Deterrence has long been a major U.S. national security objective. With the end of the
Cold War, the international security environment has evolved sufficiently to cause rethinking of how the United States will apply its deterrent capability.

The relationship between conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare--marrying them into a single conceptual package--is explored. A review of deterrence theory and the historical underpinnings of Expeditionary Warfare is provided to argue the hypothesis that Expeditionary Warfare, as defined within this project, is relevant as an effective deterrent.

There are three principal conclusions: first, that effective deterrence should be
underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost; second, that deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict; and third, forward military presence does not necessarily deter.
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EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE AND CONFLICT DETERRENCE

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The contents of this paper reflect the views of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world has changed since the demise of the former Soviet Union. Although threats to the U.S. homeland have lessened, global security issues are becoming increasingly challenging and complex in the emerging multipolar world. The President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) reflects that concern: "The unitary threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges, and our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges is still evolving."

Deterring or preventing conflict is clearly one of the strategic objectives of the NSS. Additionally, the new national security strategy is more selective and regionally focused than its predecessor in its attempt to address the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment.

As strategic vision and budget reduction measures evolve, Expeditionary Warfare has emerged as a topical form of warfare. Several initiatives attempt to address how Expeditionary Warfare supports evolving national security objectives. As an example, The Chief of Naval Operations established OPNAV 85 as Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the Navy Staff. Several conferences and symposia related to Expeditionary Warfare have been conducted within the past two years that have looked at various facets of Expeditionary Warfare.
The aim of this project was to explore how Expeditionary Warfare specifically related to conflict deterrence. Methodology required the following considerations: first, certain assumptions were made about the ramifications of the new security environment; second, to provide a starting point and facilitate research focus, it was necessary to develop definitions of both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare; third, developing a chart that reflected the exploitation of force (depicted in Figure 1) provided a visual representation of the contextual scope of the area of concern adding further precision to the research effort; and finally, conclusions were based on an examination of concepts and relationships that do not lend themselves well to empirical research. It was determined that there is a connection between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence and that the connection depends upon the extent that Expeditionary Warfare could be made relevant to influence events ashore.

Three principal conclusions have emerged as a result of the project's research. The following conclusions are supported by findings that emerged during exploration of the relationship between conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, and as such, reflect a syntheses of the two subjects:

- Effective deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost.
- Deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict.
- Forward military presence does not necessarily deter.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APA - Army Prepositioned Afloat
CINC - Commander in Chief
C + 15 - The day a contingency was declared plus 15 days
D + 10 - The day an assault began plus 10 days
JFC - Joint Force Commander
MEU/SOC - Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable
MPF - Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS - Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MRC - Major Regional Contingency
OOTW - Operations Other Than War
RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs
XW - Expeditionary Warfare
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Challenge

Challenges to our national interests did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Today we face a world in which threats are both widespread and uncertain, and where conflict is probable but often unpredictable.¹

Taken from a draft copy of the 1994 National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS), the statement above reflects how the world has changed since the demise of the former Soviet Union. Although threats to the U.S. homeland have lessened, global security issues are becoming increasingly challenging and complex in the emerging multipolar world. The President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) reflects that concern: "The unitary threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges, and our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges is still evolving."²

Deterring or preventing conflict is clearly one of the strategic objectives of the NSS.³ Additionally, the new national security strategy is more selective and regionally focused⁴ than its predecessor in its attempt to address the
challenges of the post-Cold War security environment.

As strategic vision and budget reduction measures evolve, Expeditionary Warfare has emerged as a topical form of warfare. Several initiatives attempt to address how Expeditionary Warfare supports evolving national security objectives. As an example, the Chief of Naval Operations established OPNAV 85 as Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the Navy Staff. Several conferences and symposia related to Expeditionary Warfare have been conducted within the past two years that have looked at various facets of Expeditionary Warfare.

The aim of this project was to explore how Expeditionary Warfare specifically related to conflict deterrence. Methodology required the following considerations: first, certain assumptions were made about the ramifications of the new security environment; second, to provide a starting point and facilitate research focus, it was necessary to develop definitions of both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare; third, developing a chart that reflected the exploitation of force (depicted in Figure 1) provided a visual representation of the contextual scope of the area of concern adding further precision to the research effort; and finally, conclusions were based on an examination of concepts and relationships that do not lend themselves well to empirical research. It was determined that there is a
connection between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence and that the connection depends upon the extent that Expeditionary Warfare could be made relevant to influence events ashore.

Assumptions

The following major assumptions frame the context of this paper:

- The United States is concerned with promoting democracy, is supportive of peaceful, nonviolent change, and is generally opposed to violence as a means of changing the status quo.

- The United States will deliberate carefully before becoming involved in situations that are not considered in its national interest.

- Regional diversity is relevant to how the threat of military force is applied in conflict deterrence situations.

- The United States will continue to extend deterrence to other nations.

- The United States will be deterred from using its full military capability against an opponent.⁵

- The United States prefers multilateral solutions to international problems.
Definitions

Conflict is considered in this paper to be a hostile confrontation in which the parties concerned resort to violence to resolve differences or change the status quo. In some literature, a distinction is made between the terms conflict and crisis. For example, Snyder and Diesing consider a crisis to consist of two elements—deep conflict between the parties, and the initiation of conflict behavior—and describe crises as lying at the "nexus of peace and war." In this context, therefore, deterring conflict relates more to the initiation of armed conflict than to non-violent conflict.

Deterrence is defined here to mean the way in which an opponent is dissuaded from pursuing a particular course of action because the perceived benefits do not justify the costs. This definition is adapted from an extensive review of deterrence theory which enjoys broad consensus on the key elements of prevention, dissuasion, perception and cost-risk assessment.

Thus, in combining the concepts of conflict and deterrence, this paper defines conflict deterrence as:

the process by which one party attempts to dissuade another party from resorting to armed conflict through the threatened application of force.
The next chapter will elaborate on this definition of conflict deterrence.

Several organizations have attempted to define Expeditionary Warfare, and so far there is no consensus on a universal definition. Some consider that meaningful discussions of Expeditionary Warfare require an exact definition to permit its further evaluation. Others believe the definition should be based on context and application, while still others support positions somewhere between these two. Even within various organizations, there is little agreement on what Expeditionary Warfare is, or even why such a definition would be relevant. It is safe to assume that Expeditionary Warfare, although understood as a general idea, will probably continue to elude a consensual definition for the foreseeable future.

Establishing an acceptable definition of Expeditionary Warfare is not the aim of this paper; instead, the relationship—and relevance—of Expeditionary Warfare to conflict deterrence is explored. Accordingly, the following definition is used:

Expeditionary Warfare is the application of military force (or threatened application of military force) outside the United States short of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). It can be characterized as flexible, adaptable, limited in objectives, sustainable, and tailored for specific regional requirements. It also entails committing forces on another country's territory, under U.S. command, to
control or influence events.  

Chapter III provides a detailed analysis of this project definition.

Exploitation of Force

The chart that follows was developed to organize research and put emerging issues into context. It addresses the exploitation of military force—here divided into the threatened application of force, and the application of force.

**FIGURE 1**

### EXPLOITATION OF FORCE

<table>
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<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>MEANS</th>
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<td>Threatened Application of Force</td>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
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<td>• Resolve Crisis</td>
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<td>• Compellance</td>
<td>• End Conflict on Favorable Terms</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Peacekeeping?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Credible Commitment</td>
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The chart comprises essential elements taken from the 1994 NSS and the draft NMS of the United States.

The draft NMS discusses three strategies: peacetime engagement, conflict prevention and fighting to win wars, to accomplish the strategic objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. Preliminary research suggested a difference between preventing conflict through applied force (intervention), and preventing conflict through the threatened application of force (deterrence). Understanding the difference between use and "non-use" of force is fundamental to exploring the relationship between military force and conflict deterrence.

Strategic objectives reflected in the chart were synthesized from the NSS and the draft NMS with the exception of those that appear in the intervention column in Figure 1, which were conceived separately.

The transition from "Forward Deployed/Stationed Forces" to "Expeditionary" in the "Regional Instability" and "Armed Intervention" columns acknowledges the contrast between the general nature of forward deployment with the objective-oriented forces that would be committed to deal with specific contingencies. "Expeditionary Capable" becomes "Expeditionary" upon the receipt of explicit objectives.

"Compellance" appears in both the "Regional Instability" and the "Armed Intervention" columns due to its nature. The
relationship between compellance and deterrence will be amplified in Chapter II.

Expeditionary Warfare can be applied to a wide range of roles and missions and expeditionary forces could operate in contingencies across the spectrum depicted in the table. However, for the purpose of visually representing the area of project focus, the "Regional Instability" column is the area of concentration.

Research topics

Initial research revealed that both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare have been the subjects of exhaustive examination, however, relating them specifically to each other is something that has not been significantly undertaken. In attempting to do so, the following topics emerged as especially relevant and warranted further development to focus research:

- There is a relationship between military force and conflict deterrence.
- To be effective, deterrence needs to be relevant to situations that are sui generis.
- Given the nature of conflict, deterrence must therefore be applicable across the entire spectrum.
- As a means of applying the threat of military force, Expeditionary Warfare is relevant to certain types of
conflict and not others.

Since conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare have been subjected to thorough academic evaluation and research, simply synthesizing what is already known would serve no useful purpose. However, examining the relationship between them and the relevance of Expeditionary Warfare to deterring conflict is useful, especially in light of the recent security strategy espoused by the current Administration. Accordingly, Chapters II and III will provide overviews of conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, respectively. Chapter IV will then present conclusions regarding the relationship between the two.
CHAPTER II
CONFLICT AND DETERRENCE

An Evolving Security Environment

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.10

Deterring or preventing conflict is one theme woven into the fabric of the U.S. national security strategy of enlargement and engagement.11 This new national security strategy is selective and regionally focused12 and clearly attempts to address the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. Containment appears to have been replaced by what President Clinton calls "preventive diplomacy."13

A major assumption of this paper is that the United States is concerned with promoting democracy, is supportive of peaceful, nonviolent change, and is opposed to violence as a means of changing the status quo. It also assumes that the United States will be selective rather than "reflexive"14 in how it deters conflict for reasons of national interest.

