NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE:
A VIABLE OPTION FOR THE CINC?

CAN THE RESERVES REALLY BE INTEGRATED?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Naval Reserve Force.

Signature:

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The Naval Reserve Force: A Viable Option for the CINC

Abstract: This paper examines the relevancy of the Naval Reserve Force as an operational option for the CINC's. The entering position is that the Naval Reserve Force is relevant, and as such provides the CINC with an extremely valuable option for dealing with both peacetime and wartime operational contingencies. The overarching caveat, however, and the thesis of the paper, is that in order to really integrate the Naval Reserve Force into the planning processes, the CINC must have a sound appreciation for the structure, capability and accessibility of the Naval Reserve Force, as well as its strategic culture.
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ABSTRACT of
The Naval Reserve Force: A Viable Option for the CINC?

This paper examines the relevancy of the Naval Reserve Force as an operational option for the unified Commanders in Chiefs (the CINC's). The entering position is that the Naval Reserve Force is a relevant force, and as such it provides the CINC with an extremely valuable option for dealing with both peacetime and wartime operational contingencies. The overarching caveat, however, and the THESIS of this paper, is that in order to really integrate the Naval Reserve Force into the planning processes, the CINC, and his staff, must have a sound appreciation for the structure, capability and accessibility of the Naval Reserve Force, as well as its strategic culture.

Two major issues are responsible for the fact that a seemingly natural match of requirements and capabilities is often overlooked by the CINC planners. These issues are (1) the different strategic cultures, and (2) the issue of accessibility of the Reserves when needed. The recommendations to deal with these two issues are:

** Placement of TAR and Active Navy billets on each others staffs.

** Increasing the emphasis on the Reserve Components at the service schools.

** Continuing efforts to obtain Congressional approval of the Secretary of Defense 25K call up.

** Advertising to the public and Congress the need for inclusion of Reserves in any major military action.

** Continuing efforts to reduce or eliminate administrative impediments to the use of Reserves during their regular annual drill/training cycle.
"In the post Cold War Era, we want the...reserves to play a more central role in the total force. We want them to play a lager role in a wide range of noncombat missions, and... to join our active forces in combat missions." William Perry, Secretary of Defense.1

"Yet, even with the renewed emphasis on the Reserve Components' roles,...their force structure, and relationship to their respective Active Component remain relatively little understood." COL. William Allen, Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College.2

The difference in these two statements motivated the writing of this paper. Although great strides have been made in the relationships and the interoperability of the Navy's Active and Reserve Components over the last few years, there continues to be some resistance to inclusion of Reserve assets in the planning processes which attempt to meet the CINC's operational wartime and peacetime requirements. I believe this is due to two main factors, a lack of understanding the cultural bias’, and concern over the accessibility of the Reserves. In today's Total Force atmosphere few speak, with attribution, of friction or lack of understanding between the components, and one will not find many documented instances of problems in this regard. Although several articles have been written concerning this same subject as regards the Army, and its two components. Thus the statement made here which portends that there is, at least to some degree, such a lack of understanding and appreciation within the CINC staffs, which tends to inhibit the optimum use of Naval Reserve forces, admittedly must be characterized as a personal opinion. However, based on several years of dealing
with Reserve issues, fielding countless concerns from active duty personnel, and with the unique perspective of a career which has included regular Navy, "Drilling Reserve" and TAR duty assignments, I can assure the reader that this perception is quite prevalent. Such misunderstanding can not help but influence the planned utilization of the Naval Reserve Forces during the CINC's Deliberate and Crisis planning processes, as well as during peacetime contingency planning.

This paper consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 is intended to provide the basic fundamentals of the Naval Reserve program, in the belief that an understanding of these is a prelude to appreciating both the strategic cultures involved, and the issue of accessibility. This chapter provides a brief history of the Naval Reserve, its structure and capabilities, and then matches these capabilities against the typical requirements of the CINC's.

Chapter 2 discusses the two major impediments to real integration of the Active and Reserve Components; cultural bias' and accessibility. Only by capturing, and being able to appreciate, the strategic cultures can all parties deal with the paradigms which inhibit the optimum utilization of available assets.

