Peace Operations: Workshop Proceedings

David R. Segal
University of Maryland

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EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

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University of Maryland

Technical review by

D. Bruce Bell
Benjamin Knott
George W. Lawton

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Peace Operations: Workshop Proceedings

Segal, David R.

U.S. Army Research Office
P.O. Box 12211
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

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Conceptualization of changes in peace operations, and the experience of Americans and allied military forces in such operations, were the focus of a 1993 U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences workshop. The purpose of this workshop was to identify what we know and what we still need to learn about how to screen, select, and train soldiers, units, and leaders for increasing American participation in operations other than war, particularly in a multinational context. Experiences considered ranged from the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
The nature of the world order has drastically changed in the 1990's: the threat against the United States has lessened, the forces are being reduced, and soldiers are being based at home. In light of these changes, the Army is assuming new missions, including drug interdiction, disaster relief, and peacekeeping.

The 15-17 February Peace Operations workshop was intended to help Army leaders plan for one of these new missions by bringing together researchers with special expertise in peacekeeping with Army leaders who will be applying peacekeeping knowledge. Specific topics covered included developments in peacekeeping doctrine, selection of soldiers, the content of soldier training, and how to support peacekeepers and their families during peacekeeping operations in such locations as Cyprus, Kuwait, the Sinai, and Somalia.

The workshop was sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). It drew 60 participants representing the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, other U.S. services, major Army commands, and operational units from the U.S. and NATO armies that have participated in peacekeeping operations.

The participants have shared their experiences at the conference with their agencies. Audio tapes of the conference were given to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army for immediate use in formulating Army policy. This document is expected to make a similar contribution to the Army and other interested parties.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director
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This work was supported by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) under the auspices of the U.S. Army Research Office Scientific Services Program administered by Battelle. I am grateful for the support and participating of D. Bruce Bell, the contracting officer’s technical representative on the project. Special thanks are also due to General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Major General Dave Meade, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry); and to Edgar Johnson, Director of U.S. ARI, for their support of this workshop and their participation in it. Doris Durand, Geraldine Todd, Cyndi Mewborn, and Steven Crawford, all of the University of Maryland, and Dana P. Eyre of the Naval Postgraduate School provided importance assistance in the course of this project. Comments on an early draft of these Proceedings by D. Bruce Bell, George Lawton, and Ben Knott contributed substantially to an improved product.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

The 15-17 February 1994 Peacekeeping Operations workshop was held at the University of Maryland under the sponsorship of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). It was in response to interest expressed in this topic by the Chief of Staff of the Army (General Gordon R. Sullivan) and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Procedure:

The concept, planning, and execution of the workshop were a joint effort of ARI and the workshop convener, David Segal. The steps leading to the workshop included determining the need for a workshop, developing a list of topics to be covered, soliciting presentation from acknowledged experts in those topics, inviting military agencies to send representatives, organizing and publishing the agenda, and making the physical arrangements for the workshop. The papers that follow were presented at the conference and then edited by the author(s) and the workshop convener to make them more readable and responsive to workshop events.

Findings:

The workshop had several recurring themes. They included (1) how to select soldiers, (2) the types of skills that were needed by which soldiers, (3) how much force to use, and (4) the role of family support. These and related topics are discussed in 11 formal papers which make up the bulk of this report.

Utilization of Findings:

The participants have already shared their experiences at the conference with their agencies. Audio tapes of the conference were given to the Office of the Chief of staff of the Army for immediate use in formulating Army policy. This document is expected to make a similar contribution to the Army and other interested parties as soon as it is released.
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PEACE OPERATIONS: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

INTRODUCTION

David R. Segal
University of Maryland at College Park

During the first four decades of the history of the United Nations (UN), Cold War tensions minimized the role that body could play in seeking international security through multinational peace operations. From the post-World War II birth of the United Nations until 1988, the UN mounted only fifteen peacekeeping operations. Emerging international peacekeeping doctrine precluded superpower participation in these missions, so the United States of America had military representation in only two early missions, initiated before the development of doctrine. During this period, the United States did participate in multinational peacekeeping operations under auspices other than the UN, such as regional organizations, but these too were rare events, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, and the Multi-National Force in Beirut.

By contrast, since 1988, when relations with the Soviet Union were more cordial, and particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the concomitant end of the Cold War, the United Nations has established twenty new peacekeeping missions. Not only has the number increased, but the nature of the missions has also changed. In addition to the small observer missions or the interposition of UN forces between signatories to peace treaties or cease fires that characterized early missions, which might be characterized as "first generation peacekeeping," the United Nations has gotten increasingly involved in operations that might more appropriately be classified as peace enforcement or nation building. And the United States has been increasingly involved in these. American troops were directly committed to six of the post-1988 UN peacekeeping missions as members of the UN forces, and have supported several others without putting on the blue helmets that signify troops operating under UN command.

American participation in such operations is thus both rare and recent. American policy regarding such participation has not crystallized. President Bush had supported the principle of American participation in UN peacekeeping, but stopped well short of a commitment to dedicate American units to blue helmet operations. President Clinton seemed willing to go further early in his administration, but has rethought
the issue in the light of UN operations in Somalia and Haiti. U.S. Army doctrine for peace operations is still evolving. The current edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, for the first time contains a section on Operations other than War, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These had previously been subsumed as forms of Low Intensity Conflict. A new manual on peace operations is currently being written. A particular lacuna in our understanding of peace operations is the special human resource management issues they may raise.

To help fill this gap, a workshop was held in College Park, Maryland on February 15-17, 1994, under the auspices of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, to bring together researchers, policy-makers, doctrine writers, trainers, and soldiers from a number of countries who had participated in peace operations, to help identify what we know, and what we need to know, about how to screen, select, train, and manage the soldiers, units, and leaders who will represent the United States of America in peace operations in the future. The agenda of the Workshop appears at Appendix I.

Sixty people participated in the Workshop, representing the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army, other U.S. services, major Army commands such as the Training and Doctrine Command, operational units that had participated in recent missions such as the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), the Canadian Forces, and the British Army. A list of attendees appears at Appendix II. Modes of participation varied. Some participants presented formal papers, some of which had been specially commissioned for this Workshop. Others gave briefings without written text. Others did not make presentations, but engaged in a very active dialogue over the three days of the workshop. All presenters were invited to submit written text for inclusion in these Proceedings. This volume of Workshop Proceedings contains these written, and more formal, elements of the Workshop.

OVERVIEW OF WRITTEN PROCEEDINGS

The Workshop was opened by Joseph Berger, Jr., the Director of the Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, who identified the policy challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War security environment. He noted the ongoing policy debate in the United States on whether, when, and how to use force, sometimes in the context of multinational organizations, in
pursuit of national objectives. He emphasized that participation in peace operations would not substitute for, and would not be allowed to degrade, our ability to fight and win wars. He enumerated criteria to be considered for the deployment of American personnel on peace operations, and addressed the issue of American personnel serving under foreign command.

A conceptual overview of peace operations was presented by John Mackinlay, a former British officer with extensive peacekeeping experience, who is currently engaged in research at Brown University on "Second Generation" peacekeeping operations. These are the post-Cold War multinational operations in which UN forces do not necessarily have the full support of all of the local parties to a conflict, requiring military operations beyond the traditional peacekeeping activities of observation and verification. Dr. Mackinlay highlighted the differences between first generation and second generation operations, and identified a range of Second Generation Peacekeeping tasks that might serve as the basis for a typology of operations that is too broad to be usefully identified simply as "peacekeeping". He emphasized the fact that although American, European, and British Commonwealth countries use similar language in their peace operations doctrine regarding the proportional use of force, the colonial experience of the latter leads them to define this in terms of minimal force, while American doctrine is more likely to define proportional as massive. (This difference was to emerge as one of the pervasive themes of the Workshop.) Differences in the definition of the use of force were seen by Mackinlay as consequential for the reception of the peacekeeping force by the indigenous population, and for the general role of the peacekeeping soldier and peacekeeping forces.

The first extensive discussion of a single peacekeeping operation focussed on the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO), in support of the Camp David Accords. This operation was initiated during the Cold War, and is not under UN auspices. It represents the first and most longstanding American commitment of a maneuver unit to a peace operation. The United States has been rotating light infantry battalion task forces for six month deployments to this force for more than thirteen years. Many of the participants in the Workshop, both American and allied, were alumni of the MFO.

Dr. Jesse J. Harris, currently Dean of the University of Maryland School of Social Work, who, as a lieutenant colonel, had been a participant observer attached to the first American
battalion to serve in the MFO, described human resource dimensions central to the operation. At the time of this deployment, the nature of the mission was largely unknown. The degree to which the Camp David Accords would be honored by the signatories was undetermined, and American soldiers were unfamiliar with the harsh surroundings of the Sinai Desert. Dr. Harris noted the importance and dynamics of small unit (squad) leadership and cohesion, the stress of an essentially boring observation mission for combat-trained soldiers (who nonetheless adapted well and performed the mission effectively), and the importance of both the rear detachment commander and the then-evolving Family Support Group system as factors in the morale of both the soldiers and the families left behind.

Major Larry Applewhite, who as a captain deployed with an MFO task force as its mental health officer a decade and a half after Dr. Harris, noted that while, in the intervening years, as the MFO had become a more routine peacekeeping operation, and the facilities available to soldiers had been markedly upgraded, there were still stress-producing conditions that had the potential for impairing soldier performance. These included the environment (including lack of familiarity with the indigenous culture), operational factors (including security concerns, particularly after the terrorist attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut), and interpersonal issues, including both squad dynamics and family issues. He suggested that the most important activities for avoiding the impairment of performance took place prior to deployment. These included the development of a family support system, the integration of augmentees to the unit, and realistic training for the specific requirements of the mission, including the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

While much of the long-term American experience in peacekeeping is drawn from the MFO, which may not be an appropriate model for second generation peacekeeping operations, much of the Workshop discussion focussed on the more recent Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Presentations were made both by line officers who had commanded American units in Somalia, and by uniformed behavioral scientists who had studied or participated in Restore Hope.

Major James Cartwright had deployed as a mental health officer with the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) to Baladogle, Somalia, early in 1993, in support of the humanitarian assistance operation there. Like Major Applewhite, he stressed the importance of predeployment preparation. While boredom characterized Restore Hope, as it
did the MFO, the former was also characterized by critical incidents such as deaths, friendly fire, and body handling, that were extremely rare in the latter. Critical incident debriefings were seen as important in reducing individual stress and restoring unit cohesion after such events. Major Cartwright also stressed the importance of morale-building strategies, as boredom got worse, the mission changed, resentment toward the indigenous population increased, and, from the perspective of the soldiers, application of the ROE became more uncertain.

While the United States has had limited and very recent experience in multinational peace operations, the Canadian Forces (CF), by contrast, have almost a half-century of peacekeeping experience, and have provided about 10 percent of all multinational peacekeeping forces. Dr. Franklin Pinch, a former chief behavioral scientist of the CF, discusses this history, defines the range of roles and tasks that have recently characterized peacekeeping, and uses them as a context for raising issues involved in the selection and screening of units and soldiers for peace operations. He notes that the commonly held assumption that combat units conventionally trained for war-fighting missions are appropriate for peacekeeping has been called into question, most recently by the murder of a young Somali boy who had been in the custody of CF personnel from the airborne infantry regiment. (Initial reactions in Canada seem to have blamed this incident on faulty screening of soldiers deployed with the unit. More recent events suggest that the problem was in the selection of the unit itself.) Pinch suggests that peace operations require adaptations in the human resource management policies of armed forces, and that at a minimum, additional skills are required of conventionally trained soldiers.

He notes that in Canada and the United States, more attention is devoted to screening for military service on physical fitness than on psychological fitness, and that this may be particularly problematic for peace operations. He also notes that more attention needs to be paid to the "sociological readiness of units for peacekeeping operations" (cohesion, discipline, leadership) than is currently the case in Canada. He describes the multi-stage selection and screening process for peace operations in Canada, where as one stage, units, generally from the combat arms, are matched with the mission. While these have generally been infantry units, more recently, both armor and artillery have been used in peacekeeping operations that draw heavily on infantry skills. In addition, individuals, both unit members and augmentees
(volunteers from elsewhere in the CF as well as reservists), are screened for deployability. The use of augmentees, particularly from the reserves, may have particular relevance for the United States, where we are now preparing to deploy joint Active Component/Reserve Component units for peacekeeping duty.

In a second Canadian contribution to these Proceedings, Lieutenant Colonel M.D. Capstick and Major D.M. Last discuss one of the additional skills that some analysts believe are important in peace operations. They describe a training program in negotiation skills used by a CF battalion in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Lt. Col. Capstick was the battalion commander and Maj. Last the commander of the Headquarters and Services Battery of 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, on the 58th Canadian Rotation to UNFICYP in 1992-93. UNFICYP at this time was a mature peace operation. The activities of military forces in UNFICYP were fairly routine, and relations between the opposing forces to the Cyprus conflict fairly stable. The Standard Operating Procedures for the mission were very brief, and any special training that the unit required had to be developed locally.

Capstick and Last emphasize that negotiation skills are an "add-on" to the basic individual and collective combat skills necessary for war-fighting, which are essential for peacekeeping forces as well, and are not a substitute for them. Negotiation skills represented only two percent of the predeployment training received by their battalion. This two percent, however, can mean the difference between successful and unsuccessful resolution of conflict incidents, in a situation where success is measured by ability to resolve a conflict, rather than to defeat an opposing force. The negotiation training package focussed on senior non-commissioned officers and officers. When the package was evaluated in theatre, enthusiasm for it was a direct function of rank: more senior personnel regarded it as more useful. The elements of training regarded the most useful were explanations of investigation and of preparation for meetings. Some of those who participated in the training also expressed a desire for more information on the local culture and the recent history of the conflict.

These "soft skills"--cultural awareness and negotiation, are the topic of Dana P. Eyre’s discussion. Eyre, a faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School, has interviewed over a hundred American and allied officers who have been involved in peace operations. He found his respondents divided on whether they needed training in soft skills, and among those
who felt a need for such training, there was no clear consensus on what skills they really needed. He suggests that in the absence of a clear definition of the range of activities that are subsumed under the term peace operations, and of a clear doctrine for dealing with them, it is difficult to identify the skills needed to deal with them. He praises the ability of the American soldier to have dealt with them in the absence of definitions and doctrine, but suggests that the expectation of such adaptability is unfair to the soldier, and reports that the absence of doctrine was frequently noted by his respondents. The most pressing need he identifies is doctrine that enables commanders to deal with the intricate interrelationships between military, political, and social/cultural factors in nontraditional operations—what he refers to as intelligence preparation of the political, economic, and military battlefield. This includes cultural information that is both specific and timely, and information on local patterns of communication, conflict, and conciliation.

A particular concern of the Workshop was the implications of peace operations deployments for Army families. The U.S. Army is an increasingly married force, and all deployments place burdens on soldiers’ families. However, peace operations warrant special concern because of the ambiguity of the mission. While the risks might be greater in war-fighting deployments, the sacrifices are more comprehensible to families because war-fighting is a soldiers’ job, and because national security, or at least national interests, are presumed to be at stake. When soldiers are deployed on peace operations, on the other hand, it is not always clear to families what the nature of the mission is, what the threats to national security or national interest are, or why American soldiers’ and their families are being asked to sacrifice for them.

Mady Wechsler Segal, a professor at the University of Maryland and an expert on military families, addresses these issues. On the basis of prior research on the impact of deployment in general on Army families, as well as what we know about the impact of peacekeeping deployments specifically, she suggests a typology of family issues raised by deployments for peace operations, including definitions of the mission, communication patterns, and processes of separation and reunion. Reflecting and responding to the often raised Workshop theme that we do not yet have an agreed upon set of categories useful for thinking about peace operations, she also proposes a tentative typology of missions, ranging from "observation" (first generation) and
"routine peacekeeping" (such as the MFO or UNFICYP today) to higher risk "peace enforcement" and "dangerous humanitarian" missions. She uses these two sets of categories as a heuristic device to begin a discussion on the degree to which family issues are common across types of peace operations deployments or are unique to specific types.

The United States Army is beginning to explore the degree to which personnel from the reserve components can be used to assist in the performance of peace operations. Other nations with longer traditions of involvement in multinational peacekeeping have used reserve personnel in peacekeeping, but not in the way that the United States is about to try. Canada and Austria, for example, have used relatively small numbers of reservists as augmentees in active units deployed for peacekeeping, while Norway has a reserve peacekeeping battalion. The first U.S. experiment will involve a battalion drawn 20 percent from the active component, and 80 percent from the reserve components, which will deploy as part of the Sinai MFO in January, 1995.

Personnel in the reserves are more likely to be married than active duty personnel, and some family issues are likely to differ between active component and reserve component personnel. However, we have no direct knowledge base upon which to draw to help anticipate the family concerns involved in peace operations deployments of reserve personnel. In an effort to address this lacuna, Dr. Florence Rosenberg, a sociologist at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research was asked to speak to the Workshop of her analyses of data from a sample of 236 spouses of personnel from the Army Reserve and National Guard who were mobilized during the Gulf War (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm [ODS]): the first major mobilization of the Total Force since the Vietnam War, for which the reserve components were not mobilized.

Dr. Rosenberg reported on the negative economic impact of the ODS mobilization on many reservists' families. (Presumably this factor would be less important in a mobilization that involved only volunteers). About three-quarters of the ODS spouses reported high levels of deployment-related distress, and such distress had both direct and indirect effects on physical and psychological symptoms. (The degree to which this was problematic in a peace operation deployment would probably be affected by the nature of the operation.) While most ODS spouses found social support in their civilian communities, participation in Family Support Groups (FSGs) increased markedly as a means of dealing with
stress after the activation of the reservists. They also came to evaluate support by unit leaders more positively. Support from both unit leaders and FSGs had a buffering effect on the total stress experienced by the spouses, but not specifically on deployment-related distress.
THE CHALLENGES OF PEACEKEEPING

Joseph Berger, Jr.
Office Director
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy

It is a pleasure to be with you here this morning to share a few thoughts with you on the important and timely subject of peacekeeping.

This conference is about training for peace operations. Specific training for peace operations is a subject about which consensus has yet to be reached, particularly within the Department of Defense.

Over the next few days, you are going to hear several speakers discuss training in detail, so let me begin by putting this subject into the broader context of the emerging Administration policy on peacekeeping and peace enforcement and talking about the role the Department of Defense will be playing. Finally, I will touch upon two on-going studies of peace operations training our office is sponsoring.

The security environment for the United States has changed dramatically since the end of the cold war. The threat that drove our defense decision making process for over forty years—a threat that determined our strategy and tactics, our military doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the design of our weapons, and our overall defense budgets—is simply gone.

The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and all that it implies has made profound changes in the way Americans view the world and our role in it. We are in a period comparable to the end of World War II. It is not at all clear what will replace the old bipolar world of East-West superpower rivalry. But what is clear is that we still live in a dangerous world.

Defining the Post-Soviet security environment is the first critical step in sizing and shaping a new defense, a defense that is appropriate for the times. Understanding where America has interests, what might threaten them, and how these threats may be manifested is essential to ensuring that we have the right strategy to face these challenges.

A clear understanding of the differences between the old and the new threat environments is key to providing the right defense for the new era. There is no question that the present security environment for the U.S. is less threatening. While the strategic weapons of the former Soviet Union still
exist--and remain a threat in at least the near term--we are no longer locked in a struggle for survival with one another. But, as we all learned on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait--some three and a half years ago--the world is still a dangerous place, and American lives and interests can still be threatened.

In general terms, the new Post-Soviet security environment is dominated by four broad challenges:

- First, there are the dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
- Second, there are regional dangers posed primarily by the threat of large scale aggression by regional powers.
- Third, there are dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere.
- And finally, there are economic dangers to our national security, which could destroy us if we fail to build a strong, competitive and growing economy.

Corresponding to each of these dangers is a set of opportunities that, if seized, would enhance American security. And peace operations--selectively utilized--can be an important element of our national military strategy.

Despite the changing security environment, the principle mission of our military has not changed, namely to prepare to fight and win wars decisively. And so it has been since the founding of our country.

The recently completed bottom up review, as many of you are well aware, examined four broad classes of military operations for developing a future U.S. force structure; they are:

- Major regional conflicts;
- Smaller scale conflicts or crises that would require U.S. forces to conduct peace enforcement or intervention operations.
- Overseas presence; and
- Deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, the bottom up review noted that military support will be provided for other types of operations such as peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and countering international terrorism.

The Department of Defense is attempting to meet the demands of the changing security environment by recognizing the various threats to national security that exist in today's complicated world, and the Department recognizes the role that peace operations can play in this environment.

In a recent New York Times op-ed piece, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake summarizes the emerging Administration policy on peace operations. Let me elaborate on his article and talk a little more depth about this developing policy.

First of all, developing a peacekeeping policy comes at a time when the United States is engaged in a debate over whether, when and how to use force. This debate has taken place largely in the context of ongoing crises in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. And as the Administration has been working to develop a policy for peace operations, recent experience makes clear that there are very important differences between traditional peacekeeping missions and effective peace enforcement operations.

Understanding how to conduct peace operations of all kinds is a necessary step in building an effective response to new era challenges.

The debate over peace operations, as well as the general issue of the proper role of multilateralism in U.S. strategy needs to be set in the broader context of the use of force in post-cold war times. The Department of Defense, in particular, has been working to guarantee that the emerging lexicon of peace operations does not obscure the fact that what is essentially at issues is the commitment of U.S. forces to action overseas.

The debate over U.S. policy on peace operations also needs to be considered in the context of a domestic consensus on the use of force and commitment of U.S. military forces overseas. This domestic consensus has not yet been reached--as we well know from the various reactions to Administration proposals on peacekeeping. The consensus is likely to emerge

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from trial and error as the U.S. struggles to deal with its role in today's complicated security environment.

One role for the U.S. is to work with multinational organizations, when it is in our national interest to do so. The UN and regional organizations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain, and resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.

When our vital interests are not directly threatened, we would prefer that the international community join together to address common threats, thereby sharing the costs and risks of involvement, and providing greater legitimacy and neutrality to the action undertaken.

Participation in peace operations is not a substitute for fighting and winning wars. Nor can it be allowed to degrade our ability to do so effectively. The U.S. will maintain its capacity to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our interests are at stake.

Selective U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations is one tool among many instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

The emerging Administration peacekeeping policy discusses the potential role of regional organizations in peace operations, an important part of our long-term strategy. It also contains factors to be considered when deciding whether to establish a UN operation and the extent of U.S. participation in a particular operation.

The policy outlines U.S. interest in enhancing UN capabilities, and proposes extensive improvements in staffing, organization, technological capabilities, training, logistics support, financing and other aspects of peace operations.

The policy on peacekeeping contains a new proposal for joint state-defense "shared responsibility" for peace operations.

Remember the fundamental foreign policy goal of the United States is a stable world order in which democratic values and free trade can flourish. This is no longer threatened by the tanks coming through the Fulda Gap on the new former inner German border. Rather threats to a stable and free, prosperous and economically vibrant world today will come from ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts the world over.
These conflicts, while not posing a direct threat to vital U.S. interests, may nonetheless jeopardize important interests in regional security and in democracy and human rights. Remember a fundamental foreign policy goal of the Administration is to enlarge the sphere of democratic, free market states. This has very realistic consequences for international peace because democracies are less likely to wage war against each other, and more likely to support human rights and economic opportunity.

The United Nations as well as some regional organizations can act to prevent, contain, and resolve some of these regional conflicts mentioned through peace operations. But it is very much a part of the Administration policy, as President Clinton stated in his address to the United Nations, "If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no." The President further articulated some questions the UN must address before undertaking a new peace operation--anywhere on the range from traditional peacekeeping to more complicated peace enforcement missions. These questions include:

- Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
- Does the proposed mission have a clear objective. (We can talk about how mission mandates have differed, and how this has helped determine the success--or failure of a peace operation.)
- Can an end point be identified for those asked to participate.
- And are the resources available to accomplish the mission, meaning: Does the UN have the forces, financing and mandate necessary to help ensure success of the operation?

Moreover, the Administration policy takes the questions asked for the UN and adds a few when the issue goes beyond when the U.S. should vote for a peacekeeping operation in the UN Security Council, to the point where the U.S. is considering sending its forces to be a part of the mission. In those cases, we need to ask:

- Is the use of force necessary at this point. Have other measures been exhausted?
- Is the commitment of U.S.--of American men and women--necessary at this point for the success of the proposed peace operation?

- Are the states or interests involved worth the risks to American men and women in uniform?

- Will there be domestic political support? Will there be support on Capitol Hill for such American involvement?

- Has an end point for U.S. participation been identified, which may not be the same as the end point for UN participation?

And the Administration policy on peacekeeping include additional questions to ask when significant U.S. forces are likely to be involved in a large scale chapter VII--peace enforcement--operation.

The issue of command and control of U.S. forces is another subject to have received a significant amount of attention in the debate over American peace operations policy.

Press reports regarding administration policy toward placing U.S. forces under the command of the United Nations--although only partially accurate--created considerable national concern, including the Congress, that the Administration was seeking, as a matter of policy, to relinquish command of U.S. armed forces. This occurred in the context of general concerns about U.S. participation in UNOSOM II in Somalia, the UN Secretary General's insistence upon being consulted before the initiation of NATO close air support to UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, and the potential involvement of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia.

The emerging Administration peacekeeping policy directive underscores that the President will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. It states that the President will consider, on a case-by-case basis, placing appropriate U.S. forces and personnel under the operational control of a UN commander for a specific UN operation. But it clearly states that the greater the U.S. military role, the less likely the President will be to place U.S. forces under UN operational control.

Even if the President decides to do so, Administration policy notes that the fundamental elements of U.S. command still will apply; that is to say, the inviolate chain of
command from the President on down to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains in tact; the right of U.S. commanders to refer to higher U.S. authorities' orders that are illegal or outside the mandate agreed to by the United States and the UN remains unchanged; the US's right to terminate U.S. participation and take whatever action deemed necessary to protect U.S. forces remains firm; and the primacy of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal law and the UCMJ.

The Unified Command Plan approved by President Clinton on 24 September 1993 stipulates: "Forces performing peacekeeping operations under the direction of multinational peacekeeping organizations will be assigned to a combatant commander unless otherwise directed by the NCA." This means the CINC always retains combatant command.

During his confirmations hearing, General Shalikashvili expressed his comfort with the exercise of operational control by Non-U.S. commanders over U.S. armed forces so long as the ultimate responsibility of the President is in no way compromised. He noted that with NATO, U.S. forces routinely serve under the "operational" command and control of allied commanders but that "full" command still belongs to the U.S. Current arrangements for U.S. forces in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia assign only operational control to Non-U.S. commanders for limited periods and under specific conditions.

He further stated during this hearings that the issue was not whether we should or should not have Americans serving under foreign commanders, but rather on a case-by-case basis whether we should get involved in a particular operation. Any decision should include an assessment of how robust the command and control arrangements are, who the commander is and whether we consider the commander competent to lead our soldiers in the operation.

And if we are going to make peace operations successful, the policy indicates that there are steps that the United States should take to improve its own capabilities. We all recognize now that the United Nations is also new to the business of peace enforcement.

The emerging Administration policy promises to improve the UN's capabilities to conduct peace operations, from providing additional military personnel to their headquarters, to assisting in the design and development of their situation center and identifying information requirements. The U.S. is committed to helping the UN with logistics support--something that the U.S. does as well as anyone. And the U.S. has said
that it will assist the United Nations by participating in and providing facilities for training for peace operations.

Our experience in Somalia has brought home the hard-hitting reality that, like war, peace operations are a complex, difficult, and sometimes deadly endeavor. That brings me to the most important reason why we must improve doctrine, and training for peace operations. We owe it to the fine young men and women that serve in our nation’s armed forces. We owe them the assurance that they will receive the best preparation and training that our military can offer, not just for peace operations, but for any mission they might be asked to carry out. To do otherwise, would be unconscionable. The bottom line: Peace operations are an important mission which the services must be prepared to perform effectively.

Developing peace operations and military training programs that are consistent with U.S. national security objects is an essential task. Doctrine should undergird, drive, and shape training. In reality, what we have found is that the training that is currently going on in the field is actually shaping doctrine. This paradox can be attributed to the fact that, until recently, no body of doctrine existed to guide how U.S. troops were to train for and conduct peace operations. Military doctrine for peace operations is only now emerging in the form of the Army's FM 100-23 as well as the Joint Publications 3.07 series. So, fortunately, this gap is quickly being filled.

In defense of the drafters of doctrine, many of whom are here today, some argue that the reason for voids in both joint and service doctrine on peace operations is the absence of definitive national policy guidance on peace operations. The lack of a clear national peace operations policy has meant that the military lacks necessary direction and firm commitment from the top. Admittedly there is merit to this argument. On the other hand, both the defense planning guidance and the bottom-up review make clear that our military must be prepared to carry out multilateral peace operations. So then, the question isn’t whether the U.S. is going to be involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The question is how are we going to do it right. This is why it is so important that we ensure that we are training properly for peace operations.

In the area of training, the services have been catalyzed by substantially increased U.S. participation in peace operations. The army, in particular, has initiated a wide array of peace operations training. U.S. military trainers
have capitalized on lessons learned from previous and ongoing peace operations as well as feedback from multiple sources, including foreign armies that have had extensive experience in peace operations. Of note is the peace operations training that is underway at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany. We have had a chance to go out and observe some of this training. These centers have created challenging, realistic training scenarios designed to prepare specific units for real-world missions.

Recognizing the need to ensure that our military forces are fully prepared to conduct peace operations, our office has commissioned two studies designed to evaluate peace operations training throughout the services and provide recommendations in order to determine what guidance should be issued with respect to training policy for peace missions. The first effort is a comprehensive study of training which is being conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses. Commissioned by our office last year, the study examines the relationship between training, critical skills, and mission success, in an attempt to identify how training policy would improve the chance of successful peace missions. We expect to receive the final report in March. The second study that we commissioned is the Department of Defense Inspector General Review of Peacekeeping Training. This study is assessing the adequacy of current military training for peace operations and will identify specific training requirements. The IG study team has completed its field work and is drafting its first cut. We expect to receive the final report in March. Although neither of these study projects have concluded, we are beginning to see some common themes which might be useful to mention here:

- First, the peace operations mission lacks institutional acceptance and legitimacy within the U.S. military culture. However, the resistance is diminishing as we have begun to participate more actively in peace operations.

- Second, many of the individual and collective skills required for peace operations are similar to those required for war fighting. However, these skills must be tailored to mesh with/match the operational characteristics under which they must be applied, namely, force restraint and impartiality.
• Third, there is a need for additional emphasis on peace operations within the professional military education system.

