THE JAPAN–U.S. ALLIANCE AND SECURITY REGIMES IN EAST ASIA

A WORKSHOP REPORT

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FOREWORD

A workshop, "The Japan–U.S. Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia," was held in Tokyo, Japan, from 26 to 29 July 1994, under the co-sponsorship of the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) in Tokyo and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Alexandria, Virginia.

Security specialists and academicians from Japan and the United States participated in the workshop, along with government observers from both nations. All opinions expressed were the personal views of the speakers. Discussions were on a "not for attribution" basis, although papers were prepared on specific topics to define the issues and stimulate thought.

The objective was candid discussion regarding the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. alliance in the post-Cold War era and the future role and impact of emerging East Asian multilateral security mechanisms and proposals. Participants examined issues affecting the future of the Japan–U.S. bilateral security relationship in conjunction with the current trend toward multilateralism, its motivating and driving forces, and its implications for Japan, the United States, and East Asia in general.

On most issues, participants had at least minor differences of opinion, both within and between the respective delegations. In general, however, there was a remarkable coincidence of views between the Japanese and American security specialists, especially when it came to the essentiality of the Japan–U.S. security alliance. Nonetheless, references in this report to general consensus should not be interpreted as universal agreement by all participants; they are merely an attempt to capture the general mood or sentiment of the group.
We are pleased that a Japanese report by the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defense Issues, released shortly after this workshop, endorsed many of the same initiatives aimed at strengthening the alliance and increasing Japanese active contribution to regional security affairs, within the context of the alliance and emerging multilateral mechanisms such as ARF and CSCAP.

The sponsors apologize in advance for any misreading of the views of participants and stress that the views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. or Japanese governments, their respective military agencies, the co-sponsoring institutes, or the group of workshop participants as a whole.

We thank Ralph Cossa, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum, for his superb work in drafting this report and capturing the interplay of ideas as well as the substantive issues of the workshop. We also gratefully acknowledge the outstanding support provided by the IIPS and CNA staffs, particularly Margo Cooper and Atsumasa Yamamoto, in organizing the workshop and laying the groundwork for this report.

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THE JAPAN–U.S. ALLIANCE AND SECURITY REGIMES IN EAST ASIA

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Empire have prompted calls for a reassessment of the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. security relationship. Is it still necessary? If it is necessary, is the present form suited to the current and future needs of both nations? If it is suited, can it survive the absence of an immediate threat? Has the current trend toward multilateral security dialogue in Asia, most recently evidenced by the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), rendered the bilateral relationship obsolete?

These and other related questions were recently addressed by a select group of independent policy and security specialists and academicians from Japan and the United States, who met in Tokyo concurrent with the inaugural session of the ARF. The group’s objective was to candidly discuss the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. alliance in the post-Cold War era, and the future role and impact of emerging East Asian multilateral security mechanisms. (A list of official participants is in appendix A; a copy of the agenda is in appendix B.)

Participants first examined the current security environment to identify political, economic, and military trends in the region that could endanger stability or threaten Japanese or U.S. interests. Particular attention was paid to areas where Japanese and U.S. perceptions may diverge. These include differing perceptions regarding North Korean nuclear capabilities and intentions and the most effective means of dealing with near- and long-term challenges emanating from the Peninsula, prospects for stability in Russia, and the military capabilities and long-term intentions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to name but a few of the lingering East Asia security concerns.
Participants then reviewed the current trend toward multilateralism to understand its roots, its motivating and driving forces, and its implications for Japan, the United States, and East Asia in general. Emerging governmental and non-governmental (NGO) multilateral initiatives were analyzed in terms of both their compatibility with the Japan–U.S. security alliance and their potential contribution to long-term stability in the region.

The Japan–U.S. security alliance was then discussed in the context of these security concerns as well as regional trends and implications. The future utility of the defense relationship was examined, along with the interrelationship between the security alliance and the Japan–U.S. economic relationship. Of particular relevance were discussions aimed at determining appropriate ways to keep the bilateral alliance robust and relevant.

Finally, participants discussed alternative frameworks for security regimes in East Asia and what Japan and the United States could do collectively to help bring about regimes that would both complement and build upon the existing relationship.

As this report documents and concludes, the Japan–U.S. security relationship continues to be extraordinarily important for both countries and for the entire Asia-Pacific region. The end of the Cold War has altered the context but not the centrality or underlying importance of this relationship; nor is the current trend toward greater multilateral security dialogue in Asia seen as a substitute.

The treaty alliance commits both sides not only to the defense of Japan but also to the promotion of regional stability. With the significant reduction (but not elimination) of the Russian threat to Japan's security, more emphasis should be put on the broader regional goal. This requires a renewed (and credible) commitment on the part of the United States to remain fully engaged in Asia and a willingness on the part of Japan to increasingly share in the risks and responsibilities, in order to keep the alliance robust and relevant.
The absence of an imminent threat requires a greater effort on the part of both governments to ensure public awareness of, and support for, the inherent value of the continuing defense relationship. It also opens the door for greater U.S. and Japanese participation in regional security initiatives, provided such efforts remain consistent with enduring mutual security interests and build upon the foundation provided by the Japan–U.S. bilateral alliance and other existing security relationships in Asia. Current bilateral relationships and multilateral political, economic, and military/security activities should be seen as building blocks in the construction of wide-ranging multilateral security mechanisms in Asia.

Multilateral security initiatives hold many promises for Asia, but it is important to understand the limits as well as the opportunities they present. In East Asia, a NATO-type alliance aimed at containing a specified threat was impossible even in the Cold War era, and simply does not apply to a post-Cold War Asia. Rather, East Asian multilateral activities should be seen more as confidence-building measures aimed at avoiding, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression. In reality, the latter situations can be dealt with effectively in East Asia only on an ad hoc basis.

Despite their limits, emerging multilateral security mechanisms in Asia can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. They offer a means for Japan, China, Russia, and others to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that is non-threatening to their neighbors. They provide a framework for continued direct U.S. involvement in Asian security matters. They also provide a mechanism for other regional actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional identity and a spirit of cooperation that will no doubt spill over into the political and economic spheres as well, just as growing political and economic cooperation helps set the stage for expanded security dialogue.

At the base of it all remains the Japan–U.S. alliance, which continues to serve as the irreplaceable core of any regional
security regimes. Although the old axiom that “there are no permanent alliances, only permanent interests” may be true, it is equally true that the mutual interests that bind the United States and Japan together are enduring ones, based on many shared values and objectives, and a shared and permanent commitment to peace, stability, and economic prosperity in East Asia.
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The end of the Cold War has not meant an end to security challenges in Asia or elsewhere. In the near term, this is particularly true when one looks toward the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea has kept the Cold War alive by stubbornly clinging to its failed ideology and its desire (or need) to maintain a repressive, closed society.

UNCERTAINTY OVER KOREA

It was unclear at the time of the workshop whether North Korea is committed to developing a nuclear weapons capability at any cost or is merely using the threat of doing so as a dangerous game card to achieve leverage in dealing with the West—or whether Pyongyang’s real intentions lie somewhere between these two extremes. [Note: After our workshop was completed, progress was made in dealing with the North Korean nuclear question when the U.S.–North Korean Geneva Accord was signed in October 1994. But full implementation of this important and complex agreement still lies before us. Accordingly, we continue to believe that North Korea poses the greatest near-term challenge to peace and stability in Asia.]

Even if the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is successfully resolved, other potential concerns remain. A variety of factors were highlighted, including the size of the North Korean military and the proximity of so many of its forces to the DMZ (and hence to Seoul), its continued development of long-range missiles, its general unpredictability and history of aggressive and provocative actions, and the sad state of its economy (which many assess as being on the brink of collapse). All these add to the potential for violence on the Peninsula. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula not only will be a direct threat to Japan but also will undoubtedly place strains on the U.S.–Japan security relationship, especially if Japan cannot live up to U.S. expectations of direct and indirect support for the ensuing war effort.
There was also a brief discussion on the prospects for reunification of the Korean Peninsula and the implications such an event would have on the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, if or when it occurred. One Japanese participant noted that the eventual removal of American forces from the Korean Peninsula, post-reunification, would increase the importance of the remaining U.S. forces based in Japan. The prospects of U.S. forces remaining in a post-reunification Korea were not addressed in any detail. Both sides agreed, however, on the importance of cordial relations between Japan and an eventually reunified Korea.

There were varying degrees of debate both within and between the U.S. and Japanese contingents relating to other security concerns in the region as well. The following commentary touches on the most conspicuous among the potential challenges discussed in workshop papers and by participants; it is not meant to be an all-inclusive listing.

**Whither Russia?**

Russia remains high on the list when Northeast Asian security concerns are chronicled, although the nature of the concern has shifted with the Cold War’s end and the introduction of democracy to the Kremlin. Although the border issue between Russia and Japan remains unresolved and Russian Far East military inventories are still sizable, it was generally agreed that the threat of overt military conflict between Japan and Russia is negligible today. Russian intentions are viewed in the U.S. as benign, although this view was not necessarily shared by all of the Japanese participants. Russia’s (non-strategic) military capabilities, while formidable in relative terms, are significantly reduced.

One Japanese participant noted that there is a significant difference between “lack of hostile intent” and “evidence of friendly intent,” suggesting that Americans tend to focus on the former whereas the Japanese are still awaiting proof of the latter from Moscow.

