The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process

An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework

Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll

Arroyo Center
National Defense Research Institute

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Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll

Prepared for the United States Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

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This report documents elements of RAND’s analysis on how to strengthen the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) resource allocation and management processes. It discusses the application of RAND’s decision support framework (called strategy-to-tasks) to USSOCOM’s resource allocation and management processes, as well as the functional and organizational implications of the recommended process.

The initial research on this topic was part of the “Special Operations Force Development Study” project in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND’s Arroyo Center. That research, in the summer of 1991, was undertaken in part to improve USSOCOM and the Army’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) performance in regard to the Army’s Special Operations Forces. The work took place in the Army Research Division.

Following the initial research that surveyed PPBS practices, outlined the strategy-to-tasks framework, and drew some organizational implications, RAND recommended that the work be transferred from RAND’s Arroyo Center to its National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which oversees the research for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. The Army’s portions of the tasks had been completed and the focus was to shift entirely to SOCOM. The project was transferred to NDRI’s International Security and Defense Policy Center in May 1992.

The ensuing work has focused on further fleshing out the strategy-to-tasks framework and the organizational recommendations. Subsequent work, not contained in this report, considers the imple-
mentation of the framework and the organizational recommendations.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Part of this work was also performed within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, also a federally funded research and development
center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Comments on this work can be directed to Dr. Charles Kelley, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center.
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This report examines how the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) might improve its resource allocation and management process within the structure of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) larger Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

USSOCOM AND THE DOD RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS

USSOCOM is unique among U.S. military commands in the way its resources are allocated. It behaves like a service instead of a command. Like the services, it has the authority and responsibility to construct a major force program (USSOCOM’s program is MFP-11) for the Secretary of Defense to review and include in DoD’s budget. The goals and details of the program are submitted in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). USSOCOM’s commander must therefore participate in the decisionmaking process within which all DoD resource decisions are made. This process is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

For USSOCOM to participate effectively in the PPBS, its resource management process must adhere to the structure and schedule contained in the PPBS. Furthermore, this process must be efficient and credible in the eyes of those organizations that make resource funding decisions—the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress. However, USSOCOM’s resource management must also accommodate the unique aspects of the USSOCOM program, which provides capabilities to the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Because of this complexity,
USSOCOM concluded that its current process did not sufficiently address the demands of the PPBS process or meet the standards now being set by DoD and Congress. RAND was asked to examine USSOCOM’s resource management and identify areas for improvement.

We did this through looking at PPBS practices and assessing how USSOCOM was performing certain key PPBS functions—generating options, performing trade-off analyses, and identifying key issues over time. We concluded that USSOCOM often only partially performed some of these functions or did not perform them.

**LINKING USSOCOM GOALS, OPERATIONS, AND RESOURCES**

Our analysis identified two requirements for improving USSOCOM resource management: (1) a top-to-bottom linkage of Special Operations Forces (SOF) programs that connects high-level national security goals with SOF missions, operations, and resources, and (2) a more structured resource management process that uses these top-to-bottom linkages to clarify the resource issues (the process would include analytic tool support and linked databases) and to involve the components in the resource debate.

We next built a framework for supporting resource management decisions that would meet these requirements. We adapted a framework, drawn from prior RAND research, known as “strategy-to-tasks.” The framework is intended to provide decisionmakers with an end-to-end concept of operations and to link resource decisions from national security strategy down to tasks. The framework shown in Figure S.1 demonstrates the relationships of strategies down to tasks and resources (at the most elemental level, resources are actual programs, labeled Special Operations Decision Packages [SODPs]), and resources through tasks through strategies, based on a hierarchy of linkages. At the core of the framework are operational concepts that form the links between force development and acquisition programs. An operational concept defines how a task will be performed and identifies the resources required to perform a task—personnel, equipment, and support.
As we have applied it, the framework is designed to assist the command in the development of its POM. It is not a replacement for the command’s internal resource allocation process; rather, its implementation would improve the command’s responsiveness in all phases of resource allocation and would ultimately enhance the POM-development process. While an adherence to the proposed framework does not provide a panacea for all of the difficulties encountered in the development of the POM, it does address several of the issues that USSOCOM (and its components) raised with RAND at the outset of this work.

The framework also furnishes a shared context for the various participants in the USSOCOM-POM process. It promotes a clear understanding of the top-down planning process, which in turn fosters long-term continuity in the future planning, programming, and execution of the SOF resource allocation process. The framework also
provides an audit trail from national security and military strategies through operational concepts to force elements.

The framework furthermore provides a systematic approach for determining and managing USSOCOM's resources. This enables the CINC to set "real" priorities and to understand trade-offs in the near, mid, and long term. This knowledge is important because the process now requires that one justify not only the programs that the command wishes to fund, but also those that it does not wish to fund.

**CHANGES TO USSOCOM ALIGNMENTS AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESSES IMPLIED BY THE STRATEGY-TO-TASKS FRAMEWORK**

In applying the framework, we noted possible improvements USSOCOM should consider in its resource management process and in its functional and organizational alignments.

The basic resource management issue for USSOCOM's PPBS activities can be viewed as a problem of integrating the demand for resources (i.e., requirements for accomplishing operational and employment tasks, as linked by our framework to higher-level military and national security goals) with the supply (i.e., available resources for accomplishing tasks).

This view of resource management can be overlaid onto the basic strategy-to-tasks framework, as shown in Figure S.2.

For the purposes of planning, programming, and budgeting, the upper levels of the hierarchy can be viewed as unfunded resource demands. The lower levels of the hierarchy show available resources. Between, at the level of SOF operational tasks and force elements, supply and demand are integrated. By this, we mean that trade-offs among alternative force options for accomplishing specific tasks can be generated and assessed. Based on this scheme, our main recommendation involved strengthening the integrator function. The integrator would function as a gatekeeper by providing alternatives and options for decisionmakers. The integrator is ultimately responsible for developing a balanced program by reconciling requirements (demand) and available resources (supply).
We then proposed a realignment of USSOCOM staff functions in accord with this concept of resource management. Our proposed realignment has several features that we think are critical to USSOCOM. It preserves the participatory nature of the command, but allows a structured and disciplined dialogue among the participants. This is essential to an organization like USSOCOM, whose assets reside primarily in the components but are allocated through the headquarters. We believe that this alignment will facilitate interaction between all of the major participants in the USSOCOM resource allocation and management process.

This recommended realignment also provides the command with the ability to anticipate Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance and change, which is essential in developing a responsive program. It facilitates ongoing program development of strategies, options, and alternatives, rather than “gearing up” for a biennial program.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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We would also like to thank Marney Peet for her assistance with the project’s research.
### ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>A/AF C-LIC</td>
<td>Army–Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>ARSOC</td>
<td>Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense—Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>BES</td>
<td>Budget Estimate Submission</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chairman’s Program Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCINC</td>
<td>Deputy Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>DMSP</td>
<td>Defense Meteorological Satellite Program</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>DPRB</td>
<td>Defense Program Review Board</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Development</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Future Year Defense Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Resources Intelligence</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operational Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFP-11</td>
<td>Major Force Program 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVSPECWARCOM</td>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Command</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directives</td>
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<td>NSSD</td>
<td>National Security Study Directives</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decision Memorandum</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>RDA</td>
<td>Research, Development, and Acquisition</td>
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<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea Air Land (Special Operations Forces, Navy)</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SODP</td>
<td>Special Operations Decision Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOJ-5</td>
<td>Special Operations, J-5 Plans, Policy, Doctrine, Simulations and Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SORDAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINC SOC</td>
<td>United States Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command</td>
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This report documents RAND's recommendations for improving the U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM's) resource management process. We present a resource management framework based on force planning concepts developed at RAND and tailored to the special needs of USSOCOM. The framework is intended to make planning, programming, and budgeting more rational and more credible by linking high-level strategic goals to tasks performed by USSOCOM. This linkage is intended to help USSOCOM participate more effectively in the Department of Defense's (DoD's) overall Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Based on this framework, we also recommend changes to USSOCOM's internal resource management process and to the functional and organizational structures that support it.

