JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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This study examines whether the Army can meet its joint promotion objectives, while at the same time meeting the joint specialty officer provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although the Army has shown some improvement over the past three years, it has yet to meet all of the legislative requirements. These requirements are stringent and in many cases difficult to understand even for those experienced in joint officer management. In an effort to comply with the intricate requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, the Army established joint officer management policies and procedures. This study examines how these policies and procedures impact on the Army's ability to meet these requirements. In particular, joint promotion objectives are forcing the Army to alter its current assignment policies. Joint officer management policies will exert increasing pressure on Army assignment policies and procedures in the future. This study focuses on the joint specialty designation requirements of the legislation. There are six key elements of joint officer management legislation, each of which impacts on the joint specialty officer. For this reason, the joint specialty designation provisions serve as the framework for the Army's joint officer management program.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT by MAJ Stephen J. McHugh, USA, 113 pages.

This study examines whether the Army can meet its joint promotion objectives, while at the same time meeting the joint specialty officer provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although the Army has shown some improvement over the past three years, it has yet to meet all of the legislative requirements. These requirements are stringent and in many cases difficult to understand even for those experienced in joint officer management.

In an effort to comply with the intricate requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, the Army established joint officer management policies and procedures. This study examines how these policies and procedures impact on the Army’s ability to meet these requirements. In particular, joint promotion objectives are forcing the Army to alter its current assignment policies. Joint officer management policies will exert increasing pressure on Army assignment policies and procedures in the future.

This study focuses on the joint specialty designation requirements of the legislation. There are six key elements of joint officer management legislation, each of which impacts on the joint specialty officer. For this reason, the joint specialty designation provisions serve as the framework for the Army’s joint officer management program.
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This thesis would not have been possible without the professionalism, patience, and encouragement of my committee. Their guidance and concern for the quality of my work enabled me to produce a product that will benefit the Army. Most importantly I would like to thank my loving wife Berkeley, without her constant support and encouragement this project would not have been possible.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR  Area of Responsibility
AFSC  Armed Forces Staff College
ARSTAFF  Army Staff
CINC  Commander in Chief
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COL  Colonel
COS  Critical Occupational Specialty
DoD  Department of Defense
G/FO  General/Flag Officer
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA  Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL  Joint Duty Assignment List
JDAMIS  Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System
JPME  Joint Professional Military Education
JSO  Joint Specialty Officer
LTC  Lieutenant Colonel
MOP  Memorandum of Policy
NCA  National Command Authority
NSA  National Security Council
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PJE  Program for Joint Professional Military Education
PME  Professional Military Education
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The joint officer management policies currently adopted by the Army are a product of the Army’s effort to comply with Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation. The sweeping changes brought about by this legislation were hailed by the Pentagon’s leadership as the most dramatic and far reaching since 1947. Many Defense analysts have gone so far as to credit the success of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf with the passage of this legislation. While all those familiar with the Act agree that the overall impact of the legislation has greatly enhanced U.S. forces' capabilities, there are elements dealing with joint officer management contained within the act which require additional study.

On 1 October 1986 President Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act into law. This was the beginning of a new period of change within the Department of Defense (DoD). It signified a bold move by the Congress to implement broad reforms throughout the military. The Goldwater-Nichols Act had the greatest single impact of any legislation on the DoD since its creation. The Act served as the culminating point in a series of more than twenty major studies aimed at reorganizing the DoD. In addition to restructuring the DoD, the act has been instrumental in reshaping the doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and how they would be employed in future conflicts to protect U.S. national interests. To understand the
impact of this act on the Army, it is first necessary to understand its origins and the events which led to its passage.

**Background (1947-1978)**

World War II demonstrated the need for a more efficient means for the President to control the Armed Forces of the United States. President Truman urged Congress to merge the War and Navy Departments into a single Department of National Defense. The resulting compromise became known as the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 was designed "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for the integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." The Act successfully created the DoD and divided it into three subordinate military departments: the Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the Navy (figure 1). The Secretary of Defense was appointed to head the Department. Combining military departments under one civilian secretary was the first of many steps responsible for shifting the authority away from the Services.

Another key element of the National Security Act of 1947 was the creation of a unified and specified command plan. Unified combatant commands were formed to maintain a military presence throughout the spectrum of potential conflict areas and to be ready for regional security challenges as well as threats of a global dimension. Thus the Act directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish unified commands in strategic areas where it was in the interest of national security. This resulted in the establishment of five regional commands which were
given geographic Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Additionally, four
commands were setup and given worldwide functional responsibilities.
The present structure depicting the organization of unified combatant
commands can be found in figure 2.

There are no longer any specified commands. The two specified
commands which had been formed were U.S. Forces Command and U.S.
Strategic Air Command. Both of these commands were subsequently changed
to unified commands; the last taking place in 1993 as U.S. Forces
Command was incorporated into U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM). Each of
these unified and specified commands would be headed by a combatant
commander called a Commander in Chief (CINC). The service chiefs' responsibilities for combat operations were limited to providing the
forces, equipment, and support necessary for the CINC's to accomplish their missions. 9

The National Security Council (NSC) was also created by the act
to consider national security issues requiring presidential approval.
When the council was first convened, service secretaries were charged
with providing military guidance to the president. Congress' perception
that service secretaries were tainted by individual service biases proved correct, and the NSC proved to be ineffective. Therefore, in
1949 Congress made an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947,
removing the service secretaries from the National Security Council. 10
This was a further demonstration of how authority within the Department
of Defense was being moved from the military departments to the
Secretary of Defense. Today, the only permanent members of the NSC
include the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{11}

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 1947 National Security Act was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. World War II had demonstrated the need for a formal joint structure capable of providing strategic direction to the separate military departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was modeled after the British Chiefs of Staff with which the United States had become familiar during the war. The joint staff was limited to 100 officers in 1947. An amendment to the National Security Act in 1949 created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the military advisors to the National Security Council, and increased the number of officers authorized to serve on the Joint Staff.\textsuperscript{12}

The National Security Act of 1947 has been amended more than a dozen times. A list of the amendments which have provided the greatest impact on the Department of Defense is shown in figure 3. Each of the amendments passed by Congress between 1947 and 1986 brought with it significant changes; however, none have had a greater impact on the Department of Defense than the reforms contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The message sent by Congress during the period prior to the act’s passage was that of centralized civilian control, interservice cooperation, and the reduction of waste and duplication among the military departments. Consistent with this message, officers serving in joint duty increased from fewer than 300 in 1947 to more than 8,000 at the time Goldwater-Nichols legislation was implemented. The Joint Staff has also grown significantly during this period. In 1947,
the size of the joint staff was limited to no more than 100 officers. Following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the number rose to nearly 1,000. With these increases in personnel, many new issues have been raised, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act attempts to deal with most of them.

**Background (1978-1986)**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the product of years of congressional study and debate following the Vietnam era. The level of detail contained in the act indicates the growing impatience of Congress with the Department of Defense. The layers of bureaucracy within the Department of Defense had created an environment fraught with waste and duplication. This in turn made it difficult for the Department of Defense to provide timely and accurate military advice to the President or the Secretary of Defense.¹³

During the period prior to implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, some within the DoD opposed change. The majority of leaders within the DoD favored moderate change. The Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, was one of those who favored less drastic changes. He opposed the legislation because he felt it would weaken civilian control of the military.¹⁴ He established the Packard Commission in an effort to appease Congress, which was demanding reform. Lingering post-Vietnam perceptions, the ill-fated Iranian hostage operation in 1980, and numerous problems stemming from operations in Beirut and Grenada in 1983 led to continued congressional pressure for reform. The Packard Commission issued its report in 1986. Many of the
findings of this report were incorporated into the Goldwater-Nichols Act.\textsuperscript{15}

One of the few ranking military officials within the Department of Defense to favor change was the currently serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones. It was criticism of the dominating role of the military departments over the unified commands which began drawing the attention of Congress. General Jones commissioned a special study group to make recommendations on how the joint operations of the services could be improved. This study was headed by General (Retired) Walter T. Kerwin and would be referred to as the Kerwin Study. Although the group identified many of the same problems which had surfaced numerous times in the past, it reconfirmed the need for a broad range of changes within the Department of Defense. The Kerwin Study recommended many procedural changes. However, it failed to address many of the structural changes General Jones felt were necessary. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General Jones identified four major problems which the Kerwin Study failed to address. They were:

First, responsibility and authority were diffused in Washington and in the field. Unified Commanders, had great authority in wartime, but in peacetime they had little authority or influence. All the elements of influence for the component commands of the Unified Commands--men, machines, money, and promotions--flowed from their service chiefs in Washington rather than from the unified commanders.

Second, much of the advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense was not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential.

Third, individual service interests often dominated the recommendations and actions of the Joint Chiefs at the expense of broader national interests.
Fourth, in addition to built in conflict of interest in his position, the service chiefs simply lacked the time to adequately perform his joint and service duties. Additionally, Jones made a series of recommendations to deal with these problems. Many of these recommendations would be adopted into the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

It is important to understand the position taken by the Army during this time. General Edwin C. Meyer, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, agreed with the need for reform. He developed an Army initiative for change which closely mirrored many of the provisions of the plan developed by General Jones. One of the major differences between the two plans dealt with the manner in which the Joint Staff would receive information. Jones called for a larger Joint Staff with increased numbers of quality officers from all the services making up its nucleus. Meyer's plan added some members to the Joint Staff, yet still left the Joint Staff dependent on the separate service staffs for much of its information.

By early 1986 it was clear to the key leaders within the DoD that some change was necessary. The Packard Commission and the Kerwin Study each provided significant input on what would become the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although both called for broad reforms within the DoD, neither agreed on how these reforms should be implemented. While the Kerwin Study dealt primarily with policy changes, the Packard Commission was oriented on changing the structure of the DoD. It should also be noted that both commissions made recommendations on how to improve the quality of officers serving in joint positions, but neither went into the detail which would be covered in the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation. No one anticipated the degree of change which would finally be incorporated into the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The information below is taken from the actual Title IV legislation, and it outlines the full intent of Congress in passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In ensuring this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401)---

a. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority within the Department;

b. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

c. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

d. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

e. increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;

f. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

g. to improve joint officer management policies; and

h. to otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.\(^7\)

One recommendation made by the Kerwin Study concerned the development of a series of joint officer management procedures. The intent of the study was for these procedures to be incorporated into Department of Defense policy rather than Title IV legislation. This would be a time when the frustration of Congress would override the study's intent. Skeptical of the services' commitment to provide quality personnel, these procedures were incorporated into Title IV of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The policies making up Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act encompassed all aspects of joint officer management. Of all the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Title IV was the most difficult for the services to implement. After eight years of struggling with the intricacies of Title IV, the Army has yet to meet all of its provisions.\(^8\)

The purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to create a more effective and efficient fighting force. To do this, the act sought to improve the quality and timeliness of advice given the President to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior military advisor within the DoD, to improve the ability of the unified combatant commanders to execute their mission, and finally to eliminate the waste and duplication of effort within the Department of Defense.\(^9\) By giving increased authority to the Chairman, while reducing the role of the individual service chiefs, the authors of Goldwater-Nichols provided the framework to ensure cooperation among the services. To understand the impact this act has had on the Army and all of the Department of Defense, it is first necessary to understand its origins and the events which led to its passage.

**Background (1986-Present)**

It is hard to calculate the Army’s reaction to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Much of the Army’s leadership was concerned over how the increased authority given to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commands would affect the future of the Army. But few within the Army understood the full impact the legislation would have on the military. At the time of its passage, the
Army was struggling with huge budget deficits, large entitlement programs, and the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction targets. Lost to many within the Army were the intricate details of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.\textsuperscript{20} The Army was not alone; neither the Joint Staff nor the Office of the Secretary of Defense were prepared to implement many of the provisions contained within the Act.

The Army began implementing the reforms called for in the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation soon after its passage. Many of the changes called for within the act were difficult to implement. The first of which called for a 15 percent reduction in the size of the Army Staff. This, coupled with a requirement to reorganize the Army Staff, transferring many of the functions traditionally under the purview of the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Secretary of the Army. To accomplish this task, the Secretary of the Army established a reorganization commission, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and the Comptroller.\textsuperscript{21}

The Army was also faced with the major challenge of having to incorporate the CINCs into resource decisions which previously had been the responsibility of the individual services. Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham directed his staff to develop a blueprint for incorporating future CINC involvement. While Wickham’s plan was not without flaws, it was generally recognized as an honest effort to provide equitable support to all of the unified commands.\textsuperscript{22} As the Department of Defense continued to adapt to the intricacies of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the Army would modify and adjust plans to provide support.
To understand how the Army approached Title IV, it is important to look at the number of changes they were confronted with as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The number and magnitude of these changes slowed Army efforts to comply.

In early 1987 the services sought relief from some of the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. While they were able to receive some support from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the House Armed Services Committee members were determined to stick with the original provisions as outlined in the original legislation.23 Although the services were unable to gain any substantive relief, they were successful in postponing the effective date of many key joint officer management initiatives. This delay gave the Army time to master the intricacies of what later would later become its joint officer management policy.

The specific details of the Army's efforts to comply with the Joint Officer Management provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation will be addressed in detail later. The focus of this research is directed to answering the following primary and subsequent research questions.

