PROPOSITION FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:
THE CASE FOR THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES J. KLINGAMAN, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1984

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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Proponency For Military Operations Other Than War: The Case for the United States Special Operations Command

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This study examines the potential for improving success in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) by assigning proponency (doctrine, training, institutional expertise) for MOOTW to the United States Special Operations Command. The thesis uses the Manwaring Paradigm, which is designed to analyze counterinsurgencies, to analyze a Nation Assistance operation (PROMOTe LIBERTY) and a Humanitarian Assistance operation (PROVIDE COMFORT). This hypothesis is then applied to the paradigm to demonstrate the potential effects of USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW. In both cases, the thesis finds that USSOCOM proponency would lead to greater consistent success in MOOTW. Therefore, it concludes that proponency for MOOTW should be assigned to USSOCOM.

Operations Other Than War, USSOCOM, Special Operations, PROMOTE LIBERTY, PROVIDE COMFORT, SOF, Civil Affairs

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).
ABSTRACT

PROPONENCY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: THE CASE FOR THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND by MAJ James J. Klingaman, USA, 90 pages.

This study examines the potential for improving success in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) by assigning proponenty (doctrine, training, institutional expertise) for MOOTW to the United States Special Operations Command. The thesis uses the Manwaring Paradigm, which is designed to analyze counterinsurgencies, to analyze a Nation Assistance operation (PROMOTE LIBERTY) and a Humanitarian Assistance operation (PROVIDE COMFORT). The hypothesis is then applied to the paradigm to demonstrate the potential effects of USSOCOM proponenty for MOOTW. In both cases, the thesis finds that USSOCOM proponenty would lead to greater consistent success in MOOTW. Therefore, it concludes that proponenty for MOOTW should be assigned to USSOCOM.
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval Page</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. US Special Operations Command</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. US Military Operations Other Than War Case Studies</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Distribution List</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

FIGURE 1: ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATION URGENT FURY ............. 19
2: SOF HIGH COMMAND AND USSOCOM .......................... 23
3: ORGANIZATION OF ARMY SOF ............................... 24
4: NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND ......................... 26
5: ORGANIZATION OF AFSOC .................................. 28
6: ORGANIZATION OF THE CMO TASK FORCE .................... 41
7: ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT .......... 62

Tables

TABLE 1: ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY .... 59
2: ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT .......... 72
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military skills, senior military officers sought civilian missions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully unprepared. Instead of protecting their soldiers' lives they led them to their deaths. In today's post-Cold War peacetime environment, this trap again looms large. . . . Some today within the U.S. military are also searching for relevance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with warfighting. This is an insidious mistake.¹

Harry Summers, The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012

The focus of this thesis is on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Military Operations Other Than War and their associated theory, doctrine, and execution, have increased in relative importance during the past few years because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This new, multipolar world in which the United States faces no easily identifiable, main enemy threat has resulted in a situation where the US will conduct many of its military operations in a unconventional,² or MOOTW, environment. This environment is characterized by operations that are often of long duration, with objectives that are more politically than militarily oriented. These operations may or may not require the use of force, and victory in these operations may be subtle or difficult to recognize. More often than not, such operations will include close coordination and cooperation with other US agencies, foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).³
Despite all of this, the US military's primary function remains deterring war or, should deterrence fail, fighting and winning the nation's wars. Joint Publication 1, the Joint Chiefs' of Staff (JCS) keystone document, states:

Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation's wars. When we fight, we fight to win.¹

The increasing importance and occurrence of MOOTW have the potential to degrade the military's ability to accomplish this primary task. A perceived duality of purpose (i.e., conduct war and conduct operations other than war) may lead to a lack of focus for military organizations. This coupled with a downsized force with limited resources may result in US forces that cannot serve either purpose particularly well. Assuming this is true, then, the US Department of Defense must take action to ensure that it can perform both of its major functions well. There are probably many ways in which DOD can maintain its ability to win wars while improving its ability to conduct MOOTW. A good first step might be to assign an organization as the focal point, or proponent, for all MOOTW.

Hypothesis

The primary hypothesis of this thesis is: The US DOD should assign proponency for all MOOTW to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Definition of proponency and a precise description of what it includes and excludes is critical to the development of the thesis. Secondary hypotheses are: Special Operations Forces (SOF) are essential for success in MOOTW; and USSOCOM proponency will improve performance in MOOTW. A hypothesis proving methodology, which acknowledges the author's bias on the topic, will be used during this
thesis. Early acknowledgement of this bias should promote both healthy skepticism and provide an objective examination of the topic.

Background

Military Operations Other Than War have existed for centuries. In the American experience, according to Dr. John Waglestein, a student of such operations, the American military has not been consistently successful conducting these sorts of unconventional warfare. He found the mediocre record resulted from a general unwillingness to contend with difficulties associated with learning, planning, and executing these types of war. This was partly caused by America's predominantly conventional military legacy. Early during the American Revolution, America's military leaders strove to establish a regular, conventional army based on the European model. This resulted in the formation of a conventional military society that was familiar with MOOTW but generally unwilling to cope with the demands of unconventional warfare.5

Ironically, the nation's conventional army was founded as a volunteer, unprofessional, irregular militia.

Since the American Revolution the US military has regularly taken steps to improve its unconventional warfare capabilities. More often than not, these steps addressed perceived weaknesses within a specific conflict, and have generally been temporary measures that did not provide long-term adjustments to the conventional approaches to conflict. Establishment of US Army Special Forces to conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations in the early 1950s and formation of an ad hoc joint special operations task force to conduct Operation EAGLE CLAW to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980 are some examples.6 It was not until 1986 that a major change in the force structure was made to institutionalize unconventional warfare capabilities.

In 1986 Congress enacted Public Law 99-661. Commonly called the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, it mandated that the DOD appoint an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(ASD SO/LIC) and create a new unified command specifically intended to improve US capabilities in special operations and low intensity conflict.\(^7\)

Follow-on clarifying laws outlined the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) as,

the principal civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters and (after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary) is the principal special operations and low intensity conflict official within the senior management of the Department of Defense.\(^8\)

As such, the ASD SO/LIC provides policy guidance and oversight to the new unified command specified by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).\(^9\)

USSOCOM was established to prevent the recurrence of debacles like Operation EAGLE CLAW, and to correct deficiencies encountered during other operations like Operation URGENT FURY in 1983. Since its formation in 1986, USSOCOM has had proponency for all Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their associated missions, which occur across the continuum of conflict (low, mid, and high intensity). These SOF include Army Rangers, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units; Air Force Special Operations units; and Naval Special Warfare units. Primary missions assigned to SOF include Unconventional Warfare, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, parts of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs, and other collateral activities that habitually fall under the SO/LIC umbrella.\(^10\) These operations are generally conducted by forces assigned to USSOCOM (e.g., US Army Special Forces conduct foreign internal defense and special reconnaissance, and Rangers conduct direct action).

Recently, however, the scope of unconventional operations has broadened. Peace operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterdrug operations (all part of MOOTW) have taken on
greater importance in the national military strategy. Unlike traditional special operations and unconventional missions, however, conventional military units are often involved in these operations. An example is the execution of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia by the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.¹¹ This can result in some problems: Conventional units are not adequately staffed to engage in operations that are primarily political and which are conducted in a joint/combined/interagency environment; and these units may have to refocus their peacetime preparation and devote some time and resources to proficiency in MOOTW. This may degrade the units' abilities to conduct its primary function which is to fight and win the nation's wars. The nation's military machine is being asked to do more with less and may not be able to maintain its warfighting capabilities as resources continue to dwindle.

**Limitations**

This thesis uses unclassified information. This is a limitation because many USSOCOM activities remain classified. Additionally, the topic will be delimited to an examination of certain representative types of MOOTW that currently are not primary responsibilities of USSOCOM (primary responsibilities of USSOCOM are Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations).¹² The case studies used in this thesis will focus on those operations in which conventional tactical units are employed. Specifically, a nation assistance operation and a humanitarian assistance operation will be examined. These operations were selected because they are fairly representative of MOOTW and because they contain many MOOTW activities. This study is not, however, delimited in scope as to the levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic areas are all included as necessary.
Anticipated Conclusions

It is anticipated that this thesis will determine that USSOCOM should be assigned proponency for all Military Operations Other Than War. This conclusion will be supported by demonstrating that Special Operations Forces are naturally suited for employment in MOOTW; that SOF are essential for success in MOOTW; and that therefore USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW will significantly improve US performance in MOOTW. A determination to change the current basic command relationship of USSOCOM relative to DOD or the regionally oriented Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's) is not anticipated; it is anticipated that the thesis will find that USSOCOM should remain a supporting unified command that supports the regional CINC's.

Significance

This thesis can, potentially, contribute to the solution of the problem of how to conduct MOOTW more effectively while maintaining the ability to fight and win the nation's wars. This is particularly important now as internal and external forces continue to challenge the US military's ability to accomplish its assigned missions.

Definition of Key Terms

Wherever possible, this thesis uses DOD doctrinal terms. The current body of literature on MOOTW contains innumerable definitions of key terms. Although there are many pieces of literature whose primary purpose is solely to define key terms within the topic of MOOTW, in most cases the DOD terms are adequate for this thesis. Using DOD terms will also help reduce confusion when discussing the capabilities, functions, and organization of DOD.

Conventional Forces. Those forces not specifically trained, equipped, and organized to conduct special operations. Forces that do not meet designation criteria for SOF in Section 167, Title 10, United States Code (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable)) are considered conventional forces for the purposes of this study.\textsuperscript{14}

**Counterdrug (CD).** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.\textsuperscript{15}

**Counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.\textsuperscript{16}

**Counterterrorism (CT).** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.\textsuperscript{17}

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.\textsuperscript{18}

**Humanitarian Assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{19}

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.\textsuperscript{20}

**Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).** Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic,
informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.21

**Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEUSOC).** A forward-deployed, embarked US Marine Corps unit with enhanced capability to conduct special operations. The MEU (SOC) is oriented toward amphibious raids, at night, under limited visibility, while employing emissions control procedures. The MEU (SOC) is not a Secretary of Defense designated special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities and/or the theater commander, may conduct hostage recovery or other special operations under in extremis circumstances when designated special operations forces are not available.22 MEU (SOC) is considered a conventional force for the purposes of this study.

**Operations Other Than War (OOTW).** US Army term for military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.23 The equivalent Joint term is Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Both are generally used to replace LIC, although LIC is the only term sanctioned by Public Law 99-661 and MOOTW includes some peacetime operations that are not considered in the definition of LIC.24

**Peace-Building.** Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.25

**Peace Enforcement.** Armed intervention, involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression.26
Peacekeeping. Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations, regional organizations, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. Also called Traditional Peacekeeping.27

Peacemaking. Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.28

Peace Operations. All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and those Chapter VII operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate.29

Proponent. Organization responsible for development, implementation, and maintenance of doctrine, institutional expertise, professional education, and interagency coordination for a specific functional area.30

Security Assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the US
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security Assistance Programs are administered by the Department of State (DOS), however some portions of those programs are administered for DOS by DOD.

**Special Operations (SO).** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial-operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

**Literature Review**

There is a plethora of literature devoted to SO/LIC and related topics. Most of this literature addresses various aspects of traditional LIC operations (e.g., counterinsurgency and counterterrorism). The body of literature on emerging MOOTW (e.g., peacekeeping, peace enforcement, disaster relief) is not as well established, but is significant and sufficient for the purposes of this study.

The authoritative works for examination of the American aversion to unconventional war discussed in the introduction are Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War*, and John Waghelstein's doctoral dissertation *Preparing for the Wrong War: The United States Army and Low Intensity Conflict, 1755-1890*. These works describe the formation
of the US military's conventional legacy and its subsequent distaste for anything other than conventional warfare. They are important to this study because they explain why we have not been consistently successful at conducting LIC since the birth of our nation. Additionally, they also help explain DOD's institutional resistance to change which contributed to delays in compliance with organizational reforms legislated in the mid-1980s.

The Cohen-Nunn Amendment of 1986 or Public Law 99-661, The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 is the authoritative source for examination of the formation of USSOCOM and its prescribed role. This law directed formation of a board for LIC within the National Security Council, established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC, directed formation of USSOCOM, and directed a SOF budgetary program called Prescribed Major Force Program 11. Public Law 100-180 is also an authoritative source in this area. It was the Congressional response to perceived inertia within DOD to compliance with Public Law 99-661. Among other things, it Directed the Secretary of Defense to publish the duties, responsibilities, authorities, and relationship of the ASD SO/LIC. They are important sources of information concerning SOF legislation and the subsequent formation of SOCOM are Colonel William Boykin's War College Study "Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?" and Henry Koren's article "Congress Wades into Special Operations."

The two critical events that led to the passage of Cohen-Nunn were Operation EAGLE CLAW and Operation URGENT FURY. Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, is adequately documented. Useful works on this subject are the Joint Chiefs of Staff Rescue Mission Report, Paul Ryan's The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed, and Charlie Beckwith's Delta Force. Operation URGENT FURY, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 is well documented.
Mark Adkin's book *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* and Michael Kershaw's thesis *The Integration of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces* are particularly useful. Additionally, two monographs from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies help to understand URGENT FURY; they are: Major Raymond Drummond's *The Unified Command System and Unity of Command*, and Major Daniel Gilbert's *Joint Task Force Command, Control and Communications: Have We Improved?*. These works provide the depth of analysis required to enhance understanding of the passage of Cohen-Nunn and the formation of USSOCOM.

The characteristics, organizations, and capabilities of USSOCOM are adequately described in the 1994 *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement*, an annual report over the signatures of the ASD SO/LIC and CINCSOC.

This paper examines Operation JUST CAUSE, the US invasion of Panama in 1989, and Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the concurrent civil-military operation in Panama, as the first major US operation after passage of Cohen-Nunn that included the use of both conventional and special operations forces. A definitive source for these operations, particularly PROMOTE LIBERTY, is Dr. John Fishel's *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*. Richard Shultz's *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*, is also an outstanding reference for analysis of PROMOTE LIBERTY. These works provide a large majority of the information for the first case study in this thesis.

