United States Naval Cooperation with Canada

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United States Naval Cooperation with Canada

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This paper explores the development and future of naval cooperation between the United States and Canada. Long-time neighbors, friends, and allies, both nations are in a period of reflection on national defense and foreign policy priorities as a result of the end of the Cold War. The challenge is to define a road map for naval cooperation that meets the common needs of both nations. To accomplish this goal, an understanding of the development of the naval relationship between the nations must be established, the current political-military climate reviewed, and then the way ahead proposed. This paper offers some suggestions.
This paper was prepared for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Western Hemisphere Branch (OPNAV N523); the Commander - in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Director of Plans and Policy (N51); and the U.S. Naval Attache to Canada.

The contents of this paper reflect the views of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the United States Department of the Navy.
1 April 1995

UNITED STATES NAVAL COOPERATION
WITH CANADA

The close relationship between the U.S. and Canada has often been one of benign neglect to many of those of us who live "south of the border." Although we are the closest of neighbors, two of the world's largest trading partners, and closely tied culturally, many "Americans" assume Canada will always be a friend and ally that will be there when needed. While this friendship is certainly strong, it should not be taken for granted. The post-Cold War era is generating a plethora of new international relationships and restructuring alliances that have been stable for over half a century.

This paper studies the development of U.S.-Canadian naval cooperation and examines its potential post-Cold War thrust. It familiarizes the reader with the forces affecting the development of modern Canadian naval forces, reviews the issues related to cooperation with the U.S. Navy, then examines potential points of disagreement that could affect maritime relations between the two nations. With this research in mind, recommendations are offered to best enhance future naval cooperation.

In an era of shrinking budgets and "new world order" relationships, cooperation is one key to optimizing naval assets. In support of this goal, Commander Coombs has chosen a logical starting point by examining the naval alliance with one of closest friends of the U.S. His suggestions provide many solid insights as to how best maintain this friendship and enhance mutual support initiatives.

Donald C. F. Daniel
DONALD C. F. DANIEL
Director
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Abstract of

UNITED STATES NAVAL COOPERATION WITH CANADA

This paper explores the development and future of naval cooperation between the United States and Canada. Long-time neighbors, friends, and allies, both nations are in a period of reflection on national defense and foreign policy priorities as a result of the end of the Cold War. Military budgets face severe reductions as governments seek to reap the benefits of the “peace dividend” and divert their attention to domestic affairs. The missions of combat forces are being redefined as the character of the world military balance changes from a superpower stand-off to a world faced with numerous regional crises.

Canadian naval assets, while limited in number in relation to those of the United States, can play a significant role in many naval operations that offer advantages to both nations. As the sizes of both navies shrink, cooperation will be essential to “doing more with less.” Participation of Canadian forces in combined operations offers diplomatic leverage the U.S. might not enjoy if it chose to act unilaterally. Continued cooperation encourages continued effort towards interoperability, resulting in increased combat effectiveness.

The challenge is to define a road map for naval cooperation that meets the common needs of both nations. To accomplish this goal, an understanding of the development of the naval relationship between the nations must be established, the current political-military climate reviewed, and then the way ahead proposed. This paper offers some suggestions.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies. Those whom nature hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

John F. Kennedy, 17 May 1961 to the Canadian Parliament

A common cultural heritage; the major trading partner of the United States (U.S.) both before and certainly after the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) (the U.S. and Canada exchanged $177.5 billion in merchandise in 1992); a critical defense ally during the Cold War; all these statements describe our northern neighbor Canada. Positive images prevail of our relationship: little known and often forgotten naval support during the Cuban missile crisis; the rescue of U.S. diplomats from Khomeini’s Iran by the Canadian Embassy; active participants in the NATO alliance with deployed forces at our side in Germany; allies in Desert Storm; the list goes on. Most Americans take for granted the friendship of Canada, but this concord between two nations has not always been as harmonious as it may have appeared on the surface.

Canadians are faced with many dilemmas in defining their role in the world. One of the largest countries by area, the national population is roughly

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equivalent to that of New York and New Jersey combined. Canada has potentially unlimited natural resources, but most of these are located in inhospitable territory and are economically unharvestable with existing technology. A relatively wealthy country by per capita standards, she is encumbered by a governmental spending deficit that has become a major influence on political decision making. With the world's only superpower on her southern border, Canadian citizens often find themselves budgetarily torn between depending on the U.S. for many aspects of their defense and the need to defend their national sovereignty. Internationally, Canada has maintained her influence in world affairs largely through an active membership in multinational world organizations (see Appendix I), believing this is the best route for a nation of her size to maximum influence in world affairs. This strategy appears to have been successful as it could be argued that Canadian military influence in the United Nations (U.N.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is far above that which would normally be expected of a nation with a relatively small combatant force.

Both Canada and the U.S. are now struggling to redefine their role in the Post-Cold War world. Canadians have recently elected a new Liberal government and are formally examining their position on international security affairs. The U.S. finds itself as the world's only superpower in a global environment of uncertainty. With a Democratic President and a newly elected
Republican Congress, the grappling to define the U.S. military missions and capabilities will be complex and often confusing to our allies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine maritime military cooperation between Canada and the United States. It is also intended as a primer and reference on the Canadian naval service, its history, and the events that particularly shaped its development and thinking. Unfortunately too many Americans are totally unaware of the naval history and capabilities of our closest neighbor. To improve this knowledge it will be necessary to focus on the changing political-military environment in a post-Cold War Canada and balance the analyses with developing trends in U.S. naval thinking. The recent political shifts in both nations have created significant ripples within military cadres. Canada, like the U.S., is experiencing ever increasing pressure for military cutbacks and diversion of the resultant savings into domestic programs.

Chapter II will review the history and development of the Canadian naval service. It will concentrate on events that significantly affected the origins of Canadian maritime military thought, specifically as they apply to cooperation with other nations. This paper assumes little or no knowledge on the part of the reader in the historical aspects of the Canadian naval service. Some of this background material is utilized to provide an understanding of influences on the thinking of Canadian politicians and military leaders on issues related to the navy. Readers familiar with Canadian naval history or who are limited in time may wish to skip this chapter.
Chapter III will attempt to focus on the current status, direction, and the projected role of Canadian naval forces in alliances and world affairs. Force structure, operations, doctrine, and cooperative agreements will all be examined in the context of current events and the evolving world order. The defense policy "White Paper" of the new government was released in early December 1994. An attempt will be made to determine the direction of this paper and its impact on Canadian maritime forces.

The next chapter will address the background, current status, and projected outcome of issues specific to U.S.-Canada maritime relations. Topics covered will include common air/sea defense cooperation, Arctic sovereignty, counternarcotics operations, fisheries protection, nuclear waste, pollution, and oil/mineral rights.

Finally, in Chapter V, an assessment of the way ahead for U.S.-Canada naval cooperation will be established. Recommendations will be provided for maximizing cooperation to enhance the naval objectives of both nations.
CHAPTER II

NAVAL HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

In 1995, Canada’s Navy will celebrate its 85th birthday. Over three generations of Canadians have been part of Canada’s many naval and maritime achievements.

F.W. Crickard and P.T. Haydon

In order to gauge Canadian thinking on issues surrounding their naval forces, it is necessary to take a brief look at the history of its development and the political influences that shaped it.

FORMATIVE YEARS

The House will cordially approve any necessary expenditure of a Canadian naval service in cooperation with and in close relation to the imperial navy...

Canadian House Motion, 1909

Until the war clouds prevailed in Europe at the onset of the 20th Century, Canada fell under the protective naval umbrella of the British Royal Navy (RN). Several moves by the United Kingdom sparked influential Canadians to push for some semblance of an independent navy. The first incident was an initiative by the British to spread a portion of the financial burden for expanding naval commitments in Europe amongst her domain.

At the Colonial Conference in 1897, Britain pressed for financial support for her navy. History supported the British view that “the sea was one,” that the navy protected every corner of the Empire by

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neutralizing the enemy fleet wherever on the globe it might be. This was a sound principle, but tell a Dominion voter he should pay for a navy he might never see and that could be moved at will by someone else's admiral. Strategy was one thing, politics was another.³

The fact that this request for funding apparently was not met with any increased say by the colonies in the British command structure further aggravated the situation.⁴

The establishment of special forces (colonial navies) set apart for imperial service, and practically under the absolute control of the imperial government, was objectionable in principle, as derogating from the powers of self-government enjoyed by them, and would be calculated to impede the general improvement in training and organization of their defence forces.⁵

Secondly, Canadians, to a degree, viewed their nation as being forsaken by the Royal Navy. Since Germany's world-wide responsibilities were not as great as those of the British, she could afford to keep her growing fleet closer to home waters. As one counter to this threat, the Royal Navy slowly started withdrawing her ships from Canadian waters to beef up the fleet in Europe.⁶

While it may seem strange today, at the turn of the century Canadians and British were concerned over a potential invasion by the U.S. Although relations with the U.S. were generally good, the British military did offer some buffer against American military adventurism northward. A conscious decision was

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³ Ibid., p. 22.
⁵ Sir Wilfrid Laurier, quoted in Ibid., p. 100.
⁶ German, p. 24.
made in Britain (withheld from the public) that the RN could no longer protect Canada from the United States and she would have to fend for herself.⁷

A surge of nationalism for some degree of naval self-sufficiency was the result and after several years of Parliamentary debate the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was officially founded on 4 May 1910 with the enactment of the “Naval Service Act.”

The RCN initially consisted of two aging cruisers obtained from the RN. HMCS Rainbow, was sent to Esquimalt on the west coast, and had an immediate impact on relations with the United States as “she set about a local cruise program combined with fisheries protection - basically chasing Americans out of the three mile limit.”⁸ The other cruiser, HMCS Niobe, was based in Halifax.

The next dilemma for Canadians was whether to forsake their historical alliance with the United Kingdom or to strengthen ties with the United States which was an emerging world class military power. The direct threat of a foreign invasion of Canada was remote (except from the U.S.?) and the Monroe Doctrine established the U.S. as protector of the Americas from European incursion. Canadian nationalistic sentiments leaned more towards maintaining relations with the mother country and the monarchy than submitting to the dominance of the U.S. As a result, for the next 40 years the newly establish navy was strongly influenced by the Royal Navy and served unofficially as an adjunct of that service.

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⁸ German, p. 27.
From the formation of the RCN until the outbreak of World War I, little was done to improve the size or capabilities of the service. The Canadian populace was ambivalent about a navy as were many politicians. The RN continued all attempts to utilize her independent colonies to serve her growing needs. Winston Churchill envisioned Canada as a puppet when he proposed that Canada procure three Dreadnoughts for imperial defense. Since Canada, not Britain, was making the purchase, Germany would have no excuse to enlarge its fleet in response. The proposal passed in the committee stage of Canada's Parliament, but in December 1912 it was soundly defeated in the Senate.  

THE GREAT WAR

Draw Carranza’s attention to the fact that the carrying out of unrestricted U-boat warfare will make it possible to bring England to her knees and and compel her to sue for peace within a few months.

A. Zimmerman, 16 January 1917

 Intercepted German telegram to the President of Mexico

The brief period leading up to World War I resulted in no major improvements in Canadian naval capabilities. At the outset of war, Canada had no significant assets with which she could protect her interests and was essentially dependent on the British initially and later the U.S. She was drawn into the conflict itself without consultation as the British King declared war on Germany and her allies in the name of the Empire. The primary requirement

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from the Crown for Canada was manpower to support the British Army. The Admiralty saw little potential for Canadian naval contributions in the European theater and could provide no assets of significance to the Western Atlantic.  

Canada’s role in World War I naval history was minimal, but a contribution was made. Practically devoid of military hardware, she was limited initially to establishing coastal patrols for submarines and counter-mining operations in her sea approaches. At the outbreak of war her navy consisted of 350 personnel and 250 reserves. Many of these mariners served with distinction, but did so on the decks of RN ships and in British aircraft. The cruiser Rainbow made a quick excursion to the coast of Mexico to seek out the German cruisers Leipzig and Nurnberg, but made no contact. After several more patrols south, the old cruiser was retired in mid-1917. The Niobe escorted a troop ship to Bermuda and performed some duties blockading German ships from the U.S., but was retired in 1915.  

The Admiralty held to the opinion Winston Churchill, the First Sea Lord, had given in October 1914: Canada should restrict her effort to the raising of land forces. No torpedo craft could be spared from European waters, and production in Canada was not practicable because armament, specialized equipment, and skilled manpower would have to be obtained in the United Kingdom, thereby disrupting British shipbuilding. 

During this time-frame the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) contingent in Canada was founded in 1915 with U.S. assistance to support the coastal ASW

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12 German, pp. 37-40.
13 Sarty, p. 105.
effort. In 1918, however, the RNAS was combined with the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) to form the Royal Air Force (RAF). This resulted in the navy’s loss of control over its air arm for the next twenty years.  

Canada’s major contribution in her own waters was convoy organization and protection. Assistance was requested from the U.S. for defensive assets and eight small antisubmarine vessels with U.S. crews were placed under RCN command. These vessels, along with an assortment of armed trawlers were employed to protect convoys leaving Halifax and other Canadian ports in support of the European theater of operations. At the conclusion of the war, Canadian Navy officers found their forces still lacking in their ability to prove any real defense capability for the Dominion.

Most galling for the RCN was the lack of suitable ships. Hose vented his frustration at the end of October 1918 with a far-fetched scheme for the following summer. Observing that the existing ships of the patrols were “powerless to prevent the enemy from acting when and where he pleases against shipping off Canadian coasts,” he advised that thirty-three destroyers and four submarines comprised the “minimum defence force required.” Commander J.P. Gibbs, RN, director of operations at headquarters, observed that this was “quite outside the realm of practical politics,” but he did believe that Canada should construct six large destroyers and eight submarines in her own yards. In any case, Gibbs warned, it would be “useless to build good ships...if there was not a thoroughly efficient dockyard to keep them in repair.”

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15 CAPT Water Hose, RCN, Commander Patrols Command; commanded Rainbow at war’s outbreak; future Chief of Naval Staff.
16 Sarty, p.123.
BETWEEN WARS

Despite the importance of the oceans to Canada, there has never been a strong national interest in developing more than token maritime forces.

F.W. Crickard and P.T. Haydon

The post-war period was met with general apathy from the Canadian public towards the military. Canadians had lost 60,000 men in the trenches of Europe and found little reason to strengthen their military. Support for a navy was almost nil as most of the populace lived inland and saw little urgency to understand the strategic necessity of naval forces. Matters got worse when an anti-military Liberal government under Prime Minister William Lyon McKenzie King (1921-30, 1935-48) took charge in late 1921 and immediately slashed funding for the navy from $2.5 million to $1.5 million. Naval forces were reduced to three outdated warships on each coast and just over 400 officers and men. In an effort to familiarize the public with the need for a navy, the naval secretary Commander J.A.E. Woodhouse, RN, initiated a proposal to establish a nationwide naval reserve cadre. The thinking was, if more Canadians were exposed to the necessity for an independent navy, the resulting support would make it more palatable. This approach apparently worked as the navy, its manpower, and capabilities grew steadily until the outbreak of World War II. The first ships contracted specifically for the RCN, the destroyers HMCS

17 Crickard and Haydon, p.3.
18 German, p. 55.
20 Ibid. p.63.
Saguenay and HMCS Skeena were built in the U.K. to Canadian specifications.

In 1937, the RCN regained its Fleet Air Arm from the RCAF which had been formed in 1924. At the formal outbreak of World War II hostilities, the RCN consisted of six destroyers, five minesweepers and 1,800 personnel.21

Another significant event of this period was the Ogdensburg Declaration issued in August 1940. During a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King, agreement was reached to establish a permanent U.S.-Canadian body to establish mutual defense policy. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) was chartered to study defense issues specific to North America.22 Canada, for the first time, formalized a military alliance which began a drift away from the Crown to the U.S.

WORLD WAR II

Although overshadowed by the Grand Alliance of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the Canada-U.S. alliance marked a major shift in the policies of both countries: from that moment on, North America would be considered a unity as far as defense was concerned.

Joel J. Sokolsky23

During World War II the Canadian Navy evolved from relative insignificance to the third largest navy of the victorious powers. At the outbreak of hostilities the RCN was designed to fight a perceived threat of surface raiders and mine laying submarines. The United Kingdom immediately requested that Dominion naval forces be placed under the direct control of the RN. Prime

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21 German, p. 71.
Minister King disagreed with the proposal and openly viewed his disagreement. The cabinet agreed to cooperation, but not control. As a result of this decision, the Canadian Navy gained its first degree of independence from the RN, but as a result did not benefit from the significant logistic support from the RN that other navies received.\footnote{German, p. 71-94.} This decision was later partially reversed by Canada in 1940 when her few destroyers in the European theater were placed under RN control.

The Naval Council received approval from the Cabinet War Committee to place all of the Canadian destroyers under the Admiralty’s operational control. This action, prompted by request from Britain, was recommended by the Naval Council for two reasons: first, the Admiralty were better able to take a worldwide view of naval dispositions and ensure that every ship was profitably employed; second, it was pointed out that these dispositions would probably be to Canada’s advantage.\footnote{W.G.D. Lund, “The Royal Canadian Navy’s Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic:1941-43,” James A. Boutillier, ed., The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1982), p.139.}

The well remembered losses in manpower in World War I under British control also drove Canada to concentrate on providing naval and air support to the war instead of sacrificing her soldiers.

