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FORCE XXI,
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY AND JOINT OPERATION:
ARE THEY IN SYNC?

BY

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FORCE XXI, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY, AND JOINT OPERATIONS: ARE THEY IN SYNC?

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ABSTRACT

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Force XXI is the process of changing the current industrial age Army into the information age Army of the twenty-first century. This paper examines two questions about Force XXI. First, is Force XXI grounded in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy of the United States? Second, since one of the three components of the National Military Strategy involves fighting as a joint force, how well is the Army doing at building a joint-capable twenty-first century Army? Based on an examination of the Force XXI literature and working documents, as well as conversations with proponent Force XXI directorates, the author concludes that Force XXI is well grounded in the national strategy of the United States, but that while the Army’s intent is to build a truly joint-capable Force XXI Army, the mechanisms and process to do so are not fully in place. The author ends with four recommendations based on his examination.
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INTRODUCTION

After observing the performance of the United States Army in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, one cannot escape the conclusion that the Army is the best on the planet. The Army is the nation's force for conducting prompt and sustained land combat, and along with the other services provides the nation with the ability to employ its might in support of national policy. As obvious as the stunning victory in the Gulf War, it is equally obvious today that the world has changed dramatically, and will continue to do so. The Army recognized this and is in the process of changing also: this process is called Force XXI.

The literature and Army publications state that Army doctrine is the engine of change, that how the Army fights ought to and does drive how the Army changes. This makes sense and follows logically. In the last ten years, however, America and the world have experienced profound political, economic, and technological developments of such magnitude and in such rapid succession that fundamental change has been forced upon it. All aspects of society have likewise been affected, including the Army. The real drivers of recent change in the Army are threefold: a changing world order, diminishing resources that are stretched to the limit, and the power of the computer and microprocessor. The Army has realized that it must change, take maximum advantage of the new technology, and that the nation has fewer resources and must respond to an increasingly wider array of threats in the world. These are the true drivers of change.
within the Army, the motivation behind Force XXI. This is both evolutionary and revolutionary thought.

The process of changing the Army, Force XXI, is in motion: in the words of Army briefers the Army is "moving out." Indeed, Force XXI has been embedded into the structure and inner workings of the Army. Recognizing that Force XXI is a work in progress, the intent of this paper is to answer two key questions. The first is as the Army launches on this massive and significant effort of change, is it doing so with its basis for change firmly grounded in the National Security and National Military Strategy of the United States? The second question stems from a component of the National Military Strategy which states that when called upon to fight and win the nation's wars, the military will fight as a joint force. Therefore, if the Army is to operate successfully in a joint environment with the other services, how well is it doing at building a joint-capable Force XXI? After answering these two questions, the paper concludes with four recommendations.

GROUND IN STRATEGY?

America's Cold War "...military strategy of flexible response and forward defense" worked, and it "won" the Cold War. But in light of the changing world situation, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan stated "One can safely predict that the United States will continue to hold a broad range of interests, and that, accordingly, its leaders will continue to
demand a ready-at-hand capability not only for traditional forms of warfare, but also humanitarian and peacekeeping missions."\textsuperscript{4} The United States National Security Strategy echoes this idea, revealing that "Our [America's] engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference."\textsuperscript{5} In addition, the recently published National Military Strategy articulates a strategy of "...flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment."\textsuperscript{6} Thus, both strategic documents emphasize selected engagement with the resources of the country to further America's interests.