In Chapter 3 recommendations are provided to deal with the two issues of Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 1

THE FUNDAMENTALS

HISTORY:

To begin, it may be helpful to lay out the fundamentals of the Naval Reserve Force in terms of its legal basis, mission and history. The legal basis is found today in Title 10 US Code Section 261, as amended 9 July 1952. This law established the Naval Reserve with the mission of providing:

"...trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces [in this case the Active Navy], in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as national security requires..."

The following abridged history of the Naval Reserve is paraphrased from the U.S. Department of Defense report, THE FUTURE NAVAL RESERVE: Roles & Missions, Size & Shape. It intended to convey to the reader an appreciation for the growth of the Reserve program within the Navy. Congress first authorized the Naval Reserve in 1916. For most of its history it was merely a pool of former Active Navy personnel. The units were designed and trained to augment Active units in time of war. The Pueblo Crisis of 1968 focused considerable attention on the Naval Reserve. The units recalled were not well trained, and their equipment was not compatible with that deployed in the Active fleet. For example, "no carrier was configured to operate the Naval Reserve F-8 squadrons that were mobilized." Spurred by this event, an overhaul of the force took place from this time and into the 1970's, during which the Naval Reserve was shaped along the
lines of the Active Navy. A few missions areas were placed totally in the Reserves, and commissioned units were organized with their own aircraft, ships or equipment. Unfortunately this equipment was still neither modern, nor yet, compatible with the Active Component. It was during this time that what is colloquially referred to as the "TAR Wars" took place. This being a major effort on the part of one corner of the Active Navy to absorb the Full Time Support (FTS) cadre of the Naval Reserves. Although narrowly defeated, the effort is still considered by many an example of the Active Navy contempt of Reserves. The term TAR refers to the Full Time Support (FTS) cadre of the Navy's Reserve Component, and will be discussed in greater detail latter in this Chapter. With the major expansion of the Armed Forces in the early 1980's Secretary of the Navy John Lehmans "horizontal integration" plan expanded the size of the Naval Reserve, modernized its equipment and incorporated augmentation units into nearly every area of the Navy's operations. With the reductions of the 1990's the Naval Reserve has restructured away from augmentation units towards commissioned units.\textsuperscript{6} The efforts of the 90's to achieve proportional sizing between the Active and Reserve Components reduced the number of Reserve Force ships from 33 in 1993 to 18 in 1994; the number of air squadrons from 51 to 35. Throughout the reductions, to be completed by 1999, the Naval Reserve expects to "remain at approximately 20% of the Navy's total manpower", and to maintain the cost of the Reserve program at approximately 3.4% of the total Navy budget.\textsuperscript{7}
STRUCTURE:

The Naval Reserve Force, like the other Reserve Components, consists of the Ready Reserve, the Stand-by Reserve and the Retired Reserve. For the purposes of this paper, the interest revolves around the Ready Reserve. Within this grouping are the Individual Mobilization Augmentee’s (IMA’s), the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) and the Selected Reserves (Selres). To bound the discussion even farther, the focus here is strictly on the Selected Reserves. This branch consists of the "Drilling Reserves", individuals and units who perform regularly scheduled annual training periods of 48 drills (one weekend/mos.) and two weeks of active duty. The Selected Reserves also include the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) personnel, who form the Navy’s Full Time Support (FTS) cadre for the Reserves. The charter of the TAR program is, as the name implies, to train and administer the Naval Reserve. It is an active duty career program, which is entered by active duty personnel via a Navy wide administrative board conducted bi-annually. The TAR officer career patterns mirror their active duty counter-parts. They compete with their active duty peers in all professional boards, such as Department Head, XO afloat, Commander command and Major Command. TAR enlisted personnel, likewise, advance via Navy-wide exams as the Active Navy enlisted. Current estimates of projected end strength levels in FY 99 are roughly 80,000 Drilling Reserves and 20,000 TAR’s.

