Homelands and Hostility — Measuring levels of nationalism

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The study of nationalism has recently enjoyed a renewal of interest in political science, due to the necessity to understand and explain the numerous global manifestations of nationalistic movements, conflicts, and wars. Indeed, the end of the twentieth century may become characterized as a period of "worldwide resurgence of ethnic sentiment" (Horowitz 1992, 10). Though nationalism is often discussed, it is rarely quantitatively measured or explained. One reason is due to the emotional and psychological nature of the phenomenon. It has been called a state of mind, a theory of political legitimacy, and an ideological movement (Kohn 1944; Gellner 1983; Smith 1983). A stronger and more understandable definition of nationalism is identification with and loyalty to one's nation. This forces an explicit understanding of the term nation, defined as a unique group which has separated itself as a people who believe they are ancestrally related. The essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all non-members. Often the term ethnonationalism is used to demonstrate the ethnic nature of nationalism (Connor 1994).

This study attempts to quantify nationalism by examining its manifestations. Indicators of nationalism are useful in identifying its existence and determining the potency of nationalism within a society. By studying several multinational states, a comparative approach sheds light on one of the key catalysts of nationalism, ethno-demographic change.

By the twentieth century, most nations' territorial claims were firmly established. A nation's home is associated with an area of land becoming the nation's "homeland." The psychological and emotional associations between a nation and its homeland is referred to as homeland psychology. Based in nationalism, homeland psychology extends a primal

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1Most scholars agree that definitions of key terms (nation, nationalism, patriotism, ethnic group, etc.) within the discussion of nationalism have suffered "terminological chaos." Connor's essay, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a . . .," (Connor 1994) addresses these problems. Most definitions are adopted from his work.
title to a homeland claimed by the indigenous ethno-national group (Connor 1986, 20). This geographic component of nationalism is recognized by Anthony Smith: "Ethnic movements aimed to renew their cultures and control their homelands and its resources so as to retain the culture of their ancestors; nationalism simply makes a fetish of the unique culture and does more effectively what pre-modern ethnicists tried to do, that is keep out foreigners and diffuse to their kinsmen the traditions and myths of their ancestors" (1986, 216). When not already matched, nationalism requires the congruence of political borders with a nation's homelands (Gellner 1983). Homeland psychology is used when the indigenous nationality becomes threatened. When this occurs, the primal title over the land results in a more extreme display of anti-outsider nationalism often called nativism. Due to homeland psychology, the indigenous nationality is justified in controlling the land and reducing the threat posed by the intruders.

Most homelands are not inhabited solely by the native nationality, but instead shared with one or more different nations or ethnic groups. Complicating the situation is the existence of arbitrary borders which designate a state. Hence, two or more nations share a common sovereign government. The presence of other groups can intensify nationalism, resulting in homeland psychology and the "inalienable right of the native group to assert their primary and exclusive proprietary claim to the homeland" (Connor 1986, 18). A "sense of exclusiveness" exists within the psychology of the indigenous nationality. "Exclusiveness is often latent, in that it must be activated by a perceived 'invasion' ... of whole groups of people into a national space... " (Soja 1971, 34). Hence, the absence of nationalism or ethnic conflict cannot be regarded as evidence of inter-ethnic harmony. The degree to which ethnic nationalism is manifest can vary substantially within a particular nation over time, as displayed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Consequently, change in the ethno-national composition of a homeland plays a significant role as a catalyst in augmenting or mollifying nationalism. Homeland psychology is activated whenever the nation-homeland bond is seriously threatened. As a
result, homeland psychology can become the controlling force of many decisions made by the ruling ethno-national group. As Donald Horowitz observes, "Characteristically, issues that elsewhere would be relegated to the category of routine administration assume a central place on the political agenda of ethnically divided societies" (Horowitz 1985, 8). Citizenship laws, language policies, public education requirements, immigration quotas, power distribution, ethnic composition of government, voting rights, economic policies, and political party platforms all become indicators of nationalism. Considering the myriad of ways nationalism is manifest, the effect of the demographical makeup of a nation is especially important to understand.

Research Question

Hence, I ask the question, how does change in the ethno-national composition of a homeland effect nationalism within a multinational state? Is simply the existence of non-natives enough cause for the natives to react? The answers to these questions are both important in the real world and a contribution to scholarly literature on nationalism. Our understanding is increased by examining the relationship between a key catalyst, ethno-demographic change, and nationalism. In order to isolate the relationship, I have structured my research according to the developed approach of causal inference as outlined by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).

Factors which serve to activate homeland psychology (like ethno-demographic change) should by viewed as catalysts rather than causes, since the reason for a response by nationalists lies in the sense of homeland that has evolved along with national self-consciousness. There is abundant evidence that the immigration of non-indigenes to another nation's homeland has served to heighten the perception among indigenes that the nation and its primordial claim to homeland is under attack (Kaiser 1994). Shibutani and Kwan (1965, 445) found that "the national land is often regarded as a group possession on which foreigners are interlopers." Similarly, Weiner showed that the first condition for nativism (anti-outsider nationalism) in India is an area with a nativist population who has
migrants from outside the cultural region (Weiner 1978, 275). The former Soviet Union has proven that "demographic dilution has not resulted in 'denationalization' but in rising nationalism" (Kaiser 1994, 189). Indeed, diasporas will always be considered outsiders, even though their presence may be multi-generational (Connor 1986).

This study applies the theory that ethno-demographic change has a catalytic effect on nationalism and the use of homeland psychology. By using a qualitative research design based on sound logic of inference, I seek to show that the increased presence of nonindigenes results in a corresponding increase in nationalism. This forces two significant research requirements. One, I must establish a relationship between the explanatory or independent variable (ethno-demographic change) and the dependent variable (nationalism). And secondly, I must be able to show that nationalism can be measured in a relatively unbiased, efficient manner.

Methodology

The explanation of methodology is extremely important due to the unusual, if not ground-breaking, nature of the study. Because nationalism is considered an emotional and psychological phenomenon, no previous work known to this author has attempted to measure it. Often scholars describe nations in abstract terms such as "highly nationalistic" or the "fires of nationalism are burning." Though eloquent and descriptive, it lacks any concrete explanation as to what degree of nationalism is present. Scholars of nationalism such as Hans Kohn, Anthony D. Smith, Walker Connor, Ernest Gellner, and E.J. Hobsbawm have not established any methodology to quantify nationalism and distinguish its intensity. By using sound research method and logic, I attempt to measure levels of nationalism in multinational states.

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2 In The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements (1992), edited by John Coakley, several studies measure electoral support for nationalist parties in various countries. As the title indicates, the emphasis is on "nationalist movements" and not levels of nationalism in a nation or state.
To test the effect of ethno-demographic change, I use a comparative study of three former Soviet republics; Estonia, Lithuania, and Belarus. Each country is considered a multinational, uninhomeland\(^3\) state where ethnic diversity is due to immigration and the homeland people consider the entire state to be their historic homeland. By analytically measuring the level of nationalism manifest in each state, a comparative study can provide insight as to the relationship between ethno-demographic change and nationalism.

In order to achieve unit homogeneity, cases or countries were chosen very carefully. I compare three states that have varying values on the explanatory variable (ethno-demographic change) and observe the values of the dependent variable (nationalism). It operates with the assumption that the differences we observe in the values of the dependent variable are the result of the differences in the value of the explanatory variables that apply to the observations. Using three former Soviet republics, I employ Lijphart's approach (1971) using "comparable cases," or cases which are (1) matched on many variables not central to the study (explanatory variables) and (2) differ in terms of the variables that are the focus of analysis (key explanatory variables). One significant component of comparative study is the need for variance of the independent variables to be as large as possible. However, as Lijphart observes (1971), the amount of variance of the dependent variable (nationalism) should not be a consideration in the choice of cases because this would prejudge the empirical question.

Another possible problem is "over determination" as described by Przeworski and Teune (1970). They advocate the "most different" systems design, based on a set of cases which are highly diverse and among which the analyst traces similar processes of change. Regarding the debate between "most similar" versus "most different" research designs, King et al. (1994) show the key issue is answering, "similar in relation to what?" The key

\(^3\) A "Uhomeland" is a state with only one nation's homeland within its borders.
for good data collection is to identify cases that maximize the key explanatory variable in the hypothesis.

These three case studies should produce a clear examination of the theory but still avoid selection bias. Thus, some preliminary study was necessary to ensure good choices of cases. Selection should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable. I chose countries in which some forms of nationalism exist, due to their multi-national makeup. Selection bias is minimized by using the key explanatory variable (as established by the theory) as the main determinant for selecting cases. This causes no inference problems and bias is not introduced.

Ethno-demographic change is the key explanatory variable. To obtain a full range of this variable, one appropriate case is Estonia. Of the former Soviet Republics, Estonia best demonstrates variance regarding indigenous population change. Though other former republics have a lower percentage of titular nationalities (Kazakhstan, 40%, Latvia 52%), Estonia has experienced the most change of any republic from 1939 to 1989 (32%). Lithuania provides an example of no change and Belarus is a good example of minor change (6%).

As stated, Estonia experienced significant change in the non-native population. In 1945, Estonians represented 94% of the population. By 1989, this number was down to 62%. The number of non-Estonians increased 26-fold, from 23,000 in 1945 to 602,000 in 1989 (Vetik 1993, 273). On the opposite end of the scale is Lithuania, an example of a multi-national state where the native share of the population has not changed. From 1945 estimates to 1989, ethnic Lithuanians remained at 80% of the total population. The third country is Belarus. In 1939, estimates show the native population having 83% of the population. By 1989, ethnic Belarusians represented 76% of the population, a decrease of 6%. A comparison of the three states is seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Nations as a Percentage of Their Home Republic Populations, 1945-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>83*</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Belarus percentage is from 1939 (Simon 1991, 382).