• Finally, the issue of force-structure planning for peace operations remains unsettled. However, given our recent experience with time constraints for notification and deployment to peace operations, the wise choice may very well be a combination of predesignated unit training and predeployment training.

DOD in the past did not address comprehensively peacekeeping either as a matter of policy or as an operational requirement. Nor did the OSD or Joint Staff Organization formally reflect the enormous demands that participation in peace operations has placed on us. This has changed dramatically in the past year.

In July 1993, the Joint Staff established a UN division in J-5 with functional responsibility for peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Former Secretary Aspin recognized the growing role of peace operations through the establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Peacekeeping and an Office of Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Policy. These positions provided, for the first time, a central focus within OSD for the coordination of the diverse and disparate elements of peace operations policy. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense will probably be disbanded, but the Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy will continue, currently under the Assistant Secretary for Strategy, Requirements, and Resources.

The Office of Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Policy represents OSD in the interagency peacekeeping core group, which is responsible for developing peacekeeping policy and providing oversight for ongoing operations.

Working closely with the Joint Staff, we have begun to bring the military perspective to bear on discussions of prospective operations, which has been reflected in more rigorous mission definition, exit criteria for operations, and other changes in security council resolutions authorizing peace operations.

The office also has worked closely with the Joint Staff in the interagency process to scale back the scope of the
peacekeeping policy review and place it on a more realistic footing. Our basic approach--given the complexity of peace operations and our inexperience with this new form of collective action--has been to seek to ensure that we can walk before we run. Our input has changed the tone and ambitions of the review significantly over the past year.

We work with the OSD regional offices and task forces on Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia to provide expertise relating to the functional aspects of peacekeeping. This includes mission definition, the UN process, and letters of assist to provide personnel, services and material support for ongoing operations.

We have established liaison with the services, providing input to their efforts to develop peace operations and improve related training. We have initiated several research projects on issues such as peace operations entry/exit criteria, improving capabilities of foreign forces to participate in peace operations, and future organizational and technical improvements to the UN’s Department of Peace Operations.

We simultaneously have faced the challenges of trying to compile a record of DOD’s past participation in peace operations, establishing a formal OSD interface with the UN and assembling a data base on UN activities, improving the process of providing support to the UN, and other basic but time consuming tasks that had not been performed by OSD in the past.

Effective UN peace operations offer an alternative for the United States to share the burdens of world peace with like-minded nations. To achieve success in this endeavor takes a great deal of time, effort and resources--at least in the near term. If, however, we believe the long-term benefits of less U.S. active participation in peace operations is achievable, then it seems well worth the effort first to prepare ourselves and then other to reach this goal.
UN FORCES: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES

John Mackinlay
Brown University

Military development in the twentieth century has progressed in steps. Each one, gigantic in impact and usually resulting from crisis, has initiated an intense search for new responses. In this manner we have moved from the static lines of the First World War to the "expanding torrent" and blitzkrieg of the Second World War, to "peoples war" in the period of post colonial run-down and finally to the nuclear battlefield. After each change, just as military staff master their new combat environment they are plunged into another conceptual void. Since the end of the Cold War the rising importance of the UN as the controlling authority for globally deployed forces has brought us to another threshold of military development. UN operations are now larger, more powerfully equipped and take on more hazardous and complex tasks. As a result we are facing another unexplored plateau of military activity in which long established principles on the use of power, the integrity of command and the very ethos of the warrior are being challenged.

This paper explains the changes which have taken place in the UN's post cold war military role; why these developments have caused such institutional trauma and why the peacekeeping formula cannot address the more challenging contingencies ahead. It also emphasizes that war fighting techniques and the use of overwhelming force will not provide a key for success in these circumstances; it recommends some guidelines for the doctrinal way ahead as well as the ideal characteristics needed by soldiers at the cutting edge of international forces.

THE PEACEKEEPING PROTOTYPE

Peacekeeping was developed as an instrument of a deeply divided international community. The word "peacekeeping" has no universally accepted definition and does not appear as such in the UN Charter. In its most widely used form it refers to "operations involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict" (United Nations, 1990). This definition and the military techniques which it implies have been accepted among the sixty or so nations, which from time to time contribute their military contingents for UN international peacekeeping missions. After a number of UN multinational peacekeeping forces were deployed, principles of success were developed in 1973 from their experiences. These stipulated the need for the
UN's support and authority for each mission, the neutral multinational composition of the UN military presence, the restrictions on their use of force - but above all on the need for consent (Secretary General, 1973).

In this context "consent" was the most important prerequisite to success. It implied that a successful settlement had already been negotiated between the opposed forces in the conflict zone. Most important for the peacekeepers, it implied that the parties, at the highest level of their leadership, and their forces on the ground, had agreed to a peace process and the deployment of UN peace forces. If "consent" was withdrawn, the position of the peacekeepers became untenable. There was nothing they could do to improve the conditions for their success. There was no question of them forcing a peace solution on the unwilling parties. They may have carried personal weapons but in terms of their training and attitude they did not seriously expect to have to use them in their efforts to succeed.

There were several reasons why the UN's institutional capability for organizing more effective military operations was never developed. During the Cold War there was no inclination or need to expand the elaborate provisions for organizing offensive operations under Chapter VII and the authority of the Military Staff Committee into working instruments. The peacekeeping garrisons in Cyprus and at the Arab-Israeli interface were small symbolic forces. Their organization and direction did not demand much more than a tiny civilian staff in New York. Consequently when the new, post Cold War operational pressures suddenly required a larger and more capable staff, the system failed. Lack of conceptual vision extended beyond the UN. In academia, cold war strategists were slow to orient themselves onto the military problems of a new era, and veteran "UN" academics continued to retard the process by insisting that events in Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia had no developmental significance. The UN had "seen it all before," by which they implied that there was no need for doctrinal change.

With the end of the Cold War peace forces were deployed with greater facility to conflict zones where UN involvement had been precluded by the former Cold War rivalries in the Security Council. However these new contingencies were more complex and challenging than previous peacekeeping experiences. UN forces in Cambodia, Somalia and former Yugoslavia were now faced with the problems of intercommunal, as opposed to international, conflict. Very few of the certainties of the "bufferzone" were still applicable. They
were dealing now with armed factions not regular troops, fighters who were less disciplined, less easy to identify and whose motives were sometimes at variance with the stated position of their overall leaders.

This placed the UN forces on the ground in a difficult and at times in dangerously unworkable positions. Their role and status had been altered; the preconditions previously considered essential for their success no longer prevailed. But the UN military staff in New York had failed to develop a more appropriate option and continued to apply the "peacekeeping formula" to situations which were evidently not any longer peacekeeping scenarios. The UN deployment to Namibia to supervise the election and transfer of power in April 1990 was the first demonstration of the hazards of mismatching a peacekeeping response to a situation where locally "consent" was in doubt. Where irregular militia bands comprised the major element of the peace process, the accountability of local leaders had become unreliable and their consent to the activities of UN peacekeepers was uncertain. In Namibia, UNTAG forces were too weak, and at the crucial moment too disorganized, either to anticipate or prevent the invasion of SWAPO guerillas from Angola. Fighting broke out between the South West African Police squads and the SWAPO units and in the first month of the "peace process," 400 Africans were killed (United Nations, 1990). Although UNTAG is now hailed as a UN success, in April 1990 it came perilously close to disaster. In Cambodia, Somalia and former Yugoslavia there were similar challenges at a local level to the UN mandate. UN troops were being increasingly deployed on conflict resolution missions where locally individual militia commanders refused to acknowledge their authority. Nothing in their previous experience in the bufferzones from which the mainstream of UN military development is derived, had prepared them for this. The UN's writ, authorized by the highest assembly of global powers, was being overturned locally by gang leaders and irregular militias who refused to submit to an agreed peace process. The UN had no response; a new approach was needed.

PROTOTYPE FOR A NEW ERA

In May 1992 the Watson Institute of Brown University published its first version of a prototype concept for these post Cold War contingencies (MacKinlay and Chopra, 1992) which was to have some influence on the military pamphlets developed later by UK, US and Australian defense forces. Although the later version "Second Generation Multinational Operations"
(MacKinlay and Chopra, 1993) has been described as futuristic in outlook, in reality it explained UN missions and tasks which had already taken place. It was a first step towards finding a better response to the problems of military forces in these circumstances. The definition of military tasks and the principle governing the conduct of operations were to some extent derived from the British experience of low level operations. The Watson draft distinguished a middle category of post cold war contingencies which amounted to more than traditional peacekeeping but fell short of "enforcement" by all possible means as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The characteristics which separated these contingencies from traditional peacekeeping were that they largely took place at an intercommunal or interfactional level within the boundaries of a collapsed state, rather than between states. Here UN troops had to deal with multiparty conflict among factions whose local leaders were unaccountable. Very often there would be no effective cease-fire, and outbreaks of lawlessness and violence were frequent. There would be no defined bufferzone or area of operations and typically UN forces would be deployed state wide, operating among the local population. Above all, in these circumstances consent, the essential precondition for success in a traditional peacekeeping force, was locally a questionable factor. For the UN mission to be viable the vast majority of the population would have to support the peace initiative in the first instance, but locally there might be schisms who evaded the peace process and could only survive in an environment of comparative anarchy. This minority might be expected to resist small isolated parties of the UN peace force which crossed their path.

The tasks identified in the "Second Generation" prototype are summarized below:

**Preventive Deployment** does not rely first on a truce or peace plan having been agreed between the parties. UN contingents will deploy at the request of one or all parties involved. The force will not be strong enough to resist a deliberate attack by one party on another, but it may stabilize a deteriorating situation by its presence and ability to restore order and local security. It may also act as a "trigger" to initiate a much larger military operation to restore the status quo.

**Internal Conflict Resolution Measures** are taken by a UN force to restore and maintain an acceptable level of order and personal security in an internal conflict. They rely on a substantial level of local support for
some form of conflict resolution. Tasks include: liaison between parties, conducting a multiparty ceasefire involving cantonment and disarmament; and in a later phase, supervising elections, rebuilding the infrastructure and government administration and the reconstitution of host nation police and defense forces.

**Assistance to Interim Civil Authorities** These usually follow a successfully conducted ceasefire. The overall task of the military element may be to supervise or endorse the provisions of a peace agreement and ensure an election or transfer of power is conducted in a free and fair manner.

**Protection of Humanitarian Relief Operations** Most humanitarian relief is delivered safely and effectively without military assistance. The protection of relief referred to in this section concerns the organization of a multinational relief protection force. The scale of response often dictates the need for a stand-alone operation involving the presence of combat aircraft and warships as in the case of Northern Iraq (1991).

**Guarantee and Denial of Movement** Guarantee operations may be authorized by the Security Council to ensure the freedom of ships to pass through a threatened sea lane, or for aircraft to reach an encircled city or community. Denial operations may prevent the harassment of an unprotected population by the use of combat aircraft or to prevent the delivery of chemical weapons or explosive ordnance onto a civil target. In both cases, these operations may involve powerful warships and combat aircraft.

There is unlikely to be a clearly defined boundary between tasks. Within the authority of a single mandate a UN force may carry out several tasks. Although in the list above these are shown in their likely order of operational intensity and the consequently increasing scale of UN commitment, this escalating order is not rigid (MacKinlay and Chopra, 1993).

**MILITARY RESPONSE TO A NEW ERA**

In June 1992 the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) acted as a catalyst for a tidal wave of papers and studies that followed concerning the reforms needed to achieve a more effective UN response. Military staff in the more powerful involved armies started developing ideas on
national modus operandi to meet these challenging UN contingencies. There were also efforts at regional level by NATO (NATO, 1994) and ASEAN. Significantly from the UN itself there emerged no new tactical guidance for the new-era tasks that UN troops now faced particularly in Somalia and Bosnia. In tandem with its institutional failure to develop a Military Staff Committee in the 1950s, the UN had never established a staff capability for concept development. As a result in the past, ideas generated by its multinational forces on operations have been adopted in a bottom-upwards process of improving doctrine. Following this tradition in the 1990s it has been national contingents, and the cross-fertilization of ideas between their respective staff, that have provided the nucleus of a new concept.

There are several drafts now under development at army level in US (Department of Army, 1994), UK (HQ Training and Doctrine, 1994), Netherlands, Spain, France (Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre, 1994) and Australia (Australian Defense Force, 1993). These address a tactical level of activity that is usually the responsibility of a national contingent commander, or in a larger force the formation commander who has more than one contingent under control. They explain the military tasks encountered at tactical level and are essentially expanded versions of the prototype shown above. Some nations developed training packages for their contingents about to deploy to Bosnia and Somalia. In this respect there is a common approach among NATO armies which emphasizes the need for high standards of competence in basic combat skills. Each nation has an add-on training package of 10-14 days which covers the special skills, geography and political background that are specific to each particular theater.

These developments are an essential first step in developing a response to a new era of military operations. However they cannot be regarded as anything more than a tactical life-jacket at this stage. They address the needs of troop commanders at contingent and tactical level, they offer sound advice on military conduct and survival, but what they cannot do is provide a concept for the overall success of the peace process. At operational level the essential problems in Somalia, Cambodia and former Yugoslavia are not essentially military. The success of the UN initiative will rely on the restoration of a state system that has collapsed. This involves several other elements in the UN force that will be needed to: rebuild government structures, redress human rights issues, reconcile bitterly opposed factions, restore the infrastructure, rehabilitate thousands of displaced people and conduct an election or at least effect a transfer of
power. A strategy for success would have to comprise the activities of all these elements. Although it will be planned at force level by the senior UN official or officer on the ground, it has to orchestrate all the UN elements present in the force and if possible the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) so that they act in concert towards achieving the same long term operational objectives. Some elements, particularly the humanitarian agencies and NGOs respond with reluctance to coordination efforts, and so far no commonly accepted command structure or procedures have emerged that would make the coordinating role of the overall commander easier or even viable. Meanwhile the task of the military element will be to create the conditions locally which allow the civil elements of the UN "garrison" to achieve their individual objectives.

DIVISIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

Superficially the military pamphlets described above show similarities in approach and attitude. The lists of military tasks and the principles underpinning them are not essentially different. However they are embryo documents and have not, at the time of writing, been released into the main stream of military practice. Without an official concept, unit commanders in the field have been required to act intuitively. More significantly at a much higher level of influence and decision making, general staff officers, officials and politicians have also responded intuitively to these incidents. Their reactions show that whatever the similarities in the draft manuals, there is a division between the US on one side, and the European and British Commonwealth armies on another, on the use of force.

At the highest level, US military staff and politicians continue to be fundamentally influenced by the Weinberger doctrine and its related interpretation of recent history. In particular it is understandable that military successes in Panama and the Gulf will continue to reinforce an instinctive resort to the use of overwhelming force as the key to success. US technological superiority that allows targets to be identified and destroyed from stand off positions, without closing to a mutual range with the hostile force, has great attraction for politicians and for military staff. US politicians can support foreign military involvements without them being tagged with that spectral, kiss-of-death-from-the-media epithet "the quagmire effect"; and for the military staff the technical solution is still regarded as ideal because it is short, finite and from a strictly military point of view, very effective.
The Europeans, British and Commonwealth armies approach the same question from a completely different historical standpoint. After a century of colonial experience in small isolated garrisons surrounded by overwhelmingly larger indigenous populations, they have been acutely conscious of the negative long term effects of using undiscriminating force. A colonial garrison could only survive with the tacit support of the majority of the local population. This principle became enshrined in military doctrine during the period of post colonial rundown when, together with former colonial powers, emerging states had to cope with serious threats by insurgent forces. Success they found required a very long term approach sometimes measured in decades, in which force could not be used punitively or indiscriminately to achieve a quick military victory. Short term "victories" over local dissidents involving stand-off attacks and "fix and destroy" operations, were poor options if you had to live with the consequences of using force in a way that turned the local population against the long term solution. In these circumstances the military had a more constabulary role working very close to the population, but at the same time retaining the instant capability to react in the manner of a top class combat infantryman in crisis.

These differences have not emerged as a challenge to unity during forty years of coalitions and NATO partnership. But with the prospect of participation in future multinational forces under the aegis of the UN at the low-level end of the operational spectrum, it is now more important that they are at least discussed and mutually understood, even if they cannot be resolved at a stroke.

NEED FOR CIVILIAN SUPPORT

In many ways a UN peace force operating in a collapsed state is governed by the same limitations as the isolated garrisons of colonial history. The UN troops are also isolated and vastly outnumbered by the local population; and for both contingencies, history does not seem to favor a short term solution. For these reasons it is vital to maintain civilian support. In principle the deployment of small, vulnerable groups of UN officials and troops into a conflict zone raises obvious problems, particularly of personal security. With common sense and sound local information it is possible to avoid known hazards such as minefields and no-go areas dominated by hostile fighters. A close relationship between UN commanders and local authorities is essential if the UN presence is going to be tenable and the long term peace process is going to succeed; civilian support is vital for the
effective distribution of relief, protection and security. Their involvement in the planning of long term activities such as rehabilitation and the organization of elections is a sine qua non. Without this relationship the UN force no regular source of day to day information on local events and incidents which might alter the state of security around them. If they become alienated from the population there are a number of serious consequences. Movement of convoys and individuals becomes hazardous; looting and banditry increases and information is withheld concerning the perpetrators, but above all the achievement of a long term peace process becomes almost impossible. In this way the withdrawal of local civilian support could defeat a peace process.

The loss of civil support can be caused by the ill disciplined behavior of culturally unacceptable foreign troops and by planned subversion. The latter problem may be new to UN officials and some nations without counter-insurgency experience. Techniques to mobilize popular opinion against a government or, in this case to overturn a UN presence or peace process are found in the doctrines of peoples war. The concept of a small armed minority subverting the civil population to reject a government, foreign presence or trustee administration, lies at the heart of the principles of insurgency. It is fatally easy to underestimate the ability of a small number of insurgents to exact support from exposed sections of the population by threats. Government pronouncements and the natural loyalty of a people cannot prevail if terrorists are allowed to build their organization unchecked; unprotected, the public cannot stand up to terrorism (Kitson, 1977). The function of encouraging the civil population to support the process of restoration in "new era" peace support operations, which distinguishes them from traditional peacekeeping, has become a crucial factor of success. Unless the mandate for intervention has the unqualified consent of every armed gang in the involved state, a local UN commander or official is likely to face subversion, and therefore confrontation, of some kind. Although terrorism can be inflicted and sustained by force, the techniques to counter terrorism and win back public support cannot be successfully conducted by war-fighting methods. They require troops who can work among the population and out wit the terrorist in his own environment.

THE NEW ERA UN SOLDIER

In their humble way, the infantry who stand at the cutting edge of the UN presence in a foreign country play a
major role in its success. Much is required of them: If they behave badly, overreact, use force indiscriminately or fail to win the confidence of the local people who constitute their environment, the viability of the peace process will begin to erode. In this role they are more than combat infantryman. They will have to move and operate comfortably in an urban or rural environment, projecting goodwill and security to civilians, but at the same time, in an instant they must be able to react correctly to a lethal attack. To do this they will need to interpret accurately what is happening around them, particularly among the local population. In a multiethnic society divided by civil violence this is asking a great deal of a young soldier from a foreign country.

Among the civil population, some will respond warmly to his presence and others will shun him and even react with hostility. Those who oppose the peace process and would kill him, given a risk-free opportunity, are indistinguishable. Even in factions which ostensibly support the peace process there will be varying shades of enthusiasm which may alter as the overall political situation changes. Whatever threats exist beneath the inscrutable appearance and behavior of the local people, the infantry at the cutting edge must present themselves as a supportive but neutral presence, friendly, fair but also firm; aware of, but impartial to the politics and moral judgements of the conflict.

Junior officers will have to command small, sometimes isolated, groups and make some hard decisions about the motives of the immediate civil population. They will have to succeed in developing a good cooperative relationship with the other UN agencies working in the area. In addition to combat skills which are essential for this task, junior infantry leaders must develop capabilities which do not sit comfortably with a war fighting ethos. They must be capable of negotiation, familiar with the tactics of compromise, able to use the threat of force implicitly as a bargaining tool and not in a direct, gun-pointing manner which takes the situation immediately to the brink of violence. In situations where human rights are threatened, policing skills will be needed: to gather evidence, protect and uphold the rights of threatened minorities and individuals, make searches which are effective but at the same time lawfully conducted, and make arrests. They will need a developed skill for communication, and an ability to reassure civilians, encourage them to talk, to give information and to discuss their problems and anxieties. But in addition to these personal qualities the junior commander must maintain the skills of a top class infantry soldier, and when the situation changes act swiftly
to handle a threatening confrontation and in the last resort use lethal force in a cool and effective manner.

THE WAY AHEAD

Although the UN had witnessed the problems of intercommunal violence in the past, it had never learned to cope with them successfully. As a result, after the Cold War it faced a crisis of confidence in which its writ, even when authorized at the highest level, was overturned by small unrepresentative bands that had rejected the peace process, usually for unlawful reasons. Involved defense forces are now developing a better response. But their first step, what would become the embryo of a future global military doctrine, only addresses military techniques. In reality the problems are much wider and involve civil processes to restore the structures of governance, transfer power and rehabilitate a population that has lived in violence for decades. As our experience in this environment grows, we begin to identify new dimensions of the problem. There is the instinctive difference in outlook between senior officers in the US armed forces and their opposite numbers in Europe and the British Commonwealth armies. "Success" cannot be achieved by military action alone; the military task will be to support the UN civil agencies and the NGOs to maintain an acceptable level of security and order which allows them to get on with the job of restoring a collapsed society. But above all it is increasingly apparent that the ad hoc peacekeeping routines of the Cold War are not equal to the pressures of current UN contingencies. The hastily organized multinational forces of the UN are structurally too weak to take on an internal security role where close coordination across all the elements of the force is crucial to success. If we are to master the doctrinal void and deliver UN forces which can be successful, we must now focus on the problems of developing better coordinated responses that lie beyond the purely military approach.
NOTES

1. ASEAN: There is no common ASEAN doctrine for peacekeeping but the Australian Defense Force Warfare Center hosted the first of what hopefully will be a series of ASEAN peacekeeping courses at Williamtown air base in February 1994, at which officials and military staff officers from Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan and New Zealand were represented.
REFERENCES


HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING:
SINAI OBSERVATIONS - THE FIRST ITERATION

Jesse J. Harris
University of Maryland at Baltimore

As a result of the Camp David Agreement, signed by Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in 1979, a Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) was established for the purpose of assuring adherence to the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. One of the participants in the MFO would be an infantry battalion selected from the 82nd Airborne Infantry Division stationed at Ft Bragg, North Carolina. This Battalion would be part of a Task Force that would be responsible for assuring compliance in the southern zone of the Sinai Peninsula which included the Gulf of Aquaba.

The peacekeepers would deploy prior to the political changeover of the Sinai from Israel to Egypt. The Israeli Army occupied the Peninsula and it would be a matter of weeks before the military changeover would occur and before the MFO peace keeping duties would officially begin. Consequently, troops had an opportunity to adjust to climatic and cultural differences.

As part of an approved protocol entitled Health Problems of Deployment, the department of Military Psychiatry, of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) sought and received approval to attach two (2) of its members, one officer and a Non-Commissioned Officer familiar with airborne operations, to the battalion for the six month duration of the deployment. There were several objectives to this research. Among them were to document both family and soldier patterns of stress during the deployment. The deployment occurred during the spring and summer months. The observers were "assigned" to squads and accompanied them throughout the deployment.

The squads rotated to two outposts/check points (OP/CP) of the U.S Zone; one rotation would be to the Northern sector, the next to the Southern sector and the third rotation would be to the Base Camp which was located at Sharm-el Sheik. Each rotation lasted ten days. The Base Camp approximated a small size Army post with a small PX, an athletic facility, post office, troop housing and headquarters building (these were all built during the six months of the first Task Force tour of duty). The facilities at the outposts were sparse. They consisted of an air conditioned shelter with a kitchen and
sleeping quarters. Most of the outposts were isolated and could only be reached by helicopter.

**SQUAD LEADER AS COMMANDER**

The vast geographical area of responsibility significantly reduced the Company Commander's span of command and control. The success or failure of the mission was in large part in the hands of the squad leaders.

The squad was given a "real world" mission and its importance was constantly reinforced to them by command. For the first time, many of the young squad leaders were thrust into a level of responsibility unknown to them in their brief military careers. They would have almost total responsibility for their squad twenty-four hours a day for twenty days (until they rotated back to base camp). The squad leader as compound commander was responsible for:

1) observing and reporting violations to the peace treaty occurring within his sector of control to include the air space, sea lanes, and border crossing.

2) Assuring the resupply of water, fuel and rations for his Op/Cp.

3) Training his squad

4) The health and welfare of his squad.

While the immediate chain of command had not changed, the squad leader, as the compound commander, now had much more responsibility and authority. Roles and tasks clearly had to be understood at each level of command. Various levels of leadership had to adjust to major role changes. By necessity Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants played important, but modified roles with respect to direct supervision of their men. This was sometimes stressful for some Platoon Sergeants. Likewise, squad leaders had to be aware that in the OP/CP they would have a leadership role but would have to revert to their traditional roles (similar to when they were in garrison) when in the Base Camp or on Quick Reaction Force status. (Before the end of the deployment squads would prefer to remain in the outpost and enjoy their relative independence than return to Base camp.)
SQUAD COHESIVENESS

Although some "fillers" were required, the designated infantry battalion joined the mission essentially intact. However, a significant number of soldiers in the battalion had lived "off post." With the exception of short training deployments their contact with the other members of the battalion was for only a few hours of the day. This fact, coupled with the addition of units which were required to form the Peacekeeping Task force, necessitated skilled leadership to bring about a sense of cohesion.

Because of the key role that squads would play in this mission, the Battalion Commander attempted to establish a sense of cohesion at the squad level. Consequently, prior to assuming the mission, the units began training at the squad level using the "Basic Training Model." This approach was utilized just prior to deploying from Ft. Bragg and immediately upon arrival in the Sinai.

One of his most important acts was to require squad level competition using athletic events as the medium. Sports played a significant role in developing squad cohesiveness. Squad level competitions in such events as volley ball, track and field and water sports were initially command directed. Within two weeks however, squads and sections began to challenge one another voluntarily. Nonparticipants began to voluntarily support their squad with their attendance.

Squad cohesiveness was also fostered by the close living arrangements between platoon sergeants, squad leaders and enlisted personnel in the Sinai. Such conditions resulted in at least two significant outcomes:

a) Leaders were in 24 hour contact with their men and could observe strengths and weakness to a greater extent than when in the garrison environment; and similarly

b) those squad members, who were "fillers" or who lived "off post," had an opportunity to observe squad members's strengths and weaknesses, and likewise they could be observed.

PSYCHO-SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE MISSION

There was the expected enthusiasm among the soldiers as the Israeli troops departed and the MFO officially assumed the
mission of peacekeeping. However, it should be noted that no one knew what to expect on this new mission. To what extent would the Israeli and Egyptian governments respect the Peace Accord or the MFO's authority in this historically disputed territory?

It should not come as a surprise that initially some squads over-reacted to incidents occurring in their sector of responsibility. This was especially true at night. As an example, a squad leader at a remote site peered through his binoculars and sighted what appeared to be a column of "enemy tanks." He immediately made attempts to call the headquarters for reinforcements and to get further instructions. Fortunately, he was having difficulty transmitting to the headquarters. As the column got closer it was obvious that these were a caravan of Bedouins passing through.

The times were tense. Not only was this a new mission, but the soldiers were well aware of the escalating crisis in Lebanon. The leaders had to constantly review the rules of engagement with the men. However, the communication problem through the chain of command was as bad in the Sinai as in units in the United States. There were times when the Battalion Commander's message had difficulty getting to the lower echelons of command. In the absence of facts, troops depended upon the "rumor mill." Given the changing conditions in the Middle East uncontrolled rumors could have been detrimental to good morale. The Task Force Commander continually stressed to each level of command the importance of communicating with their men to ascertain that the lowest level receives the "word."

By the third rotation to man the OPs and CPs the tasks had become routine, even boring. Men began to complain--about everything. Within a few weeks of the beginning of the mission soldiers expressed displeasure about having to repeat training tasks that they had experienced at Ft Bragg. They needed new challenges. The nature of the MFO mission experience demanded that the squad leaders modify the training. Leadership then took advantage of the desert and mountainous terrain and developed innovative training strategies and ideas. The squad leaders soon found that their squads were particularly challenged by patrolling exercises in the desert terrain. However new training strategies did not resolve the unrest for long. The soldier's perception of a military mission for their airborne infantry battalion was far different than their experiences thus far. They were trained for "action," however, they found themselves in a role of "watching and waiting." They began to question why their
battalion (and not an M.P battalion) was selected for this mission. One young soldier noted that "...training back at Bragg was more realistic than this." Boredom and complaints notwithstanding, the peacekeepers continued to perform their mission in a professional manner, but the fact was that each passing day was a carbon copy of the day before. The monotony of the mission dictated that some diversion other than training had to be developed. The Task Force Commander sought and received approval for Rest and Recreation (R&R) opportunities to travel to Cairo, Elat, and St. Catherine’s Monastery (Mt Sinai). In addition, there was a gradual improvement of the facilities in the Base camp. The commander provided opportunities for the Task Force to learn Scuba diving and qualify for diver certification. Over 500 men were certified. Soon nightly movies became available in the Base Camp and periodically live entertainment was acquired. Awards and recognitions, promotions and Troop of the Month Boards continued as they had been at Ft. Bragg. These ceremonies continued to be major moral boosters.

PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES OF THE PEACEKEEPERS

The majority of troops completed their deployment without significant crises. There may have been several reasons for this, but five are worth particular emphasis. First, these were a select group of soldiers. Second, there were no hostilities or major infractions by either party to the peace treaty. Third, the soldiers knew what to expect in terms of rotations to sector and most importantly, when they would be returning home. They had a 30 day rotation plan: Each squad expected to spend ten days at the Base Camp after having served ten days in the northern sector and ten days in the southern sector of the U.S zone. Most importantly they knew that they would serve not more than 179 days in the Sinai.

Fourth, the public attention paid to the Task Force personnel prior to the deployment had to have impressed on the soldier the importance of this mission and its place in United States military history. This, the first iteration, was heralded in major newspapers around the world. The soldiers were flown to the Sinai and given first class treatment on El-Al Airlines; upon their arrival on the peninsula they were given a heroes’s welcome, and the world press covered their activities during their stay in the Sinai. To have been assured of world support was a morale booster.

