVEM evacuated its personnel from 45 of its 67 verification posts, suspending its operations in most of Angola.

In March, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 811 (1993), strongly condemning persistent violations of the Bicesse Accords by UNITA.

In May, preliminary negotiations between UNITA and the Angolan government collapsed after the parties were unable to agree on a cease-fire.

In June, UNAVEM II's civilian chief of mission, Margaret Anstee resigned her post, and was replaced by Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye.

In July, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 851 (1993), once again condemning UNITA's military actions, calling for U.N. member states to refrain from assisting militarily the warring parties, and announcing the Council's readiness to consider economic sanctions against UNITA.

In October, UNITA agreed to accept the results of the September 1992 elections, prompting the Angolan government to propose a new round of negotiations.
INTRODUCTION

The Angolan peace process began with the March 1990 negotiations that ended foreign intervention in the Angolan civil war (see UNAVEM I). With the elimination of the Cuban and South African military presence, the contending Angolan parties embarked on a new peace initiative to be based on democratization and integration of the country’s two main political movements within national institutions.

The peace accords signed at Bicesse, Portugal, in May 1991, instituted a process for the establishment of a competitive, multiparty democratic political system, to include members of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Workers’ Party (Movimiento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido Trabalho--MPLA-PT) and the insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para la Independência Total de Angola--UNITA).

The U.N. presence in Angola was enlarged to help implement the Bicesse Accords. In May 1991, the U.N. Security Council, in Resolution 696 (1991), expanded the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the implementation of the accords.¹

This case study examines the original crisis in Angola, the factors leading to the deployment of UNAVEM II, the evolution of its mandate, the effectiveness of the deployment, and the current situation and outlook in Angola in light of the mission’s initial goals.
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

During the phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola in 1989-90, the fifteen-year-old Angolan civil war intensified as both the MPLA-PT and UNITA, seeking to capitalize on the Cuban departures, attempted to control the newly demilitarized areas. In light of this situation, an early initiative to end the fighting, sponsored by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko in June 1989, failed to produce a lasting cease-fire.²

By early 1990, the military situation in Angola had once again stalemated between the government and UNITA forces. A new round of peace talks began in April in Lisbon under Portuguese mediation. The first three rounds of the talks dealt with democratization and national reconciliation issues. The fourth round, which included the United States and the Soviet Union as observers, produced a commitment by the superpowers to a "zero-zero" option whereby all military aid would be suspended once a cease-fire was reached.³

The peace negotiations were finalized with the signing near Lisbon of the Bicesse Peace Accords on May 31, 1991. The agreement called for a U.N.-monitored cease-fire, concentrating and demobilizing the military forces within a given timetable, integrating the forces into a single national army, and holding internationally monitored multiparty elections in September 1992.

The Bicesse Peace Accords established a Joint Political-Military Commission (Comissão Conjunto Político-Militar--CCPM) to
verify implementation. The CCPM included representatives of the Angolan government and UNITA, as well as representatives from Portugal, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the U.N. Reporting to the commission were a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (Comissão Monitório para Verificação—CMVF) and a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (Comissão Conjunto para a Formação das Forças Armadas—CCFA). The principal monitoring and verification tasks were assigned to the CCPM, not the U.N. Ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the accords and sanctioning authority rested with the CCPM, whereas the U.N. was to observe the CCPM’s performance and provide support and international recognition of the CCPM’s activities.

The U.N. Response

Following the signing of the peace accords, the Angolan government formally requested U.N. assistance in verifying their implementation. The initial Angolan request was for U.N. verification of the cease-fire and the demobilization of the two forces, while the U.N. role in the September 1992 elections was not yet clearly spelled out.

In response to the Angolan request and the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Security Council expanded UNAVEM’s mandate and authorized strength to meet the new mission objectives. Resolution 696 (1991), of May 30, 1991, established UNAVEM II as a multicomponent peace observer mission under a civilian chief.
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNAVEM II’s deployment was carried out in several stages. In early June 1991, an advance party of 61 military observers and 32 civilians set up five of the six regional headquarters for the operation. At about the same time, reconnaissance missions were sent into the various troop assembly points to report on military-related conditions. Reconnaissance at some UNITA-held areas was delayed until August 1991 because of initial UNITA reluctance to clear UNAVEM II’s entry.4

During the initial phase, UNAVEM II experienced substantial delays in its deployment into Angola, taking longer than anticipated in becoming operational. The delays were caused by logistical problems in Angola, UNITA’s initial obstruction of reconnaissance in its areas, and the postponement of budget approval until August 1991.

Deployment of UNAVEM II’s military monitors in the assembly areas was completed on September 30, 1991. UNAVEM II police monitors deployed in late August and September, but because their CMVF counterparts were not in place until early 1992, patrolling of all of Angola’s 18 provinces did not commence until mid-June. On several occasions, UNITA denied government police forces access to its areas.5

As a result of delays and a poor logistical situation, the original August 1, 1991 deadline for troop assembly was not met. The plan called for the establishment of 50 assembly areas—23 for UNITA and 27 for government forces—in which troops would
concentrate and be demobilized by the CMVF under U.N. observation.

Political and Military Goals

UNAVEM II’s mandate was "to verify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties . . . for monitoring the cease fire . . . and for monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period." This mission entailed close collaboration with the CCPM and its satellite commissions; however, the U.N. had no direct role in the demobilization process or the retraining of the new army, and it was to remain operationally separate from the Angolan organizations. One of UNAVEM II’s primary political objectives was to verify that the CCPM conducted its operations in a nonpartisan and efficient manner.

UNAVEM II’s military objectives included monitoring the concentration and demobilization of MPLA and UNITA forces in designated assembly areas, investigating allegations of cease-fire violations, monitoring police activity, and providing technical support for the training of the new Angolan armed forces.

On March 24, 1992, UNAVEM II’s mandate was expanded by Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) to include monitoring the September 1992 national elections. UNAVEM II’s new responsibilities included verifying electoral rolls, reporting on irregularities, and observing voter registration, polling, computation, and the announcement of results.7

Rules of Engagement
UNAVEM II’s personnel were unarmed and had no authority or capability to engage hostile troops. The security of the mission’s personnel was guaranteed by the Angolan government and UNITA. In response to a deteriorating security situation, UNAVEM II employed a small number of armed U.N. security guards. It was not authorized to issue orders or directives, nor could it interfere with the activities of any forces encountered.

Composition of Forces

At maximum strength, UNAVEM II numbered 1,112 persons, including 350 military observers, 126 police monitors, 87 international civilian staff, 155 local staff and 400 electoral observers; military observers were provided by 24 states.¹

UNAVEM II’s Military Division was commanded by Major General Edward Ushie Unimna of Nigeria. In February 1992, Margaret Joan Anstee of Britain was appointed Civilian Chief of Mission for UNAVEM II. In June 1993, Anstee resigned her post and was replaced by Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, a Malian U.N. official.

Equipment

UNAVEM II observer teams were equipped with an unspecified number of light ground transport vehicles as well as a civilian air unit with one fixed-wing aircraft and a dozen helicopters. A heavy cargo aircraft and a small passenger aircraft were hired as necessary.⁹ During the election-monitoring phase of the mission, UNAVEM II’s air wing expanded to 45 transport helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft.¹⁰ UNAVEM II’s communications equipment included a portable satellite earth station, radio teletype,
mobile VHF radio, crypto-fax and text cipher machines, and a voice encryption device donated by Switzerland.\textsuperscript{11}

**Training**

Some of UNAVEM II’s military observers had previous peacekeeping experience in UNAVEM I.

**Tactics**

Military observers were deployed in teams of five at 50 troop assembly areas, and in teams of two or more at 12 "critical points," primarily airports and ports not covered by the CMVF.\textsuperscript{12}

At the troop assembly areas, UNAVEM II military observers reported on the number of assembled troops and weapons being turned in to the CMVF, and on general conditions and morale. Mobile observer teams were also set up to help the CCPM investigate and resolve cease-fire violations and other problems.

UNAVEM II police monitors accompanied the Angolan police on patrols in support of CMVF monitors. Teams of four UNAVEM II police observers were deployed in each of Angola’s eighteen provinces. UNAVEM II observers patrolled in pairs, accompanying some of the CMVF monitoring teams.

**Cost**

The total cost for UNAVEM II from June 1991 until October 1992 was estimated at $121.4 million. UNAVEM II’s monthly expenditures since October 1992 have been estimated at approximately $2 million, leading to a total mission cost in October 1993 of $145 million.\textsuperscript{13}

**Operational Assessment**

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The troop assembly and demobilization aspects of the peace plan were poorly executed by both UNITA and the Angolan government. The process was characterized by missed deadlines, poor compliance, and ineffective monitoring. As a result, by September 1992, the country continued to be divided between two heavily armed camps, neither of which had taken significant, irreversible steps toward demobilizing their forces.

Throughout the 15-month period leading to the September 1992 elections, the demobilization and military integration process lagged behind other aspects of the peace plan. In June 1992, 85 percent of UNITA’s troops were assembled, but only 4 percent had demobilized; among the government forces, 37 percent had reached assembly points, half of those having demobilized. By September, only 41 percent of government troops and 24 percent of UNITA’s forces had demobilized. A large number of troops drifted away from the assembly areas prior to demobilization because of generally poor morale and discipline, as well as shortages of food, clothing, and medicine at the assembly sites. Incomplete troop demobilization increasingly threatened the success of the peace plan as the scheduled elections approached, and eventually became an important factor contributing to the resumption of hostilities.

In contrast to the demobilization and police monitoring aspects of UNAVEM II, the election monitoring component of the mission proceeded without major impediments. UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers throughout Angola in two-person mobile
teams; an additional 400 international observers were brought into the country under the auspices of the Angolan National Electoral Council (NEC). The election monitors covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, visiting about 4,000 out of a total 6,000 polling stations. In September, UNAVEM II's air transport capabilities were expanded to support the election monitoring operation, with 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft being used to deploy monitors in remote regions.

The national elections proceeded on schedule on September 29-30, 1992 without significant disruption. The voting results in the presidential race gave the victory to President José Eduardo dos Santos (MPLA-PT), with 49.57 percent of the vote, against 40.07 percent for UNITA's Savimbi. The MPLA-PT was also victorious in the parliamentary elections, garnering 53.74 percent of the vote versus 34.10 percent for UNITA. On October 17, U.N. Special Representative Anstee declared the elections "generally free and fair" despite some irregularities.

The political climate in Angola, however, deteriorated rapidly following UNITA's electoral defeat. In early October 1992, UNITA representatives charged that systematic fraud and irregularities had characterized the entire process and affected the outcome of the voting. The first major violation of the peace accord occurred shortly thereafter, when UNITA withdrew from the unified Angolan Armed Forces. Tensions escalated throughout October, leading to a resumption of fighting between UNITA and
government troops in the capital.

By early November, fighting had spread into the provinces, where partially demobilized UNITA and government forces regained their weapons and resumed military operations. The violence escalated throughout the remainder of the year, as UNITA forces, reportedly aided by Zairian army units and South African mercenaries, captured several important urban areas. In January 1992, UNITA and government forces engaged in a major battle for the central highland city of Huambo. In the course of the fighting for Huambo, 10,000 people were reportedly killed and 540,000 residents were cut off from water and food supplies.22

CURRENT SITUATION

In early January 1993, Angola was once again in a state of civil war. The intense fighting brought UNAVEM II’s activities to a virtual standstill and posed a severe risk to U.N. personnel. In February, UNAVEM II conducted emergency evacuations of its personnel from 45 of its 67 verification posts, partly in response to UNITA’s intimidation of U.N. observers. In the midst of the pullout, UNITA forces seized an estimated $10 million worth of U.N. communications equipment and vehicles.23 UNAVEM’s strength was subsequently reduced dramatically from 700 to 70 observers, pending the negotiation of a new cease-fire.

A U.N.-mediated effort in January to restore the cease-fire yielded few tangible results. On March 12, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 811 (1993), strongly condemning persistent violations of the Bicesse Accords by UNITA,
deploring UNITA’s verbal and physical attacks against U.N. personnel, and calling on U.N. member states to refrain from aiding militarily the fighting forces in Angola. In June, U.N. Special Representative Anstee resigned her post following Jonas Savimbi’s public criticism of her performance and a deterioration of relations between UNITA and UNAVEM II. Anstee was replaced by Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, a Malian U.N. official.

By the summer of 1993, Angola faced little immediate prospect of a restoration of peace. The civil war had once again settled into a stalemate, with UNITA maintaining control over 70 percent of the country, including the central highlands and the northern border with Zaire, and government forces holding Luanda, Cabinda, and most of the major towns. Despite its loss of U.S. support, UNITA appeared sufficiently well-equipped and financially independent to continue the armed struggle indefinitely. With U.N. resources and world attention focused on the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, relatively little international pressure was being brought to bear on the Angolan parties to end the fighting. In February, the World Food Program estimated that the renewed warfare had doubled the number of displaced persons in the country from 1.5 million to 3 million, many of whom faced an imminent threat of disease and starvation.24

On July 15, 1993, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 851 (1993), once again condemning UNITA’s military actions, calling on U.N. member states to refrain from assisting
militarily the warring parties, and announcing the council’s readiness to consider economic sanctions against UNITA. In response to the threat of sanctions, UNITA agreed in October to accept the results of the September 1992 elections, prompting the Angolan government to propose a new round of negotiations in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

CONCLUSION

Despite some notable successes, particularly in the observation of national elections and the removal of mines from the countryside, UNAVEM II was unsuccessful in its efforts to verify the demobilization aspects of the peace plan. This failure resulted in large part from external factors beyond the U.N.’s control, mainly, the lack of true commitment to a settlement among the combatants and the ineffectiveness of the CCPM and its satellite commissions.

Despite their cooperation in certain aspects of the peace plan, UNITA and the Angolan government did not achieve a level of confidence sufficient to warrant complete demobilization of their respective armies, as called for in the Bicesse Accords. Whereas both sides may have expressed unreserved support for the plan, neither was in fact sufficiently confident in its effectiveness to stake its survival on the plan’s requirements for voluntary disarmament. This is shown by the fact that both sides "hedged" by maintaining at least a third of their troops armed, in violation of the agreement, to guard against fraud by the other party. This lack of confidence among the parties also suggests
that the UNITA and MPLA-PT leaders had not yet developed a sufficiently candid political dialogue within which to discuss differences and defuse mutual suspicions.

It is also possible that one or both parties were obscuring their real intentions in signing the peace agreement and were in fact seeking to use the peace process as an opportunity to buy time or to exploit the opponent's vulnerability. In essence, the parties' innate and long-sustained distrust, their leaders' hidden agendas, and their physical capacity to continue fighting were factors subversive to a settlement and ultimately beyond the control of the U.N. and CCPM.

UNAVEM II's failure cannot, however, be entirely attributed to an inauspicious political climate for peace because it is evident that the mission missed certain key opportunities to prevent an unraveling of the peace process. Particularly during the time preceding the elections, when the demobilizations fell behind schedule, and immediately afterward, when UNITA began to question the results, the U.N. failed to apply pressure on the noncompliant parties. To a certain degree, the U.N. was restrained from acting more assertively by its status as a secondary observer presence in Angola, dependent on the CCPM and its satellite commissions to verify compliance with the peace plan. As the CMVF demonstrated its incapacity to keep the military demobilization on schedule, however, the U.N. did not take the initiative to bring the process back on track. Lacking a direct mandate to enforce the peace plan or sanction offenders,
the U.N. was left with few opportunities for constructive intervention.

The main flaw in UNAVEM II's mandate was that it entailed granting U.N. certification to a demobilization process that did not meet U.N. standards. Because of its limited resources, UNAVEM II came to rely too heavily on Angolan institutions and on the goodwill of the disputing parties themselves to ensure compliance. It did not, as in comparable missions in Central America, react decisively in response to early violations of the accords or insist on improvements as the demobilization process proved increasingly inadequate.
Endnotes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 389.


5. Ibid., 399.

6. Ibid., 392.


9. Ibid., 397.


12. Ibid., 397.

13. Ibid., 393.

14. Ibid., 400.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 113.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


Bibliography


March 1993.


United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

Selected Chronology

1920

League of Nations granted a Class C Mandate for South West Africa to the Union of South Africa.

1960

The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed.

1966

The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate. SWAPO began its armed struggle.

1967

The General Assembly created the U.N. Council for South West Africa and a Commissioner for South West Africa to administer the territory.

1968

The General Assembly adopted "Namibia" as the territory's name.

1969

Security Council Resolutions 264 and 269 recognized revocation of the mandate.

1971

The International Court of Justice upheld the General Assembly's revocation of the mandate and declared that South Africa was obliged to withdraw from the territory.

1973

The General Assembly granted observer status to SWAPO.

1976

The Security Council adopted Resolution 385 calling for elections under U.N. supervision and control. The General
Assembly recognized SWAPO as “sole and authentic” representative of the Namibian people. The Turnhalle Conference of internal parties established interim government.

1977

The Western Contact Group (Britain, Canada, France, United States, and West Germany) initiated negotiations to find an internationally acceptable settlement.

In November, the U.N. declared South Africa’s annexation of Walvis Bay illegal and a violation of the U.N. Charter and Declaration on Decolonization.

1978

In April, the Contact Group submitted a settlement proposal to the Security Council, under which South Africa would administer the elections under U.N. supervision and control.

In July, Security Council Resolution 431 created the office of the Special Representative for Namibia, and Resolution 432 mandated that Walvis Bay be reintegrated into Namibia. The Secretary-General immediately appointed Martti Ahtisaari Special Representative.

In September, the Security Council passed Resolution 435 adopting the Settlement Plan and establishing the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia, a mission mandated to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections.

1980

Proclamation AG 8 established ethnic administrative authorities in Namibia.

1981

The United States announced a policy linking implementation of Resolution 435 to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

1982

The Secretary-General’s Contact Group submitted a proposal on principles to govern the electoral system and the constitution, and on actions to ensure U.N. and South African impartiality.

1983

The Council of Ministers in Namibia resigned, and the
Administrator-General dissolved the National Assembly and resumed direct rule. The Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was convened in November.

1985

The South African President issued Proclamation R101, which ceded administrative responsibility to the interim government formed by the MPC and also adopted a Bill of Rights.

1988

In July, an agreement was reached at Governor's Island on "principles for a peaceful settlement" in south-western Africa among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa.

In August, the Protocol of Geneva established a cease-fire and called for implementation of the Settlement Plan.

In December, the Protocol of Brazzaville committed parties to treaties providing for the implementation of the Settlement Plan, a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the creation of a Joint Commission. The Tripartite Accord was signed in New York on December 22.

1989

In January, Security Council Resolutions 628 and 629 set April 1 as the deadline for the implementation of Resolution 435. Debate in the Security Council was held over the size of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) force.

In February, Security Council Resolution 632 approved the Secretary-General's compromise over the size of UNTAG force and authorized implementation.

In March, the General Assembly approved the UNTAG budget.

In April, implementation of the Settlement Plan began with the outbreak of hostilities in northern Namibia. The Joint Commission issued the Etjo Declaration on April 9, which called for restoration of the cease-fire and provided for the withdrawal of SWAPO forces to Angola, north of the 16th parallel.

Amnesty Proclamation, AG 13, and First Law Amendment (Abolition of Discriminatory or Restrictive Laws for Purposes of Free and Fair Elections) Proclamation, AG 14, were enacted on June 12. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began repatriation of Namibians. Registration of Voters (Constituent Assembly) Proclamation, AG-19 enacted on June 28.

Voter registration began; UNTAG proposed draft election law
on July 21.

In August, Security Council Resolution 640 demanded "strict compliance" with Resolutions 435 and 632 by all parties, "especially South Africa," and directed the Secretary-General to ensure that electoral legislation conformed to "internationally accepted norms."

In September, Registration of Political Organizations Proclamation, AG 43 was enacted.

In October, Election Proclamation, AG 49, was enacted.

In November, the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted a constitution, designated March 21 for independence, and elected Sam Nujoma as Namibia’s first president.

1990

In March, Namibia became independent; UNTAG ceased operation.
INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Namibia (formerly known as South West Africa) achieved independence on March 21, 1990, after a century of colonial rule. Before it gained independence, Namibia had been ruled by Germany in the late nineteenth century and after World War I by South Africa. The eventual Settlement Proposal, which paved the way for independence, was implemented after February 1989; it was the culmination of a series of international efforts at mediation in Namibia that originated in the League of Nations. Namibia became the last country in Africa to decolonize.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The international community became involved in the issue of Namibia’s future in opposition to South Africa’s role as colonizer of the country. In 1914, with the outbreak of the World War I, South African troops occupied South West Africa and forced Germany to relinquish its possession, which it had held since 1884. In 1920, the League of Nations entrusted South Africa with a mandate to administer South West Africa. In 1925, South Africa imposed a constitution on South West Africa that gave complete administrative control of local affairs to the country’s white minority. This system of apartheid was regarded as a violation of the League of Nations mandate. After World War II, the U.N. not only refused to conclude its trusteeship agreement with South Africa, but also disallowed South Africa’s request to annex South West Africa.
In 1950 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a ruling stipulating that the area should remain under international mandate and that South Africa should submit to U.N. control. South Africa refused to comply with this judgment. Furthermore, in October 1966, South Africa's security and anti-apartheid laws were extended to South West Africa.

In 1958 opposition within Namibia to racial segregation, land appropriation, the contract labor system, and restrictions on blacks' freedom of movement led to the establishment of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The following year, the South West African National Union (SWANU) was formed. As a result of the same principles, both groups agitated for full independence from South Africa. In 1966, SWAPO launched an armed struggle for the liberation of the territory; and its military arm, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), operated from bases in Angola and Zambia. An estimated 10,000 people died as a result of this guerrilla war.¹

South Africa was consistently criticized in the U.N. General Assembly over its extension of apartheid to the territory. In 1966, the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate to administer the territory and placed it under the direct responsibility of the U.N., creating a U.N. Council for South West Africa in May 1967. The name of the territory was changed to Namibia in June 1968. Throughout the 1960s, South Africa took a defiant stance on South West Africa in international forums. In September 1975, for instance, in the Turnhalle initiative, South
Africa held a Constitutional Conference in Namibia to deliberate on ushering in Namibia's independence under an apartheid, non-SWAPO government system. Nevertheless, from that time onward, the pace of negotiations over the territory's future quickened.

The U.N. Response

The U.N. Security Council in January 1976 adopted Resolution 385, which called for "free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations." Also in 1976, in Resolution 31/146, the U.N. General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people." Five Western members of the Security Council--Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States--formed a "Contact Group" in 1977, and began a negotiating process aimed at reaching an internationally acceptable solution.

On April 10, 1978, the Contact Group submitted to the Security Council a compromise settlement proposal that formed the basis of Resolution 435. The resolution called for internationally supervised elections; it was amended in 1982 to add provisions for a Bill of Rights, multiparty democracy, and an independent judiciary.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

Following a decade of negotiation, in 1988 the Geneva Protocol set November 1, 1988, as the date of implementation of Resolution 435. Angola and Cuba agreed to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. SWAPO and South Africa agreed to a cease-fire, completing their troop withdrawal from Namibia. On April 1, 1989, the
implementation of the resolution finally began. In December 1988, a tripartite accord, known as the Brazzaville Protocol, was signed among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, removing a long-standing impasse—the United States linkage of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola to the negotiating process. It was agreed in principle that all Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola but that South Africa would, in turn, have to withdraw its support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which was opposed by the Angolan government. The accord made possible the elections that marked a milestone in Namibia’s transition to independence. On February 16, 1989, the Security Council implemented a Settlement Proposal that led to a U.N. operation to establish an administration in Namibia that would enable the Namibian people to exercise their right of self-determination. The accord also designated April 1, 1989, as the implementation date for Resolution 435. After more than a decade of seemingly endless negotiations, free and fair elections were conducted pursuant to the 1978 U.N.-sponsored Settlement Plan, U.N. Security Council Resolution 435.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNTAG’s deployment was delayed several weeks because of delays caused by debate in the Security Council over the size of the military component and who would pay for the operation. Key personnel, however, began arriving in Namibia by February 1989. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari, arrived on March 31, 1989, the day Resolution 435 was
to be implemented.

Some 110 nationalities were represented in UNTAG forces. At its maximum deployment, during the elections of November 7-11, 1989, UNTAG's overall strength was 8,000, consisting of under 2,000 civilians, 1,500 police (CIVPOL-civilian police), and approximately 4,500 military personnel.  

Political and Military Goals

UNTAG’s goals were intended to fulfill political, electoral, administrative, police, and military objectives. Its mission was primarily political and was intended to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. Chester A. Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1981-89), described the mission's role as a "joint governor (with South Africa) of a quasi-colonial territory for the specific purpose of its decolonization under acceptable international auspices."  

UNTAG’s secondary goal was to monitor the rapid reduction and eventual removal of the South African military presence in Namibia—a precondition for free and fair elections and for the subsequent transition to independence. It also had to ensure that the remaining security forces, the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL), carried out their duties in a manner that was consistent with free and fair elections. Above all, UNTAG was tasked with ushering in a major change in the country’s political
environment.

Rules of Engagement

UNTAG's military and police functions had a nonaggressive, supportive, and subordinate role in furthering Namibia's progress toward democracy. UNTAG was not authorized to maintain law and order in the country, a responsibility that was ceded to the remaining police forces. However, the U.N. peacekeepers accompanied the police forces and monitored their discharge of duties. U.N. civilian police monitors were at times "constrained" by certain limitations, such as urging victims to file complaints.12

Composition of Forces

UNTAG consisted of civilian, military, and police components. The civilian component had five nonpolice elements: the Special Representative's Office, the Independent Jurist, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Electoral Division, and the Division of Administration. The Special Representative's Office and 42 political offices throughout Namibia carried out liaison, administrative, electoral, and humanitarian duties. The civilian component included local employees as well as more than 1,000 international personnel who came to monitor the elections.

The police component consisted of the Civilian Police (CIVPOL). Almost all of the CIVPOL personnel remained in Namibia until independence. CIVPOL was commanded by a police commissioner who had under him two commanders, one each for the northern and
southern parts of the territory. Two-thirds of CIVPOL served in the south.

The military component was responsible for all military aspects of the Settlement Plan. It was commanded by the Force Commander, who was appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Security Council. The military component, as deployed, consisted of three elements: 300 military monitors and observers, three infantry battalions, and a number of logistics units. The Security Council approved 4,650 personnel for initial deployment but the maximum number actually deployed was 4,493, as a result of a reduced requirement of personnel for air support.13

**Equipment**

The military component of UNTAG provided a logistical support in the form of transport vehicles and communications equipment to the field offices. An Italian helicopter unit ferried the mobile election teams around the country. Most personnel in the military and police components of UNTAG were equipped with U.N.-issued light weapons and transport vehicles.

**Training**

At the request of Special Representative to the Secretary-General Ahtisaari, the U.N. Training Service organized week-long mission-specific training sessions at U.N. offices in New York, Geneva, and Vienna. This training was provided for U.N. professional and general service staff; it focused on case studies, team-building, and emergency preparedness. Parallel
training programs were not extended to the civilian police.

The Training Service was also active in Namibia. The UNTAG Election Unit offered instruction in election registration, and comprehensive training materials were developed for election supervisors. Trainers provided instruction in polling procedures and led mock polling exercises.

Tactics

Because UNTAG was primarily a political operation, information management was essential. Over the course of the operation, UNTAG produced more than 200 radio broadcasts, 32 television programs, and more than 590,000 separate information items. Routine activities included monitoring the cease-fire, limiting the South African military presence in Namibia, and maintaining some surveillance over the territory's borders.

Cost

The Secretary-General in January 1989 projected the final costs of UNTAG at $416 million. In December 1989, however, costs were estimated at $367 million, $42.8 million below the previous estimate.

Operational Assessment

Given the suspicions of the major antagonists and the high expectations for the mission by the international community, UNTAG's task was extremely challenging. South Africans suspected that the U.N. desired a SWAPO victory in the elections, whereas SWAPO members accused UNTAG of going to extremes to demonstrate its impartiality. Ahtisaari, especially, was criticized by SWAPO
for authorizing the release of South African troops from cantonment to intercept a late 1989 incursion into Namibia by SWAPO fighters.

From a political perspective, the U.N. operation in Namibia succeeded in drawing opposing groups into a system of participatory democracy. The U.N.'s successful involvement with the electoral process in Namibia offered a model for other U.N. peacekeeping missions. The special emphasis on preparation of civilian personnel, it is widely believed, contributed to the overall success of UNTAG.

CURRENT SITUATION

UNTAG's mission to Namibia concluded on March 31, 1990. The government apparatus UNTAG set up—a system based on the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches—has held. The Namibian government has experienced difficulty in solving many of its social and economic problems. Ethnic, racial, and land redistribution problems remain. Yet, observers invariably agree that today the country is in a better situation to grapple with these problems than it was in the past.

CONCLUSION

On March 31, 1990, UNTAG ceased operation, having fulfilled its mandate of facilitating the process of Namibian independence. UNTAG's significance goes beyond the resolution of the last territory mandated by the League of Nations. The future of participatory democracy in Namibia had implications for changing
South Africa's system of minority rule. The international community has viewed UNTAG's involvement in preparing the ground for Namibia's democratic system of government by providing police monitors and administering the Namibian elections as a successful model to be emulated by other U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Events in early 1994 suggest cautious optimism for Namibia's future stability and indicate that lessons learned there could be extended to benefit neighboring South Africa. Following the termination of UNTAG's mandate, Namibia has established a free press and a functioning multiparty democracy and has held two fair and independent elections, both of which had high turnouts. Racial tensions in Namibia are under control, and the white population appears to have comfortably adapted to its new status—that of a dynamic minority and economic elite. According to some observers, the survival and continued prosperity of Namibia's white community might serve to reassure white South Africans about their fate in a post-apartheid South Africa.  