In a perfectly constructed design, additional cases would represent intermediary levels of decline in the native share of the total population. However, given the constraints of empirical study, these cases are the best alternatives.

By concentrating on one explanatory variable and its implication on the dependent variable, I avoid an indeterminate research design caused by more inferences than implications observed. Also, studying only one catalyst helps reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity. However, it should be established that one catalyst can be isolated.

Scholars have identified several factors which play a key role in augmenting or mollifying feelings of nationalism within a nation (Smith 1981, 1983; Connor 1986, 1994; Shibutani and Kwan 1965; Kaiser 1994). Inherent in this study is the assumption that all catalysts of nationalism need not be considered. How can we justify omitting these catalysts and not suffer variable bias? Some catalysts are discarded because they are irrelevant and not explanatory in this study; meaning they have no effect on the dependent variable, nationalism. Other catalysts can be safely omitted, even if they have a strong influence on nationalism, as long as they do not vary with the included explanatory variable, ethno-demographic change. Because these catalysts are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variable, they do not change our estimate of the relationship between ethno-demographic change and nationalism. Some variables may be relevant and vary
with the explanatory variable. In such cases they must be controlled. However, we should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of ethno-demographic change.

Factors that act as explanatory variables must be controlled or omitted to allow for an estimate of the total effect of the key explanatory variable. I followed these steps: 1) listed all variables that, according to the theoretical model, could cause an effect on the dependent variable; 2) discarded the explanatory variables that were consequential; 3) controlled for other potential explanatory variables (King et al. 1994, 174).

In his comprehensive study of the former Soviet Union, Robert J. Kaiser identifies three separate categories of catalysts in addition to ethno-demographic change which served to activate the emotions and feelings of nationalism. These three categories include social mobilization, ethnocultural transformation, and political indigenization. I briefly discuss my treatment of the distinct catalysts in each category. This allows a better understanding of the level of confidence in the study.

_Control Variables And Justification Of Variable Omission_

The first category of catalysts is social mobilization, a key aspect of which is modernization. It brings the natives and non-natives closer into contact and intensifies the competition between them for the resources of the homeland (Kaiser 1994). This social and economic process amplifies the forces of nationalism (Smith, 1981, 1983; Connor, 1994; Shibutani and Kwan, 1965). Three significant aspects of this process are urbanization, educational attainment, and occupational mobility. In regards to urbanization, from 1959 to 1989, the location of national members in the homeland urban areas in Lithuania, Belarus, and Estonia changed according to the pattern of ethno-demographic change. The increase in immigration affected both the demographics and the rate of urbanization. The Russian composition of the urban population in each republic also changed correspondingly. Urbanization is omitted from the study as a consequential variable.
School systems and educational attainment can inspire the use of nationalism in multi-national societies such as the former Soviet Union (Smith 1986). Occupational mobility is another aspect of modernization which increases contacts between indigenes and nonindigenes. Neither of these variables correlate with our key explanatory variable and are omitted. Equality among nations regarding education and upward mobility was essentially achieved independent of ethno-demographic change (Kaiser 1994, 226, 236).

Ethnocultural transformation in the Soviet sense was a struggle between the policy of Russification with attempts by members of individual republics to ensure that their cultural characteristics were retained. This process of ethnocultural transformation is another one of the "triggers or exacerbators" of nationalism. Some more recognizable catalysts are language usage, international marriage, and natural assimilation (Kaiser 1994; Smith 1986, 1992a; Connor 1986, 1994).

Language usage, though an interesting topic in the emergence of nationalism, is treated as an indicator instead of a catalyst. As Kaiser notes, "linguistic indigenization of schooling apparently corresponded with the demographic indigenization of schools" (1994, 255). It is discarded due to its consequential relationship to ethno-demographic change. The perceptions of many nationalists that their indigenous languages were in danger of extinction is not supported by statistical data. This perception was equally strong in Lithuania and Estonia, though only Belarus experienced substantial linguistic Russification. Again, it shows no relationship to our key explanatory variable.

International marriage statistics are often used to show assimilation or the lack of assimilation of an ethnic group by another group. However, Smith states, "In Wales, Brittany, Corsica, Catalonia, and the Basque country, as well as Ireland, dying languages were periodically revived and threatened cultures defended from acculturation, even if their elites were drawn toward cultural assimilation and intermarriage" (1992b, 49). Kaiser's study of the Soviet Union also showed that international marriage rates did not coincide with social and geographic mobilization of the native nationality and was overall
"extremely limited" (1994, 309). International marriage is indirectly related to assimilation as the general direction of this intergenerational process of reidentification depends on the children. The majority of children from indigenous/Russian families chose the indigenous national identity. These patterns of assimilation follow the ethno-demographic nature of the state and this variable is omitted due to its consequential relationship.

Political indigenization examines the economic and political relations between the center and periphery, a possible catalyst for nationalism in any multi-national state (Connor 1994; Smith 1981, 1986). In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev instituted programs of economic decentralization, increasing republic autonomy concerning the reforms involved with perestroika. As the center-periphery relationship changed, political groups and elites became more bold in asserting their control over republic affairs. As groups were allowed to mobilize in defense of the goals of perestroika, nationalism was aroused. The variables centered around the political and economic changes are controlled in this study. All of these republics experienced the same governmental structures and power shifts, making these catalysts constant across the group. This allowed the relationship between ethno-demographic change and nationalism to be isolated.

**Quantification Of Nationalism**

In order to study the effects of a factor affecting nationalism, it requires nationalism somehow be quantified. This ambitious goal is done within the restraints of social science. Many scholarly studies have shown how nationalism is manifest globally (Connor 1986, 1994; Smith 1981, 1983, 1986; Shibutani and Kwan 1965). I attempt to measure nationalism by surveying these different manifestations of nationalism. Though these indicators are not exhaustive nor my measurement exact, it will give a relative idea of the level of nationalism within a state when compared to similar states. These numerous indicators increase the leverage of my research as they are categorized as

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4 This list is certainly not exhaustive. It simply represents a groups of scholars who agree on basic assumptions regarding nationalism.
observable implications of the hypothesis. It helps to overcome the problem of a small number of cases by increasing confidence in the findings.

The formation of theory concerning nationalism has been a slow process (Shibutani and Kwan 1965). It has only recently become a major subject area in comparative politics (Wiarda 1993). Different arguments within the discipline exist as to the nature of nationalism and its origins. Anthony Smith recently noted, "As many scholars have demonstrated, we are very far from furnishing agreed definition of the key concepts in the field of ethnicity and nationalism, let alone a general theory able to cope with the many variations, states of development and diffusion, cultural differences, sociopolitical orientations and intensities of nationalism in every continent" (Smith 1992b, 46).

Each of these indicators of nationalism are based on a conceptual foundation established by Kohn, Smith, Connor, and Shibutani and Kwan. These scholars accept generally the same principles and definitions; namely, nationalism is manifest nationally but is similar globally. The same catalysts and indicators can be seen cutting across international lines. Nationalism is a modern phenomena, based on pre-existing ethno-national myths developed and cultured through the centuries. Inter-ethnic conflicts may use tangible evidences of group distinction such as class and religion as justification but the essence of the conflict lies in the "us" versus "them" syndrome established by ethnonationalism. All of these scholars agree that a comparative method of study is essential. As stated by Hans Kohn in his 1944 seminal work, The Idea of Nationalism, "A study of nationalism must follow a comparative method, it cannot remain confined to one of its manifestations; only the comparison of the different nationalism all over the earth will enable the student to see what they have in common and what is peculiar to each, and thus allow a just evaluation" (1944, ix-x).

Nationalism affects all aspects of life and is manifest in all aspects of life. To measure it, the whole society must be evaluated. New political freedom allowed for political parties to lure voters on issues of nationalism. Election results aid in
understanding the effectiveness of these issues. The actions of the elected legislatures show the degree of nationalism within the government. Hence, I look for nationalism in the native nationality and in the reaction to nationalism by the minority group or diaspora.

The level of nationalism manifest can be ascertained by studying citizenship laws, language policies, immigration quotas, and other general policies regarding economics and education. The reaction by the non-native minority groups is another important measure. "The most consequential aspect of homeland psychology has been the hostility engendered by an intrusion of 'the native land' by nonnatives" (Connor 1987, 209). This is observed by emigration out of the state, public opinion data, and grievances expressed by the minority leadership.

*Indicators Of Nationalism*

This study seeks to show how ethno-demographic change has intensified ethnonationalism and allowed the use of homeland psychology in multinational states. As explained by Kaiser:

"Indeed, the emphasis on contemporary ethnic demography enhances the likelihood that indigenous nationalists in a demographically tenuous position will pursue a strategy of ethnoterritorial purification in order to solidify their claim to their 'ancestral' homeland. The changing demography of nations may have diminished the relative weight of the primordial nation in certain parts of the perceived homeland, but this has not necessarily diminished the resolve of indigenous nationalists to regain or maintain control of these regions" (1994, 25).

I begin my analysis by evaluating election results during the period 1989 to 1993. All three countries had two significant elections under the Soviet regime. In March 1989, all republics elected officials for the Congress of Peoples Deputies, the first real multicandidate elections in the Soviet era. In February and March of 1990, elections were held for republic Supreme Soviets\(^5\) (renamed Supreme Councils), which act as the Republic's

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\(^5\) Many republics renamed the Supreme Soviet, "Supreme Council." To avoid confusion and allow for comparison, I use the title Supreme Council throughout the paper.
parliamentary body. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, elections were held in September and October 1992 for the Lithuanian and Estonian parliaments. Belarus held a Presidential election in 1994 which will be considered.