Finally, there was the visibility of the various levels of Command from occasional visits from the MFO Commanding
General to regular visits from platoon sergeants. There were also frequent visits to the OP/CP by the Task Force Commander to dialogue with squads on an informal basis.

While exposure to hostile fire was not a factor, other stressors were clearly identifiable. Approximately three months into the mission a few soldiers exhibited mild symptoms of depression. Leaders found it most beneficial to communicate with their men on a personal level. Squad leaders were well equipped to do this.

Many troops, although given a thorough briefing on the Sinai, were unprepared for the harshness of desert living, the sparse population and remote locations of OP/CPs. Soldiers were not prepared for the twenty days minimum turn-around time for mail deliveries. Many found the cost of phone calls to the States to be prohibitive and in most cases difficult and frustrating to accomplish. This resulted in infrequent telecommunication with families back home.

Drugs were available, primarily hashish. Major areas of concern were Naama Bay and the few outposts near populated areas. Drugs did not surface as a major problem however. Men were warned of the consequences of drug possession.

Alcohol consumption was probably less than when they were at Ft. Bragg. Initially only beer was available at the small PX and temporary clubs at the Base Camp. Over-indulgence by a few was an irritant, but not considered a problem. Commanders and medical personnel warned that excessive consumption of alcohol in the Sinai heat was a health hazard. Further, the command monitored alcohol consumption by requiring Officers and NCOs to visit the clubs and observe any unusual incidents.

The lack of privacy was a problem for some soldiers. They were forced to live with one another twenty-four hours a day during the period of the deployment. Some OP/CPs allowed "escape" (someplace to be alone). Soldiers could take a walk, run, swim, etc. Other OP/CPs are not conducive to these activities. As time progressed (about the fifth month) the peacekeepers begin to show signs of irritability with one another. Sporadic fighting ensued. Squad leaders were advised that they must provide a forum in which concerns could be openly discussed and if possible dealt with.

U.S troops got along well with soldiers of other nationalities. Concerns were expressed about the significant difference in pay that MFO units from some nations were getting relative to that of the U.S members of the MFO. Most
"conflict" was between U.S line soldiers and those of the U.S Logistical Support Unit troops. These disputes were more apparent than real however, and were based more on unit pride and the spirit of competition. There were no serious confrontations.

HEALTH ISSUES

Throughout the deployment there were very few serious health problems. Most of the soldiers who had to be repatriated for medical reasons had problems which existed prior to the deployment. Within the first few weeks of the deployment numerous cases of dehydration were reported. Soldiers had yet to become acclimated to the desert heat which averaged 104 F at Base Camp and from 110 F to 120 F at some observation posts and check points. Most affected soldiers required the administration of IV fluids. Gastrointestinal complaints, another initial problem, dropped to acceptable levels. Some soldiers suffered from a mild intestinal discomfort throughout the deployment. The most frequent medical problems however, were sprains, strains, lacerations, and abrasions.

Commanders were advised by their medical personal of the importance of continually stressing the need for personal hygiene and keeping a high state of sanitation in the OP/CP sites. They began to monitor the water intake of troops. In addition, Commanders stressed driving safety, especially on the roads in the Wadis. Consequently, there were very few serious accidents. Weapon safety was also stressed. The soldiers carried loaded weapons. There was one case of an accidental self-inflicted gunshot wound. The soldier did not require immediate evacuation however. There were two reported cases of dog bite. After the U.S troops officially began the mission (i.e., took positions in the outposts) they discovered dogs residing there. These dogs had served as mascots for the Israeli soldiers who had previously manned those same OP/CPs. The U.S troops adopted these animals and cared for them. An attempt by the veterinarian to destroy them was successfully resisted by the troops.

It was clear that the close monitoring of area sanitation and soldier hygiene were instrumental in maintaining a low incidence of health problems. It should be noted that the enlisted medical corpsmen who were assigned to the squads were very effective in monitoring fluid intake of the squad members.
FAMILY UTILIZATION OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS

By the end of the first month in the Sinai, family problems began to surface. A few men began to request emergency leave. Some families were becoming anxious with concerns about the soldier's safety (especially in light of the recent Lebanon invasion).

The Battalion Family Support Group was in its embryonic stage at the time of the notification of the Sinai deployment. The Support Group was chaired by the wife of the Battalion Chaplain. Because the battalion had been alerted several months prior to the deployment the Group was able to establish itself and become a model for future Support Groups. The FSG was instrumental in providing psychological support and more tangible supports to many of the Battalion families. Several families required the assistance of the more formally established army support institutions.

These formal support services started providing assistance to some deployed soldier's families almost from the beginning of the alert of deployment and continued throughout the deployment. The types of services that were sought can be seen from the following example:

For a two month period from 16 March 1982 to 16 April 1982, Legal Assistance, Finance, Army Community Service (ACS) and the Red Cross reported receiving requests for assistance from family members of the MFO Battalion. These agencies had a total of 19 contacts with ten different families regarding twelve different problems. The primary problem for which wives contacted legal assistance was assisting them in getting their Power of Attorney documents accepted by the business establishments. The Post Finance Office reported that the primary problem they experienced was the spouse's attempt to receive BAQ "with dependents" payments. The Red Cross was contacted about a death of a nonimmediate family member and ACS for assistance with a newborn baby. The school system reported contacting the Social Services concerning one family with problems around mother-daughter relationships. There was some concern about the mother's ability to cope with the husband's absence.

The Rear Detachment Commander (RDC) received thirty documented calls and reported that there were about twenty-five more calls which he did not document. Most of the calls were about a prohibition against mailing "care" packages to the Sinai. The issue appeared to be further complicated by the fact that some packages, particularly those mailed outside
of the Ft Bragg/Fayetteville area were getting through to the soldiers. There were also a number of calls about financial or pay problems ranging from needing help reading the soldier's pay voucher to problems which were complicated enough to have had to be referred to the Finance Officer. There were two calls from mothers inquiring about their son's address.

The chaplain noted that in addition to the inquiries concerning mail and pay, most of his contacts from wives were about the press coverage regarding drug screening of the deployed soldiers and about a photograph of a female Israeli soldier which was taken in the Sinai and appeared in the local newspaper (wives had the impression that there would be no females in the Sinai).

Generally speaking the problems which resulted from family separation from this deployment were able to be resolved by the Family Support Group, the Rear Detachment Commander and/or the traditional Support facilities. It did become clear however, that soldiers who present multiple family problems prior to deployment are at risk for early repatriation.

CONCLUSION

By all indications the first American Task Force Participation in the MFO was a success. This experience provided valuable information on the kinds of stress associated with peacekeeping for both soldiers and families. It also provided information on strategies relative to stress reduction under conditions of isolation, and boredom.

The value of the Family Support Group and the Rear Detachment Commander was validated. Effective communication between command and the soldier was found to be crucial to troop moral under these harsh conditions. Strong leadership resulting in good discipline was in large part responsible for the low incidence of disease, accidents, and behavioral problems. While many of the problems that faced the first iteration of peacekeepers have been resolved some issues continue to plague the more recent peacekeeping efforts, the communication and mail problems for example. The importance of training soldiers for various tasks of peacekeeping, (from expectations of possible hostilities to standing watch for months at a time) must be emphasized.

It is clear that continued observations of the Sinai and other peacekeeping deployments are necessary to add to the
knowledge base as the world becomes more involved in peacekeeping operations.
PREVENTION MEASURES TO REDUCE
PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS IN MFO OPERATIONS

Larry Applewhite, ACSW
MAJ, MS
Social Work Officer

INTRODUCTION

Before one can properly prepare for the human dimensions of peacekeeping in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) the threats to optimal psychosocial functioning must be identified. This can be accomplished, in part, by examining the operation of Task Force 5-21 in the Sinai from May to November, 1987. This unit was a COHORT battalion from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord, California. The author served as mental health officer in this task force.

During the operation of TF 5-21 there were a number of soldiers who exhibited problems with coping that prevented them from meeting the high standards established by the command. Although it is difficult to precisely attribute cause, the precipitating events can be categorized into environmental, operational, and interpersonal factors.

STRESS PRODUCING CONDITIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL

By the time the task force arrived in the Sinai the post facilities had been substantially upgraded to include a gymnasium, outdoor amphitheater, and an extensive club system. Nevertheless, there were several environmental factors which contributed to psychosocial impairment.

1) Climate - The heat is a well known variable in desert operations; however, for peacekeepers in the Sinai, the weather’s invariability contributes to the monotony associated with the duty and is more difficult to become conditioned to.

2) Close living quarters - The observation posts and checkpoints are configured so that an infantry squad is confined to a small area. The soldiers live in an open-bay barracks augmented with a small dining facility which offers little privacy.
3) Unfamiliar culture - Troops must demonstrate sensitivity, and at times defer, to the traditions of the local culture as well as other MFO member nations. Some soldiers expressed irritation that the U.S. flag could not be flown at the U.S. battalion headquarters because of treaty provisions.

OPERATIONAL

1) Security concerns - Apprehension over a terrorist attack, like that perpetrated on the Marines in Beirut, resulted in a heightened security posture. Soldiers labored in a massive upgrade of bunkers, sand bag walls, and construction of concrete barriers at the main gate. Also, restrictions were placed on off-duty travel reinforcing the sense of confinement.

2) Ambiguity of setting - While the U.S. force maintained a high state of vigilance, outside the fence at South Camp and some OPs, vacationers relaxed on the beach. This inconsistency made it difficult for some to accept the assumption that the force was at risk for terrorist attack and the resulting security policies.

3) VIP scrutiny - Pressure to perform was created by frequent visits by dignitaries and inspections by the MFO chain of command.

INTERPERSONAL

1) Supervisory relationship - Relationship strains developed between squad leaders and their men. Conflicts were exacerbated by: a) the close quarters; b) constant contact with each other; and, c) the increased responsibility required of squad leaders. An authoritarian leadership appeared correlated with a decrease in squad performance.

2) Family problems - Individuals concerned about problems back home comprised the largest group of referrals for mental health assistance. Specifically, soldiers expressed feeling helpless and isolated while trying to cope with marital troubles, financial burdens, and family member's medical or emotional problems.
PREVENTION PROGRAM

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

The most effective and efficient endeavors to manage the stress of peacekeeping occur during predeployment preparation. While in the Sinai most of the soldiers who experienced coping difficulties did so in reaction to family problems back home. This indicates therefore, that predeployment measures which strengthen family functioning will result in fewer instances of individual psychosocial distress. While units should concentrate on programs designed to meet the unique needs of their families, there are a number of general principles which can be adopted. Among the most useful are:

1) Mobilize the family support group - It is important that spouses view the group as a viable support network. Likewise, soldiers must be confident that the support group is capable of caring for their families during the deployment. Prior to leaving, the unit should organize family activities which stimulate active participation of spouses and clearly communicates the command’s commitment to helping families.

2) Identify families with special needs - Soldiers who have family members with special medical or emotional problems should be screened to ensure they have adequately planned for a six month separation. The family may benefit from being linked with a sponsor from the family support group to serve as an advocate should problems arise. In extreme cases the unit may be best served by having a soldier remain with the rear detachment in order to resolve family problems.

3) Selection of rear detachment commander - A strong, capable leader should be appointed as rear detachment commander and not the individual judged "least likely to succeed" in the Sinai. Being selected to take care of the task force’s families should be seen as a career enhancing assignment.

In conjunction with actions to strengthen families, units can enhance individual functioning by including training to teach coping skills. Some which have proven beneficial are:

1) Stress management training - FM 26-2, Managing Stress in Army Operations, provides a solid basis for stress management training. Although all soldiers can benefit from this training, squad leaders should be targeted because of their central role in OP/CP operations. Educating squad
leaders to prevent and to recognize signs of stress enables them to properly manage stress reactions exhibited by their squad members.

2) Integration of augmentees - Since the task force is comprised of an augmented infantry battalion, it is essential to get the augmentees quickly involved in task force operations. This reduces the sense of isolation experienced by new personnel by establishing a support network.

3) Encourage self-improvement - Soldiers can use the six month deployment as an opportunity to achieve personal goals. Completing correspondence courses or enhancing physical fitness are achievable using resources readily available in the Sinai. Setting obtainable goals provides an outlet for individuals and helps to alleviate boredom.

One of the most beneficial predeployment activities conducted by Task Force 5-21 was a two week field training exercise simulating MFO operations. The exercise, held in the Yuma Proving Grounds, exposed the task force to the demands of peacekeeping under environmental conditions similar to the Sinai Desert. Specifically, the exercise:

1) Introduced soldiers to the monotony of "observing and reporting" under environmental conditions which rarely change.

2) Reinforced the need to adhere to the rules of engagement. The Yuma exercise uncovered a tendency among infantrymen to "shoot first and ask questions later". This aggressiveness was particularly directed towards "Arabs" role-played by S2 staff. Soldiers were inclined to see all Arabs as terrorists; thus, an effort was initiated to teach restraint and emphasize the MFO's rules of engagement.

SOLDIERS AT RISK FOR DEVELOPING DISTRESS

In spite of the prevention efforts, some soldiers still exhibited psychosocial distress during the operation. Those who appeared at greatest risk for developing stress reactions were:

1) Soldiers who became alienated - Individuals who either withdrew from or were isolated by their squads appeared susceptible to psychological distress. These individuals lost their basic support network and thus, the sense of loneliness and boredom present in the Sinai became magnified. Consequently, if coping difficulties occurred they were more
likely to seek assistance from the formal support system comprised of the chain of command, chaplain, or mental health team.

2) Soldiers who abused alcohol - In the Sinai there is a well developed club system which provides one of the main sources of entertainment. The clubs' attractiveness as a diversion from the monotony of the duty day, coupled with 50 cent drinks, makes alcohol consumption a major social event. For most this does not present a problem; however, for those who have a substance abuse history and are not in active recovery the availability of alcohol can become problematic.

3) Telephone use - Several crises were precipitated by telephone calls back home. The task force had an almost unlimited access to commercial and TACSAT telecommunications. While some were able to use this vast network to maintain contact with support networks back in the U.S., some experienced extremely negative reactions to telephone conversations. The telephone for some soldiers became a means for remaining entangled in disturbing marital relations.

FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

In retrospect there were some initiatives which were overlooked that if pursued would have better prepared the task force for the MFO. The most prominent are:

1) Relations with the local population - Although contact with the local people was discouraged, it was nevertheless unavoidable. Sensitizing soldiers to the local culture helps avoid conflict with the host country. Also, preparing soldiers for dealing with situations such as, children begging for water, reduces the stress generated by unfamiliar settings.

2) Dynamics of telephone use - Families would benefit from instruction on the pitfalls associated with the telephone. Telecommunication can be helpful to maintain contact with loved ones; however, it produces mixed results. In addition to the expense of international calls, the phone conversations may not meet the expectations attached to them thus, resulting in disappointment. Managing access to telephones in a manner that retains the benefits but reduces the liabilities to troop morale is a challenge for the command.
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

Peacekeeping duty in the MFO can be stressful; however, it does not have to result in psychosocial impairment. A well conceived predeployment plan which integrates activities to enhance individual coping and strengthen family functioning prepares a unit for the rigors of peacekeeping. Moreover, key task force personnel, to include a mental health officer, should be aware of situations which increase the risk for stress reactions so proactive measures can be taken to prevent psychosocial distress and reduced productivity.
MENTAL HEALTH SUPPORT OF THE
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MISSION
IN BALEDOGLE, SOMALIA

Major James W. Cartwright
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

From 7 January 1993, and until 17 March 1993, I deployed to Somalia with the 210th FSB 10th (LI) Mountain Division for Operation Restore Hope. I will give a brief account of my particular experiences in hopes that it will contribute to an overall understanding of this historic mission toward humanitarian assistance.

When the Division was placed on alert to deploy to Somalia, the 10th (LI) Mountain Division soldiers greeted this mission with enthusiasm. The Division was eager to demonstrate that it was trained and ready for the challenge of this mission. All of us had seen graphic media presentations of starving victims in Somalia and soldiers indicated that they were proud to use their skills in an humanitarian operation. They were also pleased to gain well deserved national recognition for the 10 (LI) Mountain Division. As a Vietnam veteran, it was personally gratifying for me to engage in a mission that appeared to be well supported by the American people. The repeated delays in deployment times as well as the disruption of family plans for the holidays were well tolerated by the 10th Mountain Division soldiers.

The alert meant that the 10th (LI) Mountain Division Mental Health Section had to shift into the tasks that would adequately prepare commanders and soldiers to recognize and anticipate potential stressors inherent in the mission. The Division Psychiatrist prepared an information paper in this regard. Division mental health officers who later deployed to Somalia conducted the briefings in the Mohawk Theater, by unit. Soldiers were told to expect experiences such as ambivalent feeling, irritability, and sleep disturbance. Soldiers were advised that regardless of humanitarian relief efforts, they would likely watch helpless people die. Resentment for the famine victims may arise from ingratitude and violent outburst. Soldiers were cautioned to neither over-identify nor dehumanize Somali victims. Although a few commanders expressed mild impatience with the briefing, most commanders were receptive to information that would minimize Combat Stress, PTSD and other stress disorders for soldiers.

By late December and early January, the 10th (LI) Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, deployed two Division Mental
Health Teams to Somalia during the initial phase of the humanitarian assistance operation. One team deployed with the 710th MSB to Mogadishu, Somalia. This team was comprised of the Division Psychiatrist, Psychologist, and three NCO Behavioral Science Specialists. When needed, the Division Psychiatrist served as our psychiatry backup. My team (1 Social Work Officer and two Behavior Science Specialists) deployed with the 210th FSB to Baledogle, Somalia.

What we actually encountered in this central and isolated location was an abandoned Soviet Air Force Base in complete ruin. The buildings were damaged and stripped. There were no utilities and the early arrivals to the area lived several days without lights. The base was infested with dangerous snakes, spiders, wild boars, and bats. Many of the building floors were covered with animal feces. The early arrivals were tasked with cleaning these areas in preparation for additional military personnel. For weeks, MREs were the extent of meals. Considerable hardship was associated with the need to consume water that was transported to Baledogle for our basic needs. The environmental conditions were harsh. Temperatures were hot, the air was arid, and red dust stirred up to permeate everything. By full deployment the base was occupied by Marines, Navy, Seabees, Army and a small Moroccan unit. Within a brief period the food lines appeared to be open in the countryside. Those who lived in Baledogle saw very little evidence of famine. The danger from clan warfare was minimal in Baledogle, unlike the experiences in Mogadishu, Merka and other areas. Occasionally, random gunfire was experienced by convoys riding the highway between Mogadishu and Baledogle.

Our area of operation (AO) was Baledogle Air Base and its surrounding countryside. We were responsible for providing mental health services to all units stationed there as well as 2nd Bde units located in areas such as coastal Merka. When we arrived at Baledogle on 7 January 1993, we immediately established contact with most of the medical units located in our area and proceeded to maintain daily contact. We also established contacts with the chaplains to discuss areas of mutual concern. I made contacts with many unit commanders to provide information on mental health services and its availability.

We offered mental health services to all military personnel located in Baledogle including Marines, Sailors, and Seabees. From 9 January 1993 until my departure 17 March 1993, we had 133 direct patient contacts. There were a total of 50 individuals seen for critical incident debriefings
either individually or in group. In spite of the adverse environmental conditions and low morale at Baledogle, serious mental health needs were few and generally related to critical incidents. Because of this situation, two members of the Baledogle mental health team redeployed early February 1993. I remained until 17 March 1993.

Over time it became apparent that a primary function for Division Mental Health was to provide individual and group debriefings to every military personnel involved in an incident within our boundaries. Most commanders were receptive to debriefings when the tactical situation permitted. Most soldiers availed themselves of the opportunity to safely clarify, ventilate, and validate their feelings and responses to critical incidents. Some soldiers declined services preferring to "handle it themselves." For the individuals, the purpose of a debriefing is to lessen short term emotional and physical distress and reduce the likelihood of long term distress, i.e., PTSD. Group debriefings can work to enhance and/or restore unit cohesion. By reconstructing events together, soldiers participating in group debriefings benefit from a unified and clear understanding of what happened which seems to help resolve misperceptions as well as reduce stress. Debriefings addressed such exceptionally distressing events as the death of unit members, death of noncombatants, body handling, and friendly fire. Debriefings also served to help put soldiers in control by anticipating emotional and physical after effects and alerting them to coping strategies. Commanders were encouraged to contact their Mental Health Combat Stress Team immediately after a critical incident if possible. On a couple of occasions, Chaplains conducted group debriefings but they expressed preferences for the individual counseling of soldiers.

Everyone at Baledogle had to cope with boredom and discontent. Morale slowly deteriorated due to the particular hardships of living in the desert. However, convoy trips to Mogadishu served to foster deepening resentment toward the Somalis and the changing nature of our mission. Rock throwing, verbal abuse, and bothersome thefts contributed to a sense that Somalis were not properly grateful for our help. Soldiers expressed uncertainty about how to apply rules of engagement (ROE) in their unique circumstances and role. As street violence increased, soldiers questioned reasons for remaining in Somalia. This situation was aggravated by the increasing boredom, although some units took initiative to solicit sports equipment, games, video tapes, books, etc. From the outset delays in receiving mail from home especially
given that telephone access was nil for most soldiers, became the focus of a great deal of frustration and worry. Coupled with no news from home and feelings that Somalia was forgotten in national and world news, morale issues began to surface. Reaction to these circumstances, some soldiers sought supportive counseling. It is my opinion that in such circumstances, without opportunities for R&R, frequent rotations should be established as a preventive measure.

Overall mental health related statistics were quite low. We can speculate as to reasons for the low incidence of serious pathology. Proactive efforts to conduct predeployment briefings, stress management classes, command consultation, and accessing soldiers in their units probably accounts for these results. Chaplains were also immediately available to counsel soldiers which helps to account for favorable statistics. Lack of alcohol and of telephone contacts with home may have had an impact. Physically healthy soldiers, preventive medicine, low incidence of disease and injury was no doubt a primary contributor to low incidence of mental health concerns. Good command leadership, training, and unit cohesion are likely factors. I would like to state that it seemed quite evident that Army physicians, to their credit were more alert to soldiers presenting combat stress than were their branch counterparts.

The reunion home was appropriate. We were taken to the soldiers gym and given a brief welcome statement by garrison commander with family support festivities present. Reunion with families was immediate and most soldiers were given a week’s leave after turning in equipment.

Out of our experience with this deployment to Somalia, it seems that Division Mental Health can perform a vital function by educating soldiers and commanders to anticipate and recognize potential stressors. Groups briefings and debriefings are highly effective in providing support to soldiers. Trained mental health professionals, commanders, chaplains, and the soldiers themselves can contribute to the mental health of individuals and their units. Much of what we can do is preventive in nature. From this experience we have learned that direct access to soldiers at the time of a critical incident is most useful in the reduction of short term stress and long term disorders. I concur with the Human Dimensions Research Team findings that "mail, phones, and MWR continue to be important issues. Support in these areas needs to be front-loaded, even if the operation may be short." Finally, commanders need to continue explaining "the value of the mission, especially for soldiers who do not get to see the 'big picture,' or when the mission is complex and changing."
SCREENING AND SELECTION OF PERSONNEL FOR PEACE OPERATIONS: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Dr. Franklin C. Pinch
Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

and

FCP Human Resources Consulting
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Forces (CF) have been involved in virtually every peace operation over the past 46 years, during which, at any given time, CF members have constituted around 10% of all deployed peacekeepers. Overall, roughly 90,000 CF members have served under the United Nations Organization (UN) or other regional banners, and over 90 Canadians have lost their lives in the service of peace operations (Dunne, 1993; LePage, 1993; Pinch, 1993).

Peacekeeping roles and tasks in the CF have recently been described, based on the categories provided by the UN. These include preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, observer missions, and humanitarian assistance. They represent overlapping categories that run the full gamut from diplomatic activity through to armed intervention and rebuilding of national infrastructure, and each has a component of military activity as well as a host of national and international players and stakeholders (Deputy-Chief of the Defense Staff, 1993). Included among the types of peace mission-related tasks in which the CF have been involved are the following: physical separation of belligerents; supervision of truce and cease-fire agreements; monitoring of troop withdrawals; disarming of belligerent forces; observation and verification of peace agreements; provision of communications and logistics support to multinational contingents; supervision of elections in nations struggling to establish some form of democracy; humanitarian operations, including the delivery of foodstuffs and protection of convoys and civilian, non-combatant populations; peace restoration through armed intervention; and, assistance in enforcing shipping and other forms of embargo invoked by UN resolutions (Gardam, 1992; Marteinson, 1989; Morrison, 1991, Pinch, 1994).
The variety and concurrent levels of activity, represented by the various types of peace operations—and the need for coordination and cooperation among the many international players, including multinational forces—suggest a high degree of complexity and ambiguity in peace operations, as perceived by armed forces personnel. Part of such complexity and ambiguity lies in the fact that the latter are accustomed to clear lines of communication, authority and direction, as well as fairly detailed specifications of tasks, which will not necessarily be present. Adaptation to this environment by conventionally trained and exercised armed forces is expected to be problematic on the organizational, role and individual levels.

Recent difficulties in peace operations in Somalia—especially an incident which involved the death of a young Somali while in the custody of Canadian soldiers—and for which several CF members have been charged with second degree murder, assault, dereliction of duty and a variety of other offenses (The Sunday Daily News, 1993)—have focused the spotlight on screening and selection as a method of ensuring that similar incidents will not occur.  In fact, the Board of Inquiry that was convened to investigate the Somalia affair specifically recommended that a selection system be developed to minimize the possibility of deploying personnel unsuitable for the demands of peace operations (Department of National Defense, 1993). Results of the Board of Inquiry and media reports also suggest that problems existed within the Canadian Airborne Regiment—whose members were serving in Somalia at the time of the above incident and other alleged violations of the rules of engagement, military discipline and the like—before its deployment, which raises the more general issue of the appropriateness of a conventional war-fighting orientation among units and personnel who are deployed in peace operations, and on the nature and demands of those environments.

Therefore, although the specific purpose of this paper is to discuss the screening and selection methods operating in the CF, the discussion is set within the broader context of changing demands from the conventional war-fighting to a more constabulary model of peace operations (Janowitz, 1960). The position taken is that peace operations duty represents a distinct change in the concept of operations and the demands placed on military personnel, and requires adaptation of human resource policies: possibly, including more refined ways of assessing personnel suitability for such operations. This is particularly the case in those situations involving sub-national conflict, where deep-seated factional enmities exist and/or where conditions are more fluid and unstable than has been true for most of the history of peace operations.
CONCEPTUAL AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

As Janowitz and others (Moskos, 1975; Segal and Gravino, 1986; Segal and Waldman, 1993) have recognized, a shift from conventional, war-fighting to constabulary or peace operations means that the focus of armed forces is no longer on victory over an adversary but, rather, on stabilization and/or elimination of conflict. Although there has been resistance to accepting the constabulary concept, both by military members and scholars, the fact remains that, as yet, no better depiction has been offered for the range of activities that have been performed by armed forces in the interest of preventing and extinguishing open conflict. Moreover, even though the emphasis has changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement—where there is a higher probability of the use of force in peace operations—the major purposes of such force are consistent with a constabulary approach: that is, self-defense, freedom of movement and the prevention of a potentially wider conflict (Segal, 1991).

As Last (1992) has argued, the enemy in peace operations is the conflict itself and not the belligerents. Therefore, a great deal of the effort must be expended in demonstrating impartiality, in order to engender the trust of all belligerents, and in restraint, so as not to escalate the conflict further and thus defeat the fundamental purpose of the operation. Impartiality and restraint on the use of force are the key principles underlying peace operations interventions (Moskos, 1976); both represent significant departures from the concept of operations in conventional warfare terms, at both the organizational and individual levels of conduct.  

The ability to rapidly mobilize armed forces to world trouble spots is another characteristic of a constabulary stance (Janowitz, 1960; Segal, 1991). This means that armed forces must be ready to deploy on short notice and often without the full knowledge of the nature of the demands that will be placed upon them. When and under what conditions armed forces will be deployed are important considerations in the containment or escalation of a conflict, but are subject to political decision, which does not always appreciate the "train up" times necessary for effective action (MacKenzie, 1993). While a satisfactory level of readiness may be assumed in the conventional sense, peace operations require specific personnel planning and preparation, relevant to the conflict, as well as in such unique areas as historical background, cultural and social make-up, unfamiliar geographical terrain,
etc. For example, setting realistic expectations about the peace operations environment is a very important aspect of preparation, as well as very time-consuming.

Also, conventional force structure may not be of the appropriate configuration for such deployments, and they will have to be re-configured in order to be integrated into the multinational force matrix. The implication for personnel is that they may not be: among those with whom they are accustomed to operating, well-known to their leaders or as well prepared to cope with the demands of peace environments as they should be. That many of those deployed are augmentees, rather than part of a well-established formed unit, only adds to this problem.

There is the important question as to whether a conventional war-fighting stance is compatible with extensive peacekeeping involvements, especially as this may influence the preparedness and effectiveness of personnel in peace operations. Based on his own military experience and a review of peacekeeping studies, Malcolm (1993) has argued that the CF has remained wedded to the idea of an exclusively conventional force and, therefore, has been slow in adapting its equipment acquisition program and its personnel training system to the requirements of peace operations. He recognizes that the CF has been seen to be extremely effective in carrying out peacekeeping duties and has attained a highly professional reputation world-wide. This he calls the "success trap", whereby accolades for superior performance have acted as a disincentive to the CF for critical self-examination concerning its human resources and other policies and procedures.

The appropriateness of a conventional stance, as regards peace operational environments, has also been analyzed by Eyre (1993). He considers that, on the face of it, conventional army organizations and soldiers, in general, seem well-suited for certain types of peace operations, for a number of fundamental reasons. Conventional armies have: mass, mobility and a modular command structure; an organic communications system (and can create additional ones as needed); an extensive skill structure that permits them to be self-sufficient and perform a broad range of tasks; and, disciplined troops who will be responsive to direction and accomplish the necessary tasks, even including those that put their lives in jeopardy. However, while conventionally-trained soldiers provide the "raw material" for peace operations, they do not represent the "finished product". Eyre does not accept the inherent orthodoxy of a conventional war-fighting stance, that a combat-trained soldier or officer comes suitably
equipped for peace operations, and holds that additional preparation is necessary. In taking this position, he provides reinforcement for differentiating between the demand characteristics of peace operations environments and those of the battlefield—in other words, explicit recognition of the changed concept of operations and, therefore, the need for adjustments of human resource policies and procedures.