Writing well before the publication of the either of these documents, General Sullivan anticipated an upcoming shift in America's strategic and military engagement, from one of major land conflict to "... preventing -and responding to- regional threats against national interests...[and] from an emphasis on the military element of national power to a more balanced concern with all three elements of national power-political, military, and economic,"\textsuperscript{7} and finally "...from containing a monolithic ideological adversary to broadening the democratic community of nations."\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, the accuracy of General Sullivan's writing is borne out by President Clinton's three national security objectives of enhancing America's security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{9} The Army Chief of
Staff also wrote that the nation will call upon the Army, often with short notice, for missions that are "... only peripherally related to the Army's ethos of sustained land combat"\textsuperscript{10}, in other words operations other than war (OOTW). General Sullivan was correct, for in the National Security Strategy description of how America will maintain and enhance its security, one reads that "...our forces must prepare to participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives."\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, the National Military Strategy lists as its three central strategic components "...peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars."\textsuperscript{12} General Sullivan, the conceptualizer and architect of Force XXI, is clearly of the same mind with the National Command Authority in understanding the strategic interests and objectives of the United States and the way military force will be used to further these interests.

Force XXI's grounding in the national strategy of our nation is further articulated in a document and program called The Army Plan (TAP), the purpose of which is to provide direction to the Army's programming and budgeting effort. TAP also summarizes the National Military Strategy and security policy for the Army.\textsuperscript{13} Section III of the TAP covers Strategy Planning Guidance, beginning with national interests and objectives as identified in the National Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the TAP sets the vision which supports Force XXI, outlines the Force XXI Campaign Plan, and conceptually programs sufficient resources to support
Force XXI. Thus, from the guidance of the Army Chief of Staff to the structure of and resources targeted to the implementation of Force XXI, there is a clear and decisive link to the National Security and Military Strategy of the United States.

Thus with the motivation and strategy for change well grounded in the national strategy of the United States, how does the Army plan to go about this process? If change is indeed upon the Army, how will the Army effect this change? Impressively, the Army has decided to attempt to shape and control the process of change, to act rather than react, and to attempt to harness the process rather than simply ride the waves. This process, and the Army that will emerge from it in the early twenty-first century, is called Force XXI.

**FORCE XXI "IN A NUTSHELL"**

The Army Chief of Staff has articulated four specific and enduring roles for the Army: compel enemies to do America’s will, deter aggression through strength, reassure allies, and support citizens at home. In light of these roles, the Army of the future must be more lethal, survivable, deployable, and capable of increased joint and combined connectivity [operations]. The office responsible for coordinating and structuring the future Army is The Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, or LAM, located in Ft Monroe, Virginia. LAM was conceived in 1991, put in place in 1992, and assumed responsibility for Force XXI in July 1994. Figure 1 depicts the campaign plan for Force XXI.
Force XXI is taking place within the context of a true Revolution in Military Affairs, succinctly defined by Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Deutch:

A revolution in military affairs...involves the synergistic incorporation of new technologies in military systems, innovative operational concepts, and organizational adaptation within the armed forces that fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.¹⁹

As has already been stated, Force XXI is grounded in America’s national strategy. It is also soundly based in Army doctrine, especially Field Manual 100-5 Operations, and the concept for Force XXI is outlined in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations.²⁰ Thus Force XXI is shown in the figure as operating from a base of both strategy and doctrine.

Three axes, a main effort and two supporting efforts, make up the heart of the Force XXI campaign plan. The Joint Venture Axis, the main effort, concerns the redesign of the Operational or TOE Army and is managed by the Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, with the Director of the Joint Venture Task Force at Ft Monroe as the Action Officer. Joint Venture will focus its initial efforts around the division as the tactical and operational centerpiece of battle command, with Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) serving as the major experimental tools, or testbeds.²¹ Moving in three separate and in cases simultaneous phases, Joint Venture will progress from the redesign of the brigade (Phase I) to the division (Phase II) to the corps (Phase III) in rough accordance with the timelines
shown. With all major decisions made by the year 2000 (Decisions XXI), the end of year 2005 will see "...the full integration of information-age technology into the entire Army."22

The supporting effort is in reality two efforts, the first of which is the redesign and restructuring of the Institutional or TDA Army. This axis is headed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations as the coordinator. The General Headquarters Exercise (GHQx) is an important component of this axis, examining "...the Army Staff's ability to perform its Title X responsibilities [creating, generating, sustaining, and structuring the force] within various scenarios (two MRCs, OOTW, etc)."23