Research Questions

Primary Question

Given the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, can the Army achieve its joint promotion objectives while at the same time meeting the joint specialty officer provisions?
Subordinate Questions

1. How has the Army dealt with the requirement to meet joint promotion statistics?

2. What has been the Army philosophy on joint specialty officer management?

3. What steps has the army taken to incorporate joint professional military education into its officer management process?

4. How has joint duty assignment list management affected the process used by the Army to assign its officers?

5. How have the general officer qualification provisions of Title IV affected Army officer assignment patterns?

Assumptions

This is a turbulent period for the U.S. military. The force has been reduced by one-third since the end of Desert Storm. This has caused a wide variety of personnel changes in the Army. To conduct a thorough evaluation of the subject, several assumptions were made concerning Army officer management. The purpose of these assumptions is to develop a constant environment in which to conduct and evaluate research.

1. Current field grade promotion timelines (pin-on points) will remain unchanged. Timelines used in this study to evaluate officer career patterns will be based on current promotion rates.

2. The Army’s promotion rates for first time considered field grade officers will remain consistent with those rates recorded over the last three years.
3. The current number of officers serving in joint duty and the skills required to fill joint duty positions will remain unchanged.

4. The Army's allocations to train officers through attendance at Joint Professional Military Education Phase I and Phase II schools will remain unchanged.

5. Although many amendments have been sought to the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation, few changes have been approved by Congress. Therefore, for this research, it will be assumed that the joint officer management requirements of Title IV will remain unchanged in the future.

6. Any solutions or recommendations made at the conclusion of this thesis must be feasible given the downsizing of the Army and the current officer distribution plan.

Definitions

The following terms will be used throughout the course of my research. In conducting the initial research it was found that some confusion exists in defining some of these key terms. In fact, many of the definitions have changed as the joint policies and doctrine have developed in recent years. The most current and commonly used definitions are used to provide a consistent meaning to these terms throughout the research.

Critical Joint Duty Position. Joint duty position on the JDAL which must be filled by an officer possessing the JSO designation.

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). A military occupational specialty designated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense from among the combat arms of the Army.24
Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). An assignment to a designated position in a multi-service or multinational command activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments.  

Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). A list of joint duty positions designated by the joint commands and approved by both the Joint Staff and the affected service in which the officer gains significant experience in joint matters.

Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS). The automated management information system data base maintained by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Manpower Data Center. It is managed and updated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services.

Joint Matters. Matters relating to the integrated employment of active and reserve component land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces, national security strategy, strategic and contingency planning, command of combat operations under unified commands, and joint force development.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Program of education run under the direction of the Chairman, JCS. The program focuses on the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space and special operations forces.

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). Officers who are trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. Once completing the requirements for designation, officers selected by their service and approved by the Secretary of Defense shall be designated a Joint Specialty Officer.
Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) Nominees. An officer designated by the Secretary of the Army, who has completed an approved program of joint military education. Officers possessing a COS may be designated as JSO nominees prior to completing an approved program of joint military education.  

Program for Joint Education (PJE). Program which prescribes the joint curricula, student faculty mixes and ratios, seminar service mixes, standards, and learning objectives for all PME at both intermediate and senior levels designed to qualify officers for JSO designation.  

Specified Combatant Command. A command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from a single service.  

Title IV. Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has been incorporated into Chapter 38 of Title 10, U.S. Code. Because the major provisions of the law have remained basically unchanged, references to the legislation will continue to be referred to as only Title IV.  

Unified Combatant Command. A command which has broad, continuing missions and is composed of forces from two or more services. 

Limitations

There are several limitations which impacted on the conduct of this thesis. None of them were serious enough to warrant significant modifications to the conclusions and recommendations presented in
Chapter 6. However, they did have some impact on the research and analysis conducted as a part of this thesis.

The purpose of recording the limitations which impacted on this study, is to provide a better understanding of how these constraints affected the research and analysis conducted during this thesis. An awareness of these limitations will benefit future studies.

1. "Time" was the most critical limitation on this study. Additional time would have permitted a more detailed analysis of FY 95 data. The large number of commands and agencies which impact on the study of joint officer management issues requires a great deal of time to collect and process needed information.

2. The complex and often emotional requirements of Title IV impose unique limitations. Because of its complex requirements few officers understand all of the intricate details of Title IV. Many of the personnel managers interviewed, lacked a basic understanding of the legislation’s requirements (i.e., many were unable to differentiate between joint staff officers and joint specialty officers). Many of those who do understand the legislation, perceive that it has impeded their careers. This often makes Title IV a very emotional issue. For these reasons, many interviews with the joint commands and agencies failed to yield beneficial results.

3. Delays in the publication of the RAND study on the proposed size and composition of the JDAL and the recent release of the Chairman’s Report on Joint Professional Military Education served as limiting factors in conducting research into Title IV. These two studies have the potential to significantly impact future legislation.
Their late release allowed only a cursory analysis of their findings. Future studies will benefit, from the results of each of these efforts.

4. The final limitation concerns the fact that there is no single office designated with responsibility for the JSO. These requirements are divided among several offices within OSD and the joint staff. Often times it is necessary to contact each of these offices to determine the answer to question which pertain to the JSO.

Significance of the Study

The Army is living year to year, attempting to meet the requirements of Title IV. Many of the toughest requirements outlined in Title IV had delayed effective dates, most of which became effective 1 January 1994. This has made it difficult to assess the full impact of the Title IV legislation on the Army. The Army has made great strides to comply with the intent of Title IV, both in its policies and doctrine. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has said, "The United States Army is a proud member of the joint team. We fight together as part of a joint team." This has become more apparent over the past two years, as officers have been deferred from battalion/brigade command to complete joint tours of duty. The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight to the Army's personnel decision-makers in determining how the Army can best serve itself and the joint community while meeting the intent of Title IV in the future.
Endnotes

1Mike Galloucis, "Where we’re going: How we got where we are," Today’s Challenge: Tomorrow’s Army (January 1992): 1-3.


8AFSC PUB 1.

9Ibid.

10Fact Sheet, 3.

11AFSC PUB 1, 5-1.


13Fact Sheet, 11.


18Fact Sheet, 16.

19AFSC PUB 1, 2-6.


25Ibid.

26Ibid.

27Ibid.

28Ibid.


30AFSC PUB 1, 2-19.

31Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

TITLE IV--JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

The joint officer management initiatives contained in Title IV are comprehensive and cover a broad range of joint officer management issues. The dissatisfaction of Congress with the DoD's handling of officers assigned to joint duty is reflected in the detailed requirements contained in Title IV. Although some of the requirements had been recommended by previous studies, none of the requirements had been studied, in any detail, by the military departments. The Army took more than five years to recognize the full ramifications of the Act.

Congress itself had some misgivings concerning the legislation. First, the congressional staffers writing the legislation were provided limited amounts of data by the DoD. This resulted in many of the requirements placed in the legislation being based on the experience of those writing the legislation. Because of this, Congress allowed the DoD the opportunity to make recommendations for changing some of its provisions. Next, Congress was unsure how long it would take for the DoD to establish many of the programs outlined in Title IV. For this reason, Congress authorized many of the grace periods to be written into the law. This allowed the DoD up to eight years to implement many of the provisions' stricter requirements.

This willingness should not, however, be interpreted as a lessening of the commitment of the Congress to an effective system for preparing and rewarding military officers for joint duty service or
as permitting the Department to avoid for delay the required implementation.\textsuperscript{1}

Finally, Congress was unsure the Department of Defense could adapt its education system to produce officers who were well versed in joint matters.

The one constant for the Department of Defense was Congress’ insistence that reform take place. They wanted real improvements in the joint arena and wanted the joint officer management provisions to bring about many of these improvements. Congress was firm in its insistence that the services be held to all the requirements of Title IV.

The joint officer management requirements contained within Title IV consist of five main areas. These areas are joint specialty designation, promotion policy objectives for joint officers, education, joint duty assignments, and general officer qualification.

It is necessary to examine each of these areas to fully appreciate the magnitude of the problems facing the Army. Special attention must be given to how each requirement relates to the others. All the requirements of Title IV relate to each other and cannot be dealt with in isolation. Many of the problems associated with Title IV are the result of implementing procedures to conform with one provision of the Act without considering the effect these changes will have on the other four areas. This problem stands out repeatedly when examining how the services have attempted to deal with the requirements of the Act. The following is a detailed description of each of the areas and an analysis of how they relate to each other.
Joint Specialty Designation

The first provision of Title IV (Section 661) created the requirement for a joint specialty designation. This provision is a major source of confusion when trying to comprehend the intricacies of the Title IV legislation. One might be led to believe this is the only, or at least the most important, provision of Title IV. On the contrary, it is just one of the five requirements. The manner in which one provision relates to another often causes the confusion. For example, each of the five major provisions of Title IV contains specific requirements relating to the joint specialist. The confusion arises as a result of how these requirements are then interpreted to relate to each of the other four provisions.²

The creation of the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation was Congress' attempt to create an elite pool of officers trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters, but still knowledgeable in their individual service skills. When creating the JSO category, Congress' intent was for services to nominate their best officers to become JSOs. These officers could then compete within the joint arena and have the opportunity to rise to the four-star level.³

The requirements contained within the legislation for becoming a JSO are very stringent. First, an officer must successfully complete JPME (both Phases I and II). Following completion of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), an officer must complete a full joint duty assignment in an approved joint duty assignment list position. Before being nominated to become a JSO, an officer must first be designated a
JSO nominee by his service. To be eligible for nomination as a JSO nominee an officer must complete Phases I and II of JPME.

There is an exception to this requirement for officers possessing a Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Officers who possess a COS may be designated as a JSO nominee without completing JPME Phases I and II. A list of those Army skills designated as COS are:

1. Air Defense Artillery
2. Armor
3. Aviation
4. Combat Engineers
5. Field Artillery
6. Infantry
7. Special Forces

Congress' intent in creating exceptions for officers with a COS was to ensure that normal tour length requirements do not lead to significant deterioration of warfighting skills or personnel shortages in operational fields.

After completion of the steps listed above, officers are eligible for recommendation for selection as a JSO by a joint specialty designation board convened by the service secretary. The service secretaries forwarded their lists of recommended officers to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The complete process, culminating in the award of the joint specialty designation, can take more than four years.¹

Another aspect of JSO designation is determining how many requirements for JSOs exist. Title IV establishes that there will be a
minimum of 1,000 joint critical positions filled by officers possessing the joint specialty designation. The graph at Figure 4 details how these positions are currently divided among the services. Additionally, Title IV requires that one-half of all officers currently serving in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) be either JSOs or JSO nominees.

![Figure 4. Service Joint Critical Requirements](image)

The joint critical requirements listed in the JDAL, represent a fraction of the total JSO requirement. The requirement to fill 50 percent of the JDAL with JSO/JSO nominees is much more difficult. This requirement fluctuates based upon the size of the JDAL and the number of officers currently serving in joint assignments who possess a COS. These fluctuations have made it difficult for the Army to determine its exact JSO/JSO nominee requirement.⁵

**Promotion Policy Objectives For Joint Officers**

The next provision addressed in Title IV (section 662) dealt with promotion policy objectives for joint officers. A significant point of this provision is that Congress established promotion policies as objectives rather than requirements. If they had been made
requirements, selection boards would have been forced to select joint officers.

The wording of Title IV legislation has led to the mistaken assumption by many that promotion objectives only pertain to those officers holding the JSO designation. This is not the case. There are several different categories of promotion objectives.

Congress enacted a provision requiring the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish procedures for three primary promotion categories. Meeting the promotion objectives within these categories has proved to be one of the toughest challenges of Title IV.

The first promotion category deals with officers serving on the Joint Staff. Officers serving on the joint staff should be promoted at the same rate as those serving on the Department of the Army headquarters staff (ARSTAFF). This is done separately for those officers currently serving on the joint staff and for those officers who have previously served on the joint staff. This is further divided into categories to evaluate the performance of those officers in, above, and below the zone of consideration. Sometimes this category is written: "Joint staff officers should promote ≥ [greater than or equal to] the board average."

The second promotion category deals with those officers who possess the joint specialty designation. This promotion category looks at the total JSO population (regardless of whether they are serving in joint duty) and compares them to the promotion rates for officers currently serving on the ARSTAFF and those who have served on the ARSTAFF. This is divided into categories to evaluate the performance of
those officers in, above, and below the zone of consideration. Sometimes written this provision is written: "joint specialty officers should promote ≥ the Army Staff average."

The third promotion category looks at officers who are currently serving, or who have previously served, in "Other Joint Duty." The "Other Joint Duty" category consists of all officers serving in joint duty, with the exception of those officers previously counted in either the joint staff or JSO categories. These officers are then compared with the promotion board average. Again this is further divided into subcategories to evaluate the performance of officers in, above, and below the zone of consideration. This is often written: "officers serving in other joint duty should promote ≥ the board average."

In addition to the promotion objectives required by Title IV, the Secretary of Defense has added a requirement to monitor the quality of officers serving in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Like those officers serving on the joint staff, officers serving in OSD should be promoted at the same rate as those serving on the ARSTAFF. Again, those officers currently serving in OSD and those that have previously served are used in this comparison. As with Title IV promotion objectives, this comparison is done for officers in, above, and below the zone.6

A final Congressional concern dealt with how the military departments would give due credit to those officers serving in joint duty assignments. Therefore, Congress directed that an officer currently serving in a joint duty assignment be appointed by the Chairman to sit on each promotion board. It further directed that the
Chairman would review the results of each promotion board and if necessary make additional recommendations. It will be pointed out later how the Chairman has become involved with the Army's promotion results.

