MORALE IN THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND DURING
THE TULLAHOMA AND CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGNS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBERT J. DALESSANDRO, MAJ, USA
B.A., VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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Morale in the Army of the Cumberland During the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns

Major Robert J. Dalessandro, U.S. Army

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

This study examines insights into the state of morale of the Army of the Cumberland during the period of the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns, covering the period from June through September 1863. The thesis focused on the organization and leadership of the Army of the Cumberland. It then examined morale as the whole of diverse factors, including national and individual factors. National and Individual factors were generally out of control of the army leadership. They included a soldiers' motivation for joining the army, has views toward southern sympathizers at home, the impact of John Morgan's Ohio Raid, soldier views on conscription, and effects of the progress of the war on morale. Individual factors comprised concerns for home, family, business, and religion. The study then examined morale factors the army could control. It explored army life, attitude toward leadership, level of discipline, how the army leadership cared for soldiers, and the impact of mail on soldier morale. The thesis concludes that the Army of the Cumberland was a well lead organization. Consequently, the state of the morale of the army was high throughout the Tullahoma campaign and was not significantly diminished as a result of the defeat at Chickamauga. The thesis further concluded, that soldier conference in Major General William S. Rosecrans remained high throughout the period of the study. Confidence in many corps and some division level commanders did, however, suffer as a result of the Chickamauga.
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate:  Major Robert J. Dalessandro

Title of Thesis:  Morale in the Army of the Cumberland During the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns

Approved By:

William G. Robertson, Ph.D.
Thesis Committee Chairman

Harry L. McIntosh, M.A.
Member
Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. McIntosh, M.A.

Edwin Kennedy, Jr., M.A.
Member, Graduate Faculty
Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., M.A.

Accepted this 2d day of June 1995 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

MORALE IN THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND DURING THE TULLAHOMA AND
CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGNS by Major Robert J. Dalessandro, USA 122 pages.

This study examines insights into the state of morale of the Army of the
Cumberland during the period of the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns.
The thesis covers the period from June through September 1863.

The thesis focused on the organization and leadership of the Army of the
Cumberland. It then examined morale as the whole of diverse factors,
including national and individual factors. National factors were
generally out of control of the army leadership. They included a
soldiers' motivation for joining the army, his views toward southern
sympathizers at home, the impact of John Morgan's Ohio Raid, soldier
views on conscription, and effects of the progress of the war on morale.
Individual factors comprised concerns for home, family, business, and
religion. These areas were also largely beyond the influence of the
army leadership.

The study then examined morale factors the army could control. It
explored army life, attitudes toward leadership, level of discipline,
how the army leadership cared for soldiers, and the impact of mail on
soldier morale. The thesis concludes that the Army of the Cumberland
was a well lead organization. Consequently, the state of morale of the
army was high throughout the Tullahoma campaign and was not
significantly diminished as a result of the defeat at Chickamauga.

The thesis further concluded, that soldier confidence in Major General
William S. Rosecrans remained high throughout the period of the study.
Confidence in many corps and some division level commanders did,
however, suffer as a result of the Chickamauga defeat.

Additionally, the thesis concluded that Major General Rosecrans had been
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   Officer and Soldier Confidence in MG Rosecrans
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In war morale is to the physical as three to one.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Warrior Words

In the early morning hours of October 20, 1863, John Sanderson penned a note in his diary. "What the effect of this removal will be upon the morale of this army. I know full well. I dread the consequences."¹ The staff still lay sleeping around him as he rose from his makeshift bed. He slowly walked the short distance and tentatively awoke the general. Both he and the general had little sleep the previous evening. Major General William S. Rosecrans had held a final meeting that lasted well past midnight with his successor, Major General George Thomas. They discussed details of Rosecrans' plan for the defense of Chattanooga. At 0500 on October 20, 1863, Rosecrans left his headquarters at the Army of the Cumberland for the last time. There was no fanfare. "A handful of men saw Rosecrans off. Some wept openly--but Rosecrans kept a cheerful face, despite his sorrow."²

Many events had passed since his assumption of command. Just weeks before, he was hailed as the Nation's most capable general, perhaps even a future presidential candidate. Now, he had been relieved of his command. In the words of the Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana, "the soldiers have lost their affection for Major General

1
Rosecrans. . . . The state of this Army is lower than at any time since Bull Run." What had gone wrong? In the summer of 1863, the Army of the Cumberland was the most successful fighting force that had ever marched and fought in the Western Hemisphere. Now, it faced possible destruction at the hands of General Braxton Bragg and his Army of Tennessee.

The eight months between the victory at Stones River and the defeat at Chickamauga had been eventful. Following the defeat of the Army of Tennessee at Stones River in January 1863, Major General Rosecrans' army went into winter camp in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. In June, he resumed operations in what is called the Tullahoma Campaign. Despite unfavorable weather conditions, Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland made extraordinary progress toward the vital railroad center at Chattanooga. By September, his army had advanced over 125 miles and had managed to take the town of Chattanooga without firing a shot. The Army of the Cumberland seemed invincible. With the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July, it seemed as though the capture of Chattanooga would finally seal the fate of the Confederacy.

The fate of Chattanooga, and perhaps the Confederacy, would be decided near the Tennessee/Georgia border at a little known creek called Chickamauga. The fortunes of war and not the generals were to select the location. The final defeat of the Army of Tennessee seemed inevitable. Although outnumbered, Rosecrans' men had fought well--it seemed that victory was in reach. At 1130 on September 20, 1863, Rosecrans and his Army fell apart. Within the hour, Rosecrans' unbeatable juggernaut was retreating in disarray to Chattanooga. Was leader and soldier morale a factor in the disaster at Chickamauga? This
thesis explores the effect of morale on the leaders and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland prior to and following the defeat at Chickamauga.

This study will investigate the following research questions:
What was the state of morale across the Army of the Cumberland preceding and subsequent to the Battle of Chickamauga? Dr. Francis Lord states that morale "was directly affected by the soldiers' confidence in their officers, especially in their regimental commanders." He adds, "there was a direct relationship between good discipline and high morale." To this end, the work must satisfactorily answer the primary question, and resolve the following:

1. Did officers have confidence in Major General William S. Rosecrans and his staff?

2. Was confidence in Rosecrans' abilities undermined from within his own headquarters?

3. Did the soldiers have confidence in their officers?

4. What was the state of discipline in the Army of the Cumberland?

Studies of both morale and its impact on men abound. These studies, however, seem to focus on the World War I and World War II eras. Little work has been put forward on the great armies of the American Civil War.

Major General William S. Rosecrans was a popular commander with his troops. Following the Battle of Stones River, a junior officer in his command wrote, "with Rosecrans to lead, we think we can go anywhere in the Confederacy." However, Rosecrans was also a harsh disciplinarian, given to fits of rage aimed at his subordinate
commanders and staff. Did these two divergent sides of his character foster poor morale within his officer corps?

After Chickamauga and Rosecrans' subsequent relief as army commander, a correspondent for the Cincinnati Commercial made the following observation: "In my experience, an official act of such significance has never been so little heralded . . . it created very little surprise, and no feeling of either joy or sorrow. . . . The army seemed totally apathetic on the subject, although I had always been led to believe that Rosecrans possessed the esteem and confidence of the officers and men to an extent amounting to enthusiasm." If this observation is correct, it is difficult to understand the sudden change in attitude from adoration to indifference following the loss of a single battle. Had Major General Rosecrans lost the confidence of his soldiers prior to the battle? Was morale in the army at an ebb before the first encounter at Chickamauga Creek?

Throughout history, morale has made the difference between success and failure on the battlefield. The mere appearance of great leaders on the battlefield have often made the difference between victory and defeat. This difference was often not a result of their ability to direct troops or display tactical genius, but the effect that they exerted on morale.

This thesis will study morale both as a nineteenth and twentieth century concept. It will present a definition of morale, examine how a healthy state of morale is manifested in units, and discuss the impact of national morale factors, incorporating soldiers' reasons for joining the army, the Copperhead problem, the effect of John Morgan's Raid, soldiers' views on the Conscription Act, and the effect
of the progress of the war. Then it will examine individual morale factors, comprised of the situation at home, concern for the family, and anxiety over leaving sweethearts and wives. All of these factors affected the morale of the Army of the Cumberland. This chapter will establish the foundation necessary to determine the potential change in leadership confidence and its impact on the morale of the Army of the Cumberland during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.

The Definition of Morale

Today morale is defined as "The state of the spirits of an individual or group as shown by confidence, cheerfulness, discipline, and willingness to perform tasks." FM 22-100, Military Leadership, further defines both morale and discipline. Morale is the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of an individual. It is a measure of how that individual feels—happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad, unrecognized, or depressed. Disciplined soldiers and units are orderly, obedient, controlled, and dependable. They do their duty promptly and effectively in the absence of orders.

In the nineteenth century, the definition of morale was quite different. When the word appeared in the mid-eighteenth century, morale defined morality or morals. It addressed moral principles or practice. By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the concept of morale as a state of mind began to appear." Morale as leaders and soldiers of the time understood it, however, went far beyond a soldier's state of mind. The moral element of the earlier definition remained. In the nineteenth century, man was not as secular a creature as he is today. To him, morale also embraced his spiritual state of being.
Morale, therefore, could also be a measure of his state of moral fibre and religious belief. Today, scholars would consider this a person's morals. The nineteenth century leader felt that morals were synonymous with morale.

By the twentieth century, this aspect of morale had disappeared. As Colonel Edward L. Munson, Chief, Morale Branch, War Plans Division, would state in 1920, "The older dictionaries include a relation to morals in respect to morale. This is an error... Morale represents a state of mind--morals a state of conduct."

For the purpose of this thesis, the study will include the religious aspect of morale. Since this aspect was important to nineteenth century soldiers, it must be addressed in order to glean a full understanding of the state of the army and its morale.

As a framework for this study, morale will be defined as being the whole of the following parts:

1. National morale factors, such as a soldier's reason for fighting in the war, politics back home, and the overall war progress.

2. Individual soldier factors--comprised of attitude, health, leadership confidence, and spiritual well being.

3. Factors that the army can control--army life, leadership, discipline, and care and treatment of soldiers.

In order to accomplish results, the thesis must be able to quantify morale in the Army of the Cumberland. According to John Baynes' model, set forth in, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, the indicators of good morale are cheerfulness, willingness to salute officers, performance at reviews, soldier behavior, treatment of visitors, and the physical health of the soldiers of the command. It
was realized that Baynes' model was as applicable to the soldier of the
nineteenth century as it was to the soldier of the twentieth century.
The study uses Baynes' framework to analyze the state of morale across
the army. Each of his suggested elements can be easily defined as
follows:

Cheerfulness—this is not "that everyone must wear a perpetual
grin, but the impression of men with good cheer." It is the quality of
being able to make the best of the circumstances at hand and not become
overcome by events. Men who are in good cheer have faith in themselves,
their leaders, and their unit.

Saluting can be a key indicator of both morale itself and its
subset of discipline. Soldiers that are proud to salute their officers
have confidence in their leaders and themselves. Their actions reflect
the high mental state of confidence necessary for good morale.

Grand military reviews have been common from man's earliest
military endeavors. They have served to intimidate the enemy and raise
the confidence of friendly forces. How the soldiers appear during these
reviews can be a critical indication of morale. Men who appear sloppy
often could not care less about their organization and its success or
failure. So, units that turn out well on the field have collectively
higher states of morale.

The behavior of soldiers in a unit is a clear mark against
which the morale of a unit can be measured. Although this behavior
includes discipline, it goes beyond the traditional indicators of
discipline. Whereas discipline normally manifests itself in crime,
misbehavior, and desertions, behavior includes a wide range of actions
that a soldier performs day to day such as marching, writing home, excessive sleeping/eating etc.

The reception and treatment of visitors is another indicator of the level of morale in a unit. Leaders and soldiers who want to make their unit a showcase will make sure that visitors are well received. If morale is strong in a unit the members will want to show it off to visitors and ensure that visitors leave with a lasting favorable impression of that unit.

Health concerns break down into two parts: hygiene in the field and garrison and number of sick in hospitals. If soldiers and their living areas are kept healthy, that is neat and orderly, it follows that these soldiers are taking pride in their unit and themselves. If soldiers are discontent with their unit and have poor morale, this discontent will manifest itself in more hospital admissions.

This study will focus on the potential change in morale in the Army of the Cumberland and its impact on the performance of the army. Through research, Civil War scholars may be able to gain a better understanding of the failure of Rosecrans Army during the final moments of the Chickamauga Campaign.

The study will first give a general background of the history of the Army of the Cumberland and the senior leadership of the army. It will then discuss national morale factors, individual morale factors, and morale factors within the control of the army. The prime limitation of this study is that there are no living members of the Army of the Cumberland left to interview. This limitation can be overcome by employing contemporary sources. This thesis will rely principally on
soldiers' writings as a primary source. These contemporary sources embrace letters to loved ones, diaries, unofficial accounts, reports and extracts from speeches and memoirs. Additionally, there is a wealth of first-hand information in unit regimental histories, the War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies and the papers of the Loyal Legion of the United States. This information, often in the form of personal battlefield accounts and reminiscences, frequently discuss morale and discipline of the army.

After collection of the relevant soldier thoughts, the study will examine these contemporary observations in the context of Baynes' model. Through final interpretation, this thesis will answer the primary question and gain perspective on the state of morale of the Army of the Cumberland. Additionally, the work will glean important insights into the soldiers' state of mind in July, August, and September 1863.

A knowledge of morale before and after the Battle of Chickamauga could explain the defeat of the Federal forces during the battle and give Civil War historians a clearer understanding of leadership dynamics during the prosecution of a prolonged campaign. Although literature abounds on the Battle of Chickamauga, there is no study of morale during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. In short, if this thesis can make some important observations on the state of soldier morale and discipline within the Army of the Cumberland, the study could be of great significance to future Chickamauga historians. It could truly shed light on a forgotten part of the historical record.
Endnotes


5Lord, *They Fought for the Union*, 214.


7Letter dated October 21, 1863 to the Editor of the Cincinnati Commercial from an unknown correspondent signed "Mack" from the Collection of the Combat Studies Institute.


CHAPTER 2

THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

ITS ORGANIZATION AND LEADERS

like great glaring eyes of huge monsters standing guard over the temple of Liberty, ready to end in pieces any who would desecrate its portals and sanctuary. Tis thus we live amid the mountains, fighting for our country, its preservation, and perpetuity.

2LT Jesse B. Connelly, Journal July 28, 1863

The Army of the Cumberland

During the American Civil War there were ten principal armies of the United States operating against the Confederate forces. The Army of the Cumberland was one of these armies. Its area of operation embraced what now is called the Western Theater of the Civil War. According to Frederick H. Dyer, the Army of the Cumberland, "Was first started by a small body of Kentucky Volunteers, organized at Camp Joe Holt, near Louisville, Kentucky, by Colonel, afterwards Major General Lovell H. Rousseau, in the Spring and early Summer of 1861. The State of Kentucky lying within 100 miles of the Ohio River was constituted the Department of Kentucky May 28, 1861, but was merged into the Department of the Cumberland August 15, 1861, which Department consisted of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. This Department was again changed to the Department of the Ohio, November 9, 1861, embracing the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, all of Kentucky lying east of the Cumberland
River, and the State of Tennessee. The Department was merged into Halleck's Department of the Mississippi, March 11, 1862, but the Army retained its original title and organization as the Army of the Ohio until October 24, 1862, when the Department of the Cumberland was again recreated to consist of Tennessee, east of the Tennessee River, and such parts of Alabama and Georgia as may be taken possession by the United States Troops. The title was hereafter changed to the Army of the Cumberland.¹

On January 9, 1863, following the Battle of Stone's River, Rosecrans reorganized the Army of the Cumberland into three infantry corps. These corps would be the Fourteenth under George H. Thomas, the Twentieth under Alexander McD. McCook, and the Twenty-First under Thomas L. Crittenden.² During the Stone's River Campaign, the army had been organized into wings. This reorganization designated the wings as corps without a change of commanders.³

The army was composed of regiments from twelve States: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Minnesota, Iowa, and Kansas. There were also five regiments and four batteries of U.S. Regular Troops. Three quarters of the 252 separate organizations in the army came from four States: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky. The remaining quarter of the troops fell into regiments in the remaining nine.

This Midwestern composition gave the Army of the Cumberland a unique flavor. "Men of Scandinavian blood joined the colors with enthusiasm in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois... in which they had recently settled."⁴ In fact, some regiments, such as the 15th Wisconsin, were completely Scandinavian. Their beloved commander
Colonel Hans Heg was killed in action at Chickamauga. Germans also made up a significant percentage of the Army of the Cumberland. The 9th Ohio Regiment was one of the sixteen predominately German regiments that Ohio sent to the war. Germanic soldiers were also the majority of the 74th Ohio Regiment. Of course, as in any of the Federal armies, the Irishman was everywhere. This was to be expected since over two million Irishmen immigrated to the United States in the thirty years that had preceded the war. Most of the men who served with these "newest" Americans grew to know and respect them. However, the Irish seemed to bear the brunt of prejudice. Rank or position did not shield the Irishman from anti-Irish remarks. Nineteenth century stereotypes painted the Irish as stupid and drunken, with a special affection for the ladies. John Beatty noted that, "Lieutenant Colonel Dukat [sic], an Irishman of the Charles O'Malley school, insisted upon introducing me to the ladies, but fortunately I was sober enough to decline the invitation." The Army of the Cumberland had the majority of the "purely" Irish units that fought in the west, most notably, the 10th Ohio (Hibernian Guards), Ohio's only fully Irish regiment and the 35th Indiana, one of two Irish regiments raised in that state.