Both sides were concerned about long-term Russian economic and political stability and the rise of a hostile brand of nationalism, as manifested in the political rise of zealots such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The security of nuclear arsenals and plutonium stockpiles throughout the former Soviet Union, and the perceived willingness of some
individuals to sell nuclear materials (or their own expertise) to the highest bidder, continue to raise proliferation-related concerns as well. As one American noted, Russia's nuclear arsenal may pose a bigger threat today than it did during the Cold War, given the environmental and security problems that are arising as Russia attempts to keep its stockpiles secure.

Rapprochement between Russia and the United States (to include dialogue between their respective militaries) has progressed faster than it had, or could, between Russia and Japan, due to lingering suspicions, Russia's negligence of Japan's importance, and continuing disagreement over Russia's occupation of Japan's Northern Territories. While the end of the Cold War has reduced security concerns on both sides, political sensitivities on both sides remain high and have actually increased in Russia, making any near-term settlement of this territorial issue highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the value of increased Russo-Japanese direct dialogue was evident to all and should be encouraged, even if progress is slow.

In general, the Japanese participants appeared somewhat more concerned than their American counterparts about Russia's potential to once again threaten mutual security interests in Asia. However, they ranked the Russian threat below both the more immediate threat posed by North Korea and the potential threat caused by an unstable or unfriendly China in the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

**The Challenge of China**

Both sides were concerned about China over the long term, although all agreed that it was vital to regional security that both Japan and the United States maintain good relations with China and that a "zero sum" approach be avoided by all three sides. In this regard, concerns were expressed on both sides that disagreements between the United States and Japan over PRC policy issues—most specifically, the vigorous U.S. pursuit of its human rights policies—could put unnecessary strains on the alliance. Close coordination on China policy was strongly endorsed.

One participant speculated that increased trade and cooperation between China and the U.S. might result in a future U.S. tilt toward China. No one on the American side accepted this hypothesis or
envisioned the U.S.–China relationship becoming as close as the U.S.–Japan relationship. Japanese participants, while acknowledging that such concerns do exist in some quarters, generally shared this assessment. The U.S. view was that the real danger is not in the U.S. and China becoming too close but in their becoming estranged due to disagreements over human rights and other contentious issues. Most Japanese preferred a U.S.–China relationship that is neither unduly strained nor too close—a relationship akin to the current one between Japan and China.

Both sides agreed there is great uncertainty regarding both Chinese political stability in the immediate post-Deng era and the prospects for continued economic success over the long term. There is also the realization that an economically prosperous, politically stable China does not automatically equate to a cooperative or benign one. Nonetheless, continued Japanese and American interaction with China, especially in areas that support economic liberalization efforts, still offers the best course for ultimate political reform and greater interdependence and regional cooperation.

In the area of nontraditional threats, it was noted that China’s economic success increases the prospects for direct competition between China and Japan for Asian resources and markets. One Japanese participant stressed that such economic success poses an environmental threat to Japan and the rest of Northeast Asia as well, given China’s high level of atmospheric pollution, and that this could become a future source of contention in the region.

Military modernization in China was another topic of concern. No one doubts that China will modernize its armed forces or that it has the right (and perhaps even the need) to do so. There was a difference of perception, however, regarding the implications of a Chinese military build-up for regional stability (and Japan’s security). This seems largely due to the fact that each side viewed Chinese capabilities relative to its own respective military capabilities. This difference may be further exacerbated by the inherent geographic parallax that exists when Japan and the United States view China.

Americans considered it doubtful that Chinese military modernization efforts over the next several decades would result in a military force with sufficient power-projection capabilities to seriously
threaten U.S. military forces or interests. The Japanese perspective, and the view from many of China's smaller neighbors, is quite different. The development of even a modest naval and air force power-projection capability is seen as a significant potential threat, especially when placed in the context of China's unyielding claims to island territories occupied by Japan and many of China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and continuing concerns in the region about longer-term American “staying power.”

A continued concerted effort by China to develop power-projection capabilities, especially in the absence of a more conciliatory attitude regarding disputed territories, could prompt a spiraling arms race throughout Asia. Although U.S. attempts to overemphasize this potential threat could hamper the improvement of U.S.–PRC relations, a central Japanese theme throughout the discussion was that Washington must remain attuned to regional perspectives and concerns generated by continued PRC military modernization. Chinese regional hegemony remains a potential concern in most East Asian capitals.

Directly related to this was the concern expressed by one Japanese participant that renewed military-to-military contacts between the PRC and the U.S. would result in American arms sales or other types of technology transfer to China. American participants familiar with the situation assured their Japanese counterparts that no arms sales to China were being planned. Both sides endorsed greater military-to-military contacts between their respective armed forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army to promote greater understanding and military transparency.

Several references were also made to the weapons acquisition and modernization programs seemingly under way throughout Asia. Few identified these activities as an “arms race,” but there was uncertainty over intentions and capabilities, particularly when it came to China or (as Americans gently pointed out) Japan. The group endorsed efforts at achieving greater military transparency as one way to limit the degree of misunderstanding and uncertainty, thus preventing an even greater arms build-up in the region.

As this section indicates, the greatest security challenges in Asia today appear to be based not on imminent threats but on
uncertainty—uncertainty regarding North Korea's objectives and intentions, uncertainty over Russia's long-term stability and ability to safeguard nuclear assets, and uncertainty over China's direction in the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

**American Engagement**

Japanese participants also expressed varying degrees of uncertainty and concern over the future intentions of the United States as well. One theme running through most Japanese papers and commentary was concern over a post-Cold War "power vacuum" that could be created by the ongoing streamlining or downsizing of America's military presence in Asia. This was described by some as an American "withdrawal" from Asia. The American counter-argument emphasized that there is no power vacuum and that, in relative terms, America's military strength is greater today than during the Cold War, given the absence of any credible peer competitor. In reality, argued one American, with the exception of North Korea, there is a "threat vacuum." This, U.S. participants argued, has made possible a measured reduction in the level of U.S. forward-based forces.

As the following section points out in greater detail, the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) reports and the Defense Department's "Bottom-Up Review" assert a continued U.S. military presence in Asia. U.S. participants at the workshop referred to these documents and stressed that President Clinton has identified U.S. forces forward-deployed in Asia as the "bedrock of America's security role in the Asian-Pacific region." Unfortunately, as Japanese participants noted, such pronouncements have clearly failed to completely assuage lingering concerns in Japan (and elsewhere throughout the region) over America's long-term intention to remain fully engaged in Asia.

Such concerns also manifested themselves in the discussion by Japanese participants of America's changed attitude toward multilateral security regimes in Asia, which some skeptics fear could represent a cover for still greater reductions in the level of direct involvement in Asia by American military forces. A significant gap remains between what Americans say and what many Asians believe when it comes to the continued American military presence in, and commitment to, East Asia. Subsequent sections provide additional examples of this perception or credibility gap as it was discussed by workshop participants.
THE FUTURE OF THE JAPAN–U.S. ALLIANCE

The Japan–U.S. alliance, born at the onset of the Cold War as part of the global effort to contain communism and Soviet expansionism, has stood the test of time. Commonly referred to as “the world’s most important bilateral relationship, bar none”—a sentiment generally shared by workshop participants—it continues to serve the vital national security interests of both the United States and Japan. Four decades of positive cooperation, open communication, and growing economic interdependence are at the base of this mutually beneficial relationship.

PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE

The end of the Cold War has brought about a change in some (but by no means all) of the rationale behind the alliance and has certainly changed the security environment in which it operates; but it has not reduced the importance of the security relationship to either the two signatories or East Asia as a whole. The goals, objectives, and values that lie at the base of the security relationship are enduring ones that continue to reflect common basic beliefs and a shared commitment to democracy, stability, and prosperity. There are no serious political challenges to this perception in either country, and the Japanese Socialist Party, coincident with this workshop, formally accepted the U.S.–Japan security relationship.

Participants who had been directly involved in the security dialogue between the U.S. and Japan over the years readily attested to the vitality and flexibility of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (more commonly referred to as the Mutual Defense Treaty, or MDT). Greater acknowledgement is due for the ongoing efforts by both governments to nurture and adjust the relationship in the face of the immense changes that have occurred, not only since the fall of the Soviet Empire, but throughout the four-plus decades that the Treaty has been in place. Both formally and informally, the MDT has undergone frequent modification and adjustment since its inception. Many suggestions aimed at keeping the relationship viable into the next century were offered during the course of the workshop and are interspersed throughout this report.
The MDT commits both sides to the defense of Japan and the promotion of regional stability. It has had another unwritten, but nonetheless important, objective: it has averted the need for Japan to develop a stand-alone military capability. Fear of Japanese remilitarization runs throughout Asia, prompted by lingering memories of the Pacific War. As a result, Japan’s neighbors (especially Koreans and Chinese) carefully scrutinize Japan’s military activities and defense modernization plans. Both Japanese and American participants recognized that the alliance helps allay concerns that might otherwise arise in response to even modest Japanese efforts to improve self-defense capabilities, if these occurred outside the framework of the Japan–U.S. security relationship.