The second supporting effort is the Army Digitization Office Axis, the responsibility of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and managed by the newly-created Army Digitization Office. This is a separate and distinct effort that also supports the other two axes. The tremendous power of the microprocessor and the speed and advantages of digital processes "...led to the idea of integrating digital technology across the entire force - Horizontal Technology Integration - to increase force effectiveness."24 The Army Digitization Office (ADO) is responsible for testing and evaluating the latest electronic digitization equipment and integrating it throughout the Army to take maximum advantage of the speed and power of new technology. The primary benefits of digitization are an increased awareness of enemy and friendly situations at all echelons of the force,
and an extremely enhanced ability to command and control.\textsuperscript{25}

With all major decisions made by the end of Phase III, the Army will be fully prepared to exploit new information-age technology and engage any threat to the nation's security.\textsuperscript{26} As the Force XXI literature clearly states, the Force XXI Army is not a final end state, but a "rolling" end state that continues to change as part of a continual development process. This force will, "On most occasions, [operate] as part of a joint or combined force."\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore Brigadier General David H. Ohle, Chief of the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, states unequivocally that "This [Force XXI] Army will be ideally suited for joint operations and will be fully compatible with the operational systems of the other services."\textsuperscript{28} This new force "...will allow us to project power into any area of the world more quickly, and with greater efficiency, as part of a joint effort."\textsuperscript{29} With this emphasis on jointness in mind, how exactly are the three axes of the Force XXI Campaign Plan operating to ensure that the Army of the twenty-first century is indeed joint-capable?

\textbf{JOINT ASPECTS OF FORCE XXI}

The Force XXI Campaign Plan lists as one of its nine design principles: "Be effective in war and Operations Other Than War as a part of a joint and multi-national team."\textsuperscript{30} In TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, \textit{Force XXI Operations}, the conceptual source of Force XXI, there is reference to jointness in Chapter 3, the title of which is "Future Land Operations." This reference discusses the
importance of ensuring that the Army of the future has joint connectivity. Also, there is some mention of jointness in the manual's description of the battle dynamic of "Battlespace", which is truly a joint concept. This basically completes the pamphlet's discussion of jointness.

Although the pamphlet discusses joint Force XXI requirements and aspects, it does not do so in detail. TRADOC and the Future Battle Directorate that authors this pamphlet recognize this fact, and agree that "...the most glaring omission is a full discussion of how the Army works with the other services." The pamphlet's authors also ask important questions that reveal their concern with jointness and desire to keep the Army on track with what it can do to increase joint capability. The new TRADOC Commander, General William W. Hartzog clearly recognized the need to further develop the joint aspects of 525-5. Although the pamphlet is weak in its discussion of the specific joint aspects of Force XXI, the TRADOC commander and his Future Battle Directorate are advocates of increased jointness and have begun initiatives to indicate so in doctrine and practice. In addition, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William A. Owens, has read this pamphlet and recognized its value. He directed that the other three services receive a briefing on its content and on the entire Army Force XXI initiative. A Joint Force XXI document may well result.

Along the TOE Army Axis, Joint Venture, it is clear that as the Army redesigns its echelons from battalion to corps a
governing concept for design is one of "modularity." This implies that the various echelons, the building blocks of the force, will be designed to quickly and readily "plug in" to other blocks and headquarters from other services to form the structure of what is now referred to as "Adaptive Force Packaging." The US Atlantic Command analogy of a Rubic's Cube of different service force elements being mixed and matched to fit the intended mission is especially appropriate. Thus, the implication is that almost every echelon of the Force XXI Army, certainly from brigade to corps, has the potential to be part of a joint force and operate under a Joint Task Force headquarters. As a result the redesign of the TOE Army must be accomplished with this end in mind.

