**Title:** PEACEKEEPERS AND WARFIGHTERS: SAME FORCE, DIFFERENT MINDSET (U)

**Personal Authors:** LTC N.W. NOYES, USA

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**Ten key words that relate to your paper:**

PEACEKEEPING, SITUATIONAL DOMINANCE, SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS, CONSENT, PARTIALITY, LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, PEACEKEEPING TENANTS

**Abstract:**

THE PROBLEM WITH USING THE SAME FORCE FOR SEQUENTIAL COMBAT AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IS NOT ONE OF TASKS AND SUB-TASKS. IT IS A PROBLEM OF MAKING THE MENTAL TRANSITION FROM THE AGGRESSIVE VIOLENCE OF MID-INTENSITY WAR, TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTRAINT AND CONTROL OF VIOLENCE NECESSARY FOR PEACEKEEPING SITUATIONAL DOMINANCE. ALTHOUGH ALL OF OUR SERVICE MEMBERS HAVE THE INHERENT SKILLS TO DO BOTH, THEY MUST BE GIVEN THE TIME AND TRAINING TO MENTALLY TRANSITION TO EACH OF THESE DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS. IF SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS MUST BE CONDUCTED, THEN ROTATE THE FORCE.

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PEACE KEEPERS
and
WAR FIGHTERS:
SAME FORCE, DIFFERENT MINDSET

Submitted by:

LTC(P) WINN NOYES
16 MAY 1995
**Statistical Summary**

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THE PROBLEM

The problem with using the same force for sequential combat and peacekeeping operations is not one of tasks and subtasks. It is a problem of changing required mindsets, desired automatic reactions and conditioned responses, with insufficient time and training for reorientation of the soldier who must accomplish the tasks. The required mental transition is significant.

Assessments of American servicemen's ability to conduct sequential combat and peace operations have, for the most part, analyzed their ability to do the various required tasks and subtasks. These studies have looked at everything but the heart of the matter. Granted, a soldier who can occupy and defend a battle position in mid to high intensity combat operations, certainly has the skills to occupy a peacekeeping road block. Granted, an F-15 pilot who can fly high intensity counter air missions, can certainly fly peacekeeping deny flight missions. If, however, these young warriors approach their missions with mismatched approaches and conditioned responses, both are likely to fail. The soldiers who attempt to defend their battle position with the restraint required for peace keeping, probably will be killed before they can react to the violent attack they receive. If pilots fly their deny flight mission with the same aggressive, quick reaction mind set that has just kept them alive during high intensity battle, they are likely to unintentionally and unnecessarily escalate the situation or
even worse, shoot down friendly aircraft in a confused situation.

THE APPROACHES AND CONDITIONED RESPONSES

The approaches required for combat and peace keeping are as different as night and day. One is the dynamic approach required of our servicemembers fighting and surviving at the farthest reaches of violence that humanity has the capacity to develop. The other approach is the one required when attempting to prevent and suppress violence. This approach is similar to the balance between restraint and action required of a city policeman walking his beat. He must maintain a balance between benevolence and force application to ensure he dominates the situation.

Success in each of these missions demands a set of preconditioned responses that are significantly different from each other. Combat requires the set that matches the Army FM 100-5 tenants of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and the propensity for violent offensive action. Peace keeping requires the set that matches Army FM 100-23 and its dynamics of restraint, control of consent, control of the level of violence and maintenance of impartiality. Each set is different. The manuals are different, the tenants are different and the desired outcome is different. Each set must be carefully developed, honed and fine tuned through intensive training. Each is essential to survival and success. Neither can be developed overnight.
Combat Operations

The purpose of War is to compel your enemy, by force, to do your will. The tenants of our current operational doctrine for combat operations are Initiative, Depth, Agility and above all, the Synchronization of every shred of available combat power at the decisive point and time to overwhelm and defeat our enemy. We focus all of our energy, means and mental processes to achieve this aim. We work hard to train our servicemen and hone our units to a fever pitch of preparation to aggressively and violently pounce on our enemies.

The essence of the modern American way of war is aggressive violence and overwhelming combat power. This is typified by the counter-ambush training we give to our infantry squads and tank platoons with its resultant preconditioned responses that carry over into company, battalion, brigade and higher operations. When ambushed they must attack violently and immediately into the face of the ambush with all the available firepower they can muster. If they can overwhelm the ambushers with combat power, they will break their ambush and chase off or kill the ambushers. Most importantly, they will survive to fight again. Counter ambush training is important because it helps instill the warrior spirit of violent, immediate overwhelming action required in all combat operations. This confident, aggressive attitude is the hallmark of a unit well trained
and prepared for combat operations.

In air to air combat, he who sees the other guy first, maneuvers fastest and gets the first good shot, almost always wins. We therefore train and drill our pilots in the aggressive tenants, reactions and conditioned responses that give them the edge in each of these areas. Success in every school, every exercise, and every evaluation our best pilots go through during their careers is determined by the skill and speed with which they apply these principles. In combat, our best pilots, like our best soldiers and sailors, will aggressively and violently attack and kill the enemy before they can react or even know we are there.

**PEACE KEEPING**

Peace keeping requires restraint, cool analysis and above all, calculated and careful reaction to a plethora of situations. The U.S. Army's new Doctrinal Manual lists the guiding principle as 'Situational Dominance'. Although the term is new to most servicemembers, this dynamic principle is what peace keeping forces must achieve and maintain. Situational Dominance is significantly different from Overwhelming Combat Power. Unfortunately this difference is one that is not universally understood.

