CASE STUDIES IN RESERVE COMPONENT VOLUNTEERISM:
THE 670th MILITARY POLICY COMPANY IN
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

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May 1995

Prepared for
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

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CASE STUDIES IN RESERVE COMPONENT VOLUNTEERISM: 
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PREFACE

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) under a task entitled "Reserve Component Volunteerism." The objectives of the task are to determine the extent to which Reserve volunteers can support national military strategy, to identify the mission areas where Reserve volunteers can be most effectively employed, to assess the adequacy of legal justification and policy guidance for planning and programming Reserve volunteers for operational missions, and to suggest additional legislative initiatives for policy revisions that may be needed to assure access to Reserve volunteers. To achieve those objectives, IDA consulted published works and official documents and interviewed individuals involved in recent instances in which Reserve volunteers were used to perform operational missions. This document is one of a series of case studies that resulted from that research.

This document was reviewed for accuracy by some of those who were interviewed. It did not undergo internal IDA review.
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A. INTRODUCTION

On 16 September 1994, the 670th Military Police Company, California National Guard, was alerted for voluntary service in support of Operation Uphold Democracy—the U.S. intervention in Haiti. The members of the unit were ready for this. Over a year earlier, the unit members had all volunteered as part of the National Guard’s Standard Bearer Program to go on active duty for 45 days if called upon to support a humanitarian support mission. Most of the members had signed a contract with the National Guard saying that they would leave home, family, and job to serve in support of the Army and the nation. Now it was time to face up to their obligation.

The decision to intervene in Haiti was made on 12 September 1994. Planning for the operation had been going on for several weeks, but the details were closely held. When the decision was made to implement the operation, it was time for the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) to get the forces in place. ACOM had been a unified command since the 1950s, but its previous mission to keep the sea lanes open to Europe in a NATO war was broadened in 1993 to command all forces in the United States and be responsible for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in the Atlantic and Caribbean.

Until the last minute, the plan was to invade Haiti against the opposition of the Haitian defense forces, which though small, poorly trained, and ill-equipped were still military forces. In keeping with U.S. doctrine, the U.S. invasion forces would be large enough to bring overwhelming force to bear and win quickly. About 30,000 troops were being assembled to invade Haiti. After the Haitian military authorities agreed to let U.S. forces enter unopposed, the number of troops was reduced substantially, but there was still a sizable requirement for Guard and Reserve units and individuals to augment the active component forces. Some of the Reserve Component (RC) forces were needed in Haiti, and others were needed in Continental United States (CONUS) to backfill the Active Component (AC) forces going to Haiti.

One of the realities of post-Cold War military operations is that Guard and Reserve units and individuals are needed to augment and support the active forces for even the smallest operations. This is because the active components have been downsized and find that some of their important capabilities exist only in their Guard and Reserve components. In other cases, the active components have some capability but are already fully committed in support of forces in Germany and Korea or engaged in other small operations. When yet another operation comes up, it is necessary to get troops from the Guard and Reserve.
The degree and nature of reliance on Reserve Components differs according to the
Armed Force:

- The Air Force habitually and routinely uses guardsmen and reservists to fly
  operational missions in support of training and operational requirements.
- The Coast Guard uses reservists to augment active units for peacetime
  operations and also to increase the operating tempo for major operations.
- The Navy uses reservists frequently to provide extra resources to augment
  active units for operational missions.
- The Marine Corps is structured to be able to get along without reservists for
  about 60 days for a major operation but uses reservists for later demands either
  as units or individuals.
- The Army needs guardsmen and reservists the most but relies on them the
  least. Much of the Army’s combat support and most of its combat service
  support are in the Guard and Reserve, and the Army needs some of these
  resources for even small operations. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and
  Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) units, for example, have been involved in
  every post-Cold War operation, usually on a voluntary basis. The Army,
  however, is reluctant to rely on RC volunteers.

Because of this attitude, the Army finds itself in a dilemma. It needs Guard and
Reserve resources but cannot assume that Presidential Selected Reserve Callup
(PSRC) authority will be available for missions less critical than a major
regional conflict. Despite this, the Army opposes RC volunteerism.

B. OPERATION STANDARD BEARER

The Army National Guard’s response to this dilemma was to institute Project
Standard Bearer—a way to get whole units of volunteers [1 through 3]. There are three
related volunteer programs:

- The Operational Unit Program includes 55 high-priority contingency force pool
  (CFP) units whose members agree to volunteer to enter on active duty within 7
days after notification. This program is designed as a gap-filler to provide
essential capabilities in the period between the start of an operation and the time
that PSRC authority would be obtained. Guard volunteers for this program
realize they would be going early for a substantial operation.

- The Humanitarian Support Unit Program includes 89 units whose members
  agree to volunteer to serve on short tours for humanitarian support missions
outside the United States. Eighteen of the units are designated to report within
72 hours of alert for 45 days of voluntary active duty. The other 71 units will
be used for follow-on missions. The Army National Guard identifies unit types
that would be appropriate for this kind of mission, and the states name the specific units to be in the program [4].

• The Operational Integration Program is designed to provide tailored unit capabilities for peacekeeping or forward presence missions that permit long lead times in forming and training the units. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) says that the formation of a composite battalion staffed by AC, Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) volunteers for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in Sinai is an application of the Operational Integration Program.