And now politics was on the navy’s side. Downgraded to a mere token in peacetime, it found new favor in cabinet - though not for the sound strategic reasons that certainly prevailed. Mackenzie King feared that another huge 1914 army in Europe would bring dreadful casualties and the political nightmare of conscription. Thus, it was deemed politically wise to put the country’s effort toward the navy and air force. They were far less manpower-intensive and demanded much greater industrial effort. The country could profit from that. If war must be, then reap the industrial harvest, saves your citizens, and sell your wares! \footnote{German, p. 76.}
As it became apparent that the German submarine threat had been underestimated, initial efforts to counter it reverted to the proven convoy system to protect merchant shipping from North America. The initial Canadian role was to organize convoys and to provide whatever escort was available from Halifax, Nova Scotia. With the short range of the escorts available at the time, this left a significant gap in mid-ocean coverage which U-boats readily took advantage of. In April 1941, the Royal Navy (RN) established bases in Iceland to close this gap and Canadian escort responsibilities were expanded to cover the entire Western Atlantic. The Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF) was established in St. John's under Canadian command.\textsuperscript{27}

In its effort to meet expanding wartime requirements for both personnel and warships, Canada faced immense problems. Her shipyards were not immediately capable of producing vessels of any size nor major ancillary equipment - most significantly, sensors and armaments. Production concentrated initially on small escorts such as corvettes which were nothing more than large fishing boats with minimal armament. Manning these vessels and training crews was another immense problem. There were essentially no training facilities in Canada to cope with the expanding manning requirements. Once vessels put to sea, the demand for their services was so immediate that group training in tactics and employment was negligible. The initial conduct of

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid}, p. 87-89.
the war in the western Atlantic was thus rather ineffectual, but Canada did her best with what she had.

With the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, Canada initially found her growing navy even more stressed. As large as the U.S. Navy was, it was not well prepared for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against the U-boat threat. German U-boats operated off the east coast of the U.S. virtually at-will for the first six months of American involvement. While immediately tasked with western Atlantic convoy escort responsibility, the U.S. Navy had few assets available to meet this responsibility in the North Atlantic until May 1943. Due to a pre-war agreement with Britain, the U.S. assumed strategic control of all British forces in the western Atlantic including those of Canada. The fact that Canada was not consulted in these decisions did not set well in Ottawa.

The Atlantic Charter signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941, laid out the grand strategic plan for the defeat of the Axis powers. The U.S. got strategic control and protection of shipping west of a line running between Iceland and Greenland and south through the Azores. With no reference to Canada at all, Jones’s Atlantic Command and Murray’s Newfoundland force came under the strategic direction of the C-in-C Atlantic, Admiral Ernest J. King. Escort operations west of the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point became the responsibility of the USN’s Support Force (later called Task Force 4, then 24).

In the interim, Canadian forces assisted the U.S. as they could by providing escorts, valuable submarine intelligence from the British tracking network, and coordinating convoy routing.

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28 Ibid, p. 111.
29 Lund, p. 141.
30 German, p. 109.
Canadian efforts in obtaining autonomy and maximizing control over their forces were met with resistance from the U.S. The RCN was relegated to a sub-command of the USN. Efforts to establish a Canadian strategic liaison staff in Washington were resisted until July 1942.

This mission, called the Canadian Joint Staff, was set up after a year of arduous negotiations with the U.S. State Department; the Americans were anxious to "avoid the establishment of any undesirable precedent" which would encourage other small allies to press for military missions. The Canadian Joint Staff was actually established using the Permanent Joint Board on Defence as a guise. The Canadian chiefs of staff hoped the Canadian Joint Staff would provide a link with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on operational policy decisions involving their forces, particularly the Royal Canadian Navy.\(^{31}\)

Following the establishment of the Canadian Joint Staff (CJS), efforts centered on increasing Canadian autonomy particularly in the Northwest Atlantic where the preponderance of her naval forces were employed. For months, the naval member of the CJS, RADM V.G. Brodeur, fought the reluctance of both Washington and London to give the RCN a greater voice in its own affairs. He voiced his opinion on the lack of progress with the RN in a November 1942 memo to the Chief of Naval Staff when he stated:

This appreciation could go back to 1907 and all its political complications concerning the relations between the RCN and the Admiralty, but as the situation still seems to be very much the same as it was then, only recent facts will be related because they indicate that regardless of all decisions reached at previous Colonial and Imperial Conferences, the Admiralty still looks upon the RCN as the naval child to be seen and heard when no outsider (the USN) is looking on or listening in.\(^{32}\)

\(^{31}\) Lund, p. 145.
\(^{32}\) V.G. Brodeur, quoted in Lund, p. 147.
The RCN continued to express concern that the U.S. assumption of command in the Western Atlantic was lacking in its effectiveness and not taking full advantage of the Canadian forces and experience. Canadians were not being consulted on decisions regarding command structure and employment of assets, including intelligence resources such as high frequency-direction finding (HF-DF) ASW information. The RCN placed its emphasis for a command structure review on several unauthorized diversions of Canadian escorts by the USN without approval of the Naval Staff Headquarters (NSHQ). In a series of letters to Admiral King, disapproval was stressed and a request was forwarded for a formal conference to review Atlantic command relationships. The conference was held in March 1943 and the following month the RCN assumed full responsibility for convoy protection in the Northwest Atlantic.

The new command structure worked well, but by the mid-1944 the U-boat threat was essentially eliminated and the wolf pack tactics of Germany were abandoned in favor of individual patrols. While the major contribution of the RCN to the war effort was in the area of ASW, other operations must not be overlooked. Canadian escorts supported the Allied landings in North Africa ("Operation Torch") in November 1942 and her assault craft put troops ashore on Sicily and Normandy. In direct support of the invasion of Europe, Canadian warships provided escort and gunfire support services for the landings. Her minesweepers preceded Dominion and British assault craft to the beaches. Canada's first carrier aviation experience was gained in the later stages
of the war. Two escort carriers built in Seattle were placed under the command of Canadians although they remained attached to the RN to avoid the complications of lend-lease arrangements with the U.S. HMS Nabob and HMS Puncher saw action and provided a foundation for post-war Canadian carrier operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{33} The RCN even had some experience in the Pacific campaign when HMCS Uganda, a cruiser turned over from the British, saw brief action supporting U.S. island-hopping operations.

Canada's naval contribution to World War II is summed up as follows:

Twenty-four ships went down and nearly 1800 gave their lives. All but four of the ships were lost in the U-boat war. In return the navy sank thirty-one of the U-boats and disposed of forty-two surface ships. In the give and take the little ships saw 25,000 merchant voyages across the Atlantic, 180 million tons of vital trade. And that was Canada’s most decisive contribution, not just to the war at sea, but to the war itself.\textsuperscript{34}

At the end of World War II, Canada had the third largest navy in the world\textsuperscript{35} (See Table I) and was at the forefront of anti-submarine warfare capabilities from her years of hunting U-boats in the Atlantic. Unfortunately, a drastic post-war downsizing initiative immediately shifted into high gear. The post-war naval order of battle was initially set at "two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, twelve destroyers, and 10,000 all ranks."\textsuperscript{36} By the end of 1947,

\textsuperscript{33}German, pp. 184-188.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 203.
\textsuperscript{36}German, p.204.
however, the Canadian Navy was reduced to one carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyers.\textsuperscript{37}

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Notes: (1) Designation not used.  
(2) Counts are approximate by author. Numerous post-war decommissionings/sales in progress as of Jane’s publishing date.


\textsuperscript{37}Ibid. p.205.
POST-WAR TO PRESENT

Obviously Canada alone cannot deter aggression by a superpower. It is only through collective security arrangements that our country can contribute to international security.

VADM John Allan, CF\textsuperscript{38}

The period which preceded the Korean conflict had a marginal impact on the shaping of the Canadian Navy. The planners of the time were the former mid-grade officers of World War II. Much of their thinking was influenced by their experiences at sea in combat. Some remembered the humility of their subservient role to the RN (and perhaps the USN), while others reflected on the inferior equipment they were forced to operate. The stress therefore was initially on establishing a balanced modern navy able to meet a broad range of commitments.\textsuperscript{39} The navy fought to maintain its proposals, but the Liberal government of the time cut the budget and saw no immediate threat that justified strong maritime combat capabilities. The Canadian Navy in 1948 consisted of one carrier (the “arcticized” HMCS Magnificent), two cruisers, eighteen frigates and destroyers, and nine minesweepers.\textsuperscript{40} During this time, however, the concept was developed for the first truly Canadian-designed warship, the St. Laurent class frigate. While equipped with British machinery


and American electronics, the ship met Canadian-developed operational requirements and was built in Canada.

Morale in the post-war RCN was not high. Public support and funding for the navy was not good. Symptomatic of the less-than-ideal conditions of the time was the "Mainguy Report" of 1949. RADM Rollo Mainguy was selected to investigate the events surrounding a series of four incidents bordering on mutiny that had occurred on Canadian warships. All the incidents involved groups of junior personnel that refused to report to their assigned duties. Most of the complaints involved the less-than-perfect working conditions on the ships and poor leadership by officers. The report attached a portion of the blame for these events to a continued effort by the Navy to remain tied to British traditions and not recognize a separate Canadian identity. At this time the RCN still flew the RN white Ensign, and efforts to establish "Canada" uniform shoulder flashes and nationalistic maple leaf stack insignia for ships, had not been supported by the navy leadership.41 With this report, the RCN took one further step in recognizing its own identity.

With the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in June 1950, Canada dispatched a force of three Pacific destroyers which arrived in Japan for service one month after the formal agreement to support UN operations. Canada discovered that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) somewhat

limited its ability to provide forces in support of the United Nations. The only aircraft carrier in service was dedicated to NATO. The three destroyers deploying to Korea were designated to NATO in time of crisis, thus were subject to reassignment.

Service by the RCN in Korea was distinguished. Operating largely as a member of a Commonwealth Task Force, under overall U.S. command, her warships participated in blockade operations and numerous fire support missions. Commonwealth forces were usually deployed on the western, Yellow Sea side of Korea. As opposed to U.S. Navy operations, the chance of widening the conflict through direct contact with the Chinese was seen as more remote for Commonwealth naval forces operating in the Yellow Sea. In three years, Canadian warships fired over 130,000 rounds at shore targets and established a reputation as “train-busters” for their destruction of rail targets with naval gunfire. Perhaps the foundation of the Canadian reputation for participation in humanitarian military operations was also established in Korea. In an effort to aid the civilian populace on coastal islands, the RCN successfully created “Operation Comeback” in late 1950 to “clear out pockets of North Koreans and sympathizers, establish law and order, set up guarded fishing sanctuaries, and provide food and medical aid.” 42 Finally, a Canadian destroyer, HMCS Nootka,

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42 German, pp. 219-220.
had the honor of capturing the only enemy vessel taken during the war, a North Korean minesweeper.43

The true driving force behind the modern Canadian Navy for the two decades following Korea was its obligation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While finding a balanced force concept difficult to justify in the immediate post-war years, the navy now had a visible and discrete cause to support. Concepts for national military commitments to NATO took years to develop. The advent of atomic weaponry, in the minds of many, negated much of previous naval doctrine. Many thinkers believed convoy resupply in support of a war in Europe was no longer feasible: convoys could be taken out with a single weapon and they wouldn’t be required because an atomic war would be over before they could arrive. As this thinking matured, along with nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, military planners conceded that a protracted conventional war in Europe was still a possibility. Three developments soon affected the concepts of war at sea in the nuclear age: realization that accurate targeting for nuclear weapons against ships at sea was difficult; improved force dispersion strategies; and better sensor and anti-air tactics also improved predictions of the survivability of afloat forces. Once the need for convoys was accepted in the NATO hierarchy, the Canadian Navy realized it had a trump card to play.

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During the 1950s, Canada and the U.S. worked together to develop a series of land-based systems to defend against Soviet bomber attacks. The most likely direction of this attack was from the north so a series of radar stations were built across Canada starting with the CADIN-Pinetree Line (39 sites along the 50th parallel) in 1951 and ending with the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in 1955 (78 stations on the 70th parallel). The teeth to this system was a combination of Canadian and U.S. fighter interceptors and AAW missiles tipped with nuclear warheads (BOMARC and NIKE). While the majority of the sites looked north, the U.S. provided limited naval pickets and sea-based radar platforms to avoid “end runs.” The North American Air Defense (NORAD) agreement was formally ratified in May 1958. While the maritime aspects of this covenant were few, the agreement is worthy of comment as it has remained the basis for one of the closest military cooperative endeavors in the world.

Initially, Cold War ASW was thought of in tactical terms by Canada. World War II had provided a good deal of experience in protecting merchant vessels from U-boat attack. As weapons’ capabilities and ranges had expended, this thinking remained valid as a starting point for planning. Controversy and discourse came about when ASW evolved to a strategic role. A new mission for the submarine came about when nuclear ballistic missile technology went to sea.

The Soviets had first tested diesel-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBs) in 1955. By 1960, Hotel and Golf class SSBs were patrolling North American waters carrying SS-N-4 SARK and SS-N-5 SERB missiles with ranges of 350 and 700 nautical miles respectively. At

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44 Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Canada’s Territorial Air Defence (Ottawa: 1985), pp. 5-16.
that time the USSR lacked an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) capability and these first SLBMs were the only missiles able to strike at North America. Their limited ranges, however, made detection of the platforms easier for Canadian and American ASW forces. The 1960s saw a dramatic increase in Soviet sea-based capabilities with the deployment of the Yankee class SSBNs carrying the SS-N-6 SAWFLY SLBM with a range in excess of 1300 nautical miles. It was believed the Yankees gave the Soviets the capability to hit important targets in North America, most especially US Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases and command and control facilities.\footnote{Ibid. p.223.}

This strategic mission was not without controversy in Canada. Political bodies argued over the relevance and potential expense of Canadian ships conducting strategic ASW. Was the expense justified, and what was Canada getting from it?

In response, in July 1961, the future Vice Chief Naval Staff, Jeffry Brock produced a review of naval objectives which came to be known as the \textit{Brock Report}. The report supported Canada's role in strategic ASW and attempted to specifically focus on the need for Canada to remain engaged in multilateral relationships. At the same time, it stressed that Canada needed to preserve the capability to individually project power in support of its own policies and sovereignty.

While the importance of co-operation with other navies was stressed, the thrust of the Brock Report recommendations was that Canada needed more balanced and flexible maritime forces “to support our country's external policies.” The emphasis on NATO and cooperation with the USN and the Royal Navy was correct, but the result was that “our defence policy provides planned support for our external policy only with regard to NATO: for anything else, expediency is the answer.” The report suggested that the RCN in particular needed greater capability to support Canadian military operations outside the NATO theatre in “other than a Europe type war.” This included sea-based air support for ground
forces and mobile command and base facilities for external undertakings.\textsuperscript{46}

Significant force structure recommendations to support the policy recommendations of the \textit{Brock Report} included acquisition programs for:

- Six \textit{Barbel} class submarines by 1966.
- Six nuclear submarines by 1973.
- Eight general purpose frigates to support land operations and maintain ASW capabilities by 1967-9.
- 12 ASW helicopter frigates which could also be used for troop transport by 1975.
- Arctic research vessels.\textsuperscript{47}

The intent of the \textit{Brock Report} was acknowledged in the following years and the RCN implemented its most significant modernization and expansion program since World War II. Unfortunately many of the report's recommendations were tempered by the reality of their expense. The eight general purpose frigates noted in the \textit{Brock Report} were approved in 1962, but subsequently canceled in 1963, and a four-ship helicopter destroyer escort building program was substituted in late 1964. Canada initiated procurement of its own modern submarines in 1963. Prior hulls in RCN service had been outdated or on loan from the U.S. or U.K. The proposal for six American designed submarines was passed up in favor of three of the British \textit{Oberon} Class. The first Canadian fleet replenishment ship \textit{Provider} was commissioned in 1963. Carrying fuel, supplies, and a vertical replenishment capability with

\textsuperscript{46} Sokolsky, \textit{The RCN in Transition 1910-1985}, p. 220.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p.221.
Sea King helicopters, she significantly enhanced the RCN capability for an independent deployment.

Canada's significant naval role in the Cuban Missile Crisis is little known to most Americans. When President Kennedy announced the quarantine of Cuba on 22 October 1962, the government of John Diefenbaker (Conservative, 1957-63) had received prior notification of American intentions, but refused to put Canadian forces on the same level of alert as U.S. forces. The Canadian military, however, acted somewhat independently to increase their readiness. The RCN deployed its forces to sea, equipped its patrol aircraft with wartime ammunition loads, and implemented plans to support ASW and counter-surveillance efforts against the Soviets.

Operations plans under DEFCON 3 called for a "Subair barrier" across the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gaps. Intelligence on Soviet submarines moving down was vital, but with such heavy U.S. involvement to the south, Halifax and Norfolk jointly decided to pull the barrier closer to home. On the 24th (October 1962), while Diefenbaker dithered, the Argentia Subair Barrier went into force. It stretched from Cape Race, Newfoundland, some 600 miles southeast to a point about 300 miles from the Azores and was 100 miles deep. Across this great arc were dispersed ten USN submarines and the two RN submarines based in Halifax under Canadian operational control - HMS Alderney and Astute. Seventeen USN Neptunes were sent to fly out of Argentia. The twenty-four operational Argus aircraft from Greenwood, which had been hard at it for two weeks, were divided between surveillance and barrier patrol. Eight more joined from training squadrons at Summerside.48

Canadians also assisted in SOSUS prosecution of submarines and deployed over 22 ASW ships during the crisis. Their carrier, HMCS Bonaventure was recalled from a visit to the U.K. and subsequently relieved a

48 German, p. 266.
USN task force of ASW barrier duties north of Bermuda, allowing it to reinforce operations closer to Cuba. The most interesting aspect of RCN participation in the Cuban crisis is that it was done essentially without political endorsement from the government, and was largely disguised from the public as exercise involvement.\textsuperscript{49} These were good times for the RCN, but they were about to come to an end.

