Ensuring Adequate Intelligence Support for the Acquisition of New Weapon Systems

Myron Hura, Gary McLeod
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Community Management Staff, Contract No. 92-F143200-000.

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Myron Hura, Gary McLeod

Prepared for the Community Management Staff

National Security Research Division

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SUMMARY

Smarter and more accurate weapon systems (e.g., low observable aircraft and precision-guided weapons) are considered to be major force multipliers; however, they require specialized intelligence support. As discussed in our previous work (Hura and McLeod, 1993a, 1993b), standard intelligence products and services and current product dissemination timelines may be inadequate to support such weapons.1 Should intelligence assets be enhanced or weapon performance expectations be reduced, or could the weapons be developed and operated in ways to compensate for the intelligence support shortfall, or perhaps operators have other ways to accomplish the missions? It is often difficult to answer such questions. We sought to determine why and suggest some remedies.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES

Often, new weapon systems emerge in the operational environment without adequate planning for the integration of intelligence support. Some notable examples were the conventional variants of the Navy Tomahawk cruise missile, the F-117 stealth fighter, the LANTIRN navigation and targeting pod, and JSTARS aircraft.2 Typically, top-level decisionmakers in the Department of Defense (DoD) weapon requirements and acquisition process do not have accurate and authoritative information on intelligence system capabilities or on weapon intelligence needs to ensure that weapons are properly supported.

A major factor in this situation is that a substantial fraction of all intelligence programs that support, or can support, military needs are national systems and, thus, not under the direct control of DoD, but rather

1We define “standard” intelligence products and services as those for which a specific format, content, and accuracy have been agreed upon and that are produced or made available to operational commands according to specified guidelines. Basic target graphics, imagery products with relevant information about a target, are an example of standard intelligence products produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Because many Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) products and services are built from intelligence data sources, we also consider them as standard intelligence products and services (DMA, 1990).

2LANTIRN is an acronym for Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night. JSTARS is an acronym for Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.
under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Consequently, without authoritative inputs from the DCI about the capabilities and availability of existing and planned national intelligence assets that may support DoD systems, decisionmakers in the DoD weapon requirements and acquisition process cannot ensure adequate linkage of intelligence support for new weapons.

A second key problem is that weapon developers typically have an incentive to design their systems so that they will work with standard intelligence products or services. The incentive is that no extra cost will accrue to the weapon system program—the cost of standard products is included in the funding provided to the Intelligence Community. If the developed system does not satisfy the needs of the operators, the added costs for developing better intelligence support are not necessarily charged against the weapon program.

Third, no decisionmaker in the DoD or the Intelligence Community has the authority to ensure that total government cost is minimized while seeking the most economical combination of weapon design, intelligence system support, and concept of operations. Because the top-level decisionmaker of the Intelligence Community, the DCI, is not part of the military structure (by statute), the process for developing authoritative information and providing authoritative analysis of trade-offs is problematic. The DCI is not a member of, nor is he effectively represented on, the top-level decision bodies of the DoD requirements and acquisition process—the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)—where trade-offs between weapon designs and operational concepts are typically made. Moreover, the DCI is not involved in the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, which forms the basis for making informed affordability assessments and resource allocations decisions on defense acquisition programs.

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3The DCI serves as head of the Intelligence Community (Congress, 1992). The term “Intelligence Community” includes the Office of the DCI; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Imagery Office; the National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; and the intelligence elements of the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Department of State. The term “national intelligence” refers to intelligence that pertains to the interest of more than one department or agency of the federal government.
Finally, an analytical framework for structuring and evaluating rational trade-offs between weapon system characteristics, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts does not exist. The weapon acquisition community, the Intelligence Community, and operators have not agreed upon the procedures, models, and personnel that should be used to support JROC and DAB decisionmakers in making the necessary trade-offs.

**APPROACH TO ENSURE ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NEW WEAPONS**

To ensure that adequate intelligence support is available to new weapons, effective interactions between weapon operators,\(^4\) the acquisition community (government acquisition organizations and contractors), and the Intelligence Community are required. These interactions must begin early in the acquisition cycle of the weapon system and must lead to effective trade-offs between weapon characteristics, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. By this, we mean that the benefits and cost of providing better intelligence support need to be weighed against the cost of placing less stringent requirements on the technical characteristics of the weapons and vice versa. In examining trade-offs between weapons and intelligence, decisionmakers need to consider other options available to operators to execute the missions. For example, if the overall accuracy of an autonomously guided weapon depends on both the accuracy of the weapon’s guidance system (which is the responsibility of the weapon developer) and the accuracy of the target’s location (nominally provided by the Intelligence Community) and if the resultant combination does not satisfy an established criterion, for example, a stringent criterion of no collateral damage, operators may select other weapons, such as man-in-the-loop laser-guided weapons, to strike the target.

Decisionmakers of the three communities (operations, acquisition, and intelligence) need accurate information and unbiased, empirical analysis to make trade-offs between weapons, intelligence support, and operational concepts. Taking into consideration the distinct and separate responsibilities of the decisionmakers of the DoD JROC and DAB process

\(^4\)In the broadest sense, we define weapon operators as those commands that actually employ weapons or that represent the interest of weapon operators. At the top level, unified and specified commands, military service chiefs, and the Joint Staff represent the interest of weapon operators. At a lower echelon, component commanders and major service commands represent the interest of weapon operators.
and the DCI, we believe that the proper approach to resolve the intelligence support problem is to incorporate, as a matter of routine, the consideration of existing and planned national intelligence systems in the DoD and DAB process. The data provided should be authoritative information from the DCI or his designated representative. Specifically, the information should include the capabilities and availability of existing and planned national intelligence assets (i.e., systems and personnel) and the incremental cost to DoD of using existing assets in new ways or adding requirements to planned assets.

OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

This research examined five options for improving intelligence support to the JROC and DAB: (1) expanded intelligence support plan (ISP), (2) Military Intelligence Board with expanded capabilities (MIB+), (3) Joint Precision Strike Integration Office, (4) Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Team (JWCAT), and (5) Joint Review. Our qualitative assessment indicates that the expanded ISP, the JWCAT, the Joint Review, or combinations of JWCAT with the Joint Review or the MIB+, if properly structured, have the potential to provide satisfactory support to JROC and DAB decisionmakers for making rational trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. This assumes that the analytical framework (procedures, models, and personnel) needed to examine those trade-offs is developed.