In a display of appreciation, Namibians have set up in their national museum a high-profile exhibit devoted to the U.N. This action acknowledges that the presence of UNTAG's peacekeeping troops helped to make Namibia's transition to freedom a success.

UNTAG became a powerful symbol for hope. UNTAG's success set a precedent for using U.N.-controlled elections as a means of peaceful conflict resolution.

The Settlement Plan was more than a device for instituting
independence. It also helped Namibians develop a democratic political system. These events have a direct impact on the evolving democratization not only in South Africa but in other African nations as well.
Endnotes


3. Ibid., 345.


5. Ibid., 348.

6. Ibid., 349.


8. Ibid., 349.

9. Ibid., 349.


12. Ibid., 360-61

13. Ibid., 341.


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Bibliography


Selected Chronology

1884
Spain established a colony in Western Sahara.

1965
The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the decolonization of Western Sahara.

1966
The U.N. General Assembly supported the right to self-determination in a referendum in Western Sahara.

1972
The U.N. passed a resolution reaffirming the rights of the Sahrawi peoples of Western Sahara to independence.

1973
The Polisario Front, or Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro), was established as an insurgent group.

1974
The U.N. General Assembly turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate Mauritanian and Moroccan claims to Western Saharan territory.

1975
On October 16, the ICJ upheld the Sahrawi peoples' right to self-determination.

On October 16, King Hassan II of Morocco began the territorial occupation of Western Sahara. In a tripartite agreement, Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco agreed to share territorial administration of Western Sahara.

1976
On February 27, the Polisario declared Western Sahara an independent nation, to be known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR).

Spain relinquished its claims to Western Sahara and divided territorial rights between Morocco and Mauritania in the Magreb Accords.

1978

The Polisario was recognized by many nations.

1979

The president of Mauritania was overthrown in a coup. The Polisario defeated Mauritania, which renounced its claim to Western Sahara.

1980

The Polisario and Mauritania signed a treaty recognizing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

1981

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) called for a referendum in Western Sahara.

1983

The OAU adopted Resolution 104 urging direct talks between the government of Morocco and the Polisario.

1989

The U.N. peace efforts in Western Sahara broke down.

1990

U.N. Security Council Resolution 658 approved the peace accords, providing for a timetable for MINURSO.

1991

On April 29, MINURSO was formally established. On September 9, Morocco and the Polisario agreed to a cease-fire and a referendum.

1992

A scheduled January 24 referendum was postponed indefinitely.

1993
In Resolution 809, the U.N. Security Council approved holding the Western Saharan referendum by the end of 1993.
INTRODUCTION

The 18-year conflict in Western Sahara between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), under the leadership of the Polisario, is shaped by the process of decolonization and a people's right to national self-determination. In August 1988, both parties accepted and signed settlement proposals presented by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (U.N.).

In the face of military hostilities, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in cooperation with the OAU was established by Security Council Resolution 658 (1990) to implement a settlement to the dispute. This mission took the form of organizing a referendum in which the indigenous people in the territory were asked to choose between independence or integration with Morocco. The MINURSO mandate has faced a number of obstacles, such as inconsistent adherence and continuous modification of the agreed-upon peace plan. Other obstacles have included cease-fire violations, a political stalemate among the parties, and controversy in verifying the eligibility of referendum voters.

This case study examines the political crisis in Western Sahara that caused MINURSO's formation, the involvement of the U.N. and OAU in the dispute, and the current U.N. deployment and implementation activities in the region.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis
Western Sahara has historically been occupied by European and neighboring colonial countries. This process began with the Portuguese colonialization in 1487 and continues to the present day with Moroccan intervention. In 1884 Spain began its occupation of Western Sahara, assuming military and administrative control of the territory in 1934. In 1967 and again in 1970, the U.N. passed resolutions calling on Spain to surrender its territorial claims to Western Sahara. In response, Spain recognized the Sahrawi people's rights to self-determination in the form of a referendum in consultation with Morocco and Mauritania. Mauritania and Morocco also sought control over the territory, which has phosphates and iron ore deposits, and provides a 660-mile access to the Atlantic coast. Both countries denied Sahrawi rights to independence based in part on precolonial Moroccan and Mauritanian trade relationships with the area. In 1975, the U.N. International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the Sahrawi people's rights to self-determination and also "acknowledged" a historical Moroccan and Mauritanian connection that did not compete with or override Sahrawi rights to independence. Moroccan support for an ICJ ruling on the international legality of a Western Saharan referendum undermined any basis for the annexation or integration of Sahrawis without a free and fair referendum.

Western Sahara nationalist movements arose to end Spanish rule and embarked on an insurgency that forced Spain to declare a state of emergency in the territory in 1972. One of these
nationalist movements was the Polisario, or Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro), which was formally established in 1973. The Polisario’s insurgency succeeded in forcing Spain to recognize Western Sahara’s independence, resulting in the tripartite Madrid Agreement, signed on November 14, 1975, giving Western Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco.³

Supported by the Algerian government, the Polisario then launched a series of attacks on Mauritania, forcing Mauritania in 1979 to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara and to recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s (SADR) right to rule in the territory. Morocco, however, which still viewed Western Sahara as part of a Greater Morocco, continued to fight the Polisario with some 100,000 troops.⁴

The U.N. Response

The mandate for U.N. involvement in the Western Sahara conflict originated in the U.N. Charter, which advances the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,⁵ and the U.N. role in the decolonization process in the modern world.

Both the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have been involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. In 1981 the OAU renewed a call for a referendum to decide the territory’s future. This referendum, however, was stymied by disagreements over the right of the Polisario to OAU membership (the SADR was granted full OAU membership in 1985). The Polisario had initially threatened to reject the OAU/U.N. referendum plan unless Morocco
withdrew from the territory. On August 30, 1990, Morocco and the Polisario agreed to accept an OAU/U.N. proposal to implement a peace settlement. MINURSO was established on April 29, 1991 by Security Council Resolution 690 (1991) to carry out the 1990 agreed-upon peace accord; the accord was to culminate in free and fair elections for Western Sahara. Supervision of the referendum on Western Sahara was MINURSO’s main task.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

MINURSO was first deployed in Western Sahara in September 1991. The mission’s military forces were supported by logistics and administrative staffs at six sites, which were set up to monitor the reduction of Moroccan and Polisario troops and the surrender of their arms. Three of these U.N.-supervised sites are in Moroccan-controlled territory and three in Polisario-controlled territory.

The field headquarters of the mission was established in Laayoune, the territory’s capital, with three sector headquarters in the central, northern, and southern regions. Ten subsector team sites, also known as observation sites, were supervised by approximately 18 military observers.

A liaison office was established in Tindouf (home for 200,000 Sahrawi refugees) to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the Polisario.

Political and Military Goals

MINURSO’s main political goal was to register voters and conduct a free and fair U.N.-supervised referendum under peaceful
conditions. Within a limited deployment framework, MINURSO was to monitor and verify a September 1991 cease-fire and an end to military hostilities and obtain the release of all Western Saharan detainees and political prisoners.\textsuperscript{9}

Rules of Engagement

MINURSO conducts surveillance of Western Sahara territory and refugee towns in Algeria. Aircraft would be used to monitor the cease-fire conditions. Unarmed military observers would conduct ground, air, and/or satellite transmission patrols to MINURSO observer posts, e.g., at Zoug (relocated to Dugash but retains its original name) and Tifariti.\textsuperscript{10}

Composition of Forces

In September 1992, MINURSO comprised 346 personnel, including 223 military observers.\textsuperscript{11} MINURSO's authorized strength is approximately 1,695 military observers and troops, 300 civilian and 40 military police and about 1,039 other personnel.\textsuperscript{12} The current strength of the mission is 228 military observers, 100 military support personnel, and 103 international and local civilian staff members.\textsuperscript{13}

Equipment

MINURSO's equipment supported decentralized field operations in Western Sahara and refugee settlements in Tindouf, Algeria. Transportation equipment included aircraft (also used for surveillance) and four-wheel-drive vehicles. Communications equipment included stationary and mobile communications equipment such as a trailer-mounted International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (Intelsat) earth station, portable
International Marine Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) terminals,
radio teletype, and encrypted radio-facsimile machines in field
offices. Handheld global positioning system (GPS) receivers,
capable of identifying a user’s location within 100 meters, were
issued to MINURSO personnel.\textsuperscript{14}

Training

MINURSO military personnel had prior training either as
participants in other U.N. peacekeeping operations or as
participants in national military training in areas such as
military observation, military police duties, infantry maneuvers,
logistics, air support, and signals. The civilian police and
polling officers had previous experience in these fields.

Tactics

In mobile ground patrols, the military observers supervise
10 observation sites strategically located throughout war areas
and monitor the cease-fire agreement and adherence to the 1990
peace settlement plan.

Helicopter-borne patrols are employed to extend MINURSO’s
verification capacity and expedite the investigation of cease-
fire and/or peace-plan violations.

Sophisticated communications equipment is used to support
the speedy notification and deployment of MINURSO troops when
cease-fire violations or provocations occur.

Cost

MINURSO’s cost is approximately $35 million annually.\textsuperscript{15}
July 1993, the overall cost of the mission since its inception was estimated at $200 million, with approximately $21 million of the assessed member-state contributions in arrears. The mission is financed by means of a Special Account.

**Operational Assessment**

The MINURSO mandate has encompassed political and military objectives. Mission successes were modest and included the following:

First, the international community, through MINURSO's establishment, initially demonstrated its commitment to the decolonization of Western Sahara.

Second, the integrity and the diligence of U.N. Special Representative Manz in carrying out MINURSO goals proved critical to the mission's effectiveness.

Third, the mission's military observers fulfilled their mandate to verify and report cease-fire violations (183 of 191 were caused by Morocco).

MINURSO, however, has faced a number of obstacles:

First, adherence to the 1988 peace settlements has wavered, causing continued military hostilities and lack of progress towards a cease-fire, deployment and withdrawal of troops, and sustained peace-making.

Second, the cease-fire arrangements and deployment of Polisario and Moroccan troops were not completed before MINURSO began its mandate.

Third, MINURSO officials have complained that the Moroccan
government has moved in tens of thousands of Moroccans to pack voter rolls, refused to provide information on the number of Moroccan troops and their locations in Western Sahara, blocked supplies destined for U.N. forces in the field, and interfered with U.N. patrols.

Fourth, Morocco has not been pressed sufficiently either by the U.S. or the U.N. Security Council to cause it to support the agreed-upon peace plan.

Fifth, a report released by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticized the U.N. hierarchy for failing to provide political and logistical support to help solve Western Sahara’s problems.18

Sixth, although only a few fatalities have been incurred by MINURSO, the parties to the conflict remain heavily armed, creating further hostilities and denying the safe movement of peoples and goods in the Western Sahara and the region.

Seventh, a series of resignations by the U.N. Special Representative and other key U.N. officials and their slow replacement damaged the mission’s effectiveness in building confidence among Morocco, Polisario, and the international community.

Eighth, the U.N. mission’s impartiality has on occasion been compromised. For example, the U.N. (under Perez de Cuellar) revised and expanded voter eligibility and recognized intermittent territorial residency (prior to and after the 1974 census), which favored Moroccan settlers.
Ninth, a fair settlement of the conflict is difficult to attain without international political will to impose face-to-face discussions and adherence to the mutually agreed-upon peace plan.¹⁹

CURRENT SITUATION

Although peace talks but not face-to-face negotiations recently resumed between Polisario and Morocco, they concluded without resolution of such topics as the deployment of foreign troops, voter eligibility, a schedule for the electoral referendum, and implementation of the peace plan approved by the U.N. in 1988.²⁰

At a recent all-party meeting in the British House of Commons, organized by the Committee for a Free and Fair Referendum in Western Sahara, the consensus was that the U.N. must play a more active role in the settlement of the Western Sahara dispute.²¹ The lack of U.N. and international denouncement of a recent Moroccan referendum that included Western Saharan territorial occupants has compromised MINURSO’S goal of supervising free and fair elections.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Western Sahara continues to be a focus of confrontation among the Maghreb states. As the region becomes more volatile because of the economic and religio-political crises, the issue of the territory’s future could serve as a flashpoint for wider political and military conflict.²²

The efforts to overcome the political stalemate over the
peace plan's implementation center on the registration of Western Saharan voters based on agreed-upon eligibility requirements. Progress in fulfilling MINURSO's mission depends on the willingness of interested parties, particularly in the Security Council and neighboring states, to encourage the holding of the referendum. There is a consensus that the only peaceful solution lies in the continued role of MINURSO in the territory.
Endnotes


4. In 1980, construction of the vertical sand wall began reportedly to obstruct Polisario access to fishing reserves; the first construction phase was completed in 1982; by 1984, construction of the sand wall extended about 600 kilometers to the Mauritanian border; in April 1987 about 2,820 kilometers of the berm were completed. Polisario is said to have penetrated the sand wall by 6 kilometers inside Western Sahara.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Initially scheduled for January 1992, the referendum was delayed.

10. These two sites are located in Polisario-controlled territory. There are additional observer posts, some situated across the sand berm that defines the Morocco line of control.


20. Akakpo, 1397.

21. Ibid.


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"Secretary-General Reports Progress Towards Just Solution for Western Sahara," UN Chronicle, 27, No. 4, 1990, 28.


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Selected Chronology

1960

In July, Somalia's first civilian government came to power when the Italian-administered southern territory merged with the former British colony in the north to form the present state of Somalia.

1969

In October, a military coup overthrew the civilian government. A Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was formed under the chairmanship of General Mohamed Siad Barre.

1970

The SRC declared Somalia a socialist state and formed alliances with the communist bloc.

1974

A Treaty of Friendship was signed between Somalia and the Soviet Union.

1991

In January, the government of President Siad Barre was overthrown. A new government was formed by a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC).

In September, armed conflict broke out in the USC between the followers of General Mohamed Faarah Aideed and interim President Ali Mahdi. The conflict soon turned into an all-out battle to control the capital, Mogadishu.

1992

On January 23, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council issued Resolution 733 calling for a cease-fire, an embargo on weapons shipments, and an increase in humanitarian aid to Somalia.

On April 24, the Security Council passed Resolution 751 establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

On December 3, the Security Council passed Resolution 794, authorizing the use of force to facilitate humanitarian relief.
operations. On December 9, the first elements of the United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived in Mogadishu.

1993

On March 15-28, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia convened.

On March 26, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814, establishing UNOSOM II, with an expanded mandate, to replace UNITAF.

On April 30, UNOSOM's mandate terminated.

On May 4, UNITAF's mandate ended.

On June 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 837 condemning attacks against UNOSOM II.

On August 6, a regional peace conference was held in Kismayo.

An all-Somali conference was held from September 30 to October 1 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In October, President Bill Clinton announced that United States forces would withdraw from Somalia by March 31, 1994.

INTRODUCTION

Somalia is the first peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter since the end of the Cold War and thus is viewed as an important test case for future missions. Chapter VII allows the use of military force to achieve the objectives of U.N. resolutions.

Two U.N. peacekeeping operations have been deployed in Somalia. The first, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM, also known as UNOSOM I), was established in April 1992 to provide humanitarian relief operations. It was accompanied by the deployment of a United States-led military contingent, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to restore order to the country. UNOSOM's mandate was terminated on April 30, 1993, while UNITAF's mandate ended on May 4. On March 26, 1993, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established with a large peacekeeping component, to replace UNOSOM I and UNITAF.

UNOSOM I/UNITAF

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

Somalia, which has a population of around 6,709,000, occupies a territory slightly larger than the state of Texas. The main religion is Sunni Islam. Somalia's first civilian government came to power in July 1960, when the Italian-administered southern territory merged with the former British colony in the north to form the current Somali state. Nepotism, corruption, and clan infighting created serious political
instability in the new government. Deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions led in October 1969 to a military coup. The coup leaders dissolved the National Assembly, arrested leading civilian leaders, and formed a 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). Its chairman was General Siad Barre, in whose hands power became concentrated.¹

A year later, the SRC declared Somalia a socialist state and introduced extensive political and social changes. United States Peace Corps volunteers were expelled, and all professional and political organizations were disbanded. Somalia drew close to Eastern bloc countries, signing a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1974 and beginning a campaign to indoctrinate the people with socialist ideas. Harsh human rights conditions, a deteriorating economic situation, and the pervasive clan rule that dominated the government caused mounting opposition to the rule of President Siad Barre.²

In January 1991, the government of President Siad Barre was overthrown after a month-long, intense battle in the capital, Mogadishu. A new government was quickly formed by a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC), but because the government had no popular mandate, opposition soon arose. Relations among the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the USC—the three major opposition groups that had united to carry out the coup—began to deteriorate. In May 1991, the SNM, based in the north and the strongest and oldest rebel force in Somalia, declared the north to be independent

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Somaliland. Meanwhile, in the south clan-based factions began engaging in combat.  

By September 1991, a had split developed within the ruling USC, erupting into armed conflict between the followers of General Mohamed Faarah Aideed and those of the interim President Ali Mahdi. By late 1991, this conflict had turned into an all-out battle to control Mogadishu. The battle, which continued for weeks with no clear victor, led to massive destruction of property and loss of civilian lives, and armed gang violence gripped the capital. Thousands of people fled the capital to look for food in rural areas. Humanitarian relief work became impossible because of the intensity of the violence and growing insecurity in Mogadishu. According to relief agencies and newspaper reports, between 20,000 and 30,000 people had been killed or wounded by January 1992. More than half the population needed emergency assistance by this time.  

The U.N. Response

With the crisis in Somalia escalating and the civilian death toll rising rapidly, the U.N. came under strong criticism for its failure to act. The worsening situation led to an announcement on December 27, 1991 by then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to the President of the Security Council of a peace initiative to restore order to Somalia. Following a visit by senior U.N. officials to Somalia, the Security Council then issued Resolution 733 on January 23, 1992.  

The resolution called for a cease-fire, an arms embargo, and for increased humanitarian...
aid. The next month, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had succeeded de Cuéllar as U.N. Secretary-General, convened the so-called New York Conference at the U.N. to try to resolve the crisis. He stressed that Somalia presented a special challenge because the extraordinarily complex, tragic situation made conventional solutions ineffective. He urged that innovative methods commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation be explored. The conference was attended by representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (Arab League), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and leading Somali political factions. After intense negotiations, on March 3, 1992, a cease-fire was agreed upon among Somali warring factions. On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 746, which called for dispatching a technical team to plan for the cease-fire. The resolution was carried out on March 23, when 40 military observers arrived in Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. They were accompanied by a contingent of U.N. civilian police tasked to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Mogadishu area.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established on April 24, 1992, when the Security Council passed Resolution 751, requesting the immediate deployment of 50 unarmed observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. On April 28 the Secretary General appointed Mohammed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, as U.N. special representative for Somalia. This was
followed on August 12 by the Secretary-General’s announcement that a UNOSOM contingent of 500 U.N. security personnel would be deployed in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{12}

The U.N. operation faced a tremendous challenge. General Aideed had ousted interim President Ali Mahdi from Mogadishu, but Mahdi’s clan dominated the area around the capital. Moreover, factional clan fighting on the north-south issue threatened to escalate into a full-scale civil war. Critics of U.N. Resolution 751 claimed that the force was too small to be effective in monitoring the cease-fire agreement and that lasting solutions to the Somali crisis could be found only by the Somalis themselves. The United States, for its part, was concerned about the financing of the peacekeeping force; the cost was estimated to be $23 million for six months. The United States agreed to pay about a third of this amount.\textsuperscript{13}

On July 5, 1992, the UNOSOM mission arrived in Somalia. Its efforts were stalled, however, by the uncooperative stance of the various warlords who controlled parts of Somalia. On July 27, with an estimated 30 percent of the Somali population starving, the U.N. Security Council approved an emergency airlift of relief supplies. Relief workers and supplies were targeted by bandits, however, so the U.N. decided on additional peacekeeping troops. On August 28, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 775, which authorized the deployment of up to 3,000 security troops to UNOSOM to protect relief supplies.\textsuperscript{14}

As anarchy rose and the death rate increased in Somalia, the
U.N. Security Council unanimously approved on December 3, 1992, the use of all necessary force to secure the environment for humanitarian relief operations. Resolution 794 (1992) marked the first U.N. sanction for the use of force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief. It stemmed from the assessment by the Secretary-General that the existing course of UNOSOM would not "be an adequate response to the tragedy." During the debate on the historic resolution, council members said that an "approach different from the usual form of peace-keeping operation" was warranted by the "exceptional" circumstances of human suffering in Somalia.¹⁵

The first phase of the unified military response sanctioned by Resolution 794 was launched by the United States. On December 4, 1992, in a nationwide address, President George Bush said that the United States was sending military units into Somalia to "create a secure environment" and that it would later withdraw these troops and hand over responsibility for secured areas and delivery of supplies to a U.N. peacekeeping force.¹⁶

The U.N. Secretary-General said on December 8, 1992 that there was no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows the use of military force to achieve peace. Any forceful action should preferably be under U.N. command and control, but if that were not possible, a Security Council-authorized operation undertaken by member states should be considered. Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council that the United States was prepared to take the lead in organizing the
operation.\textsuperscript{17}

**DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

The UNOSOM mission arrived in Somalia on July 5, 1992. On September 14, 1992, the first contingent of an additional 500 UNOSOM security troops arrived in Mogadishu. By the end of September, UNOSOM’s total strength in Somalia reached 4,219 personnel.\textsuperscript{18} This was followed by the deployment of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF, also known as Operation Restore Hope) on December 9, 1992.\textsuperscript{19}

**Political and Military Goals**

U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in a message to the people of Somalia on December 8, 1992, said that the military troops arriving in their country came "to feed the starving, protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction."\textsuperscript{20}

**Rules of Engagement**

UNOSOM’s rules of engagement authorized the use of force by U.N. troops. UNOSOM was to use all necessary means, including "shoot to kill," in order to establish a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.

**Composition of Forces**

By late December 1992, an estimated 44 countries had expressed interest in contributing troops, money, and logistical assistance to the operation. The U.S.-led UNITAF deployment peaked in mid-January at 25,800 troops, which was less than the anticipated 28,000 because other countries made substantial
contributions. The number of non-U.S. troops reached 11,000 by mid-January 1993.\textsuperscript{21} The peacekeeping troops encountered little resistance and made rapid progress in deploying around Somalia and protecting relief supplies. This success enabled the United States to begin incremental troop withdrawals on January 19, 1993.

**Equipment**

A relatively low level of armaments was deployed in Somalia. The U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed a helicopter squadron and amphibious assault vehicles. Equipment was pre-positioned on a squadron of maritime ships, which sailed in from the island of Diego Garcia. Four ships of Pacific Fleet Task Force 176 were deployed off the coast of Somalia. U.S. Transportation Command Headquarters (Transcom) sent 30 C-141 and 25 C-5 Galaxy aircraft.\textsuperscript{22}

**Training**

The U.S. Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, which formed the bulk of U.S. forces, were highly mobile forces trained for rapid deployment. Many of these forces had served in Operation Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{23}

**Tactics**

The first phase of UNITAF’s mission, known as "Operation Restore Hope," began on December 9 with the successful seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by a U.S. Marine special-purpose air-ground task force supported by U.S. Navy elements.
The second phase of the U.S.-led operation involved securing the relief centers of Baidoa, as well as Oddur, Beledweyne and Jalalaqsi. The third phase involved expanding the operations to the south to secure the port and airfield at Chisimayu, Baardheere, and the land route from Baardheere to Baidoa. The fourth and last phase was the transfer of responsibility for maintaining a secure environment for UNOSOM peacekeeping forces. On December 31, President Bush visited with U.S. troops in Somalia.24

The main tactics of the UNOSOM force included working with UNITAF to maintain security at Mogadishu Airport, providing movement control for U.N. flights, and escorting all relief agency personnel and food convoys within the city of Mogadishu.

Cost

During the period from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993, the General Assembly appropriated $109.7 million to UNOSOM I.25 The mission was financed by assessments of member states drawn from a Special Account.

Operational Assessment

UNITAF’s mission ended on May 4, 1993. There was wide agreement that the U.S.-led operation had succeeded in bringing an end to starvation and allowing near-normal conditions to resume in Somalia. Schools, shops, and markets had reopened, and police had returned to the streets. Agreement had also been reached among the various political factions on a transitional administration for the country. According to U.S. Special Envoy
to Somalia Robert Oakley, the effort "to restore hope and stop
the killing from war, famine and disease . . . has largely been
accomplished."  

Nonetheless, the mission had some failures. Weapons were
still abundant in Somalia, and various tribal and factional
leaders remained poised to see what would happen next as the U.N.
attempted to orchestrate reconciliation and recovery in the face
of a challenge by General Aideed. He had threatened that Somalis
would fight any attempt to turn the country into a "U.N.
trusteeship." Many were concerned that anti-U.N. and anti-U.S.
sentiments demonstrated by pro-Aideed guerrillas and civilians
indicated increasingly widespread resentment over the role of
foreigners in Somalia.  

UNOSOM II

The Initial Crisis

In the first months of 1993, Boutros-Ghali sought U.N.
Security Council approval of a successor force to UNOSOM I and
UNITAF, and on March 26, 1993, he won approval of UNOSOM II with
the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 814. The
resolution was enacted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
which authorizes the use of force. Citing its concern over the
crippling famine and drought in Somalia, which had been
aggravated by civil strife, the Security Council transferred the
task of securing humanitarian aid deliveries from a U.S.-led
international peacekeeping force to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation. UNOSOM II was also designed to help Somalia take its
first steps toward rebuilding its economy and government.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Adoption of U.N. Resolution}

By unanimously adopting Resolution 814, the Council endorsed
the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNOSOM II formally
take over from the Unified Task Force on the target date of May
1, 1993 and authorized its mandate for an initial period through
October 31, 1993. Stating that there was a "need for a prompt,
smooth and phased transition" from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the
resolution referred to the "continuing reports of widespread
violations of international humanitarian law and the general
absence of the rule of law in Somalia."\textsuperscript{29} The resolution also
emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament" and demanded
that all Somali parties comply fully with commitments they had
undertaken at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January
1993. All Somali parties were to "take all measures to ensure the
safety of the personnel" of the U.N. and its agencies, as well as
the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross and
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations engaged in
humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia.

\textbf{DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES}

\textbf{Political and Military Goals}

The overall military goal of UNOSOM II was to transfer the
task of securing humanitarian aid deliveries from a United
States-led international force to a U.N. peacekeeping operation.
Specifically, this included maintaining control of the organized
factions' heavy weapons and seizing small arms of unauthorized armed elements; continuing the mine-clearing program; assisting in the repatriation of refugees; and securing all ports, airports, and lines of communication. This expanded U.N. operation was designed to help Somalia take its first steps towards rebuilding its economy and government. The main political goal was to restore Somalia as a functioning member of the community of nations by rehabilitating its political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.

Rules of Engagement

Like UNITAF forces, UNOSOM II operated under the provisions of Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force. UNOSOM II's rules of engagement were to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, to take action against factions violating the cease-fire; maintain control of the organized factions' heavy weapons and seize small arms of unauthorized armed elements; continue the mine-clearing program; assist in the repatriation of refugees; secure all ports, airports and lines of communications for the delivery of humanitarian aid; and protect personnel and installations of the U.N. and other organizations. As with UNOSOM I, the use of force was authorized against those attacking or threatening the troops.30

Composition of Forces

The strength of the forces had to be substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in
security conditions. UNITAF, which had an initial strength of 37,000, was already deployed in 40 percent of the territory. It was estimated that the somewhat smaller UNOSOM II force would number approximately 28,000 and be deployed in the entire area of Somalia. With the transition from Operation Restore Hope to UNOSOM II, troops from other countries assumed major security roles. Forces from Italy, Morocco, and Pakistan, along with those from the United States, have played major combat roles. The largest contingents in Somalia as of July 14, 1993, were from the United States (4,039), Pakistan (4,700), and Italy (2,442). U.S. forces included a 1,200-1,300-member infantry element serving as a Quick- Reaction Force that remained under U.S. command. The bulk of the remaining U.S. troops served in logistical roles and were "blue helmeted" forces under U.N. command.

Equipment

In contrast to UNOSOM I, member states contributed heavier weapons, including armored personnel carriers, tanks, and attack helicopters to confront and deter armed attacks against U.N. forces. The United States deployed powerful AC-130 gunships, which were flown in by U.S. Air Force special operations forces.

Training

The units deployed for UNOSOM II had participated in UNOSOM I and Operation Restore Hope, where they had gained training and experience for the second phase of U.N. involvement in Somalia.