The three dynamic variables that must be kept in balance for success in peace operations are the level of consent, control of the level of violence and the degree of impartiality. The sensitivity of these variables
significantly changes the environment from that of combat in several specific ways. Peace operations often take place in situations where even the most minor measures and actions may have immediate strategic consequences. The environment is one which often requires major decisions to be made by junior leaders. Peace operations require significant coordination with other government and non-government organizations. DOD may not be, and often is not, the lead agency in the operations.

Virtually every servicemember or civilian in the environment has the potential of upsetting the delicate balance of the variables required to maintain situational dominance. Their preconditioned responses to each situation must be in line with the restrained approach and principles of this specific mission.

In combat operations, consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander. In peace operations though, it is crucial. The very reason that the military forces are present for peace keeping is because the belligerents have agreed to them being there and the purpose of their presence. Maintenance of the consent requires a conscious effort by the entire chain of command and each servicemember. Determining the balance between benevolence and self defense is a constant chore for every leader in this environment.

An attitude of benevolence, coupled with the demonstrable strength and will to provide security and discipline must be projected and maintained. Much like the
severe impact a crooked police officer can have on a neighborhood, the perception of undisciplined and uncaring soldiers will destroy the balance they are trying to achieve. One or two minor acts of indiscipline or one significant act which catches media attention will quickly turn consent into resentment and rebellion. One minor act of theft or brutality can turn the public view of the peace keepers from one of benevolence to one of occupation forces. One mis-coordinated action resulting in the shooting of a friendly aircraft may have an irreversible impact. Failure to prevent brutality and enhance security can have the same impact. In short, the attitude of the peace keepers, as demonstrated by their discipline and actions, will determine the success of the commander’s ability to maintain the consent required for the success of the mission.

Peace operations forces must control the level of violence and escalation. Restraint and absolute understanding of not only the what, but the why of the rules of engagement is mandatory for every peace keeping servicemember. Restraint must now override the conditioned response instilled in most warriors. In its place must be the restrained and calculating conditioned response of the peace keeper. If a young Sergeant, manning a UN checkpoint responds with overwhelming combat power to a sniper round fired in his general direction, his excessive response will most likely trigger an increase in escalation that may cause hostilities to resume. In a peace keeping environment, he
must first decide if the incoming round is really a direct threat, then he must apply his ROE and decide if he will respond, who or what he will respond against and the level of violence he will use in his response. Failure of this junior leader to understand this different environment and apply the different rules of engagement, will result in loss of control over the escalation and level of violence. His approach and conditioned responses must be significantly different from combat operations if the mission is to be successful.

Peace keeping operations must be conducted with an even handed and impartial approach. The peace keeping forces must not only act impartially, but must also be perceived as being impartial. Nothing can more quickly destroy the level of consent or lead to the resumption of hostilities than a perception that the peace keepers have taken sides. Conversely, a strong impression of impartiality increases the level of consent and significantly decreases the necessity for use of force.

Management of the partiality perception requires a constant and conscientious effort from the entire chain of command and each peace keeper. Again, junior leaders are in an environment where even minor decisions can have immediate and significant strategic impact. Again, the why of the local policies and rules must be clearly understood, not just the rules. Consider the young Sergeant in desert storm who is moving north with his unit and passes a group of starving refugees. In the combat environment he can throw them a
case of MREs and drive away with no strategic impact. If the same sergeant in a peace keeping environment gives a case of MREs to refugees, he may have just set a precedent that will have immediate and national strategic implications. He has shown partiality by feeding one faction and not the others. Depending on the negotiation skills of his commander, this incident could grow to epic proportions. It is the perfect World News Event for exploitation by any of the belligerent sides.

THE CHALLENGE

The end state of a successful peace operation is the relatively permanent resolution of a conflict that was facilitated by peace operations forces who were able to maintain situational dominance. The end state of a successful combat operation is an enemy who has been compelled to do our will by the overwhelming application of our combat power. The challenge is whether the same force can go sequentially from one mission to the other and make the required mental shift that will insure success and preclude unnecessary loss of life.

EXAMPLES

Recent training events and recent operations show that our servicemembers may be able to easily shift from peace operations to mid-intensity combat, but that going from a combat mindset to a peace keeping one, without some
retraining is exceptionally difficult. In fact, it is so difficult that whenever possible, the same force should not be used for sequential combat and peace keeping operations with significant retraining.

The change in mindset difficulty is easily demonstrated by a training scenario often run in Europe for troops preparing for peace keeping operations. Within 24 hours of the training unit moving into their initial lodgement area, in their new peace keeping mission area, a BRDM or other vehicle, that 24 hours ago was their declared enemy, drives within sight and range of the defensive perimeter of the lodgement area. This force is no longer a declared enemy, but is now one of the belligerent forces the peace keepers must separate and maintain situational dominance over. No obviously hostile intent is demonstrated and the belligerent forces are careful to insure none of the BRDM's weapons systems are pointed at the lodgement area. The soldiers from the BRDM dismount and mill around for a few minutes watching for a reaction from the lodgement area. If there is no reaction, one of the soldiers will fire one round from his individual weapon in the general direction of, but not specifically at any person or vehicle in the compound, normally well over their heads. All of them then jump in the BRDM and quickly leave.