The government of Lester Pearson (Liberal, April 1963-April 1968) took office and subsequently issued a "White Paper" on defense in March 1964 endorsing integration of the Canadian military under a single chief-of-staff followed by unification of the three services into a single defense force. The key supporter of this initiative was the new defense minister, Paul Hellyer. Through political maneuvering and the establishment of an effective public relations team, Hellyer forced his plans on the military with little consultation. Integration was directed in July 1964 when Parliament eliminated the existing Chairman of Defence Staff and his trilateral service chief team and replaced them with a single Chief of Defence Staff, an Air Chief Marshal. The result was a great deal of disharmony among much of the senior military leadership. The originator of the aforementioned Brock Report, RADM Jeffry Brock, then Flag Officer West Coast, was fired by Hellyer for voicing his position against unification to a parliamentary committee. "In July, 1966, only two of the top thirteen officers in the Canadian forces had held their appointments for more

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., pp. 260-272.
than a month. In two years the six senior admirals had gone before their
time.\textsuperscript{50} The RCN saw itself as getting the worst of the situation as it was
greatly outnumbered in the new integrated military by larger air force and army
staff organizations. Important navy acquisition programs were placed under the
leadership of officers of other services who naturally failed to both understand
or support them.\textsuperscript{51}

Total unification became law in February 1968. The Liberal government,
again paid little heed to its military leadership. In arguing the navy's case
against unification, Brock's successor and subsequently Commander, Maritime
Command, RADM William Landymore, was also fired by Hellyer. With
leadership in a turmoil, career security in jeopardy, and the fear of an identity
loss, the new maritime arm of the Canadian Forces was not in the best of shape
as an effective fighting force. Previously promised force structure improvements
were downgraded to enhance defense savings. Due to the unification, however,
some of the more positive human resource aspects of the former air force and
army arms were also incorporated in the sea service. Pay and social service
benefits expanded, but funding for material remained sparse. "The Canadian
Forces became the best-paid, best-fed, and, as time went on, the worst-equipped
armed forces in the world."\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. p. 288.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. p. 284.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. p. 292.
In 1968, Pearson’s successor, Pierre Trudeau (Liberal, April 1968-June 1979, March 1980-June 1984) totally shifted the emphasis of Canadian defense policy. Upon taking office the government directed a defense review, the results of which were published in a 1971 White Paper. The center of Canada’s military focus changed from supporting NATO to protection of Canadian sovereignty. Trudeau cut Canada’s contribution to NATO forces in Europe in half, eliminated carrier air capabilities, and imposed a three year defense spending freeze.

These changes were based on an optimistic view of the international environment, one where a stable East-West balance of power coupled with arms control would reduce the role of armed forces. These were years, moreover, during which Ottawa’s attention was drawn toward domestic and international economic issues as well as problems concerning national unity.53

The effect on Maritime Command was a relatively static force for the next decade as naval proponents were essentially forced to “hold what they had.” The number of major warships had dropped from a high of 44 in 1964 to a total of 24 in 1969 largely due to pre-Trudeau governments.54 Canadian carrier aviation came to an end when Bonaventure was decommissioned as an economy measure in late 1969. Retirement of aging ships was offset somewhat by the commissioning of four Tribal class helicopter destroyers in 1972-73. This situation did not change markedly until 1977 when a six-ship Coastal Patrol

Frigate (CPF) program was initiated. These vessels were intended as dual purpose for both sovereignty protection and NATO escort ASW duty. The first was intended to enter service in 1985. This program evolved into the Halifax class frigate which eventually entered service in July 1992.

The 1970s were also a time of transition for NORAD. The threat had evolved from Soviet bombers to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The expense of developing technology to defend against ICBMs had shifted the focus to limiting defensive systems and concentration on massive offensive capabilities. The strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) would guarantee that enough forces would survive a first strike to retaliate and destroy the attacking nation. As a result, the emphasis in NORAD was improvement of early warning capabilities and cuts in interception requirements. Radar sites were reduced, interceptor requirements drastically cut, and most AAW missile sites dismantled.\(^{55}\)

With the passing of the Liberal government in 1984, the Conservatives under Brian Mulroney (1984-1993) began a ten year term in power with the highest political majority in any Canadian election. The government was elected largely on trade and economic issues, but pledged “to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces and to restore allied confidence in Canada as a reliable partner in collective defence.”\(^{56}\) Military levels remained fairly constant, however, as the

\(^{55}\) Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, *Canada's Territorial Air Defence* (Ottawa, 1985), pp.5-16.

government was unable to increase military spending levels. One success was the aforementioned Halifax frigate program which first saw results when the lead ship of a planned twelve of the class was commissioned in June 1991. In addition to excellent ASW capabilities, this class of frigate also incorporated an anti-air warfare (AAW) self-defense capability with the vertically launched Sea Sparrow. For sea-control/anti-surface warfare duties they were equipped with the U.S.-manufactured Harpoon missile. The Tribal DDHs, built in the early 1970s, received a significant AAW capability with the addition of vertically launched Standard SM-2 missiles in the Tribal Class Upgrade and Modernization Program (TRUMP). Plans were implemented to replace aging CH-124 Sea King ASW helicopters with the modern British-Italian built EH-101.

In 1987, the Mulroney government issued its White Paper on defense which reevaluated Canada’s military commitment to the world. The emphasis of the paper was that Canada needed to revitalize its armed forces by replacing obsolescent equipment and improving their ability to meet commitments on a world-wide basis. Canada would shift away from the neutralist role emphasized by the previous Liberal government and accept more responsibility in supporting her alliances. The Pacific and Arctic were specifically noted as areas for Canadian involvement, necessitating a three-ocean navy. The most dramatic recommendation of the paper called for procurement of 10-12 nuclear attack submarines to support NATO and national sovereignty claims in the
Arctic. Canadians were particularly sensitive to U.S. and Soviet submarine under-ice operations in their claimed territorial waters, something they were helpless to prevent.

Prime Minister Mulroney’s government was re-elected in 1988, but faced great pressure to reduce government spending deficits. The nuclear submarine costs had been underestimated and faced considerable public discontent. As a result they were scrapped in the April 1989 budget, as were seven military bases and 3000 personnel.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pressure for budget cuts continued to grow. In September 1991 Canada announced base closures in Germany and a major reduction of its deployed forces. This action was followed in early 1992 by a declaration that all Canadian forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1994. The move was part of $2.2 billion in cuts to military spending over the following five years.

Canada’s initial contribution to 1990 UN Security Council resolutions directed against Iraq was a maritime force consisting of the destroyer Athabaskan, the frigate Terra Nova, and the replenishment ship Protecteur. This task group sailed in August and initially participated in coalition maritime interdiction operations in the Gulf of Oman. The ships remained in the area throughout Desert Storm and relief crews were cycled to the theater. The

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57 Ibid., pp.11-17.
58 Caldwell, pp. 79-84.
Canadian government decided in late September to provide its ships with a combat air patrol (CAP) capability and moved a squadron of CF-18 fighter/attack aircraft from Germany to Qatar. 60 These aircraft were frontline players in the Gulf War flying more than 2,700 missions. 61 On 29 January 1991, in cooperation with a U.S. Navy E-2C aircraft, Canadian CF-18s first fired in anger when they attacked an Iraqi surface craft with 20MM cannon. “Canadian CF-18 squadrons played an important role by manning one of the northern Persian Gulf CAP stations continuously from early October until the start of the war and then supplementing those stations through the end of hostilities.” 62 During the period of hostilities, Canada took charge of 14 destroyers and 30 large logistics ships and directed the Gulf resupply effort. This was “the only major naval responsibility during the war not commanded by the USN.” 63 Following the war, Canada continued to support UN sanctions with a warship to enforce UN-directed embargo operations through July 1991.

When the Conservative government of Kim Campbell (June-November 1993) was ousted by the Liberals under Jean Chrétien the post-Cold War examination of the role of Canadian defense forces shifted into high gear. Chrétien had won the election “with a mandate to cut defence spending now

that the Cold War has ended and his first act will be to cancel a $3.6 billion
(C$4.8 billion) contract for military helicopters." The government directed an
immediate "White Paper" defense review of Canada's military role and
requirements. Projections of the results of this paper will be a subject of later
discussion.

LESSONS OF HISTORY

Examination of the historical development of Canadian naval forces
reveals some interesting findings for further contemplation. Common threads
that emerge seem to be a Canadian desire for self-sufficiency to enforce national
sovereignty, consistently tempered by the economic sacrifices required to
maintain modern military forces and by ties to Britain and the U.S.

Popular support, which equates to funding support, for a strong navy has
been historically difficult to obtain. Canadians, in general, have not seen the
need for a sizable naval service. With the exception of the massive national
effort in support of World War II, Canadian naval planners have had to struggle
to retain minimally effective combat capable force levels. Prior to World War II,
the sole justification for a navy was to support Canadian nationalistic sympathies
to establish a degree of independence from Britain. Following the War, the
break with the mother country was established and the focus shifted to support
of NATO requirements. As a result, the Canadian Navy developed a capable
ASW force in the Atlantic and maintained only a token presence in the Pacific.

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64 Anthony Boadle, "New Canadian Leader to be Less Chummy with U.S.," The Rueter Library
While both Conservative and Liberal governments espoused sovereignty protection requirements during campaign rhetoric, major programs in this area had little public support when expenses were delineated.

Another factor affecting public thinking in Canada was most certainly the military shield offered by the U.S. and previously by Great Britain. A superpower in the first half of this century, the U.K. offered unparalleled sea power protection to the members of its Dominion. From World War II until the present, the U.S. has been challenged in the naval arena only by the former Soviet Union. It is easy to visualize why the average Canadian saw little need for a navy of size.

The bulk of Canadian post-World War II politico-military initiatives have focused on support of U.N. peacekeeping efforts, the majority of which involved land forces. With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Canadian naval planners have de-emphasized some multinational requirements and continued to stress sovereignty protection to justify their capital programs. Current naval programming initiatives will be outlined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

MARITIME COMMAND TODAY AND TOMORROW

(Canada's armed forces) must be able to fight alongside the best, against the best.

Highlights of the 1994 Defence White Paper

After reviewing the history and factors affecting the development of the Canadian naval service, the current status of the service and projections for its immediate future will now be examined. With the recent collapse of the Soviet "threat" of the past forty years, Canadians have joined the rest of the world in rethinking their defense priorities. This review by the newly elected Liberal government is still in progress; however, a parliamentary base-line report led to issuance of a "White Paper" early December 1994. This report, open press information, and interviews with Canadian Forces personnel will be utilized to assess its impact on the on the naval capabilities of Canada.

THE CANADIAN NAVY TODAY

Maritime Command's mission is to maintain balanced, combat capable, general purpose maritime forces to meet Canada's defence objectives.


Regular Forces. Canadian Maritime Command, with a personnel strength of over 17,000, is structured to support a two-ocean fleet (see Figure 1). The Maritime Forces Commander (MARCOM) and his staff are located in Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Halifax, Nova Scotia (NS). The next echelon commanders, Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) and Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) are located in Halifax, NS and
FIGURE 1

Esquimalt, British Columbia (BC) respectively. Naval surface forces are organized into mission-oriented "operations task groups" with odd numbered groups in the Atlantic and even in the Pacific. Task groups 1 and 2 are the fleet operational units available for mission taskings and crisis deployment. Groups 4 and 5 (no Group 3 exists) consist of coastal vessels while groups 6 and 7 are ships in work ups or refit. All three Canadian submarines are assigned to MARLANT, most probably for consolidation of maintenance facilities and in support of NATO commitments.

All ASW helicopter assets (CH-124 Sea King) are currently based on the east coast at Shearwater, Nova Scotia and Patricia Bay, British Columbia (see Table 2). Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) are concentrated on the east coast with three squadrons at Greenwood, NS. The one west coast squadron of MPA is located at Comox, BC.

Reserves. Twenty-five percent of the personnel serving with Maritime Command are reservists. The Canadian Navy sponsors 24 naval reserve units nationwide with approximately 900 officer and 3,200 enlisted personnel.1 As with other funded programs, the reserves in Canada are also under scrutiny for economy measures. While the navy claims they are a cost saver, others argue that the training is too expensive in relation to the potential gain. Canadian reserves are not protected from employer retribution as are reserves in the U.S.2

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2 April Lindgren, "Canada's Military Reserves; Would They Know What to Do? Are They Worth the Cost?", The Ottawa Citizen, 8 October 1994, p.B3.
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**Abbreviations:**

MPA = Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
MP&EU = Maritime Proving and Evaluation Unit  
HOTEF = Helicopter Operational Test & Evaluation Facility  
EW = Electronic Warfare  
ASW = Antisubmarine Warfare  
ASUW = Anti-surface Warfare  
TASMO = Tactical Air Support to Maritime Operations  
CS = Combat Support  
MH = Maritime Helicopter

**Sources:** Jane’s Fighting Ships 1994-95; USNI Data Base; NDHQ Canada Interviews
C$746 million has been obligated for modern Coastal Defense Vessels for the naval reserve yet some parties argue they will be too complex for the reserves and personnel may not report when required. Canadian reserve duty is totally voluntary.

Reservists aren’t obligated to report for duty when needed. That hasn’t been a problem so far, but the auditor general in 1992 said only about one third of reservists would turn out during an emergency and less than half would show up for a combat assignment outside of Canada. The federal cabinet can put reservists on active duty, but this hasn’t happened since the Second World War.³

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

**There is no realistic alternative to the concept of balance.**

*The Naval Vision.*

**Surface Forces.** The surface combatant force of Maritime Command is centered on four Tribal Class destroyers. These gas turbine ships were built in Canada and commissioned in the early 1970s as ASW escorts. To maximize ASW capabilities, the class was equipped with variable depth and hull mounted sonars, plus 2 embarked CH-124 Sea King ASW helicopters. A self-defense AAW capability was provided with NATO Sea Sparrow missiles and an OTO Melara 127MM gun. In support of increasing emphasis on the sovereignty protection mission, the Tribal Class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) was initiated and contracts were awarded in 1986. The TRUMP has provided a significant improvement in class capabilities, particularly in command and control (C2) and AAW. Improved data processing, communications links, and

³ Ibid.
display systems make the TRUMP Tribals the choice for a command platform for a deployed operational commander. The installation of vertical launch Standard SM-2 AAW missiles gives Canada her first long range AAW defensive capability.

The newest and most modern ships of the Canadian fleet are the 12-ship Halifax Class (also known as the City Class) being constructed under the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) program. Although the contract for this class was awarded in 1983, contractor and management difficulties delayed the first commissioning until July 1992. Ten of the ships are scheduled for commissioning by the end of 1995. One of the first ship classes to incorporate stealth technology design, the Halifax is described as a multi-purpose frigate. She is equipped with a hull mounted sonar, the Canadian towed-array sonar (CANTASS), and one CH-124A Sea King. An AAW self-defense capability is provided by two NATO Sea Sparrow vertical launchers and a Vulcan-Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS). The class carries eight Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles in canisters.4

The balance of the surface warship fleet lies in elderly steam powered frigates, some of which have had a degree of modernization. One Annapolis class ASW frigate serves on each coast. Both ships, commissioned in 1965-66, received upgrades to their combat systems in a destroyer life extension (DELEX) program in the mid-80s which was intended to stretch their lifetime through 2001-2. This class is essentially limited in its capabilities to ASW. Its ASW suite

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includes hull and towed array sonars, plus the capability to embark one ASW helicopter. Three improved Restigouche class steam powered frigates, commissioned in 1958/59, round out the Canadian surface combatant inventory. While updated under various DELEX programs, the combat capabilities of these ships is essentially limited to patrol duties and ASW. Two of the improved Restigouche received an eight-missile Harpoon launcher and a Phalanx close-in weapons system (CIWS) for operations in the Gulf War. These were borrowed from the Halifax assembly line and subsequently have been removed.

A new class of six frigates, to be produced over the next 15 years, is in the design stage. Designated the Canadian Surveillance and Sovereignty Enforcement Vessels (CASSEV), these ships may be of a small water area twin-hull design, displace 2,000 to 3,000 tons, and be capable of speeds in excess of 20 knots.

An acquisition program of $541 million (C$746 million) for twelve maritime coastal defense vessels (MCDV) is in progress with planned deliveries commencing in 1995. The primary mission of these small warships will be coastal defense with a secondary capability in mine countermeasures (MCM). The sweep gear for these ships is being procured from the U.S., but budget restrictions will preclude initially equipping all ships of the class. Future options under review include installation of remotely piloted minehunting

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5 Ibid. p. 82.
equipment. Initial manning plans center on crewing these vessels with reserves who will form the nucleus for Canadian experience in MCM. Discussions are ongoing on this proposal as some believe this manning plan may not be as attractive a cost-cutting measure as was initially envisioned.

An independent at-sea replenishment capability is provided for Canadian warships by three AORs: two Protecteur class (HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver) and the HMCS Provider. All three ships were completed in the 1960s and are similar in characteristics (see Table 3). Protecteur is assigned to the west coast and Preserver to the east. The older Provider acts as a swing ship, fulfilling operational requirements when the other ships are in overhaul. When acting as swing ship, Provider is crewed largely by manpower from the ship she is replacing. The Protecteur class has also been utilized in the roles of troop carrier, sealift, and command ship. Both classes are helicopter capable. A replacement for the aging ships has been conceptualized in a proposal for four Multi-Role Support Vessels (MRSVs). While the concept is not yet finalized, the class is envisioned as being capable of providing at-sea replenishment, sea-lift for Canadian forces, command and control support, plus off-shore surveillance and enforcement. The concept survived the 1994 Defense White Paper in a comment that, in order to “maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops, equipment, and supplies for multilateral operations, the support ship HMCS

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9 Lindgren, p. B3.
Provider (initially slated to be paid off in 1996) will be retained in service, and plans for the eventual replacement of the existing fleet will be considered.”

