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THE 1994 AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE WHITE PAPER: AN AMERICAN VIEW

In an era that has seen a sea change in the global strategic environment, it is not surprising that governments and defense ministries have paused to reflect intensely upon the current state of their defense policies and structures. This observation is true for both the countries which have been most directly affected following the implosion of the Soviet empire, i.e., Europe, as well as countries more physically removed from previous direct East-West confrontation. For, if nothing else, assumptions of future U.S. policy and strategy, combined with regional security developments following the end of the cold war, dictate such reviews. In the particular case of the Far East, the almost complete disappearance of the Soviet Union from regional affairs, and the as yet unknown nature of future Chinese external behavior and ambitions, may be combining to produce a shifting balance of power in the region.

For Australia, a country that in recent years has profoundly reassessed its national strategy and diplomacy toward East Asia, the convergence of these events has, in part, resulted in the release in November 1994 of a new white paper on defense, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper, 1994*. As a general observation, the paper is of interest both for its continuity in the general direction of defense policy, as well
as its less than certain view of the future outlook for regional security.

The review reestablishes that the prime mission of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) continues to be that of the defense of Australia, with a slight modification in existing strategy for achieving this ambitious objective. Significantly, however, the document is less than sanguine about the future outlook for regional security than the assessment which appeared in the previous white paper, Defence of Australia 1987. While acknowledging that Australia’s region is currently comparatively peaceful, the document states that this condition of peace may not last given regional political and security trends. Maintaining Australia’s security must, therefore, be pursued through a combination of "depth in defence," a heretofore well-received diplomatic initiative called "Regional Engagement" with Australia’s Southeast Asian neighbors, and continued close strategic partnership with the United States. In short, the review argues, Australia "...need[s] to take account of a more complex and changeable strategic environment."

To analyze of some of the key aspects of this new government statement on defense, as well as provide an unofficial U.S. perspective, this essay will address five general topics. First, when assessing the general tenor of the
white paper, it is instructive to recall that this particular paper should be seen in light of the long-standing Australian "defense dilemma," i.e., Canberra's attempt to square planning for the defense of Australia, while maintaining a capability to project military power outside of Australia in support of national interests. Second, the white paper takes a realistic attitude toward the future character of the U.S. diplomatic and military presence in its region. In short, Washington exhibits no desire to assume primary responsibility for maintaining stability and security in the region. Third, the document does not in any way outline policies or programs which are inimical to the continuation of close defense cooperation between Canberra and Washington. Fourth, the current writer does question, however, whether the assumptions of U.S. capabilities to support the ADF in crisis are correct, given force structure reductions in the U.S. Armed Forces. Fifth, given the predominance of Canberra's diplomacy of Regional Engagement toward Southeast Asia, unless this policy is framed in a zero-sum context vis-à-vis the United States, this initiative and its supporting defense policy outlined in the white paper are not inimical to the continuation of bilateral security relations.

In essence, the white paper should be assessed from the perspective of the United States as a positive statement regarding the future aspirations and direction of Australian
defense policy. To be sure, there are shortcomings in terms of some conceptual underpinnings of defense policy, not to mention how the government will find the necessary funding to pay for this ambitious program. Nonetheless, from a U.S. perspective, the white paper recognizes the fundamental import of continued peacetime security relationship with the United States. From a broad perspective, whether particular defense cooperative programs or arrangements continue over time pales in value to the continuation of close consultative ties at all levels in each country’s bureaucracy. Indeed, this particular aspect of the relationship is arguably more important in the post-cold war world than was previously the case. Upon review of the current white paper, the value of this aspect of the bilateral relationship is recognized and nothing in this document detracts from its continuation.