A detailed look into how the Army has modified its joint officer management procedures in an effort to meet the provisions outlined above will be addressed in Chapter 5. It should be noted that the Army has yet to meet all of the promotion objectives established by Congress in any given year. If Congress had established these as requirements rather than objectives, the Army would have been forced to establish promotion floors which would have changed board results.

**Education**

The third provision of Title IV (section 663) dealt with Education. Title IV required the Secretary of Defense to review and revise the curriculum of the schools, both within the military departments and the National Defense University. It was not until the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee concluded its review of joint education in 1989, that the current two-phased JSO education process was created.

The result was a modification at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia, changing it from a six-month intermediate school to a 12-week Temporary Duty (TDY) school. The college would now be attended by officers en route to their joint duty assignment, or officers would return within the first year of their joint tour to attend. The course would be taught as a follow-on to the instruction received at the intermediate level staff colleges. The committee also recommended that the two senior service colleges at the National Defense
University award credit for both phases of joint education. Officers graduating from other senior service colleges would attend a 12-week course of instruction at APSC to complete their phase II training. Other education requirements contained within Title IV required that more than 50 percent of the graduates of National Defense University schools (National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Armed Forces Staff College) immediately be assigned to a JDA. Finally, the act called for the establishment of a capstone course for all newly selected general and flag officers. The course was designed to prepare officers to work with general officers of the other Armed Forces.

Joint Duty Assignments

The legislation enacted in 1986 established minimum tour lengths for officers assigned to joint assignments. The minimum tour lengths were designed to ensure continuity within the joint organizations. The original Title IV legislation required that general officers serve a minimum of three years in a joint duty assignment and that all others serve at least three and one-half years. The services were able to get a modification to Title IV in 1987, dropping the minimum tour length requirements to two years for general officers and three years for all others assigned to joint assignments. This was one of the few concessions made by Congress following passage of the Act.

The legislation did allow for certain waiver provisions. First, the tour length could be waived by the Secretary of Defense on a case-by-case basis. Second, officers with critical occupational specialties would be permitted under provisions established by the Secretary of
Defense to serve less than three years. Finally, Title IV established that officers completing their joint duty assignment as a result of retirement, separation from active duty, or suspension would not be held to the three year tour length.

The focus of my current research question will not allow me the opportunity to research how the Army is currently dealing with the minimum tour length requirement or the problems associated with its share of the current Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). I will look at the timing of joint assignments as it relates to qualification for the joint specialty designation. A comprehensive study effort has been undertaken to validate the joint requirements on the JDAL. RAND Corporation and the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), two Research firms have been contracted to assist in the study.

Consideration of Joint Duty in General Officer Qualification

The last major provision of the Title IV legislation dealt with the joint qualification of general officers. The legislation required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit an evaluation of those officers recommended for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and above. The legislation additionally required the Secretary of Defense forward with the Chairman’s evaluation a list of the qualifications required by the position the officer was being nominated to fill.

Additionally this provision of Title IV required that only those officers who had successfully completed a full JDA would be eligible for selection to brigadier general without a waiver. The full impact of this was to take effect on 1 January 1994, when most waiver provisions
were to expire. The services have been unable to promote officers to the grade of brigadier general without extensive use of these waiver provisions. An extension of the waiver provisions was granted by Congress in 1993 legislation. In passing this amendment, Congress did convey its displeasure with the progress of the military departments in meeting this provision. The new waiver provisions established by Congress provide for waivers until fiscal year 1999. This thesis will examine this provision in the context of ensuring that sufficient opportunity is present to allow the Army to create its general officers of the future.

Additional Requirements of Title IV

The Title IV legislation adopted in 1986 also made the Secretary of Defense responsible for submitting a series of reports each year. These reports made it clear to the Department of Defense that the Congress intended to remain involved in the joint officer management issues.

It is worth looking again at how each of the joint officer management provisions overlaps. Although the creation of the JSO is the key provision of Title IV, it is the other four requirements that have caused much of the Army's concern since passage of the Title IV legislation. This research will focus on looking into how the personnel initiatives taken by the Army will enable it to meet all of the provisions of Title IV and not just one of its provisions.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.


4 Goldwater-Nichols.

5 Ibid.

6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 1330.02, Review of Promotion Board Results by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), 1-7.

7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM 344-90, Military Education Policy Document. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), III-1.


9 Ibid.

10 Goldwater-Nichols
CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The principles of joint officer management are still new concepts within the military. The legislation has drawn a great deal of attention since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Since its enactment, much has been written concerning the provisions of the act and its impact on the services. Still, most published accounts dealing with Title IV focus on the expanded roles of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the reorganization of the unified commands and defense agencies, and joint education. The joint officer management provisions contained within the legislation have received far less attention.

There are two reasons why Title IV has drawn so much attention. First, the principles of joint officer management are written into the law, unlike other personnel management areas within the military which are based on Department of Defense or service policy. An officer working personnel issues for the Army once commented, "We can make and break Army policy on a daily basis, but when it comes to Title IV we are accountable to Congress and locked to a single course of action."1

The second reason Title IV generates so much interest is that it is critical to the individual careers of service members. This makes it an emotional issue. Most of the material available on the subject
has been written by officers who have been personally affected by the requirements of the legislation.

**Books**

Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been the subject of numerous books, most of these works discuss joint officer management only in broad generalities. The books do provide excellent accountings of the legislation and the events leading to its passage, but fail to address the major issue of Title IV.

To understand why Title IV has been overlooked in many of these publications, attention must be focused on Congress's intent. Congress wanted to reduce bureaucracy, improve the lines of communication within the Department of Defense, remove service parochialism from the decision making process at the NCA (National Command Authority) level, and provide a better mechanism whereby military advice could be provided to the President.

It had been the inability of the joint staff and individual services to work as a team that paved the way for Goldwater-Nichols reform. The lack of quality officers serving in joint positions contributed to this dysfunctional relationship, but it was not the problem Congress set out to fix when it drafted the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. As such, the focus of the legislation was the increased authority given to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified command and defense agencies.

Another reason Title IV did not draw more attention can be attributed to the complex nature of its subject matter. Most authors addressing the requirements of Title IV summarize them by noting they
will provide an increase in the quality of the officers serving in joint
duty assignments.\textsuperscript{2} The complex requirements also make it difficult to
measure service progress without a great deal of research. In the years
shortly after passage of the legislation, the data was not yet available
to determine whether or not services had made progress. The result is
that most of the material which has been published on the joint officer
management provisions of Title IV is based on personal opinion.

There have not been any books published in the area of joint
officer management. Two books which provide insight into the background
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are \textit{Four Stars}, by Mark Perry and \textit{American
William Taylor, and Lawrence Korb. Both books state that one of the
results of the Title IV legislation will be to improve the quality of
officers serving in joint duty assignments.

In the book \textit{American National Strategy Policy and Process}, the
purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is described as a push for
“jointness” and interservice cooperation.\textsuperscript{3} The term “jointness” is used
in different contexts by many authors. In this book it refers to the
relationship between the services; others will use it to describe
individual officers meeting their joint requirements.\textsuperscript{4}

James A. Blackwell and Barry M. Blechman do a credible job of
detailing the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and at the same
time attempting to assess the impact of Title IV in a collection of
essays, \textit{Making Defense Reform Work}. One of the essays contained within
this book titled, “Fulfilling the Promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
in Operational Planning and Command,” written by Paul Y. Hammond, gives
an appropriate analysis of the legislation's early impact. This essay was extremely useful in beginning an examination of the implementation of the provisions act.

These books were useful in examining the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols and the determination of Congress to have these measure approved. They did not provide the necessary insight into the Title IV requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In most of the books, credit is given to Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for having improved the quality of officers serving in joint assignments. Although this credit may be premature, certainly notable progress has been made. Many of the books which give credit to Title IV were published just three years after its passage, nine years after its passage the full impact of the legislation is still being studied.

**Government Publication**

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act lists very specific requirements of the legislation. It does not, however, provide any details on its implementation. In fact, in some instances the legislation directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense to provide further guidelines. For this reason, government sources have proved extremely useful in determining the exact requirements of the legislation, but they must be critically examined.

Government publications do present a number of problems. First, because of the rapidly changing joint environment, the material in some of the publications is out of date, or was printed in error in the early stages of Title IV and still has not been amended. Second, disagreements among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, and the individual services have blocked or delayed the publication of many needed publications.

Following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DoD began publishing a series of policy memoranda. In June of 1989, the Joint Staff published the first publications laying out the requirements of Title IV. JCS Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) was published in June of 1989, and the MEPD (Military Education Policy Document) was published in May of 1990. The MEPD was updated in March 1993 and is currently undergoing a second revision. These two documents provided the services with a set of guidelines from which they could begin to formulate policies of their own.

One of the documents which has not yet been published is a DoD directive on joint officer management. This publication was first published in draft form in 1990. Yet, because the Office of the Secretary of Defense could not get a consensus from the services, it has yet to be finalized. The joint staff and the services have waited for the approved directive before updating and changing many of their own policies. The DoD directive is intended to serve as the base document for joint officer management within the military. When published, the directive will update or replace dated and inconsistent policies which have remained in effect waiting for its publications.

The JCS Admin Pub 1.2, still represents the most current guide on the joint officer management requirements of Title IV. Yet since its publication, Title IV has been amended on three separate occasions. These changes affect many of the basic principles of the Title IV legislation.
The Army has also fallen behind with regard to updating the requirements of the Title IV legislation. The Army's Officer Ranks Personnel - Update 14 was published in September of 1990. It contains current Army officer management policies and procedures. The joint officer management policies contained in the Officer Ranks Publication contain numerous errors and omissions. The Officer Ranks Publication is currently undergoing revision, expected release date is currently not available.

There are several other defense publications which provide current joint officer management information. One is AFSC PUB 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991. AFSC PUB 1 provides an in-depth look at the background of Title IV and gives the reader a feeling for the magnitude of the change encompassed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation. It also gives insight into the joint specialty provisions of the legislation. Next, Joint Pub 1 provides an overview of the joint process. It helps to put joint officer management into the proper perspective. Finally, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 1330.02 provides detailed policy guidance governing joint representation to and analytical review of officer promotion selection boards by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Periodicals

Many articles are published dealing with the requirements or impacts of Title IV. These articles, with a few exceptions, can be broken into two categories: (1) those published before Desert Storm which attempt to outline how the requirements of Title IV will ruin the officer corps; and (2) those printed after Desert Storm, crediting our
success to the increased quality of officers serving in joint duty assignments.

One of the exceptions to this rule is "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb," by William E. Depuy. In this article General (Retired) William E. Depuy describes the opportunity opened to officers desiring to pursue assignments in the joint arena. He also describes the "Five Steep Hills" a joint specialty officer must climb. They are:

- Raising the quality of joint military advice
- Improving the track record in operational art
- Determining joint force requirements
- Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations
- Creating the conditions required for the synchronization of cross-service support at the tactical level

While General Depuy has correctly identified those areas in which the architects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act wanted improvement, many have argued that during Operation Desert Storm the military was able to climb each of the hills described by him. The points presented in his article provide a starting place in determining whether the success of military to operate in a joint environment was because of the joint specialty officer or in spite of him.

Reports and Studies

There have been several studies and reports which have been undertaken both within the Department of Defense and the Army which attempt to study the provisions of Title IV. There are two studies which are currently ongoing which could have a significant impact on Title IV legislation.
The first of these studies deals with the size and composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The study is being conducted by the RAND Corporation and is scheduled for completion in the Spring of 1996. The study was directed by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act. In the 1993 Act the Secretary of Defense was directed to conduct a study which would:

(1) Assess the appropriateness of the current allocation of joint assignments and joint critical assignments, with such assessment:
   (A) to place particular emphasis on the allocations of joint duty positions to each Defense Agency; and
   (B) to determine any changes in regulations that are necessary to ensure that the joint duty assignment process provides appropriate crediting as service in joint assignments in the case of officers assigned to Defense Agencies in positions that provide them with significant experience in joint matters;

(2) Assess whether officers who have the joint specialty under chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, are being assigned to appropriate joint duty positions; and

(3) survey the positions that provide military officers significant experience in joint matters but are now excluded from joint duty designation under section 661 of such title or other provisions of law.  

The FY 93 Act also required that a report on the results of this study be provided to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees by 15 April 1993. The DoD was unable to meet this deadline. Much of the delay can be attributed to the complex nature of Title IV. An interim report published by the RAND Corporation in April of 1994 suggests that progress is being made. The interim report states that changes in the size and composition of the JDAL appear warranted. It further identifies that there may be a smaller requirement for joint critical positions on the JDAL.  

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The second, and currently ongoing study, is titled "A Strategic Vision for Professional Military Education in the Twenty-first Century." The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, convened a panel to examine joint professional military education. Its mission was to

- provide observations on the ability of the existing PME framework to provide and optimum system for preparing joint warfighters and strategists in the future.
- make recommendations of issues for further study.¹⁰

The February 1995 draft report submitted by the panel suggests it is prepared to recommend many new changes to the current framework of professional military education. Among the recommendations made by the panel are to redefine the educational prerequisites for designation as a JSO nominee, recommend progressive joint educational opportunities throughout an officers' career, and recommend future reviews be conducted to determine the need for future education requirements.¹¹

Both of these studies might possibly help improve current joint officer management policies within the Department of Defense. However, neither study adequately addresses the fundamental management problem facing the services with regards to Title IV, the "Joint Specialty Officer." Each of the studies is trying to solve the problems of the Title IV legislation in isolation. Only by looking at all of the requirements of Title IV can a long term solution be developed.

