KOREAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

by

Boo-Kyoon Lee

December, 1994

Thesis Advisor: Edward A. Olsen

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KOREAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

by

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M.A., Korea University, 1992

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of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The division of North and South Korea since World War II has been solidified by continuing hostility and confrontation. The growing heterogeneity of the two political systems constitutes a serious obstacle to national unification. The present hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an amicable and cooperative relationship.

This thesis attempts to ascertain the unification policies of South and North Korea in order to project the future relations of the two countries. For this purpose, the study examines the inter-dependence between international and domestic politics in shaping the two Koreas' unification policies and tries to illuminate the major factors contributing to changing tactics and strategies in the quest for unification.

The North and South Koreans have pursued diametrically opposed unification policies. The North Korean regime's ultimate aim has been to overthrow the government of South Korea and to reunify the peninsula under communist rule. On the other hand, the unification policy of South Korea has always called for a step-by-step approach, beginning with the recurring of a lasting peace, the easing of tension, and the restoration of trust, thereby building the foundations of national unification.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the first half of the 20th century, Korea lost its independence and suffered great frustration and humiliation under Japanese colonization due to its failure to muster its inherent national capabilities to cope with the changing international situation. As a consequence of Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Korea was divided by the victors and suffered a serious war. Tragically, the land still remains divided even though it has been almost fifty years since it was liberated from colonial subjugation. Although the Cold War ended in 1989-90, Korea continues to be the last battlefield of the former Cold War.

Relations between South and North Korea are bound to enter a new phase following the 1994 death of Kim Il-Sung who had ruled North Korea for nearly five decades. Having run into the limitations of its socialist system that has led to increasing international isolation and mounting economic woes, North Korea will almost certainly have to attempt a major transition as it readjusts its post-Kim Il-Sung power structure.¹

Although many books and articles concerning Korean unification have been published, most of them emphasize the expressed policies of South and North Korea without offering positive suggestions for unification or legal analysis for unification planning. This is understandable, given the possibility that Korean unification might not be easily achieved in the foreseeable future under the present circumstances.

However, Korean unification is a prerequisite to the development of the Korean nation as a democratic country in order for it to carry out its proper role in the future of the world. The Korean nation, with a population of over sixty million people and a cultural tradition spanning thousands of years, has not taken its proper place in the modern world due to the tragic national division imposed by outside powers.

Geographically situated among the major powers of the world, Korea has struggled for survival throughout most of its history. Korea's historical experience shows that Korean survival and prosperity are not necessarily guaranteed through a balanced policy toward the major powers, but may be guaranteed by becoming a major power. Korean unification is a prerequisite for reaching this goal. It is essential for the two Korean states to seek the means for unification and to formulate a legal basis for this national task. To this end, a brief survey of South and North Korean unification policies and various related facts will be examined. The legal situation of a divided Korea will also be analyzed. Finally, in light of this research, some feasible methods for Korean unification will be suggested.

Germany's Berlin Wall and Korea's 155-mile long Armistice Line, epitomized by Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), have been the most conspicuous symbolic sites of the bipolar division of the Eastern and Western Blocs since World War II. The Korean Peninsula has remained a dangerous conflict zone - a powder keg - since the 1953 Armistice Agreement ended the Korean War.

Can the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the transformation of Eastern Europe affect North Korea, the most isolated and dogmatic country of the Communist bloc? The presently hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an amicable and cooperative relationship. Yemen failed to prevent a civil war after it was politically unified because it was unified hastily and superficially without having gone through a process of real reconciliation and cooperation. Can this influence North Korea to open its closed door and pursue the easing of tension and a peace settlement in the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps even ending the artificial division of Korea? What methods and proposals must emerge, and what conditions must be met, to realize these ends?
These difficult and fundamental questions preoccupy the thoughts of every Korean. To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the current political and economic situation, and the policy direction of the North and South Korean Governments. My perspective is based, in part, on experiences gained while serving as chief of the Political and Economic Branch in the Republic of Korea / United States (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command (CFC) under the Ministry of National Defense from the Spring of 1982 to the end of 1992.
II. THE CREATION OF A DIVIDED KOREA

With the unconditional surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, the Korean people were liberated from the Japanese imperialists, and the Korean people rejoiced over this event. But it was not that simple. The Korean peninsula was liberated from the Japanese but it remained under the military occupation of the Soviet and American armed forces, with the 38th parallel designated as an arbitrary boundary line from which the Soviets on the North side and the United States on the South side could process the repatriation of the Japanese prisoners. This arrangement was actually a by-product of the allied victory in World War II. Korea's independence had already been promised by the Cairo Declaration of the allied powers in 1943. So the destiny of Korea was determined by external forces. And the emerging international cold war and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Korea and the Far East resulted in the permanent division of the country.

Throughout much of World War II Korea had been a "forgotten nation". During the talks among the world powers, however, the seeds of future misfortune on the Korean peninsula were sown by agreements on a Korean trusteeship and division of the Korean peninsula into the north and the south. In April 1943, President Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden agreed in their meeting that Korea "would fall under international trusteeship" and "the trustees might be the United States, the Soviet Union and China." A Korean trusteeship reflected the idea of Roosevelt, who had long thought that the liberated Asian colonial peoples should come under the tutelage of the Great Powers and be educated in democratic institutions. Meeting in Cairo in November 1943 to plan the new order in Asia, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek declared that after the defeat of Japan "the three great powers are determined that in due course, Korea shall be free and independent." At Teheran Stalin endorsed this declaration. At Yalta, the

anticipated entry of the USSR into the war in East Asia obliged Roosevelt and Churchill to make provision for Soviet interests in Northeast Asia. Subsequently and hastily, due to the sudden collapse of Japan, the Allied High Command agreed on the 38th parallel as the dividing line for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender in Korea.³

The Russians arrived in northern Korea on August 12, 1945, after a lightning campaign in Manchuria. The Americans, preoccupied with Southeast Asia, China, and Japan, did not land in southern Korea until nearly a month later. From this beginning, the Korean Peninsula was divided, with the Russians in control in the North and the Americans in the South. Meeting in Moscow, December 1945, the Big Three (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) agreed to move toward unification by establishing a provisional government under a four-power trusteeship -- the Big Three plus China, then under Chiang Kai-shek. This denial of immediate independence infuriated South Koreans.⁴

At this Yalta meeting, President Roosevelt said there might be a trusteeship for Korea composed of Soviet, American and Chinese representatives for at least twenty or thirty years.⁵ But the division of the Korean peninsula, originally set up as a temporary measure to disarm a vanquished enemy, remained. At the Potsdam summit meeting among the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union in July 1945, which President Truman attended in place of the deceased Roosevelt, items agreed on at the Cairo meeting with respect to the Korean question were reaffirmed, thus emphasizing again the principle that Korea should be made independent "in due course."

⁴Ibid., p.31.
As the war neared its end without any firm plan regarding the Korean question the
Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. The United States then
had to decide where to draw the dividing line for the U.S. and Soviet occupation zones on
the Korean peninsula. Under these circumstances, the U.S. government, accepted the
recommendation of Colonels C.H. Bonesteel (who later served as Commander-in-Chief of
the United Nations Command in Korea) and Dean Rusk (later Secretary of State) of the
General Staff of the War Department. They proposed that the Soviet Union be authorized
to receive the Japanese surrender north of the 38th Parallel and the United States troops
receive it south of that line. Under this arrangement, South and North Korea quickly
developed into separate states following the Japanese surrender. The territorial division,
imposed upon the Koreans against their will, hardened as time passed. From the very
moment of division, South and North Korea began to pursue divergent roads. The
interests of the United States and the Soviet Union were, of course, critically important.
As the Cold war intensified, both Washington and Moscow worked against the evolving
political forces in their respective occupation zones that might be unfriendly toward them.
But when the United States and the Soviet Union set up temporary zones of military
occupation, the 38th parallel became not only a boundary between the political spheres of
influence of the two superpowers, but also, in time, a boundary between mutually
incompatible political and socio-economic systems. Since the inauguration of the North
Korean regime in September 1948, the South and the North of a divided Korea have thus
existed as independent entities with different political systems. South Korea developed into
a western style democracy under the auspices of the United States: North Korea became a
Communist satellite.

6Dr. Park, Gun-Yang "Unification Policies of North and South Korea" (1990) p. 17
By the early part of September, 1945, the Soviet Occupation Authority had established firm control throughout North Korea. Instead of setting up a military government, the Soviet Forces in North Korea let Korean Communists organize People's Committees throughout the entire area to conduct local administrative work. The Soviet Occupation Authority also supported the Communists as an undisputed political force in North Korea. The Supreme People's Assembly for Korea held its first meeting in Pyongyang and ratified the constitution on September 3, 1948. Kim Il Sung was formally installed as "Premier" of the North Korean regime that was officially established on September 9.

In South Korea, however, the United States acted slowly. U.S. forces came to Korea as late as September 8, 1945, but unlike the Soviet occupation forces, the United States established a military government to maintain law and order. To understand this development, it is necessary to compare Washington's and Moscow's military occupation policies from 1945 to 1947. In 1945 the American Military Government (AMG) was unprepared for its occupation of South Korea. It had neither plans nor trained personnel. The High Command (AMG) decided against any long range plans either for the Koreans or for the occupation personnel because it would be only a matter of months — six months, perhaps before the Army forces were withdrawn. However, the AMG was guided by the lofty principles of American democracy and quickly decided that South Korea would have a free and democratic system. This announcement encouraged a proliferation of political parties in South Korea (three hundred by August, 1946) and a division into the rightist and leftist groups. The AMG recognized neither the new People's Republic (tentative

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7Ibid. p. 21
government structure) nor the Korean Provisional Government (exile government) but supported a new bureaucracy (collaborators with Japan, the wealthy foreign-educated, and the Christians) against the Communists.\textsuperscript{10} From 1945-1947 the unpreparedness of the American military government and the power struggle among South Korean leaders created turmoil in South Korea.

Unlike the U.S. military government, the Soviet army had both a concrete plan and trained personnel. When the Soviet army occupied North Korea, they carried out their plan using native Koreans as their instrument. Under the protection of the Soviet army, Kim Il-Sung's Soviet trained partisan detachments played an important role in implementing the Moscow plan. This group, which consisted of possibly two hundred men, had fought against the Japanese in Manchuria before 1940. With Kim Il-Sung as leader, they had also served in the Soviet army in Siberia from 1940 to 1945.\textsuperscript{11} The Soviet army transferred all of its administrative power to the "people's committee" in the provinces. In Pyongyang "an Administrative Bureau of Five Provinces" was organized to consolidate and centralize control over the local people's committees. On August 28, 1946, the North Korean Workers Party was established by combining the Korean Communist Party and the New People's Party. The Korean Workers Party thus became the political and social organization which established a North Korean government modeled on the Russian system.

During 1945, while both American and Russian military occupation forces maneuvered for political spheres of influence, the Korean problem was discussed in Moscow at the foreign ministers' level, with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain participating. The final plan provided for placing Korea under a four-power

trusteeship for five years. During this time, Korea was to be ruled by a provisional government established through the efforts of a Joint (U.S.-Soviet Union) Commission. At the end of the five-year trusteeship, Korea was to be granted full independence. The trusteeship was deemed necessary due to the Korean people's lack of political experience. There had been no Korean self-government under Japanese rule. Strong opposition to the trusteeship proposal immediately sprang up in Korea. At first the Korean Communists were opposed to trusteeship but they changed their position and launched a propaganda campaign "upholding" trusteeship. In accordance with the decision of the Moscow conference, the first session of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission was held in Seoul on March 20, 1946. In May, however, the commission adjourned without results. The second session, held three weeks later, also failed. The main reason for the failure of the Commission lay in its inability to devise a formula for establishing a government for all of Korea.

The United States insisted that all parties in both North and South Korea take part in a democratic election, while the Soviet Union wanted only those "democratic" parties that had a pro-Moscow orientation to participate. As a result of this deadlock, the United States submitted the Korean question to the United Nations. On November 14, 1947, the United Nations established a UN Temporary Commission on Korea, and on January 12, 1948 the Commission met in Seoul and reported to UN headquarters its inability to contact authorities in North Korea. Therefore, by a resolution of the United Nations, elections under UN supervision were held in South Korea only on May 10, 1948, which resulted in the formation of a Korean National Assembly, establishing the Government of the

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13Dvid J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948) p. 284
14George McCune, pp. 616-619
Republic of Korea with Syngman Rhee as the first President. The National Assembly convened for the first time on May 31, 1948. On August 15, the new Republic of Korea was formally inaugurated in Seoul.

Ten days later, in response to developments in southern Korea the communist groups in North Korea established the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" as noted above and continued its preparations to make all Korea a Soviet satellite. On December 31, 1948, the Soviet Union announced the evacuation of its troops from North Korea. On January 19, 1949, the Republic of Korea applied for membership in the United Nations. On June 29, 1949, the United States occupation forces withdrew from South Korea, leaving only five hundred members of the American military advisory group.