*Defending Australia 1994: Historical Perspective.*

To those unfamiliar with the history of post-war Australian defense policy, *Defending Australia 1994* is the latest iteration and refinement in a policy that dates to 1972. In brief, in the final year of its 23 uninterrupted years in national power, the Liberal-Country Party coalition government published the first formal white paper on defense. Significantly, *Australian Defence Review* argued for the creation of a defense policy of self-reliance in light of the impending withdrawal of British forces from the Far East,
President Nixon's 1969 U.S. "Guam Doctrine," and the evident failure of the U.S. strategy of intervention into Vietnam.\(^5\) This policy was further elucidated and with stronger language in *Australia's Defence, November 1976*. Reliance upon allied military assistance in the event of a direct threat to Australia would no longer be assumed, thereby giving impetus to the creation of a balanced, more self-reliant defense force.\(^6\) The apotheosis of the quest for self-reliance was imbued in *Defence of Australia 1987*. For the first time, the policy concepts of "self-reliance" and the "defense of Australia" were given the necessary government sanctioned strategy, and eventually guidance, to provide for their attainment. A strategy of "defence in depth" was adopted to guide the development of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).\(^7\) Specific strategic guidance followed in 1991 that established that priority would be given to improving the ability of the ADF to operate in the north of the country through increasing presence and stationing of forces.\(^8\)

In light of this précis of the evolution of Australian defense policy since 1972, it is difficult to discern fundamental differences in the 1994 defense white paper from defense concepts expressed from previous defense reviews. Rather, what the white paper presents is a refinement in these concepts and an acknowledgment of the challenges involved in
their pursuit. For example, while self-reliance remains the key policy objective of defense policy, it is defined in a more positive and meaningful way: the defense of Australia without combat assistance from allies.9 "Defence in depth" has become "depth in defence," thereby providing a more holistic approach to national defense employing all available national assets, as opposed to its earlier more limited definition.10

A discernible change in previous defense policy is the acknowledgement in the white paper for the ADF to be able to conduct missions outside of the defense of Australia. However, the ADF's force development will continue to be guided by the defense of Australia, with capabilities for regional engagement, peacekeeping and external deployment being considered, albeit tangentially.11 Finally, there is no mention in the document of the definition of "Australia's area of direct military interest," which had been given considerable prominence in Defence of Australia 1987;12 perhaps an intended signal by Canberra of its more constructive and inclusive perception of itself in the Southeast Asian region?

That said, the document, from a policy perspective is disappointing in one important area. While marking a major departure from its 1987 predecessor in terms of expressing a less than sanguine outlook for regional security over the next 15 years, the document apparently continues to take as a given
the continued validity of some key precepts initially articulated in the 1970s. For example, in view of the end of the cold war and Canberra's new diplomatic initiatives toward Southeast Asia, is there still the need to provide resources to the "defense" of Australia, as currently defined and with its garrisoning policy? Or, should greater emphasis be placed upon securing the sea-air gap to the north of the continent,\textsuperscript{13} perhaps in conjunction with regional states? While recognizing the obligation of every country to be able to defend its national territorial sovereignty, the basic precepts supporting the attainment of these objectives are not necessarily immutable. In short, a revisiting of these basic assumptions in the review, even if found valid, would have made for a more persuasive, and perhaps over time politically and financially supportable, white paper.

\textbf{U.S. Policy Assumptions.}

The Australian Labor government in its white paper provides a realistic and frank assessment on future U.S. policy toward the Southeast Asian region. U.S. policy toward the region is described as one that does not seek to dominate the region and has pressing requirements elsewhere in the world. Moreover, while the United States remains a superpower, countries in the Far East will nonetheless continue to expand their own military capabilities. It is with justification then
that the paper argues that, in future, regional security will be increasingly dictated by regional states themselves. Thus, while regional security will continue to require a U.S. presence and commitment, Washington will increasingly find itself in a position that its influence in regional areas diminishes.\textsuperscript{14}

