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15. Abstract: Peace operations are assuming an increasingly visible and important role as an instrument of international diplomacy and national policy. The transition between two types of peace operations, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, represents an operational shift that has strategic implications.

Anticipating the optimum point at which to make this transition presents the regional CINC with a significant operational challenge. A potential approach to developing reliable measures of effectiveness with which the CINC can assess operational progress and anticipate this transition is to link them to broad, enduring concepts such as the variables of peace operations (force, consent, and impartiality), the six principles of military operations other than war (objective, restraint, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, and perseverance), and selected operational concepts (center of gravity and culminating point of attack).

The 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic included a successful transition from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping. Although formal peace operations doctrine was relatively immature, attention to the aforementioned broad, enduring concepts proved effective during the operation and provided a useful focus for developing measures of effectiveness with which to assess operational progress and anticipate the operational shift from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS:
THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE-ENFORCEMENT TO PEACEKEEPING

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...................................................... ii
Introduction .................................................... 1
Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping .......................... 2
Measures of Effectiveness ..................................... 4
The 1956 Dominican Republic Intervention ................. 9
Conclusion ....................................................... 13

Endnotes ....................................................... 14
Bibliography .................................................... 16
INTRODUCTION

Peace operations have assumed a more visible and important role as the international community focuses on threats to regional security and stability around the world. President Clinton’s 1995 National Security Strategy includes peace operations as a policy instrument designed to enhance national security and support democracy and conflict resolution abroad.¹ The National Military Strategy addresses two types of peace operations, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, that contribute to two major components of the military strategy: (1) deterrence and conflict prevention and (2) peacetime engagement.²

The common, strategic-level objective of both peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations is to create and sustain the conditions for long-term peace.³ At the operational level, however, the objectives are different. Since they are certain to be involved in peace operations in their respective areas of responsibility, either in support of multilateral, U.N.-mandated efforts or in charge of unilateral or multilateral, U.S.-led efforts, the regional CINCs must understand the different objectives and discern the distinct nature and dissimilar environments of each type of peace operation. Furthermore, they must assess operational progress and effectiveness in order to determine the optimum point at which to transition from a peace-enforcement operation to a peacekeeping operation. Elements of emerging peace operations doctrine can provide a focus for the measures of effectiveness that the CINC needs in making this critical determination.
PEACE-ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING

Clausewitz asserts that "the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." This is relevant to peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations; failure to accommodate the difference can be disastrous. For example, failure to accommodate the difference and adjust security measures accordingly contributed to the tragic bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Ten years later, a U.S.-led peace enforcement effort to protect food distribution in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, succeeded because both the CINC and the American envoy had clear objectives and understood the nature of the operation; they did not mistake it for, or try to turn it into, something alien to its nature. On the other hand, a U.N.-directed sequel to Operation Restore Hope, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), failed because its objectives were vague and its scope unlimited; a subsequent obsession with capturing and punishing the leader of one of the belligerent parties blurred the operational focus and undermined the prospects for long-term, political success.

The nature of the peace operation must be consistent with operational objectives. When these objectives change, the operational shift (or transition) in the nature of the operation will significantly influence long-term, strategic success. The transition can occur in either direction. Shifting from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping signals progress towards the long-term, strategic objective; it is
intentional and requires deliberate planning and focused execution. Conversely, shifting from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement is likely to be a crisis action in response to a failed peacekeeping operation. Paul Kennedy cautions that the latter is as probable as the former in today’s unsettled international security environment.\textsuperscript{8} Regardless of the direction, however, "commanders must avoid inadvertently slipping from one type of peace operation to another."\textsuperscript{9}

Clausewitz also asserts that war is an instrument of policy rather than "something autonomous."\textsuperscript{10} The same is true of peace operations. As instruments of policy, they are conducted to create and sustain conditions in which long-term peace can flourish by achieving distinct, operational-level objectives tailored to the specific security environment in which they are conducted. Of the various operations that constitute the spectrum of peace operations, "the critical threshold is between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping."\textsuperscript{11}