In short, during the early postwar military occupation period, the liberated Korean nation was artificially divided by the two superpowers. Though they differed in planning and strategy, each intended to create a political sphere of influence. With the exception of China, the Allied powers persistently refused to consult with the Korean leaders on the destiny of Korea. Thus, viewed from the Korean side, the division of the country was a product of international politics. Korean political attitudes formed around the United States and Soviet Policies toward Korea. As the international situation changed, the South and North changed their policies and programs.

Of course, the Koreans can not be considered totally blameless for the division of their country. The bitter ideological confrontation between the right wing and the left wing of the political spectrum, and the blind loyalty of the Korean Communists to the Soviet Union were important factors contributing to the division of Korea. It is, however, undeniable that Korea became one of the first sacrifices of the Cold War between the East and the West and a victim of their policies. No domestic force in a small nation like Korea

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15 Korea: Past and Present, p. 79
16 Ibid, pp. 79-80
could realistically resist or deter the imposition of international politics played by the world powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, it may well be said that the division of Korea was imposed by the power politics of the major powers and the dominating international environment at that time. The United States, Russia, China, and Japan therefore have some obligation to assist in the reunification of Korean peninsula.
III. THE REALITY OF SOUTH-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

A. SOCIAL HETEROGENEITY

When American and Soviet troops landed in the southern and northern regions of Korea across the 38th Parallel at the end of World War II, most Koreans, regarded it as a temporary action and never thought it would become a barrier blocking the travel of people and the flow of goods between the two sides, much less cause the suspension of communications.

However, the Soviet forces who entered northern Korea before the American troops landed in the South,\textsuperscript{17} cut off the Kyongwon Railroad Line at the 38th Parallel on August 24, 1945, forcing South-bound trains to turn around at Chonkok, just north of the parallel. On August 25, they banned travel and the flow of goods across the parallel. Further, on September 6, the Soviets severed the trans-Korean telephone and telegraph lines in the Haeju area and suspended postal services between the two areas.

At a preliminary meeting of the Joint US-USSR Committee, held in the Toksu Palace in Seoul on January 29, 1946, the U.S. military authorities proposed that the administrative aspects of North Korea and South Korea be integrated immediately, with the 38th Parallel functioning only as a boundary between the U.S. and Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{18} The U.S. military authorities further proposed that the operation of railroads and the electricity and communications of the two sides be integrated; the two sides use a single currency system; and travel between the two sides be liberalized under specific procedures to be agreed upon by both sides.

\textsuperscript{17} Soviet forces landed in Kyonghung, Hamkyonbukdo, on August 8, 1945, and entered Pyongyang on August 22 after the Japanese surrendered on August 15. U.S. troops landed in Inchon on September 8, 1945.

The Soviet authorities responded passively, presenting a plan to allow barter trade between the two sides. The plan covered the exchange of specific commodities and facilities, and the limited integration of railroads and automobile traffic. However, even such limited exchanges could not be instituted due to the breakup of the Joint US-USSR Committee.

Although the peninsula was divided, more than 3.5 million North Koreans escaped to the South before the Korean War, in spite of the fact that many were killed near the 38th Parallel. Still, the mass migration indicated there were some loopholes along the "iron curtain." These loopholes allowed limited and unofficial exchanges of personnel and materials, called "38 trade" and "38 post." The Korean War, however, completely sealed even these loopholes. The war is eventual truce brought a total separation of the two societies.

With the social breakup, the Koreas started to evolve in different directions. The South has grown into a free, open society based on the political order of liberal democracy while the North has been transformed into a uniform Leninist society which has wholly rewritten or altered national history, based on the materialistic class view. From the time of its founding, South Korea faced the continuous threat of North Korea's desire to communize the entire peninsula by means of violent revolution or armed conquest. Thus, special emphasis on national security was an inevitable element in the fight for survival. On the other hand, security also served as the official reason or excuse for many restrictions. The South had to go through many trials and errors before it managed to root solidly the ideology of liberal democracy. Basically, however, the South has been an open society and since the late 1980s, when democratization solidly set sail, the South has enjoyed social stability and prosperity, though it has encountered some persisting pains.19

In contrast, North Korea has been a closed, authoritarian regime. Under the superficial excuse of "constructing a Communist society", politics was geared to ensure Kim Il-Sung's absolute power and to facilitate a hereditary system of power succession. In this process, the North Korean authorities thoroughly depersonalized their people through extensive ideological control. The North tightened ideological integration and unity among the people by resettling, purging or interning, in "special dictatorial districts," those branded as ideologically "reactionary" or "unreliable." In time, the North adopted the concept of "juche" (self-reliance) in an attempt to beautify such integration.

In this way, the North Korean people have been trained to "think the way the Great Leader thinks" and to regard this as a "glory even if they die in the course of fulfilling the instructions of the Great Leader." In late 1994, campaigns were launched to deify Kim Jong-II, son of the deceased leader, Kim Il-Sung.

Thus, for part of the national society, national history was interrupted and traditional culture almost obliterated. This destroyed the national homogeneity of the Korean peninsula: South Korea tried to retain the nation's historical continuity by allowing the flower of liberal democracy to blossom fully on the basis of the proper inheritance and development of national culture. North Korea degraded the legacies of national culture to a superficial level and strove to replace its essential value with that of Communism. If this national heterogeneity is left unaltered, the two societies will become so different from each other that the people of the two sides will feel hardly any brotherhood when they happen to meet.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20}\textsuperscript{National Unification Board "A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea" Seoul, Korea (1990) p.15}
B. THE DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Before the division of the peninsula, northern Korea was economically greater than the rest of the country. Mining and heavy manufacturing industries were concentrated in this region. Northern Korea had most of the natural resources and industrial facilities while two thirds of the total population lived in the predominantly agricultural southern region. Consequently, the South had a very weak economy from the time of liberation until the early 1960s; so weak that it could not sustain even food self-sufficiency. Without the help of foreign grants, South Korea's economy could hardly have survived.

Beginning in the 1960s, however, the South experienced an epochal economic development. Thanks to the successful implementation of the first five-year economic development plan, begun in 1962, the South registered a 7.8% growth rate per year during the period of the plan. The second plan period (1967-71) recorded a 9.6% expansion rate; the third plan period (1972-76) saw a 9.8% growth rate; the growth rate for the fourth plan period (1977-81) was 5.8%; and the expansion rate for the fifth plan period (1982-86) was 8.7%. A 7% growth rate was for the sixth plan period (1987-91). In addition, South Korea's growth rate reached 5.6% in 1993, and 8.5% in a half of 1994 (Jan.-June).

This remarkable growth and prosperity was not due to effective economic planning from the outset. As far as economic planning was concerned, the North initially far outdid the South, introducing economic plans as early as 1947. The problem originally was the efficiency of the North Korean economic system. In contrast, the government in South Korea, upholding the principle of industrial freedom, assisted key industries and other major sectors starting during the Park Chung-Hee years. In so doing, they expanded social overhead capital to foster an environment advantageous to private industries. In addition,

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22See Comparison of the Economic Situations of South and North Korea (Seoul: National Unification Board, December 1989), p.28
23Korea Trade Cooperation (KOTRA), (Nov. 15, 1994)
the South introduced foreign capital to smoothly raise necessary investment funds, while concentrating on the expansion of international cooperation and exports through the positive pursuit of an open policy. Due to the continuation of an export-oriented open economic system and the principle of industrial freedom, the South was able to build up its national strength so much that it was able to surpass the North in the 1960s and 70s and host the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988.\textsuperscript{24}

North Korea, on the other hand, pursued a socialist revolution and construction under the guise of securing a material base for the "liberation of South Korea." Since they sought development only within the framework of the concept of a limited value, the North failed to take proper advantage of the economic superiority they enjoyed over the South at the time of division.

The poor performance of the North Korean economy is attributable to the fact that in the North private ownership of production facilities has been banned in favor of social or cooperative ownership. On this basis, a planned economy has been instituted in which all production, distribution and consumption activities undertaken on orders from authorities.

In North Korea, agrarian reforms were effected in March 1946 during the Soviet military rule, prior to the establishment of the Communist regime. In August of the same year, major industries such as important manufacturing plants, transportation, communications and banking facilities, began to be nationalized. Thus, a foundation for public ownership of all assets was established.

After the Korean War, from 1953 to 1958, agriculture was collectivized and private sectors of commerce and industry were socialized. In 1958 private ownership of all production means was eliminated in favor of overall social ownership in all economic areas. The only private ownership in the production area allowed was that which farmers

\textsuperscript{24}The Korean Times (May 26, 1990)
produced through the cultivation of 66 square meters of land around their houses and through other businesses they operated during their off-duty hours.\textsuperscript{25} This planned economy was relatively effective for post-war rehabilitation and early-stage industrialization. With the progress of industrialization, or the rooting of Kim II-Sung's monolithic system, the planned economy began to backfire, and its reverse function has since deepened.

The reversal of economic superiority began in the late 1960s, when the South took a striking lead over the North.\textsuperscript{26} In 1992, the South's GNP stood at $294.5 billion and the per-capita GNP at $6,749 whereas the North's were $21.1 billion and $943, respectively.\textsuperscript{27} The economic gap between the two sides of Korea arises from the disparity in the bases of their respective economic policies. The bases of their policies, in turn, stem from differences in their economic systems. In other words, the reason for the growing economic gap may well lie in the fact that whereas the South has allowed its economy to follow the principle of economic development, North Korea has subjugated its economy to such political goals as the unreasonable communization of their society, schemes to communize the South, and Kim II-Sung's idolization.

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* Source: The Bank of Korea (Nov. 1, 1994)\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25}See Article 22 of the Constitution of North Korea.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., pp. 36-37

\textsuperscript{27}General Evaluation of North Korean Economy (Seoul: National Unification Board, August 17, 1994), p. 36

\textsuperscript{28}The Korean Times (Nov. 8, 1994)
As shown above, there is a tremendous difference in the amount of goods that the South imports from North Korea and the amount of goods that the North allows the South to export into the North. Also, this means the South Korea has already become one of North Korea's major trading partners. If the two sides are to increase trade, it will be inevitable for both sides to adopt a barter system in the initial stage. This system will be developed later into a co-production system in which a division of labor based on comparative advantages will be encouraged.

C. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA UNIFICATION

1. Four Powers' View and Role

Due to its geopolitical conditions, the Korean peninsula has throughout the post-war period remained the target of concerns by world powers surrounding the region. The Korean question has now become the major concern of the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. The position and role of these four powers are sure to exercise significant influences on the future of the peninsula. In this respect, the following analysis endeavors to answer to two major questions: 1) what profits these powers have sought from the Korean peninsula? and 2) what change Korean unification, if realized, may bring about in their national interests?

a. United States

It can be said that the United States since it approached the Korean peninsula in the 19th century has pursued two major interests: military interests and economic interests. Up until its intervention in World War II, the United States had stuck to isolationism in foreign policy, and therefore it had refrained from interfering in Korean affairs.\(^{29}\) However, after World War II it emerged as one of the parties directly involved in

the Korean problem. The United States played the major role in deterring Soviet influence from expanding southward. To this end the United States employed a containment strategy represented by its forward deployment of troops. The United States also played the role of preventing conflicts from taking place on the Korean peninsula, thus eliminating the possibility for any of the surrounding powers to intervene in Korean affairs.\textsuperscript{30}

The United States appears to be absolutely favoring Korean unification from its belief that unification will be achieved in a way Washington wishes: a unified Korea will contribute not only to the stability of the region but also to the promotion of U.S. economic interests. On the part of the United States, the process of unification can be regarded as more important than the unification itself.\textsuperscript{31} The United States has played the role of a power-balancer in the region. This role is still regarded as important in the future because the Korean peninsula will be under constant threat from the possible emergence of a hegemonic power.

\textit{b. Russia}

Historically Russia has indulged in geopolitical and economic concerns regarding the Korean peninsula. Despite the termination of the Cold War, Russia's geopolitical interests still remains the same. Now Russia appears to admit the possibility of capitalist South Korea's absorption of North Korea,\textsuperscript{32} but it does not want to see the Korean peninsula emerge as a state threatening its security. In this respect, Russia has expressed its intention to form a multi-national security consultation body for the region. In principle, Russia maintains an opposition to the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula; however, it does not want to see either Japan or China replacing the role of U.S.