Another difference between the Army of the Cumberland and its eastern counterpart, the Army of the Potomac, was the spirit of the individual soldier. The western soldier tended to be more of an individualist than the eastern soldier. In the words of an easterner, "the eastern armies are composed of citizens, the West of pioneers." This spirit of individualism gave western soldiers the reputation of being undisciplined to most easterners. Major Alonzo Merrill Keeler made the following observation after his transfer from the Army of the
Potomac. "The Regiment has been in service just a year but does not know ABC about the military . . . . The army plunders horribly." Western soldiers may have lacked discipline, but they made up for it in fighting spirit. Sherman best summed up the fighting spirit of the western soldier when he spoke of the battle of Shiloh: "We fought, and held our ground, and therefore counted ourselves victorious. From that time forward we had prestige." It was this prestige that made the Army of the Cumberland eager to fight Bragg's forces anywhere and anytime.

Leaders

While it is not this study's intent to give a full biography of the leaders of the Army of the Cumberland down to division level it is important to make some observations about these leaders as a matter of background. Chapter Four will give detailed insights into these leaders' personalities and the confidence their soldiers had in them.

The Department Headquarters

Major General William Starke Rosecrans was the Department Commander of the Army of the Cumberland. William S. Rosecrans is central to this study; therefore, he will be treated in greater detail then the officers subordinate to him. Rosecrans was born on September 6, 1819 in Delaware County, Ohio. He was a graduate of the West Point class of 1842, here he gained the respect of his classmates and a reputation as the "brilliant Rosy Rosecrans." At West Point, Rosecrans became a devout Roman Catholic. His religious beliefs would have a strong influence on the remainder of his life. Following graduation, he spent the first ten years of his career in Engineer positions resulting in a missed opportunity to participate in the
Declining health coupled with frustration with garrison duty caused him to resign from the Army in 1854. Rosecrans then pursed a career as a chemical engineer and was injured in an accident that left him with the appearance of a perpetual smug grin. At the outbreak of the war, he served as an aide on General George B. McClellan's staff and eventually commanded a brigade under him. McClellan thought that Rosecrans was often not aggressive enough and noted that he was, "a silly fussy goose." Following the successful campaign in Western Virginia, he was transferred to the Western Theater. After a string of successful, but indecisive battles, he took command of the Army of the Cumberland on October 27, 1862.

Staff positions in Rosecrans' army were not as tightly standardized as they are today. Rosecrans relied on a staff consisting of his chief of staff, various aides-de-camp, adjutant general, inspector general, commissary, quartermaster, and an assortment of other special staff officers. The scope of their operations was truly diverse. At its peak, Rosecrans' staff managed and coordinated support from Nashville to Chattanooga for over forty separate brigade-sized organizations. To answer these needs Rosecrans relied primarily on his chief of staff.

Brigadier General James A. Garfield served as Rosecrans' chief of staff. Garfield was born in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. He graduated from Williams College in 1856. In 1859, he was elected to the Ohio Senate. He was commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel in the 42nd Ohio in August 1861. Garfield commanded a brigade under Buell and was promoted to Brigadier General for his victory at Big Sandy Valley, Kentucky. He saw action at Shiloh and Corinth. Garfield became Rosecrans' Chief of
Staff following the Battle of Stone's River. As a result of his actions at Chickamauga, he was promoted to Major General. Shortly after the Battle of Chickamauga, he left the Army to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives. He was eventually elected as the twentieth President of the United States.

Garfield functioned as Rosecrans' devil's advocate, often serving as the lone voice against Rosecrans during decision making at the headquarters. Although generally loyal to Rosecrans, Garfield made the unforgivable military faux pas of voicing his displeasure with his commanding general to his friends in Washington, particularly Secretary of the Treasury Chase. Garfield's criticisms of Rosecrans would ultimately be a contributing factor to Rosecrans relief as army commander.

Fourteenth Army Corps

October 24, 1862 - The troops under the command of General Rosecrans, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, ordered to constitute this corps.

January 9, 1863 - This corps divided into three corps: the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and the Twenty-first.

August 1, 1865 - Discontinued.

The Fourteenth Corps was the power punch of Rosecrans' army. It consisted of four divisions—the bulk of Rosecrans' combat power. The Fourteenth Corps was aptly led by Rosecrans' most able leader, Major General George H. Thomas. Thomas was unique among his fellow commanders. He was born in South Hampton County, Virginia, on July 31, 1816. As a child, he and his family fled their home during Nat Turner's Rebellion. He graduated from West Point with the Class of
1840. Thomas served his first years in the army assigned to coastal forts, saw service in the Seminole Campaign, and fought in the Mexican War. Prior to the Civil War, he served on the frontier in Texas. He was one of the few officers of Southern birth to stay with the Union. He served as a brigade commander in the Shenandoah during First Manassas. He was transferred to Kentucky where he fought at Mill Springs, Shiloh, Corinth, Perryville, and Stone's River. He distinguished himself during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. In the latter he received the name "The Rock of Chickamauga" for his tenacious defense of Horseshoe Ridge.

The Fourteenth Corps was divided into four divisions of three brigades each. Thomas' First Division commander was Brigadier General Absalom Baird. Baird was born at Washington, Pennsylvania. He graduated from West Point in the Class of 1849. Prior to the war, Baird saw service in the Seminole War, served as an instructor at West Point, and was posted to the Texas frontier. He served in staff functions in the Army of the Potomac during First Manassas and the Peninsula Campaign, following which he was transferred to the Army of the Cumberland. Baird gained fame for his heroic stand on Horseshoe Ridge during the Battle of Chickamauga.

The First Division drew the majority of its soldiers in first and second brigades from Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The third brigade was composed entirely of United States Regulars. One of the regiments in the second brigade, the 24th Illinois Regiment or "Hecker Regiment," was a purely German regiment. Of the ten volunteer regiments, four were three year regiments. Only one regiment under Baird's command came from his native state.
Major General James Scott. Negley served as Second Division commander. Negley was born near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He graduated from Pitt University in 1846. He served as a private during the Mexican War. When the war came he was appointed as a Brigadier General and placed in charge of recruiting in the Pittsburgh area. He commanded a division under Thomas during the Battle of Stone's River and was promoted to Major General. He showed great promise during the Tullahoma Campaign as Commander, Second Division. At Chickamauga, however, he was accused of desertion of his division on the battlefield. A subsequent board of inquiry cleared him of these charges.24

The Second Division consisted primarily of soldiers from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. All of its regiments were from the volunteer force. Of a total of thirteen regiments, five were three-year regiments. The 19th Illinois, the Irish Legion, was a purely Irish regiment. Only one regiment came from Negley's home state.

Brigadier General John M. Brannan was Third Division commander. Brannan was born in Washington, D.C. He graduated from the West Point Class of 1841. He served in the Mexican War and was breveted to Captain for gallantry at the Battle of Contreras and Churubusco. At the outbreak of the war, he was appointed as a Brigadier General. He served on the South Atlantic coast and eventually was transferred to the Army of the Cumberland.25 He commanded a division during both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.

The Third Division was composed of regiments principally from Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky. Half of the soldiers in the division came from Ohio. The 9th Ohio Infantry, "Die Neuner Regiment," was a German
regiment. Of the thirteen infantry regiments assigned, six were three year regiments.

The Fourth Division was commanded by Major General Joseph J. Reynolds. Reynolds was born in Flemingsburg, Kentucky. He graduated from West Point in the Class of 1843. He saw served on the frontier in Texas. He left the service and ran a grocery business in Lafayette, Indiana. At the start of the war, he was appointed as a Brigadier General in the Indiana Volunteers. He served with Rosecrans at Cheat Mountain and was a division commander through both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns."\(^{26}\)

The Fourth Division drew its regiments from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Of the fourteen regiments assigned only one was a three year regiment. Ten of the regiments came from Ohio and Indiana (five from each). Reynolds' division was unique in that his 1st Brigade was a mounted infantry brigade. This unit was mounted and equipped with Spencer repeating rifles following the Battle of Stone’s River.\(^{27}\) This combination of firepower and mobility would earn the First Brigade the nickname "Wilder's Lightning Brigade."

### Twentieth Army Corps

- **January 9, 1863** - Constituted as part of the Army of the Cumberland.
- **September 28, 1863** - Consolidated with the Twenty-first, and constituted the Fourth Corps.
- **June 1, 1865** - Discontinued.\(^{28}\)

The Twentieth Corps was divided into three divisions. The commander was Major General A. McD McCook. He was a member of the "Fighting McCook" family. The family provided seventeen sons to the
Union army. McCook was born in Columbiana County, Ohio. He graduated from West Point in 1852. Prior to the war he served on the frontier. After service at Manassas, he was transferred to the Western Theater. He led the XX Corps during both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns. He would be charged with blame for the Union disaster at Chickamauga.  

First Division was under the command of Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis. Davis was born in Clark County, Indiana. He served as a private during the Mexican War in the 3d Indiana Regiment. Following the war, Davis earned a direct commission in the Regular Army. He commanded a division under Rosecrans at Stone's River, and throughout the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.  

The First Division was composed of regiments principally from Illinois and Indiana. Seven of the divisions' twelve regiments were from Illinois. The 15th Wisconsin Infantry, a pure Scandinavian regiment, was assigned to the second brigade. Only two of the regiments, the 25th Illinois and the 35th Illinois, were three year regiments. One regiment, 22nd Indiana, came from the division commander's home state.  

Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson commanded the Second Division. Johnson was born near Smithland, Kentucky. He graduated from West Point in the Class of 1849. Prior to the war, he served on the western frontier with the 2d Cavalry. At the beginning of the war, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He commanded a division during the battle of Stone's River and throughout the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns.  

The Second Division had fourteen regiments assigned. Units came principally from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. There was one purely
German regiment, the 32nd Indiana. The 39th Indiana was a mounted regiment. The division had three regiments that were 3 year regiments.

The Third Division commander was Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan. Although his place of birth has never been firmly established, his memoirs state that he was born in Albany, New York. He graduated with the West Point Class of 1853. All of his prewar service was on the frontier. He served with Halleck's Army of the Southwest as chief quartermaster and eventually earned command of the 2d Michigan Cavalry. He fought at Perryville and Stone's River. He would become one of the best known Union officers of the Civil War era.33

Sheridan's division consisted of troops from Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Michigan. Of his twelve regiments, eight were from Illinois. The entire third brigade was made up of Illinois regiments. Two-thirds of the soldiers in three of his regiments were immigrants from Germany, the 27th Illinois, 36th Illinois, and 44th Illinois. Three regiments were three year regiments.

**Twenty-First Army Corps**

January 9, 1863 - Constituted as part of the Army of the Cumberland.

September 28, 1863 - Consolidated with the Twentieth, and constituted the Fourth Corps.34

The Twenty-First Corps was commanded by Major General Thomas L. Crittenden. The corps consisted of three divisions. Crittenden was born in Russellville, Kentucky. He was a successful lawyer and district attorney. He served as Zachary Taylor's aide during the Mexican War and won a colonelcy in the 3d Kentucky Regiment. He served as a political appointee when Taylor became president. At the outbreak of the war, he
was commissioned a Brigadier General. He fought under Rosecrans at both Stone's River, and Chickamauga. Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, charged him with responsibility for the disaster at Chickamauga.35

Crittenden's First Division commander was Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood. He was born in Munfordville, Kentucky, and graduated from the West Point Class of 1845. Wood saw service during the Mexican War and was brevetted for gallantry at Buena Vista. He served the remainder of his antebellum service on the frontier. At the start of the war, he was responsible for mustering in Indiana troops. He commanded a division at Shiloh, Perryville, and Stone's River. His name became inexorably linked to the Union failure at Chickamauga after his actions on the second day of the battle.36

The First Division consisted of fourteen regiments principally from Indiana and Ohio (six and five respectively). There was one three year regiment, The 15th Indiana.

Major General John M. Palmer commanded the Second Division. Palmer was born in Scott County, Kentucky, but moved to Illinois at an early age. He was a successful lawyer and ardent anti-Slavery Republican. At the outbreak of the war, he commanded an Illinois regiment and later a division at New Madrid, Corinth, and Stone's River. He led his division through both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.37

The Second Division was assigned fourteen regiments. The division was a mix of troops from Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois. Ohio had the largest representation with five regiments. There were five 3-year regiments. Two regiments came from Palmer's home state.
The Third Division commander was Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve. Van Cleve was born in Princeton, New Jersey. He was educated at Princeton and graduated from West Point in 1831. He resigned from the army in 1836 and became a farmer and educator, eventually moving to Minnesota. At the start of the war, he was commissioned Colonel of the 2d Minnesota. He fought at Shiloh and was wounded at Stone's River. 

Van Cleve's division had thirteen regiments assigned. These regiments were from Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky. Ohio regiments held the majority with five assigned. There were four three year regiments, 9th Kentucky, 13th Ohio, 19th Ohio and 59th Ohio.

Reserve Corps

Major General Gordon Granger commanded the Reserve Corps. Granger was born in Joy, New York, and graduated in the West Point Class of 1845. After graduation, he saw service in the Mexican War where he won brevets to First Lieutenant and Captain for gallantry. He served on the frontier until the outbreak of the Civil War. He fought at Wilson's Creek, New Madrid, Island Number 10, and Corinth. He was promoted to Major General following the Battle of Corinth. He distinguished himself during the Battle of Chickamauga for marching, without orders, to the aid of General Thomas' Corps." The Reserve Corps consisted of three divisions.

The First Division commander was Brigadier General James B. Steedman. Steedman was born in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. He had no formal education, but became a successful printer. He served in the Mexican War, the Ohio Legislature, and went to make his fortune in
California during the Gold Rush. He was ultimately active in politics. When the war began, Steedman became a Colonel in the 14th Ohio.

His command consisted twelve regiments of infantry. Regiments were drawn from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Ohio regiments were the majority, with four assigned. There were no three year regiments.

Brigadier General James D. Morgan commanded Second Division. Morgan was a native of Quincy, Illinois. He was a successful businessman and served in the Mexican War. As Second Division commander, he commanded fourteen regiments of infantry. The soldiers assigned to his command were from Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Tennessee. Illinois troops were the majority with seven regiments assigned. The third brigade had two purely German units assigned, the 106th Ohio and the 108th Ohio. This brigade also had the 10th Tennessee assigned—a unit recruited from Middle Tennessee. There was one three-year regiment, the 10th Illinois.

The Third Division commander was Brigadier General Robert S. Granger. Granger was a West Point graduate of the Class of 1838. He was a professional soldier from Ohio. Prior to the war, he saw service against the Seminoles in Florida and during the Mexican War. He served in staff positions until he was promoted to Brigadier General and assigned to the Army of the Cumberland. During the campaign, his units were engaged in camp and garrison duties, including guard of lines of communication. He commanded thirteen regiments of infantry from Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Kentucky. Illinois had the majority of regiments with four assigned. The third
brigade was composed entirely of troops from Tennessee. There were no three-year regiments assigned.

**Cavalry Corps**

Major General David S. Stanley was commander of Rosecrans' cavalry arm. He was born in Cedar Valley, Ohio, and graduated from West Point in the Class of 1852. Stanley was assigned to Indian fighting duties at Fort Washita in Oklahoma until the outbreak of the war. He fought at Wilson's Creek, New Madrid, Island Number 10, Shiloh, Corinth, Iuka, and Murfreesboro. He was Rosecrans' Chief of Cavalry during the Tullahoma Campaign. General Stanley was on sick leave during the concluding days of the Chickamauga Campaign.43

Major General Robert B. Mitchell was acting Chief of Cavalry during the latter stages of the Chickamauga Campaign. He was born in Mansfield, Ohio, and graduated from Keyon College, Ohio, and Washington College, Pennsylvania. Mitchell practiced law and served as a lieutenant in the Mexican War. Following the Mexican War, he served as in the Kansas Territorial Legislature. At the outbreak of the war, Mitchell was commissioned a Colonel in the Kansas Infantry. He fought and was wounded at Wilson's Creek. Mitchell was promoted to Brigadier General and commanded a division at the Battle of Perryville.44

Mitchell's First Division commander was Colonel Edward M. McCook. McCook was born in Steubenville, Ohio. He received his schooling in local public schools and was elected to the Kansas territorial legislature in 1859. He became a successful lawyer and was appointed as a lieutenant of cavalry in 1861. He commanded cavalry units during the battles of Shiloh and Perryville.45 The First Division
consisted of twelve regiments. Kentucky regiments held the majority with four assigned. These four regiments composed the entire third brigade.

The Second Division was commanded by Brigadier General George Crook. Crook was born near Dayton, Ohio. He graduated from the West Point Class of 1852. Crook was stationed in northern California until the outbreak of the war. He saw service in the Eastern Theater at South Mountain and Sharpsburg. Crook was transferred to the Western Theater and served with the Army of the Cumberland through both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. His division had eleven regiments assigned. The division's regiments were drawn from Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Iowa, and US Regulars. His first brigade had the only United States Regular Cavalry unit, the 4th US Cavalry, that served with the Army of the Cumberland.