We note, however, that none of these options will improve intelligence support to new weapons if decisionmakers do not have the incentives to make the necessary trade-offs; presumably, current budgetary constraints now offer such incentives. Also, there are inherent difficulties in reaching an agreement on an optimal solution when the three different communities (operations, acquisition, and intelligence) each has its own objective functions and responsibilities. Moreover, because of the number of different organizations that need to interact and to be involved in the process, the process will, at times, be inefficient and imperfect. However, now is the time to improve the process, by selecting one of the preferred

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5It appears that there is a current effort to implement one of these combinations. During the preparation of this report, we became aware of an initiative by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to enlist analytical support from federally funded research and development centers to assist him and the MIB in their support of the various JWCATs (Clapper, 1994).
options or combinations listed above or another option not described, as long as the option provides the decisionmakers with the necessary information and analytical support to make trade-offs between weapon characteristics, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

\footnote{For example, one potential option not examined in this research is the newly established Defense Intelligence Executive Board (DIEB), which is the senior corporate advisory body to the Secretary of Defense for review and oversight of DoD intelligence programs and activities (Deutch, 1994a).}
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Sean Roche of the Community Management Staff for his assistance in obtaining directives and documents necessary to complete this work, and for providing insights to the procedures and dynamics of several top-level Intelligence Community forums. We would also like to thank Captain Harry Ulrich (Navy), formerly of the Joint Staff; Major Michael Nostrand of Headquarters, Air Force; and Captain Michael Lancaster of the Air Force 497th Intelligence Group for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

The encouragement and support of our RAND colleagues David Gompert and Eugene Gritton were essential to completing this research. We are also indebted to our RAND colleagues John Bondanella and Lucille Horgan for their useful insights and suggestions on this research. Of course, we alone are responsible for any errors of omission or commission.
ACRONYMS

ACAT  Acquisition category
ACMC  Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
ACSI  Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Air Force)
ADDO(MA)  Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Military Affairs (CIA)
ADM  Acquisition decision memorandum
AIA  Air Intelligence Agency
AF  Air Force
AF/IN  Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (office symbol)
AFOTEC  Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
AFSARC  Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council
AF/XO  Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (office symbol)
APB  Acquisition program baseline
ASD(C3I)  Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
C3I  Command, control, communications, and intelligence
C3ISC  C3I Systems Committee
C4I  Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CINC  Commander in chief
CIO  Central Imagery Office
CMS  Community Management Staff
CNA  Center for Naval Analyses
COEA  Cost and operational effectiveness analysis
CONOPS  Concept of operations
CSAF  Chief of Staff of the Air Force
DAB  Defense Acquisition Board
DARO  Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
DASD(I&S)  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence
DCSINT  Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Army)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DIEB</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Executive Board</td>
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<td>DMA</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
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<td>DMI</td>
<td>Defense Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDD</td>
<td>DoD Directive</td>
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<td>DoDI</td>
<td>DoD Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR&amp;E</td>
<td>Defense Research and Engineering</td>
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<td>DSPO</td>
<td>Defense Support Program Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTED</td>
<td>Digital Terrain Elevation Data</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDIP</td>
<td>General Defense Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human source intelligence</td>
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<td>IC/EXCOM</td>
<td>Intelligence Community Executive Committee</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>Intelligence counterpart officer</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>IPR</td>
<td>Intelligence production requirement</td>
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<td>IPS</td>
<td>Integrated program summary</td>
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<td>IPSG</td>
<td>Intelligence Program Support Group</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Intelligence support plan</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ISWG</td>
<td>Intelligence support working group</td>
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<td>J-2</td>
<td>The command senior intelligence officer</td>
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<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Joint Direct Attack Munition</td>
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<td>JMIP</td>
<td>Joint Military Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>JPSIO</td>
<td>Joint Precision Strike Integration Office</td>
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<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>JSOW</td>
<td>Joint Standoff Weapon</td>
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<td>JSPO</td>
<td>Joint system program office</td>
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<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
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<td>JWCAT</td>
<td>Joint warfighting capability assessment team</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTIRN</td>
<td>Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>Major command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and signature intelligence</td>
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<td>MC&amp;G</td>
<td>Mapping, charting, and geodesy</td>
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<td>MIB</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MIB+</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Board (expanded capability)</td>
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<td>MNS</td>
<td>Mission need statement</td>
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<td>NAIC</td>
<td>National Air Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>NFIP</td>
<td>National Foreign Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORD</td>
<td>Operational requirements document</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OT&amp;E</td>
<td>Operational Test and Evaluation</td>
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<td>PA&amp;E</td>
<td>Program Analysis and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDUSD(A&amp;T)</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology</td>
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<td>PGW</td>
<td>Precision-guided weapon</td>
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<td>PMD</td>
<td>Program management directive</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program objective memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>Research, development, test, and evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAE</td>
<td>Service acquisition executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF/AQ</td>
<td>Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition (office symbol)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Special access required</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Sensitive compartmented information</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>System program office</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>System threat assessment report</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEMP</td>
<td>Test and evaluation master plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIARA</td>
<td>Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSSAM</td>
<td>Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(A&amp;T)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCJCS</td>
<td>Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Problem

- Often, the DoD requirements and acquisition process has not ensured adequate intelligence support for new weapon systems
  - Intelligence support not considered early on
  - National intelligence capabilities and cost not adequately considered
  - Weapon developers lack incentive to include intelligence cost
  - No single decisionmaker has authority to ensure that cost to government of weapons and intelligence support is minimized

**Outcome:** Real trade-offs are not examined

- Today, solving the problem takes on increased importance
  - New weapons require specialized intelligence support
  - Uncertainties about likely adversaries stress intelligence collection and production
  - Intelligence-related technologies have potential value
  - Decreased funding constrains options for new intelligence systems and weapons

In the past, the Department of Defense (DoD) requirements and acquisition process did not adequately consider the intelligence support necessary to effectively develop and employ new weapon systems.¹

Often, top-level decisionmakers of the DoD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)² were not

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¹Several examples of inadequate support for new weapon systems were noted in the recent Gulf War: (1) the lack of certain imagery products initially constrained F-117 operations, (2) the accuracy of standard intelligence products proved inadequate to support effective F-15E Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) operations, (3) standard products proved inadequate to attack high-value targets with precision-guided weapons, and (4) the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) deployed without an adequate intelligence infrastructure. Similar problems were encountered when conventional variants of the Navy Tomahawk cruise missile first reached initial operational capability in the mid- and late 1980s.

²As discussed in subsequent charts, the JROC is the top-level decisionmaking body for validating new weapon systems needs, and the DAB is the top-level decisionmaking body for the acquisition of new weapon systems.
provided with the necessary information to adequately consider possible trade-offs between weapon characteristics, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. By this, we mean that information on the benefits and cost of providing better intelligence support was not weighed against less stringent requirements on the technical characteristics of the weapons, and that decisionmakers were not adequately informed about other options available to operators to execute the mission if the operators deemed the combination of weapon characteristics and intelligence support to be inadequate. For example, if the overall accuracy of an autonomously guided weapon depends on both the accuracy of the weapon’s guidance system (which is the responsibility of the weapon developer) and the accuracy of the target’s location (nominally provided by the Intelligence Community) and if the resultant combination does not satisfy an established criterion, for example, a stringent criterion of no collateral damage, operators may select other weapons, such as man-in-the-loop laser-guided weapons, to strike the target.

A major factor in this situation is that a substantial fraction of all intelligence programs that support, or can support, military needs are national systems and, thus, are not under the direct control of DoD, but rather under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Without authoritative information on national intelligence capabilities from the DCI, rational trade-offs cannot be made. Further, because of the split in responsibilities between JROC and DAB decisionmakers and the DCI, no decisionmaker in the DoD or the Intelligence Community has the authority to ensure that total government cost is minimized while seeking the most economical combination of weapon design, intelligence system support, and concept of operations.

Complicating the problem of providing adequate information to top-level decisionmakers is the lack of an analytical framework for structuring and evaluating rational trade-offs among weapon characteristics, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. The weapon acquisition community, the Intelligence Community, and operators have not agreed upon the procedures, models, and personnel that should be used to support JROC and DAB decisionmakers in making the necessary trade-offs. The next section discusses these factors in more detail.