The security relationship promotes regional stability in other key ways as well. For example, the basing of U.S. forces in Japan under the alliance agreement permits the U.S. to respond more rapidly to crises and contingencies throughout and beyond the region, as Okinawa-based Marines did during Desert Storm and during disaster relief operations in Bangladesh and elsewhere. This adds to the credibility of America’s commitment to regional stability.

With the significant reduction, though not elimination, of immediate external threats to Japan’s security, it was the clear consensus of the group that the alliance’s focus must continue to reach beyond the defense of Japan and encompass the broader regional goals of further enhancing regional stability and cooperation on global security issues. This requires a renewed, credible commitment on the part of the United States to remain fully engaged in East Asia and a willingness on the part of Japan to increasingly share in the risks and responsibilities in order to keep the alliance robust and relevant. What such “full engagement” and “sharing of risks” involved were central issues during the workshop discussions.

THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

One of the most important aspects of the alliance is the nuclear umbrella the U.S. provides over Japan. This is an essential element, since it obviates the need for Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability—an event that would have severe regional and global consequences. Not surprisingly, a considerable amount of discussion was devoted to this topic.
Several points were generally accepted as givens: first, that it was well within Japan's ability to develop nuclear weapons (and the necessary long-range delivery systems) if it chooses to do so, given its advanced nuclear and rocket technologies; second, that current attitudes in Japan were firmly opposed to doing so—that Japan's three non-nuclear principles (which prohibit the manufacture, possession, or introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons) were firmly supported by the current government and by an overwhelming majority of the Japanese population; and third, that a reversal in Japanese attitudes regarding nuclear weapons was totally unthinkable, provided the Japan–U.S. alliance is effectively maintained.

As regards the last point, Japanese participants acknowledged that the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan was currently illegal under the Atomic Power Basic Law (which limits Japan's use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes) but was not unconstitutional per se, since the development of a nuclear deterrent capability could technically be viewed as a strictly defensive measure. Article nine of the constitution, as presently interpreted, however, does prevent Japan from possessing the long-range, offensive, power-projection weapon systems needed for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Constitutional issues notwithstanding, Japanese anti-nuclear sentiments run deep. As one Japanese participant noted, this sentiment is more than a national consensus; it represents a firm determination of the Japanese people.

What, then, would drive Japan to "go nuclear"? According to the Japanese participants, the single most important determinant of Japan's nuclear future is the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. security alliance. As long as this alliance remains firm (that is to say, as long as Tokyo believes that the U.S. nuclear umbrella will not be withdrawn), there is virtually no chance that Japan will elect to develop nuclear weapons. The reverse could also be true, however. Should the alliance for any reason crumble and the nuclear umbrella be removed, several Japanese members believed (as did several Americans) that Japan would invariably feel compelled to develop a nuclear deterrent capability.

Some American participants speculated further that should North Korea be proven to possess nuclear weapons, this fact—in
and of itself—could provide sufficient incentive for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as well. This thesis was strongly challenged by the Japanese participants, who were firm in their assertion that Japan will not develop an independent nuclear weapons capability, even if North Korea cannot be deterred from pursuing or achieving this objective, as long as the Japanese remain confident that the Japan–U.S. alliance remains firm and the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains open over Japan.

One Japanese security specialist observed that there was some skepticism in Japan during the Cold War as to whether a Soviet nuclear attack on Japan would bring about an American nuclear response, given that the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal put all of the United States at risk. He felt that today the probability is considerably greater that the United States will respond in kind to a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan, since Pyongyang's ability to directly threaten the U.S. is virtually nonexistent. As a result, the U.S. nuclear umbrella should serve as an even greater deterrent in the case of North Korea than it did vis-a-vis the Soviets. As one American participant had stated earlier, if a massive Soviet nuclear arsenal (or a smaller but still formidable Chinese nuclear weapons capability) had not driven Japan to "go nuclear," why would a few crude weapons in North Korea?

This argument was not universally accepted, however. One Japanese participant believed that just the opposite was the case: namely, that with the Soviet threat the U.S. had to respond, but, since North Korea's capabilities do not threaten the U.S. directly, its commitment to Japan is less reliable than before. This appeared to be a minority viewpoint, but it still reflected the general Japanese anxiety as to the continued viability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The cause of this anxiety was clear. As noted in the previous section, considerable distrust of China lies just below the surface in Japan today, despite the generally hospitable current state of Sino-Japanese relations, and it requires no digging at all to find Japan's anti-Russian sentiment. As one Japanese participant starkly observed, if U.S.–Japan relations soured, Japan would be faced with two alternatives: become a subject nation of China (or Russia), or
develop nuclear arms; this is why the Japan–U.S. alliance remains vital. In the minds of most Japanese, a Japan with its security in the hands of either China or Russia is even more unthinkable than a Japan armed with nuclear weapons; the Japanese would build their own nuclear umbrella before they would rely on one made in China or Russia.

The geopolitical costs of such a decision would be high. The Japanese acknowledged that the development of nuclear weapons would cause intense distrust and paranoia among Japan’s neighbors. The likely results, in military/security terms, would be a massive regionwide arms build-up (possibly including the proliferation of nuclear weapons) and/or a closer accommodation between China and many other Asian countries.

U.S. and Japanese participants agreed that neither Japan’s military nor economic security would be enhanced by its obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, without the security assurance provided by America’s nuclear umbrella, Japan would seriously have to consider developing its own nuclear capability, given its vulnerability to potentially hostile, nuclear-armed neighbors in a still-dangerous and uncertain world.

Given the importance of America’s nuclear assurance to Japan’s security and future strategic decision-making, it was little wonder that Japanese participants sought firm reassurances that the U.S. nuclear guarantee will remain valid despite the end of the Cold War. In fact, the “need to reconfirm the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella” was identified as one of the primary security concerns confronting Japan at present. As a result, Japanese participants repeatedly stressed the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the need for constant reassurance from the United States that it will not be withdrawn. To the best of their ability, American participants at the workshop provided such assurances. Japanese participants, for the most part, did not directly challenge the continued viability of an American nuclear umbrella as an integral part of the overall U.S. security guarantee, although several Japanese continued to express concern over whether the strength of this commitment might have weakened with the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

If the nuclear umbrella is an intangible or invisible aspect of the alliance, the presence of U.S. military forces stationed in Japan or forward deployed in East Asia is clearly a key tangible element. A continued American forward military presence is directly equated by the Japanese both to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to remain engaged in East Asia and to the viability of the alliance itself. The U.S. has committed itself to keeping its forces in the region. As noted earlier, however, Japanese participants at the workshop pointed out that U.S. pronouncements to the contrary have failed to assuage lingering Japanese concerns over America’s long-term intention to remain fully engaged in East Asia.

In response to these expressed concerns, American presentations emphasized that the immediate post-Cold War reduction in U.S. Asia-based military forces was closely coordinated with America’s regional allies and clearly outlined in advance in the EASI reports. Also noted was the fact that the recently concluded U.S. Defense Department Bottom-Up Review concluded that U.S. force levels in East Asia would remain generally constant for the remainder of the decade, while European forward-deployed assets will be reduced to East Asian levels. In addition, President Clinton, in defining his vision of a “new Pacific community,” stated that U.S. forward-deployed forces in Asia constituted one of its key pillars.

Despite such assurances, Japanese participants suggested that some Japanese (along with other Asians) remain unconvinced. They look at previous force cutbacks, ongoing U.S. budget pressures, and frequent calls by American congressmen (among others) to “bring our boys home,” and wonder whether this or any other American administration can withstand the political pressure. Logic might argue in favor of America’s continued engagement in Asia, but given the region’s growing economic and strategic importance, some Japanese still feel uneasy.

This uneasiness prompted one American to wonder whether the priorities for this gathering had been misplaced. He felt that perhaps more attention should have been placed on developing new bilateral mechanisms to close the “perception gap” between the U.S. and Japan
rather than on seeking multilateral mechanisms for doing so on a broader regional basis. Obviously, the two efforts support one another, but the point was well taken: the U.S. and Japan must be aware that even the closest of bilateral relationships is not immune to perception (or credibility) gaps, and constant attention must be given to this potential stress point.

American participants reminded their Japanese colleagues that voices were also being raised in Japan—and particularly in Okinawa—questioning the desirability of a continued U.S. presence and Japan's willingness to continue its generous levels of host-nation support. Japanese participants also pointed to the strains exerted on Japan's static or declining defense budgets by rising costs associated with their generous host-nation support. Both sides agreed that their governments must do a better job of explaining to their respective publics the importance and continued viability of our mutual defense ties in the post-Cold War environment.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

Although most participants agreed that the alliance remains on solid ground today, it remains subject to strains and challenges as it continues to adjust to the changing security environment. Both sides acknowledged strains caused by the uneven nature of the security arrangement. The disparity in size and capabilities of the two militaries and the constitutional (and psychological) restrictions placed on the employment of Japan's self-defense forces have resulted in an asymmetry between the United States and Japan in terms of the responsibilities and risks inherent in the defense relationship.

As several Americans noted, however, this asymmetry is not unique to the Japan–U.S. relationship; virtually all U.S. defense relationships are asymmetrical. It was further observed that the Japan–U.S. relationship is asymmetrical by design, based on a mutual desire that Japan not develop a stand-alone military capability. This desire is embodied in the Japanese constitution. It also reflects the desires, and helps assuage the concerns, of Japan's neighbors who, as noted earlier, fear a militarily independent Japan.