The years ahead will not be free of conflict. In The Fighting Never Stopped, Brogan identifies at least eighty wars that have occurred since 1945 and concludes that conflict is an immutable condition of world affairs.15
Additionally, this period also marked unprecedented U.S. military involvement. Blechman and Kaplan identified 215 incidents between 1946-1975 involving the use of U.S. military force; 16 Zelikow similarly identified seventy-one incidents between 1975 and 1984, 17 while Siegel identified 207 incidents involving the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps between 1946-1990. 18 The use of military force has demonstrably been a vital component of American foreign policy in the past: it will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

The end of the Cold War presented the United States with two new realities: first, the United States is no longer constrained by a strategy of ideological containment—it can afford not to become involved globally without fear of yielding ground; and second, as a result of the devolution of the former Soviet Union's power, the United States can intervene without provoking a superpower confrontation. 19

Notwithstanding the "CNN-effect" 20 that has arguably contributed to the increasing democratization of U.S. foreign policy, 21 the American public evidently does not want the United States to become involved in protracted, expensive quagmires. It would be difficult in today's environment to imagine a U.S. president invoking John F. Kennedy's vision of an America willing to "pay any price, bear any burden" to support and defend liberty. In fact, President Clinton's
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) reinforces a U.S. predilection for exercising caution and selectiveness in peace support operations.\textsuperscript{22}

Conflict deterrence as a means of averting military intervention makes good sense. Interventions (here considered to be the application of force to alter the status quo)\textsuperscript{23} usually incur costs that may be measured in terms of lives, scarce defense dollars, and increased political obligations. Combined with the continuing U.S. military draw down, additional costs may be incurred in the form of increased burdens on military personnel and equipment trying to respond to global "9-1-1" tasking.

From the perspective of avoiding cost, intervention may be considered when other avenues to resolve crises have been exhausted. If crises are allowed to escalate into conflict--following Schelling's observation that "the probability of war rises with a crisis"\textsuperscript{24}--the international community may have to bear the cost of conflict resolution. Conflicts tend to be difficult to terminate once started. Similarly, getting participants in a conflict to disengage is difficult and may require physical intervention by third parties. Conflicts may escalate and spread, dragging in outside nations. They can create massive outflows of refugees seeking shelter in bordering states and generate internal problems there. In short, therefore, intervention may be
required to contain conflict from threatening international security. As Ambassador Albright stated, "we live in a world not without conflict, but strive for a world where conflict is contained."25

How then is the United States to carry out "preventive diplomacy," and how can it try to control or shape events to prevent certain kinds of conflict from occurring? In its most basic form, diplomacy has elements of both carrot and stick, of reassurance and coercion.26 If used properly, reassurance and coercion can be effective in achieving a satisfactory end state.

Coercive diplomacy has two "levers": one is deterrence, and the other compellance. Deterrence and compellance may be differentiated in terms of how force is either threatened or applied. Schelling provides insight on the difference: "a useful distinction can be made between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence is concerned with the exploitation of potential force."27 Thus applied military force is not considered deterrence but rather a form of compellance. Where deterrence seeks to convince an adversary that he is better off by not pursuing a particular course of action,28 compellance requires the targeted party to act in ways that are "usually highly visible."29 It is said that the difference between deterrence and compellance is slight, and that the two are theoretically "often just two
sides of the same coin."\textsuperscript{30} As this paper is concerned with exploring the relationship between the threatened application of force and deterring conflict, \textit{this distinction is important, however.}

Some deterrence theorists argue that the only effective threat is one underwritten by the threatened application of military force. In Mearsheimer's opinion "a potential attacker's fear of the consequences of military action lies at the heart of deterrence."\textsuperscript{31} In its most abstract form, however, deterrence theory does not specify that threats must be underwritten by military force, merely that whatever underwrites the threat is credible to the deterree.\textsuperscript{32} Additionally, the deterree should be able to distinguish the threat from other "noise" that sometimes accompanies confrontations.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Rethinking Deterrence}

The intent of this chapter is not to provide a summary of the evolution of deterrence theory. Instead, it will examine what the end of the Cold War signifies for U.S. deterrence objectives, and explore what options might be applicable to deter conflict. While the evolution of deterrence theory--and strategic nuclear deterrence in particular--is interesting, the focus of this paper is to provide a fresh approach to a new security environment.\textsuperscript{34}
As discussed earlier, the international security environment has experienced a fundamental shift that also requires rethinking how the United States plans to carry out its national security strategy. The deterrence concepts that appear to have deterred the Soviet Union for forty years need to be overhauled.

In "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?," Allan lists three ramifications that the new security environment has for deterrence: first, that the end of the Cold War has caused a de-emphasis in the central role that nuclear deterrence once played; second, that U.S. deterrence strategy can no longer focus on a single opponent but must now consider a number of regional powers; and third, that the concept of extended deterrence will continue to be important in protecting U.S. interests far from the United States.  

Rethinking the U.S. deterrence issue was the topic of a high-level Pentagon workshop held in July 1994 which concluded that "U.S. deterrence thinking needs to be updated and broadened, to take account of the unique features of diverse and complex regional planning environments..." A revised deterrence concept that stresses the threatened use of conventional force to deter aggression is a topic that deterrence theorists have now turned to. This does not imply that strategic nuclear deterrence is no longer relevant,
nor does it imply that the ideas of nuclear and conventional deterrence are mutually exclusive, but that conventional deterrence may be more important in addressing the post-Cold War security environment.\textsuperscript{38}

**Key Deterrence Components**

A broad review of conventional deterrence theory was conducted to establish a set of key deterrence concepts that are applied in an exploration of the relationship between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence. Research revealed a consensus on the following key components that constitute deterrence.\textsuperscript{39}

The first deterrence component, *credibility*, is considered the probability that a particular threat will be carried out, and is perceived by the targeted party to be a reliable threat. This involves perception that the deterrer has both capability and resolve to back up his threat.\textsuperscript{40} An example of how a lack of credibility can lead to deterrence failure is the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. In its post-invasion analysis, the *Falkland Islands Review* determined that whatever signal the military commitment—represented by the armed research vessel H.M.S. *Endurance* and a forty-two man contingent of Royal Marines garrisoned ashore—was supposed to send, other non-military signals convinced Argentina that the British commitment to
the defense of the Islands was not credible. These non-
military signals included the British government's failure to 
expand the island's runway (a requirement to accommodate long 
haul civilian aircraft flying from countries other than 
Argentina)\textsuperscript{41} and the failure of the British Nationality Act 
to extend British citizenship to Falkland Islanders.\textsuperscript{42} 
Inconsistent signals can negate a commitment's credibility 
and it is important to recognize that deterrence does not 
necessarily operate in a purely military vacuum, but must be 
integral to economic, diplomatic, and political 
objectives.\textsuperscript{43} 

An additional consideration is that a threat must be 
relevant to the deterree to be credible. This may mean that 
the deterrer will have to know the value structure that he is 
operating against--knowing what Snyder and Diesing define as 
"the net value each party places on each outcome, including 
war"\textsuperscript{44}--and be able to threaten force within this context. 
As an illustration, Cable, in Gunboat Diplomacy, discusses 
the issue of relevance concerning naval force:

\... Limited naval force is only applicable in 
particular and rather unusual circumstances. It is not 
an all-purpose tool, but a screwdriver and, as such, can 
be a miserable failure in hammering home a nail. The 
same is true of most diplomatic expedients, each of 
which is suited to some situations and useless in 
others.\textsuperscript{45}

Value structures present a twofold problem in deterrence
planning: first, the process of identifying an opponent's value structure is filtered by political, cultural and ethnic differences; and second, in trying to predict how an opponent will react to a given threat based on rational behavior models, the deterrer may misunderstand his opponent's decision-making process. Deterrence theory, as Lebow and Stein state, does not predict that actors will be rational, but specifies conditions under which "rational" actors will consciously not attack. An actor may be considered "irrational" if he does not adhere to his value hierarchy when presented the option to do so. In a multipolar world with different value structures, knowledge of regional actors is important; "what constitutes a credible threat and (conversely) unacceptable damage may differ from theater to theater, and contingency to contingency." 

The second deterrence component deals with the deterrer's capability, which relates to the deterrer's means to carry out a threat. This is partly a function of weapon capability (such as the accuracy of U.S. cruise missiles) and partly of operational reach (the ability to project sustained power, for example). As it relates to conventional deterrence, however, this component has experienced a significant paradigm shift caused by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that has opened up the potential for non-nuclear options in deterrence planning. RMA has
enhanced conventional weapon lethality, accuracy, and ability to target an aggressor's value structure, while reducing the potential for friendly force casualties, enemy collateral damage and concomitant political costs. The importance of RMA to deterrence is therefore that it enhances both the capability of the military deterrent and its credibility. In making a conventional force (such as Expeditionary Warfare) more usable by reducing some of the intervention costs discussed earlier (for example, military and civilian casualties), RMA may influence how potential aggressors perceive U.S. will to resort to force. Thus, if one accepts the premise that conventional force has become more punishing and more usable, the use of conventional force as a deterrent becomes more credible.\textsuperscript{49}

The third component, communication, provides the articulation of a credible and capable threat to the potential aggressor.\textsuperscript{50} The defender has to be able to communicate his force's capability, his resolve in using it, and what he wants the potential aggressor not to do. For example, a naval expeditionary force steaming at the twelve mile limit needs to have its presence communicated if it is to affect an aggressor's calculus. Not only should the deterrent threat be visible, or seen to exist, but it also should be communicated in such a way that the signal will be received as the deterrer intended. If the defender intends
to signal his commitment with a token military force, he should understand that unless his token force incurs political cost, it may contribute little to an effective deterrence. A potential aggressor's calculus of the situation may therefore involve his estimation of the defender's willingness to incur political costs as a yardstick against which he can measure his opponent's resolve, rather than the symbolism that the force presents. If this is true, then the actual deterrent signal received by potential aggressors sent by forward deploying forces may well be different from that originally intended by the deterrer.