The organizational structure of the Naval Reserve Force can be viewed in terms of its command organization, and its types of units. Organizationally the Naval Reserve Force is arranged into three flag
level commands, as shown in Appendix A, B, and C. The Commander, Naval Reserve Force is an Echelon II command directly below the Chief of Naval Operations, and is one of the Navy's Major Claimants. As such it is authorized manpower and financial resources in the same right as Commanders in Chief Naval Forces Atlantic and Pacific are. The Commander, Naval Reserve Force is in practice a dual hat of the Director, Naval Reserve, VCNO (N095), an Active Navy two star. Below this echelon are the Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force and Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, both Echelon III commands, and commanded by a TAR one or two star. While the Director, Naval Reserve is located in the Pentagon, the Commander, Naval Reserve Force staff, as well as Naval Surface and Air Reserve Force staffs, is located in New Orleans, LA. In '94 all three staffs restructured along the lines of the CNO staff with similar N-codes.

Within the Naval Reserve Force are two types of units, commissioned and augment units. Commissioned units comprise about 32 percent of the Selected Reserve. They can, and often do, include both TAR and "Drilling Reserve" members, and are self contained organizations possessing their own major end items of equipment. "These units are structured to mobilize and be functionally independent or deploy alongside AC [Active Component] units. The types of units in this category include ships, aircraft squadrons, construction battalions, cargo handling battalions, mobile inshore undersea warfare units and special boat units". The four Fleet Hospitals belonging the Naval Surface Reserve Force are also commissioned units. Commissioned units are commanded either by Active
or Reserve Component officers. All of these units report their readiness via the same readiness reporting system as the Active commissioned units.

Augmentation units differ primarily in that they are not stand alone units. These are units which augment Active Component units with trained personnel, and are staffed by "Drilling Reserves". Each billet in an augment unit corresponds to an unfunded billet in the parent unit. "Such units are tailored to augment designated ships, the Military Sealift Command, special warfare commands, Marine expeditionary forces, security groups, intelligence staffs, communication and meteorological activities, medical and dental facilities, intermediate maintenance units, shore command and headquarters organization. Their function is to allow for peak operations for an indefinite period of time. They also provide a surge capability and then sustain the high level of activity required to support deployed forces." These units make up the remaining 68 percent of the Selected Reserve.

The operational chain of command for Reserve units varies. Certain units fall under the operational control (OPCON) of the fleet CINC’s. Experience has shown that in many cases this is the optimum arrangement. One outcome of Operation Desert Shield/Storm was to place virtually the entire Reserve Naval Construction Force under the OPCON of CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT. This process involved the transfer of over 18,000 Active and Reserve billets, as well as associated financial resources to the fleet CINC’s. Examples of these units are the Naval Reserve Force Ships, the Craft of Opportunity
(COOP), Explosive Ordnance Disposal units, and Reserve Ship Intermediate Maintenance units. All units maintain an ADCON relationship with Air or Surface Reserve Force.

CAPABILITY:

As the active Navy downsizes, the both the Surface and Air Naval Reserve are realigning to maintain, or assume, various capabilities which have significance in either CONUS or forward presence type missions. In the Surface Reserve, the number and types of Naval Reserve Force ships are changing. Five minesweepers and eight 1052 class Fast Frigates, along with two NRF Landing Ship Tank’s (LST’s) were decommissioned in FY 94. However, beginning in FY 95 the first of the new Minehunters (MHC’s) will join the Reserve fleet as well as projections for two replacement LST’s. These assets will provide continued minesweeping and Marine lift capability within the Naval Reserve Force. Examples of Surface Reserve capability include:

** Provide platforms for support of Naval Reserve divers and underwater rescue and salvage with two Auxiliary, Rescue & Salvage (ARS) vessels.

** Protect sealift, participate in battle group operations, and perform presence operations with 16 modern Guided Missile Frigates (FFG’s).

** Backfill Medical Treatment Facilities with doctors, nurses and corpsmen from augment units. As well as provide combat medical treatment with five Fleet Hospital units.