American participants argued that all the U.S. expects from its allies and friends is a timely effort commensurate with their
capabilities. Although Japan has been extremely generous in its levels of host-nation support and its financing of such international security efforts as Desert Storm, "checkbook diplomacy" alone will not suffice. Japan must be more willing to share the burdens, risks, and responsibilities of international leadership. The problem is not a lack of symmetry but near-total risk avoidance—which helps feed the view, exaggerated by many American critics, that Japan is getting a free ride at America's expense. At the same time, as one Japanese participant observed, his nation was frustrated that Japan's sizable $13 billion contribution to Desert Storm drew hardly so much as a "thank you" from the United States or Kuwait.

American commentators emphasized that they were not demanding that Japan send combat troops overseas. They were aware of the constitutional restrictions and adverse regional reactions inherent in such a dramatic departure from the status quo. But Japan could do many things short of sending ground troops into combat—and should have done several things to better support the 1991 Gulf War effort (e.g., deployment of minesweepers or others in the early stages of the confrontation, and deployment of logistic units, engineer units, and/or medical corps personnel before or immediately after the conflict). Some Americans felt that Japan's reluctance to support the war effort directly, and the agonizing debate within Japan over its eventual financial support to the war effort, may have weakened the fabric of the alliance somewhat, making it more susceptible to future tears.

A failure by Japan to respond in a manner that approaches U.S. expectations the next time there is a major crisis or contingency—especially one that directly affects Japan's national interests (as the Gulf War did)—could place serious, perhaps even fatal, strains on the relationship. In this regard, a U.S. participant observed that, although regional crises could serve as the trigger, the real danger to the future of the alliance emanates not from outside forces or events alone but from attitudes among policymakers in Washington and Tokyo and their respective domestic constituencies as well.

While many scenarios were touched upon, the one most frequently discussed (and deemed most likely) involved conflict on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. and Japanese participants expressed
a common concern that a Japanese refusal (or lukewarm effort) to support U.S. forces in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula could seriously strain, and might ultimately have a devastating effect on, the alliance.

Once again, Americans stressed that they were not talking about the employment of Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force troops on the Korean Peninsula. This was neither necessary nor desirable, and would probably be unacceptable to the Koreans as well. However, Japan would be expected to play an active sea lane defense and surveillance role and to participate actively in missile defense efforts that could include the deployment of Aegis ships well forward in the Sea of Japan. Tokyo would also be expected to support U.S. efforts to prosecute the war while staging from Japanese bases.

The question of noncombatant evacuation operations was also raised. Can Japan legally participate in such operations? Would it be able to help rescue endangered Japanese citizens trapped amidst hostilities on the Peninsula? Would Japan assist in the rescue of American or other third-party nationals? The Japanese advised their American colleagues that such questions were already under serious consideration but that legislative, as well as attitudinal, changes would be required before they could be satisfactorily answered.

U.S. participants also noted that there are steps that Japan could take now to help reduce the asymmetry, ease the tension, and demonstrate its willingness to shoulder an increased share of the defense burden, while both sides prepare to better deal with conflicts that cannot be avoided or deterred. These steps include, among others, the implementation of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to ensure greater interoperability and logistical efficiency in time of crisis, and greater theater missile defense cooperation—issues that have been high on the American agenda for several years.

The level and focus of combined military training should also be further adjusted to meet current realities. Americans felt that future combined military exercises should focus on command-post exercises and political-military simulations that go beyond the strictly tactical issues of defense of Japan and address, head-on, the more politically sensitive issues involved in Japan's direct involvement in a regional crisis. Americans place high value on
such political-military simulations because they help identify key
decision points and stumbling blocks that must be overcome dur-
ing crisis situations. Such “war games,” to be successful, would
require Japanese players to ask highly sensitive questions and make
politically difficult decisions. Japanese military planners, to date,
have not been inclined to tackle such issues, except in an imme-
diate or ongoing crisis, especially if the desired actions run contrary
to the current popular consensus.

Several Japanese participants expressed uncertainty as to
whether Japan would be capable of acting promptly during periods
of increased tension, given the weakness of crisis-management pro-
cedures within the Japanese government. Others confidently pre-
dicted that, in times of actual crisis, Japan would be capable of rap-
 idly achieving a consensus in order to “do the right thing.” It appears,
however, that Japanese concern over the political dangers inherent
in discussing sensitive issues in peacetime presently prevails over
the potential security dangers that could be faced by being less than
fully prepared to deal with a crisis once at hand. As one Japanese
stated, “For our bureaucrats to make a statement before something
happens is almost suicidal.” Americans cautioned that this re-
results in a lost opportunity both to better prepare for potential chal-
leges and to demonstrate Japan’s willingness to at least identify
the actions that must be taken if Japan is to assume a greater
share of the defense burden.

The American side believed, and many Japanese participants
agreed, that it was desirable for the United States and Japan to
address more candidly the broader geopolitical and strategic ques-
tions, testing together the limits of Japan’s willingness and ability
to contribute to regional defense. Potentially divisive questions
pertaining to the MDT and constitutional interpretations must be
addressed now if the security relationship is to remain viable and
truly relevant into the next century. Nonetheless, most Japanese
participants were uncertain whether this would be possible in the
near term, due to the slow decision-making process in the
Japanese government and the turmoil involved in the current on-
going political restructuring.

Japanese participants pointed out that a more balanced
relationship requires give and take on both sides. For its part,
the United States must recognize that greater responsibility-sharing mandates shared decision-making as well. As one Japanese participant noted, “Power must be shared for responsibility to be shared.” The United States must demonstrate an increased willingness to consult with Japan before making decisions that affect Japan’s security interests, and Japan should be less reluctant to make proposals or to criticize proposals that do not appear in its best interest. Both sides agreed that the two governments must make a concerted effort to reach a mutual agreement regarding threat perceptions, policy priorities, and the most appropriate means of achieving mutual security goals.

**THE ECONOMIC CONNECTION**

Not all the strains in the alliance come from the defense relationship. Both sides expressed growing concern that increased trade frictions between the world’s two largest economies would spill over into the security arena and urged that every effort be made to keep the two issues separate. Trade frictions were seen as a side effect of the deepening economic interdependence between the U.S. and Japan. The two economies are so deeply integrated that it was widely agreed that a serious trade dispute would be suicidal to both sides, as would attempts to link trade disagreements to the security alliance. Although clearly an area of concern, it was generally believed that U.S.–Japan trade frictions are presently insufficient, in and of themselves, to rupture the alliance. Nonetheless, they do add straw to the camel’s back. As a result, it was agreed that both sides must make a concerted effort to keep the trade disputes in their proper perspective and keep them divorced from the more essential security aspects of the relationship.

Broader regional economic developments were addressed as well. It was generally agreed that economic integration among and between the major regional players enhances regional stability. This could represent a doubled-edged sword, however. An American participant offered the case of conflict between China and one of the other Spratly Island claimants as an illustration. Would Japan or others with significant investments in China participate in a U.S.-led economic embargo of China in response to Chinese aggression? What happens when a nation’s security interests (in this
case, maintaining the Japan–U.S. alliance directly conflict with its economic interests? Which way would Japan go, and how long would it take to make a decision? Although cases such as the above are too scenario-dependent to be fully analyzed, participants agreed that differences of opinion over the priorities and implications behind potential crises could place additional strains on the alliance. They also add to the importance of conflict-avoidance mechanisms.

The Alliance Validated

In summary, there was a general consensus that the end of the Cold War has not signalled an end to the importance of the Japan–U.S. security alliance, both as an essential element in the overall relationship between the world’s two economic superpowers and as the solid foundation upon which to build regional peace and stability. The alliance remains in the vital national security interest of both signatories and the region as a whole. A continued, credible U.S. forward military presence and a demonstrated commitment to remain engaged are essential, as is an increased willingness on the part of Japan to assume a greater share of the actual burden and risk. It is also essential, participants agreed, for a new Japanese consensus to be built on the extent and depth of such commitment.

At the same time, participants agreed that any expansion in Japan’s security role or defensive capabilities should continue to take place in the context of the Japan–U.S. bilateral alliance or broader-based multilateral activities that build upon the alliance. As one Japanese noted, any unilateral Japanese movement toward more risk- or responsibility-sharing “would likely provoke a counterproductive reaction around East Asia.” For this reason, if Japan is to increase its risk-sharing, “the U.S. must firmly support and endorse any change in the division of labor to keep regional fears rested.”

The Japan–U.S. security alliance has been the most effective vehicle to date for maintaining U.S. military presence in the region and for increasing Japanese responsibility-sharing. But several multinational mechanisms also can serve these purposes, as the next section demonstrates.
MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN EAST ASIA

In recent years, there has been a decided shift in regional attitudes toward, and U.S. support for, multinational security initiatives in East Asia. It was not that long ago that most Americans and East Asians viewed multilateralism in much the same way as an aeronautical engineer views the bumblebee: namely, as something that theoretical analyses suggest cannot fly. As recently as 1991, when then Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama suggested at an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) gathering that a forum be established to discuss regional security issues, his remarks were not well received in the region. The U.S., in particular, was cool to such an idea, at least in part due to memories of earlier Soviet Cold War proposals that were seen as thinly veiled attempts to reduce or eliminate U.S. influence and military presence in the region.