Tactics

UNOSOM II's military operations were conducted in four
phases: transition from UNITAF, consolidation and expansion of security, transfer to civilian institutions, and redeployment. In Phase I, military support of relief activity and disarming of factions continued. In Phase II, operations were extended into northern Somalia, based in the port cities of Berbera and Bender Cassim, then moved to Hargeysa and Garoowe. The operation was to conclude when UNOSOM II was operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions. In Phase III, the military presence was to be scaled down in the more stable areas to give way to Somali civilian authorities. When major U.N. military operations were no longer required, the Secretary-General would make recommendations to the Council under Phase IV to redeploy or reduce forces.\textsuperscript{32}

Cost

The total cost was initially estimated at $327.2 million for the first two months of UNOSOM II. The estimated annual cost to the U.N. is $1,550 million, with the mission’s budget drawn from assessments of member states to a Special Account.\textsuperscript{33} By April 30, 1993, approximately $352 million in contributions to UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II were in arrears.\textsuperscript{34}

Operational Assessment

The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia has been undermined by several factors. First, there have been disagreements among the peacekeepers. Some of the participants, Italy in particular, have been unhappy about their lack of a role in the overall command structure and at times have been reluctant
to obey U.N. orders. In the Italian view, U.N. peacekeeping operations were too heavily influenced by U.S. civilians and military officers in the U.N. command. U.N. officials have responded to Italian complaints by redeploying Italian troops outside Mogadishu and sending the senior Italian commander home in mid-July. The question of how and when to use military force has led to disputes among Italy, the United States, and the U.N. central command in Somalia. Italy has questioned the decision by Turkish General Civvak Bir, the U.N. commander in Somalia, and U.S. forces stationed there to retaliate against General Aideed for attacks against U.N. troops.  

The underlying problem is a lack of consensus among the peacekeepers on how to handle this nontraditional peacekeeping mission. In the opinion of countries such as Italy, military goals have overshadowed political and humanitarian operations to the detriment of the peacekeeping mission. Ireland and Kenya have joined the critical voices by calling on the U.N. to reconsider its combat role. The immediate cause of their criticism was the July 12, 1993, attack on the suspected headquarters of General Aideed by the U.S. Quick-Reaction Force. The attack led to rioting in southern Mogadishu and the murder of four journalists by mobs. The press in Italy and Kenya featured articles portraying the July 12 action as a reprisal, a massacre, and an example of "gunboat diplomacy" by a U.N. force that had fallen under the control of the U.S. 

The U.N.'s political strategy in Somalia is seen by some
critics, including members of the U.S. Congress, as too crude. They argue that the United States is involving the U.N. in Somali clan politics, touching off even greater problems in the region, and point out that there has been no significant progress in clan reconciliation at the regional levels and hardly any progress on disarmament outside Mogadishu. These same critics are concerned that anti-U.N. and anti-U.S. sentiments demonstrated by pro-Aideed forces and civilians point to widespread discontent stemming from local resentment over the role of foreigners in Somalia.\(^7\) The mounting violence against U.N. forces in Mogadishu, which has caused the deaths of growing numbers of U.S. servicemen, reinforces this concern. Finally, there is the general problem that the U.N. violates its principle of impartiality when it goes after men like General Aideed. In the case of Somalia, the peacekeepers are not remaining impartial referees, as they did in past U.N. missions.

**CURRENT SITUATION**

U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia are facing increasing obstacles. Since the launching of UNOSOM II, violence has escalated in Mogadishu, as General Aideed and his followers have challenged the UNOSOM II presence there. In June 1993, before the July raid on Aideed’s suspected headquarters, Aideed forces ambushed U.N. peacekeepers and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. In early August, four U.S. soldiers died when a command-detonated mine exploded beneath their vehicle.

Weapons continue to abound throughout the country, and the
various tribal and factional leaders are waiting to see how the U.N. will react to the challenge posed by Aideed.

Following a series of attacks on American troops in Somalia, the U.S. Government announced in late August that it planned to send 400 of its most highly trained combat soldiers--U.S. Army Rangers--to buttress U.S. forces in Mogadishu. The decision to send these forces appeared to foretell a new round of military confrontation with General Aideed. The U.S. government has made no secret of its aim of getting rid of Aideed, either by killing or capturing him. Immediately after their arrival, on August 30, U.S. Army Rangers launched a raid on a building in Mogadishu believed to house top aides to Aideed. By mistake, the rangers rounded up a handful of U.N. aid officials and their Somali assistants, detaining them for several hours. The episode served as a reminder of the many pitfalls confronting U.N. soldiers trying to find Aideed.

Meanwhile the U.S. Government has reiterated its commitment to U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia, and in early October 1993 announced plans to send additional U.S. troops to Mogadishu. The administration has also expressed a desire to resume stalled political peace talks among Somali political factions, but has not determined the procedure for inviting participants. Fear that Aideed might intimidate participants in the negotiations has discouraged the United States from reconvening talks.

CONCLUSION

What happens next will depend upon the actions of the
Somalis and their ability to reach a political reconciliation. Another factor will be whether or not other nations are willing to contribute forces to this U.N. operation over the long term. In the immediate future, the U.N. command must respond to the criticism of its operations, particularly to the growing claims that it has drifted from its humanitarian mission.

The question of how long UNOSOM II will last remains uncertain. The U.S. Government has argued against a time limit on the participation of U.S. troops in UNOSOM II because it would hamper the U.S. ability to support the U.N. and respond to unexpected developments in Somalia. Many of those who favor a continuing, substantial U.S. role in UNOSOM II realize that the fighting in the summer and autumn of 1993 could cause further pressure on the United States to withdraw. Essential to the success of the continuing mission is the U.N. ability to deal with the Aideed problem, heal relations with Italy, and restore an image of UNOSOM II as a humanitarian and peacekeeping mission, rather than a military one.

Whether the United States and other countries will support a substantial, long-term international role in Somalia has become unclear in view of the hostility shown by Aideed backers toward the U.N. According to those who argue for such a role, it is the only way to prevent war and famine, but skeptics claim that the international community is wasting its resources in trying to promote peace and stability in a country where reaching these goals is impossible.
Endnotes


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


12. Ibid., 81.


17. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 84.


21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


32. Copson, Somalia, 3.

33. Ibid.


37. Copson, Somalia, 1-2; Africa Confidential [London], 34, No. 15, July 30, 1993, 1.


Bibliography


United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Selected Chronology

1975

Mozambique won its independence from Portugal. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) government was installed. Its radical political and socio-economic programs provoked a Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) guerrilla insurgency.

1977

Civil war broke out in Mozambique.

1980

South Africa extended its support of Renamo’s insurgency.

1982

Renamo insurgents occupied 9 of the 11 provinces in Mozambique, denying the Frelimo government full administrative control over the country.

1984

The Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, was signed (although not adhered to).

1988

The government of Mozambique launched successful offensives against Renamo rebels in the Zambézia, Tete, and Nampula provinces, with the aim of taking control of agricultural heartlands and the Beira Corridor. The flow of traffic, overland communication, and emergency aid were reestablished.

Presidents P. W. Botha and Joachim Chissano of South Africa and Mozambique, respectively, met to reestablish conditions for adherence to the Nkomati Accord.

1989

A Renamo conference was held in Maputo to alter the organization’s guerrilla character.

The Fifth Congress of Frelimo abandoned its 11-year commitment to Marxism-Leninism, supported talks with Renamo, and called for multiparty elections.
In June, Soviet military advisers announced a reduction in their military assistance to the government.

1990

On July 8-10, the first round of face-to-face negotiations between the government and Renamo were held in Rome. In a joint communiqué, both sides expressed a commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On December 1, the government and Renamo met at the headquarters of a vatican-linked charity, the Community of the St. Egideo Organization in Rome, and signed the Point 1 Accord.

1991

By mid-year, the Joint Commission of Verification received complaints about cease-fire violations by Renamo and Frelimo.

1992

In July, a declaration was signed by the government and Renamo on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance. In August, a joint declaration was signed in Rome.

On October 4, Mozambique President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, signed a General Peace Agreement (the Rome Accord).

On October 15, the United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping contingent arrived in Mozambique to observe the cease-fire between Renamo and the government.

On December 16, the U.N. Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was formally established.

1993

After several months of stalemate, President Chissano and Colonel Dhlakama of Renamo held talks in Mozambique, in which they agreed on a transition government to facilitate elections in October 1994.
INTRODUCTION

The civil war in Mozambique began in 1980 when Renamo (the Mozambique National Resistance Movement) embarked on a violent insurgency against the Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)-led government. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established in December 1992 upon the termination of the civil war, following the General Peace Agreement, signed in Rome, Italy, on October 4, 1992, by the Mozambique President and the President of Renamo.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

Upon independence on June 12, 1975, the government of Mozambique inherited a situation of economic chaos and political instability because of its Portuguese colonial legacy and regional geopolitics. South Africa, and earlier Rhodesia, supported Renamo’s insurgency because they felt threatened by the new Mozambican government’s Marxist policies, as well as its support for national liberation movements in the southern African region.

Renamo also opposed the government’s Marxist policies. With support from the South African Defence Forces (SADF), Renamo’s strategy was to take over the country’s 11 major provinces and disrupt the transportation and communication systems, in order to destabilize Mozambique’s development potential. The government then launched a counterinsurgency offensive against Renamo.

On October 4, 1992, following a debilitating 12-year civil
war, the government and Renamo signed a peace accord in Rome. Witnessed by the St. Egideo Community and international representatives, the Rome Accord signalled both parties’ commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The U. N. Response

The Rome Accord outlined the terms of a cease-fire agreement between the Frelimo and Renamo forces, their gradual demobilization, and prepared the ground for the detachment of a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping mission to monitor the situation. Several commissions were to be formed to implement the accord, which addressed such matters as election law, formation and recognition of political parties, funding, refugee problems and other internal population resettlement issues.

The accord also outlined the U.N.’s participation in monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the provision of technical and other monitoring assistance for the upcoming elections. Five days later, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on the proposed U.N. role in Mozambique. He recommended appointing an Interim Special Representative to oversee U.N. activities in the country. On October 13, Aldo Ajello of Italy was appointed Interim Special Representative for Mozambique, in line with Security Council Resolution 783 (1992). The dispatch of a team of up to 25 military observers was also approved.²

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 797 on
December 16, 1992 authorizing the establishment of ONUMOZ. The Resolution called on the government of Mozambique and Renamo to implement the terms of the October 4, 1992 peace agreement, particularly agreements concerning the cease-fire and deployment of their respective military forces. Prior to ONUMOZ’s establishment, on October 13, 1992, Security Council Resolution 782 established the initial U.N. peacekeeping presence in Mozambique to monitor and guarantee the peace agreement’s implementation.³

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

On October 15, 1992, 21 ONUMOZ military observers arrived in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. Five days later, two teams of military observers were deployed in the Nampula⁴ and Beira corridors. Two additional outposts were established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Zimbabwe and Malawi, in particular.⁵

Political and Military Goals

The General Peace Agreement between the Mozambique government and Renamo focused on political, military, electoral, and humanitarian goals.⁶ The political goals included guiding the peace process, carrying out the negotiated agreements specified in the Rome Accord, and administering the functions of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission.

The military goals included demilitarizing all armed forces and deploying troops in 49 pre-identified areas. These goals included maintaining the cease-fire between the government and
rebel forces, verifying the disbandment of "informal" groups,\(^7\) completing the withdrawal of foreign troops, and collecting, storing, and destroying weapons.

Upon completion of the military goals, the ONUMOZ was scheduled to facilitate the electoral and humanitarian mandates, under the supervision of the National Elections Commission and the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The U.N. mission was charged with administering, verifying, and supporting the execution of each mandate as outlined in the ONUMOZ charter. The U.N. Special Representative was charged with the management and coordination of all four elements of ONUMOZ’s operations, through the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission.

Rules of Engagement

The rules of engagement consisted of impartially facilitating the implementation of the October 1992 peace agreement, monitoring and verifying the cease-fire arrangements, monitoring the activities of the country’s new police force, providing liaison services to the parties, providing security for U.N. and other international non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) involved in implementing the peace process, and providing assistance to humanitarian relief efforts in the country.\(^8\) ONUMOZ military observers are lightly armed and were authorized to use weapons only in situations requiring self-defense.

Composition of Forces

U.N. Resolution 797 approved the assignment of 7,000 to 8,000 military and civilian personnel.\(^9\) The military component
included 354 military observers; five infantry battalions, each composed of up to 850 personnel; one engineer battalion; three logistics companies; a headquarters company; a movement control company; a communications unit; a medical unit; and an air unit.¹⁰

In addition to the Office of the Interim Special Representative, the personnel requirement for the elections and humanitarian operations would increase the overall size of ONUMOZ. Approximately 1,200 people would be required to monitor the election process.¹¹

The resettlement of Mozambican refugees and displaced persons entailed the services of ONUMOZ personnel in addition to other local and international organizations.

**Equipment**

The ONUMOZ mandate required various equipment, such as jeeps, mobile telecommunications systems, and helicopters. Weapons were standard equipment inasmuch as all of the infantry battalions consisted of armed soldiers.

**Training**

Drawn from existing U. N. peacekeeping operations, the military observers had previous training in conducting such activities. In the absence of language training and peacekeeping experience, rank-and-file troops received logistics training on site and their prior military experience was considered basic training for the operation.¹²

**Tactics**
ONUMOZ, as a peacekeeper, has focused mainly on cease-fire verification and negotiating an interim power-sharing accord between the contending sides. ONUMOZ’s mission called for securing the country’s transportation corridors, demobilizing all armed forces, and facilitating the creation of a restructured police force and a 30,000-member Mozambican army.

Cost

The annual cost of the ONUMOZ mission was $310 million in 1993. A Special Account was established to provide for the mission’s financing. Approximately $114 million in contributions to the mission’s budget was in arrears as of April 30, 1993.

Operational Assessment

ONUMOZ has striven in many ways to support the efforts of Renamo and the Mozambique government to implement the terms of the October 1992 peace accord. The uninterrupted tenure of the U.N. Special Envoy to Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, has been particularly helpful in this regard.

First, the peacekeeping process, fledgling during the first 12 months, has been holding since the cease-fire accords were implemented under the direction of the U.N.-monitored Cease-Fire Commission.

Second, ONUMOZ has survived its initial period of deployment. The 7,500-strong U.N. peacekeeping mission is now fully deployed, and troops from Bangladesh, Botswana, Italy, Uruguay, and Zambia are guarding the country’s major transport corridors. This action fulfills the Secretary-General’s mandate.
to prevent any disorder that could be exploited by armed irregulars pending the formation of the new unified armed forces.

Third, about 35 of the 49 confinement areas have been investigated and approved. These areas will be used to receive and disarm the government, Renamo, and other armed groups.

Fourth, a British training center in Nyanga (Zimbabwe) has been established and has begun receiving government and Renamo officers for training. The government has provided its 270-person requirement; Renamo’s full obligation, however, has not been met.16

Fifth, three countries (Canada, Britain, and the United States) have submitted proposals for removing mines for review and approval.

Sixth, ONUMOZ’s operation has been accompanied by few fatalities, indicating a desire for peace on the part of both government and Renamo forces.

Seventh, the ONUMOZ operation has smoothed the way for the resettlement of refugees.

Finally, the peace dividends promote economic redevelopment. The Beira, Tete, and Nampula corridors generate receipts from the transportation of food and material goods throughout the region. This post-civil war climate encourages foreign investment and facilitates national privatization efforts.

Future problems, however, are likely in a number of areas:

First, the ONUMOZ operation has met with numerous delays. U.N. budget delays and disputes between the government and Renamo
commission representatives have complicated the peace plan timetable.\textsuperscript{17} Six months after its initial deployment, only one-fifth of the operation was on site in Mozambique. This staffing was considered inadequate to verify complaints of cease-fire violations. Inadequate security forces to guard transportation corridors encouraged slow foreign troop withdrawal.

A British-financed training center in Nyanga, Zimbabwe threatened to close after five months to reduce its losses because the government and Renamo had not sent their full 270-officer requirement for training.

Second, the timetables for troop demobilization and national elections have been rescheduled. The new timetables have constrained ONUMOZ's mandate to complete its work before the October 1994 U.N. Security Council deadline.

Third, the mine removal operation has proved to be very extensive, with an estimated 2 million unexploded mines left in the country.\textsuperscript{18} This operation requires additional training and funding.\textsuperscript{19}

Fourth, because troop demobilization relates to the resolution of other issues still under dispute, ONUMOZ must proceed carefully because problems may arise that could undermine the entire peacekeeping process. In was not until the spring of 1993 that the government and ONUMOZ signed an accord outlining rules of engagement to be in effect during the peacekeeping and transition period until the upcoming elections.

Fifth, the resettlement process remains incomplete. It is
one of the largest refugee resettlement operations supported by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. More funding and resources are required to complete the process of national reintegration. Refugees are maintaining their pre-cease-fire residences until they are convinced that Mozambican peace can be sustained.

Finally, there is unease that ONUMOZ has been relegated by the U.N. Security Council to a secondary status in relation to other U.N. peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{20}

CURRENT SITUATION

On August 22, 1993, Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, and President Chissano held face-to-face talks in Mozambique. To expedite the October 1994 elections, they agreed to form a transition government. Several political conditions have also been addressed, such as the verification of the Trust Fund funding to subsidize newly formed political parties, the setting up by Renamo of headquarters in the capital of Maputo, the naming of Renamo-appointed assistants to each provisional governor, and agreement by the government to request a U.N. police contingent.\textsuperscript{21}

Signed in April 1993, an agreement between the government and ONUMOZ has provided a framework for further U.N. peacekeeping assistance.

Other political issues include how the state-controlled media will support Renamo and other political opposition parties during the transition period and pressure from external elements
to hasten the approval of the new electoral law for the October 1994 elections.

ONUMOZ has registered and demobilized government soldiers in the Maputo and Gaza provinces, but it is still uncertain when the formal and complete demobilization of government and Renamo forces will take place.

CONCLUSION

ONUMOZ has thus far proven to be a successful peacemaking operation. Peacekeeping progress, however, is stymied by the delay in demobilizing government and Renamo forces and other preconditions required to fulfill the October 1992 peace agreement. Nevertheless, the cease-fire has held so far, and Renamo and Frelimo, and other registered parties have continued to meet as part of the efforts to resolve the conflict.
Endnotes

1. In addition to the Frelimo and Renamo troops, other armed groups in Mozambique, numbering approximately 2,000, were to be demobilized.


4. Nampala, one of eleven provinces situated along the northeastern corridor, connects Nacala and Nampula railway service between the Indian Ocean and Malawi, Tanzania (in the east), Zambêzia Province to central Mozambique, and Beira railway corridor.

5. According to the July 30, 1993 issue of Africa Confidential, 34, No. 15, 3-5, Zimbabwe units left the Beira Corridor in mid-April; on June 9 Malawian troops left the Nacala Corridor.

6. Chissano and Dhklama signed a joint communiqué on July 10, 1990 and an agreement dated December 1, 1990. The communiqué and the agreement are important components of the General Peace Agreement.

7. Armed bandits who operate independently and the Naparamas (traditional militia) are armed groups not organized under Renamo or under government supervision.


10. Ibid.

11. More than 125 international and local support staff would supplement the election monitors.


Bibliography


--------, and Jarat Chopra. "Second Generation Multinational


317
United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA)

Selected Chronology

1989


1991

On September 14, the National Peace Accord (NPA) was concluded in South Africa between the governing National Party and the African National Congress (ANC).

1992

In June, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a report on South Africa.

On August 17, U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 772, authorizing the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). In September, an initial contingent of UNOMSA members was detached to South Africa and was deployed in all of the country’s eleven regions by the end of November.

1993

On December 7, the Transitional Executive Council, a multiparty, multiracial body, was installed to oversee preparations for the country’s April 27, 1994 parliamentary elections, based on universal suffrage.
INTRODUCTION

In September 1993 the first contingent of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) was deployed to assist in implementing the terms of the 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) to transform the country’s system of apartheid into a nonracial democratic society. The mission was authorized to remain in South Africa during the period of transition leading to the April 27-28, 1994 national and provincial elections, which were expected to usher in a five-year transitional government of national unity.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

The Initial Crisis

On December 13, 1991, the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly discussed the progress made by South Africa in negotiating a new constitution as part of the transition to a multiracial democratic political system. The assembly praised the September 14, 1991 National Peace Accord, which was concluded by the South African government, the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and other parties to usher in the post-apartheid era.

In response to the General Assembly statement, South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha said that it was encouraging that the U.N. was "at last recognizing important political developments in South Africa." Earlier, in November 1991, Botha had informed the Secretary-General that his government did not accept the premise that punitive sanctions against South Africa, in particular the
trade embargo, were required in the light of "real, profound and irreversible changes" there.²

ANC President Nelson Mandela, addressing the General Assembly on December 3, 1991, said that continued international pressure was necessary to encourage speedy movement toward ending apartheid. Sanctions should be lifted in phases that corresponded to actual progress being made within South Africa, he said. Two major phases would be the establishment of an interim government and the election of a new government based on a democratic constitution.³

These positive developments toward democracy and an end to apartheid in South Africa were disrupted on June 17, 1992, when armed whites randomly attacked residents of Boipatong and Slovo in the Johannesburg area and 39 people were killed. Mandela called off talks begun under the auspices of the National Peace Accord. On June 19, the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid said that it was "appalled" by the June 17 massacre and that the escalating violence in South Africa continued to demonstrate Pretoria's inability or unwillingness to end it.⁴

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged South African leaders to resume negotiations, but to no avail. Following talks in late June with South African leaders in Lagos, Nigeria and Dakar, Senegal, Boutros-Ghali noted a growing consensus for a U.N. role in talks on transitional arrangements leading to democratic rule in South Africa. The precise nature of that role, he said, would have to be defined in agreement with the parties
to those talks, known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), and the support of the Security Council would be required for the U.N. to play such a role.

In July, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali underlined his concern about the deteriorating situation in South Africa resulting from the June massacre. He stressed the need for strong international cooperation in ending the violence and helping to reach a political accord among South African political groups. According to the Special Committee Against Apartheid, the massacre "lent additional credence to the allegations that the violence was being orchestrated and aimed at disrupting ongoing efforts to foster a peaceful political process."

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

On August 17, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 772, authorizing Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to deploy U.N. observers in South Africa to help end the spiraling cycle of violence, the continuation of which, the council said, "would seriously jeopardize peace and security in the region." The resolution invited the Secretary-General to assist in strengthening the structures set up under the September 1991 NPA. Deployment of U.N. observers, the council stated, should be implemented by the Secretary-General "in such a manner and in such numbers as he determines necessary to address effectively the areas of concern noted in his report."

In addition to UNOMSA, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the British Commonwealth, and the European Community (EC),
were also requested by the major negotiating parties in South Africa to send observers.  

**DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

On September 9, 1992, the Secretary-General announced that 50 U.N. observers would be deployed in South Africa, in accordance with Resolution 772. An advance party of 13 observers arrived in South Africa on September 11, and set up the mission’s headquarters in Johannesburg. A regional office for the Natal/KwaZulu province, led by the Deputy Chief of Mission, was established in Durban. Upon UNOMSA's full deployment, the mission’s observers were posted in the country’s 11 regions: Natal/Kwazulu, Border/Ciskei, Wits/Vaal, Western Cape, Orange Free State, Northern Cape, Far Northern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Eastern Cape, and Western Transvaal.  

By the end of November, the U.N. observer mission was in full force and deployed in all eleven regions. The South African government, political parties, and other organizations were called upon to extend their full cooperation to the U.N. observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively.  

In early March 1994, it was announced that over 5,000 international observers would be used to monitor an estimated 10,000 polling stations, including 2,840 from the U.N., the Organization of African States (OAU), and the Commonwealth. To prepare the ground for the deployment of the observers, a Joint Operations Unit was established, chaired by the U.N.'s Chief of Mission, Angela King.
Political and Military Goals

UNOMSA’s political goal was to monitor the holding of the April 27-28, 1994 national and provincial elections, and to observe whether participants in the electoral campaign were allowed to follow the established principles and guidelines for marches and political gatherings. Free and fair elections constituted part of the ultimate goal of assisting the country’s progress toward full democracy. The mission was also authorized to cooperate with the NPA’s own conflict resolution bodies. Following the election, the mission was tasked with preparing a joint statement of the U.N., Commonwealth, OAU, and European Community (EC) regarding the fairness of the vote.

The mission’s military goal was to monitor the activities and conduct of the South African police and military services during the transition to democratic rule.

Rules of Engagement

As an observer mission, UNOMSA’s rules of engagement called for impartially monitoring the activities of the South African police and military forces, particularly during demonstrations and mass rallies, in addition to monitoring the holding of free and fair nonracial national elections. The mission’s observers were authorized to maintain informal contacts with the country’s political groupings at all levels. The observers were not authorized to carry arms.

Composition of Forces

Over 36 countries, including the United States and Britain,
sent representatives to observe the April 1994 elections.

UNOMSA’s size grew exponentially as South Africa prepared to hold the vote. Thus, in September 1993, UNOMSA consisted of more than 100 observers, while by March 1994, the number of observers from the U.N., the OAU, and the Commonwealth increased to 2,840. Other international organizations and countries sent an additional 2,160 international observers to monitor the polling stations.

**Equipment**

As an observer mission, UNOMSA personnel were unarmed. The observers were provided with ground vehicles, such as jeeps, as well as binoculars and medical supplies.

**Training**

The mission’s observers consisted of professionals with expertise in criminal law, political science, economics, election monitoring, human rights, security, policing, socioeconomic development, public diplomacy, human resource management, education, and administration.

**Tactics**

The election observers monitored demonstrations, marches, public meetings, and other forms of political activity, covering more than 8,500 political events and gatherings throughout South Africa during the period from August 1992 to September 1993. Informal contacts were maintained with most of the country’s political groupings and civic associations. The observers also monitored the activities and conduct of the country’s police and
military services during the transition to a nonracial democratic political system.

Cost

The cost of the mission, which was handled under the regular U.N. budget, was estimated at $13,121,300 from mid-September 1992 through December 1993. This amount included communications, travel, and operational costs.  

Operational Assessment

Tom Vraalsen of Norway was dispatched to South Africa on November 23, 1992, as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to assess the U.N. mission. After a 17-day trip, he reported on December 9, 1992 that the increased momentum toward resuming multiparty talks was a "hopeful sign." On December 22, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed "guarded optimism" about the success of the U.N. observer mission and the prospects for a negotiated settlement in South Africa. He noted that all parties appeared to agree in principle that multiparty negotiations were the only solution to resolving South Africa’s political problems. However, he pointed out, violence continued to be a feature of daily life in South Africa.  

CURRENT SITUATION

South African President F.W. de Klerk announced in December 1992 a timetable on the transitional process in South Africa that envisaged a full representative government of national unity in place no later than the first half of 1994. An agreement on multiparty negotiations was reached in September 1993, with the
Transitional Executive Council was inaugurated in December 1993. Nonracial, democratic national elections were scheduled to be held on April 27, 1994.

CONCLUSION

Given the complex political situation in South Africa, it would be unreasonable to expect that a small U.N. observer mission could have a significant impact on events there. Nonetheless, this mission sends a signal to political actors in South Africa of U.N. interest in their country’s future. It could pave the way for deeper and more extensive U.N. involvement in the future. In other words, limited as the objectives of UNOMSA are at present, they are significant and useful as a first step. Having observers on the spot in South Africa enables the U.N. to keep up with events there and to gain enough information to make measured decisions about future U.N. policy toward South Africa.
Endnotes


2. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


14. "10,000 Polling Stations for Election."

15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

Bibliography


United Nations Military Observer Group
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

Selected Chronology

1947

On August 14, India and Pakistan became independent dominions in accordance with the terms of Indian Independence Act of 1947.

1948

In January, India complained to the Security Council that Pathan tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, were invading Kashmir.

On January 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 39, creating a three-member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the dispute over Kashmir.

On April 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 47, thereby enlarging membership of the commission from three (Argentina, Czechoslovakia, and the United States) to five representatives (with Belgium and Canada now added). United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) received an indirect mandate from the resolution.

1949

On January 1, the cease-fire between India and Pakistan became effective.

On January 24, the first group of United Nations (U.N.) military observers arrived in Kashmir.

On July 18, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement, establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by observers.

1950

On March 14, the Security Council adopted Resolution 80 (1950), thereby terminating the UNCIP.

1951

On March 30, the Security Council, adopted Resolution 91 (1951), which formally "authorizes" UNMOGIP to continue to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir, replacing UNCIP, which was terminated the year before.
1965

In August, hostilities broke out along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, eventually spreading to the international border between India and Pakistan. The war lasted until September.

1971

On April 17, Bangladesh formally declared independence. On December 3, Pakistan launched preemptive air strikes against India, which supported Bangladesh. The following day India invaded East Pakistan. On December 16, Pakistani military surrendered to the Indian armed forces, and East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh.

On December 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 307 --thereby demanding a durable cease-fire remain in effect until all armed forces had withdrawn to their respective territories and to positions that fully respected the cease-fire line in Kashmir supervised by UNMOGIP.

On July 2, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement.
INTRODUCTION

The Kashmir territorial dispute between India and Pakistan ranks among one of the most vexing peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations (U.N.). The challenge for the successful resolution of the conflict over Kashmir is daunting not only because of the longevity of the problem but also because of the almost visceral reaction to the issue by both sides.

In August 1947, India and Pakistan gained independence from Britain, in accordance with a partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Under that scheme, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (referred to as Kashmir) was free to accede either to India or to Pakistan. The accession immediately became a matter of dispute between the two countries, and fighting broke out later that year.

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) began operations in January 1949 as part of the cease-fire arrangement between India and Pakistan ending the first war over Kashmir. UNMOGIP's predecessor organization, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), a group of observers established in January 1948 to observe and mediate the dispute while hostilities were ongoing, was disbanded in 1951 but provided the core of UNMOGIP. An administrative adjunct, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), was later created when war broke out again over Kashmir in 1965 and disbanded when the war ended.