Important, as well, are Eyre’s further distinctions between "classical" or "traditional" and "high intensity" peace operations. According to Eyre:

the model of interpositional peacekeeping deployments dominated the international scene from 1956 until the early 1990s. Peacekeeping operations in these environments involved truce stabilization activities between belligerent parties that had agreed to stop fighting and make a negotiated peace. Central to these operations was the fact that belligerent governments, by and large, were able to exercise a real and effective control over most elements of their population as well as subordinate military commanders (Eyre, 1993).

Eyre contrasts these stable operations against what he sees as "high intensity peacekeeping" or operations in an "unstable environment". These environments are characterized by incomplete or no control being exerted over belligerent armed forces by legitimate government or military authorities and by the increased frequency of:

accidental engagements, denial of freedom of movement, encounters with freebooters and brigands, outposts being over-run, peacekeeping forces coming under direct attack, peacekeepers being taken hostage and encounters with mines and booby traps (Eyre, 1993).

These risks occur in situations where mandates and rules of engagement may be unclear and where military responses are "severely constrained". The environment is also characterized by "significantly more players...significantly less precise definitions of relationships" (Eyre, 1993), and the hierarchy is less clear than is the case in more typical military operations. Moreover, military personnel, of all ranks, have to deal with members of other armed forces contingents, and may have to interact with refugees, non-government and government organization personnel, diplomats, tourists, non-combatants, factions, multiple belligerents and the media--each of which has its "own turf and...agenda" (Eyre, 1993). Even the multinational force headquarters may have less
refined procedures and doctrine than is encountered in other military operations. While it could be argued that these conditions exist more or less in all multinational operations, none of which are without risk, recent peace operations are becoming more complex, more ambiguous and more stress-provoking for the average service member (Fournier, 1994).

Added stress comes from witnessing atrocities, which one is helpless to prevent, from experiencing language and cultural barriers to communication with belligerents and non-combatants, from random shelling and sniping, and from having to be constantly wary and on-guard for the unexpected. On virtually all types of peace operations, respondents have reported a range of environmental/social and interpersonal stressors, both chronic and acute, which tax their abilities to cope and to carry out their duties (Shorey, 1994). Part of the problem for service members stems from the frequent lack of foreknowledge of the potential sources of stress that might confront them, their inability to recognize individual and group signs and symptoms of stress, and their poor understanding of individual and group coping strategies.

This, then, is the changed concept of operations for peace: a social environment which is complex, ambiguous, potentially dangerous and often lacking in the usual military supports (e.g., clear hierarchy, absence of intrusive third parties, specified courses of actions, etc.). Within these environments, CF peacekeepers have reported some of the personal characteristics they believe necessary to perform effectively; these include: a high tolerance for ambiguity and frustration; patience; flexibility; personal confidence and self-sufficiency; ability to gain acceptance and elicit the trust of others under trying conditions; ability to get along well with and relate to others, to fit in and to maintain an optimistic outlook; ability to take calculated risks, and to withstand the stress of boredom, separation, being under threat, living in sub-standard accommodation and/or in close quarters; the ability to solve problems independently; the capacity to practice self-discipline, self-control and restraint.4 Taken together, these characteristics represent a mature and healthy personality, in addition to social sensitivity and skill, which cannot be assumed for all those who are or may be deployed in peace operations.

Until recently, the dominant CF response to the question of what type of characteristics are necessary to successfully adjust to peace operations has generally been that, for frontline operations, those characteristics of a well-trained combat arms soldier, preferably from the infantry. This
somewhat limited view of peace operations, which have required
deployment of a wide variety of military personnel, is now
seen to be unrealistic. Also, there is now explicit
recognition that "add on" skills are necessary to increase the
adaptability and effectiveness of conventionally-trained
combat arms personnel in the conduct of peace operations, as
well as an appreciation of the criticality of support roles.
Also, while excellent leadership, a high level of military
professionalism among all ranks and cohesive units are seen as
a hedge against the effects of the more unstable peace
operations environments on personnel, these do not totally
overcome the requirement for adaptive policies and procedures
in minimizing problems among personnel for such deployments.6

This view that special human resource policies and
procedures are required for peace operations is buttressed by
findings recorded by Shorey (1994) for military observers and
monitors. In fact, he recommends that a rigorous screening and
selection strategy be developed to select only the most
suitable, and that training and orientation for such
deployments be integrated within the naval personnel system.
"Orientation" stands for setting appropriate norms and
expectations among those who are deployed on peace operations;
it is doubtful that this can be done effectively without being
embedded within the military socialization and training system
(Malcolm, 1993), where, for example, understanding of and
tolerance for other cultures can be taught and reinforced.
Nor is it a question of personnel screening versus
training/orientation but, rather, the way in which both may be
effectively integrated within the human resources system of
the military.

SCREENING AND SELECTION

Screening and selection do not stand alone but are part
of the overall human resources management strategies of any
armed force, including the CF. Therefore, they cannot be
understood in isolation from the approaches and methods that
operate at any given time; nor should formal selection
strategies be considered sufficient to overcome other
deficiencies in the leadership, management and supervision
within armed forces. This was one of the major implications of
a comprehensive review of the CF's selection system in 1984,
after a shooting incident involving a CF Corporal (Wenek,
1984).

In addressing the screening and selection function, Wenek
developed a model of occupational fitness, defined as "all
those individual attributes which are required in varying
1985). As Okros has stated, "the principal aim of CF selection and training is the assessment and development of occupational fitness" (Okros, 1989). The components of occupational fitness include those requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) and levels of physical and psychological fitness necessary to meet the demands of a military occupation. The antecedents of these three components are general aptitudes and interests (KSAs), physical health (physical fitness) and psychological health and psycho-social stability (psychological fitness).

In both the Canadian and United States forces, the assessment of KSAs and physical fitness is rigorously done at the entry level with somewhat less attention being accorded to specific, in-depth assessment of psychological fitness. The reason for this is the low validity of personality measures, which would unlikely improve appreciably predictions of general suitability for military service, or provide increased justification for candidate rejection (Wenek, 1984). The formal screening and selection system operates in conjunction with other aspects of the human resources management system, and assumes adequate training, socialization and assessment of CF members, as well close supervision of behavior and identification of possible psychological problems at the early stages of training and employment.

The teaching and assessment of occupational skills and competencies are generally done well, but other aspects are pose problems. As summarized by Okros:

the assessment of psychological fitness and its antecedents occurs throughout ones (military) career. The effectiveness of the procedures is the greatest during entry training, acceptable but not ideal during recruit and special employment selection and only limited during standard or special employment (Okros, 1989).

In particular, supervisors do not always detect changes in service members' behavior that might have significant import for future adaptation or, worse, for commission of violent or other deviant behaviors (Okros, 1989; Wenek, 1984). Also, in special military environments, such as submarine service, specialized assistance in predicting adaptation and successful performance is often necessary. Generally speaking, special selection approaches (i.e., secondary selection) are called for in particularly stressful environments requiring a high degree of psychological fitness and/or where the concept of operations has changed (Wenek, 1985).
In voluntary forces, where self-selection plays a prominent role, and formal selection and assessment procedures are in effect, the incidence of psychopathology and abnormal behavior may be expected to be considerably lower than in the general population or, for that matter, in conscriptive forces (Okros, 1989; Wene, 1984). However, despite a multiple hurdles selection, development and assessment system (from the entry level through to fully trained military employment), the presence of 100% psychologically robust personnel—who can adapt to all stressful circumstances—cannot be assumed (Wene, 1985). Moreover, and quite obviously, military training and socialization "develops individual aggressiveness as a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units and, in fact, as a prerequisite for survival in war" (Okros, 1989).

The emphasis on aggressiveness and violence against an enemy is likely to be adequately managed within a properly functioning unit and integrated within a suitable behavioral repertoire of most soldiers; it is those units and personnel who—for socialization and other reasons, are on the normative fringes of the military—will have more difficulty distinguishing the nuances inherent in situational demands. With respect to current peace operations, aggressiveness is indeed sometimes warranted for those situations where personal survival is at stake or where peace enforcement operations are undertaken; however, this need for aggressiveness must be balanced against a need for mature, reasoned and flexible responses to conflict situations encountered in peace operations, where restraint on the use of force and impartiality are the rule.

A screening and selection system is one of the management tools that should help to minimize problems inherent in the above type of situation, and one of the important considerations is the degree to which the procedures in the CF are formalized. This is dealt with in the subsequent section.

**PRACTICES CURRENTLY IN EFFECT**

CF members are screened and selected for peace operations as individuals or as part of a formed unit. As to the selection of the units themselves, there is an attempt to match up units with the type of mission and task. For example, in Cyprus, where the task was to patrol and resolve conflict along the demarcation line between the Greeks and Turks, it was initially believed that only infantry units were suitable
for deployment; but, subsequently, both armored and artillery units were rotated in and out of Cyprus, with no noticeable change in effectiveness (Pinch, 1994). Current peace operations draw upon elements of all combat arms units, as well as upon airlift-capable units, naval supply ships and destroyers for coastal patrols associated with embargoes (e.g., in Haiti). Army, navy and airforce officers perform military observer and monitor missions and, recently, a large contingent of naval officers and senior non-commissioned members (Sr NCMs) have been involved in waterway and inland observation missions in Cambodia (Shorey, 1994).

Nonetheless, the army, which still operates under a regimental system of named regiments and battalions, takes a lead role in deploying front-line personnel for peace operations. Loomis (1994) and others have argued that the regimental system is the most adaptable and effective for developing troops for any ground-based mission and for operating under any political regime. One of the arguably prominent features is that a regiment operates as a family, where other members are known—for their strengths and weaknesses—and this facilitates selection of personnel for operational deployment. Also, despite criticisms that regiments resist positive change and sometimes operate in a self-interested and arbitrary manner, they are considered excellent vehicles for the development of cohesion, loyalty and professional skills (Pinch, 1994).

Screening for operations has developed as a variant on screening for overseas deployments in general, and the procedures are outlined in two Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) (Department of Supply and Services, undated). Units within regiments have developed their own informal arrangements for determining suitability for deployment, and they tend to vary both in procedure and rigor across regiments and units. The one constant is that, ultimately, the deployment of all personnel is approved by the Commanding Officer (CO).

The process of screening and preparing members of a formed unit is a joint effort by delegated senior members of the unit (usually, for officers, the Deputy Commanding Officer [DCO] and, for NCMs, the Regimental Sergeant-Major [RSM]) and a Departure Assisting Group (DAG). The DAG—which is referred to as an entity and a process—both screens and updates personnel in the areas of administration, occupational training and coursing requirements, security, medical, dental, supply/clothing and the like. CF members and their spouses are also screened for family-related problems and there is a
possibility for cancellation of deployment for compassionate reasons, which happens infrequently. The DAG procedure is referred to as the "sausage factory", since, at least for Junior NCMs, it involves queuing and being "processed" through the various "check points". However, there is no question but that the DAG performs an important function as part of screening procedures, and that unit COs take the results of this screening into account.

As to the unit, the focus is on basic and special skill requirements for a particular operation, and a review of an individual's service file is conducted for evidence of indicators of problems that may be exacerbated or create dysfunction, in the operational environment. Social and military conduct, misuse of alcohol or other drugs, poor performance, attitudinal or behavioral problems and the like are noted, and may be followed up in an interview by the DCO or RSM. As one RSM stated: "We know our people, and, if possible, we leave the 'problem children' behind." But it is admitted that the system is not perfect and some who should not be deployed slip through, only to become problems after deployment. However, leaving those who might not adapt to the deployment setting is usually possible, since most peace operations do not require a full battalion of combat and combat support personnel. Therefore, there is always a substantial complement of unit members designated to perform garrison and other duties as members of the Rear Party or Rear Guard. The latter, for example, "takes care" of families of deployed members, including maintaining contact and communication, providing assistance for travel, responding to family emergencies, etc. The Rear Party is a very important coordinating body in the overall personnel support process, as is its counterpart, the Welfare Section, established in-theater for stabilized, long-term peace operations (e.g., Cyprus).

All those not deployed as part of a formed unit are called "augmentees" and they include: support staffs for headquarters and other second or third line unit positions; UN and other observers, such as those for the Multinational Force and Observer Organization (MFO), and members of the European Community Military Monitor (ECMM) group; and, reserves. For some missions (i.e., the Sinai and the Golan Heights), where primarily support personnel are deployed, the entire complement may be augmentees, drawn from units across Canada. There are also those who are deployed as replacements for personnel repatriated, transferred to other operations, or who are killed or die while on peace operations duty. The Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff is responsible for peace operations
undertaken by the CF, and he has a coordinating Director of Peacekeeping Operations (J3 Peacekeeping), who pays particular attention to the screening, selection, training and deployment of augmentees. In fact, most of the important policy and program changes, as well as the day-to-day coordinating on the personnel and training side, in recent years, are attributable to this small but active staff.

In general, those who are not deployed as part of a formed unit (except for reserves) are drawn from an international standby list (ISL) — maintained originally by career managers at National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ) but now maintained by the separate operational commands. To be on the ISL, a member must voluntarily apply and be recommended by his/her CO; there are plenty of volunteers, since CF members are highly motivated to undertake peace operations, for a variety of reasons.\(^9\) Screening procedures of regular force augmentees are conducted roughly the same way as is done in formed units, but a lack of routinization of procedures at some units means the individual CF member may have to show considerable initiative to be completely processed. Also, like those in formed units, augmentees are given series of orientation briefings, which is coordinated by J3 Peacekeeping desk officers at NDHQ, over a three-day period; for those who will form part of a service (support) battalion or an engineering unit, training on basic military, occupational and special skills are conducted in a central location. The more complete the screening, training and preparation program, the more confidence the CF member reports in his/her ability to cope with the peace operations environment, and the converse is also true (Pinch, 1994).

All reserves are volunteers and they receive partial screening (primarily for occupational qualifications and other eligibility criteria) at their units, before being sent to a regular force unit, where they are tested for physical fitness (typically via a timed route march) and undergo the DAG process. Those who are screened at this stage undertake approximately three months of training under the supervision of the regular force; for reservists from the combat arms, with those regular force members who are about to be deployed as a formed unit, and, for those in support occupations, with regular force augmentees at a central location. As would be expected, substantial numbers of combat reserve personnel do not meet the regular force standards, but pragmatic decisions are made regarding the deployment of junior personnel (i.e., Corporals and Privates) who, by and large, have performed well on peace operations.\(^{10}\)
The most disadvantaged, in terms of screening, are those who are deployed as replacements, and their training and orientation is also more spotty and less certain. More generally, however, there are numerous examples of all categories of CF augmentees who have been obliged to leave at short notice, and it is a standard complaint among a great number that they have not had sufficient time to prepare for their deployments. Women are routinely selected for deployment in peace operations, as are members of various ethnic and visible minorities and, in some cases, a specific attempt is made to select those linguistically capable for the area of operations. Experience in other peace operations also plays a significant role in selection, especially for more senior ranks.

Overall, the potential exists within the present operating procedures to conduct a careful screening and selection of those who are deployed on peace operations, but the urgency of deployments, the fact that there are large numbers of augmentees and other factors tend to militate against this always occurring. Thus, no standard has consistently applied across units, occupations, locations or ranks and, in fact, no formal evaluation of screening success for peace operations has ever been conducted. A review of the 1993/1994 partial statistics for UNPROFOR reveals that the vast majority (over 75% or 22 out of 28) of CF members, who did not complete the six-month rotation, were repatriated for medical (physical and psychological) or administrative reasons, and most were Jr NCMs. These may well reflect adaptive difficulties to the peace operations environment, but more definitive results are needed to determine how well screening, selection and preparation policies are working.

In summary, CF screening and selection methodology employed up to now is under the control of the unit CO, assisted by base and unit staffs. For the vast majority of augmentees, screening, training and preparation is coordinated by J3 Peacekeeping at NDHQ. The screening/selection process is both formal and informal in nature, the latter in the sense that the actual procedures employed from unit to unit are not clearly documented, and the same is true for the decision rules for determining social and behavioral suitability for deployment. While the elements for an appropriate screening and selection process appear to exist, they are not formalized. In this sense, the process is consistent with the ad hoc nature of many of the arrangements regarding peace operations over the long history of CF involvement (Henry, Clark, and Heenam, 1992; Malcolm, 1993). But this is rapidly
changing toward rationalization of policies and procedures (Deputy-Chief of the Defense Staff, 1993).

TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE SCREENING/SELECTION SYSTEM

As defined earlier in this paper, the overall aim of screening and selection is to assess occupational fitness, for the demands of a given environment. Occupational fitness has a knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) component, a physical fitness component and a psychological fitness component. As also noted, peace operations have heavy implications for social functioning, and, therefore, a sociological component should be added into the screening process. These are all important and should receive systematic attention in a more or less standardized manner and, for formed units, this should be done at the unit level. For augmentees, this becomes more difficult, especially where additional training and group orientation are concerned. Therefore, some centralized coordinated effort is likely to be needed.

Screening and selection guidelines must take account of the demand characteristics of peace operations environments, which have been previously defined as special employment. There are two aspects to this: special knowledge and skill development (e.g., knowledge of the conflict, the history, geography, etc. and negotiating/mediation skills, according to the rank and responsibility level) and basic military skill updating for support augmentees. These are a matter of specific training and, while screening in these areas are essential, they are relatively straightforward in terms of assessment. Less clear-cut is the issue of sociological and psychological fitness, and it is here that the disjunction between the requirements for conventional war-fighting and peace operations roles are likely to be the greatest.

The basic requirement at the unit and individual level for peace operations is discipline--group discipline and individual discipline to the appropriate norms--which is similar, but not identical, to that required for conventional operations. There are two ways in which this is so. One is that the norms of constraint in the use of force and of impartiality require a different orientation from conventional war-fighting and put both a premium on interpersonal skills and limits on the range of acceptable behavior. (The situational demands are, of course, also different, as has been indicated earlier). Bonding in the primary group (horizontal) and with the leadership (vertical) must be at least partly based on these norms and on positive attitudes.
toward peaceful conflict resolution. Deviance in group behavior must also be identified with the above elements and sanctioned accordingly (positively and negatively). The second reason why discipline for peace operations is different from conventional war-fighting is that, for the former, self-discipline becomes much more important, simply because the individual service member tends to operate with greater autonomy in peace operations and thus becomes a public representative of his or her unit, group, or even the nation, with more serious attendant consequences when things go wrong. Mature self-discipline, self-control and self-restraint are of the essence in peace operations. Of course, all of this can be taught and assessed, better for some than to others.

The above suggests very strongly that much more attention must be focussed on the sociological readiness of units that are to be deployed on peace operations, and equally so for those individual augmentees who will have to fit into multinational units on deployment. For the former, there should be a system of qualitative screening following orientation training to peace operations norms, prior to deployment. It is not the intention to spell out how this would be conducted, except to say unit members must demonstrate an understanding of them and recognize when they are or are not being applied. The leadership and supervision in imparting appropriate norms and team-building on that basis should also be assessed and critiqued. This should all be part of the pre-deployment preparation, but need not wait for a specific deployment; in other words, it forms an integral part of conventional preparation within formed units, where alternate exemplary scenarios may be used to effect.

As to the psychological fitness of the individual member, attitude and behavior screening is necessary, probably with the help of personnel specialists, but with unit COs making the final "go/no go" decision after all of the information is considered (including the results of the DAG). The areas to be examined would include those already considered by the more conscientious units: service record and experience; social conduct, in and out of the military; history and incidence of alcohol and other substance abuse; social and family stability and interpersonal skills; attitudes and behavior toward other cultures and social groups, etc.

Such screening and selection should follow straightforward and specific guidelines, and be underpinned by theories, concepts and results of well-known psychological and sociological research, as well as by the good judgement of
experienced officers and Sr NCMs. The screenings should be recorded, so that justifications and the bases for decision-making will be transparent, and will meet the standards of fairness and objectivity demanded by human and individual rights legislation: that is, they should be based on the bona fide requirements of the peace operations environment and be applied equally to all. The rank level at which they are applied would be a matter of discussion and consensus, but the higher the better, given that the forces are led by senior example.

Individual augmentees pose something of a problem, since it is more difficult to develop and screen them to a group norm, given that they are widely dispersed across a number of units and are deployed across time. The venue for accomplishing this task could either be on basic military skills training, which must be done as a group, or during orientation training. In any event, screening for appropriate attitude and behavior characteristics can and should be done at the home unit, again, with specialist assistance, if necessary, and in a standardized and transparent manner.

It should be noted that none of the above detracts from normal military operating procedures, in which development, counselling and assessment proceed apace. In fact, the latter should ensure that there are few surprises while, at the same time, ensuring that those units and personnel deployed will operate at optimal efficiency, and ensure that the excellent reputation of CF peacekeepers will not be tarnished by rare lapses in member conduct and behavior.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has dealt with the issue of screening and selection for peace operations from the broad perspective of changing concepts and conditions from conventional operations to peace operations--based on the extensive experience of the CF in virtually all of these special employment areas. From a human resources systems perspective, a well-developed screening and selection system is warranted, since peace operations--especially those defined as high intensity or unstable--place special demands on military members, and these should be taken into account when suitability for deployment is being assessed. In particular, these tend to be complex, ambiguous and stressful environments, where individual weaknesses are likely to be magnified and where a high degree of occupational fitness--including psychological and sociological fitness--are necessary for effective adaptation.
and performance. The fact that reservists and personnel from a variety of non-combat occupations are being utilized in ever-greater numbers adds to the heterogeneity of military background of deployees and renders careful screening and selection even more important.

Peace operations duties may be considered special employment which calls for specialized inputs. The proposed screening and selection strategy, sketched only in general outline in this paper, is but one example of such inputs. It promises to provide greater standardization and should assist in preventing adaptive problems in peace operations by focussing greater attention on critical decisions regarding suitability of personnel for peace operations deployments. Whether such a strategy would ultimately lead to improvements depends on two factors: whether a technically sound screening instrument could be developed, for the formed units, augmentees, and reserves; and, whether or not it could be successfully integrated with other procedures now operating within and across units. Also, given long-standing attitudes about the preparation, screening and selection of personnel for peace operations deployments, implementation offers a considerable challenge. As in all changes, the approach and degree of involvement by the users will be important.

Beyond selection and screening, are a number of other changes in human resources policies and procedures that the CF are, of necessity, implementing within the training and preparation procedures for deployment (Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff, 1993). These are designed to bridge the gap between socialization and training for conventional war-fighting and the personnel demands of a variety of peace operations. They may ultimately prove to be of greater value than a screening or selection system.

It is doubtful whether any military could, or should, orient its forces totally toward peace operations. Certainly, the CF has viewed a conventional war-fighting stance as being compatible with the demands of peace operations, and it is held that training for war is a pre-requisite to the capability to effectively perform in the interest of peace. Nonetheless, there is clear recognition that for this compatibility to exist, considerable attention is necessary in promoting the norms of peace operations at the unit level, especially those that relate to respect for other cultures and those of restraint on the use of force and impartiality in the treatment of belligerents. That is, additional training is necessary in the specific peace-mission related skills and in group and individual re-orientation as well.
Issues of who should perform peace operational roles appear to be moot since, in the CF, at least, representatives from all three operational elements and a variety of support personnel have been deployed--reserves and regular force alike. However, combat arms personnel are likely to continue to perform front-line operations, with other units and occupations playing supporting roles, and officers (and perhaps even Sr NCMs) of various backgrounds playing observer and monitor roles. The compromise is that the combat arms will have to develop a broader range of non-combatant skills and orientations and, in fact, this has already begun. On the other hand, deficiencies in basic military skills have been apparent among support elements and they, too, will require remedial attention. This is very important since it has implications for the confidence that support augmentees have in themselves and their acceptance by combat arms personnel.

Like many other forms of military endeavor, peace operations can be done more or less well, and the consequences of difference in approach and level of effectiveness are not completely transparent. This is the case, since much of the critical performance in peace operations is hidden from public view and involve many players, making the relationship between individual and group effort and results hard to assess. However, in the longer term, the development of a formalized, systematic approach to screening, selection, training and orientation for peace operations--embedded within the overall framework of a general purpose, conventional model--appears to be required. It is hoped that this paper provides some notion of how the above objective might be achieved.
NOTES

1. The major incident, one of many that happened over a six-month period in Somalia, resulted in the death of a 16-year-old Somali boy on March 16, 1993, and was widely reported in the media two weeks later. This incident and others have resulted in nine charges being laid against members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, from the rank of Private to Lieutenant-Colonel.

2. Moskos notes that non-coercion or minimal force and impartiality are the underlying themes found throughout the writing on peacekeeping operations.

3. CF commanding officers in deployed units have indicated that company and platoon sizes have had to be changed, and that other support elements have had to be constructed from augmentees from a number of reserve and regular force units.

4. Taken from preliminary results of a larger study on the human resources impacts of peace operations, now in progress, and from Shorey, 1994.

5. This is still the view expressed by many senior infantry officers as the ideal; however, the need for artillery and armored troops, especially for peace enforcement missions, is accepted "as long as they are well-trained in basic soldiering skills."

6. It is the recognition of this fact that has led the CF to develop a comprehensive training and preparation policy, aimed at ensuring that all categories of peace operators will receive adequate screening and preparation.

7. This appears to have been the case for elements of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, whose social norms of behaviour and attitude represented a disruptive and destructive variant on those considered acceptable by the CF overall.


9. Ample evidence is found in the large numbers on the ISL and in a larger study on the human resources aspects of peace operations being conducted by the author.
10. The greatest difficulties reported by both regular and reserve
force members has been with Sr NCMs, many of whom do not have
the requisite experience to operate independently on peace
operations deployments. In general, reserve officers and Sr
NCMs are "paired off" with regular force members above or
below them in the rank structure.

11. Reported to the author in group sessions and individual
interviews by individual CF members and their supervisors.

12. Statistics provided for each category by J3 Peacekeeping.

13. Greater autonomy is consistently reported in peace operations,
including by the more junior ranks, and it is one aspect of
the appeal of peace operations.

14. The combat arms have a long experience in scenario training
for peace operations over the almost 30-year period that the
CF was in Cyprus. Recently, the same has been done for
UNPROFOR, once the initial experience had been acquired.
Specific negotiation and mediation skill training may well be
added in the future, at the appropriate levels.
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NEGOTIATION TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS:
ONE UNIT'S EXPERIENCE OF TRANSLATING THEORY TO PRACTICE

Lieutenant-Colonel M.D. Capstick*
Land Force Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec

and

Major D. M. Last
Writer/Researcher
Land Force Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec

After 29 years of service under the United Nations Flag in Cyprus, the Canadian army might be excused for feeling that it has mastered peacekeeping in that particular setting. With little personal experience and minimal guidance the officers of the 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (1 RCHA) drew on negotiation theory to build a training package which would assist them to deal with incidents anticipated in the comparatively stable environment enjoyed by the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

The unit's experience in developing and evaluating a negotiation training package and attempting to contribute to the resolution of incidents can serve as an example of the application of theory, and a starting point for developing tactical negotiation skills for more complex and demanding missions. This paper describes the development of the negotiation package, its use at unit level, its evaluation in theatre, and observations concerning the interaction of unit and force headquarters. While a good deal of progress remains to be made, it is in the last area that the most work is required.

BASIC TRAINING AND PREPARATION

By the 58th rotation, the training guidance to units preparing for UNFICYP consisted of just two pages, listing subjects such as weapons training, vehicle and rank recognition, first aid, crowd control skills, and familiarization with the conflict. In contrast, direction to units preparing for deployment to Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) runs to more than 20 pages, and is backed up by instruction packages which differ for units deployed to Croatia, Bosnia and the Canadian logistic support group. It was the absence of such detailed instruction which led 1 RCHA to prepare a negotiation training package from first principles, building
on work in the fields of industrial relations, police crisis intervention, and applied social psychology.

This training package must be seen in the context of the unit's other preparations. It represented only twelve hours, or about two percent of more than 500 hours of training and exercises over a 60 day period prior to embarkation leave. Moreover, the majority of the negotiation training was received by officers and senior non-commissioned officers only. The importance of a well-trained and cohesive unit cannot be over-emphasized. Indeed, it is unlikely that the negotiation techniques advocated could be effective under any other circumstances.

BASIC INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE MILITARY SKILLS

The Canadian army's experience of peacekeeping has provided ample evidence that peacekeepers need individual and collective combat skills. In any peacekeeping operation there is an element of risk and soldiers must be able to defend themselves. Collective combat skills normally associated with "war-fighting" are required for three related reasons.

First, combat capability is the foundation of force credibility. Regardless of the status of the belligerents--irregular militia, regular conscripts or professional army--the credibility of the peacekeepers will often depend on the perception of professionalism and competence. The requisite image of professionalism can only be projected by well trained, well led and well disciplined troops--whether regular or reserve.

Second, only officers who understand all aspects of the combat team are equipped to evaluate events involving opposing force parts of that team, or sway their counterparts of the opposing force with convincing military logic. Military proficiency at every level is integrally related to the effectiveness of non-violent efforts to resolve incidents.

Third, threats to the force can rapidly escalate to the level where collective combat skills are necessary for self defense. As the environment becomes more unstable, both negotiating skills and military skills become more important.

One of the great truths of peacekeeping is that section commanders (or squad leaders) have far more responsibility than in conventional operations. Small groups of soldiers are usually deployed in isolated observation posts; foot and vehicle patrols over a wide area are the norm; and service
support elements often do not have the luxury of a rear area. Soldiers employed in this type of environment must be fit and have attained a high standard of weapons handling and shooting skills. These are basic skills demanded of any soldier and should not be compromised. All soldiers must also be familiar with squad or section weapons. Emphasis must be placed on the linked skills of observation, recognition, reporting and communications. The individual rifleman will be expected to know how to observe in a variety of terrain and to recognize what he is actually seeing. The soldier must then be taught to report the information. This is accomplished through the use of simple checklists. It is on all these skills at the soldier level that the appropriate handling of incidents ultimately rests. In most peacekeeping operations the soldier cannot depend on close supervision and the comfort provided by numbers.

Pre-deployment training must provide time for thorough training in these basics skills. Most of the skills which a soldier has learned as part of his conventional military training are directly transferable to the peacekeeping role, but should be reinforced as for any mission where time permits. This reinforcement of individual skills can be a major factor in the development of small-unit cohesion. An imaginative and rigorous programme will provide individuals with the "shared experience" which will lead to the development of effective teams.

For Cyprus, as for any other mission, the types of skills demanded at the various levels of command depended on the normal factors associated with military operations. The mission, terrain and opposing forces were considerations. Section and platoon level skills such as patrolling, the establishment and manning of checkpoints and observation post duties were deemed essential. Company and battalion level requirements included crowd control procedures, reconnaissance, defense and withdrawal operations as well as the exercise of command and control. Again, a wide range of tactics, techniques and procedures designed for war-fighting are directly transferable to peacekeeping.