The degree of actual support for the MRSV will be reflected in future budgets.

Submarines. The Canadian submarine force is currently limited to three 1960’s vintage, British built, Oberon class boats. These diesel-powered submarines were last updated in the 1980’s when they were modified to take the U.S. Mark 48 torpedo and received new sonar systems. Towed array sonar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Displacement (Full Load)</th>
<th>Fuel/Aviation Fuel/Dry Cargo/Ammunition (Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecteur/Preserver</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td>13,700 / 400 / 1,048 / 1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>12,000 / 900 / 250 / 0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1994-95

systems have been procured and are due for installation over the next several years. The class has no subsurface-to-surface missile capability. Originally

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scheduled for retirement between 1993-96, the Oberons may remain operational through 2000.  

Canada’s submarine program has been in a state of flux for the past 20 years. The prime mover for replacement submarines has been the capability to operate under the Arctic ice cover, but in an attempt to further justify procurement, counter-narcotics and fisheries patrol have also been noted as potential missions. Canada specifically desires the capability to preserve its sovereignty claims, but currently has no platform capable of operating under ice against foreign nuclear submarines. As noted previously, the 1987 Defense White Paper recommended procurement of 10-12 nuclear submarines, but the proposal proved too costly and unpopular with the public. Recent concentration has been on conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems which would permit diesel submarines to operate underwater for up to 14 days. The Canadian Maritime Command has “started a separate (R&D) program to evaluate AIP technology and is funding research by two Canadian companies to build scaled-down versions of a fuel-cell AIP device. Defence Department officials said they expect that by the turn of the century the Navy will have enough information to complete a full-scale, land-based AIP site.” Firms from other countries that have approached Canada with offers to construct submarines include:

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13 Shadwick, p. 30.
14 Ibid.
Australia Australia Submarine Corporation
France Direction Construction Navales
Germany Thyssen Norsewerke Ltd
Netherlands Rotterdam Dock Yard (Walrus Class)
Sweden Kockums AB
United Kingdom Vickers Shipbuilding

The Australians have offered to sell their model of a Swedish Kockums-designed class of submarine.  

Under pressure for defense cutbacks, the British have also have offered to sell their new diesel-powered Upholder class boats. While 1994 estimates from Maritime Command state a requirement for up to six SSK's, precise quantities are on-hold until cost estimates are finalized. The Upholders appear to be the preferred option as the 1994 Defense White Paper authorizes exploration of procurement of four of the class. Finance options under review include foregiveness of U.K. World War II debts to Canada and compensation relief for U.K. use of Canadian low-level air training routes.

**Fixed Wing ASW/Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA):** Shore-based aviation ASW and maritime patrol is provided by 18 CP-140 Aurora and 3 CP-140A Arcturus respectively. These aircraft are assigned to Maritime Group of the Canadian Air Force (CAF). Both aircraft types are variants of the Lockheed P-3. The Auroras are equipped for ASW missions and, while aging (delivered to Canada in 1978-79), are expected to be flying through 2010. Aircraft sensors

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15 Ibid.
include radar, sonobuoy processors, and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment. Primary armament is the ASW torpedo. The three Arcturus were delivered in 1992-93 and were outfitted by Canada with a portion of their avionics and electronics suites. Primarily designed for an Arctic surveillance and search and rescue (SAR) missions, the aircraft do not have an ASW sensor suite, but are equipped with an advanced surface search radar and communications systems.19 The Canadians are also using these aircraft for pilot training to extend the life of the more expensive Aurora.20 The Aurora Life Extension Program (ALEP) plans to update the aircraft beginning in 1996 by upgrading the surveillance and computer systems.21

**ASW Helicopters:** The Canadian ASW helicopter program received an abrupt shock after the October 1993 election. The newly elected Liberal government came through on a campaign promise and canceled plans to replace 30 thirty year old Sea King with 43 modern EH-101s at a cost of C$4.8 billion. This decision has been subsequently questioned following a fatal crash in April 1994 and the grounding of all three Canadian helicopters participating in the multinational Pacific exercise RIMPAC for mechanical problems in July 1994.22 The 1994 “White Paper” reopened the replacement helicopter with a

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commitment to investigate replacement alternatives. Possible options include the French Puma, the U.S. Sikorsky Sea Hawk or a variant, and new U.K. Westland manufactured Sea Kings.

The operational Sea Kings are equipped with a surface search radar, dipping sonar, and sonobuoys. Armament includes a capacity for four MK46 ASW torpedoes or depth charges.23

**Attack Aircraft/Fighters:** Canada has no at-sea embarked fixed-wing aircraft. Maritime fighter/attack support is available from four operational tactical fighter squadrons of modern CF-18 Hornet fighter/attack multi-mode aircraft. The current order of battle includes approximately 72 aircraft, but the 1994 Defense White Paper directs a reduction to between 48 and 60.24 The CF-18s are land-based, but can be in-flight refueled by Boeing 707 (CC-137) and CC-130 tanker-configured aircraft.25 As noted in Chapter II, the aircraft were employed in the Gulf War as air cover for surface combatants.

**Coast Guard:** Founded in 1962, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is a civilian organization of about 6,700 personnel whose duties are similar in nature to their counterparts in the U.S. The government fleet consists of over 100 vessels (including several hovercraft), helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft (See Table 4). CCG missions include:

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- Ice breaking and commercial vessel escort in ocean and inland waters
- Installation, supply and maintenance to navigation aids
- Search and rescue (SAR)
- Hydrographic survey and sounding
- Laying, maintenance, and repair of submarine cables
- Pollution monitoring/control

Headquartered in Ottawa, the Coast Guard is assigned to the Department of Transport which is realizing budget squeezes similar to the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard operating budget has been reduced 12% in the last five years and planners estimate additional cuts of 3% per year through 1998. Consideration is also being given to privatizing many Coast Guard functions as a cost-saving measure. 

Coast Guard support to the Navy during a conflict would most likely center on SAR, surveillance, and communications. All services interact on a regular basis in performing cross-departmental missions such as SAR, fisheries enforcement, and counter-narcotics operations. This interaction is necessitated by a lack of resources by any one service to accomplish missions single-handedly. In an effort to reduce spending through duplication and increase the efficiency of maritime assets, a major effort is underway to consolidate information exchange networks of the sea. "The Canadian Maritime Network (CANMARNET) will link surveillance information between DND (Department of National Defense), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the

26 Ibid. p. 88.
27 Vansun, "Ottawa at Sea Over Coast Guard," The Vancouver Sun, 24 May 1994, P.A16.
Department of Transport through the Canadian Coast Guard, and the Solicitor General’s Department through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)."  

| TABLE 4  
Canadian Coast Guard Summary |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Gulf Icebreakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Gulf/River Icebreaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icebreaker/Supply Tug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Icebreaker/Major Navaids Tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Icebreaker/Medium Navaids Tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Navaids Tender/Ice Strengthened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Navaids Tender/Ice Strengthened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Navaids Tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large SAR Cutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate SAR Cutters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small SAR Cutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hovercraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters (Shipboard)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1994-95  

Fisheries Patrol: Only a cursory examination is required to realize why Navy involvement in fisheries protection is required. With a 200-mile fishing zone off one of the largest coastlines in the world, Canada has only six dedicated fisheries patrol ships and fourteen designated “Survey and Research Vessels.”  

The Navy “contributed 155 sea days and 939 hours of aircraft time to DFO (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) in fiscal year 1993/1994.” While  

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29 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1994-95, pp. 100-102.  
30 Ibid., p. 8
normally assigned to monitoring missions, all DFO patrol vessels are equipped with machine guns and are capable of conducting armed boardings.

RECENT/CURRENT OPERATIONS

Simply put, my staff and I have one goal, to effectively use the warships under my command to ensure that no weapons or fuel that could be used in the Balkan War effort get by our blockade. CDRE Greg Maddison, CF

Recent operations of forces assigned to Canadian Maritime Command have centered on support to United Nations (UN) resolutions in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia.

Haiti. In late September 1991, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti was overthrown by a military coup. The following month Canada supported an initial trade embargo against Haiti imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) and a subsequent naval blockade imposed in October 1993 by the U.N. Security Council. On 18 October 1993, three Canadian ships joined six U.S. warships and a French frigate in enforcement operations.31 The frigates HMCS Fraser and HMCS Gatineau were diverted from exercises off Puerto Rico and the supply ship HMCS Preserver joined them on-station. Conjecture exists that Canada had practiced a similar Haitian crisis contingency in the past. A 1988 press report stated that a Canadian “infantry battalion” of French-speaking Canadians was sent to the U.S. naval base in Puerto Rico to support two frigates

in the Caribbean in case evacuation of Canadian citizens from Haiti was required.32

Politics governed Canada’s policy toward Haitian “boat-people.” The government refused to accept rescues as refugees. The Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet stated that Canada would not offer to take any refugees, but would support a U.N. policy of trying to resettle them close to their homelands.33 In a reflection of this policy the frigate HMCS Terra Nova, rescued 67 Haitian “boat-people” on 6 July 1994, but following direction from Ottawa, turned them over to the U.S. Navy.

The Canadian government chose not to participate in the invasion of Haiti under U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940, as it was felt this “would have undermined its effectiveness as a guarantor of public order during the pacification phase.”34 The government chose to concentrate its efforts on post-invasion measures intended to boost confidence in the Haitian democracy such as the establishment of a police force trained and organized by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Some viewed this position as an implied statement of Canadian independence from the U.S. by the new Liberal government of Jean Chrétien.35

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35 Ibid.
Canada supported the embargo operations with warships until landings by the U.S. were effected in September 1994.

**The Adriatic/Former Yugoslavia:** NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcing a naval embargo of arms and fuel to the former Yugoslavia in November 1992. Canada, anticipating participation in these operations, shifted HMCS Gatineau with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) to the Mediterranean (SNFM) in preparation for blockade duties in late August of that year.\(^{36}\) In June 1993, the embargo operations (Operation SHARP GUARD) became a joint NATO/WEU operation. Canada has supported the embargo with her front-line, NATO-designated ships. Two Iroquois Class destroyers succeeded Gatineau in the Adriatic, HMCS Algonquin relieved in June 1993 and was in turn relieved by HMCS Iroquois in October 1993, in support of the Canadian commander of SNFL. Subsequent requirements were met with the first operational tours of the new Halifax Class frigates, HMCS Halifax (April-September 1994) and HMCS Toronto (September 1994-January 1995). HMCS Montreal was expected on station in January 1995. HMCS Preserver provided logistic support to Canadian and other NATO forces from March to June 1994\(^{37}\) and is scheduled for a return deployment in 1995.

In support of initial naval blockade operations, the Canadian Maritime Air Group provided two Aurora aircraft for surveillance operations. They

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operated from a NATO air base in Sigonella, Sicily, and augmented other MPA from Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.S. These aircraft are no longer deployed.

Disaster Relief:

**Somalia:** Following the December 1992 U.S.-spearheaded landings in Somalia, Canadian forces were deployed to support U.N. humanitarian efforts. Some 1,250 Canadian troops were sent to Somalia and were based in Mogadishu and Belet Huen.\(^{38}\) While these troops did not participate in landing operations, they established patrol sectors and a logistics support air base at Baledogle (85km northwest of Mogadishu) which relieved U.S. forces to focus attention elsewhere.\(^ {39}\) National support for these troops was provided by HMCS *Preserver* initially stationed off the coast, but later located in Mogadishu. *Preserver* played a key role in establishing the Canadian presence by establishing a base-camp ashore for its forces and serving as a repair and maintenance facility. Embarked medical personnel assisted in the relief effort by treating injured and diseased Somalis. Technicians provided extensive assistance to non-governmental relief agencies by repairing equipment. Canadian forces departed Somalia in June 1993.

**Hurricane Andrew:** Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida in August 1992, devastating the area. Canada provided the first on-scene foreign assistance

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by sending HMCS Protecteur to assist in the disaster relief and cleanup effort.\(^{40}\) The ship left Halifax on 10 September and arrived in Miami four days later. Operations were directed from Miami Harbor in support of the ship’s crew and 90 engineers from a RCAF squadron from Alberta. With its load-out of 50 tons of building materials and construction equipment, these personnel rebuilt two area elementary schools and assisted in several other relief projects.\(^{41}\) Upon departure from Miami, the Protecteur assisted in relief operations in the Bahamas prior to sailing to Esquimalt, British Columbia for a scheduled refit.

**CURRENT STATUS**

Canada maintains a modern navy that fully supports its national interests with the exception of sovereignty enforcement. Maritime Command has proven its ability to react to a wide range of missions from combat in the Gulf to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Canadians have chosen to remain engaged in world politics and have utilized their modest military capabilities when considered necessary. With a nucleus force of command and control AAW destroyers, a state-of-the-art fleet of multipurpose frigates under construction, a logistics support capability, and minimum naval air support, Canada can deploy its naval forces world-wide in response to crises.

As a “medium power,” Canada has effected a force structure that is primarily designed for multinational, coalition operations, largely under U.N. or


NATO control. Canada is not a superpower and continues to seek the best balance between the expense of military forces and their capability to support national interests. On the world scene this balance can be argued as generally adequate. The Canadian military has supported recent national interests when required. In the area of sovereignty protection, the sheer size of the Canadian landmass and bordering seas in relation to the population has precluded procurement of adequate assets. This predicament will be a subject of discussion in chapter IV.
CHAPTER IV
U.S.-CANADIAN MARITIME ISSUES

The government is prepared to discuss cooperation in all aspects of the defence of North America. But we will not allow Canada’s sovereignty to be compromised. We will be a partner with our allies and not a dependent.

Canadian Defence Minister Perrin Beatty, 1987

Following a review of the development and current status of Canadian maritime forces, contentious issues specific to the interests of the U.S. and Canada must now be examined in order to assess future cooperation. These issues could prove to be considerable stumbling blocks in advancing good relations. For the past 40 years our two nations have been militarily and politically tied as common opponents to the Soviet bloc. As a show of unity against this foe, smaller disagreements have often been overlooked or ignored in favor of an appearance of cohesiveness in world affairs. As the “Red Menace” has faded, Canadians are more likely to shift focus to their exercise of sovereignty over claimed air and water space. The current Liberal government has already stressed its desire, on several occasions, to act independently from Washington influence. The U.S. public has also expressed indications of withdrawing inward, tiring of performing as the “world policeman” and looking for some “peace dividend” defense savings. As the two nations look closer to home, issues that were minor in the past may rise in significance. The major areas of concern related to maritime forces are discussed below.


59
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

In the Northwest Passage dispute, many Canadians believe that anything less than full U.S. recognition of Canada's claims constitutes a challenge to the very ability of the party in power to govern.

D.W. Middlemiss and J. Sokolsky ³

Canada is one of eight Arctic nations (U.S., Russia, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark (at Greenland), Norway) and claims within her borders almost 25% of the polar land mass.⁴ While almost the entire population of Canada lives on the southern border, Canadians claim the entire region to their north, obviously with the exception of Alaska. Infringements upon this territory and its surrounding waters have been considered direct affronts to Canadian sovereignty. No serious challenges have been made to Canadian primacy over Arctic land territories since 1925 when a National Geographic scientific expedition, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, ignored requirements to obtain a permit to visit islands in the Northwest Territories.⁵ More serious repercussions have resulted, however, from recent U.S. challenges to Canadian claims of Arctic maritime sovereignty. The Northwest Passage is an area of major U.S.-Canadian disagreement. The Passage consists of a series of east-west navigable

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water routes, approximately 900 miles long, passing through the northern
Canadian archipelago (see Figure 2). First transited by the Norwegian explorer
Roald Amundsen from 1904-1907, the Passage is potentially a critical strategic
transit route for seaborne commercial and military traffic. “The United States
maintains it is an international passage through which ships of any nation can
pass freely at any time. Canada, however, considers the passage to be part of its
inland waters over which it has total control, including sole authority to regulate
maritime traffic.” 6 While the Passage is not a heavily traveled commercial or
surface military sea lane at present, many experts predict traffic will increase as
Arctic energy reserves are increasingly exploited and ice transit technology
advances. 7

The main military maritime issues surrounding the Canadian Arctic
center on nuclear submarine under-ice transits and operations. The strategic role
of Canadian Arctic waters is self-evident when viewed from a geographic
perspective:

The Arctic Ocean, in many ways resembles the Mediterranean.
Both have few exit points. What the points are, are guarded and narrow.
Exit from the Arctic can be made from only four points: out the Bering
Sea, which is treacherously shallow; out through the thin gap between
Greenland and Canada; out through the maze of the Canadian
archipelago and the Northwest Passage; and finally, out the widest route,
the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is carefully
monitored by NATO. 8

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6 Honderich, p. 40.
7 RADM F.W. Crickard, RCN (Ret’d), Sovereignty, Security and United States Maritime
Interests in the Northern Seas. Niobe Papers, Vol. 1 (Halifax: The Naval Officers’ Association of
Canada, 1990, p.66.
8 Handerich, pp. 93-94.
Such transits of U.S. attack submarines (SSNs) are known to occur although their precise periodicity and routing are subject to classification. Of interest, a Canadian naval liaison officer was embarked on at least one of these transits. In May 1960, Owen Robertson, was on board the USS Seadragon when she discovered a deep-channel route through the Northwest Passage and later surfaced at the North Pole with USS Skate. In May 1986, three U.S. attack submarines, Hawkbill, Ray, and Archerfish, simultaneously surfaced through the ice at the North Pole. Hawkbill approached from the Pacific through the Bering Strait, but Ray and Archerfish approached from the Atlantic. While the precise approach routes remain classified, they were assessed by Canadians as most likely through their claimed waters, piquing nationalism and driving the government to review the procurement of its own SSNs to enforce sovereignty claims. The U.S. naval doctrine of the 1980s centered on forward presence operations. As Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were deployed close to their own homeland and often under the ice for self-protection, U.S. SSNs were required to deploy to the Soviet operating areas. Arctic waters thus became one of the keys to U.S./NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact strategies.