\textsuperscript{32}Herbert J. Ellison, Recent Trends in Soviet East Asian Policy : The Soviet Crisis and Foreign Policy Toward East Asia, Vol. 6 (The National Bureau of Asian and Soviet Research, 1990), p.27
troops there. For this reason, Russia may prefer to see the United States improve between
the relationship Pyongyang and Tokyo.\textsuperscript{33}

Russia also harbors an affirmative view regarding Korean unification.
Moscow in the Post-Cold war period believes Korean unification will be achieved in the
from of the capitalist South's absorption of the North. One specific concern of Moscow
will be that currently it is not in a position to directly intervene in the unification process
because it is bound by domestic affairs. In this respect, Moscow may prefer to see
unification delayed until it recovers its strength so that it will be able to play an influential
role in the process of the unification. For Russia, the Korean peninsula has always been an
important geopolitical point located on the road to its southward advancement. So far as
the Korean peninsula remains stable without creating any threat against Moscow's security
posture, it has no reason to raise any objection to Korean unification. Moscow still
maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang based on their military alliance treaty
concluded in 1961. In pragmatic terms, however, Moscow has already tilted toward Seoul.
In this respect, Moscow cannot be regarded as harboring any objection to Korean
unification. Most probably, Moscow may prefer to see unification achieved in the form of
the South's absorption of the North.\textsuperscript{34}

c. China

China is not in a position to object to Korean unification, though it still
appears to be concerned about political questions regarding its traditional ties with North
Korea. Beijing is now concerned more about economic problems than political problems.
So long as the Korean peninsula is not the target of hegemonism by other foreign powers,
Beijing will be willing to sanction unification. On the other hand, China will be reluctant

\textsuperscript{34} Suck-Kyo Ahn, "Prospects for Economic Integration of Socialist Economies in Northeast Asia," The
Asian-Pacific Community in the Year 2000: Challenges and Prospects, Monograph Series 91-01, No. 6
to see any of the following conditions taking place on the Korean peninsula — 1) any condition threatening China's vested rights over the peninsula, 2) any factor hindering China's political system or 3) any expansion of third countries' influence.

Regarding Korean unification, Beijing may harbor both affirmative and negative views. From a political position, Beijing has to take into account two negative factors — its longstanding support for "two states and two systems" in its formula for the unification with Taiwan, and its traditional ties with Pyongyang which is desperately sticking to socialism. But in economic terms, the emergence of a unified Korea can be expected to contribute to the promotion of Beijing's interests. Moreover, China is expected to seek a mutual assistance structure with the unified Korea that can act as an apparatus to deter Japan from pursuing an expansionistic policy. But the above-mentioned negative factors seem to be losing their importance due to Beijing's pragmatic policy which can be characterized by its economic reforms. The change in Beijing's policy in part surfaced when it withheld its veto right over the question of the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the U.N.\(^{35}\)

\(d\). Japan

The Japanese position can be cited as different from the other surrounding powers in that anti-Japanese sentiments still remain deeply rooted in the minds of the Korean people. Japanese worries are that a unified Korea may emerge as a state taking the most vigilant attitude against Japan. From Japan's perspective, it may be safer if the Korean peninsula continues to remain divided so that Japan will be able to apply the "divide and rule" policy, as Great Britain did in the past on the European continent. Japan's commencement of normalization talks with North Korea can be interpreted as being motivated by its intention to begin an equi-distant diplomacy toward the two Koreas.

\(^{35}\)National Unification Board (Republic of Korea) "Information Service on the Unification Question of the Korean Peninsula" (Apr. 30, 1993), pp47-49.
Now in the post-Cold War era, Japan appears to be endeavoring to take over a leading role in the region especially surrounding the Korean peninsula. Japan has shown a sensitive attitude toward the changes in the Korean situation which were represented by the rapid progress of South Korea's nordpolitik, the simultaneous entry into the U.N. by Seoul and Pyongyang and especially by Seoul's entering into diplomatic relations with Moscow and Beijing.\textsuperscript{36}

The Japanese policy toward the Korean peninsula has been represented by dualism: in official terms, it has stuck to the mutual cooperation system among Tokyo, Washington and Seoul, but on the other hand it has endeavored to maintain contacts with Pyongyang through non-governmental channels, while using its links with Seoul.

As was pointed out above, the four surrounding powers, with the exception of Japan, now appear to be favoring Korean unification. Japan, despite its difference of position, however, will be also compelled to adapt itself to the changes in the circumstances surrounding the peninsula. It can be said that now the future of the Korean peninsula is heavily dependent upon the efforts by the directly concerned parties, South and North Korea themselves.

2. South Korea

Since the relations between South and North Korea made little progress after Kim Il-Sung's death (July 8, 1994) and, accordingly, the expectations for unification escalated, some in South Korea argue that the South should achieve rapid unification by pursuing hardline policies towards North Korea. In summary, the policies are first, South Korea should exploit the present unfavorable situation of North Korea, both domestic and

foreign. Second, South-north economic cooperation helps the North not only to maintain, but also to strengthen, its present regime.

However, for the reasons discussed below, South Korea must pursue a continuation and extension of the present strategy, which seeks changes in North Korea's policy, while continuing to maintain an effective deterrent based partly on the alliance with the United States and the presence of U.S. forces.

First, if the peninsula is unified under current conditions, that is, under conditions of continued political, economic, social, and cultural differences, it is expected that South Korea will be faced with unmanageable post unification problems, which, in turn, could lead to political, economic, and social instability. On the other hand, if the Korean peninsula is unified by first implementing and realizing the Basic Agreement, then moving toward South-North reconciliation, followed by the opening of an era of cooperation, peaceful coexistence, and common prosperity, and finally working toward full unification gradually and peacefully through cooperation, both sides can, given sufficient time for preparation, overcome in advance many problems which might otherwise appear after unification.

Second, given the rigidity of the North Korean regime as the isolation of North Korea deepens and its economic difficulties are aggravated; as a result of South Korea's hardline policy towards the North, there is a remote possibility that the North might initiate an all-out war.

Third, while the unification of the Korean Peninsula should be achieved through dialogue and negotiation between the authorities of South and North Korea, a unified Korea will probably necessitate a new international relationship in Northeast Asia, requiring

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37 Young-Kyu Park, "Korean Reunification: Implication for Northeast Asia" by the Pacific Forum/CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, (June, 1992), pp. 89-93
the cooperation of, and support from, the neighboring powers, which cannot be obtained in the short-run.

3. North Korea

Unfortunately, North Korea still refuses to abandon its long-standing strategy of unification by force and continues to ignore the Republic of Korea's efforts to promote inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. However, through the successful pursuit of its northward policy, based on the spirit of the July 7 Declaration, together with the various practical steps it has taken to promote a national community, the South has steadily built the foundations for inter-Korean peace and unification.³⁸

In analyzing the basic strategy of North Korea on the inter-Korean talks, it is evident that since the July 4th South - North Joint Communiqué of 1972, North Korea has capitalized on the inter-Korean dialogue as a tool for their united front strategy to "liberate" South Korea. The North has insisted on the withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea, and has agitated extremists and radicals to violent revolution. The changes in South Korea, which threatened social stability and shook the fabric of existing political, social and labor relations, have been viewed by North Korea as an opportunity to accomplish its united front strategy. North Korean reunification strategies changed from massive war to peaceful coexistence, to peaceful offense, followed by People's Revolution.

The reason that the North adheres to its nuclear weapons program despite the difficulties it faces (power transfer, economic plight and international isolation) is that any country possessing nuclear weapons automatically becomes a major military power. Fortunately, the United States and North Korea have reached a broad agreement on freezing North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for a series of concessions from the

³⁸National Unification Board, "To Build a National Community through the Korean Commonwealth", Seoul, Korea (September 1989), p. 34
United States (on October 18, 1994). South Korea welcomed the agreement reached in Geneva. "We assess that the agreement has established an important base for a fundamental solution of the nuclear problem and the preservation of stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula," South Korea's Foreign Minister told reporters in Seoul.\footnote{New York Times (October 18, 1994)} If it partly overcomes its international isolation through such effort, the North will call it a remarkable diplomatic achievement by the new leader Kim Jong-II, and will try to utilize it for reinforcing its internal integration. After that, having saved the face of its political system, the North is expected to open partially its society in the pursuit of economic gains, which may or may not be used for opening its society wider, but could be invested instead in war preparations.

In conclusion, North Korea has not acknowledged any change in its basic objective of unification by force if necessary. Would the North really prefer a peaceful confederation to a conquest by force? It maintains tactical flexibility to solve its three big difficulties by utilizing its nuclear weapons program and the nuclear card. Therefore, we should note carefully the relations between the United States and North Korea in the future.
IV. THE CURRENT UNIFICATION FORMULAS

A. SOUTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION FORMULA "KOREAN NATIONAL COMMUNITY UNIFICATION FORMULA (KNCUF)"

1. History of "KNCUF"

The essence of the Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Reunification, which the South announced on August 15, 1970, was that the two sides, rather than committing hostile acts against each other, should engage in a good-intentioned competition toward development, construction and creation in order to determine which system was better. This competition pre-supposed the co-existence of the South and the North. The July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972), a highly significant historical document because it was the first agreement ever reached between the two sides, recognized each other's entities and maintained mutual co-existence. Based on this spirit of peaceful co-existence, the South announced the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. Often referred to as the June 23 Declaration (of June 23, 1973), which featured: 1) tolerance of North Korea's entry into international organizations, 2) simultaneous entry into the United Nations pending unification, and 3) opening the door of the South to all other countries including Communist bloc nations regardless of ideologies or political systems.40

On January 18, 1974, the South proposed the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement. On August 15 of the same year, South Korea announced the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification incorporating the systematized overtures, declarations and agreements made in the past. The three principles were that: 1) a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the South and the North to establish peace on the Korean peninsula, 2) the two sides should open their doors to each other and restore their mutual trust, and to this end, South-North dialogues should be carried out

faithfully, and multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation should be promoted, and 3) based on these, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, to accomplish unification.

The announcement of the three principles was based on the perception and judgment that since prompt unification is impossible, given the reality of inter-Korean relations and the nature of international politics, the groundwork for peaceful unification, or durable peace on the Korean peninsula and the reconciliation of the Korean people, should be laid first, and on this basis, political integration should be promoted. North Korea denounced the three principles as a "scheme to forge two Koreas." However, since the existence of two political entities on the Korean peninsula is a stark reality, its recognition cannot constitute any new act of forging.

In the early 1980s, South Korea proposed mutual visits between the top leaders of the two sides on January 12, 1980, and a summit meeting on June 5, 1980. North Korea rejected a joint meeting between political parties and social organizations. Here, the South was obliged to make public, unilaterally, a unification formula which it had prepared for discussion at a top leaders' meeting.

The idea of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, announced in a Presidential address on state affairs on January 22, 1982, featured the formation of a Consultative Council for National Reunification, with representatives from the two sides participating under the principles of: 1) national self-determination, 2) democracy, and 3) peace, in order to draft a unified constitution, thus making possible the accomplishment of unification through general elections held in both sides under the terms

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41 Koo, Yeoung-Nok and others, "Han Kuk eui Ton Il Jung Chaek" (Korea's Unification Policy), Seoul Korea: Nanam Publishing House, (1993). p.97
of the constitution. North Korea's response was negative. Since unification concerns two separate entities, a unification idea of any type can be rendered meaningless if North Korea, one of the parties directly involved, rejects it.

However, as can be seen in the case with East Germany and West Germany, calls for unification are bound to end up as nothing but lip service if there does not exist a party which takes the initiative. The July 7 Special Declaration, stated that the South would regard North Korea not as the target of competition or confrontation, but as a member of the nation and, further, as a "good-intentioned partner" with whom a national common prosperity, based on mutual trust, reconciliation and cooperation, should be pursued.

The July 7 Special Declaration was supported extensively in South Korea and abroad, and contributed much to the successful staging of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. It also gave a boost to the successful implementation of the South's northern policy. The South Korean government aligned the National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification in line with the July 7 Special Declaration and announced the Korean National Community Unification Formula on September 11, 1989. President Kim Young-Sam also re-emphasized the Korean National Community Unification Formula on August 15, 1994, when Korea was confronting tensions over the nuclear question.

2. Contents of the "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

The Korean National Community Unification Formula, announced in a "special address" by former President Roh on September 11, 1989, details: a) principles for unification; b) process for unification; c) organization and roles of an interim unification

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42Ibid., p. 48.
43Seo, Byong-Chul, "Gong Sam Kwan Bung Kae wa Dok Il eui Tong Il" (Communist Block Collapse and German Unification) Seoul, Korea, Kyechook Publishing House, (Oct. 1991), p. 68.
44The Korea Times, (August 15, 1994)
team; d) procedures for the establishment of a unified state; and e) the future image of a unified Korea.

a. Three Principles for Unification

The Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth three principles for unification: independence, peace, and democracy. The president enumerated these principles by stating, "Unification must be achieved independently in keeping with a spirit of national self-determination and under the principles of peace, non-use of military force, and grand national unity through democratic procedures."45

b. Process of Unification

The Korean National Community Unification Formula provides that the two sides proceed toward the state of the Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending unification.

The address laid down the process of unification as: a) a South-North summit meeting, 2) adoption of a national community, 3) formation of a Korean Commonwealth, 4) formation of a common sphere of national life and restoration of national homogeneity, 5) formation of social, cultural and economic communities on the basis of mutual recognition, non-aggression and co-existence and prosperity, and 6) realization of political integration.

c. Organization of an interim Unification System

South Korea, which suggested the creation and operation of a Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending the realization of a unified Korea, proposed the establishment and operation of: a Council of presidents; a Council of Ministers; a

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45 Special Address Made by President Roh, Tae Woo at the 147th Regular National Assembly, Korean National Community Unification Formula: Basic Explanatory Materials (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1989), p.48
Council of Representatives; and a Joint Secretariat as the organizations of the interim system. South Korea also proposed the creation and operation of a "peace zone."