BACKGROUND: THE PPBS

The PPBS is DoD's primary system for planning and managing defense resources. It links the overall national security strategy to specific programs. It was designed to facilitate fiscally constrained planning, programming, and budgeting in terms of complete programs (i.e., forces and systems), rather than through artificial budget categories.¹ The goal is to determine force system and program

costs; the PPBS is designed to elicit options and provide for an evaluation of these options in terms of costs and benefits. The output of the process, the defense program, is the official record of major resource allocation decisions made by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

The PPBS is one of the SECDEF’s key management tools. The process provides the SECDEF with the means to set and control the department’s agenda. The goal is to frame issues in national, rather than service-specific, terms. The process, which includes documentation and databases, is supposed to capture all important decisions affecting current and future defense budgets.

The process is not supposed to be linear, either during a phase or from one phase to the next. Rather than being a “lock step” system, it is designed to be highly interactive. The PPBS provides the forum for both the informal and formal debate of the issues and options at all levels of the DoD. To prepare for the formal debates, the decisionmakers and their staffs must interact with one another on an informal basis to share information, develop options, and even define a particular participant’s strategy in the debate for resources.

There is a hierarchy to the PPBS (see Figure 1). The planning phase starts with broad decisions involving the senior decisionmakers in DoD and progresses to the budgeting phase, where prior decisions are reviewed in detail to determine how they can best be implemented.

Figure 2 shows the key PPBS events as they have existed since the implementation in 1986 of a two-year budget cycle. In practice, Congress has generally appropriated funds on an annual basis, and therefore the internal DoD process has had to compromise with the demands of producing a budget submission every year. From an external perspective, this behavior could look like the one-year cycle that existed before 1986.

Planning Phase

A new PPBS cycle begins immediately after the budget is submitted to Congress. During the planning phase, whose horizon may extend
15 years into the future, the existing military posture of the United States is assessed against various concerns, including national security objectives and resource limitations, available military strategies, and national security objectives contained in National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) and National Security Study Directives (NSSDs).

Figure 1—Decision Process as Shaped by the PPBS

Figure 2—Generic Two-Year Cycle
The output of the process is the strategic plan for developing and employing future forces. This plan is defined in the SECDEF's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which may be published in the fall or early winter. The DPG contains the SECDEF's top-level guidance for producing the defense program. It is responsive to the President's national security strategy, from which the national military strategy and fiscal guidance are derived, as set out by the President through the National Security Adviser and Office of Management and Budget. It may also contain explicit program guidance regarding core programs that the SECDEF wants the services and DoD agencies to fund in the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

**Programming Phase**

The transition from the planning phase to the programming phase (from the SECDEF's perspective) falls somewhere between the issuance of the DPG and the submittal of the POMs by the military departments and defense agencies in the spring. The POMs are the resource programs that reflect the DPG and fiscal guidance. The POMs are reviewed by the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to determine whether the programs meet the Secretary's guidance. The programming phase looks five to six years into the future.

The Joint Staff's evaluation of the POMs appears in an internal document, the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA assesses the risks in the total force proposed by the services and defense agencies in their respective POMs. Included in the assessment is an evaluation of how well the POMs satisfy the requirements identified by the various Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).

OSD reviews the departments' POMs and the CPA. Based on these reviews, OSD raises "issues" if there are problems identified during the reviews. These problems are then discussed, debated, and resolved within the Defense Planning and Resources Board, which consists of the SECDEF and selected high-level decisionmakers within OSD. Frequently, individuals (usually assistant secretaries and service chiefs) involved in a particular issue are asked to attend a specific session. Decisions on problem issues are published in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF).
Budgeting Phase

The PDM marks the end of the programming phase and the beginning of the budgeting phase. The reality is that the services and agencies have already begun to build detailed budgets when they submit their POMs. After they receive the DEPSECDEF’s program decisions, they must adjust their programs and budgets to conform to program decisions. Their programs and budgets are submitted to the OSD Comptroller in the form of Budget Estimate Submissions (BES), following which budget hearings are held. Major budget issues may be heard in a Defense Program Review Board (DPRB) Budget Review, with final decisions announced in a series of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The totality of the final PBDs, when used to revise the various BESs, becomes the President’s budget for DoD, which is submitted to Congress.

USSOCOM AND THE PPBS

USSOCOM was created in 1986; its assigned mission is to support the unified and specified commands in missions such as anti-terrorism, personnel recovery, foreign internal development (FID), and humanitarian assistance (HA). The command has three components: Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSECPWARCOM), and Air Force Special Operations (AFSOC).

USSOCOM differs from other commands in two ways. First, it is the only command with its own budget. In the resource management arena, USSOCOM acts like a service. Like the services, USSOCOM is responsible for constructing a major force program (Major Force Program 11, or MFP-11) that forms part of DoD’s biennial budget request to Congress. By OSD direction, USSOCOM’s research and development (R&D), procurement, and funding processes mirror those of the services. This means that USSOCOM must respond to fiscal and program guidance, propose programs in response to that guidance, and implement programs based on the SECDEF’s direction. Second, USSOCOM has no specific regional responsibilities. It is a supporting command to the unified and specified commands; it is organized, equipped, and trained to provide a capability to different theaters.
These features make USSOCOM a unique participant in the DoD resource management process. USSOCOM must define the regional requirements for Special Operations and translate those requirements into capabilities that support Special Operations. These requirements must then be presented and justified to OSD and Congress. The command interacts with a variety of organizations in the development of its program. For instance, it must have strong ties to its internal organizations—the components and the combatant commands—in defining its missions and the requirements to perform them. Externally, the command must interact with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and Congress.

THE PROBLEM

To be effective in the DoD resource allocation and management debate, USSOCOM must have a planning, programming, and budgeting process that is consistent with DoD’s PPBS framework and schedule. USSOCOM’s resource management process must facilitate the command’s ability to articulate its resource capabilities during a period in which many of its warfighting and nonwarfighting missions have not been clearly defined.

The issue for USSOCOM is how it can effectively participate in the total PPBS process, including both the formal and informal elements. Within USSOCOM, there is a concern that the current process will not provide a credible force development program or the “right” outcome. By “right” outcome, we mean a program that funds sets of capabilities in support of USSOCOM’s missions and is defensible and executable within the fiscal and program guidelines defined by the SECDEF. USSOCOM’s current system is not sufficiently sophisticated and analytical to meet these criteria.

With these concerns in mind, United States Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) asked RAND to analyze current USSOCOM resource allocation and management, taking a broad view to include the PPBS process, and to propose improvements.
STUDY APPROACH

The research team began by evaluating how USSOCOM currently plans, programs, and budgets its resources. The emphasis was on the planning and programming functions.

The team visited USSOCOM’s components, key OSD personnel, and analytic tool builders, and interviewed the individuals involved in all aspects of the building, review, and implementation of the MFP-11 program. In addition, the team reviewed internal memoranda, POM documents, and OSD and congressional guidance.

From this analysis, we constructed a strawman template (see Figure 3) that was used as the analytic framework to evaluate the current process. We then compared the current system and the ideal process.

Since our ultimate objective was to support improvements in USSOCOM resource management decisions, we concentrated on USSOCOM's activities during the PPBS process, with particular emphasis on the programming phase.

![Diagram](RAND-MR445-3)

Figure 3—The Strawman Template
We concluded that any recommendations to USSOCOM for improving resource allocation and management must contain the elements that DoD requires in the various PPBS phases—links from the national security strategy down to specific military tasks. Furthermore, these elements must be credible, replicable, and easily audited.

We also observed that various members of the Special Operations community lack a shared terminology for describing operations and resources. We attributed this deficiency to the newness of the command. In defining and allocating the command’s resources, all participants must work off the “same sheet of music.” The absence of a consistent lexicon appeared to be a major hindrance to USSOCOM’s resource management process. For instance, the command often views resources as individual items—personnel and equipment—rather than as groupings of critical resources that reflect the most efficient means to accomplish a task. To capture the resources at an appropriate level of aggregation (so that trade-off analyses among different capability packages could be generated), we need consistent definitions of key terms for operational objectives, tasks, and resources.

Our analysis led us to formulate three suggestions for improvement:

1. Develop linkages between national security objectives and USSOCOM programs and resource needs.
2. Change USSOCOM planning and programming processes, functions, and data structures in light of these linkages.
3. Realign selected functions and organizational structures.

