IS THE ARMY PROPERLY POSTURED TO SUPPORT COMMANDER IN
CHIEF REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE JOINT TASK FORCE
HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS?

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Gregory Louis Kammerer, MAJ, USA
M.P.A., Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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The joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ) is normally a joint organization tailored to meet contingency warfighting requirements for the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). It involves two or more services normally for a limited objective and duration, and requires no centralized logistic support. While the Army has a long history of participation in joint operations, it has only been in the past two decades that joint task force operations have become commonplace. In today's strategic environment, the joint task force is perhaps the most likely organization in which Army forces and headquarters will participate in military operations. An analysis of current CINC requirements for joint task forces indicates that either an Army Corps HQ or Division HQ may be required as the base for a JTF HQ. While the Army is properly postured to support JTF operations in terms of organization and training, it needs to push for further joint doctrine initiatives and refine the procedures for the provision of HQ augmentees to a JTF HQ.
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
IS THE ARMY PROPERLY POSTURED TO SUPPORT COMMANDER IN CHIEF REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS?
by MAJ Gregory L. Kammerer, USA, 142 pages

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While the Army has a long history of participation in joint operations, it has only been in the past two decades that joint task force operations have become commonplace. In today's strategic environment, the joint task force is perhaps the most likely organization in which Army forces and headquarters will participate in military operations.

An analysis of current CINC requirements for joint task forces indicates that either an Army Corps HQ or Division HQ may be required as the base for a JTF HQ. While the Army is properly postured to support JTF operations in terms of organization and training, it needs to push for further joint doctrine initiatives and refine the procedures for the provision of HQ augments to a JTF HQ. Designation of the appropriate ARFOR HQ and the need for that HQ to integrate with and properly support the JTF HQ is another area of concern to which the Army needs to devote more attention.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to LTC (retired) Willbanks, LTC Sperl and DR Kipp for their patience over the duration of this endeavor.

Thanks to all the experts on joint task forces that took time out of their busy schedules to give me the benefit of their experience and wisdom.

Thanks to Catriona for the usual top notch proofreading and encouragement along the way.
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MRC  Major Regional Contingency
NCA  National Command Authority
OOS  Operational Operating System
SOPs  Standing Operating Procedures
TTP  Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
UJTL  Uniform Joint Task List
USACOM  United States Atlantic Command
USCENTCOM  United States Central Command
USEUCOM  United States European Command
USPACOM  United States Pacific Command
USOUTHCOM  United States Southern Command
USSOOCOM  United States Special Operations Command
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Primary Research Question

The United States has employed joint forces dating as far back as the Revolutionary War. In 1781, George Washington led French land forces that operated jointly with French Admiral DeGrasse’s naval forces to achieve victory at Yorktown.¹ In today’s lexicon the joint task force (JTF) is normally a joint organization tailored to meet contingency warfighting requirements for the Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (11 August 1994), delineates that a JTF involves two or more services normally for a limited objective and duration, requires no centralized logistic support, and is created at the direction of either a unified or subunified commander, the National Command Authority (NCA), or another JTF commander.²

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is no longer strategically focused on responding to a global threat. Our armed forces are now postured to respond through force projection to a variety of regional threats across the spectrum of conflict (to include Operations Other than War). As the 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement emphasizes, "The United States is the only nation
capable of conducting large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders. The JTF has evolved into a joint warfighting headquarters "stood up" to command and control the full range of possible contingency operations. Recently deployed JTFs in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, as well as domestic efforts in Los Angeles and Florida, have focused attention on the structure of the Joint Task Force, as well as its ability to meet the needs of any given Combatant Commander. CINCs have also tailored headquarters augmentation packages to "plug in" to service operational headquarters that will serve as JTFs, such as Army Corps, Navy Fleets, or Numbered Air Forces. The US Pacific Command DJTFAC (Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell) and US Atlantic Command's JTF 140 cadre are examples of such packages.

The 1991 Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures "establishes joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing, and redeploying a joint task force (JTF)," but leaves a great deal of latitude for JTF design and employment. Even with a host of other post Goldwater-Nichols (1986) joint doctrine efforts and the "standing up" of US Atlantic Command (USACOM) as both a joint force integrator and joint training headquarters, it is apparent that there is little standardization within individual services or among the Combatant Commands on how to optimize the organization and training of a joint task force headquarters. An inhibitor to such efforts is that standardization must still allow for the flexibility to tailor a headquarters package based on METT-T and other situational considerations.
Despite the fact that the Army was the lead service for several major JTFs over the past decade, and considering the slow pace of emerging joint doctrine, there is still an absence of extensive Army doctrine (or even tactics, techniques, and procedures) to explain "how the Army fights" as part of a JTF or what role the Army should play in the formation of a JTF headquarters. Clearly the individual CINCs are the lead Department of Defense agents for JTF formation and employment. Yet, as Gen. Gary Luck, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, and others have pointed out, Army forces and headquarters should expect to be deployed as or as part of a joint task force in future military operations. Short of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) at the highest end of the conflict spectrum, future Army force projection operations in support of our National Military Strategy will very likely be under the command and control of a deployed JTF headquarters. It would therefore seem in the Army's interest as a service to optimize its participation in such operations.

Therefore, this thesis poses the following question: "Is the Army correctly postured, relative to the other services, to support Combatant CINC theater requirements for future joint task force (JTF) headquarters operations?"

Secondary Research Questions

While the thesis question is somewhat broad in its scope, it raises some fairly specific secondary questions. The major question is: What are the theater CINC's requirements for JTF HQs? In other words, how have the Combatant Commanders (or the NCA) historically employed JTF headquarters with associated forces? This question encompasses the
expected range of requirements for the JTF headquarters. While careful historical analysis is key to properly "sizing" this requirement, there is also some utility in a brief examination and discussion of future threats/scenarios and their application to JTF operations as well, all within the context of the current National Security and National Military Strategies.

The second major question in sequence is: What are the theater CINC Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for JTF HQ formation and operation? As noted earlier, several of the Unified Commands maintain CINC-level JTF augmentation cells to assist the operational-level service headquarters when they are tasked to serve as a JTF HQ. Again, this relates back to the first question on requirements; it is necessary to first examine the CINCs needs and how they "routinely do business" before any conclusions can be reached on how the Army should posture itself for future JTF requirements.

The third question is: What is the optimal command and control arrangement for a JTF? Or the question perhaps more properly restated is: At what level should a JTF HQ be organized? Clearly under Title 10 of the United States Code, it is the business of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to "organize, train, supply, equip, and maintain" Army forces. Determining the warfighting needs of a combatant CINC during deliberate or crisis action planning is outside the purview of the Department of the Army. Nevertheless, some Army leaders would argue that the Army must conduct parallel planning in conjunction with the planning executed by the Regional CINCs. This was a major recommendation of a special study group in the Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) tasked to consider the JTF requirements for the Commander in Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) during the Somalia crisis in October 1993, following the deaths of 18 US Rangers. Consequently, it may be possible for the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to influence the Chairman, JCS (CJCS) or the Unified Commander by recommending the optimal (from an Army perspective) JTF package. The Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to a CINC should also offer such advice. Nevertheless, once this question is resolved, it allows for further consideration of other service organizational considerations in support of the JTF (i.e., communications, force structure, etc.)

The next major question in logical sequence is: What does joint doctrine prescribe for JTF organization, training, planning, employment, and command and control? In addition to Joint Pub 5-00.2, there are a variety of other Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrinal publications that are pertinent to JTF operations. It is also important to ask the related question: How does Service doctrine address the formation, training, and employment of a JTF? While many of the service doctrinal publications are still under final post-Cold War revision (e.g., the Army’s FM 100-15, Corps Operations, among others), there is a fair amount of debate within service professional journals on the JTF topic.

For a service such as the Army that places a determined emphasis on the training of its soldiers and units, the next question is vital: What are the training requirements for a JTF headquarters (and by implication assigned forces)? As a result of the Gulf War and as suggested in Gen. Powell’s 1993 CJCS Roles and Missions Report, the
majority of CONUS-based service forces are now assigned to United States Atlantic Command (USACOM). Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (CINCACOM) thus has a significant new role in the training of both joint forces and joint headquarters. Adm. Paul David Miller, the past CINCACOM, in a recent article in Military Review, outlined USACOM's three-tiered strategy for joint training, which includes in the third tier a "goal to train the XVIII ABN Corps, III Corps, 2nd MEF and 2nd Fleet as a joint task force [HQ]. Training will consist of an academic phase...a joint planning phase and an execution phase." The creation of the Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Operations Group-Delta (OPSGRP-D) within the past year to provide BCTP training rigor for potential JTF HQ staffs indicates that the Army feels that JTF HQ training is a service Title 10 responsibility as well.

Finally, the last question, and perhaps the most difficult to address, is: Do service traditions and/or roles and missions have a bearing on JTFs? The Congressionally chartered Roles and Missions Commission is currently in session to further streamline redundancies in service efforts along many different functional lines. The intent of this question is to consider the somewhat intangible service biases on different issues that may have an impact on JTF formation, organization, and training. C. Kenneth Allard, in his widely read work Command, Control, and the Common Defense, notes that:

The common thread linking [development of individual weapons systems and equipment, military organization, and command structure] is that the services, in preparing their forces for war, can have very different perspectives on war itself... Historically, these service viewpoints feature the respective applications of land power, sea power, or air power as a first priority, generally stopping well short of a joint perspective in
which the different element of warfare are combined in pursuit of a nation's strategic goals.\(^9\)

While Goldwater-Nichols, Gen. Powell's personality as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other fundamental changes have moved the services towards a "joint center," the perspectives that Allard outlines cannot be discounted in any JTF discussion. An ancillary question that also needs to be addressed in terms of roles and missions is: How does a JTF satisfy requirements for OOS (operational operating systems) when integrated with other service headquarters and forces? The OOS (such as operational fires—a topic hotly debated especially since the Gulf War) provide a fundamental measure of synchronization at the operational level of war, and should help to provide some clarity in the JTF discussion of service roles, missions, and capabilities.

**Assumptions**

Some assumptions need to be delineated up front in order to ensure that there is consistency in follow-on research efforts:

1. Current Bottom Up Review and Defense Planning Guidance will not change significantly in the near future (particularly in terms of the force structure and theater employment of Army forces).

2. CY 93-95 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Adaptive Planning Guidance will not substantially change in the new CY 96-99 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

3. USACOM Adaptive Joint Force Packaging initiatives will not evolve into force packaging concepts that materially affect JTFs across other unified commands.
4. The 1994-5 Roles And Missions Commission will not dictate that USACOM or any other CINC maintain standing JTFs or fundamentally alter service roles in JTFs.

5. No new doctrinal initiatives at Service or JCS level will drive JTF organization in a radically new direction in the near future.

Definition of Terms

**Adaptive Planning.** The concept that calls for development of a wide range of options, encompassing the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military), during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. These options are referred to as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO’s).

**Allocation.** In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment.

**Apportionment.** Making resources available to the Combatant Commander for deliberate planning. Apportioned resources are used in the development of operations plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning or actual execution.

**Assigned Forces.** Forces in being that have been placed under the combatant command or operational control of a commander.

**Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).** A subordinate organization to the US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) that conducts realistic, stressful training for Army division and corps commanders and their staffs. The components of this training include training standards, computer simulation, opposing forces (OPFOR), observer controllers (OCS), after action reviews (AARs), and a senior (retired three or four star) observer.
Campaign Plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to achieve strategic and operational objectives, within a given time and space.\textsuperscript{15}

CINC. The Commander in Chief of a unified or specified command.\textsuperscript{16}

Coalition Action. Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually used for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.\textsuperscript{17}

Combatant Command (COCOM). Nontransferrable command authority established by Title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. Combatant command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions (also called COCOM). A CINC may also exercise COCOM over assigned forces through the Commander of a Joint Task Force.\textsuperscript{18}

Combatant Commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified command established by the President.\textsuperscript{19}
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). NATO-designed rapid deployment combined joint task forces. These forces will be a hybrid capability that combines the best of both coalition and Alliance forces: rapid flexible crisis response and a trained, ready multinational force backed by an in-place infrastructure. A multinational, multi-service task force consisting of NATO and possible non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond NATO’s borders, under the control of the NATO military structure, the Western European Union (WEU), or even a coalition of states.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{COMJTF}. The Commander of a Joint Task Force.\textsuperscript{21}

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander of assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.\textsuperscript{22}

Contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.\textsuperscript{23}

Crisis Action Planning (CAP). The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process involving the time-sensitive development of plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to
formulate and implement an effective response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Expeditionary Force.} An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Functional Component Command.} A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of two or more services, which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or extend over a period of time.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Interoperability.} The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. May also represent the condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability can be defined when referring to specific cases.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Joint Doctrine.} Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, Services, and the Joint Staff.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Joint Force.} A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control.\textsuperscript{29}
Joint Force Commander (JFC). A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.30

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). A continuously evolving system developed through the integrated enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.31

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations.32

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Furnishes guidance to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to the CINCs, and is based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget activities. The JSCP offers a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice to the NCA.33

Joint Task Force (JTF). A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy, and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a
unified command, subordinate unified command, or an existing joint task force. 34

**Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC).** A regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than those involved in a Major Regional Contingency. Missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum. 35

**Major Regional Contingency (MRC).** A regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to US vital interest in a region that warrants the deployment of forces greater than division wing combinations. 36

**Operational Control (OPCON).** Transferrable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects (with the exceptions noted below) of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of
itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.37

Operational Level of War. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistics and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.38

Unified Command. A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.39

Limitations

As has been the case at least since the failed rescue of the Iranian hostages in 1980, the nature of joint operations is rapidly changing. The Roles and Missions Commission for 1994 is meeting once again to debate Service redundancies; they may recommend further service reorganizations along functional lines, which could affect JTF organization. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is also under review, although changes to the JSCP should not radically alter
the concept of JTFs. Doctrine, both joint and service, is constantly in flux, particularly in the operational realm; Navy doctrine is just now being published for the first time in history. Finally, the possibility exists that the US may become involved a contingency operation in such diverse areas as Bosnia, Cuba, or the Middle East in the near term, with major implications for concepts of theater expeditionary warfare, to include the use of JTFs.

This research effort cannot hope to "freeze the joint world" in time to facilitate analysis of Joint Task Forces. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that conclusions and recommendations reached on this important aspect of joint warfare may have a limited "shelf life" at best.

**Delimitations**

There are some existing standing Joint Task Forces that perform specific missions in peacetime. JTF 4 in USACOM and JTF 5 in USPACOM both perform counterdrug operations in their respective CINC AORs. JTF 6, under USACOM, also conducts counterdrug missions in the southeastern United States. Other examples of standing JTFs are JTF Bravo in US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (nation assistance in Honduras), and JTF-Full Accounting in US Pacific Command (USPACOM) (POW-MIA). Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is a fully resourced, standing JTF that responds to specific terrorist threats and other special operations specific crises. This research will examine only JTFs in the context of crisis response in support of theater requirements, primarily in contingency operations. Standing joint task forces are also contrary to current joint doctrinal
prescriptions. Finally, disaster assistance joint task force operations will not be considered; they exhibit unique characteristics which deserve a separate study.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act significantly changed the nature of joint operations, particularly in terms of command and control at the strategic and operational level. Therefore, the scope of analysis will not extend any further back in history than Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama (1989). A critique of earlier joint operations may not yield useful or valid conclusions about the nature of or requirements for JTFs.