9 "Commodore Owen Robertson (Obituary)," The Times, 21 December 1994.
Crucial to the success of a northern maritime strategy is establishing control of the Norwegian Sea and the Bering Strait. In order to protect the sea lanes in the North Atlantic and North Pacific in time of war, these options appear both necessary and feasible. For these containment options to work, the control of the passages in the North American Arctic is required. These are the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and in Nares Strait, between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. These passages are thus crucial to U.S. maritime security interests in the northern seas.\footnote{Crickard, pp.65-66.}

Control of these choke points may be less relevant in the post-Cold War environment, but the option for employment of these routes by a reemergent threat from Russia bodes for prudent contingency planning.

In addition to the submarine launched ballistic missile danger there is the cruise missile threat:

The current development of the SS-NX-21 poses a different threat. With a range of 1,600 miles, Victor- and Yankee-class boats fitted with the SS-NX-21, can, in principle, find operating locations in the waters of the Arctic archipelago from which they can reach secondary population targets in Canada and the northeastern United States, and, perhaps at the very limit of their range, strategic military targets in the northern states of the United States. Given the long flight times (up to three hours) and the prospect of detection and interception, the use of Arctic-launched SLCMs in a surprise attack is surely remote. But it is nevertheless the case that, in addition to their potential as a second-strike weapon, there is now a very small but still identifiable possibility that SLCMs launched from the Arctic archipelago could be used in a first strike capacity.\footnote{David Cox, "Living Along the Flight Path: Canada’s Defense Debate," The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the MIT The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1987, p.98.}

The SS-N-21 remains in the Russian inventory as well as its successor, the larger SS-N-24 which is essentially equivalent in range and carried by modified
Yankee class submarines.\textsuperscript{15} As the Russians have developed these potent cruise missiles, they obviously have employment plans and tactics for their use. Whether they would utilize nuclear tipped cruise missiles launched from covert Arctic approach routes in an attack on the U.S. is subject to debate. The option exists and offers flexibility over a strictly ballistic missile strategic attack.

While covert submarine usage of the passage has been a subject of much conjecture, several open surface transits of the Passage have largely been the focus of attention on sovereignty issues. In 1969 the U.S. commercial tanker Manhattan transited the Northwest Passage to test its feasibility as a trading route. "The Canadian government cooperated from the outset. The Canadian icebreaker John A. Macdonald accompanied the Manhattan, although the U.S. government had not made an official request for an escort."\textsuperscript{16} The spark which ignited the modern Canadian sovereignty flame over the Passage came when the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea conducted an east-to-west transit in 1985. Canada was notified in advance of the transit, but permission was not requested. Operational requirements justified the transit as Polar Sea was needed back in her Pacific home waters after relieving a mechanically crippled ice breaker which resupplied the U.S. base at Thule, Greenland. The northern return route saved approximately 30 days in transit time over the Panama Canal option and $100,000 in fuel costs.\textsuperscript{17} The transit was not received well in Ottawa and focused

\textsuperscript{16} Caldwell, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
Canadian resolve to take action to assert its sovereignty claims over Arctic waters.

In response to perceived Arctic incursions, the Canadian government passed a series of legislative initiatives designed to strengthen both their political position and enforcement capabilities over their claimed waters. Their first step was to redefine borders of their territory when, in 1963, a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone from the coastline was declared. Prime Minister Pearson also "announced the application of the 'headland-to-headland' system to determine the line from which both the fisheries and territorial waters would be measured. Under this system, instead of the fishing zone conforming with contour of the land, imaginary baselines would be drawn from the headlands or points that protruded farthest out to sea."\(^{18}\) These actions were, however, applicable to waters surrounding the mainland and claims over waters of the Arctic archipelago were not formally expressed.

In 1970, Canada extended its territorial waters to 12 miles which then incorporated a larger portion of the Passage waters. It also passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.

This law proclaimed Canadian jurisdiction over pollution control out to 100 miles from land in the region above 60 degrees north. The only country to recognize Canadian jurisdiction over pollution control in the Arctic archipelago was the Soviet Union, which had long maintained effective control over the Northern Passage. The United States and some of the Western European countries openly disputed Canadian jurisdiction over Arctic waters. They wanted an international or regional solution to the problems of Arctic pollution and navigation.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) Honderich, pp.50-51.
\(^{19}\) Caldwell, p.49.
The only country to recognize Canadian jurisdiction was the Soviet Union.

In 1973, Canada first formalized its Arctic waters claims in a statement from the Justice Department which stated:

Canada also claims that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on a historical basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation.\textsuperscript{20}

Several other initiatives are viewed by Canadians as strengthening their claims over Arctic waters. In 1977, Canada expanded its exclusive fishing zone out to 200 miles.\textsuperscript{21} In 1982, an “Arctic Clause” (Article 234) was incorporated into the “U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea” (\textit{Law of the Sea, 1982}) which gave “Arctic coastal states the right to ‘adopt and enforce’ laws for the ‘prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas.’” The article allowed such anti-pollution laws to be enforced up to 360 kilometers from shore [within the limits of the EEZ].\textsuperscript{22} A major problem for Canada, however, was that the U.S. was not a signatory to the accord.

Following the passage of the Polar Sea in 1985, Canada declared territorial boundaries which enclosed all islands and waters of the Arctic archipelago. Straight baselines were drawn around the perimeter of Canadian

\textsuperscript{20} Statement of the Bureau of Legal Affairs (Ottawa:Queen’s Printer), December 1973, quoted in Honderich, p.52.
\textsuperscript{21} 44 nations extended their fishing zones to 200 nautical mile between 1975-77, including the U.S.
\textsuperscript{22} Honderich, p. 53.
Arctic islands and all waters within these boundaries were claimed as internal (see Figure 3). 23

A final act of legislation worthy of note is the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act of 1985 which extended Canadian civil and criminal law to offshore areas. The law also declared that Canadian law would be “applicable to oil drillings and other activities on the Canadian continental shelf beyond the 12 mile limit, and; extend criminal law to cover any offense involving a Canadian in the 200-mile fishing zone off the coast.”24

U.S. remains firm that the Canadian claim that Passage waters are internal is illegal. There is “no basis in international law to support the Canadian claim...and to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian control of the Northwest Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation rights through the passage under international law.”25 Current argument is largely based on refuting Canada’s right to proclaim straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago. Article 46 of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 only authorizes straight baselines for archipelagic states which are defined as “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.” As Canada has a significant mainland, establishment of straight baselines is unfounded.

23 Ibid. p. 51-53.
While still maintaining that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, the U.S. did sign an Agreement on Arctic Cooperation with Canada in January 1988 and stated “The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada.” 26 Although not intended to cover commercial and warship transits, some Canadians subsequently claimed that the agreement would apply to all surface ships as ice conditions would always require an icebreaker escort. 27

A final note of interest: to stress the increasing importance of the Arctic region to Canada, the first “Circumpolar Ambassador,” Mary Simon, was appointed in 1994. Her tasking was to improve relations with Canada’s seven Arctic neighbors in trade, pollution control, and sovereignty issues. She has been directed to develop the concept of an “Arctic Council” as a formal forum to discuss and resolve Arctic regional issues. Major Arctic priorities include improvement of cooperation with Russia and Greenland and demilitarization of the North. 28

Canadian public resolve to press Arctic sovereignty issues has proven more emphatic in the diplomatic arena than in procurement programs for equipment required to make enforcement feasible. Expressions of nationalism

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have not resulted in support for loosened defense purse strings. The Canadian
Forces do not have adequate manpower nor equipment to maintain effective
Arctic surveillance, let alone enforcement capabilities in northern regions. A
review of previously discussed force structures will show that ship and aircraft
assets are far below the levels required to cover the immense Canadian northern
land mass.

Immediately following the Polar Sea transit, the government in place
implemented measures intended to expand Arctic military presence. These
included increased MPA reconnaissance missions and construction of an
icebreaker, the Polar 8, which would provide a year-round presence capability
not possible with smaller icebreakers. The 1987 defense “White Paper”, perhaps
riding on a bow wave of nationalism, made recommendations for 10-12
Canadian nuclear submarines and six additional Aurora patrol aircraft to
support domestic surveillance capabilities. Consideration was given to building
a naval base in Nanisivik on Baffin Island, Northwest Territories. With a
projected cost of $680 million, the Polar 8 was canceled in the 1990 defense
budget.29 Also eliminated was the Canadian SSN program.30 As previously
mentioned, continued hope for an under-the-ice capable submarine now rests
with naval support for Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems research for
conventional submarines. With the retirement of older Grumman CP-121

30 David Hughes, “Canada’s Defense Budget Cancels Key Programs in 1987 White Paper,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 08 May 1989, p. 28.
Tracker aircraft and the procurement of only three P-140A Arcturus patrol planes since the 1987 "White Paper", it can be surmised that Canada's territorial surveillance capabilities have actually been reduced rather than expanded. Other initiatives such as placement of underwater detection arrays in suspected submarine transit areas have also been axed at the budget table.

The status of the Northwest Passage remains to be settled. The U.S. and Canada have politically "agreed to disagree" and current activity in the straits is so limited as to preclude any notable degree of confrontation. While Arctic submarine activity most likely continues, Canadians have no direct capability to counter it, but could resort to diplomatic and economic pressures. The potential exists for further disputes.

Territorial sovereignty issues on the Pacific coast are also ongoing and are worthy of brief note. Disagreements have arisen over national jurisdiction of shipping in the traffic separation scheme on the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In 1993, Canada considered charging fees to vessels utilizing the Inside Passage (see Figure 4) claiming these were internal waters and in June 1994, Canada announced that it would charge a fee of C$1,500.00 to all U.S. fishing vessels "traversing key inside water passages on the British Columbia coast (between Vancouver Island and the mainland, Fitz Hugh Sound, Finlayson Channel, Princess Royal Channel, Principe Channel, Grenville Channel and Laredo Sound)."31 U.S. merchants were quick to point out that they had always had

FIGURE 4
PACIFIC COASTAL WATERS
"historical" unencumbered use of this sheltered route to and from Alaska. The fee for fishing boats was imposed and later dropped. Many Canadian politicians also oppose the right of free passage by U.S. submarines through the Dixon Entrance to sonar testing facilities in Ketchikan Alaska.

**FISHERIES PROTECTION**

We’ve been compelled to be assertive, some would say aggressive, because the alternative is to, with our eyes open, preside over the destruction of the (fishing) resource.

Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin

You do not resolve international disputes with the use of force. You resolve them with negotiations. If Canada is going to resort to force, so can we!  

U.S Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass)  

The angry rhetoric of Representative Frank and Minister Tobin is uncharacteristic of the normally cordial public relations between the two nations. While a shooting war with Canada over fishing rights is difficult to imagine, the armed boarding by Canadian Defense Force personnel of two U.S. scallop boats in July 1994 is indicative of increasing friction over the harvesting of fisheries resources. Disagreements between the nations center on economic issues as well as differing assessments of the level of fisheries depletion and conservation proposals.

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33 Ibid.
Canada and the U.S. share what were, at one time, some of the richest fishing grounds in the world. The Georges and Grand Banks were, until recently, considered an almost endless supply of living resources. Salmon were once in such great supply that U.S. union contracts contained provisions limiting the number of days per week it could be served as a meal.\textsuperscript{35} Today increases in the sea temperature in the North Atlantic and intense over-fishing have seriously depleted supplies of marketable fish (see Figure 5). Concern over preservation and, in some cases, restoration, of precious resources has become a major concern in international politics. Action to restore fisheries has been at the forefront of Canadian concerns, for good reason. One representative case study is that of Newfoundland.

In 1992 the Government of Canada imposed a two-year moratorium on the Newfoundland cod fishery, which has been extended indefinitely and now covers other species of ground fish. This has led to unemployment for over 50,000 fishermen and plant workers in Atlantic Canada, causing a great deal of social dislocation. It has also called attention to accusations of over-fishing just outside the Canadian EEZ (exclusive economic zone/200 mile limit).\textsuperscript{36}

It is thus easy to understand Canadian irritation at foreign attempts to harvest fish stocks on the continental shelf immediately outside the EEZ, when thousands of domestic fisherman are out of business due to the moratorium.

\textsuperscript{35} Cameron Brandt, "Fish of the Day, Gone Tomorrow; Commercially Valuable Fish Stocks Worldwide are Being Exploited to the Point of Collapse," \textit{World Paper}, July 1994, p.10.

FIGURE 5
NORTH AMERICAN FISHERIES

Cooperative fishing agreements between the U.S. and Canada date back to the period immediately following the U.S. Civil War. In an attempt to patch up many of the discords with Britain over its support of the Confederacy, a conference was held in Washington in 1871. As a result, Article III of the "Treaty of Washington" permitted U.S. fishermen:

...unmolested right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all other banks of Newfoundland; also in the St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish; and also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island); and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America...37

Obviously these accords have been adjusted through time and are presently not quite as advantageous to U.S. interests.

A strong supporter of the United Nations (U.N.), Canada has pressed its modern fisheries agenda through several fora, one being the Law of the Sea. 1982. Canada contends that provisions in this treaty strengthen claims that coastal states have the right to enforce national conservation laws beyond the EEZ. The previously mentioned U.S. scallop boat seizure by Canada in international waters was based on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 77 (Rights of the Coastal State Over the Continental Shelf). This Article was initially adopted

into Canadian law by an amendment to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act in 1990.\textsuperscript{38} The article states, in part:

1. The Coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.

2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.

3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express proclamation.

4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organism which, at harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or subsoil.\textsuperscript{39}

The U.S. position, at the time of the seizure, was not Canada’s right to jurisdiction over the continental shelf, but whether or not the Icelandic scallop was sedentary or mobile. Many species of scallops have the ability to propel themselves with a water-jet. Subsequently, U.S. scientists agreed to the Canadian position and acknowledged that the Icelandic scallop was sedentary and permanently attached itself to the bottom with a “byssal thread” similar to that used by mussels.\textsuperscript{40} As the Law of the Sea, 1982 extends a coastal state’s

\textsuperscript{38} “U.S. Recognizes Canada’s Jurisdiction Over Iceland Scallops on Continental Shelf Outside 200 Miles,” Canada News Wire, 24 November 1994.


\textsuperscript{40} “U.S. Recognizes Canada’s Jurisdiction Over Icelandic Scallops on Continental Shelf Outside 200 Miles,” Canada News Wire, 24 November 1994.
sovereignty out to 350NM or further for exploitation of its continental shelf, the
Canadian seizure is arguably consistent.41

Frustrated with diplomatic efforts to limit perceived foreign exploitation
of fish stocks, the Canadian Parliament passed a May 1994 update to the Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act which empowered federal authorities to seize vessels
outside the Canadian EEZ for violating a fishing moratorium on cod and other
ground fish. This move was necessitated by the Canadian view that many
nations who were members of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO) (Canada, European Union, Bulgaria, Cuba, Romania, Denmark,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia), which voluntarily imposed fishing
restrictions off the Grand Banks, were not enforcing the regulations.42 The
intent of the law was to restrict harvesting to allow regeneration of stocks in the
NAFO Regulatory area which is bounded by:

(a) North of 35 degrees north latitude and west of a line extending
due north from 35 degrees north latitude and 42 degrees west longitude
to 59 degrees north latitude, thence due west to 44 degrees west
longitude, and thence due north to the coast of Greenland, and
(b) the waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Davis Strait and Baffin
Bay south of 78 degrees 10 minutes north latitude.43

This area (see Figure 6) extends well beyond the EEZ recognized by the U.S. as
the limits of jurisdiction over fish stocks living above the sea bed. Canada has
interpreted several provisions of the Law of the Sea, 1982 as providing

42 Terrance Wills, “Fish Plunderers Could Face Tough, New International Laws, Ottawa Says,”
43 Statutes of Canada, 1994, c.14, Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, 30 June 1994, Chapt
C-33, Sect. 2., p31-4.
FIGURE 6
NORTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES ORGANIZATION (NAFO) REGULATORY AREA
authorization to enforce regulations beyond the EEZ. Article 64 encourages "co-operation" with regional organizations or neighboring states in the conservation of highly migratory fish stocks in areas within and beyond the EEZ. No article, however, specifically authorizes enforcement of national fisheries regulations outside the EEZ. "Foreigners caught fishing for species banned under Canada’s moratorium face fines of up to $550,000 and risk seizure of their catch and vessels."44 The U.S. and European Community (EC), among others, disagree with Canada's recent interpretation of fisheries protection aspects of the Law of the Sea, 1982 and have registered formal complaints with Canada.45

Canada continues to advance its position in the UN for international regulation of high seas fishing at an ongoing "Conference on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks" which is expected to conclude in 1995.46 Canada recently proclaimed that it was the first to implement a November 1993 agreement by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to regulate high seas fishing activity of national fishing fleets. In September 1994, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation approved for submission to the full Senate S.2455, the High Seas Fisheries Licensing Act of 1994, which would have implemented the FAO proposal for the U.S. In summary, the bill would have:

"1. Required publication of a list of international conservation and management measures recognized by the U.S. for compliance by U.S. high seas fishing vessels.