EMBRACING MULTINATIONALISM

But, as American and Japanese presentations both confirmed, attitudes have shifted. During his April 1993 confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord identified a commitment to enhanced multilateral security dialogue as one of the Clinton Administration's ten priority policy goals for Asia. In the meantime, a few of the ASEAN states and several regional research institutes began pressing for the introduction of security-related issues into ASEAN PMC deliberations. As a result, in contrast to 1991, then Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa's 1993 endorsement of a similar concept in Bangkok was widely endorsed by other participating countries.

American participants noted that the U.S. has continued to embrace the concept of multilateral security dialogue in East Asia, with President Clinton calling it one of the four pillars of his vision for a "new Pacific community." However, this new support for multilateralism has raised some concerns among those who are skeptical regarding America's long-term commitment to Asia. Japanese participants, while clearly supportive of the concept and pleased with the change in U.S. attitude, relayed regional concerns that multilateral security dialogue and cooperation might serve as a cover or excuse for a reduced American military commitment.
MULTILATERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE

It was the clear consensus of the group that future multilateral security arrangements should not be a substitute for a continued U.S. military presence in Asia. As one Japanese speaker observed, "If bilateral alliances merged into multilateral activities without careful monitoring, tremendous risks could emerge." Japanese participants urged that multilateral initiatives, if they were to be effective, should be built upon the foundation provided by the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance.

The American side fully understood and generally concurred with this concern. It was noted that both Japan and the United States predicate their support for increased regionalism upon the premise that such multilateral efforts complement or build upon, and not be seen as a substitute for, enduring bilateral relationships such as the Japan-U.S. alliance.

As one American noted, President Clinton's support for multilateral frameworks should be seen in the context of four assumptions:

- The U.S. presence in Asia will continue indefinitely.
- Japan will not pursue a course independent from the United States but will approach multilateral initiatives in close consultation with its number-one ally.
- The Japan-U.S. alliance will remain a fundamental constant in the equation.
- Regional stability is best promoted through a combination of bilateralism and multilateralism, not by "either-or" scenarios.

The group also underscored the continued relevance of other existing security relationships in Asia. Foremost among these are America's security ties with Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand; the Five Power Defense Arrangement or FPDA (linking Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom); and the various agreements that separately tie many of the ASEAN countries to one another and to outside powers. Of note, all except the FPDA are currently bilateral, and the FPDA, as the name implies, is an "arrangement"; it is not an alliance in the traditional sense of the term.
Security agreements between North Korea and both China and Russia could also play a constructive role, especially if they helped underwrite any confidence-building measures that emerge as a result of renewed North-South or U.S.-North Korea dialogue. As one American participant pointed out, if North Korea’s apparent quest for nuclear weapons is based, even in part, on genuine (to them) security concerns, then outside security guarantees may be required, and China is in the best position to provide such assurances.

A review of existing multilateral activities, at both the governmental and NGO level, reveals that most appear compatible with existing bilateral arrangements. As a result, these ongoing bilateral and multilateral initiatives were seen as building blocks toward even greater security cooperation throughout the region.

Multilateral security initiatives are not totally new to East Asia. Many have been attempted, a significant percentage with U.S. sponsorship. Some, like the old Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) pacts, failed to stand the test of time. Their failures may have also increased skepticism on the part of the U.S. and many Asians as to the applicability of multilateral security alliances to South and Southeast Asia. Sponsorship of Asian multilateral initiatives by various Kremlin leaders during the Cold War, which were seen as thinly veiled attempts to dilute or eliminate American influence while gaining Soviet entry into Asia, also added to the earlier cautious approach both in Washington and Tokyo regarding multilateral security initiatives. This factor is no longer relevant, and both the U.S. and Japanese participants agreed that Russia would gradually play a more active role in multilateral Asian forums.

On the positive side of the ledger, other less ambitious multinational efforts have been quietly effective in Asia for decades. The FPDA, for example, has been in effect for over 20 years and has helped create a level of trust and interoperability between the U.K. and Oceanian and East Asian nations. It has also provided an indirect link, via the Australian common denominator, between the U.S. and the ASEAN members of the FPDA. This has greatly facilitated growing bilateral ties between the U.S. and both Singapore and Malaysia.
In many respects, the region’s militaries have been ahead of their political counterparts, thanks to several highly successful seminar programs. For example, the Pacific Armies Senior Officer Logistics Seminar, instituted by the U.S. Army in 1971, today brings together annually military officers from over 20 nations to discuss common logistics matters and joint operations and training. Similarly, the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, established in 1978, provides a forum for senior military officers from more than 30 nations to discuss military management problems. Recent agendas have focused on international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations—two areas that were stressed during the workshop as highly suitable for multinational efforts.

These military initiatives have also provided a comfortable venue for military officers from China, Russia, Japan, and India, among others, to interact with military officials from many nations that would find it difficult, if not politically impossible, to engage one another bilaterally. These confidence-building measures have also helped set the stage for new proposals emanating from the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, the ARF, and several NGOs to create a more structured multilateral forum for direct talks about security issues among the region’s senior-most military and defense officials. Such initiatives were strongly endorsed by U.S. and Japanese workshop participants. As one Japanese paper put it, “Exchanges of military personnel can correct the images they have of other countries’ military strength, which are prone to exaggeration, and this can help ensure that sensible defense policies are maintained in their own countries.”

Survey of Multilateral Activities

These are but a few of the multilateral mechanisms and initiatives already in place and thriving in Asia that have served as building blocks for current, more ambitious multilateral initiatives. An expanded list of existing and emerging governmental and NGO initiatives organized under three categories—security, military, and economic—is included as appendix C to this report. These initiatives run the gamut from regionwide dialogues to practical, more focused activities on a subregional level. A quick glance reveals a marked proliferation in security-oriented initiatives since 1991.
Of particular note is the broad range of successful economic-oriented activities that are flourishing in East Asia. As several participants pointed out, economic organizations also play an effective confidence-building role that further promotes regional security. They have also provided a useful foundation upon which to now build the more sensitive, security-oriented mechanisms.

Workshop participants were especially supportive of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which links 17 economies in the region. It is aimed at managing the effects of growing economic interdependence in the region, but has important political and security consequences as well. Only a few members supported adding security topics to the formal APEC agenda, but most agreed that when heads of state attend annual APEC meetings, a heavy security dimension is automatically introduced. As one participant noted, “Even if security issues are not on the official agenda, leaders are likely to discuss such issues in the corridors anyway.”

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that APEC provides one of the few governmental forums in which both China and Taiwan participate. As one Japanese participant noted, this sets a helpful precedent that permits individual nations to justify closer direct economic interaction with Taiwan while still abiding by the “one China” policy. The group was highly supportive of APEC in general and continued “summit meetings” in particular, although most cautioned that expectations should not be overinflated; very little in terms of concrete positive actions was likely to come from such meetings. In this, as in many other instances of multilateral dialogue, the process itself may be the most important product, since increased dialogue promotes increased understanding. It is hoped that this in turn will lead to a reduced risk of conflict, which remains the ultimate aim of all security-oriented mechanisms.

Another multinational organization with economics at its base has also taken on important political and security dimensions. ASEAN, established in 1967, was acknowledged as one of the most successful practical examples of Asian multilateral cooperation in action. Through its various mechanisms (outlined in appendix C) and its close affiliation to member-nation think tanks, ASEAN has
helped lay the foundation for several of the region's most promising mechanisms for multilateral dialogue.

At the official level is the recently established ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brings together senior ministers from the six ASEAN States (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), their dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and the European Community), and other key regional players (China, Russia, and Vietnam, plus Papua New Guinea and Laos)—18 nations in all—to discuss regional security issues. The inaugural meeting was held in Bangkok in July 1994, concurrent with the IIIPS-CNA workshop. Workshop participants strongly endorsed the ARF's concluding statement and the agreement by the senior ministers to continue to meet on a recurring basis.

The ARF is seen as particularly suited to becoming the consolidating and validating instrument behind many security initiatives proposed by government and NGO gatherings in recent years. Its support of such ideas as an Asian arms registry, military transparency, and other confidence- and security-building measures should generate greater support for, and provide greater focus to, efforts at both the official and non-governmental levels to develop innovative new measures for dealing with potentially sensitive regional security issues.

Among the most promising mechanisms at the NGO level is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) that links regional security-oriented institutes and, through them, broad-based member committees composed of academicians, security specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defense officials. CSCAP predates the ARF and now hopes to provide direct support to it while also pursuing other “track two” NGO diplomacy efforts. Several CSCAP issue-oriented working groups are already focusing on specific topics outlined in the ARF's final communique. Of particular note is an international working group, led by the U.S., Korean, and Singaporean member committees, to address confidence- and security-building measures in the Asia Pacific.

Mechanisms for dealing more directly with Northeast Asia security concerns were also endorsed, either separately or as
subgroups under the ARF and CSCAP. Several efforts already under way are designed to bring officials from the four major Asian powers (the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan) together with representatives from both South and North Korea to discuss regional security issues. A few include Canada as well. NGO sponsorship was seen as key to bringing officials from these nations together, with the caveat that each was acting “in a private, as opposed to an official, capacity.” Unfortunately, the nuclear standoff on the Peninsula derailed these efforts just when they were most needed, when North Korea stopped participating. Workshop participants all endorsed renewed direct dialogue between North and South Korea, along with involvement by the major Asian powers in promoting and underwriting agreements reached by both protagonists.