Significance of Study

As the Literature Review will reveal in detail, there is not an extensive amount of published material available about how the Army (or the other services, for that matter) organize, train and equip headquarters, staffs, and forces to support CINC needs for Joint Task Forces. In a 1993 article in Proceedings on "The Army's View of Joint," the former TRADOC Commander, Gen. Frederick M. Franks, does not address the subject of the JTF despite a lengthy discussion of the Army's role in the conduct of joint warfare operations. Nevertheless, a JTF is perhaps the most likely organization in which Army forces and headquarters will participate in joint warfare over the coming years. As such, it is important that the Army prepare to the greatest extent possible to support CINC requirements for JTFs. This study hopes to map out, through specific recommendations, ways in which the Army, as an institution, can better understand, organize, and train to support CINC JTF requirements. Moreover, as the "roles and missions" debate

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completes "Round 2" (with other rounds potentially looming) and all Services remain at risk in terms of some of their basic functions, it is in the Army's best interest to optimize support for the current (and likely future) joint operational requirements for a JTF. Any recommendations in terms of training, doctrinal, or organizational changes may have some limited degree of utility in shaping the expeditionary Army of the future. Finally, any further progress the Army makes in the area of JTF formulation can only the benefit the other services and the nations overall joint warfighting readiness.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

General

While there is a wide array of literature that mentions JTFs, the subject still remains somewhat unexplored in the joint and service arenas. There is no definitive book that addresses the joint task force in any depth. Several recent publications by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) (the Navy's government-sponsored research organization) are the most comprehensive of any to date: Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993, by Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri, and JTF Operations Since 1983, by George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel. These CNA publications are the result of "quick reaction analysis", however, and neither are fully documented with primary sources. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations" (in the Winter 1993 Naval War College Review) by former US European Command (USEUCOM) Deputy CINC Gen. James P. McCarthy (USAF retired) is an excellent examination of theater operations and command and control, to include the employment of joint task forces. Retired Army Ltg. John H. Cushman has also published a series of works in professional journals and through Harvard University’s Program on Information Policy that delve into theater command and control issues, and discuss the JTF concept in some detail. "Joint, Jointer, Jointest" in the May 1992 Proceedings is perhaps the best Cushman piece on the subject; his Thoughts for Joint
Commanders (1993) from the Naval Institute Press is also a valuable reference, as is Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Future of Force Projection Operations, an unpublished draft from June 1991.

Historical Review

Joint operations undertaken by the US military up to the time of World War II were rather limited. Aside from several amphibious operations (to include a combined French-US disaster at Newport in 1778), 1 Yorktown was perhaps the most significant (and successful) joint operation of the Revolutionary War. French Admiral DeGrasse sailed his ships up the York River from Chesapeake Bay, blockading the city of Yorktown from reinforcement by the British fleet and isolating Lord Cornwallis' forces. This allowed Gen. George Washington and the French commander, Comte de Rochambeau, to conduct a successful combined siege of the city of Yorktown that resulted in Cornwallis' surrender; the victory was a significant turning point for the American side.

The first true joint task force operation viewed in modern terms was most likely Gen. Winfield Scott's expedition to Vera Cruz in 1847 during the Mexican American War. Gen. Scott had served up to the level of brigade commander in the War of 1812, 2 and his experience with flawed joint operations between Army and naval forces on the Great Lakes may have shaped his later planning efforts at Vera Cruz. He mustered a force of around 10,000 soldiers on 21 February 1847 at Lobos Island, seven miles off the Mexican coast; the location was selected as an "intermediate staging base" due to its excellent harbor. 3 There Scott linked--up with Navy Commodore P.S.P. Conner's flotilla and over wooden surfboats, the first specially built American amphibious craft. 4 On 2 March, the fleet and embarked forces sailed to Anton Lizardo, 12 miles
south of Vera Cruz, and began two days of reconnaissance. The largest amphibious assault ever attempted by an American force to that time was launched the next day, with Conner's fleet providing covering fire while steamers towed the surfboats to shore three miles southeast of Vera Cruz. Scott's soldiers transloaded onto the landing craft, disembarked on shore, lay siege to and successfully captured the city. This allowed American forces to later move overland and capture Mexico City. While the Vera Cruz assault was an unopposed landing, the interservice coordination and cooperation between the Army and Navy was largely responsible for this early example of a successful joint operation.

There were several Union joint operations during the Civil War that merit mention. Gen. George McClellan's lack of authority over naval forces, and failures in joint cooperation in the execution of operations during the Peninsular Campaign accelerated the Union Commander in Chief's demise early during the war. Forts Henry and Donelson, along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, were bombarded and seized by the combined efforts of Navy Captain Andrew Foote and Union MG US Grant in February of 1862. The largest joint/amphibious operation of the war was at Fort Fisher along the North Carolina coast December 1864 through January 1865. Two separate attacks had to be conducted. The first, which could only be characterized as a disaster, was led by Radm. David Porter with 57 ships and Army Mg. Benjamin Butler in command of 6,500 soldiers; the second and more successful attack was again by Radm. Porter with 59 warships, while 9,000 soldiers under MG Terry disembarked from 21 transports. Again, no formal doctrine and
procedures existed for either service to draw upon. After initial
efforts stalled due to personality conflicts, effective personal
coordination and cooperation between the respective service commanders,
Porter and Butler, finally resulted in a successful operation. Another
important joint effort was the naval bombardment and Army siege of
Vicksburg, a key city on the Mississippi River, by Union Generals US
Grant and William Tecumsah Sherman, and Adm. David Porter in 1863.
Operations at Vicksburg succeeded mainly due to the personal relations
and cooperation between Sherman and Porter.9

The Spanish-American War represented a low water mark for
interservice cooperation. The siege of Santiago, Cuba was an ill-
conceived, poorly planned, and haphazardly executed operation, although
it was ultimately successful. US Naval forces trapped the Spanish fleet
in the harbor at Santiago, but were unable to enter the harbor due to
shore-based defensive works. The Army was mobilized for a force
projection operation to move inter-theater by transport, disembark, and
seize the port to alleviate the naval stalemate. Hampered by its
inability to rapidly mobilize and move from CONUS ports, and somewhat
hastily conducting operations once they finally arrived in Cuba, the
Army forces under Mг. William Shafter eventually succeeded in seizing
Santiago; the Navy under Adm. William Sampson had earlier destroyed the
Spanish fleet as they fled the harbor. This was after a continued lack
of cooperation between the two commanders required the intervention of
the President.10 "The Cuban campaign of 1898, despite its ultimate
success, served as an example of how not to conduct joint and combined
operations." 11 As a harbinger of a problem that would plague the
military well into the next century, "the absence of a unified command was exacerbated by a lack of joint or general staff." 12

The poorly coordinated and executed operation at Santiago and other problems during the Spanish-American War led Congress to mandate in 1903 the establishment of a joint Army-Navy board to foster cooperation between the services, as well as develop joint operational procedures. 13 While earlier operations such as Yorktown and Vicksburg succeeded due to the mutual cooperation of service commanders, unity of command in joint operations simply did not exist (with the possible exception of Gen. Scott at Vera Cruz). Early joint operations also lacked what in modern terms is a joint staff. The joint staff became a reality during the 2nd World War, but unity of command between services continued to be a problem long afterwards.

World War II was heavily characterized by large-scale joint and combined operations, many of them amphibious. Operation TORCH in North Africa was the first major joint/combined effort of the war in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), and the lessons learned there set the stage for future joint and combined efforts in both theaters. TORCH was followed by several landings in Italy, to include Operation HUSKY in Sicily, the initial invasion of the Italian peninsula codenamed AVALANCHE, and the combined British-US landing at Anzio known as SHINGLE. The largest joint and combined operation of the war was the invasion of France at Normandy, NEPTUNE (commonly known as OVERLORD). All the amphibious landings in the ETO, while executed with Naval Forces, were Army-only and did not involve the Marine Corps. 14
In the Pacific the Army conducted major amphibious operations at Leyte and the Lingayen Gulf while the Marines went into Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima. Joint Army/Marine landings were conducted at New Georgia, Kwajalein, Guam, and Okinawa. The final tally of assaults (amphibious) of World War II was as follows:

+ 42 Army-only,
+ 10 Marine-only,
+ 6 Army-Marine,

Assault Division equivalents (58 Army, 16 Marine)

It would be difficult not to characterize the majority of these operations as joint; most were supported by Naval Forces with either air cover, naval gunfire, and transport. The Army Air Corps also played a significant role in many landings with the provision of air support and air transport for airborne operations. Nevertheless, a grave problem arose in the Pacific during the war over the creation of two separate theaters: the Army-only in the Southwest Pacific under Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Navy-led Central Pacific theater under Adm. Chester Nimitz. This lack of unity of command was based more on the fact that neither the Army or Navy wished to be subordinate to the other, more than any strategic necessity. Such interservice rivalries again arise in post-WW II operations as unity of command problems continued. The Army and Navy struggle over the Southwest Asia Area of Operations (which would later become CENTCOM) is a prime example of this joint command problem.
In 1946, when Gen. Eisenhower was the Army Chief of Staff, he proposed what would later become the Unified Command Plan (UCP):

Under this document, theater commanders would be appointed who were responsible to the JCS, which in turn would have the responsibility of strategic direction of the armed forces assigned to the unified command. This responsibility would be exercised through the unified commander.\(^{19}\)

This approach was formalized in the National Security Act of 1947 (and amended in 1958 when the chain of command was redefined with the President and the Secretary of Defense exercising direct command of the unified and specified commands).\(^ {20}\) The first test for this new command arrangement was the Korean War, when Army Gen. Douglas McArthur was named the CINC, Far Eastern Command. McArthur acted as a theater CINC in joint and combined operations, to include the brilliantly conceived amphibious turning movement at Inchon, which involved the participation of significant forces from all services. The X Corps amphibious landing at Wonsan, while not as widely studied as Inchon, was another integrated joint operation from the war.

The joint nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946 may have been the first official JTF operation.\(^ {21}\) In fact, all of the "earliest JTF's, numbered 1, 2 and 3 were formed by JCS to conduct large scale nuclear tests and weapons systems evaluations."\(^ {22}\) JTF 2 was used for air defense tests in New Mexico in the late 1960s and JTF 3 also involved nuclear tests on Kwajalein Island. Such operational testing organizations continue to this day:

Government agencies and the JCS continue to create numbered JTFs responsible for interagency and multi-service tests of major weapons systems. . . Two current examples are JTF 17 for the Advanced Tactical Fighter, and JTF 22 for the Future Strike Aircraft. However the focus during the 1980s changed from test and
evaluation JTFs to standing operational JTFs under unified and specified commanders.23

From the Korean War up until the time of Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983, there were approximately nine JTF or JTF-like operations (see Table 1.) Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic was one of the first major force projection contingency operations that employed a JTF. POWER PACK was fraught with problems, to include the fact that the contingency featured four entirely different command and control arrangements from 30 April to 7 May 65.24 At one point, while the Navy-based JTF 122 was operational in theater, there was no unity of command as the JTF controlled only half of the operations on the island.25 Lawrence Yates, writing about POWER PACK, points out that LTG Bruce Palmer, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, deployed to country to assume the JTF 122 commander’s role, but in essence became a subunified commander under US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), vice a JTF commander.26

JTF organization fundamentally changed when:

On 1 October 1979 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) HQ was established. It marked a first in the nation’s military history—the first time a permanent, fully-staffed JTF HQ had been organized, trained and equipped in peacetime with forces from each of the armed services. Its mission was to “plan, train, and exercise and prepare to deploy and employ forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.”27

The RDJTF had a focus primarily on the Persian Gulf, and later evolved in 1983 into a new Unified Command with a Mideast mission: US Central Command (CENTCOM). The RDJTF played a key role in that it “was successful in forging jointness...its efforts helped forge much of current joint doctrine.”28
Unsuccessful JTF operations into the 1980s had a major impact on the future of the US military. With repetitive failures in theater command and control (C2) in operations in such diverse areas as Iran (DEsert ONE-1980), Lebanon (the Marines in Beirut-1982), and Grenada (URGENT FURY-1983), it took the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to finally streamline theater C2 under the unified commanders.\textsuperscript{29} The intent was for the NCA to exercise command through the CJCS to the unified CINC, who then would exercise "Combatant Command (COCOM) [which] is the command authority over assigned forces vested in the CINC’s by Title 10, United States Code, section 164."\textsuperscript{30} The desired endstate was for the Unified Commander to achieve unity of command (and effort) over those forces operating in his theater. As discussed earlier, under Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), one option for the CINC to exercise command over forces operating in his theater is to stand up a joint task force.

In the decade following the Grenada invasion, 1983 to 1993, the Joint Task Force became a very prevalent form of military operation; there were approximately 21 JTFs established during this period (see Table 2.).\textsuperscript{31} There was an almost equal likelihood that any of the four services would command these JTFs, and over half the JTFs had a primary mission of disaster relief or humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{32} There was also an equal chance that any or all of the four services would be required to participate in these operations; most operations required forces from all four services. There were also other operations in this period that were either a JTF or JTF-like in their organization (Table 3.) In and around the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the stability of the
Cold War evaporated, with a corresponding expansion of regional and ethnic conflicts, as well as a new focus on humanitarian assistance.

Today, as the Army's FM 100-5 states: "Unity of command means that all forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in a unified purpose."

Frequently, that represents a joint task force commander and his HQ, stood up by the NCA or a Combatant Commander to perform a wide range of missions throughout the world.

An examination of some of the more significant recent JTF operations is necessary to establish the basis for further analysis.

**Operation JUST CAUSE**

As discussed above, it was an evolutionary process for the American military to reach the degree of success in unified theater command and control (C2) that was evident in Operation JUST CAUSE. In February, 1988, in response to harassment of American citizens by Gen. Manuel Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), US Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) began contingency planning at the direction of the JCS. US SOUTHCOM OPLAN Elaborate Maze had a requirement for a JTF to command and control forces in operations against a hostile Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). US Army South (USARSO) was designated as the HQ that would assume that role and began planning and preparation in-country.

On 17 March 1988 the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 82nd Airborne Division conducted a JCS-directed EDRE as a show of force to Palmerola Air Base in Honduras. Two thousand Sandinistas had crossed
the Honduran border several days earlier. The EDRE was to be a "rehearsal" for later operations:

XVIII Airborne Corps was well-suited to provide the command and control for this joint exercise. The corps had planned for, and built, a contingency joint task force (CONJTF) staff months earlier and in conjunction with HQ, 12th US Air Force, had employed the cell on previous joint exercises. The CONJTF was designed to plan, coordinate, and execute short-notice operations that required rapid projection of Continental-based US forces under the operational command of a warfighting commander in chief (CINC).

Exercise Golden Pheasant was under the operational control of the CINC US Southern Command. The joint task force was commanded by BG Daniel R. Schroeder, XVIII Corps chief of staff, who provided interface with the unified command, host nation and other US services. 36

Post Goldwater-Nichols unity of command and greater jointness in the execution of military operations was quickly becoming evident, but the "single-service" mindset among some senior leaders would not disappear "overnight".

JTF Panama was activated by CINCSOUTH to command and control limited combat operations on 9 April 1988, and in the next week was involved in operations involving Army, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Marine units in repeated skirmishes with the PDF. 37 The commander of the JTF was the US Army South (USARSO) commander, Mg. Bernard Loefke, and the JTF HQ was almost exclusively Army in composition, despite the fact that multi-service forces were OPCON to it (Figure 1.) 38

Operations were complicated by the fact that there was a separate Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) reporting directly to CINC. JTF Panama continued to perform its "joint" mission over the course of the next several months, with little assistance or augmentation.

In 1989, as it became apparent that the crisis in Panama could escalate to possible US military intervention, President Bush replaced
Gen. Frederick Woerner, CINCSOUTH, with Gen. Maxwell Thurman. Gen. Thurman then chose to delegate the warfighting responsibility in Panama to a joint task force, which was entirely consistent with joint doctrine: "The commanders of unified commands may establish: 

(C) JTFs to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives." 39

With the approval of the CJCS and the NCA, Gen Thurman then crafted a command and control arrangement where all the forces in Panama were under the control of the designated JTF South Commander, Ltg. Carl Stiner. This joint task force, using XVIII ABN Corps as the nucleus for the staff, allowed Gen. Thurman to avoid the difficulties that Gen. Woerner had in trying to "cobble together" an effective warfighting joint task force HQ from the administrative staff of US Army South (JTF Panama).

Gen. Thurman provided augmentation from the USSOUTHCOM staff to enhance the theater connectivity to JTF South: "The JTF Panama Staff was assimilated into the XVIII Corps staff when JTF South was activated." 40 This became a much more viable structure than the organization it replaced. Ltg. Tom Kelly, the JCS J-3: "thought that General Woerner's notion of keeping the warfighting Joint Task Force in Panama was byzantine. Southern Command didn't have the horsepower, staff, or communications to run any large scale contingency operation." 41

CINCSOUTH was also quite clear in his intent for command and control:

"I've got a whole theater to run," Thurman said. "And I'll handle all the CINC duties and you [LTG Stiner] take care of the contingency planning, the training of all the forces and the operations. They're all yours, all services." . . . Just as
important, Thurman knew that as commanding general of the 18th, Stiner had all the best equipment, an operations staff three times the size of the CINC's staff in Panama, a big intelligence shop, and the best communications.42

Also significant in the JUST CAUSE command and control arrangement (Figure 2) was the fact that Gen. Stiner was in charge of both conventional and special operations, which contributed to unity of command in theater. By avoiding any confusion on the roles of the service component commanders, Generals Stiner and Thurman further streamlined the theater command and control. Finally, and perhaps most important, General Thurman summed up his idea of unity of command for JUST CAUSE, "I am not a war fighter," Thurman had told Kelly. 'I need a war fighter. Carl Stiner is my warfighter and everybody in Panama carrying a gun works for Carl Stiner."43 CINCSOUTH's statement left no confusion in the mind of his subordinates about how unity of command was to work in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE.