These elections are significant for several reasons. First, any legitimate constitutional or structural changes in the state were made by these elected bodies. Second, in general, these groups were freely elected by the citizens of the republic and reflect their political values and opinions. Thirdly, the actions of the elected bodies help to gauge the nationalistic fever within the elites and indirectly reflect the opinions of the populace.

Nationalism scholarship provides guidance as to how a people and its leaders will act and react when nationalism is allowed to become a political force within the state. Shibutani and Kwan (1965) established that the natural goal of every nation is to secure and expand the power in its own state. As nationalism increases, the native population begins to employ homeland psychology to guide its actions toward the non-indigenous population, especially concerning political representation. Because the state is their natural homeland, they reserve the "exclusive" claim to control the state (Connor 1986). This is observed to differing degrees in Lithuania, Belarus, and Estonia.

POLITICAL SPECTRUMS AND ELECTIONS: 1988-1993

In Lithuania, the political spectrum is distinguished economically and nationally. Economically, the former Communists favor privatization and investment, in capitalistic fashion. The more nationally minded elements favor a populist tradition, with egalitarian programs and social welfare. In this analysis, positions regarding nationalism will be used to set a scale with the radical nationalists on the left and the former Communist, conservatives on the right. As communism fell and independence arrived, former Communists took a more moderate approach as minority anti-nationalist

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6 Information regarding the elections and political parties was compiled from all of the sources listed in the bibliography. I have attempted to annotate all personal observations.
groups became increasingly extreme. The spectrum of each country has been filled with
groups establishing themselves as center, center-right, or center-left. In Lithuania and
Estonia, five elements along the scale are distinguishable, compared to only three in
Belarus. Diagram 1 gives the political spectrum of Lithuania. The extreme left is
represented by the radical nationalists, while the far right is defined by the minority groups
such as Yedinstvo and Polish Coalition, distinctively non-Lithuanian organizations.

**Diagram 1: Lithuanian Political Spectrum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAD</th>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>CEN</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>MIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Nationalists</td>
<td>Moderate Nationalists</td>
<td>Centrists</td>
<td>Former Communists</td>
<td>Minority Anti-Nationalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom League</td>
<td>Sajudis Homeland Union</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Democratic Labor Party</td>
<td>Polish Coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most well-known groups are the former Communist party, now renamed the
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP) and the Sajudis Popular Front movement,
now known as the Homeland Union. The growth and popularity of Sajudis grew as the
Lithuanian Communist Party's control and support diminished. A brief background aids in
understanding how these groups emerged.

In June, 1988, the Sajudis (Lithuanian Reconstruction Movement) was formed as
an initiative group of thirty-six people. In October 1988, the first Sajudis Congress was
held with 1,127 delegates. One of the original thirty-six was Vytautas Landsbergis, a
Professor of Musicology who was elected Chairman of the Sajudis Council. Also in
October, the Lithuanian First Secretary was replaced by Algirdas Brazauskas, a former
state economic official. Nationalistic issues separated Brazauskas and Sajudis. In
February 1989, Sajudis was calling for full restoration of Lithuanian sovereignty.
Brazauskas responded by accusing Sajudis of "pushing Lithuania into ruin" and blaming
the organization for increasing the ethnic polarization of Lithuania (Vardys 1989, 71). Sajudis prepared carefully for the March 1989 elections. Sajudis backed candidates won 36 of 42 seats.

Other small groups were beginning to form at this time. The Lithuanian Liberty League organized in 1988 and held demonstrations for returning to the pre-War Republic of Lithuania. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the founding congress of Yedinstvo was held in May 1989. Yedinstvo or Unity was a group organized to unite non-Lithuanians against the growing influence of the Sajudis. Since November 1989, it had been working against Sajudis, declaring themselves Marxist-Leninist despite "criminal distortions of socialist construction in the past" and trying to strengthen "the union of sovereign republics of the USSR" (Senn 1990a, 240). The Polish Union, led by local Polish intellectuals, emerged in February 1990. These two minority groups disagreed over independence for Lithuania; however, they would both support more moderate groups in the 1992 elections.

As predicted by the Congress of People's Deputies Elections, the Sajudis movement won big in the February 1990 election for the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Sajudis stood on a platform of complete independence and the continuity of the Lithuanian republic. Landsbergis was elected chair of the new Supreme Council and Brazauskas as a deputy Prime Minister.

Popular support had clearly shifted to Sajudis and Landsbergis. However, Sajudis was not a homogeneous group. Radical nationalists broke off to form the Independence party. By October 1990, the remaining Sajudis fraction split into another radical nationalist fraction (United) and the more moderate, Center Fraction. By 1991, these nationalists, once freed from the moderates, became more brazen concerning their agenda. They attempted to build support for new political districts to divide up the Polish minority and allow solely Lithuanian representation. As noted by one scholar, "the Lithuanian Right also seems to be manipulating the 'Polish menace' for personal and party advancement, and
perhaps also to rally the Lithuanian nation" (Lieven 1993, 171). Other groups, including
the Tautinikai Nationalist Party which had supported the inter-war dictator Smetona, were
supported by a group of deputies in the Supreme Council. Its party platform was built
upon protecting the interests of ethnic Lithuanians in the republic and refused to accept
non-Lithuanians as members (Hosking 1992, 59).

After the August coup and restored independence, Lithuanians grew increasingly
disgruntled with the parliament and government, reflecting poorly on Sajudis and
Landsbergis. Political infighting paralyzed Lithuania during the summer of 1992 and the
October elections provided significant change. Table 2 summarizes the results.

Table 2: Electoral Support for Lithuanian Political Groups (in percentages )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Groups</th>
<th>Congress of People's Deputies (March 1989)</th>
<th>Supreme Council (March 1990)</th>
<th>Supreme Council (October 1992)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIN Polish Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR Demo Labor Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN Social Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT Sajudis</td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD Independence</td>
<td></td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Radicals existed but were simply Sajudis backed candidates in March 1990

Source: Lieven (1993); Dawisha and Parrott (1994); Girnius (1994b)

The 1992 parliamentary elections saw a definite shift away from nationalism, as
voters moved away from Landsbergis and other nationalists to the more experienced,
moderate Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party headed by the former First Secretary of the
Lithuanian Communist Party, Algirdas Brazauskas. The Communist party had adapted to
find popular support for their more moderate platform. Brazauskas had been a popular
leader of the people who stood up against Moscow while seeking greater Lithuanian
sovereignty. Although economic policy was a campaign issue, nationalism played a
significant role in differentiating parties. Pravda blamed the Sajudis loss on "excessive nationalism" (Sivistunov 1992, 17). Lieven notes, "The difference between the party programmes [sic] lay generally in the differing levels of nationalism, rather than profound differences of economic philosophy." As for the reaction by the populace, "The nationality issue played relatively little part in the thinking of ordinary Lithuanian voters, who did not regard the small Russian and Polish minorities as a great threat" (Lieven 1993, 269).

The shift in electoral support along the political spectrum is seen in Figure 1. From the 1989 to 1992, a move from the nationalist left to the more moderate right is evident.

**Figure 1:**

![Lithuanian Electoral Support](image)

The political spectrum in Belarus has failed to expand and develop as in Lithuania. A Belarusan Popular Front group did emerge in October 1988, only four month after Sajudis. The Popular Front followed the initiative of the "Confederation of Belarusan Youth Associates to Belarusan Youth." The group met in December 1987 and declared:

"The cause of self-determination for the Belarusan youth movement has ripened not only because of internal reasons. We are watched with hope and concern by
the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They are waiting for us to join the formidable wave of national upsurge that is rolling over the Baltic region. In Belorussia's [Belarus's] joining this surge, there is the assurance of the irreversibility of the revolutionary changes in the Baltic republics as well as throughout the entire Soviet Union, which means that it is our internationalist duty to do so" (Urban and Zaprudnik 1993, 110).

Interestingly enough, past crimes from the Stalin era helped to formulate the Belarusan Popular Front. In June 1988, a popular Minsk weekly published the findings of Zianon Pazniak, an archeologist and art historian. The report detailed the discovery of 500 mass graves near Minsk with an estimated 300,000 bodies, genocidal executions by the Soviet regime from 1937 to 1941. Two weeks later, 10,000 people marched to the site of the killings to commemorate the dead and demand a full investigation. In October, Martyrology of Belarus was founded to compile a great Martyrology of Belarus's losses and martyrs. They also established a political organization, the Belarusan Popular Front, with Pazniak as chairman.

The Popular Front presented an eleven point platform as an appeal to the citizens of Belarus. The last point discussed the development of the indigenous culture and language. Kathleen Mihalisko speculated, "Perhaps the Popular Front will succeed in keeping [Belarus] afloat by demonstrating that the language, culture, and national values are worth preserving" (1988, 6).

Unlike Lithuania, no corresponding shift in the position of the ruling Communist Party occurred. The Belarusan Communist Party seemed genuinely pro-Union. There were was little resonance within the existing political structure to support the Popular Front and increase the development of the Belarus state. As illustrated by Diagram 2, the political spectrum is bounded by the two groups; the former Communists and Communists and the Popular Front or Nationalist groups.7

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7 This representation was still accurate even into April 1994 (Markus 1994c, 11).
Diagram 2: Belarusian Political Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>CEN</th>
<th>FOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalists/</td>
<td>National Accord</td>
<td>People's Movement,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Party,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic, National</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In January 1989, the second convention of the Confederation of Belarusian Youth Societies was held, this time in Vilnius as the authorities in Belarus refused to allow them to meet. Sixty-six groups attended and called for national renewal, democratization, language and cultural policy, and independence. In February, over 50,000 attended a rally in Minsk organized by the Popular Front. The traditional Belarusian national flag and nationalist symbol (a mounted knight) were displayed. Though smaller than other demonstrations around the Soviet Union, it proved the existence of widespread public support for the Popular Front platform (Clem 1990).