While some may feel this assessment rather blunt, the precepts outlined are, in reality, quite accurate and do not mark any significant difference from long-standing U.S. policy. Since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 the United States acknowledged that it was unable to dominate the region militarily. The result of this change in policy at the time was to shift the U.S. military presence to one based on maritime, as opposed to ground forces. This regional strategy was well-suited to the policy realities of the region, as well as for balancing Soviet naval forces later deployed to the region.\textsuperscript{15}

With the end of the cold war and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region, coupled with the removal of U.S. bases and forces from the Philippines, Southeast Asia is no longer a region of strategic immediacy for the United States. Although stating that "security comes first" in East Asia, the focus of the latest National Security Strategy of the United States, perforce, is largely toward Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{16} While not
diminishing the security concerns of regional states, the fact remains that Northern Asia continues to dominate U.S. attention. Moreover, notwithstanding the recent sea change in the political balance of the U.S. Congress, there are no discernible moves in that body to alter U.S. policy and force structure toward the Far East. In fact, although budgetary realities may obviate its eventuality, the Republican Party’s Contract with America stipulates that U.S. defense spending should be increased, thereby mitigating against further defense reductions overall.¹⁷

Notwithstanding this assessment of the future role of the United States in overall regional security, the white paper argues that the bilateral relationship between Canberra and Washington is based upon shared interests and value, vice the need for any mutual threat and remains the basis for the continuation of the defense alliance.¹⁸ Indeed, it is interesting to note that defense cooperation between the two countries has been at its height during periods when there was no direct threat to either country’s vital regional interests.¹⁹ Yet, in keeping with its realistic approach, the white paper recognizes that the alliance relationship will be more complex and will require "careful management." Major trends in the regional security environment can be expected to affect Canberra’s relationship with the United States. It can also be
expected, the white paper argues, that the nature and perception of U.S. interests and force capabilities will change, as well.

American expectations of the alliance will change with them, as the previous emphasis on alliance cohesion against the Soviet Bloc is replaced by a more complex and evolving US posture. Equally, Australia’s requirements of the alliance will change as we develop our capabilities further, and become even more active in regional strategic affairs.²⁰

From Washington’s perspective, Australia’s traditional value remains unaffected. The closing of U.S. naval and aerial facilities in the Philippines has made Australian defense facilities increasingly more important for the support of U.S. operations in, and transiting through, Australia’s region. While the U.S. Navy will decrease in overall size and the extent of its presence in the Far East will diminish, U.S. naval and aerial forces will continue to be active in the region. Moreover, the Joint Australian-U.S. Defense Space Research and Communications facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, respectively, should continue to serve both countries’ interests.²¹ While Nurrungar may well become redundant by the turn of the century, as acknowledged in the white paper,²² even if there is no longer a need cooperatively to monitor ballistic missile launches (and this may very well not be the case), the end of such activities would not, in itself, strike a death blow to bilateral defense relations. As
will be argued below, the strength of the alliance, and arguably its true value, does not stand solely on the continuation of any particular program, no matter how important it may be.

**Basis for Continued Defense Cooperation.**

It has been long-standing U.S. policy to expect its allies to be able to defend themselves. The 1947 Senate Vandenberg Resolution, as reiterated by the Guam Doctrine of President Nixon, clearly stated that the United States expected its allies to defend themselves to the best of their national ability. Conceptually, and in practice, as long as allied defense capabilities are not obtained at the expense of the abilities of allied forces to operate alongside U.S. forces and to contribute to wider Western security interests and objectives, then these efforts are very much in U.S. national interests.  

