# Ideology and Amnesia: The Public Debate on Women in the American Military (1940-1973)

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IDEOLOGY AND AMNESIA: THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON WOMEN
IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY, 1940-1973

by

LORRY M. FENNER

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in The University of Michigan
1995

Doctoral Committee:
Professor John Shy, Chair
Professor Carol F. Karlsen
Professor Gerald F. Linderman
Assistant Professor Lisa McLaughlin
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"These women are making up a history that does not exist."
- Elaine Donnelly
  on the dedication of the Vietnam
  Women's Memorial, Veteran's Day 1993

Still very quiet around here. Haven't gotten mortared for a couple of weeks now.

- 2Lt. Sharon A. Lane
  312th Evac Hospital, 24 June 1969
  Killed in a rocket attack in July
For all the truly special
women who made this possible
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although the Air Force sponsored this project, the work in no way reflects any official position of the U.S. armed services or government. Without the Air Force's support this project would have taken much longer, had it gotten done at all. I appreciate the encouragement of my superiors, colleagues, and friends at the Academy especially the Weavers, Dr. Betsy Muenger, George Carlisle, and Tim Castle. And a special thanks goes to Fern Kinion who introduced me to other female officers, WAF Officers Associated, and so many women veterans who told me their stories. I can not name them all but those who were especially encouraging and concerned include Martha Stanton, Yvonne Pateman, Norma Breedlove, Dona Hildebrand, Mattie Treadwell, and Welda Smith. In addition, through Ms. Kinion, with USAFA research funds, I was able to interview two of the most amazing women I have ever had the privilege to meet, Colonels Geraldine P. May and (the late) Emma Jane Riley. They served as inspiration through the most difficult parts of this project.

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Kearney's computer skills were most helpful. Other long time friends kept tabs on me and provided countless pep talks.

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Larry Weaver once told me, "you have to do it by yourself but you don't have to do it alone." These people and many who I have failed to mention, remind me by their presence that he was absolutely right. I could not have finished this work without the efforts of Carol Karlsen, who challenged and nurtured me; and Carolyn Alexander, Harriet Bassett, Melisa Buie, Janette Lutz, Monique Mansoura, and Liz Wentzien who spent endless hours typing, catching errors for me, keeping me awake, and making me smile; and Reshela DuPuis, who was most essential in helping me pull together my ideas. I thank Janette (Ruby) for giving me confidence with her calm self-assurance that we could solve any technical problem. I value Resh and Carol for their encouragement, wisdom, and warmth. And finally, my very deepest and heartfelt appreciation goes to Liz and Monique--the neighbors, the buddies. I hope they realize at least a little of what they did for me.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAC/AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Corps/Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAUW</td>
<td>American Association of University Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAN</td>
<td>American Association of Nurses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Army Territorial Auxiliary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Air Transport Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVC</td>
<td>American Veterans Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Civilian Air Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Citizen's Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Civil Air Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat IV</td>
<td>Category IV - lowest acceptable intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS (OCONUS)</td>
<td>Continental U.S. (Outside CONUS/Overseas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACOWITS</td>
<td>Defense Advisory Council on Women in the Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Daughters of the American Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Equal Rights Amendment (27th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBPWC</td>
<td>Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>General Equivalency Diploma (High School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFWC</td>
<td>General Federation of Women's Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI (Joe/Jane)</td>
<td>Government Issue (Male Soldier/Female Soldier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>House Rules Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUAC</td>
<td>House Un-American Activities Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPN</td>
<td>Licensed Practical Nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAGV</td>
<td>Military Advisory/Assistance Group, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFBPW</td>
<td>National Federation of Business and Professional Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLHV</td>
<td>National League of Woman Veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NME</td>
<td>National Military Establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>National Women's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS/OTS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate (Training) School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POW  Prisoner of War
PTSD  Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome
PX    Post Exchange
QM    Quarter Master
R&R   Rest and Recreation
RCT   Reserve Cadet Training
RN    Registered Nurse
ROK   Republic of Korea
ROCS  Reserve Officer Candidates
ROTC  Reserve Officer Training Corps
SASC  Senate Armed Services Committee
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SPAR  Semper Paratus, Coast Guard Motto, Female CG member
SRC   Senate Rules Committee
SSS   Selective Service System
SUAC  Senate Un-American Activities Committee