This report will explore these recommendations in depth. Chapter Two presents a generic framework for accomplishing the linkages we recommend and then applies it to USSOCOM’s programs and resources. Chapter Three discusses suggested revisions to USSOCOM’s PPBS process and functional realignments to support the changes. Chapter Four contains our conclusions.
Chapter Two

A FRAMEWORK FOR LINKING OBJECTIVES, TASKS, AND RESOURCES

This chapter describes the basic framework—strategy-to-tasks—that we adapted to USSOCOM's resource management activities during the PPBS. We first describe the generic framework we identified for linking USSOCOM programs to higher-level national security goals; then we adapt the framework to USSOCOM's specific needs.

THE RAND STRATEGY-TO-TASKS FRAMEWORK

We concluded that USSOCOM needs a framework for planning, programming, and budgeting that would address the concerns we identified—the need for a hierarchy of linkages and a credible, replicable, and "open" POM-development process. We also concluded that attempts to instruct the command on the PPBS process were insufficient, for the PPBS is a global process that only identifies required outputs according to an established schedule; what is needed is a process that is consistent with the PPBS, but also provides a structure that assists the USSOCOM staff in how to think about, develop options for, and then perform its resource allocation function. We concluded that simply providing a database or a support model was not the solution to the identified problem. Rather, what is needed is a methodology or framework that provides a structure with which to operate and perform all the functions required within the PPBS process, but that is specific to USSOCOM.

The research team attempted to find a number of methodologies that would provide a framework for resource decisionmaking and allocation. The resource decision methodology had to provide a structured set of procedures that would discipline the command's
planning and programming process, provide a mechanism for USSOCOM planners and programmers to assess their resources at consistent levels of aggregation, and standardize the lexicon. We evaluated both the literature and current PPBS practices among OSD, defense agencies, and the services.

No existing processes were found. The closest identifiable system was RAND's strategy-to-tasks framework, which, if used, would require some modifications. The team decided to modify the existing framework so as to accommodate the unique aspects of USSOCOM's resource environment.

The strategy-to-tasks framework, developed at RAND during the late 1980s, is used by several DoD organizations. The framework is a decision support process for the planning and programming phases of the PPBS. It provides decisionmakers with an end-to-end concept of operations. If used correctly, it links resource decisions to specific military tasks that require resources, which in turn are linked hierarchically to higher-level operational and national security objectives. The framework establishes the downward connection from strategies to programs and tasks as well as the upward connection from tasks up through strategies.

**Strategy-to-Tasks Hierarchies**

At the highest levels of the hierarchy, we consider national goals, which are derived from the U.S. heritage and are embodied in the U.S. Constitution. These do not change over time. The national goals form the basis for all U.S. statements regarding national security. See Figure 4.

National security strategy is formulated at the executive branch. It embodies the nation's political, economic, military, and diplomatic activities to achieve U.S. wartime and peacetime national security objectives. National security objectives define what must be done to preserve and protect our fundamental principles, goals, and interests.

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with respect to threats and challenges. In contrast to national goals, national security objectives change in accordance with changes in the geopolitical environment.

*National military objectives* are formulated by the SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The national military objectives define how the U.S. national security strategy will be supported militarily. Collectively, they define the national military strategy, which identifies (at a high level) how the United States will respond to threats to its national security.

*Operational objectives* define various military strategies. They describe how forces will be used to support the national military objectives. They also define the military strategy for a particular region. A particular regional military strategy is defined within the framework of the national military strategy and from the SECDEF’s and CJCS’s guidance. Functional objectives (as shown in Figure 4) indicate the support activities necessary to sustain any military operation.

*Tasks*, formulated by the CINCs, are the specific actions that must be taken to accomplish an operational objective. Each task is defined by an operational concept. An operational concept weaves together the various systems, organizations, and tactics needed to accomplish
a particular task. Figure 5 is a schematic diagram identifying the key functional elements of a generic operational concept. The operational concept is disaggregated into five elements: surveillance, assessment, battle control/dynamic control, mission preparation, and mission execution. Surveillance assets collect raw data on the object(s) of the task and relay the data—sometimes indirectly—to assessment centers, often called intelligence fusion centers. Such centers turn the raw data into information that can be easily used by various control elements and, in some cases, by operational units as they prepare for and carry out their missions. Control centers assign specific targets to attack platforms and may also provide real-time assistance in directing the platforms to their targets. Operational units engage in detailed mission planning and prepare the attack platforms and munitions. Finally, dedicated forces, sometimes with the aid of dynamic control elements, execute the mission. Mission execution generally involves three phases—move to engagement, engage, and return to base.

Figure 5—Generic Operational Concept for Accomplishing a Stated Military Task
Adapting the Framework

The next step was to apply the framework to USSOCOM. In doing so, we first plugged USSOCOM’s specific objectives and tasks into the generic framework and related these to higher-level military and national security objectives. Second, we extended the framework from the task level down to the resource level to link USSOCOM’s requirements with the resources available to perform them.

The main challenge in adapting the framework to USSOCOM was to extend the hierarchy of linkages from tasks down to resources. In previous work, the strategy-to-tasks framework had never been used as a context for resource allocation and management; it had been applied only to single systems.

Another challenge centered on USSOCOM’s size: because its force structure and budget are relatively small, USSOCOM defines its resources at detailed levels (single battalions, rifles, trucks, and so forth). It was therefore difficult to aggregate resources at a sufficiently high level (1) to conduct trade-off analyses among different resource packages for accomplishing a specific task, and (2) to enable the command to present its resource demands to OSD, the Joint Staff, and Congress at a level consistent with other DoD entities. This is particularly important in helping USSOCOM compete in the DoD resource debate.

To overcome this difficulty, we added several resource-related columns to the framework so that resources could be aggregated (for trade-offs and for consistency with DoD perspectives) and disaggregated down to a level that USSOCOM deals with. The new columns are Special Operations Forces (SOF) employment tasks, force elements, MFP-11 POM position, and MFP-11 Special Operations Decision Packages (SODPs). These columns and terms are defined and discussed in greater detail below. The completed framework provides a structure that captures all of USSOCOM’s resources and links them from the national security strategy down to the specific resource decisions that make up the MFP-11 program.
THE USSOCOM STRATEGY-TO-TASKS FRAMEWORK

Figure 6 shows the revised strategy-to-tasks framework as applied to USSOCOM.

National Security Objectives

The impetus for USSOCOM's goals as a command originates with U.S. national security objectives. These objectives support the national goals as embodied in the Constitution. The national security objectives are found in the national security strategy of the United States. These objectives are based on the perceived goals, intents, and behaviors of potential adversaries and their capabilities to exe-

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cute strategies that threaten our national security. As stated earlier, national security objectives change in response to the changing environment. The four major national security objectives are

- survival of the United States
- a healthy and growing economy
- healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations
- a stable, secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

National Military Objectives

Normally, national military objectives would be drawn directly from the national military strategy. Special Operations, however, also include political and economic activities. For instance, the foreign internal defense and peacekeeping missions must be coordinated with multiple non-DoD agencies (e.g., the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] and the State Department) and do not include direct military actions. To capture all the potential military objectives that could affect Special Operations, we examined documents and briefings from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC), the State Department, and the Joint Staff.  

The national military objectives as defined in the national military strategy are to

- deter or defeat aggression in concert with allies
- ensure global access and influence

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• promote regional stability and cooperation
• stem the flow of illegal drugs
• combat terrorism.

Using the national military strategy, we identified four SOF-specific military objectives. The rationale was to define sufficiently broad categories so as to capture all of USOCCOM's activities (both military and nonmilitary) and to be consistent with the broadly defined national military objectives. The categories also had to fold in the strategic concepts as found in the national military strategy—deterrence, force reconstitution, forward presence, and crisis response—that support the national military objectives.

The SOF military objectives are (1) warfighting capability, (2) peacekeeping military activities, (3) national mission capability, and (4) support functions, which include research and development.

**Warfighting Capability.** Inherent in the definition of warfighting capability are deterrence and the ability to deploy forces throughout the world to show U.S. commitment and support of our allies. Warfighting capability also includes the ability to enhance regional stability and provide crisis response while promoting U.S. influence and access. Crisis response and power projection include the ability of the United States to respond rapidly to deter, and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. For USOCCOM, this means that it must maintain a credible capability to support the warfighting CINCs.

**Peacekeeping Military Activities** include both warfighting and nonwarfighting activities that contribute to the support of U.S. military strategic concepts. The category includes forward presence as embodied in (1) nation assistance and (2) security operations.