At unit level, the most difficult training task is to strike the balance between the instinctive aggression needed in war and the tempered escalation demanded of a police force or unit in internal security operations. The only way to do this is to conduct a unit level collective training programme with a wide range of scenarios and a formal system of feedback. Leadership in collective training is critical. Junior leaders must know the boundaries and have full confidence in
their ability to exercise initiative within them without being micro-managed. It is imperative that junior commanders and the chain-of-command build an attitude of mutual trust and confidence. The unit training programme cannot hope to replicate all of the incidents which will occur during the deployment. Nor can it really replicate the responses of the combatants. However it can be the major factor in building mutual confidence and teaching junior leaders to think through problems as part of the larger team.

NEGOTIATION SKILLS

The negotiation training package was developed with a focus on the senior non-commissioned officers and officers of the unit. The three main elements of the original package were an orientation to the rules of engagement and the use of force, an examination of basic procedures for investigations and meetings, and an introduction to different approaches to negotiation. While the first two elements drew on practical experience and military manuals, the third drew largely on theory from the social and behavioral sciences.

ORIENTATION TO USE OF FORCE AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Negotiation skills are an alternative to the use of force in the execution of military duties. Beyond this, they can be a means for achieving objectives over time which cannot be achieved by force, such as changes in the attitudes and behavior of opposing forces. The relationship between negotiation and the use of force makes it logical to link familiarization with rules of engagement to familiarization with alternatives to force.

Rules of engagement are far more fluid and potentially complex now than for traditional peacekeeping missions like Cyprus. The military challenge is to translate the rules into simple instructions for soldiers, which are comprehensible under the diverse circumstances they are likely to face.

Familiarity with internal security operations can be used as a starting point. The first principle is the use of minimum force, and the second is that the right to self defense is never denied. Starting with these principles allows the soldier to apply common sense when faced with new situations.

A military lawyer discussed use of force and rules of engagement with all leaders. It might be useful to do this with all ranks in a battalion group, rather than just with
leaders. Before commencing, the lawyer and commander must be familiar with the rules of engagement currently in use in the theatre. These are used as concrete examples. Against this background it is useful to discuss actions for which a soldier will go to jail, and actions for which he will be exonerated.

Although time was not set aside for this in the 1 RCHA training programme, the discussion could be followed up with staged situations or scenarios read to the assembly. Leaders and individual soldiers would then have to make "shoot/don’t shoot" decisions. The majority of the scenarios in such an exercise should be clear-cut choices with a "correct" answer, preferably (but not necessarily) taken from real incidents in theatre. A small number should present difficult choices, but the commander must be prepared to say clearly what he would expect soldiers to do. This gets everyone thinking in the same way. The commander might wish to discuss his answers with the lawyer first.

Discussing use of force and rules of engagement in "plenary session" is an important step toward common purpose and group cohesion. Like fire discipline for gunners, the rules of engagement are the language of fire control: there is no room for misunderstanding. When the rules of engagement change, they must change explicitly, and by the chain of command. Commanders cannot allow soldiers to assume that rules of engagement have changed because circumstances have changed. Rules of engagement should be reaffirmed at short intervals when the situation is fluid.

"DOCTRINE" -- LECTURE/Demonstration and Checklist

The second element of negotiation training was a guide to investigations and the preparation and conduct of meetings at platoon and company level. These are fairly simple procedures for which clear guidelines exist in the manuals used by Canada, Australia, the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. What is not obvious from the manuals, and must be learned for each mission, is the way in which incidents arise and are routinely resolved. All ranks must understand this.

In stable operations like Cyprus the range of types of incidents is narrow, and the sequence of actions comparatively simple and predictable. Doctrine on handling incidents includes the immediate action to be taken, the investigation of the incident, preparation for and conduct of a meeting, and the resolution of the incident. These elements were all addressed in a single lecture-demonstration lasting about three hours including skits and discussion.
Common incidents include shots, restrictions to movement, new construction, unauthorized moves, the presence of weapons in restricted areas, and so on. Soldiers require a simple aide memoir of appropriate reactions to incidents of this type. Some are forms to be filled out (as for aircraft sightings and shell impacts) while others simply require a soldier to report and observe or call a supervisor.

The aim of an aide memoir is to ensure that the right information is reported quickly, but it should not be so detailed as to stifle the natural instincts of a well-trained soldier. The Canadian experience in Cyprus is that even junior soldiers on patrol can resolve incidents. For example, when an observation post is manned with more troops than permitted by local agreement, the UNFICYP corporal on patrol shouts or gestures until the offending troops depart.

Once an incident has occurred which cannot be resolved by the soldier on patrol or at the observation post, detailed knowledge of the situation and background information is necessary for successful negotiations. This is achieved through investigation. The process of painstaking and neutral investigation involving the belligerents has a calming effect on disputes and inspires confidence in the force. A checklist for the conduct of investigations is attached as Appendix 1. This sequence was illustrated in a skit in which a section commander investigated new construction adjacent to the buffer zone.

The demonstration of an investigation leads logically to preparation for a meeting at which the platoon commander had to negotiate the removal of the new construction. This also serves to reinforce the idea of escalation within the chain of command, making negotiations an orderly and familiar process. There are two reasons for introducing negotiation to all ranks. First, any soldier may require the basic elements, and should be familiar with a simple checklist. More importantly, all soldiers should understand how incidents are resolved at successive levels. This helps them contribute to the process, and dispels some of the frustration resulting from incidents where they may feel powerless.

There are now many examples of checklists for the conduct of negotiations, some in wide circulation and others prepared for specific circumstances. Appendix 2 provides the list and tips used by 1 RCHA and included in the training package reported here. Other useful checklists similar to those in Appendix 2 can be found in the British, Nordic and Canadian manuals.
The training must give soldiers a clear idea of what constitutes a "resolved" incident, so that they understand their aim in approaching each type of incident. For example, a "restriction of movement" incident is resolved when freedom of movement is restored, or when the higher headquarters accepts the restriction. A weapons violation is resolved when the offending party moves or is disarmed. A construction violation is resolved when the new construction is removed or the status quo restored. Many incidents will not have clean resolutions—shootings, shellings, and movement violations are transient and cannot be retracted, but they must be investigated, culprits identified, and protests escalated in order to retain the confidence and respect of both sides. This is part of the process of introducing or reinforcing pride of "self-control" in the belligerents.

The constant process of minute reinforcements to order and stability without the use of violence seems to be the main vehicle for de-escalating tensions, judging from the Cyprus records 1964-68. Soldiers who understand the principle and process of resolving incidents can contribute to the mission in their daily interaction with belligerents. A young officer clearly in control of his platoon can confront a company commander of the opposing forces with the implied question: if you are really in control, how can these violations be occurring?

Armed with an understanding of immediate reaction, the investigation of incidents, negotiations, and the eventual resolution of incidents by escalation if necessary, all ranks are in a position to contribute to the de-escalation of tensions and the preservation of the status quo.

ESTIMATE AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The Peacekeeper's Handbook and the UK field manual refer to a number of different approaches which might be used in the course of peacekeeping operations. They include: mediation, arbitration, conciliation, negotiation, and consultation. Beyond listing them, they do not describe the differences between these approaches or indicate when each might be used. In an attempt to prepare officers for more complex situations, several approaches were examined in a lecture illustrated by skits purporting to show how each might be used in Cyprus.

In the absence of enlightening military sources, academic work from police studies, social sciences, and industrial relations was pressed into service. The search was conditioned by the understanding that UN forces are a neutral

These concepts are almost certainly sound, and have been further explored and developed by Fetherston (1993). However, since 1974 UNFICYP officers have not had a direct mediating role because of the effective separation of the island. The inter-communal meetings described by Harbottle (1979) from his days as UNFICYP Chief of Staff in 1968 have not occurred since partition. The vast majority of incidents since partition have been primarily two-party engagements: the UN and the South or the UN and the North. In practice, unit officers have had only a negotiating role more appropriately addressed by Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991) and perhaps even by how-to books like The Haggler’s Handbook (Koren and Goodman, 1991).

The idea of crisis intervention as practised by police forces in domestic situations seemed to be applicable to some incidents experienced in the past in Cyprus. Accordingly the studies of Bard and Zacker (1976) and Boyd and Bell (1985) were discussed in this part of the training. Again, theory without direct experience was an inaccurate guide. Entry techniques are not applicable to incidents which occur outside in the buffer zone. De-escalation in police work relies heavily on language skills, but tense situations usually occur at the soldier level, and there is little opportunity to "talk down" soldiers who do not share a common language. There are some lessons which may be applicable by analogy, but the analogy would have to be stretched some distance. It would almost certainly be more fruitful to study the real crises which have been experienced by troops in the former Yugoslavia.

The skits which were written in Manitoba to illustrate crisis intervention, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration were entirely fictitious and intended only as illustrations. In retrospect, this portion of the training was rather naive, and probably did more to test the acting ability of the "thespian section" than the intellect of the officers. It proved difficult to translate a superficial understanding of theoretical literature into something digestible or useful for a military audience with no prior experience of negotiations or peacekeeping. It may not be an impossible task, but the nature of the incidents likely to be faced and circumstances of the mission, (particularly the level of incipient violence) need to be very clearly understood before it is attempted. It
would probably be preferable to introduce "advanced" techniques after having been in theatre for a while, when participants could furnish their own examples. Nevertheless, the training introduced some alternatives and pointed to the need to assess a negotiating situation before planning a meeting.

As part of the effort to link training to familiar military problems, the idea of the "estimate" or "military appreciation" for negotiations was introduced. The estimate is simply a disciplined approach to solving military problems—aim, factors, course open, plan. The factors taught for a traditional tactical problem include enemy, ground, own troops, time and space, and so on. For a negotiation situation at platoon or company level, relevant factors might include opposing forces, nature of the dispute or incident, ground, time and space and own troops. The similarities are obvious. As with a tactical estimate, the deductions are the difficult part. At several points in the lectures and exercises the estimate was illustrated in skits.

EXERCISES AND THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS

There were three "exercises" associated with the negotiation training package. These were run in the officers' mess, with all officers and selected senior non-commissioned officers present. They consisted of a series of scripted skits. No attempt was made to have "free play" between "actors" and officers because it was not reasonable to expect Canadian soldiers with no in-theatre experience to extemporize as Greek- or Turkish-Cypriots. Instead, the skits were stopped in progress at certain points, and the presenter then asked questions or led a discussion for a few minutes which highlighted lessons from the lectures, or mistakes being made in the skit (for example deviations or omissions from the checklist).

Since the level of experience was fairly low, and the skits were (in retrospect) not particularly realistic the exercises risked becoming a case of the blind leading the blind. This is not dissimilar to the problem of TEWTs for modern battles—so it should not, in itself, be a reason to abandon the exercise. More contact with currently serving units would enhance realism. In practice, the real value of the exercise process was that officers learned how their superiors reacted to the handling of particular situations, and developed an understanding of what was accepted and what was not. The presenter is a foil for commanders, and it is neither necessary nor desirable for him to have all the
answers. The role of the commander is to shape the discussion to develop a common problem-solving approach to negotiations. This is very useful later on in operations, allowing platoon commanders to take different parts of the line over from each other with minimal disruption in the handling of incidents.

EVALUATION IN THEATRE

After the unit had been in theatre for about three months, leaders were asked to evaluate the negotiation training which they had received prior to deployment. The key results of the survey questionnaire supported the training programme, but indicated that the value of negotiation training varied directly with rank: the higher the rank, the greater the enthusiasm for the package. Both officers and senior non-commissioned officers found the checklist explanations of investigation and preparation for meetings (the second element) the most useful. Non-commissioned officers found the lecture on the estimate and alternative approaches the least useful, while some officers found it useful. In the revised package, this time was reallocated to practical guidelines and providing more examples from experience.

Those who participated in the training recommended the following changes to the package. Many felt that there should be a greater focus at the platoon level, although conceded that it was useful for them to understand the process at company and battalion level. Many also felt that more information on the local culture and recent history of the conflict would have been useful. Video tapes of actual or simulated negotiation sessions involving an experienced contingent would be useful. Finally, more time and attention should be devoted to training those who conduct the training sessions.

COMPARISON WITH TRAINING DIRECTION

The training guidance did not mention negotiation specifically, but its outline shows a clear emphasis on traditional military tasks. Comments suggest that this emphasis was not misplaced. If the package was to be presented again, the quality of the skits and lectures could be improved, and more attention could be devoted to preparing those conducting the training, but the time allocated would not be increased by much, if at all.
In the case of preparing for Yugoslavia, the training direction is more explicit, but the time spent training for negotiations was not appreciably greater. The precis recently prepared by the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) is more succinct than the 1 RCHA lectures, but more expansive than the 1 RCHA aide memoir.

The most important improvement to be made to training is to integrate the skills at the unit level more effectively with those of the force. This is something which cannot be done within a unit; it argues for in-theatre training directed at sector or force level.

INTEGRATING SKILLS

Integrating the military and negotiating skills of a battalion with the force headquarters is probably the most difficult task a commanding officer faces. The difficulties stem from the multi-national environment, lack of doctrine, lack of standardization, and frequently from the absence of an integrated campaign plan.

At force and sector headquarters, it is probably even more difficult for the commanders and staff to devise a coherent campaign plan and direct the multi-national forces at their disposal to execute it. The lack of common doctrine, common terminology and even a common language can sometimes be insurmountable barriers. Simple instructions will often have different meanings to different elements of a multi-national force and the difficulties are compounded by the type of direction headquarters are likely to issue. For example, "maintain the integrity of the buffer zone by patrolling to its full extent" is more open to interpretation than the order, "capture the enemy position at hill 378." Techniques and attitudes will often differ between national contingents and orders from a force headquarters will usually reflect a degree of imprecision resulting from the need to cater to a variety of national characteristics and sensibilities. Personality, especially the personality of the force commander, is also important. Pre-deployment training can do little to prepare unit staff and commanders for this sort of environment.

A reconnaissance by commanders is an essential step in unit preparations. This will provide some familiarity with the operation, allow commanders to meet key people and give the staff an opportunity to review pertinent documents. Except in the case of a newly formed mission, the experiences
of other units is one of the most valuable sources of information. Canadian units consult with units which have recently served in the theatre and acquire copies of their training plans, after-action reports and supporting plans. During the reconnaissance it is essential that the commanding officer gains a clear understanding of the force’s concept of operations and the nature of the tasks which his unit will be expected to carry out.

In an established mission, there will be a number of places and issues which have habitually caused problems. A review of these "hot spots" is valuable to obtain an idea of how past incidents have been handled. Similar incidents can then be replicated in training, based on the historical records and operational files. In general, 1 RCHA was successful in this, but the technique has some limitations. The opposing forces’ reactions are highly unpredictable; a unit will soon find that it is largely dependent on the role-playing ability of its exercise staff. It is also very difficult to duplicate the feedback, dynamics and direction of the Force Headquarters, even for those who have recent experience of its actions.

Ensuring that the unit headquarters, especially the operations staff, are properly exercised is very difficult in the context of unit training. This drives the requirement for a control element which is flexible enough to vary the tempo of training to ensure that the commanding officer meets his objectives. These training problems might be mitigated by the use of computer-based scenarios, perhaps built around the automated after-action reports now being developed by the Canadian Land Force Command.

The entire issue of reaction to incidents and appropriate escalation is probably the crux of the difference between the conduct of peace operations and war-fighting. The soldier’s instinct to apply massive combat power from the outset of an operation must be replaced by policeman’s measured escalation and minimum use of force. Canadian experience with internal security operations is directly transferable to peacekeeping operations. The concepts of escalation, measured response (proportionality) and rule of law are all germane to peacekeeping missions.

Using escalation effectively requires the integration of the unit’s actions with those of the headquarters; it is more art than science. In Cyprus the force employment order and standard operating procedures laid out a sequence of escalation which entailed a series of verbal and written
protests at each level in the chain of command. These culminated in a show of force which might be accompanied by direct action by the UN force. Escalation in the level at which negotiations are held should not be confused with escalation in threats or shows of force, still less with the use of force.

One example which was encountered by 1 RCHA involved the removal of a concertina wire fence which one side had placed in the buffer zone. In this case the unified effort of the unit, the force headquarters and the political advisor to the force commander, escalated to the government in question, led to the removal of the wire without a confrontation. Such coordination was rarely achieved.

At the tactical level traditional peacekeeping operations are largely reactive and each and every situation demands a suitable response which is probably different from any other. This makes "learning how to escalate" a real on-the-job training experience. Here again, the use of simulations in training could help commanders and staffs in the pre-deployment phase. Scenario-based familiarization could, as a minimum, help shape the attitude change required to make the transition from war-fighter to peacekeeper.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the key lessons learned from applying negotiation theory to the practical experience of Cyprus was that negotiation is an add-on skill. Like a physician's bedside manner or a lawyer's courtroom presence, it can make the difference between success and failure. When it succeeds, however, it does so by building on sound professional knowledge and the discipline and cohesion of an effective unit. Training civilians to negotiate in military situations is not the answer to military problems, although reserve officers can bring valuable skills from the civilian world to complement their military experience.

The files in Cyprus give one a frustrating sense of déjà vu. There have been periods of consistently de-escalating tension which suddenly reversed; there have been periods when UNFICYP seized the initiative and succeeded in demilitarizing tense areas, but then failed to follow through with more expansive plans. In conflict resolution terms it reads like the first battle of Cambrai: it started with such promise, achieved great things in a small way, and ran out of steam.
If there are solutions to the protracted social conflicts now raging in so many parts of the world, they lie in political, social and economic change. To contribute effectively to campaigns for peace and stability, soldiers will need negotiating skills, and the professional knowledge to integrate their actions with those of other players in a comprehensive campaign plan.
NOTES


2. This is evident from the cases studied in UNFICYP. It is also implicit in Lieutenant Colonel Waqausa's lecture, "Training on the Techniques of Negotiation: A UNIFIL Training Lecture," although he does not address investigations separately.

3. The *Peacekeeper's Handbook* offers definitions of mediate, negotiate, conciliate and arbitrate (pp. 273-4), but no indication of when or how different approaches might be used. The UK manual refers to negotiation and mediation without drawing a distinction between them. The Canadian manual concentrates on negotiation.

4. Bartos (1968) found that a negotiator's beliefs play a crucial role in negotiation. To the extent that these beliefs are based in his society's culture they are likely to be stable. Lack of cultural knowledge is a barrier to effective training. This should not stop at knowledge of the civilian culture, but should include the military culture with which peacekeepers will have to deal.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1: CHECKLIST FOR THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS

1. Complaint or incident
2. Inform next level of command
   a. incident
   b. proposed response
   c. get permission for special activity (e.g. photos)
3. Task and brief an investigator/investigating team (ensure impartiality)
4. Notify opposing forces of your actions
5. Investigator/team collects evidence
   a. verbal
   b. material
   c. circumstantial
6. Monitor progress of the investigation and inform opposing forces and next level command
7. Prepare a report (verbal or written)
   a. aim of investigation
   b. nature of complaint/incident
   c. date/time of investigation
   d. locations visited
   e. particulars of witnesses
   f. evidence with supporting
      (1) maps
      (2) photos
      (3) sketches
      (4) statements
8. Follow up on investigation
   a. pass to next level and opposing force(s)
   b. permission for special activities, if required
   c. arrange meetings/prepare negotiations if required
APPENDIX 2: CHECKLISTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. RCHA CHECKLIST

1. PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

   a. familiarization with the problem (past and present)
   b. formulate a plan
   c. arrange a meeting (who, what, where, how, and what if...)

2. EXECUTE NEGOTIATIONS

   a. opening the talks (salutations, small talk, assess mood, etc.)
   b. listen to one side
   c. listen to other side
   d. get agreement on facts or record differences
   e. state your understanding of the cases presented by each side
   f. adjourn if necessary to investigate
   g. introduce solutions from either side or from PK

       (1) reach an agreement (always subject to confirmation), or
       (2) agree on facts, or
       (3) agree on next step, or
       (4) agree on "parallel undertakings," or
       (5) indicate intent to escalate

   h. close meeting by restating exactly what has been agreed

3. FOLLOW-UP ON NEGOTIATIONS

   a. report and record
   b. confirm with higher authorities
   c. verify
APPENDIX 2: CHECKLISTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS
(continued)

II. TIPS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

1. Ensure incidents/complaints are handled properly

2. Preparations for negotiation.
   a. facts
   b. background
   c. rules and SOPs
   d. understand positions
   e. negotiate at the right level

3. Conduct of negotiations.
   a. be fair
   b. Security - do not pass information from one side to the other
   c. honesty - never lie or attempt to deceive
   d. caution - don’t accept statements at face value
   e. no guarantees - never offer guarantees
   f. face-saving - leave counterpart a way out
   g. solidarity - don’t tolerate criticism of UN or opposing forces
   h. terminology - use the right language
   i. meticulous work - have all the facts before a meeting; history is important
   j. dispassionate - don’t allow counterparts to upset you with personal attacks
   k. Translation - caution with translators; use the delay
   l. Liaison and communications - use and develop the existing system to be more responsive

4. Follow up on negotiations.
   a. BF deadlines and check
   b. personal attention
   c. verification
   d. check both sides
CULTURAL AWARENESS AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS
IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Dana P. Eyre
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

I'd like to begin my talk with a story which I frequently use to illustrate need for cultural awareness and negotiation training. After the story, however, I'd like to explore in greater depth our ideas about the need for training in cultural awareness and negotiation skills because there isn't a lot of agreement about the need for these skills. The story recounts the experience of one platoon sergeant on one day in Somalia. Operating at a checkpoint near Chismayu, the platoon had prepared to handle 5-6 cars at a time. After disturbances in town, however, a large group of cars (estimated at 125) approached the checkpoint and stopped. Initially, the checkpoint continued with its mission, searching vehicles and seizing weapons. However, a leader of the group approached the platoon sergeant and threatened to begin shooting if the search continued. The platoon sergeant was caught between the need to follow his orders and the possibility of an incident with a large number of military and civilian casualties. When asked what he did, he responded "I talked, (pause) and I talked, and I talked, and I talked, and I talked, and I talked some more. I became a diplomat."

In doing my research, I should have stopped talking to people when I reached this platoon sergeant. I could have used this story as a great example of why we need to do training in cultural awareness and negotiation skills. Using this story as an all purpose example, it would have been easy to then lay out a series of lessons plans. Unfortunately, I went on to talk with over 125 soldiers, mostly US, along with a scattering of British, Canadian, Italian, Israeli, Venezuelan and Senegalese soldiers, and a few Marines, about Peace Operations. I asked them about role of political, economic, and cultural awareness; about negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills; and about civil affairs and psychological operations. In short, I tried to explore with them the role of "soft skills" in Peace Operations, and their perceived need for training in this admittedly broad area. And I found that I started to get all sorts of answers. The world, I would suggest, is a much easier place to understand if you only look at one experience, or at one single example.
However, out of the 125 interviews a pattern started to emerge. In fact, I found that I got two types of answers to questions about the importance of "soft skills." The first was "We don't need the soft skills, focus on traditional military skills" and the second was "Yes, we need them, they are absolutely critical and we need to train on them." If I followed up the second answer, with the question "What sort of training would be useful?" I again found another pattern of answers. The first was "That's a really good question, I don't know but I know I need to know more about this stuff, I just didn't feel I understood what I should know" (that is, they repeated the statement that soft skills are critical, but they had difficulty describing what specific skills or knowledge were important) or they said something like "Knowing about the clans in Somalia was really useful" (that is, they were able to identify some specific knowledge that was useful in their particular experience, but not able to generalize about the issue in a way useful for preparing training for future deployments).

Now, I admit that I've caricatured these answers, but not very much. I want to emphasize that these were smart people that I talked to, they were thinking about their answers, and most of my respondents had actively reflected on their experiences in peace operations before my interview. I want to suggest, therefore, that this is a significant pattern of answers and we need to take it seriously. It is not the pattern of answers that one would get if one asked about some other aspect of their professional knowledge, for example, the importance of the ability to adjust artillery fire, or to write an operations order. Here, we would expect to get much more uniform answers. We should be prompted to ask why do we get this pattern? We can't teach soft skills if we can't assess the need or make reasonable decisions about what to teach, to whom, and how much.

Before assessing the need for soft skills, I want to make three observations about the state of the world which might help us understand this pattern of answers. First, the Army is struggling to adapt to a significantly changed environment; the only quote I can work into any talk I give is Nora Kinzer Stewart's 1990 remark that "from this point forward everything needs to be written in pencil." The continuing evolution of peace operations doctrine is no exception. The adaptation of the Army to this new world is particularly difficult because the nature of the threat has both changed and broadened. We face the continued existence of "traditional threats" (the clearest example being North Korea) along with the proliferation of "weak threats" which are not able to directly
challenge traditional interests but who indirectly challenge stability and order in regions of U.S. concern. I would offer that, to some degree, variation in perception of the importance of peace operations, and correspondingly perceptions of the importance of "soft skills" varies with political perspective and threat perceptions in the post-Cold War world. To the degree one focuses on the general threat posed by instability and disorder (as laid out in arguments developed by analysts such as Donald Snow in Distant Thunder and Robert Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy" in The Atlantic, February, 1994) one emphasizes the importance of peace operations and correspondingly sees increased need for "soft skills". To the degree one concentrates on traditional threats one discounts the need for these skills. It is important to note that this disagreement is not one caused by something as simple as partisan politics. The world presents us with a significantly broadened threat array and reasonable observers can disagree about the relative importance of different challenges.

Second, despite the superficial unity suggested in use of the umbrella term "peace operations," these operations cover a wide range of tactical, operational, and strategic terrain, conceptually everything from Canadian tundra to the deserts and jungles of Mexico. The need for soft skills varies with the nature of the mission, and an individual's assessment of need for soft skills varies with that individual's experience with peace operations. The recognition of this commonplace truth is obscured by the nearly terminal terminological confusion that wraps discussions of operations other than war in a dense conceptual fog. None the less, a reasonably simple relationship can be asserted: in war, you can be as impolite as you want (even with your allies if you have enough guns) and talking with people is peripheral to success. In peacekeeping, negotiation skills and understanding are important and useful because they are part of the tool kit you use to sustain an agreement. In peace enforcement, however, where the primary purpose of the politico-military effort is to build an agreement, they are critical.

Finally, and most importantly, the Army doesn't yet have a doctrine which incorporates the role of soft skills in mission accomplishment. Although the developing FM 100-23 touches on these issues it only starts to address them. We know we need to know how to do a call for fire because we have a doctrine which tells us how to use artillery and what artillery can do for us in an effort to accomplish the mission. That doctrinal understanding is not in place for peace enforcement and for "soft skills." Observers disagree
about the importance of soft skills because they do not have a framework for understanding how to employ these skills in the accomplishment of peace enforcement missions.

Together, these three factors make it very difficult to come to agreement about the need for training in "soft skills." I want to suggest, however, that we do in fact need to pay attention to these skills and I want spend the next several minutes sketching out a framework which will let us understand why and when "soft skills" are important. I argue that to understand the importance of these skills for the Army, we must first understand the dynamics of the conflicts that we face in contemporary peace enforcement efforts. Understanding the importance of soft skills is nothing more than an extension of a very traditional military insight: when the nature of the enemy, and the political goals sought change, the nature of the military tools employed must change.

That the military conflict in Somalia doesn't look like a Soviet tank army coming through Fulda is a statement of such obvious truth that it is rarely stated. Yet the truth of the statement doesn't mean that it is always apparent or remembered. The Soviet threat was a "strong threat"--that is, it is a threat directly able to challenge the primary safety and security of the United States. Somalia was at the other end of the continuum; it posed a "weak threat"--a threat only able to very indirectly challenge U.S. interests. Yet the label "weak threat" is something of a misnomer. These threats are frequently militarily weak but politically highly charged and carry with them the seeds of long term regional instability. Ethnic strife is a prime example of this challenge. However, ethnic conflict isn't the only, or potentially even the primary, long term "weak threat." More significant is the growth in social and economic challenges to states and societies. While the particulars for any given country or region vary (Chiapas isn't Peru, and neither is southern Africa), the general model of the circumstances which generate "weak threats" is clear--environmental challenges (e.g., that posed by decertification, agricultural collapse, or flooding); social instability (e.g., created by rapid urbanization, population growth, AIDS, or ethnic strife); economic difficulties (through worldwide or regional recessions, e.g., the drop in coffee prices); and political incompetence or corruption lead to situations in which the continued stable existence of numerous nations and societies is at doubt. Sometimes "weak threats" feature "coherent" forces (that is, traditionally organized military forces), sometimes they do not, resembling war less than large scale banditry and the breakdown of order. In either case, the
The political goals pursued in the face of these threats are correspondingly different. The primary U.S. goal is frequently not "victory" in the traditional sense of vanquishing an enemy, but the restoration of a modestly stable social and political order. The traditional Clausewitzian description of the two types of war aims--"either to destroy the enemy...or else to prescribe peace terms to him"--do not describe the goals sought in peace enforcement. The political goals sought in a peace enforcement operation can be very real and very clear, but they are frequently harder to translate into specific military objectives and it may be significantly tougher to find a "center of gravity" to give focus to an operation. The operational goals of peace enforcement missions may be more diffuse and correspondingly more difficult to translate into a campaign plan (this should not be a surprise to those who have read Clausewitz, who pointed out the less "total" a war, the more difficulty involved in aligning military objectives with political ends).

These difficulties in translating political goals into military objectives are compounded by the fact that military force, while still important, may not be the primary means for the pursuit of political goals. In traditional war, other things being equal, the greater the use of force, the greater the chance of accomplishing the political goal of vanquishing the enemy. In peace operations, every individual killed is potentially a step away from a peaceful solution. Thus, in peace enforcement operations, force is still an important, and may indeed be a critical, tool, but it is by itself ultimately inadequate for the achievement of national aims. The key to success in peace enforcement lies in the management of meaning—the meaning & interpretation of the operation (both locally and internationally) are the critical to ultimate accomplishment of mission. UNTAC (the UN operation in Cambodia) worked, to at least a modest degree, in spite of Khmer Rouge resistance, because of the UN information campaign. Cambodia isn’t solved, but there is the promise of a solution, the foundation of a long term resolution, that was put in place through an integrated civil affairs/psyop/security campaign. Success in that campaign was achieved through the UN’s ability to convince the Cambodian people that the election would be held and that their participation mattered. The key to success in "complex emergencies" (to use an apt bit of U.N. jargon) lies as much in story telling as in military force. This inescapable reality requires that the managers of force must understand a great deal more about the
political and social situation, and about how force complements, or contradicts, the pursuit of national goals by non-military means, than in traditional conflicts.