The election for the Congress of People's Deputies was still largely controlled by the Communist Party. The Popular Front successfully supported eight independent candidates on a platform of renewal of the national culture. It held its founding Congress in Vilnius three months later. Even then, the Belarusian Popular Front was seeking only to increase a sense of national consciousness and not employ homeland psychology to stir up the population against the minorities. Vasil Bykau, a board member of the organization and Belarus's best-known writer, spoke to the conference regarding national minorities in Belarus:

"All the nationalities that comprise the Belarusian state will find a place within it. We are not excluding from it our brothers, the Russian people, with whom we share our land and fate, who for a long time have innocently suffered together with us. Nor do we exclude the tragic Jewish nation with whom we have shared the modest fruits of our land during the entire course of our history. The Poles and Lithuanians are our brothers and we have countless examples of shared and truly fraternal coexistence" (Urban and Zaprudnik 1993, 112-114).
Though the Popular Front grew to over 100,000 members, it continued to struggle with the establishment. The Communist Party of Belorussia was the only republic-level communist party in the USSR which forbid its member to join a popular front. The March elections for the Supreme council resulted in a significant change but not a complete transformation. Although only 27 of the 345 deputies belonged to the Popular Front faction, about 100 deputies agreed to set up the Democratic Club to oppose the conservative majority. Though difficult to gage, at least 160 deputies were Communists with others joining smaller groups on both sides of the spectrum. Stanislau Shushkevich, a former professor at the Belarusian Academy of Sciences was elected to the Supreme Council and represents the small moderate group who joined neither the Popular Front or the Communist Party. Shushkevich was elected the national deputy with the support of the Popular Front but disagreed with it concerning the national issue of becoming independent from the Soviet Union.

By the fall of 1990, the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB) was losing discipline of its members. At the thirty-first CPB Congress in November 1990, the First Secretary warned, "chauvinism, nationalism, and separatism are on the rise" and that "the crisis could grow into a catastrophe" (Zaprudnik 1993, 154). Smaller parties began to emerge which helped shape the political spectrum slightly. The United Democratic Party (November 1990), National Democratic Party (June 1990), and Belarusian Association of Servicemen (October 1988) each shared a common goal with the Popular Front; an independent Belarus and the revitalization of the national culture. After the failed August coup, Dzemaintsei was forced to resign as Chairman of the Supreme Council due to his support of the coup leaders. Shushkevich replaced him in September. Former Communists began to organize new parties after the CPB was banned, such as the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress and Justice (October 1991) and Party of Communists of Belarus (December 1991). The Union of Officers of Belarus also joins the
ranks of these groups which were united around the theme of a strengthened union with Russia.

In 1992, the Popular Front lead a referendum campaign to oust the Communist-dominated Supreme Council and hold early elections. After presenting 446,000 signatures in favor of the proposed referendum, the Supreme Council sat on the issue and decided to defeat it by simple inaction. This left the 1990 elected deputies in power until the end of their term in 1995.

The most influential organization in the government became the newly formed Popular Movement of Belarus (Summer 1993). It united eighteen parties and advocates a confederation with Russia. It's chairman, Syarhei Haydukevich, "believes that the country's woes are the result of the breakup of the USSR and that the only solution is to restore a unitary state" (Markus 1993c, 21). The Popular Movement also favors a bilingual state and full support of minority interests. This group opposes the Popular Front on the issue of neutrality. Without any elections in 1992 or 1993, it is somewhat difficult to determine the support of the general populace.

However, a poll of in June 1993 by the Media and Opinion Research Department (MOR) of the RFE/RL Research Institute did a survey of political attitudes. The sample of 1,990 respondents is one of the few reliable polls taken in the country since its independence (Mihalisko 1993b). Of the 45% who said they would vote if elections were held that week, 16% support the Popular Front and 17% the Communist Parties. Another 13% would support other democratic parties similar to the Popular Front. Most significantly is the lack of party identification with almost half of the respondents indicating "do not know or no answer."

To help understand the trend, results from the 1994 presidential elections are included. There were six candidates with the winner, Lukashenko, attached to none of the parties. He is very pro-Russian and stated his support for reunification with Russia. The
results could show personality bias; however, they give an idea of the strength of nationalism in the country. The most salient feature separating the major candidates was support for a neutral Belarus state and increased emphasis on culture, or stronger ties with Russia with little importance placed on developing the identity of Belarus (CSCE 1994). The leader of each group ran in the election. The results of are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Electoral Support for Belarus' Political Groups (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOR Popular Movement</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN National Accord</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT Popular Front</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some 47% answered "Do not know" or "no answer"


In the 1994 elections, the former Communists or Pro-Russia side of the spectrum included the winner Lukashenko (45%), the Prime Minister Kebich (17%) and the chairman of the Belarusian Communist Party Novikau (4%). The Centrists were represented by the former Supreme Soviet chairman Shushkevich (10%) and the Nationalists by the chairman of the Popular Front, Pazniak (13%). As reported by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Pazniak was the strongest advocate of "Belarusian cultural and linguistic primacy, fervently reject[ing] economic and cultural entente with Russia, and was accused by his enemies of being too nationalistic. Toward the end of the campaign, Pazniak tempered his approach by issuing a position paper, 'What Zenon [Pazniak] will not do,' seeking to reassure non-Belarusians about his policies if elected" (CSCE 1994, 6). Shushkevich and Pazniak both supported a more
independent Belarus which seemed to be to their disadvantage as they combined for just 23% of the vote.

In the second round of voting, Lukashenko won 80% of the vote over Kebich. Regarding the strength of nationalism, Ustina Markus of RFE/RF remarked that the 80 percent popular vote shows "that nationalism is not an overriding concern for the electorate in Belarus" (1994e, 339). The shift from the 1993 opinion poll to the 1994 election indicates a large number of undecided voters moved behind Lukashenko, an observation supported by pre-election polls (CSCE 1994, 15). It shows a lack of general nationalism within the population, with little support for programs justified by homeland psychology. Figure 2 gives a graphic representation of the results, showing continued support for the former Communists.

Figure 2:

Belarusian Electoral Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Legislative Body or Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In Estonia, the political spectrum is very similar to Lithuania, reflecting a more developed democracy with groups filling gaps to gain the support of the electorate. The Estonian Popular Front movement began in April 1988, originally in support of perestroika reforms and economic autonomy for Estonia. It developed into a nationalistic organization devoted to sovereignty for Estonia and minimal ties with Moscow. The impact of the Popular Front was almost immediate, aiding in the removal of the Estonian
First Secretary Karl Vaino in June 1988, who was replaced with Vaino Valjus, an ethnic Estonian much closer to the Popular Front position on most issues. Other nationalistic groups also emerged, such as the National heritage Society (April 1988) and the Estonian National Independence Party (August 1988). In September, the Estonian Song Festival of 1988, organized by the Popular Front, drew an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 people. The founding congress of the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) was held in October. The new First Secretary spoke, as well as many current deputies in the Supreme Council. Only five percent of the delegates were non-Estonian, showing the strong nationalistic overtones the organization portrayed (Taagepera 1993).

In reaction, non-Estonians began to form their own groups. The Intermovement was founded in Tallinn in July 1988. Predominately Russian, they represented the more extreme opinions of Estonian minorities. At an August 1988 demonstration, slogans such as "Down with the Estonian language" were reported on Estonian television. A more moderate group, a Forum of Estonia's Nationalities, attempted to bring together the representatives of seventeen minorities, ranging from Russians to Armenians (Taagepera 1993, 142). A larger group called the Joint Council of Work Collectives or (JCWC) was formed as a protest against the idea of placing all economic activity, including industry, under the control of local authorities. The JCWC consisted mainly of the directors and workers of large plants and enterprises subordinate to the all-Union ministries in Moscow (Clemens 1991, 153).

Diagram 3 shows the political spectrum defined by the extreme nationalist groups on the left and the minority representation on the right.

**Diagram 3: Estonian Political Spectrum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAD</th>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>CEN</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>MIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Nationalists</td>
<td>Moderate Nationalists</td>
<td>Centrists</td>
<td>Former Communists</td>
<td>Minority Anti-Nationalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independents</td>
<td>Fatherland</td>
<td>PFE</td>
<td>Free Estonia</td>
<td>Intermovement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFE Allies</td>
<td>Secure Home</td>
<td></td>
<td>JCWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The radical nationalists quickly defined their position. At the founding congress of the Estonian National Independence Party in February 1989, it called for the voluntary emigration of the Russian-speaking population out of Estonia. Trivimi Velliste, head of the nationalist Estonian Heritage Society, stated, "The Russian colonist population here is effectively a military garrison in civilian clothes and there can be no question of giving them citizenship until they have satisfied some important requirement..." (Lieven 1993, 307). These groups were already beginning to form domestic policy for a post-Soviet Estonia.

The radical nature of these groups forced the PFE to become more centrist, seeking compromise with the established government while building mass support among the population (Hosking 1992). The March elections to the Congress of People's deputies showed the widespread support for the PFE as they won 27 of 36 seats. Many Estonian communists were leaving the party to join PFE. Intermovement and JCWC won five of 36 seats with the Communists receiving the rest. At this time, there was no distinct moderate nationalist groups and the more radical groups refused to participate in the election.