**Nation assistance** entails U.S. political, economic, informational, and military actions that support a host nation's program to promote internal development and growth of a nation's infrastructure. These actions are integrated through the U.S. ambassador's country plan, which is the political, social, and economic road map for U.S. assistance in a particular nation. The goal of nation assistance is to promote long-term regional development, and thus stability. This includes the furtherance of democratic governments, viable
economies, and pluralistic societies. Nation assistance addresses the causes of instability in order to preempt the need for U.S. military intervention.

Security operations encompass training or military involvement for U.S. forces and foreign nationals. The activities include the preparation for the actual application of lethal force to achieve security objectives.

National Mission Capability/Crisis Action provides the U.S. National Command Authority with the offensive means to selectively respond to crisis situations at any time and place at which U.S. vital interests are threatened. In the case of Special Operations, it is the capability of a surgical military action.

Support Functions encompass the full array of national systems that support SOF in the performance of its nonmilitary and military missions. They include command, control, and communications systems; national intelligence support systems; air and sea power projection; and logistics.

**SOF Operational Objectives**

Operational objectives represent the CINC’s vision and strategic perspective on how the various SOF assets could support the national military objectives and the national security objectives. They are the link between higher-level national and military objectives and SOF-specific operations and the resources that support those operations. The operational objectives were derived from a variety of USCINCSOC references.4

In all, we identified 24 operational objectives. These are subdivided among the SOF-specific national military objectives/categories of warfighting, peacekeeping engagement, national mission, and support functions.

Nine operational objectives fall in the warfighting category:

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Strategic agility—maintain a capability to assemble decisive force by rapid movement to wherever forces are needed.

Contingency operations training—sustain a credible power projection capability into vital regions and the capability to defeat or reverse an adversary’s initial conventional attacks.

Forward basing—maintain judicious forward basing in support of U.S. interests.

Training exercise deployments—conduct deployment exercises of varying duration in promotion of U.S. influence and access.

Materiel prepositioning—preposition warmaking means at locations supportive of crisis response contingencies.

Technological superiority—achieve and maintain preeminence in weapons and supporting systems that apply technology to special operations to offset potential adversaries’ quantitative advantages, reduce risk to SOF personnel, and enhance the potential for swift, decisive termination of the conflict.

Power projection—maintain the ability to project power, from both U.S. and forward-deployed locations, to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort.

Realistic, objectively measured training—maintain the ability to mobilize manpower, form, train, and field wholly new SO, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and civil affairs (CA) forces.

Decisive force—maintain the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win. The concept of applying decisive force is to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly, with a minimum loss of life, and to activate the SOF-unique industrial base on the required scale. Employ the appropriate mix of heavy and light SOF plus reserve component elements.
Peacekeeping Military Activities

Peacekeeping military activities\(^5\) have both military and nonmilitary operational objectives. Many operational objectives necessitate interactions with a variety of U.S. intergovernment agencies and host nation governments. The objectives are to alter the behavior of a host nation to prevent conflict and support U.S. regional policies. There are 11 operational objectives in this category:

Foreign internal defense activities—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, in any of the internal development action programs taken by the host nation to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Contingency operations (nonlethal)—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to support the host nation during disaster relief operations and during nonlethal security assistance activities. These operations include other humanitarian assistance activities beyond disaster relief and nonlethal security assistance, such as medical assistance, infrastructure development, and, when appropriate, PSYOPS.

Peacekeeping operations—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to assist the host nation in the supervision of free territories, cease-fires, withdrawals and disengagement, POW exchanges, demilitarization and demobilization, and the maintenance of law and order.

Anti-terrorism operations—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to support defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism.

Institutional development (as part of the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD))—at the request of the host nation. Conduct

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\(^5\)USSOCOM uses terminology that is specific to the command. We attempted to bring the terminology as close as possible to that used by the broader community, but here again there is a great deal of inconsistency. For instance, the Air Force’s SOF terminology is not always consistent with Army views. Differences between generally accepted terminology and that of USSOCOM are noted.
activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to assist in improving, restructuring, reinforcing, rebuilding, or establishing private and public sector institutions in the host nation to promote democratic values and market economies.

Security assistance (noncombat)—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to equip and train military forces and provide other defense-related services to the host nation in furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives.

Contingency operations (lethal)—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to support training or action missions that require preparation for or actual application of lethal force to achieve security objectives, including show of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, search and rescue, attacks and raids, freedom of navigation and protection of shipping, operations to restore order, DoD support of counterdrug operations, and support to U.S. civil authorities.

Counterterrorism operations—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Counterinsurgency operations—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. governmental and host nation governmental agencies, to prevent, deter, and respond to insurgent threats aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government.

Support to counterdrug operations—conduct activities, in coordination with other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies, to support the disruption, interdiction, or destruction of illicit drug activities.

National Mission/Crisis Action

This military objective focuses on the ability to conduct surgical strikes in those situations that threaten U.S. citizens or property. There is only one operational objective in this category: National Command Authority (NCA) crisis action—conduct highly sensitive special operations that require Presidential approval and congres-
sional oversight, are highly compartmentalized, and are centrally managed and controlled.

Support Functions
The support functions contain a wide variety of operational objectives, including command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), logistics, and research and development. We grouped the activities under two broad operational objectives: generic support activities—support functions for all SOF operations; and Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Council activities—provide the means to maintain broad technological supremacy in those areas that support or could support special operations.

SOF Operational Tasks
SOF tasks (see the appendix for a complete listing) support the SOF operational objectives. An operational task is the SOF activity that must be performed to support one or more SOF operational objectives. The hierarchy also attempts to capture all of the discrete tasks that support an operational objective. For example, there are several less-recognized (but just as important) operational tasks that support SOF peacekeeping objectives. In addition to humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development, peacekeeping includes for USSOCOM special operations strategic reconnaissance, special operations search and rescue, and psychological and deception activities—all of which must be considered in the building and funding of a complete USSOCOM peacekeeping capability.

SOF Employment Tasks
Employment tasks are the actions that must be performed in support of a complete operational task. For example, conducting PSYOPS and deception activities includes a number of employment tasks that are not normally considered until a complete operational task is to be funded. PSYOPS and deception activities include such diverse employment tasks as providing intelligence on internal and externally controlled and funded terrorist activities, conducting PSYOPS to alter the attitudes of the sponsoring regime and indigenous popu-
lation toward the United States, and conducting information gathering and dissemination activities.

An individual employment task may contribute to more than one operational task, and, in turn, an operational task may support more than one operational objective. This alteration to the generic strategy-to-tasks framework enabled us to eventually define a discrete set of tasks that contains all of USSOCOM's resources and tasks, enabling USSOCOM decisionmakers to assess how their resources might be applied to more than one task. The ability to perform a task provides a complete SOF capability. The command, based on its resource decisions, provides SOF capabilities to the warfighting CINCs.

**SOF Force Elements**

Force elements are the groups of resources (personnel, training, and equipment) needed to perform an employment task. Because many different types of force elements can be used to support a task, decisionmakers must choose the resource combinations that are most cost-effective in accomplishing a task. As new threats or missions emerge, new force elements may be defined to support the new operational objective and its associated tasks.

Typical SOF force elements are Special Forces battalions, Ranger battalions, SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) platoons, AC-130 aircraft and crews, and PSYOPS battalions. SOF force elements are grouped together to form a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

To provide a link to the MFP-11 program, we defined SOF force elements in two ways: (1) SOF force elements (resource linked), and (2) SOF force elements (service ordered). The resource-linked structure lists the resource packages needed to accomplish a task. Often these packages reflect the JSOTFs. Each JSOTF is task-organized so that it supports a specific task and operational objective. This task organization is in effect an employment concept for how to apply special operations forces against a given threat or requirement. The service-ordered structure organizes resource packages by components—Army, Air Force, Navy—the suppliers of the resources. This two-dimensional approach enables USSOCOM resource managers to assess the mix of resources needed to accom-
plish a task and then to assess which component possesses the various resources.

**MFP-11 POM Position and MFP-11 Special Operations Decision Packages**

The MFP-11 POM position is another column that we added to the framework. The MFP-11 POM is a document that outlines the baseline USSOCOM program. It specifies the resources currently funded in the USSOCOM program. The MFP-11 POM column enables the resource managers to link a force element to the current program to assess how a particular resource is funded. Special Operations Decision Packages are programs funded by USSOCOM. However, we have recommended several changes to the SODP structure.