In addition to the lack of an adequate process to address intelligence support, weapon developers have no incentive to carefully examine the intelligence support requirements of their weapons. For example, during the cost and operational effectiveness analysis, which is required in the first phase (concept exploration and definition) of the DoD acquisition process, it is usually assumed that the proposed weapon system concepts
would rely on “standard” intelligence products. Standard intelligence products are provided at no extra cost to a specific weapon system. This allows weapon developers to exclude the cost of intelligence support in their weapon system acquisition program. If standard intelligence products later prove to be inadequate, the cost of providing the necessary intelligence support is effectively externalized by weapon system developers to operators and the Intelligence Community.

The need to address the preceding problems is more acute today. Smarter and more accurate weapon systems (e.g., low observable aircraft and precision-guided weapons) are considered to be major force multipliers; however, they require specialized intelligence support. As discussed in our previous work (Hura and McLeod, 1993a, 1993b), standard intelligence products and services and current product dissemination timelines may be inadequate to support such weapons. Moreover, the end of the cold war has created uncertainties about likely adversaries; their numbers continue to grow with time. This, in turn, will stress U.S. intelligence collection and production assets, which were focused primarily on the former Soviet Union and its allies. Further, the ongoing information revolution may require changes in how the DoD weapon acquisition process deals with intelligence-related technologies. The value added by advances in traditional aerospace technologies (propulsion, materials for airframes and other vehicles, sensors, communications systems, etc.) may be outweighed by advances in intelligence-related technologies. Finally, the decreased funding for improved or new Intelligence Community programs and the acquisition of improved or new DoD weapons places a premium on making effective trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

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3We define “standard” intelligence products and services as those for which a specific format, content, and accuracy have been agreed upon and that are produced or made available to operational commands according to specified guidelines. Basic target graphics, imagery products with relevant information about a target, are an example of standard intelligence products produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Because many Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) products and services are built from intelligence data sources, we also consider them as standard intelligence products and services (DMA, 1990).
The objective of this study is to assist the Intelligence Community (defined below) in developing policy and procedures that will improve its support to the acquisition of new weapon systems. To be useful, the policy and procedures must address the entire life cycle of the weapon system—from the operators’ initial identification of need to the retirement of the weapon system from inventory.

This research was sponsored by the Community Management Staff (CMS), one of the staffs providing direct support to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI, 1992b). The DCI serves as head of the Intelligence Community (Congress, 1992). The term “Intelligence Community” includes the Office of the DCI; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Imagery Office; the National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; and the intelligence elements of the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Department of State. The term “national intelligence” refers to intelligence that pertains to the interest of more than one department or agency of the federal government.
2. EXISTING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JROC AND DAB

Outline

- Introduction
- Existing Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB
- "Bottom-Up" Alternative to Improve Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB
- "Top-Down" Alternatives to Improve Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB
- Assessment and Observations

In this section, we discuss the existing DoD requirements and acquisition process and examine the intelligence support currently provided to the JROC and DAB. In Section 3, we discuss the Air Force intelligence support plan (ISP), a new "bottom-up" initiative for addressing the intelligence support shortfalls in the acquisition programs of new weapon systems. In Section 4, we discuss four "top-down" alternatives to improve intelligence support to the JROC and DAB. We conclude the briefing with an assessment of the five alternatives examined and with some top-level observations.
Improved Intelligence Support Should Come Through DoD Requirements and Acquisition Process

DoD relies on an interrelated process for developing requirements and acquiring new systems or materiel to satisfy the operational needs of war fighters. If there is to be an input from the Intelligence Community to weapon system acquisition, it should occur through this process. All acquisition programs, excluding highly sensitive classified programs, are placed into one of four categories. This study focuses on major defense acquisition programs defined as (1) a program designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) as a major defense acquisition program, or (2) a program estimated to require a total research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditure

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4Major defense acquisition programs are in ACAT I. ACAT II programs are those that do not meet ACAT I criteria and are designated by the DoD component executive as ACAT II programs, or are estimated to require (1) an eventual expenditure for RDT&E of more than approximately $115 million in FY 1990 constant dollars or (2) an eventual expenditure for procurement of approximately $540 million in FY 1990 constant dollars. ACAT III programs are those that do not meet the criteria for ACAT I or ACAT II and are designated by the DoD component executive as ACAT III. For ACAT III, the milestone decision authority is at the lowest level deemed appropriate by the DoD component executive. All other acquisition programs for which the milestone decision authority should be relegated to a level below that required for ACAT III are ACAT IV. For more information on the categorization of DoD acquisition programs, see DoDI 5000.2 (1991).
of more than approximately $300 million in FY 1990 constant dollars, or (3) a program estimated to require an eventual expenditure for procurement of approximately $1.8 billion in FY 1990 constant dollars (DoDD 5000.1, 1991). Major defense acquisition programs are further divided into two acquisition categories (ACAT) ID and IC. The USD(A&T) is the milestone decision authority for ACAT ID programs. The milestone decision authority for ACAT IC programs is the DoD component head or, if delegated, the component acquisition executive.

The requirements generation part of this process provides information to acquisition decisionmakers on operators’ projected system or materiel needs. The acquisition management system is designed to assist specifically designated decisionmakers to translate those needs into alternative concepts and, ultimately, into a final system design that meets operators’ needs. This interrelated process consists of phases (indicated by rectangles in the chart) and decision points or milestones (indicated by circles) for which formal procedures are defined.

A mission need statement (MNS) formally documents the operators’ need. The MNS is submitted for validation and approval to a designated requirements approval authority. Next, the MNS is reviewed by the acquisition milestone authority, who determines if concept studies should be conducted. Milestone 0 is the initial interface between the requirements generation and acquisition management system. At Milestone 0, decisionmakers define the range of concepts that should be explored. *It seems reasonable for decisionmakers to require the examination of system concepts with alternative levels of intelligence support in Phase 0.*

After completion of the concept exploration and definition phase, the milestone authority reviews the concepts and determines which, if any, should go forward to the demonstration and validation phase. Comparable phase and milestone procedures are repeated until the production and deployment of a new weapon system are initiated. If a new weapon system requires major modification after its initial deployment, the proposal for modification may undergo Milestone IV review.

The DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is used to establish initial affordability goals and resource commitments for new system acquisition programs. These goals and resource commitments are subsequently refined based on program progress and major changes in out-year fiscal projection. Although the interaction of the PPBS with the Intelligence Community may be important, this area was outside the scope of this study. However, we believe that an analysis of the interaction of the PPBS and the Intelligence Community should be conducted.
The governing DoD instruction for defense acquisition management policies and procedures (DoDI 5000.2, 1991) requires the consideration of intelligence support in the acquisition process of major systems. The preparation and validation of threat and threat-risk information are clearly defined in the instruction, and the process for developing the system threat assessment report (STAR) is well established (DIA, 1992). The instruction also requires that intelligence support cost be included in the projected life-cycle cost of the acquisition program.