The major uncertainty about the Operational Unit Program and the Humanitarian Support Program was whether the members who had volunteered to go on active duty would really do that when the time came. There was general agreement that the contract that each member of a Standard Bearer unit signed was not legally binding, and that the number of actual volunteers would be affected by external circumstances, such as the season of the year. As the program matured, the original commitment was modified from providing complete units to assuring that the entire leadership group and a substantial number of other unit members would volunteer, thus ensuring that the Guard would deliver a complete unit to the Active Army. Even this less-demanding program represents a considerable advantage to the Army, but doubts persist in the Army everywhere except in the Army National Guard. The use of National Guard Standard Bearer units for Operation Uphold Democracy was the first opportunity to see if use of these volunteer units is feasible.

C. NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

When Headquarters, Department of the Army, asked the Army National Guard (ARNG) to provide three military police combat support companies for Operation Uphold Democracy, the ARNG chose them from the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of Project Standard Bearer.

The Army’s initial assumption by the when planning for an operation in Haiti started was that the PSRC authority would not be available. Despite a lack of TTAD funds, the Army opted at that stage to make use of volunteer units while increasing its efforts to obtain PSRC authority.

The ACOM planners responsible for the operation had assumed in their initial planning that the PSRC would be available. Because of the close hold nature of the planning, however, they failed to tell the mobilization planners. When ACOM found that it was its responsibility to request the PSRC authority, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC),
Admiral Paul Miller, asked the Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, for urgent action to have President Clinton authorize the involuntary call up of Selected Reservists under the PSRC.

The Chairman obliged by initiating forthwith a decision package requesting the PSRC authority. Within OSD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict supported the PSRC request. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deborah Lee, however, favored using volunteers and annotated the PSRC request with a note suggesting that maximum reliance be placed on volunteers. The Secretary of Defense accepted the Reserve Affairs comment and, when the decision package was returned by the White House after Presidential approval, issued guidance to “make maximum use of volunteers.” The National Guard was able to order some of its members to active duty involuntarily, but only if they had volunteered to serve.1

Early in the planning for the intervention in Haiti, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) had notified the NGB of a need for three Military Police (MP) companies—two ARNG and one USAR—for CONUS backfill missions. Later, the Department of the Army—without reference to FORSCOM—tasked NGB to provide three MP companies [4].

The Army National Guard picked the three “most ready” MP combat support companies on the Humanitarian Support Unit Program for the Haiti mission. Although they were the 544th MP Company, Puerto Rico; the 855th MP Company, Phoenix, Arizona; and the 670th MP Company, Sunnyvale, California.2 It was decided that the 544th would go to Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 855th would go to Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the 670th would go to Fort Drum, New York.

The Army National Guard was allocated 400 spaces for the three MP companies. Although the allocation was more than adequate to perform the assigned backfill mission, this meant that the units would have to serve at less than their full authorized strength of

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1 The Army Reserve did not follow the guidance to order up only volunteers and called up an entire unit, the 458th Transportation Movement Control Detachment, Belleville, Illinois, involuntarily under the PSRC.

2 The initial alert order issued by the NGB on 16 September 1994 listed the 870th MP Company, Pittsburgh, California, another unit of the 49th MP Brigade, as the unit to go on active duty. In May 1994, the 49th Brigade requested that the 870th MP Company replace the 670th in the Humanitarian Support Unit Program, effective 1 October 1994. This was approved by the California National Guard and submitted to the NGB. Thus, the NGB listed the 870th in the initial alert order. The mistake was corrected immediately, and only the 670th was placed on alert [5 and 6]. This mix-up does not square with NGB assertions that they picked the most ready MP companies.
158 personnel each. The available spaces were allocated as shown in Table 1. The 544th got a larger allocation of spaces because the Fort Bragg assignment was thought to be more demanding than the workload at the other two posts. The 544th was mobilized on 20 September 1994, and the other two companies, on 5 October 1994.

Table 1. Allocation of MP Company Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MP Company</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Required Strength</th>
<th>Strength Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>544th MP Company</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>855th MP Company</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670th MP Company</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. THE 670TH MP COMPANY

The 670th is a combat support military police company designed, equipped, and trained to provide area security and battlefield circulation control in support of a corps or division. The unit was authorized 46 HMMWVs with radios and armed with pistols, rifles, and machine guns. It was authorized 158 personnel but had 164 assigned when alerted. The 670th is stationed in Sunnyvale, California, in the Silicon Valley. One of its four platoons is located in Eureka, California, in the northernmost corner of the state near the coast. The 670th is assigned to the 185th Military Police Battalion, which, in turn, is assigned to the 49th Military Police Brigade.

The 670th had been active on other missions before it was called upon to support Operation Uphold Democracy. In 1991, some of the unit members deployed to Southwest Asia with other units of the 49th MP Brigade as part of Operation Desert Storm, even though the unit itself was not called. In 1992, the unit mobilized for service in the Los Angeles riots and was walking patrol duty in west Los Angeles within 14 hours after being alerted [5]. In March 1994, the 670th MP Company participated in Optimal Focus, a full-scale-mobilization exercise. During Optimal Focus, the unit went through three of the four stages of mobilization. It prepared at home station with 10 percent of its unit strength, alerted and assembled the rest of the unit at home station, packed for movement to its mobilization station, drove to a local park, and returned to the armory [4, 6, and 9].

The primary source of the information about the 670th MP Company is a briefing and several meetings at Fort Drum on 10 November 1994 [7]. Additional information was obtained from Captain Brown [8].
through this rehearsal of the mobilization process paid off when it was time to do it for real in September 1994.

In 1993, the 670th volunteered for the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of Operation Standard Bearer. Units in the Humanitarian Assistance Program are expected to be able to deploy on 72-hour notice with 70 percent to 80 percent of the unit strength serving voluntarily for 45 days on a humanitarian relief mission outside of CONUS [4]. The unit itself decided to do this, partly because the members wanted to be part of the action, but also to compensate for not having been called up for the war with Iraq [10].