The Army that marched from Stone's River was a diverse one. Rosecrans had five corps-sized elements drawn from as far east as Pennsylvania and as far west as Kansas. There were city folk and country farmers, pioneers from the farthest reaches of the new republic, and city boys from Chicago and Cincinnati. His army had Anglo-Americans, Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians in great numbers. Their leaders were often as diverse as they were, professional soldiers, politicians, businessmen, and clerks. Diverse as they were, all the members of the army were united in the one cause--saving the Union. In short, the Army of the Cumberland was a people's army, banded together to answer the call in their nation's time of need.
Endnotes


7John Beatty, *The Citizen-Soldier; or Memories of a Volunteer* (Cincinnati: Wiltstach, Baldwin & Co, 1870), 27. Charles O'Malley was a fictional character in a novel written by the famous Irish writer Charles Lever. The O'Malley character was the personification of youthful impudence.


10Major Alonzo Keeler, 22nd Michigan Infantry Regiment, to Wife, July 15, 1863, Alonzo Keeler Papers, Michigan Historical Collection, Bently Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

11William M. Lamers *The Edge of Glory* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), 15. (Although naturally very biased in favor of anything "Rosecrans," William Lamers' tribute to Rosecrans is required reading for the serious student of the Army of the Cumberland. His research has shed light on the day-to-day workings of the army staff during the Tullahoma/Chickamauga Campaigns.)


Robert D. Richardson, "Rosecrans' Staff at Chickamauga: The Significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' Staff on the Outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign." (Master of Military Art and Science. Thesis US Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 194-196. (Richardson's study is the best work available on Rosecrans' staff. Richardson details each of the staff positions and describes the function of each staff member in administering to the army.)


Salmon Portland Chase was the Secretary of the Treasury. He was a very influential anti-slavery politician, well connected in Washington political circles. He sustained his political influence through his daughter Kate's famous parties. The guest list for these events was a "who's who" of important Washington politicians. Through these parties, Chase often lobbied for his current cause at hand. Chase saw himself as Garfield's political mentor.

Although the background and intrigue surrounding the relief of Rosecrans could fill a volume in itself, no such volume exists. For a concise, but slightly pro-Rosecrans' discussion see: The Society of the Army of the Cumberland, The Burial of General Rosecrans at Arlington National Cemetery, (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1903), 84-102.


Nat Turner's Rebellion was a slave uprising that occurred in the summer of 1831. Turner and his band of about 70 slaves went on a killing spree leaving more than 50 whites dead. Turner was quickly captured and he and 16 of his followers were hanged. Some of Thomas' biographers suggest that as a result of Turner's Rebellion, Thomas would always be anti-slavery.


The Spencer Repeating Rifle was invented in 1860. It was the most successful breech-loading weapon of the war. Its magazine had the capability to hold seven rounds of ammunition. A Navy Department test established the Spencer Rifle's rate of fire at twenty-one rounds per minute. The First Brigade Commander, Colonel John T. Wilder, a successful businessman, purchased the Spencer Rifle for his regiment prior to the commencement of the Tullahoma Campaign.


CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL MORALE FACTORS

in any war victory is determined in the final analysis by the state of mind of the masses which shed their blood on the field of battle.

Mikhail V. Frunze, Warrior Words

Morale factors in the Civil War were no different than any other war in American History. Many forces played upon the American people during the course of the war. Soldiers joined the army for many different reasons and often these reasons had a direct impact on their expectations of army life. The national political leadership was not always pleased with how Lincoln was running the war and those who were displeased often spoke out. Soldiers read the criticism of their commander in chief and the army in their hometown newspapers. John Morgan and his fellow raiders had a nasty tendency to make war on the home front--this while the soldiers were serving in distant Tennessee or Georgia. There was talk that Lincoln would have to implement conscription to fill the ranks and of bloody riots in the streets when conscription went into effect. Then there was the war... things did not always go as well as the Union Commanders hoped they would.

Progress of the war also had a day-to-day effect on the common soldier. Today, we would call these factors "personal baggage," those thoughts and feelings that the soldier brought with them to a unit. Personal
baggage comprises the first part of morale factors that the commander
can never hope to control.

Saving the Union

The Northern states were electrified by the attack on Fort
Sumter. War fever broke out in every corner of the remaining loyal
states. On April 15, 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 troops for three
months. Lincoln's call was answered by 91,816 souls.² There would be
other calls for troops, and many of these calls would exceed
expectations. What made a soldier leave his home to fight a distant
foe? Some joined to save the Union. Others signed up because it was
their Christian duty. Some fought to abolish slavery as an institution.
Then there were those who simply wanted adventure and glory. Whatever
their reason, soldiers marched to war from all corners of the west.
These new soldiers would be the life blood of the Army of the
Cumberland. Understanding their reasons for joining the cause will set
the backdrop for overall morale of the army.

Most soldiers joined because it was simply the patriotic thing
to do. Every generation before had been called to save the Union. Now
it was their turn. The appeal of saving the Union struck a chord for
most soldiers. After the battle of Chickamauga one soldier simply
commented, "We braved it Sunday and hope [always] to be ready to 'Rally
round the Flag.'³ Another factor that inspired soldiers to join up was
religion. "For God and the Union" was heard as a frequent cry.
Preachers often mixed religious sermons with political rhetoric to
inspire soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Carter Van Vleck, Commander, 78th
Illinois Regiment, summed up his views in a letter to one of his fallen officer's wives. "Remember that you are not as those that remain without hope. Your husband died a true soldier of the cross, as well as the Stars & Stripes: a Christian and a patriot, the pride of his regiment & an object of affection to all who knew him."

Some soldiers believed strongly in abolition. These men flocked to the army to end the hated institution of slavery. A soldier in the 86th Illinois stated in his journal, "the colored population [was] making a strike for deliverance from bondage, in which they had been cruelly held." Private Mungo Murray, a Fourteenth Corps soldier, put it far more eloquently in a letter to his sister,

> If we accomplish but the last of these, that is, unshackle the four million of human beings held in bondage, I should consider myself richly repaid for a lifetime of hard service. Could I portray slavery as it is in the United States, there would not be a man in the north with one spark of humanity but would cry "Down, down with this institution."

Other soldiers did not have as high a purpose. Some simply joined for the fun. George Marsh often wrote to his Brother about his army adventures. He summed up his experience, "Soldering [sic] agrees with me first rate." Whatever their reason--patriotic, religious, anti-slavery or just for the adventure--the reason a soldier joined up had a crucial effect on morale.

The Copperhead Problem

Today, we see the Northern states during the Civil War as a united group of people determined to restore the Union. Given a charter by God to suppress the Southern Secessionists, and blessed with the greatest leader since George Washington, every hand and heart would set
out to restore the Union and continue the great experiment of democracy. Unfortunately, such was not the case. Although Lincoln would prove to be an effective wartime president, he had to evoke strong executive powers to ensure the war effort stayed on track. He accomplished this through arrests, suppression of the press, and suspension of habeas corpus and censorship.¹

When the war broke out, the Democratic Party was immediately polarized. The party divided into two factions, War Democrats, who generally favored Lincoln's policies and Peace Democrats, more commonly known as Copperheads. The Copperhead Party became one of Lincoln's biggest political problems. Named for the poisonous snake by their enemies, the Copperheads fervently opposed presidential policies. On the whole, they did not necessarily favor succession, but wanted to maintain status quo in the Union. Copperhead party members felt that slavery was legal and that the Federal Government was gaining too much power at the expense of the States. They believed in ending the war by nearly any means available. In short, Peace Democrats felt that the war was a result of Lincoln's failure to gain a negotiated peace.²

The Copperheads were particularly strong in two areas of the country: the New York--New Jersey area and the area of the Southern Midwest (Ohio/Illinois/Indiana). The sectionalist Midwest became a breeding ground for pro-Copperhead sympathizers. The small farm-based economy, dependent on the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois river network, more closely resembled its Southern neighbors than the increasingly industrial North.¹⁰
It is key to remember that of over two hundred separate fighting organizations that comprised Rosecrans' Army, 75 percent came from the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky, in that order.¹¹ The remaining States, in order of representation in the Army of the Cumberland, were: Michigan, Wisconsin, Tennessee, United States Regular Army Troops, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Minnesota, Iowa, and Kansas. Two-thirds of the Army's population was, therefore, drawn from the hotbed of Copperhead sentiments.

One of the candidates for Governor of the State of Ohio in the election of 1863 was Clement L. Vallandigham. He was one of the most outspoken Peace Democrats and a former Ohio Congressman. Vallandigham, a large part of whose constituents were in the field with the Army of the Cumberland, summed up his feelings for their cause when he stated he would rather have his "right arm plucked from its socket and cast into eternal burnings" than lend support for the war.¹² As a congressman, he introduced legislation to censure the president for illegal arrests and later introduced a bill to imprison Lincoln for subverting the Constitution.

Vallandigham and his outspoken opinions would continue to cause problems for the Lincoln Administration until his arrest by General Bumside on May 5, 1863. This arrest by military authorities would again bring Vallandigham into the headlines. Democrats of all factions would rally to support his release. Lincoln, anxious to defuse growing support for Vallandigham, had him handed over to Confederate authorities. Officers from the Army of the Cumberland would be charged
with execution of the turnover on May 25, 1863. The soldiers simply branded Vallandigham "that northern traitor." Copperheads were not loved in the Army of the Cumberland. Most soldiers looked at them as cowards, afraid to fight and simply hiding behind the cause of peace. In a letter to his wife, Alexander Ayers, 125th Illinois Regiment, spoke for the majority of the army, "While I feel it was my duty to be in the service--& may God bring me through safely--& yet I can not help but hate all Copperheads--& cowards--men who ought to be in service & yet are too big cowards. There will be a reconing [sic] when we get home." First Lieutenant Elbert J. Squire, 101st Ohio Regiment, said, Do the copperheads ever think that soldiers are not fighting for himself, but for the People . . . for the poor as well as the rich . . . no more for Abraham Lincoln than the veriest beggar that walks the streets of an Ohio village. They pretend to be the friends of the soldiers, what does the soldier want of the people . . . to unite the support of the Government and of the Administration . . . and we would soon conquer peace. . . . I don't believe the peace Democrats know the harm they do, or they would desist from their opposition to the government.

Squires' feelings were the norm. Copperheads were resented and branded as cowards, an opinion nearly universal in the army.

The Copperhead press was a constant concern for Lincoln. As late as June 1, 1863, military authorities were forced to shut down the Chicago Times for making disloyal statements. Although Lincoln quickly intervened, allowing the Chicago Times to reopen, it sent a powerful message to the press.

The role of the press in relation to the military is often poorly understood.
It was important that the people at home receive news of the armies that their enthusiasm might be kept high, and it was equally important that the soldiers should also get the news. The soldiers wanted to know what the people at home thought of them, how the situation of the armies was being described, and what was being written about the battles.\textsuperscript{10}

The press could have both a profoundly positive or negative effect on soldiers. The Copperhead press often counteracted any positive effect that the press could have had on morale. When soldiers read criticisms voiced in the press, they often became outraged at the newsmen and the politicians' failure to understand the truth. Lieutenant Eben P. Sturges, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, summed it up, "The reports sent North by irresponsible persons, saying we have suffered a defeat are either the croakings of knock-kneed individuals, or lies gotten up to help the Copperheads."\textsuperscript{19} Such was the common view in the Army of the Cumberland of the Copperhead press.

Secret Copperhead organizations, on the other hand, led to fear, suspicion, and rumors. Such existed with the sole purpose of fueling Copperhead sentiment on the home front, and none was more hated than the Knights of the Golden Circle. Formed in 1854, its goal was the extension of slavery and the expansion of the United States.\textsuperscript{21} The organization flourished in Indiana and Illinois with other chapters in Michigan, Ohio and Iowa.\textsuperscript{22} It was said that the Knights of the Golden Circle assisted deserters, acquired supplies for the Confederacy, and was poised to overthrow the Pro-Union government within their chapter states. On July 6, 1863, a group of Knights of the Golden Circle members forced their way into the depot at Huntington, Indiana and seized guns and ammunition. In fact, the organization accomplished
little beyond rumors. Its existence, however, doubtless led to an unsettling fear that rebellion within one's home state could break out at a moment's notice. Edwin Payne, a soldier in the 34th Illinois, wrote home, "We have heard here that the Copperheads have organized themselves into a society of the K.G.C. If it is so please tell me all you know or hear about it and who they are." Payne was no different than the other soldiers in the army, who wanted to be kept informed about the doings of the K.G.C. Perhaps, through information, soldiers felt they could keep these dangerous organizations in check.

**John Morgan's Raid**

By July of 1863, General John Hunt Morgan was the embodiment of terror to the people of the Midwest. His exploits had gained him infamy throughout the Army of the Cumberland. Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan, a rich Kentucky businessman, had gained notoriety the previous year by conducting what would become known as Morgan's Third Raid. He was the personification of the bold cavalier and a figure of romance and dash. His romantic exploits with Mattie Ready were the stuff of dreams to Southern women. During his Third Raid into Kentucky, his soldiers struck deep into Union territory, capturing nearly 2,000 prisoners and destroying property valued at more than $2,000,000. He spread fear throughout Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, and even captured the garrison at Cynthiana, Kentucky.

As Rosecrans' troops launched the Tullahoma Campaign, General Braxton Bragg granted Morgan authority to conduct another raid into Kentucky. Bragg felt that the raid might result in slowing Rosecrans'
advance toward Chattanooga. Bragg did not want Morgan to cross the Ohio River and directed Morgan to confine his raiding activities to Kentucky. In this way, Morgan's forces would be at less risk from the populace at large and could quickly return to Bragg's area of operations if necessary. Morgan chose, for reasons we may never know, to disregard Bragg's guidance and conduct the operation as he saw fit.

On July 2, 1863, Morgan launched this, his final and most daring raid, into Union held territory. From July 2nd through July 26th, Morgan's men terrorized town after town throughout Kentucky, Ohio and Indiana (See Figure 1). Finally, he was captured near New Lisbon, Ohio on July 26, 1863. John Morgan's raid attacked the heartland of Rosecrans' Army. His operations were conducted in areas that regiments of Rosecrans' Army had been recruited from. It is one of the few examples during the war when Confederate forces were fighting on Northern ground while soldiers from that State were involved in a campaign distant from their homes.

The soldiers were deeply distressed by having Confederate forces operating on their home soil. Lieutenant Colonel William D. Ward of the 37th Indiana Infantry Regiment wrote daily of his concern for his wife. His July 14, 1863 journal entry stated: "Morgan raids Indiana. Uneasy about Sarah." His apprehension mirrored that of the other soldiers in the Army. Morgan's Raid had other effects, as well, and not all the soldiers in the army were upset about Morgan's rampage through Indiana and Ohio. First Lieutenant Alfred Pirtle, a member of Brigadier General Lytle's staff, summed it up: "John Morgan may inflict some damage in Indiana but the more he does the better for us, for the people
Figure 1. John Morgan's Ohio Raid
will have a relizing [sic] sense of what war is, and will rally to support our armies." Pirtle was most probably expressing his frustration with the Peace Democrats that had found broad base support in both Indiana and Ohio. First Lieutenant Alexander Ayers added, "Morgan's Raid seems to have excited the people in Indiana, Ohio and eastern Pennsylvania, but the soldiers all seem to be glad he got up there." The typical soldier felt that the northern population should get a taste of the war. Morgan provided that taste.

When John Morgan was captured, "it was great cause for celebration throughout the Army." An Ohio soldier noted: "I was pleased to hear how the people rallied to capture John Morgan." Second Lieutenant Jesse B. Connelly, 31st Indiana Regiment, enthusiastically stated: "News received today of the capture of John Morgan. Let every man rejoice, blow on wind instruments, and sound the "Gong", build huge bonfires, and make a big fuss, generally." With John Morgan captured there would be no further military threat to the home front, but other forces continued to play on soldiers fighting so far from their homes.

**Conscription**

In early 1863, a bill was introduced in Congress that would bring the first draft to the United States. Draftees would serve a three year term in the army. The bill, however, still allowed for the use of substitutes and for buying out of the draft. The draft bill passed through Congress and was approved on March 3, 1863. It required enrollment of all males between 20 and 45. Bachelors would be called first, then married men between the ages of 20 and 25. The effect on
the army was immediate and favorable. Captain Daniel W. Howe, 79th
Indiana Regiment, articulated the majority of soldiers' views when he
wrote, "The whole power of the Government should be used to push the
draft to the last extremity if it deludes [sic] the North with blood." 33
Lyman E. Widney, 34th Illinois Regiment, added, "We who are already in
service consider conscription a glorious thing so do old men, women,
children and cripples but able bodied men who want to stay home, and
especially "Copperheads" are very much exercised in spirit. Our ranks
need recruiting if not by willing volunteers then by the unwilling
conscript." 34

The effect in the civilian sector was not as favorable. Bloody
draft riots broke out in New York. Lincoln was forced to rush in troops
to suppress the rioting. News of the riots reached the Army of the
Cumberland quickly. Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, 39th Indiana Regiment,
commented, "I have heard a great deal about Copperhead doings of late.
They took quite a bold stand in New York, but I think they will be sorry
that they ever raised a hand against the draft." 35 Once the initial
resistance passed, the draft act became part of American tradition. For
all its shortcomingd, in the end the draft would continue to fuel the
Union army until the close of the war.