The second case study, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, uses John Fishel's *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm*, and after action reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Also useful are LTC John Cavanaugh's SAMS monograph *Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations*, which is generally consistent with Fishel's work and provides emphasis in some different areas; and the ANDRULIS Research Corporation analysis *United States Army*
Reserve in Operation Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq, which gives some particulars about CA employment in PROVIDE COMFORT.

There are many Department of Defense doctrinal references that relate directly to this study. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms is the authoritative reference for most of the terminology in this study. This reference is particularly important because of the myriad of loosely defined and inconsistent terms that are present throughout the body of literature on SO/LIC. Where Pub 1-02 is inadequate, definitions have been modified or taken from other authoritative sources. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations is the keystone document for joint operations. It provides the current doctrinal base for all joint activities and operations in a joint/interagency environment and includes command relationships for unified commands, combatant commands, and joint task forces. Joint Publications 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3-07, Doctrine for Military Operations in LIC, are current authoritative references that describe the roles and functions of the armed forces in SO/LIC. US Army doctrinal references are also used in this study to examine the conduct of OOTW at the tactical level. The key Army doctrinal references are FM 100-5, Operations, which devotes a chapter to OOTW and proposes a set of principles to guide OOTW akin to the principles of war. FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War, is authoritative for LIC, with a newer version currently in preliminary draft.

Research Design

This study flows generally chronologically. First, EAGLE CLAW and URGENT FURY are examined to show the historical development of contemporary SOF and, more importantly, to show why the US Congress felt compelled to enact SOF legislation and create USSOCOM.

Then, the organization and capabilities of USSOCOM are described. The intent of this portion of the thesis is to show that
USSOCOM is naturally suited to take the lead in MOOTW because of its unique capabilities, relationship to the National Command Authority, and relationship to the regionally oriented CINC's. The effect of these capabilities and characteristics of USSOCOM are then measured in the analysis of two MOOTW case studies.

The case studies demonstrate how the unique capabilities of USSOCOM have already been employed in contemporary MOOTW, and will prove that these capabilities are essential for success in MOOTW. The analysis then shows that such capabilities can be further leveraged and exploited by the US through assigning USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW.

The Manwaring Paradigm, which is designed to analyze counterinsurgencies, is used as the definitive basis for analysis of MOOTW. This paradigm considers factors of legitimacy, organization, support to the targeted government, intelligence, discipline and capabilities of the armed forces, and reduction of outside aid to insurgents. Although this paradigm was designed specifically to analyze counterinsurgencies, it has application across the spectrum of MOOTW. It is based on empirical analysis of 43 post-World War II insurgencies, and boasts impressive statistical accuracy in predicting success or failure. The analysis conducted using this paradigm provides the vehicle for arguing both against and for USSOCOM proponency of MOOTW.

Each case study is first described to establish what happened in each operation. Then each operation is analyzed using the six critical aspects of the Manwaring Paradigm to show US actions that resulted in positive and negative effects on the overall success of the operation. The analysis is then continued to determine the anticipated effect that USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW would have had on the success of the operation; again, using the various aspects of the paradigm. This portion of the analysis is broken into two parts. First, arguments against USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW are discussed. These arguments
attempt to show that USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW would not have had a positive impact on the overall success of the operations discussed. Next, arguments for USSOCOM proponency are forwarded to defeat the arguments against USSOCOM proponency. If the arguments against USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW are successfully defeated, then the hypothesis is proven correct.

After the primary and secondary hypotheses have been proved or disproved using the method discussed, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations will be made—the study will be complete.
CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Congress was trying to tell the Executive branch to look beyond the cold war. More than military power is required to cope with terrorism, insurgency, counter insurgency, and other forms of low-intensity conflict. 36

Colonel William G. Boykin, "Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was It Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?"

Introduction

This chapter explains the events that led up to the passage of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, which in turn caused the DOD to involuntarily establish USSOCOM. The reader must understand why Congress felt compelled to legislate such unprecedented change. Although the specific events that precipitated the legislation were failures of Direct Action operations (EAGLE CLAW and URGENT FURY), Congress was also very interested in improving US performance in LIC. According to Christopher Mellon, a professional staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Cohen's objectives for the SOF legislation were:

[1] Providing close civilian oversight for low-intensity conflict activities; [2] Ensuring that genuine expertise and a diversity of views are available to the National Command Authorities regarding possible responses to low-intensity conflict threats; [3] Improving interagency planning and coordination for low-intensity conflict, and [4] Bolstering U.S. special operations capabilities in a number of areas, including: joint doctrine and training, intelligence support, command and control, budgetary authority, personnel management, and planning. 37

Congress, aware that SOF was capable of success in LIC (as demonstrated by Army Special Forces working with the MILGROUP in El Salvador since 1981), wanted to institutionalize that expertise so that it could be further exploited in future operations. This desire, coupled with
constant frustration with DOD intransigence, led to the passage of Cohen-Nunn.

**Background**

The beginning of the reorganization of special operations forces began in 1977. In that year, the German Counterterrorism Unit GSG-9 conducted a very successful airline seizure operation in Mogadishu, Somalia. Inquiries by President Jimmy Carter into similar US capabilities led to the formation of the Army's Delta Force in 1977.\(^{38}\) This was the first concrete step in a long-term revitalization of SOF, intended primarily to combat terrorism. Two years after its creation, Delta would comprise the ground force for the infamous attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran.\(^{39}\)

**Operation EAGLE CLAW**

The operation mounted to rescue American hostages held in Iran in 1980 was called Operation Eagle Claw.\(^{40}\) The concept, planning, and tactical execution for this operation were fundamentally flawed in several respects. Lack of unity of command, severe compartmentalization, ad hoc organizations, inadequate equipment, lack of a standing command and control headquarters, insufficient intelligence, and service rivalry all had a strong hand in dooming this operation to failure.\(^{41}\)

The disaster at Desert One precipitated an examination by a specially assigned group, known as the Holloway Commission, to determine the causes of the failure.\(^{42}\) In addition to the board’s findings, which were generally concurrent with the deficiencies listed above, the Holloway Commission made two recommendations for improvement: The establishment of a Counterterrorist Joint Task Force with permanently assigned personnel, and the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel.\(^{43}\) Subsequently, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was established as a standing Joint Task Force with SOF elements.
from all the services to,

serve as a command-and-control headquarters for high-risk overseas contingency operations, and an administrative headquarters for such dedicated strike forces as might be assigned.44

Three years later, on 21 October 1983, it was JSOC, along with Atlantic Command, that was alerted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seize the island of Grenada.45

**Operation URGENT FURY**

The operation to capture the island of Grenada, and rescue American citizens there, called URGENT FURY, began on 25 October 1983. The events of the week prior to the initiation of the invasion demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the US to conduct contingency operations.

Major General Richard Scholtes, USA, the commander of JSOC, was initially designated as the supported commander for URGENT FURY as the commander of JTF 123. The initial plan was for Rangers to seize Grenada's two airfields while other SOF rescued American citizens. CINCLANT was to provide follow-on general purpose forces to relieve the JTF.46

This command and control arrangement was quickly changed by the JCS so that CINCLANT would be the supported command (JTF 120). During the evolution of the command structure for URGENT FURY, all assigned elements received numerous mission changes.47 Ultimately, the command organization for the operation on Grenada included SOF (JTF 123), the 82d Airborne Division (TF 121), 22d Marine Amphibious Unit (TF 124), and a Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF)(See Figure 1).48

Throughout the planning for Grenada, change and uncertainty were the norm, with a marked lack of unity of command or effort. H-hour for the initial assault was changed from 0130 to 0500 to accommodate the use of Marine helicopters; the Rangers were effectively an ad hoc organization because shortage of airframes caused both battalions to
deploy significantly less than their full strength (about 30% of 2/75); and intelligence was poor.\textsuperscript{49}

Figure 1. Organization for Operation URGENT FURY  

Likewise, there were significant problems during the execution of URGENT FURY that were to have a great impact on the evolution of US SOF capability. Due to a blocked runway at Point Salines Airfield, the Rangers had to make last-minute changes in the air for the main body of the force to conduct a parachute assault instead of the planned airland operation.\textsuperscript{50} In-flight communications problems and loss of critical avionics made this change even more problematic. Despite these problems and heavier than expected enemy resistance, the Rangers were able to clear Point Salines to enable TF 121 (82d Abn) to land and begin their relief in place. On the evening of the 25th of October, CINCLANT placed the two Ranger battalions under the operational control of TF 121. This was done due to the unexpectedly heavy enemy resistance and the failure
of other, more surgical elements of TF 123 on their unilateral special operations.  

Probably the most tragic event of the operation occurred under these ad hoc command and control arrangements. On 27 October, the 2d Ranger Battalion with C Company of the 1st Ranger Battalion, was placed under the operational control of a brigade of the 82d to conduct an air assault raid onto Calvigny Barracks. The helicopters for the operation were to come from the aviation battalion assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. The result was disaster:

Close air support pounded the objective and was followed closely by the UH-60's of the 82d Aviation Battalion. Landing on the southern camp boundary, two of the first four Blackhaws overshot their landing points and collided causing the fourth to crash. Three Rangers were killed and four seriously wounded in the accident. The remainder of 2/75 cleared the barracks area without encountering any enemy. On this tragic note, the role of SOF forces in Grenada ended.

The performance and use of SOF in Grenada had a significant impact on the legislative reform of SOF in the mid-1980's. MG Scholtes, then retired, testified before the Senate Sea Power and Force Projection Committee in August 1986 in which,

He explained how, as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, his forces were misused during the Grenada operation. Scholtes told the lawmakers how his forces were robbed of their unique capabilities by the conventional planners and chain of command. . . . Senator Cohen was so moved by the testimony of this retired general that he took MG Scholtes to the chambers of numerous senators who were not at the subcommittee hearing.

Cohen-Nunn

"Iran, Grenada, Vietnam, the Mayaguez incident, Beirut, and several other situations pushed lawmakers to the edge of their tolerance for failure." Public Law 99-433, The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was passed in October 1986. This Act directed DOD to review the missions and functions of the unified commands and to consider "creation of a unified combatant command for special operations missions. . . ." Less than one month after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, Congress
passed binding legislation that directed the President to establish such a unified command.\textsuperscript{57}

Public Law 99–661, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, commonly referred to as the Cohen-Nunn Act, took unprecedented steps to overhaul the DOD in order to correct "serious deficiencies in the capabilities of the United States to conduct special operations and to engage in low intensity conflicts."\textsuperscript{58}

Cohen-Nunn mandated the formation of a unified combatant command for special operations forces (known now as USSOCOM). Congress mandated that the commander of this new command be a General or an Admiral. All special operations forces, both active and reserve, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, were to fall under the control of this new command. Cohen-Nunn assigned USSOCOM responsibility to "conduct all affairs of such command relating to special operations," and to be prepared to to command and control selected special operations as required, although normally special operations missions were to be conducted "under the operational command of the unified combatant commands in whose geographic areas such missions are to be conducted."\textsuperscript{59} Additionally, Cohen-Nunn mandated the formation of a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict within the National Security Council, and established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). The intent here was to attempt to force systemic changes that would rectify institutional deficiencies reported by the 1985 Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project:

\begin{quote}
Short of war, we have no strategy or comprehensive plan to address the challenges of political violence. ... We will need the courage to depart from conventional institutional norms and the vision to maintain a pragmatic defense posture increasingly relevant to a world characterized by neither war nor peace.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Cohen-Nunn also created a specific budget category for SOF, Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11), and prescribed that SOF commanders in EUCOM, PACOM, and other unified combatant commands be a flag-rank officer.\textsuperscript{61} The intent of these measures was to increase the influence
of SOF within DOD and the national command structure, and to prevent the siphoning of funds by other DOD components away from SOF programs.

Subsequent legislation was required in order to force DOD to implement Cohen-Nunn as intended. This legislation included Public Law 100-180, passed in December 1987 and Public Law 100-456, passed in September 1988. P.L. 100-180 clarified the role of the ASD SO/LIC and assigned CINCSOC with head of agency authority in order to execute the development and procurement of SOF peculiar equipment. P.L. 100-456 gave CINCSOC the authority to direct and control expenditure of all funds for all units assigned to USSOCOM. Since the enactment of these laws, USSOCOM and the SOF command structure has been established with few exceptions. The most notable deficiency in compliance with SOF legislation to date is the failure of the LIC Board to regularly meet. 

Organization of USSOCOM

USSOCOM is comprised of three component commands and one sub-unified command. The component commands are the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The sub-unified command is the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). (See Figure 2.)

US Army Special Operations Command

USASOC is commanded by an Army Lieutenant General and is headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It is comprised of five major subordinate commands: The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Command, and the Special Forces Command. Organization is depicted at Figure 3.
Army SOF Capabilities

Army SOF operate across the operational continuum. They have missions and functions in all operations, both war and Operations Other Than War. Each element of Army SOF has unique capabilities.

Special Forces are regionally oriented groups which are capable of executing numerous special operations missions. The base unit of SF is the Operational Detachment. The twelve-man team is composed of specially selected and trained officers and non-commissioned officers. Within each team are requisite advanced skills in medicine, engineering, demolitions, communications, and weapons. Language fluency consistent with regional orientation is characteristic. Special Forces have the unique capability of working with and training indigenous forces.67

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Figure 2. SOF High Command and USSOCOM.
The 75th Ranger Regiment is composed of three Ranger battalions (one each at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Benning, Georgia) and a Regimental headquarters also located at Fort Benning. Rangers provide USASOC with its most potent strike force.

Rangers are capable of deploying by land, sea, or air to conduct direct action operations at the company, battalion, and regimental level. Primarily fighting at night, Rangers rely on the elements of surprise, teamwork, and basic soldiering skills to achieve success.86

Tactical mobility for Rangers and other SOF is provided by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The 160th SOAR is a group of specially selected and highly trained rotary-wing aviators equipped with technologically advanced equipment. The regiment has a variety of aircraft to "provide extremely
accurate heliborne lift and attack capabilities . . . including force
insertion and extraction, armed escort, target suppression and
destruction, and resupply."