Once the unit was part of the Humanitarian Support Unit Program, all unit members were asked to sign volunteer agreements, and new members who would volunteer were solicited. Strictly speaking, volunteering to serve was not a condition of membership in the unit. According to the unit commander, "Individuals did not have to agree. They did so willingly. No one was prevented from joining the unit who would not sign an agreement."[4 and 9] A unit member who did not sign the agreement was not removed from the unit, and the 49th MP Brigade always anticipated the need to fill the 670th from within Brigade resources if it were called upon for a humanitarian support mission [5]. There probably was considerable peer pressure within the group to volunteer. By the time the unit was mobilized, about 90 percent of the members had signed agreements.

By the fall of 1994, most of the members of the 670th were busy doing other things and had almost forgotten about being in Project Standard Bearer. They soon learned that the National Guard had not forgotten.

E. MOBILIZATION OF THE 670TH MP COMPANY

Brigadier General Jerry W. Fields, Commander of the 49th MP Brigade, called Captain Wayne C. Brown, the commander of the 670th, at about 4:30 PM in the afternoon of 13 September 1994. Captain Brown did not know what to expect, but General Fields soon enlightened him by explaining that the 670th MP Company was being alerted for voluntary service for a humanitarian support mission under Project Standard Bearer. Captain Brown and his troops assumed they were going to Haiti, and the members of the 670th responded positively to the call to serve on TTAD for about 45 days, as they had

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4 The tenor of the responses from the NGB and the unit indicate that there was no formal requirement to be a volunteer to belong to the unit but that there was an informal understanding to that effect. All new members accessed after Captain Brown assumed command did sign a volunteer agreement.
agreed to do. The company commander reported up his chain of command that the 670th MP Company would be able to do the mission.

The informal notification to the company was the result of the NGB’s asking the California National Guard on 12 September 1994 about the availability of the 670th MP Company for an Uphold Democracy mission on voluntary status [4].

When the company received its official alert order on 16 September 1994, the conditions had changed. The company was being ordered to active duty involuntarily under the provisions of the PSRC, and instead of 45 days, its members were being asked to serve for a period “not to exceed 90 days.” The company would have an authorized strength of 125 personnel. Most important, the new guidance was that the members of the unit would still have to volunteer even though they were now being ordered to active duty “without their consent” under the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 673b [11].

On 23 September 1994, the unit received its official orders to active duty effective 5 October 1994. These orders announced that the unit’s mobilization station would be Fort Drum, New York, and the period of service was stated in the orders as “not to exceed 90 days” [12]. Although not specified in the orders, the word was that the unit would actually perform its service at Fort Drum. This was the first time the unit knew officially that it would serve in CONUS instead of Haiti [13].

Deployment to Haiti had never been considered for the 670th MP Company, but the unit members had not known that. Many unit members had wanted to go to Haiti and continued to hope to serve there despite growing indications that they would serve in CONUS. Although the initial alert messages did not specify a destination, Captain Brown was able to find out by making some phone calls that the unit would serve as a backfill at Fort Drum. The NGB confirmed this on 20 September 1994. When it became a certainty that the unit was going to stay at Fort Drum, several volunteers withdrew [6].

The organization of the 670th MP Company was being adjusted during this period to conform to the authorized strength of 125 and tailor it to the anticipated mission at Fort Drum. Negotiations between Fort Drum and the National Guard Bureau led to some changes. For example, the number of cooks being sent was increased from two to five at the request of Fort Drum. Some confusion was caused when it was discovered that the unit was using a newer MTOE to staff its company headquarters than was known to the Office

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5 The ACOM message of 12 September 1994 that asked for RC forces and set off the request for the PSRC authority specified that the three RC MP companies were to be used for backfill. This was the first notice that the Joint Staff had of the RC requirements.
of the Adjutant General of California. This discrepancy was soon reconciled and had no effect on the unit’s organization or staffing for the Fort Drum mission. While these organizational changes departed from the ideal of calling up whole units, they were necessary under the circumstances \[4 \text{ and } 14\].

As the 670th MP Company proceeded through the stages of its mobilization, the conditions of service changed and the strength of the unit available for the mission decreased. Some of the members did not volunteer for active duty, and others were disqualified. Table 2 shows the number of unit members who were available to serve at each stage.

### Table 2. Members of the 670th MP Company Available To Serve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of Service</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Alert Strength</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 days in Haiti</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 days at Fort Drum</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The available strength was reduced by 42 members between the pre-alert stage and the initial mission of 45 days in Haiti. That reduction was due entirely to disqualification of individuals for insufficient training or medical reasons. This left a core of 122 volunteers ready to fulfill their contracts under Project Standard Bearer. When the final conditions of 90 days of service in CONUS became known, about 30 of the 122 withdrew. During the processing of the unit at home station, another 22 personnel, including two officers, were disqualified by the California National Guard for various reasons.\[6\]

- One volunteer (a cook) was disqualified because she had braces on her teeth. While this might have made sense for overseas duty, it should not have applied to duty at Fort Drum, where some AC soldiers had braces on their teeth.
- Three volunteers were disqualified for medical reasons.
- One volunteer was disqualified because he did not have and could not get a security clearance.
- Some volunteers were not accepted because their skills were not included in the tailored organization adopted for the Fort Drum mission.

\[6\] According to Reference [15], 42 volunteers were not allowed to go on active duty because they were not qualified in their Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs).
Two officer volunteers were disqualified because they were not branch qualified as MPs.