Pakistan and India fought major wars in 1947-48 and in 1965,
and have engaged in many other border skirmishes over Kashmir. The countries approach the Kashmir problem from different perspectives. India is a predominantly Hindu country while Pakistan is predominantly Muslim. Hinduism has often been described as being more of a philosophy and encompassing way of life than a formal religion. Indian adherents of a secular state argue that Hinduism is more inclined toward a separation of church and state. Pakistanis maintain that according to Islamic law there is no such separation of church and state. Thus differences over how Pakistanis and Indians regard the social and political polity run deep and their arguments develop a religious coloration. These differences have been especially manifest in the principles they apply to defend their positions on Kashmir.

The argument used by India to justify its claim to Kashmir is that it is part of a multiethnic India. In this perspective, Kashmir was, and always will be, an integral part of India's cultural diversity. Furthermore, the fact that the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir—a mostly Muslim state—was persuaded to join India immediately after partition makes Kashmir a territory not subject to dispute.

The Pakistani claim to Kashmir is premised on the successful creation of an Islamic state based on what was to be called the "two nations" theory of Hindu and Muslim separatism. For the Pakistanis, the creation of a separate state based on shared religious identity is part of the "natural order" of events as would be the accession of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir to
Pakistan.

Fundamentalist thinking--Islamist in Pakistan and Hindu in India--is growing and has become strong enough to affect government decision making in both countries. Pakistani nationalists believe that India's retention of a Muslim-majority area such as Kashmir represents an assault on Muslim rights, while Hindu nationalists in India demand that India become a nonsecular Hindu state. In this view, Muslims who decided to stay in India after partition constitute a potential fifth column and a force supporting the secession of Kashmir. The struggle over Kashmir is thus seen as a prelude to the balkanization of the other states in India and the eventual breakup of the union. This perspective, which has gained much currency in the past few years in India, reduces the possible solution to the Kashmir problem to one of the state reasserting internal control over civil unrest--a direction that allows little recourse to international mediation.

PREPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The Kashmir problem had its genesis in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 when the Muslim League--the political party that represented most Muslims in India in the years preceding independence--espoused Mohammed Ali Jinnah's "two nations" theory, which argued for a permanent separation between Muslims and Hindus. This partition of India into two states was bitterly opposed by the predominantly Hindu Congress Party led by
Jawaharlal Nehru and Motilal Gandhi. The Congress Party and the Muslim League, which was led by Jinnah, were unable to agree on the terms for a draft constitution for a united independent India. As a result, in 1946 the British government declared its intention to grant dominion status to what became two separate nations—India and Pakistan.

To achieve partition, British India, Bengal, and the Punjab would have to be partitioned according to the principle of communal majority; the remaining princely states would be offered the chance to accede either to India or to Pakistan. Independence within the Commonwealth was granted to both countries in August 1947.

All but three of the more than 500 former princely states quickly acceded either to Pakistan or India. Under guidelines established with the aid of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British Viceroy of India, the states decided to join Pakistan or India after considering the geographic location of their respective states and the religious majority of the people of the state. Hyderabad, the most populous of the princely states and one with a Muslim plurality was surrounded by territory that would go to India. It and Junagarh (a small state with a Muslim prince but a Hindu majority) presented a problem. Both the governments hesitated, but their states were quickly absorbed into India. The status of the third state, Kashmir, was not resolved peacefully. Its indeterminate status has poisoned relations between South Asia’s two most powerful states for almost a half century.
Despite the overwhelming Muslim majority, following a period of indecision, Kashmir was ultimately pressured to join India. Pakistan immediately invaded Kashmir, with Indian forces occupying the eastern portions of the territory, including the capital, Srinagar.

The war, relatively modest in scale, was contained in Kashmir and ended on January 1, 1949, upon implementation of a truce agreement mediated by the Security Council-appointed UNCIP. The truce was soon followed by a bilateral accord between India and Pakistan (the Karachi Agreement) authorizing the establishment of a Cease-Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir and the presence of observers to monitor it. By November 1, 1949, this line was delimited and became one of the United Nation's (U.N.) earliest peacekeeping operations. The UNMOGIP was then charged with monitoring the cease-fire.

The U.N. Response

The issue of Kashmir was first broached by India in the Security Council in January 1948. India had complained that tribesmen, with active Pakistani encouragement, were invading Kashmir, resulting in extensive fighting. Pakistan denied India's charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India was illegal. That India first solicited U.N. intervention on the issue of Kashmir and thereby internationalized the issue is of considerable importance. By taking this action, in the view of many observers, India weakened its argument that the issue of accession must ultimately be settled bilaterally with Pakistan.
without the benefit of the U.N.-sponsored plebiscite conditions
to which it had originally agreed.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

On January 20, 1948, after extensive consultations between
the Security Council and the governments of India and Pakistan,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 39, which established the
three-member UNCIP. The resolution was passed 9-0, with the
Soviet Union and Ukraine abstaining. Although India and Pakistan
were consulted on the above resolution, serious disagreement
arose between the two governments regarding its implementation
--specifically, disagreement as to which country would constitute
the third member of the proposed commission. India nominated
Czechoslovakia, whereas Pakistan chose Argentina. The choice of a
third country, however, could not be agreed upon.

On April 21, 1948, the Security Council met to decide on
enlarging the membership of the commission from three to five
members (Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the
United States) and authorized the commission to establish “such
observers as it may require.”¹ Thus UNMOGIP received its mandate
indirectly. A military adviser to the commission was appointed to
organize and oversee the U.N. observers.²

On March 30, 1951, the Security Council decided by its
Resolution 91 to terminate UNCIP and replaced it with a U.N.
Representative.³ The Security Council also decided to separate
the responsibilities of UNMOGIP from those of the U.N.
Representative, whose responsibilities were primarily political.
The military adviser was then made Chief Military Observer (CMO). Henceforth, UNMOGIP operated as an autonomous operation led by the Military Observer who, in turn, served under the authority of the Secretary-General.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The UNCIP arrived in the subcontinent on July 7, 1948 and immediately consulted with Indian and Pakistani authorities. On July 20, the Secretary-General was asked to appoint a high-ranking officer to act as military adviser to the commission.

The cease-fire between India and Pakistan came into effect on January 1, 1949, and a first group of U.N. military observers arrived in the area on January 24, 1949. On July 18, 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by the observers of UNCIP. These observers, who initially included a Plebiscite Administrator, formed the nucleus of the UNMOGIP. When UNCIP did not achieve its goals of mediating in the Kashmir dispute and overseeing a plebiscite, it was disbanded in March 1950. Following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by Resolution 91 of March 1951, allowed UNMOGIP to continue to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir, which it has done to the present day.  

Political and Military Goals

UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed by the Chief Military Observer. UNMOGIP is charged with reporting and investigating complaints of cease-fire violations and is
supposed to submit its findings to both India and Pakistan as well as the Secretary-General. Throughout its existence, however, UNMOGIP has had to modify its agenda to accommodate new limitations imposed on it by changed circumstances in Kashmir.

In early August 1965, hostilities again broke out on a large scale along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and eventually spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The Security Council called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all forces to the positions held before the hostilities began. In Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Security Council was exercised by UNMOGIP. In addition, because the hostilities extended beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line, the Secretary-General established UNIPOM, an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of supervising the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the withdrawal of troops in 1966, UNMOGIP reverted to its original task, and UNIPOM was terminated.

At the end of 1971, full-scale hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan. By the time fighting had ended and a cease-fire had gone into effect, a number of military positions on both sides of the 1949 cease-fire line had changed hands. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir, which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the cease-fire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1949. At this juncture, India took the position that
the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed because it had related specifically to the cease-fire line under the Karachi Agreement and did not extend to the actual Line of Control that had come into existence in December 1971. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position. UNMOGIP continued, however, to pursue its peacekeeping activities but solely on the Pakistani side of the border.

Rules of Engagement

Political scientist Robert Wirsing succinctly described the limitations the UNMOGIP has been forced to operate under during the past two decades as "operating essentially—and dishearteningly—on one leg in Kashmir." The Karachi Agreement of 1949 had barred the strengthening of fortifications in the cease-fire zone, which was a 500-yard wide strip on either side of the line. Until their movement was significantly curtailed after implementation of the Simla Agreement in 1972, U.N. observers customarily visited both Indian and Pakistani forward pickets to confirm that no defenses had been strengthened or altered in this zone.

The bilateral Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan was signed in July 1972, following Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 that gave birth to Bangladesh. This agreement placed new restrictions on any attempts at international monitoring of the situation in Kashmir. UNMOGIP's Simla-imposed limitations on monitoring activities were multiple. Because a new Line of Control replaced the former cease-fire line
zone, the former 1,000-yard-wide zone effectively disappeared, changing the basis for the Karachi Agreement. Furthermore, military observers were denied access to the Line of Control except at three crossing points on the Indian side. The Pakistanis insisted that UNMOGIP continue to implement the monitoring activities sanctioned by the Karachi Agreement, but doing so was possible only on the Pakistani side. On the Indian side, the U.N. maintained a limited presence. U.N. officials stated that they know a great deal about Pakistani troop deployments but little about Indian deployment because of the forementioned limitations to their mobility. From the onset of the U.N. involvement in the India-Pakistan dispute, observers were under instructions not to engage directly in combat.

Composition of Forces

As of 1993, UNMOGIP has 38 observers from eight countries--Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Uruguay--deployed on both sides of the Line of Control that had been agreed upon by India and Pakistan in 1972. The observers are divided into two groups, one attached to each army, and are rotated periodically to prevent partisanship. UNMOGIP observers are headquartered from November to April in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and from May to October in Srinagar, India.

Equipment

Both India and Pakistan provide the U.N. observers with necessary transportation as well as food and lodging, making the units highly mobile, but quite dependent on the largess and

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goodwill of their hosts.

**Tactics**

Observers operate in teams of two and are attached to the various peacekeeping units as circumstances require. The number and location of the Field Observation Teams are determined according to need and sometimes at the request of either the Indian or the Pakistani army.

**Cost**

UNMOGIP is financed from the regular budget of the United Nations under the heading "Special Missions and Inquiries." The annual cost of the operation is about $7 million.⁷

**Operational Assessment**

The Kashmir dispute has changed in nature since 1948. U.N. peacekeepers have been challenged by three wars between India and Pakistan (1947-49, 1965, 1971), India's subsequent claim to the Siachin Glacier in northern Kashmir in 1984, and a Kashmiri separatist uprising that began in 1989. According to most assessments of the situation, the U.N. presence is today even less well equipped than it was more than four decades ago to find a successful resolution to the persistent problem of Kashmir.

UNMOGIP faces a conflict that has changed fundamentally. First, the problem of boundary delimitation is now much more complex. The original UNCIP-supervised Pakistani and Indian military teams, which had undertaken the delimitation exercises in 1949, stopped approximately 40 miles short of the Chinese border. This inaccessible area is now recognized for its
strategic importance and has become a sharply contested territory.

Second, a movement for Kashmiri self-determination that excludes both the Indian and Pakistani agenda is growing. Since 1989 UNMOGIP also has had to confront the increased tempo of events and heightened tensions in the Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir. The Indian army, which maintains three heavy divisions supported by large numbers of ill-trained and often unruly paramilitary forces, including the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force, has been unable to quash a rebellion that has had more success politically than militarily against India. By its heavy-handed actions in Kashmir, India has attracted the scrutiny of human rights groups worldwide; these investigations have increasingly given credence to Kashmiri complaints of Indian abuse. Although this uprising has been supported by Pakistan, the fact remains that many Kashmiris want their own state, separate from either India or Pakistan—a very unlikely eventuality.

Third, cross-border infiltration by militants has turned Kashmir into a battleground. The Kashmiri uprising has brought Indian charges of covert Pakistani support for insurgents. Although the Indian press has routinely exaggerated the number of infiltrators, termed Anti-National Elements from Pakistan, most third party observers agreed that Pakistan has maintained training camps in Azad Kashmir (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, according to India) and has offered material support to
insurgents fighting the Indian government.

The U.N. response to the changed circumstances of the Kashmir situation has been less than vigorous. On the Indian side, UNMOGIP is severely hampered in fulfilling its intended peacekeeping role, and on the Pakistani side its role is also somewhat circumscribed. With an observer group numbering less than 40 officers—by far the smallest U.N. peacekeeping mission in existence today—its resources are incommensurate with the scale of violations occurring. Political scientist Robert Wirsing has stated that the past two decades of peacekeeping in Kashmir have witnessed the “severe functional decline of UNMOGIP.”

CURRENT SITUATION

UNMOGIP is now operating under significant Simla Agreement-induced limitations. The bilateral 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan made no explicit reference to UNMOGIP. Yet, the Simla Agreement did not formally disestablish UNMOGIP. The role UNMOGIP plays today—serving neither as an effective agent of change nor as a defender of the status quo—is far vaguer now that the element of bilateralism—introduced by the Simla Agreement and espoused by India—has been brought into the equation.

UNMOGIP has continued its duty to observe cease-fire violations. Complaints continue to be lodged, but mainly on the Pakistani side. India, for its part, has not lodged a complaint since 1972. Still, India, which hardly acknowledges UNMOGIP, continues to provide accommodation, transport, and other
facilities to UNMOGIP. The Secretary-General’s position on UNMOGIP is that although it plays only a circumscribed role today, it will continue to be maintained with the same administrative arrangements as before unless it is terminated by a decision of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{8}

CONCLUSION

UNMOGIP is simply too small and has too many restrictions on its movement to be an effective force. UNMOGIP accomplished its original objective of overseeing a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. Since the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, however, the Kashmiri situation has changed substantially while the mandate under which the U.N. peacekeepers operate has not. For more than two decades, Pakistan has continued to report incidents to UNMOGIP, but India virtually ignores its presence, thereby undermining its significance. However, the argument can be made that a continued U.N. presence in this troubled area provides a useful signal of continuing international interest and concern, and acts as a restraint, albeit minor, to two now de facto nuclear countries at loggerheads over a very volatile and explosive issue.

Another important change in the Kashmir situation is that the conflict has increasingly become less of a contest between opposing armies and, on the Indian side, more of an internal conflict pitting the Indian army and police against a suppressed civilian population. This populace is supported by Pakistan in what has been called a “Kashmiri intifada” against India. The
extent to which Pakistan has militarily supported Muslim
militants in Kashmir has varied over the years, and the Indian
threat to retaliate for this support has increased in the last
few years.

Despite helping "keep a lid" on a potentially dangerous
situation, the U.N. mediation efforts have not progressed very
far, and the dispute remains far from resolution. India remains
adamant in its claim that Kashmir is an Indian territory; India
appears no longer willing, as it did in its early resolutions, to
entertain the idea of a plebiscite to determine the fate of
Kashmir.

The issue of Kashmir is deep-rooted for India and Pakistan.
The nearly half century of continuing violence indicates that
this conflict is more than a boundary dispute. The Kashmir
dilemma is acute for India because the dispute internationalizes
India's internal ethnic and religious differences and poses the
question of the survival of the Indian nation. For Pakistan,
Kashmir is symbolically central to its nationalist, military,
and Islamic identification. At present both countries have weak
governments that can be manipulated by ethnic or religious
pressure groups. In each country, any attempt at resolving the
Kashmir dispute that even hints at accommodating the opposing
view would mean political suicide. A tough nationalist stance on
the Kashmir issue is the safest political course to take in both
Pakistan and India. Only a strong government willing to take
major risks could make concessions significant enough to defuse
the Kashmir conflict.

Indian Prime Minister Rao in 1993 hinted at holding elections in Kashmir to determine its future, but at the same time sanctioned the presence of some 400,000 security troops that occupy the state. It is therefore not surprising that militant groups in Kashmir insist that only a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite will suffice. Even in this demand the Kashmiri militants are divided. Pro-Pakistani groups support carrying out the original U.N. resolutions, whose context was a choice between India or Pakistan, whereas groups such as the militant Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front seek an open plebiscite formula with a third option of independence.9

Much of Pakistan's position revolves around India's prior acceptance of the U.N.'s original resolution promising a plebiscite, yet Pakistan has not recognized the major changes that have taken place over the years, particularly in the military balance. India, on the other hand, believes it has to keep a sullen and predominantly Muslim Kashmir under its control in order to preserve its secularist ideology and demonstrate that its sizable Muslim minority population should remain within its domain. Furthermore, there is a reluctance to acknowledge a rising tide of Kashmiri self-determination that eschews accession to either India or Pakistan.

U.N. involvement in the Kashmir issue is important, but to be effective, it must be redefined. It is important because no proposal that has relied on bilateral instruments of conflict
management between India and Pakistan has ever worked. Most Pakistanis view the bilateral Simla Agreement--signed in the wake of its defeat over Bangladesh--as a document that codifies its defeat and submission to Indian regional hegemony. An international effort at mediation is probably the only course of action that can realistically resolve this long-standing issue.\textsuperscript{10}
Endnotes

1. Iftikhar H. Malik, "Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian Politics: The Kashmir Conflict As A Case Study," Malik, Round Table, 322, 207-8.


3. Ibid., 277-83.

4. Ibid., 278.


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United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)

Selected Chronology

1828-36

First Dutch settlement in West New Guinea (known to Indonesia as West Irian or Irian Barat).

1896

Permanent Dutch settlement reestablished in West New Guinea.

1945

On August 17, Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands.

1949

In November, the Netherlands government agreed to the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the independence of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. On December 27, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the Indonesian archipelago, but not the territory of West New Guinea, to Indonesia.

1950

On August 17, federal states dissolved into the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

1956

In May, Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and in August repudiated its international debt to the Netherlands.

1957

Labor and trade unions seized Dutch property and businesses, turning them over to military control. A number of Dutch nationals were expelled from Indonesia; approximately 40,000 Dutch nationals departed Indonesia.

1960

On August 17, Indonesia broke diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in the continuing dispute over claims to Dutch rule over West New Guinea.
1961

On January 15, at a news conference in Washington, President Kennedy declared that he favored United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General U Thant's efforts to prevent a Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West New Guinea.

On June 10, documents, reportedly providing for a continuation of Soviet arms aid to Indonesia, were signed in the Kremlin by defense ministers Abdul Haris Nasution of Indonesia and Rodion Y. Malinovsky of the Soviet Union.

On August 17, Indonesian President Sukarno threatened to use military force to annex West New Guinea, but also offered to negotiate with the Netheralnd for the territory's transfer to Indonesian rule.

On September 26, Foreign Minister Joseph M.A.H. Luns of the Netherlands declared that the Dutch government was prepared to offer a settlement in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea on the basis of a new concept in "decolonization"; it was ready to give control of West New Guinea to the U.N.

In December, President Sukarno stated that he was ready to "mobilize" his country for a military struggle against the Netherlands and began to infiltrate guerrilla fighters into the disputed territory.

1962

On January 2, Netherlands Prime Minister Jan Eduard de Quay told the Dutch parliament that his government had dropped its demand that Indonesia accept the principle of self-determination for the Melanesians as a precondition for talks over the disputed lands.

Netherlands Prime Minister de Quay told the Dutch parliament that Dutch forces had killed 22 Indonesian paratroopers in West New Guinea and had captured 119 others. On May 28, Dutch forces reported their troops had "isolated" all Indonesian paratroopers in West New Guinea.

Following a June 16 meeting between U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and U.N. Representative C.W.A. Schurmann of the Netherlands, Sukarno was notified on June 17 that the Netherlands had accepted in principle U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's plan for settling the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

On June 24, Dutch military headquarters in Hollandia (later known as Jayapura) announced that an estimated 150-200 Indonesian paratroopers had been dropped near Merauke in West New Guinea.
At a July 31 meeting, Dutch and Indonesian negotiators agreed on a plan giving Indonesia full administrative control over West New Guinea by May 1, 1963; the territory would be administered by the U.N. until then.

On August 15, U Thant appointed Brigadier General Indar Jit Rikhye of India to head an observation team to supervise the cessation of hostilities in West New Guinea. A military truce between Dutch and Indonesian forces went into effect on August 17.

On September 4, the United Nations Security Force's (UNSF) commander, Major General Saad Uddin Khan, of Pakistan, arrived in West New Guinea to assume control over the UNSF. By the end of November, six military units had been deployed.

U Thant appointed Chief of Cabinet Jose Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala as the temporary Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and UNSF.

On October 5, the UNSF, composed of 1,500 men, mostly from Pakistan, took up their positions in the disputed territory.

On October 19, Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed to select Dr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran as the permanent U.N. administrator for West New Guinea.

1963

In March, diplomatic relations were restored between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Full administrative control over West New Guinea, renamed Irian Barat or West Irian, was transferred to Indonesia by the U.N. administration on May 1, 1963. The U.N. contingent was completely withdrawn. Indonesia agreed to hold a plebiscite, the "Act of Free Choice."

On October 21, U Thant reported that he had established a U.N. fund for the economic and social development of West Irian.

1968

As required by the 1962 agreement, U Thant appointed Fernando Ortiz-Sanz to participate in monitoring the "Act of Free Choice" administered by Indonesia.

1969

By August 2, the representative councils of West Irian had voted unanimously to remain with Indonesia. West Irian became Indonesia's twenty-sixth province.

On November 19, the U.N. General Assembly proclaimed that
the tasks assigned to U Thant under the August 15, 1962 agreement had been fully implemented.

1972

Name of Irian Barat changed to Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian) to avoid charges of territorial aggrandizement over "Irian Timur" (East Irian), the U.N. trusteeship territory of Papua, New Guinea, then moving toward independence.
INTRODUCTION

When the Indonesian nationalist leadership, under the direction of Sukarno, proclaimed the independence of the unitary Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, it intended to assert its authority over all the territories historically incorporated within the boundaries of the Netherlands Indies. This area included West New Guinea (West Irian), which since 1828 had been considered part of the Netherlands Indies. The dispute over the future of West New Guinea arose largely as a result of a larger conflict that quickly developed between Dutch and Indonesian nationalists. The Dutch were well aware that extensive changes were needed because the former status quo in the Netherlands Indies could not be restored after World War II. The Dutch government thought of creating a larger commonwealth of nations, similar to the British model, in which the Netherlands would continue to play the dominant role. With the emergence of the Republic of Indonesia and the incompatibility of Indonesian demands and Dutch objectives, the idea of separating various segments of the former Netherlands Indies, including West New Guinea, and incorporating them into the Indonesian Republic began to materialize.

In the midst of warfare between Indonesia and Dutch forces, a series of conferences were held to discuss the future of the archipelago, but no definitive agreements were reached. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) was established in 1947 to mediate the dispute, and on December 27, 1949, the
Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the Indonesian archipelago to the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia, but West New Guinea was not included in the transfer and the issue remained unresolved. The deadlocked dispute was finally broken when the Dutch and Indonesian governments mutually agreed to the UNCI proposal to continue Dutch rule for one year, during which its future status would be resolved by further negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Unfortunately, the issue became bogged down, and the deadlock continued for several additional years. In heated public debates before the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly between 1954 and 1957, Indonesian representatives accused the Netherlands of reneging on the 1949 Netherlands-Indonesian Union, which recognized the independence of Indonesia and agreed to hand over West New Guinea to Indonesia after one year. The Netherlands, on the other hand, insisted that Indonesia was calling for total capitulation and was not engaged in constructive negotiations. Finally, when the 1961 U.N. General Assembly failed to settle the dispute, the Indonesian government, impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations, decided to take direct military action by infiltrating guerrilla fighters into West New Guinea. This case study examines the origins of the dispute in West New Guinea (West Irian, or, in Indonesian, Irian Barat), the internal dynamics leading to the detachment of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and the United Nations Security Force (UNSF), and the effectiveness of the UNSF deployment.
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

At the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, the debate revolved around a proposal advanced by the Dutch Permanent Representative, C.W.A. Schurmann, to place the territory of West New Guinea under a U.N. trusteeship, subject to the condition that the rights of the Melanesian (or Papuan) population to ultimate self-determination be suitably guaranteed. The Netherlands maintained that the Melanesians of West New Guinea were an ethnically and culturally unique racial group, distinct from the Indonesian majority of the East Indies archipelago, and thus had a moral and political right to self-determination. Thirteen African states, led by Ambassador Omar Adeel of Sudan, presented a draft resolution calling for the free-expression of self-determination by the people of West New Guinea. Although the African group was unable to garner the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the resolution in the General Assembly, it managed to obtain the support of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, most of Latin America, and the non-Arab African states.¹

A counter-proposal, submitted by Indonesia and vehemently supported by India, which at this time had its own plans of annexing the Portuguese colony of Goa, rejected the principle of self-determination and accused the 13 African states supporting the plebiscite of being accomplices to "the colonial powers' well-known policy of 'divide and rule.'"² With the General
Assembly once again unable to resolve the dispute and military clashes escalating, Prime Minister Jan Eduard de Quay of the Netherlands announced that the Dutch government was abandoning its insistence on self-determination as a precondition for new negotiations with Indonesia. Sukarno demanded that the administration of the territory be turned over to Indonesia, but conceded that Indonesia might give "eventual" self-determination to the Melanesians if it could administer the territory in the meantime.³

The Dutch government, realizing that by this time it had lost much of its U.S. support, decided to "cave in." The United States, deeply engaged in the affairs of Asia and caught up in a worldwide confrontation with communist countries, was concerned about the future development of Indonesia along lines not antithetical to the larger American position and national interests in the area. The U.S. government feared that escalation of the military situation in West New Guinea into a major international crisis would strengthen the position of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and drive the country to join the communist bloc in search of support and material assistance, especially from the Soviet Union. In fact, in 1961, Indonesia signed a $400 million arms contract for the delivery of Soviet jets, bombers, and submarines.⁴ The massive scope of Soviet assistance was encouraging a growing dependence on communist sources, especially for arms. It was clear that Soviet diplomacy was skillfully fostering a major reorientation of Indonesia's
international position through support of Jakarta's foreign policy objectives, as in West New Guinea, and by the apparent generosity of its aid programs. With the failure of the 16th U.N. General Assembly to assume temporary control over West New Guinea and the military situation escalating to near-dangerous levels, the prospect of an all-out war persuaded U.S. President John F. Kennedy to take a more active and visible role in resolving the dispute.

The U.N. Response

With fighting escalating to new levels in late 1961 and early 1962, both Acting Secretary-General U Thant and President Kennedy became alarmed at the deteriorating situation in West New Guinea. At about the same time that the United States was undertaking a more decisive role in searching for a peaceful solution, U Thant intervened actively in the dispute, lending the prestige and power of his office. With United States assistance, he arranged a meeting between Indonesian and Dutch permanent representatives to the U.N. to accept former U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as a neutral mediator to work out a solution acceptable to both parties. On June 17, 1962, U Thant informed Sukarno that the Netherlands had accepted in principle Bunker's plan for settling the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea. A formal agreement turning the administration of Netherlands New Guinea over to Indonesia on May 1, 1963—following temporary U.N. control of the territory starting October 1, 1962—was signed by Dutch and Indonesian

Under the terms of the agreement, by the end of 1969 Indonesia was to arrange a U.N.-supervised plebiscite known as the "Act of Free Choice," in which the territory's 700,000 indigenous inhabitants, mainly Melanesians, acting through their tribal leaders, would decide whether to remain with Indonesia or sever their ties. The agreement provided for a truce between Dutch and Indonesian forces to take effect on August 17, 1962.

The Dutch-Indonesian agreement was accompanied by an exchange of letters in which the Netherlands and Indonesian governments resumed diplomatic relations, which had been broken on August 17, 1960. The agreement was signed by Indonesian foreign minister Subandrio and two Dutch officials—Jan Herman Van Roijen, ambassador to the United States, and the U.N. Permanent Representative C.W.A. Schurmann. U Thant and Ambassador Bunker attended the ceremonies. Bunker's proposals formed the basis for the settlement, and he acted as mediator in the discussions on U Thant's behalf.

The compromise called for administration of the territory to be transferred from the Netherlands to the UNTEA under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General provide a UNSF to assist UNTEA in its peacekeeping operations.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

After considering Secretary-General U Thant's reports, the
U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 89 to 0, with 14 abstentions and 5 absentees, adopted Resolution 1752 (XVII) on September 21, 1962 establishing the UNSF. Most of those who abstained were delegates to the Brazzaville group, comprised of former French colonies in Africa. Upon adopting the resolution, U Thant appointed Chief of Cabinet Jose Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala as temporary administrator of the UNSF for a period of approximately six weeks. On October 22, 1962, under Article IV of the agreement, U Thant replaced Administrator Rolz-Bennett with Djalal Abdo of Iran as permanent U.N. administrator.

**DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

To arrange an immediate ceasefire and facilitate the arrival of UNTEA and UNSF personnel in West New Guinea, U Thant designated his military adviser, Brigadier General Indar Jit Rikhye, to lead an advance observation party to supervise the cessation of hostilities. The observation team, stationed at four main centers and headquartered in Hollandia (later renamed Jayapura), arrived on August 20, 1962, and consisted of 21 military representatives recruited from six member states—Brazil, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria, and Sweden. Upon completion of their mission on September 21, 1962, they were replaced by the permanent UNSF, headed by UNSF Commander Major General Saad Uddin Khan of Pakistan.6

**Political and Military Goals**

The U.N. operation in West New Guinea was charged with a number of functions, including peace-observation and
peacekeeping. It observed the implementation of the cease-fire agreement among the respective countries, prevented military clashes that might endanger the security of the Dutch-Indonesian forces, and restored law and order by forming a police force. UNTEA’s political functions were providing for full administration of the disputed territory, informing the population of the eventual transfer of powers, preparing the inhabitants for self-determination, and advancing the status of education among the population. The U.N. mission also performed other roles in West New Guinea’s internal and external affairs.