According to the Army's Joint Venture Initiatives Directorate in Ft Monroe, Virginia, a subordinate element of the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, there is no formal way to work joint issues in the Joint Venture Axis, and no special office to oversee this. The Joint Venture Advanced Warfighting Experiment in 1994 called "Prairie Warrior 94", which focused its efforts on a new type of division called the "Mobile Strike Force" (Figure 2), was run as an Army-pure exercise and was not joint. However, this was an attempt to focus on just the land combat aspects of the strike force, and from that perspective the lack of joint integration is understandable. Future Prairie Warrior exercises, beginning in 1995, will indeed be joint.
Figure 2. Mobile Strike Force

From discussions with personnel from the Joint Venture Task Force (currently the office of the Battle Lab Integration & Technology Directorate at Ft Monroe, VA), there is a concerted effort to focus Force XXI design in light of joint capabilities. Indeed, 80% of all Advanced Warfighting Experiments are joint experiments, the six Battle Laboratories (the Army testbeds for experimenting with Force XXI) are all joint integrated, and the Joint Venture Task Force is linked to the doctrine commands of the other services. It is also clear that the joint aspects of Force XXI are developed from the bottom-up and the issues are investigated and worked as they are encountered. There is currently no formal process to oversee and integrate joint issues.

The Institutional/TDA Axis has the mission of redesigning
"...the Institutional/TDA Army...to effectively and efficiently perform service Title 10 functions to support redesigned Army warfighting organizations in order to insure a trained and ready Army, fully capable of doing its part...in joint and combined operations..."39 Also, the axis has a fundamental objective of "[conducting] Institutional Army redesign to support [the] Force XXI Baseline Task Force [Task Force XXI]."40 This objective supports the TDA Army core competency of being able to "Create, provide and sustain the land component of the Combatant Commander’s Joint/Multinational Force."41 Moreover, the TDA Axis Campaign Plan calls for the complete synchronization of the TDA Army redesign measures with the Joint Venture and ADO Axes.42

In order to carry out its mission, the Institutional/TDA Redesign Campaign Plan identifies fourteen Title 10 Functional Areas that encompass all Army Title 10 responsibilities.43 The plan also assigns a proponent to each Functional Area, and sets a time schedule for the conduct of Functional Area Assessments to evaluate the status of progress in each area.44 These Functional Area Assessments, which will begin in September 1995, will include "jointness" as an evaluation element of each assessment.45 Also, the plan sets forth ten principles for the redesigning of the TDA Army, and Principle #3 is linkage of the redesign "...to the National Military Strategy..." and consistency with the Army's role of operating within a joint environment.46 This principle of linkage is carefully followed in the complete Institutional/TDA Army redesign effort, and
Intermediate Progress Reviews conducted by the proponents include examination of joint issues. Thus the TDA Axis has systematically integrated joint issue consideration into its effort.

The Army Digitization Office Axis is the most technical of the three Force XXI Axes and is responsible for the integration of new digital technology into the Army. The Army Digitization Office has a solid campaign plan that is directly linked from the interoperability requirements published by the Joint Staff to Army digitization and command and control systems. The Joint Interoperability Directive written by the Joint Staff, "C4I For The Warrior", is derived from joint interoperability requirements and creates a broadly connected joint command and control system. The ADO's task is to ensure that the Army's C4I capability "... is in compliance with the Joint Staff's 'C4I For The Warrior' concept." The ADO does this in four ways (Figure 3). First, it insure that the basic digital means of information flow (architectures) are coordinated and are totally interoperable with those of the other three services. Then, the ADO Campaign Plan designates four axes, or "thrusts" (Acquisition, Internet, Integration, and Future), each of which is totally interoperable in its effort. In fact, the Acquisition Thrust entails the purchase of enhanced digital systems for application to select platforms of the Marine Corps and Air Force to participate in Advanced Warfighting Experiments. All four thrusts of the plan are executed in an environment of joint
interoperability. The joint focus of the ADO is critically important since the ADO has broad authority to coordinate with industry and to procure equipment that is fully joint compatible. The Army Digitization Office is fully immersed in the joint interoperability effort.