In the particular case of Australia, some officials and analysts have argued that given northern Australia's difficult operating environment, achieving self-reliance would, and/or should, produce an ADF less capable of external deployments. While framed in the contemporary debate, this tension between "defense of Australia" and "forward defense" schools dates back to federation in 1901 and has continued, in different manifestations, ever since. The problem is simply one of the
immense defense requirements needed to defend Australia and Canberra's limited resources to direct toward the Defence Vote. Yet, a concern the current author has expressed elsewhere is whether capabilities limited for operations in the north would be procured at the expense of more generic and deployable capabilities which could be used to support alliance and peacekeeping missions outside of the north of Australia.²⁶ It would appear, however, that as particularly the Australian Army shifts a greater percentage of its standing forces northward and expands its operations in this physically challenging area, traditional combat and combat support capabilities are indeed applicable, albeit in non-traditional configurations.²⁷

The white paper has finally publicly acknowledged that "Planning for the defense of Australia takes full account of our broader strategic interests." In recent years, such broader strategic interests have included deployment of warships in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and significant peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Somalia.²⁸ The paper argues, however, that capabilities for the defense of Australia are sufficiently adaptable to enable them to be used for such deployments.²⁹

No matter how conceptually sound this argument may be, if the current Labor government is serious about maintaining these capabilities, it may be wise for Department of Defence to
explore the possibility of developing a new "Strategic Concept" to support these types of missions—the basic building block in the Australian defense planning and force development system.\textsuperscript{30} The rationale for this assertion is that under the current planning system, it is increasingly difficult to obtain scarce funding for defense capabilities unless it can be shown that they can directly support one of nine existing Strategic Concepts.\textsuperscript{31} Or, another solution would be instead of developing a new single Strategic Concept, a perhaps more methodologically palatable solution would be to revisit each of the existing nine Strategic Concepts and ensure that there is adequate provision within each of them to support operations outside of defense of Australia. Either way, given the increasing frequency that the Australian government has been contributing forces for peacekeeping operations alone, not to mention operations like Desert Storm/Desert Shield, addressing this shortcoming in its defense planning methodology would be wise. Moreover, such an adjustment would send a signal to Canberra’s allies that it was not becoming "obsessed" with planning for the defense of northern Australia, at the expense of being capable of supporting common interests and objectives.

\textbf{Self-Reliance and the United States.}

Although "self-reliance," an almost paean in Australian defense policy,\textsuperscript{32} was passively defined in the 1987 defense
white paper as the ability to defend Australia with its own resources, the 1994 paper clarifies the meaning of this concept in a more positive and open manner. "Self-reliance" is defined as being the national capability to defend the country "...without depending on combat help from other countries."\textsuperscript{33}

Indeed, Prime Minister Paul Keating has even stated that the ADF must be able to defend Australia alone by 2010.\textsuperscript{34} These more precise definitions of self-reliance are interesting in that they open as many new conceptual questions as the framers of the white paper may have hoped to have answered, not to mention practical problems concerning their assumptions.

First, assuming that self-reliance has been defined as an aspiration, vice a statement of fact, how does the ADF intend to be able to validate this goal? Moreover, how can it be verified given the fact that Australian defense planning, to quote the white paper, "...focuses on capabilities rather than threats."\textsuperscript{35} One can seriously question the logical strength of this line of argumentation. This is particularly the case when one considers whether this type of policy declaration truly provides to defense planners the necessary clear guidance, or if it creates needless barriers to planning flexibility. The reality, of course, is that the ADF is, and will remain for many years to come, dependent upon combat support and combat service support from its principal ally, the United States.
This is not an unusual condition since many allies equally find themselves in the same situation. And, as such, the white paper does acknowledge that Australia would expect extensive U.S. support in a crisis.\textsuperscript{36}

The problem concerning this assumption is whether the Australian government is correct in assuming that the U.S. Armed Forces will have the necessary capabilities in the quantities required by the ADF. Reductions in U.S. force structure since the end of the cold war have been significant. In the particular case of the U.S. Army, the number of active duty divisions has been reduced from 18 to 10, with a corresponding reduction in the combat support and combat service support formations.\textsuperscript{37} To be sure, there remains extensive support capabilities in Army Reserve and National Guard components. However, it requires a politically-sensitive Presidential public determination for up to 270,000 reserve personnel to be called up for up to 180 days. Any personnel required above this number or after this time period requires congressional approval.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, as the U.S. defense establishment discovered in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda, peace support operations are combat support and combat service support intensive.