This simple scenario is often an acid test of whether the American unit has made the mental transition in mission approach and conditioned response to be successful. The
desired response is the maintenance of situational dominance by careful, alert restraint and measured, controlled response to the level of threat. A well prepared peace keeping unit would go to heightened but restrained alert immediately when the BRDM appeared. The reaction force would be alerted, but would not move out. They would continue to watch, but not react to the BRDM unless he demonstrated hostile intent. When the enemy soldier fired his round in the vicinity of the lodgement area, the young leader on the ground would have to determine if it was a hostile act. If he felt it was and his soldiers were in danger, then he should appropriately return fire at that enemy soldier with an appropriate level of force such as a machine gun. When the enemy jumps into their BRDM and leaves, he should cease fire and end the incident.

The reaction from a unit that has just completed a major combat operations training program, and not made the mental transition is almost always quite different, but very predictable. Occasionally, they will open fire with a tank main gun and destroy the BRDM as soon as it comes into view. If they allow the BRDM to continue, they will invariably open fire when the enemy soldier fires his round, killing all the enemy soldiers and destroying the BRDM.

Forty-eight hours ago, the BRDM was declared hostile just by being present. Now though, the rules for what is hostile and hostile intent have dramatically changed. So have the desired approach and conditioned responses of the peace keeping soldiers.
On 14 April 1994, two U.S. Air Force F-15s mistakenly shot down and destroyed two U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters operating in northern Iraq. Twenty-six friendly people died. Irrespective of the many procedural errors by the various servicemembers involved, the mental approach and demonstrated conditioned responses of the two F-15 pilots were clearly mismatched to this mission and contributed significantly to the catastrophe. Major General Andrus, the US Air Force investigation board president said in his conclusions that "CPOC (Operation Provide Comfort) personnel did not receive consistent, comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the USEUCOM directed ROE. As a result, some aircrews understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied, became over-simplified."

The 'if it flies, it dies' approach these two pilots took to this mission and their response to two unknown helicopters showed the mind set that had made them successful in their combat training and careers so far. Like in the training mission above, it was precisely wrong for this peacekeeping, deny flight mission. Restraint, positive identification of hostile aircraft and an evaluation of hostile intent were required. One quick pass and a partial identification is insufficient in an environment where unarmed helicopters from 4 different nations are constantly operating. Not only was the application of the ROE oversimplified and misunderstood, but so were the required approach and conditioned responses necessary for its
application.

Another telling training scenario often run for European units preparing for peace keeping missions is the car bomb incident. In this scenario, a car bomb explodes while an American patrol is going through a village. The villagers capture the suspected perpetrator and proceed to lynch him. If the American patrol has not made the mental transition from combat operations, their response will be confused and uncertain because this is a civil disturbance and doesn't fit into any of their conditioned responses. It is no direct threat to them so they will normally stand by and watch the lynch mob complete their objective and thereby inadvertently sanction the action. The strategic and political ramifications of their inaction can be horrendous. They have inadvertently violated the principles of impartiality, allowed escalation of violence, mob rule and will bring into question the consent of the belligerent parties.

If the American patrol has made the required mental transition and approaches this situation with the policeman like balance between restraint and action, their required response is clear. They will stop the lynching, capture the suspected perpetrator and turn him over to the legitimate authorities for proper legal disposition. No unnecessary force will be used, but sufficient force will be applied to insure the safety of the peace keepers and their situational dominance.
On the first day after our troop’s recent landing on Haiti, the New York Times front page story was an American Army patrol watching a Haitian policeman beat a civilian man to death for simply welcoming the “American liberators”. Reading the article was like reading the script for a peacekeeping training scenario where the soldiers had not yet made the required mental transition.

The requirement for a peacekeeping mindset does not only apply to the warriors. Captain Rockwood, a U.S. Army counterintelligence officer from the 10th Mountain Division was obviously unable to make the transition. For two months before the Haiti landing he had been preparing for forced entry and military occupation. One of his specific tasks was to inspect the notorious Haitian prisons and stop the human rights violations. When the invasion force’s mission changed to peacekeeping, so did Captain Rockwood’s.

Department of Defense was no longer the lead agency for prison control and reform. Both the State Department and the Justice Department were working the issue. For Captain Rockwood to now enter the prisons without authority from the legitimate government would violate the sovereignty of the nation we were trying to support. He should have rightfully been concerned about the human rights abuses he knew were happening, but the mission required him to approach the problem and respond to it much differently than if he had been part of an occupation force. If he had understood the differences, he could have been of significant help in the
eventual resolution of the problem. However, unable or unwilling to understand the differences between the missions, Captain Rockwood, after being expressly ordered not to, climbed over the fence in his compound and presented himself with his personal weapon at the Haitian prison to complete what he personally interpreted as "Bill Clinton's mission." Forcing his way into the prison at gun point, he was only stopped when a member of the U.S. military attache's office arrived and talked him into unloading his weapon and obeying an order to leave the prison. His actions violated each of the peace keeping principles and could have easily threatened the overall success of the mission.

CONCLUSION

In 1993, Mr Boutros Boutros Gali⁸ made his famous statement that 'Peace Keeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it'. Part of what drove him to make that statement was the realization that while military forces had all the skills and resources for these missions, their normal approach and the conditioned responses they were trained for were not conducive to good peace keeping. What was really needed was a military force with the approach and conditioned responses normally found in police forces.

The argument of whether or not peace keeping is a proper military function is long past. It is permanently added to our list of specified missions. Now, it is imperative that we do not simply add peace keeping as a lesser included list.
of tasks, but formally address its distinct differences.