The last report which provides an insight into many of the details of Title IV was done by the Association of the United States Army in early 1987. The title of the report is Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Its Impact on the Army.
This report was one of the first published documents to attempt to give a layout of all of the Goldwater-Nichols provisions. The report further looks at how many of these provisions would impact on the Army. While the Army was busy reorganizing and cutting the army staff and implementing new fiscal reforms, this report noted that "Title IV may be the most difficult provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the services to implement."¹²

There is much information currently available on the subject of joint officer management. The intent of this thesis will be to answer its primary question:

Given the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, can the Army achieve its joint promotion objectives while at the same time meeting the Joint Specialty Officer Provisions?

While some parts of this question have been addressed by authors within this chapter, they fail to completely address the Army's current problems meeting joint promotion objectives and joint specialty officer requirements. This thesis addresses both of these areas.
Endnotes

1 Unidentified officer within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.


5 Hilton.


7 Ibid, p.4.


10 Joint Chiefs of Staff Report, A Strategic Vision for Professional Military Education in the Twenty-first Century (Draft), (February 1995): 2.

11 A Strategic Vision, iv.

CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This thesis will examine the Army’s ability to meet the joint specialty provisions of Title IV by analyzing what impacts its current joint officer management policies have had on its ability to meet these provisions. The examination will also include an analysis of how the Army’s position on joint officer management has evolved over the past 8 years. An analysis into the evolution of Army joint officer management policies will provide insight into the current trends regarding the joint specialty officer.

Chapter 5 will analyze how the joint specialty provisions of Title IV are affected by each of act’s other key elements. It will also review the specific problems imposed by the requirements to meet joint promotion objectives. A review of the successes and failures of the Army in complying with these key elements will be incorporated into the analysis. Finally, the opinions of the joint commands and agencies on the Army’s ability to comply with the provisions of Title IV will be considered.

This thesis will determine whether or not the Army can meet both the joint promotion objectives and the joint specialty provisions of Title IV. The analysis used to support the answer to this question
will be fair and unbiased. By using the methodology described above, this thesis will answer its primary question "Given the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, can the Army achieve its joint promotion objectives while at the same time meeting the joint specialty officer provisions?" The methodology also provides a framework for determining supporting the conclusions and recommendations found in Chapter 6.

The Department of Defense Reaction to Title IV

Before analyzing Army policies and procedures, it is useful to review how the Department of Defense dealt with the requirements of Title IV. The process of developing policies and procedures to support legislative requirements began within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) late in 1986, following passage of the Title IV legislation. The legislation was met by a "wait-and-see" attitude by most of the decision makers within OSD. During the period immediately following the act’s passage, attention within the DoD focused on Gramm-Rudmann deficit reduction legislation and the DoD reorganization requirements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Those in the DoD charged with working Title IV legislation focused their attention on easing the strict measures of the act rather than on its implementation. This strategy proved successful in changing some measures (i.e., changing the minimum tour length to three years and securing waivers for some technical skills). However, these changes proved to be relatively minor and further aggravated an already frustrated Congress.

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The belief within Congress was that the DoD had not made sufficient progress to warrant easing the legislative requirements. While the sentiment in the House was generally more sympathetic to the DoD than that of the Senate, both bodies were growing impatient for change to begin taking place. Even as the Congress approved changes, it warned the DoD to expect tougher guidance if some progress was not made.

In the FY 1988, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, published nearly five months after the act’s passage, no mention is made of any of the Title IV provisions. Whereas, other portions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are discussed in great detail throughout the report (i.e., the restructure of JCS, the changes surrounding the unified and specified command plan, and a revamping the Defense Department acquisition system). In fact, the report goes so far as to ask Congress to consider alternative personnel initiatives not already contained in the act. This demonstrates two key points. First, although all the provisions of Title IV were widely staffed with each of the military departments, the JCS and OSD, most within the DoD were caught off guard by the passage of this legislation. Next, it demonstrates an overall reluctance by the DoD to change existing officer management policies to comply with newly established joint officer management provisions.

There was little effort made by the DoD to implement Title IV provisions until Fiscal Year (FY) 1988. Although still hesitant, the DoD began discussion on joint officer personnel policies. The following passage by then Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, was taken from the FY 89 Annual Report.

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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 contained the most extensive legislation concerning joint officer personnel management in history, and poses the most complex implementation requirements since the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980. During the past year, we have made significant progress in implementing the provisions of Title IV (Joint Officer Personnel Policy) of the Act.

We have devoted considerable effort to identifying policies and procedures necessary to effect the provisions of the Act. Pending publication of formal directives, policy memoranda have been issued concerning the following areas of joint officer personnel management: assignments; promotion objectives and procedural issues; education and training; nomination and selection for the joint specialty; designation of critical occupational specialties; and career monitoring considerations.

The Secretary of Defense outlined several key points concerning the attitude of the Department of Defense in late 1989. First, he demonstrated his preparedness to deal with the complex issues associated with Title IV. Many of the key decision makers within the Department of Defense were becoming familiar with the requirements of Title IV. It had taken nearly three years for the DoD to understand the magnitude of the change which Title IV required.

Second, he demonstrated that the DoD needed more time to implement the many facets of the legislation. The Secretary of Defense had merely begun to identify the policies and procedures necessary to effect the provisions of the Act. Yet, many of the grace periods extended to the services would begin to expire in FY 1989. It would take several more years for all the provisions to be put into effect.

Finally, as the Department of Defense began to implement the policies and procedures required to support Title IV legislation, it started developing an understanding of the critical elements of Title IV. However, it still lacked the experience necessary to see how each
of the newly created policies would affect future joint officer management issues. The provisions contained within Title IV were both visionary and ambitious.

The policies necessary to implement the legislative requirements of Title IV were developed in isolation, by different offices. Responsibility for different sections of the Title IV legislation were divided among different staff agencies both within OSD and JCS. The process was further hampered by the lack of available data for analyzing the elements and the lack of qualified personnel to conduct the analysis. The formal DoD directive covering joint officer management policies and procedures referred to by the Secretary of Defense above is still published only in draft form (it is scheduled for final publication in early 1995).

The lack of a clearly defined focus within the DoD has contributed to its overall lack of understanding of joint officer management principles. When Congress enacted Title IV, it left many of the details of its implementation to the Secretary of Defense. As stated above, much of this guidance has yet to be published. This has, in many instances, left it up to the individual services to determine how the provisions of Title IV are to be met.

Within the DoD, the task of developing policies to implement Title IV was delegated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) was given the task of implementing those policies and providing guidance to the Secretary of Defense. To date, it has been the joint staff developing and
implementing policy.® Chapter 5 addresses how this process has created problems in implementing some Title IV provisions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a joint working group to resolve joint issues and assist in the creation and implementation of the new policies and procedures. The group was made up of representatives from OSD, JCS, and each of the military departments. Although numerous issues were studied at length by the working group, individual service biases prevented many of them from being resolved.®

The Title IV legislation created many new joint officer management issues. OSD’s lack of experience in dealing with these issues hampered its ability to develop policies and procedures necessary to implement the act. For this reason OSD was forced to rely upon the joint officer working group for input. The inability of the joint officer working group to provide OSD with unbiased input, often led to OSD publishing untimely and watered down policies.7

The joint staff was more successful than OSD in the development of policies and procedures necessary to implement Title IV. It did not rely upon a consensus of the joint officer working group before taking action on Title IV issues. The joint staff began developing the management tools necessary to implement and monitor the provisions of the law. The two most critical tools were the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) and the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS).

The JDAL is the foundation upon which the joint officer management system is based. The first JDAL was published in 1988 and
contained 8,452 joint duty positions, including the 1,000 joint critical assignments required by Title IV. It serves as the source for tracking and managing the joint duty positions of the unified commands and agencies. The JDAL is published quarterly by the Joint Staff with input from the Unified commands and Defense Agencies.

The JDAMIS is another important tool which has become essential in joint officer management. It is a system capable of tracking and storing vast amounts of information. The Joint Staff began developing JDAMIS as a means to accurately track and maintain the large quantities of data required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation. The detailed reporting requirements established by Congress, created a demand for a system capable of accurately tracking the joint careers of officers from all branches of service. The system tracks not only officers currently serving in a JDA, but also tracks previous joint experience, joint education, and joint specialty designation status. The system has been expanded to meet the increasing tracking and reporting requirements placed upon the system. The system today can be accessed by each of the services, JCS, and OSD and is an invaluable tool in the preparation and submission of reports to the Congress.

The Army's Efforts to Comply

The remainder of this chapter examine the policies and procedures adopted by the Army in its effort to comply with Title IV. The Army, like the rest of the DoD, reacted slowly to the passage of Title IV. In part, this can be attributed to the piecemeal manner in which the Department of Defense began establishing policies and issuing
guidance on joint officer management. Another reason for the Army's hesitation was its belief that Congress would eventually yield to pressure and grant modifications or relief from the provisions of the act. Although both of these problems contributed to the Army's slow start, they were only contributing factors. The greatest roadblock to the Army in meeting the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was its inability to overcome service parochialism and alter accepted career paths for its officer corps.

During the first 18 months after the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation was adopted, the Army did little in the way of adopting measures to implement the provisions of the Act. Most of its effort was spent supporting the DoD led initiative to alter the provisions of Title IV. In early 1988, after attempts to lessen the impact of Title IV had met with only limited success, the Army began taking seriously Congressional threats for further action. Then, the Army began to take action. The first significant measure taken by the Army was the establishment of a joint officer management branch within the Army's Personnel Command (PERSCOM). Although at times other offices would become involved in specific issues dealing with joint, this branch became the Army's focal point for the development of joint officer management policies.

The Army's joint officer management branch first began in earnest to adopt its joint officer management policies in July of 1988. The first area which drew Army concern was the creation of a pool of Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). The two requirements for JSOs were: (1) to fill its joint critical billets with JSOs (the first JDAL had
given the Army 376 joint critical positions), and (2) that one-half of the Army’s JDAL be filled with JSOs or JSO nominees (the Army was given 2900 joint duty assignments).  

The Army’s need to create a pool of JSOs was again driven by legislation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was filled with grace periods meant to allow the services time to properly plan for and implement the provisions of Title IV. As with many extensions, these grace periods allowed the Army to procrastinate further, rather than plan for their implementation. The first and most important of the grace periods which could impact the Army was referred to as the sunset provision. This provision stated that until 1 January 1989 an officer could be designated as a JSO, based upon either joint education or joint experience (this provision was later extended to 1 October 1994). There was a significant time savings to both the Army and the individual officer by taking advantage of the sunset provision. After 1 January 1989, an officer would be expected to complete both a complete Program of Joint Education (PJE) and a full joint tour of duty before designation as a JSO. This process took an average of 4 years to complete, compared with officers who were made JSOs after only 6 months of joint education or one as little as one year in a joint duty assignment prior to 1 January 1989.

Another of the grace periods having an effect on the Army’s JSO concerns dealt with the requirement to fill joint critical billets. The original Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation allowed the services to fill only 80 percent of their joint critical billets with JSOs prior to 1 January 1994. After 1 January 1994, the services were obligated to fill
100 percent of their joint critical billets with JSOs. Only a waiver approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could give the services authorization to put a non-JSO into a joint critical position.

Based on the policies established by the OSD and JCS, the Army convened a board to select officers for award of the joint specialty skill identifier. The Army instructed board members to recommend all officers who met either the education or joint tour of duty requirements. The board was further given guidance that only those officers with the potential to serve in joint critical assignments in the future should be recommended. Because of the large number of officers meeting the criteria, the Army convened a standing board in 1988. This board met through the summer of 1989, a period that became known as the transition period.

By the end of the transition period, the Army’s standing board had recommended more than 7,100 officers for award of the joint specialty designation. This represented a ratio of nearly nineteen JSOs to each joint critical billet requirement. The JSO board considered the files of roughly 8,700 eligible officers, giving the board an overall selection rate of greater than 81 percent. The graph in the figure below illustrates the breakout of officers designated as JSOs during the transition period. The significance of this figure becomes apparent in Chapter 5 when the number of available JSOs are identified for years following the transition period.
Figure 5. JSOs designated during the Transition Period

Current Army guidance to JSO boards is to only select those officers showing clear promotion potential to the next higher grade. The Army created a sufficient number of JSOs to meet the requirements of Title IV during the transition, but it failed to look beyond the transition period to analyze how this large pool of JSOs would affect other provisions of the act. Since the end of the transition period, the JSO population in the Army has fallen to below 2,800 officers. The ratio of JSOs to joint critical billet requirements has fallen to twelve to one. This relationship between JSOs and joint critical requirements will also be examined in Chapter 5.

Another area in which the Army modified its policies to comply with the provision of Title IV was in the quality of officers assigned to joint duty. In the early stages of Title IV implementation, the Army assigned officers to joint duty assignments (JDAs) based on matching the duty position requirements and the officer's skill and experience. While this was an appropriate method of assignment in the past, it would not hold up to the rigid promotion objective established within Title IV. While the Army was accustomed to identifying its top officers and
assigning them to positions demanding the requisite caliber officer, it was not accustomed to taking a block of positions (i.e., the JDAL) and restricting assignment to those positions of only officers meeting certain prerequisites. In addition to its immediate objective of having to meet joint promotion objectives, the Army was also concerned that it "joint qualify" those officers eligible for selection to brigadier general.