Prior to the development of the strategy-to-tasks framework, the SODPs were used by USSOCOM to determine the funding for each equipment group and personnel. In the recommended framework, we are resourcing operational tasks; thus, the SODPs would function as "resource/decision buckets" for force elements.

The linkage from the SODPs to the force elements and operational tasks up through to the national security strategy defines a clear "road map" that explicitly demonstrates a coherent relationship between USSOCOM's program and the national security strategy.

Figure 7 illustrates an example of the linkages for one operational task, PSYOPS. Each block shows how the national security strategy is linked down to the force elements, and finally, how a PSYOPS capability is resourced in the SODPs.

There is now consistency across the hierarchy beginning at the highest level and a funneling down to the actual force element resources in the SODPs. It has been difficult for USSOCOM to keep its resources defined at a sufficiently high level of aggregation so that resource options can be debated.
Figure 7—Operational Road Map for PSYOPS Force Structure
Chapter Three

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING USSOCOM'S RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

This chapter explores several implications for improving USSOCOM's resource management practices that emerged from our framework. We first flesh out the connections between the strategy-to-tasks framework and our concept of resource management. Next, in the context of our framework, we recommend specific changes in USSOCOM's internal PPBS processes. Finally, we identify organizational restructuring needed to support these changes. This restructuring takes into account USSOCOM's request that our recommendations should (1) retain the participatory nature of the command; (2) minimize staff turbulence; (3) streamline functions; (4) support CINC decisionmaking; and, in particular, (5) support the CINC's interactions with the services, Joint Staff, OSD, and Congress.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGY-TO-TASKS

In the previous chapter, we provided a framework for linking USSOCOM's operational tasks, the force elements that perform the tasks, and the resources from which force elements draw. The framework demonstrates a coherent relationship between USSOCOM's program and its objectives in light of the national security strategy. However, although we added resource elements to the framework, it was not (as we have noted) explicitly designed to support resource management decisions. Therefore, in order to identify areas for improvement in USSOCOM's resource management practices, we developed a concept of resource management consistent
with the framework that would allow us to look at USSOCOM’s current practice and recommend improvements.

The basic resource management task for USSOCOM’s PPBS activities can be viewed as a problem of integrating the demand for resources (i.e., requirements for accomplishing operational and employment tasks, as linked by our framework to higher-level military and national security goals) with the supply (i.e., resources for accomplishing tasks).

This view of resource management can be overlaid onto the basic strategy-to-tasks framework as shown in Figure 8.

For the purposes of planning, programming, and budgeting, the upper levels of the hierarchy (shown on the upper left-hand side of Figure 10) can be viewed as unfunded resource demands. The lower levels of the hierarchy show available resources. Between, at the level of SOF operational tasks and force elements, supply and demand are integrated. By this, we mean that trade-offs can be generated and assessed among alternative force options for accomplishing specific tasks.

Figure 8—Strategy-to-Tasks Framework with PPBS Framework
According to basic management principles, two criteria should govern this integration. First, integration decisions must be independent: that is, organizations should be structured so that choices of resource mixes made by one element of the organization do not influence choices made by other elements. Second, decisions must be separable: that is, certain functions must be considered independently in making resource allocation decisions; these entail (1) an estimation of desired capabilities, (2) an estimation of when the resource will be available, and (3) a consideration of alternatives.

With these principles in mind, we defined an organizational structure for USSOCOM resource management. For example, a USSOCOM component's resource choices should not influence the choices made by another component. Or, if they do, the influence on the affected unit or process must be acknowledged and understood by the resource integrators. Figure 9 shows the independence and separability criteria applied to the USSOCOM environment. The figure illustrates that separability, as it pertains to USSOCOM, means that "demand" (the required capabilities) must be determined without regard to "supply" for the command to fulfill its various missions. Similarly, "supply" must define all available resources (such as personnel, equipment, and training) that can potentially match the required capabilities. A separate integration function then must weigh the demand against the available resources to determine the best mix of resources. This function serves as a "gatekeeper" between supply and demand. If this function is performed correctly, it should result in a balanced program.

We next determine how this concept of demand, supply, and integration mapped onto the various USSOCOM resource groups (see

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2These two criteria are essentially amalgams of the principles behind the GE business unit model of strategic planning. See May's speech and Moder, pp. 266-267.
Figure 9—A Notional Concept of USSOCOM Resource Management

Figure 10). Directorates within the headquarters (shown on the right-hand side of the figure) are usually responsible for overseeing certain resources. The top of the figure shows the guidance that is received from such external organizations as OSD and CJCS. The left-hand side of Figure 10 shows the demand—all of the requirements for the command to carry out its various missions: combat forces, support forces, operational tempo (OPTEMPO), concept and doctrine, etc. The upper right-hand side of the figure represents the supply—personnel, training, research and development (R&D), facilities, logistics, etc. Part of the supply consideration is how these various suboptions are aggregated to a higher level (e.g., total force options). The center of the figure shows how the various elements of supply and demand (along with various other independent considerations) need to be integrated and developed into the USSOCOM program.

In specifying functions within the new organizational structure, several attributes needed to be defined. It was clear, given the complexity of the USSOCOM resourcing environment, that all the key
Figure 10—Organizational Overlay

NOTES: The Special Operations Joint Directorate consists of J-1, Directorate of Personnel; J-2, Intelligence; J-3, Operations; J-4, Logistics; J-5, Plans, Policy, Doctrine, and Combat Developments; J-6, C4I; J-8, Resources; and J-9, PSYOPS and Civil Affairs. SYDP = Six Year Defense Plan.
USSOCOM players, including the components as well as the staff elements, had to participate.

The structure was designed to address two problems. First, USSOCOM has difficulty responding to OSD guidance. The command also must respond to a myriad of schedules, documents, and decision papers. There is also an informal process that is often equally important in that it is used to establish a command position or to define the exact course of the resource debate before the formal meetings.

Second, within USSOCOM headquarters, the resource debate is often driven by service perspectives rather than by a command perspective. Resources frequently are allocated based on a concept of “fair share” to each of the participating components, rather than by a consideration of changes in roles and missions, defined by cost-effectiveness and efficiencies. This practice is reflected in the composition of the resource panels and USSOCOM Decision Packages. The panels, which consist of groups that convene during the programming phase to debate and recommend funding priorities, are composed of colonels and lieutenant colonels from the USSOCOM staff. Special subject experts are often brought in from the components to serve on the panels. The panels perform what we would term an integration function. Programmatically, the resources are actually allocated (with funding put against them) within the SODPs, which are incorporated into the USSOCOM POM. The SODPs are the records of the funded USSOCOM programs.

The structure that best fit our criteria and addressed the difficulties we identified was based on a strong integrator function within the command headquarters. It would be responsible for developing a balanced program (by integrating the requirements [demand] against the available resources [supply]). The integrator would be a “gatekeeper” who would provide alternatives and options to decisionmakers.

This organizational structure would adhere to the rules of independence and separability to ensure that resource needs were objectively weighed. Also, no one participant could have a preponderance of influence in the resource debate. Another consideration in selecting an organizational structure is that it must support the strategy-
to-tasks methodology by providing a clear audit trail tying specific resource decisions to high-level military and national security goals and supporting a credible, persuasive PPBS process.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PPBS FUNCTIONS

Once it was determined that this organizational concept was feasible, we examined how the various functions should be performed. We asked three questions: (1) Which staff elements should perform which functions? (2) What information is needed to support CINC decisionmaking at each stage of the PPBS? (3) Who should own the databases and analytical support tools?

Figure 11 shows our concept of functional organization by staff element. The figure shows that some directorates function as both demanders and suppliers. This does not violate our independence and separability criteria as long as the organization recognizes that these overlapping organizational functions need to be kept separate.