Peace Keeping requires an approach and set of conditioned responses that are much more like that of a policeman than those of our traditionally trained servicemembers. Our soldiers must be trained to peace keeping’s specific requirements and given the time and opportunity to make the mental transition required for their success and survival before they are committed to the mission. Failure to do so will be as irresponsible as sending untrained recruits to their death in a pitched and violent high intensity battle. If sequential operations are necessary, change the force when you change the mission.
END NOTES

1. For the purpose of this paper, Combat and Combat Operations are defined as those military operations conducted against a declared enemy. These operations range across the conflict spectrum from high intensity warfare to some operations required for peace enforcement.


9. Haiti is significant to this article for several reasons. For a more thorough analysis, see appendix A.


U.S. Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, Washington, 8 April 1994


U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low
Intensity Conflict, Joint Pub 3-07(test), Washington, 18
October 1990.

U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM 1, Washington, 6 March
1985
Significance of Haiti

Haiti is significant for several reasons. First, it was a joint operation. The soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and all other forces that participated, are some of the best trained and best led servicemembers our nation has. Approximately 45% of their soldiers from 10th Mountain Division had participated in previous peace operations. Second, the mission our forces trained for changed three days before execution. For two months they had prepared for a forced entry and occupation of Haiti and were well prepared, both mentally and physically for combat operations. Three days before the invasion, their mission changed to peace keeping while the State Department and other governmental agencies facilitated the return of the legitimate government. Leaders at all levels spent those three precious days frantically retraining their servicemembers on the new rules of engagement and attempting to make the required mental transitions.

The success of the Haiti operation can be measured by the end state they achieved and by the limited number of improper incidents that occurred during the conduct of their difficult mission. However, the incidents that did occur, clearly point to the difficulties created when soldiers are required to make the mental transition from combat operations to peace keeping with insufficient time for retraining.
APPENDIX B

ARMY HELICOPTER SHOOT DOWN ARTICLES
AND DOCUMENTS
Army, Air Force again linked in grief

Friendly fire tragedy

Here is the sequence of events that led to the accidental shooting down of two U.S. Army helicopters by Iraqi fighter pilots over northern Iraq April 14.

A Two Black Hawk helicopters were from Iraq, where, with U.N. officials on board to Seifnistan in middle of Kurdish zone.

A Two F-15 Eagle pilots over Iraqi airbourne fuel tanks.

A Two F-15 pilots shot at friendly forces.

A Iraqi missile in Iraq.

A Iraqi Army.

A Iraqi missile in Iraq.

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This Week
THE BLACK HAWKS’ DOWNING

Tragedy results despite intricate safety measures

By Sean D. Taylor

WASHINGTON — The two Army F-15 Eagle pilots that shot down a pair of Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in northern Iraq on April 14 did so despite an array of safety precautions and procedures designed to prevent just that from happening.

The pilots detailed in an interview April 13, personal flights by the task force commander to verify the safety of his procedures for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and high-risk identification friend or foe (IFF) year, which should have told the jets that the helicopters were friendly. U.S. officials were at a loss to explain why, despite those measures, the F-15 pilots still believed they were engaging the first Iraqi helicopters over to penetrate that far north into the newly won zone and the first Iraqi aircraft to cross the 35th parallel that marks the southern border of the exclusion zone in a year.

"There were half a dozen procedures we have in place," said Defense Secretary William Perry. "Any one of them, if they had been working, could have prevented this accident... They didn’t have to all operate. Just one or two of them to operate, and this accident would not have happened."

The helicopters were assigned to the 9th Battalion, 108th Aviation Regiment based in Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and were on a mission to assist U.S. forces in northern Iraq. The F-15s were from the 33rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base.

Coalition fighters had flown 2,500 sorties over western Iraq in the three-year history of the no-fly zone, and Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview, there had been 1,400 civilian helicopters in missions similar to that of April 14.

"Throughout the cruise, the same procedures that were essentially in place (April 14) when this tragic accident occurred," Shalikashvili said.

"The procedures were not being followed exactly as they should have been," he said. "The pilots were not following the standard operating procedure for engaging helicopters.

"There were half a dozen procedures we have in place," said Defense Secretary William Perry. "Any one of them, if they had been working, could have prevented this accident... They didn’t have to all operate. Just one or two of them to operate, and this accident would not have happened."

Comparing the Hind and the Black Hawk
The Iraqi Hind and the U.S. Black Hawk are not considered visually similar, but the downed American helicopters had wing-mounted fuel tanks similar to those on the Hind. However, the American helicopters are green while Iraqi helicopters are tan and green on top and light blue on the bottom.

MI-24 Hind

| SIZE: 70 ft. 6.5 in. long (incl. rotors) |
| 13 ft. 5 in. high |
| 5 ft. 7 in. wide |
| SPEED: 183 mph |
| MISSION: Gunship with transport capability |

UH-60 Black Hawk

| SIZE: 64 ft. 10 in. long (incl. rotors) |
| 16 ft. 10 in. high |
| 7 ft. 9 in. wide |
| SPEED: 252 mph |
| MISSION: Utility and transport |

Two services, linked in grief — once again

By Yago Muradian

WASHINGTON — Not again. For the second time within a month, the Air Force and the Army have been involved in a horrendous accident. The first recent one, April 14, claimed 26 lives — 15 of them Americans.

The first tragedy, at Pope Air Force Base near Fayetteville, N.C., March 23, killed 23 Army paratroopers and injured more than 80.