The Army developed several policies to meet joint promotion objectives and joint qualify officers for possible selection to brigadier general. It first developed what became known as the "rocket model" approach in 1989. The rocket model called for assigning fifty percent of all officers selected below-the-zone (i.e., early selections for promotion) for major to joint duty each year. Concurrently goals were established for the assignment of lieutenant colonels and colonels to joint duty assignments. The rocket model approach failed to achieve desired promotion rates in all joint promotion categories, it was successful in improving the rates for lieutenant colonels serving in joint. The failure to meet the remaining joint promotion objectives was caused by an overall lack of commitment by the Army's senior leadership to continue paying the high cost associated with their implementation. After less than two years the programs were discontinued.\textsuperscript{11}

While Congress tracked the promotion statistics for all promotion boards major through colonel, the Army focused its attention on the lieutenant colonel and colonel promotion boards. The promotion results from the majors board have never been a source of concern for the Army. This is because a small number of captains are assigned to
joint duty assignments prior to being selected to the grade of major. Additionally, those few who are assigned have generally done very well.

The turning point for the Army in terms of developing a policy to meet all of the Title IV provisions came in October of 1992. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell nonconcurred with the FY 92 Colonels' list which the Army had forwarded for approval. He stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, "Jointness is not a concept that services can view as a distracter and an impediment to a 'quality' officer's quest for senior promotions." General Powell's action forced the Army's leadership to make hard decisions regarding Title IV for the first time. These decisions resulted in the Army adopting initiatives aimed at allowing it to meet the provisions of Title IV. These initiatives are outlined in Chapter 2. By adopting these initiatives the Army averted what the Chief of Staff of the Army saw as the worst case scenario (i.e., returning the list to the board to select officers with joint experience rather than those best qualified) by adopting new initiatives which would ensure future compliance.

**New Army Initiatives**

These new initiatives went far beyond any approach so far taken by the Army to comply with Title IV. They were incorporated into a policy signed by the Secretary of the Army on 5 November 1992. The Secretary of the Army stated within this policy that "by implementing these policies, we expect to meet the promotion objectives to colonel for officers 'serving-in' other joint duty and Joint Staff positions by next year's board." He also made commitments that the Army would meet
all joint promotion categories within the next three to five years. The following is a review of each of the five initiatives adopted by the Army.

First, the Army learned that other services had a general officer approve each of their officer’s assignments to joint duty. Therefore, the Army directed that the Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), Total Army Personnel Command, a brigadier general, would personally approve each assignment.

Second, the Army recognized that the majority of officers selected for promotion to colonel were successful battalion commanders, commonly referred to as FBCs (former battalion commanders). To ensure success on future promotion boards, the Army determined it needed to send an additional 25 to 30 FBCs to joint duty each year. This would immediately improve the joint promotion statistics in fiscal year 1993.

Third, the Army was aware that it must also concern itself with the “Have-Served” promotion category. Recognizing that this category could not be fixed in the short term, the Army focused on long term solutions. Using a policy similar to that of the “Rocket Model Approach”, the Army determined that it needed to send 60 Below-the-Zone (BZ) majors each year to joint duty assignments. These majors had to be senior in grade so that they would still be serving in joint duty when they were considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel (when calculating promotion statistics an officer may only be counted in the “Have Served” category once to the next higher grade). Because of the many requirements placed on officers between their 15th and 19th years of service, this becomes a very complex issue. This added a new
dimension to the Army’s problem of meeting its joint promotion objectives.  

Fourth, the Army had been sending a large number of its Senior Service College graduates to joint duty assignments each year. Yet, because these officers were assigned to joint duty following the convening date of the annually scheduled colonel’s promotion board in May, the Army was not given credit for these officers in their joint promotion statistics. This by itself meant the difference between passing and failing certain promotion categories. Therefore, the Army moved the colonel’s promotion board from May to August, giving officers the opportunity to graduate from SSC and report to their new joint assignment prior to the convening of the board. This was another instance in which the Army could immediately impact its promotion results. It was also acceptable to the Army’s senior leadership because of its minor impact on current officer management guidelines.

Finally, the Army recognized the only way to improve JSO promotion rates was to increase the quality of the officers scheduled to attend Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II. This is another area in which the Army could not use a short-term solution. The large number of JSOs boarded by the Army during the transition would impact on the Army’s ability to meet this objective within the next five years.

These policies produced increased promotion rates at the grade of colonel for two of the three major promotion categories the following year for officers serving-in joint duty assignments. The recently completed FY 94 promotion board has met all of the promotion objectives.
for the serving-in category. While this is good news, the Army still has not met any of the promotion categories for officers who "Have Served" in joint duty, nor has the Army been able to consistently meet objectives for JSOs. The Army has been given until 1997 to correct these shortcomings. Chapter 5 analyzes whether the above measures will produce the desired results; or what additional steps must be taken.

Other Areas of Concern

In the area of joint education, the Army has been confronted with difficult decisions over the past three years. On three different occasions over the last five years, the Army has had to shift its position with regard to whom it will allow to attend the Program for Joint Education (PJE) Phase II education course taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). This has created confusion among officers selected to attend the school and those who are deemed ineligible to attend by the Army. One of the causes for the Army's shift in policy was its failure to meet established promotion objectives for JSOs. The initiatives adopted by the Army committed it to improving the quality of students scheduled to attend the course. The Army, therefore, has adopted a policy which requires all BZ majors assigned to joint duty to attend PJE Phase II within the first twelve months of their assignment. Although this will improve the quality of officers eligible to become JSOs, it is a long-term solution. The first officers sent to joint duty under this policy become eligible for selection to colonel in 1998. The next problem facing the Army in producing JSOs is the lack of PJE Phase
II allocations. Figure 6 illustrates the Army's allocations for attendance over the last four years.

![Bar chart showing allocation for Intermediate and Senior军官 between 1981 and 1994.](image)

Figure 6. The Army's PJE Phase II Course Allocations

The decline in the available school allocations coupled with a slight increase in the number of Army joint critical billet requirements has caused the Army to intensely monitor its school allocations. It is important that the Army choose the right officers to become JSOs before investing the more than four years required to become a JSO. Chapter 5 details how many school seats are necessary to support current joint critical billet requirements.

Any analysis of the Army's ability to meet the joint specialty officer provisions of Title IV must include an assessment of the joint commands and agencies requirements. Both the joint promotion objectives and joint specialty provisions of Title IV were designed to increase the quality of officers serving within these commands. Interviews were conducted with six of the joint commands and four defense agencies.

The Army is marginally meeting the demands of the joint commands, as determined from by interviews. Although specific problems
varied between the commands some common trends were noted. These included:

1. Losing officer for twelve weeks to attend JPME. Joint commands believe this training should be done prior to arrival (particularly when assigned to overseas commands).

2. Some commands believe they are not given an equitable share of quality officers assigned by the Army. These arguments are based on the promotion rates for officers currently serving in the command. (This comment was most prevalent within the Defense Agencies.)

3. Commands across the board have cited underlaps of six months to a year in filling key billets.

4. The Army was slow to react to changes in their joint manpower request changes. (Although this comment was directed at the Army, almost all commands acknowledged this was a problem which should be addressed by either JCS or OSD.)

There can be no solution to the Army's problems dealing with Title IV which does not address the concerns of the unified commands and agencies.

Summary

In Summary, this chapter looks at the Army's reaction to the legislative requirements of Title IV. The Army's early failure to understand the intricate details of the legislation caused it numerous problems when forced to comply. With the possibility of having promotion boards dictated to by both the CJCS and Congress, the Army
developed a set of initiatives which would ensure future compliance with Title IV.

These initiatives were bold management decisions which resulted in a paradigm shift within the Army. The Secretary of the Army had established programs which would ensure joint duty assignments would become a part of a successful officers career path. Having looked at the Title IV requirements and the Army’s initiatives, the need to answer the primary question of this thesis becomes clear;

Given the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, can the Army achieve its joint promotion objectives while at the same time meeting the joint specialty officer provisions?

Chapter 5 analyzes the successes and failures of the Army in meeting these requirements and examines past and present joint trends in developing conclusions and recommendations. The methodology described in this chapter will provide a framework upon which this analysis can be formed. It is imperative that this analysis examine all aspects of Title IV and the Army’s joint officer management initiatives.
Endnotes


Ibid.


Department of the Army, Memorandum of Instruction, 19 March 1988.

Total Army Personnel Command Memorandum, Rocket Model Approach to Joint Qualification, 22 April 1989.

Colin Powell Memorandum to the Secretary of the Army dated 6 October 1992.

Secretary of the Army Memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 5 November 1992.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 1130.02, Review of Promotion Board Results by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), 1-7.
CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze how the five elements of Title IV have been affected by the Army's joint officer management initiatives. The focus of the analysis will remain on the JSO. The impact each element of Title IV has on the JSO will be examined. This will permit deductions to be made addressing the Army's potential to succeed in meeting the JSO provisions of the legislation.

The chapter will begin with an analysis of the JSO and of joint critical requirements. The purpose of this is to build a framework which allows the major issues confronting the JSO to be examined. This framework will permit a detailed analysis of current problems confronting the joint specialty provisions of the legislation. Finally, the chapter will examine the successes and failures encountered by the Army in the implementation of its joint officer management initiatives.

What is Joint Specialty Designation?

The element of Title IV referred to as Joint Specialty Designation is the most complex provision of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. It has also been the most difficult for the services to comply with. The complex legislative requirements associated with joint specialty designation challenge even those most familiar with the intricacies of joint officer management.
The creation of the joint specialty category was an emotional issue in Congress. The original language and tone of the legislation dealing with joint specialty designation has been watered down. Congressional records reveal how strong Congress felt about joint specialty designation. In a HASC staff report published in 1989, many of these feelings are made apparent. In this report, part of the rationale for creating the JSO was expressed as follows:

All professional military assignments have special requirements for prior training and experience. Submarine skippers, F-15 fighter pilots, and infantry battalion commanders all require--and are given--careful preparation.

The same should be true for officers serving in Joint Assignments, such as the Joint Staff or the Unified Command headquarters.¹

The authors of the joint specialty designation provisions of Title IV desired to create an elite class of joint officers. These officers were intended to become experts in joint matters as well as within their own service.² To ensure the services nominated only their best officers as joint specialists, strict measures were developed to measure their performance. These strict performance measures are linked to the JSO through promotion objectives, joint critical billet requirements (for both field grade and general officers), and joint education. These linkages make it impossible to separate the joint specialty provisions of Title IV from any of its other provisions.

The services were initially opposed to the creation of the joint specialty designation. They were concerned that the requirement for officers to serve in consecutive joint duty assignments would result in a loss of currency in service doctrine, operations, and capabilities.³ This was a view shared by former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General (Retired) John W. Vessey, Jr., who wrote in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified commands consider service functional expertise the most important prerequisite in selecting officers to fill joint-duty positions, and they consider a separate career specialty unnecessary to ensure that qualified, experienced personnel are selected for joint-duty assignments.¹

Following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it was hoped that JSOs might be the answer to many problems within the joint arena. An area in which it was hoped they might have an immediate impact was in restoring credibility to the joint staff. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger charged, "Advice proffered by the JCS was generally irrelevant, unread, and largely disregarded."⁵ Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (Retired) David Jones would also add, "JCS advice was not crisp, timely, useful, or very influential."⁶

It was comments such as these which prompted Congress to enact the joint specialty provisions of Title IV. Congress hoped the creation of a JSO, specialized in joint matters, would assist in removing service bias from recommendations and improve the overall quality of advice offered by the joint staff. Many felt JSOs had the potential to enhance the capabilities of joint commands and agencies to operate efficiently in a joint environment.

General Depuy was among those who felt the JSO could enhance the capabilities of the staffs on which they served. General Depuy's article describing the five hills JSOs must climb suggests that officers experienced and trained in joint matters will add capabilities to the joint commands and agencies in which they serve. By providing quality advice, increasing strategic awareness, breaking service paradigms and
focusing on jointness, increasing the ability to command and control joint operations, and synchronizing the effort of the land, sea, and air forces, General Depuy believes that JSO will have a significant impact on our ability to operate as a joint team. The hills described by General Depuy represent his vision for the JSO.

What is the future of the JSO?

Missouri Congressman Ike Skelton chairs the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Military Education formed in 1988. He has been a prominent figure in the development of the militaries current joint education process. Additionally, he has played a key role in the development of Title IV legislation. As such, he has become well versed in the requirements and problems associated with the joint specialist.

Congressman Skelton has encouraged the services to recommend improvements in the educational system. While expressing his approval for the progress made by the services, he believes that further improvements are possible in joint education. For example, Congressman Skelton has proposed that a school for advanced military studies be established at the Armed Forces Staff College. Although little action has been taken to follow-up on this proposal, the idea does warrant serious consideration.

Congress Skelton's views on opening a school for advanced military studies demonstrate his interest in looking toward the future. A school for advanced military studies which focuses on "joint matters" could lead to an evolution in the training of the JSO. Officers
educated under a school for advanced military studies would bring a wealth of joint knowledge to the joint commands and agencies.