Further, the instruction allows for the generation of new intelligence production requirements (IPRs) if existing intelligence products do not adequately address critical intelligence parameters required by the new system. The instruction also permits the generation of intelligence requirements if new source material is required. This can be interpreted to mean that the need for new collection assets should be explored in subsequent trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

The need for identifying mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) data requirements is also defined. These requirements have important implications for the Intelligence Community because many MC&G products rely on information and materials collected by intelligence assets.
For example, high-resolution imagery is needed to produce accurate Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), a standard MC&G product from the Defense Mapping Agency.
The JROC has the responsibility for reviewing, validating, and assigning priority to a MNS submitted by unified and specified commands, military departments, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or the Joint Staff (JS). The JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACM) are members of the council. It is the responsibility of the council to confirm that the MNS cannot be satisfied by nonmateriel solutions, such as changes in doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, training, or organization. If the council determines that a nonmateriel solution is not feasible, it forwards the MNS as approved or disapproved to USD(A&T).

The DAB is the top-level decisionmaking forum for major defense acquisition programs. It is chaired by the USD(A&T), with the VCJCS as the vice chairman. The other members of the DAB are the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (PDUSD(A&T)); service acquisition executives (SAEs) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DR&); the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E); the Comptroller of the Department of Defense; and the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E). *We note that no high-level decisionmaker of the Intelligence Community is a member of the JROC or DAB.*\(^5\) However, as we shall show in a subsequent chart, information on current and planned intelligence system capabilities is provided to the JROC and DAB by advisors.

For a MNS approved by the DAB at Milestone 0, the milestone decision authority, in the form of an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM), typically (1) defines the minimum set of materiel alternative concepts to be examined, (2) identifies one or more organizations to explore the concepts, (3) establishes the analyses that must be presented at Milestone I, and (4) identifies the amount and source of funding for the study of concepts in Phase 0.

During Phase 0, government and/or industry teams conduct a short-term cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) of alternative concepts. The information generated by the COEA serves to define the most promising system concept(s) and an overall system acquisition strategy. If required by the ADM, government and/or industry teams could examine trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts as part of the COEA, and then provide that information for Milestone I review.

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\(^5\)As we shall discuss later, it is not clear that a high-level decisionmaker from the Intelligence Community should be a member of the JROC or DAB; it is more critical that a process is implemented that can provide the JROC and DAB with authoritative information on national systems.
As discussed in the preceding chart, intelligence information and analytical support to decisionmakers of the JROC and DAB process are provided by advisory organizations. The command senior intelligence officer (J-2) and designated representatives of other subordinate intelligence organizations may provide information about intelligence needs and implications to authorities responsible for generating the MNS. The authorities responsible for drafting the MNS may, or may not, include intelligence needs and implications in the MNS. Typically, the MNS lists threat information.

The heads of service intelligence organizations—the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT); the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI); the Marine Corps’ Director for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I); and the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI)—can, and do, provide intelligence information and analytical support to their respective vice chiefs and, therefore, indirectly to the JROC.

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is specifically designated as the principal advisor on intelligence matters to the JROC/DAB review process (DoDI 5000.2, 1991). The Director of DIA can
call upon the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) to assist him in this role. The next chart describes the MIB.

DAB decisionmakers are also supported by the DAB C3I Systems Committee (C3ISC). Principally, this committee is responsible for providing information and analytical support on technical and architectural command, control, communications, and related intelligence issues.
Military Intelligence Board (MIB)

Functions

- Acts as senior board of advisors to Director of Defense Intelligence Agency for defense military intelligence issues, both substantive and resource
- Oversees GDIP development, reviews integrated program and budget, and resolves program issues

Composition

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<th>Principals</th>
<th>Associates</th>
<th>Advisory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dir DIA (chair)</td>
<td>ADDO(MA), CIA</td>
<td>DASD(I&amp;S)</td>
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<td>Dep Dir DIA</td>
<td>Dir DARO</td>
<td>Dir IPSG, ASD(C3I)</td>
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<td>DCSINT (Army)</td>
<td>Dir Policy Support, DIA</td>
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<td>DNI (Navy)</td>
<td>Dir C4I (USMC)</td>
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The MIB is the senior board of advisors to the Director of DIA for defense military intelligence issues, both substantive and resource. It oversees the development of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), reviews the program budget, and resolves program issues. The MIB includes several representatives of service, joint-service, and DoD organizations, and a representative from a national intelligence agency outside DoD control.

The Director of DIA is the chairman of the MIB. The Deputy Director of DIA, DCSINT (Army), DNI, ACSI (Air Force), the Marine Corps’ Director for C4I, and the Directors of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Imagery Office (CIO) are principal members of the MIB. The Central Intelligence Agency’s Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Military Affairs (ADDO(MA)), the Director of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), and the DIA Director of Policy Support are associate members of the MIB.

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6This associate member is the only representative from a national intelligence agency outside DoD control. NSA and CIO are combat support agencies of DoD under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
Advisory members of the MIB include the Director of the Intelligence Program Support Group (IPSG) from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (DASD(I&S)), the Director of the DMA, and the Director of the Defense Support Program Office (DSPO). Currently, the MIB lacks a representative that can provide authoritative information on the capabilities of existing and planned national assets and the incremental cost to DoD of using existing assets in new ways or adding requirements to planned assets.
One of the central issues in ensuring adequate intelligence support is the level of interaction between top-level decisionmakers representing the interest of the operators (JROC), the weapon developers (DAB), and the Intelligence Community (DCI). Based on a review of the directive and instruction governing the interrelated JROC/DAB process (DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2, 1991), one can infer that there are strong interactions between the top-level decisionmakers involved in the process. The same cannot be said about the interaction of the Intelligence Community with the JROC and DAB.

Intelligence programs are grouped into two categories, the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. All intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated jointly by DCI and the head of a U.S. department or agency or by the President, are in the

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7In this case, the JROC represents the unified and specified commands, military services, and OSD and Joint Staff organizations that generate mission need statements.
NFIP. Intelligence programs and applications designed to support solely DoD needs constitute the TIARA program.⁸

The DCI, as the head of the Intelligence Community, is responsible for developing and presenting the annual budget for the NFIP to the President. To that end, the DCI provides guidance to elements of the Intelligence Community for preparing their annual budgets and approves such budgets before they are incorporated into the NFIP. Moreover, the DCI is the reprogramming authority for the NFIP; no funds may be reprogrammed from the NFIP by any element of the Intelligence Community without his prior approval (Congress, 1992).

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is solely responsible for developing and submitting the TIARA budget to the President. However, the Secretary of Defense also has responsibilities pertaining to the NFIP. He shall ensure that the budget of the Intelligence Community elements within DoD are adequate to support the intelligence needs of DoD, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that elements of the Department of Defense within the NFIP implement appropriately the policies and resource decisions of the DCI (Congress, 1992).

The subdivision of intelligence programs and the distinct responsibilities of the DCI and Secretary of Defense lead us to characterize the interaction between the national elements of the Intelligence Community and the JROC and DAB as ad hoc. By this, we mean that a process for providing authoritative information on national intelligence programs and possible alternative levels of support to DoD systems has not been formalized. This, in turn, impedes effective trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts within the existing JROC and DAB process.