War Progress

The period between the victory at Stone's River and the onset
of the Tullahoma Campaign had not brought about good news for the
Federal forces (See Campaign Chronology, Table 1). In the East, the
Army of the Potomac had experienced major setbacks, first at
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>Battle of Murfreesboro or Stone's River Begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>Emancipation Proclamation Issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 January</td>
<td>Rosecrans' Forces Victorious at Murfreesboro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January</td>
<td>Burnside's Mud March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January</td>
<td>Burnside replaced as Commander Army of the Potomac.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Draft Act Approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 March</td>
<td>Morgan's Cavalry Raiding in Kentucky.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Richmond Bread Riot.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-4 May</td>
<td>Battle of Chancellorville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>Siege of Vicksburg begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>Siege of Port Hudson begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Tullahoma Campaign begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>Hooker Replaced as Commander Army of Potomac.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 July</td>
<td>Battle of Gettysburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Morgan's Ohio Raid begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>Vicksburg Falls to Federal Forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>Knights of the Golden Circle capture guns and munitions at a depot in Huntington, Indiana.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>Conscription Act goes into effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Port Hudson Falls/Morgan's Raiders cross Ohio River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>New York Draft Riots.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>John Hunt Morgan captured.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>Sack of Lawrence, Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September</td>
<td>Rosecrans' forces enter Chattanooga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 September</td>
<td>Battle of Chickamauga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October</td>
<td>Ohio voters defeat Clement L. Vallandigham in his bid for Governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>Rosecrans' relieved as Commander Army of the Cumberland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fredericksburg, then during the disastrous "mud march". These two military setbacks resulted in the relief of Major General Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac. In May, that Army had suffered yet another setback under its new commander, Major General Joseph Hooker, at Chancellorsville. By the start of the Tullahoma Campaign, Confederate forces were moving north somewhere in Maryland or
Pennsylvania. In the East, the situation looked gloomy. The Western theater did not seem to be progressing any more favorably. Port Hudson and Vicksburg were still holding out under siege. The end of the war did not seem one day closer.

July the Fourth 1863--The world was turned upside down! The Army of Potomac defeated General Lee's invincible Army of Northern Virginia in a three day slugging match at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Vicksburg fell to Grant's forces with the surrender of an entire Confederate Army, and four days later Port Hudson capitulated. The soldiers of Rosecrans' army knew that Chattanooga would soon follow. The dawn was breaking . . . at last the end of the war was in sight. A soldier in the army summed up the feeling of every man when he wrote, "the boys are all in good spirits and believe [sic] that we will get home before long." 36 An Ohio artilleryman wrote his wife, "the war is fast drawing to a close." 37 Several days later he added, "The fighting in the West is now about over." 38 As the Army of the Cumberland marched forward to what the soldiers felt would be the final engagement with the Army of Tennessee, they felt confident the tide of war had shifted in favor of the Union.

National morale factors played on the mind of every soldier. Their letters bespoke the importance of these National events in their daily life. Their reasons for joining the army were directly linked to how they thought or felt. The statements of the Copperheads could anger or intrigue them. John Morgan could make them fear for the safety of their loved ones or give them satisfaction that the "stay behinds" were getting a taste of the war. The impending draft could make them proud
or annoy them with the public reaction. Finally, the progress or failure to make progress in the war effort could give their morale a boost or defeat them as effectively as any Confederate soldier. All these factors acted on the soldier and, therefore, the Army.
Endnotes


3 Charles W. Hill, *A Company, II 5th Illinois Regiment, to Sister, October 8, 1863, Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, Fort Oglethorpe, GA.*


7 George Marsh, 104th Illinois Regiment, letter to Brother, September 7, 1863, Marsh Family Papers, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, IL.


10 Jackson, *Twenty Million Yankees*, 24-25.

11 Thomas B. Van Home, *History of the Army of the Cumberland* (Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1988), 378-385. I am defining fighting organizations as those units that fought as an entity on the battlefield. This method causes the figure to appear slightly skewed. I am counting a regiment, that potentially could have 1000 assigned, in the same category as a battery of artillery, often with less than 100 men assigned. These, however, were both separate units in the organization of the Army. Subordinate companies of the regiment did not normally fight independently; artillery batteries did. In the end, if artillery batteries are discounted, the composition of the Army still falls out with the same states in primacy.


Captain William D. Evritt, 81st Indiana Regiment, letter to Wife, September 28, 1863, William D. Evritt Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

First Lieutenant Alexander Miller Ayers, Quarter Master, 125th Illinois Regiment, to Wife, September 22, 1863, Alexander Miller Ayers Papers, Special Collections, Emory University Atlanta, GA.

First Lieutenant Elbert J. Squire, 101st Ohio Regiment, to Mother, September 7, 1863, Elbert J. Squire Letters, Regimental papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.


Lieutenant Eben P. Sturges to Folks, 2 October 1863, E. P. Sturges Papers, Civil War Times Illustrated Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute Collection, Washington, DC.


Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, 466.


William D. Ward Diary, Entry for 14 July 1863, William D. Ward Papers, DePauw University, Greencastle, Indiana.

First Lieutenant Alfred Pirtle to Sis, July 12, 1863, Alfred Pirtle Letters, Filson Club, Louisville, KY.

First Lieutenant Alexander Miller Ayers, 125th Illinois, letter to Sister, August 8, 1863, Alexander Miller Ayers Papers, Special Collections, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.


A. S. Bloomfield, Battery A, 1st Ohio Artillery Regiment, to Sister, August 8, 1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH.

Substitutes were paid to fill your place in the ranks. Often, draftees ran advertisements in the local papers offering to pay for a substitute. The system was often abused and highly unpopular. However, the government felt that it was necessary to allow people in important businesses to be excused from army service. Draftees could also buy out of service by paying a fee (Usually around $300.00). Again, this system allowed for a more flexible draft system. For a further discussion of this subject see Mark M. Boatner III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York: Random House Books, 1988), 858.


Captain Daniel Waite Howe, 79th Indiana Regiment, Journal entry for July 16, 1863, Daniel Waite Howe Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

Lyman E. Widney, Sergeant Major, 34th Illinois Regiment, Journal entry for August 1, 1863, Kennesaw Mountain National Military Park, Kennesaw, GA.

Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, Commander, 39th Indiana Regiment, to Wife, August 17, 1863, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.


A.S Bloomfield, A Battery, 1st Ohio Artillery, Letter to Wife, July 11, 1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH.

A.S Bloomfield, A Battery, 1st Ohio Artillery, Letter to Wife, July 23, 1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH.
CHAPTER 4

INDIVIDUAL MORALE FACTORS

do not mourn me dead; think I am gone and
and wait for me, for we shall meet again.

Major Sullivan Ballou, Warrior Words

Try as they may, leaders cannot always control all of the
factors that influence their men during the conduct of a campaign. In
order to understand the overall morale of the soldiers in the Army of
the Cumberland, we must take a look at events in addition to those
discussed in the previous chapter—the events that occurred on the home
front. Many incidents were occurring daily that had a far reaching
impact on the soldiers in Rosecrans' Army. These happenings could not
be controlled by Rosecrans or his field leadership. This chapter will
address factors that fall into the context of home front concerns.
These concerns included: Was the farm or business being managed
properly while the soldiers were away; were family members healthy; did
the soldiers' wife or girlfriend still love him; and how did the
soldier's religious beliefs contribute to his daily feelings. Although
some of these categories seem to be intangibles far removed from
soldier's thoughts in the field, their writings clearly speak of their
importance to the nineteenth century soldier. Today, we know that home
front concerns are central to soldier readiness. In the nineteenth
century, leaders had not fully come to grips with the importance of

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management of the home front. Nevertheless, soldiers valued their homes and loved ones. They longingly looked to the day when the war would be over and they would once again be reunited.

Management of Farm or Business

Chapter Two discussed the makeup of the Army of the Cumberland. In order to understand the soldier's attitudes, however, keep in mind that this was an army of farmers often led by small businessmen. The Army of the Cumberland was vastly different from the Army of the Potomac. Units were raised principally out of what was then the frontier of the contiguous United States. The soldiers came from as far east as Pennsylvania and as far west as Kansas. Their concerns centered around farm and family.

Most of the soldiers in the army had left an agrarian way of living. In their letters home, they often addressed their concerns that the farm was being properly managed. Success of the farm was often the means of survival of their families. Failure of a crop or crops could literally mean starvation for their family at home. In a letter home, an Ohio soldier asked, "is the mare grown much . . . how many cattle have you got . . . how does your hogs look . . . well concerning the wheat it is bound to be high . . . our army must be fed." These comments were typical of other soldiers in the army. Soldiers were always anxious for any news from the farm. A soldier from the 29th Indiana Regiment wrote home, "I am sorry to hear of the frost in your section of the country. I hope you will secure [plenty of] fodder for the stock." Soldiers often commented on the condition of the local
farms they passed, or the crops they observed. Lieutenant Eben Sturges wrote: "passed rich cornfields, fine springs, and peach orchards, in which was an abundance of fruit, of poor quality however and most being unripe." Lieutenant Sturges obviously took pride in his home town peaches.

Concerns for business also commonly surfaced in soldiers' letters home. Claiborne Walton wrote, "How about our goods business? Are you making a merchant? You must look out for our interest." Like so many of his comrades, these letters were Walton's only connection with his former livelihood. Some even saw opportunity for future ventures as they marched through the South. An engineer with Rosecrans' headquarters was quick to write his father that there would be many bridges needing repair at the end of the war.

Members of the Army of the Cumberland did have an edge on their Confederate counterparts. In 1863, Scientific American stated that "Farming was child's play to what it was twenty years ago." This improvement in farming was a result of the increase in mechanization of farming through the use of mechanical mowers and reapers. Poorer farmers had to resort to the method a missionary in Iowa observed in 1863, "I met more women driving teams on the road and saw more at work in the fields than men." Many soldiers looked forward to the day when they would once again call themselves farmers. Edwin Perkins, 59th Ohio Regiment, wrote home, "Father I am glad to hear you say that you have plenty of land for me. That is all I want and good helth [sic] and I can do as much as ane [sic] man I think. I will live at home and I want to do all the work [on the farm]." Continued success of the way of
life back home remained uppermost in the minds of the soldiers in the army. Often, the only measure of success was crops flourishing, animals thriving, or successful business. Only then would the family be truly secure.

Family Concerns

As soldiers left their homes and farms to march off to war, their concerns were very different from those of soldiers today. Their health and that of their families were of constant concern. Infant mortality rates were high, life expectancy was short and the medical sciences were in their infancy. Illness felled great numbers of the soldiers that marched off to war. Often, soldiers' family members expired while they were serving in distant locations. Although this was a fact of daily existence to the nineteenth century soldier, it had a significant impact on his morale. In their letters, soldiers always devoted a few lines to reporting their state of health. Colonel John G. Parkhurst, 9th Michigan Regiment, was typical of his fellow soldiers when he reported, "I hasten to write you a few words to let you know I am in good health." Additionally, soldiers were always anxious to hear about the health of their families back home. Samuel Shepardson of the 30th Indiana Regiment wrote to his sister: "... am thankful that the "old folks at home" are all, as yet, among the living [sic], and hope this may find them, all, enjoying good health." It is rare to find soldiers' correspondence that does not address their concern for the health of themselves or their families.
Infant Mortality

No doubt, most of the soldiers in the army had witnessed the death of an infant brother or sister. Infant mortality rates were about one in ten during the second half of the nineteenth century. Infant mortality was so common that diary entries often simply state "Levi Cannons child died today of Dysentery." Colonel Thomas J. Harrison seemed unaffected after learning of the death of his son. He wrote his wife: "I hope you will not grieve over the death of our little boy. I have determined to be quite reconciled of it." Infant mortality was not the only danger in childbirth. Childbirth could often be as dangerous for the mother as it was for the child. First Lieutenant Alexander Ayers noted that, "Colonel McCooks' [Daniel McCook, Commander, 125th Illinois Regiment, Reserve Corps] wife is . . . not expected to live his child died last week but his wife does not know yet that it is dead."14

Given the danger of childbirth, which offset the normal female longevity over males, life expectancy rates for 1855 were 40.2 years for both male and females.15 Sickness and death were frequent visitors to any soldier's home. As they marched off to war, many soldiers realized that given a prolonged war, this farewell might be their last look at some of their loved ones.

Medicine

The average soldier of the nineteenth century knew that medicine could not provide the answer to sickness at home. The period of the Civil War saw great advances in technology. The use of the
rifled musket and cannon, improvements in logistics, through employment of railroad lines, real time communications via telegraph, and the appearance of the ironclad warship. Medicine did not yet enjoy these great advances in technology. Medicine was still, as yet, a fledgling science. Illness was often blamed on an imbalance of vital body fluids, bad air, or miasmas. Since the medical sciences could not provide an answer to their maladies, soldiers often resorted to quack remedies as cures. These cures were immensely popular from the middle of the eighteenth century through the close of the nineteenth century.

Soldiers were quick to recommend them to loved ones, "If Triphena has dyspepsia [indigestion] then she will be benefited in taking Hannapottz medicine."

Although we will never know if the Hannapottz medicine worked, it is probable that it only annoyed poor Triphena’s condition. Most patient medicines were nothing more than flavored alcohol. The lack of faith that soldiers had in medical science is best summed up by a young soldier who wrote, "inform me how you are as soon as possible for every time that I hear of sickness at home I expect to hear of death in the next letter."

**Homesickness**

Soldiers were constantly attacked by another sickness—homesickness. "Home sickness broke the moral fiber of countless numbers of soldiers."

In fact, contrary to our beliefs today, one of the most popular songs among soldiers during the Civil War was "Home Sweet Home."

An incident occurred at Fredericksburg worth noting. Although this was a completely different theater of operations, the incident is
illustrative of the nostalgic nature of Civil War soldiers on both sides. A New Hampshire soldier reported that a battle between Union and Confederate bands located on both sides of the Rappahannock broke out one evening. Each band played a patriotic air which was quickly countered by the band across the river. Then a Union bugler played "Home, Sweet, Home." He commented that its effect was stirring to the soldiers: "As the sweet sounds rose and fell on the evening air, . . . all listened intently, and I don't believe there was a dry eye in all the assembled thousands." The song had the same effect on soldiers in the Army of the Cumberland. Sergeant Major Lyman E. Widney noted that, "we were summoned to worship by the musical tones of a church bell which found an echo in our hearts to the sweet refrain of "Home Sweet Home." A cavalryman from the 4th Michigan related a story to his Mother concerning an impromptu truce. As the Confederate forces and the Union forces looked at each other across the Tennessee River, the regimental band began to serenade the Confederates. At length a Confederate officer appeared to request a song. "Play "Home Sweet Home" was heard." A lieutenant from Illinois summed up the soldiers' feelings best when he wrote his wife, "You have no idea the amount of nerve it takes for a man to sit down in his tent all alone & think of his family -- & then think that tonight he may be ordered out & some unfriendly bullet cut short all his fond hopes of getting home."

The Girl I Left Behind Me

First Lieutenant Thomas Prickett, 9th Indiana Regiment, characterized most soldiers when he wrote, "Your constancy to me in my
absence has been sufficient proof to me, that your love was more than that of mere friendship, while my fellow soldiers have in several instances received the intelligence of the faithlessness of their sweethearts. You have proven by your devotion that yours was a love that nothing but the "cold hand of death" could erase. 26 Soldiers constantly worried that their sweethearts had forgotten them during their term of service with the army. Joseph Woods, 99th Ohio Regiment, wrote his sister, "Among my many other neglects Nell has forgotten to write me for a long time . . . I presume she has reasons for the delay but anything for an "agony" which she knows how to lay on so well. I will march right on to the gulf & then drown my sorrows in the "briny deep"." 27 We may never know whether Nell wrote to Joseph or not, but his concern was all too often well founded. Not all the "Girls Left Behind" would remember their soldiers serving far away. Few letters survive to document that soldiers were, in fact, forgotten by their sweethearts. Perhaps, they were quickly discarded. There is one fact that cannot be disputed. Regardless of the outcome, romantic matters often had a penetrating effect on soldiers' morale.