As the Chairman of the panel on military education, he advocated that the joint specialist become an expert in matters dealing with their respective service as well as those in the joint arena. In his committee’s final published report, the attributes of the joint specialist were listed:

- a thorough knowledge of his or her own service, some knowledge of the other services, experience operating with other services, trust and confidence in other services and the perspective to see the “joint” picture. Ultimately, a JSO must “understand the capabilities and limitations, doctrine and culture of the services.”

This description of a joint specialist has been useful in providing a framework from which joint specialty designation policies and procedures could be established. However, in today’s rapidly changing military environment, a better definition is required.

How are Joint Critical Requirements Determined?

A new definition must go beyond this the current broad framework definition and encompass the specific attributes of a JSO. These attributes must be considered when designating positions to be designated as joint critical duty assignments. Recent attempts by the joint staff to develop a new JSO definition have been unsuccessful.

Title IV requires that there be a minimum of 1,000 joint critical billets on the JDAL. This represents less than 15 percent of the overall requirements contained on the JDAL. These requirements were apportioned to all joint commands and agencies on a fair share basis. Each joint command and agency must distribute its joint critical billet
requirements among its total number of JDAs. For example, CENTCOM has a total of 500 joint billets, their fair-share distribution of joint critical billets was determined to be 12 percent. This meant assigning the joint critical designation to 60 of their 500 joint duty positions.

While this system has ensured compliance with the Title IV requirement to maintain 1,000 critical billets on the JDAL, it is the responsibility of each joint command and agency to determine which JDAs will designated joint critical. This results in a lack of consistency in the type of positions selected to become joint critical. For example, in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where 70 percent of its positions are coded for military intelligence officers, the command has no choice but to select these positions as joint critical.

According to Colonel Frank Cushing, Chief of Personnel, for DIA: "The current system of designating joint critical positions limits DIA's ability to place the right officer in the right job." According to Colonel Cushing, his actual joint critical requirement represented less than one-fourth of the number he was required to maintain. Colonel Cushing explained, "An officer's experience and background in 'intelligence matters' was much more important than his experience in 'joint matters' in most joint critical positions within DIA."\(^{12}\)

Over 50 percent of the joint critical positions on the joint duty assignment list today are designated for officers with combat support skills. These positions are coded primarily for military intelligence (MI), communications (SC), and foreign area officers (FAO).\(^{13}\) In contrast, there are only two joint critical positions designated joint critical which require infantry officers. Less than 30
percent of the joint critical positions currently on the JDAL are coded for Combat Arms (CBT ARMS) officers. A breakdown of the skills which make up the majority of joint critical requirements is shown in Figure 7.

![Diagram of joint critical billet composition](image)

Figure 7. Joint Critical Billet Composition. Note: Combat Arms skills account for less than 30 percent of the total joint critical requirements on the JDAL.

While there are certainly cases where officers trained in combat support skills could fill joint critical positions, generally these officers are trained in technical fields which do not require a broad understanding of doctrine or the capabilities and limitations of the other services as described above. The combat arms branches of the services are more inclined to fill many of these positions.

Two examples of why a more encompassing definition is required can be seen by examining two billets currently on the joint duty assignment list. The first one calls for an Army colonel to command a signal brigade in Europe. This command is not unlike many of the signal brigades assigned to other Army commands. It was made joint critical because, according to the J-1 representative from EUCOM (European Command), the CINC had determined that this position was absolutely
critical to the success of EUCOM in carrying out its mission. While other reasons for designating this billet joint critical might exist, the importance of the position should not be used as the basis for designating a position joint critical.

A second example exists in a joint billet in Korea. The billet requires an Army colonel, military policeman, to serve both as commander and the provost marshall for U.S. Forces Korea. While this too is an important billet, it is unlikely that the officer filling this position need more joint training than a provost marshall position not falling under a joint command. In both of these examples, officers who did not possess the joint specialty designation were found to be best qualified for the job. Waivers had to be signed by the Secretary of Defense prior to either officer being assigned to these essential positions. Both positions have since been made non-critical on the joint duty assignment list, but they each serve as an example of the problem which results when essential positions are confused with joint critical positions.

Increased exposure to joint operations and improvements made in current education systems give further evidence that the definition of a JSO should be reconsidered. The original legislation stated that officers selected for the joint specialty would be trained in and oriented toward joint military matters. Although appropriate in 1986, today’s educational system, coupled with an increased involvement in joint operations, has resulted in many more officers being trained in and oriented toward joint matters.

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation gives specific guidance on (1) the number of joint critical positions the services must fill, (2)
the criteria for becoming a joint specialty officers, and (3) the standards by which a joint specialist will be measured. The legislation is much less clear in stating what purpose the JSO will serve or how they will be used by the joint commands and agencies. Congress admits that the specific requirements of joint specialty designation (i.e., 1,000 joint critical billets) were not based on specific data, but were reasonable estimates made by its authors. The lack of specific guidance has resulted in each joint command and agency adopting its own designation criteria in determining which positions it should designate as joint critical.

The ability of the joint commands and agencies to determine which positions should be designated joint critical, offers them a certain degree of flexibility. However, without clear guidance on what kinds of positions should be designated joint critical, this flexibility often results in the random and inconsistent designation of joint critical billets. While some flexibility is good, a negative aspect of the lack of guidance has been the emergence of what is best described as a shell game. The game involves moving the joint critical designation from positions which are vacant to positions already filled by JSOs. This allows the newly vacated positions to be filled by the best qualified officer rather than the first available JSO. Over the last three years, nearly 20 percent of the positions designated as joint critical have been changed to non-critical.

When the Army had an abundance of JSOs it routinely assigned these officers to non-critical positions. Today, the declining population of JSOs causes the Army to exercise caution in assigning JSOs
into non-critical positions. Fewer JSOs being assigned to joint non-critical positions, limits the joint commands and agencies ability to play the shell game.

**What is the Problem?**

Without question the Army, along with the other services, have made numerous advancements in our ability to operate in a joint environment. Following Operation Desert Storm, General (Retired) Norman Schwarzkopf, General (Retired) Colin Powell, and Congressman Ike Skelton are but a few of those who have praised the services for their ability to operate in a joint environment. Two questions which must be answered are: First, how has the JSO impacted on the military’s ability to climb the five hills described by General Depuy? Second, if the JSO hasn’t had a role, what provisions have contributed to the military’s success.

The importance of these questions is magnified when considering that while the Army has successfully improved its ability to operate in the joint arena, its JSO population has not. The Army’s JSO population has failed to meet the expectations of both Congress and the joint commands and agencies over the past five years. This failure is manifested by the Army’s inability to meet joint critical billet requirements and the failure to meet joint promotion objectives in each of the last five years.

These failures have left the Army with a dilemma, which up to this point it has been unable to solve. That is a dilemma which pits “quantity versus quality.” Failure by the Army to produce sufficient numbers of JSOs, while at the same time meeting its joint promotions
objectives, will result in intense scrutiny by both Congress and the joint commands and agencies. Up to this point, the Army has been unable to satisfactorily address either of these issues.

Army Efforts to Address the Issue of "Quantity"

This point is made clear when analyzing the Army's early efforts to create a pool of JSOs. The Army recommended more than 7000 officers for JSO designation during the transition (Fiscal years 1988 and 1989). Aware that the stringent requirements of JSO designation would take effect following this period, the Army boarded large numbers of JSOs to meet its joint critical requirements. The recommendations of these boards were made without regard to how JSO promotion comparisons would be affected.

By selecting large quantities of JSOs, the Army was successful in its short term JSO problems. This allowed the Army to become very selective in assigning officers to joint critical assignments. Another result has been the development of a complacency in the Army in its management of JSOs, treating them as if they were an inexhaustible resource. The Army was left with thousands more JSOs than it could sustain following the expiration of the transition provisions.

Today, the Army is limited in the number of JSOs it can produce by the number of officers who can graduate from PJE Phase II training in a given year. In 1994, 348 officers graduated from joint programs of education which award credit for PJE Phase II. This means that following the completion of a joint tour of duty, the Army would have 348 officers eligible for consideration by a JSO board. Most of the officers designated as JSOs in 1994, attended JPME in 1992.
This illustrates why the retention of officers selected to receive PJE Phase II training is important. The limited number of training opportunities means officers sent to receive training must complete a joint tour and be selected as a JSO before they are able to fill a joint critical requirement. An officer who leaves the service prior to filling a joint critical assignment, represents a lost asset to the Army. The challenge presented to Army personnel managers is determining which officers must attend PJE Phase II training in 1995 who will then be available to fill a joint critical requirement in 1999.

The following example illustrates how difficult this is for personnel managers to determine. Of the 348 officers which graduated from PJE Phase II in 1991, less than 135 were recommended for JSO designation in 1994. Of the 348 that received training in 1991 more than fifty percent have either retired from the service, failed to complete a full joint tour of duty, or failed to perform well in their joint duty assignment. Of those that were competitive, the board selected 132 for designation as joint specialists. The remainder were felt by the board to be promotion risks or lacking the necessary qualifications for nomination to joint critical assignments. The Army cannot afford this kind of return on its investment of officers sent to attend PJE Phase II training. The JSO selection rate will improve as the Army continues to tighten its selection criteria for those officers selected to attend PJE Phase II training. Still the low selection rate reflects the problems associated with a lengthy qualification process for officers who are nearing retirement eligibility.
Figure 8 illustrates how the total number of JSOs in the Army has declined since the end of the transition period. This figure includes the limited number (approximately 400 JSOs) of officers designated as JSOs following the transition period.

![Graph showing JSO population decline](image)

Figure 8. The Army's JSO Population. Note: The Army's JSO population has declined each year since the end of the transition period in 1989.

A side effect of the Army's transition boards was that it left many within the Army unprepared to deal with JSO shortages. Army personnel managers had become accustomed to having large numbers of JSOs to choose from when filling joint critical assignments. This problem has become even more magnified because of the effects of the drawdown, which has depleted the number of JSOs in the inventory even faster than expected.

In 1990, the Army had more than 18 JSOs for every joint critical requirement; today that ratio has slipped to having less than eight JSOs for each joint critical requirement. In many specialized career fields, this ratio gets even worse. It has become increasingly more difficult for the Army to fill all of its joint critical requirements as the number of JSOs continues to decline.
The Army was aware of its JSO requirements prior to conducting its transition boards. It did not possess the experience to know how many JSOs it would need to fill those requirements. There are two provisions contained within Title IV which go into determining the Army's total JSO requirements. These are its share of the total number of joint critical billets and its requirement to fill 50 percent of its share of the joint duty assignment list with JSOs or JSO nominees.

The first half of the requirement was not difficult to determine. In 1988, the Army had 376 joint critical positions to fill. At that time the Army was required to fill 80 percent of those positions with JSOs. Beginning 1 January 1994, Title IV required that 100 percent of these positions be filled with JSOs.

The requirement for filling one-half of the JDAL with JSOs or JSO nominees was much more difficult to determine. In addition to filling one-half of the JDAL with JSOs or JSO nominees, the legislation further stipulates that no more than 25 percent of that one-half may be JSO nominees without PJE Phase II credit. This restriction has come to be known as the "1/4 COS Rule," because it involves COS officers. This is because only COS officers can be designated as JSO nominees without completing PJE Phase II.

In 1988, this meant the Army was required to fill at least 50 percent of its 2900 joint duty assignment list billets (1450 billets) with JSOs or JSO nominees. Of the 1450 billets which then must be filled with JSOs or JSO nominees, no more than 382 can be filled by COS officers who have not attended PJE Phase II.
A testament to how difficult these computations can become is in the fact that they are being incorrectly reported in the Secretary of Defense’s annual report to the President and Congress. The exact method for making these computations is very complex and could easily be misinterpreted when reading the legislation. After passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DoD spent a great deal of effort interpreting the various requirements of the Title IV legislation. It is often useful to look back at early publications which describe the requirements of Title IV than is possible within the legislation. One such document is JCS Admin Pub 1.2. This publication gives a more detailed description on how to compute the requirement for filling 50 percent of the JDAL with JSOs and JSO nominees. The requirement reads as follows:

Approximately 50 percent of the total JDA billets must be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. Officers who have a designated critical occupational specialty may be designated JSO nominees before completion of JPME; however, only 25 percent of the JDA billets requiring JSO or JSO nominees may be filled by such COS JSO nominees. For example, out of a total of 9,000 JDA billets, 4,500 (50 percent) must be filled with JSOs or JSO nominees. Up to 1,125 COS JSO nominees may be counted toward meeting the 50 percent fill requirement. At least 3,375 additional JDAs must be filled by JSOs or nominees who are JPME graduates. Although the 25 percent limitation for COS JSO nominees is an overall DoD requirement, each Service should use the same figure for planning purposes.  

Table 1 illustrates how the fiscal year 94 annual report fails to take into account the one-fourth COS rule in computing the JSO fill rates. When computed correctly, only the Army meets the requirements of filling 50 percent of the JDAL with JSOs or JSO nominees. By not accurately reporting the JSO fill rates, the seriousness of the problems surrounding the JSO has failed to receive the recognition it deserves.
### TABLE 1

FISCAL YEAR 94 ANNUAL REPORT DISCREPANCIES

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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</table>

Note: Row 1 = total positions; row 2 = number of filled positions; row 3 = % of filled positions; row 4 = JSOs and JSO nominees serving in joint; row 5 = % of JSOs and JSO nominees serving in joint; row 6 = JSO nominees without PJF serving in joint (25% of line 4 is maximum allowable); row 7 = % of nominees filling positions without PJF (25% maximum).