The NCA, CJCS, and CINCSOUTH were able to achieve success in the political and strategic direction of JUST CAUSE that was unparalleled to that point in modern contingency operations. The creation of Joint Task Force South by CINCSOUTH Gen. Thurman also paid great dividends in streamlining the theater C2 arrangements, thereby facilitating the execution of the force-projection contingency operation. As Joint Pub 1 dictates, "The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple. . . Unity of command is the guiding principle of war in military command relationships."44
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

After the completion of the Gulf War, the Kurds in Iraq took advantage of the weakened Iraqi military and the Shia uprising in Basra and staged their own rebellion. The fact that the Kurds soon controlled a wide area in Northern Iraq prompted retaliatory attacks from Saddam Hussein and his forces. This resulted in a huge number of Kurdish refugees, attempting to escape Hussein’s repression by occupying the mountainous border areas with Turkey and Iran, an area then known as the Kurdish enclave.

On 6 April 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began as a unilateral effort by the United States to provide aid to the Kurds that been displaced from their homes as a result of violence and repression in northern Iraq. Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT was quickly stood up by CINCEUCOM at the direction of the NCA. The initial COMJTF, USAF Mg. James L. Jamerson, was given a mission to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds. His specified tasks included the airdrop of food, organization of camps, supervision of the distribution of food and water, and assistance with sanitation and medical care. The initial JTF for PROVIDE COMFORT was similar to an earlier joint task force, JTF Proven Force, which Mg. Jamerson had commanded in Turkey during Operation DESERT STORM. JTF Proven Force had provided air support to coalition forces from Incirlik, Turkey. The PROVIDE COMFORT JTF, although it had a different mission than its predecessor JTF PROVEN FORCE, was similar in structure to the earlier effort. JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was built primarily around the staff from HQ US Air Forces
Europe with significant augmentation from special operations personnel.⁴⁷

By mid-April 1991 the scope of operations for PROVIDE COMFORT had expanded considerably. It had become a coalition effort, and CINCEUR named Ltg. John Shalikashvili as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander. A multinational build up of forces soon began in Iraq and Turkey. By the end of May 1991 Ltg. Shaliskashvili commanded a 20,000-man coalition force including almost 11,000 American soldiers.⁴⁸

Major forces assigned to the CJTF included the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Britain’s Three Commando Brigade, and the US Army’s 3-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment from Vincenza, Italy (Figure 3).

CJTF Provide Comfort was a particular challenge due to the diversity of missions it conducted, as former CINCUER Gen. John Galvin outlines in the RUSI Journal:

Not only was a peacekeeping effort going on at the same time as there was peacemaking, but there was also some low-intensity conflict because the Kurdish PKK were attacking the Iraqis and the Iraqis were fighting back. So a mix of missions was conducted concurrently; there was deterrence, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and conflict.⁴⁹

Approximately thirty nations provided humanitarian assistance, and over sixty non-governmental organizations were represented.⁵⁰ US Army civil affairs personnel were also assigned to the JTF HQ and played an active role in the conduct of humanitarian operations. CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT CA units coordinated host nation support, provide civil administration support, conducted area assessments and studies, conducted humanitarian and civil assistance activities, served as an interface with NGO/PVOs, advised commanders on civil-military operations, and a host of other tasks.⁵¹ JTF PROVIDE COMFORT as of May
1995 remains an operational joint task force, although on a much smaller scale than during the initial humanitarian assistance missions.

The CJTF operation was a solid example of both unity of effort among members of a diverse coalition as well as an effective Joint Task Force operation. The coalition included 13 nations, and the COMJTF integrated staff officers from many of these individual nations into his Task Force HQ. This arrangement facilitated command and control, communications, and interoperability between nations. CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT also had two subordinate joint task forces, JTF A and JTF B, which were also multinational in their individual composition, although each was commanded by US Army General Officers. These subordinate JTFs were also extremely effective, perhaps for the reason Ltg. (retired) Cushman cites:

GEN Shalikashvili’s organizing principle was simple: give subordinates the disparate service and national elements for a given function, then hold them responsible for pulling that function together.

While perhaps not as widely publicized or analyzed in the media as Operations JUST CAUSE or DESERT STORM, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a solid success as an example of a well-planned and executed Combined Joint Task Force operation. It was clearly another post Goldwater-Nichols "joint" success and became a model for future humanitarian relief operations as well:

Especially in its early weeks, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The CJTF and subordinate commanders used Service capabilities where they were needed. They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance; and established command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment. It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the endstate and posthostilities operations.
Operation RESTORE HOPE

UNOSOM I was established in April 1992 to provide unarmed United Nations personnel to monitor the cease fire established between the warring factions in Somalia.\textsuperscript{55} The initial UN resolution (751) authorized the creation of United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM), and the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance to the Somali people. By August 1992 the US had initiated Operation PROVIDE RELIEF (a small JTF operation run mainly out of Kenya)\textsuperscript{56} to airlift food to Somalia, and the scope of the UN operation had rapidly expanded due to the interference of Somali gangs with the relief shipments. Soon thereafter, nearly 4200 UN soldiers were deployed to Somalia, with a charter to protect humanitarian relief convoys that were delivering food to a nation that was on the verge of mass starvation.\textsuperscript{57} The broad UN concept of the operation was to employ security forces to open up supply lines in order to diminish the ongoing famine.

The situation further deteriorated in Somalia in the fall of 1992. As international aid, primarily in the form of food, continued to pour into the country, rival clans and gangs continued to intercept it. UN forces in country were incapable of stabilizing the situation. The famine worsened; at its peak in August 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that some 4.5 million Somalis were starving.\textsuperscript{58} By 9 December 1992 the United States had offered to take the lead in organizing a new operation in Somalia. The UN had passed a new resolution (749) authorizing the use of all necessary means to restore order, and US Marines began landing in Mogadishu under the control of the US-led UNITAF (Unified Task Force).\textsuperscript{59} While the UNOSOM
mandate and force still existed, it became the co-equal as the US and Eighteen other nations stood up UNITAF, which became the lead for UN operations in Somalia.60

American forces arriving in Somalia under the overall umbrella of UNITAF marked the beginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE. After US Central Command was directed by the NCA to execute the operation, CINCENT established JTF Somalia as the command and control headquarters in-country (Figure 4). The staff of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) served as the core of the JTF HQ and was given the mission of providing a secure environment to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the Somali people.61 As CINCENT, Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar, described the JTF HQ arrangement:

The First Marine Expeditionary force was the choice to establish Joint Task Force Somalia with Lieutenant General Robert Johnson as its commander. This was a logical step since the unit had exercised for this type of operation. Organizationally, the plan was for the Marines to fill most of the task force slots, with the other services providing augmentation to ensure that all joint and combined requirements were addressed. . .designating a component or element headquarters as the foundation of the mission. . .[it] allowed an established service staff to transition quickly to a JTF staff with little start-up time.62

The I MEF staff, while forming the core of the JTF HQ, had significant augmentees from the other services, to include approximately 160 Army personnel.63

The US Army 10th Mountain Division (LI) provided the bulk of Army combat forces in theater, and the 10th Mountain Division (LI) Commander was designated the Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR).64 The deployed Marine and Army forces were initially very successful in their assigned security and humanitarian relief missions. By the end of December food distribution dramatically improved, and the number of
malnourished children under five in Mogadishu fell to 10 percent; only
five months earlier it stood at 60 percent.65 By February 1993 US
forces had expanded their presence in Humanitarian Relief Sectors and
conducted operations to disarm warring factions.66

On 29 April 1993, the transition to UNOSOM II began as US forces
and the JTF HQ prepared to hand over the operation to a United Nations
Command. The US-led UNITAF had accomplished its mission as forces had
secured the area of operations to allow international relief
organizations to reverse the famine crisis in Somalia.67 While at
times there were substantial problems with the organization and
functionality of JTF Somalia, for the most part the JTF executed
effective command and control of assigned US forces in Somalia and
performed assigned missions in a timely and orderly fashion.

UNOSOM II was authorized by the UN Security Council under a new
and strengthened UN mandate.68 While the United States kept
substantial support forces in Somalia during the initial stages of
UNOSOM II, the majority of US combat forces were withdrawn by May 1993.
A Turkish General, Ltg. Cevik Bir, assumed command of the UN operations
and his HQ stood up as JTF Somalia (I MEF) conducted transition
operations and began to depart Somalia. General Bir’s UN command
included a force of some 8000 Americans (mainly support troops with some
infantry and Marine Forces still on the ground as the reaction
force.)69 US Army. Thomas Montgomery became the commander of US Forces
Somalia (USFORSM), which included the quick reaction force from the 1st
BDE of the 10th Mountain Division (LI) that remained in country.
The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was a not a seamless effort. It was an extended process, that included several contentious issues such as funding, UN command structures, US versus UN command relationships, and a wide range of UN bureaucratic problems. Nevertheless, the transitional problems were finally resolved and UNOSOM II was firmly in charge with its own staff by early May 1993. The operation at this point was no longer centered around the unilateral efforts of the US, and became a more multinational effort under the control of the UNOSOM II staff.

UNOSOM II developed problems as it struggled with its political mandate and strategic objectives. A particularly brutal and well-publicized ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers occurred on 5 June 1993, resulting in the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers and the wounding of 50 others (the biggest single UN loss ever in a peacekeeping operation). By the late summer of 1993 UNOSOM II was consumed with efforts to kill or capture the Somali warlord Aideed and the US began to reinforce the operation with selected special operation capabilities and units. There were violent anti-foreign and anti-American reactions which culminated in the death of four US soldiers in an ambush 8 August 1993.

These events triggered a "backlash" in the United States, which resulted in the deployment by the NCA of units from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) and Task Force 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment to Somalia on 22 August 1993, to perform selected raids against highly visible clan targets. The tragic ambush of a US Ranger company and other special operations personnel took place on 3 and 4 October 1993, forcing the NCA to redeploy conventional units (e.g.,
elements of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from FT Stewart and additional units from the 10th Mountain Division (LI)) to Somalia to protect American lives and provide stability.

Once again a potential requirement for a JTF HQ was identified by the CENTCOM staff and the JCS. Dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II and Commander, US Forces Somalia, US Mg. Montgomery simply did not have the robust staff to meet multiple planning and operational requirements. CINCENT determined that this "new" JTF HQ would be built around an Army HQ, but chose to designate the 10th Mountain Division (LI) HQ as the nucleus of the JTF HQ (providing up to 50 percent of the staff)\(^4\) rather than a more robust headquarters. Army Mg. Carl Ernst (who was not the 10th Mountain Division (LI) Commander) was designated as the JTF Commander. A significant number of Army and Marine Corps augmentees were also attached to the 10th Mountain Division (LI) HQ nucleus to form the final JTF HQ element.

There were substantial problems with the Army division headquarters performing this difficult JTF HQ mission in light of the unit's limited organic command and control capabilities. The October 1994 final draft of the Center for Army Lessons Learned Report on US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II is very elucidating:

Nominees to augment the staff were not screened for joint staff experience. For Army augmentees, joint staff experience was not a prerequisite nor was it stated as a desired characteristic for nomination. This resulted in a staff that had very little joint staff experience or education below the staff chief level...A division headquarters will not normally have the joint staff experience or staff structure to serve as the base for a JTF staff. . . .Extracting a JTF staff from a division staff does not leave the division with a functioning staff. . .The staff organization was designed by the 10th Mountain Division, with no input from the other services. . .
There was a conscious decision to limit the size of the staff. In many cases this has resulted in a situation of 'one deep by service, which precluded 24 hour operations. The limited size of the staff caused the omission of...key sections.\textsuperscript{75}

Clearly the idea of utilizing an Army division headquarters as the nucleus of a JTF HQ was a significant issue that arose during UNOSOM II operations in Somalia.

The CALL report on UNOSOM II also highlights the difficulties with maintaining an effective ARFOR HQ under Joint Task Force Somalia:

The 10th Aviation BDE was the senior Army headquarters in JTF-Somalia. A brigade is a tactical combat headquarters. It has no major, routine combat service support function. While not so designated, the 10th Aviation Brigade was the \textit{de facto} ARFOR headquarters. As such, it was distracted from its tactical mission by having to perform such ARFOR missions as troop rotation, helicopter replacement and personnel service support to include personnel management and administration.\textsuperscript{76}

The issue of the designation and functionality of the ARFOR HQ in relation to the designated JTF HQ was also significant relative to this phase of operations in Somalia.

UN and US operations after the Ranger ambush were severely curtailed, and by March of 1994 the majority of US forces had departed Somalia, and JTF Somalia stood down. UN forces, primarily from Pakistan and Bangladesh with limited US involvement, remained in country until February 1995.

\textbf{Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY}

On 18 September 1994, US military forces began final preparations for a full-scale invasion of the island of Haiti under the combatant command of CINCCOM, culminating almost 18 months of operational planning and preparation. By 1800 hours that day, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter had brokered a potential peace agreement
with the Haitian military leadership, and by 2130 hours President Clinton had cancelled the invasion and briefed the nation that US forces would execute a permissive entry into Haiti. The following day combat units began arriving from the 10th Mountain Division (LI) to commence operations to establish a secure and stable environment in Haiti. Selected XVIII Airborne Corps and special operations units were also involved, despite the fact that it had become a permissive rather than a forced entry operation.

Initial plans for the invasion of Haiti had called for multiple airborne assaults by the 82nd Airborne Division under the command and control of Joint Task Force 180, formed by the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters commanded by Ltg. Hugh Shelton. Nevertheless, as JTF 180 made its final preparations at FT Bragg, on or about 9 September 1994, JTF 190, built around the 10th Mountain Division (LI) Headquarters, stood up at Ft Drum, New York. Prior to that time USACOM had validated the 10th Mountain Division (LI) JTF HQ structure and the Army’s Battle Command Training Program Operations Group Delta (BCTP OPSGRP-D) had conducted JTF HQ training at the Division’s home station. The reason for this second JTF HQ was to provide command and control for a permissive entry, if required (an option favored by the NCA).  

After the President called off the invasion on 19 September, the decision was made to employ both JTF 180 and JTF 190 in Haiti to provide command and control for joint operations on the island. While JTF 190 reported directly to USACOM after it was established, upon arrival in Haiti an arrangement soon evolved where the JTF 190 commander was "de facto" subordinate to the JTF 180 commander. JTF 180 and JTF 190 were
parallel HQ in that both reported directly to CINCACOM, and for a period of time performed some of the same basic planning and headquarters functions (Figure 6). Over time JTF 190-Multinational Force under the 10th Mountain Division commander, Mg. Dave Meade, became the standing JTF HQ controlling operations in Haiti as JTF 180 was gradually disestablished by 25 October 1994.

The designation of the optimal HQ to serve as the ARFOR HQ for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was not an easy task. As the Center for Army Lessons Learned report explains:

JTF-190 initially formed an ARFOR headquarters based on the DIVARTY headquarters with the ADC-O as its commander. However, by D+10 this element was reformed as another maneuver headquarters and all Army elements reported directly to the JTF headquarters [JTF 190].

It appears that the NCA’s intent in standing up two parallel JTFs concurrently was that JTF 180 would provide initial command and control until JTF 190 was fully established. This arrangement appears to have been based upon the fact that the planned invasion became a permissive and unopposed entry only minutes prior to planned execution. A further rationale might have been that the NCA desired to retain the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Commander in country to facilitate arrangements with the Haitian military leadership. It also appears that USACOM DJTF 140c was not used to augment either JTF HQ, and that liaison officers and communication augmentation primarily went to XVIIIth ABN Corps/JTF 180.

A situation that mirrors UPHOLD DEMOCRACY where two parallel joint task forces are stood up may not develop again in the future. Nevertheless, it remains a plausible scenario that is worthy of study.
Both JTFs were formed from existing HQs, but required extensive augmentation. Extensive training and assistance was also provided to both JTF HQs by the Army and USACOM. Preliminary indications are that UPHOLD DEMOCRACY represents another successful JTF operation.