Religion

Religion was central to the nineteenth century person. When possible, the army rested on Sunday and held church services. Second Lieutenant Leroy S. Mayfield, 22nd Indiana Regiment, reported in his journal, "Sabbath. Day passes drearily away, as always does the Sabbath in the army. Divine worship at Division Headquarters, all invited to attend." 28 Attendance at church was a major part of soldiers' lives.
Regiments were often proud of their Chaplain and his preaching skills. Unlike today, every well-read person had studied the bible. Many soldiers felt so strongly about their personal commitment to reading the Bible that they commented on their progress in their journal. One guilty soldier, assigned to the 17th Kentucky, frequently noted, "this is Sunday but did not read my Bible much today." Soldiers at every level of education were prompt to quote from scripture. Soldiers were also quick to thank the Almighty for living through what seemed to be unsurvivable situations. John Russell wrote his sister after the Battle of Chickamauga, "God in His mercy has spared me and given me hope of a speedy recovery. I trust I may give Him praise." Russell typified the nineteenth century soldier, one who saw God as being personally involved in his daily existence. This attitude is not surprising given the mortality of the average person during this period. God was everywhere in the minds of the majority of the soldiers and they were quick to look to God for guidance on what they saw. An Ohio soldier upon seeing slaves wrote, "I consider it [slavery] an insult to God, He who has proclaimed Himself a friend of man, a God of mercy and justice." Religion played an infinitely greater role in soldiers' morale than it would in future wars. Soldiers saw God involved in their daily efforts. They knew that "God was with the Right." After his mortal wounding on the second day of the battle of Chickamauga, Corporal Merritt J. Simonds, 42nd Illinois Regiment, wrote his father: "I am resigned to abide the kind will of our Heavenly Father. I read my testament and pray to Him that whether I live or die I may do all to his Glory. Pray for me." Two weeks later, in his final letter home,
he bid farewell with these words of comfort, "You must not take this [news of his death] to heart but look to a higher source for comfort, for it is God's will and I feel resigned to my fate. I hope to meet you all in a better world." Like many of his comrades faced with the horror of war, Corporal Simonds had placed his faith in the only constant he knew--His faith in God.

Individual morale factors had a measurable effect on soldiers' efficiency in the army. Most of the commanders of the army had not fully come to grips with this very real aspect of human behavior. If the home front was unstable, the soldiers' mind was not on his army mission, it was devoted to thoughts of home. If the farm or business failed, the soldiers' family survival could literally be threatened. The sickness or death of a family member could bring on months or years of depression, and homesickness could often be as crippling to a soldier as Confederate bullets. The girl back home could send a soldier into a state of severe depression by simply writing that she no longer cared. Sermons by the spiritual leader at home could send a soldier off to the war, but these holy men failed to address the wholesale killing that might be contrary with a soldiers religious beliefs. In brief, these are the factors that make an army and its soldiers human--compassion for fellow man, caring for loved ones and the desire for security and love. They could, and often did, translate into tangible aspects of soldier morale in Rosecrans' mighty army.
Endnotes

1 As a result of lessons learned during Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm the United States Armed Forces have invested significant amounts of time and money into Family Support Groups. These organizations exist to solve problems that occur at home while the soldier is deployed. The Armed Forces have invested this degree of effort because the current belief is that soldiers will able to concentrate on their mission if they know their loved ones are being cared for. For a more in depth look at lessons learned on the home front see: The Yellow Ribbon, Special Bulletin Number 91-2, Center For Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. The publication brings out the cogent points of the problems encountered at home during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. There are strong parallels between problems encountered by our modern army and those encountered by soldiers in the Army of the Cumberland.

2A.S. Bloomfield, A Battery, 1st Ohio Artillery, to Wife, September 14, 1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH.

2Bergun H. Brown, C Company, 29th Indiana Regiment, to Friends at Home, September 14, 1863, Bergun H. Brown Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

2Eben P. Sturges to Mother, 19 August, 1863, Eben P. Sturges papers, Civil War Times Illustrated Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Washington, DC.


7Klein Life in Civil War America, 2.

7Edwin Perkins, 59th Ohio Regiment, Letter to Father & Mother, September 9, 1863, Edwin Perkins Papers, Regimental Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.

7Colonel John G. Parkhurst, Commander, 9th Michigan Regiment, to Dear Sisters, June 28, 1863, John G. Parkhurst Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bently Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

7Samuel Shepardson, 30th Indiana Regiment, to Sister, August 8, 1863, Samuel Shepardson Letters, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, IN.

12Alonzo Keeler Diary, 22 Michigan Infantry, Entry for August 5, 1863, Alonzo Keeler Papers, Michigan Historical Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

12Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, Commander, 39th Indiana Volunteer Regiment, to Wife, August 17, 1863, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

12First Lieutenant Alexander M. Ayers, Quartermaster, 125th Illinois Regiment, to Wife, July 11, 1863, Alexander Miller Ayers Papers, Special Collection, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.

12Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics, 56.

12Miasma is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as: A poisonous atmosphere formerly thought to rise from swamps and putrid matter and cause disease. In the true 19th century context, a miasma went beyond bad air. Miasms could attack a person in fresh air particularly if your body was weakened through exposure to extreme weather conditions.

12One of the earliest "Patent" medicine was made by Robert Turlington in England in 1744. His twenty six ingredient "Balsam of Life" was touted as a remedy for every known malady. Turlington's elixir became an overnight success in England and the colonies. It launched a long running industry of patent medicines. Turlingtons Balsam of Life Bottles are still dug in great numbers in Civil War camp trash pits.

12Captain Nathaniel P. Charlot, 22d Indiana Volunteer Regiment, letter to Harriet, undated, Nathaniel P. Charlot Papers, Ralph Brown Draughon Library, Auburn University, Auburn AL.

12James H. Wiswell, Company C, 4th US Cavalry, letter to Father, September 15, 1863, James H. Wiswell Papers, Manuscript Department, Pekins Library, Duke University,


12The original version of Home Sweet Home can be found in The American Heritage Songbook (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co, 1969), 98. [The song was originally written for an opera produced in London in 1823. It is interesting to note that "Home, Sweet Home" quickly became America's first "hit" song. Jenny Lind performed the song on her American Tour for President Millard Fillmore at the White House. It was still popular when the war broke out and became an instant favorite of soldiers on both sides. For a more complete history of "Home, Sweet Home," see: Irwin Sibler, Songs of the Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), page 121.]
Robertson, Soldiers Blue and Gray, 85.

Journal of Lyman E. Widney, Sergeant Major, 34th Illinois Regiment, for August 6, 1863 [A day of Thanksgiving declared by President Lincoln], Kennesaw Mountain National Military Park, Kennesaw, GA.

George W. Chase, 4th Michigan Cavalry Regiment, Letter to Ma and Terry, September 6, 1863, George W. Chase Letters, Michigan Historical Collections, Bently Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

First Lieutenant Alexander Miller Ayers, Letter to Wife, September 22, 1863, Alexander Miller Ayers Papers, Special Collections, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.

First Lieutenant Thomas Prickett, Company E, 9th Indiana Regiment, to Dearest Matilda, July 12, 1863, Thomas Prickett Letters, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.


Second Lieutenant Leroy S. Mayfield, 22nd Indiana Regiment, Journal entry for September 6, 1863, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN.

David M. Cloggett, 17th Kentucky Regiment, Journal entry for August 9, 1863, Chickamauga Chattannoga National Military Park, Fort Oglethorpe, GA.


Mungo P. Murray, Company K, 31st Ohio, to Sister, August 24, 1863, Mungo P. Murray Letters, Civil War Times Illustrated Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Merritt J. Simonds to Father, October 3, 1863, Merritt J. Simonds Papers, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL.

Merritt J. Simonds to Father, October 27, 1863, Merritt J. Simonds Papers, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL.
CHAPTER 5

MORALE FACTORS WITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE ARMY

Morale, only morale, individual morale as a foundation under training and discipline will bring victory.

Field Marshall Viscount Slim June 1941

Thus far, this thesis has discussed factors that were out of the control of the leaders in the Army of the Cumberland. This study illustrated that army units consisted of divergent individuals with varying motives and backgrounds. Molding these individuals into an effective combat force fell into the purview of the army's leadership. Victory on the battlefield often was directly related to the degree of success that the leadership had building individuals into a combat team.

Numerous factors contributed to overall morale and served as an indicator to the leadership of the success they were enjoying toward their team building goal. Previous chapters focused on the elements of morale that the leadership could not influence. There are, however, many facets of morale that the leadership has a direct effect upon. These elements include soldiers' attitudes toward army life, their attitudes toward leadership, the level of unit discipline, or for that matter indiscipline, a caring spirit put forth by unit leaders, and a moral and healthful living environment. By carefully shaping attitudes and conditions surrounding these elements, the leadership of the army could directly affect soldier morale. This enhanced morale could
translate directly to increased combat effectiveness and strong soldier support of the chain of command.

Soldiers' Attitudes Toward Army Life

Attitudes that soldiers held toward army life directly equated to unit morale. Leaders could influence these attitudes by providing distractions to the boredom encountered during daily camp routine and by maintaining a healthy camp environment. For veteran soldiers, army life was not always filled with excitement. In fact, soldiers would spend less time fighting in combat than in any other pursuit. Following the victory at Stone's River, Rosecrans' army wintered south of Nashville. Rosecrans planned to use this time to refit the army prior to launching the his spring campaign. As a result of this plan, soldiers were relegated to camp from January until June of 1863. To the average soldier, this period of restriction to camp consisted of drill and guard duty punctuated by the occasional review parade. The soldiers used this time to occupy themselves with the daily necessities of living. They cooked, cleaned, repaired, wrote letters home, and read newspapers. General Gordon L. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, stated that, "an army does three things: camp, march, and fight." For the period between January and mid-September of 1863, the Army of the Cumberland would principally be engaged in camping and marching. Given this period of intense boredom and extreme military routine, it would seem that soldier attitudes toward army life would be unfavorable. Quite the contrary is true. George Marsh, 104th Illinois Regiment, summed up the feelings of most of his comrades when he wrote, "Soldiering agrees with me first rate." Camping and marching was a
time for strict enforcement of the army regulation. When this strict enforcement of rules met with the independent spirited westerner, it often led to grumbling and boring ritual. Soldiers were always looking for ways to break this ritualistic monotony. They played cards, discussed the news, organized "stag" dances, and generally made the best of the lull between campaigns. Sometimes, they turned to pranks to vent frustration with camp routine, army rules or unfair regulations.

Following the Tullahoma Campaign, General Thomas released a directive forbidding soldiers to steal food from the local civilians. Shortly thereafter, a soldier in Colonel Scribner's Brigade was caught stealing hams secreted away by local citizens. Officers of his regiment arrested him, confiscated the hams, and confined him to the guard house for one day. The contraband hams were then cooked and served at the brigade officer's mess that evening. Upon release from the guardhouse, our errant soldier caught wind of the fate of his hams and quickly vowed revenge. Several days later, the enterprising soldier found a fat "secessionist" bulldog and killed him. He butchered the dog and carved the carcass into the shape of a ham. He proudly marched himself and his "ham" in front of the officer's quarters; where he was quickly apprehended and placed back into the guardhouse. Once again, the confiscated ham was delivered to the officer's mess, where it was served that evening as ham soup. Delighted at the outcome of his joke, our wayward soldier quickly shared his story with his comrades. Much to Colonel Scribner and his staff's confusion and dismay, for the remainder of the campaign their presence was met with subdued barking which built up to a crescendo of uncontrollable barking and laughter by soldiers in the ranks. Poor Colonel Scribner and his staff may not have shared the
soldier's delight in this joke, but after all, it was only good clean fun.

On the whole, it appeared that departure from the standing camps at Murfreesboro lifted the morale throughout the army. First Lieutenant George W. Landrum, 2nd Ohio Regiment, wrote, "Our army is in fine spirits, eager to advance...we are having a delightful Summer." A soldier in the 38th Indiana added: The dismal days...days of death by homesickness, were over and forgotten, and bright the sun shone for all." Despite the horrific weather conditions that prevailed throughout the Tullahoma Campaign, the morale of the army was generally high. When the torrential rains ended, the morale of the army reached a new zenith. William Stookly, 42nd Indiana Regiment, noted that, "The health of the boys is very good they are in good spirits and believe (sic) that we will get home before long." Thus, the soldiers had a profoundly positive attitude toward their living conditions throughout the campaign.

Attitudes Toward Leadership

One of the most important elements of unit morale is the faith, or lack there of, that soldiers place in their leaders. Comments about leaders abound in soldiers' writings. And as could be expected, the army, corps and division commanders were often a topic of discussion in these comments. By this point in the war, most of the senior leadership had seen extensive combat service and across the board they were generally effective as leaders. As with any given group, there were those individuals that fell along the full range of the spectrum from beloved and effective to hated and ineffective.
Unlike some of his counterparts, Major General William S. Rosecrans was both effective and beloved by his men. Many of the soldiers in the army felt that his presence at Stone's River had been the cornerstone of their victory. Speaking about the Tullahoma Campaign, Lawrence Fisher, a member of the Headquarters, Army of the Cumberland staff, wrote, "He was the greatest strategist of the Union Army and we may be confident that such will be the final verdict of history." Another soldier put it this way: "I do not believe the world could produce a better fighting army than General Rosecrans commands. . . . This ever victorious general came along the lines talking to his privates as friendly as though they had been his children; he inquiring if they had all they could eat, and if there was anything we wanted, let him know and he would obtain it for us." Throughout the army, soldiers knew that Rosecrans was a compassionate leader as demonstrated by his care and concern for the health and comfort of his troops. Even after the debacle at Chickamauga, Rosecrans was held in high regard by the soldiers. A voice from the ranks said, "I think seriously [Rosecrans] is the best man on earth now. Washington might have been good, but he was no better than Old Rosey. I tell you the boys will fight for him to the last." Rosecrans' removal also prompted soldiers to remark about their confidence in their former commander. Captain Orville Chamberlain, 74th Indiana Regiment, wrote, "The removal of Old Rosy . . . makes me feel as if I wished I was resigned. Old Rosy has always done well. He did well at Chickamauga, and only failed to accomplish impossibilities." Rosecrans' popularity with his soldiers lasted until the end of the lives of the members of the Army of the Cumberland. John Fitch, Rosecrans' Staff
Judge Advocate, summed it up best. "His genial countenance, pleasing smile, and easy, unaffected manners, everywhere the same, have kindled in all his friends an affection as lasting as it is warm; and many a soldier and citizen will in after-years remember with feelings of admiration and love the present commander of the Army of the Cumberland." History would prove John Fitch right; to his men, Rosecrans would always live on as "Old Rosy."

Rosecrans' chief lieutenant, Major General George Thomas was also held in high regard by his men. His men dubbed him "Pap" Thomas as a result of his slow, deliberate and often paternal manner. Critics usually referred to him as "Old Slow Trot" referring to his preference to move at a slow trot on his mount. Despite his reserved manner and slow movement, George Thomas was beyond reproach in the eyes of his men. One of his brigade commanders noted, "I began to know and love that matchless soldier General George H. Thomas." William Bickham, a correspondent for the Cincinnati Commercial, summed up Thomas this way,

The veterans knew him and revered him to a man. . . . He had the confidence and esteem of the officers . . . General Rosecrans had a reverential respect for him . . . Most men diminish as you approach them . . . A few magnify, and you feel their greatness . . . His form grows upon you like a mountain that you gradually approach."

Soldiers of the Fourteenth Corps loved and admired their corps commander.

The division commanders in the Fourteenth Corps enjoyed the same reputation with one notable exception—Major General Lovell H. Rousseau. Rousseau served as First Division commander during the Tullahoma campaign. Although John Fitch stated he was, "honored by his compeers and esteemed by his men." Colonel John Beatty, a brigade
commander in the Second Division, Fourteenth Corps, described him as, "an ass of eminent gifts." Although it is unclear exactly how the soldiers perceived Rousseau, their lack of comment about him in existing documents points up the fact that perhaps Beatty's view is a little more accurate than that of Fitch. Rousseau was not present at Chickamauga. He rejoined his unit the following day. Brigadier General Absalom Baird was reassigned from the Reserve Corps as his replacement in the interim. Baird was,

Always cool and collected, he never lost control of himself in the heat of battle, but was at all times in the front personally directing his command . . . such a commander endears himself to his men, and hence it is not difficult to account for his popularity . . . with those under his command.18

Baird was quickly accepted and liked by the soldiers of the First Division.

Major General James S. Negley commanded Second Division. John Beatty described Negley as, "a large, rosy-cheeked, handsome, affable man, and a good disciplinarian."19 While moving across Raccoon Mountain, elements of Negley's Division found it necessary to effect repairs to part of the road they were moving along. Negley came upon the men and joined them, "laboring with his own hands--coat off and sleeves rolled up--in true Western style." This willingness to pitch in endeared him to his men. The observer continued, "the sweat-drops on his manly brow were deemed of greater worth than jeweled coronet, by his brave officers and men."20 Although this spirit made him popular with his soldiers, Negley was not popular with the West Point officers. When he resigned from the army in 1865, he spent the rest of his life blaming West Pointers for discrimination against him.21
Brigadier General John Brannan, was newly assigned to the Army of the Cumberland from duty in the Department of the South. It is probable that the reassignment resulted from his wife's exploits in Europe. Perhaps, the leadership felt he was no longer effective following publication of the details of his divorce. His problems all started when Brannan advertised in local newspapers and dragged lakes, fearing the worst, following his wife's disappearance. In fact, Brannan was completely cuckolded; his wife had run away to Italy with her lover and was supporting him as a prostitute. The transfer must have worked, since soldiers in his division did not comment on the general's personal dilemma.

Major General Joseph J. Reynolds, Fourth Division Commander, was well respected. His adjutant wrote, "General Reynolds is safe, after exposure on the very front all day. Twice have his personal efforts saved our lives." The soldiers of Company H, 72nd Indiana Regiment, Reynolds' provost guard, concurred with his adjutant's remarks. Reynolds always seemed to be where he could influence the action, regardless of the personal danger to himself.