As described above, the Force XXI Campaign Plan contains three simultaneous efforts or axes that move in a common direction and in accordance with common guidance. These axes are kept in synchronization with one another by two complementary mechanisms. The first is the Synchronization Directorate in the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force responsible for monitoring and synchronizing the three axes. The Synchronization Directorate follows a Synchronization Matrix as its primary tool in the
synchronization effort. The Force XXI Campaign Plan of September 1994, published by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), tasks the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force with publishing a five year Force XXI synchronization matrix (Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lanes/Departmental Process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisions</td>
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<td>Intermediate Obj</td>
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<td>Decisive Point</td>
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<td>Joint Venture</td>
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<td>Training / Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development</td>
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<td>TDA/NSI</td>
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<td>ADO</td>
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<td>Simulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>STOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Events (MACOM/JCS Exercises)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrine &amp; TTP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader Development</td>
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<td>Modernization</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Analytical Baseline</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Events/Independent Variables</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Force XXI Synchronization Matrix Lanes

The lanes in the matrix control the overall direction and integration of Force XXI throughout the Army. Each lane has what the DCSOPS refers to as a "Lane Meister" who is responsible for "...ensuring that activities and events within their respective
lanes are supporting the three main axes of the Force XXI Campaign. There is, however, no lane that specifically addresses joint capability, nor is there specific mention of joint issues.

The overall thrust of the Army Force XXI campaign appears to be proceeding in the right direction with emphasis on joint capability and operations. The principles are in place and are being followed. Army Force XXI proponents and agencies understand the requirements for joint capability. However, it also appears that there is no overarching joint integration mechanism for Force XXI, nor are the four services operating from a joint modernization concept or directive. The Army is in front of the services in its modernization effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The fact that in the past the services have not acted effectively as a joint team was clearly recognized by the Congress of the United States. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was a clear mandate to the services to take jointness more seriously. While the Army has made an honest attempt to adhere to the letter of jointness, it is not clear that jointness is firmly embedded in its collective consciousness, nor does it appear to be as firmly embedded into the design and structure of Force XXI as it could be. None of the services, and certainly not the Army, can afford to undergo a process of significant change and yet fail to produce a more
joint-capable force in the process. The following four recommendations are made with this thought in mind.

First, as the Army is already in the process of doing, rewrite TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 to reflect greater emphasis and specificity on how the Army is to operate as part of a joint force. Chapter 3, "Future Land Operations", address the fact that Army units will often work under a Joint Force Commander and function in accordance with both Army and joint doctrine. Discuss in some detail the issue and responsibilities of the Land Component Commander and how Army forces will at times work along side or be attached to Marine units. Address the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the role he will play, and that Army aviation units may well be commanded by the JFACC. There is also room for discussion of jointness in Chapter 4, "Implications." The six TRADOC domains of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) all have significant implications from the joint context. Include them in the pamphlet, and since TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is the driver of the Joint Venture Axis of the Force XXI Campaign Plan, the joint concepts, ideas, thoughts, and direction for that axis will be clearly articulated.

Second, install a "Joint" Lane in the Force XXI Synchronization Matrix, and list it as the very first lane in the column. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (who also sits on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC] which addresses and oversees service requirements from a joint perspective)
should be responsible for the Joint lane with the DCSOPS as the Lane Meister. This lane would directly concern itself with the joint aspects of Force XXI and insure that all elements of the Force XXI effort are indeed moving in a clearly joint direction and are synchronized from a joint perspective.

Third, the Army must include far more emphasis on the joint nature of future Army operations in its literature and especially in the Force XXI publications. Jointness is a mindset that the Army wants but still does not fully have. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili accused the services of doing the easy things to become more joint, but not doing the hard things. In order to set the tone for doing the hard things, the Army must firmly implant the concept of jointness in the minds of soldiers and civilians. If jointness does not appear consistently and frequently in the literature, then perhaps it is not an important concept after all. As an example, the Department of the Army FRAGO #1 to the Force XXI Campaign Plan lists nine Force XXI Design Principles for guiding force redesign efforts. The last principle, number nine, is "Be effective in war and OOTW as part of a joint and multinational team in all operational environments." Although it is significant and important that this principle is listed, the reader receives a different message when the principle is listed last. One would receive a far stronger message about the importance of jointness if this principle was listed first.