Psychological Operations units are located within USASOC in both
the active and reserve components. The PSYOP Groups are regionally
oriented and therefore have expertise in appropriate foreign languages
and cultures. PSYOP units are capable of supporting special operations
or general purpose forces across the operational continuum. The primary
function of psychological operations is "influencing opinions, emotions,
attitudes, and behaviors of foreign audiences to create conditions
favorable to American or host-nation goals." 70

USASOC's Civil Affairs units are found primarily in the reserve
component. These units support SOF and GPF commanders in fulfilling
their responsibilities to civilians in an area of operations. The
majority of CA personnel have civilian occupations which contribute
expertise in their assigned roles within civil affairs. CA units
contain expertise in such applicable functions as public safety, health,
agriculture, economics, and legal systems. They have the capability to
use these and other skills to "save lives, provide humanitarian
assistance, engage in peace operations, and rebuild the infrastructure
of a country." 71 CA units are regionally oriented and contain personnel
with language proficiency relevant to their respective regional
associations.

Naval Special Warfare Command

The NAVSPECWARCOM is located in Coronado, California. It is
comprised of the Naval Warfare Center, the Naval Special Warfare
Development Group, two Special Boat Squadrons, and two Naval Special
Warfare Groups. Organization is depicted in Figure 4. 72
Figure 4. Naval Special Warfare Command.

NAVSPECWARCOM Capabilities

Naval Special Warfare forces provide SOF capabilities to conduct Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Counterterrorism.

SEAL Teams are 16-man combat teams designed to conduct various special operations across the operational continuum. "Operating ... from sea-based platforms, SEALs primarily conduct clandestine ground and waterborne reconnaissance and DA missions in a maritime... or riverine environment in support of joint and fleet operations."73

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams are composed of SEALs and other support personnel who operate Seal Delivery Vehicles (SDV's) and Dry
Deck Shelters. Dry deck shelters enable specially modified submarines to delivery SDV's clandestinely.\textsuperscript{74}

Special Boat Squadrons (SBSs) are composed of highly trained naval personnel who operate small special operations surface watercraft. SBSs have at their disposal strategically deployable high speed boats, rigid inflatable boats, and Patrol Coastal (PC) ships.\textsuperscript{75}

* Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOC operates technologically advanced fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to conduct insertion/ extraction of special operations forces, resupply, aerial fire support, refueling, CSAR, psychological operations, and aircrew training in support of FID. Its organization is depicted at Figure 5.\textsuperscript{76}

* AFSOC Capabilities

AFSOC capabilities are best portrayed by functional description of organic aircraft.

The HC-130, know as the Combat Shadow, is a C-130 Hercules airframe specially modified to conduct aerial refueling of special operations helicopters. This capability enables AFSOC to support long-range infiltration and exfiltration of special operations forces.\textsuperscript{77} The MC-130, or Combat Talon, is a C-130 Hercules airframe specially modified with advanced avionics and navigation systems. Combat Talons are used for long-range insertions, extractions, and resupply in hostile territory. They also possess the ability to conduct PSYOP leaflet drops and drop BLU-82 15,000-pound bombs, as they did in operation Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{78}

The MH-53J Pave Low helicopter is equipped with advanced avionics and is used to conduct insertions, extractions, resupply, and CSAR for special operations forces.\textsuperscript{79} MH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters are similar in capability and function to the MH-53J, only with a lesser troop capacity. Both aircraft are air-refuelable.
The EC-130 Commando Solo is a modified C-130 that is equipped with television and radio broadcast equipment. This aircraft is used to conduct psychological operations.\textsuperscript{60}

AC-130 Spectre gunships are heavily armed C-130 airframes capable of providing extremely accurate aerial fire support to both SOF and GPF.\textsuperscript{61}

The Special Tactics Squadrons (STS) depicted in Figure 5 contain Combat Control Teams (CCT) and Pararescue personnel. CCT personnel provide assault aircraft terminal guidance, terminal guidance for weapons, and control of fire support assets. Pararescue personnel primarily support medical and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations.\textsuperscript{62}
Joint Special Operations Command

JSOC, established in 1980, has five primary functions:

Maintenance of expertise in joint special operations requirements and techniques; coordination of equipment compatibility and interoperability among SOF; planning and execution of training exercises for joint special operations forces; development of tactics and doctrine; and maintenance of institutional expertise for a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force.⁸³

Summary of Capabilities Relevant to This Study

USSOCOM is a unique organization responsible for maintaining the unusual and special capabilities of SOF. In summary, these capabilities are:

1. Ready access to the National Command Authority through the ASD SO/LIC or the CJCS.
2. Major Force Program-11 funding; separate from DOD service components.
3. PSYOP/CA: USSOCOM possesses the only PSYOP and Civil Affairs units within DOD.
4. Regional Orientation: USSOCOM possesses regionally oriented forces (SF, PSYOP, CA), proficient in foreign languages and familiar with foreign cultures.
5. Worldwide orientation of the command: USSOCOM is prepared to support all regionally oriented CINC's, and does, in fact, support them on a daily basis.
6. Capability to produce doctrine, special training, and education through its recently established Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI) and other associated agencies within USSOCOM (JFK Special Warfare Center, Naval Special Warfare Center, AFSOC Special Operations School, and JSOC).⁸⁴
7. Head of agency authority to conduct development and procurement of special equipment.
Conclusion

Special Operations Forces have unique capabilities that make them naturally suited for employment in MOOTW. Congress legislated formation of USSOCOM to institutionalize such capabilities and to ensure that the units that possessed them were adequately resourced. USSOCOM has a worldwide orientation and has been supporting regional CINC's with expertise in LIC and MOOTW since 1987. The following case studies show that proper exploitation of SOF capabilities has often led to reasonable success in MOOTW, however further exploitation of those capabilities is possible and greater success in MOOTW is probable by assigning proponency for MOOTW to USSOCOM.
CHAPTER 3

US MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR CASE STUDIES

The world community needs, more than it has ever done [sic], skilful and disciplined warriors who are ready to put themselves at the service of its authority. Such warriors must properly be seen as the protectors of civilisation, not its enemies. The style in which they fight for civilisation - against ethnic bigots, regional warlords, ideological intransigents, common pillagers and organised international criminals - cannot derive from the Western model of warmaking alone.85

John Keegan, A History of Warfare

Introduction

This chapter examines two case studies of contemporary US Military Operations Other Than War using the Manwaring Paradigm to identify characteristics that contributed to success or failure of those operations. These critical characteristics are then used later to help validate the proposal that US SOCOM proponency for MOOTW would have a positive effect on such operations.

The case studies discussed are Operations PROMOTE LIBERTY and PROVIDE COMFORT. PROMOTE LIBERTY can best be classified as a nation building operation, however it contains elements of humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, shows of force, and security assistance. PROVIDE COMFORT can best be classified as a humanitarian assistance operation, but it contains elements of combat search and rescue, noncombatant evacuation operations, shows of force, and peace operations. These two operations represent reasonable MOOTW case studies against which to apply the Manwaring Paradigm. This initial
analysis, in turn, becomes the foundation for considering the effect of USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW.

**Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY**

**Background**

Goldwater-Nichols, Cohen-Nunn, and the formation of USSOCOM provided the needed revitalization for SOF that resulted in a dramatic success in December 1989 during the US invasion of Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE. During this operation, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) led the invasion force by executing a complex forced entry that allowed conventional forces to follow them in and rapidly attain their military objectives. The stated objectives for the operation were to protect Americans, safeguard the provisions of the Panama Canal Treaties, reestablish Panamanian democracy, and bring Manuel Noriega to justice.86 Equally important to the success of operations in Panama was Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the restoration of government in Panama, the first case study in this thesis.

Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was planned concurrently with Operation JUST CAUSE. It was the logical adjunct to the invasion of Panama and can best be classified as a nation building operation. The purpose of PROMOTE LIBERTY was to reestablish democracy to the Republic of Panama, one of the overall US strategic objectives for JUST CAUSE, although it is arguable that democracy had never been established there in the first place.

The antithesis of democracy in Panama was Manuel Noriega—head of the Panamanian Defense Forces and de facto military dictator of the Panamanian regime. Noriega, who was implicated in smuggling drugs to the US, was indicted by two US grand juries in February 1988. These indictments caused the JCS, on 28 February 1988, to direct CINCSOUTH to begin planning for possible US military operations in Panama.87
Planning

The initial SOUTHCOM plan for operations in Panama was known as ELABORATE MAZE. The combat portions of this plan were approved by the JCS in March 1988, after which planning for the restoration of Panama began. The few Civil Affairs (CA) planners within the USSOUTHCOM Directorate of Plans, Policy, and Strategy (SCJ5) quickly analyzed ELABORATE MAZE and began initial planning for Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in the aftermath of combat operations. Their initial plan, based on guidance from CINCSOUTH, was to generally follow the military government model established at the end of WWII. The CINC directed that he would be in charge of a military government in Panama for about the first 30 days after any combat operations. This transitional military government would transfer responsibility for CMO as soon as practicable to the US Department of State (DOS) after the establishment of a legitimate Panamanian Government.

As ELABORATE MAZE evolved, the CA planners in USSOUTHCOM SCJ5 determined that they alone could not adequately formulate the CMO portion of the plan. Accordingly, they recruited CA personnel from the 361st CA Brigade in a voluntary temporary duty status (TTAD) to do the bulk of the planning. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the Army Reserve, these volunteers were only readily available in this temporary status for up to 31 days. Therefore, the CMO planning for ELABORATE MAZE was conducted by groups of CA planners who rotated into and out of SOUTHCOM from the 361st every 31 days. The result was an incremental and disjointed approach to planning that was bereft of continuity.

As separate but concurrent planning for combat and CMO occurred, ELABORATE MAZE evolved into a family of independent plans called PRAYERBOOK. Due to the ultra-sensitive nature of these plans, they were severely compartmentalized; so much, in fact, that the CA planners from the 361st had no access to the combat portions of PRAYERBOOK. Therefore, although the CMO portion of the plan, known as KRYSTAL BALL,
was made concurrently with the combat plans, it was made semi-
independently of those plans.

During planning, CINCSOUTH directed that each plan within
PRAYERBOOK had to be independently executeable. With this and other
guidance from the CINC, the CA planners made several planning
assumptions during the formulation of KRYSTAL BALL: (1) CINCSOUTH would
head a military government in Panama to establish/maintain order and
restore basic governmental services after any combat operations. The
CINC, therefore, would have responsibility for US CMO in Panama until
such responsibility could be transferred to the US Ambassador in Panama;
this would be accomplished as soon as practicable after a legitimate
Panamanian government was established, hopefully within thirty days. If
an internal Panamanian solution was reached, and no US military
intervention occurred, then the Ambassador would have all responsibility
for the conduct of CMO.92 (2) CMO operations in Panama would be
executed primarily by the Army Reservists of the 361st CA Brigade. This
would require use of a Presidential Reserve Call-Up. These reservists
would be augmented as required by others using both the call-up and the
the voluntary temporary duty process.93

KRYSTAL BALL addressed a series of functional areas (e.g.,
public safety, health, education, administration, and economic
restoration). CMO assessments of many of these functional areas had been
conducted by the 361st over the past 5 years, but needed to be
reassessed and revised. Therefore, the plan called for the first phase
of execution to be CMO assessments of these functional areas. The
Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) plan was formed as a series
of functional annexes, the intent of which was to provide a significant
head start to whomever was eventually assigned responsibility for its
execution. This would allow the assigned unit, CA or not (anticipating
a less than timely Presidential Call-up), to get the ball rolling.
KRYSTAL BALL was completed in August 1988, was renamed BLIND LOGIC, and
was shelved along with the rest of PRAYERBOOK as the events in Panama died down to less than crisis proportions.  

After over six months of relative inactivity in Panama, PRAYERBOOK was pulled off the shelf in March 1989 after the PDF seized and detained 21 US schoolbuses, some of which had US dependent children on board. BLIND LOGIC came off the shelf for review as well, however no significant changes to the existing plan were recommended, although the CA planners in USSOUTHCOM Directorate of Operations (SCJ3) were growing more wary of the assumption concerning a Reserve Call-Up of the 361st. Following this review, PRAYERBOOK and BLIND LOGIC were returned to the shelf as the Panamanian national elections approached.

In May 1989, national elections took place in Panama. Noriega, in an effort to maintain the status quo, attempted to unfairly influence the elections so that his chosen candidates would win. This attempt failed, and the opposition consisting of Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderon, and Billy Ford won the election handily. Noriega immediately annulled the election and a few days later loosed his Dignity Battalions (DIGBATS) on an opposition rally. Images of the DIGBATS viciously assaulting Endara and Billy Ford were televised around the world and served to refocus international attention on the crisis in Panama. At SOUTHCOM, the PRAYERBOOK was once again pulled off the shelf.

During this next plan review, responsibility for BLIND LOGIC was transferred back from SCJ3 to SCJ5 because of a self-perceived lack of adequate capability within SCJ3 staff. An additional factor that influenced the return of the plan to SCJ5 was that the CINC reinforced his dictum that the J5 would serve as the commander of the CMOTF (COMCMOTF) for execution of BLIND LOGIC because a general officer on the CINC's staff would be required to effectively execute this politically sensitive operation. Also, approval to begin exploring alternatives to the assumed Reserve Call-up was gained.
Alternatives to a Reserve Call-up were extremely limited and less than desireable. CA planners at SOUTHCOM determined that initial restoration operations in Panama could be minimally accomplished using forces on the ground, and elements of the 96th CA Battalion (the only active duty CA unit in the Army), armed with the functional annexes of the CMOTF plan. Knowing that the TTAD arrangements used thus far for planning would be less than timely in the event of US intervention in Panama, CA planners decided that the best course of action to adopt was to "preselect" twenty-five key personnel, primarily from the 361st CA, and equip them with orders that would allow them to deploy in a TTAD status almost immediately upon notification. These twenty-five personnel would form the nucleus of the CMOTF staff.