In addition to the key deterrence components discussed above, it is useful to look at some related concepts that will be revisited in the final chapter of this paper. Counterforce and countervalue are two useful concepts that help to define the context in which the threat of force is applied. Counterforce embraces all measures which degrade an enemy's military capabilities. Countervalue, on the other hand, connotes operations to destroy or degrade selected civilian population centers, industries and other components that make up the fabric of the enemy society. Countervalue deterrence was particularly applicable during the Cold War for its relevance to the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.51
Denial and punishment are terms that are often associated with counterforce and countervalue. Denial of a potential aggressor's objectives can be applied to concrete or abstract situations. A defender can seek to deter an aggressor from seizing territory, or he can deny objectives in a more abstract way. For example, a state can attempt to deter terrorism by refusing to accede to objectives that terrorists want—a case in point is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and subsequent conviction of the terrorists involved, with the intended signal that future terrorist acts would be denied their objective. Deterrence by denial seeks to convince an aggressor that his attack will fail and be fruitless. Deterrence by punishment on the other hand, seeks to deter through the threat of pain, suffering or attack on the aggressor's value structure. For example, in response to an aggressor's threat to seize an objective, the defender might declare that he will retaliate by destroying something of value to the aggressor, and not necessarily related to the aggressor's military force. In looking at the concepts of counterforce, countervalue, denial, and punishment, it is important to understand that deterrence should not necessarily be exclusively counterforce, or that it should attempt to deter through denial and not punishment. Quester concludes that deterrence will have to entail some suffering (or cost) to be effective. 52 Conventional
deterrence may thus require a tailored mix of counterforce and countervalue options in order to apply the most leverage against an opponent.

Measuring deterrence effectiveness is difficult for deterrence analysts. As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of compellance is easier to measure since it usually requires the target to move or react in some visible way. To appreciate the difficulty in determining if a particular deterrent was effective, consider the following questions:

- Did the potential aggressor intend to attack?
- Did the detererrer communicate a threat to the potential aggressor, and did the detererrer act accordingly?
- Did the potential aggressor receive the threat as the detererrer intended?
- Was the resultant inaction on the potential aggressor's part caused by his calculation of the deterrent?\(^{53}\)

Under the kinds of conditions listed above, empirical deterrence analysis becomes difficult to conduct; a favorable outcome does not necessarily mean that deterrence worked. The only objective method would be to establish the actual intentions of each actor involved--and who would be open about admitting that he was successfully deterred from pursuing a course of action?

The 1961 British intervention in Kuwait to prevent Iraqi
annexation of the sheikdom provides an excellent example of the difficulty in attempting to discern intent from action. Kuwait was a British Protectorate from 1899 until 19 June 1961 and under terms of the agreement ending its status as a Protectorate, Kuwait requested British help if threatened. On 24 June 1961 the Iraqi premier, Abdul Karim Kassem, announced that Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq" and he considered Kuwait part of the Province of Basra. Kuwait's ruler Sheik Abdullah al-Salah, asked for British protection, and the first British forces disembarked from the amphibious ship H.M.S. Bulwark (600 Royal marines from 47 Royal Marine Commando) on 1 July. Within days, the British forces had grown to over 5,000 troops, reinforced with heavy armor, artillery, and eight Canberra bombers to counter the perceived Iraqi threat of invasion.\textsuperscript{56} The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, said that the British action would "deter any aggression against Kuwait."\textsuperscript{55}

What was Iraq's real intention? On 2 July 1961, Sir Patrick Dean, in his address to the U.N. Security Council, said that there were "indications during the past few days that reinforcements, particularly tanks, [had] been moved down southward from Baghdad."\textsuperscript{56} In the end, Iraq did not annex Kuwait and British forces were withdrawn from the territory by 11 October 1961 when they were replaced by an inter-Arab peace force.\textsuperscript{57} Although this example illustrates
unambiguous action and intent by the defender, as well as open communication of the defender's intentions, Iraq's intentions were unknown. Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Iraqi delegate to the U.N., insisted that Iraq never had any intention of using military force against Kuwait (although he may have meant that Iraq expected Kuwait to capitulate without a fight).⁵⁸

Similarly in October 1994, when Saddam Hussein deployed his Republican Guards toward the Iraq-Kuwait border, provoking a show of force from the United States, Iraq claimed that it had no intention of invading Kuwait. Whether Saddam Hussein was deterred from doing so by the threat of American force is impossible to determine. However, as with the earlier British incident, this one ended with a favorable outcome for the defender (and protege).

Self-deterrence is another concept that has to be factored into a deterrence situation. An August 1994 report prepared for the U.S. Congress identified several factors that have contributed to U.S. self-deterrence: first, the threats to vital U.S. interests are limited; second, Americans believe that the United States should not use force unless vital interests are threatened; third, the U.S. military's insistence on having clear objectives and end state; fourth, the reluctance by the U.S. Congress to intervene; and fifth, a reduced tolerance to U.S. war
Self-deterrence may also involve a situation confronting a military force in which it is unable to apply its full military capability against an opponent. For example, the United States might be self-deterred from responding to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons since it cannot respond in kind to chemical or biological weapons, and might be unwilling to use nuclear weapons in a situation in which the survival of the United States was not in question. Another example is the reluctance of the United States to use nuclear weapons during the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts. Additionally, because of the self-deterrence aspects of nuclear weapons use in practically all situations other than an attack on the United States itself, the issue of what constitutes an extended deterrence "umbrella" in the post-Cold War world is a relevant concern for U.S. allies.

There is an important distinction to be made between immediate deterrence and general deterrence. Immediate deterrence, defined by Morgan as, "the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it," differs from general deterrence, which "relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack." Additionally,
Immediate deterrence tends to focus on crisis stability—unlike general deterrence that is more concerned with the sources of crises.\textsuperscript{63}

Immediate deterrence can therefore be viewed as situational-specific: time, location, issue and adversary are relevant.\textsuperscript{64} Immediate deterrence is usually associated with situations of imminent conflict, in which the actors, issues, and threats are known. Contextually, this situation might be represented by the "Regional Instability" block of Figure 1, where the intended strategy is conflict prevention. The deterrer's threatened application of force in this instance should be relevant, unambiguous, and be enhanced by the key deterrence components discussed earlier—credibility, capability, and communication. Immediate deterrence might be characterized by threats to use force that directly influence a potential aggressor's calculus: in most cases this will most likely involve a credible commitment on the deterrer's part.

General deterrence on the other hand, applies to situations where actors, threats, and issues may not be known—a type of deterrence that Morgan calls "fuzzy, amorphous [in] nature."\textsuperscript{65} Contextually, general deterrence might be applicable to the situation under the "Regional Stability" block in Figure 1. This situation is characterized by regional stability, where cooperative
diplomacy supports the strategy of peacetime engagement.

General deterrence may be characterized by military preparedness and "showing the flag"--for example, maintaining forward deployed general forces. It may also be characterized by a country's military capability--such as nuclear forces, strategic bombers, or aircraft carriers. A limitation of general deterrence is that an ambiguous and unspecific signal may result when attempting to deter unknown or general threats.

Deterrence may therefore be seen to span a continuum ranging across the spectrum of situations discussed above; from general to immediate deterrence. As a situation escalates towards crisis, an effective deterrent threat also needs to adapt to become more specific, clear, and immediate.

Defining the Target

The discussion thus far has been limited to general deterrence concepts. At this point, defining the target of deterrence--who and what that the United States might consider deterring--needs to be amplified. The draft NMS envisions a strategic environment threatened by regional instability, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and transnational dangers. It outlines other threats such as acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens,
acts of aggression against U.S. allies and interests and arms proliferation. What does the draft NMS have to say about how these threats will be deterred? In fact, it says very little.

In applying deterrence theory to this question, it becomes apparent that the strategic environment outlined in the draft NMS needs to be further defined in terms of who and what the threats are. This is based on the premise that the deterrer needs to identify who and what he wants to deter to make his deterrent relevant. When the United States decides to threaten to use force, the target of the threat is an actor or actors capable of choosing between alternatives. This fundamental assumption of deterrence theory recognizes that there is a relationship between the deterrer, the nature of the threat that he wishes to express, and the deterree. This is why knowing who the actors are is so important in deterrence. A representative sample of some actors that the United States is concerned about includes the states of Syria, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Serbia, and Cuba.

What of non-state actors? This is where identification of individuals whom the United States might want to target becomes challenging: these individuals do not possess the same attributes that state actors do (sovereignty, territoriality, and diplomacy). The Somali warlords and the leaders of the various Lebanese factions are illustrative
of the types of non-state actors that the U.S. has had to deal with—largely unsuccessfuIly.

Clearly, the spectrum of potential actors inherent in transnational situations probably defies establishment of a relevant deterrent strategy without resorting to a "strategic Swiss army knife—a device that is versatile but never the precisely correct tool for a given job." Seeking to apply the "precisely correct tool" is important in deterrence situations that require specificity and unambiguity to be effective. A general deterrent applied to an immediate deterrence situation may result in a ends-means mismatch, with subsequent deterrent failure.

This paper posits that conflict falls into three broad categories: interstate conflict by which is meant conflict between nation-states, intrastate conflict which relates to conflict within a state, and transnational conflict which deals with conflict that extends beyond national boundaries—such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, arms proliferation and piracy. (See Figure 2.)