A Council of Presidents, or the chief executives from the two would function as the highest decision-making organ of the proposed Korean Commonwealth. A Council of Ministers, to be co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of the South and the North and to be comprised of about ten cabinet-level officials from each side, would discuss and adjust all pending South-North issues and ensure the implementation of its decisions. Under the Council, five standing committees would be created to deal with humanitarian, political, diplomatic, economic, military, and social / cultural affairs.

The standing committees are to carry out programs related to: the reunion of dispersed families; easing of political confrontation; prevention of costly and counterproductive inter-Korean rivalry on the world scene and the promotion of the interests of overseas Koreans; opening of the South and North Korean societies and promotion of inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation; development of national culture; formation of a common economic sphere for co-prosperity; promotion of confidence-building in the military area and arms control; and replacement of the Armistice Agreement system with a peace system.

The South proposed the establishment of a unified state by: drafting a unified constitution; finalizing the draft constitution; holding general elections; and forming a unified legislature and a unified government. On the other hand, the Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth a blueprint for a unified Korea relating to: the formation of the state; the formation of a legislature; and the features of a national society.

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46Ibid., p. 54.
47Ibid., p. 68.
3. Features of "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

In light of the global trends toward universal freedom, welfare and openness, the development of South-North relations should be focused on promoting the well-being of the entire Korean people. The Republic of Korea sincerely hopes that North Korea will pursue reform and openness under conditions of stability. The South has no desire to unify the Korean Peninsula by absorbing the North.48

South Korea's immediate aims of the policy toward the North are as follows:

- Persuade North Korea to abandon its ambitions to communize the South.
- Make improvements in the human rights situation in the North and resolve the issues of 1) the numerous families separated by the partitioning of the land 2) South Koreans who rated better by the division of the country and 3) freeing South Koreans who have been abducted by the North and are being detained there.
- Convince the North to faithfully comply with the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (commonly called the South-North Basic Agreement) and the South-North Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This should include, among other things, the cessation of mutual slandering that is detrimental to reconciliation, and steps to build military trust with the goal of ending military confrontation.
- Open the South-North dialogue.
- Convince the North to cease nuclear adventurism. If and when Pyongyang ensures the transparency of its nuclear activities, the ROK is prepared to support the North's development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light-water reactor construction, by helping to make the necessary capital and technology available.

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48bid, p. 16
– Get the North interested in the Korean National Community Unification Formula and work together with them to design and carry out projects aimed at helping to build a single national community. The contemplated support for light-water reactor construction could be the first such project.49

The ROK will make the necessary preparations for every possible mode of unification at any time. It is prepared to share the pain and sacrifice that could accompany unification. The South will explore ways to cooperate with the North to ease the economic hard ship of the North Koreans, who are members of the same ethnic family as South Koreans. Toward that end and to promote the unification process, it is essential to first develop South Korea into a model democratic community.

4. Basic Aims

Unification no longer remains in the realm of a pipe dream or wishful thinking. It has now become a realistic goal, a feasible task. This calls for greater preparedness on the part of the South for unification, including the buildup of its capabilities to accomplish the task, as well as its more active efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.

The German and Yemeni experiences show that unification abruptly realized, without careful and systematic planning and preparations, can lead to enormously adverse consequences, even a new and real national catastrophe. Of course, the Administration has been pursuing a policy of progressive South-North integration, first to bring the two heterogeneous societies together into a single national community and further develop it so that a fully politically unified Korea can be built eventually. However, it would be wise to rule out the possibility that unification can take place abruptly and unexpectedly against the

49The Korea Times, (Oct. 22, 1994)
wishes of the South. Accordingly, all possible scenarios must be examined and sufficient preparations made for any possible turn of events.

The most important way of preparing for unification is by translating the vision of a unified homeland into reality first in the South itself. We must develop South Korean society into a model democratic community. This calls for a clear understanding on the part of each and every citizen of what his or her duties, as well as rights, are. The public should also be fully prepared to share the pain and cost of attaining the glorious goal of unification. President Kim's Liberation Day speech was based on an acute awareness of all those implications and ramifications of the unification process. It was intended to prompt both the Government and the general public to think ahead and brace themselves for this momentous national task.\(^{51}\)

North Korea is now in a state of flux following the death of Kim Il-Sung, its only leader for the past half century. Consequently, it appears that South-North relations will enter a new phase. This offers the Republic an unprecedented opportunity to actively transform inter-Korean relations. Considering the current situations of South Korea-Russia and South Korea-China diplomatic relations, and the North Korea-United States nuclear issue agreement, South Korean unification policy should be changed in order to accept a more resolute and more active North Korean unification policy.

In summation, South Korea's basic aims are (1) to turn changes into opportunities, (2) to deal with the new North Korean Regime, (3) to urge shifts in the North's policy toward the South, (4) to outline joint projects for national development, and (5) to step up preparations for unification.

\(^{51}\)The Korean Times (August 16, 1994)
B. NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION FORMULA "DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF KORYO (DCRK)"

1. History of the "DCRK"

On August 14, 1960, the eve of the anniversary of National Liberation, while South Korea was in utter confusion following the April 19 Student Uprising, North Korea first advanced the idea of unifying the Korean peninsula under a confederal system. In a speech, former North Korean president Kim Il-sung, calling for unification through general elections, suggested the adoption of a confederal system as an interim step toward unification, adding that if a confederal system could not be instituted outright, then the two sides should first engage in economic exchange.

Considering its timing, the overture seemed to be strategically motivated. It had obviously been designed to steer the South's unification fever in a direction which would be favorable to the North. However North Korea's suggestion of a "confederal system" as an interim form of unification and of a "confederal office between the representatives of the South Korean and North Korean government," was seemingly reasonable and realistic. However, since North Korea demanded (1) the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and (2) the replacement of the South Korean government with a people's regime as prerequisites to inter-Korean negotiations for a confederal system, it was more than natural for the South to reject the idea of a confederation.

Beginning on June 23, 1973, the North made its unification policy consistent with its unification idea. On that day, which coincided with former South Korean President Park's announcement of the June 23 Declaration in the South, former North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in a speech at a public rally welcoming the visiting Czechoslovak Party Secretary, General Husak, set forth the so-called "five-point unification program."

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52 Yang, Ho-Min and others "Nan kwa Buk, Euo Tuke Hana ga Doena" (North and South Korea: The Road to Unification) Seoul, Korea: Nanam Publishing House, (1992), pp. 157-159
The five points were: (1) prior settlement of military issues, (2) multi-pronged collaboration and exchanges, (3) convocation of a grand national conference, (4) unification under a Koryo confederation system, and (5) joining the United Nations under a single ticket.

The North thus began laying down prerequisites intended, in large measure, to eliminate South Korean government authorities. The confederation system the North proposed, now given the name, "Koryo", was not a confederation between the government authorities of the South and the North, but a form of government to be adopted at a "grand national conference", to be attended by the political parties and social organizations of the two sides.

No concrete principles and other rules for the idea of a Koryo confederation system were produced at this stage. The prerequisites, also, were by no means concrete, and were designed primarily to eliminate the Seoul government authorities from talks on the Korean issue. However, in a speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party in October 1980, North Korea produced a method for "establishing a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," by setting forth more concrete principles for the creation of a confederal government and more complicated prerequisites. Contrary to its "South-North" confederation idea of the 1960s, a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" has been advanced as the final form of unification.

After that, the form and characteristics of the North's confederation idea underwent some change in 1973, when the word "Koryo" was added to its name, and again in 1980, when the words "democracy" and "Republic" were affixed to it. This confederation idea was incorporated into its unification policy when the North announced the "five-point peaceful unification program" in 1973.
2. Contents of the "DCRK"

The idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea describes as the "most perfect and reasonable form of unification," was contained in North Korea's policy report made at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party. The part of the speech pertaining to the idea of a confederation system consisted of three sections: (1) prerequisites to a confederation system, (2) principles for the formation and operation of a confederal government, and (3) ten major policies for a confederal government. The following summarizes those three sections:

a. Prerequisites

First, to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland, the North provided the following prerequisites couched in traditional communist rhetoric: "military fascist rule should be liquidated and the democratization of the society realized in the South so that the present regime can be replaced with a democratic regime, voicing and defending the opinions and interests of the people."

Second, fascist laws such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law should be repealed and all tyrannical offices abolished in the South.

Third, all political parties and social organizations (including the Communist Party) should be legalized; freedom of political activities by political parties, social organizations and individuals (including Communist activities) guaranteed.

Fourth, a dialogue should be realized and a peace agreement concluded between North Korea and the United States. The U.S. authorities should withdraw their troops from Korea at an early date.

Fifth, the American scheme to forge two Koreas should be thwarted in order to realize the independent unification of the fatherland, and an end should be put to the United States' interference in the internal affairs of Korea.
Given these prerequisites, it becomes certain that the idea of a Democratic
Confederal Republic of Koryo is a unification formula that can be put into practice only
when the South Korean government is replaced with a pro-Communist regime, called a
"democratic regime," acceptable to the North. While thus denying the other side in
dialogue, in favor of an imaginary regime, the North shows some tolerance when it comes
to the issue of formation and operation of a confederal government.

b. Principles for Formation and Operation of Confederal Government

First, the most realistic and reasonable method of unifying the fatherland,
on the principles of independence, peace and national unity, is for both sides of Korea to
ally themselves and form a confederal state while retaining their ideologies and systems.

Second, the North and the South should form a unified national
government on the basis of recognizing and tolerating the ideologies and systems existing in
each other's areas as they are; a government where they shall participate as equals and
where both the North and the South shall maintain their own regional autonomy, carrying
equal rights and obligations.

Third, the North and the South should form a Supreme National
Confederal Assembly among the appropriate number of their respective representatives and
overseas delegates, under which they should create a confederal standing organization
(confederal government office) to guide the regional governments of the two sides and to
take charge of the overall programs of the confederal state. Fourth, the confederal state
shall be called the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," named after the
universally well-known unified state of our country and reflecting the common political
ideal of the South and the North, democracy.\(^\text{54}\)

\(^{54}\)The Research Institute for National Unification, The Korean Journal of National Unification, Seoul, Korea,
It can be easily perceived that these principles run counter to the prerequisites. Whereas the North demands the stepping down of the South Korean government in favor of a "democratic regime," as well as a change in the South's political ideology, political system and laws, it suggests that the two sides form a confederal government as equals, retaining one's ideologies and systems and tolerating the other's as they are. The North disregards reality by arguing that the political form of the proposed confederal state should be a Democratic Republic, reflecting the common political ideology of the North and the South. This may be taken to mean that a confederal system could be adopted only when a regime pursuing the same ideology as the North's seizes power in the South.

When North Korea discussed the principles for the formation of a confederal government in 1980, they did not produce any operational principles for the confederal system. They were laid down only in Kim Il-Sung's speech at a reception held to mark the 35th anniversary of his regime, on September 9, 1983. North Korea's idea was that the two sides put up co-speakers and co-chairmen of a Supreme National Confederal Assembly and a Confederal Standing Committee, who would then operate their organizations by turn.55

**c. Ten Major Policies for a Confederal State**

(1) Enforcement of independent policies in all areas of state activities.

(2) Implementation of democracy and promotion of national unity in all areas, throughout society and in all sectors.

(3) Implementation of economic collaboration and exchanges, and guarantee of the self-reliant development of national economy.

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55Ibid. pp. 76-77.
(4) Realization of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of science, culture and education, and promotion of the uniform development of science-technology, national culture and national education.

(5) Connection of transportation and communications of the North and the South, and the guarantee of free use of transportation and communications across the country.

(6) Promotion of the stability of the lives of workers, farmers, other working masses and the rest of society, and elevation of the people's well-being.

(7) Elimination of the state of military confrontation between the North and the South, and organization of allied national forces.

(8) Support and protection of the national rights and interests of overseas Korean residents.

(9) Proper handling of the external relations which the North and the South established before unification and uniform adjustment of the external activities of the two regional governments.

(10) Development of friendly relations with all other countries as a unified state, and implementation of peace-loving external policies.\textsuperscript{36}

This 10-point policy is a kind which can be translated into action not only after the implementation of a confederal system, but even before its enforcement. These points, can also be carried out, regardless of a confederal system, for the sake of unification and unity of the nation. Nevertheless, North Korea continues to postpone any inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation until after the realization of a confederal system. Its rejection, therefore, of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at this stage is hardly understandable.