Another significant issue raised during this iteration of planning was acquisition of CMO support forces, specifically engineers, military police, and medical units. These units would initially be OPCON to the JTF conducting combat operations in Panama (XVIII Corps), but would, once certain conditions were met, be transferred to the CMOTF. CA planners at SOUTHCOM coordinated these issues with elements of the XVIII Corps staff and incorporated these "agreements" into BLIND LOGIC. None of these coordinations, however, were incorporated into the XVIII Corps plans for several reasons: (1) At the time, XVIII Corps staff had no authority to make agreements with SOUTHCOM. (2) BLIND LOGIC was not yet a fully approved plan, and (3) General Woerner's unexpected, and probably forced, retirement had been announced and therefore he and his SOUTHCOM staff were viewed by XVIII Corps staff as "irrelevant."

As the CMOTF planning progressed, the planners at SOUTHCOM became sensitive to the fact that many of the issues in their plans were normally within the purview of the DOS. To ensure a semblance of unity of effort, the planners requested permission to coordinate the plan with the Embassy. Permission to do this was denied because "the plan was
controlled exclusively within DOD channels." As General Woerner explained:

And the reason we could not develop that [BLIND LOGIC] past a certain level was because I was not permitted to enter into plans with the Department of State, for security reasons. Remember, we're now planning an invasion of a friendly nation with whom we have diplomatic relations. Eventually the lead CA planner was allowed to conduct limited, generic discussions with DOS personnel about issues that were contained in BLIND LOGIC, however, the specific plan was not discussed.

On 1 October 1989, the day after General Thurman assumed command, SOUTHCOM learned of a planned PDF coup, the object of which was the deposition of Noriega. The coup attempt occurred on 3 October and, like so many coup attempts, almost worked—but failed. The attempt was portrayed by the media as a botched US opportunity to get rid of Noriega. Subsequently, planning for US intervention in Panama was reinvigorated—PRAYERBOOK once again came off the shelf.

BLUE SPOON, the combat portion of PRAYERBOOK, originally focused on a deliberate massing of US forces in and around Panama City. This plan, formulated under the watch of General Woerner, was intended to force an eleventh hour Panamanian solution to the crisis. If this effect was not realized, then US forces would have little trouble dispatching the PDF and imposing a US solution to the crisis. This version of BLUE SPOON had an advantage from a CMO standpoint in that the concentration of US forces in Panama City "would have the dual effect of decapitating the PDF while, at the same time, providing a sufficient force to prevent the complete breakdown of order." However, BLUE SPOON fundamentally changed shortly after General Thurman assumed command of SOUTHCOM.

Thurman, along with Lieutenant General Stiner, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps (JTF-South), believed that the capabilities of the PDF demonstrated in defeating the coup attempt in October, that is, their ability to rapidly move and mass forces, required a shift in focus
for BLUE SPOON. Therefore, the focus of the plan shifted away from Panama City to its periphery. Specifically, the new BLUE SPOON called for a surprise, simultaneous night attack on twenty-seven targets located in the Panama City-Colon corridor; in effect, a coup-de-main to defeat the PDF. This revision, however, would result in very few US forces in Panama City, the anticipated result of which would be a complete breakdown of law and order—a condition which, according to BLIND LOGIC, was the responsibility of JTF-South until transferred to the CMOTF. As Dr. John Fishel insightfully points out:

Added to this was the propensity of the XVIII Airborne Corps to see its military role in terms that could be described as breaking things while leaving it to somebody else to put them back together.\textsuperscript{108}

Therefore, while BLUE SPOON was being fundamentally changed, BLIND LOGIC was being fundamentally ignored, other than to have responsibility for it once again change hands. SCJ5 recommended transfer of BLIND LOGIC to US Army South (USARSO), both for planning and execution as COMCMOTF. This recommendation, accepted by the CINC, caused a staff review of the plan by SCJ5 and USARSO staffs. USARSO did not believe that BLIND LOGIC could be executed until it had been fully coordinated with the DOS and other US government agencies. Naturally, SCJ5 did not agree. So the situation in the beginning of December 1989 was that BLIND LOGIC has not been changed to account for fundamental changes in BLUE SPOON, responsibility for BLIND LOGIC hung somewhere in a void between SCJ5 and USARSO, and none of the CMO functions for JTF-South envisioned by BLIND LOGIC were written into XVIII Corps plan. The cards dealt, this was the hand SOUTHCOM was forced to play when the execute order for JUST CAUSE was issued on 17 December 1989.

Execution

On 16 December 1989, a US Marine Corps Lieutenant was killed by the PDF. A US Navy Lieutenant and his wife, who had witnessed the killing, were detained and harassed by the PDF.\textsuperscript{109} These events led
directly to the NCA issuance on 17 December 1989 of the order to execute BLUE SPOON--Operation JUST CAUSE.\textsuperscript{110}

Operation JUST CAUSE, initiated on 20 December 1989, was well planned, well rehearsed, and well executed. It "generally went like clockwork. . . . For an incredibly complex mission there were very few glitches."\textsuperscript{111} Unfortunately, as foreseen by some, the chaos in the center of Panama City (created by a lack of US presence) began early on 20 December. Fishel writes:

Early on December 20, looting of the center had begun. Later it would crescendo to a massive scale before subsiding on the third day. The looters were a mixed group ranging from Noriega's Dignity Battalions through common criminals to wealthy citizens looting the stores they normally shopped. In some individual stores the looting was countered by vigilantism as owners and their friends defended property. . . . To the looting was added general lawlessness, occasional firefight between vigilantes and criminals or Dignity Battalion members, remnants of the PDF, Dignity Battalions, and U.S. forces. In short, downtown Panama City was in a state of chaos for the first 3 or 4 days.\textsuperscript{112}

Fishel also contends that anyone who believes that this chaos came as a surprise is either being insincere or is admitting to a huge mistake.\textsuperscript{113} He explains that the array of US forces under General Thurman's revised BLUE SPOON made this outcome much more than likely. Fishel is careful to point out, however, that his criticism is not directed against Thurman or Stiner, rather it is directed against "the planning process that permitted them to ignore the political-military consequences of military action."\textsuperscript{114} Richard Schultz's analysis of the planning process also supports this contention:

Panama provides an example of what can occur when planning requirements are neglected. Destabilizing developments appeared, not foreseen in the contingency plan (Operation Blind Logic), that considerably weakened restoration efforts. Massive looting, a new Government of Panama (GOP) that was "hollow" and not ready to govern, an empty treasury, and a decaying societal infrastructure proved to be major obstacles.\textsuperscript{115}

Once the order was received to execute BLUE SPOON, SOUTHCOM SCJ5 prepared to execute BLIND LOGIC as the CMMOTF because transfer to USARSO had not been completed. During the last few days prior to the
initiation of JUST CAUSE, hasty revisions were made to BLIND LOGIC and the operation was christened PROMOTE LIBERTY. On 20 December the final draft of PROMOTE LIBERTY was sent to the JCS for approval. This version retained the Presidential Call-up of the 361st CA, but also called for the establishment of a long-term CMOTF under the control of JTF-South. One day after execution of BLUE SPOON, the JCS ordered execution of PROMOTE LIBERTY which it had approved with one large exception. The JCS disapproved the Reserve Call-up for the 361st CA and instead advocated acquisition of CA personnel on a voluntary basis—much like the aforementioned contingency plan for the 25 “pre-selected” CA personnel. The JCS policy, however, was interpreted by ARSOF at Fort Bragg to mean that these volunteers had to serve for a minimum of 139 days. This proviso shattered the plan for the 25 pre-selected CA Reservists to staff CMOTF—reservists with civilian careers who had readily volunteered for 31 days. Of the original 25 volunteers from the CA community, only three were able to participate on the COMCMOTF staff in the initial phases of PROMOTE LIBERTY due to this change.  

Another major planning assumptions contained in the PROMOTE LIBERTY plan was nullified immediately by the unexpected inauguration of the Endara government. As discussed, the plan assumed that there would be no legitimate Panamanian government initially, and that CINCSOUTH would head a military government for up to 30 days. When the execute order for PROMOTE LIBERTY was received, the Panamanian “government” (Endara, Arias Calderon, and Ford) was in place with US diplomatic representation in the form of the Charge d’Affaires. Because of this development, CINCSOUTH placed Brigadier General Benard Gann, his J5/COMCMOTF, under the control of the Charge d’Affaires. 

This situation significantly increased the complexity of the CMOTF’s task, which was to establish the new government of Panama. As PROMOTE LIBERTY got underway, the Panamanian government consisted of three people—Endara, Calderon, and Ford—a President and two Vice
Presidents. Additionally, the US Embassy was less than adequately staffed (effective strength of 15 personnel) to tackle the job at hand. Thus Gann found himself in the unenviable position of being in charge while being told that he was not in charge.

The CMOTF organized itself differently from the original plan, but built itself around the functional areas originally identified in BLIND LOGIC. Organization is shown below: 

![Diagram of CMOTF Organization]

Figure 6: Organization of the Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF). Source: John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 83.

When the CA reservists began arriving in Panama, they immediately faced an unanticipated dilemma. The 361st CA had been
tasked in XVIII Corps OPLAN to establish a Joint Civil Affairs Task Force (JCATF) under JTF-South, while the PROMOTE LIBERTY plan called for the same unit to staff the CMOTF. For their first week in country, the CA operators worked under JTF-South, but then fell in under the CMOTF.

The first major task that the Endara government had to accomplish was the establishment of security, primarily within Panama City. This responsibility fell to them, because they had officially been sworn in as the legitimate government. Unfortunately, they had no assets with which to accomplish this task. This situation was made even more problematic because the CMOTF did not have the assets either. Discussions amongst Endara; the CINC; the Charge d'Affaires; COMJTF-South; Commander, US Army South (COMUSARSO); and others resulted in the decision to form a police force, the Panamanian Public Force (PPF), from the remnants of the PDF. Major General Cisneros, COMUSARSO, seized the initiative to build the PPF after the Endara government selected Colonel Roberto Armijo as the organization's commander. Cisneros headquartered the PPF at the old National Transit Authority Building, across from Albrook Air Force Station; he sent his Deputy Commander of the US Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin America to assist the PPF; and he had his Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics set up an advisory office staffed with US Army Foreign Area Officers, which became the US Forces Liaison Group (USFLG).

While this was occurring, the CMOTF was coordinating the development of Endara's new security force, and the establishment of a refugee camp. It also coordinated security of key public facilities and worked to reopen the international airport. By mid-January, very basic government services were in place and running, and security had generally been established. This limited success was the result of what Fishel calls "ordered chaos" which was made possible by a reasonable
framework provided by the PROMOTE LIBERTY plan and numerous impromptu solutions to extremely complex and dynamic problems.

Interestingly, near the end of December, General Lindsay, CINCSOC, coordinated with General Thurman to send a senior CA Colonel to Panama to assess the situation and to assist Thurman's staff in devising an organization to carry the restoration of Panama through the long-term. Lindsay did this because he believed that PROMOTE LIBERTY was not progressing as well as desired.\textsuperscript{120} Schultz explains,

As the Panama operation unfolded, Lindsay and members of the J-9 concluded that the restoration plan being executed "was not built around what was needed to be done in order to transition from war to peace. . .[T]he transition was not planned as well as it should have been."\textsuperscript{122}

The resulting conceptual organization, due in large part to the recommendations of the SOCOM planner, became known as the Military Support Group (MSG). In concurrence with the recommendation of the SOCOM planner, the MSG would contain SOF, CA, PSYOP, and CSS elements under a single commander, subordinate to the JTF. Additionally, the MSG would assimilate the US Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) and the Military Police. This new organization, the US Military Support Group–Panama (USMSGPM) was activated in mid-January 1990. It became responsible for Civil–Military Operations in Panama with the mission to build upon the modest, but real, success of CMOTF and USFLG et al. Specifically, the mission of the MSG was to "Conduct nation building operations to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama."\textsuperscript{122} Generally, the MSG transitioned into the role as the dominant CMO player smoothly.

The USFLG was easily absorbed by the MSG; it became the Public Force Liaison Division (PFLD) with a role identical to the USFLG's. The PFLD focused its efforts on the establishment of a credible Panamanian National Police force. It arranged, with some difficulty, for the acquisition of new uniforms for the PNP (old PDF uniforms were
unacceptable for obvious reasons). PFLD also coordinated purchases of
equipment for the PPF with US security assistance funds. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the PFLD coordinated and administered a police
training regimen for the PPF—courtesy of the CATF which put together a
team of CA operators with civilian experience as police.123

The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was also under
the operational control of the MSG. COMJSOTF, however, was the
commander of Special Operations Command-South (SOC SOUTH), and in this
normal role reported directly to CINCSOUTH; whereas in his role as
COMJSOTF, he was to report to the commander of the MSG.124 Because of
this, the JSOTF "was able to maintain a greater degree of autonomy under
the MSG than anyone had envisioned."125 The JSOTF provided SF teams
within Panama City to assist the local police precincts, and throughout
the interior of the country to provide credible US presence and to
identify and remove unacceptable members of the PNP (former PDF).126

The Military Police unit under OPCON to the MSG was the MP
Brigade from JTF-South (XVIII Corps). It operated within the Panama
City-Colon corridor and its primary function was to conduct combined
patrols with the PNP to maintain order in Panama City. A desired
collateral effect of these combined patrols was that the performance of
the US MP's tended to "rub off" onto their Panamanian counterparts thus
providing an element of training.127

The MSG headquarters was staffed ad hoc with personnel from
USARSO. Although the Army initially agreed to authorize USARSO a
personnel overstrength to account for this requirement, it reneged when
Army Colonel (P) James Steele, the MSG commander, insisted that the MSG
be a joint organization.128 The end result of which was that MSG had "a
largely ad hoc and changing staff that always was understrength and
always came out of USARSO's hide."129 Fortunately, key positions were
filled with quality, knowledgeable people and the organization was able
to function adequately.