In interstate situations, the deterrer's objectives are straightforward—to dissuade the aggressor from taking action—and are usually related to issues of sovereignty and territoriality. Knowledge of the actors involved, while imperfect, is used in the defender's calculus and applied against what is known about the aggressor's value structure.
The deterrer's play book may include deterrent options that maximize his military capability to ensure that the aggressor will incur unacceptable cost if he chooses to ignore the defender's warning.

In intrastate situations, the deterrer's task is more complex, not only because there may be many actors that require deterring, but also because each side may have different objectives and value structures—especially if the situation fractures along ethnic or religious lines. The source of conflict may be intractable and be beyond the deterrer's ability to apply a relevant deterrent option.

Transnational situations may lie outside the realm of effective military deterrence even though they may affect the fabric of the security environment. Williams and Black note that states are at a disadvantage when trying to combat transnational threats because the agencies used are fundamentally different from their opponent's that operate in a more flexible and responsive structure. For example, drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations continue to thrive in the international community, despite efforts to curtail both. They tend to be more flexible and adaptive than the state bureaucracies that oppose them.
FIGURE 2
CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interstate</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.K.-Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>Narco-trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piracy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal cartels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons proliferation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Transnational value structures may also lie outside the scope of military deterrence because their value structures may not relate to sovereignty, territoriality, or organizational structure that a military threat can target. Relevant deterrent options against transnational actors may need to resort to targeting of the actors themselves. However, the United States tends to be self-deterred from resorting to this option: applying military force against transnational actors in the form of direct threats against them is not an acceptable option under the current "play
Observations

Four principal observations can be made with regard to conflict deterrence: first, the new security environment has been transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar, regionally oriented one in which the United States faces fresh challenges. Threats to vital U.S. national interests are limited; the emergence of intrastate and transnational situations may be more widespread than interstate conflict; and the United States may be self-deterred from committing ground forces to deter any but very specific conflicts.

Second, regional conflicts do not lend themselves easily to Cold War nuclear deterrence policies for a number of reasons. Notwithstanding the effect that the Revolution in Military Affairs has had on enhancing the destructiveness of conventional warfare, conventional warfare may not provide the desired general deterrent effect that nuclear weapons offered. An appreciation of the contextual setting of conflict both in terms of the type of actors involved, and the type of security situation is crucial to the policy maker trying to make deterrence relevant. This contextual setting frames the ends of a strategy of conflict prevention, and focuses the means through which this can be accomplished.

Third, the limitation of determining deterrence
effectiveness through empirical analysis brings a caveat that policy makers should be wary of using deterrence alone as a guideline for when deterrence is appropriate, and when it is not.

Finally, in considering how to enhance the effectiveness of a particular deterrent, relevance is important. The more relevant—and more immediate—a deterrence is, the more effective it may become.
CHAPTER III
EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE

Introduction

Conflict deterrence was contextually developed as the threatened application of conventional force. A further definition of Expeditionary Warfare is necessary in order to explore not only the relationship between it and conflict deterrence, but to examine whether it has relevance to a potential aggressor's calculus.

As provided in Chapter I, the project definition of Expeditionary Warfare has several essential force elements. They are: outside the United States, short of an MRC, flexible, adaptable, limited in objectives, sustainable, tailored for specific regional requirements, capable of being committed on another country's soil, and under U.S. command. Elaboration on these is important in understanding what makes Expeditionary Warfare different from other forms of warfare.

"Over There"

... alternating enthusiasm and dejection observed in the organization and preparation of the expeditionary forces, show the diversity of political ideology in the group of leaders of our country. ... One of the consequences of this anomaly in the governmental sphere was the resentment of the country to the indispensable psychological preparation for
the conflict.\textsuperscript{73}

Although this quotation pertained to the reluctance by the Brazilian populace to embrace preparations for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force participation in Italy in 1945, it is representative of the general diffidence of democratic nations towards conflict that is, in essence, "over there." "Over there," however, is just one of the elements of Expeditionary Warfare.

Historically, nations have dispatched forces "over there" to influence events or obtain objectives. The known history of fighting on or from the sea dates back to 1210 B.C., when the first recorded sea battle, the clash between the Hittite and Cypriot fleets, took place.\textsuperscript{74}

"Time and time again the geography, politics and the global focus of the United States has mandated that it possess forces of an expeditionary nature."\textsuperscript{75} Being a maritime nation, the history of the United States is rich with examples of expeditions that were formed and sent "over there" to influence events and accomplish limited political objectives.

The historical underpinnings of the expeditionary nature of the United States Armed Forces date back to the early 1800s when the fledgling country's pride was questioned by the actions of the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli. Karamanli was allegedly so aggrieved by the President of the
United States, John Adams, that ". . . he ordered his men to chop down the flagpole (May 14, 1801) that stood before the United States Consulate in Tripoli--the accepted way in the Barbary States of declaring war." 76 Although littered with minor successes, the nineteen-month conflict with the pirates of the Barbary States was not an overwhelming demonstration of maritime strength by the new nation. The United States ultimately bought off Yusuf Karamanli with $60,000.00--less than he demanded, but still a tribute. 77 The war, however, demonstrated to the world that the United States did have the capability to project power and that it would fight when it felt it must.

An interesting analogy might be to relate the deterrent effect of the United States during the Barbary War to that of the current era. The Barbary States were not deterred by the United States because they were largely unaware of the new state's capabilities, sensitivities, and willingness to become engaged. Since the United States had not ventured outside of its immediate geographic area other than to trade, it was an unproven entity in global politico-military affairs. So, although capability to assert itself was present, any deterrent effect was minimal because that capability was largely unknown.

Today, however, it can be argued that there is little doubt that the United States maintains the capability to
literally annihilate any country that it chooses. The perception of reluctance to use this capability—or the credibility of its use—is the problem. Furthered by the image of former President Carter's "peace at all costs" trips to Korea and Haiti in 1994, there is an impression of domestic and political aversion for the United States to apply force. Hence, the lack of a deterrent effect is grounded in perceptions of reservation—not as in the Barbary War era in lack of knowledge regarding capability.

It is important to understand that contingency operations involving U.S. military forces within the United States are not considered expeditionary. An example of this type of use of military forces was evident during the crisis created by Hurricane Andrew in Jacksonville, Florida, in August of 1992. Although the military responded and provided outstanding service, its efforts would not be considered expeditionary since that contingency was within the United States. Expeditionary Warfare gains no deterrent effect when U.S. military forces respond to U.S. disasters. There is a distinction between U.S. military forces being used for non-Expeditionary Warfare situations and the application of U.S. military force.

Short of a Major Regional Contingency

Bearing in mind that this project is an exercise in
examining conceptual relationships, the statement "short of an MRC" connotes that entering into an MRC is beyond the contextual scope of Expeditionary Warfare. The National Security Strategy indicates that a major regional contingency could be represented by the forces required to fight and defeat aggression by countries such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. "Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces that can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor."81

It is acknowledged that some, most likely a significant portion, of Expeditionary Warfare-capable forces would continue to prosecute operations upon crossing the threshold into the realm of a major regional contingency. However, in the interest of narrowing the focus for meaningful analysis of the conceptual relationships noted earlier, examination of Expeditionary Warfare force conduct during the prosecution of an MRC is better left to follow on research.

Flexible

Being able to perform a variety of actions, produce a wide range of effects and influences, and effectively react to changing circumstances and environments are some of the essential characteristics of flexibility.82 Flexible
expeditionary forces enable national command authorities to shift focus based on evolving situations, reconfigure force requirements, and to realign forces to react to a range of possible contingencies. Based on current and projected equipment capability such as the LCAC, AAAV, and the V-22 for the Marine Corps and the inherent insertion capability of the contingency forces of the Army, the United States maintains the flexibility to go abroad and apply force that is unequalled among other nations. Innovation is an essential component of developing methods that capitalize on flexibility. The combat art of maneuver warfare is ideally suited to take advantage of many of the principal strengths of U.S. forces.

Almost fifty-one years ago, the United States participated in the last great opposed landing during the forceful seizure of Beito Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands. Few battles have ever matched the concentrated violence evidenced in such a compressed time-frame. With the possible exception of a second Korean War, it is difficult to imagine a situation that would require the type of battle that was apparent in Tarawa. Dr. James Tritten noted that a forte of maneuver warfare is that it pits strength against a principle objective at a decisive time.

Admiral Raoul Castex of the French Navy (1878-1968) was a pioneer in the art of maneuver. According to Admiral
Castex:

Strategic manoeuvre is a key element in the conduct of operations. It is a method used by strategy to improve the conditions of the struggle, to multiply the return on her efforts, and to obtain the greatest results, whether in the duel between the principal forces themselves or to the benefit of particularly important non-maritime requirements. It is therefore necessary to devote a special study to this method.  

Operational maneuver as espoused by the Marine Corps, results in an effort to remove the seam at the high water mark that has traditionally separated naval and land combat. In this new approach, sea and land are both used as maneuver space for a single fluid operation. Marine Corps Major General Cushman supports this by saying: "... its inshore and onshore geography form a single environment. ... [which] by exploiting technology and operational ingenuity, can bring ashore in a seamless continuum well-supported maneuver power that hits the enemy fast and hits him hard, but hits him where he ain't."  

Maneuver warfare enables a quantitatively inferior side to exploit its potential for qualitative superiority. As forward basing rights diminish, end strength decreases and OP/PERS TEMPO reach critical stages, flexibility will be the underpinning of successful military employment. Maneuver warfare may portend a capability that the potential enemy must be wary of—and include in his calculus: that he is
vulnerable to attack from any direction, at any time.