I want to argue that, because of these dynamics, the critical need for the understanding of "soft skills" is not found at the individual soldier level, or even at the individual leader level (though they are important there), but at the organizational level, in doctrine. Training individual soldiers how not to offend the local populace, or training a platoon sergeant how to negotiate effectively, without understanding how cultural and political dynamics must shape the conduct of Peace Operations, is like putting frosting on a cardboard cake. Peace enforcement operations require that traditional military skills be integrated with non-traditional "soft skills" in ways we are not yet comfortable with. As an example of this tight mutual dependency, I would like to briefly recount some of the details of our operations in Northern Iraq (this account is drawn from interviews with COL John Abizaid, who commanded the unit portrayed). Although not thought of as a "peace operation" these operations do serve to illustrate the complex relationship between traditional and non-traditional military skills.

Third Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry Regiment arrived in Iraq on 26 April, 1991; after conducting a variety of operations in initial sector, including the conduct of mounted patrols, the battalion was tasked to move east to expand the coalition controlled sector. During this period, elements of the battalion ran into an Iraqi minefield, while other elements pushed Iraqi elements out of an Iraqi town after a long standoff. Later, in early May, the battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force, discovered a major withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and moved rapidly to prevent clashes between Iraqi and Kurdish forces. From 6-12 May, the battalion found itself dug in near the town of Dahok, in close contact with Iraqi forces. Elements of the battalion conducted patrols, escorted convoys, and served as the JTF air assault reserve. During early May, the operations conducted by the battalion were for the most part standard infantry missions (movement to contact, defense, conducting patrolling operations) but with significant differences in some of the details, including restrictions on the use of force imposed through rules of engagement. These operations were similar enough to standard operations that the Battalion Commander assessed the battalion as trained in six of the battalions major tasks at the conclusion of this period. This experience illustrates both the importance of standard military skills in nontraditional
missions and the need for flexibility and adaptation to the special demands of nontraditional missions.

After the security zone was stabilized, the character of the battalion operations changed. Operations in early May were dynamic, the battalion found itself moving over large distances and reacting to a fluid and rapidly changing situation. During this second period, the battalion found itself in static operations. Again, the operations were grounded in standard military missions, but with more modifications and unexpected challenges. The battalion set up checkpoints to control and search traffic, conducted patrols, and participated in a variety of security and "show the flag" missions. Leaders in these missions faced situations including an Iraqi nuclear scientist who wanted to defect, Kurdish guerrillas who wanted to pass through to attack Iraqis, Iraqi "civil authorities" who wanted to arrest a Kurd, a mother with a dying child, and roving reporters in search of stories. As Kurds moved down out of mountains the battalion conducted a variety of missions which may be descriptively labeled as "colonial police" missions. For example, members of the battalion found themselves in villages mediating disputes between Kurdish factions and between Kurds and other Iraqi citizens, coordinating for civil affairs support, and even mediating between Kurdish factions and a small number of Iraqi troops authorized to remain in the security zone to protect a palace belonging to Saddam Hussein. This period illustrates, again, the need for a highly trained unit, but also the way in which non-traditional missions call upon a wide variety of non-traditional knowledge and skills.

I use this operation because it illustrates a critical point about the dynamic nature of peace operations. This operation evolved over time, going from a situation very much like war, to one very different from war. The stories could, however, be drawn from almost any "non-traditional" mission we have participated in the past few years. I should point out, by the way, that these aren't new lessons, they are the same lessons we learned in the counterinsurgency battle in Vietnam. Traditional military operations and "soft skills" operations must be integrated if they both are to succeed, and successful integration requires understanding of the social, political, economic, and military dynamics of the conflict.

Let me at this point say three things. First, I admire the American soldier for his/her amazing ability to think on their feet, to understand complex situations and to adapt to almost any challenge. Second, in large part because of this ability, it is possible to participate in peace operations
without prior preparation. Finally, however, I would argue that it is both unfair to soldiers, and it substantially reduces the possibility of successfully accomplishing these missions to participate in these missions without understanding and preparing for them.

The first problem in preparation for peace operations is building leader understanding. In the case of operations in northern Iraq, the battalion commander was, by mere accident, a qualified Middle Eastern foreign area officer, spoke Arabic, and had served in UNTSO. Clearly, such an ideal match will not always be possible, however, we must begin to build understanding of peace operations in our leaders. Army leaders are, for the most part through idiosyncratic individual effort, becoming aware of the existence of operations other than war. With individual exceptions, however, the leaders I interviewed had difficulty discussing the dynamics of these operations, the role of force in them, the similarities and differences between conventional and non-traditional operations, the problem of escalation, the role of civil affairs and psychological operations, or the principals of these operations. Again, this is not a reflection of the quality of the officers involved, but rather due to the lack of an available framework for analysis. It is very difficult to make the connection between such diverse considerations as the pattern of security operations, the sighting of a refugee resettlement area, and the progress of political negotiations without having had some prior doctrinal framework.

The absence of doctrine for nontraditional missions was noted in several interviews, by individuals at various levels in the chain of command from squad leader through senior officer. Interviewees commonly remarked on the need to "think on their feet" or noted that most of their activities were "ad hoc" and unguided by anything other than their "common sense." One company grade officer said "well, when I thought about it I used my high school civics course as a guide." Although any activity never before engaged in is likely to prompt some remarks of this sort, it is likely that the absence of doctrine was a significant factor in these perceptions. Several respondents explicitly compared the situation they found in non-traditional missions to those they experienced in more traditional missions, including Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and noted more confusion or uncertainty in the non-traditional setting.

A second example of the lack of understanding of nonstate war was the inability of informants to discuss how variations
in the "political & social battlefield" (that is, in the culture and society of the particular population the force is working with) should translate into variations in the activities of the tactical commander. For conventional war, a prepared commander is able to understand the impact of variations in battlefield conditions (enemy forces, weather, terrain) and translate them into actions for his own forces. Thus, an infantry company commander knows how operations against a conventional dismounted force in a wooded area would be different from operations against a mounted force in open terrain. In contrast, although informants acknowledge that such knowledge was critical, they were for the most part unable to respond to the question "How should the operations you conducted in Somalia be conducted in a different cultural environment, say in Panama?" The vast majority of informants asked this question acknowledged both the importance of the question and their lack of a framework to use in answering it.

To summarize, the most pressing need is for a doctrinal framework which will allow commanders to understand the dynamics of the conflicts they face, and to understand how military force should be employed to accomplish political ends in these conflicts. This framework must capture the sociopolitical nature of peace support operations, and it must give commanders the ability to understand the battlefield and to anticipate the impact of alternative courses of action on mission accomplishment. This doctrine must be grounded in both the classic literatures of military doctrine (military history and art) and the far less familiar literatures of sociology and psychology (including areas such as conflict resolution, ethnicity and identity), along with political science and international relations. Ideally, leaders must be as comfortable with discussions of the dynamics of ethnic and religious conflict as they are with discussions of the tradeoffs involved in the use of artillery support in preparation for the attack. Realistically, we can not achieve this end. We must, however, make leaders at least aware that issues such as the dynamics of ethnic and identity based conflict are central to the conduct of peace support operations. Leaders must have a background in the insights offered by the sociological and social-psychological literatures on ethnicity, identity formation and activation, group formation and cohesion, along with an understanding of political sociology, peace studies and conflict resolution, and political science and international relations. No academic department in the United States would ever think of giving a faculty member this assignment, let alone an undergraduate. Yet the platoon leader who is the sole United States representative in a Somali town faces situations which
draw on all of these areas, as does a battalion commander who finds himself negotiating with an Iraqi Colonel one day and Kurdish guerrillas the next.

The Army must therefore work to develop doctrinal frameworks for intelligence preparation of the social, political, economic, and military battlefield [IP(SPE)B]. Without such a framework individuals can not cope with the complex requirements of the peace operations battlefield. Discussions of peace support operations by observers frequently feature calls for greater training in "cultural awareness" but such outside observers are rarely able to detail the actual substance of this awareness or to give such a framework. Leaders who have participated in such operations also strongly identified the need for more cultural knowledge. However, their sense of what constituted useful cultural knowledge was also undeveloped. They frequently were able to identify one or two bits of knowledge which they found particularly useful in their activities, but, not surprisingly, they didn't know what they didn't know. I don't have time to lay out such a framework here. However two general guides for the dissemination of cultural knowledge did ring out from my interviews.

First, once a general IP(SPE)B framework for understanding cultural knowledge is in place, knowledge given to tactical and operational leaders must be both specific and timely. In the course of this project, two officers with prior knowledge of Somali culture were interviewed, one had served in Somalia as a logistics officer, the other had some background in college on Islamic culture and Africa. Both of these officers commented on the relatively uselessness of general knowledge of "Islamic culture" for understanding events in Somalia. While general knowledge is foundation and framework for specific knowledge, these comments underscore the importance of knowledge focused on the specific situation faced in the operation. Background information (including history) must be relatively limited and clearly linked to understanding the current situation. Recognizing, if not articulating, that the population was key in nontraditional operations, they wanted information on the society they were operating in. In Somalia, the most frequently requested knowledge concerned the clan structure of society. Generalizing a bit, what is needed is a population "topographical map." That is, information which gives the commander a sense of the organization and flow of society. This information would include basics on the economic system and the patterns of daily life (e.g., What do most people do to sustain themselves? What are the market patterns in the
society?); the governance and stratification structures, both formal and informal (e.g., official governmental structures, and the informal but very real structures such as the village elder system) along with the boundaries of these elements; and patterns of religious, family, and cultural life (e.g., the systems of sect, tribe, clan which give individuals their identity and sense of belonging, and make sense of the world for members).

In addition to this basic information on population patterns, informants recognized the importance of information on typical patterns of communication, conflict and conciliation. One senior officer remarked on the importance of knowledge of the Somali system of retribution and compensation. (I believe he was referring to the system known as dha.) He noted that under this system, the payment of appropriate compensation for a death to the deceased's clan eliminated the duty of retribution by that group. Under this system, "enemies" can be relatively quickly converted to allies by the appropriate payment. Clans did not have permanent alliances or enemies, but shifting ones depending on the state of this system. The senior officer noted that, after he found out about this system (well into his tour in Somalia), the shifting alliance patterns he saw became, if not predictable, at least more comprehensible. While I can not vouch for the accuracy of this officer's portrayal of the system, it is clear that knowledge of basic systems of communication, conflict and conciliation is vital to successful nontraditional operations.

In terms of skill development, we must recognize that, while it is not possible to make a squad leader (or even a brigade commander) into a skilled negotiator, we can significantly improve their abilities with relatively modest training requirements. First, they can expose participants to a wide range of these activities. Although participants did not clearly articulate the difference, the activities they participated in included both negotiation efforts (where they were an interested party, seeking a particularly goal) and mediation efforts (where they were a third party, without a direct interest in the outcome, seeking only to insure that the other parties involved arrived at a solution that was stable and satisfactory). It goes without saying that ones strategy and efforts in each of these circumstances are different. Second, training can give leaders a basic list of tactics, techniques and procedures for negotiation and mediation. For example, one astute senior leader noted that he always had his executive officer negotiate for him. The executive officer was senior enough to impress the other
parties, but could also claim, with some justification, that he could not make final decisions. This is a useful technique, and it worked in this occasion, but it clearly isn’t an all purpose solution. We need to give leaders a basic set of "tactics" that they can employ in negotiations; without a basic understanding of negotiation and mediation processes, and a set of basic techniques for them, it is difficult for leaders to think "tactically" about negotiations and to think ahead of other participants. Third, it is important that training for negotiation and mediation also take into account the special circumstances of these activities in non-traditional missions. Leaders need to be made aware of how the larger context of negotiations can affect the negotiating process. Most business-oriented training in these areas assumes a cultural and political context that may not be applicable in nontraditional missions. Leaders need to understand the basic process of negotiation and mediation, and they need to be made aware of how this process can be different in different cultural and political environments. Negotiations between U.S. business representatives, or between American lawyers, are likely different from negotiations between Afghan guerrilla leaders, and French, U.S. and Pakistani military officers.

Discussions of peacekeeping and peacemaking frequently feature calls for "more language training." These discussions are also notable for their lack of specific requirements. That we need more skilled linguists is a truism. Two unasked questions, however, are 1) How can we best train native speakers to serve as linguists? and 2) How can we best provide "nonlinguists" with minimal, but functional, language skills? Several interview respondents noted difficulties in employing newly hired native linguists because of the linguists lack of understanding of military terms and ways. These problems suggest the need for a "military as a second language" program to rapidly train native speakers in military terms, culture, and the role of the translator/linguist. The second question, how much language training do soldiers and junior leaders need in order to effectively execute peacekeeping missions? has also not been systematically addressed. We have traditionally tried to give a minimal language skill to soldiers through the mass distribution of language cards and tapes. Such efforts occasionally are successful: the most interesting comments I heard in this area were from platoon leaders who remarked on the utility of soldiers in their units who were able to rapidly pick up essential bits & pieces of the language. This suggests the possibility of fundamentally different approach to language for non-linguists. Is it possible to identify these soldiers on entry (through, for
example, a "mini-Defense Language Aptitude Test" given on entry) and then provide more focused pre-deployment language training, e.g., through a CD-ROM computer system?

I've rushed through the some of the details of a thirty plus page paper but in summary I want to emphasize one point. Peace operations are military operations. They may be operations in a different environment, seeking different goals, and using additional tools, than the modern Army is accustomed to, but they are still military operations. There is no doubt that adapting to their unique needs, while retaining the capability to conduct traditional operations, is a challenge. Discussions of this difficult balance tend to either concentrate on the maintenance of traditional skills, or call for the establishment of "blue helmet" dedicated forces. Neither extreme solution meets the nations needs. While most of the skills, indeed perhaps 90 percent of the skills, required for peace operations are already in the training schedule of the average infantry battalion, the 10 percent difference is significant. A 10 percent difference in skill is the difference between a triple-A ball player and a major leaguer. We need to focus attention on that 10%, and to develop the new skills and understandings, so that the Army can meet the demands of the nation whatever they may be.
FAMILY SUPPORT ISSUES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Mady Wechsler Segal
Department of Sociology
University of Maryland

OVERVIEW

Research and policy attention to Army families has increased dramatically in the past 15 years. As a result, we know a great deal more about the relationship between families issues and organizational issues. We also have enough evidence on which to base policy decisions with respect to many issues.

The U.S. Army has not had extensive experience with large-scale peace operations until recently, and not much research has explicitly addressed family issues in such operations. But we know enough to begin to specify the similarities and differences between peace operations and other military missions in their effects on families. We can also anticipate the consequences for Army family policy. Additionally, we can analyze the differences among different types of peace operations in their implications for family issues.

My goal in this paper is to propose a conceptual framework for analysis and to fill in some of the components from what we know. This knowledge comes from research on military (including Army) families generally, as well as research conducted specifically on families of soldiers on peacekeeping duty. (References given here are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.) More of the pieces of the picture can be added as there is more experience with peace operations. This framework is intended to serve as a basis for analyzing the results of future experiences with peace operations and of research on family processes related to those operations.

Many of the important family issues for peace operations are related to the family separations that deployment brings. For some types of peace operations, family reactions to both separation and reunion, as well as the types of social and organizational support they need, will resemble what families experience when their loved one is away on training missions or for relatively routine unaccompanied tours. Other peace operations will be experienced by families as more similar to wartime deployment and will, therefore, require different organizational policies, programs, and practices. Some family experiences are common to both types of situations; others will be unique to the latter.
This analysis is preliminary. Further work is needed to refine the framework. For example, are the categories useful? Have important issues been omitted? Is the focus on issues that are less important?

The conceptual framework contains six major types of family issues and divides peace operations into six categories (see the matrix presented in the Figure). Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive.

FAMILY ISSUES

Here are the family issues that are important to analyze:

1. The social construction of the mission;
2. The degree of concern for the safety of the service member;
3. The family’s need for information regarding the well-being of the service member;
4. Degree of uncertainty about the service member’s departure and return;
5. The need for and nature of communication between the service member and family members (to include parents, spouse, and children);
6. Separation and reunion processes; these include preparation for the separation, changes in the service member and family members during the separation, problems encountered during the separation, and readjustment following reunion.

TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

For purposes of this analysis, I have tentatively divided peace operations into 6 categories. One dimension differentiating them is degree of danger. However, there are other bases of differentiation, and no order is implied in this list.

a. "Routine peacekeeping" missions are those that have become relatively routinized and that have a history of being relatively safe. Included here is the mission to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Issue</th>
<th>Routine peacekeeping</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>New peacekeeping</th>
<th>Peace enforcement</th>
<th>Pure humanitarian</th>
<th>Dangerous humanitarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social construction of the mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for service member's safety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for information about service member's well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about service member's departure and return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication between service member and family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation and reunion processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. "Observation" missions require service members merely to observe and report what they see, but not to take action. The actions to be observed include violations of agreements regarding troop movement, the firing of weapons, etc. These missions may be routine missions or new missions, depending on the circumstances. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group would be such a mission.

c. "New peacekeeping" missions are those that at least appear to have the support of previously antagonistic sides. The first Sinai MFO mission would be an example of this type.

d. "Peace enforcement" involves enforcing a peace accord or peace initiative where the likelihood of danger is high because there is at least one armed force that is resisting the peace or the settlement. An example is the MNF (Multi-National Force) in Lebanon (after the massacres at Sabra and Shatila).

e. "Pure humanitarian" operations are those that have a low likelihood of danger. This would include stateside missions involving disaster relief, such as in Miami after hurricane Andrew.

f. "Dangerous humanitarian" missions are those relief operations that have a high likelihood of danger because there is at least one armed force that will resist the efforts. The recent mission in Somalia is a vivid example.

FAMILY ISSUES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

For each of the 6 family issues, let us consider how they apply to the different peace operations. I will focus on some of the ways in which peace operations may contrast with each other with regard to family issues.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSION

Many reactions of service members and their families are a function of their definition of the operation, including families’ understanding of the goals of the mission (Segal and Segal, 1993; Segal, Segal, and Eyre, 1992). The degree to which they support policy decisions to send their loved ones away depends upon certain conditions with regard to the mission. Very important is their sense of the mission’s legitimacy and its importance - weighed against the degree of danger involved. Families judge their sacrifices in reference to their social construction of the mission.
In general, I would expect that Army families would be more supportive of deployment for pure humanitarian missions than for dangerous humanitarian missions. Further, if soldiers deployed for what was at least initially defined as a pure humanitarian mission are fired upon (and some are wounded or killed), then families are likely to withdraw their affective support for the mission. Similar withdrawal of support for our troop involvement can occur with new peacekeeping missions that evolve into peace enforcement (as happened in Lebanon). This attitude change occurs partly because of the increased danger to the service member, but it is not the absolute level of danger that determines the support. Rather, support is withdrawn when there is a violation of families' construction of the mission. This happens, for example, when there is a perception that our troops are there to help a group (e.g., the Somalis); then firing on American service members by any members of that group indicates to families that they do not want us there and we should withdraw.

Social construction of the mission is related to stages in a mission. Many missions have uncertainty at first and then get more routinized so that families (and service members too of course) understand the mission better. Such routinization may increase or decrease the perceived legitimacy of the mission, depending on the degree of perceived fit between the mission and the units being sent to perform it.

DEGREE OF CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE SERVICE MEMBER

The degree to which family members are worried about the safety of their loved one has a major impact on their experiences during any mission deployment (Bell, 1990; Lewis, 1984; Rosen, 1991; Segal and Harris, 1993; Teitelbaum, 1991; USAREUR, ODCSPEP, 1991; Westhuis, Rosen, and Teitelbaum, 1991). The highest risk peace operations are Peace Enforcement and Dangerous Humanitarian missions. The lowest risks are encountered in Routine Peacekeeping (which should resemble routine unaccompanied tours). New Peacekeeping is in the middle; there is uncertainty, and therefore concern, until the mission is established and then it becomes either high or low risk. The degree of concern about risk for Observation and Pure Humanitarian missions depends on the circumstances. For example, some disaster relief (such as in a flood) places troops in the disaster, while other missions involve providing aid after the disaster - and its danger - has dissipated (such as providing residents with tents as temporary shelters after a hurricane).
The same mission can change over time in the degree of danger. When a peacekeeping mission is new, there is a great deal of uncertainty. If the mission is successful and becomes routinized, then concern will decrease. Such has been the case with the Sinai MFO mission (although the Gander crash served to keep families of soldiers subsequently deployed to the Sinai from being sanguine about the mission) (Segal and Segal, 1993).

FAMILY'S NEED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT SERVICE MEMBER'S WELL-BEING

Families' need for information about the service member's well-being is a direct function of the risk associated with the mission: the greater the concern, the more family members will want up-to-date and accurate information on the whereabouts and day-to-day activities of soldiers (Bell, 1991; CFSC, 1991; Lewis, 1984). But the need for information is also affected by the nature of service members' living conditions (Westhuis, Rosen, and Teitelbaum, 1991). For example, there may be low likelihood of armed confrontation in Pure Humanitarian missions, but service members may still be experiencing hardships - and even the threat of disease.

In the absence of direct (and fast) means for soldiers to communicate to their families (or where such means are expensive) the organization must take responsibility for keeping families informed. Such action will reassure both service members and their families.

Peace enforcement missions are likely to involve young combat soldiers. Almost all of them will have parents worried about them. These parents are likely to be more geographically dispersed than spouses and children of soldiers, making communication from the organization more difficult.

One issue that arises concerns the categories of people who should be kept informed. Relationships that are not legally defined as "family" may be just as important to service members (and the attitudes of these persons toward the organization are just as important in retaining soldiers) (Orthner, Bowen, Zimmermann, and Short, 1992). The most direct way to deal with this issue is to ask service members to specify who should be kept informed.
DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT SERVICE MEMBER’S DEPARTURE AND RETURN

The difficulties associated with family separations and reunions are exacerbated by uncertainties about the timing of troop movement (Westhuis, Rosen, and Teitelbaum, 1991). Obviously, some missions do not allow for advance notice and clearly make family adjustment more problematic. But even Routine Peacekeeping can cause greater family stress if departure or return dates are uncertain - or perhaps even worse, announced and then changed. It is important for the organization to provide as much predictability of scheduling to service members and their families as possible within the constraints of mission readiness and success.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SERVICE MEMBER AND FAMILY

There is variation among missions in the degree to which families are dependent on the military organization to provide information - or at least to support the mechanisms by which families communicate. We know from previous experience and research that if service members have commercial means of communication (especially telephones) at their disposal, then they will use them (Applewhite and Segal, 1990; Ender, 1992; Gravino, 1989; Segal and Segal, 1993). We also know that high use of these means has created financial difficulties for families. The organization has a responsibility to know about available means of communication and their relative advantages and disadvantages (including costs) and to inform soldiers and their families of these.

Communication is important for the maintenance of family relationships (Berger and Kellner, 1964; Segal, Kammeyer, and Vuozzo, 1987). It has sometimes been identified as among the primary concerns for soldiers on peacekeeping duty (Gifford, 1994; Segal and Segal, 1993). The organization has to weigh this importance against the potential negative effects of the communication of bad news or of family conflicts during communication.

There are also circumstances where it is especially important for the organization to provide service members with information from home, such as when a wife is pregnant or a family member is ill. One way to maintain service member and family morale, as well as family support for the military, is to provide special means of communication when such family situations exist.

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I recommend that there be support of communication, to include mail, telephone, videotapes, and electronic mail. But it is also important for leaders to be aware of particular ongoing family problems and to have trained counselors available following communication in such families.

SEPARATION AND REUNION PROCESSES

Almost all military families find separations stressful, to a greater or lesser extent depending on many of the family's circumstances (Coolbaugh and Rosenthal, 1992; Schumm, Bell, and Tran, 1994; Segal, 1986, 1989; Segal and Harris, 1993. The most problems are experienced by families with fewer resources, including financial resources, social support, and personal experiences that serve to bolster coping.

Different types of peace operations are likely to involve different numbers and categories of military personnel. Therefore, we may be able to anticipate the different family issues that arise during separation and reunion, as well as the kinds of support the organization will need to provide. For example, humanitarian missions are likely to involve substantial numbers of medical personnel, who tend to be older and more likely to have families, increasing the sheer numbers of spouses and children left behind. Further, medical units (and other support units) have relatively high proportions of military women. Women are less likely to have families than their male peers (Schumm, Bell, and Tran, 1992a). However, those with families are more likely to be single parents or members of dual service couples (Schumm, Bell, and Tran, 1992a). There is little systematic information on how the husbands of female soldiers have fared while their wives are deployed (Segal and Harris, 1993).

To the extent that a peace operation involves young soldiers with spouses and/or children, the organization will need to provide more support to such families than for the families of older, more experienced service members (Orthner and Bowen, 1990). These soldiers' spouses and children will need certain kinds of support from the organization, especially if they are geographically separated from their extended families, such as help with financial planning and child care (the child care is to relieve some of the stress young parents have in caring for children on their own and will reduce the risk of child abuse).

Separations that involve the deployment of large units from one geographic area will raise different family issues
from those involving small numbers of personnel or service members from more geographically dispersed locales. Observation missions are more likely to involve small numbers of more senior personnel than Peace Enforcement missions.

One of the experiences common to many family separations is that each of the family members experiences some changes during the separation and there are adjustments necessary following reunion (Schumm, Bell, and Tran, 1994; Segal, Kammeyer, and Vuozzo, 1987; Segal and Segal, 1993). The nature of these changes and the required adjustments vary both by the personal characteristics of both spouses and by the nature of the mission. Organizational supports should be designed to meet the differential needs of the different types of families.

We may be able to predict some of the likely occurrences by type of mission. Service members returning from peace operations that involve actual combat (or at least being fired upon), such as Peace Enforcement or Dangerous Humanitarian missions, may experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Even seemingly less stressful peace operations may involve PTSD. For example, service members on Humanitarian Missions are likely to be confronted with some form of human misery. While it may give them great satisfaction to be able to help, they may witness dire cases that are beyond help. Seeing the aftermath of natural disasters (such as hurricanes) may give them a sense of their own vulnerability. Assisting earthquake victims involves the experience of the aftershocks. All of these experiences will leave some residual effects on service members when they return home - and these may play a part in reunion adjustment.

CONCLUSIONS

The emphasis in this paper has been on trying to distinguish among different types of peace operations in the family issues that are likely to be salient. Clearly, there are some family experiences that are common to all peace operations regardless of the nature of the particular mission: all deployments involve separation of soldiers from their family members and other civilians (and non-deployed soldiers) with whom the soldier is close. These may include any of the following categories: spouses, children, parents, grandparents, in-laws, step-parents, surrogate parents, and boyfriends or girlfriends. Separations are stressful for soldiers and their families (and tend to reduce soldier
retention) and require special supportive attention by the organization at various levels.

This paper is a first attempt at systematically addressing family issues in peace operations across types of missions. As the U.S. Army gains further experience with such operations, it is important to analyze family issues in those operations according to the dimensions specified here. The conceptual model can be modified to reflect those experiences more accurately. Other variables that emerge as affecting the nature of family experiences and appropriate policy responses can be added. For example, peace operations are currently being planned that involve deploying units with heavy compositions of reserve and National Guard personnel. Family issues should be among the areas studied to determine the similarities and differences in family dynamics as a result of these personnel compositions (e.g., because of greater geographic dispersion of family members). That research can help to determine the different policies, programs, and practices of the organization (and its sub-parts) that are effective in helping to support soldiers and their families during the separation.
REFERENCES


SPouses OF RESErvists AND naTIONAL GUARDSMEn:  
A SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF DESERT SHIELD/STORM  

Florence R. Rosenberg, Ph.D.  
Dept of Military Psychiatry,  
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research  
and  
Dept of Psychiatry,  
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences  

INTRODUCTION  

BACKGROUND  

Shortly after the first U.S. troops deployed to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Storm, a request for a study of the families of deployed soldiers came from the Army Vice Chief of Staff. This request was initiated with a letter from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel (DCSPER) in late August 1990, tasking various Army research agencies to collaborate in a set of field studies entitled Human Factors Research in Operation Desert Shield. The site visit interviews portion of the tasking was led by the Community and Family Support Center (CFSC). The survey portion of ODS family research was undertaken by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR).  

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the Family Factors Field Study in ODS was to gather information on the impact on family well-being of the Persian Gulf deployment and on the effectiveness of various Army elements in assisting/supporting families. The study was to include spouses of soldiers on active duty at the time of the deployment, as well as spouses of mobilized Reservists and National Guardsmen. Another long range purpose was to examine the effects of family stress on soldier morale through matching spouse data with information collected in a parallel study of soldiers in the Persian Gulf area.  

Identification of Significant Family Issues: In October of 1990, a team of twenty researchers visited seven Army installations, eleven Army reserve units and nine National Guard units. All were units from which soldiers had been deployed either to the Persian Gulf or elsewhere as part of Operation Desert Shield. Informal interviews involving open-ended questions were conducted with groups of spouses, family support group leaders, rear detachment staff, garrison leaders and program/service providers. Questions were aimed at identifying specific stressors that spouses and children were
facing in relation to the deployment as well as stress mediators. The latter included both formal and informal support sources as well as personal factors such as prior experience, knowledge, training and coping skills. Information gathered during the site visits was used to develop measures of stress and social support that were used later in the survey portion of the study and also to develop hypotheses that would be tested in the survey.

Two separate but parallel surveys were developed: the first pertained to Active Duty Army spouses; the second to spouses of mobilized Reservists and National Guardsmen. Although most of the items and scales included in the two surveys were essentially the same there were some differences; for example, the wording of certain questions and the inclusion or exclusion of certain items reflected the differences in experience of these two groups. The analysis which follows in this report is based on the survey of Reservist and National Guard spouses.

Sample: When the study began, the course and outcome of the deployment and, indeed, the numbers of soldiers that would eventually be deployed was not known. Nor was it known if and when a war began whether this research would have to stop because of the possibility of large numbers of casualties in the families of respondents. Because of these unknown and constantly changing events, it was difficult to execute a well-designed sampling plan. Several weeks prior to the January 15 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, a random selection of deployed Army, National Guard and Reserve units was made for inclusion in the study. The units were then contacted and asked to provide us with address labels and rosters of all spouses.

As indicated above, we attempted to develop a random sample of Reserve and National Guard units among those who had deployed. Many units failed to respond to our request for rosters, often because they did not have any. For those who had rosters, we found that many addresses were either incorrect or out of date. These difficulties involving records of personnel reflect some of the major differences between the active Army and the Reserve and National Guard components; the latter are more difficult to identify and to reach in a survey. Consequently, the final sample of spouses in this part of the survey consists of a "convenience" sample of 236 spouses. It is not a probability sample and thus, any findings must be considered as suggestive, rather than statistically generalizable.
SAMPLE

DEMOGRAPHICS

Unit Type: Nearly half of the soldiers (48%) are in transportation units; the next largest groups are in Combat Support (13%) and Chemical (11%) followed by small groups in Engineering, Quartermaster and Ordnance. An additional 12% list "other" as their unit type.