Thirty-eight U.S. service members died in the two incidents, in nearly one quarter of the 146 killed in combat during the Persian Gulf War.

In the wake of the April 14 shooting down of two Army UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters by a pair of F-15 Eagle fighters, the services again plunged into mourning, while military and Pentagon officials launched yet another investigation into the mystery of the tragedy.

Missiles suspended

In response to the incident, Defense Secretary William Perry ordered a one-week suspension of fighter missions, which ended April 16, a Pentagon spokesman said.

Also, Perry said there was an immediate change made to procedures in the no-fly zone, although he would not give details of the change for security reasons.

The F-15 pilots said they had shot down a pair of Iraqi Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters according to senior military officials.

The accident most likely was caused by a failure to communicate by either verbal or electronic means by mechanical, human or procedural causes. This is where possible

The Army helicopters may be

See CRASH page 12

Coverage guide

Tragedy strikes despite precautions

WASHINGTON — The fate of 14 combined Task Force 1-442 soldiers flying in northern Iraq on the day the F-15 pilots shot down a pair the previous day is in detail as the result of a mission gone wrong, according to Lt. Gen. Richard Kepner, U.S. European Command chief of staff.

On April 13, the briefing was given to the crews of the 24 high-performance jets, one of which, the 30th Airborne Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) early warning radar and one Army Black Hawk helicopters that were involved in the following day’s mission, he said.

"The day before, you would get all the aircraft in place, you would brief the plan, you would indicate who was going to be where and, you would discuss altitude, safety, frequency and the things that would have you conduct a safe mission, and also sweep the radar zone to see if there had been any violations in there," Kepner said.

He spoke April 14 via telephone to a roomful of reporters at the Pentagon.

Black Hawk flights to Kirkush Village once on "probably half of the days of the month," he said, and the procedures typically vary little from mission to mission.

An Air Force AWACS plane, which can track every aircraft across hundreds of miles of airspace, was in the air monitoring the radar zone when the incident occurred, Kepner said.

Kepner said the F-15's "were not as close to the AWACS as they should have been, and the pilots were not aware that there were any Hinds in the area.

In addition, Kepner noted, "Weather conditions were reported to be good," and the F-15 pilots visually identified the helicopters as Iraqi Hinds, making two passes, before engaging them.

While the Soviet-built Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter and the Black Hawk utility helicopter are not typically considered visually similar, an Army source said that when a Black Hawk is carrying external fuel tanks, as the two over northern Iraq were April 14, then "depending on the angle of the aircraft," and a Black Hawk can look very similar from the rear.

However, the Black Hawks were painted dark green, according to a Pentagon press release, whereas Iraqi Hinds typically have a camouflage pattern of tan and olive green on top, with a light blue belly, said Washington-based military analyst David Lauer.

Kepner emphasized that the Black Hawks were flying more than one village in northern Iraq, and would periodically land, thus dropping off the AWACS radar screen while they were on the ground.

"It is not as if Black Hawk is in the air the entire time," he said. "He may stay up an hour or two hours with the village, (then) come back up in the air.

"The incident was significant in that it's going to result in a suspension of missions," Kepner said.

"The requirement was that he should immediately make radio contact and squawk the AWACS so that he’s under positive control, and then continue his mission," he said.

Squawk contact refers to the coded messages sent out by the helicopters’ IFP equipment.

See SAFETY next page

See SAFETY next page
Human error behind Black Hawk:

The investigation into the April 14 accidental shooting of two Army Black Hawk helicopters over northern Iraq uncovered a myriad of command failures and errors in procedure that led to the tragedy. Many were particular to Operation Provide Comfort and already have been corrected. Others were considered to extend beyond the operation to similar missions worldwide.

The Pentagon’s remit for them.

Problem: Personnel connected to the incident had a list of their roles and the role of their organization in the Joint Task Force conducting Operation Provide Comfort.

Remedy: The Pentagon is directing its commanders in chief (CINCs) worldwide to review their Joint Task Force operations to ensure they are conducted in accordance with Joint Staff procedures and that the CINCs, in turn, establish a program of regular oversight of their Joint Task Force operations; and the Joint Staff will review the curricula at all relevant military schools to ensure organization, procedures and operations receive proper emphasis. In late July, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Shalikashvili will hold conference of all the Joint Chiefs and CINCs to discuss actions being taken to prevent such accidents.

Problem: F-15 pilots were not integrated properly, resulting in F-15 pilots being unaware that Army Black Hawks were flying close to them.

Remedy: Shalikashvili has directed his staff to write new doctrine for air operations "between joint forces, to be completed before Oct. 5. It will be incorporated into all relevant training and operations.

Problem: The F-15s’ Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) failed to alert the jet pilots that the helicopters they could see were friendly.

Remedy: Shalikashvili is directing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to expedite the delivery of new IFF systems and to report back to him by Sept. 30. In a July memo to Defense Secretary William Perry, Shalikashvili requested that the Pentagon work to "agree on technology development and acquisition actions to remedy this deficiency."

The Pentagon also plans to re-emphasize training in the operation of IFF systems, and in their limitations.

When interviewed by investigators, two AWACS personnel refused to answer any questions on the advice of their lawyers, and a third declined to answer "two or three questions," An Andreas said.

He added the fact that the four crucial minutes of the videotape taken inside the AWACS during the embarrassing moment were taped over by a crew member shortly after the incident.

"The board found no evidence indicating the tape-over was deliberate," Andreas said, adding that the service member who recorded over the tape "had not been part of the incident sequence."