The 670th was unable to provide all of the 125 personnel required for the mission. Well over 125 unit members had volunteered to serve, but after the various rules and regulations were applied, only 3 officers and 67 enlisted personnel of the unit could serve. The opportunity to volunteer was extended to qualified personnel of the other MP units of the 49th MP Brigade, with satisfactory results.

The final source of volunteers selected to serve at Fort Drum was as shown in Table 3. Of the total, 106 were MPs, and 19 were support personnel. Three of the officers and 17 of the 23 senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were from the 670th. All the members of this group understood that they were volunteering to be called up involuntarily under the provisions of Title 10, USC Section 673b—the Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC)—to serve at Fort Drum, New York, for a period not to exceed 90 days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>670th MP Company</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>649th MP Company</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>970th MP Company</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270th MP Company</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>870th MP Company</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion/Brigade Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the meantime, the unit was going through the mobilization process that it had rehearsed in the summer. Right after the alert on 17 September 1994, twelve Traditional Guardsmen of the unit reported to work with the three full-time personnel to get things going. A family support meeting was held at 49th MP Brigade Headquarters on 28 September. Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) was completed on 2 October. The unit was officially mobilized on 5 October and continued processing with its call-up authorization of 125 personnel. The unit took to Fort Drum only personal clothing and equipment and sidearms, so the vehicles, radios, and crew-served weapons had to be placed in storage. New 9mm pistols were issued to replace the older .45-caliber pistols. The unit conducted range firing tests on 7 October. The 9mm pistols and holsters had been available for some time, but a lack of ammunition pouches had delayed their issue.
On 25 September 1994, First Lieutenant Bradley Rossmiller, the company executive officer, Corporal Richard Brown, the unit supply NCO, and four members of the California State Area Command (STARC) visited Fort Drum to obtain information on living conditions and the mission. This trip turned out to be a good thing; much useful information was obtained. A larger advance party left on 7 October to prepare for the imminent arrival of the main body of the unit.

After a farewell ceremony at home station on 8 October, the unit flew by commercial air and arrived on 9 October 1994 at its new mobilization station and duty station—Fort Drum.

F. 670TH MP COMPANY ACTIVITIES AT FORT DRUM

After arriving at Fort Drum and getting settled, the initial administrative in processing was completed efficiently by 12 October, and the unit was declared mission ready.

A question arose as to whether the 670th was “validated” or not. Validation is a process to ensure that Guard and Reserve units meet deployment criteria and are mission capable. Validation is usually assessed by a group of officials at a mobilization station. The result of the validation process is a go/no-go decision on whether the unit can be deployed or not. The 670th was not to be deployed, was not going to accomplish its wartime mission, and indeed had none of the equipment it would need to perform its wartime mission. Thus, “validation could not be performed” [14]. The National Guard Bureau, on the other hand, says that validation was performed [4].

What happened was that a group of officials at Fort Drum got together and decided that the 670th was capable of performing the work at Fort Drum that it was sent there to do. The Fort Drum Mobilization Assistance Team (MAT), which has the official duty of validating Reserve units mobilizing at and deploying from Fort Drum, did not get involved with the 670th. The informal validation team consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Larry Holiday, USAR Mobilization Planner; Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Porter, Chief of the Reserve Component Support Division and ARNG Advisor for Fort Drum; Lieutenant Colonel David M. Woodruff, Director of Plans, Mobilization, and Security; Mr. Ron Irwin, Readiness Group Drum Mobilization Plans Specialist; and Major David W.

7 According to Major Manville [6], the possibility that the 670th might "have to rotate as replacements to Haiti" was discussed during the mobilization process. If the 670th did send soldiers to Haiti, the 10th MP Battalion would provide the necessary equipment.
Haywood, 10th MP Battalion Rear Commander and Acting Provost Marshal. Colonel Joel E. Williamson, the Garrison Commander made the final determination that the 670th MP Company was “validated” to function at Fort Drum [14].

First, however, the unit had to get some additional training. All MP units and personnel coming to Fort Drum are required to complete training on law enforcement. The unit had not trained for that role before. Combat support MP companies devote almost all of their training time to battlefield circulation control and area security. As a result, the members of the unit had to be trained and re-equipped for the law enforcement role, as described below:

- The MPs were issued leather belts and holsters to replace their web equipment. Leather holsters are safer than web holsters for situations requiring the soldier to draw quickly.
- The MPs completed New York State driver training. Even though their California licenses remained valid, they had to know the local traffic laws in order to enforce them.
- The MPs took a two-week MP Graduate Law Enforcement Standardization Course required of all MP soldiers before they are allowed to perform law enforcement duties on the post.
- Additional range firing was conducted with the 9mm pistol.

Fort Drum needed some backfill, but an entire MP company of 125 personnel was more than was required to do the law enforcement mission at the post. The 670th MP Company was sent to Fort Drum because three AC MP companies on the post deployed to Haiti. “The post had been contacted by the FORSCOM Provost Marshal’s Office and had submitted a request based on minimum need [14]. Two of the three AC MP companies being backfilled at Fort Drum by the 670th were combat support companies that spent most of their time on combat support training and provided only some of their MPs to augment the Provost Marshal’s office for law enforcement. The third AC MP company being backfilled was the 10th MP Battalion headquarters and headquarters company “whose military personnel support[ed] Provost Marshal Operations with MP’s dedicated to the Law