3. Features of the "DCRK"

The idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea boasts as the most reasonable method of unification in this period, harbors several contradictory and problematic points in terms of requisites necessary for a unification formula. The confederation idea superficially calls for peaceful unification. In substance, however, it retains the basis of the North's unification policy, that is, "revolution in South Korea first and unification under communism later." The features of the idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"\textsuperscript{57} are:

First, the idea of a confederation system, in its prerequisites, denies the system of the other side in dialogue. In other words, the idea of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" is not a unification formula designed to introduce a confederal system through dialogue and negotiations between the governments now existing in the South and the North. In as much as it asserts that a confederal system could be adopted only when a regime suitable to the idea is established in South Korea, the North's idea of a confederation system is a "unification idea without any object," at least at the moment. The number one prerequisite is that the incumbent Seoul regime should step down in favor of a "democratic regime" (people's democratic regime), which, in effect, means "revolution in South Korea."

Second, despite the rejections, in its prerequisites, of the ideology and system of the other side, the confederation idea, in its principles for the formation and operation of a confederal organization, calls for the introduction of a confederal system on the basis of mutually tolerating different ideologies and systems, thus leaving room for mistaking the confederation idea for a unification formula based on peaceful inter-Korean coexistence. The contradictions between its "prerequisites" and its "principles for the formation and

\textsuperscript{57}National Unification Board, "A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea," Seoul, Korea (1990), p.92
operation of a confederal office" are obviously intentional and not the product of ignorance or mistakes. This can be seen in the fact that the emphasis is placed on "principles" instead of "prerequisites" when the North propagandizes its confederation idea.

Third, one of the "principles," that "the two sides mutually recognize and tolerate the difference in their ideologies and systems," does not refer to tolerance and coexistence between the liberal democratic system of the South and the Communist system of the North. Instead, it implies co-existence based on the mutual recognition and tolerance of the difference between the ideology and system of the South after the "prerequisites" are fulfilled (namely, people's democracy of the South), and the socialism of the North. Thus, as far as this is concerned, it is a hoax, but no logical contradiction exists, at least on the surface, between the "prerequisites" and the "principles."

Fourth, the North makes it clear that the 10-point policy is for implementation after unification is achieved under a confederation system. If so, the 10-point policy cannot be a policy that has anything to do with the idea of unification. The North's policy to engage in exchanges and cooperation, and promote grand national unity only after unification, does not conform to the procedural order of unification and runs counter even to the principle of grand national unity, one of its own three principles for unification. The South and the North should engage in exchanges and cooperation and promote unity to achieve unification. However, this is not to say that both sides should promote unification in the interests of exchanges and cooperation. To those who view the 10-point policy without a perusal look at the procedural order of the institution of a confederal system, the policy may seem plausible. However, it should be pointed out that a pitfall exists here, a pitfall in which the procedural order of unification turns upside down.

Fifth, the fact that there is a difference in the description of the word "confederation" in Korean and in foreign languages, represents another indication of the
duaL-nature of the idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo." In Korean, "confederation" is expressly defined as "federation." In substance, also, it calls for a kind of federation-style integration. Under such a system, a federal government exercises external sovereignty including military and diplomatic rights. In English and other foreign languages, however, the word "confederation" embodies the concept of the association of states and is used in a different way than "federation." This confusion in terminology is obviously intentional, since the North is aware that the idea of the "association of states," rather than the more appealing "federation" as an interim stage of unification, is discussed often in the international community. 58

In this way, the idea of "democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" harbors several problematic points: concealment of strategic goals, antagonism in prerequisites and principles, inversion of procedural order, one-sidedness of contention, and ambiguity of the expression of the basic concept. Still, North Korea argues that the confederation idea is the most reasonable plan true to the three major principles for unification: independence, peace and grand national unity. North Korea explains the prerequisites (aimed at engineering a "revolution in South Korea") in the context of "independent unification"; the principle of forming a confederation through collaboration between a "people's democratic regime" of the South and the North Korean regime, in the context of "peaceful unification"; and the 10-point policy, in the context of "grand national unity", respectively. 59

4. Stratagem in the "DCRK"

North Korea's Glossary on Political Terminology says "the system of federation is one of the forms of association between or among nations with different languages, customs and cultures." It adds that if a "federal system" were to be formed, a "federal constitution should be established." In reality, the countries which have adopted the federal system are multi-racial nations. Good examples are the former Soviet Union, the United States and Switzerland. Therefore, if South Korea and North Korea were to be unified, it does not need to be under a confederal system. The Koreans are not multi-racial, nor do they have different languages, customs and cultures. However, since the political and economic systems of the two sides differ in reality, the need to have an interim stage in the course of forming a unified state exists. In this event, it is necessary to do an in-depth study to determine which would be better, a confederation or an association of states. In April 1945, the Chinese Communists had gone so far as to propose the creation of a "coalition government." In Vietnam, from September 1960 through the early 1970s, the North Vietnamese Communists abetted the split in South Vietnam through their persisting offer to the Saigon government for the establishment of a coalition government. Using this tactic, they finally succeeded in communizing South Vietnam. East Germany, also, proposed to West Germany, on December 1956, the idea of the association of states as an interim step pending German unification. However, this was outrightly rejected by West Germany.

In this manner, the Communists sought, successfully in some instances, to achieve their goal of communization through various forms of the tactics of association, or federations. Employing these same Communist tactics, North Korea has ceaselessly been demanding a confederation system. There are signs that show that North Korea has

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particularly used Chinese and North Vietnamese tactics as a model. For example, the North's so-called 10-point policy resembles, in substance, the "10-point nation-saving policy against Japan" which the Chinese Communists advanced in their proposal for the second collaboration with the Kuomintang, or the "10-point national liberation policy" the Vietcong offered in their call for the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon.\(^6^1\)

What should also be pointed out is that since North Korea started to advocate the idea of a "Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo" as a unification formula, the overtures the North has made to the South were mostly aimed at getting the prerequisites realized. For example, the North proposed mostly rally-like meetings such as a "joint conference," a "political conference" and a "pan-national conference" between political parties, social organizations and people from all social backgrounds, instead of talks between government authorities with due competence and responsibility. Similarly, rather than resuming the suspended existing dialogues such as the Red Cross, economic and sports meeting, the North advanced new meetings which were related to its call for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, which included arms reduction talks, high-level political and military meetings, a joint parliamentary conference and a tripartite meeting.

Seen thus, the North's idea of 'Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo' cannot be taken as anything but a device intended to establish a regime in the South which will be subservient to the North Korean regime.

\(^6^1\)For an analysis of the background leading to the announcement of the July 7 Special Declaration, see Lee, Hong-koo, Policy Basis and Implementation Direction of Korean National Community Unification Formula, Theoretical Basis and Policy Direction of Korean National Community Unification Formula (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990), pp. 11-14
C. COMPARISON OF UNIFICATION FORMULAS

The main purpose of this section is to understand the differences and similarities in the unification policies of South and North Korea so as to project a possible course, or set of courses, for future Korean Unification.

1. Similarities

So far, unification policies were instituted by both sides for the political purpose of attaining long term power. In other words, there are rivals who are politically opposite with regard to the unification issues. Also they would both have to adhere to a change, and therefore, the unification policy gives both government's leaders a feeling of uneasiness. That is why there has been no substantial progress.

Both the North and South Korean governments have set forth official formulas for national unification which they consider blueprints on how each side would proceed with the "peaceful" unification of the two separate states. Each side claims that its own formula is fair and workable so that the other side must accept. Indeed, both formulas have been used as excellent vehicles for extensive propaganda campaigns. 62

A free North-South general election for complete union will be held eventually in a democratic way. Also, both formulas are designed for domestic consumption because the Korean populace living both in North and South consider the issue of national unification to be an important national task. 63 Namely, both the DCRK and the KNCUF proposals are structural devices designed to play unification politics for domestic purposes, largely ignoring value integration. North Korea had taken a variety of initiatives for reunification which contained conditions more favorable to the North than to the South. Kim Il-Sung

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called for revolutionary strategy to turn North Korea into a powerful revolutionary base by fortifying its political, economic, and military capabilities. In the meantime, South Korea's unification policy in the 1960s, which was carried out by Park Chung-Hee, concentrated on the building of economic power at home and international support abroad while simultaneously ignoring all overtures from North Korea. In other words, South Korea rested its basic position toward North Korea on the "economic construction first, unification later" slogan.64

In the 1970's, however, the situation changed. South Korea achieved remarkable economic growth and its ability for its own defense has also grown, while the amount of U.S. assistance, both economic and military, has gone down considerably. Under such circumstances, South Korean decision-makers understandably tended to place greater stress on self-help and self-reliance. The emergence of Japan also gave South Korea an increasing margin of choice. Since the signing of the treaty to restore diplomatic relations, Japan has emerged as a major foreign power in terms of its political and economic influence in South Korea. By the same token the U.S. monopoly of influence over South Korea both in political and economic aspects has declined.

Finally both North and South have constantly reiterated that the unification of the divided country is basically an internal problem of the Korean people. However, changes in strategy have frequently been forced upon the both Korean leaderships by various external factors such as the multipolarity of international environment. In pursuing their objectives, North and South Koreans have continually articulated positions which are diametrically opposed to each other.

64Dr. Park, Gun-Yang, "Unification Politics of North and South Korea: Development and an alternative" The University of Texas at Austin, (1990) p. 182
2. Contrasts

There are several significant differences in the unification formulas set forth by South and North Korea. First is a difference in the organization and policy of a unified state. The South Korean unification formula seeks to establish, by peaceful, democratic means, a completely unified democratic republic pursuing the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and individual well-being. In contrast, the North Korean formula seeks an incomplete unification under which two regional governments are to exist under the cloak of a confederation. Moreover, North Korea's ultimate goal is not even confederation but actually the communization of the entire peninsula. As preconditions to discussing confederation, the North has insisted that the South replace its anti-Communist government with one sympathetic to Communism and that the American forces in Korea be withdrawn. Their obvious intent is to create the conditions conducive to a Communist takeover. Second are differences in the method of unification. The South Korean unification formula provides a set of democratic procedures leading to unification: (1) the drafting of a constitution of a unified country by the Consultative Conference for National Reunification, (2) the making of the constitution into law through national referendums, (3) the holding of general elections under the constitution, and (4) the forming of a unified legislature and government through general elections. The North Korean formula, however, forecloses any democratic procedures. It excludes specific persons of the Republic of Korea from taking part in "confederal organizations" such as the Supreme National Confederal Conference and the Confederal Standing Committee; and attempts to force unilateral conditions upon the South.

Third is the difference in the approach to unification. The unification formula of the Republic calls for the normalization of inter-Korean relations through the conclusion of

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a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea as a measure conducive to unification. Based on this Agreement, steps would then be taken to restore national solidarity, remove factors detrimental to unification and prevent the recurrence of war, thereby fostering national harmony and an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful and democratic achievement of unification. In contrast, while North Korea's formula outlines some inter-Korean cooperation in what is called the "ten major policies," Pyongyang expressly states that there can be no cooperation until after a confederation is formed, or in other words, until the "communization of the whole of Korea has become a certainty." This is so unreasonable and unrealistic that there is no chance of success.

The fourth is the difference between the Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR) and the Meeting to Expedite Unification or the Grand National Conference. The CCNR would be composed of participants from each side who would represent the views of the residents of their respective areas. Each side would select its representatives under its own political order and would not interfere in the selection of the other side's representatives. The responsibility of the CCNR would be to draft a constitution of a united country. North Korea, on the other hand, has set limits on who could take part in the Grand National Conference which they recently renamed the Meeting to Expedite Unification. North Korea insists that the authorities of the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea could not take part in the meeting along with a number of other South Koreans singled out by North Korea. Pyongyang has made the additional assertion that to "facilitate" the meeting, the Republic of Korea should change its judicial, political and social systems. Also, there are different definition of the words. "Peace" is certainly an important value toward which both sides could converge. However, "Peace" is perceived differently, and the means to achieve it is conceived differently by the leaders and the people of the North and the South. The fifth difference concerns
conflicting views on the U.S. forces presence in South Korea. As they see it, the most serious stumbling block for the North Koreans to achieve peace on the peninsula is the 43,000 U.S. forces stationed in the South. However, the American presence is perceived by the South Koreans as "the corner-stone of peace." The leaders of the North strongly believe and the people are educated to think that all the hardships they are suffering are caused by the threat from the American forces and that they have to sacrifice their well-being in order to defend themselves.

The sixth major difference is the fact that since their division, South and North Korea have maintained different ideologies and systems. Nevertheless, both have invariably voiced the need for national unification. When it comes to policy goals and methodology, however, the two sides show a substantial disparity, leading to a state of acute confrontation. More specifically, North Korea's policy is "unification first", that is, North Korea's main objective is to unify the Korean peninsula under the rubric of "Juche" by initially realizing the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in Korea, then stimulating a pro-North Korean attitude in the South and then taking the initiative to open a dialogue with South Korea on the unification issue. On the other hand, the South has adopted a step-by-step approach toward unification in which both South and North Korea will seek co-existence and co-prosperity, and build mutual trust which will be a basis for integrating the two Koreas.