Understanding the definition and nature of peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations is fundamental to recognizing this threshold. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides for a peace-enforcement function, which the U.S. Army defines as the "application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."\textsuperscript{12} Chapter VI of the Charter addresses the peacekeeping function, defined by the Army as "military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support
diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement. At the operational level, peace-enforcement is offensive in nature, seeking to establish peace in a hostile environment, while peacekeeping is defensive in nature, seeking to preserve peace once it has been established.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS**

The nature of peace operations is characterized by three essential variables -- the amount of force employed by the intervening force, the level of consent to the presence of the intervening force, and the degree of impartiality exhibited by the intervening force. Peace-enforcement generally requires a significant level of force, while the circumstances requiring its employment generally dictate that the levels of consent and impartiality will be low. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, generally requires that force be employed in self-defense only, that consent be given by the host nation, and that the peacekeeper's impartiality be recognized by each belligerent. Argersinger states that consent is essential to the legitimacy of the peacekeeper's presence and that "impartiality is the sine qua non for whatever effectiveness, authority, and leverage peacekeepers have."14

The principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) apply to peace operations. The principle of the objective states that every military operation should be directed toward a "clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."15 A successful peace-enforcement operation creates a stable environment in which follow-on peacekeeping operations can succeed.16 In order to describe such an
environment, operational objectives must include clearly defined end states that, in turn, suggest measures of effectiveness and indicators of the optimum transition point.

The principle of restraint cautions commanders to "apply appropriate military capability prudently." Applying the minimum level of force required to achieve a specific purpose is critical; failure to exercise appropriate restraint may instigate a response in kind, escalate tension and violence, and embroil peace operations forces in an unwanted, long-term conflict. During peace-enforcement, military force must be judiciously applied to halt hostilities; during peacekeeping it should be a self-defense measure of last resort. Simple and clear rules of engagement and well-trained and disciplined forces are essential to the exercise of restraint.

Legitimacy is the "willing acceptance by the people of the right of government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions." To achieve and sustain legitimacy, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping forces must operate with a scrupulous regard for international and local norms regarding military force. Unfortunately, the nature of peace-enforcement suggests that at least one belligerent party will challenge the legitimacy (as well as the impartiality) of the peace-enforcer. On the other hand, the nature of peacekeeping requires legitimacy (and impartiality) as a pre-condition for success.

Unity of effort emphasizes cooperation and consistency between each element involved in a peace operation. Shaping the environment and managing levels of force,
consent, and impartiality requires that individual efforts be in concert with an over-arching operational concept.

The principle of *security* clearly applies to peace-enforcement operations -- hostile encounters are expected. Its application to peacekeeping, which features the absence of hostile action, is less clear. A peacekeeping force that does not attend to security may be inviting hostile action, especially if a belligerent perceives the peacekeeper to be a lucrative target from which to gain an advantage.

Finally, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping forces must prepare for protracted operations. The frequently long, drawn-out process of diplomatic negotiations makes this particularly applicable to peacekeeping operations. To succeed, forces must have the *perseverance* to remain committed to the operational objectives, patiently supporting the diplomatic process and recognizing that temporary tactical success can be counterproductive to the achievement of lasting strategic success.

In concert with the variables of peace operations and the principles of MOOTW, operational concepts may provide the CINC with additional insight as to the progress of peace-enforcement or peacekeeping and help him to anticipate a transition between the two. The *operational center of gravity* is one concept that may be useful in this regard.\(^{19}\) Waugh notes that identifying and exposing the enemy's center of gravity while protecting one's own center of gravity lies at the essence of the operational art; even if the enemy's center of gravity cannot be identified, the peacekeeper must protect his own.\(^{20}\) During peace-enforcement, the "enemy's" center of gravity may include his physical capacity and his moral commitment to the continuation of
hostilities. The center of gravity of the peace-enforcer is primarily its military force, although international and regional legitimacy, political commitment, and popular support at home are also critical, suggesting the relevance of Clausewitz’ "paradoxical trinity" in assessing the progress of peace operations.\(^{21}\)