UCMJ  Uniform Code of Military Justice
UMT/UMS Universal Military Training/Service
UP/UPI United Press/International
USA   U.S. Army
USAF  U.S. Air Force
USAF Academy
USANC U.S. Army Nurse Corps
USCG  U.S. Coast Guard
USMC  U.S. Marine Corps
USNA  U.S. Naval Academy
USN   U.S. Navy
USNNC U.S. Navy Nurse Corps
USO   United Services Organization
VA    Veterans' Administration
VFW   Veterans of Foreign Wars
WAC   Women's Army Corps (Air WAC-AAC)
WAAC  Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
WAF   Women in the Air Force
WAFS  Women's Air Ferry Service
WASP  Women's Air Service Pilots
WAVES Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service/Navy
WCTU/WCTU Women's Christian Temperance League/Union
WOTC  Women's Officer Training Corps
WREN  Women's Royal Navy
Yeoman (F) Female sailor

1-A Fully qualified for military service
1-Y Reclassified 4-F as salvageable for service
4-F Unqualified for military service
NOTE

In the text and footnotes I have kept the primary source's spelling and style without comment, except in cases where this may cause confusion. For instance, the New York Times used the acronyms "WAAC" and "Waac" interchangeably. Sometimes sources capitalized the organizational designator (WAVES) and sometimes they did not (Waves).

I have stayed true to the text within quotes. 'Feminine' was often used for 'female' and I have used 'femininity' to denote reference to ideological constructs that have little to do with the biological/physical elements of femaleness. I have also used titles appropriate to the time period and used by the media such as "Mrs." and a husband's first name for married women. At other times, sources identified married women by "Miss" and their maiden name.

For often used publications, I have used a shortened title, e.g. Times. Also, in citing works in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

NYT
NYer
Tm
Nwk
Lf
CSM
CSMMag
RD
Nat
USN

New York Times
New Yorker
Time
Newsweek
Life
Christian Science Monitor
CSM Magazine
Reader's Digest
The Nation
U.S. News and World Report
SECTION I

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1

EITHER YOU NEED THESE WOMEN OR YOU DO NOT\(^1\)

In a 1988 interview, former Director of Women in the Air Force (1957-1961) Colonel Emma Jane Riley mentioned that during her tenure male officers exhibited much antipathy towards women in the services. In particular, the Air Staff was constantly initiating studies such as "Why WAF?" because the senior officers thought that their Chief, Gen. Curtis LeMay, was trying to find a way to justify eliminating women from the Air Force. Riley said she would not be surprised if, even in 1988, someone in the Pentagon was being tasked to research and write such a paper.\(^2\)

Riley's intuition was sound. Reaction to the deployment of women for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990/1991 and the report of George Bush's Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces show that the debate on the place of women in the American military has not been resolved. In addition, discussions surrounding both the Commission's 1992 report and the 1991 Tailhook incident demonstrate that the public is either generally unaware of the history of women's military participation, including the debate surrounding their initial integration and conditions of service, or intentionally ignores this history. More significantly, these and more recent discussions show that the issue has only peripherally been about the 'assignments' or jobs women should hold, i.e., whether they should participate in the ill-defined arena of 'combat'. Instead, the debate is about whether they should serve in the
armed forces at all. That debate has continued for more than forty years in much the same terms.

When Elaine Donnelly, a member of President Bush's Commission and a self-styled expert on women's military preparedness, either out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or disingenuousness made an announcement on the occasion of the 1993 dedication of the Vietnam Women's Memorial that women were making up a history for themselves that did not exist, some people may have assumed that the evidence that did exist had not been made available to the public. Contrary to that expectation, this study shows that the information has been visible to the public. It was not confined to the halls of government and Pentagon offices but has been presented and debated in full public view. This project is thus also dedicated to consolidating and making accessible the public part of that history one more time.³

Although women were temporarily mobilized in large numbers as an official part of the military during World War II, were made a permanent part of the Regular forces in 1948, struggled for continued inclusion when they were threatened with the dissolution of their corps in the late 1950s, and, finally, were even more fully integrated into the services through the 1960s and 1970s, resistance to women being part of the American military remains. This resistance, in the forms of antipathy and outright antagonism, has been fairly constant. As a result, women are integrated but not fully accepted and have had to struggle continually against official and unofficial barriers to their full contribution and participation.