By the fall of 1989, the PFE united on the question of independence and published their platform which called for an independent Estonia outside of the Soviet Union. The gap between the PFE and the Radical Nationalists should have decreased, but significant differences remained as to how to achieve the goal of independence. The PFE supported working through the existing political institutions toward gradual increased autonomy and sovereignty. The radical nationalists claimed the Republic of Estonia had never ceased to exist but was only occupied. The restoration of the republic was the main goal. As the nationalists organized their own Congress of Estonia, the PFE prepared for the 1990 Supreme Council elections.

Many communists sensed the change of political sentiment and began to break away. Younger, more junior Communist Party members joined the Popular Front. Senior Communists formed the Free Estonia group at the end of 1989. Free Estonia and its allies
won about 27 seats of the 101 seat Supreme Council in the March 1990 elections. The minority groups consisting mainly of Russians won 26 seats while the opposite side of the spectrum, the Radical Nationalists, won 6 seats. The clear winner was the PFE, which received approximately 43 seats. The results showed a complete shift towards Estonian independence. As noted by Cythnia Kaplan, "The growing strength of nationalism was made clear during the elections" (1993, 214).

During the rest of 1990 and spring 1991, Estonia acted more cautiously than its Baltic neighbors Lithuania and Latvia. In the March 1991 referendum, an estimated 30% of the Russian minority supported independence along with the nearly unanimous Estonian vote. After the August coup and recognition of independent Estonia, leaders of the PFE allies and Radical Nationalists sought to find common ground. The Prime Minister, Edgar Savisaar, lost a vote of confidence signifying a shift in the Estonian Supreme Council. In spring 1992, the Fatherland moderate nationalist alliance was formed. Former PFE supporters gravitated to the Fatherland alliance as did many less radical nationalists. In the September 1992 elections, nationalism was a key factor. One study showed the personality factor was less important as political programs became more clear (Kivirahk et al. 1993, 155). A local newspaper reported: "Calls for decolonization were high on the agenda during the election campaign last autumn" (FBIS 1993a). The Citizens of Estonia alliance won 8 seats, lead by Juri Toomepuu, who campaigned to change citizenship laws to the disadvantage of the non-Estonians. Toomepuu, who won twice as many personal votes as any other candidate, later stated that the "invaders [Russian population] and their descendants be given no political rights" (FBIS 1993b, 87).

The results of the elections are shown in Table 4. The Fatherland coalition won the largest percentage of votes and formed a coalition with radical nationalist National Independent party, Social Democratic Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party. The new President, Lennart Meri, was strongly supported by the Fatherland coalition. The position of the new government was clear -- Estonia for the Estonians. Meri often reinforced a
sense of kinship among ethnic Estonians and alienated the non-Estonian minority. On the 76th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, he addressed members of the parliament and government:

"Politics is culture primarily because the ultimate aim of politics is to defend the individual, to assist the individual to determine and deepen the characteristics of a person. The primary characteristic of a person is the phenomenon: that a person does not exist outside a culture. The Estonian people have therefore created a nation for themselves" (Meri 1994).

Table 4: Electoral Support for Estonian Political Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Groups</th>
<th>Congress of People's Deputies (March 1989)</th>
<th>Supreme Council (March 1990)</th>
<th>Supreme Council (September 1992)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIN Intermovement</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR Secure Home</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN PFE</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT Fatherland</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD Natl. Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Nationalists were part of the PFE at this time


After the election, Estonian politics reflected a "left-left" struggle between radical nationalists and moderate nationalists, both groups being on the same side of the spectrum (Park 1993). Compared to Lithuania and Belarus, Estonia's elected bodies progressively became more nationalistic. Figure 3 illustrates the shift towards nationalism from 1989 to 1992.

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8 Park uses the terminology "Right-Right" but it is the same idea.
Figure 3:

Estonian Electoral Support

![Bar chart showing electoral support for different parties over time.]

The use of nationalism to build support for a particular party, group, or leader has been manifest in each of these countries, with varying degrees of success. Mass support for these platforms is a method to reveal the nature and degree of nationalism within the society. As Connor states, "The question is not the sincerity of the propagandist, but the nature of the mass instinct to which the propagandist appeals." Thus speeches and programs of national leaders are a "fruitful source" when trying to understand nationalism (Connor 1987, 206). Using the platforms of political parties allows for construction of a political spectrum. Combining this spectrum with electoral results gives a good indication of the level of nationalism within the voting population.

ETHNIC REPRESENTATION OF ELECTED BODIES

Another indicator is in the ethnic identity of the legislative bodies elected. Homeland psychology justifies the exclusive right to rule. The ethnic representation of national minorities shows the extent to which their grievances are recognized. As shown by Table 5, Estonia, the state with the highest percentage of minorities, has the most homogenous parliament. No ethnic minorities were elected in the last parliamentary
election. The current Lithuanian parliament, controlled by the LDLP, has eight Polish representatives and was supported by the "overwhelming majority" of the Russian minority in the 1992 elections (Girnius 1994b, 5). However, the actual level of representation is unknown. The Belarus parliament, remaining from the 1990 elections, has a higher percentage minority representation than the actual population of minorities.

Table 5: Over-representation of Indigenous Nationality in Elected Bodies in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5 (85)</td>
<td>7 (87)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-6 (70)</td>
<td>-2 (74)</td>
<td>no elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19 (81)</td>
<td>15 (77)</td>
<td>38 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kaiser (1994, 349)

Sources: Tishdov (1990a, 122-123); Tishdov 1990b (47-49, 53-57); Human Rights Watch (1993). (The figures of republic delegates the Congress of Peoples Deputies do not include those elected by Public Organizations).

Figure 4:
Figure 4 portrays the percentage of over or under-representation for the indigenous nationalities in the elected bodies. It shows the use of homeland psychology by Estonians to seek complete control of the national parliament. Additionally, this trend is also evident in the government. The cabinet of centrist Edgar Savisaar elected in 1990 included about 9% ethnic Russians as ministers. In 1992, the moderate nationalist Mart Laar installed a completely ethnic Estonian cabinet. This starkly contrasts with Belarus, which has a slight over-representation of minorities in its current Supreme Council. Lithuania shows a slight under-representation of its minorities. However, as stated, the current ruling party in the Supreme Council is supported by the minority groups. To understand the effect of ethnic representation, I examine another indicator of nationalism; the legislation passed by these elected bodies in their respective states.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS: 1988-1993

Nationalism plays an integral part in shaping the laws and policies by which the ruling majority controls the homeland and state. Laws dealing with language and citizenship use homeland psychology to justify excluding the minority nationalities. These laws and policies are globally manifest as indicators of nationalism (Shibutani and Kwan 1965), (Smith 1987), (Connor 1994) and (Kaiser 1994). Concerning the homeland state, "public policies are apt to reflect concern with maintaining the ethno-national purity of the homeland" (Connor 1986, p. 21).

In this comparative analysis, three types of actions by the parliaments are tracked and evaluated. These actions include (1) declarations of sovereignty and independence, (2) laws defining citizenship and loyalty, and (3) laws on the use of language. Using a chronological timetable, each action will be evaluated according to its nationalistic nature. Nationalism inspires the use of homeland psychology, which legitimizes policies aimed at ethnic purification and increased exclusive control over the homeland. The comparative analysis allows for a rough scale to be used, giving these actions a rating of high, medium, or low on the "nationalism scale" (indicated in Bold at the end of the paragraph). The
long-term ramifications of the action and the reaction by the national minority populations will aid in applying an accurate rating. Nationalistic legislation was first passed by Estonia in November 1988, Lithuania in January 1989, and by Belarus in January 1990. A comprehensive review of the legislature of each country is reviewed and evaluated.

**Lithuania**

In Lithuania, a draft decree was passed on the Lithuanian language as the republic's official language, initially without a guaranteed status for minority languages. After strong public outcry by Lithuania's Polish and Russian minorities, the law was amended and passed in its final form in January 1990. The law:

"established the Lithuanian language as the basic means of official communication in state and public agencies, education, culture, science, production, and other areas of public life. For enterprises, institutions, and organizations that hitherto have conducted their affairs in the Russian language now have a period of two years in which to make the transition to Lithuanian..." (Current Digest 1989, 6-7).

The law further guaranteed that members of the non-Lithuanian speaking population may set up their own pre-school institutions and general-education schools, publish books and newspapers in their own languages, and form their own cultural organizations. When necessary, official documents may be translated into Russian or other languages, and officials may conduct their business in other languages.

After the draft was passed, the minority alliance "Unity" threatened workers' strikes and refusal to pay Communist Party dues if the November 1988 decree on the Lithuanian language was not rescinded. Polish local councils declared limited autonomy which was promptly canceled by the Supreme Council. The fact that the native majority was willing to listen to these demands and change the law shows Lithuanians accommodating the non-indigenes and reducing the hostility they perceived (Medium).

In May 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Council passed a declaration of sovereignty, allowing the Council to vote on constitutional amendments and granting Lithuania the right to veto Soviet Laws. Estonia had passed a similar declaration the previous
November, putting pressure on Lithuania to follow suite. No significant reaction was evident among the national minorities in Lithuania (Medium).

Lithuania passed a Law on Citizenship in November 1989, setting up three categories by which citizenship is granted. All residents and citizens (and their descendants) of the Republic of Lithuania prior to July 15, 1940 were automatically citizens. Additionally, persons who were born in the Lithuanian SST were given citizenship. The final category included all residents with at least two years permanent residence in Lithuania. By November 1991, over 90% of the ethnic minorities had opted for citizenship. Following some complaints about the citizenship law, the Supreme Soviet adopted a "Law on National Minorities" which "guarantees freedom of their development and a virtual cultural autonomy." Vardys comments:

"This includes the right to state support of cultural and educational activities, native language schools, press, organizations, relations with compatriots beyond republic boundaries, religious services in native languages, government employment and representation, and the preparation of needed teaching staffs and cultural workers at home or abroad. This last point is specifically important to the Polish minority" (1990, 83).