Doctrinal Review

There is a substantial amount of recent Joint Doctrine that covers joint task force operations. The major joint publication is Joint Pub 5.00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (September 1991). JTFs are also covered at length in Joint Pub 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (9 September 1993) and Joint Pub 5.00 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (15 August 1994). Other relevant Joint Pubs include the Joint Pub O-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (11 August 1994) and JCS Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces (11 November 1991). Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations (3 June 1992) is also very relevant to the JTF discussion. Neither Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (June 1994 Draft Pub) nor Joint Pub 5-00.1 Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning (Initial Draft June 1992) has any substantive discussion of joint task forces. Joint Pub 3-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations (Proposed Final Pub 24 February 1993) has detailed information on JTF Command Relationships, but no further delineation of operational procedures.

The overwhelming majority of existing joint doctrine is concerned with the NCA and CINC-level JTF issues. There is an absence
of extensive JTF literature that the actual JTF HQ can draw upon to conduct operations (i.e., at the Joint Pub 3.0 series level). 83

Army doctrinal publications in general do not contain an extensive amount of information on JTFs or associated headquarters operations. Army FM 100-7 Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (Final Draft February 1995) discusses JTF organization in significant detail and is the guiding Army doctrinal publication on the subject, while FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Final Draft January 1995), also delves into the Corps role in JTF operations in some depth. FM 100-15-1 Corps Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Final Draft June 1992) contains fairly specific information on the Corps HQ as JTF HQ. FM 71-100, Division Operations (Final Draft January 1995) mentions the Division HQ role in JTF as well as the possible role of the Division as the ARFOR HQ for a JTF. There is no distinct and separate Army doctrinal publication for joint task force operations.

This doctrinal "laydown" of the JTF does not seem to meet the requirements for Army doctrine, as outlined by Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Gen. Gordon Sullivan when he was Army DCSOPS:

1. It paints a clear picture of how military forces fight in war. . .the clearer the picture is, the better is the guidance for organizing, equipping, training these forces.

2. It identifies effective war-fighting concepts-concepts that provide a distinct advantage. . .

3. Good doctrine provides decision makers with reasonable choices. 84

However, in the defense of the Army doctrinal community within TRADOC, as noted above there is a great absence of comprehensive joint doctrine that provides specific guidance on JTF operations. The fact
that Army HQ and personnel must operate in a joint vice an Army
environment for JTF operations necessitates a void in Army doctrine
until further joint products are finalized.85

Other service doctrinal publications contain even less viable
JTF information than current Army products. While the Navy’s first
doctrinal publication Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 (July 1994) does not
address JTF operations, it is too early to determine whether follow-on
Naval doctrinal publications will cover the subject. Much of the Navy’s
doctrine has been in the form of strategic "white papers" such as
...From the Sea (1992) and ...Forward From the Sea (1994): only the
former makes reference to the JTF and JTF operations.86

Only the Marines have made any real attempt to cover Joint Task
Forces in such works as FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the
National Defense (June 1991), FM FM 1, Warfighting (March 1989) and
FMFRP 2-12 Marine-Air Ground Task Force: A Global Capability (April
1991). Some Air Force manuals refer to or define JTFs, such as AFM 1
Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine (March 1992). It is reasonable to
assume that service doctrinal publications at some point in time will
provide sufficient detail to support the present and future joint
doctrinal publications that explicitly detail JTF operations.

Analytical Review

There are a whole host of theses and monographs from the various
service colleges that discuss various aspects of the joint task force.
Again, the Army seems to have the preponderance of scholarship in this
particular area. School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs that
are very worthwhile include The Joint Task Force in Contingency

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Army officers also have written the majority of theses on JTFs which have been published to date, divided between the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College. Maj. Michael L. Henchen's Establishment of a Permanent Joint Task Force Headquarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a Command and Control Structure Capable of Executing Forced Entry Contingency Operations is a very comprehensive thesis-length work. Shorter works by Maj. Robert Gorrie, Joint Battle Staff Training, and Ltc. Nicholas Grant, Joint Task Force Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall are both very strong in the area of training. James R. Helmly's Future US Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force is strong in the areas of historical background and the implications of Goldwater-Nichols. There are a select few Naval and Air Force War College pieces that consider aspects of joint task force operations. Navy and Marine officers have written a number of articles in Proceedings that address JTF organization and employment.

Review of Joint and Service Lessons Learned

There is a wealth of information contained in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). These comments from the various Unified Commands cover joint exercises as well as actual operations. Lessons documented in the JULLS format reflect a supported CINC's After Action Report (AAR), which are entered into the Joint
Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) database, and may be a Remedial Action Project (RAP) to be resolved at the joint level. There are currently extensive observations in JULLS that address the subject of JTFs in some level of detail. JULLS also has detailed information on the domestic relief JTF operations in Florida for Hurricane Andrew (2nd US Army formed the core for the JTF Staff). The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) also covers the topic in some depth; Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned Report 3 December 1992-4 May 1993 has an extensive discussion on the use of the joint task force in an Operations Other than War role, as does US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II (Final Draft October 1994). Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Initial Impressions Volumes I (December 1994) and II (February 1995) are recent draft CALL publications which extensively cover JTF operations in Haiti.

**Summary**

Much of the past joint and Army research and scholarship on the joint task force has centered on the debate over the need for a standing joint task force, and command and control considerations (in particular communications). While joint doctrine now captures some of the intricacies of potential JTF operations, both Joint and Army doctrine need to be significantly expanded in this key area. The other services also clearly lag behind and the overall "joint community" is not as well prepared for the critical JTF mission as it should be. As CJCS Gen. John Shalikashvili recently noted:

> While we have some joint doctrine, it is really in its infancy at best. It is neither well-vetted nor well understood at all. It is certainly not disseminated out there, and certainly it is almost never used by anyone, whether that’s in operations, exercises leading up to operations, or for that matter in training.
If we have to close the seam between the services, and really fight as joint teams, that’s an extraordinarily dangerous oversight and shortcoming. 

Joint task forces are the most likely organizations to engage in future joint operations, and in particular Operations Other than War (OOTW). Yet, the joint community still is far from effectively formalizing "how to fight" in such a multi-service arrangement, as the CJCS points out.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The literature review we have already introduced some recent historical examples of JTF operations and outlined the current status of joint and service doctrine. The methodology for the research is divided into two major parts: 1) to determine the potential CINC requirements for joint task forces based on historical examples, theater CINC standard operating procedures for JTF formation and employment, and current strategic guidance, and 2) to apply a comprehensive analytical framework to determine if the Army, relative to the other services is properly postured to support CINC requirements. This framework (see Figure 7) will briefly examine service doctrine, organization, and training in order to make that determination.

CINC/NCA Requirements for Joint Task Forces

JUST CAUSE

Operation JUST CAUSE was a contingency operation that, due to the nature of the mission requirements, had the "luxury" of extended planning time. The basic mission for the joint task force was to:

- Protect American lives.
- Secure key military and canal sites.
- Neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF).
- Prepare to Restore Law and Order.
- Support Installation of a US recognized government in Panama.\(^1\)

It was an Army and special operations-heavy operation that was initially intended as a "Coup de Main". The joint task force HQ, JTF South, was built around an existing operational-level Headquarters, the XVIII Airborne Corps HQ. JTF South had substantial staff augmentation from USARSO (JTF Panama) and SOUTHCOM. The JTF did not initially have a Civil Military Operations Center, but for the post-conflict reconstruction phase of the operation a separate Civil Affairs Task Force was formed.

Some critics have noted that JUST CAUSE may not be a model for future contingency operations based on the fact that there was extended planning and rehearsal time, a mature theater of operations, and limited forces were involved from any service aside from the Army. Certainly command and control, communications, and logistics were simplified because of the above factors. As Maj. John Scudder points out, the XVIII Airborne Corps JTF HQ synchronized a ground-oriented campaign that consisted of predominantly Army forces.\(^2\) Nevertheless, the operation was a post Goldwater-Nichols success that became a strong precedent for future successful JTF operations into the 1990s.

PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a short notice, humanitarian relief operation that was characterized by limited combat operations. The basic mission of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was to:

- Stop the dying and suffering. Stabilize the population.
- Resettle the population at temporary sites. Establish a sustainable, secure environment.
- Return the refugee population to their homes.\(^3\)
While PROVIDE COMFORT was eventually commanded by an Army three star general, the initial JTF was built around an Air Force component HQ staff (US Air Force Europe, or USAFE), with augmentation. The JTF became a combined operation based on the fact that there were forces from 11 other nations involved. Nevertheless, there was limited multinational participation on the headquarters staff itself. While the JTF HQ was built around an Air Force HQ, the majority of forces assigned to the JTF were from the Army. PROVIDE COMFORT was heavily characterized by civil affairs missions; there was a robust Army-run Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) that fell under the JTF J-3.4

CJTF Provide Comfort had a wide range of missions, was fairly long in duration, and was widely considered a success. It would prove to be a model for future humanitarian assistance operations, particularly due to the unity of effort between the JTF HQ and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs). The JTF HQ was able to synchronize its missions with these organizations with the help of civil affairs personnel who "coordinated with NGOs, PVOs...[and] conducted extensive interviews with the NGOs and PVOs in Northern Iraq and determined the scope and timing of the expected arrival of their supplies."5

RESTORE HOPE

In the first phase of Operation RESTORE HOPE, I MEF as the Joint Task Force HQ (also known as UNITAP) conducted operations in Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993. The JTF was formed on short notice during crisis action planning, and while built around an existing operational level HQ, I MEF, it was heavily augmented from other
services (in particular the Army). JTF Somalia’s mission was primarily humanitarian assistance, although the use of force was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to:

Ensure the uninhibited movement of relief supplies through air and sea port facilities and allow the movement of relief supplies by UN and NGO agencies to distribution sites.\(^6\)

While there were eight multinational forces under the UNITAF umbrella, the JTF HQ was a US-only organization. I MEF’s operations as a joint task force were very successful, not only in terms of mission accomplishment, but in also in orchestrating, integrating, and synchronizing a multitude of complex tasks with a host of other organizations in a complex and demanding OOTW environment.

JTF Somalia under UNOSOM II, built around elements of the 10th Mountain Division (LI) HQ, was an ad hoc organization that was brought in to restore order in a rapidly deteriorating security environment after the incident involving the deaths of eighteen US Rangers. The stated mission was:

Joint Task Force-Somalia provides force protection for US forces in Somalia and facilitates continued US support of UN operations. As required, conduct operations to secure lines of communications to ensure continued flow of supplies. Be prepared to withdraw US forces.\(^7\)

This "new" JTF Somalia was also intended to relieve pressure from the USFORSOM Commander, Mg. Montgomery, and his staff. USFORSOM was decisively engaged with multinational forces and issues under the UNOSOM II mandate. JTF Somalia was successful in the accomplishment of a limited menu of tasks, but the situation was also problematic. The JTF HQ was a Division HQ (-) with minimal augmentation, training or
assistance attempting to function as a full-blown JTF HQ staff in a complex and demanding Operations Other Than War environment.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was planned over a very long duration (greater than 18 months) as a forced or nonpermissive entry into the island nation of Haiti. While all planning efforts were very close-hold and compartmentalized between USACOM and the JCS, indications are that the initial mission for JTF 180 (XVIII Airborne Corps) and special operations forces was to conduct a rapid "Coup De Main" on the order of Operation JUST CAUSE. The majority of forces were from the Army and USOCCOM; participation from the other services was not extensive.

Once President Jimmy Carter reached an agreement with the Haitian military leader Ltg. Raoul Cedras, the JTF mission shifted to that of an unopposed entry for peacekeeping operations in a semipermissive environment. Tenth Mountain Division (LI) HQ as JTF 190 was disembarked alongside JTF 180 and gradually assumed the majority of command and control tasks in country. While this situation may have been an anomaly unlikely to be repeated in the future, it highlights the fact that future Army requirements for JTF HQs may continue to run the gamut from Division HQ to Corps-level staffs. The significant augmentation requirements for personnel and equipment in the UPHOLD DEMOCRACY scenario is another recurring point. The lessons learned from two parallel JTFs were significant:

When building Tables of Organization for an operation where two organizations are involved, and one is designated to be a follow-on force, close coordination is essential to synchronize personnel requirements. Standing up two complete task forces independently
poses a major challenge since personnel availability is already challenged by service-wide ambitious operational tempos.8

Finally, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and civil affairs personnel again played a central role in the integration of humanitarian assistance efforts among a host of organizations, as well as performing a myriad of other tasks in country.9

Current CINC JTF Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS)

In the post Goldwater-Nichols era the majority of the Regional CINCs have employed joint task forces for a variety of real world contingency operations. As a result they have begun to formalize procedures for joint task force operations. Currently USACOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM have formal written Standing Operating Procedures (SOPS) for JTFs while USSOUTHCOM and USSOCCOM have somewhat less formal yet developed and consistent procedures.

USACOM

USACOM, as noted earlier, as a result of the 1993 CJCS Roles and Missions Report and changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), has assumed the role of the CONUS joint force trainer, packager, and integrator. USACOM initiatives such as Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP) are keyed towards seeking new solutions to the requirement of routinely providing multi-service forces to the Unified Commanders in an era of fiscally constrained overseas presence.

Despite its new status and missions in the joint arena, USACOM has routinely executed contingency operations in the past and "in the Atlantic command, commanders-in-chief have established a direct command line to two primary designated joint task forces- JTF 120 and JTF 140-
to handle specific contingency operations.\textsuperscript{10} USACOM's traditional standing JTF HQ, JTF 120, is built primarily around the Navy's 2nd Fleet. JTF 120 was the base HQ for the joint task force that conducted Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983. JTF 120 has traditionally maintained a strong maritime focus. USACOM also maintains plans to employ JTF 120, JTF 140, JTF 160 and JTF 180, all with a different regional focus within the USACOM AOR.\textsuperscript{11}

USACOM JTF 140c (distinct from JTF 140) is a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) which joins up with a designated JTF HQ to provide communications links, liaison officers, and personnel augmentation. USACOM has also published \textit{Standing Operating Procedures for Deployable Joint Task Force 140 Cadre}. The cell is primarily intended to provide augmentation in a crisis action situation to assist with planning. Plans developed as part of the deliberate planning process would normally include a robust JTF HQ and staff familiar with the operational situation.\textsuperscript{12}

Today USACOM views the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, 2nd Fleet, 2nd MEF, and 8th AF as their "three star standing joint task force commands."\textsuperscript{13} The Army's III Corps is also considered a candidate JTF HQ and has been integrated into joint exercises such as Unified Endeavor. Again, as Adm. Paul David Miller sees it, USACOM now has a major role in training the joint task force HQ:

The third cornerstone in realizing the full joint force multiplier potential is ensuring the readiness of JTF commanders and staffs to plan and execute contingency operations. Each geographic CINC is developing a JTF training concept, but the individual theater approaches are not yet grounded in a common set of JTF staff tasks, conditions, and proficiency standards. Once the universal joint task list is finalized, LANTCOM [now USACOM] will be able to train deployable JTF and component commanders in joint doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to the supported CINC's requirements from a menu of common standards that are applicable worldwide.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition, USACOM uses annual joint exercises (such as Atlantic Resolve, Ocean Venture, and Unified Endeavor) as an opportunity to facilitate JTF training. The Joint Task Force 95 (JTF-95) USACOM Adaptive Joint Force Packaging experiments also have a goal "to strengthen JTF/JTG C4I architecture... effective, efficient, and interoperable CINC C2... and joint training."\textsuperscript{15} Chapter four will explore the role of USACOM vice service Title 10 training at length.