The possibility of a more official four-power (or G4) forum involving the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China was also discussed. One Japanese participant strongly supported such a forum as a means of establishing good communications channels, arguing that resolving future problems in the region would require the cooperation of all four powers. Others were less sanguine, with one Japanese participant speculating that such a “big power scheme” would likely be resented or distrusted by other regional states. The role of the Koreas was also debated, with one American arguing that South Korea is a more appropriate candidate for membership than Russia in any G4 arrangement. Although this was not widely supported, most participants believed that both Koreas have to be involved in such an arrangement for it to work, since tensions on the Korean Peninsula are the primary regional security concern. No consensus was reached regarding the advisability of establishing a G4 forum, although most agreed that cooperation among the four major players is essential for regional stability and that, as a result, the benefits of a G4 forum might outweigh the drawbacks. Permanent Japanese membership on the United Nations Security Council was also discussed as a useful way to encourage Japan’s initiative.

Participants noted that several other subregional efforts also showed promise and believed that others may prove useful in overcoming lingering regional apprehensions about the future intentions of many of the region’s central actors. Both official and NGO forums seemed useful, with the latter better suited to dealing
initially with politically sensitive issues. For example, shortly after this workshop, two NGOs sponsored the first meeting between defense (including uniformed military) officials from Japan, Korea, and the United States, providing a politically acceptable forum for the three sides to discuss common security concerns while bringing America's two closest allies in Northeast Asia closer to one another.

One American who presented a paper at the workshop noted that second-track groupings such as CSCAP can provide "benign cover" for governments to vet new policies and strategies in a more academic setting before adopting formal proposals at the official level. NGOs could also provide a voice to nations, territories, and regional groupings that, for a variety of reasons, might be excluded from official gatherings.

LIMITATIONS AND BENEFITS

Multilateral security dialogue holds many promises for East Asia, but participants noted its limits as well. As one American suggested, bilateral activities still appear better suited to dealing with traditional security threats, and multilateral mechanisms might be better for dealing with non-traditional threats such as refugee problems or pollution and other environmental concerns. Peacekeeping and disaster relief operations also seemed well suited to a multilateral approach. Japanese participants strongly echoed this view, with one emphasizing that, in the post-Cold War period, such non-traditional security concerns are becoming more prominent and that multilateral ways of dealing with them should be fostered.

It was the clear consensus of the group that a NATO-type alliance aimed at containing a specified threat simply does not apply to post-Cold War East Asia. Rather, emerging mechanisms are more valuable if they serve as confidence-building measures aimed at avoiding, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression; the latter situations seem destined to be dealt with more on an ad hoc basis in the Asia Pacific (as they are elsewhere—witness the coalition assembled to deal with Iraqi aggression during Desert Storm).

Despite their limits, participants agreed that emerging multilateral security mechanisms in East Asia can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability, although Japanese participants were consistently more cautious in their support than
their American colleagues. Among other useful applications, workshop participants believed that Asian multilateral mechanisms could:

- assist Japan in becoming a more "normal" nation;
- provide a vehicle for China's positive engagement in the region;
- allow Russia to play a constructive security role;
- help ensure continued American engagement and involvement;
- assure that other regional voices are heard; and
- promote a sense of regional identity and a greater spirit of cooperation.

The first point was the most heavily stressed and broadly defined. It was the general consensus of the group that multilateral security forums offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that was non-threatening to neighboring countries. Japanese and American participants both acknowledged as an unfortunate, but no less relevant, fact that many of Japan's neighbors remain uncomfortable about Japan playing a larger security role in the Asia Pacific. Nonetheless, as Japan strives to become a more "normal" nation, voices inside Japan and beyond are calling (or, in some cases, demanding) that Japan become more active internationally. By actively participating in the ARF and similar forums, Japan can cautiously exert a greater leadership role in international security affairs.

In the context of this workshop, no one suggested that Japan must remilitarize or chart a course independent from its closest security ally, the United States. In many respects, "normal" is more a state of mind than a state of being, and involves Japan's acceptance by its neighbors as much as it does Japan's willingness to accept greater international responsibilities.

Although the focus of the workshop was on Asia-Pacific multilateral organizations, it was noted that the United Nations provides another useful forum for greater Japanese participation in security-related affairs. In this context, all supported greater Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities. Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council was not discussed in any detail, although the group seemed largely
supportive of this concept and did not see more active Japanese participation in so-called peacemaking activities (including military operations) as a necessary prerequisite to Security Council membership.

Multilateral mechanisms also provide a useful vehicle for China to interact more with its neighbors. Beijing appears to be gradually overcoming its historic reluctance to become involved in multilateral dialogue, and its participation in the ARF was endorsed by all. Active Chinese participation in a broad range of forums could also promote greater transparency regarding Chinese military capabilities and intentions, and this would also contribute to regional stability. Participants agreed that care must be taken not to make China, or any other nation, appear to be the enemy or target of any multilateral security arrangement. On the other hand, it was also noted that China must demonstrate that it shares its neighbors' desire for a cooperative relationship.

The same also applies to Russia. For its part, Russia has clearly signalled its desire to become more directly involved in multilateral security initiatives in Asia. For example, during the Security Council debate over sanctions against North Korea, it was Russia that proposed an international workshop of key East Asian players in order to seek ways of defusing the crisis (while assuring Russia a seat at the table). Russian involvement in Asian security dialogue promotes a degree of familiarity and respectability that also bolsters those in the Kremlin most committed to reform and international cooperation.

Organizations such as the ARF also provide a framework for continuing direct U.S. involvement in Asia-Pacific security issues and affairs. It was the general consensus of the group that continued American engagement in Asia is essential to regional stability and that participation in multilateral security mechanisms is an effective supplemental means of promoting such involvement, in conjunction with existing bilateral activities.

Workshop participants also saw the value of providing a mechanism for the other regional actors to be heard on security issues that affect them all. The ability of ASEAN to magnify the voices of its members further demonstrates the utility of multilateral settings for smaller regional nations. In
addition, nations or entities that might find it uncomfortable or politically unacceptable to engage in bilateral dialogue can still effectively interact at the multinational level, particularly in NGO forums. Multinational gatherings also contribute to a sense of regional identity and a greater spirit of cooperation. This will no doubt spill over into the political and economic spheres as well, just as growing political and economic cooperation has helped set the stage for expanded security dialogue.

Participants noted that East Asians appeared more comfortable than Westerners with what, to Americans and Europeans, appeared to be a bewildering array of overlapping multilateral forums and activities. Americans, and Westerners in general, seem to seek greater focus and specified objectives as a designated end product, whereas East Asians tend to see the process itself as being at least as important. Most supported a "building block" approach that would encourage small task-oriented activities as a means of developing greater confidence while setting the stage for more ambitious multilateral efforts. There was general agreement that multilateral forums and activities that built greater regional trust, confidence, and understanding improved the prospects for peace and stability in Asia and should be pursued jointly by the United States and Japan.

All discussions on multilateral arrangements in the Asia Pacific must end where this chapter began, with the caveat that they build upon the Japan–U.S. bilateral relationship, and not be seen as either a substitute for it or a threat to it. As one American paper put it:

The combination of the strategic interests of the U.S. and the constraints imposed on Japanese international behavior make the U.S.–Japan security alliance as close to a permanent fixture of East Asia as one can identify. Therefore, it is important to realize that all multilateral frameworks in the region are intended to complement rather than to replace this vital bilateral relationship. The interconnection is important to understand: the bilateral relationship is a precondition for multilateral initiatives; simultaneously, no multilateral initiative can or should be undertaken that would weaken the bilateral connection.
Japanese participants and papers strongly endorsed this sentiment. Noting that the alliance links two of the world’s most important, stable democracies and the two top-ranking global economies, one Japanese participant concluded that “there is no substitute” for this security relationship. This was clearly the prevailing view among both Japanese and American participants.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

As Japan and the United States look to the future, there are four options that either or both countries can take in protecting their respective security interests:

- Go separate ways. This option would require the United States either to seek new footholds in Asia or to retreat into an isolationist policy that would ill-serve its growing economic and security interests in the region. It would also require Japan to pursue a stand-alone military capability or to reach accommodation with its nuclear-armed neighbors. The first path would raise regional anxieties, and the latter one would raise anxieties within Japan. No one at the workshop viewed this option as serving either America’s or Japan’s immediate or long-term interests.

- Embrace, fully and exclusively, the growing trend toward multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region as the ultimate long-term solution to security problems in Asia—a solution that would make existing bilateral relationships seem less relevant. Workshop participants generally rejected this approach as well. They acknowledged the fact that the concept has its proponents in both the United States and Japan, but felt that a total embrace of multilateralism could be seen as leading to a weakening of the Japan–U.S. security relationship.

- Continue the bilateral security alliance and reject all regional multilateral security proposals. Although this option is better than its reverse image, it unnecessarily closes the door to greater opportunities to promote regional dialogue and thus increase stability and reduce misunderstanding and other causes of regional conflict.

- Take the road toward enhanced regional security cooperation in Asia, provided it is built upon and does not replace existing bilateral security relationships, with the enduring Japan–U.S. alliance foremost among them.