During peacekeeping, a pre-condition for success is the agreement of the belligerent parties to cease hostilities and defer to the diplomatic process. Hence, a potential center of gravity may be the conviction that diplomacy will accommodate the belligerent party’s interests. Rather than attack this center of gravity, however, peacekeeping should reinforce it. For the peacekeeping force itself, Dixon and Ayers suggest that the center of gravity is its credibility as an impartial wedge between the belligerents. The loss of credibility reduces the peacekeeper to the role of being an additional armed threat in the region. The result is likely to be an unanticipated transition from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement -- a crisis response to re-establish the climate for diplomatic negotiations.\(^{22}\)

The concept of a **culminating point of the attack**, the point at which the residual strength of the attacking force is sufficient only to assume the defense and wait for peace to be negotiated, has application to peace operations. Beyond this point during war, the attacker yields the initiative and places itself in a position of strategic weakness.\(^{23}\) The peace-enforcement analogy is that the intervening force should seek the point where its actions are sufficient to achieve the cessation of hostilities without aggravating the situation and instigating renewed fighting. Dixon and Ayers contend that even if the intervening force succeeds in separating the belligerent
parties and halting hostilities, there is the danger that prolonged operations will become politically overextended and lose international, regional, or host nation consent and popular support back home.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, Applegate suggests a "strategic point of diminishing returns" at which the potential cost of continuing the operation outweighs the potential long-term benefits. While there may be sufficient military force to achieve temporary tactical success, there may be insufficient political capital to achieve lasting strategic success.\textsuperscript{25}

Measures of effectiveness must focus on the strategic objective of peace operations -- the creation and sustainment of the conditions for a long-term peace -- and on the respective operational objectives of peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Operational and strategic intelligence is critical to measuring the effectiveness of peace operations. While tactical-level intelligence, such as the military strength and disposition of belligerent parties, is important, it does not provide the CINC with measures of progress towards operational and strategic-level objectives. The measures, or essential elements of information, needed by the CINC are political, economic, and social -- as well as military -- in nature. Their collection, analysis, and fusion requires a complex, well-integrated intelligence network involving a variety of agencies and sources.

In a Clausewitzian sense, peace-enforcement operations have reached a "culminating point of effectiveness" when belligerent parties have agreed to cease hostilities and commit to the diplomatic resolution of issues. A peace-enforcer that has militarily overpowered a belligerent party has achieved tactical success; caution
must be exercised, however, in assuming operational or strategic success. The belligerent may use the cessation of hostilities to reconstitute its military force for a future fight, or find alternative methods to upset the peace process. The reappearance of people on the street, the reopening of stores and businesses, and an apparent reduction in crime may be short-lived measures of effectiveness if discontented belligerents have merely "gone to ground" rather than become committed to the diplomatic process. The CINC must ensure that the peace-enforcement operation does not transition to peacekeeping while this situation exists.

The measure of effectiveness of peace-enforcement -- conditions conducive to the transition to a peacekeeping operation -- must focus on the security and stability of the environment in which political processes can assume preeminence. This could be indicated by the degree to which law, order, and discipline functions have been renewed, public safety and public services have been restored, and indicators of political, social, and economic stability such as elections, education, and employment have been re-instituted. A functional judicial system may be the ultimate indicator of security and stability within the host nation.

THE 1965 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC INTERVENTION

The 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic provides a useful example of the transition of a peace-enforcement operation to a peacekeeping operation. The intervention began on 27 April 1965 with U.S. Marines peacefully evacuating American citizens and other civilians threatened by a civil war that erupted
in the capital city, Santo Domingo. U.S. involvement escalated with the introduction of U.S. Army forces to conduct stability operations, essentially a unilateral peace-enforcement operation, from 30 April until 3 May to separate two belligerent parties, the pro-U.S. Loyalists and the pro-Communist Constitutionalists, and stop the fighting. When the fighting stopped, U.S. forces commenced unilateral peacekeeping operations pending the deployment of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), a multilateral peacekeeping force established by the Organization of American States (OAS) on 23 May 1965.28

At the strategic level, the American objective was to restore security and stability to the Dominican Republic and establish a stable, democratic, and strongly anti-communist regime.27 At the operational level, the objective was to restore peace and establish conditions for the transition to a multilateral, OAS-sponsored peacekeeping operation that would support peaceful negotiations. President Johnson, recognizing the unique nature and political sensitivity of this operation, demanded "the best general in the Pentagon" to command the American forces.28 In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer to be the equivalent of a theater commander under CINCLANT, but responding directly to the National Command Authority.29