My work suggests that both cultural ideology and historical amnesia, at once different but certainly related, helped to facilitate the
maintenance of such barriers and perpetuate redundant debates. From the 1940s on, media presentations of military women and of the debates surrounding their conditions of service share a feature which I argue has contributed to the tenacity of the resistance to women's participation in the American armed forces and the avoidance of the central issues of the meanings of citizenship and military obligation as they relate to gender. The most fundamental question, as with minority men and homosexuals, concerns the responsibilities, rights, and privileges of citizenship in a democracy. But debates on that particular question, especially in relation to gender and sexual orientation, have not been reported at length or in depth in the media. Where it has been discussed, in relation to race, the debates inform this study and should inform discussions of sexual orientation. Admittedly, it is more difficult to discuss the disjuncture between cultural ideologies and political philosophies than it is to discuss upper-body strength and academic test scores. But beyond that, even the discussion of professionalism and abilities have most often taken a back seat in the gender debate. Instead, for women, debates reflected in the media focused on details generally unrelated to real standards of performance: privacy, sexual behavior/morality, appearance, attire, fraternization/dating, marriage, pregnancy, motherhood, and irrelevant biological differences between men and women.

The military had, at least in part, admitted that it needed women in an official (if limited) capacity by World War II. However, the military, government, and most segments of the public were not ready for changes in gender roles or sexual divisions of labor. Nor were they ready to give up notions of the 'masculinity' of warfare and the military. I agree with others that, although these spaces have been defined as exclusively masculine, the evidence shows they have not been so. As Cynthia Enloe
suggests, the military needed women, but needed them as the "gender woman." This required that women be 'contained', which in turn required representational boundaries to allay assumed fears that women would be 'masculinized' and that American culture would be destroyed by changes in social roles.

These representational boundaries, were set by constant reinscriptions of traditional notions of femininity, insistence on heterosexuality, and a moral double standard. When anxieties around perceptions of rapid social change grew intolerable, or women threatened to transgress gender boundary containment, change could be retarded and women could be controlled by deploying accusations in these three areas—lack of femininity, homosexuality, immorality. In these cases, and even in more benign public representations, women were objectified and sexualized in the service of gendered containment.

Popular sources reveal public reactions to instances of heightened social anxieties. They also show that not only was the debate extremely redundant, and issues easily and repeatedly resolved when it was in the interest of the military to do so, but a symbiotic/synergistic relationship exists between cultural ideology (with its visceral responses to changing gender roles) and historical amnesia. This relationship created a situation where the debate itself was restricted to discussions of trivialities. The debate's containment, and the very continuation of the discussion in repetitive terms, obviously affected servicewomen as well as the discursive possibilities of subsequent debates.

The evidence presented in this study also suggests that containment of the debate functioned through representations of military women and the debate itself by the print media and other popular culture sources. As stated above, representations of military women tended to focus on the
trivial, or, even when they focused on women's significant individual and collective accomplishments and contributions, presentations were bracketed by trivialities, comedic treatments, and by insistence on gender-stereotyped images. The media's presentation of the debate, then, operated to deny that women's citizenship was at issue, that changes in social relations were in fact occurring, or that changes in these relations might even be necessary. Despite this implicit denial that ideology was an issue or that change was indeed occurring, it is apparent from sources available to the public that gender roles were contested and that ideologies remained malleable both in the service of military necessity and in order to themselves survive. Elasticity of ideology, while contributing to the ability of opponents to forestall changes (or to retard the rate of change), also allowed the astute to see the inconsistencies and illogic in gender structures and provided openings for challenges to those structures.

In fact, change was necessary as revealed in the military's willingness continually to alter the details of the conditions of women's service over the period in question. Military personnel and technical requirements drove incremental changes. These changes and the need for them, as Enloe suggests, were camouflaged by ideological and rhetorical acrobatics. These acrobatics masked the following realities: gender ideology was not concrete, gender divisions were either imaginary or contested, the services were willing to 'experiment socially' with both racial and gender barriers, service standards were not immutable nor based on performance requirements, and some integration resisters were converted to being ardent supporters by their experiences with women and with racial minorities.
But the process of representational camouflage contributed to military women's containment and to historical amnesia about their service. This dissertation is committed to investigating these practices of containment which functioned to exclude women or limit their military participation, and narrowly confine the debate about their integration. The latter insured that the discussion of women's inclusion would be fought out over details instead of over fundamental issues of the rights and obligations of citizenship.