In my opinion, this disparity in policy goals and methodology regarding unification may have derived from the fact that each side has maintained and developed its own ideology and system. More basically, however, its source may well be the deep-rooted mutual distrust caused largely by the Korean War. As a consequence, neither accepts the

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process or form of unification proposed by the other. For instance, on the one hand, South Korea argues that North Korea's "Democratic Confederational Republic of Koryo" unification formula superficially calls for peaceful unification and retains the basis of the North's unification policy, that is, "revolution in South Korea first and unification under communism later." On the other hand, North Korea criticizes South Korea's "Korean National Community Unification Formula" for perpetuating the division of the peninsula. This fundamental difference in objectives as well as strategies regarding the politics of unification, then, has resulted in the basic differences between the two Koreas.

The differences between the two sides became evident in the series of North-South meetings between September 1971 and June 1973. North Koreans publicly emphasized their peaceful intent and agreed to engage in a high level dialogue with South Korea. Pyongyang, however, began a secret buildup of its military forces at about the same time. After the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue failed in 1973, the North shifted to an intensive diplomatic lobbying campaign against the United States and South Korea, which lasted until 1976. The North Koreans supplemented their diplomatic campaigns with "carrot and stick" tactics, which consisted of occasional peace overtures to the United States and periodic tension-building initiatives such as the axe-killings of American soldiers at Panmunjom. North Korea also attempted massive infiltration into South Korea. They sent large numbers of secret agents and guerrilla units into South Korea. This type of North Korean tactical infiltration continued while the North-South Korean talks were being held.

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70Dr. Kwak, Tae-Hwan, "Han Ban Do Pyong Wha Tong Il Eun Gu" (In Search of Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula), Seoul, Korea, Computer press. (1986), p. 112.
3. Evaluation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th>North</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of the formula</td>
<td>Korean National Community Unification Formula</td>
<td>Formula for Creating Democratic Confederation of Koryo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic philosophy</td>
<td>Based on the value of freedom and democracy</td>
<td>Juche self-reliance ideology (a variation on Stalinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification process</td>
<td>In 3 phases: reconciliation and cooperation—a Korean commonwealth—a unified single nation—state</td>
<td>Gradual completion of a confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis is on building a single national community leading to full unity</td>
<td>Emphasis is on developing the structure of a unified state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim arrangement</td>
<td>Korean commonwealth</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to establish a unified Korea</td>
<td>By democratic general elections in both the South and the North under the constitution of a unified Korea</td>
<td>Through negotiations at a conference of delegates from political and civic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format of a unified Korea</td>
<td>A unified single nationstate with one system and one government</td>
<td>A confederation of two states, each with its own system and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision of a unified Korea</td>
<td>Advanced democratic country ensuring freedom, welfare and human dignity for all</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime mover behind unification</td>
<td>Entire Korean people</td>
<td>Proletariat</td>
</tr>
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The unification strategies of both the North and South have changed several times. They were dependent upon each side’s assessment of their own and their counterpart's strength, both internal and external, and of the international environment. Seoul’s unification policies changed from Marching to the North during the First Republic, to neutralism during the Second Republic, to suppression of the unification movement in order to put the emphasis on economic development and rapprochement during the Third through Sixth Republics.

North Korean policy toward the South has been highly opportunistic.71 The DPRK government is ready at all times to exploit any internal turmoil in South Korea, partly to reaffirm its own reunification plan and partly to divert the attention of its people from domestic problems. When circumstances have changed and one tactical approach has fallen short, the North Koreans have not been reluctant to try another. Pyongyang pressed for immediate, sweeping political and military measures – the formation of a North-South confederation, the abolition of the anti-Communist laws in the South, and radical arms reductions. They contended that such dramatic changes were necessary to create a new climate of trust, after which further moves could be made toward inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea demands the withdrawal of the American forces as a prerequisite for any peaceful resolution of Korean conflict. It has viewed the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea as an obstacle to an inter-Korean detente and peaceful reunification of Korea. Thus, DPRK demands for U.S. troop withdrawals have been a consistent policy since the division of the Korean peninsula. For South Korea and its allies the major obstacles preventing peaceful reunification were not the United States forces but rather the North's goal of bringing South Korea under its control – that is, reunification on the North’s terms.

In a sense South Korea's unification policy has been essentially in the nature of a response to North Korean unification policy, since it was North Korea which has maintained more aggressive strategies toward South Korea and which has resorted to both military and political means to unify the country under their hegemony.

North Korea's long-range unification strategy is a simple one; to unify the country under Communism. This policy has remained unchanged for the past half century and it is likely there will be no substantial change in the near future. The North Korean meaning of unification is clearly stated in the preamble to the revised charter of the Korean Workers' Party adopted in the Sixth Party Congress on October 13, 1980. It reads that "the ultimate task is to imbue the entire society with the Juche ideology while, at the same time, to establish a Communist society throughout the country." This statement clearly indicates that unification is exactly the same as the communization of the entire peninsula by means of revolution.

In explaining the developments of both Koreas' policies of reunification, I have paid attention to the change of leaderships. At the outset, it was premised that there is a relationship between change in leadership and change in unification policy.

V. LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN UNIFICATION

A. SIMILARITIES

There are some important similarities in the German and Korean situations. North Koreans, like East Germans, enjoyed a period of independent economic success despite disadvantageous external conditions. At the same time, South Koreans, like West Germans, appear bent upon assuming that their long-suffering compatriots must be transformed to adopt their rules, standards, etc., in short, South Korea's system. References to "deprogramming ... the North Korean people's brain washed mindset" is an extreme expression of the view that victims of communist rule have been so debased that they have nothing to bring to the unification process in the near term. 73 This attitude is central to the psychological problems which have tarnished German unification. Although this dimension is registered by Korean analysts of German unification, it is consistently underplayed in favor of greater attention to economic costs. 74

Korea and Germany experienced a painful national separation for a half century since World War II. Both nations' enthusiasm for their unification was very strong. From the confrontation during the Cold War period, West Germany and South Korea could win over the other sides, East Germany and North Korea, with efficient ideological economic and political systems.

The economic dimensions of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) vis-\-a-\-vis ex-GDR(German Democratic Republic) and South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea seem to resemble each other on the surface. Roughly speaking, the size of the FRG economy in terms of GNP was about ten times greater than that of the GDR economy before the unification. After the unification, the first reliable official economic data was released

74 Sung Chul Yang, "United Germany for Divided Korea: Learning from Euphoria and Dysphoria," Ibid., pp. 454-455.
recently. According to the Federal Government's Statistical Office, in the last half of 1990, that is, the first six months after the unification, the eastern German GNP was estimated at 105.3 billion Deutsch Mark (DM) or 60.2 billion dollars, while the western German GNP was approximately 1.28 trillion DM. Thus, the East German economic size represents only 8.3% of West Germany's.\textsuperscript{75} Similarly, it is reported that the South Korean GNP ($238 billion) in 1990 is roughly nine to ten times bigger than that of North Korea ($23.1 billion).\textsuperscript{76}

In my opinion, it seems to be that North Korean leaders are wary of absorption-unification due to the consequences resulting from the German unification example as described above.

B. CONTRASTS

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West Germany was a decentralized federal government founded originally by Laenders. The Federal Republic was created by local governments (Laender). What is more, the rise in popularity of federalism over centralism has been impressive.\textsuperscript{77} By contrast, the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea is a highly centralized typical unitary government. The ROK's central government is now wrestling with the timetable of when and how to form local administrative governments. Thus far, only the local and provincial legislative assemblies have been formed, and they have been in operation only since 1991. In short, West Germany has had (and the current unified Germany has) a firmly rooted local autonomy, while South Korea has just begun its political experiments with local autonomy.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75}Sung-jo Park and Sung Chul Yang, German Unification and Korean Division (In Korean) (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1991)
\textsuperscript{76}North and South Korean Social and Cultural Indicators (In Korean) (Seoul: Ministry of Unification Board, 1991), p. 54.
\textsuperscript{78}Byong-sak Koo, The Principles of New Constitution (In Korean) (Seoul, 1989), pp. 1000-1022
Above all, the FRG has been one of the most stable and efficient democratic nations in the post-War world. Thus far, it has experienced two inter-party transfers of power from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) coalition to the Social Democratic Party (SDP) coalition in 1969 and from the SPD coalition back to the CDU-CSU (Christian Social Union)-led coalition in 1982. During this period, the FRG had five presidents and thirteen cabinets of which eight were formed by CDU-led coalitions, and five, by SPD-led coalitions.\(^{79}\)

By contrast, the ROK has been marked by political instability during the same period. It had six republics with nine constitutional revisions, not to mention two military coups (1961 and 1979), three major student and popular uprisings (1960, 1980 and 1986) and some twelve declarations of martial laws and emergency decrees. Since its founding, the ROK has experienced only two peaceful transfers of power in 1988 and in 1993. Even then, the power succession did not occur between parties, but within the ruling party. Thus, South Korea has yet to experience a peaceful transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party. All in all, South Korea is in the midst of an early phase of democratization at best, or it is still being plagued by political instability and political infantile paralysis.\(^{80}\)

Noteworthy also is the fact that West German government is a typical cabinet-type system, while South Korea's current Kim regime is a presidential system. The West German legislature is bicameral, Bundestag and Bundesrat, and that of South Korea is unicameral, the National Assembly. The powers and authority of German Laender are strong and growing, but the newly created South Korean local assemblies are inherently


weak. They are dependent upon, and subject to, the control of the central government.\textsuperscript{81} Worse still, South Korea unilaterally postponed the mayoral and the provincial gubernatorial elections until 1995. In doing so, he has, in fact, violated the local autonomy laws which, among other things, prescribed such elections by June 1992. In protest, opposition parties - the Democratic Party and the United People's Party - boycotted the normal operation of the 14th National Assembly.

The FRG and the ROK's legal or constitutional provisions for unification, too, are in stark contrast. The FRG's Basic Law was "temporary" in nature as its Preamble stipulates, i.e., "desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany...." Consequently, the German people are yet to enact a new Constitution (Verfassung) for the united Germany. The irony is that the FRG's Basic Law has remained virtually intact, albeit two revisions during the last forty years, despite its "transitional" character. By contrast, the ROK's constitution, its seemingly "permanent" nature notwithstanding, was revised nine times with six substantial changes.

The FRG's Basic Law had two legal provisions enabling unification (Articles 23 and 146), while the ROK's current constitution has six provisions dealing with unification. Unlike the West German basic Law, however, the South Korean constitution claims the territory covering both the present South Korea and North Korea (Article 3). Most importantly, the German framers of the Basic Law, as well as its key political leaders, placed the task on both the ruling and opposition parties and seldom resorted to using the Basic Law or its revision as an instrument for perpetuating or strengthening their own partisan power. By contrast, the South Korean politicians have often misused or abused

\textsuperscript{81}David Marsh, Op. Cit., p. 79
the constitution or its revision as if it were their personal political tool to rationalize or perpetuate their own political power.\textsuperscript{82}

Glaring differences in international and external dimensions also exist between Germany and Korea. To begin with, the German people did not experience the fratricidal proxy war in the early 1950s that victimized the Korean people and others. As a result, the Korean people both in the North and the South still have a deep-seated and lingering mutual distrust, while similar feelings are virtually absent from the minds of the German people.

Germany's centerstage position and Korea's periphery, semi-periphery or, at best, middle-power status are also noteworthy. Germany, the claimant of the traditional Mittel Europa, the principal actor of both World Wars and the main locomotive of European integration, differs sharply from Korea, the principal victim of both the Sino-Japanese (1894-1905) and the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars, World War II and the Korean War, let alone of the Cold War. In this connection, Gurtov's view that "unlike the German case, where unification was commonly perceived as a direct contribution to Europe's long-term stability and integration, Korean unification may be perceived as destabilizing, even potentially threatening, to the major powers," is thought provoking.\textsuperscript{83}

C. LESSONS

Korean unification would be somewhat different from the German case in terms of the political situation. West Germany alone is the strongest economic power in Western Europe with the largest population. The West German population is about 62 million, while the East German population is about 17 million.\textsuperscript{84} A unified Germany with a

\textsuperscript{82}Sung Chul Yang, Op. Cit., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{84}U.S. Department of State, Status of the World's Nations, Washinton: GPO, 1983, p.6
population of 80 million is the dominant power in Europe as compared to France (54 million) and the United Kingdom (56 million).\textsuperscript{85}

A unified Korea would have a population of 60 million and a territory of 221,000 square kilometers. Korea's neighboring countries exceed this size. A unified Korea would not be a threat to its neighboring countries.

Bearing in mind the increasingly tedious nature of the unification question, this portion will examine the following two questions in some detail. First, it will identify some problems and difficulties stemming from the swift realization of united Germany. In so doing, Korea, still a divided land, should maximize the so-called advantages of the late-comer by learning from the German experiences. Second, by observing and learning from the German unification experiences, a new approach to the Korean question is proposed here as an alternative to the currently existing official and unofficial models and formulas for the Korean unification.