Finally, the Army must take the lead and lobby for the
creation of a "Joint Force XXI" in the Department of Defense. BG Ohle has already spoken with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about Force XXI and Admiral Owens has expressed an interest in a Joint Force XXI Initiative.58 Should this Joint Force XXI be established and overseen by the Joint Staff, America then have the development of the twenty-first century defense force under the eye of the JROC which has the legal authority ". . . for exercising the synergism of a joint approach to military planning and programming."59 This is the best possible alternative for the Army and the country. For the four services not to be in concert with one another during this time of uncertainty does not bode well for the conduct of future joint operations and for the effective utilization of increasingly scarcer resources. The danger is, as Admiral Owens writes, that "Building a joint military capability to harness the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs] is not easy. History reveals a tendency to diverge rather than coalesce during periods of relative fiscal austerity."60 At the present time America is in a period of relative security and has the time to effect this modernization in a controlled manner. The Army should take the lead in working this with the Department of Defense, and if successful (and the interest shown by Admiral Owens is a good sign that it could be), the Vice Chairman of the JCS should add "Joint Force XXI" to his Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment matrix shown below, and thus ensure that Army modernization proceeds in concert with that of the other services (Figure 5).
It is clear that in this era of diminishing resources and continuing roles and missions debate that it would take a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in this area to drive the four services.

![Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments Table](image)

**Figure 5. Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments**

**CONCLUSION**

The Army has assumed the initiative in taking control of change and making it work for it rather than allowing itself to fall into the historical trap of resting on its laurels and preparing to fight the last war. Force XXI is a dynamic and farsighted initiative. It is firmly grounded in the National Security and Military Strategy of the United States and is in consonance with the values, interests, and objectives of the country. Force XXI is a solid concept that is now deeply embedded into the structure and processes of the Army. The Force
XXI Campaign Plan is well-designed and will help produce the best possible Army that time and resources will allow.

To date, however, the Army Force XXI effort has not fully incorporated the mechanisms to produce a twenty-first century army that is fully joint-capable. As Force XXI progresses, the Army must make itself a truly joint-capable force from top to bottom, from the mindset of the soldiers to its equipment and doctrine. Jointness is a necessity today. It is a combat multiplier that becomes increasingly vital to the fulfillment of the National Military Strategy. Unless the fundamental nature of mankind changes, the root causes of war will remain in this world. The challenges of lethality and tempo on future battlefields increase the importance of the first battle. The first battle of the next war could well be the only battle. America cannot afford to lose it.
ENDNOTES


7. Sullivan, p. 10.

8. Ibid.


15. Ibid., pp. 11, 13, 15.

17. Ibid., p. 22.


25. Ibid., p. 5.


30. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, *PRAGO #1 to Force XXI Campaign Plan* (Draft), (Ft Monroe, VA: March 7, 1995), p. 4.

32. Ibid., p. 3-8.


34. Ibid., Enclosure 2, p. 5.

35. Ibid., Tab A, p. 7.


38. James Greer, Colonel, Operations Officer for the Joint Venture Task Force and Experiment Director for the Battle Lab Integration & Technology Directorate, Ft Monroe, VA, telephone conversation with the author, 4 April 1995.


41. Ibid., unnumbered slide following page E-1.

42. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

43. Ibid., pp. C-2 through C-7.

44. Ibid., pp. C-1 through C-7.


47. Brown, telephone conversation with the author, 10 April 1995.

49. Ibid., p. 9.


51. Ibid., p. 9.


55. *FRAGO #1 to Force XXI Campaign Plan* (Draft), p. 3.


57. *FRAGO #1 to Force XXI Campaign Plan* (Draft), p. 4.

58. Greer, telephone conversation with the author, 4 April 1995.


60. Ibid., p. 56.

61. Sullivan, pp. 7-8.

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