Rules of Engagement

The UNSF’s rules of engagement entailed the posting of military observers in the main towns and districts to oversee and deter any attempts to violate the cease-fire and to prepare the outlying communities for the smooth transfer of power. The six military units comprising the UNSF were under the command of Major General Saad Uddin Khan of Pakistan. They were not to be dispersed throughout the countryside, but instead were to be deployed in the major port towns and instructed to remain in their garrisons on call for any emergencies.

Composition of Forces

At maximum strength, the UNSF consisted of 1,608 personnel from five nations, including a U.S. Air Force transport unit composed of 99 officers and enlisted men, and a Royal Canadian Air Force flying and maintenance crew of 12 members. The bulk of the UNSF was composed of approximately 1,500 army and navy
personnel from Pakistan, who also provided engineers, supply personnel, signal corps, and other support units. In addition, the UNSF was supplemented by a military contingent of approximately 1,500 men from the Papuan (West Irian) Volunteer Corps, the civil police, Netherlands forces awaiting repatriation, and troops of the Indonesian armed forces. One month before the Republic of Indonesia took over the administration of West New Guinea, the U.S. presence decreased to 49 personnel and the Canadian contingent, whose primary task was largely logistical—transporting men and equipment from Biak, an island off the northern coast of New Guinea, to Fakfak on the main island—decreased to 11 members.  

Equipment

Because the primary function of the UNSF was to supplement the existing police force in maintaining law and order in West New Guinea, the officers and enlisted men were lightly armed. Ground transportation equipment was limited but included some light vehicles and trucks left by the departing Dutch forces. The UNSF air detachment unit stationed at Biak consisted of four United States Dakota DC-3s and six light helicopters from the Thirteenth US Task Force for the Far East, and two amphibious Twin Otters from the Royal Canadian Air Force. The aircraft were used primarily for reconnaissance flights, troop transport, daily patrols, and air support missions. Although some initial mechanical problems were encountered with the aircraft, the planes proved well-suited for the operations and few incidents.
Training

The 21-member group comprising Brigadier General Rikhye's observation team had been assembled largely from existing U.N. operations, with the majority having obtained training and other peacekeeping experience in the Congo and the Middle East. With the exception of the Indonesian infiltrators, who had been incorporated into the UNSF by agreement, the U.S., Canadian, and Pakistani units, together with the Dutch-trained Melanesian soldiers and the nonrepatriated Dutch forces, were all well-trained and experienced personnel.9

Tactics

Because the strategic aim of the U.N. operation was to provide law and order in the disputed territory, the tactics consisted of immediately notifying the rebel Indonesian troops—dispersed deep throughout the jungles—of the cessation of hostilities. With aerial support provided by U.S. and Canadian crews, the U.N. observers helped resupply the ailing and starving Indonesian rebel forces with food and medicine and regrouped them in select areas for better access. U.N. aircraft provided supplies and equipment in four staging areas: Sarong, Fakfak, Kaimana, and Merauke.10 By the end of 1962, six military battalions of the UNSF had been deployed, one in each of the major administrative areas. The personnel remained in their compounds, on call for emergencies, and were not dispersed throughout the countryside. By 1963, direct radio links between
field headquarters at Hollandia and Jakarta had been established.

Cost

Under the terms of the August 15, 1962 agreement, the governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands each agreed to reimburse the U.N. for all costs "incurred by that organization and to make funds available in advance for the discharge of Secretary-General's responsibilities." The parties agreed also to share on an equal basis the costs of such reimbursements and advances. By early September 1962, each country had contributed $1 million; each country advanced another $5 million apiece by early November 1962. The total cost of the 1962-63 UNSF operation was $26.4 million, of which Indonesia and the Netherlands each contributed about $13 million.

Operational Assessment

Within the terms of its mandate, the UNTEA and the UNSF were considered successful operations. The mission's successes included:

First, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's ability to formulate and direct the peacekeeping operation on a short schedule. His leadership reflected the competence of the U.N. organization and its personnel.

Second, the UNSF's stabilization of a potentially dangerous military situation within a relatively short period of time. Functioning as a internal law and security force, the UNSF supervised the staggered withdrawal of Dutch naval and land forces from the territory without any major incidents.
Third, a U.N. mission's assumption of complete temporary administrative control over a disputed territory under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General for the first time in its history. The departure of the Dutch civilian administration and the lack of Papuan replacements had left a dangerous social vacuum. Administrator Rolz-Bennett quickly recruited international, as well as Indonesian and Dutch personnel, to immediately replace the administrative gaps. The territory's judicial bodies were quickly replaced with qualified judicial officers from the Republic of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{13}

Fourth, the UNSF's successful use of a single security force for peacekeeping operations; the UNSF consisted largely of a Pakistani contingent.

Fifth, addressing the massive economic and social issues confronting the territory. With the departure of Dutch personnel and a lack of qualified Papuan workers and technicians, unemployment was high. UNTEA reactivated work on existing community projects and public works, and formulated plans for similar projects to develop the economy in the territory. In the field of public health, the UNTEA administration not only pursued the construction of community health clinics, centers, and hospitals, but also embarked on a successful drive to address regional epidemiological problems by providing valuable health teams and necessary medical supplies.

Sixth, instituting a campaign to prepare the indigenous population for the eventual transfer of powers to Indonesia and
educating it about the provisions of the agreement by distributing posters, pamphlets, texts, and creating discussion groups.

Seventh, using aerial support provided by U.S. and Canadian air crews to successfully conduct an ambitious campaign to locate and resupply Indonesian troops dispersed throughout the jungle with food and medicine. In addition, 500 Indonesian political detainees were repatriated to Indonesia.

The UNTEA mission also had some failures:

First, the U.N.'s primary objective—the right of the people of the territory of West New Guinea to exercise their freedom of choice in self-determination—was a dismal failure. Indonesia, and not the U.N., arranged for the Melanesian population to participate in the act of self-determination.

Second, instead of a truly "free" plebiscite, the choice was put to specially designated delegates who voted unanimously in favor of Indonesian rule.

CONCLUSION

On initial examination, the resolution of the West New Guinea conflict by the U.N., if evaluated strictly in terms of the successful maintenance of peacekeeping operations, must be declared an unqualified success. The rapid cessation of hostilities and the relatively smooth transfer of full administrative control from Dutch to Indonesian authorities, completed without any major incidents and a minimum of violence, is a tribute to U.N. leadership. Moreover, the close financial
cooperation among the warring parties in equally sharing the peacekeeping expenses, Secretary-General U Thant's determination to handle personally the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions, and the timely formation of a U.N. military force demonstrated the unique competence of the U.N. peacekeeping organization, its personnel, and their procedures.

However, because of the broad and extra-dimensional tasks assumed by UNTEA forces, the resolution of the West New Guinea dispute cannot be judged solely on the basis of the results of the UN operation. From a long-range view, the resolution must be viewed as a failure because it did not achieve the objective of upholding the principles of international law.\textsuperscript{14} By allowing Indonesia the responsibility of implementing the self-plebiscite rule, and by extending the issue until 1969, the U.N. de facto relinquished its authority and made it possible for Indonesia to achieve the "right decision" in the final plebiscite.\textsuperscript{15}

Fear of a power vacuum led the U.S. administration to pressure the Dutch authorities to appease Indonesian aspirations for fear of a rise in communist influence. For reasons of political expediency and fears of being entangled in a long and bloody war, the U.S. government did not provide any political or military support to the Netherlands to prevent the infiltration of Indonesian guerrilla forces into West New Guinea.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, by casting Ambassador Bunker in the role of "U.N. observer" rather than "U.S. mediator," the U.S. was exercising its own policy of realpolitik and promoting its own national
interests at the expense of the U.N. organization. At the time, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut and Representative John J. Rhodes of Arizona agreed with Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania that the episode was a "sellout of West New Guinea" and of genuine "self-determination" inasmuch as the U.N. was rewarding aggression by giving its consent to a solution imposed outside the U.N., in disregard of the U.N. Charter.
Endnotes


2. Ibid., 77-78.

3. Ibid., 78.


6. Ibid., 291.

7. Ibid., 291.


12. Ibid., 289.


14. Ibid., 419.


16. Ibid., 78.

17. Ibid., 80.

18. Ibid., 80.
Bibliography


United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia

Selected Chronology

1941

In April, Norodom Sihanouk, then aged 18, succeeded his grandfather as monarch.

1945

In March, the Japanese sweep defeated the Vichy French administration in Cambodia and induced Prince Sihanouk to proclaim independence. The Japanese remained in control until their defeat by France, which reimposed its authority.

1953

On November 9, Cambodia attained independence.

1955

In March, King Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father in order to enter the political arena. Now known as Prince Sihanouk, he formed a political movement, the Popular Socialist Community (Sangkum Riastre Niyum).

1960

In April, the Parliament elected Prince Sihanouk as Head of State.

1970

In March, Prince Sihanouk was deposed in a coup led by Lieutenant General Lon Nol.

1975

In April, the Khmer Rouge, or Party of Democratic Kampuchea, began its rule, which ended in January 1979.

1991

On October 23, the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed in Paris.

By December, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNMIC)—composed of 300 men—was in place in Cambodia.
1992

On February 28, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established by Security Council Resolution 745.

On October 13, the Security Council demanded that the Khmer Rouge allow UNTAC troops to deploy in areas under its control.

On November 30, the Security Council determined that preparations for May 1993 elections would proceed in all areas to which UNTAC had full and free access as of January 1993.

In March, UNTAC began operations.

1993

From May 23 to 28, elections were held in all 21 provinces, and the royalist party, known as Funcinpec, emerged with a plurality, joining the Phnom Penh government in forming the joint interim government, with representatives of the former Khmer People's Front as junior partners.¹

On June 15, the Security Council, in Resolution 840, endorsed the results of the elections to secure a peaceful transition to democracy.
INTRODUCTION

Cambodia has a particularly painful and troubled history. A former protectorate of France (dating from 1864), it has been in a state of protracted armed struggle since it was invaded in World War II by the Japanese. When the country was granted independence from France in 1953, Cambodia's leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk—who abdicated the throne to become head of state—sought to keep his country neutral in an effort to avoid being caught up in the war that engulfed neighboring Vietnam and Laos in the 1960s. This proved impossible, however. By 1970 Cambodia could no longer escape the effects of the war in Vietnam and began enduring repeated border incursions by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.

Cambodia soon found itself in the throes of a civil war. In the spring of 1975, only a few weeks after the communist victory in neighboring Vietnam, the communist Khmer Rouge took over the country. The victors, under Prime Minister Pol Pot, proceeded to impose what is considered one of the most genocidal regimes in history. It eventually claimed more than 1 million Cambodian lives. This period came to an end in 1979, following a full-scale invasion and occupation by Vietnam. A new government in Phnom Penh under Hun Sen was installed by the Vietnamese army. For the next twelve years, a coalition that included the ousted Khmer Rouge and two non-communist resistance groups continued to wage a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese-backed government. The combination of Khmer Rouge brutality, the Vietnamese invasion,
and the ensuing years of fighting produced a refugee population of more than 500,000. Resistance guerrilla groups continued their struggle against the Vietnamese-backed government until October 1991, when all the parties agreed to the terms of a United Nations (U.N.)-sponsored peace agreement.

This chapter examines efforts by the U.N. to establish basic democratic institutions and principles in a country best known for its "killing fields." Emphasis is placed on the factors leading up to the detachment of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC), the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation in the country in light of the operation's goals.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

The Vietnamese-supported government in Phnom Penh was resisted by the Khmer Rouge and other noncommunist groups and thus gained little legitimacy. In 1983, former Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk formed the Cambodian National Resistance, which joined two noncommunist guerrilla armies--Sihanouk's National Army of Independent Kampuchea and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front--in an uneasy alliance with the Khmer Rouge. It had, however, become clear by the late 1980s that neither the government nor the resistance coalition had sufficient military strength to prevail. In February 1989, the resistance called for a U.N. peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from the country, to oversee
national elections, and to supervise the creation of a new integrated national military force. When Vietnam pulled out its remaining 50,000 troops in 1989, a power vacuum ensued with the potential for civil war. U.N. action was critical in defusing a potential armed struggle in the country.

The U.N. Response

The U.N. Security Council concluded that the time had come to intercede in the Cambodian quagmire because of a number of factors. These included the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the collapse of many communist regimes, the Soviet Union's unwillingness or inability to support its client states, and certain other domestic and military developments in Cambodia.

The window of opportunity for U.N. action in Cambodia was narrow, however. In 1991, there was little likelihood that Prime Minister Hun Sen's Phnom Penh government and the three resistance factions opposing it could find common cause toward a lasting peace. Yet by late 1990, Vietnam, which had created and continued to support the Phnom Penh government, and China, patron of the Khmer Rouge and their two resistance coalition partners, had begun to normalize their relationship. By June 1991, the Khmer Rouge, the most rigid of the factions, had concluded that it was stalemated on the battlefield, could not count on continued Chinese support, and that it was time to compromise and join its two coalition partners in seeking rapprochement with Phnom Penh.

A meeting of the Phnom Penh government with the three resistance factions in the Thai resort of Pattaya, later in June,
provided the opening toward a peace agreement. China’s acquiescence in giving Sihanouk a free hand to force the factions, including the Khmer Rouge, to compromise provided the impetus needed for the peace process. The four factions met under the auspices of the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC consisted of six Phnom Penh delegates and two delegates each from the three resistance factions. The SNC was designed as a Cambodian sovereignty forum to give each faction a say in the country’s political developments in the period preceding the U.N.-supervised election. Sihanouk was its leader and spokesman.

The U.N. policy planners hoped that the SNC would be the sole repository of Cambodian sovereignty during this period. The SNC format was first suggested by Australia and introduced by the Security Council as part of its plan in late 1990.

The SNC agreed to continue the cease-fire and prevent all foreign military supplies from entering the country. This meant ending the shipment of arms from the Soviet Union and Vietnam to the Phnom Penh government, and from China to the resistance. A second SNC meeting in August, also at Pattaya, and a third meeting shortly thereafter in New York completed the compromise process. Finally, the last obstacle to signing the U.N.-brokered agreement—the voting method in the upcoming elections—was resolved.

Adoption of U.N. Resolution

The four factions of the SNC and representatives from 19 nations, grouped under the Paris International Conference on
Cambodia, met in Paris on October 23, 1991 to sign the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (also known as the Paris Agreement). The agreement represented the efforts of more than a decade of negotiations in which the U.N. had been closely involved from the outset. Under the guidelines set up by the Paris Agreement, the Security Council was invited to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his proposed implementation plan. The Council approved that report and, by Resolution 745 of February 28, established UNTAC under its authority for a period not to exceed 18 months. UNTAC began operations on March 15, 1992.

**DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

The Paris Agreement was signed on October 23, 1991. It called for a transformation of Cambodia's political system. Because of the magnitude of the peacekeeping operation and its ad hoc nature, the U.N. faced a number of initial problems. A staffing shortage delayed the implementation of the operational plan. Second, information for determining the location of troop deployments and manpower requirements was scarce. Data became available only in December. There also were logistical and provisioning obstacles. Meanwhile, UNTAC was expected to be in place by August 1992. As an interim measure, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), comprising 300 persons, was
in place by the end of 1991. UNAMIC included 40 communications
officers charged with linking the headquarters of all four
factions, 50 military liaison officers to resolve cease-fire
violations, and a 20-person mine awareness team to train
civilians to avoid and report land mines.

In early 1992, the U.N. mission remained in the planning
stage. UNAMIC was only a preliminary force. The full
peacekeeping contingent was still needed. Continued delay in the
deployment of the main body of peacekeepers, it was feared, would
threaten UNTAC's authority. As the period of official transition
approached, the situation in the country deteriorated. Armed
deserters from various factions turned to banditry, government
corruption increased, and the police became unruly and predatory.

By the end of February 1992, UNTAC's mission was ready to be
deployed. The first U.N. troops arrived in Phnom Penh in
mid-March 1992. These forces included 10,200 troops in infantry
battalions and 12,000 other military and civilian personnel.²

Political and Military Goals

The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was not meant to
be a permanent mission. It had a specific objective and a limited
time frame. Above all, UNTAC was entrusted with organizing
general elections—the focal point of the comprehensive
settlement in Cambodia. Voter registration, which began on
October 5, 1992 and ended on January 31, 1993, accommodated more
than 4.6 million Cambodians. UNTAC's mandate also dealt with
human rights, military arrangements, civil aviation, law and
order, the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, and the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure during the transitional period.

UNTAC's mission was all encompassing. The 1991 Paris Agreement empowered UNTAC to police a cease-fire, repatriate refugees, organize elections, create an interim government, oversee key government ministries, remove Cambodian officials from office, manage the economy, rid the country of tens of thousands of land mines, and install its own communication system. In short, UNTAC was mandated to take over the government--thereby constituting a nation-building mission as well as a peacekeeping one.

Rules of Engagement

UNTAC's rules of engagement resulted from the effort to establish a politically neutral environment conducive to holding free and fair elections. As part of its human rights responsibility, mission personnel were empowered to investigate, arrest, detain, and prosecute suspects accused of human rights abuses. Its electoral responsibility called for managing the electoral process in all its phases, including registering voters. Its military charge entailed verifying and investigating the withdrawal from the country of foreign forces; supervising the cease-fire, the separation of forces and their demobilization; and assisting with mine-clearing operations. To carry out its military responsibility, mission peacekeepers were armed and authorized to use force.
Composition of Forces

UNTAC’s authorized strength was 22,000 military and civilian personnel. In 1993, some 47 nations contributed to UNTAC 15,900 troops, 3,600 civilian police, and 2,400 civilian administrators. UNTAC’s staff also consisted of U.N. staff personnel, including those of its specialized agencies, and local personnel. In 1993, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Mission was Yasushi Akashi of Japan. The Commander of UNTAC forces was Major General John Sanderson of Australia.

Equipment

In the military component of UNTAC, most peacekeepers were equipped with small arms. Logistical equipment was used by reconnaissance units, and most UNTAC ground transportation consisted of light vehicles.

Training

Few UNTAC personnel had previous experience in Cambodia. Yet, depending on which component they served, most UNTAC peacekeepers had a fair amount of technical expertise. The military component of UNTAC set up mine-clearance training centers and trained some 1,600 personnel in mine-clearing. The civilian component of UNTAC emphasized the day-to-day involvement of its advisers in setting up the new democratic governmental machinery. U.N. civilian advisers worked alongside their Cambodian counterparts in the transition period. By July 15, 1992, UNTAC had established administrative offices in all 21 provinces of Cambodia. Like other UNTAC components, however, the
civilian administrators were denied access to Khmer-controlled areas. The UNTAC Civilian Police Component gave special instruction to police officers and judges to allow the new penal code to be enforced locally. UNTAC also awarded graduation certificates to Cambodian police officers.\textsuperscript{4}

Tactics

UNTAC's tactics were intended to stabilize the security situation and build local confidence to end the conflict. Specific tactics included the verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of foreign forces, their arms, and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire; the cantonment and disarmament of opposing factions; weapons control; assisting in mine clearing; and peacekeeping training.

After the May 1993 elections, which were boycotted by the Khmer Rouge, the U.N. recognized that the Khmer Rouge was intent on taking power and viewed UNTAC as an obstacle to that end. As UNTAC winds up its mission, its primary tactic is to buttress the anti-Khmer coalition forces in the hope that they will prevail over the Khmer Rouge.

Cost

The total cost of UNTAC has been $1.7 billion.\textsuperscript{5} Initially, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of some $840 million for the expenses of UNAMIC and UNTAC through October 31, 1992. As of November 1992, contributions to the UNAMIC and UNTAC Special Accounts amounted to $4,215 million.\textsuperscript{6}

On December 22, 1992, the General Assembly appropriated $484
million for UNTAC's operation for the period November 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993. It also authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments of $242 million. In addition, voluntary contributions from nongovernmental organizations fund the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. The June 1992 Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, for example, received pledges of some $880 million.

**Operational Assessment**

The U.N. effort in Cambodia was scheduled to end in November 1993. Many of the U.N. peacekeeping operation's objectives have been met, especially when the difficulties inherent in the political situation in Cambodia are considered. UNTAC's agenda was extremely ambitious—to set in motion the machinery of electoral, public information, and security institutions. In essence, UNTAC attempted to put in place much of what was needed to create a democratic political system nurtured by a viable economy.

UNTAC is credited with the following successes:

First, the peacekeepers organized free and fair elections, with a large voter turnout. This democratic election represented one of the greatest accomplishments in Cambodia's history.

Second, the U.N. peacekeepers made it possible for some 350,000 Cambodian refugees to return to their homeland. Cambodians thus regained control of their country for the first time since Vietnam invaded in January 1979.
However, UNTAC’s mission has encountered several problems. First, some of UNTAC’s national contingents have objected to the cautious and nonconfrontational style of UNTAC commander General John Sanderson. They have complained that he stymied efforts to force the Khmer Rouge to disarm or allow U.N. peacekeepers to enter areas under Khmer control. French general Michael Loridon, who was Sanderson’s deputy, was particularly vocal in his criticism of UNTAC’s lack of toughness and was subsequently replaced.

Second, criticism was also expressed of the political cautiousness of Yasushi Akashi, head of the UNTAC mission. Akashi believed that the key to a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict was the inclusion of all opposing factions, causing him to overlook much Khmer Rouge resistance to his democratic initiative. Although it had agreed previously to the terms of the U.N.-sponsored 1991 Paris Agreement, the Khmer Rouge, which never disarmed, refused to permit the U.N.-monitored voter registration to take place in areas under its control, and it boycotted the May 23-28, 1993 elections held under U.N. supervision. The Khmer Rouge has thus played the role of spoiler in the peacekeeping operation, while demanding a major role in the government it had no part in choosing.

Third, U.N. peacekeepers have failed to contain the military threat posed by the Khmer Rouge, the largest rebel force, which still threatens to wreak havoc in the fragile country.

CURRENT SITUATION
On June 15, 1993, the Security Council, in Resolution 840, endorsed the outcome of the Cambodian elections and called on all the parties to abide by the results and cooperate in securing a peaceful transition.

The Security Council expressed full support of the new 120-member Constituent Assembly, which was to draw up a constitution and then transform itself into a legislative assembly in order to set up a new government. The Security Council emphasized that the assembly must complete its work as soon as possible—within the three-month time frame stipulated in the Agreement. Furthermore, the Security Council stressed that UNTAC and the SNC must cooperate through the transition period. The Secretary-General was requested to make recommendations to the Security Council by mid-July 1993 on the U.N.'s role following the completion of UNTAC's mandate. The Security Council urged the international community to contribute to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia.

The "co-premiers," Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, leader of the royalist opposition that won the election, and Hun Sen, who was prime minister in the Vietnamese-installed government that was voted out of office in May, have agreed on an "interim power-sharing arrangement" under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of state and former monarch. The interim government is the best hope to achieve national reconciliation.

However, as of August 1993, the Khmer Rouge was still
threatening to renew the civil war unless it got its way. The Cambodian Armed Forces, the interim government’s military, had by late August 1993 taken the initiative against the Khmer Rouge and launched its largest offensive since the U.N. peacekeeping mission was established in Cambodia. This offensive responded to weeks of mounting Khmer Rouge subversion and violence. The U.N. has given more than tacit support to the anti-Khmer Rouge operations. The U.N. has begun financing the new army in the hope that this army will be able to ensure stability in the country until a new government is formed.

CONCLUSION

The Khmer Rouge is once again threatening to resume its rebellion unless it is given an advisory role in the new government, despite having boycotted the election of that government and having threatened to sabotage it. Thus, the Paris Agreement’s basic premise is questionable: that the Khmer Rouge can become a part of the solution to the Cambodian problem rather than remain a source of discord and armed threat. The Khmer Rouge realizes that its capacity for disruption is not likely to be eliminated by the emergence of a democratically elected government. Thus, on the one hand, it is pursuing a strategy of appearing to accede to UNTAC’s demands and to play by the Paris Agreement’s rules, while on the other hand, it awaits UNTAC’s departure from the country before making a move to seize power.

Thus, a key element of the Khmer Rouge strategy is to draw out the peace process, as part of its expectation that the
international community eventually would withdraw support for such an expensive peacekeeping operation. Mounting Khmer Rouge denunciations of UNTAC and the U.N.-sponsored election process appear to confirm that the Khmer Rouge is following such a strategy. These denunciations are, in effect, a declaration of war against any future democratically elected government.

In late August 1993, the Cambodian armed forces, the interim government's newly unified army, launched a major offensive against the Khmer Rouge to counter a recent upsurge in the Khmer Rouge's campaign of blowing up trains, attacking bridges, killing Vietnamese settlers, and detaining U.N. peacekeepers. Observers believe this latest offensive is an attempt to increase Khmer Rouge leverage on the new government. With its 10,000- to 15,000-man force, the Khmer Rouge now controls some 20 percent of Cambodia and continues to present a grave threat to the gains made by the U.N. peacekeeping operation.
Endnotes


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United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

Selected Chronology

1979

In July, after two years of civil war, a coalition of political opposition groups and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional--FSLN) deposed the authoritarian government of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle and established a provisional Government of National Reconstruction.

1980

The governing coalition collapsed as power became concentrated in the nine-member FSLN Directorate.

1981

The Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras) was established by various dissident groups in Nicaragua and expatriates operating from bases Honduras and Costa Rica.

1983

In January, representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama convened on Contadora Island, Panama to discuss ways to restore peace and stability to Central America.

1986

In June, the Contadora talks collapsed after differences arose among Nicaragua and the other Central American states over questions of democratization and national reconciliation.

1987

In August, the five Central American presidents signed the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II), committing their governments to undertake various measures to restore regional peace and democracy.

In October, the U.N. General Assembly issued Resolution 42/1 expressing its "firmest support" for the Esquipulas II Agreement.

1989

In February, at a regional summit in Costa del Sol, El Salvador, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega promised to hold
free and fair elections by February 1990.

In July, at a Central American summit in Honduras, the five presidents issued the Tela Accord, containing a joint plan for demobilization and repatriation of the Contras.

In August, the U.N. General Assembly established the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN).

In November, Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to monitor compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement.

1990

In January, ONUCA began its deployment in all five Central American states.

In February, Nicaragua held internationally monitored presidential elections.

In March, Security Council Resolution 650 (1990) expanded ONUCA's mandate to include direct supervision of the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

In April, Security Council Resolution 653 (1990) once again expanded ONUCA's mandate, authorizing it to establish "security zones" within Nicaragua in which to demobilize the Resistance.

In May the Nicaraguan demobilization process stalled amid charges of violations by the former combatants. Demobilization resumed after the contending parties negotiated the Managua Protocol.

In June, the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance was completed.

1992

In January, ONUCA completed its operations. Some ONUCA personnel and equipment were transferred to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).
INTRODUCTION

The Central American crisis of the 1980s was caused by the escalation of internal civil wars into a regional crisis of wider strategic significance. Beginning in the late 1970s, Central America experienced a series of political convulsions that shook the foundations of military authoritarian regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All three countries subsequently experienced civil wars between leftist insurgencies and militarily backed right-wing regimes.

In Nicaragua, the insurgent movement against the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle escalated into a full-scale civil war in 1978. Debayle was ousted by a broad-based coalition of civic and insurgent groups in July 1979. A second civil conflict erupted in 1981, when several opposition groups rebelled against the increasingly authoritarian policies of the new revolutionary government dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional--FSLN).

By the mid-1980s, the Nicaraguan civil conflict was becoming increasingly internationalized as the Sandinista government received assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union and was accused by the United States of arming the leftist insurgency in El Salvador. The Nicaraguan Resistance (also known as the Contras), on the other hand, relied on U.S. military assistance and on safe havens in southern Honduras and northern Costa Rica.
Alarmed by the threat of a regional war, several Latin American nations began in 1983 to devise a regional peace plan. After the collapse of the first peace process in 1986, a second peace plan was negotiated in 1987 by the Central American governments that called for democratization, the declaration of permanent cease-fires and an end to cross-border weapons transfers and insurgent activities. On November 7, 1989, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to verify compliance with the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II) and facilitate the demobilization of the Contras.

This case study examines the original crisis in Central America, the factors leading to the establishment of ONUCA, the evolution of its mandate, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America in light of the mission’s initial goals.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

After two years of civil war, a revolutionary government assumed power in Nicaragua in July 1979. The provisional junta consisted of a coalition of the Directorate of the FSLN and other opposition leaders.

In the months following the junta’s assumption of power, the governing coalition collapsed as the FSLN bypassed the moderate leadership and implemented increasingly radical political and economic policies aimed at establishing a socialist regime.
Executive power became concentrated in the nine-member FSLN Directorate led by Daniel Ortega Saavedra.

By 1981 increasingly authoritarian FSLN rule and the absence of meaningful opportunities for effective civilian opposition in the emerging single-party hegemonic system drove a variety of groups into armed insurrection. The Contras consisted of a variety of guerrilla groups operating mainly from bases in the border regions of Honduras and Costa Rica. Covert training and military assistance for the Contras was initially provided by the governments of Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and the United States. The main benefactor of the Contras, however, was the United States.

By the mid-1980s, Nicaragua was again in a state of full scale civil war. Compounding the destabilizing effects of the internal conflict were the external linkages of the warring parties. Nicaragua depended on aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union while providing assistance to the Salvadoran insurgency, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional—FMLN). The Contras depended on United States aid and safe haven in southern Honduras and northern Costa Rica. These external linkages threatened to convert the Nicaraguan civil war into a regional conflict between Central American states.