The above brief description of reductions in the U.S Army in no way should be interpreted as casting doubt over U.S.
national intentions to support allies in crisis. Rather, what Australian defense planners must recognize is that the U.S. Armed Forces do not have the depth they once had. While the Republican-dominated Congress may attempt to increase defense spending to a greater degree than the Clinton administration's supplemental budgetary request, the party’s *Contract with America* also calls for tax cuts and a balanced federal budget. In short, prudent planning must assume that, barring a major war, a significant increase in American defense forces may be problematic.

In consequence, it would be in both Australian and U.S. interests if the ADF were better prepared to conduct and support independent military operations. A means of achieving this ambitious goal is, again, to develop a Strategic Concept that establishes the requirement for sufficient combat support and combat service support, ADF wide, to implement the other Strategic Concepts. Or, another option is once the current draft ADF stocking policy has been approved by the Department of Defence, it needs to have adequate funding so as to enable it to be responsive to the "Chief of Defence Force's Preparedness Directive." In sum, a self-reliant ADF is both in Australian and U.S. interests. What needs to be decided is how greater independence is to be obtained, as well as obtaining the necessary resources to fund this objective.
Regional Engagement and the U.S. Alliance.

Finally, in keeping with Canberra's strong commitment to improving bilateral relations with regional Asian countries, the defense white paper stresses that Australia will be a partner "...in determining the strategic affairs of the region..." The previous Hawke and current Keating government have expended considerable political capital, and increasingly, defense resources, in support of their policy of "Regional Engagement." This policy, in brief, attempts to make Australia a more engaged and constructive player in regional affairs than has been the case in the past. The defense aspect of Regional Engagement consists of high-level military-to-military exchanges, combined exercises, logistic support arrangements, science and industrial cooperation, cooperative equipment acquisition, and training cooperation.

Regional Engagement, and particularly its supporting defense aspects, have not been without their critiques. Greg Sheridan strongly critiqued Defending Australia 1994 on the grounds that it effectively downgrades the U.S. alliance below regional defense cooperation. Sheridan argued that the ADF probably depends more upon the United States for logistic support than ever before, thereby making the U.S. relationship even more important than before. He also claims that the white paper makes the faulty assumption that the end of the cold war
has made traditional allies less important. Finally, he argues that the assumption in the white paper over-sells the potential value of Regional Engagement in terms of fundamentally promoting Australian security.\textsuperscript{45}

These are strong criticisms, particularly coming from one as erudite in foreign and defense matters as Greg Sheridan. Moreover, his critique encapsulates concerns and criticisms expressed over time about this new course in Australian foreign policy. However, it seems to the current writer that the knowledgeable Sheridan and others overly stress certain aspects of Regional Engagement, while ignoring a key strength in the Australian-U.S. relationship.

In addressing these criticisms, it is difficult to see how the white paper diminishes the bilateral security alliance with the United States. While perhaps there is some "significance" in the alleged reestablishment of priorities in Australian defense policy by physically placing in the review the U.S. relationship after that of Regional Engagement, it difficult to ascertain how this affects bilateral ties in a substantive sense. Nowhere does the paper outline any proposals for reducing activities or meaningful cooperation with the United States. On the contrary, the review recognizes that maintaining close defense ties with the United States will be
more challenging in future and states that Australia is prepared for this eventuality.\textsuperscript{46}

In any case, given the outlined regional security complexity the Australian government expects to see evolving over the next 10-15 years, it makes sense that Canberra would expend greater attention and resources on coming to grips unilaterally with this reality. After all, whether correct or not, the government assumes a less engaged United States in its region and regional forces will increasingly dictate the region's future. From a solely U.S. perspective, Regional Engagement has important attractions. Any effort on the part of Canberra significantly to improve relations with its regional neighbors, particularly Indonesia, can only be assessed in a positive light. One only has to review the historical record of the stresses placed upon Australian-U.S. relations during periods of dispute between Djakarta and Canberra to appreciate the wider importance of stability between these two regional countries.\textsuperscript{47}