![Figure 11 — Concept of Functional Organization by Staff Element](image)
Adhering to USSOCOM’s guidance that changes should minimize staff turbulence, we noted that several functions followed current organizational structures; for instance, the demand side followed, for the most part, existing staff elements. SOJ-3 defines the operational requirements for the command. SOJ-6 is responsible for command, control, communications, computers, and information systems. In its role as a demander, it defines USSOCOM’s C3I and computer demands. On the supply side, it draws support from the components and other agencies. We concluded that SOJ-5-F, Force Development, could function as the demand-side integrator. This division would define the required capabilities (both warfighting and nonwarfighting) across the command in a more balanced manner than, for example, SOJ-3, who is primarily responsible for operational or warfighting requirements.

We found that many demand-side organizations had management oversight of supply-side functions. This is the case with SOJ-1, SOJ-3, SOJ-6, and SOJ-9. For instance, SOJ-1 allocates personnel to meet the command’s warfighting and nonwarfighting requirements, but the personnel are “owned” by the components.

Because the components own most of the resources, the supply-side integrator must oversee not only the resources within headquarters, but also those owned by the components. The supply-side integrator must, therefore, interact between the components and members of headquarters staff. The components, on the other hand, need to interact not only with the USSOCOM headquarters but also with the various directorates within the components. Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Council (SORDAC) is included in the supply side because it owns the R&D and acquisition management resources for the command.

The integrator function ensures that available resources are evaluated against both required and prioritized requirements. The function should change as one moves through the planning, programming, and budgeting phases. For instance, the preplanning and planning phases have few, if any, fiscal constraints; therefore, the SOJ-5-F oversees all of the planning function.3

3The term force development includes all the major assets that are owned by a command. For instance, personnel, equipment, logistics, training, and base installations
The integrator must also interact with the military departments to secure certain resources and capabilities. For instance, USSOCOM must negotiate lift capability with the Air Force. During the planning phase, SOJ-8 would support SOJ-5-F with the development of alternative options. During the programming phase, however, SOJ-8 would work closely with SOJ-5-F in the fiscally constrained planning and the "what if?" options.

Figure 12 lists the major supply, demand, and integration functions by organization. This one-dimensional snapshot does not show how SOJ-5-F and SOJ-8 interactions would work through the various PPBS phases. For example, SOJ-5-F and SOJ-8 are both function integrators during the programming phase; SOJ-5-F is the lead integrator, with SOJ-8 integrating the supply side and supporting SOJ-5 in the development of alternatives.

Figure 12—Concept of Organization: Integration Function for SOJ-5-F
CINC Decisionmaking

The CINC is ultimately responsible for resource management decisions. Since the strategy-to-tasks framework is a decision support system, we also used it to identify information the CINC had to give and receive through each resource planning and execution phase—interpreting the guidance, planning, programming, and budgeting. The strategy-to-tasks framework thus provides a structure by which to ensure that the appropriate information is supplied.

This phase of the analysis identified only the key types of information that must be given within the command to be responsive to the PPBS's demands. Our goal was then to identify which directorates within USSOCOM could best support CINC decisionmaking through the various PPBS phases.

Figures 13 through 16 show the levels of the strategy-to-tasks framework (left-hand side) and the information supplied to or provided by the key players during each PPBS phase. The figures contain the

![Diagram of CINC Decisionmaking](image-url)

**Figure 13—Interpreting CINC Guidance**
Figure 16—Budgeting Phase: USSOCOM Information Flows

POM is developed by the staff and approved by the CINC. The staff is responsible throughout the programming cycle for developing a baseline program from which options are generated to define the best resource mix consistent with CINC priorities. The components also participate in the process: they comment on the various employment concepts and develop options on how each employment concept might be resourced. The components, however, only provide recommended options; they are not responsible for determining which options should be selected.

During the budgeting phase, earlier program choices or modifications directed by the CINC are worked out in greater detail. See Figure 16. CINC staff is responsible for defining the selected options in greater detail, including cost and an assessment of operational effectiveness. During this phase, the CINC also begins to prepare his spring congressional testimony that presents and justifies USSOCOM's program.
The analysis suggested that the USSOCOM organizational structure should provide the CINC with the right set of information in a timely manner consistent with the schedule and the agenda set by the PPBS and supported by the strategy-to-tasks framework. The organizational structure also must preserve the participatory nature of the existing USSOCOM organization. Staff functions need to be structured so as to provide the CINC with a balanced picture of his resources and the trade-offs that could be made. The organization should be able to anticipate DoD guidance rather than merely react to changes. The components, schools, and Special Operations Commands (SOCs) have to be able to fully participate in the process, but at the appropriate level and in a disciplined manner. They should receive the program guidance early and have well-defined mechanisms for allowing their opinions and alternatives to be shared through each PPBS phase. The headquarters' staff should be responsible for putting the final program together and for making sure that the CINC can justify his resource choices to OSD, the Chairman, and ultimately to Congress. If these challenges could be overcome, the structured process could also fulfill unstructured (crisis) decision-making needs.

**Staff Functions During the PPBS**

Our analysis of CINC decisionmaking leads to a notional concept of how the staff functions might work through the various phases of the PPBS. The concept is shown in Figure 17. The shaded areas show the key integration functions through the various stages of the program-build cycle. The top portion of the figure shows the various functions through the PPBS phases. SOJ-5-F is the lead integrator, but shares programming responsibilities with SOJ-8. In the early stages of the planning phase, SOJ-5-F is responsible for the development of the plan; it also works with SOJ-8 to review fiscal constraints that should be imposed. As the command undergoes the transition from the planning to the programming phase, SOJ-8 is responsible for overlaying the fiscally constrained planning factors onto the analysis. SOJ-5-F, during this phase, plays a supporting role, providing key inputs and integration guidance. The transition from the programming phase to the budgeting phase sees SOJ-5-F and SOJ-8 share the responsibility of monitoring the approved program.
Figure 17—Suggested USSOCOM Staff PPBS Functions
Program disconnects are identified with the help of SOJ-8 and its analytic support tools. But SOJ-5-F and SOJ-8 together coordinate and develop a plan for monitoring implementation of the approved program. SOJ-8, on the other hand, ensures that the components/SOCs have been informed about the contents of the program. It also oversees the actual assemblage of the program and its execution.

USSOCOM also requested that we provide some structure for a procedure for interacting with the components. The shaded areas on the figure show how the directorates responsible for supplying information during each PPBS phase interact. For instance, SOJ-5-F acts as the lead integrator through the planning phase. As the command enters the programming phase, SOJ-8 becomes critical, working in conjunction with SOJ-5-F. But as one moves from the programming to the budgeting phase, SOJ-8 is responsible for the actual building of the MFP-11 program. Once this is completed, SOJ-5-F, along with SOJ-8, supports the CINC in the justification of USSOCOM’s program before Congress. SOJ-8 continues to monitor the execution of the approved program. The figure also shows how the other USSOCOM directorates provide information to SOJ-5-F and SOJ-8 in support of the USSOCOM program.

The next step in the analysis was to “game” the interactions among the USSOCOM program planners. Particular attention was paid to interactions between the USSOCOM staff, the components, and the SOCs. We assessed the information flows over time and the information needed from phase to phase, as shown in Figure 18. For example, the program review cycle informs the components and SOCs of the alternatives under consideration and the priorities. The selected alternatives ultimately result in an SOF program and, finally, in the program execution. The components and SOCs participate, but the USSOCOM staff is in charge of the overall process and determines its final configuration. We refer to this as a “structured dialogue,” because the components/SOCs participate in the process, at an appropriate level.

The components and SOCs are particularly important in the development of various employment concepts. They provide a source for the command to pose excursions from the current employment concept for assessment by the components. It is the responsibility, how-
Figure 18—Suggested USSOCOM Organizational and Functional Interactions
ever, of the command staff to weigh the options and make the final
decision.

The USSOCOM staff (primarily SOJ-8) also is responsible for notify-
ing the components of current and potential program disconnects.
Here again, SOJ-8 would request that the components provide op-
tions for how the disconnects would be remedied.

Resource Decision Panels

Critical to our recommended concept of organization are changes to
the resource decision panels. Under the current structure, individual
systems or capabilities are resourced through the SODP panels. The
panels are aligned according to broad command requirements:
mobility/force structure (Red Panel), equipment and support (Gold
Panel), military construction (Blue Panel), and Special Access
Programs (Black Panel).