However, Perry said he believed that the matter warranted further review, and had directed Air Force Maj. John Lob, chief of the Air Combat Command, "to determine whether any administrative or disciplinary action is appropriate."
This Week

Lead F-15 pilot feared Iraqi trap

Says he ‘was positive’ he saw enemy copters; partly blames wingman

By Vago Muradian
Times staff writer

TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. — The lead pilot of the two Air Force F-15 fighters that shot down two Army helicopters over Iraq on April 14 said he thought he was being lured into an Iraqi trap.

Capt. Eric Wickson said he and his wingman, Lt. Col. Randy May, were certain that the downed UH-60 Black Hawks were Iraqi Hind helicopters.

Lawyers present defense

Wickson, from the 53rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, testified Oct. 19 at a pretrial hearing that was convened to determine whether five officers aboard an Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS, plane should be tried for dereliction of duty in the deaths of the 26 people aboard the helicopters, including an Air Force lieutenant. Wickson has been granted immunity in return for his testimony.

But May faces 26 counts of negligent homicide and two counts of dereliction of duty in the deaths and is scheduled to face a similar pretrial hearing beginning Nov. 7 at Sembach Air Base, Germany. Wickson also is expected to testify there.

In his testimony, Wickson said he and May both made mistakes.

He said he thought the helicopters were being used as a lure to set him and May up for an attack by Iraqi fighters.

Wickson said neither he nor May, who were flying out of Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey, was told that friendly aircraft would be operating in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

The encounter began when Wickson and May spotted something on their radars 50 miles away while flying at an altitude of about 27,000 feet.

If [Lt.] Col. May had any doubt on his mind then it was his responsibility to say something.

— Capt. Eric Wickson
Lead F-15C Eagle pilot

At about 11:22 a.m. local time Wickson locked his radar on a target 40 miles to the southeast and interrogated it with his Identification, Friend or Foe equipment, which should have gotten an automatic positive response from friendly aircraft. He received no reply, he said.

When the fighters reported the contacts, the AWACS crew reported that it had intermittent radar contact with something in the same area. Because the AWACS did not tell him anything else, Wickson said he assumed that the command plane also was unsure what the contacts were.

As the planes closed in on the helicopters, Wickson tried unsuccessfully to contact them with his IFF equipment six more times over the next eight minutes.

He said he used his IFF one final time “out of habit” to confirm the identity of the helicopters before firing. He didn’t use an encrypted frequency used by all aircraft in the no-fly zone because “I didn’t have time,” he said.

After seeing the helicopters, he vacillated between identifying them as Hind attack helicopters and Hip transports, according to testimony. After he checked an aircraft identification guide he felt certain they were Hinds. He said his conclusion was confirmed by May.

‘Four eyes are better than two’

“I was positive I saw Hinds,” he said. “But four eyes are better than two. . . . I don’t remember [May’s] radio call, but he specifically confirmed they were Hinds.”

Wickson fired first, downing the trailing helicopter with an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. Seconds later May fired an AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking missile at the lead helicopter. After the shot down, May said that he was not certain that the helicopters were Iraqi Hinds, Wickson testified. But he said May should have said something before opening fire.

“If [Lt.] Col. May had any doubt on his mind then it was his responsibility to say something,” Wickson said. About 30 seconds after making what he and May thought was a positive visual identification of the helicopters, they shot down both aircraft. One hour after the shot down, Wickson heard a call from the AWACS on the emergency frequency asking the helicopters to report their position.

“I became very nervous,” Wickson said. “It gave me a very bad feeling; it was the first inkling I got” that something was wrong. But in Turkey, their squadron mates surrounded Wickson and May and congratulated them on their victory. A few hours later the euphoria wore off. The two were kept in a room for five hours before they were officially told they had shot down friendly helicopters.

But they already had heard the news.

“We found out we had shot down Black Hawks from CNN,” he said.

Unhappy about pay

Many military people want more, survey says

So far, the Clinton administration has not earned many accolades for its proposals on military compensation. The administra-

In different worlds

More officers than NCOs are content, poll finds
APPENDIX C

CAPTAIN ROCKWOOD ARTICLES
American Officer's Mission
For Haitian Rights Backfires

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

FORT DRUM, N.Y., May 11 — An Army officer who took the words of the nation's Commander in Chief to heart and went off on his own in search of human-rights violations among Haitian penitentiary inmates faced a court-martial today with his career and his conscience on the line.

A panel of five fellow officers sat in judgment of the odd, passionate case of Capt. Lawrence P. Rockwood, a fourth-generation military man who talked his way alone into the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince last year during the multinational Haitian incursion in a zealous and unauthorized search for abused political prisoners.

His one-man mission, intercepted before he could complete it, has ruined his 15-year career and left him facing a possible 10 years in prison. But as he took the stand this morning, the captain defended his belief in conscience, a belief that was bolstered, he emphasized, by his soldier-father, who took him as a boy to the Dachau concentration camp in Germany and taught him about the individual soldier's duty to human rights over rote obedience.

"He explained why these things exist in the world," Captain Rockwood told the tribunal here in a simple barracks courthouse.

"What happened there was the

Continued on Page A24, Column 4

Capt. Lawrence P. Rockwood at Fort Drum, N.Y., on Wednesday.
An Officer's Rights Mission Backfires

Continued From Page A1

result of cynicism and blind obedience," he said, speaking of Dachau. He justified his prison adventure by invoking international law and President Clinton's stated concern for "stopping brutal atrocities" as a main motive for the military intervention in Haiti that began Sept. 19.