USEUCOM

USEUCOM has conducted a wide range of joint task force operations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The diversity of these operations is without parallel among the other Unified Commands:

Evacuating more than 2400 noncombatants from a murderous civil war in Liberia; conducting devastating air strikes flown from Turkey against Iraq in the Gulf War; swiftly deploying Patriot missiles units from Germany to defend Israeli civilians against Scud missiles; rendering humanitarian aid to half a million displaced Kurds and then securing northern Iraq for their safe return home; transporting French and Belgian forces to Zaire and evacuating civilians in response to widespread Zairian army uprising; and conducting air operations from Turkey to preserve peace and order in northern Iraq for UN relief operations.\textsuperscript{16}

USEUCOM has also made a strong effort to refine operating procedures and "how they do JTF business" since 1991. They have published a Joint Staff Officer's Brain Book (April 1993), a JTF Help List (April 1993), and EUCOM Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures (1992).
Normally USEUCOM's service component commands (e.g., USAREUR, USAFE, etc.) are the HQs identified as the potential nucleus for a JTF HQ. This is an approach not followed by the other CINC's, but has advantages, as USEUCOM notes:

A component provides permanent structure; it can provide small elements, either staff or forces, to participate in a training program; and finally, it owns things - something the USEUCOM doesn't. Building on a component basis provides us with the only affordable, supportable, and flexible option. 17

Standing JTFs are not maintained in USEUCOM, 18 although JTFs such as PROVIDE COMFORT have remained active for extended periods of time (the JTF is still ongoing, although on a much reduced scale). USEUCOM attempts to divide up the JTF HQ responsibility among service component staffs so that no single HQ is greater than 50 percent committed to the operation. 19

Since 1992 USEUCOM has refined a concept it calls the Joint Planning Cell (JPC). When there is an impending crisis within the USEUCOM AOR, a Crisis Action Team (CAT) is formed from the USEUCOM staff. If the determination is made to establish a JTF HQ, then the JPC augments the JTF staff. This approach bridges the gap between crisis action planning and JTF staff execution, and is unique among the regional CINC's. 20

In the area of training for JTF operations, USEUCOM has an extensive program, as former Deputy CINC Gen. James McCarthy notes:

We [USEUCOM] have focused our initiatives on forming, deploying, and employing JTFs. The resulting programs seek to to enhance USEUCOM's contingency planning. . . JTF cadre preparation; individual, unit, and headquarters training; joint and combined exercises. 21
With demonstrated requirements, and based on their strong focus on JTF training and preparation, USEUCOM has undertaken numerous initiatives: seminars and training sessions to prepare senior leaders to be future JTF commanders, the Joint Warrior Program to familiarize potential task force commanders with service and SOF capabilities, and intensive media management efforts.\textsuperscript{22}

It is important to emphasize that USEUCOM will have a significant role if the new NATO CJTF concept for rapidly assembled and deployable peacekeeping forces is actually realized within the USEUCOM AOR. In the words of USEUCOM’s LTC Charles Barry:

If successful, the NATO CJTF will be a hybrid capability that combines the best attributes of both coalition and Alliance forces: rapid flexible crisis response and a trained, ready multinational force backed by an in-place infrastructure. CJTF will be a stand-by capability for conducting peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. It will be a multinational force, seasoned by regular exercises and trained in common procedures, ready to respond in time of crisis.\textsuperscript{23}

While the concept is certainly exciting and one that may at some point have a great impact on future JTF operations, the challenges in building such a powerful NATO capability seem overwhelming, at best.

USPACOM

USPACOM is generally regarded as the first Unified Command to formalize joint task force operations\textsuperscript{24}; Adm. Charles Larson as CINCPAC developed the idea of two-tiered command and control for contingency operations. USPACOM designates a JTF Commander based around the I Corps, III MEF, 13th AF or 7th Fleet. A Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) from USPACOM then "plugs" into this operational HQ and provides liaison, communications, and JOPES support.
The DJTFAC is made up of personnel from both the service component HQs and from the CINCPAC staff. As the former CINC Adm. Charles Larson explains in his 1994 posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Over the past two years, we have successfully employed the DJTFAC in over 20 training and contingency operations including typhoon Omar in Guam, Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii, and Provide Refuge in Kwajalein Atoll. This streamlined, two-tiered command and control structure maximizes our flexibility, agility, and adaptability, while minimizing layers of bureaucracy.

USPACOM procedures are formalized in two major documents, USPACOM Instruction 3020.11, Organization and Administration of USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) (17 July 92) as well as USPACOM Instruction 3120.25E, Establishment of Contingency Joint Task Force (20 January 1993). Moreover, as noted above, USPACOM exercises the JTF HQ concept along with the DJTFAC during the annual Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand. They also conduct exercise Tempest Express on a regular basis; this training is 5 days in duration and is designed to train JTF HQ staffs at their home station.

USSOUTHCOM

CINCSOUTH maintains a standing JTF, Joint Task Force Panama, which under the command of the Commander, United States Army South (USARSO) Commander, and performs a variety of tasks for the Unified Command. JTF Panama is intended to exercise operational control over US forces in Panama and to allow the CINC to maintain the requisite AOR-wide focus throughout the entire Central and South America region. JTF Panama is not necessarily suited for real world contingency operations for many of the same reasons it was replaced with XVIII Airborne Corps
during Operation JUST CAUSE. US Army South is an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Headquarters which meets a Title 10 administrative and logistic requirement within theater. It is not resourced with personnel or communications to serve as a joint, operational warfighting headquarters in a true JTF HQ capacity. And, as CINCSOUTH Gen. Barry McCaffery notes, since JUST CAUSE, "JTF-PM has been responsible for SOUTHCOM’s post-conflict programs designed to support democracy within the Republic of Panama and to assist in the recovery of the nation’s infrastructure."²⁹ USSOUTHCOM also maintains a standing JTF HQ, JTF Bravo, which fulfills nation assistance requirements within Honduras.

Other Unified Commands

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) does not normally deploy a joint task force unless it is subordinate to or as part of a regional CINC’s JTF HQ. This Joint Special Operating Task Force (JSOTF) is similar to a normal JTF HQ element. It is mission-tailored, normally for a short duration across specially focused mission areas. The JSOTF may be a separate joint HQ or established around existing service force structures.³⁰ USSOCOM is also developing JTF support packages that will augment the existing capabilities of the CINC special operations components with Civil Affairs and PSYOP-specific modules.³¹

USCENTCOM does not have a refined JTF HQ SOP or standing joint task force but, as noted earlier, has employed JTFs in the past and may have a potential need to employ a JTF HQ in support of a given contingency mission. It is plausible that such a future requirement may arise in the CENTCOM AOR for a JTF HQ. Possible scenarios include maintaining the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Persian Gulf,
or deploying a transitional JTF HQ to respond to regional aggression threatening US oil interests.

General Strategic Considerations

President Bill Clinton's 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement charges the US to "deploy robust and flexible military" forces that must deal with major regional contingencies, provide credible overseas presence, counter weapons of mass destruction, contribute to multilateral peace operations, and support counterterrorism efforts and other national security objectives.32

The National Military Strategy of the United States: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (February 95) echoes the four principle dangers identified in the President's strategy: regional instability, weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, and dangers to democracy and reform. The National Military Strategy goes on to highlight two complementary military objectives: to promote stability and thwart aggression. It further highlights that through the strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection the military may be called on to perform a range of missions across the spectrum of conflict. Finally, it delineates three components of the strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and warfighting.33

This strategic guidance has great relevance to the likelihood of JTF formation and employment by the regional CINCs in the security environment of the 1990s. It is entirely possible that in the initial stages of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) that a joint task force HQ could be deployed as the initial or transitional command and control HQ.
During the October 1994 crisis in Kuwait (when it initially appeared that Iraq was once again massing on the border), CENTCOM at one point intended to deploy selected members of the the 3rd Army/US Army Central Command to serve as a joint task force HQ. The purpose of this transitional JTF HQ was to provide initial command and control of deployed joint forces until it became feasible for a CENTCOM forward HQ to assume that mission. As Army FM 100-15-1 notes, "The contingency JTF provides the supported CINC with initial, joint command and control in crises which demand rapid, coherent prior to the arrival of significant combat forces."

Due to its usual contingency nature, the joint task force HQ is not normally used in an overseas presence capacity unless it is performing that role as part of a larger operation or in a joint exercise. In the annual USPACOM joint exercise Cobra Gold, the US Army's I Corps has in the past formed a JTF HQ; its deployment to Thailand clearly serves as overseas presence consistent with the National Military Strategy. As part of CINCPAC's strategy of Cooperative Engagement the JTF is normally tailored for crisis response, but Cobra Gold is illustrative of its potential role in overseas presence.

CINCACOM's recent experiments with Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP) are in part designed to provide joint force packages to the regional CINCs to meet their forward (overseas) presence requirements. As USPACOM and USEUCOM have solid in-theater JTF HQ
capabilities and procedures, it is not likely that CINCCOM would provide a JTF HQ to either of these CINCs to augment an AJFP in the event of a crisis.

It is very likely, as demonstrated in Operations JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT, RESTORE HOPE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY that the joint task force HQ will be employed to deal with Operations Other than WAR (OOTW). FM 100-5 defines the possible range of OOTW missions from support to US, state, and local governments, to disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement. It is very reasonable to expect that future requirements would exist for a JTF HQ to execute the above missions, with particular emphasis on support of peacekeeping operations. Of the thirty-five CJCS execute orders issued since DESERT STORM, all of them were tailored for OOTW requirements. It is likely that future requirements will be similar, and that a corresponding JTF will be required. The joint doctrine community has realized the importance of such operations, and the Joint Warfighting Center has produced a Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Pre-Printing Version 28 February 1995), which is an excellent guide for the COMJTF commander and his staff.

The JTF HQ may be expected to operate with multinational forces or as a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Joint Pub 1 explains that there is a good probability that any military operation undertaken by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual interests established by our nation around the world.
Again, the NATO CJTF is an ongoing initiative in USEUCOM to facilitate contingency operations with other NATO and non-NATO Forces for peacekeeping. The outcome of CJTF experiments with NATO may have a significant impact on future US joint task force contingency and/or peacekeeping operations.

The only range of missions from the National Security Strategy that seem inappropriate for the employment of a conventional JTF are the countering of weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism. Such missions might fall under the direction of the Joint Special Operations command (JSOC) or a contingency Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), but would not normally be assigned to a regional CINC due to the unique capabilities required.

In summary, as former CINCCOM Adm. Miller points out:

We must maintain the broad defense capability needed for major regional contingencies, but, maintaining that capability and deploying effective and efficient force packages for peacetime presence and contingency response are two separate and distinct issues.41

It is very probable that JTF HQs will be employed by all the regional CINCs to provide command and control for their deployed forces across the spectrum of conflict for a wide variety of missions. More specific requirements are delineated below.

**Expected CINC Requirements for Joint Task Forces**

Today's Unified Commander has six options for the establishment of a command structure over his assigned forces: subordinate unified command, joint task force, functional component, service component, single service force, and specific operational force (direct command).42 As noted earlier, it is very likely that the operational
necessity may cause a given Unified Commander to choose the JTF option to deal with a range of contingencies, particularly for OOTW. Maj. Lance Betros explains the advantage of the JTF:

The appeal of the JTF as a command structure is its potential for overcoming the effects of uncertainty. If the events of the last decade are a clue, future contingencies will develop in unexpected times and places that defy our ability to gather complete intelligence. American forces will have to act quickly and decisively, regardless of the inevitability of incomplete information. The characteristics of a JTF--decentralized execution, semi-autonomous multi-service forces, low decision threshold--make this organization well-suited to the uncertain challenges that await us.43

Figure 8 depicts some of the possible inputs that may drive the establishment of a joint task force. As described in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, the conditions that determine whether a CINC or the NCA choose to stand-up a JTF HQ include whether the operation is of limited duration, it involves two or more services, dictates a significant scale and close integration of effort, and centralized logistics is not required. If an operation involves a large scope and long duration (as in a Major Regional Contingency, (MRC)), is only a single service, or a subunified command is available, then it is not likely that a JTF would be established.

Based on the review of the four historical joint task force operations since 1989, as well as an overview of past JTFs in general, the following represent expected CINC requirements for future joint task force HQs:

1) JTF HQs may be designated by the CINC for the execution of specific OPLANS in deliberate planning under JOPES.

2) JTF HQ requirements will be more frequent for contingency operations, during which limited planning time will be available. JTF HQs will be stood up by the CINC and/or NCA during the initial
stages of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) under JOPES (see figure 8). Many COMJTF's have had less than 72 hours to plan and prepare for execution of operations.44

3) The range of JTF missions will vary, but generally are at the low end of the conflict spectrum with an emphasis on Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Humanitarian/disaster assistance operations are extremely likely within the OOTW range of missions.

4) The environment for the introduction of the JTF will either be permissive or non-permissive. Non-permissive environments dictate a forced entry, are generally more complex, and require a robust JTF HQ. The Army's XVIII Airborne Corps or one of the Marine MEF HQs are very likely candidate JTF HQs to provide C2 for non-permissive operations due to their high state of readiness and unique capabilities.

5) A JTF HQ may be required for a transitional HQ building towards a Major Regional Contingency (MRC):

The contingency JTF provides the supported CINC with initial, joint command and control in crises which demand rapid, coherent projection of combat power prior to the arrival of significant combat forces to prosecute operations...It will plan, coordinate and synchronize execution of discrete, specific combat operations for a limited duration...It facilitates transition of command and control to sustained land operations.45

6) The primary role of the JTF HQ is to synchronize operations of the services. Specific functions of the HQs would include a range of tasks such as:

- Plan for deployment, redeployment, and employment of the JTF.
- Assist the C[OM]JTF in directing, control, and coordinating operations of assigned forces.
- Prepare plans and orders.
- Synchronize component plans.
- Coordinate operational requirements with the CINC.
- Promulgate planning directives for the ARFOR, AFFOR, NAVFOR, MARFOR, and SOF as appropriate.
- Coordinate with the CINC for support from other agencies, commands, and organizations.
- Coordinate joint fire support.
- Conduct liaison with country team.
- Synchronize combat operations...to accomplish assigned missions.
- Establish the joint area air defense commander.
- Establish joint boards and offices.
- Establish priorities.46
7) JTF HQ alignment will generally follow the service with the majority of forces assigned to the JTF. The JTF HQ will be based around a standing HQ; Ad Hoc HQs will be the exception.

8) Future JTF operations will likely involve multi-service special operations forces provided by USSOCOM, or from those SOF forces already assigned to the supported CINC.

9) The likelihood of Army civil affairs requirements is very high. Establishment of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) will be Standard Operating Procedure in most operations.

10) Extensive requirements will exist for the JTF to coordinate "with forces or agencies outside the JTF’s chain of command".47

11) The most likely Army--based JTF HQ desired by any given CINC will be a Corps HQ, followed by a Division HQ, and then an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) HQ.

- Corps HQ will most likely be required for contingency, forcible entry, or complex operations involving the use of force. "In its JTF HQ role, the Corps HQ’s principal function is to prosecute the CINC’s campaign plan synchronizing the operations of the services."48

- Division HQ will be required as a JTF HQ primarily for limited operations, with minimal assigned forces. The operation will likely be an OOTW, under permissive conditions. Other service participation is not extensive.49

- USEUCOM is currently the only CINC likely to involve the ASCC as a JTF HQ.

Similarly, the most likely Navy-based HQ is the Fleet HQ, the most likely Marine-based HQ the MEF HQ, and the most likely Air Force-based HQ the Numbered Air Force HQ.

12) Any of the designated JTF HQ will require some degree of Army and/or multi--service augmentation from an external source, even when the CINC provides a DJTFAC or other form of augmentation from the Unified Command.

13) Duration of the JTF operation will vary widely. A contingency JTF HQ operation could transition to a semi-permanent "standing" requirement (example: PROVIDE COMFORT).

14) USPACOM and USEUCOM are likely to use their SecDef assigned HQ (i.e., I and V Corps, respectively) for their JTF requirements vice identifying a force projection requirement to CINCPACOM.50

15) Coalition considerations are a factor in CINC requirements for JTF HQ, particularly in USEUCOM. Evolving CJTF arrangements...
in NATO will determine future EUCOM operations. Likelihood of combined JTF operations within other Unified Commands also remains high.

16) JTF HQ Communications and Intelligence requirements will be complex and present some of the most unique and demanding challenges to the COMJTF and his staff; i.e. CINC/JTF requirements will likely exceed JTF HQ capabilities and/or training proficiencies.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The desired outcome of the remainder of the analysis is to determine whether the Army, in relation to the other services, has properly postured its headquarters to effectively deal with the growing challenges of joint task force contingency operations across the range of requirements in support of the regional CINCs delineated above. As per the methodology at Figure 7, the next step is to determine the adequacy of existing doctrine, both at the joint and service levels. An organizational analysis in terms of tactics, techniques, and procedures, force structure, and organic communications assets is then required. Finally, the last step is to determine the adequacy of current training before any final conclusions are reached.
Chapter 4

ANALYSIS

Doctrinal Analysis

Joint Doctrine

Existing joint doctrine is fairly specific in addressing the establishment of a joint task force, particularly with regards to the headquarters element. As discussed earlier, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 11 August 1994, discusses at length the authority to "stand up" and the circumstances under which a joint task force should be established. It also highlights that "the commander of a JTF exercises OPCON over assigned forces and normally over attached forces" and that a JTF commander may be a Service Component commander, but then is responsible for two sets of duties.¹

Joint Pub 0-2 is clear on this point:

The commander of a joint task force will have a joint staff with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to that command.²

This is a vital area, as staff representation on Joint Task Forces has been and will continue to be an important issue from a service perspective. Joint Pub 0-2 also describes the requirements for a joint staff for any joint headquarters:

Staff members should be assigned in a manner that ensures that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that service
representation and influence generally reflect the service composition of the force.³

When a JTF is established using a standing HQ (such as a Corps, Division, or MEP), the majority of personnel assigned are normally from that "base" HQ. Moreover, as we have seen, the initial JTF HQ usually is from the service with majority of assigned forces. This then results in a situation where the joint staff composition is skewed to the dominant service. This may or may not have an impact on the effectiveness of a JTF HQ. It is a problem which is currently not addressed in existing joint doctrine.