The strategy-to-tasks methodology emphasizes the need to “resource
a concept,” which means that operational concepts (i.e., the end-to-
end accounts of how particular tasks will be accomplished) should
be funded through capabilities packages. See Figure 19. Capabilities
packages should reflect the most cost-effective means of accomplish-
ing a task. A capabilities package is a combination of different com-
ponents’ resources. An operational concept must also consider non-
SOF assets. For instance, lift is not an MFP-11-unique capability, but
is critical to the execution of most SOF missions. It therefore has to
be considered in the development and funding of a capabilities
package in support of an employment/operational concept.

We recommend that USSOCOM reorganize its panels according to
the operational objectives as laid down in the strategy-to-tasks
framework. The panel and SODP managers should reside in J8 since,
during the programming phase, this organization does the fiscally
constrained planning and costs the resources through the panels and
the SODPs. Figure 20 shows our notional concept of how the panels
might be linked to employment/operational concepts, which in turn
would result in the funding of capabilities packages. Our concept
shows that even within the panel structure supply, demand, and in-
tegration functions are kept separate, thus enabling the “demanders”
of resources to debate with the "suppliers" over the best resource mixes. In our concept, the panels are organized along the major operational objectives; the panels include both warfighting and non-warfighting objectives. Capability defines the panels, but there must still be SODP managers to provide the crosswalk to capabilities that demand the same resources. This is also (notionally) shown by the arrows in Figure 20.

**ANALYTIC CAPABILITIES AND TOOLS TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS**

We were asked by the USSOCOM staff to provide a brief analysis of the analytic capabilities and tools necessary to support our recom-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOF Operational Objectives</th>
<th>Demand (J5-F) Capability Panel Manager</th>
<th>Integration (J5-F)</th>
<th>Supply (J8) SODP Manager</th>
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<td>J2, J3, J4, J6</td>
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<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, J3, J4, J6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>J5</td>
<td>J3, J6, J9</td>
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<td>Training exercise deployments</td>
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<td>J5</td>
<td>J3, J4, J9</td>
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<td>Materiel prepositioning</td>
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<td>J5</td>
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<td>Technological superiority (fielding)</td>
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<td><strong>Peacekeeping Military Activities</strong></td>
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<td>Nation assistance:</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, J4, J6, J9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, J4, J6, J9</td>
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<td>Contingency operations</td>
<td>J3</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>Anti-terrorism activities</td>
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<td>Institutional development activities</td>
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<td>Security assistance activities</td>
<td>J3</td>
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<td>J2, J4, J6, J9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security operations activities:</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
<td>J3</td>
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<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<td>Contingency operations</td>
<td>J3</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<td>Support to insurgencies</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to counter-drug operations</td>
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<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<td>“Other missions”</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, 3, 4, 6, 9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>R&amp;D, Support Functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological superiority (RDA)</td>
<td>SORDAC</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J2, J3, SORDAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support functions</td>
<td>J1, 2, 3, 4, etc.</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J1, J4, J6, J8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF logistics functions</td>
<td>J4</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J4, J8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 20—Linking Panels to Operational Concepts and SODPs
mended concept of operation. We concentrated on the tools that would support a decision support system like strategy-to-tasks as well as the force structure development process.

The most important analytic requirement for USSOCOM is the ability to accommodate and integrate data sets. The SOF analysts need access to all major data sets that make up and influence their program. Such a capability would facilitate common levels of aggregation of data and terminology and, most important, an ability to participate. The OSD databases are critical to the development of SOF program elements. The services’ data provide information concerning the development of SODPs. Also important is USSOCOM’s ability to use the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), which contains the joint command and control information for conventional operation planning and execution. JOPES addresses such issues as mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. It is designed to support commanders and planners at national, theater, and supporting levels. This system is critical to USSOCOM’s accomplishing its joint operational planning. It links SOCOM’s planning and programming functions with the OSD and service databases.

Another required analytic capability is the command’s ability to simulate/model force capability using component input. This is critical for converting service-unique structures into joint concepts.

The command should obtain from the services as many relevant models as possible to allow the command to look at options and alternatives, and to exercise them in the joint-oriented environment. Particular attention should be paid to costing and cost-forecasting models, because the services often use different costing methods. In addition, the command should import from the services any quick “what if?” cost and capabilities analytic tools.

\[\text{Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1991–1992.}\]
Chapter Four

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This project’s goal was to assist USSOCOM in improving its resource allocation and management process. The application of a modified strategy-to-tasks framework provides the command with a well-defined resource decision support process that can assist it in its internal resource debate and decisions. The framework also provides a structure with which it can justify the MFP-11 program to the OSD, CJCS, and Congress.

The strategy-to-tasks framework is designed to assist USSOCOM in the development of its POM. The methodology does not replace good analysis and decisionmaking, but rather facilitates it. The framework must be supported by both well-trained analysts and comprehensive analytic tools—cost databases, simulations, capabilities models, and the like. If implemented, it could improve the command’s ability to participate in all phases of the PPBS, thereby enhancing its POM-development process. The matrix enables the POM-development process to be disciplined and compliant with all the PPBS elements. In the planning phase, the framework requires that the national goals, national security strategy, and national security objectives be linked. The USSOCOM analyst (in the planning directorate) assesses whether the national security strategy and objectives have changed from the current baseline framework. If they have changed, the first three left-hand columns are revised to reflect those changes. This signals to the USSOCOM POM developers that there are possible changes in how USSOCOM might want to allocate its resources.
The transition from the planning phase to the programming phase necessitates an assessment of how changes in the national security strategy and objectives have affected SOF operational and employment tasks. Changes in the SOF operational and employment tasks could then affect the force elements needed to carry out a task (or tasks). Such changes require the USSOCOM programmers to revise existing force elements or to develop new ones. The combinations of force elements then become the options that are considered in the POM panel deliberations of what should be funded. Funding decisions would be shaped by the CINC’s relative priorities for the operational tasks.

In the budgeting phase, the strategy-to-tasks process continues to necessitate that final resourcing decisions be based on the command’s ability to provide capabilities derived from its operational concepts rather than from the funding of individual items—guns, trucks, SEAL teams, and the like. The framework thus provides a traceable audit trail from national security and military strategies through operational concept to force elements.

Although adherence to the proposed framework does not provide a panacea for all of the command’s difficulties in developing the POM, it does address several of the issues that USSOCOM (and its components) raised with RAND at the outset of this work. For instance, it does not solve the problem that USSOCOM must have a headquarters staff that is trained in the PPBS process; it does, however, provide the staff with a road map of what must be done within each phase of the PPBS—by filling out the matrix. The matrix disciplines the process of generating options at each phase; it does not ensure the quality of those options, for that is a function of the staff and the analytic support tools that it has available to it. Strategy-to-tasks also fosters operationally oriented statements to the CJCS, SECDEF, and Congress concerning SOF capabilities; it does not, however, ensure that USSOCOM will obtain all of its demanded resources, for that is a function of which other demands are being placed on OSD and Congress. The framework, however, can assist USSOCOM in better posturing itself to defend its resources; USSOCOM resource demands are presented and justified within the context of the national security strategy and linked to sets of capabilities that are used to support multiple or highly specialized missions.
The framework will provide an audit trail of not only what was funded by USSOCOM, but also what has been traded away in the near, mid, and long term. This knowledge is important because the DoD resource decision process now requires that one justify not only the programs that the command wishes to fund, but also those that it has chosen not to fund. The framework enables USSOCOM to revisit its resource decisions.

A final caution in undertaking the implementation of the proposed process is in the use of consistent operational terms and concepts. USSOCOM combines the talents and experiences of many diverse and, at times, divergent viewpoints and perspectives. The most relevant elements to SOF planning and programming are the viewpoints of USCINCSOC, the CICS, and ultimately, the SECDEF. It is within this context that USSOCOM must compete with the services and other CINCs for resources. So doctrinal discipline and a shared understanding of a philosophy for SOF operational employment are essential for the most effective application of the taxonomy. Useful discourse within USSOCOM during force planning and program development as well as during the defense of the CINC’s program decisions depends upon the precise, commonly understood meaning of a validated set of operational terms. It is imperative that the USSOCOM staff provide the unifying taxonomy for the discourse of SOF issues. The proposed framework provides a useful baseline in this effort.