**The Central American Peace Process**

In early 1983, several Latin American states initiated a multilateral peace negotiation effort to defuse the most serious
civil conflicts in Central America. The Central American peace process formally began in January 1983 when the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela convened on the Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss threats to regional peace and security stemming from the crisis in the region. Between 1983 and 1986 the Contadora Group, which in 1985 became a broad regional forum that included a "support group" of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, issued several proposals for resolving the Central American crisis. The Contadora process ultimately failed in 1986 when its recommendations for arms reductions were rejected by the Central American governments. Contadora was also weakened by a lack of support from the United States and the Nicaraguan government's unwillingness to implement its recommendations on democratization and national reconciliation prior to the cessation of United States aid to the Contras.

Although it failed, the Contadora process laid the groundwork for a future regional peace initiative. The main differences between this second effort and Contadora were that the new proposals were developed among the Central American nations themselves with a greater emphasis on internal democratization.¹ The new peace initiative was led by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sánchez who, on August 7, 1987, convened a summit of the five Central American republics in Esquipulas, Guatemala, to develop a plan based largely on the previous draft Contadora documents. The Arias plan, also known as
the Central American Peace Agreement or Esquipulas II, committed
the Central American republics to restore regional peace and
democracy by negotiating cease-fires, discontinuing outside aid
to insurgent groups, and denying safe haven for cross-border
insurgent activities.

After losing momentum in 1988 because of a lack of progress
in ending the Nicaraguan civil war, the Esquipulas II initiative
was revitalized in early 1989 by a variety of factors, including
a major shift in U.S. policy toward Contra aid, informal U.S.-
Soviet agreements on nonintervention in Central America, and the
announcement by Nicaraguan President Ortega in February 1989 that
presidential elections would be held no later than 25 February
25, 1990. Further progress toward implementation of Esquipulas II
was made at the Central American summit in Tela, Honduras, on
August 5-7, 1989. The Tela Accord, which cleared the way for
direct U.N. participation in the peace process, included a joint
plan for demobilization and repatriation of the Contras and a
proposal for constructive dialogue between the Salvadoran
government and the FMLN.

The U.N. Response

From 1987 to 1989, the U.N. played a supportive but minor
role in the Central American peace process. In October 1987, the
U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 42/1 expressing its
"firmest support" for the Esquipulas II Agreement.² It requested
that the Secretary-General afford the fullest assistance to the
Central American governments in their efforts to implement the
agreement. In accordance with this resolution, the U.N. and the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) dispatched a small advance team to Central America in late 1987 to establish criteria for monitoring compliance with the Esquipulas II peace plan. The U.N.-O.A.S. advance team defined four minimum requirements for effective verification: (1) a clear definition of the peace observers' roles; (2) a cease-fire that would be respected by all parties in the conflict, including irregular forces; (3) agreement on the details of disarmament; and (4) guarantees of freedom of movement and physical security for the observers.  

No further progress was made toward establishing a U.N. peace observer mission until February 1989, when the five Central American foreign ministers met in New York with U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar to discuss a U.N. role in Central American peacekeeping. During the talks, the Secretary-General emphasized that the four conditions outlined by the 1987 advance team would have to be met in Nicaragua prior to deployment of any U.N. observer mission. Disputes between Central American countries over the size of the mission and the scope of its mandate would also need to be resolved.

The Costa del Sol Declaration in February 1989 and the Tela Agreement in July set the stage for further U.N. involvement. With a resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict apparently underway, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 637 (1989) on July 27, expressing the Council's firmest support for the
Esquipulas II Agreement and endorsing the Secretary-General's provision of good offices.

In March 1989, the U.N. General Assembly, responding to a request by the government of Nicaragua, established the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) to monitor the Nicaraguan electoral process. ONUVEN officially opened its offices in Managua on August 25, 1989. The mission consisted of 207 civilian observers authorized to evaluate the organization and mobilization of political parties, the electoral campaign, and the elections held on February 25, 1985. After six months of monitoring throughout Nicaragua, ONUVEN declared electoral process "impartial and fair." ⁴

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established by Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) on November 7, 1989. ONUCA's original mandate was to conduct on-site verification in all five Central American nations of the security undertakings contained in the Central American Peace Agreement, namely, the cessation of aid to irregular forces and the non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on other states. ⁵

At the request of the Secretary-General, ONUCA's mandate was expanded on March 27, 1990 by Security Council Resolution 650 (1990), which authorized, on a contingency basis, the addition of armed personnel to the mission to allow direct U.N. supervision of the voluntary demobilization of the Contras. ⁶

A further expansion of ONUCA's mandate took place on April
20, 1990, when the Security Council passed Resolution 653 (1990). It authorized ONUCA to monitor the Nicaraguan cease-fire, the separation of forces, and the demobilization of the Contras in designated "security zones" within Nicaragua.  

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

An advance team of ONUCA personnel arrived in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in December 1989, establishing a provisional headquarters in the offices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Honduras. The first ONUCA military personnel arrived a few days later under the Command of General Augustín Quesada Gómez of Spain. Regional offices were subsequently established in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.  

The majority of ONUCA resources and personnel were concentrated in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the Contra demobilization was taking place. In March 1990, ONUCA's 260 military observers were reinforced by an additional 116 unarmed monitors and an armed infantry battalion of approximately 800 troops from Venezuela. The Venezuelan battalion was deployed among the eight Contra demobilization zones between April and June 1990. Upon completion of the demobilization in June, the armed battalion was withdrawn. Thereafter, ONUCA was rapidly scaled down, with its strength reduced to approximately 200 personnel until its mandate expired in January 1992.  

Political and Military Goals

ONUCA's original mandate, composition, and operational
concept established it as an unarmed verification and peace-
observing mission, not a full-scale peacekeeping mission. As
such, its political objective was to help maintain the momentum
of the Esquipulas II process by monitoring whatever cease-fires
might develop as a result of government-insurgent negotiations in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. ONUCA’s initial military
objective was to conduct mobile surveillance of key border and
strategic areas that might be used for staging cross-border
military operations or conducting illicit transport of weapons
across international boundaries. These limited political and
military objectives were in effect from November until March
1990.

In March 1990, ONUCA’s military objectives were
significantly expanded to include monitoring of the voluntary
demobilization and repatriation of the Contras. The expansion of
the mandate was made in response to a request from the Central
American governments issued at a regional summit in San Isidro de
Coronado, Costa Rica, in December 1989. The new mandate
reiterated ONUCA’s initial verification and surveillance duties
but added an armed peacekeeping contingent to the peace-observer
force. The peacekeeping contingent was deployed to assist in the
demobilization of the Contras, the only regional insurgency that
had signed a permanent cease-fire and had agreed to demobilize.

ONUCA’s mandate was expanded once again on April 20, 1990,
when the Security Council, with the consent of the Nicaraguan
government, authorized the establishment of "security zones" from
which the EPS would withdraw to allow the Contras in Nicaragua to concentrate and be demobilized. ONUCA’s military objectives in Nicaragua were first, to monitor the cease-fire throughout the country; second, to verify the separation of forces within the security zones; and third, to receive and destroy on the ground the weapons and uniforms of the Contra’s troops as they entered the security zones."

Rules of Engagement

ONUCA’s original rules of engagement entailed unarmed ground and air patrolling along the Nicaraguan-Honduran and Salvadoran-Honduran borders, as well as maritime patrolling in selected rivers and the Gulf of Fonseca. Mobile military observer teams were charged to monitor and verify the cessation of aid to irregular forces and the non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on other states. Under its original mandate, ONUCA was not authorized to issue orders or directives and could not initiate or engage in combat with any forces encountered.

Following the second and third expansions of ONUCA’s mandate, the rules of engagement were changed. ONUCA was subsequently authorized to enforce order within the Nicaraguan security zones and to engage in defensive combat against any hostile forces. Nevertheless, continued emphasis was placed on the voluntary nature of demobilization of the Contras.

Composition of Forces

At maximum strength, ONUCA consisted of 1,195 personnel from 13 nations. This included an 800-strong infantry battalion and a
logistics unit from Venezuela; 29 naval personnel from Argentina; a 124-man helicopter unit from Canada with; 13 civilian medical personnel from the Federal Republic of Germany; 169 military observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela; 85 U.N. international staff personnel; and 89 locally hired civilians.¹²

During its first year, ONUCA was commanded by Major General Augustín Quesada Gómez of Spain. Following the reduction in its size and mission in November 1990, ONUCA’s command was transferred to Brigadier General Lewis McKenzie of Canada, who was succeeded by Brigadier General Victor Suanzes Pardo of Spain.

**Equipment**

Under its first mandate, ONUCA’s military observers were unarmed. With the addition of a 800-strong mobile infantry battalion, ONUCA could count on a significant small arms capability for self-defense and security enforcement. Ground transport consisted of light vehicles, including several dozen four-wheel-drive vehicles. Maritime transport consisted of four coastal fast patrol craft. Air transport consisted of four CH-139 Jet Ranger light observation helicopters, twelve UH-1 "Huey" transport helicopters, and one Dornier 228-200 fixed-wing VIP aircraft.¹³ Communications equipment included INMARSAT portable terminals for secure voice and fax transmissions between El Salvador and U.N. Headquarters in New York.¹⁴

**Training**

Some units participating in ONUCA had experience in previous
U.N. peacekeeping missions. The Canadian and Spanish officers were experienced U.N. peacekeepers. The Venezuelan battalion had previously served with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.\textsuperscript{15}

**Tactics**

Under ONUCA's original mandate, tactics consisted of establishing mobile teams of military observers patrolling from verification centers, each of which was manned by up to ten observers, and from smaller operational posts in forward areas. In rugged mountain areas, patrolling was conducted primarily by helicopters. Less rugged areas were patrolled by four-wheel-drive vehicles. Offshore fast patrolling was conducted in the Gulf of Fonseca.

Following the second and third expansions of ONUCA's mandate, armed peacekeepers were stationed along the perimeters of the Nicaraguan security zones.\textsuperscript{16}

**Cost**

The total cost of ONUCA from November 7, 1989 until its termination on January 16, 1992 was approximately $87 million.\textsuperscript{17} The operation was rapidly scaled down after the demobilization of the Contras was completed on July 5, 1990.

**Operational Assessment**

During the initial implementation phase of the mission, ONUCA was partially successful in fulfilling its initial mandate under Security Council Resolution 644 (1989). Although the effectiveness of ONUCA's verification patrols was marginal, ONUCA
effectively investigated reported violations of Esquipulas II and helped build confidence among the disputing parties.

Because of the ruggedness and the large extent of the territory being patrolled, the small size of the original observer contingent, and the limited number of vehicles at its disposal, ONUCA lacked the remote surveillance capability needed to verify full compliance with the arms-trafficking restrictions of Esquipulas II. As a result, ONUCA concentrated its efforts on mobile surveillance of strategic areas along the Honduran-Nicaraguan and Honduran-Salvadoran borders, and in the Gulf of Fonseca. Additionally, ONUCA established verification centers in the national capitals to process and investigate charges of Esquipulas II violations. ONUCA responded to government requests for investigations on eight occasions. None of those investigations yielded evidence of significant violations.

During the second phase of the mission, ONUCA encountered temporary political delays and obstacles to the fulfillment of its expanded mandate, but eventually succeeded in fulfilling its mandate under a revised deadline.

Following the Nicaraguan elections of February 25, 1990, and the passage of Security Council Resolutions 650 (1989) and 653 (1989), ONUCA’s efforts focused on the voluntary demobilization of the Contras. The demobilization effort, which thereafter consumed the bulk of ONUCA’s resources, was designated "Operation Home Run." 18

Between March 27 and May 30 1990, ONUCA made little progress
toward demobilizing the Contras because of the reluctance of several of the groups to recognize the Esquipulas II agreement and their concerns over personal safety during the demobilization and repatriation process. In addition, a key faction of the Contras refused to demobilize until specific guarantees for resettlement assistance were provided by the Nicaraguan government.

On May 30, the Nicaraguan government and Contra Commander Israel Galeano (Commander Franklin) signed the Managua Protocol, which committed the Nicaraguan government to resettle demobilized Contras in designated "development areas," to provide them with economic aid, and allow them to join a police force to be set up in those areas. In exchange, the Contras would demobilize completely within a given deadline. Between May 30 and June 29, 1990, the remaining Contras, totalling 19,614 personnel--16,361 of them armed--were demobilized in the eight security zones established by ONUCA.¹⁹

Despite estimates that less than half of the weapons originally in the possession of the Contras were turned in to ONUCA and the subsequent "remobilization" of about 3,000 "Recontras," ONUCA was generally successful in fulfilling its expanded mandate under Resolution 650 (1989) and Resolution 653 (1989). The main achievements of Operation Home Run were first, to support the Nicaraguan cease-fire by assisting in the break up of the Contras as a significant military force; second, to make possible the reintegration into Nicaraguan society of those
members of the resistance who wished to return to civilian life in the new democratic political context; and third, to help bind the Nicaraguan government into honoring its commitment to implement drastic reductions in the Sandinista Popular Army (Ejército Popular Sandinista--EPS).

CURRENT SITUATION

Following the completion of Operation Home Run on July 29, 1990, ONUCA was rapidly scaled down and reverted to its original mandate. Many of ONUCA's personnel and much of its equipment were transferred to El Salvador for service in the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). ONUCA was reduced in size to about 200 personnel until its mission was completed on January 16, 1992.

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of ongoing political conflicts in Nicaragua and the incapacity of the Chamorro government to fulfill the commitments made in the Managua Protocol, elements of the Contras began to "remobilize" in early 1991. The so-called "Recontras" reportedly numbered between 300 and 1,100 combatants by June 1991. At about the same time, discharged members of the EPS, claiming comparable land rights and other government benefits, resorted to banditry and antigovernment guerrilla activities. Elements of these two groups had reportedly joined forces and were engaged in operations against the Chamorro government in 1992.

In Managua, the political arena became increasingly
polarized as the FSLN attempted to block economic structural adjustment through violent strikes and other forms of civil disobedience. The political environment became further polarized as the National Opposition Union (Union Nacional Opositora--UNO) coalition, which had brought the Chamorro government to power, protested the increasingly close collaboration between the government and the FSLN. A main point of contention was the continued political affiliation of the armed forces with the FSLN under Defense Minister Humberto Ortega.

In early 1992, UNO withdrew its support for the government and entered into opposition. As political polarization intensified, general lawlessness and political violence became increasingly widespread. The political outlook for Nicaragua was one of continued sporadic violence, but without the scale or intensity of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s.

Despite the continuing problems of political polarization and rural insurgency in Nicaragua and illegal arms trafficking in Central America, ONUCA can be considered a qualified success. ONUCA's success is attributed to the specificity and limited scope of its mandates, particularly the monitoring of compliance with the Esquipulas II agreement and the verification of the Contra demobilization. By adhering strictly to the letter of its mandate and avoiding broader political commitments, ONUCA was able to uphold the U.N. principle of neutrality, and thereby contributed significantly to confidence-building between the disputing parties. Such confidence building made possible further
steps in the deescalation of the Central American civil wars, including the drastic reduction of the Nicaraguan EPS and the eventual acceptance by the Salvadoran government and FMLN insurgents of U.N. mediation and verification of the Salvadoran peace process.
Endnotes


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United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)

Selected Chronology

1979

In October, a reformist military-civilian junta deposed the authoritarian government of General Carlos Humberto Romero Mena. The junta decreed extensive land reform but failed to curb human rights abuses by the armed forces against leftist groups.

1980

In January, several leftist groups united under the banner of the Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas--CRM), calling for armed insurrection.

In March, Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated by a right-wing death squad. Mass violence erupted between demonstrators and security forces at Romero’s funeral.

1981

In January, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional--FMLN) launched a "final offensive" campaign against the government.

1982

Elections were held for a provisional government and Constituent Assembly.

1983

The Contadora initiative began.

1984

In national elections, Christian Democratic Party candidate José Napoleón Duarte Fuentes was elected president.

1986

The Contadora process collapsed.

1987

In August, the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II) was signed by the five Central American presidents.
1989

In March, Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista--Arena) candidate Alfredo Cristiani Burkard was elected president.

In September, negotiations were initiated between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN.

In November, the FMLN launched a major offensive against San Salvador, leaving 2,000 dead. Six Jesuit professors at the Central American University were assassinated by an army squad.

1990

In July, the government and the FMLN signed the Agreement on Human Rights, calling for a United Nations (U.N.) Verification Mission to monitor the agreement.

1991

In May, U.N. Security Council Resolution 693 established ONUSAL.

In December, the government and FMLN negotiated a peace agreement, calling for a cease-fire effective February 1, 1992.

1992

In January, U.N. Security Council Resolution 792 expanded ONUSAL’s mandate to include verification and monitoring of the peace agreement. Military and police divisions were added to ONUSAL.

In October, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported on delays in implementing the peace accords and proposed adjustments to the agreement’s timetable.

In December, the civil war was officially ended.

1993

In January, the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces in El Salvador issued a report implicating 103 Salvadoran officers in human rights violations and recommending their retirement or dismissal. The U.N. endorsed the commission’s findings.

In February, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN requested U.N. verification of the forthcoming March 1994 general elections.
In March, the Truth Commission issued a report documenting human rights violations during the civil war.
INTRODUCTION

The Salvadoran civil war was one of three major civil conflicts that erupted in Central America during the 1980s. The civil war began in 1980, when fighting between revolutionary leftist groups and the predominantly right-wing Salvadoran government, backed by their allied paramilitary "death squads," escalated into nationwide civil unrest.

After a failed urban offensive against San Salvador in January 1981, the leftist insurgent groups belonging to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional--FMLN) launched a protracted rural-based guerrilla insurgency against the Salvadoran government. The ensuing civil war left 70,000 dead and resulted in the flight of more than half a million refugees from the country, with 500,000 becoming internally displaced. By the early 1990s, damage to El Salvador’s economic infrastructure exceeded $300 million, with an estimated $1 billion required to rebuild the economy.¹

Efforts to restore peace began in 1984 when Christian Democratic president José Napoleón Duarte Fuentes initiated an unsuccessful dialogue with the FMLN. Following the collapse of the Duarte peace initiative, further peace efforts were promoted by the multilateral Contadora Peace Process. The failure, in turn, of Contadora led to a third peace initiative under the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II) of 1987.

Intermittent peace talks resumed in 1987 in accordance with the Esquipulas II agreement. Further progress was made following
the election of President Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, of the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista--Arena) party. The peace negotiations were interrupted in November 1989 when the FMLN launched a second major offensive against San Salvador. The FMLN offensive was effectively repulsed by government forces, but left a death toll of 2,000.

Realizing that the civil war had developed into a stalemate, the warring parties returned to the negotiating table in 1990 with the assistance of United Nations (U.N.) mediation. In July 1990, the government and the FMLN signed the Agreement on Human Rights, which provided for the establishment of a U.N. verification mission to monitor nationwide observance of human rights by the warring parties. On May 20, 1991, the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) to monitor all agreements concluded between the government and the FMLN.²

This case study examines the original crisis in El Salvador, the factors leading to the deployment of ONUSAL, the evolution of its mandate, the effectiveness of the deployment, ONUSAL's current status, and the current situation and outlook in El Salvador in light of the mission's initial goals.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

*The Initial Crisis*

In October 1979, reformist junior officers of the Salvadoran army ousted the authoritarian military government of General
Carlos Alberto Romero Mena and established executive authority in
the first of four military-civilian juntas. Concerned over the
possibility of a mass uprising similar to the Nicaraguan
Revolution of July 1979, the junta governments sought to
implement extensive land reform measures but were unable to curb
widespread human rights abuses against civilians by the armed
forces and paramilitary death squads.

Sporadic political violence intensified throughout 1980,
particularly after the assassination by a right-wing death squad
of the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero
y Galdámez, an outspoken critic of human rights violations by the
armed forces and its associated death squads.3 Political
violence intensified after right-wing army officers reasserted
their control over the armed forces in May 1980, effectively
halting land reform and implementing further draconian measures
against the leftist opposition.

Spurred by the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
several Salvadoran guerrilla groups met in Havana in early 1980
to establish a unified command under the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada--DRU), an
insurgent front that eventually evolved into the FMLN. Soon
thereafter, other left-wing and center-left-wing opposition
movements became affiliated with or integrated into the FMLN.

The civil war intensified on January 10, 1981, when the FMLN
launched a major offensive against the capital, San Salvador. The
Salvadoran armed forces repelled the guerrilla offensive with the
help of U.S. military aid. Following the defeat of its urban offensive, the FMLN regrouped and embarked on a protracted guerrilla war in the countryside. The army responded by launching a series of rural counterinsurgency campaigns in which torture, extrajudicial executions, and massacres of noncombatants were widespread.

Efforts to resolve the Salvadoran civil war began in October 1984 when newly elected President José Napoleón Duarte Fuentes initiated a dialogue with the FMLN. The Duarte initiative stalled, however, and eventually failed after his daughter was kidnapped by an FMLN faction.

Further efforts toward a negotiated solution were made in the mid-1980s in response to the Contadora Process, a multilateral effort by several Latin American states to defuse the Central American civil wars by promoting regional democratization and disarmament. The Contadora Process also lost momentum and ultimately failed in 1986.

Preliminary progress toward resolving the Salvadoran conflict was finally achieved under the provisions of the Central American Peace Agreement, signed on August 7, 1987. This regional peace agreement called for ending outside aid and safe haven to insurgent forces, decreeing amnesties to political prisoners, initiating dialogue between governments and opposition groups, negotiating cease-fires between governments and insurgent groups, and promoting the development of a "pluralistic and participatory democratic process" in all signatory states.
During 1987 and 1988, El Salvador took tentative steps toward complying with the Esquipulas II Agreement. It decreed an amnesty for political prisoners and initiated peace talks under temporary cease-fires. Progress toward complying with the Esquipulas II Agreement halted abruptly in November 1989, however, when the FMLN launched a major offensive against San Salvador. The ensuing street battles killed 2,000 persons and were accompanied by further human rights abuses by the armed forces, most notably the assassination of six Jesuit priests on the campus of the Central American University.

The U.N. Response

The U.N. has played a central role in the mediation and verification of the Salvadoran peace process. U.N. involvement was initially conducted within the framework of the Esquipulas II Agreement and was subsequently expanded to mediate and monitor the Salvadoran Human Rights and Peace Agreements.

In October 1987, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 42/1 expressing its "firmest support" for the Esquipulas II Agreement and requesting that the Secretary-General assist Central American governments in their efforts to implement the agreement. U.N. support for Esquipulas II was reiterated by Security Council Resolution 637 in July 1989, which welcomed Esquipulas II and the subsequent agreements of the Central American presidents, and supported the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices to the region. On November 7, 1989, Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) established the United
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to verify the Esquipulas II security commitments in all five central American states. The ONUCA mission in El Salvador was initially limited to monitoring selected border zones for Esquipulas II violations.


As a result of U.N.-mediated talks, the first substantive agreement in the Salvadoran peace process was reached in July 1990 with the signing of the San José Accord on Human Rights. The agreement provided for the establishment of a U.N. verification mission to monitor nationwide observance of human rights by the security forces and the FMLN. The U.N. was also requested to establish a human rights verification mission prior to the cease-fire agreements.

In response to the Salvadoran request, the Security Council dispatched an advance team to El Salvador in January 1991 to study the possibility of deploying a human rights verification mission prior to the signing of a cease-fire.

After a new round of U.N.-mediated talks in Mexico City, the
Salvadoran government and the FMLN reached an agreement in late April 1991 on governmental, military, and constitutional reforms. They also agreed to create a U.N. Truth Commission to investigate violations of human rights.

In response to the Mexico accord, the Security Council issued Resolution 693 (1991) on May 20, 1991, establishing ONUSAL as an "integrated peacekeeping operation" with an initial mandate to verify compliance with the San José Accord on Human Rights.¹

Further rounds of negotiations in New York resulted in a permanent cease-fire on December 31, 1991, and a comprehensive peace agreement in Chapultepec, Mexico, on January 16, 1992.

On January 14, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 729 (1992) expanding ONUSAL's mandate to include verification and monitoring of the Chapultepec Agreement. In addition to verifying compliance with the San José Accord on Human Rights, ONUSAL was to verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of forces, including the demobilization of the FMLN, and to monitor the maintenance of public order during the transitional period while a National Civil Police was being established.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Approximately 40 ONUSAL human rights observers began arriving in El Salvador on July 26, 1991.⁵ From July to September, ONUSAL's primary task was to set up its headquarters and regional offices and deploy its communications and transportation equipment. In October ONUSAL personnel began to investigate cases and situations involving allegations of human
rights abuses. In February 1992, 380 military observers arrived in El Salvador and deployed as mobile teams in government and FMLN concentration zones.\(^6\)

**Political and Military Goals**

ONUSAL’s initial mandate established it as an unarmed, predominantly civilian observer mission. Its political objectives were to monitor and investigate the human rights situation in El Salvador and recommend improvements for implementing human rights.

On January 14, 1992, ONUSAL’s political and military objectives were expanded to include verification and monitoring of the Chapultepec Agreement. This entailed the addition of a Military Division to monitor the separation of military forces, the demobilization of the FMLN, and the creation of a U.N. Police Division to supervise the maintenance of public order by the existing National Police (Policía Nacional--PN), pending the establishment of a new National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil--PNC).

Under its expanded mandate, ONUSAL’s military objectives included supervising the concentration of the approximately 63,000 members of the armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador--FAES) into 62 designated areas, with FMLN forces concentrated in 15 areas.\(^7\) Subsequently, ONUSAL military observers were to inventory and destroy in place the weapons of FMLN personnel who were being demobilized.

**Rules of Engagement**

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ONUSAL’s rules of engagement entailed unarmed monitoring of troop movements as well as police activities. ONUSAL personnel were authorized to visit any site without prior notice; to receive communications from any Salvadoran individual, group or entity; to interview freely any individual or group; to conduct direct investigations; and to use the media to fulfill its mandate.\(^8\) ONUSAL was not authorized to issue orders or directives, and could not engage in combat or otherwise obstruct the activities of any forces encountered.

**Composition of Forces**

At maximum strength, ONUSAL consisted of 1,098 personnel from 18 nations. ONUSAL’s 356 military observers included 47 from Brazil, 55 from Canada, 8 from Colombia, 45 from Ecuador, 11 from India, 12 from Ireland, 1 from Norway, 138 from Spain, 9 from Sweden and 40 from Venezuela. In addition, there were 29 naval crew members from Argentina, 294 police observers from Austria, Chile, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, and several helicopter aircrews from Canada as well as 95 civilian staff.\(^9\)

ONUSAL was established as an "integrated" U.N. peacekeeping operation under a civilian chief of mission. The first ONUSAL chief of mission was Iqbal Riza of Pakistan; he was succeeded by Augusto Ramírez Ocampo of Colombia on April 1, 1993.

**Equipment**

ONUSAL’s civilian, military, and police observers were unarmed. Ground transport consisted of light vehicles, including
several dozen four-wheel-drive vehicles. Air transport consisted of an unspecified number of UH-1 "Huey" transport helicopters from Canada. Maritime transport consisted of four coastal fast patrol craft from Argentina.

Training

Most ONUSAL military observers had previous peacekeeping experience in the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Canadian and Spanish military observers had other prior experience as U.N. peacekeepers.

Tactics

ONUSAL’s initial operational objectives were to establish a presence at its headquarters in San Salvador and its regional offices and sub-offices in selected cities in El Salvador. Subsequently, teams of civilian observers from ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division would travel throughout the country, making contacts with political, military and juridical authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and the FMLN to gather evidence as required for investigation of human rights violations.

The tactics of ONUSAL’s Military Division consisted of establishing mobile teams of unarmed military observers to verify the concentration of FAES and FMLN forces. Verification teams were deployed at all 15 FMLN concentration zones, while mobile teams periodically visited and inspected the 62 FAES concentration areas. Additionally, the ONUSAL Military Division was to assure safe passage and provide transport for FMLN commanders engaged in concentration and demobilization, as well
as logistical support and consultancy as resources permitted. Military observers were to receive, inventory, and destroy weapons turned over by the FMLN during demobilization in its concentration zones.

Cost

The total projected cost of ONUSAL from May 1991 until December 1993 was approximately $96 million. An additional $7 million was projected to be spent in monitoring the March 1994 national elections. ONUSAL was financed from a special assessed account established by the General Assembly on June 21, 1991.

Operational Assessment

During the initial human rights monitoring phase of the mission, ONUSAL was only marginally effective in fulfilling its mandate under Resolution 693 (1991). Despite a well executed deployment and aggressive monitoring by ONUSAL personnel, no discernible improvement in the human rights situation occurred in the first six months after ONUSAL’s arrival. The initial lack of progress on human rights resulted largely from continued hostilities during the ONUSAL deployment. However, ONUSAL’s human rights monitoring contributed indirectly to an improvement in the human rights situation by creating an atmosphere conducive to the eventual cease-fire, which produced a dramatic decline in rights violations.

From January to October 1992, ONUSAL was partially successful in fulfilling its mandate under Resolution 792 (1992), which entailed supervising the demobilization of the FMLN and
institutional reforms by the security forces. By midyear, implementation of several commitments contained in the peace agreement had fallen behind schedule, particularly the provision of agricultural land in the former zones of conflict and the government's purge of army officers accused of human rights abuses as recommended by the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces. Moreover, both parties appeared to be evading full compliance with the agreement by postponing their major force reductions.