Adaptable

Adaptability connotes the synergistic effect of exploiting the combined potential of aircraft, ships, ground battalions and information structure (e.g., an entire C4I network) as performance platforms. The effective employment of an eclectic force across the entire peace/conflict continuum is the essence of adaptability. It is important to recognize that Expeditionary Warfare includes both joint and combined forces. We will briefly examine both (joint and combined) forces in order to establish their relevance to Expeditionary Warfare.

Since the Goldwater/Nichols act of 1986, the United States has placed heavy emphasis on training and operating with joint forces. The incontrovertible reality is that Expeditionary Warfare is--and will stay--a joint venture. Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the following:

I am well aware of the difficulty of shedding . . . individual service orientations and addressing the broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, however, that the need for joint operations, joint thinking, and joint leadership has never been greater as we meet the global challenges and in order to get the most of our finite resources.

Necessarily situation-dependent, the level of
"jointness" will vary from operation to operation. Outstanding examples of joint forces formed to prosecute operations abroad and that could serve as blueprints for future expeditionary endeavors were those relating to the crises in Haiti in September of 1994 and Iraq in October of 1994.

Admiral Paul D. Miller, commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command, ordered two of the Navy's centerpieces—-the carriers U.S.S. Eisenhower and U.S.S. America—to deploy in an unprecedented manner: the two steamed south toward Haiti without their air wings and without surface or submarine escorts. Instead, the two ships were loaded with 2,500 Army troops each, supported by army helicopters. Admiral Miller's "adaptive force packaging" concept, in which multi-service task forces are deployed in new and different ways, tailored specifically to the mission at hand, was tested in impressive fashion. Although Admiral Miller's "packaging" has come under critical review, it is most likely a harbinger of joint efforts to come.

When Iraq's Hussein begin amassing his forces on the border with Kuwait in October of 1994, the world watched to see if the United States would respond. It did so, with a joint force that sent a strong signal to Hussein and to the world. The following represents some of the forces that were dispatched to the region by President Clinton and they serve
to underscore the joint flavor of the response:

**U.S. Navy**

U.S.S. George Washington  
U.S.S. San Jacinto  
U.S.S. Leyte Gulf  

U.S.S. Hewitt  
U.S.S. Davis  
U.S.S. Reid

**U.S. Marine Corps**

Over 2,000 embarked in the ARG  
Tripoli AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP  
U.S.S. Tripoli  
U.S.S. Cleveland  

U.S.S. Fort McHenry  
U.S.S. Rushmore

**U.S. Air Force**

F-15E  
F-16  
F-111  

Tankers  
F-117A  
AWACS

**U.S. Army**

3,900 ground forces initially  
40,000 scheduled to be dispatched to the region  
2 Patriot missile batteries in the region

Additionally, the Marine Corps had plans to dispatch the Diego Garcia MPS.

The joint mixture provided a formidable and credible force that was dispatched with haste. "The rapid deployment of thousands of Army troops from Georgia to Kuwait to join up there with their tanks... marks the first real test of a system put in place only after the 1991 Persian Gulf War." The immediacy of the response that was directed at Iraq's transgressions was necessary in order to have a dramatic and immediate deterrent effect. Placing the forces on the ground
signalled commitment and capability and was necessary to influence Hussein's calculus. A general and disjointed threat of moving an aircraft carrier into the region or threatening to use U.S. based forces would not have had the same immediate results. Specific transgressions call for immediate deterrent actions. The swift U.S. response could serve as an example for future Expeditionary Warfare operations.

The international security environment also demands that we continue to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. Historically, coalitions and alliances have been created for these basic reasons:

- To provide sufficient power to resist or carry out aggression.
- To make known to potential adversaries an alignment of powers as a form of deterrence.
- To transform common goals to formal commitments.
- To legitimize U.S. military action.

The United States has become involved with coalitions and alliances at different times for different purposes. Although multinational forces increase adaptability, it is important to understand that there are both capabilities and limitations that are inherent to coalitions.

There are few instances that exemplify a rapid capability of a combined force. One example, however, is
again the combined force that assembled quickly and converged on the Middle East in response to Hussein's October 1994 force buildup on the border between Iraq and Kuwait. In addition to the joint forces that were discussed earlier, the following combined forces were immediately assembled:101

**British Royal Air Force**

Squadron of GR-1A low level reconnaissance Tornados and GR-1 fighter-bombers
4 VC-10 tankers
8 Jaguar strike jets

**French Air Force**

10 Mirage 2000 fighters
8 Mirage F-1 fighters
KC-135 tankers

**British Royal Navy**

1 Type-42 destroyer (H.M.S. Liverpool)
1 Broadsword-class frigate (H.M.S. Cornwall)
1 Supply ship (R.F.A. Brambleleaf)

The combined forces could have supported the ground arm of a multi-national effort.

In most cases, coalition partners have a better understanding of the cultural, religious, and historical underpinnings of the various nations across the different regions. As U.S. human intelligence assets continue to decrease due to reductions in manning, there will be more reliance on the part of our partners to provide better understanding of the regional political and military
considerations. This coalition capability can only increase in importance.

With the exception of NATO and the forces that gathered recently in the Middle East, assembling a multi-national force to pursue expeditionary operations is beset with difficulty. As the modus operandi of combined operations becomes more ad hoc due to the nature of the changing international situation, the time to assemble a credible fighting force would normally be considered outside the time requirements of Expeditionary Warfare. This statement is not intended to lessen the importance of fostering multi-national relationships, however, there are specific areas of difficulty when operating with combined forces, including: doctrine, intelligence, language, training, equipment, logistics, differences in culture, and national sensitivities. Dependence upon forces from an ad hoc coalition could result in problems.

The Naval Doctrine Command is examining the types of capabilities that the allies and potential coalition partners might, at some point, bring to Expeditionary Warfare. The ultimate goal would be the development of readily available forces capable of routinely responding on short notice in support of multi-national expeditionary operations. Specifically, the Naval Doctrine Command is exploring combined supplementary capabilities (e.g., covering hard-to-
reach areas that the United States cannot routinely cover) and complementary capabilities (e.g., augmenting U.S. efforts with additional forces).\textsuperscript{103} Adapting these types of capabilities with U.S. joint forces could result in a formidable multi-national force capable of demonstrating might to potential aggressors.

The United States has the unparalleled capacity to respond unilaterally to contingencies with formidable swiftness and fury. A unilateral expeditionary response, although very capable, could be perceived as a foray. That same response coupled with multinational forces and/or diplomatic underpinnings could lend coalition legitimacy that would result in a permanent solution to a crisis. The immediate deterrent effect is significantly enhanced by combining joint and multinational forces.

Limited in Objectives

To be designated as expeditionary, the objectives of the expeditionary forces must be limited. Vague or general objectives are not consistent with the precision required by Expeditionary Warfare.\textsuperscript{104} The Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War provides an excellent example of the detrimental impact of ill-conceived objectives.

With the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine, the lassitude of the Navy and the nation disappeared and the United States
entered into a war with Spain. Lacking clear national objectives from national authorities, the Navy and the Army set out to determine their own views on national objectives and formulated their respective plans accordingly. With no overall commander, the Army envisioned a limited expedition of 6000 men and the Navy forged ahead with plans for a blockade of Santiago harbor. President McKinley ultimately intervened and determined that the invasion force should be a large one and that its objectives should be to either "capture or destroy the garrison inland... or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet." With fractured command and control and with conflicting—or at least ambiguous—objectives, the Santiago Campaign moved forward.

The breakdown of cooperation between the Navy, Army and insurgents was nearly immediate. In spite of the difficulties, the United States prevailed and the Spaniards surrendered. Inter alia, Santiago provided the following important lessons that were learned regarding joint/combined expeditionary operations:107

- There was a need for superior authority and diplomatic adjustment in the intercourse between the services.

- Placing responsibility for the ocean transport and supplies with the Army did not work.108

- The breakdown of cooperation between the Cubans and
Americans was unfortunate and unnecessary. The insurgents could have been better used as guerilla warfare attacking forces to disrupt Spanish relief or resupply routes instead of being expected to fight alongside U.S. soldiers. Being under-equipped, they could also have been better suited for scouting or guide functions. They were not consulted, and after the initial skirmish, were largely distrusted by the Americans.\textsuperscript{109}

- Lack of clear objectives caused deep-rooted animosity between the Army and the Navy that lasted long after hostilities ceased.

Increasingly, the U.S. public has an input into the selection of what crises or contingencies the United States will become involved.\textsuperscript{110} Concise objectives with termination and extrication policies clearly stated are required prior to gaining public support. Prospective aggressors are aware of the internal debate that takes place in the United States before there is a decision to commit forces. Broad or ill-defined objectives have little value in deterrence overseas and will gain little U.S. domestic support.

\textbf{Sustainable}

The term "sustainable" is a difficult one to bound. Again, several organizations are attempting to develop the
concept of sustainment pertaining to Expeditionary Warfare that would satisfy a majority of constituents. For analytical purposes, Expeditionary Warfare might usefully be considered in terms of geography, intensity, and time. Examining Expeditionary Warfare in this framework should bound the issues more concretely.

Largely as a function of geo-strategic reality, the United States has historically operated in those geographic areas that can be operationally reached by maritime or maritime-supported forces. Factors regarding deployment include resupply, reinforcement, and equipment limitations that affect operational reach. U.S. Army contingency forces could be inserted anywhere in the world, but reach is limited and support is necessary for sustainment. The Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit can be inserted into almost any littoral on short notice via an Amphibious Ready Group, but is then constrained by the operational reach of its equipment and the tether to resupply by maritime assets which equates to approximately fifteen days. Assumptions regarding future reach may be influenced by equipment procurement that is dependent on budget considerations.\textsuperscript{111}

Intensity and time can best be addressed by examining current operational time-phased force employment planning. To illuminate this point, one might consider three complementary, but distinct phases of troop deployments.
The first phase would be represented by those troops, Army and Marine mentioned earlier, that could respond on short notice in support of national command authority tasking. The Army Airborne and Marine MEU/SOC are examples of those kinds of forces. Although swift to respond, the intensity of combat that they could become involved in would necessarily be limited due to their relatively light nature and the small total numbers of personnel involved.