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8 Our initial discussions with NGB and at Fort Drum on 10 November 1994 were clear on this point. More troops than necessary were used to highlight the benefits of expanded training and the use of the MPs for some optional law enforcement missions that had not been performed routinely. In its formal response of 15 December 1994 [14], Fort Drum said that a conclusion that there is insufficient law enforcement workload to keep the 670th MP Company busy is “harsh and not entirely accurate.” Also, during our visit to Fort Drum, we got the impression that the additional training was a good way to fill up time, but the formal response says that the training was being performed because of a "commitment to maintain trained and ready MPs."
Enforcement Duties" [14]. The core requirement was for about 30 MPs to perform law enforcement.9

Law enforcement was the primary job of the 670th MP Company at Fort Drum. The 57B MPs in the unit were used for patrols, community policing, provost marshal operations, and post support activities. About 30 MPs were engaged in such activities as game wardens, civil liaison, dog handling, traffic enforcement, desk operations, and criminal investigation assistance. Ten MPs were used to provide community policing, which involves walking a beat in housing areas. Twelve MPs were used to conduct augmented motorized patrols of the post. Entire platoons were used for selective enforcement and for special events, such as extra presence for Halloween Safety and the Division Run. At any one time, about half of the 100 57B MPs in the 670th were engaged in law enforcement or related activities.

The lack of enough law enforcement workload to keep the entire 670th MP Company busy made it necessary to find other work. In addition to the law enforcement work, the unit was engaged in unit administration, training, and community involvement.

- **Unit Administration.** Members of the 670th who are not 95B MPs worked at administering and supporting the unit. The five unit cooks, for example, worked in the Consolidated Dining Facility.

- **Training.** Working together, the Provost Marshal and the unit leaders created numerous training activities for the company members, including much training that they would never have been able to receive from the Guard. Five soldiers attended the Primary Leadership Development Course (normally only for AC soldiers); two attended a Graduate Hazardous Materials Course; two took the Light Navigator Course; six took the NBC Defense Course. One hundred soldiers received CPR training, and 55 received cold-weather training. One platoon went through the OPFOR Orientation Course, and each of the platoons trained one at a time on their combat support tasks, using equipment borrowed from the post. This training was valuable, and benefitted both the guardsmen and the units to which they returned after the completion of their tour of active duty.

- **Community Support.** Fort Drum and the local military community welcomed the guardsmen warmly and fully, and the guardsmen reciprocated. Unit members entered into post life enthusiastically. A team from the 670th competed in the intramural flag football competition. Morale-boosting

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9 The Fort Drum response refers to a "minimum need" estimate but does not say what that was. The 30 MP figure was cited as the core requirement at meetings with Colonel Michael Squier, NGB, on 24 October 1994 and at Fort Drum on 10 November 1994.
activities, such as shopping trips, a visit to Ottawa, and a Halloween party, were held. The troops of the 670th adopted the family support groups of the deployed AC MP companies to assist the families in baby-sitting, moving, and removing snow.

The 670th made a substantial contribution to the post by renovating the old, unused MP Operations Center, which had been in sad condition, into an attractive and functional office. Guardsmen with civilian skills as builders, electricians, and carpenters refurbished the place with materials provided by the post.

Fort Drum was very supportive of the troops of the 670th. The guardsmen were billeted in refurbished World War II barracks that are subdivided into two-person rooms. These billets are warm and comfortable—much better than unreconditioned World War II buildings the troops are used to living in during annual training. In compliance with standing orders at Fort Drum, the guardsmen wore the 10th Mountain Division patch along with everyone else stationed there. The guardsmen say they were treated the same as the AC soldiers. The company commander and first sergeant are justifiably proud of their troops, who were well-behaved, enthusiastic, and professional in the performance of their duties.

G. INITIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE 670TH MP COMPANY

At the start of the tour, three areas posed problems for the 670th: ammunition, pay, and transportation.

- **Ammunition.** The problem with ammunition was over who should pay for it. California paid for the ammunition to fire the new pistols, but there was no account at Fort Drum to buy ammunition for additional range firing tests. The solution adopted was for Fort Drum to pay for all training ammunition. This minor problem was symptomatic of the Army’s failure to think through all of the implications of using RC units for operations other than war.

- **Pay.** A more serious problem with pay stemmed from a decision by the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) to keep the members of the 855th and 670th MP Companies on the RC pay system but use the AC entitlements. Most RC units coming on active duty are converted to the AC pay system immediately, and this was the case for the 544th MP Company serving at Fort Bragg. This peculiar arrangement caused great problems for the overworked finance office at Fort Drum and caused some pay problems initially for several of the guardsmen. Finance personnel at Fort Drum believe that DFAS did this arrangement as a test. The NGB believes the problem was the result of an understaffed finance office at Fort Drum and “growing pains”
from the implementation by DFAS of a new RC pay system [4]. Whatever the cause, most of the pay problems were resolved after two or three months.\(^\text{10}\)

- **Transportation.** The most serious problem facing the unit during the first few weeks at Fort Drum was a lack of vehicles to get around the post and the local area. Initially, unit members had only three vans and a bus to serve their needs. The official MP sedans are used for vehicle patrols that are not available for personal use. The troops were billeted in Old Post, a half mile from the mess hall and 2.5 miles from their duty station at the Law Enforcement Command building [14]. These distances are too far to walk in the sub-zero temperatures and deep snow of winters in upper New York. Unlike other soldiers at Fort Drum, the guardsmen from California do not have private vehicles. Two of the troops purchased cheap cars, but the cost of insurance made that too expensive for most of them. After this situation was made known to the Fort Drum authorities, the unit was provided five vans, two sedans, five HMMWVs, and a 44-passenger bus [4].\(^\text{11}\)