More often than not the requirement exists for augmentees to "round out" the JTF HQ. From the Army's perspective this becomes not only a manning issue but a training issue as well. In order to fill such billets, officers with joint experience are highly desirable, but they must also possess tactical and technical competence in Army-specific knowledge as well. There is no guidance in joint doctrine pertaining to augmentation. If the possibility that a permanent JTF HQ will be created in the future is set aside, then augmentation becomes a central issue that joint headquarters and the services must continue to grapple with.

The central doctrinal publication for the joint task force, Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, was written to "establish joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing and redeploying a JTF for short notice contingency operation."⁴ Joint Pub 5-00.2 expands on the basic information furnished in the UNAAF, and then delineates JTF operations in the context of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

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(JOPES). It also devotes a chapter to the organization and functions of the JTF HQ itself. A criticism of the publication is that over half of it is devoted to checklists for the JTF HQ and individual JTF HQ staff sections. As JTF HQ are frequently, as we have seen, somewhat ad hoc in their composition, this is probably a necessary inclusion. Nevertheless, it fails to provide the necessary level of detail for the JTF to adequately function at the operational level of war. As there is now such a lengthy history of JTF operations (see Table 1-3), there are a host of lessons learned and historical examples upon which to draw for detailed information to round out existing joint doctrine. For example, there is no discussion of operational operating systems (OOS) in any of the JTF doctrine. These systems are critical for the integration and synchronization of multi-service forces in a JTF construct.

Overall, there appears to be an absence of doctrine at the Joint Pub 3.0 level that a joint task force commander can draw upon in planning the deployment, employment, and operation of his joint task force. Much of this information could be published in the form of "tactics, techniques, and procedures" (TTP). Regardless of the form or the nomenclature, a valid requirement exists and there is a definite need for such information in the joint arena.

One initiative that should help to fill this void is the JCS-sponsored Joint Task Force Headquarters Mission Training Plan (JTF HQ MTP) (First Draft 15 October 1994). This extensive document has a very specific purpose, as the:

Joint Task Force Headquarters Mission Training Plan (JTF HQ MTP) is primarily a training document designed to assist probable or designated JTF Commanders and staffs in training an assessing the
performance of individual and collective command and staff tasks during crisis situations. The JTF HQ MTP serves in:

- Planning for JTF HQ/Operations
- Conducting JTF HQ Training/Operations
- Assessing JTF HQ performance in Training/Operations

This Mission Training Plan is developed from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), joint doctrine, and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTCP). As noted above, both current joint doctrine and JTCP do not provide a wealth of information for the JTF Commanders use. As such, the JTF HQ MTP, when published in final form, should at least provide a substantive interim source of definitive guidance to the JTF Commander. The fact also remains that many of the Unified Commanders, in particular CINCPAC, CINCEUCOM, and CINCACOM, have well-defined Standard Operating Procedures to guide their Joint Task Force headquarters and operations.

The Joint Warfighting Center, a new organization stood up by the JCS J-7 to assist in joint doctrine, training, and warfighting simulation, has published a draft Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Pre-Printing Version 28 February 1995). This comprehensive and well-written JTCP provides the JTF Commander and his staff detailed information to aid them the complex synchronization and integration required for a JTF to function effectively during peace operations. The Air-Land-Sea Application Center (ALSA) has published a final draft (March 94) of Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. This document addresses forming a Joint Task force in terms of organization and augmentation in humanitarian assistance operations. It highlights the role of special operations forces (SOF), civil affairs (CA) units, and psychological operations
(PSYOP) units. It also outlines the key process of tailoring functions for the unique challenges of humanitarian assistance.

If similar products are drafted by the Joint Warfighting Center, the joint community will at least have a baseline of reference material to complement CINC SOPs and bridge the existing void in JTF doctrine at the operational level.

The current Armed Forces Staff College Publication 2, Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces (August 1992) provides a great deal of pertinent information relative to a JTF Commander. After an extensive examination of service warfighting philosophies, it shifts to strategic and operational synchronization, and then force and functional synchronization. This non-doctrinal work could serve as an ideal template to craft further joint doctrine. The intent would be to provide the joint task force commander with the necessary information to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Army Doctrine

Current Army doctrinal manuals for Division Operations (FM 71-100, 1990) and Corps Operations (FM 100-15, September 1989) are completely inadequate in their discussion of JTF operations. Any discussion of the JTF and associated HQ are cursory at best. The revised 71-100 (Final Draft January 1995) mentions the role of the Division as part of a joint task force. It emphatically states that "Divisions are not normally designated as JTF HQ," and then goes on to discuss the Division's possible role as the ARFOR (normally under a JTF).
The revised FM 100-15 (Final Draft 31 January 1995) contains a
great deal of useful information on the Corps' potential role as a joint
task force headquarters: "the information discussed in this manual is
designed to assist Army units in developing operational and training
plans for coordinating activities as a JTF HQ." It goes on to cover
such vital areas as joint battle synchronization, JTF operations and
organization, augmentation, and joint staff directorates to include
joint boards, command and control, and joint fires.

The new FM 100-15 is a substantive work that should greatly
assist the Corps Commander in a COMJTF role. The companion manual to FM
100-15, FM 100-15-1, Corps Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Final
Draft 1992) superbly complements the basic doctrine and provides the
potential JTF Commander detailed supplemental information in many of the
same areas covered in FM 100-15.

The most comprehensive Army doctrinal work on the subject of the
joint task force is the pending revision of FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
The Army in Theater Operations (Final Draft 1 February 1995). Focused
primarily on Army organizations and operations at Echelons Above Corps
(EAC), in chapter 6 the manual has an extensive discussion on Army
Service Component Command (ASCC) operations. This section is very
specific in its discussion of the joint task force as a CINC option for
theater organization.

FM 100-7 expands on the FM 100-5 Operations (June 1993)
discussion of Army headquarters as joint task force headquarters. FM
100-5 notes that a corps commander or a numbered Army commander (which
today only represents 3rd Army/ARCENT) could be a JTF Commander, or
potentially a component commander when the operation dictates large land
forces over a large land Area of Operations.\textsuperscript{10} FM 100-7 concentrates
on the Corps Commander as the potential JTF commander, and explains the
command and support relationships between the JTF Commander, the Unified
Commander, and the Army Service Component Commander.

The main thrust of the new FM 100-7 is to explain the revised
concept of Army operations within a theater, and to educate the Army on
theater organization without the Cold War Theater Army. While the JTF
discussion may not provide a potential commander sufficient information
in the requisite level of detail, FM 100-7 meets its intended purpose.

Unfortunately, the companion document to FM 100-7, FM 100-16
Army Operational Support (Approved Final Draft 17 February 1995) has
only three "sketchy" paragraphs on support for a JTF. As Title 10
administrative and logistic support to the JTF HQ remains a service
responsibility, FM 100-16 fails to provide the level of detail required
in this vital area.

The lack of extensive joint doctrine targetted to the joint task
force commander precludes the Army from developing complementary
doctrine. Such Army doctrine would not be sufficiently integrative in
scope. Nevertheless, the likelihood of significant future JTF
operations necessitates that the Army examine the possibility for
publishing a separate TTP for joint task force operations as the
necessary joint products become available.

Other Service Doctrine

Other service doctrine for the most part fails to consider the
joint task force in any detail, if at all. The Marines are the only
service that have devoted any significant doctrinal attention to the subject. That may be due to the fact the Marine have explicitly acknowledged that a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) HQ could be required to serve as a JTF HQ. *FMFM 1-2, the Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (June 1991), *FM FM 1, Warfighting* (March 1989), and *FMFRP 2-12 Marine-Air Ground Task Force: A Global Capability* (April 1991) all at least address the joint task force. Nevertheless, none of the Marine Corps doctrine has the specificity on JTF HQ found in Army doctrine.

Naval doctrine is still in the developmental stage. The recent Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 (June 1994) is silent on the subject of the JTF, although the manual is very broad in scope. As noted earlier, Naval Strategic products such as *...From the Sea* do in fact highlight the role of the JTF (although, once again, *...Forward From the Sea* lacks such a focus). Air Force doctrinal publications do not address the Joint Task Force in any level of detail.

While the Army may lead the other services in its approach to the joint task force in terms of published doctrine, the fact remains that none of the services can proceed with implementing doctrine on the JTF until there is further joint doctrine drafted on the subject. Adequate joint doctrine currently exists on the establishment of the JTF and JTF HQ, but the doctrine is lacking at the operational level for the JTF Commander to perform his requisite duties. The JTF MTP and Joint Warfighting Center JTPP products may fill the void in the near term, but eventually more joint doctrine products are required.
Organizational Analysis

US NAVY

For the Navy, the Fleet Headquarters is the most likely organization to serve as a JTF HQ. The Fleet, under a three star commander, is the Navy’s operational level warfighting HQ that performs some of the same basic functions as the Army Corps HQ. The Fleet has the requisite communications, staff, and intelligence architecture to adequately serve as a JTF HQ. In a crisis, a carrier task force probably has enough capability to fulfill initial requirements for a JTF HQ, but its span of command and control over a large joint force would be limited. There are currently 4 Navy Fleet headquarters available to serve as joint task forces: 2nd Fleet in USACOM, 3rd and 7th Fleets in USPACOM, and 6th Fleet in USEUCOM.

The advantages to using a Navy Fleet HQ as a joint task force HQ include responsiveness, routine forward presence through rotational deployments, and the proximity of Naval forces to virtually any crisis. Nevertheless, despite its new posturing to be "Forward from the Sea" and its newfound abilities to conduct littoral as well as blue water operations, Lcdr. (retired) Terry McKearney, in "Rethinking the Joint Task Force", explains that:

The Navy’s skepticism regarding joint operations remains. ... we seem to be alone among the other services in pointing out the problems.

Navy complaints regarding joint operations generally have centered on the inherent difficulties in supporting these operations from a forward-deployed posture where resources are lean. The primary concerns are logistics, communications and a cumbersome chain of command that ties the hands of on-scene commanders.
He further highlights problems in ship to shore communications, use of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) between services, helicopter fuel, and message formats. The proximity to the "fight" and responsiveness of Naval Forces and Fleet Headquarters makes them well-suited to form at least an initial JTF during a crisis. Nevertheless, the Navy has room for improvement in doctrine and organization that could enhance its ability to perform such operations.

US Air Force

The most likely organization in the Air Force to serve as a JTF HQ is the Numbered Air Force. The Numbered Air Force, also under a three star commander, has the capability to stand up a full Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) and has the adequate communications and liaison officer capabilities. For a limited show of force mission, the Air Force maintains three composite wings that could project force quickly under a one star commander to serve as a limited JTF. Air Force power projection capabilities are similar to the Army. Using modular organization the Air Force can tailor a package quickly to meet a particular requirement. There are currently 9 Numbered Air forces that could serve as joint task force HQs: 3rd AF (RAF Mildenhall, UK-EUCOM), 5th AF (Yokota, Japan- PACOM), 7th AF (Osan, ROK-PACOM), 9th AF (Shaw AFB South Carolina-CENTCOM), 11th AF (Elmendorf, Alaska-PACOM), 12th AF (Davis Monthan, AZ-SOUTHCOM), 13th AF (Anderson AFB, Guam-PACOM), 16th AF (Aviano, Italy-EUCOM), 17th AF (Sembach, Germany-EUCOM).

The Air Force is well-suited to provide a JTF HQ for most postulated scenarios across all theaters. JTF HQ operations do not
appear to be a capability, however, that the Air Force aggressively seeks or promotes in the joint arena. Little discussion or debate appears in joint or Air Force publications on the Air Force role in the JTF HQ. Of all the services, the Air Force devotes the least attention towards posturing to support JTF operations, but its historical record in responding to requirements (such as PROVIDE COMFORT) is as solid as any of the other services.

USMC

The most likely Marine organization to serve as a JTF HQ is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). A MEF Forward (an Army Brigade size combat force with substantial combat multipliers such as organic aviation) may be the initial base for a JTF HQ, but a full MEF (Army Corps-size HQ equivalent) would normally serve as the JTF. The MEF, commanded by a three star, has the full complement of personnel and communications to function as an effective JTF HQ. There are currently 3 MEFs in the Marine Corps that are candidate JTF HQs: I MEF (San Diego) and III MEF (Okinawa) under USPACOM, and II MEF (Norfolk) under USACOM.

There is a line of thought in the USMC that As a closely integrated and highly trained combined arms team, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can be the 'embryo' from which a joint task force (JTF) can grow. By designating a MAGTF as a JTF, a unified commander can effectively and expeditiously initiate joint operations in crisis response or transition from seapower to landpower in a major regional conflict. As a MAGTF can range anywhere from a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to full-blown Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), this argument appears to
be reasonable. Nevertheless, much like fact that the Army Division is only suitable as a JTF for limited scenarios, the same applies for the MEU and the MEF (FWD). They can provide initial forces and an austere command and control headquarters (capable of controlling joint forces) quickly, but their capabilities are limited.

The Marines definitely see a role for themselves in future Joint Task Forces, and most view the MEF as a strong candidate to serve as the base for the JTF HQ nucleus. The USMC does seem to recognize that their own posture to support the JTF may not be at the requisite level. Despite their outstanding performance in complex operations in the past (such as Operation RESTORE HOPE), there is room for improvement, as Maj. John Ballard highlights:

Marines have served in 21 of the 32 joint task force operations of the past 15 years. Of those 21, Marines commanded in 6. As the other services shrink and the Corps retains most of its end strength, Marine participation and leadership in the JTF realm most likely will increase. The most important focus of this effort is the JTF staff, which, for the Marine Corps, most often be formed from Marine expeditionary force command elements, and they are not particularly well organized to function as JTF staffs. The Corps must improve its responsiveness in the formation and employment of JTF staffs, for they are clearly the future response of choice for our regional contingency-based armed forces.22

For many of the same reasons that the MEF is not able to command and control multiple divisions in sustained land operations with the same effectiveness as an Army Corps, it is relatively austere and may be limited in some ways in the JTF role:

No MEF is permanently staffed at a manning level adequate to exercise true corps-level responsibilities...The MEF currently cannot offer its commander the full range of command-and-control assets—from voice to digital communication—required to orchestrate a multi-dimensional, extended joint or combined operation.23
Nevertheless, the Marine Corps offers forward deployed, responsive, well-organized and highly trained forces and headquarters that can provide a range of JTF capabilities. Their proximity to potential conflict areas across all theaters in conjunction with forward deployed Naval Forces makes them a tremendously responsive capability that will continue to serve the Nation well.

US Army

Based on projected CINC requirements described earlier, it is clear that both the Corps and Division Headquarters are candidates to serve as JTF HQs. There is fairly widespread agreement that the optimal level of Army organization to serve as a JTF HQ is the Corps HQ. The Corps is the highest level of tactical warfighting organization within the Army, and is also capable of functioning at the operational level of war. The austerity of the Division HQ, particularly in terms of available personnel, communication, and intelligence assets makes it somewhat ill-suited to serve as a JTF in other than limited operations.

Maj. Blair Ross, in The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations, points out that, to be effective, a headquarters must be able to address four key functional requirements in the planning process, even on shortest notice:

- integrate complete intel picture and disseminate it to all operational components. . .
- capability to identify and address communications interoperability issues. . .
- ability to coordinate the wide range of air assets available to support contingency operations. . .
- fully integrate the actions of all ground forces in the area. 24
These functional requirements are key to not only the planning but also the execution of contingency operations.