Overall, the leaders of the Fourteenth Corps were held in high esteem. The leadership confidence level in this corps higher than any of its sister organizations. Given the confidence that the soldiers of the Fourteenth Corps had in their leadership, it is not surprising that Thomas was able to rally the remains of the army on Snodgrass Hill on the afternoon of September 20, 1863.

Rosecrans was not as fortunate with the leadership in his remaining two corps. Although the corps commanders were not incompetent, in the main, they were not held anywhere near the level of
esteem that the commander of the Fourteenth Corps enjoyed. The Twentieth Corps Commander, Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, was a son of the state of Ohio. His Ohio background gave to him a influential friend in Secretary of War Edwin McMasters Stanton. McCook appeared to be universally unpopular throughout the army. John Beatty summed him up as "a chucklehead." He then went on to say, "[McCook] looks more like a blockhead than ever, and it is astonishing that he should be permitted to retain command of a corps for a single hour."24

The Twenty-First Corps commander, Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, had powerful political connections both within his native state of Kentucky, where his father had been a U.S. Senator, and on his own right reaching back to Zachary Taylor's administration. One of his officers stated, "We always loved our General and at Stone's River his corps did splendid fighting."25 John Beatty, however, noted that, "Wood and Crittenden knew how to blow their own horns exceedingly well."26

W.F.G Shanks, a newspaperman present at the battle of Chickamauga, summed McCook and Crittenden up as follows: "Never did an army possess such weak corps commanders as Alexander McDowell McCook and Thomas L. Crittenden. They were doubtless brave and gallant—every soldier is supposed to be that; they doubtless did their duty to their full ability—every soldier does that, and expects no particular commendation for it; but these men were not capacitated by nature or education for the positions they held. Not one of them had any iron in his nature—neither were deep reasoners or positive characters. They were of a class of men who "intended to do well," but who, without any fixed and unswerving principle to guide them, vacillated and procrastinated until the great motive and the propitious time for action
had passed, and left them the doers only of positive evil or negative
good, which is just as bad."27

Division commanders in both these corps did not share the
popularity or success of the leaders of the Fourteenth Corps. McCook's
officers generally fell into this mold. Brigadier Jefferson C. Davis
was most remembered by his soldiers, not for his inspiring leadership,
but for the murder of his ex-commanding officer, General William Nelson.
Davis shot Nelson down in cold blood following a quarrel. Davis would
have probably seen prison had it not been for the immediate intervention
of Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton, Davis' political mentor.28 One
of the members of his division remarked, "He was a genial, clever
fellow, a good soldier, and made a fine record for himself during the
war, but I believe the unfortunate affair in which he shot and killed
General William Nelson, cast a gloom over him which he was never able to
throw off."29

Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson was clearly blamed by both
his superiors and subordinates for the disaster on the right wing at
Stone's River. By the end of the Tullahoma Campaign, he had partially
overcome this stigma. One observer noted that Johnson's men had,
"first impugned his character [but after observing his leadership style]
soon found the error of their judgment . . . in a short time [his
soldiers] gave him the full confidence of loyal men and true
soldiers."30

There was one exception to the otherwise unremarkable nature
of the senior leaders in McCook's corps--Major General Philip H.
Sheridan. "Little Phil," as by this time he had come to be called by
his admiring soldiers, was held a capital fighter, and much liked."31
Sheridan's men had great respect for him and although his performance was less than envious at the battle of Chickamauga, he would remain held in high esteem by his men.

Of Crittenden's division commanders, Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood was considered the most promising. William F.G. Shanks said that, "General Wood was a captious officer, but a decided brave, and energetic one." He continued, "The place which that clever gentleman, but very poor soldier, Thomas L. Crittenden, filled, was properly Tom Wood's years before he got it, for he really filled it. He was ever at his right hand and as his right hand, furnished him with all the military brains." The soldiers of Wood's division must have been generally content with their leaders as they failed to comment in the existing documents one way or the other.

The second division commander, Major General John M. Palmer commanded the largest division in the corps. According to one of his couriers, Henry Harrison Eby, Palmer was well thought of and a gallant officer. During the first day of the battle of Chickamauga, Palmer was inspecting the division's breastworks when an enemy bullet struck a log, sending splinters flying through the air. Palmer said, "Down with your head, my man, you only have got one head and you may want to use that in a minute." A few moments later, failing to follow his own advice, another Confederate round ripped through the Generals pants. "One of the boys seeing what took place looked at the General and said: General, down with your legs, you have only one pair and you may want to use them in a minute." This good natured exchange bespeaks the healthy command environment in this division.
Brigadier General Horatio Phillips Van Cleve was the oldest division commander in the army. At 53, his appearance was patriarchal, with a long gray beard and spectacles. Glen Tucker described him as, "A plain, unostentatious man, careful but never inspirational, indisposed to promote himself, he had reached his peak as commander of a division."35 Charles Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, had slightly stronger feelings: "all parties feel that Van Cleve ought to be relieved on account of his age, and the utter confusion of mind and incapacity he manifested on Saturday and Sunday."36 Either way his soldiers seemed to find him rather unremarkable. He was an average commander at best.

Rosecrans' commanders in both the Reserve and the Cavalry Corps were a mixed lot. Major General Gordon Granger was generally held in contempt by his subordinates following an incident which occurred in early September, 1863. After completely losing his temper, Granger attempted to whip a group of men as punishment for violating his order against foraging. The incident would have ended in mutiny had the cooler heads of General Steedman and Colonel Dan McCook not intervened. An observer, Sergeant Robert M. Rogers, 125th Illinois Infantry, noted: "From that day on our dislike for Granger was intense; he had proved himself a tyrant, and a man of ungovernable passion, and we fairly hated him."37

Brigadier General James B. Steedman, commanding Granger's First Division was a gallant officer. Steedman's men knew him well and held him in adoration. They would would follow him anywhere. During an impromptu council of war held with his officers on the morning of September 20, 1863, Steedman announced in disobedience of orders that
he would march to the battlefield. According to his Division Surgeon, J.T. Woods, the officers of the command trusted Steedman completely and stated that, "The announcement that they were immediately to move from safety to danger . . . [met with] approval by the most enthusiastic expressions, and with evident delight obeyed the final instruction to proceed at once to their respective posts." Steedman was probably the most trusted commander in Granger's corps.

Brigadier General James Dada Morgan commanded the Second Division. He remained stationed near Bridgeport, Alabama during the battle of Chickamauga. No record remains to shed light on how his soldiers felt about him. His First Brigade commander, Colonel Dan McCook, however, seemed displeased with Morgan. He felt that Morgan had caused him to be overlooked for advancement. Doctor Woods, however, did not hold Colonel McCook in high esteem. He believed McCook to "have a desire to get into the grooves of glory." Woods continued, noting that Colonel McCook was pleased upon assignment to Steedman because, "he had been placed under a fighting officer who could afford him a chance to win distinction . . . and thus deserved promotion." Although we may never have a complete picture of leader confidence in the Second Division, it is safe to assume that all was not well.

The Cavalry Corps commander, Major General David S. Stanley was not the stereotypical cavalryman. Stanley was an apt leader described as "bold and dashing, his action tempered and guided by skill and prudence, which make him a successful commander." Stanley was universally liked by his subordinates. The First Division Commander and acting chief of cavalry during the battle of Chickamauga, Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell did not quite live up to Stanley's standard.
Elisha A. Peterson, a soldier from the Headquarters, Cavalry Corps escort, noted "General D.S. Stanley being sick Rob B. Mitchell was in command of the Cavelry [sic] forces, & I think did not handle them as Stanley would have done, he is a very hard horseman, which makes it hard on the men."42

Brigadier General George Crook commanded the Second Division. Although there were no references to his abilities in the writings of Second Division soldiers, Crook had commanded the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division in the Fourteenth Corps. He was transferred from this command on July 31, 1863 to assume command of a division. The soldiers of the 3rd Brigade were universally happy about his departure. Colonel Philander P. Lane, 11th Ohio Regiment, wrote: "The Brigade was greatly pleased now to have a new commander."43 Josiah Dexter Cotton, 92nd Ohio Infantry, added, "I think we will like him [Brigadier General Turchin] better than Crook."44 Second Lieutenant A. Piatt Andrew III, 21st Indiana Battery, seemed to be the only person slightly sympathetic to the change. He stated, "I am not dissatisfied with the change--not on account of General Crook, but because he had a staff by no means agreeable."45 Be it Crook or the working of his staff, it seems George Crook was best summed up by John Beatty as follows: "[Crook] is an Ohio man, who has not, I think, greatly distinguished himself thus far."44

**Discipline**

Discipline is the cornerstone of any army in the field. Foraging, violent crime, desertion, or other infractions of military law were daily occurrences that commanders had to come to grips with. As we observed in the case of Gordon Granger, the manner of punishment for
these crimes often had a direct impact on both discipline and morale. It is often stated that discipline was more lax in the western armies than in its eastern counterpart. This statement is unfounded. In light of the record, it is evident that steps were immediately taken in Rosecrans' department to correct errant behavior on the part of both soldiers and civilians within his department's jurisdiction.

The Provost-Marshal General's Department, headed by Major William M. Wiles, dealt with every form of nefarious activity from drunkenness, through the trade of "contraband" by sutlers and the issue of passes to civilians, to the control of camp followers. Of course, in most cases, criminal infractions were handled by the regimental chain of command. Occasionally, however, even minor criminal activity drew the attention of the headquarters. On September 18, 1863, Rosecrans' Assistant Adjutant General fired off the following order: "The Commanding General directs you take charge of the discipline of the Headquarters Camp, to see that everything is kept in proper order and that the guards are efficient. There has been complaint recently that many articles are stolen from the wagons. The General desires you to devise some means to prevent this and punish the offenders."**

Rosecrans' staff may have succeeded in controlling theft, but according to William R. Stockly, 42nd Indiana Infantry Regiment, the provost marshall was less successful controlling the camp followers. In an unusually frank letter to his wife Stockly wrote, "as to getting home for twenty to thirty dollars just to sleep with a woman ... I can get to sleep with them without going two miles from camp and with less than half the money and I never miss an opportunity."** Amusing as
his statement seems, the large amount of camp following caused the army constant problems ranging from petty theft to more violent crime.

Minor infractions usually drew time in the guard house, however, the department dealt harshly with violent crime—it usually carried the death penalty. Alonzo Merrill Keeler, 22nd Michigan Regiment, wrote, "Hiram Reynolds, 82nd Illinois, hung at 12 M at the penitentiary Nashville for shooting a fellow soldier—Plead intoxication & was swung off while praying—seemed much agitated." Although executions were rare, they gave soldiers a memorable example of the reality of military discipline. At least two cases of rape were reported during the Tullahoma Campaign. The first case occurred at the mid-point of the campaign near McMinnville, Tennessee. Saddler Jacob Leonhart, 26th Pennsylvania Battery, entered the home of Mrs. Jane Young and, "did then and there, feloniously and against her will, [did] attempt to commit rape upon the person of "Sally," a Negro woman in her employ." Leonhart was caught and promptly sentenced to the penitentiary for the remainder of the war. The second case involved one of the officers of the Army of the Cumberland. Lieutenant Harvey John, 49th Ohio Regiment, encountered Mrs. Catherine Farmer on a road near Tullahoma. John assaulted her and did "forcibly and unlawfully ravish and carnally know Mrs. Farmer against [her] will." The lieutenant would spend two years in the penitentiary for his crime. Violent crimes, however, were the exception. Most indiscipline revolved around drinking and foraging. Soldiers of all ranks were quick to enjoy the outlet afforded to them by alcohol. First Lieutenant Robert Dilworth, 21st Ohio Regiment, noted on August 3, 1863, "the sutlers brought on a large lot of sutlers goods, beer, ale, etc. About half the regiment became
pretty merry over it and some so that they had to be taken into custody.
Every thing went pretty quietly considering the amount of beer which had
been drank." Soldiers were not the only ones who enjoyed their
spirits. John Beatty tells us that after a party at General Rosecrans'
headquarters, Generals McCook, Crittenden and Rousseau were so
intoxicated that the three left the party, arm in arm, singing *Mary Had
A Little Lamb.* With the exception of large amounts of occasionally
intemperate soldiers and the frequent foraging that occurred during the
Tullahoma Campaign, disciplinary infractions seemed minimal throughout
the period of this study. In fact, the level of discipline of the
soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland seemed to be equal or better to
that of their eastern comrades.

**Care and Health of Soldiers**

Major General Rosecrans insured that the soldiers of the Army
of the Cumberland were well cared for. Prior to opening the Tullahoma
Campaign, Rosecrans had continually goaded the War Department to upgrade
his department in both logistical and cavalry capability. Although he
was not completely successful, the result of his efforts left the army
generally well equipped, well feed, and healthy. In fact, Colonel John
P. Sanderson, a member of Rosecrans' staff, noted that, "The army is in
prime condition, full of confidence. I was told yesterday by one of our
medical staff that we have no sick, and that the aggregate number of
patients within the last two weeks does not exceed one hundred. This is
wonderful." This low sickness rate gives us a direct reading on unit
morale. Writing on unit morale in the early nineteen twenties, Colonel
Edward Munson noted that, "Health rates thus form one of the best
indices of morale. High rates [of sickness] usually express the results of poor discipline and control, personal carelessness and lack of consideration for the rights of others."56 General Rosecrans and his staff placed great emphasis on keeping encampments clean and healthy. He enforced this standard through a system of frequent inspections of his soldiers' living areas. Captain John D. Inskeep, 17th Ohio Regiment, noted in his journal, "Inspections have been more frequent and minute than usual—blank inspection forms have been furnished us lately and the rules there laid down are very stringent."57 This program of inspections coupled with inspector general involvement58 to implement fixes to problems discovered by the staff facilitated the best possible living conditions for the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland.

Moral Environment

The importance of religion to the average soldier of the nineteenth century was discussed in the previous chapter. It was, however, the duty of the command to insure that time and facilities were made available in order that soldiers could practice their faith. Additionally, it was the responsibility of the leadership to provide a morally acceptable environment for the soldier to live and work in. As discussed earlier, while criminal activity fell under the purview of the Provost Marshal General, "guarding and guiding the spiritual well-being of the soldier was the responsibility of the army chaplains."59

Reverend Father Treacy was the chaplain assigned to General Rosecrans' personal staff. He acted as Rosecrans' confessor and expended great effort visiting soldiers in camp, hospital and on the battlefield.60 Figures on the number of assigned chaplains for the army
have thus far eluded my efforts, although, a report to the Secretary of War in mid-1863 stated that of six hundred seventy-six regiments on file, only three hundred ninety-five had chaplains assigned. This would indicate a fifty-eight percent fill across Federal forces or in the case of the Army of the Cumberland a shortage of about one hundred chaplains. This shortage was offset by scores of visiting civilian preachers, although they did not provide the moral leadership offered by a permanently assigned member of the command.

A devout Roman Catholic, Rosecrans built an environment conducive to moral living. During their encampment at Murfreesboro, elaborate chapels were built for the soldiers to worship in. Once the army departed winter camp, religious ceremonies became more simple, often held anywhere men could gather. "The leading religious service in camp took place on Sunday afternoon so as not to interfere with morning duties and inspections." The men might then sing one or two hymns, hear a reading from scripture and finally hear the sermon. This sermon was the highlight of the service, after which the soldiers returned to duty. In early July 1863, First Lieutenant Robert Dilworth made note of a sermon "preached by a man from Pennsylvania. A very appropriate sermon ... After sermon the minister distributed testaments, hymnbooks and religious papers." Letters and journals abound with references to both quality and quantity of the services at headquarters on the Sabbath. There is no doubt that in the days preceding the Tullahoma Campaign through those following the battle of Chickamauga, the Army of the Cumberland was provided as moral a living environment as could be expected.
Mail

When General Rosecrans assumed control of the department, there was virtually no means of directing the mail. The amount of outgoing and incoming mail was voluminous: the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland sent twenty two thousand letters per day and in return the department received about an equal amount. Rosecrans tasked his chief of Secret Police, "Colonel" William Truesdale to correct this problem through the establishment of a locator service. Truesdale performed this duty efficiently and within weeks the system was operating beyond expectation. Since mail was the only means of communication with the home front, it had a pivotal effect on the soldiers' morale. Almost every soldier mentioned his desire for more frequent letters from home. Colonel John G. Parkhurst, 9th Michigan Regiment, is typical of all soldiers when he implored, "Write me as often as you can," or later "Helen you must write me," or still later "Am I not going to hear from you?" Thomas Jefferson Conely spoke from the ranks of the same regiment when he wrote, "I have not heard from you since we have been on the march. Have been very anxious to hear from you." From the private to the general, mail was a critical part of the morale equation. Rosecrans' department managed to handle mail seriously and efficiently. It is interesting to note that soldiers in the army even received mail following action on the first day of the battle of Chickamauga. John Fitch summed up the impact of mail as follows: "Its influence on the soldier can hardly be overstated. It is a messenger of love and hope, bringing words of comfort and cheer in those dark and trying hours." The leaders of the Army of the Cumberland would go to great lengths to insure that this important messenger got through.
And so the leaders of the army attempted to make the best out of the worst circumstances for their soldiers. They worked to have a positive impact on the facets of morale that the leadership can have a direct effect upon. The leaders forged a strong organization by influencing soldiers’ attitudes toward army life, improving attitudes toward leadership, working to build unit level discipline, putting forth a caring spirit, and maintaining a moral and healthful living environment. This enhanced morale manifested itself in increased combat effectiveness and strong soldier support of the chain of command. It truly gave the army the edge necessary during the coming campaign. Rosecrans’ army truly had become a brotherhood of warriors, proud of their collective organization and ready to face the foe in the field.
Endnotes


3From a speech given on November 9, 1994 by General Gordan L. Sullivan to the Command and General Staff College Class of 1995, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


6First Lieutenant George W. Landrum, 2nd Ohio Regiment, letter to Amanda, June 28, 1863, George W. Landrum Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio. Lieutenant Landrum was killed in action at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863.