**H. DURATION OF ACTIVE-DUTY TOUR**

The most serious problem the unit faced was the extension on 28 November 1994 of the unit’s period of active duty from 90 days to 180 days under the PSRC authority. This extension constituted a breach of contract with these volunteers. The extension of the Humanitarian Support Unit Program volunteer commitment of 45 days of active duty to 90 days was not a breach of contract because the guardsmen who went to Fort Drum volunteered for 90 days. Although the company commander and the California National Guard realized that an extension for another 90 days was possible and even likely, the troops thought they were going for 90 days, and the official orders placed them on active duty for a period “not to exceed 90 days.”\(^\text{12}\)

The members of the 670th MP Company agreed to volunteer for 90 days and made personal and employment arrangements accordingly. Extension for another 90 days threatened in several cases to cause severe personal hardship. Captain Brown, for example, is a salesman who works on commission, and while he was able to minimize his losses for the first 90 days, he lost sales by staying on active duty longer than that. The same problem

\(^{10}\) Information on the pay problem was provided by Mrs. Ellen Ginnelly, RC Pay Branch, whose professionalism and helpful manner not only eased the problem but also mollified the aggrieved soldiers.

\(^{11}\) After the visit by the NGB/IDA team on 10 November 1994, the company commander made a formal request for extra transportation, and Fort Drum filled the request.

\(^{12}\) Captain Brown was informed by Major Monville and others that a 180-day tour was likely, even certain, but this was not stressed in soliciting volunteers.
existed for others, particularly those who are self-employed and have to do work to get paid. When asked, however, the troops said without exception that they would do their duty for the full 180 days, although many also admitted that they would not be happy about it.

Captain Brown perceived in early November that the active-duty extension would be a problem. He consulted with Major David W. Haywood, the Fort Drum Acting Provost Marshal, to see if some of the unit members who would be particularly hard hit by a longer absence could leave active duty in early January. Major Haywood was sympathetic and agreed that it would be unwise to keep the entire unit if it were not needed. In mid-November 1994, Captain Brown took an informal poll of the unit, asking for volunteers to stay beyond the 90-day point of 3 January 1995. Forty-three lower graded enlisted personnel said they would stay for another 90 days, but no officers or senior NCOs committed themselves [16]. Neither Captain Brown nor personnel at Fort Drum liked this because, although there would be sufficient numbers of guardsmen remaining, there would be no real unit chain of command—only “a pool of individual augmentees [that] could be attached to our Headquarters and Headquarters Company” [14]. The 49th MP Brigade agreed that this method was unsatisfactory.  

The idea of rotating new MP units to Fort Drum was also addressed, but this was considered to be “an extremely costly process” that would fill most of the rotation period with training to meet Fort Drum requirements [6]. On Thanksgiving Day 1994, it appeared that all of the guardsmen of the 670th would be on active duty at Fort Drum until 4 April 1994.

Captain Brown and Major Haywood went back to the drawing board to work out another plan. The goal would be to get soldiers with hardships home as soon as possible after 3 January 1995, but do it in a way that would at all times provide Fort Drum with the support it needed.

The 670th MP Company Redeployment Plan provided for a three-phased movement from Fort Drum to California. It was detailed, comprehensive, and workable. The plan was prepared in consultation with Fort Drum, the 10th MP Battalion, the 185th MP Battalion, the 49th MP Brigade, the California National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau, and it was approved by the Commander of the 10th MP Battalion and the Commander of the 10th Mountain Division. The redeployment plan was published on 29

13 During the entire tour, Major Haywood was scrupulous about coordinating and informing the 49th MP Brigade about matters pertaining to the 670th MP Company. This had a good effect on all parties.
December 1994 and distributed to all of the parties. It included schedules for out-processing from Fort Drum and in-processing at the Reserve Center at Sunnyvale. Rosters were made up to inform each soldier of where he or she stood in the redeployment process. Provision was made for transferring to their original units the soldiers of the 49th MP Brigade who had volunteered to join the 670th on the active-duty tour.

When the time came, the plan was implemented as follows [17 and 18]:

• On 6 January 1995, an Advance Element of 36 soldiers departed Fort Drum for California. The Advance Element, commanded by First Lieutenant Rossmiller, included those with the most urgent needs to return to civil life. These soldiers were released from active duty on 18 January—after 106 days of active duty.

• The Main Body of 54 soldiers, led by Captain Brown, returned to California on 25 January 1995, and these soldiers were released from active duty on 8 February 1995.

• The Trail Element of 34 soldiers—all volunteers—remained behind to provide law enforcement support until AC military police returning from Haiti could assume the mission. The Trail Element was an organized MP platoon commanded by First Lieutenant Daniel Williamson and a full complement of NCOs. The 10th MP Company and 511th MP Company returned to Fort Drum on 27 January 1995, regrouped, and took over the post support mission on 16 February 1995. The next day, 17 February 1995, the remaining soldiers of the 670th MP Company left Fort Drum to return to California and were released from active duty on 5 March 1995.

The careful, coordinated planning initiated and accomplished by the 670th MP Company and Fort Drum for the redeployment stands in stark contrast to the improvised and incoherent manner in which the original deployment was done.

The other two National Guard MP companies were released before the 670th. The 544th at Fort Bragg went back to Puerto Rico on 15 December and its members were released from active duty on 19 December 1994. The 855th MP Company at Fort Polk went back to Arizona on 19 December and its members were released on 28 December 1994 [19].

The soldiers of the 670th remained enthusiastic throughout their active duty tour. They were gratified by the efforts of their leadership and of Fort Drum to give them a fair shake. They believe that their active-duty tour was a good one. There were no Inspector General (IG) or congressional complaints. These troops are older (average age of 31 years) and more experienced than their AC counterparts, and they take their military service
seriously. Indeed, the most positive aspect of the situation was the willingness of the officers, NCOs, and soldiers of the 670th MP Company, California National Guard, to serve their nation and do their duty.