This study makes several organizational and functional recommendations for USSOCOM. We believe that these recommended changes will assist in the development of a credible USSOCOM program. The analysis was shaped by an attempt to establish standard organizational structures drawn from case studies and by the guidelines USSOCOM requested. The RAND-recommended organizational structure is consistent with the strategy-to-tasks methodology. The key recommendations to USSOCOM are to: (1) retain the participatory nature of the command, (2) minimize staff turbulence, (3) streamline functions, (4) support CINC decisionmaking by having a staff organized in such a way as to provide him advice, options, and alternatives, and (5) organize the staff so that it can support the CINC’s ability to justify USSOCOM’s resources to the services, the Chairman, OSD, and Congress.
Efficiency underlines the fundamental objective in our organizational and functional scheme—to conserve staff and analytic resources. There cannot be any risk of misinterpretation of information requested of the command, by the command, and within the command. The “structured dialogue” approach minimizes this risk by defining by phase the general types of data needed to be supplied or given to the various organizational entities in order to build and justify USSOCOM resources. It also ensures that the components receive the appropriate guidance and actively participate in the resource decisionmaking. The strong integrator function ensures that there will be institutional memory and (via the strategy-to-tasks) that over time there is a consistent record of decisions.

Since this analysis was undertaken, USSOCOM has adopted elements of the strategy-to-tasks framework. It has used the framework to develop linkages from the national security strategy to its resources; the command has moved to the concept of resourcing capabilities rather than individual items. Up to this point, however, systematic adoption of the framework has been slow, as it requires the organizational restructuring presented here.

USSOCOM’s 1992 reorganization adopted many of RAND’s organizational recommendations. The organizational structure did not, however, have the strong integrator function recommended by RAND. The CINC warfighting function was strengthened through the development of a strong Directorate of Operations (J-3). The Plans and Force Structure Directorate (J-5) was redefined and became (briefly) the Strategy/Plans Directorate (J-5/7). The roles of J5 were refocused on planning, and J-8 handles only programming issues during the programming phase. Thus, J-3 has become the integrator of the “demand” side, but there was no strong integrator for the “supply” side. Under the new structure, supply-side concerns are the responsibility of the panels.

Currently USSOCOM is undergoing another reorganization, with the goal of rebalancing the staff functions between the “supply” and “demand” functions and the development of a strong integrator function, as originally proposed by RAND. As of this writing, the reorganization has not been fully implemented. It will now be undertaken in parallel (and consistent) with the implementation of the fully accepted strategy-to-tasks methodology.
Appendix

SOF OPERATIONAL TASKS

WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY

Strategic Agility

- SO-Direct Action
- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-Counterterrorism
- SO-Search and Rescue
- SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
- SO-Special Activities
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
- PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
- PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Military Deception Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
- CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
- CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Contingency OPS Training

- SO-Direct Action
- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-Counterterrorism
- SO-Search and Rescue
- SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
- SO-Special Activities
- PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Activities
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Military Deception Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
- CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
- CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
- CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
- CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory
- CA-Exercise Temporary Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Authority Over Occupied Territory (Military Government)
Forward Basing

- SO-Unconventional Warfare
- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-FID
- SO-Counterterrorism
- SO-Humanitarian Assistance
- SO-Security Assistance
- SO-Counternarcotics
- SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
- PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Counternarcotic Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
- PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
- PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations
- CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
- CA-Foreign Internal Defense
- CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
- CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
- CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
- CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Activities
- CA-Support Counternarcotic Operations
- CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
- CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

**Training Exercise Deployments**

- SO-FID
- SO-Humanitarian Assistance
- SO-Security Assistance
- PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counter-insurgency, and Insurgency
- PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
- PSYOPS-Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Activities
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
• CA-Support of Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Materiel Prepositioning
• SO-Unconventional Warfare
• SO-FID
• SO-Humanitarian Assistance
• SO-Security Assistance
• SO-Counternarcotics
• SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations
• CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
• CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• CA-Support Counternarcotic Operations
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Technological Superiority
• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Counterterrorism
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Counternarcotics
• SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Counternarcotic Operations
• PSYOPS-Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Military Deception Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Activities
• PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities
• CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations

Power Projection

• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Counterterrorism
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Counternarcotics
• SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Military Deception Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
• CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
• CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
• CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Realistic, Objectively Measured Training

• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Counterterrorism
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Counternarcotics
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Prisoner of War Operations
• PSYOPS-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Operations
• CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory
• CA-Exercise Temporary Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Authority Over Occupied Territory (Military Government)

Decisive Force

• SO-Unconventional Warfare
• SO-Direct Action
- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-FID
- SO-Counterterrorism
- SO-Search and Rescue
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Military Deception Operations
- CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

PEACEKEEPING MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Foreign Internal Defense Activities

- SO-FID
- SO-Humanitarian Assistance
- SO-Security Assistance
- PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
- PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Activities
- PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities
• PSYOPS-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
• PSYOPS-Support of Prisoner of War Operations
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Contingency Operations
• SO-Humanitarian Assistance
• SO-Security Assistance
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Peacekeeping Operations

• SO-Unconventional Warfare
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-FID
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
- PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations
- CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
- CA-Foreign Internal Defense
- CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
- CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
- CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
- CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
- CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

**Anti-Terrorism Activities**

- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-FID
- SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
- SO-Special Activities
- PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
- PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities
- CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
- CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

**Institutional Development Activities**

• SO-Humanitarian Assistance
• SO-Security Assistance
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

**Security Assistance Activities (Nonlethal)**

• SO-FID
• SO-Humanitarian Assistance
• SO-Security Assistance
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Activities
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Foreign Internal Defense Activities

• SO-Unconventional Warfare
• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-FID
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
• PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Prisoner of War Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
• PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities
• CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Activities
• CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
• CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Contingency Operations
• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Prisoner of War Operations
• CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Activities
• CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
• CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

**Counterterrorism Activities**

• SO-Direct Action
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Counterterrorism
• SO-Search and Rescue
• SO-Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Counterterrorist Operations
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• CA-Support Counter- and Anti-terrorism Operations

**Support to Insurgencies**

• SO-Unconventional Warfare
• SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
• SO-Humanitarian Assistance
• SO-Security Assistance
• SO-Special Activities
• PSYOPS-National Strategic Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Insurgency
• PSYOPS-Provide Psychological Assessments
• PSYOPS-Information and Counterdisinformation Operations
• PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
• PSYOPS-Support of Foreign Internal Defense and Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Activities
• PSYOPS-Support of Public Affairs Programs
• PSYOPS-Support of Unconventional Warfare
• PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities
• CA-Support Battlefield/General Purpose Activities
• CA-Support Security Assistance Programs
• CA-Foreign Internal Defense
• CA-Support Military Civic Action Programs
• CA-Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (as requested by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development)
• CA-Support Unconventional Warfare Operations
• CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory
Support to Counterdrug Operations

- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-FID
- SO-Counternarcotics
- SO-Special Activities
- CA-Support Counternarcotic Operations
- CA-Support DoD Assistance to Domestic Civil Sector
- CA-Reinforcement or Restoration of Civil/Indigenous Government Administration in Friendly Territory

Security Assistance Activities

- SO-Unconventional Warfare
- SO-Strategic Reconnaissance
- SO-FID
- SO-Humanitarian Assistance
- SO-Security Assistance
- SO-Special Activities
- PSYOPS-Support of Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and Special Reconnaissance
- PSYOPS-Support of Contingency Operations
- PSYOPS-Support of Security Assistance Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Noncombatant Programs
- PSYOPS-Support of Prisoner of War Operations
- CA-Support Peacetime Contingency Operations
- CA-Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NATIONAL MISSION CRISIS ACTION

National Command Authority (NCA) Crisis Action Activities

- SO-Direct Action
- SO-Counterterrorism
- SO-Special Activities
- PSYOPS-Special Psychological Activities

SORDAC ACTIVITIES

Technological Superiority (Selected Supremacy)

- Conduct infiltration/exfiltration (air/land/sea) research, development, and acquisition activities
- Conduct communications and intelligence research, development, and acquisition activities
- Conduct arms and ammunition research, development, and acquisition activities
- Conduct unit equipment research, development, and acquisition activities

GENERIC SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Support Function Capability

- Communication support
- Intelligence support
- Information campaign support
- Force protection support
- Force sustainment support
- Liaison support
- Advisory assistance support
- Intercultural communications support
- Interoperability support
- Mobilization assistance support
- Resources control support
- Sustainment training support
- Coalition training support
- Security training support
- Funding support
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