General Palmer established priorities that clearly indicated his sensitivity to the key variables of peace operations. The level of force, dictated by rules of engagement (ROE), was commensurate with the objectives of each phase of the intervention. During the stability operations (peace enforcement), the level of force was high
enough to separate the belligerent parties and protect American forces while minimizing injury to innocent civilians. As soon as the belligerent parties were physically separated and hostilities were reduced to sporadic sniping, General Palmer tightened the ROE to calm the situation and enhance the peace process. The level of military force was the minimum required to accomplish the mission while the OAS worked to establish the multilateral IAPF. This fostered the conditions that enabled the IAPF to assume control of a stable situation without sacrificing the progress that the unilateral U.S. action had achieved.

President Johnson used the request for U.S. intervention from the Loyalist junta leader to justify and claim host nation consent for the intervention. The level of consent was low, however, among Latin American countries fearing a return of Uncle Sam’s "big stick" attitude. In addition, the United States recognized and supported the Loyalists; in spite of U.S. claims of neutrality, it was clear that the level of U.S. impartiality was low. This changed when the cease-fire took effect. A well-publicized line of communication and numerous checkpoints throughout the city connected U.S. forces, stemmed the flow of arms, and separated the belligerents. Thereafter, U.S. forces worked diligently, and successfully, to remain neutral while politicians negotiated for a diplomatic solution. As Greenberg notes, "the American shift was both successful and noticed, for on 22 May [rebel leader] Colonel Caamaño told OAS Secretary General Mora that he now considered U.S. troops neutral."

One significant indicator of political progress was the establishment of a new junta headed by a military leader and three distinguished civilian leaders, including a
civil engineer, a lawyer, and an editor. This was a tangible effort to widen public support and reduce the military’s influence over the political process.\textsuperscript{31} As the peacekeeping phase progressed, emphasis was placed on civil affairs and humanitarian aid. American soldiers assisted relief agencies in restoring public services and utilities and in distributing food and medical supplies. "Soldiers who only weeks earlier had been met with rocks and snipers’ bullets began to see smiles and signs of appreciation from the population of Santo Domingo."\textsuperscript{32}

Early in the evolution of peace operations doctrine, the successful U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic demonstrated the importance of the variables of peace operations and the application of the principles of MOOTW. The transition from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping succeeded because the theater commander skillfully measured the effectiveness of the peace-enforcement effort and anticipated the transition to the peacekeeping phase, ultimately shifting the unilateral operation to a multilateral peacekeeping operation. In the end, "Overwhelming American combat forces had separated the combatants and forced a military stalemate...The application of a disciplined, restrained force, capable of shifting its neutral position so as to complement political negotiations, was rapidly bringing a violent situation under control...Unilateral American military actions laid the foundation upon which the Inter-American Peace Force could be established and operate in an atmosphere of relative calm and stability."\textsuperscript{33}
CONCLUSION

As peace operations continue to assume a more visible and important role as instruments of international diplomacy and national policy, the transition from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping will continue to present the regional CINCs with a significant operational challenge. Meeting this challenge will require measures of effectiveness with which the CINCs can recognize peace-enforcement success and anticipate the optimum point at which to make the operational shift to peacekeeping. Defining such measures of effectiveness has been a difficult problem to solve; an approach to the solution involves elements of current U.S. Army peace operations doctrine. Linking specific, situationally-oriented measures of effectiveness to broad, enduring concepts such as the variables of peace operations, the principles of MOOTW, and selected operational concepts can provide a starting point for assessing progress, anticipating a transition, and forecasting the achievement of the common, strategic-level objective of both peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations -- the creation and sustainment of the conditions for long-term peace.
ENDNOTES


15. *FM 100-23*, p. 15.

17. FM 100-23, p. 17.

18. Ibid., p. 18.


23. Clausewitz, p. 528.


27. Ibid., p. 25.


31. Ibid., p. 50.

32. Ibid., p. 53.

33. Ibid., pp. 53,55.
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