Rank: The ranks are distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pvt - SPC/CPL</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT - SGM</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the great majority (over two-thirds) are senior enlisted soldiers ranging from rank E5 through E9.

Gender: Ninety-seven percent of the spouses are female. (For this reason, we will refer to "she" where appropriate.)

Age: The majority of respondents fall into the age categories of 25-35 (37%) and 36-45 (33%). Only 17% are between the ages of 17 and 24 while 13% are over 45 years of age.

Family Status: Twelve percent of the sample has been married for less than 1 year; 29% for 1-5 years; 20% for 6-10 years; 9% for 11-15 years and the remainder (30%) 16 years and over. These figures reflect the relatively mature ages of many of the respondents.

The majority of the respondents have children; 78% have at least one child living at home. Most of these respondents have between one and three children. A substantial minority report children living away from home (30%); again, the maturity of the respondents suggests that these are adult children who have left home.

Race and Ethnicity: Over half of the respondents are white (57%), 36% are Black, 6% are Hispanic and the remainder are either Asian or "Other," e.g., Native American.
**Education:** Over one-third of the spouses are high school graduates or have a GED and an additional 35% have had some college or technical training. Only 6% have not finished high school while 19% are college graduates.

**Current Residence:** Reserve spouses are distributed over a variety of communities. The table below shows this distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large urban area</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb near large city</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium sized city or</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb near city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small city or town</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm, ranch or rural area</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great majority of reservists' spouses reside in either an apartment, house or trailer; 41% are renting while 47% own (i.e. are making mortgage payments) their residence. Less than 1% currently live on post.

Very few live near a military installation as the figures below indicate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 miles or less</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-25 miles</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-50 miles</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-100 miles</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-200 miles</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 200 miles</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/live on post</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transportation:** The great majority (89%) have drivers' licenses and 87% have the use of a vehicle for daily transportation. About two-thirds of the respondents describe local transportation in their area as either very adequate (33%) or fairly adequate (30%) for their needs.
Power of Attorney: Nearly four-fifths of spouses have power of attorney, enabling them to handle legal and other matters during the reservist's absence.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Employment status and occupation: Employment status of reservists' spouses is described in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed full time</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed part time</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed but seeking work</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker, not seeking work</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that most spouses are either working or in the labor force; only 20% are currently not looking for work.

Occupations: Most employed spouses are in the traditional "female" occupations (reflecting the fact that 97% of the spouses are women). Twenty-two percent are in clerical jobs such as secretary or clerk; 13% are in professional occupations e.g., nurse, librarian, social worker; 10% are school teachers and most of the remainder are in administrative, sales or service jobs. This distribution contrasts with the civilian jobs of the reservists who tended to be factory operatives, bus and truck drivers, craftsmen and administrators. Nearly half of the reservists worked for private businesses, 30% had government jobs (either state or federal) and only 4% were self employed.

Effect of activation: The survey indicates that deployment had negative economic effect on many reservist families. Over two-fifths of the respondents cite decrease in income since deployment, and half of these describe decreases of 25% or more. Thirty-five percent report no change in income and 23% have experienced an increase. The great majority of spouses are now receiving sure pay with joint checking (85%) while an additional 11% receive an allotment from the reservist.

It is perhaps significant that over half of the reservists were holding a second job before being called to active duty. This additional income almost certainly was lost upon activation. Another important financial loss consists of benefits; only 21% report that the main civilian employer has
continued to pay the difference between civilian salary and military pay; 34% and 12% indicate that employers have continued health insurance and life insurance benefits, respectively. Finally, among the small group who were self-employed, 46% report some difficulty maintaining the business or practice while 42% have had no difficulty.

Finally, most respondents (63%) indicate that their creditors (e.g., bank credit card companies, department stores, etc.) did make some adjustment in their interest payments although some experienced initial difficulty.

RESULTS

WELL BEING AND SATISFACTION AMONG RESERVISTS' SPOUSES

The survey includes considerable data on problems, stress and feelings of well being and satisfaction among reservists' spouses. The following questions examine how effectively spouses are functioning in two life domains. The results are presented below.

"Overall, how well did you manage during the past week in accomplishing your daily household tasks such as shopping, paying bills, taking care of the children getting to appointments...?"

"If you work for paid employment, please indicate how well you managed your job during the past week."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life Domain</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Well</th>
<th>About average</th>
<th>Poorly</th>
<th>Very poorly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household tasks</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is striking how similar the two sets of figures are. Half of the spouses are performing household tasks very well or pretty well while 56% feel they are doing their jobs very or pretty well. In both cases, 11% say they are performing poorly and a very small group (6% and 2%) are functioning very ineffectively in these two life domains.
Satisfaction in another life domain, marriage, is measured by an eleven-point scale ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. Respondents are asked to evaluate their marriages before deployment. If we combine categories, we find the following distribution with regard to marital satisfaction. (The categories are in parentheses.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Satisfaction</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied (1-2)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied (3-4)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure (5-7)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied (8-11)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that the overwhelming majority of spouses were satisfied with their marriages; only a tiny proportion indicate dissatisfaction.

A more global question asks how satisfied the respondent is with what she does every day (including homemaking as well as employment). This variable can be considered a rough indicator of general life satisfaction. Once again about half (52%) are either very satisfied or satisfied while 24% are neutral and most of the remainder are dissatisfied (22%) with only 2% very dissatisfied. We can conclude from these data that approximately half of the spouses are satisfied with their daily lives and feel they are functioning effectively. Only very tiny groups fall into the highly negative categories on any of these variables. These data suggest that there is considerable consistency between respondents' evaluations of their effectiveness in several life domains and in their general life satisfaction. We should point out that marital satisfaction differs from the other variables in the extremely positive distribution of responses.

The survey includes an extensive series of items measuring physical and psychological well being, the Hopkins Symptoms Check List - HSCL - (Derogatis, et al, 1974). This consists of a list of 25 symptoms such as headaches, poor appetite, heart pounding, lack of interest, feeling blue, feeling fearful, low energy, thoughts of ending life, terror, etc. These symptoms tend to reflect either depression or anxiety. Respondents are asked to indicate if they have been bothered by any of these symptoms during the last month. Responses are assigned a score as follows: not at all (zero); a little (1); quite a bit (2) and extremely (3). For the twenty-five items, scores can range from a low of zero to a
high of 75. The actual range is from zero through 74 with the median at about 26.5, indicating a distribution skewed toward low scores (low symptoms). If we divide the score into three equal intervals, we find the following distribution, showing the preponderance of low scores (i.e., low incidence of psychological/physical symptoms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HSCL Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (0 - 25)</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (26 - 50)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (51 - 75)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of the respondents score in the lowest third and another two-fifths in the middle. Only 9% manifest high symptom scores on the symptom check list.

It seems likely that life satisfaction, and performance in the household and on the job are related to these psychological and physical symptoms, i.e., individuals who score high on symptoms may also manifest poor performance and low satisfaction. The correlation matrix below examines the association among these four variables. All of these coefficients are statistically significant (P = .01 or less).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HSCL</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Satis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HSCL</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household tasks</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with everyday life</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations are all positive because of the scoring method used, i.e., satisfaction in different life domains and low symptoms are assigned low values, resulting in positive correlations. We can see that low symptoms are strongly related to effective functioning at household tasks (r = .51) and to satisfaction with one’s everyday life (r = .44). Similarly, satisfaction with everyday life and household task performance are also strongly associated (r = .44). On the other hand, the relationship between performance on the job and everyday satisfaction and symptoms, while perceptible, is considerably weaker. An interesting finding is the similarity in results for household tasks and everyday life satisfaction;
both are strongly associated with HSCL (r's = .51 and .44) and identical correlations with job (r's = .24). Although the questions are phrased quite differently, it is possible that, for most respondents, satisfaction with everyday life encompasses the home and the role of homemaker. Finally, with one exception, the correlations between marital satisfaction and the other variables measuring well being and functioning are virtually non-existent. The exception is deployment distress which has a significant correlation of -.18 with marital satisfaction, i.e., those who are dissatisfied with their marriages are less likely to suffer deployment related distress than are the happily married, a result that is not surprising.

STRESS

Deployment Distress: One of the objectives of the survey is to examine stress and distress produced by the deployment of the reservist. It should be noted that 88% of the reservists were deployed to the Persian Gulf area. Respondents are asked how much distress they have experienced as a result of a series of factors related to deployment. The results are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Great deal/ Moderate</th>
<th>Can't say</th>
<th>Little or none</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing spouse</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicating with spouse</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's emotional well being</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying to be both parents to children</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern about spouse's living conditions</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about length of mobil.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern about spouse's well being &amp; safety</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall changes caused by mobilization</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several factors which have caused a great deal of distress to the majority of spouses: missing spouse (71%), length of mobilization (71%), spouse's well being (68%) and
overall changes (53%). These figures refer only to a great deal of distress, excluding the moderate group included in the table above. It is clear that the mobilization of reserve units has produced problems and stress among most of their spouses in a number of areas.

Five of these items have been combined into a score to measure deployment distress. This score excludes items related to children and refers specifically to the reservists’ mobilization and deployment. The score is based on the following items: missing spouse, communicating with spouse, spouse’s living conditions, length of mobilization and spouse’s safety/well being. These items also represent the areas of greatest distress to the spouse. A value of 1 through 5 is assigned to each response, reflecting low to high distress on each item. Scores range from 5 through 25 with the median falling close to 21, indicating a very strong concentration in the high distress scores. This is even more striking if we divide the scores into three equal intervals presented below. We see that nearly three-fourths of the respondents score in the high distress category while only 4% have scores indicating very low distress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Distress Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low distress (5 - 11)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium distress (12 - 18)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High distress (19 - 25)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stressful Events** (or total stress): Another set of survey items observes specific sources of stress, i.e., problems and hassles of everyday life that have occurred since the reservist was called to active duty. These stressful events include: eviction; bankruptcy; non-recognition of ID card; breaking a lease; problems with landlord, banks, transportation, household repairs, mechanics, military entitlements, power of attorney, household budget, and childcare; extra expenses; no chance to say goodbye to spouse; too many goodbyes because of changes; sexual harassment; robbery reports in neighborhood. The eighteen items are combined into a total stress score, assigning 1 to each stressful event that was experienced by the respondents. Total scores can range from 0 (indicating no stressors) through 18 (every stressor was experienced). Actual scores range from 0 through 11; the median is just under 3 reflecting low incidence of these events (i.e., half of the respondents experienced less than three stressful events) Thirty-nine
percent report between three and six stressors while only 10% experienced between seven and eleven stressors. The two most frequent sources of stress are straining the budget because of extra expenses connected with deployment such as phone and mail and saying goodbye to spouse several times because the date of departure kept changing (73% report experiencing each of these stressful events).

Life Events: The literature on stress assumes that life events involving change of any sort, whether positive or negative, produce psychological distress (Holmes and Rahe, 1967). The survey includes a group of items, adapted from Holmes and Rahe, designed to measure the incidence of life events among the sample of respondents. These items differ from the stressful events described above in two ways: they include events with positive, negative or neutral affect; and they refer to life events at three different time intervals: a) before activation; b) after activation; c) both before and after activation. There are twenty-five life events listed which can be grouped as follows: moving; illness or death of child, friend, parent or relative; work (new job, fired, laid off, finding job spouse’s work problems); health (spouse ill, pregnancy and complications, miscarriage/abortion, other illness); financial (bills, childcare); marital difficulties; trouble with law; friend moving away; victim of crime or other crisis such as fire.

The number of life events experienced by respondents at each time interval is summed up in the table below. The last column adds up the total number of events for all three intervals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Life Events</th>
<th>Pre Activation</th>
<th>Post Activation</th>
<th>Pre &amp; Post Activation</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 or more</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most significant figures here are found in the last column, total events, which comprises the total events, pre and post activation as well as those occurring both pre and post activation. Only 20% of the respondents experienced none of these events while the great majority (73%) report between one and five events. However, it should be noted that the
maximum number of total events is eleven, reported by only 1% of the sample.

If we examine the specific events, the most common, either before or after activation, are starting a new job (12%), pregnancy (10%), moving to a new residence in the same city (10%), moving to a different city or state (9%) and death of a close friend or relative (9%). However, the single most frequent event involves finances, i.e., trouble paying bills, reported by 7% pre-activation, 19% post-activation and 11% at both times.

In this section, we have described the results of the survey with respect to three sets of items, each of which has been combined into a score: distress related to deployment of reservist (deployment distress); stressful events in various life domains since deployment (total stress); life events before and after activation (total events). The correlation matrix below presents the associations among these three scores as well as their relationship to the two measures of well being described earlier: HSCL (Hopkins Symptom Checklist) and satisfaction with everyday life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Total Stress</th>
<th>Deployment Distress</th>
<th>HSCL</th>
<th>Everyday Satisfac.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stress</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy. distress</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSCL</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satis. everyday</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that there are very powerful associations among some of these variables. The Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) shows particularly strong relationships with deployment distress, total stress and satisfaction with everyday life (r's = .53, .43, and .44, respectively). (The correlations are positive because high symptoms, high distress, high stress and low satisfaction were assigned similar values.) Total stress is strongly correlated with both total events (r=.38) and satisfaction with everyday life (r=.37), suggesting that life events (i.e., changes) do produce stress and that general life satisfaction is affected by these. Deployment distress has a moderate correlation with both total stress and everyday satisfaction (r's = .21 and .24, respectively but shows virtually no association with total events (r=.06). Finally, life events has only relatively modest associations with HSCL.
and satisfaction with everyday life (r's = .17 and .19) and, as indicated above, no relationship with deployment distress (r= .06). To understand these results, we must consider the content of the scores: total life events focuses on change which may be either positive or negative in terms of well being; deployment distress refers solely to deployment related issues involving the reservist while total stress and satisfaction with everyday life relate either to specific problems or overall quality of daily life. Thus, while deployment distress may produce anxiety and depression reflected in the HSCL score, it may have considerably less effect on aspects of everyday life.

We have seen that the Hopkins Symptom Checklist has strong associations with a number of other measures of stress, distress and functioning. To assess the relative impact of these variables on physical and psychological symptoms, we use the multiple regression model. HSCL is the dependent or outcome variable; a series of other factors represent the independent variables regressed on the dependent. In each case, the regression coefficient indicates the association between HSCL and the independent variable, controlling on all other variables. Once again, all correlations are positive because of the coding methodology. This is not a causal model as the sequence of independent variables is not specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zero order Correlation</th>
<th>Multiple Regression Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment distress</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stress</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everyday life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household tasks</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original correlations between HSCL and total life events and job functioning were modest; in the multiple regression model, they are virtually eliminated and are statistically insignificant. The relationship between HSCL and deployment distress is reduced somewhat but remains highly significant while correlations between HSCL and both satisfaction with everyday life and household tasks diminish from strong to modest associations. We can conclude that deployment
distress, i.e., anxieties related to spouse's activation, more than any other single factor, has a powerful impact on well being as measured by incidence of psychological and physical symptoms.

We can construct a path analysis including several of these variables in a causal sequence. In the model below, symptoms (HSCL) is the dependent or outcome variable, deployment distress and total stress (stressful events since deployment) are the independent or exogenous variables and satisfaction with everyday life is the intervening factor. The original zero order correlations between the variables are shown in parentheses.

Figure 1

This path analysis shows that deployment distress retains a powerful direct impact on physical and psychological symptoms, even when satisfaction and stressful life events are taken into account (B = .41). On the other hand, total stress affects symptoms largely through satisfaction with everyday life; the direct effect of total stress on HSCL is reduced from .43 to B = .24, when the other variables are controlled. The association between satisfaction and symptoms decreases from .44 to B = .27, when the exogenous variables are entered into the path. In summary, deployment distress affects well being (measured through symptoms) both directly and indirectly, through satisfaction with everyday life. However,
the direct effect is more powerful. Conversely, total stress also affects well being but, in this case, the indirect effect (through satisfaction) is the stronger path. Finally, satisfaction with everyday life, continues to have an impact on well being, independent of the stress variables, but this effect is considerably weaker than the original correlation.

STRESS MEDIATION

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS), there was considerable emphasis by the military on alleviating stress among family members, both of active duty soldiers and of reservists mobilized for active duty. In this section, we will examine some of the agencies established to deal with stress as well as other support resources used by reservists' spouses.

Family Support Groups: These organizations (FSGs) consist of groups of spouses organized on a volunteer basis for mutual support; they are usually associated with the soldier's unit. Although they exist in peacetime, the data show clearly that FSGs expanded in terms of numbers, activity and participation during ODS. The tables below show the comparison for the periods before and after activation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before Activation</th>
<th>After Activation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No group</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group, not active</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group, active</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never participate(d)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely participate(d)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes participate(d)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently participate(d)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proportion of spouses who either report no group or who do not know (which may indicate that no group exists) decreased from 76% to 17%. Moreover, over three-quarters describe the FSG as active after activation compared with only 11% before activation. The number of spouses who participate frequently or sometimes rose from 21% to 59% between the two periods. Generally, we can conclude from these figures that Family Support Groups became more prominent in every respect after the mobilization of reservists. With respect to non-participation, the major reasons, either pre or post-
activation, are distance (meetings held too far from home) or meetings held while respondent is at work.

Among respondents who have experienced a Family Support Group, 43% percent describe the FSG leadership as consisting of volunteers representing all ranks while 13% state that leaders are mostly senior NCO and officers' spouses. However, a considerable group (43%) do not know who most of the leaders are.

Respondents are also asked to evaluate the effectiveness of their FSG with regard to a series of six activities: holding informational meetings; sending out newsletters; passing on information through a telephone tree; organizing interesting or fun activities; providing emotional support to one another; providing assistance in an emergency. A score is computed for each respondent to summarize her evaluation of the FSG. Response categories and the value assigned to each are as follows: group has this activity and it works well (2); group has activity but it needs improvement (3); group has activity but it is not working (4); group does not have activity (5). Total scores thus range from 12, reflecting a highly positive evaluation of the FSG through 30, a very negative score. The median score for spouses is a little over 15, indicating that responses are highly concentrated at the positive end. The distribution is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of FSG Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>(12 - 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral or mixed</td>
<td>(18 - 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>(24 - 30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59%
37%
4%

If we divide the scores into three equal intervals, the skewed distribution is even more striking. Almost three-fifths of the response scores are in the positive third while only 4% are clearly negative. We can conclude from these data on the Family Support Groups that their activity and participation increased markedly during ODS and that their performance in a number of activities has been highly effective.

We can also compare the Family Support Groups in terms of their type of leadership, i.e. whether leadership represents all ranks or whether it consists mostly of senior NCO and officers' spouses. In the following tables, we are omitting those who do not know the leadership or who do not have a
Family Support Group. Consequently, the total number of respondents is small (N = 60 out of a total of 236 respondents) but the comparisons do suggest some differences between the two types of group leadership. The table below presents FSG effectiveness based on the score described above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSG Leadership</th>
<th>Senior NCO &amp; Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of FSG Score</td>
<td>All ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive (12-17)</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/mixed (18-23)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (24-30)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The small number of cases makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions from these data but it is clear that FSGs whose leadership represents volunteers from all ranks are much more likely to be evaluated positively than those led by senior rank spouses.

If we look at activity and participation both before and after activation, we find that pre-activation, FSGs led by all ranks were more likely to be active (58% compared to 42%). After activation, type of leadership had no effect as almost all FSGs (96%) became active, regardless of type of leadership.

Participation in FSGs before activation was similar for groups with both types of leadership. However, after activation the groups led by all ranks were considerably more likely to elicit high participation - 57% of the spouses in FSGs led by all ranks participated frequently compared to 35% of the spouses who describe their FSGs as led by senior spouses.

These data, qualified by the small number of respondents, do suggest that the "democratic" type of leadership in Family Support Groups tends to work better than senior-led groups; this is reflected particularly in the evaluation of the groups' effectiveness on a series of activities and in level of participation.

**Unit Support:** While Family Support Groups tend to be based on the unit, they involve volunteer spouses rather than unit leaders. In order to assess spouses' feelings about unit
leaders, the survey includes three sets of questions: a) unit leaders' supportiveness of families before activation (five items); b) leaders' supportiveness after activation (three items); c) effectiveness of family support coordinators (a position similar to the Rear Detachment Commander in the active Army) since activation (four items). A score is constructed for each set of items, a low score indicating that the spouse perceives the unit leaders as supportive, a high score reflecting the reverse. The distribution of scores for each group of items is presented in the tables below. The figures in parentheses are the score intervals in each category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre Activation</th>
<th>Post Activation</th>
<th>Family Support Coord.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High support</td>
<td>32% (5-11)</td>
<td>47% (3-6)</td>
<td>37% (4-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>50 (12-18)</td>
<td>35 (7-10)</td>
<td>40 (10-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low support</td>
<td>18 (19-25)</td>
<td>18 (11-15)</td>
<td>22 (15-20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several conclusions to be drawn from these data. First, only a minority in each case evaluate unit leaders and family support coordinators as either unsupportive or ineffective. Second, family support by unit leaders is perceived more positively after activation than before activation (percentage who perceive high supportiveness rises from 32% to 47%). Finally, family support coordinators are perceived somewhat less positively than are unit leaders after activation.

These measures of support all refer to the unit either directly or indirectly through Family Support Groups which also tend to be based on the unit. It is not surprising therefore that these variables show relatively high intercorrelations as shown in the following table. (All of these coefficients are statistically significant, most at the .0001 level).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FSG</th>
<th>Pre Unit Sup.</th>
<th>Post Unit Sup.</th>
<th>Fam. Sup. Coord.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSG effectiveness</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Support (pre-act.)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Support (post act)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Support Coord.</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data suggest that various aspects of unit support are interrelated, i.e., if leaders are perceived as supportive, the unit is likely to have effective Family Support Groups and Coordinators. This finding is consistent with other research in this area.

Family support organizations and activities are designed to provide information, activities, and help to families in order to mitigate problems, stress and anxieties. These functions may be particularly crucial in a period of mobilization when rapid change is occurring in families' lives. Furthermore, for reservists' families who have not been part of a military community, alleviating anxiety may be even more important. The next set of figures examines the relationship between each of these support measures and several variables relating to stress and anxiety. The letters "ns" indicate that the correlation is not statistically significant. The others are significant at the .05 level or lower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deploy. Distress</th>
<th>Total Stress</th>
<th>HSCL</th>
<th>Everyday Satisfact.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSG effectiveness</td>
<td>.06 ns</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.11 ns</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Sup (pre)</td>
<td>.001 ns</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.09 ns</td>
<td>.04 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Sup (post)</td>
<td>.13 ns</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Sup. Coordinator</td>
<td>-.03 ns</td>
<td>.11 ns</td>
<td>.02 ns</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These correlation coefficients indicate that Family Support Groups are moderately related to total stress, i.e., stressful events such as financial problems, health problems, etc. (r=.22) and have an even stronger impact on satisfaction with everyday life (r=.39). Their effect on deployment distress and symptoms is insignificant. Unit support, pre-activation, has little effect on the indicators of well being with the exception of total stress (r=.22). On the other hand, unit support, post activation, has a moderate, but statistically significant, effect on total stress, symptoms and satisfaction with everyday life; its effect on deployment distress is not significant. Finally, the Family Support Coordinator has little effect on well being except for satisfaction with everyday life (r=.19). In summary, it appears that everyday life (hassles, stressors, satisfaction) is affected by unit supportiveness reflected by leaders or FSGs. However, these support activities do not mitigate deployment distress to any significant extent.
The path model below incorporates several of the variables discussed in this section. The exogenous variables are total stress (i.e., stressful life events and hassles) and deployment distress; the intervening variables are unit support after deployment and satisfaction with everyday life and the outcome variable is the Hopkins Symptom Checklist. The original zero order correlations are indicated in parentheses.

Figure 2

This model indicates that total stress retains its association with unit support, everyday satisfaction and symptoms, independently of the other factors. The path between total stress and unit support (B=.25) shows little change from the zero correlation of .26, when deployment distress is controlled. Similarly, the path between total stress and everyday satisfaction decreases only slightly from r=.37 to B=.32. The association between stress and symptoms remains significant although weaker (B=.24).

Deployment distress shows a different pattern in this model. Its correlation with unit support disappears when total stress is taken into account. In other words, most of the original correlation between deployment distress and unit support is due to their mutual association with total stress. However, deployment distress retains an independent, but
weaker, relationship with both everyday satisfaction and symptoms ($B$'s = .16 and .41, respectively) when other variables are controlled.

Unit support, after deployment, shows virtually no association with either everyday satisfaction and symptoms, when the exogenous variables are included in the model. It is likely that total stress accounts for the zero order correlations between unit support and the outcome variables.

Finally, everyday satisfaction continues to be associated with symptoms, even when all other factors are included. However, the association is reduced from $r=.44$ to $B=.26$. At least some of the original correlation is due to deployment distress and total stress.

In summary, these data indicate that unit support and total stress are related; however, deployment distress is unaffected by unit support. Both total stress and deployment distress influence everyday satisfaction independently. Finally, stress and distress affect physical/psychological symptoms both independently and through their association with everyday satisfaction; the independent effect of deployment distress on symptoms is particularly strong.

Other Sources of Social Support: In the sections above, we have described formal sources of support for reservists' spouses, support based on Family Support Groups and unit leaders. However, spouses may rely on informal sources of support as well. The table below shows to what extent spouses count on certain people and groups for support and help with problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Support</th>
<th>Most/all the time</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Rarely Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservist/Guardsman from unit</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse of Reservist/Guardsman from unit</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor/friend not associated with unit</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of your extended family</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Count on for help
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very sup/</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very unsup/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unsupp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers/supervis. at work</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse’s civilian co-workers</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A church group</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the community</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your clergyman</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other group</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the two sets of questions are worded somewhat differently, they do provide comparable data on sources of support. It is apparent that reservists’ spouses rely much more on family, friends and neighbors than on members of the unit or unit members’ spouses. Within the community, colleagues at work, church groups and clergymen are perceived as either supportive or very supportive. The data on all community sources are very similar, with the exception of spouse’s civilian co-workers who are described as somewhat less supportive than other groups. In any case, only small minorities describe family, friends, neighbors, co-workers and community groups as rarely helpful or non-supportive.

**Types of Support:** Thus far, we have described social support in terms of sources, both formal and informal, military and community-based. The survey also includes a section on types or dimensions of support. Respondents are asked whether they can go to someone outside the home for each of several types of help or support. The table below presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Support</th>
<th>Can Obtain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Def/prob.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to me</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To do something enjoyable</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take care of my children</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in emergency</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide transportation</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give me advice when I</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I need it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give me emotional support</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150
These results are very clearcut; the overwhelming majority of reservist spouses perceive that they can rely on various types of support from other people, e.g., emotional, material, companionship or psychological. Furthermore, most of the "yes" responses fall into the definite, rather than the probable, category (the proportion of respondents answering "definitely yes" ranges from 50% for providing transportation to a high of 70% for listen to me when I talk).

These items have been combined into a Support Score, excluding the question on taking care of children since many spouses have no children. A high score indicates perceived support, a low score perceived non-support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low support</td>
<td>(5 - 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium support</td>
<td>(12 - 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High support</td>
<td>(19 - 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over four-fifths of the spouses perceive high support; furthermore, 40% achieve the maximum score, 25, indicating that they feel they can definitely rely on others for all types of support.

The most important impact of perceived support is on total stress (i.e. stressful life events); the correlation between these variables is -.36.* In addition, support is related to two measures of functioning: how well the respondent is performing household tasks and how satisfied she is with everyday life (r’s = -.24 and -.25, respectively). These coefficients are all highly statistically significant (P=.0003 or less). On the other hand, the correlations between perceived support and symptoms, deployment distress and job effectiveness are very minor or non-existent. Probably perceived support has the greatest impact on everyday stress, problems and well being but may have less effect on certain stresses outside the respondent's control such as deployment related factors.

* The negative signs are due to the scoring method: effective functioning is assigned a low value, total stress is assigned a high value and supportiveness has a high score, resulting in inverse correlations (e.g., effective functioning related to high support, low stress related to high support).
COPING WITH DEPLOYMENT

We have been describing stress mediation resources, i.e., people and organizations that reservists' spouses rely on for support and help, both in general and after activation. The survey also includes additional material on how respondents have coped with deployment. One set of questions measures change in utilization of certain support resources by reservists' spouses. The questions ask if the respondent has increased her use of the following resources since deployment of the reservist. (Results are presented in descending order of increased use.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Increased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance of FSG activities</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance at church or synagogue</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall use of Military Services</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to health care providers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of recreational facilities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to counselors</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that we are measuring only change, not total use. It is clear that use of military-related resources has increased substantially; only religious attendance even comes close to military resources in terms of increased use. The data on FSGs is consistent with the results reported earlier, describing great expansion of Family Support Groups in terms of existence, activity and participation.

In the previous sections, we have described support sources and resources, both in terms of perception and use. The survey also includes data on coping strategies, i.e., how the respondent approaches problems and their solution (Billings and Moos, 1981). Specifically, the question asks how the individual has faced her most important problem since her spouse deployed. Nineteen coping strategies are presented and the respondent indicates if she has used each method. These behaviors can be divided into two groups: those that are directed toward problem solving and those that focus on control, expression or management of emotions. The two types of behaviors are listed below in descending order of use for each type.
Coping Behaviors

Problem Directed Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tried to find out more about situation</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talked with spouse or other relatives about it</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered several alternatives to handling it</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to step back &amp; be more objective</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made a plan of action &amp; followed it</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drew on past experiences</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talked to professional</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emotion Focused Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Took things a day at a time, one step at a time</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayed for guidance and strength</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to see positive side of situation</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got busy with other things to keep my mind off problem</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared for the worst</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept my feelings to myself</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to reduce tension by exercising more</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took it out on other people when angry or depressed</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to reduce tension by smoking more</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t worry, figured everything would work out</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to reduce tension by eating more</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried to reduce tension by drinking more</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scale includes a preponderance of emotion-oriented coping behaviors - twelve compared to only seven problem-directed behaviors. However, the coping strategies employed most frequently include both types. Taking things one at a time, prayer, optimism and keeping busy represent efforts to gain emotional strength and are reported by about 80%-90% of the respondents. On the other hand, large groups also try to gain information, talk to others about the problem, consider alternative solutions and try to develop objectivity; these strategies try to deal with the problem itself. It should be noted that certain behaviors designed to reduce tension which may be considered psychologically or physically unhealthy (e.g., smoking, drinking or eating more or taking tension out
on others) are reported by relatively small percentages of spouses.