On 5 March 1995, the members of the 670th Military Police Company were honored at an awards ceremony conducted at the Sunnyvale Armory. They earned it!

I. OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF VOLUNTEER UNITS

Although the experience of the 670th MP Company is only one example, it is possible to make some tentative general observations about Standard Bearer and other volunteer units. These are explained in the following paragraphs.

The conditions of service need to be established before the call is made. Too often during this process, the rules were changed after they were announced to the troops. In particular, the soldiers need to know in advance the length of time they will serve. This knowledge will help the volunteers prepare their families and employers for their absence [20]. The troops will put up with a lot, but they resent being told one thing and having it changed several times. The White House, OSD, and the Army leadership need to make firm decisions on mobilizing reserves at the outset and stick to those decisions. Changing the rules after the fact is symptomatic of poor management and has adverse impact on soldiers, whether they are volunteers or not. Moreover, the Army should have considered how many MPs were really needed at Fort Drum before they decided to ask for a volunteer unit to serve there. Even after the several recent military operations in which guardsmen and reservists were used, the Army still does not know what to do with them or how to treat them.

Officer branch qualification could be a major obstacle to obtaining volunteer units intact. A typical National Guard or Army Reserve officer will serve in several branches throughout a full military career. This is because of the unit vacancy rule that requires each Selected Reserve officer to fill an authorized position in a unit or as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). Most guardsmen and reservists serve in units near their homes, and as the force structure changes and units go out of existence or are reorganized or as the officers move around, it is necessary for them to adopt the branch of the units they can join in order to remain in the Selected Reserve.14

14 The typical active component officer, on the other hand, stays in the same branch for a full military career.
In this case, two of the officers of the 670th MP Company were not branch qualified at the time the unit was ordered to active duty. All five of the officers serving in the unit at the time of the alert volunteered to serve, but two of them had recently transferred to the Military Police Branch and had not fulfilled a DA requirement to complete an MP Branch orientation course by correspondence. The California National Guard determined that the two officers were not to be brought to active duty, even though they had been assigned as MP officers to the 670th MP Company. Two other officers in the 49th MP Brigade—both former members of the 670th—volunteered to serve.

The consensus of the participants in this operation—except perhaps the two MP officers who were left behind—is that the decision to disqualify the non-branch qualified MP officers from active duty was correct. As stated by Brigadier General Jerry Fields, then commander of the 49th MP Brigade: “Officers who have not become technically proficient in their new branch should not lead troops in life and death situations which can be true in Law Enforcement missions” [5].

While not questioning the general principle of branch qualification, it is possible to question the application of that principle in this case. How much more technically proficient would these officers have become if they had completed a branch orientation course by correspondence? Few, if any, of the other personnel in the 670th were qualified to perform law enforcement, and all of them had to be trained at Fort Drum to perform this particular function. In one respect, the two new MP officers lost a good opportunity to become better qualified as MPs by participating in realistic on-the-job training. On the other hand, it is hard to disagree with the view that “real world law enforcement is not a place for OJT [on-the-job training]” [5].

If MPs have to be branch qualified to perform law enforcement at Fort Drum, this will be important also for officers of other branches, particularly for service in a combat theater. Insistence on branch qualification before officers are allowed to serve on active duty will affect volunteer unit programs.

Inflexible application of personnel rules to disqualify unit members—volunteers or not—makes it impossible to obtain complete reserve units. The mobilization system worked to disqualify for various reasons many of the personnel of the 670th who volunteered to serve. The matter of officer branch qualification was addressed above. Some of the other reasons for disqualification were inappropriate and one was downright silly,

15 The two officers had enrolled in the orientation course but had not completed it.
considering the unit’s backfill mission. Sending away volunteers because of MOS mismatches or braces on the teeth did not make sense. Lack of volunteers was not the cause of the 43-percent show rate from the unit. Because of the administrative disqualifications, the unit’s available strength would have been about the same if it had really been ordered to active duty involuntarily. If the Army wants to preserve the cohesion of Reserve units being ordered to active duty—either voluntarily or involuntarily—it needs to simplify and ease up on the application of the multitude of rules that effectively prevent some Reserve volunteers from serving.

Large organizations can provide volunteer units. In this case, the 670th was unable to qualify enough qualified volunteers to meet the authorized strength, but was able to get enough qualified volunteers from the other units of the 49th MP Brigade. The troops say that getting the new people from other units of the same brigade made it a lot easier to integrate them into the company and form a cohesive team. The troops had worked together before, were also military policemen, and shared the common bond of serving in the same brigade. This was important to the soldiers, and it indicates that the technique of designating major functional commands to provide smaller units of volunteers has merit.

The 670th MP Company was serving on an overseas tour. These troops from California were 3,000 miles away from home, without their families, without their own cars, and living as strangers in a strange land. For them, it was just like being in Haiti, or Somalia, or some other foreign place. In fact, being in Haiti would have been better for some; at least service there would have been exciting and in the real action. Also, in Haiti all of the Army units would have been on the same hardship basis; at Fort Drum only the 670th was without family, friends, cars, and the other advantages of home.  