Again, Lithuania proved its ability to respond to minority concerns. The relatively liberal citizenship law allowed almost all minorities to be citizens of the Republic. The follow-up "Law on National Minorities" was passed the same month to appease any minority concerns (Medium).

In March 1990, the newly elected Supreme Council with Landsbergis as Chairman declared Lithuania to be an independent state by a vote of 124-0 with six abstentions. It was the first republic in the Soviet Union to do so. The newly elected Sajudis parliament had just been installed. The action was followed by the deputies singing the Lithuanian  

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9 This was noted in the Council of Europe Report (1992b) on the "Lithuanian Law and International Human Rights Standards."
national anthem and a crowd tore the Soviet insignia off the door of the parliament building. In response, the Lithuanian Communist party collected tens of thousands of signatures asking for the reinstatement of the more moderate Brazauskas as Chairman (High).

Less than a year later in January 1991, the Lithuanian parliament made a major concession over the question of language, passing an amendment to the state language law permitting the use of minority languages in areas in which the relevant minorities constituted a substantial proportion of the population. The long-term effect has shown this only works when the minority is in fact a local majority. Though not fully implemented, minorities fully supported the measure (Low).

In May 1992, the newly independent Republic of Lithuania further defined its rules of citizenship. All previous citizens of independent Lithuania, registered before November 1991, together with those who were born in Lithuania, would automatically have a right to Lithuanian citizenship. Otherwise the requirements were 10 years residence, some knowledge of the Lithuanian language and constitution, and permanent employment in the republic. The Lithuanian citizenship law is extremely liberal and has never been criticized. Compared to the law passed by Estonia the same year, this law was considerably more lenient and inclusive (Low).

All of these legislative actions are plotted in Figure 5. Lithuania's legislature was moderately nationalist through 1988 to 1989. In 1990, Lithuania led the Soviet republics in pushing for decentralization and sovereignty with Sajudis and Landsbergis in power. Though these groups were nationalist, they did not use homeland psychology and attempt to gain exclusive control of the state. As noted by Leiven, "No one could have exceeded Landsbergis and the Sajudis radicals in their nostalgia for the pre-1940 republic; but because the demographic aspect was lacking, they felt quite able to compromise even on such a key issue as citizenship" (1993, 310). As the political mood in
Lithuania shifted away from radical nationalists so did the legislature. By 1992, former
Communist moderates assumed power and legislation reflected the power change.

Figure 5:

![Legislative Nationalism in Lithuania]

Belarus

Initial nationalistic legislation in Belarus centered on the topic of language. In
Belarus, language became a symbol for national identity and a rallying cry for nationalists.
It's crucial role is often exaggerated in the national debate. Connor explains:

"In situations where language is a principal issue, for example, the aggrieved group
will typically perceive the preservation of the native language as indispensable to
the survival of the national 'soul'; liquidate the language and you liquidate the
nation, it is charged" (1994, 153).

The language campaign was used by the Popular Front and other activist to prod
the Supreme Soviet in Belarus to act on demands to legislate protection of the Belarus
language. In January 1990, the "Law About Languages in the Belarus SSR" was passed.
The rationale behind the law closely resembles Connor's 1984 observation. The law's
preamble states:

"Language is not only a means of communication, but also the soul of a nation, the
foundation and the most important part of its culture. As long as the language
lives, the people live... It is an honor and duty of all of us to esteem the native
language, to contribute to its development and flourishing, and to respect other
peoples' languages (Zaprudnik 1993, 138)."
The law also gave protection to languages of minorities. Though Belarusian was made the official language of the state, it did not affect the constitutional rights of citizens of other nationalities to use Russian or other languages. The Ministry of Education drafted plans for schools to continue teaching in their languages of instructions, namely, Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Yiddish and Tartar. The Communist Party first secretary called those who pushed for the law "extremists" but the overall reaction by the minorities was minimal (Zaprudnik 1993, 139) (Medium).

In July 1990 the Belarusian Supreme Council passed the Declaration on State Sovereignty. It declared the supremacy of Belarusian law on Belarusian soil and Belarusian ownership of all economic and natural resources. It announced that the BSSR had become a nuclear free zone, that is was officially neutral in international affairs, reserved the right to raise its own army and security forces, as well as establish its own national bank and issue its own currency. In the preamble is reaffirmed "respect for the dignity and the rights of the people of all nationalities who reside in the Belarusian SSR" (Zaprudnik 1993, 205). The vote was adopted with 115 abstentions of the total 345 deputies. This move was considered quite bold for Belarus. It was only the third republic to declare sovereignty, behind Estonia and Lithuania. A large number of the Supreme Council showed their disapproval through abstaining which indicates the strength of the Popular Front in pushing through its agenda (High).

After the August 1991 coup attempt, the Supreme Council declared Belarus politically and economically independent and two weeks later changed the name of the country to the Republic of Belarus, adopting the flag and symbols of the Belarus Democratic Republic of 1918. Unlike Estonia, Belarus waited until the coup was over to make their declaration. There wasn't a forceful rush to make the declaration as Belarusian leaders had hoped to salvage some type of treaty to unite the majority of the republics. Shushkevich, a political moderate and centrist, was installed as the new Chairman of the Supreme Council. In December, he met with Yeltsin and Kravchuk to form the CIS. The
Prime Minister and Communist government leaders suspended the Belarusian Communist Party and their membership while remaining in power. Six months later the Party was allowed to resume its activities (Medium).

In December 1992, the Supreme Council mandated the Belarus military take an oath of loyalty. The need for some type of oath was forced due to the ethnic imbalance within the military. Only one of nine deputy defense ministers and 30% of the office corps was ethnic Belarusian. Half of the rank-and-file were ethnic Russian. The military oath of loyalty was taken on December 31, 1992. However, it did not stipulate that a solder had to be a citizen of Belarus. "Such legislation has not given any cause for Russians, or any other minority to feel discriminated against, nor has it forced any particular ethnic group to move out of their homes" (Markus 1994c, 10). In June, the head of the nationalist Belarusian Association of Servicemen, was dismissed from active service in the armed forces and demoted to the reserves because of his active political role (Markus 1994a). The legislature and the military are eager to control nationalism while keeping the national minorities comfortable (Low).

A new citizenship law for Republic Belarus was passed in July 1993 which stated that anyone residing in Belarus was considered a citizen. The law is considered a zero-option law, meaning all were accepted without any qualifications. No complaints were made by the minority groups (Low).

Belarus showed signs of institutional nationalism as the Popular Front movement gained momentum. However, with no moderate groups to fill in the gap, the legislature was bifurcated into pro-Union and pro-National factions. Due to the 1990 elections, the pro-Union forces controlled the Supreme Council and following the August declaration of independence, no significant nationalistic legislature has emerged. Figure 6 gives a good representation of the limited amount of nationalistic legislation and the low level of nationalism manifest.
Figure 6:

Legendative Nationalism in Belarus

Estonia

Estonia has been extremely active in legislating who shall or shall not be citizens of the restored republic. Nationalism evoked stringent policies following the rationale of homeland psychology. The national debate centered on how to return to the 1938 status of the republic. Kaiser observes: "In several of the nationalistic successor states, constitution and laws on citizenship, property rights, language, and migration are being used to reconstruct the ethnic stratification system in order to secure a dominant position for members of the indigenous nation" (1994, 348). After minorities lost all representation in 1992, the radical right gradually became more powerful and enacted legislation.

The "reconstruction" began as early as November 1988, when the Supreme Council voted a declaration of sovereignty, giving Estonian laws precedence over Soviet laws and itself the right to veto the jurisdiction of All-union legislation in Estonia. It passed by a vote of 258-1 with five abstentions (Raun 1991). Estonia was the first republic to declare its sovereignty. The declaration showed the degree to which the Estonian Communist Party was becoming independent of Moscow and the bold nature of the Supreme Council (High).
Two months later in January 1989, the Estonian Supreme Council passed the Law on the Status of the Estonian Language, making Estonian the state language and requiring its knowledge by various occupations. All civil servants and service personnel were to have a basic knowledge of both Estonian and Russian languages within one to four years. For Estonians, this requirement caused no problems as they already had an adequate command of Russian. For many non-Estonians, this was quite a difficult task. A poll taken in April 1988 showed that 62% of non-Estonians responded that their knowledge of Estonian is poor or none. The government's 1989 census showed that only 13.7% of the Russian-speaking population considered themselves fluent in Estonian. However, the law made concessions to non-Estonian speakers, including the right to use a language other than Estonian in dealing with the state and the right to be educated in Russian. (Human Rights Watch 1993). Still, a survey in December 1991 revealed that 52% of non-Estonians were not satisfied with the language requirement (Medium).\footnote{Both the poll and survey are from Vetik (1993).}

In November 1989, the Law on Republican Elections was passed. The law limited the eligibility to vote to those residents living within an electoral district for two years or within Estonia for five years. It further stipulated that candidates in local and republican elections were required to reside for five years in the district they sought to represent. This measure attempted to establish different citizenship rights for recent immigrants and residents. Almost all of the recent immigrants were Russian. After numerous demonstrations and strikes by Estonian minorities, Moscow declared the law unconstitutional and directed the Estonian Supreme Council to change it. After the strike, the law was amended to place no minimum residency requirement on voters, but candidates' requirements were extended from five to ten years (High).

During the failed August coup, the Estonian Supreme Council declared full independence. In early September, all three Baltic States receive international diplomatic
recognition as well as Soviet recognition of their independence. It is noteworthy that Estonia declared independence on the second day of the coup when the outcome was still unknown. A significant number of Soviet troops were based in Estonia and the military commander of the Baltic district had openly joined the reactionary coup (Taagepera 1993). Polls showed the Estonians united behind the decision, with 97% of the Estonians fully supporting the Declaration, compared to only 33% of non-Estonians (Saar and Joe 1992). The difference in support reflects the nationalism of the Estonians compared to the divided opinions of the non-Estonians (High).