The second phase could begin commensurate with the first and would entail dispatching the nearest available Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron to the crisis area. Phase I forces could be used to prepare ports and airfields for the arrival of a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Within ten days, the resultant Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) could be in place and ready to accomplish the following missions: "preemptively occupy and defend key choke points along strategic sea lines of communication, reinforce an ally with credible force prior to hostilities, support or reinforce an amphibious operation, establish a sizeable force ashore in support of a land campaign, and other missions assigned by CINCs and JFCs." Using crisis action modules, the MPF could support missions that cover a full range of operations. The MPF package comes with thirty days' sustainment. Beyond the thirty day point, Expeditionary Warfare becomes a major regional conflict or a
protracted presence mission such as the case in Haiti in September 1994.

The third phase of deploying armed forces would be dependent upon equipment brought from CONUS to the crisis area aboard the Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSRs). These are mentioned to demonstrate the sequential force deployment packages.

Without belaboring the point, the geographic scope, intensity, and time of Expeditionary Warfare are unsettled and are largely dependent upon factors such as size and quality of enemy force, U.S. equipment procurement, depth of inland reach, and allied participation. They are mentioned here to underscore the importance of sustainment and also to point out that sustainment is a moving target. As it pertains to Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence, sustainment does not include anything beyond the 30 day point.

Regionally Focused

The National Security Strategy examines the applicability of the strategy to specific regions. Although some would argue that the United States has always had a regional focus, the NSS clearly states that "... policy toward each of the world's regions reflects our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and
opportunities." Hence, Expeditionary Warfare reflects the NSS emphasis to facilitate collective, comprehensive security across the divergent regional spectrum. The respective CINCs know what their specific requirements are—tailoring expeditionary forces to meet those requirements is the key.

Another Country's Soil

Committing forces on the ground to influence events abroad is the essence of Expeditionary Warfare. The United States and its allies maintain the capability for swift response that would be ideally suited for retaliation or for other short-fused requirements (e.g., bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986). Placing U.S. and coalition forces on foreign soil in order to obtain objectives, however, is critical to Expeditionary Warfare. The efficient insertion of U.S. forces was evidenced at Vera Cruz in 1914.

Although operationally insignificant and politically ill-conceived, the 1914 Landing at Vera Cruz provides an example of the beginning of rapid deployment in support of expeditionary operations. Woodrow Wilson, on the eve of his inauguration said, "It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs." With the detaining of a group of American sailors by Mexican soldiers in Tampico, Mexico, on 9 April, 1914, President

53
Wilson's irony of fate was taking form as he set out on a collision course with General Victoriano Huerta and the expedition to intervene in Mexico was launched.

Vera Cruz is discussed here because of its important contributions and lessons related to expeditionary operations. Specifically, it proved invaluable in developing the following principles:117

- Forward Deployment. Because of the prepositioning of forces, the assault elements of two advance base regiments were ashore and fighting within the first twenty-four hours.118

- Time-phased Force Deployment Planning. By D+10, five regiments of Marines were either ashore in Mexico or on station offshore. Although depleting the barracks in the United States, the impressive phased deployment for prosecution in Mexico revealed significant planning and mastery of the importance of bringing forth troops and capabilities in an orderly and timely manner.

- Strategic Lift. Unit integrity was significantly degraded due to the haphazard manner that troops were transported. In view of the limited operations, transport was ultimately satisfactory, but the sealift shortage was acknowledged as being especially significant for larger-scale operations.

- Unit Integrity. Beginning with embarkation, unit
integrity was an essential characteristic of successful expeditionary operations. Although a considered strategic victory, there were numerous tactical and operational setbacks caused by the associated breakdown in unit integrity.

Of note, Vera Cruz was also the catalyst for the Navy's departure from the large raiding party operations that had been one of its hallmarks from the beginning. Although they fought heroically, Navy personnel took disproportionate casualties. As a result of the Vera Cruz landing operation, the Marines were on their way toward becoming the Navy's choice as its power projection force.

As was the case in Vera Cruz, forces on the ground are instrumental in fighting or in sending a strong signal. Although the types of forces that can be placed abroad has changed, the impact is largely the same. Inserting a fighter wing on the ground in friendly territory adjacent to a potential aggressor's country is a powerful sign of commitment. Whether the troops on the ground come in the form of a fighter wing, a Patriot battery, or ground combat forces, the signal sent by the United States is that it is strongly underwriting its deterrent with a credible commitment.
Under U.S. Command

The final premise is that the forces inserted would be under U.S. command. Being a superpower, the United States expects that in any situation that it determines to be in the realm of its national interests, the United States will assume a leadership position. In May of 1994, President Clinton signed PDD-25, which, inter alia, lays out the "three levels of criteria" that would be required in order to commit U.S. forces to peacekeeping. Among the second level criteria is the necessity for "acceptable command and control" arrangements. It specifically states that U.S. troops will remain under U.S. command but does allow for operational control of those forces by a non-American "competent UN commander." Although related specifically to peacekeeping, this can be applied to all involvements requiring U.S. force participation. By assuming a preeminent position, the United States could signal the depth of its resolve to potential aggressors.

Observations

Many military forces and capabilities fit one or more of the elements of the project definition. In order to be considered as Expeditionary Warfare capable, they should fit all of the characteristics.

Forward presence can reduce reaction time. However,
forward presence, for Expeditionary Warfare purposes, must include an ability to insert forces onto foreign shores. An aircraft carrier is not considered Expeditionary Warfare-capable unless it is tethered to an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit. The carrier air wing that supports Marines going ashore connotes a formidable force. Relatively, a bomber wing in the continental United States must be in support of U.S. ground forces "over there" in order to pertain to Expeditionary Warfare.

Expeditionary Warfare has been an evolutionary, not revolutionary process. From its very beginning, the United States has agonized over sending troops "over there" in order to protect its interests or to influence events on foreign shores. From the Barbary War to Santiago, Gallipoli to Guadalcanal, the United States and its allies have learned the lessons of influence.

Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence enjoy a unique relationship. It is a relationship based on relevance. The Expeditionary Warfare forces must be relevant to events ashore in order to have a deterrent effect. As discussed, relevance results from a combination of capability, credibility, and communication. The deterrent effect of Expeditionary Warfare will be diminished if any of the three are disregarded.

There is a danger of examining Expeditionary Warfare and
conflict deterrence in a vacuum. Expeditionary Warfare is a subset of military force that in turn is a subset of foreign policy which must also include diplomatic, economic, and political underpinnings. Too much dependence on any one tool can lead to a policy that has marginal effect.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

Principal Conclusions

Three principal conclusions have emerged as a result of this project's research. The following conclusions are supported by findings that emerged during exploration of the relationship between conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, and as such, reflect a synthesis of the two subjects:

- Effective deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost.

- Deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict.

- Forward military presence does not necessarily deter.

Findings

Deterrence theory does not indicate when we should and should not use it. While deterrence theory possesses what George and Smoke call "internal logical consistency"^{124} that in its most abstract form is simple and elegant, it becomes problematic when operationalized. Using deterrence theory to establish causality is challenging—in this respect Achen and
Snidal note that, "the most substantial body of empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that [deterrence theory] is seriously deficient." Subsequent research confirmed the conundrum facing deterrence theorists—that there is an imperfect connection between abstract theory on the one hand, and verification of the theory on the other. Applying deterrence theory to explain why individuals pursue one particular course of action as opposed to another, is fraught with analytical difficulties and this fact was important to note early in the course of background research.

Further research indicated that there is broad consensus on the key components that comprise deterrence: credibility, capability, and communication. These were expanded upon in Chapter II to show why they are crucial and why deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment to be effective. However, it was also noted that these factors alone may not be sufficient to decisively influence a potential aggressor's calculus of the situation—Lebow and Stein assert that in the deterrence failures cases they examined, the aggressor's actions resulted from factors other than those of deterrence.

It was found that caution should be exercised when using deterrence as a policy guideline: deterrence theory does not provide criteria for when it should or should not be used. George, Smoke, Lebow, and Stein agree that a major
limitation of deterrence theory occurs when it attempts to provide criteria for when deterrence should be used in foreign policy. "Leaders can get no guidance on when an attempt at deterrence is appropriate, when it is likely to fail, and when it is likely to provoke an incautious adversary." Failure to understand this could result in the misapplication of force and vitiate the deterrent effect.

Deterrence effectiveness is difficult to prove. This is perhaps one of the most controversial aspects facing empirical deterrence analyses. Seminal works on deterrence that attempt to categorize actions in terms of deterrent success or failure such as Huth and Russett's What Makes Deterrence Work, Zelikow's "The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary," or Blechman and Kaplan's Force Without War have been criticized. Part of the difficulty stems from a selection bias in case study analyses. Achen and Snidal observe that "analysts who want to know how often deterrence fails and how often it succeeds can be badly misled by consulting only wars and crises." They go on to assert that studies of crises and wars give no information about the success rate of rational deterrence. It is impossible to determine every instance where deterrence has worked for the following reasons: a successful deterrent may exact invisible concessions from a potential aggressor and are therefore impossible to measure; the deterrer may have
issued a threat when there was no intention on the part of the deterree to pursue a proscribed course of action; and finally, documented evidence about successful deterrence may not exist. The fundamental objective of deterrence is to dissuade an opponent from not taking action—subsequent inaction on the opponent's part does not necessarily mean that he was deterred.

Research also noted the distinction between deterrence and compellance is important when examining the subject of threatened application of force.