It was the clear consensus of workshop participants that this last path should be followed. The group endorsed emerging multilateral
security dialogues, such as the ARF and CSCAP, which appear consistent with existing bilateral relationships. These overarching mechanisms are built upon the firm base provided by a multitude of cooperative political, economic, and security activities that had prepared Asia, over the past 20 years, to proceed today along the path of greater multilateral security cooperation. These bilateral and multilateral arrangements continue to serve as practical “building blocks” for strengthening regional security.

Because the bilateral Japan–U.S. alliance provides the strategic foundation for both countries to participate in expanded multilateral efforts, it was further concluded that steps must be taken to ensure that the alliance remains robust and relevant into the next century. This will require greater public awareness of the enduring value of the treaty and frequent candid dialogue between the U.S. and Japan to narrow or close perception or credibility gaps. It will also require greater willingness on the part of Japan to share in the risks and responsibilities inherent in a more balanced bilateral security relationship.

A more balanced relationship requires give and take on both sides, however. For its part, the United States must recognize that greater responsibility-sharing mandates shared decision-making; it must demonstrate an increased willingness to consult with the Japanese before making decisions that affect Japan. At the same time, Japan should be less reluctant to make proposals or criticize proposals that do not appear in its best interest.

Many practical issues were tabled during the course of the discussions relating to closer Japan–U.S. cooperation in the security arena. Many are detailed in this report. Some of the major observations are briefly reviewed below, even though there was not full agreement on all of these suggestions.

The United States needs to continue providing its nuclear umbrella (and Japan needs to remain confident about this protection). Most important, American military forces must remain forward deployed in Japan and elsewhere throughout East Asia. This was seen by Japanese participants as the “litmus test” of continued U.S. resolve to remain engaged in Asia.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The United States should also continue to provide the power-projection forces, strategic intelligence-collection assets, long-range logistics support, and strategic lift. These are areas in which the United States excels. They are also areas in which a markedly improved Japanese capability would be met with great suspicion and trepidation throughout the region. Nonetheless, Japanese participants expected that there would be some modest interest in improving Japanese intelligence and logistic support capabilities, although this would be done in close coordination with the United States and in a manner that would complement the security alliance.

Both sides agreed that Japan should continue to develop its own self-defense and sea lane defense capabilities. Of particular significance, according to American military specialists, is expanding Japan's airborne warning and control (AWACS) capability, to monitor and defend the air and sea corridors and overall territorial integrity of Japan. And, given the growing potential of North Korean missiles to threaten Japanese territory, more work must be jointly done in the area of missile defense, to include continued cooperation in ballistic missile defense research and development. For example, the Japanese have already made a significant investment in acquiring Aegis technology. The challenge now is to ensure that Japanese Aegis-equipped ships will be fully integrated into future sea-based theater missile defense schemes. Progress on an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is also long overdue.

Japan must also improve its ability to make decisions more quickly in times of crisis and must be more willing, in peacetime, to conduct political-military simulations dealing with sensitive issues beyond the defense of Japan. The United States, for its part, must better understand the political sensitivities involved and must work with Japan to build a national consensus for required actions. Together they must also begin preparing for "the military after next" through technology-sharing and joint R&D efforts.

The absence of an imminent threat also requires a greater effort on the part of both governments to ensure public awareness of, and support for, the inherent value of the continuing defense
relationship. American politicians and pundits need to understand that sharp public criticism of Japan, especially when accompanied by false or exaggerated claims, can undermine mutual confidence and damage the fabric of relations beyond any intent the critics may have had. Their Japanese counterparts must recognize that their tendency to cite “pressure from the United States” as the reason for actions taken in Japan’s own interest is equally destructive. A bit more courage and honesty on the part of politicians on both sides of the Pacific would go a long way in solidifying the security relationship and improving public awareness both in the United States and in Japan.

The course ahead will not always be smooth. Sovereign nations, and especially ones who are economic competitors, do not always see eye to eye on either the nature of problems or the applicability of particular solutions. Such disagreements reflect the strength and maturity of the relationship. But, for both nations, the stakes are too high and the consequences of failure too severe to permit the inevitable challenges to become impenetrable obstacles. Many shared values, compatible goals and objectives, and common national interests continue to bind us together; our vital economic and security interests are fully intertwined. For these reasons, the relationship should endure as long as both sides continue to have a clear understanding of their respective long-term national interests.

It was also the clear consensus of the group that the time is opportune for both Japan and the United States, together and in close consultation, to become more actively involved in emerging multilateral security mechanisms, provided they are consistent with, and supportive of, the bilateral relationship. Efforts that build upon both existing bilateral relationships and the successful multilateral economic, political, and low-key security initiatives that already exist in the Asia Pacific seemed of particular value. The ASEAN Regional Forum at the government level and CSCAP at the NGO level were seen as particularly relevant first steps. Subregional groupings focused on Northeast Asia could also make a positive contribution.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The group believed that multilateral security initiatives hold many promises for the Asia Pacific, but that it is important to understand the limits as well as the opportunities they present. Emerging mechanisms should be viewed more as confidence-building measures aimed at averting, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression. In many instances, the process is as important as the product.

Despite their limits, within the vital framework of existing bilateral security relationships, emerging multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia Pacific can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. They offer a means for China and Russia to be more constructive players involved in regional security matters in a manner that is non-threatening to their neighbors. They also provide a vehicle for Japan and others to play a more active role. They provide a framework for continued direct U.S. involvement in Asia-Pacific security matters. They also provide a mechanism for other regional actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional identity and a spirit of cooperation. This cooperation will no doubt spill over into the political and economic spheres as well, just as growing political and economic cooperation has helped set the stage for expanded security dialogue.
APPENDIX A: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

İIPS PARTICIPANTS

Seizaburo Sato, co-chairman
Research Director, Institute for International Policy Studies
Professor of Keio University

Koichi Hasegawa
Advisor, Shin Maywa Industries, Ltd.
Commander (JASDF, retired), Air Training Command

Sumihiko Kawamura
Senior Advisor, Machinery and Information Industries Group,
Okura & Co., Ltd.
Rear Admiral (JMSDF, retired), Vice Commandant,
Joint Staff College

Satoshi Morimoto
Senior Researcher, Nomura Research Institute
Former Director, Security Policy Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Yoshio Okawara
President, Institute for International Policy Studies

Philipp Schuller
Visiting Research Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies
D. Phil. Candidate, Oxford University

Toshiyuki Shikata
Research Councillor, Institute for International Policy Studies
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Commanding General (JGSDF, retired), Northern Army Corps

Atsumasa Yamamoto
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies
Major (JGSDF), Defense Bureau, Defense Agency
CNA PARTICIPANTS

Jerome Kahan, co-chairman
Director, Regional Issues, Center for Naval Analyses

Lyall Breckon
Senior Analyst, Center for Naval Analyses
  Foreign Service Officer (retired)

Margo Cooper
Part-time analyst, Center for Naval Analyses

Ralph Cossa
Executive Director, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic
  and International Studies
  Colonel, United States Air Force (retired)

Patrick Cronin
Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies,
  National Defense University

Paul Kreisberg
Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
  Consultant, Center for Naval Analyses

Michael Nacht
Assistant Director, United States Arms Control Disarmament
  Agency (ACDA)
  Former Dean, School of Public Policy Affairs,
  University of Maryland

Larry Vogt
Rear Admiral, United States Navy (retired)
  Consultant, Center for Naval Analyses
  Former Director of Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command
APPENDIX B: WORKSHOP AGENDA
26–29 JULY 1994

TUESDAY, 26 JULY

1700–1730  Working Meeting
1830–2030  Welcome Reception

WEDNESDAY, 27 JULY

SESSION 1: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

0930–1230
Chair
Professor Seizaburo Sato

Paper Presenters
Mr. Satoshi Morimoto
Mr. Paul H. Kreisberg

Commentators
Major Atsumasa Yamamoto
Mr. Ralph A. Cossa

1230–1400  Lunch

SESSION 2: MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES FOR STABILITY IN EAST ASIA

1400–1700
Chair
Mr. Jerome Kahan

Paper Presenters
Major Atsumasa Yamamoto
RAdm. (ret.) Larry G. Vogt

Commentators
Mr. Satoshi Morimoto
Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
THURSDAY, 28 JULY

SESSION 3: FUTURE OF THE JAPAN–U.S. ALLIANCE

0930–1230  
Chair  
Professor Seizaburo Sato
Paper Presenters  
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Toshiyuki Shikata
Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
Commentators  
RAdm. (ret.) Sumihiko Kawamura
Mr. Paul H. Kreisberg

1230–1400  
Lunch

SESSION 4: A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE EAST ASIA SECURITY REGIMES

1400–1700  
Chair  
Mr. Jerome Kahan
Paper Presenters  
Professor Seizaburo Sato
Dr. Michael Nacht
Commentators  
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Koichi Hasegawa
Mr. M. Lyall Breckon

1730–1900  
Working Dinner

FRIDAY, 29 JULY

SESSION 5: U.S.–JAPAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EAST ASIA SECURITY REGIMES

0930–1230  
General Discussion

1230–1400  
Farewell Lunch
APPENDIX C: A COMPENDIUM OF MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN EAST ASIA

This compendium was prepared by Rear Admiral Larry G. Vogt, USN (ret.), with the assistance of Margo R. Cooper. It is meant to be an illustrative rather than a comprehensive list of examples of the kinds of security-related multilateral activities that are taking place in East Asia.