Platoons of soldiers, on their way to the port of Milot on an orderly cadence this morning as the captain faced charges of leaving his assigned post and ignoring orders. In the view of the Army, Captain Rockwood was a military intelligence specialist who was in Haiti with a separate agenda and a loaded rifle when he scalped the fence of his base on the night of Sept. 30 and found his way to the national prison announcing that he was there to inspect it for prisoner abuses.

Back at the base, his superiors in the 10th Mountain Division found a note on the captain's bunk. "I can no longer function in the U.S. forces," it read in part. "I'm going to do my job and you can court-martial my dead body."

Captain Rockwood's defense is that he needed too well the words of Mr. Clinton. The 36-year-old officer said he acted on his own after he was rebuffed in various attempts at going through the chain of command and found the military too preoccupied with protecting its own invasion force to attend properly to the human rights abuses in Haiti.

"The chain of command had cowardly failed to carry out the primary objective of the Commander in Chief," the captain firmly insisted, saying he had to act. "It felt it was my duty."

Prosecution witnesses characterized the intense, articulate officer as "misdirected and dangerous" in shouting demands for human-rights investigations at superiors and "pushing his nose" at the Army, as Capt. Charles Pede, the Army's trial counsel, put it.

"He said he was going to complete Bill Clinton's mission," Capt. John Gorley, a psychiatric nurse, testified as prosecution witnesses presented a tape of "Captain Rockwood's" as an obsessed, distraught officer.

The captain countered that he had carefully gathered intelligence information from a number of sources and was convinced that political prisoners faced torture and murder in the Port-au-Prince prison, long a target of criticism by human-rights monitors.

"I felt human life would be lost," he said, arguing that the Army was required to take action under international law. Hours before his prison adventure, the captain had accused his own command of dereliction in a written complaint to the Inspector General of the Army. It was "a career-terminating move," Captain Rockwood said. The captain edged toward sarcasm in denouncing military officials for "pandering" but when Capt. Pede asked whether he claimed broad authority to selectively reject or re-interpret orders.

"I am personally responsible for carrying out international law," Capt. Rockwood replied. "That is the Nuremberg Principles. Under the Nuremberg Principles, established by the Allies after World War II, a crime against world law can be subject to punishment, heads of state can be held responsible, and obeying orders does not exempt subordinate officers when there is the possibility of a moral choice.

"The prosecution objected repeatedly to the attempts by the captain's lawyer, former Attorney General Ramsey Clarks, to focus on reports from international monitoring groups that the Port-au-Prince prison was noxious, with up to 65 percent of the inmates incarcerated for political opposition, not crimes.

"The captain's certainty that the prison was the scene of torture and murder was not borne out by one defense witness, Col. Michael Sullivan, a military police officer who visited the prison on an authorized visit soon after Captain Rockwood. "I saw no signs of physical torture or abuse," the colonel declared while testifying that the living conditions were miserable and subhuman, like those in much of Haiti, and deserved the attention of relief agencies.

Captain Rockwood insisted that throngs of political prisoners in Port-au-Prince were at heightened risk as Haiti's despotic de facto regime was on the verge of collapse, a point supported by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, a private advocacy group. To superiors' claims that no intelligence reports of prison abuse in Port-au-Prince were ever received, Captain Rockwood insisted that the Army never sought them out in the first place.

"I was aware that you are not allowed to walk on the grass to stop a rape," he said in an interview before he took the stand, referring to the Army's rules for actions soldiers could take against Haitians. He said at the time he rated the court-martial risk as negligible in the face of the obligation he sensed by law and family tradition.

The trial presented a crosscurrent of military and human values, with Mr. Clark's laxmoe, sharp-edged interrogation a counterpoint to the terseness and crisp uniforms and endless "sir's" of the military witnesses. The presiding judge, Lieut. Col. Robert Newberry, showed an ease hand and wry demeanor. At one point he gently sought to establish "a "vulgarity spectrum" of words rated bad by one witness to see if the defendant, hailed by friends as a dedicated and insouciant believer in Buddha, could actually have used a traditional Army explicate in denouncing the high command.

The ghosts of old and new armies seemed on trial, too. Prosecution witnesses hailed Operation Uphold Democracy, the military name for the Haitian incursion, as a great success under difficult post-Cold War circumstances. But the defense insisted the history of World War II atrocities and the My Lai massacre in Vietnam as agonizing milestones pointing to the primacy of Captain Rockwood's conscience under the conditions he sensed in Haiti.

Once he was inside the prison, the Haitian authorities summoned help from the United States Embassy. A military attaché, Maj. Roland S. Lane, told the court that he arrived to find a self-righteous and self-righteous capitan holding a loaded weapon and "trying to take action into his own hands" during a "fragile" period of transition in Haiti.

"I thought, 'This could really turn nasty,'" the major testified, adding that Captain Rockwood was "unstable" in fluctuating from calmness to shouting rages and demanding the right to check on prisoners' conditions. The captain was eventually talked into unlocking the weapon and obeying an order to leave the prison.

He was taken to an Army hospital for a psychiatric examination and was cleared as healthy. But was accused of leaving the hospital without authorization after he went back to his barracks.

"He's a soft person, a gentle person," Mr. Clark said in discussing the captain's excited state when confronting superiors. "He became upset because he knew if he went home his work would be severely damaged."