** Participate in SOF missions with Reserve Seal Teams and Special Boat units.

** Provide a vast array of construction forces.

** Augment major staffs with watch officers, intelligence and administrative aid.

** Provide surface mine countermeasures.
Within the Air Reserve Force one of two carrier air wings was decommissioned in Dec 1994. The remaining wing, besides maintaining its strike capability, has assumed the adversary and Fleet Electronic Warfare training functions for the Navy. As a joint consolidation effort the two Reserve Helicopter Mine Sweeping Squadrons have merged with the two Active squadrons under the operational control of the CINC’s Navy component. These integrated AMCM squadrons fly the new MH-53E helicopter which the Reserves brought to the table. Other capabilities the Naval Air Reserve Force include:

** 100% of the Navy’s C-9 and C-130T airlift capability. These squadrons maintain a forward presence in both the Mediterranean and Western Pacific AOR’s.

** Two maritime patrol wings which provide ocean surveillance and ASW support.

** Augment units for the carriers.

** Strike warfare.

** Helo Strike and Rescue.

** Electronic Warfare and Surveillance.

** Security Group and Intelligence services.

The Naval Reserve Force capabilities are summarized in Appendix D.

THE CINC’s REQUIREMENTS:

Having examined the structure, and capability of the Naval Reserve Force it is worth while to identify the requirements faced by the CINC, and to see how these match the capabilities of the Reserve Force. Many publications and writings have defined these requirements in various ways. *Forward...From the Sea*, refers to four specific areas; C2, Battle Space Dominance, Power Projection and Sustainment. The Total Force 93 War Game, conducted at the Naval War College in
December 1994, identified requirements based on what was defined as the five "Phases" of a Major Regional Conflict. In an attempt to remain loyal to the joint theme, this paper will defer to the wartime requirements as determined by the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment. This assessment is currently considering nine specific areas as wartime missions. These nine areas are listed in Table I as Wartime Requirements. While we correctly think of the CINC as a warfighter, the reality of life requires him to prepare for, and react to not just wartime scenarios, but lesser contingencies as well. As we saw in Panama following Operation Just Cause, the CINC was forced into nation building when it became apparent that he had the only organization capable of meeting the need. Like it or not peacetime requirements exist, and the CINC must plan assets to address them. It may be appropriate to keep in mind the words of the fictional character Horatio Hornblower commenting on his career as an officer in the 19th century British Navy, that in the course of a thirty year career as a Naval officer only six minutes of it had spent been in actual combat. The CINC requirements, including those other than war, have been laid out in Table II. This table shows requirements in terms of three categories: wartime, Quasi wartime and peacetime. The Quasi wartime category of requirements includes requirements not generally thought of as warfighting actions, but which have been shown in recent years to be something that the military will become involved in. The last category of "peacetime requirements" reflects strictly the day to day evolutions which the CINC and his component commanders are involved in.
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**TABLE I: CINC REQUIREMENTS**

These requirements may be placed alongside the capabilities described earlier, as shown in Table 2. As can be seen there is a significant overlap between the CINC requirements and Reserve capabilities.

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**TABLE II: CINC REQUIREMENTS vs RESERVE CAPABILITY**
CHAPTER 2

IMPEDEMENTS TO REAL INTEGRATION

There are two main obstacles which seem to impede the real integration of Active and Reserve Naval forces. These are different strategic cultures, and the issue of accessibility.

STRATEGIC CULTURES:

If we are going to operate together we must understand each other. The strategic culture, or ethos, of the Reserve forces and its Active counter-part play a major role in whether, or not, the Naval Reserve Force is really integrated in the Total Force. It can be gleaned from the previous brief recap of history that, for most of its 79 year history, the Naval Reserve has striven to be a relevant and useful part of the active Navy. However, saddled with outmoded equipment, lack of attention and small size it could hardly claim to be relevant. In the late 1970's and early 1980's this changed radically. The Reserve force today believes that it has come of age, is proud of what has been achieved, tends to resist relinquishing or diluting these gains and most of all recognizes itself as a supplier to the CINC of assets which can be employed in both wartime and peacetime operational events. To quote RADM Hall, Commander, Naval Reserve Force, "All Naval Reserve programs are being restructured to meet the needs of the Active Navy..."13 TAR's consider themselves fleet operators, with operationally current backgrounds, who, have obtained a sub-specialty in Reserve management. This attitude stemming from their similar career patterns, mutual competition with
their Active counter-parts in professional boards, and their assignability to either Active or Reserve ships or squadrons. TAR's will assert that in order to maintain relevancy, absorb budget reductions and to attract quality individuals it is essential to maintain an operational combat capability within the Reserve force. What at one time was referred to as the "Dry TAR", the TAR who became land locked after his/her first division officer tour, is generally a relic of the past. The movement toward operational currency was an outgrowth of the "TAR Wars" referred to earlier and Secretary Lehman's efforts at "horizontal integration". This movement has been significant in two regards. First, the warfighters who manage the Navy's Reserve program understand both the requirements of the Active Component as well as the Reserve. Second, because of the first, there has been a major effort within the last few years to remove those regulatory items which served only to impede the access of Reserves to the fleet.