2. Required all U.S. fishing vessels operating on the high seas have on board a valid license issued by the Secretary of Commerce, and prevent vessels [of other nationalities] from obtaining a U.S. license to avoid punishment for violation of international measures.

3. Required the Secretary to maintain a register of vessels licensed under the statute and to report to the FAO information on those vessels and their activities.

4. Established enforcement procedures, civil and criminal penalties, forfeitures, and license sanctions consistent with the Magnuson Fisheries and Conservation Act.\(^47\)

The Senate has “given advice and consent to ratification” of this treaty, but has not yet passed it.\(^48\) Through this pending legislation, the U.S. would have authorization, as Canada already has, to regulate the high seas activities of its national fishing fleet and would be a step in the right direction to prevent “reflagging” to avoid inter-nation fishing agreements. Any projection of Congressional action at this point is difficult to assess due to the shift from Democratic to Republican control of the Congress. Even without this shift, issues related to fisheries protection in the U.S. have been difficult to resolve.

Intended to control exploitation of U.S. fisheries, the aforementioned Magnuson Act of 1976 has had limited success. The act established regional bodies to place limits on takes inside the 200 mile EEZ. These bodies have proved ineffective to the point where valuable stocks remain in decline.\(^49\) Proof of their failure was the Commerce Department closure of 6,600 square miles of the U.S. portion of


the Georges Bank in December 1994 for three months, possibly longer. While
the focus was on ground fish (cod, haddock, flounder), the ban was on all
fishing. Congressional debate on amendments to the Magnuson Act stalled in
1994 and were deferred to the 1995 session of Congress.50

U.S.-Canadian west coast fisheries issues center largely on salmon stocks.
As a migratory species, many salmon transit the waters of each nation enroute to
their spawning grounds in the other nation. During these transits they are
subject to harvesting, thus giving each nation a degree of responsibility in
conserving the breeding stock of the other. One provision of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty signed in 1985 was to provide an annual means of setting limits on
salmon takes. 1994 talks broke down as Canadians claimed U.S. fishermen from
Alaska and Washington were harvesting more than their fair share.51 “The U.S.
has refused to reduce interceptions of Canadian-origin salmon. In fact they are
seeking to increase interceptions up to $100 million in 1994 alone.”52 In a move
to pressure the U.S. into further negotiations, Canada imposed the previously
mentioned fee of C$1500 in June 1994 for U.S. fishing vessels transiting the
inland passages off British Columbia.53 While this toll was later dropped, a new
salmon agreement was not reached in 1994.54 The Canadians lay most of the

50 Scott Sonner, “Congress Gives Up This Year on Magnuson Act Fish Conservation,”
51 Bob Mottram, “Lowry Asked to Intervene in Canada-U.S. Fish War,” News Tribune, 13 July
53 Anthony Bowdle, “Canada Angers Allies With New Cod, Salmon Measures,” The Reuter
blame on fragmentation of the U.S. delegation. They claim the four representatives, one each from Alaska, Oregon, Washington and native Americans, cannot present a united front. A Canadian Consulate officer stated "the difference is so great between Alaska and the others at times that we refer to (Alaska) as the North Americans and the others as South Americans."55

As of this writing, the salmon issue is still contentious and unresolved. Canadians have demonstrated the seriousness of their position with their initiative to implement tolls on U.S. fishing vessels to counter losses and spur diplomatic efforts. While no known armed seizures have occurred, there is no reason why such a precedent established on the eastern coast could not emerge in the west.

Canadian fisheries policy and enforcement action has been, and remains, much more aggressive than that of the U.S. Canadians have committed to some hard decisions, placing thousands of fishermen out of business in an effort to protect and replenish valuable fisheries. Many of the actions taken are viewed by the U.S. as illegal under international law. The U.S., however, is beginning to find itself faced with many of the same quandaries related to conservation of living resources that Canada has addressed. It is critical to our future relations that a dialogue be maintained to resolve or compromise our differences on this key international issue. If not, further contentiousness and increased tensions may be inevitable.

55 Ibid.
COUNTER-NARCOTICS

When something like the drug role comes along, you grab onto it like a drowning man onto a buoy.

Anonymous Canadian Defense Official

With over 151,000 miles of coastline, much of which is rugged and isolated, Canada offers an attractive entry point for narcotics into North America. While faced with its own drug problems, it is also a "transit country" for drugs destined for the U.S. Most news coverage has been directed to southern U.S. borders, but Canada offers an alternative routing strategy for U.S. bound drugs, possibly to avoid the intense surveillance focus to the south.

The long, relatively open border Canada shares with the U.S. is attractive to traffickers for the bilateral flow of cocaine between the two countries. Generally, the transfer of cocaine across the border from the U.S. to Canada is via land vehicle. The Cali and Medellin cartels ship cocaine to Canada by private aircraft, commercial container vessels, fishing vessels, and coastal freighters. Canadian authorities believe that Canada is being used increasingly to trans-ship heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia to the U.S., most of which arrives by ship and by couriers using commercial airlines. Hashish from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Lebanon, and marijuana from Southeast Asia are also smuggled into Canada by sea on both coasts. [Emphasis added]

The Canadian lead agency for counter-narcotics operations is the Royal Canada Mounted Police (RCMP). As the RCMP is limited in maritime enforcement assets, they have had to rely on the establishment of an interagency counter-narcotics cooperation scheme with Maritime Command, the Coast

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Guard, and the Fisheries Department. “The RCMP first approached National Defence (department) for assistance in the late 70s, at about the same time that smugglers began using ‘mother ships’ to offload drugs along Canadian coasts.” A command system designed to share and coordinate maritime assets (also used for fisheries patrol, SAR and other maritime requirements) has subsequently been established and is headquartered in Halifax at the Maritime Operations Center. In addition, a military liaison billet has been established at the RCMP Headquarters Drug Enforcement Directorate. This coordination mechanism is designed to maximize the effective utilization of Canadian maritime fleets in meeting national requirements. For its contribution to the drug interdiction effort in FY93/94, Maritime Command provided 22 at sea ship-days and 597 patrol aircraft hours to the RCMP.

In the U.S., conscription of the military into the drug enforcement arena has not been without controversy. Many military leaders were reluctant to assume what was considered a civilian “police” role, fearing that it would detract from the primary military mission of defending the nation from foreign combat forces. In an April 1989 report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, it was estimated that an anti-drug smuggling net in the Caribbean Basin would cost up to $760.5 million annually, use one-third of the Navy’s fleet,

and yet only increase drug smuggling detection capabilities by 25 percent. As the Cold War military threat declined, however, some military planners grasped the counter-narcotics mission as a way to avoid anticipated budget cuts. Much the same has happened in Canada, although resistance to the military's performance of constabulary duties seems to be less controversial. Almost every Canadian naval budget or policy proposal openly endorses a counter-narcotics enforcement role for the military. From the new construction Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, to submarines, to aircraft procurement; all programs stress counter-narcotics as a viable mission area. While the U.S. military has agreements delineating cooperation with other federal agencies spearheading the counter-narcotics effort, major publications outlining the role of naval forces do not openly acknowledge this mission. The most recent U.S. naval strategic concept “Forward...From the Sea” stresses forward deployment of forces and use of naval forces in support of regional littoral crises. U.S. military forces may provide a wide range of assistance and support to civilian counter-narcotics law enforcement agencies, but the emphasis remains on warfighting vice constabulary roles.61

While the Canadian counter-narcotics effort places a much heavier proportional funding emphasis on drug education than that of the U.S.62,

61 Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea, (Washington: 1994).
cooperation between U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies is considered excellent.\textsuperscript{63} Canadian cooperation with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and local police forces consists of intelligence, equipment, and personnel sharing programs. Cooperation in naval enforcement programs to-date have been limited in scope, perhaps due to a U.S. focus in priorities to the south. A surge in the routing of drugs north through Canada could, however, result in a refocus of priorities and the need for increased levels of cooperation.

**IMPACT ON COOPERATION**

To-date, the politics surrounding maritime issues between the U.S. and Canada have had little impact on cooperation between the respective navies. The two navies regularly exercise with each other, mutually run operational and test facilities, and retain a great degree of interoperability largely through their common link to NATO. The objective of this chapter was to identify the potential sources of conflict that could result in a naval confrontation. Hopefully this conflict will never surface, but a familiarity with the applicable issues and sensitivities is necessary to provide an awareness of the capacity for conflict. The next chapter will look ahead and offer advice on optimizing future cooperation between the navies.

\textsuperscript{63} *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, p. 141.
CHAPTER V

FUTURE NAVAL COOPERATION

Canada's defence relationship with the United States is the most important and extensive it has with any country. Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (1994)

Through necessity, major differences in philosophy exist between U.S. and Canadian naval planners in justifying their respective navies. Defense planners in the U.S. continue to stress that the reason for naval forces is to defeat an enemy in wartime and exert influence in situations of national interest.\(^1\) Canadians, perhaps less encumbered with the political complexities of superpower status, are turning more inward, often justifying naval forces for protection of sovereignty interests.\(^2\) While the U.S. military resists a constabulary role, the Canadians more readily accept it as a means to justify maintaining force levels. This strategy is understandable when the Canadian electorate is considered. Historically, except in times of war, most Canadians have not seen the need for a large military and have resisted major capital programs. Canada's roles in her two largest alliances, NATO and NORAD, are under evaluation in view of the changing nature of the post-Cold War world. As both nations search for budget savings, the military becomes an attractive target. Maritime Command is struggling to hold its ground and has been recently hit by the mid-phase cancellation of a much needed helicopter replacement program.

\(^1\) Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea." (Washington:1994).
(though a different replacement program for a less expensive variant was subsequently authorized for review in the 1994 White Paper). The future of replacement programs for both submarines and patrol aircraft are also in jeopardy. Faced with a large national debt, a shrinking Canadian dollar, and no visible direct threat, military spending is not a priority. As such, sovereignty enhancement capabilities will most likely be a requirement of any Canadian military spending proposal for the immediate future.

In an effort to establish the optimum thrust of future cooperation between the two navies, this final chapter will initially focus on identifying overlapping national goals and objectives. Once these common goals are identified, specific recommendations will be offered on how to enhance cooperation in an effort to achieve them.

COMMON GOALS

Navies in general have three fundamental roles. These are to fight, to exercise naval diplomacy and to protect national interests or sovereignty.

C.G. Chaulk, President
Naval Officers’ Association of Canada

In defining future mutual operational priorities between the two navies, it is useful to briefly examine their respective national strategic outlooks, then find common ground. The broad range of operations from minor naval presence to major regional crises should be examined with respect to the best means of mutual support and most efficient use of the specific national assets available.

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Table 5 provides an extraction of key strategic concepts recently established for both navies (not arranged in any priority order). The most common ground appears to be a focus on responding to regional crises, both small and large in scale.

| TABLE 5  
| Naval Strategic Concepts |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| **U.S. Navy and Marine Corps** | **Canadian** |
| "Forward...From the Sea" | 1994 Defence White Paper |
| *Focus on aggression by regional powers* | *Regional conflict resolution* |
| *Engaged in forward areas* | *Peacekeeping/Humanitarian Operations* |
| *Prevent conflict/control crises* | *Protection of sovereignty* |
| *Instrument of foreign policy* | *Multi-purpose forces* |
| *Maintain interoperability with allies* | *Interoperability* |
| *CV Battle Group and Amphibious Readiness Group as the keys* | *Improved security relationships with S. America/Pacific nations* |
| *Theater ballistic missile defense* | *UN/NATO/NORAD membership* |
| *Strategic Sealift* | |

Sources: Forward...From the Sea, 1994 Defence White Paper (Canada)

The U.S. has chosen to remain forward deployed and rely on carrier and amphibious readiness groups for a quick response capability. Due largely to force size limits, Canada has never maintained a continuous forward presence
capability, but has chosen to maintain the capability to support distant operations if required. Recognizing they cannot support operations of significant scale on their own, the Canadians have elected to maintain maximum interoperability with the U.S. and NATO. The U.S., while historically maintaining the capability for unilateral operations, has recognized the political leverage obtained from multinational operations and has also stressed the interoperability requirement. The Canadian forces continue to stress their involvement in peacekeeping as a tool in the management of regional crises. Based on less than positive experiences in both Somalia and Haiti, the U.S. has become more cautious in the use of military forces for U.N. peacekeeping missions. Action is underway in Congress to restrict U.S. participation in peacekeeping missions. As part of the Republican “Contract With America,” House Resolution (H.R.) 7 entitled the National Security Revitalization Act passed by a wide margin, 241-181. The bill sets limits on the President’s ability to place U.S. forces under foreign command and cuts contributions to peacekeeping operations. While the Senate is expected to modify the resolution and not enough votes are available to override a Presidential veto, the initiative is reflective of the political mood against U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The problem U.S. and Canadian naval forces will face, when identifying common interests related to effectively responding to regional crises, will thus

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be centered on the political guidelines controlling the operation, specifically mandate and command of forces issues. These, however, are common issues to any multinational operation. The basic precepts of effective multinational military teamwork such as development of combined force employment methods, doctrine for coordinated combat operations, and interoperability will remain the primary objectives of cooperation between the nations' navies.

**COMBINED EXERCISES**

**Combined exercises are invaluable to effect coalition operations.**

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
Final Report to Congress*

Naval forces of the U.S. and Canada have effectively exercised with each other for years. Whether under the auspices of NATO, NORAD, or the CANUS Basic Defense Plan, the basis of these exercises for the last 50 years centered on countering the Soviet/Russian threat. As the world changes, the spectrum of warfare relationships must be reviewed and updated. National priorities for participation in expensive afloat exercises will be under intense examination as budgets decrease and voters look for cutbacks in both nations. Exercise programs therefore should be reflective of the national strategic priorities outlined above. The main focus should be on U.S.-Canadian cooperation in regional crises scenarios, both major and small scale. Major emphasis should shift from countering a Soviet style threat to that posed by both developing littoral nations and stateless entities. The full spectrum of operations from

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humanitarian relief to full scale combat should be reviewed with the objective of optimizing each nation’s forces based on the scale of the operation. The many lessons learned in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti should be the basis for development of combined doctrine and exercise scenarios.

While the old Soviet threat may have subsided, contingency capabilities must be preserved to counter a revitalized Russia and new potential modern threats such as China. Once the major emphasis of U.S. Navy strategic planning, ASW has faded somewhat on the list of priorities. Canada continues to have a great deal to offer in the arena of ASW. While both nations still maintain this warfare area proficiency, the Canadian retention of a diesel submarine force offers a great mutual training opportunity in the type of operations that could occur in littoral type maritime campaigns. The U.S. maintains a nuclear submarine force that could be of use in maintaining Canadian proficiency in countering a Russian and/or Chinese style strategic threat. In an era of a 350 ship U.S. Navy, the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis should not be forgotten. Canadian ASW forces were there to assist.

Other specific recommendations include:

- Incorporate the role of international organizations such as the UN into exercise play. Increased play might improve the caliber of U.N. operations and understanding of military combined operations.

- Incorporate naval peacekeeping scenarios into exercise objectives. Exercise both traditional and muscular peacekeeping options.

- As the Halifax class frigate is the mainstay of Maritime Command, combined exercises should focus on the most effective use of this asset.
- Encourage active participation of emerging navies, specifically some of those of South America and the Pacific Rim, to enhance interoperability.

- Determine the feasibility of U.S.- Canadian theater missile defense exercises with a NORAD interface.

- Review feasibility of expanding inter-American naval exercise opportunities.

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

_The destruction of the enemy's armed forces is the means to the end._

*Carl Maria von Clausewitz*

Worst case military scenarios always center on major combat. While the threat of a world-wide conflagration hopefully is fading, smaller regional conflicts will not go away. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, U.S. forces have been in combat in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. Canadians were shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. personnel in all three of these conflicts, supporting common objectives of regional peace and humanitarian action. While the number of platforms and troops contributed by Canada may appear disproportionately small when compared to those of the U.S., the political and moral gain of the Canadian support was invaluable.

Canadian naval forces will maintain a world-wide deployment capability for the foreseeable future. Trained and equipped for NATO operations, the Canadians offer a distinct advantage in that the majority of their equipment is interoperable with that of the U.S. and they train for combined operations. Stand-up times for operations with the Canadian Forces would be minimal. The

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U.S. should appreciate the potential which Canadian naval support could provide for combat operations. Specifically:

- The Tribal Class frigates, equipped with highly capable search radars, SM-2 missiles, and modern command and control suites, provide a viable AAW capability that could be utilized by any expeditionary task force. As the U.S. Navy expands its AAW responsibilities to theater missile defense (TMD), Canadian assets could fill gaps in coverage or could offer a medium-range defense role, providing a layer of coverage in the time-proven tactic of defense-in-depth. U.S. Aegis-capable units would be free to concentrate on the ballistic missile threat while Canadian assets defend against the cruise missile and air-to-surface portions of the TMD triad. With improved tactical data link capabilities, the Tribals could potentially play a role in ballistic missile intercepts. As a long-time NORAD partner, TBM launch/warning information could be also made available to assist in intercept targeting.

- The new Halifax frigates are modern ASW platforms that could be effectively employed against the coastal, shallow water diesel submarine threat that might be expected from a smaller littoral nation. These frigates train against their own submarines, thus are arguably more experienced than U.S. crews with less exercise time opposing diesels. A multi-purpose frigate, these ships have already proved their worth in combined blockade operations in support of UN peacekeeping initiatives.
- While restricted, the minesweeping capabilities of the new Maritime Coastal Defense Vessels could play a role in coastal amphibious assault operations. The MCDVs could also be deployed for low intensity peacekeeping missions such as truce observation, humanitarian relief, and environmental clean up.