A Corps HQ is currently resourced such that it has adequate personnel to include LNOs, communications, and equipment to meet basic JTF HQ requirements. Operations JUST CAUSE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY support that conclusion. However, very much like the arguments against the posture of the MEF to function as a JTF the same line of thought has been applied to the Corps HQ. Maj. John Sterling argues in The Corps Staff in the JTF Role that

First, the Corps headquarters can function well as a JTF for a well-rehearsed operation involving small numbers of mostly single service forces. . . second observation is that where little advance notice and preplanning are available, and where significant forces from other services are involved, the potential for serious joint coordination and integration problems is very high. 25

The argument is complicated by the fact that, due to a variety of factors, such as apportionment to the CINCs under the JSCP for deliberate planning, not all Corps HQ have the same level of manning, equipment, resourcing, training, and experience. Due to its unique requirements for contingency operations XVIII Airborne Corps is the best postured to meet JTF requirements, and also has the most experience in that regard. I Corps has habitually practiced JTF operations under USPACOM's two-tiered command and control system, but has no operational experience. III Corps is just now being trained and utilized by USACOM as a JTF HQ; this year's joint exercise Unified Endeavor at Ft. Hood, Texas will showcase that capability. V Corps is being integrated into the NATO CJTF concept, but has not been used by USEUCOM in the past as a JTF. A fair assessment is that XVIII Airborne Corps is fully capable of
serving as a contingency JTF, with the others Corps HQ in relatively solid positions to perform that requisite function.

Division Headquarters require significant augmentation in terms of personnel (particularly to serve as liaison officers), communications, and equipment in order to function as a joint task force HQs. 10th Mountain Division (LI) requirements for augmentation of personnel, equipment and training assets to execute their JTF HQ missions in Operations RESTORE HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were quite extensive.

Fiscal realities dictate that is not feasible to resource all Division HQ’s to meet future JTF HQ requirements. Possible options are as follows:

1) Resource the most likely candidate Division HQ (ie 10th MTN DIV (LI), 25th ID (L)) with the robust capability to meet contingency JTF HQ requirements.

2) Resource all Division HQ with the minimum of additional resources required to effectively function as a JTF HQ.

3) Keep the present Division organization and devote resources and attention to JTF HQ augmentation requirements.

Another organizational issue is the role of the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) within theater. The fact that the ASCC (e.g., USARPAC, USAREUR, ARCENT, ARLANT, and USARSO) has replaced the Theater Army has not yet been widely accepted or acknowledged throughout the Army. The ASCC plays a critical Title 10 role in the interface between the CINC, the Service departments, and deployed joint task forces. The ASCC, while primarily a administrative and logistic headquarters, may have personnel augmenting the JTF as part of an organization such as the PACOM DJTFAC. Once the JTF is deployed the
ASCC becomes the critical link in ensuring that the JTF is properly supported from a service perspective.

There is also discussion at all levels of the Army whether it is appropriate to use the ASCC as a HQ for a joint task force. While USEUCOM builds its JTF HQs from the nucleus of the service component, USAREUR has never been fully employed as a JTF HQ. There is an ongoing initiative by the Army to stand-up the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Livorgno, Italy as a standing JTF for OOTW, although SETAF is a NATO subordinate command vice an ASCC. ASCCs are currently resourced as Title 10 headquarters are not equipped in any sense to serve as deployable JTF HQs. Options currently exist to resource the ASCC as a JTF HQ, but it is not evident that a valid requirement from the Unified Commanders currently exists.

Training Analysis

Collective

As discussed in Chapter 3, USACOM as the joint force integrator, provider, and trainer has the primary proponentcy for the training of JTF HQs as well as that of most joint forces located within CONUS. As Adm. Miller explains, USACOM is active in

Ensuring the readiness of JTF commanders and staffs to plan and execute contingency operations. Each geographic CINC is developing a JTF Training concept, but individual theater approaches are not yet grounded in a common set of JTF staff tasks, conditions, and proficiency standards. Once the universal joint task list is finalized, LANTCOM [now USACOM] will be able to deployable JTF and component commanders in joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to the supported CINCs requirements from a menu of common standards that are applicable worldwide.
As also noted earlier, USACOM has published an October 1994 draft JTF HQ Mission Training Plan as a partial basis for JTF training. USACOM's joint training concept consists of three tiers, and

Tier three training is aimed exclusively at commanders and staffs. It will be conducted in a computer-driven, simulated wargame environment. We hope to create the conditions that will allow us to link field training exercises with simulations. We also hope to train joint staffs less expensively, more responsively and more accurately to meet the requirements of a particular CINC. The ultimate goal is to train the XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, 2nd Marine Expeditionary force and 2d Fleet as a joint task force headquarters. Training will consist of an academic phase [training seminar] to teach joint issues, a joint planning phase [CJTF OPLAN development exercise] and an execution phase [CAX/CPX involving CINC, CJTF, and components].

Existing evidence to date indicates that USACOM has been successful in its new role in training JTF headquarters. They have pursued an aggressive exercise schedule which has paid dividends already:

Exercise AGILE PROVIDER 94 was a CJCS approved, USACOM sponsored, CJTF 140 executed, joint FTX designed to train joint staff headquarters and forces in planning and conducting joint combat operations, to exercise joint relationships, and to improve joint operating procedures-doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures...AGILE PROVIDER exercise objectives included joint command and control, joint forcible entry. . .CJTF transition, humanitarian relief operations planning, and JTF standup and operating procedures.

During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, when USACOM had made a determination that the 10th Mountain Division (LI) would serve as a JTF HQ:

The unit contacted the J-7, USACOM for assistance. Several personnel from the J-7 directorate deployed to FT Drum and conducted a workshop on the requirements and roles of a JTF headquarters. The workshop was based on the initial training plan for a JTF headquarters developed by J7, USACOM. Applying the relevant factors of METT-T, the division staff used the MTP to develop a draft TO&E for the JTF-190 headquarters.

Nevertheless, the Army stood up BCTP OPSGRP-D in April 1994 to provide rigorous training for JTF HQ elements. Their charter from the
CSA and the TRADOC Commander is to train corps and division staffs to serve as JTF HQ and/or ARFOR HQ, as required. At first glance it seems that there is a duplication of effort between BCTP and USACOM, but that is not the case. Their missions are parallel and complementary. USACOM, in its role as the joint force provider, is primarily concerned with training potential JTF HQ in CONUS so that they are prepared for force projection operations in support of theater CINC requirements. The Army’s BCTP focus is more towards training of overseas HQ, and in the end will probably focus their training on Army HQ assigned to the geographic CINCs (USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM.)

The newly established Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) at Norfolk, VA is also involved in the training of JTF HQ. "The JWFC three areas of responsibility are to help unified CINC’s prepare for joint exercises, support joint training and develop, assess, and revise joint doctrine." Indications are that this is only a transitional role for the JWFC and that they will eventually concentrate more specifically on joint doctrine and training simulations, vice JTF training.

As USACOM becomes more involved and adept at joint training, the relationship may change, but for the time being it appears that the Army has taken the initiative in training the JTF staff. BCTP OPSGRP-D has trained all deployed Army JTF staffs since its inception. It has a particularly vital role in training a Division HQ, as that size element has the least experience as a JTF, particularly at the operational level of war. Indications are that eventually USACOM and BCTP will become more similar in their approach to training:

Retired four-star officers with joint command experience will act as mentors to the participants. The USACOM J-7 staff
will eventually have two teams that do what BCTP teams at FT Leavenworth have been doing for Army divisions and corps. In two or three years, those teams will put each of the six designated JTFs through a three-phase JBCTP drill once every two years.\textsuperscript{35} BCTP has been invaluable to this point in training JTF staffs, and as USACOM comes on line with a complete training package the two training teams will indeed fill two mutually complementary roles.

Other Service Collective Training

The Navy has no separate training program for the JTF HQ or JTF operations. The Battle Group would normally train-up for any potential JTF requirements prior to its scheduled rotational deployment.\textsuperscript{36} The Air Force also does not maintain a separate JTF training program, but relies on the joint education programs for its officer corps to gain the requisite level of expertise.\textsuperscript{37} The Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Mobile Training Team (MTT) visits each MEF HQ yearly and provides 5 days of intensive training, to include on execution of JTF HQ operations.\textsuperscript{38}

Individual Training

The Army also has an acute interest in the training of its leaders to fulfill JTF HQ staff officer responsibilities. The likelihood that a given officer will serve in a joint assignment continues to increase, and, as we have seen, the likelihood of future JTF operations across the spectrum of conflict is extremely high. As such, the Army must continue to devote particular attention to Joint Professional Military education within its formal school system. Joint task force issues are currently covered in depth at both the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, with the intent of at least familiarizing officers
with the intricacies of such operations. Continued emphasis is necessary in the curriculum to complement the efforts of the Armed Force Staff College and other joint training venues.

**The Roles and Missions Question**

The Congressionally chartered Department of Defense Roles and Missions Commission for 1994-95 has not yet reported out on its findings. While the role of the joint task force was not a specific issue area, other areas such as the Unified Command Plan and overseas presence could have an impact on JTFs.

As the post Goldwater-Nichols joint community continues its struggle towards further joint integration (or "jointness"), there has been a recent call for more single-service operations to meet joint warfighting requirements. As Stephen Canby argues in "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences,"

It is another thing, however, to view units nominally similar and functionally interoperable, such as wings and divisions, as composed of interchangeable components and to divide and group their disparate parts in task forces and expect them to function as intricately as single service units (especially if single-service units suitable for a mission already exist). For large and medium-size contingencies, there is a need for an overarching joint command framework (that is CINCs and joint commands) to fit in and coordinate service contributions; but there is little need for component packaging. For small contingencies, especially those of a coup de main nature, jointness itself may not be operationally desirable and should be held to a minimum.

Certainly the record of successful joint task force operations since 1989 (JUST CAUSE) speaks for itself. The crux of the argument is not that the JTF is irrelevant for joint operations, but that all joint contingency operations due not necessarily need to involve all four services. Lcdr. (retired) McKearney outlines a very cogent argument for
limiting JTFs and the need for some single service operations in his Proceedings article on "Rethinking the Joint Task Force":

1. The current joint task force organization [each service represented in a JTF] doesn't make tactical sense.
2. Equal or token representation of forces in every joint operation is not appropriate.
3. Jointness will not solve service-unique problems.
4. We [the services] don't speak the same language!
5. Who's in charge?...mix and match approach to joint command...
6. Is everyone bringing something to the joint fight? Not all of our armed forces have a role in every military operation.
7. Is everyone reporting to the right boss?
8. Are all the bosses in the right place? [colocation]
9. Is a joint task force really necessary? [to accomplish the given mission]?^40

It is a complex issue that will not be easily resolved until the joint community becomes completely comfortable in the delineation between, and complementarity of, joint and single service operations to meet future CINC warfighting requirements.
Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

General Observations

The Army is properly postured, relative to the other services, to meet potential CINC requirements for joint task force headquarters. The importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated, for as discussed earlier, "After a gestation period of nearly a decade, a fundamental shift in military thinking has finally taken hold; in the post cold war world, the JTF has become the hallmark of US military operations."\(^1\)

The likelihood that the Army will routinely be required to provide forces and headquarters to form a joint task force in support of Unified Commanders, particularly for Operations Other Than War (OOTW), is extremely high. While many authors recommend the creation of a standing Joint Task Force HQ\(^2\), that is not a realistic possibility in today's environment of severely constrained resources. As the majority of past JTF operations have involved three or more services, there is a strong probability that Army forces will be required in any JTF. The greater the participation of Army forces increases the likelihood that an Army headquarters will be selected by the CINC and or the NCA to stand-up a JTF HQ.

While the Air Force, Navy, and US Marine Corps are fully capable of supporting JTF HQ requirements involving their particular service, we have seen that in several key areas such as doctrine, organization, and
training the Army has taken more initiative to ensure the success of JTF HQ in an uncertain security environment. As more joint doctrine becomes available on the JTF, and USACOM further defines its role as a JTF trainer, it is likely that the other service will further refine their efforts to provide Title 10 support to properly tailored JTFs.

There are limited circumstances where it may be appropriate for Unified Commanders to apply single-service forces and headquarters to accomplish military objectives. Operations of a severely limited nature and duration may dictate that only one service is involved. A single service operation negates the need for joint integration and synchronization, and simplifies efforts at unity of command. On the negative side it lacks the synergy of a truly integrated joint operation. While there may be a future trend away from strictly joint operations, the Army must remain fully postured to support JTF operations.

There are many areas and aspects in which the Army is well postured to support future CINC JTF requirements. We have come a long way since 1990, when Lt. Col. (retired) John Cushman wrote that

The joint task force (JTF) is a transient. Even when it is occasionally brought together, the JTF commander is insulated from his forces by service-component walls. The influence of battle leadership is at best fleeting, the commanders operational style appears unimportant, and C2 is seen primarily as a technical matter.3

Successful JTF operations in JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT, RESTORE HOPE, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY indicate that joint operations are slowly breaking down these "component walls". Nevertheless, there are also some areas in which the Army remains notably deficient. Two key factors
that will determine the Army's ability to better support JTFs are resourcing and readiness.

In an era of severely constrained fiscal resources within the Department of Defense, the Army must carefully prioritize its efforts to better support the JTF. Similarly, restricted budgetary realities have resulted in tiered readiness. Not all Army forces and headquarters can be maintained at the highest states of readiness. The Army must carefully identify candidate JTF HQs and resource them appropriately.

All of the services are currently constrained by the lack of joint doctrine at the operational level that provides sufficient guidance to the JTF Commander and his staff. Once such doctrine is promulgated, individual services can draft implementing doctrine that is sufficiently detailed to provide the information required to properly execute JTF operations.

**Specific Conclusions**

1. The Army is properly postured to support future JTF operations in the following respects:

   a) If a Corps HQ is selected as a JTF HQ, its organization, staffing, and training will allow it to function effectively at the operational and tactical levels of war in accordance with current joint doctrinal requirements. Augmentation is still required.

   b) If a Division-level HQ is required to act as a JTF HQ, under normal circumstances significant staff and communications augmentation are required. Nevertheless, with additional preparation and training the HQ can adequately meet JTF HQ mission requirements, albeit more easily at the tactical than at the operational level.
Operations RESTORE HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY support this conclusion. Nevertheless, the Division HQ should only be employed as a JTF HQ under very limited circumstances: primarily in an Operations Other Than War scenario, when the Army provides the preponderance of assigned forces, and only in missions of extremely limited scope and duration.\textsuperscript{4}

c) The Army has had enough past experience in providing HQ augmentees for the JTF HQ (all four operations considered) and has a reputation for sending the first team from FORSCOM, Combined Arms Center, etc. While there is no "system" per se, all requirements are met with the appropriate expertise.

d) Joint Professional Military Education at the Command and General Staff College, US Army War College, and other venues provides officers the requisite exposure to JTF operations to adequately serve on short notice in the capacity of a JTF HQ staff officer. Continued curriculum emphasis at Intermediate and Senior Level Service Schools is required.

e) The Army has unparalleled expertise and capability relative to the other services to perform civil affairs operations. The Army's ability to deploy, staff, and employ a functional Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) that can integrate a wide spectrum of functional civil affairs requirements is superb. Cooperation with NGOs/PVO's and external agencies is greatly enhanced by such an arrangement.\textsuperscript{5}

f) The Army's doctrinal shift over the past five years towards the routine consideration of OOTW operations has allowed it to better support the full range of JTF mission requirements.
g) Acquisition of more joint communications compatible communications systems such as the Joint Tactical Information Data System (JTIDS), Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) will provide enhanced joint interoperability with other service forces as part of a joint task force. The Army needs to remain committed to fielding systems at the tactical and operational levels that will enhance joint connectivity and interoperability.

h) The Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) OPSGRP-D is without parallel among the other services. Their ability to provide rigorous training and preparation for potential JTF HQ staffs gives the Army a tremendous advantage in maintaining trained and ready units that can meet potential JTF mission requirements. When and if USACOM comes on line with the same capability there should be a clear delineation between CONUS and overseas training requirements between the two organizations.