The demobilization process nearly broke down in October 1992 when both the government and the FMLN suspended their demobilizations, alleging noncompliance by the other party. Following successful U.N. mediation of the dispute, a revised timetable was issued for completion of the demobilizations with a new target date of December 15, 1992.

Between October 31 and December 15, 1992, further progress was made by both sides in implementing the Chapultepec Agreement. The FMLN demobilized the final 40 percent of its forces (a total of approximately 6,000 personnel and 4,000 weapons), while the military reduced its forces by more than 50 percent from (63,000 to 31,000). The Salvadoran government also began to purge officers identified by the Ad Hoc Commission as perpetrators of human rights violations.

Based on his assessment of compliance by both parties, on December 23, 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the armed conflict between the government and the
FMLN had formally ended on December 15 in accordance with the agreed adjustments in the timetable for implementing the peace agreements.

Despite repeated delays and political crises, ONUSAL has been generally successful in implementing its expanded mandate under Security Council Resolution 792 (1992). Two of its mission objectives, verifying and assisting the demobilization of the FMLN and the purging and reduction of the FAES, have to a large extent been attained. A third objective, monitoring public order while the new National Civil Police was being established, was hampered by insufficient U.N. personnel and resources.

CURRENT SITUATION

Following the completion of the demobilizations in December 1992, ONUSAL’s military observers were withdrawn, reducing the mission personnel to approximately 400 human rights monitors and police observers. On May 27, 1993, Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) expanded the mission’s mandate once again to include monitoring and verification of the March 1994 general elections. Approximately 900 civilian election observers will be added to ONUSAL to monitor the polling. ONUSAL’s mandate is expected to terminate shortly thereafter.

CONCLUSION

In May 1993, FMLN compliance with the peace agreement was brought into question when a clandestine FMLN weapons cache was discovered in Managua, Nicaragua. Responding to this discovery, the U.N. found the FMLN to be in violation of the peace agreement.
and issued a 45-day deadline for the surrender of all weapons that were not included in the original FMLN inventory. On August 18, 1993, the U.N. announced that all remaining FMLN weapons had been presented to the U.N. for destruction and found the FMLN to be in compliance with the peace agreement.

Despite these violations of the peace agreement, the political climate in El Salvador has improved. The FMLN has joined the political process and begun to field candidates for the March 1994 elections. On March 12, 1993, General René Emilio Ponce, the senior military officer implicated in human rights violations by the Ad Hoc Commission, resigned his post as Minister of Defense. Three days later, the Truth Commission issued a report on human rights violations that implicated the FMLN, the army, and the security services.

Given its effectiveness in restoring peace and democratizing the Salvadoran political process, ONUSAL can be judged a successful peace observer mission and a model for future U.N. peacekeeping operations. Part of ONUSAL's success is attributed to its ability to transcend traditional peacekeeping roles and to involve itself in "peacebuilding" functions such as monitoring the creation of a new democratic political system. Moreover, the integration of the different aspects of the U.N. presence under a single civilian chief of mission has provided for concerted action on a wide range of interrelated problems within the host country.
Endnotes


5. Ibid., 28.

6. Ibid.


11. Baranyi and North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible, 31.

12. Ibid.


18. Baranyi and North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible, 33.
Bibliography


Selected Chronology

1986

In February, President Jean-Claude Duvalier fled into exile in France following an outbreak of public protests against his rule. An interim military-civilian National Council of Government headed by General Henri Namphy assumed executive authority.

1987

In March, a new constitution was approved in a national referendum by 99.8 percent of voters.

In November, Leslie Manigat was elected president in voting marred by violence and fraud.

1988

In June, General Namphy ousted Manigat and abrogated the Constitution.

1990

In December, Father John Bertrand Aristide was elected president with 67 percent of the vote in United Nations (U.N.)-monitored elections. Concurrent legislative elections gave Aristide's National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National Pour le Changement et la Démocratie--FNCD) five of the 27 seats in the Senate and 18 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

1991

In July, President Aristide removed several senior officers in the armed forces, appointing General Raoul Cédras as Commander in Chief of the Army.

In September, following an emotionally charged speech by President Aristide calling for the "necklacing" of political opponents, a military junta led by General Cédras overthrew the government in a violent coup. Aristide was forced to leave the country; the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the coup and automatically imposed an economic embargo. Hundreds of demonstrators and Aristide supporters were killed by security forces, and several thousand people attempted to flee to the United States by sea.

In October, the military forcibly convened a quorum of
legislators to approve Joseph Nerette as interim president. Nerette’s appointment was rejected by the international community, which recognized the government-in-exile of President Aristide.

1992

In February, OAS-mediated talks between Aristide and members of a Haitian legislative delegation resulted in the signing of an interim agreement for Aristide’s eventual return. Under pressure from the military, the agreement was declared null and void by the Haitian Supreme Court.

In June, as a result of a tripartite agreement reached a month earlier by the Haitian military government and parliament, Nerette vacated the presidency and Marc Bazin was appointed prime minister of a "consensus government."

In September, the Bazin government authorized the dispatch of 18 OAS human rights monitors to Haiti.

1993

In January, United States President Bill Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Aristide’s return to Haiti and announced intensified U.S. efforts to find a democratic solution to the crisis.

In February, the Bazin government authorized the dispatch to Haiti of 200 U.N. and OAS human rights monitors.

In June, the U.N. imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.

In July, U.N.-mediated negotiations led to the signing of the Governor’s Island Agreement and the New York Pact, which called for President Aristide’s return to Haiti in October, the appointment of a new prime minister, an amnesty from criminal prosecution for the military, the resignation of General Cédras, and the dispatch of a U.N. technical mission to train a new police force and professionalize the military.

In September, President Aristide appointed Robert Malval as the new prime minister. Attacks against Aristide supporters continued with the complicity of the security forces. After dispatching an advance team of 30 military and police specialists, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 867 (1993) establishing the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).
INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1991, the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a violent military coup led by rebellious junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Haitian army. Following the restoration of the chain of command, a military junta led by Army Commander in Chief Raoul Cédras assumed control of the government and compelled Aristide and his closest advisers to go into exile. In the aftermath of the coup, an estimated 3,500 Aristide supporters were killed by paramilitary police and the armed forces.¹

Facing deteriorating economic conditions and intensified political repression, thousands of Haitians attempted to enter illegally into the United States by sea in poorly constructed and overcrowded boats. Thousands of refugees drowned when their boats capsized or sank; approximately 40,000 were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and eventually returned to Haiti after being denied political asylum in the United States.

In October, the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed a regional oil and arms embargo against Haiti and reaffirmed the international legitimacy of the Aristide government, rejecting an effort by the Haitian military to install a new civilian government. In support of the OAS action, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council imposed a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993.

On July 3, 1993, President Aristide and General Cédras signed the Governor’s Island Agreement in New York, which
provided for President Aristide’s return to office in Haiti by October 30, 1993, the suspension of international sanctions, the appointment of a new prime minister, an amnesty from prosecution for military personnel involved in the coup, the resignation of General Cédras, and the dispatch of a U.N. technical mission to train a new police force and professionalize the armed forces.²

In response to progress made toward resolving the Haitian crisis, the U.N. Security Council suspended the oil and arms embargo against Haiti on August 27, 1993. On September 23, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 867 (1993), establishing the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months, to assist the implementation of the Governor’s Island Agreement.³

This case study examines the original crisis in Haiti, the factors leading to the dispatch of UNMIH, the problems that UNMIH is likely to face, and the potential for success in light of current and foreseeable conditions in Haiti.

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Initial Crisis

On February 7, 1986, nearly 30 years of uninterrupted authoritarian rule in Haiti ended when President Jean-Claude Duvalier fled to France during an outbreak of civil unrest and mass demonstrations against his government. Three decades of corrupt and despotic rule under Duvalier and his father, François "Papa Doc," had resulted in the stagnation of the Haitian economy and had reinforced economic disparities between the mulatto
entrepreneurial elite and the darker skinned majority. Upon his departure in 1986, Duvalier left behind the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and the lowest ranked on virtually every indicator of general health and welfare.

In the absence of democratic civilian institutions, the power vacuum left by Duvalier's departure was immediately filled by the Haitian army, which established an interim military-civilian administration, ostensibly to serve as a caretaker until a new constitution could be written and democratic elections held. Despite its declared democratic intent, the interim government, headed by General Henri Namphy, was widely criticized for retaining many former members of the Duvalier cabinet. Under General Namphy's supervision, a new constitution was written in March 1987 and approved by 99 percent of voters in a referendum. A civilian government with strong ties to the military was voted into office in January 1988 in elections marred by extensive fraud.

The Haitian army demonstrated its continuing influence over political affairs in June 1988, when it ousted President Leslie Manigat after he had attempted to discharge General Namphy as Commander in Chief of the army. General Namphy subsequently imposed martial law and abrogated the Constitution of 1987. Two months later, General Namphy was ousted by an army faction led by General Prosper Avril. General Avril took tentative steps toward restoring democratic rule before being forced to resign in March 1990 in the midst of popular opposition and diplomatic pressure.
for his removal on the part of the United States.

Following General Namphy’s resignation from the presidency, a civilian interim government headed by Supreme Court Justice Ertha-Pascal Trouillot assumed executive authority until presidential and legislative elections were held on December 16, 1990.

The elections, which were monitored by U.N. and OAS observers, gave a landslide victory in the presidential race to Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, a popular left-wing activist and priest, secured 67 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential voting. Aristide’s allies in the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front Nacional pour le Changement et la Démocratie--FNCD) achieved minority representation in the legislative chambers, capturing 5 of 27 seats in the Senate and 18 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.5

President Aristide’s nine-month tenure was punctuated by bitter political clashes between his left-wing administration and right-wing opponents in the legislature and the business community. Although the populist president took tentative steps toward restoring civilian control over the military, he failed to foster a climate of consensual democratic politics, relying instead on an autocratic style of government and on intimidation of political opponents to effect his policies. Tensions mounted in August 1991, when a large crowd of supporters of President Aristide and Prime Minister René Préval marched on the parliament building and threatened with violence legislators who had
convened to consider a vote of no confidence against the government. The following day, pro-Aristide mobs set fire to FNCD headquarters after its leader, Evans Paul, publicly broke with Aristide over his political tactics and endorsed the no confidence vote.⁶

President Aristide’s most dramatic departure from democratic discourse occurred on September 28, 1990, when, in a speech before a large crowd in Port-au-Prince, he alluded favorably to the practice of "necklacing" (the placement of a flaming tire around a person’s neck), as a means of redressing social grievances. By this time, Aristide had also alienated the military by establishing a paramilitary presidential guard independent of the Armed Forces High Command.

Alarmed by the President Aristide’s oratory and wary of losing their traditional privileges under a left-wing government, members of the commercial sector and the traditional elite joined with right-wing sectors of the army in support of a coup. On September 30, 1990, junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Haitian army deposed President Aristide in a violent uprising. After several hours of disorder, General Raoul Cédras declared himself still in command of the Army, assumed de facto control of the government, and forced Aristide to leave the country.

In the months following the coup, approximately 3,500 persons, mostly Aristide supporters victimized by the police and armed forces, were killed in factional violence. International human rights monitors reported widespread violations of human
rights by the armed forces throughout the country. There was also a dramatic increase in the number of persons attempting to escape Haiti by crossing the Dominican Republic border or by navigating the Windward Passage toward Florida in poorly constructed and overcrowded boats. Reports of capsized vessels off the coasts of Cuba and Florida indicated that thousands of refugees had drowned attempting to cross the Windward Passage. Approximately 40,000 refugees were intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and detained for processing at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo, Cuba, while an estimated 300,000 persons fled to the Dominican Republic.  

As the flow of refugees threatened to become a mass exodus in late 1992, the U.S. government announced a policy to deter illegal immigration from Haiti, including immediate repatriation of persons intercepted at sea. This policy was renewed in January by President-elect Bill Clinton, who expanded the Coast Guard presence in the Windward Passage while promising intensified U.S. efforts to find an early democratic solution to the crisis.

The OAS Response

The response of the international community to the crisis in Haiti was spearheaded by the OAS. On October 1, 1991, the OAS convened in emergency session at its headquarters in Washington to discuss the situation in Haiti. In accordance with the Santiago Protocols for the protection of hemispheric democracy signed in May 1991, the OAS condemned the coup and reiterated its recognition of Aristide as the democratically elected head of
state, calling for his immediate restoration, imposing a regional arms and oil embargo against Haiti, and considering further measures to restore democratic rule.

In February 1992, OAS-mediated talks between President Aristide and members of a Haitian legislative delegation resulted in the signing of an interim agreement for Aristide’s eventual return. This agreement was repudiated, however, after the Haitian Supreme Court, under pressure from the military, declared it null and void.

In an effort to obtain international legitimacy for the de facto government, the Haitian military engineered a tripartite agreement in May 1992 among itself, the legislature, and the interim president that called for the interim presidency to be vacated and center-right politician Marc Bazin to be appointed prime minister. This agreement, which conceded Aristide’s status as head of state but imposed highly restrictive conditions for his return to Haiti, was also rejected by the international community.

In September, the OAS dispatched to Haiti an 18-member Civilian Commission to monitor human rights conditions in the country. In February 1993, President Aristide requested, and the Bazin government authorized, the expansion of the Civilian Commission to 200 O.A.S. and U.N. human rights observers.⁸

The U.N. Response

requested that the Secretary-General cooperate with the OAS to resolve the crisis. In accordance with the Assembly request, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on December 11, appointed Dante Caputo as his Special Envoy to Haiti. Special Envoy Caputo met with President Aristide and General Cédras later that month to explore avenues for resolving the crisis. As a result of these meetings, the Bazin government in February approved the dispatch of a joint U.N.-OAS Civilian Observer Mission to Haiti, comprising 200 civilian observers, to monitor the human rights situation.

On June 16, 1993, the Security Council issued Resolution 841 (1993), imposing a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti in order to pressure the de facto government into making further concessions toward restoring President Aristide. Facing toughened sanctions, the Bazin government agreed to resume U.N.-mediated negotiations with President Aristide on terms for his resumption of office in Haiti.

A U.N.-mediated agreement on the return of President Aristide and the restoration of constitutional rule was signed on July 3, 1993, on Governor’s Island, New York. The main terms of the Governor’s Island Agreement were: (1) the establishment of a timetable for Aristide’s return; (2) the naming of a new prime minister by Aristide; (3) the granting of a general amnesty for the military and members of the de facto government; (4) the retirement of General Cédras and twelve legislators elected since the coup; and (5) the creation of a new Haitian police force and
the retraining of the military with U.N. assistance. A follow-up agreement, containing a series of political accords supportive of the main agreement, was signed in New York on July 16.

In accordance with the provisions of the Governor's Island Agreement and at the request of President Aristide and General Cedras, the U.N. offered to dispatch a technical mission to Haiti to oversee the training of a new police force and the professionalization of the armed forces. Responding to recent progress toward the restoration of democracy, the Security Council, on August 27, issued Resolution 861 (1993), suspending the embargo. On August 31, the Security Council issued Resolution 862 (1993), authorizing the dispatch to Haiti of an advance team of 30 personnel to prepare for the possible deployment of the technical mission. On September 23, Security Council Resolution 867 (1993) authorized the dispatch of UNMIH for an initial six-month period.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

On September 8, 1993, an advance team of 30 U.N. personnel arrived in Haiti and established a headquarters in Port au Prince. The deployment was directly supervised by Special Envoy Caputo, who acted as civilian chief of mission.

Political and Military Goals

UNMIH will consist of a police monitor unit, a military construction unit, and rotating teams of military trainers. The civilian police monitors will "assist the Government in monitoring the activities of those members of the Armed Forces
who are currently carrying out police functions."¹⁷ They will also "establish liaison at all levels of the Haitian police force in order to provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations and ensure that legal requirements are met and police actions correctly executed."¹⁸

The military construction unit will be deployed "to work with the Haitian military to carry out construction projects relevant to the modernization of the military and of benefit to the civilian population."¹⁹

The military training teams will "provide training in non-lethal skills for officers and non-commissioned officers, at the general staff, regional and unit levels."²⁰

In his report to the Security Council proposing the mission to Haiti, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the deployment would serve an additional symbolic function by demonstrating the international community's commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and by discouraging civil unrest during the implementation of the Governor’s Island Agreement.

Rules of Engagement

U.N. police observers will be authorized to carry sidearms for their own protection, but will not conduct police duties and will rely upon the Haitian police and armed forces to comply with the Governor’s Island Agreement. The observers will require access to all information on the deployment of all personnel charged with civilian police functions and will enjoy complete
freedom of movement throughout Haitian territory. They will also be entitled to hold discussions freely and confidentially with any person or group and to collect any information deemed relevant.21

Composition of Forces

UNMIH will consist of approximately 1,600 personnel, including 567 police monitors from Canada, France, Algeria, and countries in the Caribbean, and a 600-member contingent of military engineers and medical and civil affairs specialists from the United States. In addition, UNMIH will employ 99 international civilian staff and 271 local civilian staff.22 The mission will work in close collaboration with the 200-person U.N.-OAS Civilian Commission already in Haiti.

Equipment

Police monitors have been authorized to wear sidearms, while the United States contingent has been assigned a "nonconfrontational role" and will deploy unarmed. The mission will require naval, air, and land transport, including trucks, light vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and heavy construction equipment as well as portable secure communications equipment.

Training

Information on the training or prior peacekeeping experience of U.N. personnel is unavailable.

Tactics

UNMIH will establish its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and
subheadquarters in different parts of the country. As in prior police monitoring missions, U.N. police monitors will be divided into mobile teams that will accompany the Haitian police and armed forces on patrols throughout the country, monitoring all activities, but will not assume any law enforcement functions themselves. A contingent of the police unit will also help establish a new police academy in Port-au-Prince.

Cost

The total projected cost of UNMIH during its first six months is estimated at $49,856,000.²³

Operational Assessment

Under its current mandate, UNMIH’s success depends upon its ability to persuade the Haitian army to relinquish its internal security functions and reorient itself toward external defense and technical roles. Although General Cédras and the Army High Command have publicly endorsed these goals, their ability to direct junior officers and the rank and file to work cooperatively with foreign military personnel remains in doubt in light of the factionalism and corruption that has characterized the Haitian army during the past six years. Moreover, it became apparent in the immediate aftermath of the September 1991 coup that General Cédras had only a tenuous command of his troops.

Should mid-level officers opposed to Aristide’s return choose to disregard orders to cooperate with UNMIH, the U.N. mission might face an insurmountable obstacle to the fulfillment of its mandate. Whether Haitian officers can be commanded to
forego their lucrative and powerful positions under the current regime and enter into less prestigious labor under a democratic government remains doubtful.

A second potential problem arises from the presence of a large contingent of U.S. military personnel within UNMIH. Some Haitian political leaders, appealing to nationalist sentiment, have drawn unfavorable comparisons between UNMIH and the U.S. military occupation of Haiti from 1916 to 1934. If this perception were to become widespread, the mission could be jeopardized and popular support for President Aristide could dissipate in light of his apparent dependence on United States military support.

An additional risk to UNMIH arises from the fragility of the Haitian democratic process and its almost exclusive identification with the central personality of President Aristide. Recent events indicate that President Aristide’s safety upon his return to Haiti has not yet been assured. If he were to be assassinated or forced again to leave the country, the ensuing unrest could pose a hazard to UNMIH personnel, who might be blamed for failing to protect the president.

CURRENT SITUATION

The current situation in Haiti poses a severe challenge to U.N. efforts to restore democratic rule in that country. The climate of terror prevailing throughout Haiti and slow progress in implementing the Governor’s Island Agreement represent serious obstacles to UNMIH’s operations.
Between July and September, U.N. and OAS monitors reported over 100 politically motivated killings in the capital alone. On several occasions, armed civilians linked to the security forces, commonly known as "attachés," seized and publicly executed Aristide supporters. The most notable incident occurred on September 11, 1993, when a prominent Aristide backer was dragged from a Port-au-Prince church during a service and shot dead in the street while police officers nearby made no attempt to arrest the killer. Three days later, the prosecutor investigating the case resigned after receiving death threats.

Despite their obligation under the Governor's Island Agreement to ensure public safety and respect for human rights, the Haitian military and police have failed to curb violence against Aristide supporters and have themselves perpetrated attacks. Compliance with the Governor's Island Agreement has also been hampered by delays in the legislative confirmation of Robert Malval as prime minister and by widespread acts of intimidation against newly appointed Malval government officials.

CONCLUSION

In light of the continuing climate of violence prevailing in Haiti, the lack of a sustained effort by the security forces to ensure public safety and curb human rights violations, and continuing logistical and political obstacles to President Aristide's return, it is unlikely that implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement will remain on schedule. Despite General Cédras' public support for UNMIH, the lower levels of the
Haitian military have yet to demonstrate a willingness to observe human rights and redefine their mission. Until such cooperation is obtained, it is unlikely that UNMIH will be able to effectively carry out its mandate.
Endnotes


17. Report of the Secretary-General, 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 4.

20. Ibid., 3.

21. Ibid., 3.

22. Ibid., 4.


25. Ibid.
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Selected Chronology

1980

In April, Army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe assassinated President William Tolbert in a military coup and seized power.

1985

In October, Doe was elected president in elections marked by irregularities.

1989

In December, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor launched a rebellion from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire with Libyan support.

1990

In January, a regional security crisis developed when tens of thousands of Liberians belonging to the Gio ethnic group fled to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea to escape retaliation from government forces belonging to the Krahn group.

In May, the NPFL captured the port of Buchanan.

In July, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Prince Yormie Johnson captured the Monrovia port.

In August, an amphibious peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG) disembarked in Monrovia. Johnson and Doe welcomed the peacekeeping force while Taylor, denouncing it as a vehicle for Nigerian intervention, declared war against it.

In September, during an unannounced visit to ECOMOG headquarters, Doe was captured and killed by the INPFL.

In November, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under Interim President Amos Sawyer.

1991

In May, the NPFL broke off negotiations with IGNU and resumed military operations against the government. NPFL troops conducted raids against Sierra Leone.
In October, an ECOMOG-brokered meeting in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, produced a cease-fire agreement in which the rebel factions agreed to demobilize within 60 days and IGNU agreed to hold elections within six months.

1992

In January, ECOMOG deployed at air and sea ports formerly held by the NPFL and established a buffer zone along the border with Sierra Leone.

In May, NPFL forces captured and executed six Senegalese ECOMOG peacekeepers.

In August, an anti-Taylor militia clashed with NPFL forces, capturing substantial NPFL territory.

In October, the NPFL and INPFL dissidents launched an offensive against Monrovia, targeting ECOMOG and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) forces. ECOMOG responded with air and artillery assaults on NPFL positions.

1993

In July, at a summit in Cotonou, Benin, a peace agreement was signed, calling for a cease-fire, NPFL demobilization under United Nations (U.N.) supervision, and the formation of a transitional government until elections were held in seven months.

In September, serious clashes were reported on the Liberian border with Côte d’Ivoire.
INTRODUCTION

The Liberian civil war, in its various stages, entailed factional and ethnic warfare between the Liberian government and various rebel movements, the most important of which was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. Ethnic identity played a significant role in the conflict, with the former government of President Samuel Doe drawing support from the Krahn ethnic group and the rebels receiving most of their support and membership from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups.

As the fighting intensified in 1990, the Liberian civil war became a regional security crisis when hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, severely straining those countries' limited resources. The outbreak of ethnic warfare was perceived by Liberia’s neighbors as a dangerous phenomenon in a region dominated by multiethnic states.

In response to the growing threat to regional security, the countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a regional peacekeeping force to end the fighting and restore order and central government authority in Liberia. In August 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping operation, began its deployment in the Liberian capital of Monrovia.

Following the capture and execution of President Doe in September 1990 by a second rebel faction under Prince Yormie Johnson, ECOWAS established an interim government headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer. After several failed attempts to implement a cease-
fire, a peace agreement was signed on July 25, 1993 in Cotonou, Benin, calling for an immediate cease-fire, demobilization of the NPFL under U.N. supervision, and elections within seven months. By this time, the Liberian civil war had claimed more than 150,000 lives and had displaced half of Liberia's 2.8 million people.¹

This study examines the initial crisis in Liberia, the factors leading to the detachment of ECOMOG, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current situation in the country in light of the mission's initial goals.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

**The Initial Crisis**

Liberia's historical pattern of stable government was interrupted in April 1980 when the government of President William Tolbert was toppled in a military coup led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. Following the execution of the ousted president and thirteen high government officials, Doe installed himself as military dictator, and in October 1985 declared himself president after claiming victory in a fraudulent election.

Originally welcomed by Liberians as an improvement over the thoroughly corrupt Tolbert government, Doe's regime soon disappointed popular expectations by engaging in comparable corruption and repression of political dissidents and adversaries. The extent of opposition to Doe's rule became evident in 1985, when the first of several failed coup attempts
was carried out by disaffected members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).

A sustained rebellion against Doe’s government was begun by Charles Taylor’s NPFL on Christmas Eve 1989. Relying on aid and training from Libya and Burkina Faso, the NPFL commanded support among the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. A second rebel front, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), consisted of exiled Liberians from Côte d’Ivoire under the leadership of Prince Yormie Johnson.

The fighting quickly intensified as Doe’s security forces, mainly from the Krahn ethnic group, conducted retaliatory killings of Gio and Mano civilians. Doe’s repression drove thousands of displaced Gio and Mano into the ranks of the NPFL and INPFL guerrillas. Many more thousands became internally and externally displaced, creating a regional refugee crisis.

By April 1990, the rebels had overcome government resistance in Nimba county. The NPFL and INPFL began taking strategic positions in the capital in late July, eventually laying siege to the presidential palace. By late 1990, the war had claimed more than 20,000 lives, the majority civilian, with at least half the deaths resulting from starvation and disease. Hundreds of thousands more had taken refuge in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.

The ECOWAS Response

The involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis began in May 1990, when, at an organization meeting held in Banjul, Gambia, Liberian hostilities were discussed. The ECOWAS
discussions concluded with the issuance of a formal statement calling for an end to the hostilities and the creation by five member states of a Standing Mediation Committee to help resolve the Liberian conflict.

Considerable differences emerged among the sixteen ECOWAS member states over how to respond to the Liberian crisis. Nigeria and Gambia were at the forefront of efforts to expand ECOWAS’s role in regional affairs and saw the Liberian crisis as an opportunity to advance this goal, whereas Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali opposed such a role expansion. The decision to dispatch ECOMOG to Liberia was therefore not unanimous, but was instead undertaken by a Standing Mediation Committee comprising Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra-Leone.

After repeated efforts by the Standing Mediation Committee to negotiate a cease-fire proved unsuccessful, ECOWAS dispatched an amphibious force of approximately 4,000 ECOMOG troops to Liberia on August 25, 1990.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

On August 24, 1990, a 4,000-strong ECOMOG amphibious landing force designated "Operation Liberty" disembarked in the port of Monrovia. The Liberian government and the NPFL welcomed the ECOMOG presence, whereas the NPFL rejected the peacekeeping mission, considering it a pretense for Nigerian military support of the Doe regime. Taylor subsequently declared war on ECOMOG and began assaults against ECOMOG forces in Monrovia.

ECOMOG experienced a major setback early in its deployment
when, during an unannounced visit by Samuel Doe to ECOMOG headquarters in September 1990, the Liberian president was captured and tortured to death by the INPFR. Following Doe’s killing, ECOWAS attempted to fill the power vacuum left by his death by intensifying its efforts to establish an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under Interim President Amos Sawyer. Sawyer, a political moderate, would preside over what remained of the Liberian central government apparatus until a cease-fire and elections could be held. The new Sawyer government was inaugurated in November 1990.

A second immediate impact of the Doe assassination was to spur more active Nigerian participation in ECOMOG. In the wake of the Doe killing, the peacekeeping force’s command and control structure was reorganized; henceforth, all the overall commanders would be Nigerian.

Preliminary progress toward resolving the Liberian conflict occurred in late 1990 and early 1991. In December 1990, ECOWAS mediated a cease-fire agreement among the NPFL, INPFL, and the AFL that proposed the convening of a national conference within 60 days to establish a new interim administration and the creation of an ECOWAS-sponsored technical committee to monitor the cease-fire. In January 1991, all rebel forces, in fulfillment of their obligations under the cease-fire agreement, withdrew from Monrovia and relinquished their positions to ECOMOG troops.

Further steps toward a political settlement were taken in April 1991, when an INFPL official was appointed vice president
of the interim government and the INPFL gained representation in the Interim National Assembly. Taylor’s NPFL, however, continued to avoid a firm commitment to enter the political process peacefully and, in May 1991, broke off negotiations with IGNU, resuming its military offensive.

In June, a third resistance movement, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Ulimo), was established by Krahn supporters of the late President Doe who had taken refuge in Sierra Leone. Ulimo’s main objectives were to defeat Taylor in his bid for power in Liberia and advance the interests of former Doe supporters.

A comprehensive initiative for resolving the Liberian conflict began in October 1991, when a summit meeting in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, produced a peace agreement between the NPFL and IGNU. Under the agreement, which was subsequently signed by the INPFL and Ulimo, the rebels agreed to disarm and to relinquish all territory under their control to ECOMOG. It was also agreed that all Liberian forces would be withdrawn from Sierra Leone and that ECOMOG would establish a demilitarized zone along Liberia’s border with Sierra Leone. The agreement would be implemented within 60 days and elections would be held within six months.