The activities examined have been sorted into one of the following three categories: economics, security policy, and military policy. We selected these three categories because they relate to the issue of regional stability. We would not want to give the impression, however, that other kinds of important multilateral activities are not taking place.

The reader will note the wide spectrum of activities examined. Indeed, the collection of a wide range of activities examined is intentional—this feature of the compendium should underscore the wide variety of multilateral activities in East Asia that contribute to stability. For this reason, the reader will find permanent organized forums, such as ASEAN, listed alongside annual conferences, such as the ASEAN-ISIS Roundtable on Asia-Pacific Security. Similarly, official governmental activities are listed alongside non-governmental forums. We use dashes to indicate that an activity included has only recently emerged or that we were unable to procure the requisite information. Following the tables, we present a list of selected references used in preparing the compendium.
## Multilateral Activities for Stability in East Asia: Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Membership/Participants</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>17 members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, S. Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, NZ, PNG, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (Laos &amp; Vietnam are observers, Myanmar &amp; Cambodia are guests.)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>To manage the effects of growing economic interdependence in the region.</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (Laos &amp; Vietnam are observers, Myanmar &amp; Cambodia are guests.)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>To accelerate economic growth, social progress, and peace and security in the region.</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>6 ASEAN member nations plus 7 dialogue partners: U.S., Australia, NZ, Japan, S. Korea, Canada, EC</td>
<td>mid 1970</td>
<td>Like ASEAN, focuses on economic issues, but also includes dialogue partners. Recently, security issues have also been addressed.</td>
<td>Useful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB (Asian Development Bank)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>45 members: 28 from Asia-Pacific region and 17 from &quot;non-regional&quot; countries</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>To promote economic and social development assistance and project loans mainly for infrastructure projects.</td>
<td>Very</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACTAD (Pacific Trade and Development Conference)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Conference participants are not fixed; they are selected based on the focus of each conference.</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>A forum in which East Asian, U.S. and Australian economists can discuss trade and development issues.</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Japan, S. Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, NZ, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, U.S. (Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia are observers)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>A forum for regional business leaders to create business relationships and address emerging economic issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>ASEAN nations, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Japan, S. Korea, Mexico, NZ, Per, Russia, Taiwan, U.S., and the Pacific Island nations</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>To promote cooperation in the Pacific Rim. Participants include businessmen, officials, and academics.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Forum</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Australia, NZ, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga, W. Samoa, Cook Islands, PNG, Niue, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Focuses on facilitating regional trade and economic cooperation. Recently began discussing security issues.</td>
<td>Important for island countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN ESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>40+ member nations</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>To provide analysis, interpretation of events, and technical assistance in area of economic development.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Multilateral Activities for Stability in East Asia: Security Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Membership/Participants</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>To accelerate economic growth, social progress, peace, and security in the Asia-Pacific region.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>6 ASEAN members and 7 dialogue partners</td>
<td>mid 1970s</td>
<td>Focus on economic issues; in 1991 began to address security issues as well. In 1993, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting decided to turn the security component of the ASEAN PMC into the ASEAN Regional Forum.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>ASEAN plus dialogue partners</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Formed to support PMC process by discussing such issues as multilateral approaches to security, preventive diplomacy, conflict management, and CBMs.</td>
<td>Useful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>18 members: ASEAN nations, ASEAN dialogue partners, and ASEAN observers</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To discuss regional security issues.</td>
<td>Shows promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN ISIS Roundtable</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>An association of NGOs registered with ASEAN. (Founding members are: CSIS (Indonesia), ISIS (Malaysia), CIDS (Philippines), SIAA (Singapore), and ISIS (Thailand)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>To function as a coordinating body of the strategic and international studies institutes of the ASEAN countries.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ASEAN-ISIS Workshop</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Invitations are relatively open, participants come from over 20 nations, including 18 members of ARF, as well as Cambodia, Taiwan, North Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Fiji</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>An annual conference held at the ISIS-Malaysia. Participants include academics, researchers, journalists, and diplomats.</td>
<td>Very Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN/Japan Dialogue</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>ASEAN plus others</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To enhance security in ASEAN.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participants from universities and research institutes in Japan, ASEAN, and sometimes U.S., Canada, Australia, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Examines economic and security issues.</td>
<td>—</td>
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## Multilateral Activities for Stability in East Asia: Security Policy (Continued)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Open to all countries and territories in the region, including PRC, Vietnam, Taiwan, 12 member think tanks are from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, NZ, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, U.S., and the EC</td>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>To conduct policy-oriented studies on regional political-security problems, with an aim to support ASEAN PMC and ARF.</td>
<td>Shows promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>12 CSCAP members plus China and Vietnam</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To identify/promote CSBMs that are applicable to Asia-Pacific region.</td>
<td>Shows promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>UK, Australia, NZ, Malaysia, Singapore</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Main function is to coordinate air defense.</td>
<td>Viable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Forum</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Australia, NZ, Fiji, Nuara, Tonga, W. Samoa, Cook Islands, PNG, Niue, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Focus is economic, but security issues were recently added.</td>
<td>Important for island countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Canada, U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea</td>
<td>1990–93</td>
<td>6 workshops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To promote discussion of cooperative security in the region. Participants come from universities, research institutes, and government departments.</td>
<td>6 workshops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Steering Committee</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>U.S., Japan, ROK, ASEAN, Indonesia, Australia, NZ</td>
<td>Nine forums</td>
<td>SLOC discussions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA Defense Chiefs' Biennial Conference</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>FPDA members</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Common security issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA Ministers Triennial Meeting</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>FPDA members</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Common security issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Asia-Pacific Dialogues on Maritime Security (IGSS)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Australia, U.S., PRC, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>To discuss arms control, CBMs, and broad security issues.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCC Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Russia, PRC, DPRK, ROK, Japan, and U.S.</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To build trust and confidence in the region.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for International Cooperation in Northeast Asia: A multilateral dialogue (The Asia Society-Japan IA)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Canada, PRC, Japan, DPRK, Russia, ROK, Taiwan, U.S., and Mongolia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To explore economic, political, and security issues.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPS (Japan)—KIDA (Korea) sponsor the “Five Countries Security Forum”</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Participants from: U.S., Russia, Japan, ROK, PRC</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>For security cooperation, arms sales, nuclear proliferation, and territorial disputes.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIDA-CSIS (USA) “North East Asian Security” Annual Meeting</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Japan, ROK, DPRK, PRC, Russia, U.S., and one or two other countries of the Asia-Pacific region</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>To discuss Northeast Asian security issues.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Senior Seminar (E-W Center Pacific Forum)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>U.S., Canada, Australia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, ROK, Malaysia, NZ, Russia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Europe</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To discuss new ideas about East Asian security and create new links among regional decision-makers.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Multilateral Activities for Stability in East Asia: Military Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Membership/Participants</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>U.S., Japan,^1^ ROK, Canada, Australia, (ASEAN countries invited)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Combined naval exercise in defense of Pacific Rim countries.</td>
<td>Effective, with potential for growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra Gold</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>U.S.-Thailand (Observers have been invited.)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Combined training in naval, ground, air, amphibious, and special operations.</td>
<td>Effective, with potential for growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Spirit</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>U.S.-ROK (Observers from UN participating countries (defense attaches) and NNSC have have participated.) DPRK has been invited to observe.</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Demonstrate readiness to defend ROK and U.S. a commitment to ROK security.</td>
<td>Effective, with potential for growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>33-plus countries, including Australia, China, Japan, NZ, S. Korea, Indonesia, Russia, PNG</td>
<td>1978^78 (meet (annually)</td>
<td>Senior officers discuss military management problems.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>22-plus countries, including: Australia, Japan, HK, S. Korea, ASEAN</td>
<td>1971^71 (started by U.S. Army) 1976^76 (taken over by Pacific Command)</td>
<td>To discuss common logistics matters, joint operations and training—meets annually.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Japan participates bilaterally with U.S.

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<tr>
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<th>Membership/Participants</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spectrum Management Conference</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>23-plus countries</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>To discuss common frequency spectrum management issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Reserve Comp Seminar (PARCS)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>22-plus countries</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>To discuss common Reserve issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Law Enforcement Seminar</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Naval officers discuss military law-enforcement issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control Symposium</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>15-plus countries</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>To discuss common C2 issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Naval Symposium</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>ASEAN, U.S., Japan, ROK, PRC, PNG, Australia, NZ</td>
<td>biennial</td>
<td>To discuss broad security issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Special Conference (PASOC)</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>U.S., Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, ROK, Malaysia, RP, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>To discuss joint/combined training.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU-USCINCPAC Pacific Symposium</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>5-plus countries with uniformed reps</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>To discuss broad security issues.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for International Security &amp; Arms Control (CISAC)</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>Fellows from PRC, Russia, Korea, U.S., and Japan</td>
<td>mid-1970s</td>
<td>Dialogue of Asian navies to enhance naval cooperation.</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trilateral Security Forum (Pacific Forum, Sigur Center)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>U.S., Japan, ROK, defense (including uniformed military officials)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To discuss NEA security issues.</td>
<td>Shows promise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SELECTED REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX C


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