Apropos the logistic dependence of the ADF upon the United States, as discussed above, this is a severe limitation long faced by Canberra.\textsuperscript{48} How the pursuit of the Regional Engagement policy could adversely affect the ADF's matériel lifeline to the United States is hard to understand. The key problem, perhaps, in Sheridan's and others' criticism of Regional
Engagement is that it is perceived as being mutually exclusive of the U.S. security relationship. In other words, if Canberra pursues a constructive policy towards its immediate region, this can only be accomplished at the expense of maintaining the U.S. security relationship. To be sure, there are possibilities where certain activities conducted in the region may be at the expense of those involving the United States. The political value of conducting such regional exercises/activities, as opposed to the operational value to the ADF of spending time and effort with their U.S. counterparts, provides one possible case where "exclusivity" could present a real dilemma for Canberra.49

Notwithstanding this potential cost to the ADF at the expense of pursuing Regional Engagement, a few points need to be taken into consideration before any definitive judgment can be passed on the implications of pursuing this foreign policy. First, part of the difficulty so far in assessing the defense costs associated with Regional Engagement is due in part to its definition. By this, there appear to be differing opinions among officials and politicians as to the degree and extent to which this policy is to be pursued; and particularly, at what cost to other activities and policies. Thus, it is very much a question of how the policy evolves and is implemented which
will eventually decide what effects it may, or may not, have on Canberra's relationship with Washington.

Second, Defending Australia 1994 makes it abundantly clear that, "Activities in support of our regional interests will not in themselves determine the force structure of the Australian Defence Force..." Thus, this should assuage those who may harbor fears that this policy might have detrimental effects upon the ADF's structure. One would think, as well, that this particular statement could be used by HQADF to defend its use of limited resources to pursuing activities in the region which are truly beneficial to all concerned--another point stressed in the white paper.

Finally, to address the question of whether the white paper "downgrades" the alliance between Australia and the United States requires one to take a broad perspective of the relationship. What has been a key strength of the alliance, and is likely to remain in future, is the depth of its institutionalization in both countries' bureaucracies. This particular strength in bilateral ties has transcended diplomatic and trade contretemps and the demise of specific defense cooperative programs and activities. Institutional and personal linkages between Canberra and Washington/Honolulu have enabled both countries' bureaucracies at the working level to begin discussions on issues and problems well before they are
raised to officials levels. Moreover, such a relationship facilitates a joint approach to these problems.52

The reason for stressing the importance of this relationship is that history has demonstrated time and again, when international crises develop which affect Western interests, Canberra and Washington "instinctively" consult on the definition of the problem and normally develop a coordinated, if not joint, response. After all, notwithstanding the defense value of cooperative activities and programs, without the institutional ability for both countries to facilitate addressing problems in this informal manner, the political value to both countries of defense cooperation is effectively diminished. Significantly, nothing in Defending Australia 1994 detracts from this key aspect of the bilateral relationship.

Conclusion.

In its broadest context, Defending Australia 1994 should be assessed as constituting the latest iteration in Australia’s continuing search for security. Although the paper is more refined and sophisticated in its argumentation and assumptions than its predecessors, the paper, in reality, differs little from earlier reviews in terms of aspirations and objectives. This is not to say that it does not differ from Defence of Australia 1987. The latest white paper does not share the 1987
version's benign view of regional security and recognizes the need for Canberra to be an active player in regional diplomatic and defense affairs, if Australia is to be in a position to influence the region's future. Additionally, from a U.S. perspective, nothing in the paper openly challenges or subtlety undermines U.S. interests in Australia or its bilateral security relationship with Canberra.