9Horace N. Fisher letter to General H. V. Boynton, September 10, 1895, Ezra Carman Papers, New York Public Library, New York, NY


12James S. Thomas, F Company, 10th Indiana Regiment, letter to Wife, September 24, 1863, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

13Captain Orville T. Chamberlain, 74th Indiana Regiment, Orville T. Chamberlain Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.


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John P. Sanderson letter dated September 17, 1863, John P. Sanderson Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.


Captain John D. Inskeep journal entry for Monday, July 20 to August 4, 1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

Robert D. Richardson, "Rosecrans Staff at Chickamauga: The Significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' Staff on the Outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga Campaign" Master of Military Art and Science, (Fort Leavenworth: Government Printing Office, 1989), 34-35. The function of the Inspector General was to report the status of areas of troop morale, camp facilities, unit administration and officer leadership. Inspector General officers also made recommendations to correct deficiencies discovered and monitored compliance to orders from the commander.


"Fitch, Annals, 327-329.


"Robertson, Soldiers Blue and Gray, 183.


"Fitch, Annals, 314.


"Fitch, Annals, 311.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The business before us is formidable, how formidable I fear the country does not quite appreciate... We here shall see the most terrible battle ever fought on this continent.

B.F. Taylor, Chicago Journal correspondent with the Army of the Cumberland

This thesis has examined the state of morale across the Army of the Cumberland in the period preceding and subsequent to the Battle of Chickamauga. The thesis laid out a short history of the Army of the Cumberland, including biographical information surrounding its leaders. It then explored morale in the context of factors outside the control of the army's leadership. These elements embraced National morale factors that were common to all Federal armies operating during the war. Individual morale factors were then probed, focusing on factors surrounding the home front and concerns for loved ones. The study then shifted focus to contemplate morale factors that army leadership can control.

Given this background, we must turn our attention back to the original questions posed in chapter one: Did the officers and soldiers have confidence in Major General William S. Rosecrans and his staff? Was confidence in Rosecrans' ability undermined within his own headquarters? Did soldiers have confidence in their officers? And finally, what was the state of discipline in the Army of the Cumberland?
Armed with the answers to these questions, we should be able to answer the primary question: What was the state of morale of the army during and after the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns?

Officer and Soldier Confidence in Major General Rosecrans

As illustrated in Chapter Five, there can be little doubt that both the officers and soldiers had complete confidence in the abilities of Major General Rosecrans before the battle of Chickamauga. Rosecrans, however, drew mixed reviews following the battle. First Lieutenant John H. Hale, 13th Michigan Regiment, carried dispatches from Rossville to Chattanooga on the evening of September 20, 1863. He noted, "From the manner in which the General acted and from what he said, I concluded he had not command of himself even, to say nothing of command of the army. Up to that time I had, like each member of the whole army, the utmost confidence in "Old Rosy" but then it was somewhat shaken." 2 Alfred Lacy Hough, a member of Rosecrans' staff, added, "[I] saw him [Rosecrans] in the telegraph office there, [Rossville] and a more crushed, overpowered and utterly lost man I never beheld." 3

Although Rosecrans was overwhelmed by the outcome of the battle of Chickamauga, he composed himself quickly and set forth preparing fortifications around the city of Chattanooga. Rosecrans had far from lost the confidence of his men. Most believed the battle of Chickamauga was a great victory. Oscar F. Avery, 11th Michigan Regiment, enumerated on the Chattanooga Campaign as follows, "To sum it up . . . we started out to take Chattanooga. We took it, we kept it, and we have had it ever since. If that was defeat, give us more of it." 4 Rosecrans, himself, wrote years later, "I know of no mistakes in that campaign

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except that not telegraphing a glorious victory at Chickamauga." Today the debate continues. Chickamauga may have been a tactical defeat for the Army of the Cumberland, but it certainly set the conditions that would spell the end of the Confederacy. Be that as it may, Chickamauga was not "as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run". Although Rosecrans enjoyed slightly less confidence from the part of the army that remained on Snodgrass Hill, in the main, the soldiers had not lost confidence in their commander.

Was Rosecrans Undermined from Within His Headquarters

If soldiers still showed confidence in their leader, and the city of Chattanooga, the prize of the campaign, remained firmly in Federal hands, what caused Rosecrans' relief? The answer to this question and a discussion of the day to day intrigue at the department headquarters could fill a volume in itself. However, I would submit that four people were directly responsible for Rosecrans' relief: Charles A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, Brigadier General James A. Garfield, Rosecrans chief of staff, General Ulysses S. Grant, ultimately commander of all Federal forces, and ironically, Rosecrans himself.

The first and most effective character in the Rosecrans relief conspiracy was Charles A. Dana. Dana, a newspaperman who acquired the position of Assistant Secretary of War through personal favor, had been sent by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to monitor Rosecrans' progress during the campaign. The War Department had continued to believe that Rosecrans had not moved quickly enough against Braxton Bragg. Charles Dana was to be the "eyes and ears" of the War Department within
Rosecrans' own headquarters and prod Rosecrans along as necessary. Rosecrans quickly alienated Dana, who Rosecrans felt was meddling in his department's affairs. As a result, Dana carried on an anti-Rosecrans campaign that would culminate with Dana charging that the army's respect for Rosecrans had, "received an irreparable blow," following Chickamauga. Dana's communications, directly to the War Department headquarters, would seriously damage Rosecrans' future as army commander.

Rosecrans' own chief of staff, Brigadier General James A. Garfield was embroiled in the plot to unseat Rosecrans as a commander. He contributed significantly toward damaging Rosecrans' reputation in Washington. As discussed in Chapter Two, Garfield's letters to Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase often voiced opinions critical of Rosecrans' decisions. Garfield shared Stanton and Halleck's opinion that Rosecrans had not moved swiftly enough against Bragg. Given that he was a witness from Rosecrans' headquarters and well appraised of the tactical situation, his comments carried great credence in Washington circles.

Additionally, by persuading his commander to return to Chattanooga vice the battlefield following the rout of the Federal right on September 20, 1863, Garfield managed to forever cast doubt on Rosecrans' iron as a commander. Although Garfield's actions were probably not premeditated, Garfield would enjoy serendipitous benefits from his commanders' decision to leave the field. In fact, in later years, Garfield did little to quell the Chickamauga legend that grew from this decision. His famous ride to George Thomas would ultimately contribute to his election as twentieth president of the United States.
Rosecrans had yet another powerful enemy that worked to effect his removal—none other than General Ulysses S. Grant. Prior to assuming command of the Army of the Cumberland, Rosecrans commanded a corps under Grant. During the battle of Corinth, Rosecrans managed to make a bitter enemy of Grant by criticizing Grant's battlefield performance. Rosecrans charged that Grant's failure to reenforce him caused the Confederate army to escape. According to Garfield, Grant made Rosecrans' relief prerequisite to Grant's acceptance of command of the Federal forces. Whatever his role, Grant was certainly vocal in the growing number of high-ranking members of the army and government calling for Rosecrans' relief.

The final character that played into Rosecrans' relief was Rosecrans himself. It may seem too simplistic to state that Rosecrans became a central figure in this intrigue, however, Lincoln stated, "It was Rosecrans' own desperate dispatches that made me come to that conclusion [replace Rosecrans]." Rosecrans had constantly asked for more soldiers, horses, supplies in his communications with the War Department during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. Initially, it seems that the War Department viewed these requests as complaining on the part of the commander. When Rosecrans continued to implore the War Department for reinforcements following the battle of Chickamauga, Stanton was quick to paint the picture of a panic-stricken commander who had lost control of the situation. In this way, Rosecrans' own words were effectively used against him.

Was Rosecrans undermined from within his own headquarters? The answer is a resounding yes. Through both intentional and unintentional actions, by early October, 1863, confidence in Rosecrans' abilities had
been shaken at the highest levels of national command. Considering that Chattanooga was "the gateway to the Confederacy" and that Lincoln could ill afford another loss in the west, immediate replacement of Rosecrans was paramount.

**Officer Confidence**

Having explored the level of confidence in Major General Rosecrans, we must now examine the remaining leaders. As portrayed in chapter five, overall, the officer corps in the Army of the Cumberland enjoyed a high level of soldier confidence. However, Albert G. Hart, 41st Ohio Regiment, made an illuminating remark following the battle of Chickamauga, "Our men were in surprising spirits. It was the generals who were demoralized. The soldiers were all right, confident & ready to trust anybody who would lead them." This observation is typical of many of the soldiers following the battle. Confidence in the company and field grade officers seemed extensively unscathed following the action at Chickamauga. Although confidence in officers at the regimental level and below remained high, flag grade officers, particularly the corps commanders, with the exception of Major General George Thomas, suffered. The soldiers did not, however, lose complete faith in the officer corps of the Army of the Cumberland. On the contrary, most felt that the officers had performed gallantly throughout the campaign.

**State of Discipline in the Army**

Chapter Five touched on the level of discipline of the Army of the Cumberland. This chapter discussed discipline in a purely punitive context. This discussion adequately illustrated that in this sense, the
Army of the Cumberland maintained a high state of discipline. To properly characterize true discipline, however, we must incorporate the behavioral elements such as saluting, performance at reviews, and health of the command.

To this day willingness of soldiers to salute is considered a strong indicator of discipline in a military unit. Saluting can also be important to the soldier. Mathias Baldwin Cotton, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was moved to note in his journal, "Am orderly at headquarters. Saluted Rosecrans and was saluted by him in return." Saluting was not the only way men manifested their spirit; cheering often accompanied the presence of respected nineteenth century officers. Howard A. Buzby, also of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, noted, "The infantrymen were in line and as "Old Rosy" was recognized he was cheered to the echo." These remarks typify the reception leaders received in the army. Soldiers were proud and willing to show support of their leaders in deed and action.

Performance at review is also a critical indicator of morale. Peter Keegan, 87th Indiana Regiment, made an observation typical of his comrades throughout the army. "I never saw the 3rd Brigade look so well. All things were decent and in order. The General reviewed each regiment separately, stopping and talking with the men. There was none of that pomposity about him that usually accompanies Generals of lesser caliber. The men were pleased with his style. He also inspected our quarters before we got in. The General praised the Division very highly as being the cleanest and best drilled, having the nicest camp." There are numerous remarks illustrating both soldiers' and officers' pride at the result of reviews and inspections conducted in the days
before the opening of the Chickamauga Campaign. The army receives high marks in this area of discipline. Unfortunately, as reviews were not held again until after Rosecrans' departure from command, we cannot measure the effect of the outcome of the battle of Chickamauga in this area.

The final behavioral area of discipline is health of the command. Chapter Five demonstrated that before the battle of Chickamauga the health of the command was at its peak. As must be expected, as a result of the battle and the ensuing siege of the city of Chattanooga, the health status of the command declined steadily following the battle of Chickamauga. Rosecrans reported 16,170 casualties as a result of the battle alone. For this reason alone, health of the command does not serve as an accurate indicator of the level of discipline following the battle.

Conclusions

We must now turn back to John Baynes' model to answer the primary research question: What was the state of morale of the Army of the Cumberland prior to and subsequent to the battle of Chickamauga? Baynes' model stated that morale was the sum of the following elements: Cheerfulness or soldier's faith in themselves and their leaders, level of discipline, or soldier behavior, performance at review, reception and treatment of unit visitors, and health concerns including hygiene in field and garrison and rate of sickness.

In light of this model, the thesis has shown that soldiers had complete faith both in themselves and their leaders before the action at Chickamauga, and with few exceptions, this confidence continued
unhindered following the battle. Discipline of the army was sound before the battle of Chickamauga and continued to remain strong beyond Rosecrans' removal from the army. Performance at review could only serve as an indicator of morale prior to the battle since there was no opportunity to conduct reviews in the time period between the end of the battle and Rosecrans' relief. Performance at reviews, however, was profoundly positive in the pre-Chickamauga period.

Although this thesis did not conduct an in-depth study of the reception and treatment of visitors, according to John Fitch guests were cordially received at headquarters. Soldiers make frequent note of visitors and seem to have enjoyed their presence and accorded the proper treatment. Brigadier General John M. Palmer, Second Division commander, Twenty-First Corps, even went so far as to comment on the dress of locals that visited the army. "We are in the mountains and amongst an interesting people but they are amongst the most odd and grotesquely dressed folks imaginable. Old styles from when I was a boy still flourish here. Six yards is a dress pattern. Hoops are but little worn, and the women nearly all chew tobacco. The men still preserve the old bell crown hat tight breeches and sharptail coats. But few women seem to have shoes and fewer still stockings." Despite their dress, it seems visitors were accorded affable welcome by units within the army.

As was previously discussed, health of the command indicated high morale before the battle and would not serve as a reliable indicator following the battle resultant from battle casualties.

In conclusion, examined individually, the elements of morale set forth by John Baynes' model engender the conclusion that the Army of
the Cumberland had a high state of morale both prior to and following the battle of Chickamauga. Rosecrans' army had indeed suffered a setback at the hands of Braxton Bragg at Chickamauga, but this setback had not spelled the end of the fighting spirit of one of the finest armies that ever served as part of the United States Army. An army whose soldiers achievements, "in strength of patriotism and valor in battle, have never been surpassed."  

What insights can today's leader gain from the study of morale in the Army of the Cumberland in a series of actions that occurred over 130 years ago? Clearly, much has changed in the years between 1863 and 1995; today we live in an army dominated by doctrinal tenets and technological revolution. The digital battlefield and precision weapons have replaced the power of the regiment, attacking forward in line. Today, the rifled musket, responsible for the appalling casualties of our Civil War, is a mere curiosity, captured behind glass in a museum display case. There is, however, one dynamic that has remained unchanged—the individual soldier. Through the written legacy left to us by the soldiers in the Army of the Cumberland, we are allowed a fleeting glimpse back in time into the ranks of his army. The faces that we see here are not unlike our own. Mirrored in these faces are the same thoughts, hopes and desires to we hold. This distant soldier felt and loved as we do, he cherished his family and friends, he had dreams for the future that he hoped to realize, he marched and fought not for some high political purpose but for his comrades, his unit, and his country. Undeniably then, it is the human dynamic of combat that has remained unchanged. This thesis, therefore, can serve the modern commander as a case study of the human dynamic of war. In this era of
ever dwindling resources and the continuing reliance on technology to fill the personnel void, it is paramount that leaders do not forget the face behind the system. It is the man or women that operates the high tech weapon that will ultimately execute our orders and pay the price for our mistakes. As their predecessors have for centuries before them, leaders in the twenty-first century must not forget this soldier. The revision of Field Manual FM 22-100, Military Leadership in the late nineteen-eighties resulted in a greatly streamlined publication. As a part of the process, references to the concept of soldier morale were largely eliminated. Leaders must view this trend with caution and hope that it does not signal the beginnings of a larger abandonment of understanding and study of the human aspect of combat. For today, more than ever before, to accomplish missions across the spectrum ranging from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to full scale war, we must know ourselves and our soldiers. As leaders, we must not forget that the man who marched the dusty road to Chickamauga and our digital warrior of the twenty-first century stand in the same ranks—the human side of warfare remains ever unchanged.
Endnotes


2John H. Hale, letter to Henry M. Cist, May 4, 1882, Cist Family Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, OH.

3A. L. Hough, letter to Henry M. Cist, June 22, 1882, Cist Family Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, OH.

4Oscar F. Avery, The National Tribune (Washington, D.C.), May 31, 1883.

5William S. Rosecrans, letter to George Opedyke, February 28, 1884, Emerson Opedyke Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, OH.


12Albert G. Hart, letter to Wife, September, 30, 1863, Albert G. Hart papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.

13Mathias Baldwin Cotton Diary, Suzanne Colton Wilson, Column South (Flagstaff: J. F. Colton & Co., 1960), 77.