As with previous agreements, compliance was only partial and was limited to observance of the cease-fire. Although some rebel units began to disarm voluntarily in May 1992, the demobilization was far behind schedule and did not significantly
reduce rebel military capabilities. Moreover, ECOMOG was not allowed to extend its territorial control beyond the capital, the port of Buchanan, and the Sierra Leone buffer zone.

The Yamoussoukro agreement collapsed in mid-1992 as the factional fighting between Ulimo and the NPFL resumed and relations between ECOMOG and the NPFL deteriorated. In May, NPFL troops captured and executed six Senegalese members of the ECOMOG forces near the Sierra Leone border. In August, Ulimo launched an offensive against the NPFL, forcing Taylor’s militia out of two southwestern counties. In September, nearly 600 ECOMOG soldiers were taken prisoner and physically mistreated by NPFL troops. The ECOMOG personnel were later released, but relations were further strained when an ECOMOG soldier fired upon Charles Taylor’s land convoy, prompting Taylor to charge that ECOMOG was trying to assassinate him.

Full scale fighting between ECOMOG and the NPFL resumed on October 15, 1992, when the NPFL and dissident elements of the INPFL launched a coordinated offensive against Monrovia, targeting ECOMOG and AFL personnel. ECOMOG sustained an undisclosed number of casualties in the fighting; among the casualties were two soldiers who, along with two United States nationals, were abducted and murdered by the NPFL on October 20, 1992.⁴

ECOMOG responded to the rebel offensive with a counteroffensive that involved tank, artillery, and air strikes against rebel positions, including Taylor’s headquarters in the
town of Gbarnga. ECOMOG also launched air strikes against NPFL supply lines and weapons caches, causing some damage among the civilian population. By early 1993, ECOMOG had repelled the NPFL offensive and had taken control of several strategic areas and economic zones, including Roberts International Airport, the Firestone plantations, and the port city of Buchanan. The peacekeeping force’s efforts to neutralize the NPFL’s military capabilities were hampered, however, by the continuing support provided to Taylor’s army by the government of Burkina Faso.

**Political and Military Goals**

ECOMOG’s political goals combined the security and humanitarian concerns of the Mediation Committee member states. These were, first, to restore stable central government in Liberia; second, to halt the spread of ethnic warfare and bring an immediate end to the mass killings of civilians; third, to repatriate war refugees; and, fourth, to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

ECOMOG’s military objectives were initially ill-defined and have undergone substantial evolution during the course of the operation, reflecting changing military conditions in Liberia and the lack of a clear operational blueprint for the separation of forces. ECOMOG’s operational doctrine also tended to change in response to changes in mission leadership, with different commanders alternating between peacekeeping and more aggressive peace enforcement approaches.

In general terms, ECOMOG’s military objectives were first,
to facilitate the disengagement of forces and police a cease-
fire; second, to supervise the concentration and demobilization
of irregular armies; and third, to restore civil peace and
establish central government authority.

Rules of Engagement

During the first few months of its deployment, ECOMOG’s
rules of engagement allowed ECOMOG troops to fire only in self-
defense. As the mission’s military capabilities increased and the
frequency and intensity of NPFL attacks escalated, ECOMOG
developed a shoot-to-kill policy for both defensive and limited
offensive actions. The policy included the selective use of
tanks, artillery, and armed aircraft against military targets.
ECOMOG was also authorized to take and hold territory by force.

Composition of Forces

At maximum strength, ECOMOG consisted of between 9,000 and
11,000 ground, naval, and air forces. From 1990 until mid-
1993, military personnel were provided by Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The largest contingent
consisted of approximately 4,000 troops from Nigeria. In mid-
1993, planning was underway for the addition of contingents from
Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to help offset the
Nigerian presence.

ECOMOG was originally commanded by General Arnold Quiano of
Ghana. He was succeeded by Nigerian generals Joshua Dongoyaro,
Rufus Kupolati, Ishaya Bakut, and Adetunji Olurin. Major General
Olurin is the current mission commander.
Equipment

ECOMOG has relied primarily on the Nigerian armed forces for its equipment needs. Equipment in use includes light weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, helicopters, fixed-wing ground attack and transport aircraft, and naval transport and patrol craft.

Among the ground equipment available in the Nigerian arsenal were T-55 and Vickers MK 3 main battle tanks; Scorpion light tanks; Saracen, 4K-7PA, and Piranha armored personnel carriers; 155mm, 122mm and 105mm towed artillery pieces; and 81mm mortars. Available naval equipment included frigates, corvettes, Ambe(Ge) LSTs, and converted commercial vessels for troop transport. Available air equipment included L-39MS and MB-339AN counterinsurgency aircraft; Alpha Jet, MiG-21MF, MiG-21U, MiG-21B/FR and Jaguar ground attack aircraft; and Bo-105D attack helicopters.\(^\text{10}\)

Nonlethal supplies and logistical support were also provided by the United States to the Senegalese contingent.\(^\text{11}\)

Training

ECOMOG Commander Olurin had prior peacekeeping experience as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Nigerian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Most ECOMOG personnel had no prior peacekeeping experience or specialized training.

Tactics

ECOMOG's initial tactics included the occupation of strategic air and sea port facilities formerly held by the NPFL
and the establishment of a defensive perimeter around Monrovia. Approximately 800 ECOMOG troops were also deployed in a buffer zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone to repel NPFL incursions into that country. Under the command of Major General Olurin, in late 1992 ECOMOG began to target directly NPFL command and control, particularly NPFL leader Charles Taylor, through artillery and air assaults. ECOMOG was also involved in escorting U.N. relief convoys along the road from the port of Buchanan to Monrovia through NPFL-held territory.

**Cost**

The estimated 1993 cost of ECOMOG was $80 million, with ECOWAS countries—primarily Nigeria—bearing the major expense of fielding the peacekeeping force in Liberia. The United States has provided $8.6 million directly to ECOMOG and $18.75 million in foreign military sales and Defense Department drawdown authority to ECOWAS member states to support the peacekeeping operation.

**Operational Assessment**

As an ongoing peacekeeping mission, ECOMOG's performance in Liberia cannot be conclusively evaluated. Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that the performance of the peacekeeping operation has been mixed.

With regard to its primary political objective—containing the conflict in Liberia and halting the spread of ethnic warfare to other states in West Africa—ECOMOG has been partially successful. No ethnically based rebel movements comparable to
Taylor’s NPFL have emerged in the subregion, but the Liberian fighting has at times spread into Sierra Leone and currently threatens Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally, Burkina Faso has been involved in clandestinely supplying the NPFL, while Ulimo has used the territory of Sierra Leone as a staging area for armed incursions into Liberian territory, prompting NPFL incursions into Sierra Leone.

A second political objective, to establish a Liberian central government authority and restore civil order in Liberia, has only tentatively been achieved and remains to be fully realized. Prior to the Cotonou Agreement, several cease-fire agreements negotiated under ECOWAS auspices failed to produce a lasting peace, mainly because they lacked a clear procedure for verifying and enforcing the demobilization of irregular forces. Moreover, the breakthroughs achieved at the Cotonou summit were made possible by the intercession of the U.N. after ECOWAS’s neutrality was questioned. Whether the current formula for demobilization, transitional government, and internationally monitored elections can be effectively implemented remains to be determined.

A third objective, relating to the humanitarian concerns of the ECOWAS states, namely, to stop the mass killings of civilians and prevent famine, has also been achieved only partially. Although ECOWAS was not able to bring an immediate halt to the killing of civilians, it has been minimally successful in establishing pockets of security where displaced persons can
receive humanitarian assistance. It has also provided for safe delivery of food convoys. Although the majority of deaths in the Liberian civil war have occurred since the arrival of ECOMOG, without the presence of the peacekeeping force the death toll would have been considerably higher than the current estimate of 150,000.

CURRENT SITUATION

The resumption of fighting in Liberia in late 1992 prompted the U.N. to increase its involvement in the Liberian crisis. On November 19, 1992, U.N. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) imposed an arms and oil embargo on all military forces in Liberia excluding ECOMOG. It also instructed the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices to help resolve the Liberian crisis.14

A new round of U.N.-brokered negotiations to end the fighting culminated in the signing of an interim peace agreement in Geneva on July 17, 1993, and a comprehensive agreement on July 25 in Cotonou, Benin. The Cotonou Agreement, signed by IGNU, the NPFL, and Ulimo, establishes a transitional government with executive authority vested in a five-person Council of State with a rotating chairmanship. The agreement stipulates that the transitional government will not take office until the U.N. has verified that the disarmament process is irreversible. As part of the agreement, the U.N. will deploy a 300-strong military observer force throughout Liberia to verify demobilization. The Cotonou Agreement further requires that ECOMOG be expanded to include contingents from Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
to help offset the Nigerian presence.

On August 10, 1993, U.N. Security Council Resolution 856 (1993) approved the dispatch to Liberia of an advance team of 30 military observers to monitor, investigate, and report cease-fire violations, as called for in the Cotonou Agreement. The Secretary-General also dispatched a technical team to evaluate the proposed establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).\textsuperscript{15}

On September 5, 1993, the U.N. reported a serious cease-fire violation at the Liberian border with Côte d'Ivoire.\textsuperscript{16} In October, the renewed fighting threatened to reignite the civil war.

CONCLUSION

The ability of ECOMOG to fulfill its mandate over the next several months will depend on its success in disarming the rebel factions and in establishing the rule of law throughout Liberia. In order to fully realize its mission objectives, ECOMOG will need to make more progress than it has to date in disarming the rebel factions and extending its presence into the Liberian interior. It will also need to work cooperatively with the U.N. to ensure that the rebel factions are being irreversibly demobilized.
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British Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland

Selected Chronology

1922

Following partition of Ireland's 32 provinces, the independent Republic of Ireland was created in the south's 26 provinces; the six counties in the northeast remain part of the United Kingdom as the province of Northern Ireland.

1969

In August, the British Army was deployed in Northern Ireland and given overall responsibility for internal security.

1972

The British government imposed direct rule over Northern Ireland and assumed responsibility for law and order.

1974

Britain legislated the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

1985

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments.

1991

Peace negotiations began under British auspices, with inter party talks between representatives of the leading political parties in Northern Ireland, except Sinn Fein.

1992

In May, M.I.5, the British domestic counterintelligence agency, was given overall responsibility for counterinsurgency against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in mainland Britain. The British army continued to play the predominant role in counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland.

In November, the peace negotiations collapsed as the negotiating sides failed to resolve several key differences.
INTRODUCTION

The insurgency in Northern Ireland (also referred to as the Ulster Province) by the Roman Catholic-based Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has forced Britain to confront for more than two decades one of the most difficult problems of terrorism in Western Europe. Protestant paramilitaries have also engaged in a parallel, although more limited, insurgency that has been primarily directed at Roman Catholic targets in the province. From 1969, when the PIRA first began its rebellion, until mid-1993, more than 3,032 people have been killed in the province (including more than 120 deaths in mainland Britain) and 35,000 injured. To resolve these insurgencies, in 1972 Britain assumed direct responsibility for law and order in the province; direct rule from London, under the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was introduced in 1972. In 1993 there was limited hope for resolution of the Northern Ireland insurgency based on developments springing from the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and the rounds of peace talks that have followed. In the meantime, in the absence of a negotiated agreement, direct rule by Britain and the deployment of the British army in the province appear to provide the only means to prevent extremist elements in the Roman Catholic and Protestant communities from destroying each other.

The British counterinsurgency campaign has employed political, legal, military, intelligence, and police measures against the PIRA, the primary insurgent group. Unlike the
traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations examined in this study, the British counterterrorism campaign has been governed by different political and military goals, rules of engagement, tactics, mix of forces, equipment, and cost.

**PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland is the product of a number of historical legacies, of which the most important was the partition of Ireland in 1922 into the 26 counties of the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic Republic of Ireland and the six counties of the predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland. Although Protestants have ruled Northern Ireland and formed the majority of the 1.6 million inhabitants, Roman Catholics have always constituted a large minority, reaching 38.4 percent of the population in 1991.²

The conflict revolves around the clashing aspirations of the two communities. Most Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland are Irish nationalists and Republicans, and seek to reunite the 32 counties of historical Ireland into a single, independent Irish state. Most Protestants are Loyalists and Unionists, i.e., they are loyal to Britain and view their future as remaining an integral part of the United Kingdom. Therefore they reject the notion of any "reunification" with the Irish Republic, where they would be reduced to a religious minority.

**The Initial Crisis**

The British involvement in Northern Ireland was caused by an escalation in violence in the late 1960s when a militant faction
within the primarily nonviolent Roman Catholic-based civil rights movement broke away to form the PIRA, and embarked on a campaign of terrorist violence.

The British Response

In April 1969, the Northern Ireland government, faced with mounting disorder and violence, asked Britain to send army units to protect key government installations in the province. In August of that year, all security forces in the province were placed under British command. In March 1972, the escalation in violence and the Northern Ireland government's inability to manage the disorder resulted in the assumption by the British government of direct responsibility for law and order in the province. This step led to the resignation of the Northern Ireland government, the abolition of the province's parliament, and the introduction of direct rule from London, with a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland appointed to manage the province's affairs.

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Although the British government had initially attempted to contain the insurgency within the province's civilian structure, the intensity of PIRA violence resulted in the transformation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the main police force, into a paramilitary organization, and the deployment in the province of the British army and other special operations forces, including the British domestic intelligence service, M.I.-5. In mainland Britain, M.I.-5 and the Special Branch of the
Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) are primarily used to counteract the PIRA.

Political and Military Goals

The British government’s political aims in the province are to maintain the rule of law, ensure that the inhabitants’ civil and political rights are protected, maintain democratic institutions, and promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Although the British government has ruled the province by decree, the ultimate aim is to establish a devolved form of government in the province that would be acceptable to both the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. Britain has aimed to bring about constitutional change in the province by drawing together in peace negotiations leaders of the major parties of the two communities who are willing to arrive at a new political arrangement. In Britain’s view, political power and resources would be handed to locally elected bodies in the new political system. The only party to be excluded from these talks is Sinn Fein, the PIRA’s political front, which steadfastly adheres to a political solution calling for a united Ireland and continued armed struggle against Britain.

The British Army’s mission in the province is to maintain security, particularly the eradication of terrorism, and to prevent an outbreak of large-scale civil war. The ultimate objective is for the British army gradually to hand responsibility for security back to the RUC and the UDR.
Rules of Engagement

The British Army's primary mission is peacekeeping and security enforcement. First, British Army personnel are given a "yellow card," which spells out the instructions regulating the use of firearms when a threat exists to the life of the soldier or another person. Second, under certain extraordinary circumstances, security forces, such as the Special Air Services (SAS), are authorized to kill PIRA personnel, particularly when the victims are engaged in an act of terrorism. Third, British army troops are forbidden to pursue or fire upon suspected PIRA fighters across the Irish border. Fourth, the movements of British army and security personnel, particularly off-duty, are restricted in the province, especially in what are termed "no-go" areas in the Roman Catholic communities. In these areas, where the chance of encountering a sniper’s bullet is ever present, there is no fraternization between British personnel and the openly hostile local community.

Composition of Forces

Britain has deployed police, military, and intelligence services in the counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. The RUC is the leading police force operating in Northern Ireland. In mainland Britain, the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) was the primary police service engaged in counterterrorism against the PIRA until 1992 when its coordinating role was taken over by M.I.5.

The British army's deployment in Northern Ireland began in
1969 with 8,000 troops. By July 1972, this deployment had increased to 21,288 personnel. On November 15, 1991, Britain called up 1,400 reserve troops from the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) for full-time active duty; this force was augmented on November 18 of that year by the deployment of 300 additional regular troops in the province.

In 1993 Britain deployed 20,000 troops in Northern Ireland. These units were composed of three brigade headquarters, one engineer field squadron, one engineer squadron, six long-tour infantry battalions, six short-tour infantry battalions, and one regiment army air corps and seven battalions of the newly-established Royal Irish Regiment.¹

The SAS Regiment of the British army is the principal military unit deployed in counterinsurgency operations in Northern Ireland. In 1992, its strength was estimated at one regiment.²

In addition to the British army, the largely Protestant UDR was deployed in the province until July 1, 1991, when it was merged with the Royal Irish Rangers to form a new Northern Irish Regiment (NIR). The NIR was established to provide a more capable security force to operate in support of the RUC. In the mid-1980s, the UDR had 2,500 full-time troops.³

**Equipment**

The equipment used by British counterterrorism units includes armored personnel carriers (APCs); Scout, Westland Wessex, and Lynx helicopters (for Army patrols in border areas);
Gazelle helicopters equipped with TV camera mountings (including thermal imagers); tanks fitted with bulldozer blades; Ferret scout cars; offensive riot-control weapons, such as plastic bullets and dye-filled water cannons; defensive riot-control equipment such as helmets, visors, long shields, and flak vests; remote-controlled tracked Wheelbarrow bomb disposal equipment; a variety of nonstandard weapons, special firearms, and Armalite assault rifles; specially designed vehicles to protect patrols from radio command bombs, vehicle trailers containing transmitters to jam detonation signals; the CRUCIBLE computer database system; high-technology bugging and listening equipment (including devices used inside weapons); overt observation posts, with posts equipped with computers linked to vehicle registrations; and high quality surveillance cameras.\(^7\)

**Training**

The British security forces initially deployed in Northern Ireland in 1970 had gained formidable experience in counterinsurgency campaigns in Borneo and Dhofar (part of Oman). All SAS personnel stationed in the province undergo rigorous and continuous training in special forces techniques, including the use of a variety of firearms, physical fitness, demolition, signaling, and first aid.\(^8\) SAS-type training is also provided to soldiers from army units. Soldiers are trained in riot control techniques, as well as civil affairs, in order to improve their relations with the local population.

Prior to their deployment in the province, British Army
soldiers undergo "work-up" training in a simulated environment that replicates Ulster streets and countryside.  

**Tactics**

For British military forces, tactics consist of manning observation posts; ground and aerial border patrolling and surveillance; intelligence surveillance, including covertly photographing terrorist movements and activities; the use of informers and defectors to gain intelligence information, as well as interrogation of detainees and prisoners; undercover activities, such as armed, plain-clothed patrols by Military Reconnaissance Forces (MRF); riot control; and the use of computer data bases to store information about terrorist personnel and activities.

**Cost**

The total cost of the British counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain has reached billions of dollars since 1969. The total cost includes funding the deployment in the province of the British military, police, and intelligence services (in addition to the deployment of M.I.-5 and the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police in combating Northern Ireland-inspired terrorism in mainland Britain), as well as providing annual socioeconomic subsidies to the province (reaching $3 billion in 1992). Additional funds are expended on diplomatic and public relations campaigns.

**Operational Assessment**

The British counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland
has succeeded in restraining the terrorist-inspired violence from breaking out into full-scale civil war. A number of problems remain, however.

First, the continued deployment of the British army is still required in the province because it is the only force capable of preventing the outbreak of full-scale civil war (by paramilitaries of both sides.)

Second, in mid-1993 the PIRA's relatively small force was still capable of mounting lethal terrorist operations against British targets, both in Northern Ireland and in mainland Britain. Furthermore, this terrorism campaign has begun to concentrate on economic and industrial targets in Britain in order to bring about economic chaos, particularly in London's financial district. Several billion dollars worth of damage has resulted from these attacks in recent years; Britain has therefore been unable to contain PIRA violence to a "tolerable" level.

Third, the links between Roman Catholic and Protestant terrorist organizations and their respective local populations have remained strong over the years, despite British attempts to proscribe these paramilitaries and subject their members to imprisonment.

Fourth, the paramilitaries have continued to provide a self-policing function in the province, despite the presence of the RUC and the British Army. The RUC continues to be considered generally weak and must rely on the British army for help in
carrying out its police duties.

Fifth, the RUC and the British army have failed to resolve the problem of the continued existence of what are termed "no-go" areas in the Roman Catholic communities. In these areas, there is no fraternization between the RUC and British troops and the openly hostile Roman Catholic community. The continued existence of these areas is one of the most serious consequences of the security problem facing the British military authorities in Northern Ireland.¹¹

Sixth, restrictions continue to be placed on the movement of British army and security personnel in certain parts of the province because of past heavy-handed behavior during violent clashes with elements in the Roman Catholic community.¹²

The main British success in Northern Ireland lies in the recognition by both mainstream Protestants and Catholics that its continuing deployment in the province is the primary instrument and guarantor for ensuring peace and stability for the province.

Second, although peace negotiations, under British auspices, collapsed in November 1992, they still hold the best promise for an eventual political solution to the conflict. These talks also represent the first time in 23 years that leaders of the contending Roman Catholic and Protestant parties have agreed to talk to one another—although the PIRA's political front, Sinn Fein, is not represented.

CURRENT SITUATION

On November 10, 1992, the Northern Ireland constitutional
talks wound down after the parties decided that there was little possibility of a settlement.\textsuperscript{13} The breakdown in these negotiations resulted from the disagreement over the type of government to be installed in the province, the nature of the cross-border body to be set up, and whether or not the Republic of Ireland was prepared to renounce its claim to Northern Ireland. By October 1993, this situation remained static, with the politically weak Conservative-led British government unable to offer new initiatives to resolve the stalemate between Northern Ireland’s Protestant and Roman Catholic parties.

CONCLUSION

Terrorist-inspired violence has continued to haunt Northern Ireland, with a spillover into mainland Britain. Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant communities have continued to maintain their own extremist paramilitary organizations, in the process accumulating large caches of arms.

To date, Northern Ireland continues to drain Britain’s resources, both in terms of lives lost and financially. It has led the British authorities to impose a heightened state of security alert not only on British military personnel in Northern Ireland and in Western Europe, but also in Britain itself, where government officials, government buildings, major cities, and centers of business and transportation are frequently targeted by PIRA terrorism.

In the absence of a military solution, the Northern Ireland conflict can be resolved only through political measures such as
peace negotiations. Until this process of compromise occurs and the paramilitary organizations begin to disarm and agree to enter the democratic political process, the conflict will continue to brutalize all sides.
Endnotes


5. "Not Always So Polite," 58.


8. Jeffery, Northern Ireland: The Divided Province, 104.

9. Ibid., 106.


Bibliography


CONCLUSION

United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations have traditionally been provisional measures, intended to be temporary. As past experience shows, they can never by themselves resolve a conflict. Their goal is to stop or contain hostilities and thus create conditions in which peaceful solutions can be reached among contending parties. Viewed in terms of these limited goals, U.N. peacekeeping operations have a mixed record of past and current successes and failures. Missions like UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan or UNFICYP in Cyprus, for example, have successfully monitored cease-fires and kept intercommunal or religious violence to a minimum, although they did not solve the underlying problems that caused the conflicts. The U.N. supervised the implementation of an effective political settlement in Namibia. It monitored the free and fair elections in Nicaragua and oversaw the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Contras. U.N. military observers are also overseeing a successful political transition in El Salvador. Similarly, the non-U.N. peacekeeping forces examined in this study--ECOWAS in Liberia and the British army in Northern Ireland--have been partially successful in achieving their military and political goals of halting the spread of ethnic and religious warfare and preventing violence from overwhelming these societies.

The U.N. operation in the Congo, on the other hand, proved unequal to the task of maintaining peace. In the words of one
expert: "As the Congo descended into chaos, there was no peace to keep, no line to be patrolled." The mission was deeply flawed and doomed to fail from the beginning because the U.N. was interfering with a regional conflict that could have been dealt with quickly by using the Belgian troops already deployed in the country.

A similar situation has occurred in Somalia, with bloodshed and violence threatening the viability of the U.N. mission there. Once the peacekeeping operation was extended beyond the provision of nonmilitary humanitarian aid, the question of strategic interests arose. The recent deaths of U.S. military personnel serving with the U.N. force have caused intense controversy in the United States and have led numerous experts and Congressmen to call for the U.N. to withdraw its mission. The Somalia problem, then, illustrates the difficulty of reaching a consensus, both domestically and multinationally, when U.N. missions extend beyond traditional peacekeeping objectives.

The lessons from past U.N. experience in peacekeeping shows that U.N. missions have been effective at monitoring conventional military forces and force separation agreements, verifying the withdrawal of forces from combat, supervising elections, and mediating political transitions in situations where all sides favored the transition. But the U.N. has not been effective in cases where it has tried to restore government authority that is undermined by civil unrest or where it has monitored borders to detect the illicit infiltration of peoples or weapons.
Although its political impartiality and international legitimacy allow the U.N. to do what no single state can do, there are still considerable constraints on its operations that date back to the period of the Cold War. U.N. members have shown considerable hesitation, for example, before committing forces to the field when there are clear military risks involved, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Here the U.N. waited for a firm cease-fire to be reached between the contending parties before committing its peacekeeping forces and as a result thousands of civilian lives were lost.

Both the U.N. mission in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and UNOSOM point to another complex issue, that of national sovereignty. The situation in Bosnia has presented a great challenge: does the U.N. abandon the notion of national sovereignty or try to preserve it by means of humanitarian intervention? As for Somalia, the issue arises of how to enable the country to regain its sovereignty after humanitarian goals have been met. The inherent tension between humanitarian intervention and national sovereignty is likely to continue to be debated when the U.N. is weighing action in what are essentially domestic national conflicts.

Clearly, past U.N. peacekeeping operations offer useful lessons that should provide the basis for future action. In the optimum situation, the U.N. operation should be preceded by a cessation of hostilities and the agreement of the disputing parties to the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force. In cases
where these conditions are lacking, prior to making a decision to become involved in a peacekeeping operation the U.N. should consider such factors as the severity of the internal political problems, the duration and size of the proposed operation, the rules of engagement, including the requirement for enforcement action by the military forces, and the tactics that will be required. The time between the initial commitment by the Security Council and the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces should be kept to a minimum and the lines of communication between U.N. headquarters and the operations in the field should be tightened so as to avoid misunderstandings over the mission’s goals. 

Despite the dangers of extending U.N. peacekeeping into the realm of enforcement, the U.N. cannot fulfill its international objectives if it renounces the use of force. If the U.N. backs down and withdraws in the face of armed opposition, as it has contemplated in Somalia and Haiti, it will send a message to the mission’s opponents in other trouble spots that any small force can thwart a U.N. peacekeeping operation.

The case studies of U.N. peacekeeping operations show that if the U.N. is to ensure collective security effectively, it must have an enforcement capability. This means that its troops must be well trained and well-equipped, criteria that have not always been met in the past. In some cases, the mixture of equipment used by the various national contingents making up the U.N. force and the language barriers among contingents have caused logistical problems. If troops from different countries have no

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experience interacting with each other, they will have trouble functioning in their initial deployment together. These were problems demonstrated in the early stages of UNEF I and later UNEF II.

In acting forcefully, the U.N. Security Council should observe certain rules. First, it must be careful to define clearly the reasons for intervention and avoid using double standards. Why does it decide to act in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kurdish Iraq or Somalia, for example, but to stay out of southern Sudan, Liberia, or Northern Ireland? Second, the Security Council must ensure that its use of force will succeed by instituting a very careful military analysis of the task to be performed and deploying sufficient forces to accomplish it. Third, the Security Council must define a means by which U.N. forces can be withdrawn without leaving chaos and tyranny behind.³

Despite these apparent difficulties, numerous proposals for strengthening U.N. peacekeeping are currently being considered at the U.N. and in the U.S. government. These proposals are motivated by the change in the international environment as a result of the end of the Cold War. New demands for peacekeeping operations have arisen as national, ethnic, and religious separatism have led to unprecedented violence around the world. The future threats to international peace are less likely to be conflicts between conventional armies of different countries than they are ethnic conflicts within nation states or humanitarian disasters resulting from massive refugee flows across national
borders.

The new international security environment generated by the post-Cold War era is likely to expand vastly the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Proposed new U.N. peacekeeping missions include monitoring a possible cease-fire between northern and southern warring parties in the Sudan; providing an observer or buffer force in Zaire; replacing the ECOWAS force in Liberia; serving as a buffer force in Sri Lanka; and providing buffer or cease-fire monitoring forces in the former Soviet republics of South Ossetia, Modova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan. There is a possibility that U.N. peacekeeping operations currently being deployed in the Arab-Israeli sector might be replaced by U.S.-led, non-U.N. multinational peacekeeping missions when peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, are signed within the next few years.

It is also possible that the role of U.N. peacekeeping operations will be expanded into other functional areas. There have been suggestions that the U.N. disregard its principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of U.N. members, so that it could resolve internal conflicts before they extend beyond a country's borders. This would mean that the U.N. would expand its mission to that of peacekeeping in a civic action or nation-building capacity. Another possible role for future U.N. peacekeeping would be in combating terrorism by the creation of highly skilled, elite counterterrorist units.
Financing the growing scale of peacekeeping operations will be an immense problem. The operational costs are rising at a rapid rate, having reached close to 2 billion dollars in 1992. From 1988 to 1993, for example, U.N. peacekeeping expenses increased by a factor of ten. Because the U.N. often finds itself responding to emergencies, calls to U.N. member states for contributions come unexpectedly, making it difficult for governments to respond quickly. Furthermore, some major contributing countries, including the United States and the former Soviet Union, have fallen behind in meeting their financial obligations to the U.N. As these countries reassess their priorities in the post Cold War world, however, they are realizing that whenever possible it is better economically and politically to act under U.N. auspices than unilaterally. This change in strategy should eventually result in a stronger and more regular financial commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations on the part of member countries.
Endnotes


Bibliography