The division between South and North Korea has now persisted for more than five decades and has been solidified by continuing hostility and confrontation. It causes a serious problem because a sense of alienation between the South and North Koreans has been growing under the two different political systems and ideologies.

Since the appearance of major studies on unification by Karl Deutsch\textsuperscript{86} and Ernst Haas\textsuperscript{87} in the late 1950's, a variety of theories seeking to show how a divided people can achieve unification have been developed. Some theorists stress the role of either elite or mass attitudes; others focus on material conditions, such as levels of communication and trade. Some scholars assign equal weight to the two factors. In Political Unification, Amitai Etzioni approaches integration through organization theory. He defines unification as a

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid., pp. 6-11
\textsuperscript{87}Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958), p. 211.
process through which the integration of a system is increased. The question for him is what level (or levels) of unit-integration are most conducive to the initiation and development of unification. Karl Deutsch speaks of integration as a process leading to the creation of security communities. He suggests that an intensive pattern of communication between individual units will result in a closer community among the whole units. While Deutsch and his students have tended to focus on such low-level phenomena as trade, tourist traffic, and news media attention, the concerns of most other scholars have been on the use of intergovernmental organizations as facilitators or arenas for joint action.

Although the main concern of this project is political unification in Korea, I would like to outline why a shift from low levels of interaction between two Koreas to much higher levels is needed for Korean reunification and how such a shift might be achieved. As we have learned from German unification, economic exchanges and cooperation can greatly contribute to unification. Non-commercial exchanges or grants under favorable conditions are especially important for reducing political confrontation.

South Korea's economic superiority indicates that the unification efforts will be led by the South. Therefore, South Korean authorities must control the private activities of the South's firms which pursue commercial interests only, and promote economic exchanges and cooperation with consistency. Also, North Korea must open its doors to induce South Korean capital and technology, because this is the first step to prepare the groundwork for the two sides to recover their national homogeneity and to expand inter-Korean economic cooperation.

The fundamental goal of inter-Korean Economic exchanges and cooperation is to upgrade the level of national welfare after unification, by establishing a foundation for a national community. Therefore, inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation should be implemented by consistently taking into account long-run considerations for restoring
peaceful coexistence. Since relations between North and South Korea remain confrontational, economic exchanges and cooperation which could lessen the North's economic difficulties and contribute to expedite political reconciliation must receive primary importance.

In the case of the former East and West Germany, they tried to settle disputes in accordance with the New York Agreement. South and North Koreans need to establish a dispute settlement committee as a subcommittee of "Economic Cooperation Committee." As we can see in the relationship between West and East Germany, their cultural exchanges were continuously performed and laid the basic foundation for present relationship. Thus, informal efforts are needed most at this point for Korean situation. I expect that Korean unification is an absolute certainty. The political transformation of the Korean peninsula, especially the Northern system, may occur at an unexpectedly rapid pace such as the German unification.

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88 Seo, Byong-Chul, "Gong San Kwoun Bung Gwi wa Dok Il Tong Il" (Communist Block Collapse and German Unification), Seoul Korea Kyechook Publishing, (Oct. 1991)p. 67.
VI. KOREA: PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS

A. DILEMMAS AND ALTERNATIVES

1. Internal Problems

The concept of a confederal system by North Korea contains the same problems as does the national conference for unification. Both proposed unacceptable preconditions for South Korea. It seems clear that the final objective of the North Korean proposals is a communization of the entire Korean nation. More concretely, North Korea concentrates first on the withdrawal of United States troops, then on carrying out the Communist revolution in South Korea, and finally focuses on unification under Communism. This objective is not merely a conclusion based on research of North Korean unification policies, but also continues to be expressed publicly by the North Korean authorities.

The North Korean "peaceful unification" would be quite different from the common notion of that concept. It would not be a peaceful unification achieved through free elections reflecting the free will of the people. Peaceful unification cannot be on these North Korean terms, considering that the South Korean population is more than double that of North Korea, and that the standard of living and economic strength of South Korea is far greater than that of North Korea. Essentially, North Korean peaceful unification means at best a Communist revolution. This cannot be achieved by peaceful means, but can only be achieved by force. This intention is seen in brutal incidents such as the Rangoon incident of October 1983, which attempted to kill former South Korean President Chun but instead killed seventeen members of the presidential delegation.89

Peaceful unification will not be achieved simply by the removal of an artificial demarcation line through a sudden agreement by both sides, but rather through the

89 The Korea Times, (October 10, 1983)
homogeneous reconciliation of the two opposing societies. Without this reconciliation of
two very different societies, unification is not feasible. If some kind of awkward
unification was temporarily established by some improbable event, it might soon lead to
another civil war. Therefore, in order to make a viable long-term plan for Korean
unification, the closed society of North Korea should be carefully studied, and some
positive measures for opening and changing this society should be taken. In consideration
of this, the special environment of North Korean society which has evolved for fifty years
should be analyzed.

To maintain total control over social life, even domestic travel is severely restricted.
Travelers must receive permission in advance and apply for food rations and coupons.
Their itineraries must be approved. Travelers are subject to identification checks on the
road and at hotels. They should have several identification documents such as residence
cards, ration cards, union or party documents and personal identification cards with
information on employment and marital status and military identification.90

2. External Problems

External changes that will confront the two Koreas are equally profound. Korean
unification should be viewed not only as a domestic issue to be addressed through inter-
Korean political processes, but also as an international issue strongly influenced by the
complex relationship and conflicting interests of the four major powers—the United States,
Russia, China, and Japan. To them stability on the Korean peninsula is a dominant
concern. Consequently, they view the reunification of Korea as a less pressing issue than
their public pronouncements seem to suggest. They see little chance of reunification in the
foreseeable future. More importantly, their own national interests are better served by the

90U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 215.
preservation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Russia has revealed an impressive degree of sophistication in its approach to East Asia, demonstrating a skillful use of diplomatic leverage in addition to military muscle to achieve its political objectives in the region. While China continues in its policy of relying on the Western capitalist countries, the United States and Japan in particular, for capital and technology, it will seriously attempt to improve relations with the United States and Japan.

On February 19, 1992, the prime ministers of North and South Korea signed the so-called "Basic Agreement between North and South on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation" along with the "Joint Declaration on De-nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula." The treaty commits them to mutual respect for each other's political system as they promised when they entered the United Nations. As the words of the treaty indicate, the two sides should have negotiated and cooperated instead of pursuing policies of confrontation and subversion. Essentially, in my view, so far the agreement is not worth the paper it is written on.

All people on the Korean peninsula appear to wish for "Peace," which is certainly a common concern and could be a basis for value integration. However, the North and the South have been diametrically opposed about how to reduce tensions and bring stability and peace on the peninsula. If both sides successfully negotiate and agree upon the follow-ups of the Basic Agreement, they are moving a step forward to "Peace". 91

B. SOLUTIONS

1. Internal Criteria

   a. **Democracy and National Strength**

   Korean unification is a difficult and complicated problem that multi-faceted efforts for five decades have not been able to resolve. Therefore, there is no clearly assured way of unification. We should try to pursue some feasible means of unification, considering all the elements that we have studied. The lack of a clear path does not indicate that there is no hope for Korean unification. The rapidly growing economy of South Korea is clearly preparing a way for unification. South Koreans do not desire unification at any cost but only unification based on a democratic system which guarantees a free market economy and basic human rights. Therefore, when we say "Korean unification," the communization of Korea is excluded.92

   The most important factor in Korean unification is national strength. Peaceful unification is not a unification achieved simply through negotiations without considering the national strength of the two sides. The Communists will never resign their ambitions unless they are forced to do so. Accordingly, maturity of economic development is an absolute prerequisite for Korean unification. Korean unification is a long-range national task which cannot be quickly achieved. Social stability is an important prerequisite to successfully carry out this long-term policy. Therefore, voluntary national unity should be consolidated under the leadership of a strong government. Unfortunately, it is true that the Korean people are not satisfactorily politically mature. Social turmoil is a possible danger.

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A strong government should be maintained for a stable society. Considering the military confrontation between South and North Korea, a long-term stable government is absolutely necessary.

b. Recognition of the North Korean Situation

The present society of North Korea is a society unique in the world. Almost the entire population is trained as military personnel and organized as a paramilitary force. The territory of North Korea is fortified as a military base. There is no freedom of movement for the people. They are kept in the dark about the news around world. Radio and TV signals are jammed so they cannot receive news from outside their country. For example, they do not even know about the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. All telephone numbers (public and private) were changed by the North Korean government authorities in 1993 in an effort to make it hard for their own people to communicate and receive information from other countries.93 Also, food ration control is used as a kind of people control measure. The society is totally collectivized and mechanized under the Communist Party's control. Unless this society is changed, Korean unification is not feasible. Even if some superficial unification is made, it could lead to another civil war. Therefore, before embarking on a program for unification, some practical measures should be taken to change North Korean society.

c. South Korean Unification Formula

Readjustment of the unification phase is necessary. Among the current three phases (1st phase: reconciliation and cooperation, 2nd phase: A Korean Commonwealth, 3rd phase: A Unified single nation state)94 of unification the first phase should be eliminated with the 2nd phase becoming the 1st phase and it would be desirable to insert the North Korean's Confederate State phase into the 2nd phase. Since the

93 The Korea Times (May 26, 1993).
94 The Korea Times (Aug. 15, 1994).
Confederal State idea is the key issue of the North's Unification formulas, if we insert the Confederal State phase, it would be very advantageous to our ability to get North Korea to come to the dialogue table for unification.

Also, a national defense system should be divided into two different objectives, national defense against external invasion and national defense in the context of South-North Korean relations. Until now the two systems have been confused. However, if South Korea wants to actively carry out a program of national unification, the two national defense systems should be clearly distinguished and reorganized.

For this, the national defense system against external invasion should be organized in alliance with the United States and other friendly nations. The present national defense system would be in this category. Also, the national defense system in the context of South-North Korean relations should be independent of any Allied system. National unification can be achieved only through self-reliance and self-determination. National unification is a Korean national problem and should be internationally publicized as such.

A dominant role for South Korea is the natural consequence of the above arguments. If unification is a Korean national problem and can be achieved only by self-reliant efforts, South Korea should take charge of all the responsibilities for the Korean question rather than its ally and friendly states.

To carry out the program of unification, the assurance of non-intervention of external powers is absolutely necessary. To obtain this assurance, South Korea must persuade all neighboring countries that a unified Korea would be best for all. The two feasible alternatives of the United States' policy in the Korean question have been explained here. Of these two alternatives, a unified Korea in South Korean terms without any foreign forces should be the basic formula for persuading neighboring countries.
South Korea should be careful in making a long-term foreign policy of unification. The East German position, which argued for two Germanys, should be a good lesson for South Korea. South Korea should concentrate on keeping the universal recognition that the Korean nation is only one nation. Until now South Korea did almost nothing to advance a change. South Korea should quickly take the offensive and carry out active measures to change the North Korean totalitarian collective society. Of course, it is difficult to penetrate a thoroughly closed society like North Korea. It is also true that the more closed a society, the more vulnerable it is to external cultures and systems. Thus, South Korea should urgently study this issue.

The South-North Korean dialogue is very important for several reasons. It offers an effective means to change North Korean society and at the same time prevent foreign intervention in the Korean question, emphasizing that Korean unification is being carried out by the Koreans themselves. Therefore, South Korea should encourage its progress.

d. North and South Korean Summit Talks

"North Korea's basic strategy is they don't want to talk with South Korea," said Cha Young Koo, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis in Seoul. "They need an enemy, still, for the stability of their regime."\textsuperscript{95}

North Korean leaders do not want South and North Korea to be unified unless it is on Pyongyang's term. In South Korea, unification implies no definitive and absolute goals; it is vague at worst and open-ended at best. At the same time, a governmental-academic unification complex, resembling a thriving business enterprise, has emerged. A ministry supervising the unification question was created (National Unification Board). Scholars and experts specializing on this topic have multiplied. Journals, papers,

books and pamphlets, as well as conferences and seminars, have flooded the Korean intellectual market. Also, unification research institutes off and on campus and civic organizations at home and abroad, some of which are supported or subsidized by the public sources, have also mushroomed. In this regard, North Korea has been pursuing much the same course, except that all these are more uniformly directed and controlled by the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK).

Thus far, both sides' approaches to unification have amounted to nothing more than a war of words. While they are engaged in this war of words, the reality of division persists, and the ideal of unification remains unrealized. The initial step in the unification process, I believe, would be a meeting between the leaders of the North and South governments. Without this interim measure neither side can move toward unification.

2. External Criteria

a. Persuasion by the Four Power Countries

The neighboring countries of Korea would like to see the status quo maintained in the Korean peninsula. This does not imply that they would oppose any Korean unification. If they prefer the status quo in Korea, it is simply because they fear the uncertainty of a unified Korea in the context of their national interests and the risk of involvement in another Korean war.