44
From January to June, the MSG continued to function and develop. The US Embassy became functional and the Panamanian government continued to increase its effectiveness. Added to this environment were representatives from various other governmental agencies, all interested in playing their part in the restoration of Panama. This situation resulted in several problems of interagency coordination. Specifically, the Embassy rejected the use of US PSYOP assets because it did not think such operations, targeted against Panamanians, were appropriate—even though such operations had been used throughout JUST CAUSE to good effect. Another example was the assistance to the PNP that USFLG/PFLD provided. Near the end of January representatives from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) visited Panama with the expectation that they would play a large role in training the PNP. MSG's good work was subsequently undermined. When Congress passed a $42 million emergency assistance package for Panama, it specifically prohibited military training of the police. Thus, training of the PNP fell to Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which was much less effective than the earlier efforts of the USFLG and PFLD.

Regardless of who may be at fault it is clear that interagency coordination between the MSG and ICITAP [International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program] failed to achieve a coherent and effective U.S. Government approach to establishing and training a civilian police force from the remnants of the PDF. The proof of that failure lies in the police mutiny (coup attempt and/or protest) of December 4-5, 1990, led by ex-DG, Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan. . . . Equally telling is that Colonels Steele and Pryor were at police headquarters. . . when Herrera's men took control. Nowhere on the premises was anyone from the ICITAP.131

Analysis--The Manwaring Paradigm

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the single most important factor in the success or failure of MOOTW. This section analyzes the actions the US agencies took that affected the legitimacy of the government of Panama, namely the government of Guillermo Endara, inaugurated on 19 December 1989.
The first action that the US took in respect to the Endara government was publicizing the inauguration of that elected government on 19 December 1989, which, interestingly enough, occurred on a US military installation. The short-term effect of this action was to establish the Endara government as the legitimate government of Panama. Therefore, by its very nature, this action had a positive effect on the legitimacy of the Panamanian government. The long-term effect of this action, however, was negative. As previously discussed, this action resulted in the expectation of Panamanians for basic government action, namely law and order. Law and order, however, were sorely lacking during the first week of JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, arguably the most critical period of the operation. In essence, the US action to establish the Endara government was premature and shortsighted—it ensured that the quest for legitimacy would be an uphill struggle, because the Endara government had absolutely no capability or resources with which to provide the populace of Panama with basic governmental services. Other aspects of the paradigm also had negative effects on the legitimacy of the Endara government, such as the next topic.

Organization for Unity of Effort

Organization under the paradigm concerns the structure of the government to effectively carry out programs and policies to ensure its own survival.

Without an organization at the highest level able to establish, enforce, and continually refine a national campaign plan, authority is fragmented and there is no unity of effort to resolve the myriad problems. . . thus, failure.\textsuperscript{132}

The evidence shows that the organizational structure of both the de facto Panamanian and US governments had some impact, often adverse, on the post-conflict restoration activities.

As discussed, when PROMOTE LIBERTY was initiated, the Panamanian government had no such abilities or structure—it consisted of only three new government officials. Under the original BLIND LOGIC plan,
there was to be a US military government headed by CINCSOUTH for the first 30 days of the operation. Because of the inauguration of the Endara government, this did not occur; however, the CMOTF essentially retained the same responsibilities as it would have regardless of whether or not a military government was established. In essence, the CMOTF acted as the de facto government of Panama at least initially. Therefore, it is appropriate that we analyze the CMOTF to see if it was organized to effectively pursue PROMOTE LIBERTY.

The CMOTF was an ad hoc organization. Originally planned to be centered around the 361st CA Brigade, it was instead scraped together from CA reservist volunteers. As mentioned, this occurred because of the lack of the planned Presidential Reserve Call-Up. Compounding this was the JCS action that specified volunteer tours of 139 days, which effectively scrapped the contingency plan to build the CMOTF around 25 key Reservists. Thus, even with an adequate organizational structure, the personnel who ended up manning that structure were basically whoever the CMOTF could gather together. Even this could not be done in a timely manner. As Richard Schultz points out, "The CMOTF stood conceptually deficient, lacked a coherent organizational structure, and was short of personnel." The credit for any successes that CMOTF enjoyed belongs to the quality Reservists who volunteered and served, and to the CA planners who put together the functional annexes of BLIND LOGIC which gave the staffers of CMOTF the information they needed to get the CMO activities started in Panama.

Like the Endara government, the CMOTF, and the Charge d'Affaires it was subordinate to, did not possess adequate resources to provide law and order. It had no operational control of any US combat or security units, and those that did eventually provide forces to bring order to Panama City did so grudgingly with the intent of being relieved of such duties as soon as possible. This caused the CMOTF, with proper endorsement, to scramble to get the PNP established from the remnants of
the PDF—an action which in no way contributed positively to the image or legitimacy of the Endara government.

Clearly the most successful organization in terms of establishing some semblance of unity of effort during PROMOTE LIBERTY was the Military Support Group. Schultz writes,

While it did not completely snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat, the MSG did save face for the United States. Conceptually . . . it had the right organizational elements— and it has future applications if postconflict situations are added to the national security agenda of the United States. The MSG should serve as a conceptual model for the development of doctrine, an area in need of serious attention within the Department of Defense.136

Additionally, the fact that the MSG was the idea of USSOCOM is extremely relevant to this study.

High-level elements of the US government also failed to establish unity of effort in PROMOTE LIBERTY. The major actors encountered during this examination of PROMOTE LIBERTY (DOD, DOS, DOJ, AID) did not operate under a single guiding plan. Recall that the planners of BLIND LOGIC were not authorized to coordinate their plan with the DOS because the plan was under exclusive control of DOD. This fact became even more ludicrous when the organization tasked to execute the plan (the CMOTF) was placed under the operational control of a DOS representative (the Charge d'Affaires)! The bureaucratic backbiting conducted by DOJ and AID to get their piece of the Panama pie (PNP training discussed earlier) is another example of a complete lack of unity of effort within the highest levels of the US government.

Manwaring points to the British example of governmental organization for this sort of situation:

an overall coordinator of all military and civil activities has usually been appointed by the British prime minister. A committee of the cabinet provides oversight, periodic general direction, and support of the individual. Normal practice has been to give him the authority to deal with people in his own government and with officials in the threatened country. Together, long-term and short-term mutually supportive objectives are determined and pursued.136
The US government had no equivalent. Who was the focal point for all US efforts in Panama? The CINC? He had all of SOUTHCOM to be concerned with, and he turned the CMOTF over to DOS. The Ambassador? Initially there was not one in country. SECSTATE? The Attorney General? In short, the British solution may not be the only way to effect unity of effort, but it is clear that the US government was not adequately organized to conduct this sort of operation. As Fishel points out, the only US agency that made a significant contribution to unity of effort was the CMOTF who, by way of its formal and informal command relationships, provided connectivity between the CINC, the DOS, and the Endara government.\textsuperscript{137} An additional attempt to create unity of effort by way of a comprehensive organizational structure was suggested by CINCSOC, whose eventual dispatch of a CA planner to Panama resulted in the formation of the MSG. Richard Schultz poses the obvious question: why did the MSG emerge as an ad hoc creation conceived out of crisis? Why not include SOCOM in the planning of Blind Logic? After all, SOCOM is a supporting command that was established, in part, for these kinds of situations. It could provide not only the forces but planning expertise.\textsuperscript{138}

When Schultz posed this question to General Thurman in an interview, Thurman indicated that such an idea falls outside the norms of the US military:

That would be nice, but it is not the way the U.S. military does business. The CINC is responsible for the planning of the operation in his AOR. The CINC can call Lindsay for suggestions, but it is structurally impossible to integrate another command in a planning/advisory role. Theoretically, you could but it is not practiced because the planning staffs of CINCSOUTHCOM should be able to handle the planning and support forces that are only brought in on the operational side.\textsuperscript{139}

The facts of PROMOTE LIBERTY, however, show that Thurman’s staff was not fully capable to plan the post-conflict operation. Thurman’s failure to request more help from USSOCOM was imprudent at best.

The DOD had its own internal problems relative to unity of effort. Discussed earlier was the autonomy of the individual pieces of PRAYERBOOK, BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC, which were obviously
interdependent, but were not both considered when major changes were made by General Thurman to BLUE SPOON. This, along with the XVIII Corps staff failure to incorporate or at least resolve issues with BLIND LOGIC planners, resulted in the chaos in Panama City which also brought into question the legitimacy of the Endara government.

Military and Other Support to a Targeted Government

This element of the Manwaring Paradigm is not so easily adapted to all of MOOTW, because the paradigm was designed to analyze insurgencies; however, some of the factors within this element can be applied to PROMOTE LIBERTY. Manwaring states that the best use of foreign military units is in a "relatively unobtrusive 'train the trainer' role." This, he suggests, helps to maintain the legitimacy of the host government by minimizing the appearance of host government acquiescence to foreign interests. Operations JUST CAUSE, and PROMOTE LIBERTY in particular, were positive in this regard.

The initial influx of American military power into Panama for JUST CAUSE was massive, however, given the pre-conflict historical US troop levels in-country and the relatively quick departure of combat units brought in for JUST CAUSE, this fact can be somewhat mitigated. In almost every instance examined during PROMOTE LIBERTY, US troop involvement was minimized whenever possible. For example, after the initial chaos in Panama City, US combat forces were brought into the city in sufficient strength to adequately discourage lawlessness. As soon as a minimally credible PNP was established, the US combat forces were withdrawn and were replaced by combined PNP/US MP patrols. Likewise, the USFLG (and later the PFLD) sequentially downsized as the legitimacy, credibility, and capability of the PNP increased.

Intelligence

Intelligence is an element of the Manwaring Paradigm that "concerns efforts to locate, isolate and destroy, or neutralize an
insurgent leadership and organizational structure." In application of the paradigm to PROMOTE LIBERTY, this is best measured against US efforts to expose and remove unacceptable officers of the PDF-turned-PNP.

US forces fulfilled this role in the interior of the country. Specifically, SF teams assigned to the JSOTF and OPCON to the MSG gathered the necessary intelligence to serve this function. Because of the dispersion of MSG personnel around the country, the MSG was able to produce good intelligence. In the words of Colonel Jack Pryor, "We found our analysis was more accurate than others. We knew what Panama looked like." These efforts, therefore, had a positive effect on the success of PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Included in the intelligence piece of the paradigm are informational efforts. This, according to Manwaring, includes psychological instruments. As discussed briefly, PSYOP elements were used to good effect during JUST CAUSE, targetting specific Panamanian audiences to contribute toward attainment of both US and Panamanian objectives. Unfortunately, because of lack of unity of effort, such assets were not available for most of PROMOTE LIBERTY because the US Embassy prevented their use, apparently because it believed such methods to be inappropriate. Shultz reported that,

> Finally, with respect to psychological operations, the MSG encountered not uncommon civilian agency biases. Conceptually, PSYOPS has an important contribution to make to postconflict reconstruction programs. . . . to constrain PSYOPS use, as in Panama, does not make sense."

The Ambassador's refusal to allow employment of PSYOP assets probably had a negative impact on the success of the operation; certainly, the lack of PSYOP activities did not have a positive effect.

Discipline and Capabilities of the Armed Forces

This element concerns the ability of the host nation armed forces to conduct their duties in a professional, effective manner. For this section, the actions of the PNP and PPF are examined, since
destruction of the PDF was accomplished by the initial JUST CAUSE combat operations.

The CMOTF, USFLG, and the MSG all had a positive effect on the capabilities of the PPF and PNP. The initiatives and contributions of these US organizations have already been discussed in sufficient detail to establish this. Once again, however, the lack of unity of effort did have some negative effects. Specifically, the performance of the Department of Justice's ICITAP in its training programs for the PNP (a role wrangled away from PFLD) initially was poor and therefore had a negative effect on the success of PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Overall, the net effect of US efforts to affect the capabilities and professionalism of the PNP was positive for PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Reduction of Outside Aid to the Insurgents

Manwaring describes this aspect as "the separation of the insurgents from their network of internal and external sanctuaries and means of support." Again, for this study we substitute the PDF for the insurgent element. US forces had a positive impact in this regard. First, by deposing Noriega they removed him as a quasi symbol of legitimacy. This, and the apparent purge and reform of the PDF hierarchy in Panama City, effectively decapitated the PDF and eliminated its support network. The US presence in the outlying regions of Panama, provided mainly by the JSOTF, served to deny PDF hardliners sanctuary outside of the population centers. This had a positive influence on the outcome of PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Analysis of the Hypothesis

This analysis now turns to a consideration of what effect, if any, USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW would have on a nation building operation like PROMOTE LIBERTY. This is done by determining what the positive and negative effects such a condition would have had across the spectrum of the Manwaring Paradigm. Negative effects, or arguments
against SOCOM proponency, are discussed first in an effort to disprove the hypothesis. Then, positive effects, or arguments for SOCOM proponency, will be discussed in an effort to nullify any negative effects.

Legitimacy

ARGUMENT AGAINST: SOCOM proponency for nation-building operations would have had little, if any, impact on PROMOTE LIBERTY. As indicated in the analysis above, the aspects of US action that negatively affected the legitimacy of the Panamanian government was the early inauguration of the Endara government, poor coordination between SOUTHCOM and XVIII Corps, and using the PDF to form the new police force.

The inauguration of Endara was a decision made at the highest levels of the US government. CINCSOUTH and CINCSOC have equal access to these areas of the government, and CINCSOUTH, as a regional CINC, probably has more power to influence the national decision making process.

SOCOM proponency for nation building would not have influenced the poor coordination between SOUTHCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps which resulted in the chaos in Panama City. This poor coordination was probably an anomaly that occurred only because of the "irrelevance" of the soon-to-retire General Woerner.

The decision to rebuild the PDF into the PNP was made by the Endara government with advice from several US agencies including the CINC and the DOS. Essentially, there were no other options that could have been executed in a timely manner. In accordance with the elements of success shown in the Manwaring Paradigm, US assistance needed to be unobtrusive to enhance the legitimacy of the Endara government. Therefore, rapid establishment of a Panamanian Police Force was essential to success. SOCOM proponency could not have changed this situation and therefore would have had no positive effect.
COUNTERARGUMENT: Proponency, as defined in Chapter 1, could have positively affected PROMOTE LIBERTY because it could have prevented those events which reduced the legitimacy of the Endara government, and because it could have amplified the effect of those actions that enhanced the legitimacy of the Endara government.