In February 1992, the Supreme Council decided to revert to the Citizenship Law of 1938, restoring citizenship automatically to pre-1940 citizens and their descendants and stripping the existing Russian population of its existing citizenship and forcing it though a rigorous naturalization process. The Estonian government argued that Soviet annexation had suspended the implementation of the 1938 law, and all those who entered Estonia after annexation did so unlawfully and were not entitled to receive citizenship automatically.\footnote{Taken from Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki (1993). Their source is a June 1993 news release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia.} The law effectively restricted approximately 83% of the non-Estonian residents from becoming citizens. This prohibited them from voting on the referendum for the new Estonian constitution and the September elections for the new Parliament (High).

One year later, various aspects of the citizenship law were considered, including the question on the upcoming local elections, mixed marriages, language requirements, and easier requirements for Finno-Ugric peoples. On February 11, the Estonian Parliament approved the language test requirements for persons applying for Estonian citizenship. It required applicants be able to understand information concerning everyday life and speak on a given topic. Additionally:

"Applicants must also be able to use the affirmative and negative, ask questions, pronounce requests, and express forbidding, wishes, opinions, suppositions, and
explanations. The applicant must correctly use the relations between tenses. The applicant's spoken Estonian must be clear enough to understand, but he or she may take the time to find a suitable word, repeat and reword the phrase, and make mistakes in grammar and syntax" (FBIS 1993a).

A government pamphlet outlining the language requirements of the citizenship law is available only in Estonian. When Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki Watch inquired as to the reason behind the lack of Russian language pamphlets, they were informed "that at this stage of the citizenship application process one would have acquired sufficient knowledge of Estonian to understand the brochure" (1993, 18). The data on the Estonian language proficiency of the non-Estonian population was available to the parliament as it considered the language requirements of the Law on Citizenship. Language proficiency is indeed a tangible symbol of a nation and helps to justify not granting citizenship (High).

The June 1993 "Local Government Council Electoral Law" extended the right to vote to all Estonian citizens, and "citizens of foreign states and stateless persons legally sojourning in Estonia, age 18 or older, who as of January 1 of this year had been a permanent resident on the territory of the local government unit for no less than five years, and who have been entered in the electoral register" (Estonian Embassy 1994). 'Citizens of foreign states' is the category used to place the majority of the non-Estonian population who only hold citizenship in the former Soviet Union (even though it is a non-existent state). However, these persons were not allowed to run for office. The law had a noticeable effect on the local October 1993 elections, allowing minorities to vote and win local offices (Medium).

In July, 1993, Estonia passed the "Law on Aliens." Initially, the law defined post-1940 immigrants and their descendants without citizenship as "aliens" and required them to formally apply for residence within one year of the law's adoption. The legislation contained "inconsistencies with the norms of public international law, in particular European law," according to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe (CSCE 1993, 14). The Russian community, upset over being classified as "aliens," or "illegal
immigrants" led protests in the Russian communities of Estonia, blocking the main highway between Tallinn and Narva for several hours. Boris Yeltsin accused Estonia of "ethnic cleansing" and referred to the measure as "the apartheid law" (CSCE 1993, 15). The amended law is still an excellent example of homeland psychology codified as it contained several requirements to be met in order to reside in Estonia (High).

Estonian legislation has consistently been nationalistic since late 1989. The only accommodating piece of legislation, the Local Government Elections Bill was later considered a mistake. Only exogenous forces appear to be able to restrain Estonia; such as the Council of Europe and CSCE. Estonia wants full membership in these organizations and is willing to accept their criticism as evidenced during the debate on the Law on Aliens. Figure 7 shows the highly nationalistic nature of the legislation. After receiving its independence in August 1991, legislation directed towards minority nationalities corresponded with the general shift to the moderate nationalists in the parliament.

Figure 7:

![Legislative Nationalism in Estonia](chart)

Figure 8 gives a comparative examination of the three states. These longitudinal data indicate a distinct decrease in nationalism within Lithuania and Belarus, compared to

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12 During the local elections in October, the ruling coalition, Fatherland, called it "a dark day for Estonian democracy" (Freedom Review 1994, 67).
a fairly consistent nationalistic Estonia. Each state has displayed what Shibutani and Kwan identify as the "natural goal" of a nationality; the "creation, maintenance, and enhancement of the power of its own state ..." (Shibutani and Kwan 1965, 444).

Language is used as a symbol of the nation and loyalty to the state. Though each state has been bilingual for decades, new laws establishing the indigenous language as the official language were enacted. In Lithuania and Belarus, citizenship was extended to all permanent residents of the former Soviet Union. However, Estonia has fashioned its citizenship laws to exclude the non-native nationalities. The effects of this measure left the overwhelming majority of non-Estonians without the right to vote in the "democratic" elections. Laws concerning loyalty were starkly different as Belarus allowed non-citizens to serve in its Armed Forces, while Estonia wanted its residents to declare their loyalties or be classified as "Aliens." These manifestations of homeland psychology show the hostility resulting from the intrusion of minority nationalities on the indigenous population's homeland.

Figure 8:

![Legislative Nationalism Compared](image.png)

RUSSIAN MIGRATION

Another key indicator of nationalism is the movement of the minority nationalities out or into the state. The decision to migrate is complex; the result of various economic,
political, cultural, or national conditions. Often, people move in response to varying economic opportunities in a different location, in hopes of improving one's standard of living or lifestyle. Economic conditions can often act as a catalyst of nationalism (Connor 1994). Economic differences between two nations can lead to significant levels of immigration or emigration. This was evident in former Czechoslovakia as Slovaks complained about the outflow of their people to Czech lands. Slovakia pushed for separation even though it benefited economically from the union. As shown in this study and elsewhere, high numbers of immigrants also increases nationalism (Weiner 1978; Shibutani and Kwan 1965).

In the Soviet Union, the high concentration of former Soviets in their national homelands shows a definite lack of dispersal. Kaiser suggests, "... homelands have exerted a 'pull' on members of the indigenous nations that has helped to hold them in place even while their members have become more socially mobilized. In addition, homelands appear to exert a 'push' against nonindigenes" (1994, 159). Recent "waves of migration" have been attributed to labor supply, nationalism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and declining living standards (Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1993). Nationalism then plays a key role in both the pushing and pulling of natives and non-natives. People feel the "magnetic tug of an ethnic homeland" and return to their native land (Connor 1994, 155). Concurrently, non-natives feel the hostility of nationalism and homeland psychology, becoming "interlopers," "sojourners," or "colonists."

Migration data are available for net migration between Lithuania, Belarus, and Estonia with Russia. In each state, the largest minority group are ethnic Russians. Column one in Table 6 gives the net migration of Russians to the three republics, showing how Russians migrated to these European republics from 1979-1989. This trend was reversed in the period of 1989-1992. The data for these years show net migration between the former republic and the current Russian Federation. As shown in Figure 9,
Estonia and Lithuania have established a three year trend of a net emigration back to Russia.

Table 6: Net Migration into the Russian Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-23815</td>
<td>-200</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>7100</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>-143904</td>
<td>-6800</td>
<td>23300</td>
<td>-4700</td>
<td>-21900</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-42960</td>
<td>-500</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>15400</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Concentration of National Members in Home Republic


Figure 9:

Migration into the Russian Federation

What is causing the Russian population to leave Lithuania and Estonia? The answer to the Estonian question is more obvious. With economic conditions in Estonia much better than in Russia, it seems nationalism is pushing the Russians out. Legislation by the national parliament has made it increasingly difficult for non-Estonians to enter
Estonia, as well as stay in Estonia. In 1990, a law on immigration was passed by the Supreme Council. It established a quota for immigration to Estonia, along with large fines (100,000 rubles per person) for municipalities registering immigrants above the quota (Arkadie and Karlsson 1992, 92).

Additionally, Estonians have made it clear that they would like to see the Russians leave. Peeter Olesk, a minister of citizenship and immigration, stated that "many want to emigrate to Russia anyway, to their historical homeland, even if they were born here" (Current Digest 1994a). The Citizens of Estonia party helped to organize the Estonian Decolonization Foundation to help the "velvet" reemigration of Russians back to Russia. In a December 1990 survey, 23% of the Russians living in Estonia wanted to return to Russia and 74% of this group said the hostility of the local population was a prime reason (Gudkov 1993). As a result, for the first time in thirty years, more people left Estonia than arrived, with a majority of those being Russians (Kirch, Kirch, and Tuisk 1993). In 1992, the number emigrants increased three times the 1991 number, indicating an upward trend in emigration.

In Lithuania, the migration of Russians has been significant. One reason for the migration may be the 1990 elections and the Sajudis government, which at the time was comprised of radical nationalists and minorities. The 1991 and 1992 numbers seem to have leveled off after the 1990 reversal in migration. It is possible that the general shift to the LDLP played a role in this. Because the overwhelming majority of Russians voted for the LDLP in their 1992 victory, migration can be expected to level off or drop in 1993. Most observers have praised the ethnic relations in Lithuania following their independence in 1991. A 1992 Council of Europe report on human rights in Lithuania reported that treatment of minorities is "reasonably good" and over 90% of the minorities have elected to become citizens of Lithuania (1992b, 254). Lithuanian scholar Alfred Senn speculates that the ease of receiving Lithuanian citizenship added to emigration. He states that granting citizenship "actually contributed to reducing the Russian population as some
Russians took citizenship, received investment coupons which they used to buy their apartments, sold the apartments and moved to Russia where they could find housing for less cost and have a small nestegg left over" (1994, 81).