This is not to suggest that the white paper is without some important conceptual shortcomings. The lack of a review of some of the basic tenets of the policy of the defense of Australia is a case in point. However, credit should be given to the government for at least recognizing that missions and capabilities, hitherto neglected in the planning process, need to be addressed. Thus, developing Strategic Concepts to support missions outside of the defense of Australia (e.g., peace support), and to support ADF deployments logistically in the defense of Australia, should be developed. Or, all existing Strategic Concepts should be reviewed to provide for these needed capabilities.

However, in the end, the Australian defense dilemma continues to defy resolution. In its most basic form, Australian defense planning faces the essentially irreconcilable challenge of desiring defense independence, leavened by resource limitations and immutably harsh geographic conditions. The government's recognition that it will be
unable to commit more than approximately 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product to defense\textsuperscript{5} makes greater self-reliance and the national ability to defend the country more of an aspiration, vice an achievable goal.

From the U.S. perspective, it is difficult to discern any substantive issues in the paper that should raise national concern. The recognition of the need to be better capable of supporting external deployments for peace support and coalition efforts is an important step. Canberra's acknowledgement of the need to manage carefully its relations with Washington is a realistic view. In an era of threat-ambiguity in the Far East and increasing focus in the United States on domestic issues, the onus will likely be on Canberra to ensure that the vitality of bilateral relations do not atrophy through mutual benign neglect.
ENDNOTES


3. "The region [Asia] is now comparatively peaceful....Yet the relative peace in Asia may not last. The pattern of stable strategic relationships which has underpinned Asia's security in recent years is changing." Ibid., p. 7.

4. Ibid., p. 11.


15. One of the best factual and conceptual analysis of U.S. strategy in the Far East in the post-cold war era is found in William T. Tow, Encountering the Dominant Player: U.S. Extended


23. For further discussion on this point, see Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, pp. 195-196.


27. See J.O. Langtry, "Army Considerations," in The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Strategic and Operational Considerations, ed. by J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991, pp. 220-261. N.B.: the claim that traditional capabilities employed in non-traditional formations is a strong impression I have discerned in my discussions with senior Army officials who have extensive experience conducting operations in the north.


30. For background on the Australian defense planning and force development system, see Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992; and, Thomas-Durell Young, Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian Experience, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 10, 1993. N.B.: Since the publication of both of these documents, the term "Operational Concept" has been replaced by "Strategic Concept."

31. For a description and analysis of Strategic Concepts, see Australia, Strategic Review 1993, Annex A, pp. 61-67. N.B.: At the time of the review's publication, only eight strategic concepts had been endorsed.


35. Australia, Defending Australia 1994, p. 22. Emphasis is in the original.

36. Ibid., p. 96-97.
37. See United States, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1994, pp. 155-160. Note the report's comment (p. 160) concerning sustainment: "Nevertheless, DoD recognizes that shortfalls may occur in some areas, such as depot maintenance, training ammunition, and spares." For a numerical comparison of force reductions in all services, see Table C-1, Appendix C, p. c-1.


39. It is interesting that the Congressional Budget Office has reported that notwithstanding the Clinton administration's request for a $25 billion increase in defense spending, a shortfall of at least $47 billion remains between planned military programs and the President's budget request. See The Washington Post, January 10, 1995.

40. CQ, "Contract with America," point 1, p. 3216; point 5, p. 3218; and, point 8, p. 3219.


42. Australia, Defending Australia, p. 85.

43. See Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Regional Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989.

44. Australia, Defending Australia, p. 86.

45. See The Australian (Sydney), December 1, 1994.

46. Australia, Defending Australia, pp. 95-96.


49. I am indebted to Peter Jennings and William T. Tow for raising this point with me.


51. Ibid.

52. For information and analysis on the details of this relationship see Young, *Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Relations*, pp. 17-30.