⁸During the preparation of this report, we became aware of a new DoD program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), that began in June 1994 (Deutch, 1994b). The JMIP contains the budget for DoD intelligence efforts that support the intelligence needs of more than one military service. The TIARA program supports service-specific intelligence efforts within DoD.
National Intelligence Programs Not Equally "Visible" to All Key Players

- "Visibility" = Information, Understanding, and Involvement

<table>
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<th>Decreasing visibility</th>
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<tr>
<td>National-Level Policymakers</td>
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<td>National Military Leaders</td>
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<td>Theater CINCs</td>
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<td>Operational Military Commanders</td>
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Another key issue in ensuring adequate intelligence support is that the NFIP is designed to provide support to national-level policymakers, national military leaders, and, as requested, theater commanders in chief (CINCs). It is not designed to support operational commanders; however, it may do so. Therefore, it is not surprising that weapon developers and representatives of organizations involved in the weapon system acquisition process have limited visibility into national intelligence programs. This lack of visibility may result in the overstatement (or understatement) of existing or planned intelligence capabilities to weapon developers and the operators. If, during the approval process, the cost to DoD of improved national capabilities is not presented, the users will be surprised when the bill is presented (especially, when many believe that national systems are paid for by the Intelligence Community and, thus, are "free").

We broadly characterize "visibility" as having adequate information, understanding the information and its implications, and then being involved in national programs. The decreasing visibility into national intelligence programs from national-level policymakers to operational military commanders reflects the current structure of the Intelligence Community.
In Actuality, the DoD Requirements and Acquisition Process Has Not Adequately Addressed Intelligence Support

- Security constraints hindered dialogue
  - Weapon systems developed within SAR programs
  - Important intelligence capabilities classified SCI

- Trade-offs between weapon system characteristics, operational concepts, and intelligence support not adequately explored (lack of authoritative Intelligence Community input on national systems)

- Life-cycle costs of intelligence support not adequately considered

- Authoritative document defining intelligence support infrastructure for new weapons not developed

A review of the top-level directive and instruction governing the DoD requirements and system acquisition process (DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2, 1991) would lead a reader to believe that intelligence support is being adequately considered in the acquisition of new systems. Often, in practice, that has not been the case. Several impediments must be addressed before adequate intelligence support can be ensured for the acquisition of new systems.

First, security constraints hinder the flow of information and the performance of analysis required to provide JROC and DAB decisionmakers with accurate information on weapon design, intelligence support, and operational concept trade-offs. The problem is most acute with weapon systems that are developed within special access required (SAR) programs. A limited number of Intelligence Community representatives have visibility into a weapon system developed under a SAR program. Consequently, the Intelligence Community may be unable to provide adequate information on the support available to such a weapon system. Conversely, many important intelligence capabilities are classified as sensitive compartmented information (SCI). A limited number of weapon developers and operators have the clearances required to access this information. As a result, weapon developers and operators
may be unaware that alternative levels of intelligence support are available to support new systems. One of the objectives of the ongoing Air Force intelligence support plan development process described in the next section of this report is to help resolve this issue (Department of the Air Force, 1992).

Second, the JROC and DAB process lacks authoritative and accurate input about the capabilities and programs of the national elements of the Intelligence Community. As we discuss in the next chart, this problem prevents decisionmakers from adequately examining trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. Moreover, the combination of this problem and the security problem precludes the calculation of accurate life-cycle cost of the intelligence support for new weapon systems.

Finally, an authoritative document defining the intelligence support infrastructure for new weapon systems is not produced as part of the JROC/DAB process. Without such a document, decisionmakers cannot adequately monitor the development of intelligence support for new weapon systems that cannot rely on the existing intelligence infrastructure to support the needs of the war fighters.
In this section of the briefing, we discuss one "bottom-up" option to address the problems in providing adequate intelligence support for the acquisition of new weapon systems. Recognizing some of these problems, the Air Force instituted a process for developing intelligence support plans. We focus on this initiative because some of our past research directly supported this initiative. Moreover, we have firsthand experience in the development of ISPs for two major weapon systems, the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) and the B-2 bomber. For additional information on our work in support of this Air Force initiative, please see Hura and McLeod (1993a, 1993b, 1994).
One Approach to Ensure Intelligence Support to Weapon System Acquisition: AF ISP Process

- Intelligence Support Plan (ISP)
  - Authoritative reference document for intelligence support requirements and costs
  - Currently, weapon-system specific
  - Weapon’s entire life cycle addressed: from identification of need to retirement from inventory

- Key players
  - Intelligence Counterpart Officers (ICOs)
  - Intelligence Support Working Groups (ISWG)

The ISP is the authoritative document for identifying, planning, and monitoring the implementation of the intelligence support infrastructure for a weapon system throughout its life cycle—from definition of need through retirement from inventory. At a minimum, the ISP will address all intelligence support requirements related to (1) collection management, (2) collection, exploitation, and production of human source intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and fused intelligence, (3) intelligence dissemination, (4) intelligence manpower and training, (5) targeting intelligence, (6) MC&G, (7) combat intelligence data, (8) modeling and simulation, (9) foreign material exploitation, and (10) foreign military sales (Department of the Air Force, 1994b). Currently, ISPs are weapon-system specific, that is, an ISP covers one designated weapon system, such as TSSAM or B-2.

The ISP is produced by the user command (Air Force major command) and becomes a formal document when it is signed off at Air Force Headquarters by the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (AF/XO), and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AF/IN). The intelligence counterpart officer (ICO) of the user command has the lead in producing
the ISP; he works closely with his ICO counterpart at Air Force Headquarters⁹ and members of the intelligence support working group (ISWG). The next chart discusses in more detail the proficiencies required of the ICOs and ISWG members and the composition of the ISWG.

Because precision-guided weapons (PGWs) have many common support requirements, the Air Force is investigating the possibility of evolving the existing Air Force TSSAM ISP into a joint-service TSSAM ISP and then into an ISP for all PGWs by including the other joint-service PGWs, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). We believe this goal has merit because more effective trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts can be made when an entire category of weapons (in this case, PGWs) is considered.

⁹Currently, the “Headquarters” ICO is a member of the 497 Intelligence Group, which reports to the Air Intelligence Agency’s (AIA’s) National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).
Competent ICOs and ISWG members who understand operator needs, weapon system characteristics, intelligence capabilities, and cost are essential in developing an effective intelligence support plan. To ensure that the ISP accurately reflects the concerns of operators, weapon developers, and intelligence providers, representatives of diverse organizations must be included in the ISWG. Moreover, these representatives must be capable and empowered to provide substantive inputs in their areas of expertise and answer questions that are important in defining possible trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

Equally important, members of the ISWG must provide information on potential trade-offs to their superiors so that they can examine and determine which trade-offs they can support. For example, if the draft concept of operations (CONOPS) envisions a weapon employment option that the technical characteristics of the weapon and/or the existing intelligence capabilities cannot support, one of several trade-offs can be made. One trade-off would be to change the CONOPS. Another would be to change the technical characteristics of the weapon, and still another would be to develop new intelligence capabilities; these two trade-offs, in particular, could significantly change the funding required for the system.
Ultimately, the choice of trade-offs should reflect the needs of the customers—the operators.

One of the key shortfalls of the Air Force ISP process is that it lacks authoritative input\(^\text{10}\) from the Intelligence Community as to the support that Air Force weapon systems can expect from national assets. Representatives from national agencies have been invited and have attended ISWG meetings but seldom provide sufficient information for defining potential trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

\(^{10}\)"Authoritative" input means information about the technical characteristics (including system specifications), program status, and funding of existing and planned national systems that is provided by designated representatives of organizations specifically authorized by the DCI to provide such information.
As one would expect, the Air Force system requirements and acquisition process for ACAT 1C programs closely mirrors the DoD process for ACAT 1D programs. Air Force major commands (MAJCOMs) generate mission need statements. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) approves the mission need statements. Approved MNSs are forwarded to the appropriate Milestone 0 decision authority for review. Following Milestone 0, Air Force Headquarters publishes a program management directive (PMD) to initiate concept studies. The PMD assigns MAJCOM responsibilities and provides funding (if available) for concept studies.