The relationship of USOCOM with the ASD SO/LIC gives it greater continuous access to the high-level decision makers within the government than any other unified command. It has additional access through the LIC Board, if convened. The fact that CINCSOC has this unique representation within DOD makes him better able to influence decisions like the inauguration of the Endara government. As the definition of proponency implies, it would not necessarily have changed any command relationships for PROMOTE LIBERTY--CINCSOUTH would have still been in charge of the operation. However, as the proponent for nation-building, CINCSOC would have had more formal involvement in the PROMOTE LIBERTY planning process.

The poor coordination between SOUTHCOM and XVIII Corps was due only in part to the "irrelevance" of General Woerner. This situation was, in fact, an anomaly for which USOCOM proponency offers no solution. What USOCOM proponency can target is the "break things" attitude of conventional forces that XVIII Corps exhibited and focus more US energy and thought on the post-conflict activity of "fixing the broken things." This is not a criticism of a necessary warfighting attitude--combat units work hard on developing such a vital warrior ethos. However, SOCOM proponency could have enlightened this attitude somewhat by providing a powerful player in the planning process whose business is (at least in nation building) to be interested in "fixing things."

The decision to resurrect the PDF as the PNP was seemingly unavoidable, but it posed a problem to the legitimacy of the Endara government; a problem SOCOM proponency might have alleviated. For
example, several months after establishment of the PNP it still had no non-PDF recruits. This fact undermined any credibility the PNP had as a reformed, professional force. To rectify this, two actors needed to be influenced—the population within Panama of potential recruits, and the PNP itself. Psychological operations targeting these two actors could have had a positive influence on the situation and also enhanced the legitimacy of the PNP and, subsequently, the Endara government. CINCSOC owns all the PSYOP assets within DOD and can therefore espouse their use. This, combined with his access to the highest levels of the government, may have enabled him to influence the DOS and the Ambassador so that PSYOP could have been employed during PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Organization for Unity of Effort

ARGUMENT AGAINST: The CMOTF was an ad hoc organization. It was ad hoc, however, because of a decision by the JCS, and the subsequently the decision of ARSOF, in regard to a 139 day vice 31 day temporary duty policy. SOUTHCOM had asked for a Presidential Call-Up of the 361st CA for PROMOTE LIBERTY, but their good plan was annulled at the national level. Even CINCSOC, who after all "owns" the 361st, could not make the Presidential Call-Up happen. Therefore, SOCOM proponency would not have fixed this lack of organization which diminished the overall unity of effort.

COUNTERARGUMENT: The problem of forming up the CMOTF from the 361st CA was compounded because of a lack of interest in non-combat operations. When PROMOTE LIBERTY was forwarded to the JCS for final approval, CINCSOUTH was on the verge of conducting combat in his Area of Responsibility. He, therefore, placed PROMOTE LIBERTY aside to address later, as he had done while revising BLUE SPOON. It was understandable that General Thurman would be more personally interested in the outcome of BLUE SPOON vice PROMOTE LIBERTY. After all, victory is relatively easy to recognize in war but very difficult to recognize in MOOTW. In contrast, CINCSOC, as the owner of all CA forces, would have a keen
amount of interest in non-combat operations. This is not to say that CINCSOC is not also interested in combat; after all, forces from his command led the invasion. As a supporting CINC however, CINCSOC has the advantage of not being immersed in operations because he is rarely, if ever, in operational control of operations. This characteristic makes it much easier for CINCSOC to evaluate and influence SOF (which includes CA) operations. In Panama, for example, CINCSOC did exactly this when he sent a senior CA planner to make recommendations for formation of the MSG. If CINCSOC would have had proponency within DOD for nation-building in 1989, then perhaps such action would have been proactive instead of reactive. Such foresight during planning combined with excellent access to the national decision-making structure might have prevented the failure to call up the 361st. This would have made the CMOTF better able to provide the connectivity between SOUTHCOM, DOS, and the Panamanian government which was so necessary for the success of the post-conflict restoration.

Military and Other Support to a Targeted Government

ARGUMENT AGAINST: As discussed, the American intervention in Panama was less than unobtrusive, but appropriate. Continually downsized as required, the US military forces in Panama did not generally contribute to a perception of Panamanian acquiescence to US interests. There was, therefore, no problem that USSOCOM proponency could have fixed.

COUNTERARGUMENT: None.

Intelligence

ARGUMENT AGAINST: US Special Forces teams, properly utilized by the JSOTF during PROMOTE LIBERTY, effectively identified and neutralized PDF members located in the Panamanian countryside and villages. This had a positive affect on the success of PROMOTE LIBERTY and therefore
indicates that proponency for nation-building in this regard is not an issue.

The issue of the use of psychological operations for PROMOTE LIBERTY does not support assigning nation-building proponency to SOCOM. The decision to use this aspect of the military instrument of power is politically sensitive and therefore must be made with great care. In Panama, the Ambassador made the appropriate decision not to allow the use of PSYOP for PROMOTE LIBERTY. Military PSYOP campaigns against segments of the Panamanian populace could have been politically damaging to both the US and Endara governments, and therefore could have undermined the objective of PROMOTE LIBERTY. Such decisions rightfully belong with the Ambassador and not SOCOM.

COUNTERARGUMENT: The fact that US SF teams were properly used to good effect does not mean that they could not have been used to better effect. As described, the COMJSOTF was dual-hatted as the COMSOCSOUTH, yet he was also subordinate to the MSG. This relationship was a burden for the commander of the MSG because, although he had operational control of the JSOTF, the commander of the JSOTF could report directly to the CINC in his role as the commander of SOCSOUTH. The operational control the MSG had over the JSOTF was thus rather loose and less than synergistic. While it seems to make sense that a SOC would be the natural choice to head a JSOTF in the region, this example seems to prove otherwise. Resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, however intuition suggests that there should be a doctrinal template for forming MSG's, CMOTF's, and JSOTF's. For MOOTW it follows that a single agency should guide development of such doctrine. The agency should be USSOCOM because of its dominant role in MOOTW.

The same logic argued above holds for the general use of PSYOP, however the real issue in this case is unity of effort. Use of PSYOP can be politically sensitive. Those sensitivities must be considered,
but such considerations must be timely and well thought out as to the larger implications. In PROMOTE LIBERTY, the reaction to PSYOP by the Ambassador, whether correct or not, seems to have been made hastily and unilaterally. Adequate organization for unity of effort, as described previously, would have at least provided a vehicle for making prudent decisions which objectively considered all views from all concerned agencies. USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW will help to establish such unity of effort and thus will help within the aspect of the intelligence piece of the Maneuvering Paradigm.

Discipline and Capabilities of the Armed Forces

ARGUMENT AGAINST: US military organizations in Panama (CMOTF, USFLG, MSG) had a positive affect on the development of a competent and professional Panamanian National Police force. Therefore, the system we currently use for such operations is not broken and does not need to be fixed. SOCOM proponency for nation-building is an unproven fix that is not needed.

COUNTERARGUMENT: SOCOM proponency is needed because the system is broken. First, SOF, in the form of SF teams and CA operators conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID), routinely conducts for DOD operations to enhance the capabilities of foreign nations' armed forces. This was adequately demonstrated during PROMOTE LIBERTY. Also demonstrated during PROMOTE LIBERTY was the competition among US governmental agencies for various aspects of nation building. During PROMOTE LIBERTY this was apparent in regard to the mission of establishing and training the PNP, which USAID and ICITAP competed for and won. Unfortunately, the evidence examined earlier showed that compared to the MSG, they did a mediocre job. This case study suggests DOD primacy in such operations, although probably the best solution would be to have DOD, AID, DOJ, et al. work together to achieve US objectives—thereby achieving overall US interagency unity of effort. In order to work with these other US governance agencies, DOD must
offer positive, workable alternatives. Having such options available may preempt nasty political backbiting. DOD must have competent and proactive representation at the levels where such decisions are made. The ASD SO/LIC with his legislative liaison cell is ideally positioned to provide such representation. Assigning proponency for nation-building to SOCOM would strengthen the connectivity from the tactical level (Military Support Group) to the strategic level (NSC) via the ASD SO/LIC. Stronger DOD representation in the strategic interagency decision-making process should contribute to increased unity of effort and potentially more US success in nation-building operations.

Conclusion

Analysis of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY showed several weaknesses in the US approach to nation-building, a key function within MOOTW that is also representative of other MOOTW activities (e.g., humanitarian assistance and security assistance). The hypothesis that SOCOM should have proponency for MOOTW was examined by first expressing and understanding the argument against SOCOM proponency and then by looking at reasons supporting SOCOM proponency. The logic for SOCOM proponency clearly outweighed the arguments against. Summary of the analysis is shown below in Table 1.

Table 1.—Analytical Summary of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARADIGM ASPECT</th>
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<th>ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF USSOCOM PROPONEY</th>
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<td>NEGATIVE (PSYOP)</td>
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<td>DICIPLINE OF ARMED FORCES (PDF/PNP)</td>
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<td>REDUCTION OF AID</td>
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Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Background

The operations known as DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM conducted in 1990 and 1991 need little or no amplification to the contemporary reader of this study and therefore are not described. However, not as well known is Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a post-conflict humanitarian assistance effort undertaken by US led multi-national forces in April 1991.

During Operation DESERT STORM strong US rhetoric encouraging ethnic insurrections and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein led to a rebellion by Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq in March-April 1991. Initially, the Kurds were able to take advantage of Iraq's military situation and made some progress in northern Iraq. However, Saddam Hussein had more forces remaining at the conclusion of DESERT STORM than the Kurds had thought. As Iraqi forces massed to quell the Kurdish rebels, the US did nothing to deter Iraqi military action against the Kurds. Iraqi Republican Guard units were then used to decisively smash the Kurd rebellion using armor and attack helicopters in fierce fighting. Subsequently, the rebellion fell apart and the panicked Kurds fled northern Iraq to the border areas of Iran and Turkey.

The Kurds established encampments in the remote mountain border areas of Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Turkey. Soon, 1000 Kurds were dying each day from combinations of exposure, starvation, and disease. Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili described the Kurds situation:

They hovered just below the snow line, without shelter, without adequate clothing, without food, without any kind of sanitation, and without any kind of medical attention . . . Before the world could realize the enormity of the tragedy unfolding hundreds of the very young and the very old were dying each day. The media began reporting on the dire straits of the Kurdish refugees, and the situation very quickly became politically critical for the US. On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed UN Resolution 688 which castigated the Iraqi repression of the Kurds, and asked the
international community to render humanitarian aid. Shortly thereafter, American President George Bush ordered US military forces to provide humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered Kurds. After hasty US governmental interagency coordination in Washington, Joint Task Force Provide Comfort (JTFPC) deployed to Incirlik, Turkey, and began airdrops of relief supplies on 6 April 1991. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, these airdrops had a minimal affect in relieving the suffering of the Kurdish refugees. JTFPC, under the command of Major General James Jamerson, USAF, initially was only to provide relief supplies via these airdrops. A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), subordinate to JTFPC and commanded by Brigadier General Richard Potter (Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)), was to provide recovery for downed aircrews. Very shortly after the start of the operation, however, Potter’s mission was expanded to include "assisting the airdrops, organizing the refugee camps, supervising the distribution of food and water, improving sanitation, and providing medical care."

On 9 April 1991, the US Secretary of State James Baker visited a Kurd refugee camp in southern Turkey—what he saw appalled him. Baker’s impressions of Kurd suffering caused President Bush on 16 April, under the authority of UN Resolution 688, to expand Operation PROVIDE COMFORT into a major US led multinational humanitarian assistance operation. Thus JTFPC, established by the Commander-in-Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), became Combined JTFPC (CJTFPC).

The CJTFPC was tasked with establishing temporary camps in northern Iraq for the Kurd refugees. Essential tasks included providing security, distribution of humanitarian assistance supplies, and construction of shelters. The general concept was that comfortable, safe camps would lure the Kurds out of the mountains and back to the vicinity of their homes. Once this was done, responsibility for them would be transferred from CJTFPC to international relief agencies.
Organization

The commander of CJTFPC was Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, the Deputy Commander of US Army Europe. On 16 April, while Shalikashvili was enroute to Turkey, immediate relief operations were being handled on the ground by Potter and his special operations forces. Organization for CJTFPC is shown below:

![Organization Diagram]

Figure 7: Organization for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.
JTF-Alpha, Potter's group, was primarily responsible for locating the Kurdish refugees in the remote mountain areas of southern Turkey and convincing them to move to camps established in the vicinity of their home villages. JTF-Alpha was composed primarily of US Special Forces Teams from the 10th Special Forces Group augmented by some CA teams out of the 432d CA Company from the 354th CA Brigade.\(^{158}\)

JTF-Bravo, commanded by Major General Jay M. Garner, Deputy Commander V Corps, was composed of several multinational contingents centered around the US 24th MEU (SOC). JTF-Bravo's primary mission was to establish refugee camps in northern Iraq. Working closely with the CJTFPC, and JTF-B specifically, was the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

The DART was headed by the Deputy Director of USAID's OFDA, Dayton Maxwell, a three-star general officer equivalent. Based on Maxwell's own assessment of the situation, he decided to attach himself and his DART personnel to JTF-Bravo, not realizing that he in fact outranked the commander, Major General Garner. This was not a major problem, although Maxwell at times was frustrated by what he perceived as inadequate communications through Garner to Shalikashvili.\(^{159}\)

Execution

On 19 April, Shalikashvili met Iraqi Major General Savan at the Turkey-Iraq border. There he informed the Iraqis of his intention to cross into Iraqi territory with coalition forces for the purpose of providing aid to the Kurds. Shalikashvili advised the Iraqis not to interfere with the operation and demanded that all Iraqi forces withdraw to the interior. The Iraqi general only acknowledged receipt of the message.\(^{160}\) Subsequently, JTF-Bravo entered Iraq to begin executing its mission while JTF-Alpha focused on its mission in the mountains.