- While limited to three replenishment ships for the immediate future, these vessels could assist in combat logistics support operations, possibly relieving U.S. assets for other taskings. With the ongoing reduction of the U.S. Combat Logistics Force (CLF), Canadian AORs could also be of assistance in providing on-station and shuttle support to combatants. Should the proposed construction of four Multi-Role Support Vessels (MRSVs) be authorized, Canada would obtain a viable sealift capability for a small contingency military force. Each of the MRSVs would be capable of heavy lift of combat equipment, replenishment of at-sea forces, and command-and-control functions for an afloat staff. Still in the conceptual stage, thought has even been given to equipping the MSRV with a ski ramp for VSTOL aircraft operations.8

The changing nature of the world scene may result in non-NATO, U.S.-Canada operations under a multitude of scenarios. Multinational campaigns such as those in Somalia, Haiti, and the Gulf will most likely be the norm in the post-Cold War era. Feasible bilateral operations could entail scenarios based on North American ocean area natural resource protection and/or western

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hemispheric peacekeeping. The point is that trained personnel and modern equipment are in-place for mutual support and should be optimized in contingency planning.

**NAVAL PEACEKEEPING**

*Only navies can have a benign as well as an effective general employment in times of relative peace...[N]avies do not intrude upon the sovereignties of other and sometimes sensitive nations around the world.*

RADM J.C. Wylie, USN

The Canadian military has always prided itself in its role in peacekeeping operations, participating in virtually every U.N. operation since the inception of the organization. The majority of its involvement to-date has been with land forces as that has been the primary requirement. The nature of what has been termed peacekeeping is changing, however, and has been the subject of considerable study in the past several years.

"Traditional" peacekeeping entails the imposition of a neutral force between previously warring factions that have achieved a truce. The mission of the peacekeepers is to observe the truce and provide a buffer between the antagonists. Peacekeepers in this role are lightly armed for self-defense only and are non-combatants. A look at recent U.N. initiatives around the world such as Somalia and Yugoslavia reveal that the nature of what was once considered peacekeeping is changing. Some theorists have offered suggestions that peacekeeping now entails a full spectrum of military operations from the

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relatively benign to full-scale combat. New terms are emerging such as "peace-enforcement," "peacemaking" and "muscular peacekeeping," implying a more pro-active role for the peacekeeping force.

Naval peacekeeping has been limited in the past, but is being utilized in a greater capacity as traditional perceptions of the mission are evolving. Maritime forces offer mobility, flexibility, and autonomy to a military mission.

A group of ships is only limited in movement by the speed of the slowest, the endurance of both its equipment and crew, and its compliance with another nation's territorial waters. Its presence is therefore not unduly restricted in either time or space, nor may there be any need to seek the agreement of any other nation in the operating area for its deployment. Sovereignty is, therefore not infringed and sustained operations can be supported for long periods.

Peacekeeping roles for naval assets run the entire spectrum of operations from observer missions to blockades and combat. Table 6 outlines specific missions toward which naval forces could contribute.

While Canadian naval forces could be employed for the entire range of peacekeeping operations, they would be ideally suited for lower and mid-spectrum operations which might not require a large U.S. presence, if any.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOW LEVEL</th>
<th>MID</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
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<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
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<td>- Observation</td>
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<td>- High Intensity</td>
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<td>- Monitoring</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>- Presence</td>
<td>- Preventive Deployment</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Active</th>
<th>Active</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Mine Clearance</td>
<td>- Mine Clearance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Separate Forces</td>
<td>- Separate Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide Safe Havens</td>
<td>- Provide Safe Havens</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Collect Weapons</td>
<td>- Disarm/Demobilize</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Environmental Clean-Up</td>
<td>- Environmental Clean-Up</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Interim Public Services (Police, Fire, Rescue, Medical)</td>
<td>- Interim Public Services (Police, Fire, Rescue, Medical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>- Humanitarian Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO)</td>
<td>- Hostage Rescue/Evacuation</td>
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<td>- Refugee Protection</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Protect Commercial Installations, Practices</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Guarantee/Deny Movement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Maritime Command has both the assets and the levels of endurance required to act independently or as part of a coalition operation. Politically, the participation of a Canadian naval force could be far more palatable to the U.N. in some situations than that of the United States. Canadian presence, while
providing a credible force in many situations, would be subject to the U.N., and perhaps other regional organizations, to fewer accusations of being superpower puppets. The U.S. could provide “non-visible” assistance to Canadians in such operations through intelligence, communications, and off-shore/out-of-sight logistics support.

Naval peacekeeping and other maritime operations short of full-scale war should continue to receive expanded attention from political, strategic and tactical planners. In an era of shrinking assets and evolving threats to international security, no one navy can go it alone. National strategies should expand the awareness of capabilities and advantages offered by the forces of other nations in representative scenarios. A “symbiotic” relationship with Canada is particularly advantageous to the U.S. for peacekeeping operations and Major Regional Contingencies and should perhaps be the foundation for future cooperation as the threat of open-ocean war has receded.

NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION

Democracies almost never go to war with each other. Nothing, it seems, can bring them to blows — except, perhaps, fish.  

The Economist

While it is currently difficult to envision direct involvement of the U.S. Navy in fisheries patrols or protection of offshore mining operations, the time may come. Just twenty years ago, few would have imagined the military playing an active role in a war against narcotics. As crises arise, nations look to

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their entire arsenal of responses to resolve them. As natural resources on and above the sea bed continue to dwindle, disputes of some level are inevitable. It has already been seen how the U.S. and Canada are reacting to fisheries shortages. While overall relations have remained excellent, tempers have flared on occasion to the extent that Canada recently exercised armed force as a show of resolve on the issue. Other nations have demonstrated that fish resources are high on the list of national interests worth fighting for. The British Royal Navy and Icelandic fisheries vessels fired “shots across the bow” during a series of “Cod Wars” lasting from 1958-1976.15 The Royal Navy is currently on guard as Spanish fisherman have attacked French and British counterparts for using illegal equipment.16 U.S. fishing boats have been seized in the past by both Mexico and Peru in disputes over tuna. In 1990, the Chilean Navy fired on a Soviet trawler.17 In October 1994, a Russian patrol boat sank a Japanese fishing boat for fishing in its claimed territory. The list goes on!18

As the UN struggles to establish international fishing regulations, these rules will be superficial unless nations have the means to enforce them. Recent proposals at the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory

Fish Stocks, if accepted by the U.S., may stretch fisheries enforcement capabilities to the limit. The proposed enforcement article states, in part:

1. The flag State (of fishing boats) shall ensure compliance by vessels flying its flag with subregionally, regionally or globally agreed measures, rules and regulations for the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. To this end, the flag State shall:
   (a) enforce such measures irrespective of where the violations occur;
   (b) investigate immediately and fully any alleged violation of subregional or regional conservation and management measures, which may include a physical inspection of the vessel(s) concerned, and report...
   (e) ...detain the vessel.\(^{19}\)

Currently, enforcement of fisheries regulations is a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) mission, but regulation of national fishing fleets on the global basis noted above will far exceed their current capabilities. Future use of U.S. naval assets in fisheries monitoring and enforcement is conceivable, possibly as a secondary or tertiary mission. As has been seen, most navies in the world already have a fisheries-related mission which has evolved from requirements to protect national interests. Scarcities of fish, such as have been emerging world-wide, may soon rise in national priorities, in both the U.S. and Canada.

Cooperation between Canadian and U.S. fisheries authorities is currently excellent. While differences on approaches to conservation exist, both nations exchange information relatively freely and monitor their own fishing fleets for

compliance with established regulations. When looking at the future, however, the focus must be on high seas fleets. With a relatively limited high seas capability, Canada is mostly concerned with incursions into national areas. The U.S., on the other hand, does have fleets capable of deploying to distant waters, many of which, such as those off South America, are not normal operating areas for U.S. Navy or Coast Guard assets. Opportunities for expanded cooperation should be reviewed under the auspices of this future scenario. In an effort to consolidate enforcement resources, perhaps Canada could extend its patrols southward to relieve U.S. assets for duties elsewhere. In patrolling areas that could be considered mutually beneficial to both nations, such as the Grand Banks, perhaps a time sharing regime between could be established. The expanded use of overhead ocean surveillance assets could reduce enforcement vessel on-station times or provide more effective patrol area coverage. The many options available depend only on the willingness of both nations to cooperate. The willingness is directly dependent on the value placed on defending the resource. Unless action is taken soon, fish may become a scarce resource and receive increased attention, similar to the protection afforded oil supplies today.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND PACIFIC SECURITY

A more concerted effort should be made to bring together suitable political, economic and military measures in an integrated continuum...

Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (1994)

While maintaining support for NATO and CSCE as the focus for security in Europe, Canada has publicly committed herself to expanding security relationships with nations of the Pacific and Central/South America. In a special joint committee foreign policy statement, these two precepts were highlighted as follows:

The Committee welcomes the efforts of Organization of American States (OAS) members to increase their cooperation on security matters within the broader UN framework. It supports Canada’s initiative to create a special OAS committee to discuss security issues.

The Committee considers that Canada should support initiatives such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum to develop a cooperative security dialogue in the region, with a view to working gradually toward regional security arrangements. As a Pacific country, Canada should play an active role in these developments, should demonstrate that it has security interests to protect in the Pacific, and should provide a more visible naval presence there.²⁰

The means for achieving these goals remain to be fully developed. From a maritime perspective the navy has expanded its relations with several South American navies. Canada became a full member of the Inter-American Defense Conference in September 1992.²¹ Specific initiatives with South American naval powers include:

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²⁰ Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa, November 1994), pp23-24.
Argentina:

1. Canada joined what was formerly a U.S.-Argentinean bilateral wargame series in April 1994. The annual series will now be trilateral.

2. Maritime Command participated in the U.S.-sponsored UNITAS exercise in 1993 and is exploring options for increased participation. The series involves deployment of joint service forces around South America.

3. During the Argentinean phase of UNITAS 94, a Canadian officer was assigned as an observer on the staff of the Argentine task group commander.

4. Following participation in the U.S. FLEETEX 2-94, the Argentinean destroyer A.R.A. La Argentina conducted a port visit in Halifax.

5. Establishment of formal navy-to-navy staff talks is under consideration.

6. A Canadian student has been invited to attend the Argentine Command and Staff College in 1995.

7. Both navies are considering the establishment of a three-month ship rider exchange program. A midshipman has also been invited to sail in the sail training ship A.R.A. Libertad in 1995.22

Chile:

1. In 1994, Chile sent an exchange officer to a Canadian frigate based in Esquimalt.

2. In September 1994, a Chilean Type 209 submarine, the Thomson, visited Canada and utilized Nanoose test facilities under U.S. sponsorship.

3. Both Chile and Canada were offered the U.K. Upholder submarines. Both operate Oberon class submarines. The Chilean Navy observed Oberon refits in 1978 to learn to perform them in Chile.23

Further expansion of naval security initiatives will most likely be constrained by budget restrictions. Distances involved in deploying ships to

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23 Interview with CDR A. Tavra, CN, Chilean Navy Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College, 8 November 1994.
South American waters call for a significant impact on fuel budgets. Other than minor personnel exchanges, the best opportunity for Maritime Command presents itself in fully joining U.S.-sponsored exercises closer to home. Expanded participation in the highly successful and established UNITAS series would seem the logical starting point. Atlantic coast opportunities for multilateral operations could be planned to coincide with Canadian training deployments to U.S. facilities in Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. The regular exercise series of the U.S. Third Fleet in Hawaiian and southern Californian waters could be expanded to include naval units from South America.

In the Pacific Basin, Canada is just beginning to explore security relationships. With no formal area defense alliances, such as NATO, to build upon, the U.S. has spent years establishing a series of bilateral, security-related arrangements. Most exercise planning is initiated years in advance and often centers on normal forward deployments. The U.S. also maintains forces and an active infrastructure in-theater. Without actually deploying forces in the Pacific, it is difficult to visualize the process for effecting solid security relationships. The 1994 Defense White Paper offers “a more regular program of visits and exchanges in the area of peacekeeping, including programs at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center” as the only printed commitment to this goal. The applicability of these commitments to naval forces is open to interpretation.
TESTING AND EVALUATION

Reliability and Accuracy
Motto, Canadian Forces Maritime
Experimental and Test Ranges

Since 1965, the U.S. and Canada have jointly operated an extensive underwater test and evaluation facility located in Nanoose Bay, British Columbia. Designated the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges (CFMETR), the facility consists of three ranges:

1. Hotham Sound Acoustic Range for sonobuoy hydromechanical noise testing and other tests which require very low levels of ambient noise.

2. Nanoose 3D Range for testing deep water ASW weapons and sonobuoys. This range can simultaneously track surface, air, and subsurface targets.

3. Jervis Inlet Range, a small uninstrumented range with a deep water mooring.24

The use of these ranges is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Department of the Navy and the Canadian Department of National Defence which is renewed on a 10-year basis. The next renewal is scheduled for 1996.

By mutual agreement, the test facility is a Canadian Forces station and Canada is primarily responsible for its administration, security, and operational control. The U.S. is responsible for “the supply, installation and maintenance of the technical equipment required...”25 The U.S. management responsibility is

24 Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges (CFMETR) Brochure, Missions and Capabilities, Undated.
assigned to the Commander, Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI with local coordination conducted through test facilities at Keyport, Washington.

The deep-water, low ambient noise environment of CFMCTR provides an excellent environment for testing underwater ordnance and sensors. The ranges can also be utilized for ASW training and exercises. The relative close proximity of the range to many U.S. west coast facilities offers great convenience and cost-savings. Projection is that this cooperative and mutually beneficial endeavor will be renewed for the immediate future.

FINALLY

That long [Canadian] frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, guarded only by neighborly respect and honorable obligations, is an example to every country and a pattern for the future of the world.26

Winston Churchill’s comment typifies the modern relationship between the U.S. and Canada. The two nations have been honorable, reliable, and committed military allies. This fact should not be forgotten in the “new world order” and every effort should be made to retain the level of cooperation that has been built between our navies over the last 85 years. The U.S. must, however, be sensitive to the pressures Maritime Command faces when attempting to justify the operational requirements of its ships and aircraft to its public. The Canadian need to stress popular programs promoting sovereignty may prove counter to the U.S. naval philosophy of forward deployment and littoral warfare. The mutual objective should be to determine the best means to

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accomplish continued cooperation and support in spite of these potentially diverging philosophies. This is especially critical in times when both nations are reducing their forces and stand to gain by combining assets for both peacetime and combat missions. Canadian naval forces are small in number, but the U.S. Navy is getting smaller. Enhancing cooperation will be one key to success in the pursuit of common objectives. It is hoped that this paper has provided some concrete suggestions in support of that goal. Two key points should be remembered:

- The Cold War military environment of the last fifty years is no longer with us. U.S. and Canadian cooperative planners must recognize and adjust to shifts in national priorities. As the primary focus on NATO campaigns lessens, mutual planning must incorporate newly developing multinational and bilateral operational concepts.

- In a time of diminishing resources, maximizing the use of common available assets is essential to maintaining effective naval forces. Shared interests, geography, and economies make the U.S. and Canada natural partners for enhanced cooperative initiatives. Planners must, however, remain current on, and increasingly alert to, national historical and present sensitivities that affect popular perceptions of military expenditures and their value.
APPENDIX I

CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP IN MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1994

Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth)
Colombo Plan (Co-operative economic development for south & southeast Asia)
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Group of Seven (G-7)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
* International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
International Development Organization (IDA)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Labor Organization (ILO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
** North American Air Defense (NORAD)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
** United Nations (UN)
UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Intellectual Property Union (WIPO)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Notes:  
* Headquartered in Canada  
** Organization with military obligations or commitments

# APPENDIX II

## CANADIAN PRIME MINISTERS AND
## MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NAVY SINCE 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Prime Minister/Party</th>
<th>Minister Responsible for the Navy</th>
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<td>1896-1911</td>
<td>Sir William Laurier (Lib)</td>
<td>L.P. Brodeur 1910-1911</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rodolphe Lemieux 1911</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911-1917</td>
<td>Sir Robert Borden (Cons)</td>
<td>J.D. Hazen 1911-17</td>
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<td>1917-1920</td>
<td>Sir Robert Borden (Unionist)</td>
<td>C.C. Ballantyne 1917-21</td>
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<td>1920-1921</td>
<td>Arthur Meighen (Unionist)</td>
<td>C.C. Ballantyne</td>
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<td>1921-1926</td>
<td>William Mackenzie King (Lib)</td>
<td>G.P. Graham 1922-23</td>
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<td>Jun 1926-Sep 1926</td>
<td>Arthur Meighen (Cons)</td>
<td>E.M. Macdonald 1923-26</td>
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<td>1926-1930</td>
<td>William Mackenzie King (Lib)</td>
<td>Hugh Guthrie 1926</td>
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<td>1930-1935</td>
<td>Richard Bradford Bennett (Cons)</td>
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<td>William Mackenzie King (Lib)</td>
<td>LTC D. Sutherland 1930-34</td>
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<td>Grote Sterling 1934-35</td>
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<td>1948-1957</td>
<td>Louis S. St Laurent (Lib)</td>
<td>I.A. Mackenzie 1935-39</td>
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<td>N. Rogers 1939-40</td>
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<td>Lester Pearson (Lib)</td>
<td>Colonel J. Ralston 1940</td>
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<td>Pierre Trudeau (Lib)</td>
<td>A.L. Macdonald 1940-45</td>
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<td>D.C. Abbott 1945-46</td>
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<td>R.O. Campney 1954-57</td>
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<td>MG G. Pearkes, VC 1957-59</td>
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<td>LTC D.S. Harkness 1960-63</td>
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<td>LTC G.M. Churchill 1963</td>
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<td>P.T. Hellyer 1963-67</td>
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<td>Brig C.M. Drury 1970 (Acting)</td>
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<td>J.E. Dube' 1972 (Acting)</td>
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<td>June 1984-Sept 1984</td>
<td>John Turner (Liberal)</td>
<td>J.A. Richardson 1972-76</td>
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<td>Brian Mulroney (Prog Cons)</td>
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<td>1993-Present</td>
<td>Jean Cretien (Liberal)</td>
<td>David Collenette 1993-Present</td>
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Sources: German, *The Sea is at Our Gates* & Canadian Almanac & Directory 1991
APPENDIX III

HIGHLIGHTS OF CANADA'S
1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
(As issued by the Canadian Department of National Defence, December 1994)

Introduction

1. The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. In the final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving.