The above table shows two errors in the fiscal year 94 annual report. First, failing to take into account the one-fourth COS rule, and second, it bases its JSO fill percentages from those filled positions (row 2), not the total number of positions (row 1). The result is that the Army is the only service to fill 50 percent of its joint duty billets with JSOs or JSO nominees (row 5).

The Army has tried to accurately determine the number of JSOs required to meet joint requirements. The Army believes that it could meet all of its joint critical requirements if it could maintain a 9 to 1 ratio (JSOs to JSO requirements). This ratio was developed by the Army using the formula in Figure 9. The formula used in this figure is based solely on the Army’s ability to fill its joint critical requirements. It does not take into account the requirement to fill one-half of the JDAL with JSOs or JSO nominees. It is the Army’s belief.
that a 9 to 1 ratio would provide sufficient flexibility within its JSO population to prevent sending JSOs to back-to-back joint critical assignments.23

<table>
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<th>358 Joint Critical Requirements</th>
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<td>2.8 Average Joint Tour Length</td>
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<tr>
<td>128 Joint Critical Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 9 to 1 Ratio required, to fill 1 critical billet
Need 1152 JSOs to meet requirements
(4.5 year mean in-grade average)

Army must make 256 JSOs each year

Figure 9. Current Army JSO Requirements. Note: Ratio developed by PERSCOM based on officer strengths and availability.

The Army’s JSO population will continue to decline in the coming years. It has become a more senior group of officers than it has ever been. Year Group (YG) 74 officers will be looked at for promotion to colonel in FY 95. After this board, more than two-thirds of the remaining JSOs in the Army’s inventory will be either Colonels or have been non-selected for promotion to Colonel.24 Figure 10 reflects how this population is becoming more and more senior.

Figure 10. Current Army JSO Requirements. Note: YG 78 marks the first year unaffected by the transition boards.
The decline in the Army's JSO population can be explained by two phenomenon. First, the downsizing of the Army has forced many JSOs to leave the service. This process has been accelerated by the Army's use of selective early retirement boards to help in achieving its drawdown goals. The second factor contributing to the declining JSO population has been the Army's development of tougher JSO selection criteria. The Army has been forced to become more selective in recommending officers to hold the joint specialty designation. Over the past three years the Army's JSO selection rate has averaged less than 50 percent. This translates to less than 125 JSOs designated each year.

An examination of the Army's current joint critical requirements reveals that the majority of these requirements are at the grade of lieutenant colonel. Figure 4 portrayed the Army's current joint critical billet requirements. Because more than half of the Army's joint critical requirements are at the grade of lieutenant colonel, less time is available to qualify those as JSOs.

In 1992, more than one-half of the Army's joint critical requirements were at the grade of colonel. The joint commands and agencies have shifted their joint critical positions over the past three years as shown in Figure 11. They did this because Army shortages of JSOs were limiting their ability to fill the billets they had originally designated as being critical. Further complicating this matter was the legislative provision requiring that by 1 January 1994 all joint critical positions be filled with JSOs. Many positions have been left vacant while replacements can be found. The result has been that joint

80
commands have shifted the joint critical designation to their least important positions.

Figure 11. Shift in Joint Critical Requirements from Colonel to Lieutenant Colonel. Note: The number of LTC requirements on the JDAL has risen over the last three years as the number of COL requirements has declined.

Increasing lieutenant colonel joint critical requirements, causes the Army to qualify JSOs at the rank of major. This gives the Army less time to create a sufficient pool of JSOs and makes sending officers to consecutive joint assignments a necessity. This requirement is often at odds with Title IV's intent. Which as stated previously, is to provide JSOs equally competent in both joint and their own service. JCS Admin Pub 1.2 states that:

The joint specialist is not expected to be a career "purple suiter" whose military service is spent in the joint arena. All officers are expected to maintain qualification in their military occupational specialty. However, a JSO is expected to maintain a high level of knowledge of joint matters to provide the greatest value to both the joint arena and his or her Service.29

This presents a difficult challenge for the joint specialist. To remain competitive an officer must command at the battalion level and attend senior service college. These requirements make it difficult for
an officer to maintain the high level of knowledge in joint matters outlined above. The problem becomes one of timing. Figure 12 depicts the career path of a combat arms officer who has been selected, due course, for promotion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CGSC</th>
<th>Assignment to Troops</th>
<th>Assignment to Joint</th>
<th>Battalion Command</th>
<th>Army Staff</th>
<th>SSC</th>
<th>Brigade Command</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. JSO Career Progression (Due Course Officer). Source: Briefing prepared by U.S. Army Personnel Command for the Chief of Staff of the Army, May 1994.

Current Army assignment practices would have an officer assigned much in the way it has been shown above. The problem is trying to determine when an officer should serve in a joint critical assignment. Pressured career managers often must send officers to consecutive joint assignments. According to officials at PERSCOM, once officers are designated as a JSO, only selection to command will prevent continued assignments to fill joint critical positions. As the above timeline points out, officers selected for command may never have the opportunity to serve in a joint critical position. The timeline demonstrates how the first opportunity many officers will have to serve in a joint critical assignment may not come until after 24 years of service. Of course, officers with 24 years time-in-service will often retire rather than move again.

Once an officer has been selected and assigned as a JSO the timeline shown in Figure 13 changes dramatically. PERSCOM maintains that officers will not be assigned to joint critical positions, if that
assignment prevents them from assuming command or attending senior
service colleges. However, the dwindling JSO population causes more and
more officers to be assigned to back-to-back joint assignments.

Figure 13 demonstrates how the timeline of an officer changes when JSOs
are assigned to fill joint critical requirements. Once an officer is
designated a JSO and not selected for command or SSC, it is likely the
remainder of their career will be spent assigned to joint critical
positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CGSC</th>
<th>Assignment to Troops</th>
<th>Assignment to Joint</th>
<th>Assignment to Joint Critical Position</th>
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<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

Figure 13. JSO Progression When Assigned to Back-to-Back Joint
Assignments. Source: Briefing prepared by U.S. Army Personnel Command
for the Chief of Staff of the Army, May 1994.

As pointed out earlier, the majority of joint critical
requirements are at the grade of lieutenant colonel. This leaves very
little time for an officer to become a JSO and then serve in a joint
critical assignment. Although it was not intended that JSOs only serve
in joint critical assignments, a large number of joint critical
assignments at the grade of LTC ensures this takes place.

**Army Efforts to Address the Issue of "Quality"**

Prior to beginning our analysis of joint promotion statistics,
it should be noted that this is another area in which there is some
question as to how the statistics are being reported to Congress. Title
IV states
Officers who have the joint specialty are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are serving on, or who have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force.

The rules for computing JSO promotion statistics are very complex. Much of the confusion surrounding whether or not JSOs should be counted both in the serving-in and have served-in categories as other promotion categories. In its annual report to Congress the military has only reported promotion rates for the "total" number of JSOs. Reporting "total" JSO promotion rates allows the Army to count its highest promotion potential officers in its JSO statistics. In spite of the fact that these officers will not serve in joint critical assignments.

The joint staff attempted to clarify this issue by publishing "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1330.02" in January of 1994. In these instructions, the Chairman directed that JSOs be considered in total and that the total would be compared with the "serving-in" and "have served-in" headquarters staff promotion rates. These instructions also contradict Title IV legislation where, in the Annual Report to Congress requirements, it specifies that JSOs will be reported in the same manner joint staff promotion rates are reported.

The Army has failed JSO promotion rates to colonel in each of the last five years. The Army’s biggest problem in meeting joint promotion objectives can be attributed to its JSO population. More than 85 percent of the Army’s JSOs were designated during the transition period. The officers selected by early JSO boards were done so based upon their potential to serve in a joint critical position.25 The result was a large number of officers selected in very junior grades.
Many of these officers have performed extremely well in joint critical assignments but have not remained competitive for promotion to colonel. Colonel Charles Henning worked in the Department of the Army, Secretariat at the time of the JSO transition boards. His involvement with the JSO designation process led him to make the following observations, "at the grade of major, officers were selected who could fill critical requirements and not for their promotion potential to colonel."30 Figure 14 reflects how JSOs have promoted as compared to those officers serving and who had previously served on the Army staff.31 JSOs who are currently serving in joint critical assignments have not promoted at a rate above 20 percent in the last three years.

![Graph](image)

Figure 14. Promotion Rates of JSOs versus the Army Staff Average. Note: Promotion rates for officers on the Army Staff and JSOs have declined each year since 1989 with the exception of 1994.

The last area in which the joint specialty category could face difficult challenges in the future deals with filling its general officer joint critical billet requirements. On 1 January 1994, one-half of all general officer joint requirements became joint critical. More
than 95 percent of the general officers designated as JSOs were done so during the transition period. As transition JSOs leave the service, the Army must ensure it qualifies its high promotion potential officers early in their careers. There are no provisions for an officer to meet the education requirements of JSO designation after selection as a general officer. At the present time this remains a long-term issue, but failure to qualify our future generals could have serious repercussions.

Army initiatives have had a significant impact in meeting promotion rates in the categories of the joint staff and other joint duty. The JSO is the one promotion category in which Army efforts have thus far failed to achieve results. In the Secretary of the Army’s letter to the Chairman, dated 5 November 1993, he said the following about the Joint Specialty Designation,

The Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) category is unique from a joint promotion objective standpoint since all JSOs, by law, count in promotion statistics for as long as they are on active duty, regardless of category (Serving-In, Have Served), or have never served.

The Army, as did all of the Services, boarded a large number of officers for JSO during the transition period allowed by Congress. This was to ensure that there were enough to fill joint-critical billets and keep one-half of the JDAL filled with JSO/JSO nominees. This large number of JSOs has limited the Army’s ability to meet the joint promotion objectives. While attrition from both voluntary and involuntary separation programs is rapidly reducing the JSO population, there are other initiatives underway that will improve the quality of JSOs in the future.

The “Early Infusion” program mentioned above will provide a highly talented pool of officers from which to send to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and then board for JSO at the earliest opportunity. The Army will also be more selective on future JSO Boards, ensuring that the right mix of high promotion potential officers with the necessary skills to fill joint critical billets are selected for JSO. That effort has already begun as evidenced by the most recent JSO Board. There were 121 highly
qualified officers selected for JSO from a pool of over 200. These steps are long-term solutions that will improve the joint duty promotion objectives within the next three to five years.\textsuperscript{32}

Of significance in the Secretary of the Army's remarks is that he states it will take three to five years for the Army to meet the JSO provisions of the legislation. This time has almost passed, and the Army is experiencing more problems than ever with the joint specialty category. It is also important that problems in dealing with the JSO are not unique to the Army. In many instances the Army is better prepared than the other services to meet all of the joint specialty provisions of Title IV. These arguments played prominently in the formulation of the legislative requirements for the JSO. Much experience has been gained throughout the DoD and Congress since the time many of the comments were made.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Army has been unable to meet the joint specialty provisions of Title IV, despite its efforts over the past several years. The reason for this failure can foremost be attributed to the Army's lack of commitment to Title IV in its early years. The Army's inability to understand the intricacies of the joint specialty provision has also contributed to the Army's lack of success.

The purpose behind the creation of the joint specialist has been lost amidst the overwhelming number of elaborate rules designed to ensure service compliance. This chapter examines how the rules governing the implementation of Title IV have affected Army joint officer management procedures. Though the Army has modified many of its
joint assignment practices, it still is unable to meet many of the joint specialty provisions of the legislation.

It is important to note that the other services have fared no better in meeting the joint specialty provisions of the legislation than has the Army. In many instances, as previously explained in the one-quarter COS provision, the Army has performed better than the other services. The problems surrounding the joint specialty provisions of the legislation exist throughout the services.

Although the joint specialty requirements established within Title IV are directed at the services, a key to their successful implementation rests with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Currently, responsibility for the JSO has not been given to any single individual or agency. This is the primary reason why so many of the problems surrounding the joint specialty officer have gone unnoticed and unreported.

In order for the joint specialty officer to live up to the expectations described earlier by General Depuy, it must be determined what purpose this officer is to serve in today's rapidly changing joint environment.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Memo, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, December 24, 1984.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 2-12.


9 Skelton addresses the MECC,” The Joint Professional Military Education Newsletter, JPME On-Line, Mar 93, 2.


13 Joint Duty Assignment List 94-3

14 Personnel officer, J-1, European Command, telephonic interview by author.


18US Army, Total Army Personnel Command (TAPC), Operating Instruction 15-1, Joint Specialty Officer Standing Board Instructions, 15 October 1988, 5.


21Public Law 99-433.

22Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Officer Management", JCS Admin Pub 1.2, 30 June 1989, IV-3.

23Captain Kurt Fedors.

24Data taken from briefing slide prepared by US Army Personnel Command to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, January, 1995

25Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Duty Assignment List 94-3.

26Ibid.

27Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Duty Assignment List 92-1.

28The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Admin Pub 1.2, 30 June 1989, III-6.

29Operating instruction 15-1.


31Multiple sources, annual reports to congress 1989 to 1994.

32Memo, Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, 5 November 1992.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Title IV has and will continue to impact on officer personnel management policies in the Army. While the Army has demonstrated its commitment to meeting the intricacies of Title IV, many of the legislation’s toughest challenges may still lie ahead. The primary aim of this thesis has been to identify these challenges, and make recommendations on how they should be met.