It would be superficial not address a dichotomy which exists between the strategic culture of the TAR community and that of the "Drilling Reserves". This is an issue which must be addressed between the factions of Reserve community. It is not so much a factor for the CINC to deal with, and is only brought out to add to the overall understanding of the Reserve program. TAR's thinking as operators at times have a tendency to dismiss, and be frustrated by the "Drilling Reserves" much as some accuse the Active Component of doing. The "Drilling Reserves", on the other hand, find it easy to think of TAR's as near active duty individuals who seek to secure their own
perpetuity by incumbering the relationship between themselves [the Reservists] and the Active Navy. In other words, TAR’s and "Drilling Reserves" do not always see eye to eye. The clearest example of this is the debate over whether or not Naval Reserve Force Ships can, or should, deploy. TAR’s see an absolute necessity in these ships working operationally with the active Fleet. This based on the need to secure a place in the CINC planning loops, maintain proficiency of the ships and crew and to ensure viable career patterns for the Reserve community. The "Drilling Reserves" properly see these ships as their training platforms whose purpose is to provide the training required to meet their mobilization readiness requirements. Their point being that if the platform they are assigned to is out of home port they have lost their ability to optimize their training.

Historically, the cultural attitude of the Navy’s Active Component towards the Reserves can be characterized as one somewhere between apathy, suspicion and concern. Apathy in that they [the Reserves] just don’t matter. Suspicion in the sense that the Reserves are trying to siphon off resources that, by rights, belonged to the active Navy. Finally, concern that the Reserve forces would not be accessible if the CINC planned on them. Although Naval Reservists were recalled for World Wars I & II, Korea, the Pueblo Crisis as mentioned earlier, and, most recently, for Desert Shield/Storm, the Naval Reserve Force has typically never been accepted as a full fledged partner. As David Shaver states in his monogram, "To the AC [active] officer, the RC [reserve] officer appears to be political, incompetent or untrained, and independent of [active] absolute
control, which frustrates the [active] officer." During the Persian Gulf War, where over 21,000 Naval Reservists were recalled, no ships augment units or Naval Reserve tactical aviation squadrons were mobilized. Nor, though 100% of the Naval Construction Force regimental headquarters staffs were in the Reserve Component, were any of these units brought to action, even though Reserve Construction Battalions had been recalled. There are many arguments and counter arguments as to why this was so. Most arguments, on either side, have a certain validity to them, however the point is that this typifies a cultural bias which exists between the Active and Reserve Components of the Navy, that support is fine, but don't tread on our combat turf. Although, the gap between extreme positions has dramatically narrowed in the recent past it has not been eliminated. To harken back to the thesis, such bias gives rise to lack of understanding, and with such a lack of understanding it is difficult to make operational decisions, which analyze, allocate and task the Naval Reserve forces in the most efficient and optimum manner.

ACCESSIBILITY:

Accessibility is a difficult issue for both the Naval Reserve Force and the CINC's. It refers to the ability of the Active Navy, the CINC, to overcome the hurdles which must be jumped in order to actually employ the Reserves. If the assets are not accessible to the CINC, it doesn't much matter how capable these are.