2. The Government has just completed a comprehensive review of defence policy. In so doing, it fulfilled its commitment to wide-ranging consultations by involving Parliament and listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations.

3. The Report of the Special Committee on Canada's Defence Policy played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its requirements are reflected in the White Paper.

4. The consensus achieved on the way ahead for an effective, realistic and affordable policy calls for multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad.

Chapter 1 - International Environment

5. The Cold War is over. Yet Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity.

6. As a nation that throughout history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations.

Recent Progress

7. The breakup of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the threat of annihilation that faced Canada and its allies for more than 40 years, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification marked an end to the division of Europe into hostile blocs.
8. Significant progress has been achieved in the elimination, reduction and control of various weapons.

9. Progress has also been made in resolving several protracted regional conflicts.

**International Security Concerns**

10. The world’s population is growing rapidly, putting pressure on global political, financial and natural resources, as well as the environment. In addition, the past decade has seen exponential growth in the number of refugees and of people displaced within their own countries. The breakdown of authority in certain states is yet another source of instability.

11. Increasingly, armed forces are being called upon to ensure safe environments for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed. And yet, the international community cannot intervene every time these pressures reach the breaking point.

12. Among the most difficult and immediate challenges to international security are civil wars fueled by ethnic, religious and political extremism. The absence today of adversarial relations among the world’s great powers suggests that, in the future, regional conflicts are more likely to be contained. That being said, Canada cannot escape the consequences of these conflicts, whether in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, or damage to important principles.

13. The spread of advanced weapon technologies has emerged as another security challenge of the 1990s. The transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery capabilities to so-called “rogue” regimes is of particular concern.

14. Diminishing resources make it more difficult for advanced industrial states to cope with global security challenges.

15. The world is neither more peaceful nor more stable than in the past. Canada’s defence policy must reflect the world as it is rather than the world as we would like it to be.

**Chapter 2 - Domestic Considerations**

16. Defence policy must respond to challenges at home - in particular to current fiscal circumstances.
17. At the present time, our prosperity - and with it our quality of life - is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt. This situation limits governmental freedom of action in responding to the needs of Canadians.

18. The Special Joint Committee called for a period of relatively stable funding for defence, but at lower levels than those set out in the 1994 budget.

19. Although National Defence and the Canadian Forces have already made a large contribution to efforts to reduce the deficit, the Government believes that additional cuts are both necessary and possible.

20. As a result of this, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will do less in some areas. The Department and the Forces will also reshape the defence program and operate more efficiently to deliver the elements of the policy outlined in the White Paper.

Chapter 3 - Combat-Capable Forces

21. At present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada, and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores. However, Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces.

22. We must maintain a prudent level of military force to:
   
   - deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime;
   - generate larger forces if needed; and
   - participate effectively in multilateral peace and stability operations and, if and when required, in the defence of North America and our allies in Europe, and in response to aggression elsewhere.

23. We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel.

24. This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combat-capable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities.
25. Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent - that is, they must be able to fight "alongside the best, against the best."

26. The challenge will be to design a defence program that delivers capable armed forces within the limits of our resources. By making difficult choices and trade-offs, we will be able to preserve the core capabilities and flexibility of a multi-purpose force. This force will enable Canada to attend to its security needs, now and in the future.

Chapter 4 - Protection of Canada

27. Taken together, the size of our country and our small population pose unique challenges for defence planners.

28. While some might argue that the dramatic changes abroad have eroded the traditional role that the Canadian Forces play in the defence of Canada, it would be a mistake to dismantle their capacity to defend our country. Canada should never find itself in a position where the defence of its national territory has become the responsibility of others.

29. The Forces must be capable of mounting effective responses to emerging situations at home. Specifically, the Canadian Forces will:

- demonstrate, on a regular basis, the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada’s territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction;
- assist, on a routine basis, other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection;
- be prepared to contribute humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and to sustain this effort for as long as necessary;
- maintain a national search and rescue capability;
- maintain a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents; and,
- respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary.
Chapter 5 - Canada-United States Defence Cooperation

30. The United States is Canada’s most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as any in the world.

31. As strategic arms reduction treaties between the United States and Russia are implemented over the next decade, stability will be enhanced. Nevertheless, potential challenges to continental defence remain: Russia retains strategic nuclear forces able to reach North America and a number of states have acquired, or are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

32. Canada-US defence cooperation continues to provide highly valued stability in a volatile and turbulent world. Though Canada-US defence cooperation continues to serve this country’s fundamental interests extremely well, certain arrangements require updating:

- Canada will contribute to aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air defence capabilities at a significantly reduced level.

- In the negotiations on the renewal of the NORAD agreement, Canada will seek to preserve its benefits and examine closely those areas which may need to change in accord with evolving challenges to continental security.

- Canada supports ongoing discussions on possible expansion beyond North America of NORAD’s missile warning function, and is interested in gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with like-minded nations.

- The possibility of developing a space-based surveillance system for North America in the next century will be explored, subject to a variety of military, financial and technological considerations.

33. Canada will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility of its relationship with the United States to help meet defence requirements in North America and beyond. To that end, the department and the Forces will:

- maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere. This includes plans for the provision
of forces already tasked for other missions to the defence of the continent, consisting of:

- a joint task force headquarters;
- a maritime task group on each coast;
- a brigade group with associated support elements;
- two squadrons of fighter aircraft; and
- a squadron of transport aircraft.

- begin formal negotiations with the United States on the renewal of the NORAD agreement that expires in 1996, ensuring that its provisions reflect North American aerospace defence priorities;

- as part of a renewed NORAD agreement, cooperate in:
  - the surveillance and control of North American airspace;
  - the collection, processing and dissemination of missile warning information within North America; and
  - the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance; and

- maintain Canada's participation in the Canada - US Test and Evaluation Program, the Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, and other existing bilateral arrangements.

Chapter 6 - Contributing to International Security

34. The complex problems that confront the international community today defy easy solutions. Nevertheless, Canada will remain a strong advocate of multilateral security institutions. We will continue to play an active role in the UN, in NATO and in the CSCE, and we will develop our defence relationships with other countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America.
A Canadian Perspective on Multilateral Operations

35. In recent years, multilateral operations have expanded to encompass the complete range of military activity - from preventive deployments to enforcement actions.

36. The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles and essential operational considerations:

- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
- There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
- The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among mission partners.
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed upon operating procedures.
- With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
- The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission.
- There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.

37. Canada will maintain its specialization in multilateral operations. Certain international scenarios will result in a prompt Canadian response, such as the need to come to the defence of a NATO state. In other circumstances, Canada will be more selective and commit forces if suitable personnel are available in sufficient numbers, if they can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task, and if they can make a significant contribution to the success of the mission.

38. Consistent with this perspective, Canada will commit maritime, land, and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations, including:
• preventive deployment of forces;

• peacekeeping and observer missions;

• enforcing the will of the international community and defending our NATO allies;

• post-conflict peacebuilding (including humanitarian assistance); and

• measures to enhance stability and build confidence.

39. Combat training remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions.

40. Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of peacekeeping training at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia.

**Organizations and Commitments**

**Strengthening the UN**

41. Canada is in favor of a vigorous and effective United Nations and we will enhance our ability to contribute to UN operations.

42. The Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve as many as 10,000 personnel.

43. Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN to two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element. If deployed simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4,000 personnel.

44. The Forces will also remain prepared to deploy, for limited periods, medical personnel, signal units, and engineers in humanitarian relief roles.
NATO Participation and Reform

45. Canada will remain a full member of NATO and will work toward striking an appropriate balance between the Alliance's traditional mission and its newer roles.

46. Canada gives its full support to NATO expansion, but continues to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully. We will participate in multilateral and bilateral programs that aim to gradually integrate all of our North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners into an effective security order for the Northern Hemisphere.

47. Canada will also remain a strong supporter of reform within NATO and believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make greater contributions to UN operations.

48. Canada will insist that the Alliance become a more efficient organization. NATO's large and costly bureaucracy needs to be reduced, and the military budget should be spent on activities that are relevant to current needs.

49. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO.

Objectives

50. The Government is renewing Canada's traditional commitment to participate in the military dimension of international security affairs. By choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, whether within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries. The Canadian Forces will:

- maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict;

- participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state, and, to that end:
• be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combinations, one or more of the following elements:

  • a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support,

  • three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armored regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support),

  • a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and

  • one squadron of tactical transport aircraft;

• provide, within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard component of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment and within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force;

• earmark an infantry battalion group as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force; and,

• have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to sustain existing commitments or respond to a major crisis;

• maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO:

  • one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic,

  • aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system,

  • approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters, and

  • the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost recovery basis;
• make three notable changes to its NATO peacetime commitments. Specifically, Canada will:

• terminate its commitment to maintain a battalion group for the defence of Northern Norway and propose to contribute an equivalent unit to a NATO force designed to deploy rapidly anywhere within Alliance territory, including Norway;

• assign, on an occasional basis, one ship to NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean; and

• scale back its contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Program so as to be able to expand our bilateral contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe under the Military Training Assistance Program.

• expand bilateral and multilateral contacts and exchanges, in response to changing geographic priorities, with selected partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa, with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and civil-military relations; and,

• support the verification of existing arms control agreements and participate in the development of future accords.

Chapter 7 - Implementing Defence Policy

51. The new defence policy heralds a fundamental transformation in the way in which the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence will conduct their operations and do business in the coming years.

52. Most areas of defence will be cut. The relative weight of the naval, land, and air establishments will be altered to allow for the transfer of more resources to where they are most needed - mainly to operational land forces. Everything is being made leaner. Everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny.

53. These measures will ensure that the Canadian Forces will remain well commanded, properly trained, and adequately equipped for the missions the Government asks them to carry out.
Management, Command and Control

54. While the structural foundations of the Department and Canadian Forces are basically sound and capable of meeting the challenge, they can be further streamlined. We will, by 1999, reduce headquarters staffs by one-third.

55. In the Government's view, the civilian-military integration of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) continues to prove its worth. There is no compelling need to reverse it.

56. A new command and control structure will be put into place by mid-1997. The command of military operations will continue to be exercised by the Chief of the Defence staff and one layer of headquarters will be eliminated.

Capital Program, Procurement and Industrial Impact

57. National Defence is radically restructuring plans to purchase capital equipment. Planned acquisitions will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years.

58. New equipment will be acquired only for purposes considered essential to maintaining core capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and will be suited to the widest range of defence roles. Emphasis will be on extending the life of equipment. Wherever possible, the Forces will operate fewer types of equipment than is now the case, and purchase equipment that is easier to maintain.

59. DND will adopt better business practices. This means, inter alia:

- greater reliance on a "just-in-time" delivery system to reduce inventory costs;
- procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology whenever possible;
- an enhanced partnership with the private sector;
- the transfer or contracting out of support functions and activities to Canadian industry; and
- a streamlined, more efficient material support process.
Multi-purpose, combat capable forces require the support of a technologically sophisticated industrial base. National Defence will work with Industry Canada, as well as Public Works and Government Services Canada, towards harmonizing industrial and defence policies to maintain essential defence industrial capability.

Infrastructure and Support

Further reductions of defence infrastructure and support are both possible and necessary. Action is underway to extend the rationalization process beyond the measures mandated in the 1994 federal budget.

Defence Studies

The modest program of assistance to Canadian universities and other institutions involved in defence studies will be maintained, and a chair of defence management studies will be established.

Personnel Issues

Personnel cuts will continue.

The Government will amend the *National Defence Act* as appropriate to meet modern military requirements. In particular, this will involve amendments to the military justice system as it relates to both courts martial and summary trials.

The Government will place more emphasis on renewable, short-term periods of service for members of the Canadian Forces. The actual period of service for engagements will depend upon the skills and training required to do the job.

Reservists participating in and returning from operational assignments will benefit from the same post-operational care now available to the Regular Force.

Military career paths will be restructured to reduce the number of postings and assignments. This will:

- result in fewer relocations;
- ease the burden on military personnel and their families; and
result in savings for the government.

68. The Forces will reduce military staff in certain occupations and trades as functions are contracted out or reassigned to civilian employees. The ratio of general officers and senior civilian officials to overall strength, as well as the ratio of officers to non-commissioned members of the regular Forces and the Reserves, will be significantly decreased.

69. The percentage of women in the Canadian forces is among the highest of any military force in the world. Nevertheless, the commitment to making military careers more attractive to women will be reinforced.

70. The need for “universality of service” in the military remains paramount. At the same time, Department and the forces will ensure that equitable employment opportunities continue to exist for all Canadians, regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture. Likewise, the workplace policy of “zero harassment” will be strictly enforced.

Civilian Workforce

71. Our civilian employees will continue to play critical roles, although their overall numbers will be reduced to approximately 20,000 by 1999.

Total Force

72. The Government remains convinced that the Total Force approach is the right one for Canada, but changes are needed to reflect Canada’s requirement for ready forces.

73. The new strategic environment has prompted the Government to reconsider the traditional approach to mobilization planning. These plans will be revised to reflect post-Cold War requirements.

74. By 1999, the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and 23,000, respectively.

75. The Government agrees with the Special Joint Committee that the land force must be expanded. Approximately 3,000 soldiers will be added to the army’s field force. Additional resources will be provided through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three environments and a reduction in the size of the Reserves.
76. The reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their main role will continue to be augmentation, sustainment and support of deployed forces.

77. While the number of reservists will be reduced, their quality and overall ability to provide the Total Force with trained personnel for unit augmentation will be significantly improved.

78. A thorough examination of all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves will be conducted. A greater proportion of the Reserves' resources must go towards improving their operational capability and availability. The new strategic and fiscal environment requires streamlining of reserve organizations and rank structures.

79. The Government will also enhance the Canadian Rangers' [small contingent of Arctic indigenous inhabitants employed by the Canadian government for sovereignty patrols] capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols, and will modestly increase the level of support to Cadet organizations.

**Operational Maritime Forces**

80. Multi-purpose maritime combat capabilities are maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations. The Canadian Forces have substantially reduced anti-submarine warfare activities connected with the protection of shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic, while increasing their participation in UN and multilateral operations.

81. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's navy will require:

- new, affordable shipborne helicopters as a replacement for the Sea King;

- the retention of the support ship HMCS Provider, previously slated to be paid off in 1996; and

- 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels.

82. In keeping with the Special Joint Committee's recommendation, the Government intends to explore the option of acquiring four recently constructed Upholder-class submarines.
Operational Land Forces

83. The importance of the Canadian Forces’ mission to support an allied land campaign in Central Europe has diminished, allowing the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations.

84. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada’s land forces will require:

- new armoured personnel carriers;
- modernization of other suitably armoured personnel carriers in the current fleet; and
- the eventual replacement of the fleet of Cougar armoured training vehicles.

Operational Air Forces

85. The focus of air planning and operations has shifted from missions driven primarily by the former Soviet threat to a more balanced set of national and international priorities. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to execute a wide variety of domestic and international operations, as well as to provide support to maritime and land operations.

86. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada’s air forces will require:

- a replacement for the Labrador search and rescue helicopters; and
- acquisition of a small number of precision-guided munitions for the CF-18.

87. Expenditures on fighter forces and support will be reduced by at least 25% through retirement of the CF-5 fleet, cuts in the cost of fighter-related overhead, reductions in the annual authorized flying rate and by cutting the number of operational aircraft from 72 to between 48 and 60. These changes will delay the need to buy a replacement aircraft well into the next century.

88. In the absence of valid offers to buy the VIP A-310 Airbus, and in recognition of the future demand for strategic airlift support, it will, as recommended by the Special Joint Committee, be reconfigured for a strategic transport and air cargo role.
Conclusion

89. The government believes the defence policy enunciated in the White Paper reflects a Canadian consensus.

90. The White Paper affirms the need to maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable sea, land and air forces that will protect Canadians and project their interests and values abroad. It also concludes that their traditional roles should evolve in a way that is consistent with today’s strategic and fiscal realities.

91. The new policy recognizes that the defence budget will be under continuing pressure as the Government strives to bring the deficit under control. More reductions can and will be accommodated, including further reductions in personnel, infrastructure and the capital program.

92. The White Paper provides Canada’s men and women in uniform and their civilian colleagues the direction they require to carry out their duties in behalf of the nation, whether the world of the future is a peaceful and stable one, or is plagued by increasing violence within and among states.

93. Whatever the future brings, the new defence policy will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century.
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