It may not be a good idea to ask soldiers to volunteer to be ordered to active duty involuntarily. The soldiers of the 670th would have preferred being ordered to active duty involuntarily rather than having to volunteer to be ordered. The difference is important to them and to their families and employers. Under the awkward arrangement for Uphold Democracy, these guardsmen got the worst of both options. They were expected to volunteer but had to pretend they were obeying orders. Many of the troops did not tell their spouses, families, or civilian bosses that they actually volunteered. They wanted to leave the impression that they had no choice. The company commander deliberately did not use the word “volunteer” in any public statements he made on local TV or for local newspapers.

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16 Major Monville believes that it is unrealistic to compare Fort Drum to an overseas tour and notes that it was possible for the troops to have family members visit them at Fort Drum [6].
in the days between alert and travel to Fort Drum. On the other hand, if the unit were really ordered to active duty involuntarily, other members of the unit—primarily those who did not volunteer to serve—might have been upset. Using the PSRC in a truly involuntary manner but then allowing some soldiers to leave early might be a useful solution.

As Colonel Ezell Ware, Jr., Commander of the 49th MP Brigade, puts it [20]:

Asking soldiers to volunteer to be ordered for active duty involuntarily places the soldiers employment or reemployment in jeopardy, causes severe strain on family relationships, and places the soldier [in the position of] falsifying information regarding his/her mobilization requirements.

This combination of voluntary service in an involuntary call up occurred in this instance as a by-product of the decision process to obtain the PSRC authority and without much advance consideration. More work is needed to establish a policy on this matter before the combination is used again.

Many backfill requirements can be met by local Guard and Reserve units on a rotational basis. Sending an entire MP company 3,000 miles from home for 90 days to provide 30 extra MPs for law enforcement is overkill. It wastes money, and it wastes the enthusiasm of the volunteers. It would have been easier and cheaper to have asked the New York National Guard or a local Army Reserve Command to provide 30 MPs for 15- to 30-day tours on a rotational basis. This solution would have attracted plenty of short-term RC volunteers to receive useful training and assist Fort Drum. It would have been better than forcing an entire company to sacrifice for a secondary mission.

The authorities at Fort Drum disagree. They point out that providing security for soldiers and their families should not be construed as a “secondary mission,” and that it would be totally impractical to use RC MP troops on short tours to do this because they would all have to take law enforcement training, which takes 30 days at a minimum [14].

Volunteer units should not be called upon too frequently. The troops did not mind this tour too much, but they agree that they would not want to do the same kind of thing again for at least 2 or 3 years. They would, of course, serve for a major regional contingency, but they do not want to have their lives interrupted too often for lesser missions. It takes time for them to reestablish their jobs, their family connections, and their lives. None of the soldiers said they would leave the Guard because of one volunteer tour; they all wanted to continue their military careers. But they all cautioned against going too often to the same well.

Volunteer units can work if they are used properly. The troops of the 670th MP Company (and almost certainly their compatriots in the other two National Guard MP
Companies) demonstrated their patriotism and devotion to duty by volunteering for this mission. They lived up to their Standard Bearer contract with the Army, even after the Army unilaterally increased the length of the tour of duty. They came through even though they were not used for the “real” mission in Haiti. They do the Army credit, but there are indications that, unless they are treated fairly in the future, the troops may not be willing to volunteer again.

The story of the 670th MP Company indicates that Project Standard Bearer will work. The story also indicates that the Army needs to revise some of its own rules to make it easier for RC volunteers to participate routinely in accomplishing Army missions.
REFERENCES


[7] Briefing and meeting attended by Stanley A. Horowitz and John R. Brinkerhoff from IDA; Lieutenant Colonel Walter Young, NGB; Lieutenant Colonel Larry Holliday, USAR, Mobilization Division; Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Porter, ARNG, Director of Reserve Components Support; Major David W. Haywood, Acting Provost Marshal; Master Sergeant Thomas P. Darras II, ARNG Operations and Training NCO; Captain Wayne C. Brown, Commander of the 670th MP Company, and about 20 other members of the unit, including First Lieutenant Bradley Rossmiller and First Sergeant Lee E. Lindley, Fort Drum, 10 November 1994.


[10] Captain Wayne C. Brown, et al., 10 November 1994 (see Reference [7]).


[12] Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army, Permanent Orders 6A-39-01, 29 September 1994. This is a corrected copy of the original orders, which were dated 23 September 1994.


A-1

ABBREVIATIONS
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander-in-chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>contingency force pool</td>
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<td>DFAS</td>
<td>Defense Finance and Accounting System</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>HHC</td>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company</td>
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<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>IMA</td>
<td>Individual Mobilization Augmentee</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>Mobilization Assistance Team</td>
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<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modification Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Presidential Selected Reserve Callup</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Soldier Readiness Processing</td>
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<td>State Area Command</td>
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<td>Temporary Tour of Active Duty</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
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## Title and Subtitle
Case Studies in Reserve Component Volunteerism: The 670th Military Police Company in Operation Uphold Democracy

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## Abstract
This is one of a series of case studies prepared to illustrate how volunteerism has been used to gain access to National Guard and Reserve capabilities in support of recent military operations. The case studies have been prepared by reference to official documents and reports with unit members and other persons involved in the operation. This case study tells about the voluntary service of the 670th Military Police (MP) Company, California National Guard, during Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. intervention in Haiti. The Army National Guard selected the 670th and two other MP companies as the most ready to serve under the auspices of the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of Project Standard Bearer. This case study serves as an example of how Project Standard Bearer can work, but it also indicates where problems may arise in the future. Based on the situations encountered by members of the 670th, the Army may need to revise some of its rules to make it easier for RC volunteers to participate in accomplishing Army missions. Troops such as those in the 670th MP company may not be willing to volunteer again unless treated more fairly by the Army. This case study is a background paper for a report on the role of volunteerism in Reserve accession policy being prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.