This was a major item during both the Total Force 93 Wargame (Dec 94) and the Logistics Wargame (Jan 95) conducted at the Naval War College. Even before these games in September 93, "the Department of
Defense established the Senior Level Working Group on Accessibility to identify major issues in accessing the Reserve Components.\textsuperscript{15}

Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes the following categories:

** Presidential Call-Up for Operational Missions-- commonly referred to as the Presidential 200K Call-Up. This authority allows for the recall of up to 200,000 reservists for 90 days which can be extended for another 90 days, under 10 USC 673b.\textsuperscript{16}

** Partial Mobilization-- expansion of the Armed Forces of not more than one million members of the Ready Reserve. Pursuant to Title 10 USC 673, this authority requires Presidential declaration of a national emergency.\textsuperscript{17}

** Full Mobilization-- gives excess to the total Reserve under Title 10 USC 672a, but requires a declaration of war, or passage of a public law.\textsuperscript{18}

** Total Mobilization-- Creates wholly new forces in addition to the existing force structure under Title 10 USC 672. This action requires the same authority as for Full Mobilization.\textsuperscript{19}

The issue of accessibility was not critical during the Cold War, Naval Reservists were expected to mobilize and deploy quickly, and there was little doubt that they would be available for that purpose. With the passing of the Cold War, and with the historical hesitancy to recall the Reserves for anything less than a major conflict, the concern is that either the Reserves will not be recalled, or, that there will be such a delay in doing so that the initial deployment of Active forces will be impeded. It is not hard to understand the lack of enthusiasm which the CINC's staff may have in inclusion of Reserve forces in their planning process for anything other than major conflicts or total war scenarios.

During a declared national emergency access to the Reserves is hinged to Presidential or Congressional action as explained above. During peacetime this access is governed by myriad of statutory and
policy regulations designed, in theory, to govern the management of the Naval Reserve program. While providing uniform drill accounting, pay and retirement credit procedures, these have ensured bureaucratic simplicity at the expense of making it extremely rigid as regards getting the Reservist out of the Reserve Center, to an Active command.
CHAPTER 3

SO WHAT'S TO BE DONE?

So far this paper has explored the "Fundamentals" of the Naval Reserve Force, in the belief that this will aid in understanding the Reserve program, and hence encourage consideration of its use in planning evolutions. Additionally, two of the major impediments to real integration of Active and Reserve forces in the operational planning processes of the CINC's have been discussed for the same reason. But, what's the answer?

Strategic cultures are difficult to eliminate, if one could even make the case that they should be eliminated. Different strategic cultures and bias' arise out of fundamental differences in origins or purposes of organizations, and as such they add flavor and color to relationships. The aim here should not be to merge the cultures of the Reserve and Active forces, rather it should be to understand and appreciate what each can bring to the table in specific scenarios. To aid in this TAR billets should be established on the Joint and CINC staffs, and likewise, Active duty billets should be positioned on the three major Naval Reserve Component staffs. Although there currently exists TAR billets on most major staffs these are generally found in the N-1 shop (ADMIN) as a Reserve coordinator billet. What is proposed here are TAR billets within the Unified, and their Navy components, staffs in the planning and operations codes. Here Reserve expertise can be applied to both the Deliberate and Crisis Planning processes with that expectation that greater integration can be
achieved. Currently on the three major Reserve Staffs the only Active
duty billets are for designators and rates which are not found in the
TAR communities, such as Medical, Legal and Civil Engineer. No Active
duty perspective currently exists in the planning or operations areas
of these staffs.

The second recommendation for minimizing the detrimental effect
of cultural bias' is improved emphasis on Reserve programs, structures
and capabilities at the service schools. As COL. William Allen
stated, "Never before in peacetime has the United States placed so
much emphasis and reliance on the Armed Forces' Reserve Components."\(^{20}\)
He goes on to say "Yet, even with the renewed emphasis on the Reserve
Components' roles, their...structure and relationship to their
respective Active Component remain relatively little understood."\(^{21}\)
At the Naval War College, a truly great institution in every other
respect, for example, approximately ten hours of course study,
slightly less than half of which is instructed by subject matter
experts in formal lectures, is devoted the structures, capabilities
and cultures of the Active Components. At the same time a maximum of
one and a half hours are dedicated to discussion of the Reserve
Components, in informal seminar setting.\(^{22}\) Such a lack of emphasis
makes it difficult to bridge rooted cultural bias' amongst the Navy's
future leaders.