In this sense, it would be useful to study the traditional American policy for Korean unification. As explained above, the United States' policy for Korean unification has been based on two feasible alternatives:96 (1) a Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarcation line with South Korea tied into the United States security

96FRUS, 1952-54, part 2, supra note 315, p. 1344.
system and developed as a military ally; or (2) a unified, neutralized Korea under the leadership of a substantially unchanged South Korea.

The current basic agreement between the South and North is supposedly in effect, but due to the lack of: (1) mutual agreement by both the South and North National assemblies, (2) notification to the U.N., and (3) verification by the four main powers, it appears to be an agreement without substance. To be effective, it must be confirmed by the powers.

The United States, Japan, China and Russia should provide substantial evidence of their support of unification on the peninsula. The leaders of the four countries always use every opportunity that arises to express their "desire for security on the Korean peninsula" but so far we have seen no actions to back up their words. So, in other words, it might not be incorrect to say that they actually would prefer the situation to remain just as it is. Even with the end of the Cold War, this attitude has not changed. This kind of attitude is advantageous to the North's policy (not really wanting a balanced form of unification) and it impacts negatively on the South's desire for unification.

b. Collective Security System

A new security vision will have a dual goal of managing the geopolitical balance of power inherited from the past as well as the emerging interdependence that will increase in the future. Therefore, it is very important to develop a variety of multilateral regimes and institutions to organize the collective action of states for coping with the transnational agenda.97

In post-World War II alliance and integration frameworks, Germany has been involved in multilateral arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE). The South Korean security alliance and external relations have been, on the other hand, primarily bilateral, e.g., the 1954 U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In recent years, some multilateral arrangements are in the offering in Korea and its region, too, but they are still in their embryonic stages. The launching of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the proposal of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), as a counterpart of the CSCE, are the cases in point.\(^\text{98}\)

The lack of a NATO-like structure in Asia strengthened the United States’ ability to manipulate the two Northeast Asian allies, weakened their ability to recognize the consequences of U.S. policy, and greatly intensified the meaning of containment during the Cold War. Because of the persistence of certain Cold War-like circumstances in the Northeast Asia region, these relationships are not just of historical interest as is true of the German-Soviet example of double containment. In Asia double-containment is fully functional in the 1990s. As the Cold War ended in this context, Korean nuclear options and prospects that a unified Korea might emerge as a rival for Japan renewed Japanese anxieties.\(^\text{99}\)

Because of the crisis which developed over the possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, Japanese anxieties are multifold. Not only does Japan fear a possible nuclear attack which in large part would result from sanctions leveled against the North, but Japan must face the scrutiny of the world community concerning weapons-grade material on Japanese soil as well as its anti-Korean racist policies toward some 680,000 Koreans living in Japan.

\(^{\text{98}}\)Ibid. pp. 43-48

c. United States - North Korea Agreement

The accord between the United States and North Korea outlines an elaborate timetable for steps by each side that would end in the complete dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program in about ten years, according to details disclosed October 21, 1994. American officials acknowledge that the agreement will require enormous patience and perseverance for the United States and its allies. And they concede that it poses a risk for much of the next decade that North Korea could change its mind, cast aside the accord and have the basic fuel in hand to produce nuclear weapons.100

Under the accord, North Korea would agree to allow full and continuous inspections of its existing nuclear sites, freeze and then later dismantle some of its key nuclear plants and ultimately ship out of the country fuel rods that could be converted into weapons. But the agreement also allows North Korea to keep those rods for an unspecified number of years. This provision means that North Korea could break its agreements and quickly produce nuclear weapons if it is prepared to run the consequent risks. The agreement, a first in diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea, is indeed a significant milestone. Conversely, the agreement itself does not, in the short term, preclude North Korea's ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. Consequently, the proximate result of the agreement rests upon the intentions of the North Korean leadership. Should North Korea abide by the agreement, this will be a major step toward entrance into the international community while having a most positive impact upon future developments and unification.

100The New York Times (Oct. 19, 1994)
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. POLICY DISPARITIES RESULTING FROM DIFFERENCES

Reality is such that a look at the unification policy bases and ideas of the South and the North shows differences only, with almost nothing in common. Seen thus, it is not totally unreasonable to regard unification on the Korean peninsula as next to impossible. The root cause lies in the fact that the two sides' ideologies and systems are different; there exists a disparity in the basic framework within which each interprets history and perceives the social and international environment. Moreover, the two sides underwent a fratricidal war which only served to deepen their mutual distrust.101

In short, North Korea sticks to a unification policy based on the concept of "revolution," "classes" and "struggles" because it believes in the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism. South Korea dwells on diverse views of values incidental to an open society instead of a single closed view of values because it subscribes to liberal democracy as its political ideology, and maintains a capitalist system. The South is sure in the conviction that a closed society can never successfully lead industrialization and democratization, and that, therefore, the North Korean system will not be able to hold on to its closed state indefinitely.

The South believes that the senses of class, struggles and revolution on the part of the North Koreans will weaken before long, and that it is only a matter of time before North Korean society undergoes a change as the trend of world history flows toward anti-totalitarianism. It is from this stance that the South calls for unification under a single state by holding general elections under democratic methods and procedures. The South's idea is that before accomplishing unification, a Korean Commonwealth, or perhaps the North Korean proposed confederal state, should be created during the interim stage, through

national reconciliation and the restoration of trust prompted by phased exchanges and cooperation.

Differences in ideologies and systems between the two sides thus led to a disparity in their interpretation of history, which in turn set off differences in the ways of perceiving each other's society, as well as international society. Such differences in the ways of perception, meanwhile, have inevitably brought about a disparity in their unification policies. As a result, the reality of today's inter-Korean relations is that the disparity in their unification policies has made it almost impossible for the two sides to carry on their dialogue on a practical basis.\(^{102}\)

Today, world countries, transcending differences in ideologies and systems, pursue reconciliation in gaining national interests and economic prosperity. In order for the two Koreas to transcend their differences in ideologies and systems, a change in the flow of the national history of Korea is necessary.

Therefore, the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea can no longer live only on the contradictions based on optimism about a change in each other's systems. Rather, they find themselves in a situation where they must readjust themselves by accommodating such a requirement. If so, the justness and reasonableness of the unification policies of the two sides can be determined depending on which one of the two policies has positively accommodated such internal and external changes and which one is in line with the flow of world and national histories.

**B. PROSPECTS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNIFICATION ISSUE**

North Korea only responds to the request for dialogue when it serves their political purposes. But this is only a scheme to buy more time to carry out their ulterior purposes.

In the final analysis, the basic philosophy behind South Korea's quest for unification is also centered on the value of freedom and democracy. With firm faith in democracy and on the strength of the independent abilities of our nation, we must strive harder to overcome the lingering remnants of the Cold War and end the territorial division in order to achieve the long cherished goal of peaceful unification without fail.\textsuperscript{103} Unification should be achieved on our own according to the wishes of our people and by virtue of our inherent national capabilities.

I think the reality of the international community is such that no intermediary exists who can coordinate the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea. Besides, the Koreans cannot delegate the task of unification to world powers, nor is there a party that can make a fair judgment. Instead, the two sides, with firm confidence in the direction of the flow of history, must first promote a stage where they can openly discuss issues, from the standpoint of brotherly love and pool their wisdom in working out an accord on matters of mutual concern. To this end, the two sides should depart from the residual Cold War era confrontation and promote a dialogue for co-existence and co-prosperity. At the same time, an international environment conducive thereto should persist for a protracted period.

Of course, today's North Korea is not in a condition to undergo resolute openness and reforms like the former Soviet Union and East European countries have. We can hardly expect any radical openness and reforms because the North has yet to root a hereditary power succession system, and because of the fear of the collapse of its system as a result of sweeping openness and reforms. The North Koreans' craving for a better economic standard of living is getting stronger. To resolve the issue, there is no other choice but to introduce both capital and knowhow from the outside world.

\textsuperscript{103}President Kim, Young-Sam's 1994 Liberation Day Speech, Seoul, Korea, (August 15, 1994)
Under the circumstances, the North's leadership will cautiously promote openness but will actually try to promote public support for its hereditary power succession system. However, such guarded openness is bound to lead to sweeping openness, due to the vitality and logic of the concept of openness itself. With regard to its unification policy, openness would significantly undermine the basis on which the North perpetuates in political propaganda and fictitious logic.

In the long run, the dialogue would make the North Korean people aware of reality and request that their leadership open Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) society to a higher standard of living, even to political freedom. Such a change would obviously be the cause of the collapse of North Korea's regime. Therefore, Pyongyang has been reluctant to continue the dialogue, at times unilaterally postponing or suspending it.

The turn of the international situation toward a new order affects, in an absolutely favorable manner, the efforts of the Koreans to overcome their division. The international trend toward reconciliation and cooperation, transcending systems and ideologies, already necessitates inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation. The changes in Eastern European countries, which are putting an end to the Communist system, demand a change from North Korea in its policy to strengthen the "three revolutionary abilities" and the unification policy based thereon. The end of the Cold War system on the international level demands an end to the Cold War mechanism on the Korean peninsula.\(^{104}\)

If North Korean society has no choice but to be changed in the direction of openness and reforms, the improvement of inter-Korean relations would become a matter of time. If and when inter-Korean relations improve, the unification issue will be resolved through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation on the basis of the reality of division. The fact that the openness and reform of former East Germany has made possible the rapid

improvement of inter-German relations and German unification provides the Koreans with a means through which they can assess the direction of the resolution of their own unification issue.

In sum, South Korea has continually proposed a step-by-step unification plan, but from the viewpoint of futurology and the social sciences, unexpectedly rapid change could occur. Rather than worrying about whether unification will occur or not, futurologists are more concerned about how to prepare for unification and how the features of a unified Korea will correspond to the global historical processes. Under the present circumstances, it is important to find ways in which the South and North can coexist and prosper together. On the basis of such a prosperity, the two societies can be integrated into one prosperous nation.

C. KOREA'S DESTINY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS

Korean unification would no doubt resolve considerable tensions not only on the Korean peninsula but in the entire Asia-Pacific region. However, it would also introduce new tensions as well. In China and Japan "Neighbor" anxiety to a combined Korean military threat and nuclear weapons on the peninsula runs high as well as unease over a United Korea's potential as an economic rival. Korean unification is a regional security issue that will depend on continued reasonably good relations in the Asia-Pacific region. If not reunited with the South, the North, increasingly isolated, will continue to develop and rely on military power combined with nuclear capability to assert itself in the region. In near economic collapse the only alternative for the North is to expand (by force) in the hope of revitalizing its nearly destroyed economy and depleted resources. This expansion would undoubtedly escalate throughout the region as well as the world.

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In order for America to promote regional stability and an open Asia-Pacific region it will have to help organize it. A much needed regional security dialogue which could lead to a more cooperative future for the region could result from unification. However, the United States' regional strategy must emphasize Korea's importance in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, however, must also plan for the possibility of disruption rather than stabilization of the region as a result of Korean unification. Not only would the United States be a central player in Korean unification but China would as well. Improperly handled unification could result in political turmoil that could drive a wedge between the two great powers. No matter the outcome, the prospect of unification has already involved complex regional diplomacy involving the United States, Russia, Japan and China as well as North and South Korea. Once the nuclear issue is settled, the difficult and the complex issues of unification and Korea's future security alignments will unfold.106

## APPENDIX A. COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS (1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>North Korea (A)</th>
<th>South Korea (B)</th>
<th>B/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>22,336</td>
<td>43,663</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1000 km²</td>
<td>122.1</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>$bn</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>294.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real growth rate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military spending</td>
<td>$bn</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of military spending to GNP</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of military spending to budget</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated acreage</td>
<td>mil.ha</td>
<td>1.974</td>
<td>2.109</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rice paddies</td>
<td>mil.ha</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>1.345</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain products</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>4.268</td>
<td>6.206</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rice</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>5.331</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corn</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>2.112</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice output per unit</td>
<td>kg/10 acre</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine products</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>5.746</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>17.56</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>25.86</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolled steel</td>
<td>mil.tons</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>35.79</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>1000 tons</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>1000 tons</td>
<td>295.0</td>
<td>285.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>1000 tons</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>1000 tons</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>165.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipbuilding</td>
<td>mil.grt</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>4.567</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: National Unification Board; Bank of Korea; Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), 1993
## APPENDIX B. MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Troops</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>655,000*</td>
<td>1,030,000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ground Force</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Unit&gt; Corps</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>50***</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigades</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Equipment&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Naval Force</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Combatants</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support vessels</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Air Force</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical aircraft</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support aircraft</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* excludes those enlisted for defense call-up, and includes Marine Corps troops within the Navy
** the Marine Corps troops who are organized into the Army are included in the Army
*** includes Marine Corps divisions

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMG</td>
<td>American Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNR</td>
<td>Consultative Conference for National Reunification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCRK</td>
<td>Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsch Mark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCNA</td>
<td>Korean Central News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNCUF</td>
<td>Korean National Community Unification Formula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPK</td>
<td>Worker's Party of Korea</td>
</tr>
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