This chapter addresses three major areas. They are: conclusions, recommendations, and areas requiring further study. The research and analysis done during this thesis has led to several conclusions. The conclusions made as a result of this thesis will highlight those areas which will require attention in the future. The conclusions will have taken into account the feasibility, acceptability, and supportability of current Title IV legislative requirements.

After addressing each of the thesis’s conclusions, recommendations will be made. These recommendations will be broken into two categories. First, those directed toward the Army and its continuing efforts to comply with the spirit and intent of the Title IV legislative requirements. Next, recommendations will be directed to the Department of Defense. These recommendations will incorporate those out of the Army’s control (Policies and procedures which require approval at
above the Secretary of the Army level). Finally, the chapter will examine areas in which further study is required in the joint officer management area.

Conclusions

The evidence collected during the research of this thesis has led to the following conclusions.

1. The Army's current joint policies will not enable it to meet all Title IV provisions.

2. Current trends indicate that the Army may face tougher challenges in the future while attempting to comply with Title IV.

3. Complex Title IV reporting requirements are difficult to understand and harder to interpret.

4. Title IV has improved the quality of officers currently serving-in joint duty assignments.

5. There are likely to be very few substantive changes to Title IV requirements.

Each of these requirements will be discussed in greater detail below:

First Conclusion. The Army's current joint officer management policies are not sufficient for it to successfully meet all of the requirements of Title IV. The joint initiatives adopted by the Army in November of 1992 had the immediate effect of improving Army promotion rates to colonel.

The infusion of high promotion potential lieutenant colonels is the primary reason for the Army's success in improving its promotion rates. The assignment of these officers has resulted in improved joint promotion statistics for officers who are currently serving-in joint
assignments. By improving its joint promotion statistics, the Army successfully demonstrated its commitment to Title IV and removed the pressure being placed upon it to show progress.

Second Conclusion. Current trends suggest that the problems experienced by the Army in complying with the provisions of Title IV will get worse before they improve. The Army's declining JSO population indicates that its ability to meet joint critical requirements will not improve in the near future. Growing requirements for JSOs at the grade of LTC means the Army must train and educate officers earlier in their careers to meet these requirements.

Promotion rates for JSOs also show few signs of improving. It is too early to determine if the Army's initiative to assign high promotion potential majors (previously selected below-the-zone) to joint assignments will improve JSO promotion results. Analysis does indicate that the number of majors being sent to joint cannot fix both the have served-in promotion category and the JSO promotion category.

Additionally, current officer career timelines preclude high promotion potential officers from returning to joint critical assignments. If these officers cannot be assigned to joint critical assignments, is the Army meeting Title IV's intent? Current policy would have the best JSOs in the Army never being utilized in a joint critical assignment.

Third Conclusion. This is a product of the analysis into the provisions of Title IV dealing with the JSO. This analysis revealed that the joint specialty provisions of Title IV are often misunderstood. The rules for managing the careers of JSOs are often out of date or non-
existent. A lack of guidance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense has left the services to develop their own guidelines. The policies adopted by the different services are often inconsistent and rarely in the best interest of the joint community.

The provisions in Title IV which outline the JSO reporting requirements to Congress are difficult to understand and in places contradictory. Evidence of inaccurate reporting in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress is evidence of this fact. In each of the last two years, errors in reports to Congress have been noted. In each case an understanding of the intent of Congress demonstrates how these errors misrepresent the current status of the JSO. For example, comparing the Army's "total" JSO promotion rate with the promotion rate for officers currently "serving-in" Army staff assignments is not a fair comparison.

Given that some of the language within the Title IV legislation is vague, it clearly states that JSOs are to be reported in the same manner as joint staff officers. This requires examining JSOs in two categories, those currently serving and those who had previously served. If JSOs serving-in joint critical assignments were compared to officers serving-in the Army Staff assignments (perhaps a more realistic comparison) a huge disparity would be revealed. As was noted previously on the latest Colonel Army promotion board, JSO's were promoted at a rate of slightly better than 10 percent, nearly 30 percent below officers currently serving on the Army staff.

The same is true when computing whether 50 percent of the JDAL is filled with JSOs or JSO nominees. Inconsistent accounting methods
hide the fact that the Army, as well as the other services are having difficulties meeting their joint critical requirements. This will continue to be a problem in the future.

Fourth Conclusion. The overall quality of the officers being assigned to joint assignments has improved. In Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s memorandum to the Secretary of the Army in September of 1992, General Powell spoke candidly about the Army’s failure to comply with the requirements of Title IV. This memorandum served as a catalyst for the Army’s efforts to implement change.

The Army has received a great deal of praise for its efforts. The success of the Army to demonstrate such a marked improvement has not come without a price. According to Brigadier General Frederick Wong:

It is my charter to ensure that officers with high promotion potential are assigned to joint duty positions and that filling these joint duty requirements remains the Army’s top priority. Joint promotion rates over the last two years attest to the fact that we are doing a good job at getting our high promotion potential officers to joint assignments. Nothing comes without a price however, there must always be a bill payer. Officers who successfully commanded battalions are the officers who have the greatest promotion potential; these officers represent a limited resource.¹

General Wong’s comments reflect the Army’s decision to send a large number of officers who commanded battalions to joint. This has impacted on other areas within the Army that longer receive these officers.

The joint officer management initiatives adopted by the Army have been successful in allowing the Army to meet many of the intricate details of Title IV. The Army has still had problems meeting the joint specialty and “have served” provisions of the legislation. It is clear
that if the military is to meet the joint specialty and "have served" provisions of Title IV, changes must be made.

The Army's joint officer management initiatives have broken service paradigms with regard to traditionally accepted officer assignment practices. The promotion rates for officers serving in joint duty assignments have more than tripled over the past three years. The same is true for officers serving on the joint staff. This has come at a heavy price to the Army. While joint promotion rates have risen, the promotion rates for officers serving on the Army staff have declined.

At the same time, the number of JSOs in the Army has continued to decline. Shortages cause officers who hold the joint specialty designation to serve in back-to-back joint duty assignments. This is a policy which goes against one of the fundamental qualities of a JSO, that of being experienced in his own service.

**Fifth Conclusion.** The research conducted in this subject suggests that although changes to the legislation are possible, substantive changes are unlikely. Congress will resist making large changes, unless it believes the services have made every effort to comply. Because service policies are often perceived to be in the best interest of the service as opposed to the joint community, this will be difficult to prove.

Additionally, Title IV is still viewed as a huge success by many within Congress. The saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will apply to any major changes requested by the services. However, Congressman Skelton and others have expressed an interest in receiving input on ways to improve the legislation. Recommendations for change
which are supported by all of the services and which are shown to be in
the interest of the joint community have a good chance of being
considered. It is important that changes be in the best interest of all
members of the joint community and not just the individual services.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are meant to improve the Army’s
ability to meet the challenges of Title IV. These recommendations
should become essential elements of the Army’s joint officer management
program. The implementation of these recommendations will enhance the
Army’s ability to provide officers prepared to meet the challenges of
the joint commands and agencies they are sent to support.

The recommendations which have been developed as a result of
this thesis can be broken into two distinct categories. The first
consists of those recommendations which should be addressed at levels
above the Secretary of the Army. The second set of recommendations will
be directed at the Army. The recommendations will not be listed in any
given priority.

The two sets of recommendations are not dependent upon one
another. It is important that recommendations be implemented at all
levels within the military. The first set of recommendations which are
to be addressed at levels above the Secretary of the Army, will for
simplicity within this thesis be directed to the Secretary of Defense.
Some of the recommendations will most likely be handled within the joint
staff.

The following recommendations should be implemented by the
Secretary of Defense:
1. The Secretary of Defense should designate an office responsible for implementing policies and procedures which affect the joint specialist.

2. Once responsibility for the joint specialist has been identified, guidance should be published which specifically addresses career guidelines, selection criteria, military education requirements, and utilization procedures IAW paragraph 661(d)(2)(e).

3. The Secretary of Defense should examine current structure of its Annual Report to Congress and correct areas which have been reported incorrectly. An explanation should accompany those areas which do not meet the requirements of Title IV.

4. The Secretary of Defense should convene a panel whose mission is to determine the roles and responsibilities of a JSO. The panel should consist of representatives from each of the military departments and the joint commands and agencies.

5. The Secretary of Defense should work with Congress to reduce the number of joint critical requirements on the JDAL. These requirements should be structured to meet the needs of the joint commands and should therefore be done in conjunction with recommendation number four.

The following recommendations should be adopted by the Army:

1. The Army must update Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization. This educates officers and provides a framework for officers to manage their careers. The current publication is out of date and fails to address joint officer management issues.
2. Another area the Army should address deals with its joint officer management system. This system must be updated and address how the Army intends to meet all of the requirements of Title IV in the future. It must revise its assessment made in 1992 which said it would be able to meet all the provisions of Title IV in three to five years. As previously stated research suggest that current policies will at no time enable it to meet all of the provisions of Title IV.

3. Next, the Army should designate an assignment branch with responsibility to manage the assignment of JSOs to joint critical assignments. The shortage of JSOs will amplify the importance of this recommendation. This branch would be capable of looking at all JSOs when finding the best one to meet a joint critical requirement, as opposed to current practices which make this an individual assignment branch responsibility.

4. The Army should take steps to provide incentives to officers who work in joint critical positions. The dramatic decline in the JSO population within the Army must be curtailed. A primary reason for the decline in the JSO population is that JSO are poorly treated at a point in their career when a retirement option is available. Incentives must be found which encourage officers to remain on active duty to fill these joint critical assignments (a high percentage of these joint critical assignments are overseas, many in remote areas).

5. Finally, the Army must continue to improve its efforts to send those officer's most qualified for selection as JSOs to PJE Phase II schooling. It is important for the Army to remember that the JSO
selection process should begin when officers are selected to attend PJE Phase II not when a JSO board is convened.

The recommendations made above constitutes a framework which will enable the Army to meet the provisions of Title IV while at the same time providing better qualified officer to the joint commands and agencies. If the Army's joint officer management program is to become successful then the Army must adopt a strategy to deal with the joint specialist.

The Department of Defense has faced numerous problems in adopting its current joint officer management philosophy. It's continued success will rely on how it deals with the joint specialty officer problem. Recent studies undertaken by the Department of Defense fail to take the JSO into account. They address ancillary issues which may delay or prolong the problems associated with joint specialty designation, but they do not address the issue.

Areas Requiring Further Study

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols act will present numerous challenges to the military in the future. The Army must continue to modify its joint officer management policies, in order to meet the requirements of Title IV. The Army is not alone in trying to comply with the provisions of Title IV.

The Department of Defense has initiated several studies which deal with the complex issues of Title IV. While a great deal of time and effort has gone into these studies, preliminary indications are that the results of these efforts will fail to adequately address the problems relating to the joint specialist.
The two studies with the greatest potential to impact on the joint officer management policies of the services are the Joint Duty Assignment List Study and the CJCS Joint Professional Military Education Review. Each of these studies are scheduled for completion in the spring of 1995. But each should give some indication of the direction which the Department of Defense will pursue in the future.

Close attention should be given to what impact these studies will have in the future. It is unclear how these studies will impact on the role of the JSO. Future studies should examine how these studies will impact on the joint specialist.
Endnotes

¹Brigadier General Frederick Wong, Director, OPMD, Total Army Personnel Command, interview by author, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 3 October 1994.
Figure 1. Organization of the Department of Defense.
APPENDIX B

President

Secretary of Defense

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

U.S. Atlantic Command * ACOM
U.S. Central Command * CENTCOM
U.S. European Command * EUCOM
U.S. Pacific Command * PACOM
U.S. Southern Command * SOUTHCOM
U.S. Space Command ** SPACECOM
U.S. Transportation Command ** TRANSCOM
U.S. Special Operations Command ** SOCOM
U.S. Strategic Command ** STRATCOM

* Regional Commands - ACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM
** Functional Commands - SPACECOM, TRANSCOM, SOCOM, STRATCOM

Figure 2. Unified Command Organization Plan.
## APPENDIX C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation or Directive</th>
<th>Key Changes in legislation</th>
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| 1947 National Security Act (NSA) | - Created Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
- Created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (limited to maximum of 100 officers).  
- Created first unified command plan. |
| 1949 Key West Agreement | - Created Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
- Increased maximum number of officers allowed on the Joint Staff to 210. |
| Reorganization Plan of 1953 | - Added responsibilities given to OSD  
- 6 assistant Secretaries added to OSD |
| 1958 Amendment to NSA | - Increased authority to Sec Def  
- Creation of the Defense Agencies  
- Military Departments roles redefined  
- Directed Chain of Command to run from Pres. to Sec Def through CJCS to unified command.  
- Increase Joint Staff size to 400 officers |
| 1963-1964 Internal Reorganization | - Created position Director, Joint Staff  
- DIA established  
- Increase in military serving in JCS |
| 1967 Amendment to NSA | - 4 year term limits military department service chiefs |
| 1979 Amendment to NSA | - Marine Corps commandant made full member of JCS  
- JCS establishes C3 Directorate |
| 1986 Reorganization Act | - Reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian control  
- Increased responsibility to Combatant Commands  
- Improved military advice to President, NCA, and Secretary of Defense  
- Creation of joint officer management policies |

Figure 3. Key Legislation effecting the Department of Defense.
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