15Peter Keegan, journal entry for August 11, 1863, Dwight Reynolds, The Diaries of Peter Keegan (Indianapolis: Privately Published, 1938)


ORGANIZATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND

Commanded by

Major General William S. Rosecrans

General Headquarters

1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters - CPT Gershom M. Barber
10th Ohio Infantry - LTC William M. Ward
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Escort) - COL William J. Palmer

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

Commanded by

Major General George H. Thomas

9th Michigan Infantry (Provost Guard) - COL John G. Parkhurst
Company L, 1st Ohio Cavalry (Escort) - CPT John D. Barker

FIRST DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General Absalom Baird

First Brigade

Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner

38th Indiana Infantry - LTC Daniel F. Griffin
94th Ohio Infantry - MAJ Rue P. Hutchins
2nd Ohio Infantry - LTC Obadiah C. Maxwell
33d Ohio Infantry - COL Oscar F. Moore
10th Wisconsin Infantry - LTC John H. Ely

Second Brigade

Brigadier General J.C. Starkweather

1st Wisconsin Infantry - COL George B. Bingham
21st Wisconsin Infantry - LTC Harrison C. Hobart
24th Illinois Infantry - COL Geza Mihalotzy
79th Pennsylvania Infantry - COL Henry A. Hambright
Third Brigade

Brigadier General John H. King

1st Battalion, 15th US Infantry - CPT Albert B. Dod
1st Battalion, 16th US Infantry - MAJ Sidney Coolidge
1st Battalion, 18th US Infantry - CPT George W. Smith
2nd Battalion, 18th US Infantry - CPT Henry Haymond
1st Battalion, 19th US Infantry - MAJ Samuel K. Dawson

Division Artillery

Battery A, 1st Michigan Light Artillery - 1LT George W. Van Pelt
2LT Almerick W. Wilber
4th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - LT David Flansburg
Battery H, 5th US Artillery - 1LT Howard M. Burnham

SECOND DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

Major General James S. Negley

First Brigade

Brigadier General John Beatty

42nd Indiana Infantry - LTC William T.B. McIntire
88th Indiana Infantry - COL George Humphrey
104th Illinois Infantry - LTC Douglas Hapeman
15th Kentucky Infantry - COL Marion C. Taylor
3rd Ohio Infantry - COL Orris A. Lawson

Second Brigade

Colonel Timothy R. Stanley
Colonel William L. Stoughton

19th Illinois Infantry - LTC Alexander W. Raffen
11th Michigan Infantry - COL William L. Stoughton
18th Ohio Infantry - LTC Charles H. Grosvenor
69th Ohio Infantry - COL Joseph H. Brigham

Third Brigade

Colonel William Sirwell

37th Indiana Infantry - LTC William D. Ward
21st Ohio Infantry - LTC Dwella M. Stoughton
74th Ohio Infantry - CPT Joseph Fisher
78th Pennsylvania Infantry - LTC Archibald Blakeley
Division Artillery

Bridgess Battery, Illinois Light Artillery - CPT Lyman Bridges
Battery G, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Alexander Marshall
Battery M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Frederick Schultz

THIRD DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General John M. Brannon

First Brigade

Colonel John M. Connell

82nd Indiana Infantry - COL Morton C. Hunter
17th Ohio Infantry - LTC Durbin Ward
31st Ohio Infantry - LTC Frederick W. Lister
38th Ohio Infantry - COL Edward H. Phelps

Second Brigade

Colonel John T. Croxton

10th Indiana Infantry - COL William B. Carroll
74th Indiana Infantry - COL Charles W. Chapman
4th Kentucky Infantry - LTC P. Burgess Hunt
10th Kentucky Infantry - COL William H. Hays
14th Ohio Infantry - LTC Henry D. Kingsbury

Third Brigade

Colonel Ferdinand VanDerveer

87th Indiana Infantry - COL Newell Gleason
2nd Minnesota Infantry - COL James George
9th Ohio Infantry - COL Gustave Kammerling
35th Ohio Infantry - LTC Henry V. Boynton

Division Artillery

Battery D, 1st Michigan Light Artillery - CPT Josiah W. Church
Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - LT Marco B. Gary
Battery I, 4th US Artillery - LT Frank G. Smith
FOURTH DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

Major General Joseph J. Reynolds

First Brigade

Colonel John T. Wilder

92nd Illinois Infantry - COL Smith D. Atkins
98th Illinois Infantry - COL John D. Funkhouser
123rd Illinois Infantry - COL James Monroe
17th Indiana Infantry - MAJ William T. Jones
72nd Indiana Infantry - COL Abram O. Miller

Second Brigade

†Colonel Edward A. King

80th Illinois Infantry - LTC Loyd Wheaton
68th Indiana Infantry - CPT Harvey J. Espry
75th Indiana Infantry - COL Milton S. Robinson
101st Indiana Infantry - LTC Thomas Doan
105th Ohio Infantry - MAJ George T. Perkins

Third Brigade

Brigadier General John B. Turchin

11th Ohio Infantry - COL Philander P. Lane
36th Ohio Infantry - COL William G. Jones
89th Ohio Infantry - Caleb H Carlton
92nd Ohio Infantry - COL Benjamin D. Fearing

Division Artillery

18th Indiana Battery - CPT Eli Lilly
19th Indiana Battery - CPT Samuel J. Harris
21st Indiana Battery - CPT William W. Andrew

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS

Commanded by

Major General Alexander McDowell McCook

Company H, 81st Indiana Infantry (Provost Guard) - CPT William J. Richards
Company I, 2d Kentucky Cavalry (Escout) - LT George W.L. Batman
FIRST DIVISION, TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis

First Brigade

Colonel P. Sidney Post

59th Illinois Infantry - LTC Joshua C. Winters
74th Illinois Infantry - COL Jason Marsh
75th Illinois Infantry - COL John E. Bennett
22d Indiana Infantry - COL Michael Gooding

Second Brigade

Brigadier General William P. Carlin

21st Illinois Infantry - COL John W.S. Alexander
38th Illinois Infantry - LTC Daniel H. Gilmer
81st Indiana Infantry - CPT Nevil B. Boone
101st Ohio Infantry - LTC John Messer

Third Brigade

†Colonel Hans C. Heg
Colonel John A. Martin

25th Illinois Infantry - MAJ Samuel D. Wall
35th Illinois Infantry - LTC William P. Chandler
8th Kansas Infantry - COL John A. Martin
15th Wisconsin Infantry - COL Ole C. Johnson

Division Artillery

5th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery - CPT George Q. Gardner
2d Battery, Minnesota Light Artillery - LT Albert Woodbury
8th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery - LT John D. McLean

SECOND DIVISION, TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson

First Brigade

Brigadier General August Willich

89th Illinois Infantry - LTC Duncan J. Hall
32d Indiana Infantry - LTC Frank Erdelmeier
39th Indiana Infantry - COL Thomas J. Harrison

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15th Ohio Infantry - LTC Frank Askew
49th Ohio Infantry - MAJ Samuel F. Gray

Second Brigade

Colonel Joseph B. Dodge

79th Illinois Infantry - COL Allen Buckner
29th Indiana Infantry - LTC David M. Dunn
30th Indiana Infantry - LTC Orrin D. Hurd
77th Pennsylvania Infantry - COL Thomas E. Rose

Third Brigade

Col. Colonel Philemon P. Baldwin
Colonel William W. Berry

6th Indiana Infantry - LTC Hagerman Tripp
5th Kentucky Infantry - COL William W. Berry
1st Ohio Infantry - LTC Bassett Langdon
93rd Ohio Infantry - COL Hiram Strong

Division Artillery

Battery A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Wilber F. Godspeed
20th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Edward Grosskopff
5th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - CPT Peter Simonson

THIRD DIVISION, TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS

Major General Philip H. Sheridan

First Brigade

Brigadier General William H. Lytle
Colonel Silas Miller

36th Illinois Infantry - Colonel Silas Miller
88th Illinois Infantry - LTC Alexander S. Chadbourne
21st Michigan Infantry - COL William B. McCready
24th Wisconsin Infantry - LTC Theodore S. West

Second Brigade

Colonel Bernard Laiboldt

44th Illinois Infantry - COL Wallace W. Barrett
73d Illinois Infantry - COL James F. Jacquess
2d Missouri Infantry - MAJ Arnold Beck
15th Missouri Infantry - COL Joseph Conrad

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Third Brigade

Colonel Luther P. Bradley
Colonel Nathan H. Walworth

22nd Illinois Infantry - LTC Francis Swanwick
27th Illinois Infantry - COL Jonathan R. Miles
42d Illinois Infantry - COL Nathan H. Walworth
51st Illinois Infantry - COL Samuel B. Raymond

Division Artillery

11th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - CPT Arnold Sutermeister
Battery G, 1st Missouri Light Artillery - LT Gustavus Schueler
Battery C, 1st Illinois Light Artillery - CPT Mark H. Prescott

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS

Commanded by

Major General Thomas L. Crittenden

Company K, 15th Illinois Cavalry (Escort) - CPT Samuel B. Sherer

FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood

First Brigade

Colonel George P. Buell

100th Illinois Infantry - COL Frederick A. Bartleson
58th Indiana Infantry - LTC James T. Embree
13th Michigan Infantry - COL Joshua B. Culver
26th Ohio Infantry - LTC William H. Young

Second Brigade

Brigadier General George D. Wagner

15th Indiana Infantry - COL Gustavus A. Wood
40th Indiana Infantry - COL John W. Blake
51st Indiana Infantry - COL Abel D. Streight
57th Indiana Infantry - LTC George W. Lennard
97th Ohio Infantry - LTC Milton Barnes
Third Brigade

Colonel Charles G. Harker

73d Indiana Infantry - LTC Alfred M. Kendall
3d Kentucky Infantry - COL Henry C. Dunlap
64th Ohio Infantry - COL Alexander McIlvain
65th Ohio Infantry - LTC Horatio N. Whitbeck
125th Ohio Infantry - COL Emerson Opdycke

Division Artillery

8th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - CPT George Estrep
8th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - LT William A. Naylor
6th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Cullen Bradley

SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST CORPS

Major General John M. Palmer

First Brigade

Brigadier General Charles Cruft

31st Indiana Infantry - COL John T. Smith
1st Kentucky Infantry - LTC Alva R. Hardlock
2d Kentucky Infantry - COL Thomas D. Sedgewick
90th Ohio Infantry - COL Charles H. Rippey

Second Brigade

Brigadier General William B. Hazen

110th Illinois Infantry (Battalion) -
9th Indiana Infantry - COL Isaac C.B. Suman
6th Kentucky Infantry - COL George T. Schackelford
41st Ohio Infantry - COL Aquila Wiley
124th Ohio Infantry - COL Oliver H. Payne

Third Brigade

Colonel William Grose

84th Illinois Infantry - COL Louis H. Waters
36th Indiana Infantry - LTC Oliver H.P. Carey
23d Kentucky Infantry - LTC Janes C. Foy
6th Ohio Infantry - COL Nicholas L. Anderson
24th Ohio Infantry - COL David J. Higgins

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Division Artillery

Battery H, 4th US Artillery - LT Harry C. Cushing
Battery M, 4th US Artillery - LT Francis L.D. Russell
Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - LT Giles J. Cockerill
Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - LT Norman A. Bladwin

THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS

Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve

First Brigade

Brigadier General Samuel Beatty

79th Indiana Infantry - COL Frederick Knefle
9th Kentucky Infantry - COL George H. Cram
17th Kentucky Infantry - COL Alexander M. Stout
19th Ohio Infantry - LTC Henry G. Stratton

Second Brigade

Colonel George F. Dick

44th Indiana Infantry - LTC Simeon C. Aldrich
86th Indiana Infantry - MAJ Jacob C. Dick
13th Ohio Infantry - LTC Elhannon M. Mast
59th Ohio Infantry - LTC Granville A. Frambes

Third Brigade

Colonel Sidney M. Barnes

35th Indiana Infantry - MAJ John P. Dufficy
8th Kentucky Infantry - LTC James D. Mayhew
21st Kentucky Infantry - COL S. Woodson Price
51st Ohio Infantry - COL Richard W. McClain
99th Ohio Infantry - COL Peter T. Swaine

Division Artillery

7th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - CPT George R. Swallow
26th Battery, Pennsylvania Light Artillery - CPT Alanson J. Stevens
3d Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery - LT Courtland Livingston
RESERVE CORPS

Commanded by

Major General Gordon Granger

Company F, 1st Missouri Cavalry (Escort)

FIRST DIVISION, RESERVE CORPS

Brigadier General James B. Steedman

First Brigade

Brigadier General Walter C. Whitaker

96th Illinois Infantry - COL Thomas E. Champion
115th Illinois Infantry - COL Jesse H. Moore
84th Indiana Infantry - COL Nelson Trusler
22d Michigan Infantry - COL Hebert LeFavour
40th Ohio Infantry - LTC William Jones
89th Ohio Infantry - COL Caleb H. Carlton

Second Brigade

Colonel John G. Mitchell

78th Illinois Infantry - LTC Carter Van Vleck
98th Ohio Infantry - COL Moses J. Urquhart
113th Ohio Infantry - LTC Darius B. Warner
121st Ohio Infantry - LTC Henry B. Banning

Third Brigade

Colonel Coburn

33d Indiana Infantry - COL James E. Burton
85th Indiana Infantry - LTC Alexander B. Crane
22d Wisconsin Infantry - COL Edward Bloodgood

Division Artillery

18th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery - CPT Charles C. Aleshire
Battery M, 1st Illinois Light Artillery - LT Thomas Burton
9th Ohio Battery - CPT Harrison B. York
SECOND DIVISION, RESERVE CORPS

Brigadier General James D. Morgan

First Brigade

Colonel Robert F. Smith

10th Illinois Infantry - COL John Tillson
16th Illinois Infantry - LTC Charles D. Kerr
60th Illinois Infantry - LTC George W. Evans
10th Michigan Infantry - LTC William H. Dunphy
14th Michigan Infantry - COL Henry R. Minzer

Second Brigade

Colonel Daniel McCook

85th Illinois Infantry - COL Caleb J. Dilworth
86th Illinois Infantry - LTC David W. Magee
125th Illinois Infantry - COL Oscar F. Harmon
52d Ohio Infantry - MAJ James T. Holmes
69th Ohio Infantry - COL Joseph H. Brigham

Third Brigade

Colonel Charles C. Doolittle

18th Michigan Infantry - COL John W. Horner
106th Ohio Infantry - COL Gustavus Tafel
108th Ohio Infantry - LTC John Good

Division Artillery

Battery I, 2d Illinois Light Artillery - LT Charles M. Barnett
10th Wisconsin Battery - CPT Yates B. Beebe
Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery - CPT George P. Kirtland

CAVALRY CORPS

Commanded by

Major General David S. Stanley (Absent)

Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell (Commanding)
FIRST DIVISION

Colonel Edward M. McCook

First Brigade

Colonel Archibald P. Campbell

2d Michigan Cavalry - MAJ Leonidas S. Scranton
9th Pennsylvania Cavalry - LTC Roswell M. Russell
1st Tennessee Cavalry - LTC James P. Brownlow

Second Brigade

Colonel Daniel M. Ray

2d Indiana Cavalry - MAJ Joseph B. Presdee
4th Indiana Cavalry - LTC John T. Deweese
2d Tennessee Cavalry - LTC William R. Cook
1st Wisconsin Cavalry - COL Oscar H. LaGrange

Third Brigade

4th Kentucky Cavalry - COL Wickliffe Cooper
5th Kentucky Cavalry - LTC William T. Hoblitzzell
6th Kentucky Cavalry - MAJ Louis A. Gratz

Division Artillery

Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - LT Nathaniel M. Newell

SECOND DIVISION

Brigadier General George Crook

First Brigade

Colonel Robert H.G. Minty

3d Indiana Cavalry - LTC Robert Klein
4th Michigan Cavalry - MAJ Horance Gray
7th Pennsylvania Cavalry - LTC James J. Seibert
4th US Cavalry - CPT James B. McIntyre

Second Brigade

Colonel Eli Long

2d Kentucky Cavalry - COL Thomas B. Nicholas
1st Ohio Cavalry - LTC Valentine Cupp
3d Ohio Cavalry - LTC Charles B. Seidel
4th Ohio Cavalry - LTC Oliver P. Robie
Division Artillery

Chicago Board of Trade Battery (Two Sections) - CPT James H. Stokes

UNASSIGNED TROOPS

Pioneer Brigade - BG J. St Claire Morton
1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics - COL W.S. Inness
2d Kentucky Battery - duty with 1st Michigan Engineers
1st Kentucky Battery - Duty at Murfreesboro, TN
12th Indiana Battery - Duty at Nashville, TN
13th Indiana Battery - Duty at Gallatin, TN
20th Indiana Battery - Duty at Nashville, TN
Battery C, 2d Illinois Artillery - Duty at Fort Donelson, TN
4th Tennessee Cavalry - Duty at Nashville, TN
8th Kentucky Cavalry - Duty at Clarksville, TN
12th Regiment US Colored Troops - Duty on Nashville & Northwestern Railroad
Endnotes

1The 9th Michigan was not engaged in the battle. They were detached as a Train Guard for the corps.

2The 38th Ohio unit was detached as a Corps Train Guard during the battle of Chickamauga.

3The 80th Illinois was on duty in Nashville throughout the campaign.

4The 39th Indiana was detached from their parent unit and serving as mounted infantry.

5The 51st Indiana was on duty in Nashville.

6The 73d Indiana was on duty in Nashville.

7Five companies of the 1st Kentucky were serving as wagon guard during the battle of Chickamauga.

8The 21st Kentucky was detached, guarding the Whitesides Trestle.

9The 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio were temporarily attached to the division.

10This brigade was on garrison duty and did not participate in the battle of Chickamauga.

11BG James Morgan remained with the balance of his division guarding lines of communication near Stevenson, Alabama.

12This brigade was assigned garrison duties and did not fight at Chickamauga.

13The 69th Ohio was temporarily attached from Second Division.

14The Third Brigade did not fight at Chickamauga.
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