The SOF assigned to Potter's JTF-Alpha were the first significant forces on the ground for PROVIDE COMFORT. The SF teams proved invaluable in their ability to locate, contact, assess, and
communicate with the Kurds in the remotest areas of southern Turkey and northern Iraq. The US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reports on the performance of SOF with JTF-Alpha are exceptionally complimentary:

The training, maturity, and quality of the individuals assigned to SOF units made them ideal for this operation. SOF soldiers, with their unique skills, provided the right mix for humanitarian support.161

Ironically, the SF teams sent into northern Iraq and southern Turkey were not regionally oriented toward that area—10th SFG's regional orientation is Europe, "however, because of their past operations with various people around the world, and past training... the soldiers recognized the importance of cultural awareness."162 Because of this they were able to use the Kurdish family and tribal organizations to contribute toward effective organization of the refugee camps. The SF training and doctrine for Unconventional Warfare provided them the framework they needed to accomplish this:

The elements planned, infiltrated, assessed, organized, and trained the Kurdish refugees. However, instead of training the personnel in combat-oriented operations, the SOF soldiers trained the Kurdish personnel to construct sanitation facilities and water storage areas and to control their own people to ensure fair food and water distribution. Additionally, the SF medical personnel not only treated the injured and sick personnel, but also conducted training for the refugees in the prevention and treatment of the various camp sicknesses and diseases such as dysentery.163

Other SOF, particularly the 354th CA Bde, played critical roles in the success of PROVIDE COMFORT.

The 354th CA Bde worked with all elements of the CJTFPC, but it worked particularly closely with JTF-Bravo and the DART. It was very busy; its activities included the coordination of host/foreign nation support; the preparation of area assessments; conduct of liaison with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and private volunteer organizations (PVO's); and the conduct of dislocated civilian operations, primarily the operation of the refugee camps established by JTF-Bravo. As noted by observers:
CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent for Civil-Military operations. For this reason, CA units should be among the first considered for inclusion in humanitarian assistance operations.\textsuperscript{144}

The actions of the CA units, along with the contributions of the DART, were instrumental in changing the perceptions of Shalikashvili and other commanders within CJTFPC as to the functions, capabilities, and operating procedures of their organizations and also of the other non-governmental groups involved in PROVIDE COMFORT. As John Fishel notes, "From General Shalikashvili down U.S. officers perceived the UN as some kind of unified organization like the U.S. Government."\textsuperscript{145} Fishel believed the correction of such perceptions was one of the major contributions of DART and the Civil Affairs Command.

As PROVIDE COMFORT grew into a major US-led operation, the initial work done by SOCEUR and JTF-Alpha became the foundation that other assets built upon. For example, US national level intelligence assets used SOF inputs to confirm that all of the remote Kurd encampments had been found.\textsuperscript{146}

PROVIDE COMFORT was unique, in that while primarily a humanitarian assistance operation, it included elements of peace enforcement. This was because it occurred in areas where the threat of combat with Iraqi troops was ever-present. Therefore, providing a secure environment was one of the greatest challenges for CJTFPC. Establishing security in northern Iraq was a key task for JTF-Bravo, which did so effectively using a combination of sheer boldness, innovation, and intimidation with respect to the Iraqi forces. The JTF created a semi-permissive environment in which the coalition could accomplish its mission, albeit with a few tense moments of confrontation with Iraqi troops.\textsuperscript{147}

In early May 1991, JTF-Alpha began moving refugees down to the camps established in northern Iraq by JTF-Bravo. By the end of May, final preparations for transfer of the operation were coordinated with UN officials. JTF-Alpha completed its mission in the mountains by 7
July and subsequently redeployed to its home stations in Europe and the US. Almost all the Kurdish refugees had returned to their homes by mid-July, and on 15 July the CJTFPC withdrew from Iraq. The CJTFPC subsequently stood down, having accomplished its mission.  

**Analysis—the Manwaring Paradigm**

**Legitimacy**

Again, legitimacy is the key element in the success of MOOTW. UN Resolution 688 provided legitimacy from an international perspective for PROVIDE COMFORT. The operation was intrusive to Iraq but the UN did not concern itself with the operation's legitimacy from an Iraqi perspective. Therefore, this analysis of PROVIDE COMFORT considers the legitimacy of the US-led UN coalition from the perspective of the Kurdish refugees. For humanitarian assistance operations the factor of legitimacy can be distilled into factors like rapport and sensitivity with regard to the affected population.

The Special Forces teams assigned to JTF-Alpha established legitimacy early on when they conducted their assessments of the Kurdish encampments in the remote mountain areas of Iraq and Turkey. The concern, understanding, and sensitivity they showed towards Kurdish ethnic needs were paramount to the success of the establishment of this legitimacy. Testament to this is the fact that the majority of Kurds moved voluntarily out of the mountains and into the camps of JTF-Bravo within a month of initial contact by the Special Forces.

The legitimacy initially established by JTF-Alpha was maintained by JTF-Bravo in the transit camps established in northern Iraq. This was done by providing adequate security. The fact that JTF-Bravo could protect the Kurds from the Iraqi security forces was enough to ensure a Kurd perception of legitimacy. Additionally, the Civil Affairs and PSYOP elements that operated in the refugee camps took active steps to maintain this perception of legitimacy.
From all aspects, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had a positive affect on the factor of legitimacy which, in turn, greatly contributed to the success of the operation.

Organization for Unity of Effort

Execution of PROVIDE COMFORT was not anticipated; when it was executed, it had to be done quickly. Additionally, the environment for the operation was remote and semi-permissive. These factors led to DOD assuming responsibility as the lead agency for this operation. A collateral effect of this decision was that there were very few other US agencies competing for the lead over pieces of the operation. Therefore, organization for unity of effort at the US strategic level was not a contentious issue. The key aspect of PROVIDE COMFORT, however, is the organization for unity of effort amongst the international community (NGO’s, PVO’s) provided by CJTFPC. As discussed, the organizations helping to provide unity of effort among the international actors involved in PROVIDE COMFORT were the Civil Affairs units and the DART. Credit for having appropriate CA planners on hand from the very beginning of the Kurd situation belongs to General John Galvin, CINCEUR. Because of EUCOM’s involvement in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Galvin insisted that key reservists augment his staff throughout those operations. This included a CA planning cell from the 353d CA Command.169 Having these CA personnel assigned to CINCEUR did not come easy, but was apparently worth the effort:

CINCEUR specified the unit and even the names of the personnel it wanted. DA resisted the request from CINCEUR for specific personnel from a particular unit, even though it had routinely agreed to similar requests from CINCCENT, and offered to send logistical specialists from the Active Component instead of Reserve CA specialists. CINCEUR insisted, and the 19 CA soldiers were sent to Europe on 13 February 1991 on TTAD.170

Interestingly, Brigadier General Donald F. Campbell (USAR), the commander of the Civil Affairs Command for CJTFPC, was not called to active duty for the operation but instead served on Special Active Duty for Training (SADT).171 Regardless of Campbell’s controversial status,
it is extremely fortunate that he served during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, because he personally had a very positive effect on the establishment and maintenance of unity of effort:

One of General Campbell's principal duties was to deal personally with the representatives of the 50 or more international agencies seeking to help the Kurds. These included the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the United Nations. General Campbell and his staff helped these agencies to apply their efforts in the best way and smoothed out the inevitable frictions which occur when so many different groups work in a limited area.172

The service of the CA elements of CJTFPC in the role of coordinator with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and nongovernmental organizations was invaluable and had a positive effect on unity of effort.

Likewise, the DART also had a positive effect on unity of effort. Beyond correcting US military perceptions in regard to operations and organization of the UNHCR and other NGO's, DART took other proactive measures because of the OFDA Director Andrew Natsios, who had been very recently involved in a similar operation in Kuwait as the Executive Officer of the Kuwait Task Force.173 He sent one of his key aides, Dayton Maxwell, to Turkey with the knowledge of "just how important it was that his operation be fully integrated with the developing military effort."174

The overall effect on the entire task force created effective unity of effort, although it is important to note that both CA and DART were present and able to facilitate this unity of effort because of the foresight of a few knowledgeable individuals, particularly Galvin and Natsios.

Military and Other Support to a Targeted Government

Recall that the Manwaring Paradigm suggests that the best role for foreign military personnel in an internal conflict is in "the relatively unobtrusive 'train the trainer' role."175 While difficult to apply to MOOTW other than insurgencies, application to PROVIDE COMFORT
indicates that the techniques of the Special Forces in encouraging long-
term self-reliance amongst the Kurds had a positive impact within this aspect of the paradigm.

The tactic of developing smaller camps along family and tribal lines linked to distribution points encouraged Kurdish leaders to take responsibility for camp labor and security. This concept was extremely successful. . . . this innovative approach enabled 480,000 refugees to be either turned over to international agencies or returned to their homes. It also allowed the withdrawal of the multinational force from Iraq by 15 July 1991.176

The use of Special Forces had a decisive impact in regard to the type and character of the support provided to the Kurds. As lauded by the after action reports, "Every general officer interviewed validated the following statement: '. . . JTF-Alpha's Special Forces Teams were the only ones who could have accomplished the mission in the mountains.'"177

Intelligence

This part of the paradigm is best measured against US efforts in PROVIDE COMFORT to locate, influence, and exploit the leadership of the Kurds in order to get them to cooperate and positively contribute to the objectives of the operation. The well-established positive impact that the Special Forces Teams of JTF-Alpha had in this regard has already been discussed. The tactics, techniques, and procedures of the SF had a tremendously positive effect in this area of the Manwaring Paradigm.

Discipline and Capabilities of the Armed Forces

This criterion is normally applied against the forces of the assisted government, but in this case the US armed forces must be scrutinized to determine whether their performance had a positive effect on the operation. Without question, the professionalism and competence of the US personnel assigned to CJTFPC did have a positive effect on the Kurds and the subsequent success of PROVIDE COMFORT, as already shown. Beyond the Kurds, however, there were other actors who were favorably impressed by the outstanding character of US forces:
Initially, coalition forces found it difficult to work with the various civilian organizations and persons involved in refugee operations. In particular, NGOs resented the military and its disciplined approach to the refugee situation. ... Gradually, the professionalism and abilities of SF and CA soldiers working the mountain camps voided most concerns, and the attitudes of the NGOs changed.  

The positive impact indicated by the above statement cannot be overstated. The performance of the military personnel greatly enhanced the legitimacy and unity of effort of the operation by changing the attitudes of the various civilian relief agencies.

Reduction of Outside Aid to the Insurgents

This part of the paradigm seems unadaptable to the situation in northern Iraq, however we can adapt it and apply it in a useful fashion. It could become instead, "Reduction of Iraqi intimidation of the Kurds," therefore making the Kurds the protected party, and the Iraqis the external hostile actor.

In one situation, the CJTFPC discovered that the Kurds of a certain village refused to return to it because Saddam Hussein had sent several hundred Iraqi police there to establish control, some of whom were actually soldiers of the Iraqi 66th Special Forces Brigade in civilian clothes. Acting on advice from members of the DART, a psychological tactic was employed to cause the Iraqis to leave. As USAID officials explained to John Fishel, this tactic was to:

- go to the authorities, because we had military control, get a list of all their names and functions, get a list of where they are assigned and what they are going to be doing, make sure we have visitation rights. Then we publicize their names, so everthing is transparent. With that kind of peaceful transparent initiative, they lose their secrecy, their capability of working in a covert way to harass or intimidate the refugees as they come down [from the mountains].

This tactic, combined with a significant show of force and aggressive coalition patrolling, intimidated the Iraqi forces to the point at which they were not willing to stay. Thus, Iraqi police departed, and the Kurds returned to the village.
Analysis of the Hypothesis

ARGUMENT AGAINST: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was such a huge success that LTC Patrick Cavanaugh, author of a study on PROVIDE COMFORT, holds it up as a model for future NATO operations. USSOCOM proponency for humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, or any of the other MOOTW activities conducted during the operation would not have increased the success that was attained. DOD already knows, as the facts of this case study show, how to effectively conduct MOOTW and successfully employ SOF.

SOF was instrumental in the success of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Legitimacy of the effort was enhanced by the conduct, professionalism, and techniques of the Special Forces assigned to JTF-Alpha; unity of effort was improved by employing Civil Affairs elements; SF teams were unobtrusive, mobile, and created synergy amongst the Kurd refugees; all SOF employed were exceptionally professional and served to win the hearts and minds of the NGO's and PVO's; and SF was able to gather intelligence on the organization structures of the Kurdish people that made most of their success possible. But SOF was only part of the equation that added up to success in PROVIDE COMFORT. The Marines, MP's, engineers, and coalition forces of JTF-Bravo along with transportation, supply, medical, and signal units of the Combined Support Command, also made significant contributions to the success of the operation. SOCOM cannot possibly succeed in being the proponent for operations that rely on such a variety of forces. SOCOM's proper role in this regard is to develop and maintain its SOF for employment in MOOTW.

COUNTERARGUMENT: This case study shows that SOF is the key ingredient in humanitarian assistance operations, for all the reasons listed above. The capabilities of SOF are essential in managing the MOOTW environment which, in turn, facilitates the successful employment of conventional forces like the MEU, the engineers, and MP's. In MOOTW,
SOF create the conditions for success in which conventional forces will operate. Conventional forces provide valuable and essential functions that are complementary to their conventional wartime mission (e.g., Marines secure areas, airborne troopers conduct patrols, engineers build roads, MP’s control traffic). SOF’s role is different. It is the glue that holds the operation together, provides it synergy, and helps communicate the purpose or focus of the operation to all involved. Yes, PROVIDE COMFORT was successful, and the way to continue that success is to institutionalize the aspects of the operation that made it so. USSOCOM proponency for humanitarian assistance may not have made a difference to the success of this operation, but may ensure success in the next humanitarian assistance operation.