Expeditionary Warfare means inserting ground forces overseas. Forces ashore on foreign soil connote commitment. In order to be perceived as a commitment, they should incur political cost. The forces can come in various forms such as a fighter wing, a Patriot battery, or ground combat forces. Whatever the form, they send the signal that the United States is committed to that particular situation and that an attack against host country forces and/or U.S. forces connotes something to follow. A perception of something to follow should dissuade a potential aggressor from conduct contrary to U.S. national interests.

From the Boxer Rebellion to Somalia, infantrymen largely determined success or failure. R. Scott Moore, in his examination of seventy expeditionary operations that were conducted by the United States, Great Britain, and France
between 1898 and 1992, concluded that although operations were conducted for various political reasons, committing forces on the ground was the overriding mechanism of influence.\textsuperscript{132}

Expeditionary Warfare is unique in its capability to place U.S. joint and combined forces on foreign soil to influence events. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith in his "Development of Amphibious Tactics in 1946," noted that in spite of technical improvements, new methods, and logistical skill, the fundamental characteristics of Expeditionary Warfare remained largely the same.\textsuperscript{133} Expeditionary Warfare is still "over there" and still requires insertion of troops ashore.

Conversely, the carrier battle group over the horizon does not incur the same level of political cost. This does not mean that the aircraft carrier is irrelevant; it is a valuable instrument of foreign policy. Its strength of being autonomous and outside territorial limits has benefit. There will be times that the United States cannot or will not incur the cost of placing troops on foreign shores. Having the capability to strike anywhere in the world is an excellent form of reassurance to allies and of might to potential adversaries.\textsuperscript{134} Additionally, a carrier battle group that is tied to an Amphibious Ready Group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit that is capable of being inserted ashore
does have utility to Expeditionary Warfare.

*How the United States applies deterrence needs rethinking.* The new security environment has created a fundamental shift that requires the United States to rethink its deterrence concept. Three important ramifications have materialized in the post-Cold War era: first, there is a de-emphasis in the central role of nuclear deterrence; second, deterrence strategy must now consider a greater number of regional powers; and third, the concept of extended deterrence is still valid.\[^{135}\] Nitze argues, for example, that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be useful in deterring threats of regional aggression, and that a more credible deterrent is one based in part on enhanced conventional weaponry.\[^{136}\]

The impact that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has had on deterrence thinking is significant: with enhancements in the destructive potential of conventional forces and reduced risk of U.S. casualties RMA advocates suggest, conventional deterrence may become more flexible, usable and more attractive to policy makers concerned with reduced political costs. This preference for "stand-off solutions" that minimize risks to U.S. ground forces by relying on technological superiority, however, may adversely impact U.S. deterrence credibility.\[^{137}\] Ultimately, committing Expeditionary Forces in support of a deterrent
objective reinforces the notion that effective commitment incurs cost.

*The new security environment requires adaptive U.S. forces.* The new international security environment is more complex and requires adaptation of both policy and force structure. Understanding diverse regional planning environments is critical to developing deterrent measures that are relevant to events overseas.

Conflict can originate for many reasons and take many forms. The three forms of conflict discussed in Chapter II include interstate (between nation states), intrastate (within a state) and transnational (beyond national boundaries). Each form of conflict may require different deterrent measures. It is important to recognize that Expeditionary Warfare may not be relevant to each form of conflict or that it might not be possible to apply it even if it is relevant.

It has been demonstrated that the United States, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations, can swiftly respond to the potential aggression by one state upon another. The cases involving Iraq (July of 1961 and October 1994) cited earlier are evidence that joint and combined forces could rapidly respond overseas on short notice. Hence, Expeditionary Warfare appears to be well-suited for a deterrent role in interstate conflict. It is important to
determine which interstate conflicts comprise U.S. national interests and are worthy of U.S. force commitment. There is a danger, however, of applying interstate conflict paradigms to intrastate conflict situations.

In the post Cold-War security environment, intrastate conflict has emerged as the most widespread and yet complex type of conflict. Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda are examples of intrastate conflict. Expeditionary Warfare has little value in deterring these types of conflict. Outside influence is not very relevant to intrastate concerns.\textsuperscript{138} Military measures associated with intrastate conflict do not often bring about the political changes that are necessary for long term conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{139} Intrastate conflict often requires the restoration of order. As Moore states, "significantly, those whose mission involved restoring order tended to extend for more than a year."\textsuperscript{140} It was determined in Chapter III that protracted situations such as those inherent to intrastate conflict are beyond the scope of Expeditionary Warfare.

Expeditionary Warfare has minimal deterrent effect on transnational conflict; however, punishing a transnational organization (such as a terrorist organization) may be within the capability of Expeditionary Warfare forces. The irrationality, unpredictability and demonstrated immunity to military deterrence makes transnational organization actors
difficult to deter by the use of Expeditionary Warfare forces.

The evolving security environment requires constant adaptation. Understanding the origins of conflict is paramount in developing the necessary deterrent measures. Recognizing the limitations of Expeditionary Warfare in deterring some types of conflict is important.

**Expeditionary Warfare is limited.** As discussed in Chapter III, Expeditionary Warfare is limited in geography, intensity, and time, and its limitations are largely a factor of sustainment. Hence, Expeditionary Warfare is ideally suited for the short duration operations. Keeping Marines at sea in an Amphibious Ready Group for long periods of time diminishes their war-fighting potential. Navy Secretary Dalton remarked: "Our ability to establish the nation's presence, at the crisis site but without active intervention, will become increasingly important to the protection of security and economic needs." However, reduced numbers of military personnel, fewer overseas bases, and fewer ships and aircraft, result in less staying power. Expeditionary Warfare forces cannot linger indefinitely in a crisis area without experiencing a reduction in readiness.

Increasingly, U.S. military forces have become involved with Operations Other Than War (OOTW). According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September of 1994:
"About 48,500 military personnel are currently serving in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations including Iraq, Bosnia, Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda and the Caribbean Sea." Expeditionary Warfare forces have been engaged in these operations. Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that "... fighting men may be somewhat out of place in humanitarian missions." He also noted that the U.S. leadership must consider the impact on readiness that the humanitarian missions exact. It is a near zero-sum situation—for every dollar or hour spent on using the military forces for humanitarian missions, there is at least some portion of a dollar or hour unavailable to train to fight and win our nation's wars. The perception of a hollow Expeditionary Warfare force could result in a reduced deterrent effect.

The United States will be self-deterred in some situations. U.S. willingness to use force appears to be constrained by several factors, as noted in an August 1994 special report to the U.S. Congress:

- There are fewer threats to vital U.S. interests.
- Americans apparently believe that the United States should only use military force unless vital interests are threatened.
- A low tolerance for U.S. casualties.
- Insistence by the U.S. military on clear objectives
and end state (such as Weinberger's six criteria).

- The apparent unwillingness by the U.S. Congress to intervene overseas.\(^{144}\)

The short-term effect of this self-deterrence phenomenon appears to be an unwillingness to incur political costs associated with intervention, and a much more rigorous appraisal of when the United States will become involved overseas, (PDD-25 exemplifies this methodological approach).

*Expeditionary Warfare works best in compellence situations.* The United States has demonstrated an unparalleled ability to insert troops and war-fighting material anywhere in the world. In that respect, the ends and means are in synchronization. As such, Expeditionary Warfare forces are inherently suited for a compellance role. There is a need to translate the compellance capability into a deterrent message. There are examples that demonstrate what happens when the United States does not incur political cost or does not compel. One such example was the situation in Haiti in October of 1993.

The turning away of U.S.S. Harlan County by armed thugs in October of 1993 from Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, provides an interesting example of the relationship between several of the concepts related to Expeditionary Warfare. The small, lightly armed force of U.S. and Canadian personnel embarked in *Harlan County* were part of an international peacekeeping
force acting on behalf of the United Nations. The leaders of Haiti at that time realized that allowing foreign forces on Haitian soil would allow the United States to incur political cost and result in foreign leverage—something the leaders wanted to avoid. With resistance evident on the pier, the ship turned away and the forces were not sent ashore. In essence, the United States did not incur the political cost of following through and inserting the troops. Since it did not incur that cost and did not compel the Haitian leaders into accepting the international force (which was certainly within its capability to do), the United States ultimately had to pay much greater costs when it intervened in October of 1994.

_Expeditary Warfare should be employed in an immediate vice general deterrent role._ Expeditionary Warfare is best suited for immediate vice general deterrence. In order to become relevant across the diversified regions, forces must be tailored to specific situations. Regional actors should be aware of a capability that specifically targets them, should perceive willingness to use the capability against them, and should consider this capability in its calculus before acting. Expeditionary Warfare can provide that capability.

Chapter III discussed the Expeditionary Warfare requirements of flexibility. Being able to produce a wide
range of effects and influences and effectively react to changing circumstances and environments are but a few characteristics that are inherent to Expeditionary Warfare. The flexible force attributes in Expeditionary Warfare allow for a wide range of operations and options, and can be tailored for specific situations and actors.

The adaptive nature of Expeditionary Warfare exploits the combined potential of aircraft, ships, ground battalions and information structure and is ideally suited for specific situations. Although retaining the capability for unilateral action, combining U.S. Expeditionary Warfare force strength with complementary combined capabilities can provide a potential aggressor with a strong signal of commitment to a specific course of action.

*Expeditionary Warfare is context specific.* The use of Expeditionary Warfare forces is contingent on limited objectives. Secretary Weinberger's six criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military force was warranted were similar to General Powell's four propositions on when it is appropriate to use force.146 Weinberger's Six were developed during the cold war and held prominence until 1991. Powell's were formed after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Both specifically address the requirement for military objectives to be clearly identified and defined.
Forward deployed forces showing the flag are excellent for reassurance to friends and allies. A force such as a carrier battle group that is ideal for showing the flag, maintains the capability for swift response well-suited for retaliation or compellance (such as the U.S. intervention involving Libya). However, largely operating over the horizon as a general purpose force with the broad objective of forward presence, the carrier battle group has marginal utility in Expeditionary Warfare/conflict deterrent matters. Once a situation develops that results in clear and limited objectives, the carrier battle group can then perform invaluable support to operations to accomplish limited objectives ashore.