In Phase 0, the user or operating command leads the COEA efforts and determines the preferred solution. The operating command prepares a brief operational requirements document (ORD) describing the preferred solution. During this phase, the Air Force Materiel Command, with the operating MAJCOM and the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), develops the STAR and the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) for the preferred solution, the integrated program summary (IPS), and the acquisition program baseline (APB) (Department of the Air Force, 1994b).

For non-ACAT 1D programs, the Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council (AFSARC) is the approval authority for Milestones I through IV.
The ISP process is designed to assist decisionmakers involved in the Air Force requirements and acquisition process in ensuring adequate intelligence support for new weapon systems. The key elements of the ISP process are shaded in the chart. The ICO of the MAJCOM generating the MNS documents the initial intelligence requirements and ensures that the MNS includes an accurate description of weapon intelligence support requirements. After the MNS is submitted to the CSAF for approval, the headquarters ICO scopes the intelligence requirements and documents the intelligence implications related to the MNS.

During Phase 0, the headquarters ICO and the operating command ICO determine the agenda, timing, and location for convening the ISWG. The ISWG discusses intelligence needs and cost for the alternative system concepts identified in Phase 0 and assists the operating command ICO in building the ISP. After the ISP is approved by SAF/AQ, AF/XO, and AF/IN, it becomes part of the formal documentation required for subsequent milestone decisions. The ISP is a living document that is updated to reflect changes in weapon system characteristics and operational concepts. The ISWG monitors the development of the acquisition program and helps the operating command update the ISP. A more complete discussion of the Air Force ISP process can be found in the ICO handbook (Department of the Air Force, 1993a) and the Air Force instruction describing intelligence support to the acquisition process (Department of the Air Force, 1994a).

As previously discussed, a key shortfall (shown in the lower righthand corner of the chart) of the current Air Force ISP process is the lack of an authoritative input on national systems from the Intelligence Community.
AF ISP Process Is a Logical, but Complex, Process

- Considers operators, weapon developers, and intelligence concerns and serves to highlight and resolve key issues
- Leads to commitment by acquisition, operations, and intelligence decisionmakers to the development and use of defined intelligence support infrastructure
- Requires dedicated resources (personnel, funding)
- Involves participation of knowledgeable individuals from many organizations with diverse responsibilities and objectives

Example: Development of AF ISP for TSSAM began in early 1992 and is now ready for final sign-offs

Based on our direct participation in the development of the Air Force ISP process, from its inception through the building of two weapon-specific (TSSAM and B-2) draft ISPs, we consider the process to be logical and potentially very useful as an approach for ensuring adequate intelligence support for new weapon systems. The process considers operators, weapon developers, and Intelligence Community concerns and provides a forum for defining and exploring trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. For example, the process of building the TSSAM ISP led to changes in the weapon’s initial draft CONOPS, intelligence support requirements, and ORD, when it became clear that the technical characteristics of the weapon would not support the draft CONOPS and that the weapon would not operate effectively with standard intelligence products.

To be effective, the ISP process must be supported with dedicated funding to cover personnel, data gathering and analyses, and administrative cost. The process requires numerous interactions between ISWG members, who represent many organizations with diverse responsibilities. Typically, data gathering and analyses are conducted to examine the relative merits of trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence
support, and operational concepts. Several drafts of the ISP for a single weapon are required before a final draft is produced.

The ISP development process, from the first ISWG meeting to the publication of the authoritative ISP, may take substantial time. For example, the initial TSSAM ISWG meeting was held in early 1992. The final draft has been signed by the operating command and the joint system program office (JSPO) responsible for building TSSAM but has not yet (as of November 1994) been signed by SAF/AQ, AF/XO, and AF/IN.

The experience of the TSSAM ISP is not unique; the development of ISPs for several other weapon systems is consuming comparable amounts of time. Some of the delays in producing the current set of ISPs can be directly attributed to the fact that the weapon systems of interest are well into the acquisition cycle (many are now in the engineering and manufacturing development phase). Implementing the ISP at that stage limits the flexibility of decisionmakers to make trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts, and to equitably apportion intelligence support cost across many programs. Other delays appear to have been caused by the fact that the ISP process was a new initiative and not yet institutionalized. When fully institutionalized, we anticipate that the ISP process will be synchronized with the acquisition process.
One approach that may improve the intelligence support to the DoD requirements and acquisition process for new weapon systems is to incorporate an expanded Air Force ISP process into the JROC and the DAB. As shown in the lower righthand corner of the chart, the "expanded" ISP process to support the DAB would include an authoritative input from the national elements of the Intelligence Community. By this, we mean that the ICO of the organization generating the MNS, the ICO of the organization designated to lead the program, and members of a DoD-level ISWG with proper clearances are provided accurate information on existing and planned national intelligence capabilities (i.e., technical characteristics, access [availability to DoD], coverage, accuracy, and timeliness of national systems) and on the incremental cost to DoD for the use of those capabilities. This information is provided in briefings by an empowered national community representative(s), who is a designated member of the ISWG, and via official correspondence. If necessary, guidance for preparing and providing authoritative information on national systems for this and the other options could come from the Intelligence Community Executive Committee (IC/EXCOM), the principal Intelligence Community advisory body to the DCI (DCI, 1992a). Among others, the DCI, the VCJCS, the
Director of the DIA, and the ASD(C3I) are permanent members of the IC/EXCOM.

Accurate and authoritative information about national systems is essential to the ICOs and the ISWG members in structuring possible trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. JROC and DAB decisionmakers need accurate information on the possible trade-offs to select the preferred intelligence infrastructure, which is then documented in an ISP. If necessary, the ISP would have an SCI/SAR annex that could discuss national-level intelligence support and SAR weapon program issues.

Recently, the Air Force briefed the PDUSD(A&T) on the ISP program. He believes that the Air Force initiative has application for acquisition programs throughout the DoD, and he has asked the Army and the Navy to comment on the initiative and to compare it with what they are currently doing to address intelligence support issues for weapon acquisition programs (Longuemare, 1994b).
4. "TOP-DOWN" ALTERNATIVES TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JROC AND DAB

Outline

- Introduction

- Existing Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB

- "Bottom-Up" Alternative to Improve Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB

- "Top-Down" Alternatives to Improve Intelligence Support to JROC and DAB

- Assessment and Observations

In this section of the briefing, we discuss four "top-down" options to address the problems in providing adequate intelligence support for the acquisition of new weapon systems.
Alternative “Top-Down” Approaches

- JROC and DAB are appropriate top-level forums
- Options for improving JROC/DAB process
  - MIB provided with authoritative Intelligence
    Community input on national systems (i.e., MIB+)
  - Joint Precision Strike Integration Office (JPSIO)
  - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Teams
    (JWCATs)
  - Joint Review

Based on our examination of the JROC and DAB process, we believe the JROC and DAB are appropriate top-level forums for ensuring adequate intelligence support for major new weapon systems. However, without changes, these forums will not be able to accomplish this objective. In the next series of charts, we discuss four “top-down” approaches for improving the ability of the JROC and DAB decisionmakers to ensure adequate intelligence support to new weapons.