Conclusion

Analysis of PROMOTE LIBERTY showed, in this instance, an effective US humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement operation, key functions within MOOTW that are representative of many other MOOTW activities. The question of the validity of SOCOM proponency for such operations was again examined by first looking at the arguments against such an arrangement. Support for proponency seemed to be justified because of the need for the US to achieve similar success in the future. Summary of the analysis is shown in Table 2 below:

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If the Armed Forces are to serve the Nation in confronting the challenges that lie ahead, perceptions of a military unable or unwilling to entertain any idea which is not supported by a consensus of all the services must be put to rest now and forever. The world is changing and it is time for the military to do the same through reform that goes beyond Goldwater-Nichols.183

Peter W. Chiarelli, Joint Force Quarterly

Conclusions

This analysis of Operations PROMOTE LIBERTY and PROVIDE COMFORT suggests that assigning proponency for MOOTW to USSOCOM would be beneficial and prudent. SOCOM's outstanding access to national strategic decisionmakers enables it to enhance unity of effort in MOOTW. This capability will be amplified by giving proponency for MOOTW to SOCOM because proponency will allow CINCSOC to more formally influence the planning of such operations. This additional influence will contribute to the proper use of SOF assets like Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces, which the case studies show to be key elements for tactical and operational success in MOOTW. These SOF assets have proven to be essential to success because of their unique capabilities: Regional orientation, cultural sensitivity, language capabilities, and the ability to work in unconventional, MOOTW environments. Such capabilities lead to success in MOOTW because they are essential to the establishment of legitimacy of US operations and supported governments. Additionally, SOF assets, specifically Civil Affairs units, are key in establishing rapport, cooperation, and unity.
of effort among military forces and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations; arguably one of the greatest challenges in conducting successful MOOTW.

Both case studies show that the capabilities of SOF have already been exploited during the conduct of MOOTW, but they have been exploited to varying degrees and with decidedly mixed results. USSOCOM proponency for MOOTW will allow us to fully capitalize on the unique capabilities that SOF offer for the conduct of these operations. Additionally, SOCOM proponency will help establish unity of effort within DOD for the conduct of MOOTW, and, as a worldwide oriented supporting command, USSOCOM will be able to better support the regionally oriented CINC's with SOF and MOOTW expertise. This being the case, then, conventional units can concentrate on maintenance of their warfighting skills, confident that if they are called to serve in a MOOTW, they will only conduct functions that are consistent with their normal capabilities. Likewise, regionally oriented CINC's can concentrate on warfighting within their AOR's, confident that they will receive professional and effective assistance as MOOTW scenarios emerge. The end result can be more efficient use of both SOF and conventional forces, and, most importantly, increased success in MOOTW.

This conclusion seems to be consistent with the intent of the SOF legislative reforms of the mid-1980's. In fact, some would argue that the legislation should have been even stronger. LTC Robin Cababa writes:

From an organizational perspective, the corrections made by Congress do not go far enough. While a coordinating methodology was created, no one was given overall responsibility, let alone authority for the mission.184

Regardless of whether the legislation was strong enough or not, the point is that assigning proponency for MOOTW to USSOCOM arguably would not violate the intent of the legislation.
Some would disagree. For example, John Fishel argues that,

SOF in not LIC, nor small wars, nor OOTW, nor conventional
operations. Rather, SOF is one set of assets that can be
applied against military missions anywhere within the range of
military operations. If SOF is not LIC then CINCSOC also is
not CINCLIC. In fact, there is no CINC in charge of LIC
although every theater CINC has a significant responsibility
for LIC. . . . 185

Fishel is correct--SOF is not LIC (or MOOTW). MOOTW, however, is best
described as an environment--not a list of potential activities that may
or may not be all inclusive, as we see in the DOD doctrinal
publications. The MOOTW environment is colored by political, social,
economic, cultural, and organizational subtleties; to a much greater
extent than an environment of war, although, as Fishel points out, it
would be anti-Clausewitzian (and hence wrong) to think that conventional
war was devoid of politics. 186

The MOOTW environment is complex and unconventional. The
research shows that MOOTW often causes problems for conventional US
units and leaders. On the other hand, Special Operations Forces, as
discussed, are naturally suited for employment in MOOTW--they are
normally regionally oriented, they habitually work within regional CINC
AOR's, and they are comfortable working with NGOs and IGOs.
Additionally, SOF enjoy working in the MOOTW environment. An interview
with a Special Forces officer who had recently returned from leading his
A-team in Haiti (Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY), is representative of this
phenomenon. He enjoyed his mission, working in the rural areas of
Haiti, because he got to employ the skills of his team. As he said, "It
was a blast, I got to do all my missions--FID, Direct Action, and
Special Reconnaissance." 187 This may seem like a frivolous point, but it
is important--as good a reason as any for assigning propensity for MOOTW
to USSOCOM is that SOF relish working in the MOOTW environment while
conventional soldiers have to take extraordinary means to adapt to it.
Conventional soldiers often seem to equate OOTW to "Operations Other
Than What-I-Signed-Up-For."
That is not to say that conventional forces ignore MOOTW. Certainly they have been and will be involved in the support of MOOTW—given the scale of the operations considered in this thesis, conventional force commanders will most certainly command MOOTW. Recall that the given definition of "proponency" in chapter one did not include operational control of MOOTW. In conventional operations, conventional forces lead (in terms of doctrine, training, and employment) and special operations forces support; in MOOTW, perhaps special operations forces should lead (in the same terms) and conventional forces should support.

USOCOM proponency for MOOTW should help US forces create unity of effort. There is, however, a larger problem that was evident in the examination of PROMOTE LIBERTY and PROVIDE COMFORT—unity of effort at the strategic level. Specifically, the US government seems inadequately organized to effectively conduct MOOTW. LTC Cababa, a student at the Naval War College who examined this issue, states,

Efforts at the national level are ineffective because while there might be a clear understanding of the usefulness of nation assistance [MOOTW], there is no effective integrating policy nor mechanism to link together and synergistically employ the instruments of national power.188

This was apparent in both case studies, however it was most prevalent during PROMOTE LIBERTY. There are many potential solutions to this problem. LTC Cababa offers these: (1) The LIC Board could start meeting and do its job, or (2) Give MOOTW, in total, to either DOD or DOS, or (3) Hire civilian contractors to conduct MOOTW.189 The British method of assigning an overall coordinator in charge of all military and civilian functions in a given MOOTW, briefly described in Chapter 3, is another possibility. Although analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this study, the point is that even if DOD successfully establishes internal unity of effort for MOOTW, it will still have to contend with problems caused by a relative lack of unity of effort with other US agencies.
Recommendations

First, USSOCOM should have proponency for MOOTW. It should be DOD's executive agent for development, maintenance, and publication of MOOTW doctrine. As such, it will coordinate doctrine with other agencies, both without and within the US government (e.g., DOS, DEA, USAID, CIA, UN, NATO, etc.). Additionally, USSOCOM should maintain usable, real expertise in all aspects of MOOTW. This expertise should be recognized in joint doctrine and formally incorporated into regionale CINCs' deliberate and crisis action planning procedures, perhaps in the form of a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) or some other sort of staff augmentation package, or through the regional subunified Special Operations Commands (SOC).

USSOCOM's basic command relationships should not change. It should remain a worldwide oriented, supporting, combatant command. Proponency, again, does not equal operational control.

The relationship among the CINC's, USSOCOM, and the regional SOC's should not change. In regard to MOOTW, regional SOC's will provide connectivity between SOCOM proponency and unique regional situations.

Issues Warranting Further Study

1. How should the US Government change organizationally to effect unity of effort for MOOTW at the strategic level?

2. How should a USSOCOM DJTF or staff augmentation package be organized?

3. Assuming USSOCOM proponency of MOOTW, what is the impact on USACOM's Adaptive Joint Force Packaging concept?

4. Assuming USSOCOM proponency of MOOTW, what is the future of institutions like the US Army Peacekeeping Institute?
NOTES

Chapter 1


2. For this study, the term unconventional will be used to mean "not conventional; not conforming to customary, formal, or accepted practices, standards, rules, etc." See Webster's New World Dictionary, 1994. Not to be confused with "Unconventional Warfare," defined later in Chapter 1.


5. John D. Waghetstein, Preparing for the Wrong War: The United States Army and Low Intensity Conflict, 1755-1890 (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1990), 283.

6. The first Special Forces Group constituted in the Regular Army was the 10th SFG which was activated on 19 June 1952 for the purpose of conducting Unconventional Warfare. See Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret (Novato, CA: Presidion Press, 1986), 171. The formation of the ad hoc joint task force to conduct EAGLE CLAW is recounted in Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 17-43.


78
Collins, Special Operations Forces, 53.


Joint Pub 3-05, GL-7.

Ibid., GL-08.

Ibid., GL-09.

Joint Pub 3-0, GL-08.

Joint Pub 3-05, GL-10.

Ibid., GL-13.

Ibid.

Department of the Army, Operations, Glossary-6.


Ibid.

Ibid., GL-15.

Ibid., GL-13.

Ibid.

There is no DOD doctrinal definition for the word "proponent," although it is commonly used in military circles and in military curriculum. Webster's New World Dictionary defines the word as [1] a person who makes a proposal or porposition [2] a person who espouses or supports a cause. Using this definition as a departure point, the author invented the given definition based on his eleven years of military service and his understanding of the common use of the word.

Joint Pub 3-05, GL-18.

Ibid., GL-20.

Collins, Special Operations Forces, 8-9.


Manwaring's model accurately predicted 88.37 percent of the cases that he examined. The coefficient of determination (R2) for the model is (.91) or 91 percent. See Max G. Manwaring, "Toward an Understanding of Insurgency Wars: The Paradigm," in Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 20.
Chapter 2


38 Boykin, 4.


40 Ibid.


42 James L. Holloway III, Rescue Mission Report (Joint Chief of Staff, 1980), i.

43 Ibid., 61.


46 Kershaw, 87-88.

47 Ibid., 88.

48 Ibid., 88-90.

49 Ibid., 91.

50 Two sources, Kershaw's thesis and the author's informal interviews with John Fishel, differ on whether or not the main body of Rangers was planned to jump onto Point Salines. Kershaw claims they were not, while Fishel claims they were. Both sources cite interviews with Wesley B. Taylor (the commander of 1/75 Rangers during URGENT FURY) as the source of their information.

51 Kershaw, 92-95.

52 Ibid., 95-96.

53 Ibid., 96.

54 Boykin, 28-29.

55 Ibid., 34.

56 Ibid., 8.

57 Ibid.
58 Public Law 99-661, 533.
59 Ibid., 534.
61 Collins, Special Operations Forces, 8-9.
62 Ibid., 9-10.
64 Holmes, Posture Statement, B-1.
65 Collins, Special Operations Forces, 13.
66 Holmes, Posture Statement, B-2.
67 Ibid., 10.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., B-3.
73 Ibid., 11.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., B-4.
77 Ibid.
79 Holmes, Posture Statement, B-4.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Holmes, Posture Statement, B-5.
Chapter 3

84 Message from the Commander, Joint Special Operations Forces Institute to the Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Subject: Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI), dated 151000Z November 1994. Provided to the author by LTC Robert Soucy, USAF Element, USACGSC.


88 Fishel, Fog, 7.

89 Ibid., 8.

90 Ibid., 10-11.

91 Shultz, 20.

92 Fishel, Fog, 10-11.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., 12-14.

95 Ibid., 17.

96 Ibid., 17-20.

97 Shultz, 10.

98 Fishel, Fog, 18.

99 Ibid., 19.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 21.

102 Ibid.


105 Ibid., 99-100.

106 Ibid., 75.

107 Fishel, Fog, 26.
108Ibid., 27.

109Narrative account of these two related incidents can be found in Woodward, 131-133.

110Fishel, Fog, 28.

111Ibid.

112Ibid., 29.

113Ibid.

114Ibid., 31.

115Shultz, xii.

116Fishel, Fog, 32.

117Ibid., 83.

118Ibid., 35.

119Ibid., 36.

120Ibid., 39.

121Shultz, 33.

122MSG unclassified briefing of July 1990 as quoted by Fishel, Fog, 43.

123Ibid., 45.

124Ibid., 47

125Ibid.

126Ibid.

127Ibid.

128Ibid., 48. Steele had been nominated for promotion to Brigadier General, hence the (P).

129Ibid.

130Ibid., 48-49.

131Ibid., 51.

132Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars, 21.

133Shultz, xii.

134Fishel, Fog, 51.

135Shultz, xii-xiii.

136Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars, 21.

137Fishel, Fog, 59.
Six months after execution of JUST CAUSE, there were about 10,000 US troops stationed in Panama, the same number as were stationed there prior to the start of the force buildup in 1989. See Donnelly, 389.

This description assumes effective operation of the LIC Board in accordance with the intent of SOF legislation; the LIC Board, however, has not met. Likewise, reasonable effectiveness of the ASD SO/LIC is assumed, but during PROMOTE LIBERTY he had been isolated by an intransigent DOD bureaucracy.


Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Command, 1992), iii.
163Ibid., 11.
164Ibid., 13.
165Fishel, Liberation, 56.
166Ibid.
167Ibid.
168Ibid., 57.
169Ibid., 52.


171There are several very controversial issues surrounding the service of BG Campbell. Department of the Army resisted calling him to active duty for several reasons: The effect of an additional BG on Active Component promotions of Colonels to BG, and an unwillingness to have Active Component units (specifically the 96th CA Bn) serve under the command of a Reservist. For a good discussion of the specific relevant issues see Brinkerhoff, 57-62.

172Ibid., 59.
173Fishel, Liberation, 53.
174Ibid.
175Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars, 21.
176CALL, iv.
177Ibid., 13.
178Ibid., 18.
179Cavanaugh, 20.
180Fishel, Liberation, 56-57.
181Ibid., 57.
182Cavanaugh, Provide Comfort.

Chapter 4

183Peter W. Chiarelli, quoted in Bergensen, AJFP, 92.
186Ibid., 3-5. Fishel's discussion of Clausewitz and the Army's doctrine was partially drawn from Thomas K. Adams, Military Doctrine and the Organization Culture of the United States Army (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1990), 93-94, 661.

85

Caba, 2.

Ibid., 22-24.
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