In order to examine the association between coping behaviors and well-being, we construct a score for each type of coping, assigning a value of 1 to each behavior reported by the respondent. Scores for emotional coping range from 0 through 12, for problem solving, from 0 through 7. Over two-thirds of the spouses score between 5 and 7 on emotional coping while over 40% fall into the middle categories of 3 and 4 on problem-directed coping. The two types of coping are not strongly intercorrelated; \( r = .22 \), reflecting only a modest association between emotional and problem-oriented coping behaviors. Correlations between each coping type and indicators of well-being or stress are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coping Type</th>
<th>HSCL</th>
<th>Total Stress</th>
<th>Deployment Distress</th>
<th>Satis. with Everyday life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that problem-oriented coping has little relationship to any of the variables measuring psychological well-being; the correlation coefficients are statistically not significant. However, behavior focused on emotional reactions does show considerable association with several of these variables. Emotional coping and symptoms are positively correlated \( (r = .36) \) indicating that a high incidence of physical and psychological symptoms is related to emotion-focused coping. This suggests a causal sequence in which people with physical/psychological symptoms cope by focusing on emotional reactions. In the case of stressful events, e.g., financial, childcare, or household problems, there is moderate positive association \( (r = .27) \); high stress is related to emotional coping behavior. The causal sequence is not entirely clear as stressful events may lead to emotional coping but the latter may, in turn, produce stress as the focus on emotions may discourage efforts to solve problems objectively. Deployment distress and emotion-focused coping are also positively related \( (r = .29) \). In this case, there is little the respondent can do to "solve" the problem of deployment; consequently, there may be an effort to cope by relying on emotional types of behavior. Finally, satisfaction with everyday life shows little association with either type of coping behavior; \( r \)'s of -.13 and .12 for problem and emotion-focused coping are statistically non-significant.
ARMY SERVICES

The Army maintains a wide variety of permanent services, usually on the installation level. As we have observed earlier (see section on Current Residence), relatively few reservists' families live near a post or military installation (only 9% live within ten miles of a military facility). Consequently, it is not surprising that many have never used any of these services. The list below shows the proportion of reservist spouses who have had no experience with each service. The list is in order of experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>No Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAMPUS</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Assistance Center</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Legal Assistance Program (JAG)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post recreational facilities</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Medical Care</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Community Services (ACS)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Employment Office</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Emergency Relief</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Youth Activities Program</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain's Religious Program</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Development Center</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain's Family Life Center</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Social Work Services</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the great majority has had no experience with most of these services. It is significant that the only service that close to half of reservist spouses have used is CHAMPUS, the military medical insurance program which is not based on the installation. The single most frequent problem with regard to use of these services is non-accessibility, cited by about one-third of the respondents.

A more detailed series of questions asks respondents to indicate if they used each service: a) before deployment with satisfaction; b) before deployment with problems; c) after deployment with satisfaction; d) after deployment with problems. For each category, a score is computed assigning a value of 1 to each service used. Thus scores range from 0 (no usage) to 14, (all used). The results are summarized below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre/satis</th>
<th>Pre/prob</th>
<th>Aft/satis</th>
<th>Aft/prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-no service used</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 services used</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 services used</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 or more services used</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data show that usage of services did rise after deployment. If we combine columns a and b, 27% used at least one service pre-deployment; this rises to nearly 50% after deployment (columns c and d). If we examine the three most widely used services, we see that CHAMPUS showed the greatest increase between the two periods, from 10% to 32% of the respondents using it, including both satisfied and dissatisfied. Family Assistance Centers also show a substantial increase in use from 4% pre-deployment to 19% after deployment while the Red Cross increased slightly from 10% to 12% of the sample.

The most significant finding is that these three services are all community-based, rather than being located on a military installation. It should be noted that Family Support Groups for reservists expanded both in terms of activity and participation after deployment. The FSGs are also located within the reserve community (e.g. at the Armory, Reserve Center or other community facility). These data indicate that reservists will use facilities and services located within their community; however, they do not take advantage of installation-based services probably because of inaccessibility (i.e., distance). However, if we relate use of military services to distance from an installation, no clear pattern emerges. Unfortunately, there are too few respondents who live near a military installation (only 9% live within 10 miles of an installation) for any meaningful comparisons. The overall increase in use of military services (see Coping with Deployment above) is clearly limited to services that are accessible within the reservists’ home communities.

The correlations between use of Army services pre-deployment, either satisfied or not, and indicators of well being (e.g. HSCL, total stress, deployment distress, and satisfaction with everyday life) are not significant in most cases. Only after-deployment use with problems shows a statistically significant, but modest, correlation with
symptoms and total stress (r's = .17 and .14, respectively). Overall use after activation (satisfied and dissatisfied) is associated with symptoms (r = .15, statistically significant). Once again, it is probable that distance and accessibility are the crucial factors in use of Army services by reservists' spouses.

There are several additional items in the survey that relate to deployment experience, utilization of Army agencies and feelings about Army-family interaction. One question asks if the respondent received any prior special training to prepare her for deployment. An additional series of items examines the respondents' attitudes toward Army-family interaction during deployment. The results are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received special training before present deployment</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree*</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My spouse kept me well informed about the Army</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel comfortable dealing with military agencies and medical system while spouse is away</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses of activated soldiers deserve to be given special treatment by Army</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It's the Army's responsibility to try to solve all problems of spouses of activated soldiers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The agree category includes strongly agree/agree; the disagree category includes strongly disagree/disagree.

It is apparent that few spouses received any training for ODS deployment of reservists. In terms of Army-family interaction, there is considerable variation in the results. Most (two-thirds) think their spouses have kept them well informed; nearly as many believe spouses of activated soldiers
deserve special treatment; only about one-third think the Army is responsible for solving problems of spouses; and, finally, less than half are comfortable dealing with Army agencies.

We can analyze the association between well being among reservists' spouses and the factors described above: training, information, feelings about Army agencies, whether spouses should get special treatment and the Army's responsibility to solve spouses' problems. The correlations are presented in the table below. The letters "ns" indicate a non-significant correlation while the remainder are all significant at the .05 level or better.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deploy. Distress</th>
<th>Total Stress</th>
<th>HSCL</th>
<th>Satis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training for deploy.</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08 ns</td>
<td>.05 ns</td>
<td>.09 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse informed</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with Army agencies</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special treatment</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.06 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army responsibility to solve problems</td>
<td>.12 ns</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the coding methodology assigned a low score to positive responses (e.g., low stress and distress, symptoms, high satisfaction, training, ease in dealing with agencies, non-special treatment and not expecting the Army to solve problems). Thus all the correlations are positive. These correlations are generally weak, even when statistically significant. Training has little impact on any indicators of well being except for a modest effect on deployment distress (r=.14). The importance of information is evident as it relates to all four measures of well being, most strongly to total stress (r=.21). These results suggest that information, and knowledge help the spouse in coping with everyday hassles and stressors. The strongest relationships are observed with respect to dealing with Army agencies, i.e., spouses who feel comfortable with agencies are lower on all the indicators of stress and higher on well being. An important result, omitted on the table above, is the strong correlation between information and dealing with Army agencies (r=.30). This finding indicates that information about the Army enables the reservists' spouses to feel more comfortable in dealing with agencies which, in turn, has an impact on well being. Finally, there are significant associations between desiring special treatment for spouses and Army responsibility to solve problems and several indicators of well being such as symptoms.
and total stress. These data suggest a causal sequence in which spouses suffering physical/psychological symptoms and everyday stress and hassle believe that the Army should provide special help. It should be emphasized that most of these associations are modest to moderate, indicating some relationship but not a very strong one.

CHILDREN

As we noted earlier, most of the respondents have children; 78% have at least one child living at home. About three-fifths have one or two children living at home and less than 20% have three or more children. The age distribution of children living at home is summed up below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Child1</th>
<th>Child2</th>
<th>Child3</th>
<th>Child4</th>
<th>Child5-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infants (less than 1 year)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school (1-5)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school (6-11)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high or high school (12-18)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 18 years old</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that very few respondents have more than three children living at home. Furthermore, children are concentrated in three age groups: pre-school, elementary school and junior and senior high school ages.

For each child living at home, the respondent is asked two sets of questions as follows:

...indicate whether any of your children ...had any of the following during the year prior to the present deployment.

- learning disability
- saw counselor for problems
- serious health problems
- on medication for hyperactivity
- doing poorly in school
- problems with drugs or alcohol
- trouble with the law

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Most respondents (79%) indicate that none of their children had any of these problems; 15% cite one or two problems and only 6% experienced three to five problems. The most common problem was doing poorly in school followed by seeing a counselor and learning disabilities.

An analogous question asks if any of your children have experienced any of the following since deployment.

- increased sadness, tearfulness
- new or increased discipline problems at home
- new or increased discipline problems at school
- increased academic difficulty
- demanding more attention
- refusing to talk or communicate
- increased immature behavior
- new or increased eating problems
- nightmares
- trouble with sleep
- child needed professional counseling
- child saw a counselor for problems
- child did not see a counselor because could not afford it

After deployment, it is clear that many more problems were experienced by children as the following table indicates. It should be noted that the number of problems is the total for all of the respondent's children. Thus, if three problems are cited, this may reflect one child with three problems or three children with one problem each, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Problems</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 and over</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority (56%) of reservists spouses experienced at least one of these problems and a substantial minority report multiple problems.

The most frequently report problems are increased sadness/tearfulness and demanding more attention, each cited by 37% of the respondents. These are followed by discipline problems in the home experienced by 28% of reservists' spouses. The remainder of the post-deployment problems were
experienced by only small minorities ranging from 18% for sleep problems to less than 2% who believed their child needed counseling but could not afford it.

We can examine the relationship between problems with children and indicators of stress and well being, i.e., deployment distress, total stress, satisfaction with everyday life and symptoms. We find that pre-deployment, the number of problems with children relates only to total stress, i.e., stressful events or hassles, and this relationship is modest but statistically significant, r=.14. After deployment, as might be expected, the incidence of children's problems has a considerably stronger effect. The correlations between children's problems and total stress, satisfaction with everyday life and symptoms are .30, .22 and .17 respectively, all significant at the .01 level or less. Only deployment distress, reflecting anxiety rooted in the reservist's service, is unaffected by children's problems. In summary, it is fair to conclude that problems experienced by children after deployment have an adverse effect on spouse's well being.

RETENTION

The Army is interested in retaining its soldiers, both in the active and the reserve components. Furthermore, it is assumed that opinions and attitudes of spouses toward remaining in the Army will affect the soldier's decision. The current survey includes two questions relating to spouses' attitudes in this area; the results follow in the table below.

"How would you feel if your spouse were to remain in the USAR/ARNG until eligible for retirement?"

"If your spouse could get out of the Reserves/National Guard tomorrow, should he/she?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain until retire</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get out tomorrow</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over two-fifths of the spouses would be either satisfied (13%) or very satisfied (28%) if soldier would remain in the reserves until retirement; this compares with 26% who would be dissatisfied with this decision (17% express great
dissatisfaction). With regard to getting out immediately, the results are somewhat less positive (35% say no or definitely no) but the differences are not great. The majority of spouses apparently feel at least somewhat positive or are not sure of their attitude toward remaining in the reserves.

As might be expected, these results are strongly negatively intercorrelated - r = -.77. That is, spouses who do not want their husbands to stay until retirement are likely to favor leaving the Army immediately.

We are interested in the factors that influence these attitudes toward retention. To examine these, we will focus on the item "remain until retirement." This is more likely to measure stable attitudes while feelings about getting out tomorrow may reflect more transient feelings. In any case, the results are very similar for both items.

Among the demographic variables, there are no significant correlations between age, rank or education and feelings about retention. However, if we categorize respondents into rank groups, we do find the following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>E1-E4</th>
<th>E5-E9</th>
<th>WO/Com.Off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the spouses of higher ranking reservists (warrant officers or commissioned officers) are more likely to favor remaining until retirement than are the lower ranks. If we examine the dissatisfied (negative), there is a clear linear relationships between dissatisfaction and rank. (The lack of a significant correlation between rank and retention attitudes is due to the small number of cases in the highest rank category.)

The table below presents the variables that are significantly correlated (P=.05 or less) with spouse attitude toward retention. The variables are grouped into three
categories: well-being; support mediators; and variables relating to Army-family interaction.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude toward Retention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment distress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with everyday life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSCL (symptoms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support mediators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSG effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit support (pre-deployment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit support (after deployment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army-family interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse kept me informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable dealing with Army agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses deserve to be given special treatment by Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army’s responsibility to solve all problems of spouses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These correlations can be summed up briefly as follows:

1. Respondents who experience less deployment-related distress, greater satisfaction with everyday life and fewer physical/psychological symptoms are more likely to want their spouses to remain in the reserves until retirement.

2. Respondents who evaluate their Family Support Groups as effective and who feel that the unit was supportive before deployment and after deployment are also likely to favor remaining in the reserves.

3. Respondents who feel they were kept informed and who are comfortable dealing with Army agencies tend to favor retention. Those who think the Army should give spouses special treatment or that the Army should solve all problems

*These correlation coefficients are all positive because of the coding methodology: favoring retention, low distress, high satisfaction, low symptoms, effective support, satisfaction with Army-family interaction all have low scores.
are less likely to want their spouses to remain in the reserves, i.e., attitudes favoring special treatment and Army responsibility are related to negative feelings about retention.

4. Finally, certain factors show virtually no relationship toward retention; these include total or everyday stress, participation in the FSGs either before or after deployment, attitudes toward the Family Support Coordinator and whether or not the spouse received training for deployment.

DISCUSSION

A major finding in this survey of Reservist and National Guard spouses is that they live in a civilian, rather than a military, world. Only about one-fifth reside within 25 miles of a military installation while 37% live over 100 miles from one. It is perhaps not surprising that most of these spouses have had no experience with a variety of Army services such as ACS, Chaplain, Youth Activities, recreational facilities and post medical care. The services with which they are familiar tend to be non-installation based: 45% have experience with CHAMPUS, 28% with the Family Assistance Center (these were established at reserve centers) and 25% with the Red Cross.

In terms of stress and well being, the majority of Reservist and Guard spouses coped well with their jobs, household tasks and were generally satisfied with everyday life. Relatively few (9%) experienced a high level of psychological and physical symptoms. The major source of stress was deployment; factors such as uncertainty about the length of deployment, missing one's spouse, difficulties in communication, concern about spouse's safety and living conditions produced considerable distress among the respondents. Everyday problems and stresses were less significant than deployment distress. Financial problems and multiple goodbyes due to changes in date of departure constituted the major stressors.

These respondents generally found social support in the civilian community, rather than from military sources. The great majority felt they could count on extended family and friends not associated with the unit at least most of the time. Much smaller groups cited relying on either unit members or spouses of unit members. Other sources of support were co-workers, clergy, church groups and people in the community.
With regard to social support, activation did produce an important development in military sources of support. The Family Support Groups show a great increase both in activity and in participation after activation. The percentage of active FSGs increased from 11% to 77% while spouses who participated sometimes or frequently rose from 21% to 59%. Furthermore, most spouses evaluated the FSGs positively in terms of effectiveness. There is some indication that FSGs led "democratically" (i.e., by spouses of all ranks) were rated more positively than those led by senior ranking spouses. Respondents also perceived support post-activation by unit leaders somewhat more positively than before activation. These support sources (unit, FSG) had a buffering effect on total stress but little impact on deployment related distress.

Spouses coped with deployment in two major ways: problem directed behavior (e.g., considering alternatives, making plans, talking to professional) and emotion focused behavior (prayer, looking a positive side, preparing for the worst). Results indicate that spouses who used emotion-focused coping were more likely to manifest high symptoms but were also more likely to alleviate deployment distress than were those who used problem-directed behaviors. Respondents also report that since deployment, they have increased attendance at Family Support Groups, churches and synagogues and increased their use of military services.

Certain other factors relating to Army-family interaction also affected well being. Spouses who felt they were kept informed, who were comfortable dealing with Army agencies, who did not expect special treatment or solution of all their problems by the Army tended to report less stress and higher well being. On the other hand, training for deployment had little or no impact on these variables.

Children’s problems, as might be expected, tended to increase after deployment, and also had a negative effect on well being. However, deployment distress, defined in terms of concerns about the soldiers’ safety and living conditions, was unaffected by problems with children.

Respondents were divided on the question of soldiers remaining in the service until retirement: while two-fifths were positive, one-third were unsure and over one-quarter did not favor retention. Many of the factors described above affected attitudes toward retention: a) well being (symptoms, everyday satisfaction, deployment distress) b) perception toward support mediators (FSG, unit support) and c) feeling
about Army-family interaction (kept informed, dealing with Army agencies, special treatment and expecting Army to solve all problems).
REFERENCES


Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

PEACE OPERATIONS WORKSHOP
February 15-17, 1994
Inn and Conference Center
University of Maryland University College
College Park, MD 20742-1610

AGENDA

FEBRUARY 15

08:30-09:00  Registration and Coffee

09:00-09:30  Welcome and Administrative Announcements
             Professor David R. Segal, University of Maryland

09:30-10:00  The U.S. Armed Forces in Peace Operations
             Chair: Professor David R. Segal
             Speaker:
             Mr. Joseph B. Berger, Jr., Director,
             Office of Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement
             Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense

10:00-10:30  Q & A and Discussion

10:30-10:45  Coffee Break

10:45-11:15  Changes in the Nature of 'Peace Operations:'
             Implications for the Selection, Training, and
             Education of Peace Soldiers.
             Chair: Professor David R. Segal
             Speaker:
             Dr. John Mackinlay, Brown University

11:15-11:45  Q & A and Discussion

11:45-12:45  Lunch Break

12:45-13:15  Human Resource Dimensions (Selection, Training,
             Education) in Regional Peacekeeping: Field
             Observations from the Sinai MFO
             Chair: Professor David R. Segal
             Panel:
             Dr. Jesse J. Harris, Professor and Dean, School
             of Social Work, University of Maryland
             Major Larry Applewhite, AMEDD Center and School

13:15-14:15  Q & A and Discussion

14:15-14:30  Coffee Break
14:30-15:00  FM 100-23, Peace Operations  
Chair: Professor Dana Eyre, Naval Postgraduate School  
Speaker:  
Mr. Richard Rinaldo, TRADOC  

15:00-16:00  Q & A and Discussion  
16:00  Break for Day  

FEBRUARY 16  

08:30-09:00  Coffee  

09:00-09:45  Human Resource Dimensions (Selection, Training, Education) in UN Peacekeeping: Field Observations from Somalia  
Chair: Dr. Steven Crawford, University of Maryland  
Panel:  
Col. Robert Gifford, Army Systems Hazards Research Program  
Maj. James Cartwright, Walter Reed Army Medical Center  

09:45-10:30  Q & A and Discussion  
10:30-10:45  Coffee Break  

10:45-11:30  Unit Leadership Issues in Multinational Peace Operations  
Chair: Dr. Alma Steinberg, Army Research Institute  
Panel:  
LTC Jim Sikes, Commander, 2/87 Inf.  
LTC William David, Commander, 2/14 Inf.  
Col. Brian L. Baker, Commander, 502nd MASH Task Force  

11:30-12:15  Q & A and Discussion  
12:15-13:15  Lunch Break  

13:15-14:00  Alternative Models of Selection and Screening for Peace Operations  
Chair: Dr. Steven Crawford, University of Maryland  

A-2
Panel:
Dr. Franklin C. Pinch, FCP Human Resources
Colonel Bruce A. Malson, Commander, U.S.
Military Observer Group, Washington
Col. Kenneth Getty, Commander, 1st Special
Warfare Training Group, USAJFKSWCS

14:00-14:15 Coffee Break
14:15-15:15 Q & A and Discussion
14:15-15:15 Alternative Models of Training for Peace
Operations
Chair: Major Angela Manos, CSA Staff Group
Panel:
Lt. Col. M.D. Capstick and Major David M. Last,
Land Forces Command Headquarters, Canadian
Forces
Col. Thomas Green, TRADOC
Professor Dana P. Eyre, Naval Postgraduate
School
Mr. Michael Snyder, Military Police School

15:15-16:00 Q & A and Discussion
16:00 Break for Day

FEBRUARY 17

08:30-09:00 Coffee
09:00-10:00 Family Support Issues in Peace Operations
Chair: Dr. Paul Gade, Army Research Institute
Panel:
Mrs. Sylvia Kidd, Vice-President, National
Military Family Association
Dr. Mady Wechsler Segal, Professor and
Associate Dean, University of Maryland at
College Park
Dr. Florence Rosenberg, Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research and Uniformed
Services University of Health Sciences
Mrs. Ruthann Sikes, Family Support Group, 2/87
Inf.

10:00-11:00 Q & A and Discussion
11:00-11:15 Coffee Break
11:15-12:15  Senior Leadership Issues in Peace Operations  
Chair: Professor David R. Segal  
Speaker:  
Major General David C. Meade, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division

12:15-13:15  Lunch Break

Chair: Professor David R. Segal  
Speaker:  
LTC William D. Hewitt, MFO Desk Officer, ODCSOPS

13:45-14:00  Q & A and Discussion

14:00-14:30  What do we know? What do we need to know? How can the R&D community help?  
Chair: Dr. Edgar M. Johnson, Director, Army Research Institute  
Panel: Professor Segal, Professor Eyre, Dr. Steinberg, Dr. Gade, LTC Sikes, Major Manos

14:30-14:45  Q & A and Discussion

14:45-15:00  Coffee Break

15:00-15:30  Peace Operations and the Army Mission  
Chair: Professor David R. Segal  
Speaker:  
General Gordon R. Sullivan  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

15:30-16:00  Q & A and Discussion

16:00  End Workshop
Appendix B: Workshop Participants

PEACE OPERATIONS WORKSHOP
15-17 FEBRUARY 1994
INN AND CONFERENCE CENTER
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742-1610

Albert, Mr. Louis
US Army Concepts Analysis Agency
8120 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814-2797
COM (301) 295-1526 FAX (301) 295-1662

Applewhite, MAJ Larry
Unit:
Student Co
AMEDD Center and School
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
Home:
8901 Ellsworth Ct
Silver Spring, MD 20910
(301) 587-4629

Arnold, MG Wallace C.
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DAPE-ZB)
The Pentagon, Room 2E736
Washington, DC 20310
COM (703) 695-2250

Baker, COL Brian L.
Commander
502nd MASH
APO AE 09105
COM 49-0911-723-323

Bell, Dr. Bruce
U S Army Research Institute (PERI-RP)
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-8119 FAX (703)224-8578

Berger, Mr. Joseph B., Jr.
Director, Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Rm 1-C-661
Washington, DC 20301-2300
COM (703) 695-2310 FAX (703) 693-0519
Brumley, LTC Robert  
HQ FORSCOM  
Deputy Director of Operations, G3  
Attn: APOP-TIN  
Ft McPherson, GA 30330  
COM (404) 669-6554        FAX (404) 669-6130

Capstick, LTC M.D.  
Land Forces Command Headquarters  
St. Hubert, Quebec  
CANADA  J3T 5T5  
COM (514) 462-7240

Cartwright, MAJ James  
Thornhurst Court  
Olney, MD 20832  
(202) 576-1855

Cotton, MAJ Tony  
Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit  
Suite 600  
4900 Yonge Street  
Willowdale, Ontario  
CANADA  M2N 6B7  
COM (416) 224-4966        FAX (416) 224-5148

Crawford, Dr. Steve  
School of Public Affairs  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD 20742

David, LTC William  
10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)  
Fort Drum, NY 13602  
COM (315) 772-5566

Decker, LTC Timothy  
HQS USA TRADOC  
ATTN: ATTG-U (LTC Decker)  
FT Monroe, VA 23651  
COM (804) 728-5741        FAX (804) 728-5743

Dehoust, COL Walter  
USMC Combat Development Command  
CODE 462, MCCDC  
Quantico, VA 22134  
COM (703) 640-3701        FAX (703) 640-3729
Durand, Ms. Doris
Department of Sociology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20642-1315
COM (301) 405-6420 
FAX (301) 405-5743

Emmerichs, Mr. Robert M.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
RM 2E580
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
COM (703) 697-2631

Eyre, Professor Dana
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
COM (408) 656-2831 
FAX (408) 656-2949

Fafara, Dr. Richard
Community and Family Support Center
1434 Hoffman I
2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22331

Gade, Dr. Paul A.
U.S. Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-8866 
FAX (703) 274-8578

Getty, COL Kenneth W., Jr.
Commander
1st Special Warfare Training Group (A)
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
COM (910) 432-3600

Gifford, COL Robert K.
HQ, US Army Medical Research and Development Command
SGRD-PLL
Fort Detrick
Frederick, MD 21702-5012
COM (301) 619-7301 
FAX (301) 619-2416

Grandmaison, CPT Larry
Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit
4900 Yonge Street, Suite 600
Willowdale, Ontario
CANADA M2N 6B7
COM (416) 224-4971 
FAX (416) 224-5148
Green, COL Thomas
HQ USA TRADOC
ATTN: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Fort Monroe, VA 23651
COM (804) 728-5702/5701 FAX (804) 728-5743

Harris, Dr. Jesse (COL RET)
School of Social Work
University of Maryland at Baltimore
Kaplan Hall
525 W. Red Wood Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
(410) 706-7794

Hewitt, LTC William D. Hewitt
Department of the Army
ATTN: DCSOPS (DAMO-ODO LTC Hewitt)
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
COM (703) 978-7138 FAX (703) 693-5570

Hiller, Dr. Jack H.
5001 Eisenhower Ave.
Alexandria, VA 22333
COM (703) 274-8815

Hunter, Mr. Horace
Army/Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict
Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556
COM (804) 764-5804 FAX (804) 764-4595

Johnson, Dr. Edgar
Director
Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-8638

Jones, CPT Joseph
11311 Baritone Ct
Silver Spring, MD 20901
(301) 681-6826

Jones, LTC Gregg
HQDA ODCSOPS
DAMO-SSP RM. 3E519
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
COM (703) 614-5347 FAX (703) 614-8623

B-4
Jones, MAJ Peter
Headquarters
1 (United Kingdom) Armored Division
British Forces Post Office 15
(COM) Germany 05221-892359 FAX Germany 05221-830656

Kerrigan, LTC Michael
6534 Clearwater Drive
Columbus, GA 31909
(706) 835-7114 FAX 706-835-7500

Kidd, SMA Richard A.
DACS-SM
Rm 3E677
400 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
COM (703) 695-2150

Kidd, Mrs. Sylvia
17 Lee Avenue
Fort Myer, VA 22211
COM (703) 695-2150/2152 FAX (703) 693-565

Last, MAJ David M.
Command Secretariat
Land Forces Command Headquarters
St-Hubert, Quebec
CANADA J3Y 5T5
COM (514) 462-7191 FAX (514) 462-8025

Lawton, Dr. George
Army Research Institute
PERI-BR
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Va 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-5590 FAX (703) 274-5162

Mackinlay, Dr. John
Cross Keys
East Meon
Petersfield
Hampshire GU32 1NN
UNITED KINGDOM
COM 011 447 3082 3632 FAX 011 447 3082 3632

Malson, COL Bruce A.
The Pentagon
ATTN: DAMO-ODU (USMOG-IV)
Washington, DC 20310
COM (703) 695-1301
Manos, MAJ Angela  
(DACS-ZAA)  
Office of the Chief of Staff, Army  
Room 3D714  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-0200  
COM (703) 693-8363  FAX (703) 693-8433

Marcum, Ms. Cheryl  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (MRA)  
RM 2E591  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301  
COM (703) 697-8202

Meade, MAJ GEN David C.  
10 Leray Dr  
Fort Drum, NY 13603  
COM (315) 772-5565

Phelps, Dr. Ruth H.  
1910 University Drive  
Boise, ID 83725  
COM (208) 334-9390  FAX (208) 334-9394

Pinch, Dr. Franklin C.  
97 Greenwich Dr.  
Dartmouth, NS  
CANADA B2V 2N5  
COM (902) 462-6208  FAX (902) 462-6208

Rinaldo, Mr. Richard  
ATDO-J (Strategic Vision Division Joint Doctrine Directorate)  
HQ TRADOC  
Fort Monroe, VA 23651  
COM (804) 727-2965  FAX (804) 727-3658

Rosenberg, Dr. Florence  
Department of Military Psychiatry  
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research  
Washington, DC  
COM (301) 427-5210  FAX (301) 427-5086

B-6
Segal, Dr. David R.
Department of Sociology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-1315
COM (301) 405-6439   FAX (301) 405-5743

Segal, Dr. Mady
Department of Sociology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-1315
COM (301) 405-6439   FAX (301) 405-5743

Sikes, Ms. Ruthann
9075B Nancy Road
Fort Drum, NY 13603
COM (315) 773-3244

Sikes, LTC Jim
HHC, 2-87 INF
BLDG 10130
Fort Drum, NY 13602
COM (315) 772-5072

Simutis, Dr. Zita M.
US Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Va 22333
COM (703) 274-8844   FAX (703) 274-8861

Snyder, Mr. Michael
USAMPS
ATZN-MP-TCM (ATTN: Mr. Snyder)
Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030
COM (205) 848-5313/3507   FAX (205) 848-6139

Steinberg, Dr. Alma
US Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-5610   FAX (703) 274-8861

Sullivan, GEN Gordon R.
Chief of Staff USA
(DACS-ZA)
RM 3E668
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310
COM (703) 695-2077
Thombs, LTC Victor
Integration Division
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, VA 22134
COM (703) 640-4915 FAX (703) 640-4917

Thompson, MAJ Mark
14 Westbrook Lane
Stafford, VA
COM (703) 640-3613 FAX (703) 640-2534

Wagstaff, COL Larry
US Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
COM (703) 274-8772/3 FAX (703) 274-5674

Walsh, Professor Mark
US Army Peacekeeping Institute
US Army War College
Carlisle, PA 17013
COM (717) 245-3199 FAX (717) 245-3719

Whitworth, Ms. Shauna
Chief, Family Liaison Office
(DAPE-ZXF)
RM 2D665
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310
COM (703) 695-7714

Wilkinson, LTC Philip
HQ Doctrine and Training
Trenchard Lines
UPAVON
Pewsey
Wilts SN9 6BE
UNITED KINGDOM
COM 0980 615126 FAX 0980 615304

Wolfenden, MAJ Robin
Directorate of Personnel (ARMY)
MOD
Metropole Building
Northumberland Avenue
London WC2N 5BL
UNITED KINGDOM
COM 071 218 9388 FAX 071 218 9384