During the preparation of this report, we became aware of the newly established Defense Intelligence Executive Board (DIEB) (Deutch, 1994a), which held its first meeting on 29 October 1994. The DIEB is the senior corporate advisory body to the Secretary of Defense for review and oversight of DoD intelligence programs and activities. It is also the senior management body providing planning, programming, and budgeting oversight for the Joint Military Intelligence Program. The DEPSECDEF chairs the DIEB (in addition to the DAB), and the DCI is a member of the DIEB. Because of the newness of this forum, we did not have sufficient visibility into the DIEB process to include it as one of our “top-down” options for improving intelligence support for the acquisition of new weapon systems; on the surface, we believe it merits investigation.
This option envisions one major change to the current MIB. In this option, the MIB is given authoritative information on the capabilities of existing and planned national intelligence assets and on the incremental costs to DoD of using existing assets in new ways or adding additional requirements to planned assets; we denote this expanded capability as MIB+. This input would be provided to principal members of the MIB+ by a specifically designated representative of the DCI or by official correspondence. With this information and comparable information on TIARA programs, the MIB+ would develop authoritative data on alternative levels of intelligence support that could be made available to support a MNS and, subsequently, alternative weapon systems concepts. The Director of DIA would then provide this information to the JROC and DAB decisionmakers.

With this information, DAB decisionmakers would specify (in the Milestone 0 ADM) the intelligence support alternatives that should be considered in Phase 0. In the Milestone I ADM, DAB decisionmakers could ensure that the concept baseline adequately defines and addresses intelligence infrastructure cost. Upon completion of each of these milestones, JROC decisionmakers would review the proposed intelligence infrastructure to ensure that it satisfies operator needs.
Option III: Joint Precision Strike Integration Office

- Objective: Improve technical integration of joint-service systems
- O-6 leadership rotated among services (guided by Joint Steering Committee)
- Staffed by operations, acquisition, and intelligence personnel from each service (6 to 12 personnel)
- Responsibilities
  - Coordinate service acquisition efforts in support of CINC requirements
  - Develop joint precision strike road map
  - Review and coordinate draft required by JROC/DAB process and other documents related to precision strike
  - Assess PGW accuracy, timelines, data paths, and forecast needs

The idea of creating a Joint Precision Strike Integration Office (JPSIO) was generated by the Air Force and Navy in response to a request from the PDUSD(A&T) for views on how to do a better job of technical integration and acquisition oversight in developing targeting support for standoff weapons (Longuemare, 1994a).

As discussed by the Navy and the Air Force (Department of the Air Force, 1994c) in briefings to the JROC, the primary objective of the office is to improve the technical integration of joint and service systems. The notional JPSIO is manned by 6 to 12 personnel from the services and a small number of civilians with expertise in operations, acquisition, and intelligence. A joint steering committee provides oversight and guidance to the office.

The responsibilities of the JPSIO would include (1) coordination of service acquisition efforts of precision strike systems, (2) development of a joint precision strike road map, (3) support to the JROC/DAB process on issues related to precision strike, and (4) assessment of weapon accuracy, timelines, and data paths. To execute those responsibilities, the personnel of the JPSIO would have to understand operator needs, weapon characteristics, and intelligence requirements. Therefore, for this option, we postulate that the JPSIO also would develop and provide the JROC
and DAB information on trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. However, technical integration is a major problem that, by itself, will tax the staff. Adding further personnel for another major function is not a desirable solution.
The joint warfighting capability assessment teams (JWCATs) are key elements of a larger initiative of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the VCJCS to consolidate requirements, acquisition, and program assessments (Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, 1994). The JWCATs were created to (1) assess warfighting capabilities and identify shortfalls, (2) assess the effects of reduced funding on existing and planned capabilities, and (3) provide recommendations to the JROC and DAB for addressing those issues.

The Strike JWCAT is the model for our option IV for improving intelligence support to the JROC and DAB process. The objective of the Strike JWCAT (which includes an intelligence subcommittee) is to provide a consolidated assessment of precision strike capabilities with supporting intelligence. The initial phase of this initiative has been put into practice by the VCJCS. JWCATs for nine broad warfare areas were created. The

11) JWCATs were created for the following broad areas: (1) strike, (2) ground maneuver, (3) strategic mobility and its protection, (4) air superiority, (5) deterring/countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (6) command and control/information warfare, (7) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, (8) overseas presence, and (9) joint readiness.
teams examined warfighting capabilities in those areas and presented their assessments to the JROC. After JROC review, issues deemed necessary to address in the JROC and DAB process were briefed in September 1994 to unified and specified commands. The next step is to present those issues and recommendations on which the JROC and CINCs agreed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for his review, approval, and subsequent submission to the Secretary of Defense. If approved by the Secretary of Defense, the issues would be included in the Defense Guidance Memorandum for the military services to address in their program objective memorandums (POMs). It is too early to tell whether this initiative will succeed and be institutionalized.

Assuming that the Strike JWCAT has authoritative information on national and tactical intelligence capabilities and costs and has adequate analytical capabilities, it should be able to provide the JROC and DAB decisionmakers with the necessary information to make trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

A possible variant of option IV is to integrate the information and analysis of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) JWCAT into the Strike JWCAT. But this might not be necessary because some members of the ISR JWCAT are also members of the Strike JWCAT Intelligence Subcommittee.
The Strike JWCAT includes representatives of the services, Joint Staff, unified and specified commands, OSD organizations, and two federally funded research and development centers—the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).\textsuperscript{12} The team is supported by a Strike Intelligence Subcommittee, which includes representatives from DoD and service intelligence organizations and the DCI. The broad representation of the operations and acquisition communities and the Intelligence Community on the Strike JWCAT and the supporting intelligence subcommittee, on the surface, seems adequate to ensure that the concerns of each of these communities are effectively reflected in the assessments and resultant recommendations. However, this assumes that the team and subcommittee have adequate time and the appropriate analytical skills (or can rely on competent analytical organizations for support) and that they are provided with authoritative information on existing and planned national capabilities and on the incremental cost to DoD of using the existing assets in new ways or adding requirements to planned capabilities.