His commander, Lieut. Col. Frank Bragg, testified that Captain Rockwood was "shouting and had a contemptuous attitude after he returned from the prison. Colonel Bragg said he repeatedly ordered the officer to be silent and "shut up," but the captain shouted, "I'm an American officer. I'm not a Nazi officer and I want a full accounting of human-rights abuses."

Captain Rockwood told the court what he meant was that, under international law, "there are limitations to military authority and I thought any educated officer realized that."

Contradicting the defense, Colonel Bragg said Army regulations specifically barred counterintelligence specialists like Captain Rockwood and himself from investigating possible prison atrocities. Major Lane said officials from the State Department and the Justice Department, not from the Army, had prison responsibilities in the Haiti operation.

Rather than worrying about man-rights abuses in prison, Colonel Bragg said, the defendant should have been worrying about protecting his fellow soldiers by tracing arms caches and "getting the bad guys off the streets."

Captain Rockwood's main goal lately has been obtaining the fullest possible hearing of his cause, which he opposed prosecution attempts to drop one charge of conduct unbecoming an officer, a charge that his lawyers say is crucial to his ability to explain his motives and, if necessary, appeal to international forums for relief.

In his hospital examination a day after the prison visit, Captain Rockwood was found healthy by Maj. Dean Inouye, an Army psychiatrist, who said the captain lightly amended the words of Henry David Thoreau in commenting on his own behavior: "I usually march to the beat of a different drummer but yesterday I was probably a step out of beat."
Army officer says allegations influenced panel

FORT DRUM, N.Y. (AP) — A captain dismissed from the Army says a court-martial panel spared him prison time for making an unauthorized inspection of a Haitian prison to defuse his allegations against his superiors.

"They want this story and the allegations against their criminal negligence to go away," Capt. Lawrence Rockwood said Sunday after he was sentenced to dismissal. "By sending me to prison, those allegations would not go away. It was not their ideals that motivated them. It was their lack of moral courage."

The court-martial panel convicted the 15-year veteran late Saturday on four of five charges stemming from his Sept. 30 investigation of reported abuses at the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince.

Prosecutor Charles Pede, who sought prison time, called the sentence "a fair result for the Army and the accused."

Rockwood, a 15-year veteran, said he planned to appeal.

"I am not relieved," he told reporters outside court. "The most serious penalty I was facing was dismissal. I am a soldier. It is my profession. It is my vocation, so I am not relieved by this sentence whatsoever."

The panel of five officers also ordered the loss of all pay and benefits, despite instructions from Chief Circuit Judge Lt. Col. Robert Newberry that Rockwood could lose only two-thirds of his pay if he wasn't sentenced to prison.

Maj. Gen. David Meade, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, will take up the discrepancy when he reviews the verdict. He can dismiss the verdict or reduce the penalty. The review could take several months.
APPENDIX D

HAITI ARTICLES
**HAITIAN POLICE CRUSH RALLY AS AMERICAN TROOPS WATCH**

**ARISTIDE PROTESTS**

Exiled Leader Denies U.S. Disarm Forces of Military Junta

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.

WASHINGTO | Sept. 29 — The government of Haiti said it will not act as Haiti's police, despite the military leadership's efforts to disarm the American forces. The last-minute accord negotiated by Jimmy Carter, which left the Haitian military in place for the time being, was forced to rely on the Pentagon to rewire its mission and put American troops in the field on its own. The accord was signed to prevent a downtown massacre by the Haitians' forces they had been planning to fight.

The accord, issued by the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the white House today that the United States should disarm the Haitian forces, who are engaging their supporters and American troops. Father Aristide's aides said: (Page 1)

Mr. Aristide's general counsel, Mr. Kouchakian, said there was a risk that "we in the United States" would see an occupying army supporting the Haitian military "in a way that is multi-national," he said, adding that the accord did not address the need to disarm the American forces.

The violence on the streets and the diplomatic wrangling between Fruge Aristide and the White House show the fragility of the situation. Aristide's forces continue to pour into towns unopposed. In the face of recurrent reports of American patience, he has appealed to the Congress to consider the accords as a whole. Fruge last week, he said, would be "frustrated." He said he had not been able to communicate effectively with the Haitian government.

Despite Role as Negotiator, Carter Feels Unappreciated

**Atlanta, Sept. 29 — Every time that he has helped make United States foreign policy, even now that he is stepping off the war in the Congo, Jimmy Carter still gets that looked-for feeling from the Clinton Administration.**

The worst of it, he says, is that his ploy is not working. Some have been brought into the State Department, Warren Christopher, a man once called "the finest public servant I ever have known."

"I've been here and I've got this big, "he said today, sitting in his office at the Carter Center. "We've been working on this thing for over a year."

The people are working with the communists, with the Haitian military. We should recognize that we are in a much, much stronger position today.

A coconut vendor lay in the street yesterday after a Haitian police officer clubbed him to death near the docks of Port-au-Prince.

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**Song Favorites, Dies at 88**

By ELEANOR BLAU

Julie Styne, the versatile, prolific songwriter whose tunes became standards and whose work as a producer of such classic Broadway musicals as "Gypsy," "The Sound of Music" and "Hello, Dolly!" died yesterday at Mount Sinai Hospital in Manhattan. He was 88.

Known in Hollywood as "the script whisperer," he was one of the most successful producers and composers of the golden age of Broadway. His work included over 200 songs, many of which became hits. He wrote the music for "Hello, Dolly!" and "Do-Re-Mi" from "The Sound of Music."