Expeditionary Warfare is comprised of general purpose forces that are conducive to being tailored for specific missions. When used in the proper context as defined in Chapter III (limited in geography, intensity and time), Expeditionary Warfare can offer an effective deterrent, especially for immediate deterrence situations.
NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 1. There are at least 19 instances in which the National Security Strategy discusses the prevention or deterrence of conflict.

4. Ibid., pp. 21-27.

5. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Neimeyer, USMC, Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, September 2, 1994. There are numerous instances of the self-deterrent nature of democratic nations. Lieutenant Colonel Neimeyer's "paradox of unused power" is an illuminating way to look at the problem. As evidenced in Viet Nam, the United States tends to commit to a certain level, then backs off.


8. The project definition of Expeditionary Warfare resulted from a review of numerous source documents provided by several organizations. The writers acknowledge the ongoing efforts of both the Naval Doctrine Command and the N85 Expeditionary Warfare Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for their respective efforts toward bounding the scope of Expeditionary Warfare.


12. Ibid., p. 21.

13. Ibid., p. 5.


19. Although the United States may no longer be concerned about superpower rivalry, there is some evidence to show that the United States is sensitive to "regional" power concerns--for example, Russian sensitivities in the Balkans and the "near abroad" countries--which may in part explain U.S. reluctance to become more deeply involved in Bosnia.

20. The impact of television and in particular the type of on-scene reporting of international conflict characterized by CNN on policy makers is discussed by Frank J. Stech in "Winning CNN Wars," Parameters, Autumn 1994, pp. 37-56. In
an interesting counterpoint, Stech cites Ambassador Albright's statement expressing concern about "what happens in the non-CNN wars," for example, Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, and Ngorno-Karabakh. It has been said that the reason the United States decided to intervene in Somalia and not elsewhere in Africa was driven more by public pressure caused by media influence than by impartial policy making decisions.

21. Polls seem to indicate however, that Americans generally are not fully conversant with fundamental facts about foreign affairs--for example, Donald C.F. Daniel in U.S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in Context, (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1994), p. 13, cites the results of a 1994 Times Mirror poll which indicated that of eight countries polled about public knowledge of current events, the United States ranked next to last. (Time, March 28, 1994, p. 22.) What may be more important is how the American public reacts to media presentation of crises, for example, the mortar bomb attack of a crowded marketplace in Sarajevo, starvation in Somalia, or genocide in Rwanda.


29. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence: the Elusive Dependant Variable," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 1990, p. 351. In looking at the outcomes resulting from deterrence or compellance actions, Lebow and Stein argue that it is easier to achieve visible (and therefore measurable) results with compellance compared with


37. Ibid., p. 19.


39. A sampling of references researched on this subject include: Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "The Future of Conventional
Deterrence: Strategies and Forces to Underwrite a New World Order," in Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence, p. 8; Roger W. Barnett, pp. 4-7; and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 64.


42. Ibid., pp. 32, 76.


47. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 10.

48. Ibid., p. i.

49. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., p. 11.

50. Ibid., p. 10.


52. George H. Quester, p. 50.

53. Adapted from Adam B. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises, pp. 4-5, and Patrick Morgan, p. 38.


For the British to have merely brought up a naval force to stand guard was not deemed sufficient in view of the economic value of Kuwait's oil to Britain and in view of the area's topography. The Iraqis might have sent an armored force to the city of Kuwait sixty miles from the Iraq border in a few hours. Then Britain would have faced the far more difficult task of throwing the Iraqis out.


60. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 7.

61. During an interview with Dr. J.R. Blaker, Special Assistant to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 27, 1994, he expressed the belief that the nuclear "umbrella" no longer has much credibility, and postulated that the United States can provide a "high-tech umbrella" instead. If the United States does not like to take casualties, then neither do U.S. allies who are keen to take advantage of the U.S. military's superiority in this area.


64. Roger W. Barnett, p. 4.
65. Patrick M. Morgan, p. 44.
66. Ibid., p. 43.
67. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 2-4.
69. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 1.
72. Phil Williams and Stephen Black, p. 150.
73. Marshal J. B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, The Brazilian Expeditionary Force by its Commander (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 5. Mascarenhas De Moraes goes on to say that instead of cultivating unity among the general populace for the expeditionary effort, complacency by governmental leaders almost doomed the expedition prior to its departure. Ultimately Brazil had the distinction of being the only Latin American nation whose participation abroad was represented by division strength.
77. Ibid., p. 70.

79. Daren Elliott House, "The Wrong Mission," Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1994, p. 18. Specifically related to the mission in Haiti, Ms. House puts forth the following question regarding U.S. military forces: "Are its troops warriors or welfare workers?" She maintains that the public rebels at the first casualties because of a loose connection to national security interests.

80. In an undated briefing package provided by N85, Hurricane Andrew (Florida) operations of August-October 1992 and Hurricane Iniki (Hawaii) operations of September-October 1992, were included in a slide entitled "Recent Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Operations." The project definition does not include these types of operations. It is acknowledged that there is debate on the relationship between Expeditionary Warfare and Operations Other Than War.


86. Ibid., p. 101.


90. Peter Grier, "Pentagon Speeds Forces to Hot Spots Quickly, Efficiently," Christian Science Monitor, 19 October 1994, p. 1. Grier raises the specter of fewer people, weapons systems, spare parts, strategic mobility and logistic support. He indicated that there will be further reliance on pre-positioned equipment.


92. Major William S. Huggins, USAF, "Forcible Entry in the Age of Jointness," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, p. 34-35. Major Huggins praises the Marine Corp's innovation in the development of amphibious warfare, but contends that labeling a service too narrowly detracts from the joint capabilities that they all bring.


95. Ibid. Vice Admiral Tony Less said: "It is clearly not the optimum war-fighting configuration for an aircraft carrier, but it certainly demonstrates the ultimate in carrier flexibility." However, Admiral Jeremy Boorda, while Commander in Southern Europe, contended that Marines embarked in the carrier Roosevelt resulted in "...lost flexibility without a full air wing." Others maintained that the benign area of operations in Haiti would allow such an experiment, but cautioned against its use for all occasions.


98. Major Maxwell O. Johnson, "The Role of Maritime Based Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984, p. 64. Johnson discusses the "unobtrusive nature" of maritime strategy. He also discusses the carrier as a "tangible but tactful reminder of U.S. power." These attributes are good
for reassurance, but do not have much use in an immediate
deterrence situation that would require placing troops
ashore.

99. Major General Waldo D. Freeman, U.S. Army,
Commander Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel
Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, "The Challenges of Combined

100. Charles Krauthammer, "Our Sphere, Their Sphere,"

from Defense Department Sources, 13 October 1994, pp. 1, 15.

102. Freeman, Hess, and Faria, "The Challenges of

103. The supplementary and complementary capabilities
being explored by the Naval Doctrine Command were informally
discussed at an Expeditionary Warfare Symposium held at the

104. After the bombing of the Marine barracks in
Lebanon, several high-level officials, including Secretary
Weinberger and General Powell have reiterated the importance
of clearly specified objectives before committing force.

105. Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, U.S. Army
(Ret.), "Santiago Campaign of 1898: Joint and Combined

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., pp. 11-13.

108. Ibid., p. 13. Admiral Sampson, the commander of
the U.S. flotilla during the Santiago Campaign, noted that
"until the embarkation, transport, and disembarkation of
troops and supplies come under the control of the navy as in
England, this muddle will continue."

109. Ibid. The breakdown of trust between the Cubans
and Americans caused unnecessary difficulties. The U.S. must
get better at working with/getting the most out of coalition
capabilities brought to the force.

110. George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B.
Siegel, JTF Operations Since 1983 (Alexandria, VA: Center
Fury in Grenada was an exception to the rule. There was no public debate and the operations that were conducted came as a total surprise to most of the nation. Today, however, the trend appears to indicate that prior to committing force, public support will be solicited.


118. It is important to note that the forward deployed aspect of the force contained the capability to place troops ashore. Conversely, a carrier battlegroup that is not with an ARG/MEU does not qualify for Expeditionary Warfare.


121. Ibid., p. 3.

123. Colonel James B. Agnew, U.S. Army (Ret.), "From Where Did Our Amphibious Doctrine Come?", Marine Corps Gazette, August 1979, p. 53-54. Gallipoli, although it did not include U.S. forces, was the catalyst for the development of U.S. amphibious doctrine. The development of the doctrine during the twenty-five year period that followed was operationally tested at Guadalcanal in 1942.


126. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependant Variable," p. 344, define deterrence failure as "when a challenger commits the action proscribed by the defender, or the defender backs away from a commitment in the face of the challenger's threats and demands." Another perspective on deterrence failure is provided by Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, p. 27.

127. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, p. 211. See also Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, p. 177.


129. Richard N. Lebow and Janet G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," p. 213. For additional discussion on the limitations in applying deterrence policy to guide policy making, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," p. 181; and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 54.

130. For example, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein's critical examination of Paul K. Huth in "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependant Variable,"; and Stephen Walt's review of Blechman and Kaplan in Causal Inferences and the Use of Force.


137. From an interview with Edward Foster, Royal United Services Institute, London U.K., September 21, 1994, in which he expressed misgivings about the U.S. preference for a "stand-off solution" to Bosnia. His perception is that U.S. allies absorb a disproportionate share of the burden of peacekeeping in Bosnia, particularly when lives of ground forces are factored as a cost. He expressed the opinion that effective deterrence commitments incur cost.

138. Interview with Mr. John J. Bird, Consultant to the College of Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 4 October 1994.


140. Ibid.


147. Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, p. 390.
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