2. The following deficiencies exist in the Army's ability to support CINC requirements for JTF HQs:

a) The role of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) is not well defined in theater operations. The ASCC is not a warfighting headquarters, and should be the administrative and logistical interface (Title 10) with the CINC for the support of JTF operations. In the case of the USPACOM DTJFAC, for instance, there are representatives from USARPAC on the DJTFAC that "plug in" to the designated JTF HQ. This not only allows for connectivity but facilitates proper support to the JTF
as well. The Army needs to ensure that all five ASCC's are tailored to support the joint task force, as required.

b) There are still some "gaps" in Army doctrine in the consideration of the joint task force. All Division, Corps, and Echelon Above Corps (EAC) doctrinal manuals should have a more deliberate emphasis on JTF operations, as it is very likely that the Army will be habitually involved in such operations on a regular basis for some time to come. The need exists for a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (TTP) if not a doctrinal manual exclusively devoted to JTF operations. However, the Army cannot draft such doctrine and TTPs until further joint doctrine is written.

c) There are habitual requirements for augmentation to JTF HQ staffs at all levels of organization. The Army has no formal system for the identification, training, and provision of such augmentees. The current system is strictly on an ad hoc basis. There is a formal system to provide 24-man LNO teams to the JTF HQ, but this is strictly for interoperability with combined headquarters. The creation of the so-called Power PAC 3 Communications elements by 1996-7 is also designed for combined interoperability.

d) The Army has taken upon itself to improve its ability to support CMOC requirements planning for designated vans and personnel to support such future taskings. Given such initiatives, there is no reason, even in a fiscally constrained environment, why the Army cannot create a small JTF HQ support element similar to the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) at MacDill AFB. The unit should have the capability to "plug" into any size JTF HQ with the requisite
communications architecture, and selected low-density personnel identified as critical to short notice JTF HQ support. The unit’s mission would be to provide C2 interface from the JTF to the Army Echelon Above Corps (EAC) HQ (such as the ASCC).

e) As augmentation to JTF HQ staffs seems to be a recurring requirement, and currently there is no alternative to it (i.e., a permanent standing JTF HQ or more ‘spaces and faces’ to fill existing HQ), then the Army needs to be more organized in its approach to JTF HQ augmentation. An analysis of past JTF HQ requirements should provide some degree of focus as to future requirements. Nevertheless, as the UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report emphasizes, the identification of accurate requirements will never be possible in advance:

The key component in developing the TO&E is to apply the specific requirements of the JTF mission to the process. A recurring concern from the JTF 190 staff was the criticality of conducting a thorough mission analysis to support the TO&E development. The better the analysis of what must be done, the greater the specificity in identifying the correct grade and skill needed to man the headquarters.

f) The Army still does an inconsistent job in the parallel planning process with the CINCs during deliberate and crisis action planning. The Army, through the Army Service Component Commanders and the CSA, should work closely with the CINCs/JCS/NCA to tailor JTF HQs and forces to meet future mission requirements. This interface is particularly critical during crisis action planning (CAP), and if done effectively may preclude such problems as a Division HQ hastily being established as a JTF HQ (example: RESTORE HOPE under UNOSOM II).
g) Operational and training requirements for potential JTF HQs (i.e., Corps HQ) are excessive. III Corps at Ft. Hood had thirty OPLAN requirements for the G-3 Plans to draft in one year, divided among BCTPs and associated train-ups, NTC rotations, CPXs, contingency operations, and USACOM Joint Training Requirements. Such excessive requirements significantly degrade the ability of the Corps HQ to maintain an active readiness to meet future mission requirements.

h) Designation of an ARFOR HQ is a recurring problem in JTF operations. FM 100-15-1 (Corps, Tactics Techniques, and Procedures) explains the options when the Corps commander is COMJTF and is also tasked with the command and control of all Army forces in theater:

- Remain dual-hatted (JTF HQ and ARFOR HQ) (not recommended).
- Remain dual-hatted but split the corps staff into a JTF HQ staff (with other service augmentation and JTF augmentation package) and ARFOR HQ staff.
- Designate the corps deputy commanding general or Chief of Staff as Deputy Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR) and split the corps staff.
- Designate one of his subordinate division commanders as COMARFOR and augment the division with corps staff plugs to help him perform both ARFOR and divisional duties.

As seen is both Operations RESTORE HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the ARFOR HQ issue deserves early planning consideration. It is even more problematic when the designated JTF HQ is a Division HQ; the level of manning simply does not support the Division functioning as both the JTF and ARFOR HQ, and it is not a feasible alternative to delegate the ARFOR responsibilities to an even more austere subordinate Brigade headquarters.

i) The Army needs to join the other services in pushing for quick fielding an integration of the Global Command and Control
System\textsuperscript{14} and other initiatives under the umbrella of C4I for the
Warrior. As Army Ltc. Garretson explains:

Service, agency and CINC 'ownership' cultures fostered an
environment that created 'stovepipe' C4I systems that imposed seams
and barriers to effective information flows. This situation is
expensive, overwhelms the CJTF with information (multiple displays
from each service component) and forces him to be an information
integrator and disseminator.\textsuperscript{15}
Chapter 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the Army, relative to the other services, is properly postured to support CINC requirements for future joint task force headquarters, there are some final steps the Army can take to enhance its support for future JTF HQ operations. The following recommendations are tailored to fall under the purview of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army to "organize, train, equip, supply, maintain, provide. . ." Army forces under Title 10 of the US Code:

1. The Army should take the lead with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, and the other services in promulgating joint doctrine that is specifically tailored for the joint task force Commander and his staff.¹ The focus of such doctrine should be at the operational level of war (similar to Armed Forces Staff College Pub 2) and at a minimum it should provide guidance on all of the Operational Operating Systems (OOS). This doctrine should be exactly aligned with the USACOM/JCS JTF HQ Mission Training Plan and complement pertinent Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (such as the JWFC draft on Peace Operations). Once this doctrine is published the services can proceed with the development of their own implementing doctrine on the JTF and JTF HQ.

2. The Army needs to further define the role of the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) in relation to the joint task force
Headquarters. Under most circumstances the Army’s Four Corps HQ are adequate to provide a warfighting HQ at the tactical/operational level that is trained and ready to serve as a JTF HQ. Under limited circumstances any of the Division HQ could fulfill similar roles. However, tailoring ASCCs to serve as a JTF HQ provides the Army more flexibility in supporting CINC JTF requirements. A timely decision should be made on this question, as the five candidate ASCCs are currently not resourced or trained to serve as a JTF HQ. If the Army chooses to resource the ASCCs as potential JTF HQ, then consideration should be given to standing up 5 "deployable joint task force contingency command post cells” augmented with appropriate communications units along the lines of the Power Pac III Concept. An ongoing CSA initiative is the use of the Southern European Task Force, a NATO subordinate command, as a "standing JTF" for OOTW missions in the EUCOM AOR. This initiative may have an impact on the role of ASCCs as a JTF HQ, as well as other CJTF efforts and merits further development and study.

3. The Army needs to further resolve the differentiation of responsibility among major headquarters with operational and title 10 functions within theater. Within each Unified Command the Army is a participant in two parallel chains of command: warfighting and administrative. The CINC has "absolute" COCOM authority over assigned Army forces in the warfighting chain of command. The administrative, or Title 10 chain of command is where the Army (and the other services) are key players. It is within the Title 10 arena that the Army needs to better define the role of the ASCC, the ARFOR, and other appropriate HQ
that support potential JTF requirements. One of the determining criteria in the formation of a JTF HQ is that centralized logistic support is not required. Such support is therefore a Title 10 service responsibility. The ASCCs have a vital mission in the support of the joint task force and the CINC. Better clarifying the ASCCs role as the Army continues to relook its conduct of theater operations is the post Cold War era is essential. 4 While the Department of the Army is no longer a key player in the Unified Commander's execution of campaigns and contingency requirements from a warfighting perspective, with the advent of Goldwater-Nichols, it maintains a legal responsibility to "provide" the CINCs properly trained, maintained, and equipped forces and headquarters. Regardless of the resolution of the question of resourcing ASCCs as potential JTF HQs, Army Service Component Commanders need to take an active role in the decision to form a JTF HQ. As the CINCs senior advisor on the employment of Army forces in a given theater, the Army Service Component Commander must provide timely and well-considered advice to the CINC on the need for Army forces and headquarters in potential JTF and JTF HQ operations. Particularly in this era of constrained resources and "readiness at the razors edge", parallel planning needs to take place simultaneously between the CSA and the ARSTAF and the Chairman and the Joint Staff in working with the NCA on the decision to stand up a JTF. There should be a continuous coordination/information flow among the CINC, the ASCC, the CSA, the CJCS, the NCA, and their respective staffs to ensure that the proper JTF HQ/force package is selected.
4. The Army has formalized the LNO Augmentation Team concept to support CINC JTF requirements on an as needed basis. Nevertheless, the augmentees are still identified and selected on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, these LNO augmentees are designed to fulfill requirements with multinational forces and headquarters. The Army needs to determine the best possible method for choosing such augmentees from a pool of trained officers and NCO's (i.e., with joint education and experience). A reasonable solution is to form a pool of Reserve, National Guard, and/or AGR officers that have volunteered to serve as JTF HQ augmentees when required. A Marine author has suggested "...form[ing] a cadre of reserve joint specialists. Once trained and designated, these officers will serve as augmentees to other service JTF staffs." These volunteers would be slotted against identified positions for at least corps if not division HQs to meet expected JTF requirements. This should preclude undesirable situations where augmentees are routinely selected at the last minute, such as in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY:

These augmente requirements were met by tasking non-divisional units stationed at FT Drum and by getting assistance from Corps and USACOM who in turn tasked subordinate units for the required skill and grade personnel to complete the Manning of the JTF-190 staff.

5. The Army needs to work more aggressively to focus the training requirements of candidate JTF HQs. Thirty OPLAN requirements for III CORPS HQ in one year is excessive and detracts from its readiness to "go to War" as a potential JTF HQ. Further integration of Army corps HQ into USACOM Phase III CPXs might necessitate reduction of currently planned BCTP "warfighter" requirements.
6. Individual training of Army officers to serve as joint staff officers that are capable of effectively serving on a joint task force staff needs to be further developed and refined. Two particular areas where the Army could devote more emphasis is on understanding CINC command and control arrangements and on better understanding the process of campaign planning. Such emphasis needs to occur at the Command and General Staff College and at the Army War College. As Ltc. Grant explains in Joint Task Force Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall:

In the future, the creation of qualified leaders capable of filling key staff positions in both service and joint organizations may resolve most difficulties forming contingency JTFs...

An approach is to educate and train officers and noncommissioned officers in the attributes and competencies required to serve on joint staff at all service levels where a joint staff could be formed (as in JPME PH II).

7. Army civil affairs (CA) units bring unique and important capabilities to the joint task force which the other services do not provide. The Army should further develop and refine civil affairs training and employment with emphasis on the use of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). CA and CMOC capabilities ensure Army relevance and participation in virtually all JTF operations within the realm of OOTW, as well as conventional conflict scenarios.

8. Careful designation of a correctly tailored ARFOR is critical to the success of any joint task force involving Army headquarters and forces. As the UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Center for Army Lessons Learned Report highlights:

If an Army headquarters is the core element of a JTF, a key issue is the decision to form an ARFOR headquarters. Mission analysis is the key to getting this decision correct. If the joint force is overwhelmingly composed of the organic core Army unit with limited joint assets as part of the force, consideration should be
given to rolling the ARFOR into the joint staff. In this situation, it is easier to have one staff do both functions than to split the staff in two and form an ad hoc headquarters to perform tasks that are not part of the ad hoc staff's normal METL.¹⁰

9. The Army needs to better explain its capabilities to provide forces and headquarters for joint task forces in the joint arena. Corps HQ are extremely capable of providing command and control for joint operations, and Division HQ with augmentation have performed capably with additional training and augmentation under limited circumstances. The Battle Command Training Program Operations Group Delta (BCTP OPSGRP-D) training concept is unique among the services and is a model from which USACOM has drawn upon to shape their JTF HQ training and evaluation program. Finally, the Army is the only service with the ability to provide civil affairs assets to augment a joint operation (NOTE: the Marines have limited capabilities in the Reserve Components). The Army should actively seek opportunities in joint publications, seminars, and training exercises to more actively promote its substantial capabilities for JTF HQ operations.

10. Under some limited circumstances, Army forces under control of a Corps or Division HQ could execute a single service (Army only) operation. In today's era of severely constrained resources, such an operation may have some utility. The Army leadership should take the position in the joint arena that under some circumstances a desirable course of action is to pursue a single service operation under a single service HQ, if appropriate. Nevertheless, the fact remains that as a Power Projection Army we will always to some extent remain dependent on our sister services to "get to the fight".

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### TABLE 1
SELECTED JOINT TASK FORCES 1960 TO 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Supported CINC</th>
<th>CJTF</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CROSSROADS (JTF-1)</td>
<td>Bikini Island</td>
<td>Nuclear Test</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint US Relief Force (Task Group 84.7)</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-1</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>May 1960</td>
<td>CARIB</td>
<td>Chief, MAAG Chile</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Nov 1961</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CDR, 2nd FLT</td>
<td>AR,MC,NAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-116</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Show of Force</td>
<td>May 1962</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>DCDR USARPAC</td>
<td>AR,MC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-LEO</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>STRICOM</td>
<td>USMC O-6</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Pack JTF-122</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>April 1966</td>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bold Face</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Oct 1966</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA = Not Applicable  
N/A = Not Available


Note: Findings Represent Quick Reaction Analysis and are not Final Data.
TABLE 2
SELECTED JOINT TASK FORCES 1983 TO 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Supported CINC</th>
<th>CJTF</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Fury</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>NEO/Invasion</td>
<td>Oct-83</td>
<td>LANT</td>
<td>CDR 2 FLT</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>FID/Mil Assist</td>
<td>Feb-84</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>CG 22nd MAU</td>
<td>AR,MC,NAV</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Will</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Ship Escort</td>
<td>Aug-87</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>COMCARGRU 5</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Yellowstone</td>
<td>US (Park)</td>
<td>Firefighting</td>
<td>Sep-88</td>
<td>DOD/DA</td>
<td>ADC 9 ID USA</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pheasant</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Border Security</td>
<td>Mar-88</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>CG XVIII ABC</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-AOS</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Oil Cleanup</td>
<td>Apr-89</td>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>CG AAC</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipine Coup</td>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>FID/NEO</td>
<td>Dec-89</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CDR, 13th AF</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Cause</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Oct-89</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>CG XVIII ABC</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Edge</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>May 90</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>CDR 6 FLT</td>
<td>MC,NAV</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Force</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Offensive Air Ops</td>
<td>Jan 91</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>USAFE G-3</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Human Assist</td>
<td>Apr 91</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>DCINC EUCOM</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Angel</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>May-91</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CG III MEF</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiery Vigil</td>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>Disaster/NEO</td>
<td>Jun 91</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CG 13 AF</td>
<td>AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Lift</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Sep 91</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>CG 322 ALD</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Supported CINC</td>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF GTMO</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Human Assist</td>
<td>Oct 91</td>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>CG 2d FSSG</td>
<td>AR,MC,NAV</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Human Assist</td>
<td>Aug 92</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>CENTCOM J-5</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF LA</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Civil Assist</td>
<td>May 92</td>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>CG 7th ID</td>
<td>AR,MC</td>
<td>13,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Transition</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Human Assist</td>
<td>Aug 92</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>37th ALS G-3</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Sep 92</td>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>CG 2 CONUSA</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NA</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Marianas</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Sep 92</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>COMNAV MARIANAS</td>
<td>AF,MC,NAV</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Hawaii</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Sep 92</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CG USARPAC</td>
<td>AR,MC,NAV</td>
<td>5000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restore Hope</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Relief, FID</td>
<td>Dec 92</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>CG I MEF</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NA</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Promise</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Medical Relief</td>
<td>Jan 93</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>CINCUSNAVEUR</td>
<td>AR,AF,MC,NA</td>
<td>17,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Refuge</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Human Assist</td>
<td>Feb 93</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CG 25 ID</td>
<td>AR,AF</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3
OTHER JOINT TASK FORCE OR JTF-LIKE OPERATIONS 1983 TO 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Supported CINC</th>
<th>CJTF</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpine Bandit</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Jan-88</td>
<td>LANT</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplar Tree</td>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td>Nov-89</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot Defender</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Jan 91</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AR, AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Squared</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Oct-91</td>
<td>LANT</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Feb 92</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AR, AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Watch</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>No-Fly Zone Enforcement</td>
<td>Aug 92</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>AF, NAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Angel II</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Nov 92</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>CG III MEF</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Not Available

Figure 1. JTF Panama Command and Control, Spring 1988--Spring 1989

Figure 2. JUST CAUSE Theater Command and Control

Source: Units Subordinate to JTF South from Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned Volume I, (FT Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 1990), i-2.
Figure 3. PROVIDE COMFORT Theater Command and Control

Figure 4. RESTORE HOPE Theater Command and Control (UNITAF)

Source: Author
Figure 5. RESTORE HOPE Theater Command and Control (II)

Figure 6. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Command and Control

Figure 7: Research Methodology
Source: Author
Figure 8: Standing Up a Joint Task Force
Source: Author
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