The issue of accessibility, as stated in Chapter 2, is a
difficult one. Admittedly the CINC's must have a high degree of
assurance that the Reserve forces they plan on will be available.
Several recommendations can be offered here. First, is the often
talked about Secretary of Defense 25K call up. A recommendation of the ACCESSIBILITY OF RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES study conducted by the Department of Defense, calls for Sec Def authority to recall up to 25,000 Reservists to support initial deployment of forces.\textsuperscript{23} The theory being that this authority would be easier to initiate than the Presidential 200K call up. Congress has yet to approve this authority. A second recommendation is to initiate a public information campaign to inform the public, and Congress, of the need to call up Reserves in conjunction with any sizable military action. This would attack the presumption that a Presidential call up brings a negative public reaction. If the public is braced and prepared for such action it could be anticipated that the reaction would be supportive rather than unsupportive. The final recommendation on the accessibility issue deals with accessibility during peacetime. The old rules which inhibited such Reserve access must be reviewed. This process has actually been underway within the Naval Reserve Force for the last few years. To quote RADM Hall once more, "...we must change the way we do business. We must think beyond old paradigms of how we do our jobs."\textsuperscript{24} Progress has been made in reducing obstacles such as geography, administrative requirements, citizen sailor job demands, and fiscal limits to increase the accessibility of Reserves to meet active duty operation tempos. Some of these initiatives are:

** Funding for Special Active Duty (ADT) days has been decentralized from Naval Reserve Force to the CINC's.

** Flexible drilling which combines monthly and quarterly drills with annual training in various combinations now provides the ability to train or utilize the Reservist for periods longer than two weeks.
** Major reorganization of Surface Reserve Force staff has eliminated the "middleman" in approving most Reserve training evolutions.\textsuperscript{25}

So successful have these initiatives been, that the question now in regards to peacetime support is not so much is the Reservist accessible but is he available.\textsuperscript{26}
SUMMARY

In summary, the Naval Reserve Force is a operational option for the CINC, and it is possible to fully integrate the Navy’s Active and Reserve Components. What must be done is to ask, and answer three questions:

(1) **What is the issue?** Two issues exist: a lack of understanding and appreciation the Reserve force structure, capabilities and strategic culture, and the question of whether or not the Reserves will be accessible if planned on.

(2) **Why is this a issue?** A lack of understanding impedes the planned utilization of the Reserve forces during the CINC’s Deliberate and Crisis planning processes as well as during peacetime contingency planning, and lack of assured access prevents consideration of the Reserve forces as a viable option.

(3) **How can the issue be addressed?** Recommendations provided in the previous chapter can be summarized as:

** Increase Reserve and Active integration by placing TAR billets on the Unified and component command staffs and adding active Navy billets to the major Reserve Staffs.

** Increasing the emphasis on the Reserve Component structures, capabilities, and strategic culture at the service schools.

** Continuing efforts to obtain Congressional approval of the Secretary of Defense 25K call up.

** Advertising to the public and Congress the need for inclusion of Reserves in any major military action.

** Continuing efforts on the part of the Reserve Force to reduce or eliminate administrative impediments to the use of Reserves during their regular annual drill/training cycle.
APPENDIX A

THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATION

Director, Naval Reserve/Commander, Naval Reserve Force

Deputy, Commander Naval Reserve Force

Chief of Staff

DCOS Plans/Training  DCOS Manpower  DCOS Logistics  DCOS Information Systems  DCOS Financial Management  DCOS Facilities

A-1
APPENDIX B

THE NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE

Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force

Deputy, Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force

Chief of Staff

DCOS Manpower  DCOS Logistics  DCOS Plans  DCOS Operations  DCOS Maintenance  DCOS Financial Management
APPENDIX C

THE NAVAL AIR RESERVE FORCE

Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force

Deputy, Commander Naval Air Reserve Force

DCOS Manpower  DCOS Facilities  DCOS Flight Programs  DCOS Maintenance  DCOS Financial Management  DCOS Training
NAVAL RESERVE FORCE CAPABILITIES

Data as of 30 September 1993
NOTES


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. p. 5.


8. Heller, pg. 34.


17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid.


23. Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces, p. iii.


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