\textsuperscript{12}The chart lists the organizations that were asked to participate on the Strike JWCAT and that sent representatives. Because we do not know if a formal membership for the Strike JWCAT has been established, we do not attempt to define all the office symbols.
The final option we examined is for top-level decisionmakers responsible for national and tactical intelligence programs to provide authoritative information to JROC and DAB decisionmakers on the intelligence support alternatives that should be considered in making trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. This option builds on the informal Joint Reviews that were initiated last year between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Community Management Staff supports the DCI and the Intelligence Program Support Group supports the DEPSECDEF. Since the DCI is responsible for the NFIP and the DEPSECDEF (representing the SECDEF) is responsible for the TIARA, any joint agreements they reach in this forum would be authoritative and, if communicated as such to JROC and DAB, could lead to adequate trade-offs. We also note that lower-level joint reviews are periodically conducted by the Director of CMS and the DASD(I&S).
In this final section of the briefing, we summarize the alternative approaches for improving intelligence support to the acquisition process, provide an assessment of these approaches, and conclude with some top-level observations.
Alternative Approaches
(Not Rank Ordered)

- Expand AF ISP process to include other services and produce ISP for selected DoD PGWs; incorporate process into DoD requirements and acquisition policies and procedures (Option I)

- Rely on JROC and DAB procedures and structure, but ensure decisionmakers have adequate information to make trade-offs between weapon systems, operations, and intelligence support
  - Expand Military Intelligence Board capabilities (Option II)
  - Develop Joint Precision Strike Integration Office (Option III)
  - Institutionalize Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment initiative (Option IV)
  - Formalize Joint NFIP/TIARA Reviews (Option V)

The five options for improving intelligence support to the acquisition process are summarized in the chart; one option is based on an Air Force initiative (the ISP) and the other four are “top-down” approaches.
Assessment of Alternatives

- Criteria: Potential to provide JROC/DAB with accurate information on
  - Incremental costs to DoD of intelligence support alternatives
  - Intelligence support versus weapon system trade-offs
  - Effects of alternative levels of intelligence information on operations

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<th>I Expanded ISP</th>
<th>II MIB+</th>
<th>III JPSIO</th>
<th>IV JWCAT</th>
<th>V Joint Review</th>
<th>Other</th>
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= poor  = weak  = marginal  = satisfactory  = superior

To assess the relative merits of the five options for improving the intelligence support to the acquisition of new weapon systems, we used three criteria. First, we evaluated the option’s ability to define a range of intelligence support alternatives for new weapon systems and to identify the incremental costs to DoD for those alternatives. Second, we assessed the value added by each option in defining and assessing weapon systems versus intelligence support trade-offs. Third, we examined the option’s ability to determine the effects of alternative levels of intelligence information on operations. The overall value of the option reflects our assessment of relative improvement in the accuracy and breadth of information provided to JROC and DAB decisionmakers to make effective trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. To differentiate the value of the options, we use qualitative descriptors (indicated by the shading on the chart).

With authoritative information on both national and tactical intelligence capabilities (existing and planned) and on the incremental costs to DoD of operating existing assets in new ways or adding requirements to planned assets, we believe that the first option (expanded ISP) would provide the JROC and DAB with adequate information to make trade-offs between
weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. All key players are represented in the ISWG; thus, their concerns should be adequately reflected in the definition and analysis of weapon systems versus intelligence support trade-offs. Moreover, the ISWG is a forum in which the effects of intelligence on operations can be analyzed. This assumes that ISWG members and the ICOs have the requisite analytical skills or can authoritatively request support from analytical organizations as required.

The overall assessment of option I is satisfactory. We do not evaluate this option (or, for that matter, any of the other four options) as superior overall because of the inherent difficulties of the three different communities (operations, acquisition, and intelligence), each with different objective functions and responsibilities, to reach an optimal common solution. In addition, because of the number of organizations that need to interact and to be involved in the process, the process will, at times, be inefficient and imperfect.

The MIB+ (option II) is the top-level DoD intelligence forum. With authoritative information on national intelligence capabilities (existing and planned) and on the incremental costs to DoD of operating existing systems in new ways or adding requirements to planned capabilities, this option, we believe, would develop good intelligence support alternatives and cost estimates of those alternatives. However, the MIB+’s ability to develop weapon systems versus intelligence support trade-offs and accurate information on the effects of alternative levels of intelligence support on operations is marginal. The MIB+ does not include authoritative representatives from the operations and weapon acquisition communities. (Although we understand that there is an effort under way to expand the MIB membership to include representatives from these communities when required, we do not have sufficient information to comment.) Thus, the overall assessment is marginal.

As currently defined, the focus of the JPSIO (option III) is on technical integration and acquisition oversight of strike systems. Consequently, it cannot develop intelligence support alternatives and provide incremental costs to DoD of those alternatives. Without the capability of defining intelligence alternatives and their associated costs, the JPSIO cannot effectively perform weapon system versus intelligence support trade-offs or examine the effects of intelligence on operations. Consequently, we consider this option as poor.

The Strike JWCAT was created to support JROC and DAB decisionmakers in assessing strike capabilities and to take into consideration alternative levels of intelligence support. Moreover, all key players are represented
on this team. Assuming that the representatives can provide authoritative information in their areas of responsibility, and that the JWCAT has adequate analytical capabilities or can rely on support from competent analytical organizations, we believe that this option would provide satisfactory overall support to the JROC and DAB.

The Joint Review is the forum for top-level authorities responsible for all intelligence programs (DCI and DEPSECDEF) to discuss and resolve issues of mutual interest. If the issue of intelligence support to new weapon systems is important to these decisionmakers, then this forum can define intelligence support alternatives and associated costs that should be considered by the JROC and DAB. Moreover, because one of the top-level authorities for weapon system acquisition participates in the Joint Review, this option can provide adequate information to the DAB on weapon system versus intelligence support trade-offs. However, because top-level military authorities do not participate in this option, the effects of intelligence on operations are explored on the margin. The overall assessment is satisfactory.

Obviously, combinations of these options could be structured or other options defined. For example, the JWCAT or the expanded ISP could be coupled with the Joint Review or the MIB+. If properly structured, such combinations should provide satisfactory information to the JROC and DAB. This assumes that an analytical structure is developed that allows rational trade-offs between weapon systems, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.
Observations

- An improved JROC/DAB is the proper forum for making trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts

- Two factors are required to make the JROC/DAB an effective forum for those trades:
  - Accurate and authoritative information on operational needs and the capabilities and cost of intelligence and weapon system options
  - Decisionmakers willing to make the necessary trades

- Two or more approaches may be used to provide accurate information to JROC/DAB, but none will work if decisionmakers do not have incentives to make the trades

The JROC and DAB include the top-level decisionmakers of the DoD requirements and acquisition process. With authoritative information on existing and planned national intelligence capabilities and incremental costs to DoD for operating existing assets in new ways or adding requirements to planned capabilities, we believe an improved JROC/DAB is the proper forum for making trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts.

To be effective, the improved JROC/DAB must have accurate and authoritative information on operational needs and on the capabilities and costs of alternative weapon concepts and intelligence support alternatives. It must be supported by an analytical framework (procedures, models, and personnel) that examines effectively rational trade-offs between weapon designs, alternative levels of intelligence support, and operational concepts. More importantly, the improved JROC/DAB must have decisionmakers who are willing to make the necessary trade-offs.

The existing JROC/DAB may be improved by one or more options; among those with good potential are the expanded ISP, the JWCAT, and the Joint Review, or a combination of JWCAT with the Joint Review or the
MIB+. But none of these options will work if decisionmakers do not have incentives to make the necessary trade-offs; presumably, current budgetary constraints now offer such incentives. It will be difficult to arrive at an optimal solution because of the different perspectives of the communities involved (operations, acquisition, and intelligence), but now is the time to improve the process, by selecting one of the options listed above or another option not described, as long as the option provides decisionmakers with the necessary information and analytical support to make the required trade-offs and enough built-in flexibility to evaluate rapid and unexpected military and geopolitical changes.

13It appears that there is a current effort to implement one of these combinations. During the preparation of this report, we became aware of an initiative by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to enlist analytical support from the federally funded research and development centers to assist him and the MIB in their support of the various JWCATs (Clapper, 1994).
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