The situation in Belarus is more difficult to explain. The large number of emigrants in 1990 was offset by the equally large number of immigrants in 1992. What might have been a mass exodus to Russia by ethnic Russians did not take place. Instead, it seems the Russians have stayed. Belarusan legislation or political sentiment has not given ethnic minorities a reason to leave. Legislation has provided legal protection of minority interests. Other reasons may be the difficulty for potential emigrants to obtain permanent residence in other countries and the absence of civil conflict in Belarus (Markus 1994d). Regardless, Belarus has not used homeland psychology in dealing with resident Russians and other minorities. Belarus has signed agreements with Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland guaranteeing the rights of those minorities living within its borders.

The increase in immigrants in 1992 can probably be explained by the fact that more than two million ethnic Belarusians live outside of Belarus in different areas of the former Soviet Union. This is approximately 21% of all ethnic Belarusians, the third highest percentage of dispersal of the 15 former republics. Although the effects of nationalism are indeterminate, the increase in net migration with Russia may be caused by returning Belarusians from the Russian Federation.

Conclusions and Implications

To summarize the data, all indicators are considered together. These indicators include: spectrum of political nationalism and election results; ethnic representation in the elected bodies; actions of elected bodies and the reaction of the ethnic minorities; and migration of Russians to and from Russia. Speeches and statements of leaders, polling data, and observations by other scholars and organizations were also considered. In aggregate, these indicators show clear delineation in levels of nationalism over the period 1988 to 1993.
In the initial transition to a sovereign state, each country showed growing levels of nationalism from medium to high levels. As Gorbachev struggled to hold the Soviet Union together, Popular Front movements in Lithuania, Belarus, and Estonia sought to inspire increased national awareness and push for greater sovereignty. Each movement had a significant affect on the republic’s Supreme Council in the 1990 elections, at least initially. The Popular Front in Belarus had the least effect, but still it prompted the Communist controlled group to legislate language protection and declare sovereignty. The public became more aware of its national heritage and a significant minority strongly supported increased autonomy and eventual independence.

Lithuania's Sajudis won the elections in 1990 and controlled the government for two years. However, radical nationalists caused political in-fighting, which splintered the group, and resulted in a loss of electoral support. The Lithuanian public seemed to support nationalism, but rejected nativism and the use of homeland psychology to dictate public affairs. Minorities were allowed citizenship and their rights protected. The electoral shift to the right allowed former Communists to take control of the parliament in the 1992 elections. Though nationalistic political groups still exist in Lithuania, they are not predominant and overall Lithuania is "relatively quiet" concerning national issues (Senn 1994, 86).

Estonia showed the strongest levels of nationalism during 1988 to 1993. The electorate shifted to the left, giving moderate nationalists control of parliament in support of further nationalistic policies. Total control was achieved in the government and parliament as ethnic Estonians occupied 100% of all cabinet positions and Supreme Council deputy seats. Numerous legislation justified by homeland psychology displayed open hostility to the national minority groups. Russians reacted with protests and strikes, along with increased emigration back to Russia.

Public opinion polls have attempted to use the level of animosity between groups to gage nationalism and ethnic conflict between groups. However, this is a less than
reliable measure as nationalism can exist without feelings of hostility. Some polls do give an idea of opinions on certain topics or issues related to nationalism.

In Belarus, polls concerning the opinions of only ethnic Belarusians are limited or non-existent. A few polls have dealt with questions concerning nationalistic issues. These issues reflect key differences between the Popular Front and former Communist parties. A poll taken in the summer of 1993 gave two completely contradictory results. It reported that 43% of the population favored Belarusan participation in the CIS pact with 17% opposed; then showed that 47% of those same people were for Belarusian neutrality with 24% undecided (Markus 1993c). Though the Baltic republics loudly complained about the presence of Soviet troops on their soil, Belarusians have taken a much more apathetic approach. Though nearly 70% of the population is not concerned about any foreign attack in the next five years, only 26% want the Russian troops on Belarusan territory withdrawn as soon as possible. As the Popular Front argues for a truly independent and sovereign Belarusan nation, 70% of the adult population agree that "it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists" (USIA 1992b). Whether socio-economic or political, the regret over the separation of the USSR is not caused by nationalism and indicates a lack of it.

In Lithuania and Estonia, my indicators are generally supported by a September/October 1993 comprehensive survey of the Baltics. First, a comparison is made between ethnic Estonian and Lithuanian responses to the question, "How would you describe current relations between your nationality and the other main nationality in this country?" Estonians were divided 50% to 33% between the answers "Good" and "Not good" with the rest answering "do not know." These numbers become more significant when compared to Lithuania where 83% described relations as "Good" compared to 7% as "Not good" (Rose and Maley 1994). This is reflective of the differing levels of nationalism seen in 1993, as Estonia shifted to the left displaying increased nationalism and
Lithuanians took a much more accommodating approach to the non-indigenous population.

In this study, the reaction by the national minorities to governmental policies was used as an indicator of nationalism. Occasionally, minorities express good relations with the indigenous nationality but feel unfairly treated by the government. Because they are a diaspora and not living on their homeland, the indigenous nationality does not threaten them, especially when their stay in the nation is multi-generational. However, as nationalistic legislature is passed, the non-native minority becomes aware of the hostility. The government is blamed, though it often indirectly represents the people.

This is manifest by the polling data. Russian-speakers in both Lithuania and Estonia have favorable opinions of the indigenous nationality, 74% for Estonia and 88% in Lithuania. However, when asked "Would you say that the government treats Russian-speakers living in this country fairly?" a significant difference is seen. Only 29% of Russian-speakers in Estonia agree, while 61% did not. In Lithuania, 74% supported the government while 17% did not (Rose and Maley 1994). When the survey was taken in September 1993, the Estonian Russians were reflecting on years of nationalistic legislature which has restricted their political rights and caused them to be stateless in a country where 43% of them were born. In almost a complete reversal, almost three-fourth of the Lithuanian Russians felt comfortable with the government, reflecting much lower levels of nationalism.

**Summary**

This study has attempted to accomplish two tasks. The first was to test a basic premise of nationalism concerning one of its prime catalysts, ethno-demographic change. The second task was to test the theory by measuring levels of nationalism in comparable cases. No previous study known to the author has attempted to provide longitudinal data to quantify nationalism. Though the scale is rough, it has allowed for a comparison of levels of nationalism in multinational states.
Election results and legislative actions are classified as "stronger" indicators of nationalism. Platforms and speeches indicated where the groups were located on the political spectrum. Election results showed the success of these parties, reflecting the degree of nationalism in the electorate and in the new government. Laws and policies represented how nationalism affected the state at the national level. It also is considered a "stronger" indicator of nationalism. Ethnic representation and migration statistics are "weaker" indicators, as a direct relationship is harder to verify. Ethnic representation reflects both electoral unpopularity and legalized exclusion from the political process. Migration often shows the push and pull nationalism exerts.

The six year period allowed for trends to be established. By 1992, different levels of nationalism relative to the other states were evident. For a final analysis of each state, the period between 1992 and 1993 was coded to show the end result of the trends. Both Belarus and Estonia were easily coded as low and high, respectively. Lithuania showed some degree of nationalism in both of the weaker indicators. Its level of nationalism is somewhat higher than Belarus, yet significantly less than Estonia's. In the weaker indicators of migration and minority representation, Lithuania received a medium rating compared to Belarus and Estonia, making its overall level of nationalism higher than Belarus but much lower than Estonia. Table 7 shows the comparable ratings of each indicator for each state. Figure 10 shows the cumulative level of nationalism, by combining all indicators into one measure. Stronger indicators were given a value twice as large as weaker indicators. The bars represent the total of all indicators.

The results show that a relationship exists between ethno-demographic change and nationalism. However, because Belarus has proven to be less nationalistic than Lithuania, other factors must influence the dependent variable besides ethno-demographic change. An long-time observer of Belarus noted, "It is not clear whether this passivity [by Belarus] is due to a political culture adverse to extremists, tardy development of a distinctive national consciousness, and/or lesser resentment of Soviet rule than existed elsewhere"
(Marbles 1993, 256). Future study could concentrate on some of these variables to isolate other contributing relationships which exasperate nationalism. They could include different countries and completely different relationships between catalysts and nationalism.

Table 7: Relative Levels of Nationalism 1988-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Stronger Indicators</th>
<th>Weaker Indicators</th>
<th>Ethno-demo Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election Results</td>
<td>Laws and Policies</td>
<td>Ethnic Rep. Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10:

Comparative Levels of Nationalism

Estonia proved to be another prime example of how minority nationalities can fall victim to nationalism and homeland psychology. The seemingly sudden turn of events from 1988 to 1993 has left many stateless on someone else's land. Connor describes how native nationalities worldwide have justified hostile treatment of multi-generational neighbors:
"Explanation ultimately lies in the primal title to a homeland claimed by the indigenous ethno-national group. Though it may never be exercised, the power of eviction that is inherent in such a title to the territory may be translated into action at any time. Members of a diaspora can never be at home in a homeland" (Connor 1986, 20)

A better understanding of nationalism is necessary to help multi-national states accommodate their minorities. By identifying crucial catalysts, perhaps states can work to overcome the inclination to use homeland psychology and instead include their national minorities in the democratic process. This study provides a foundation, particularly as to how nationalism can be quantified. Providing a means to measure nationalism allows for future study in even greater detail with increased cases. Different relationships and catalysts can be examined allowing eventually for predictive power regarding the intensity of emerging nationalism. Such a tool would be invaluable in today's world of nationalistic conflicts.
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