Contrary to what one might assume from reading traditional military and political histories, and even from reading some works on women, historicizing the debate on the integration of women into the American armed forces shows that discursive spaces for a deeper discussion of citizenship rights, obligations and privileges, did exist at least by the 1940s. The media made these spaces, opened by racial civil rights concerns and gender equity discussions, visible to the public. While the public did discuss citizenship and military obligation as related to minority men's conditions of service, men's liability for combat, and male conscription, debate over inconsistencies between cultural gender ideology and democratic political philosophy were largely and successfully avoided. This helped to perpetuate debates on trivial and visceral levels rather than professional or political ones.

Evidence drawn from media reflections of public debates about minority men and male homosexuals in the military shows that these parallel or intersect with discussions of women's service. The debates were not identical; patriarchal structures dictated that gender would be a separate, highly salient category. Susan Jeffords argues that gender is, in fact, the most salient for analyzing patriarchal structures and
Still, the foundational issues of all three debates—race, gender, and sexual orientation—lay in considerations of the relationship between full citizenship and service obligations. Extensive media coverage of racial debates since the 1940s, and more recent wider discussion of the military exclusion of homosexuals, demonstrate that for men the connection between citizenship and service was articulated in public view. Whereas one might then expect that the debates about integrating marginalized groups into the armed forces would inform each other more, evidence reveals that very few connections have been drawn, and that when they were, they have been immediately denied or discounted.

An important consideration to note at the outset is that military racial debates have focused primarily on black men. Women of color have seldom been referred to separately (although there were a few articles about minority servicewomen during the World War II period). Until the press recognized the part they played in the racial upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, in popular print media minority women were generally either subsumed under the category of black men, or more often, included under discussions of white women.

Having said this, certain comparisons between the processes of integrating black men into the military and integrating white women and women of color can be drawn. Continual personnel shortages precipitated both. The services restricted their participation largely to menial or 'feminized' jobs and arenas defined as 'non-combat' so that neither could compete equally for promotions. Wartime requirements, especially, drove inclusion and utilization, but not rank and file (or even senior leadership) acceptance of women and minority men. In sum, the integration of women and black men were definitely driven by a need for manpower. However, beyond that, the integration of black men was prodded by
recognition that the logistics of institutionalized segregation were militarily inefficient and costly and a realization that individual racism militated against 'good order and discipline.' Here the comparison with gender diverges. Even after all these catalysts were taken into account, the fuller integration of black men required intense civil rights agitation, physical conflict, and extensive discussions of 'earned' and 'inalienable' rights before the military as an institution accepted racial minorities and made a concerted effort to level the playing field of opportunities and to equalize benefits. Neither physical conflict nor discussions of rights fostered the process of integrating and accepting women.

It is more difficult in gender spheres than it is in racial arenas to see a clear relationship between military treatment and civilian changes. But the media did offer extensive coverage of debates on gender roles and the 'appropriate feminine sphere' in civilian contexts throughout the period of this study. A forum for the discussion of full citizenship, unrestricted by gender considerations, did exist, even though participants in the women's movement were late in explicitly addressing the barriers to women's military service. Other than concentrating on higher priorities of equal pay, marital rights, and employment discrimination, this tardiness partially resulted from traditional feminist alignment with peace movements and associated anti-militarism, opposition to patriarchal organizations, military women's assimilationist tendencies (which were often necessary for their survival during periods when a women's movement was not strong enough or available to help them), and perhaps, ignorance of the inequality military women faced. Evidence in popular print media shows that charges of a feminist take over of the
military, or of senior male leaders' collusion with or 'unmanly' surrender to feminist organizations, are blatantly ahistorical.

As with gender and race, we can compare gender and sexual orientation debates, but media discussions of the exclusion of homosexuals from the military gained currency more recently. Therefore I treat this comparison more briefly. Gay rights advocates have drawn connections between the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and their inclusion in the military, but only late in the discussion did comparisons with racial and gender discrimination inform the debate on sexual orientation. Opponents consistently deny that these comparisons are valid. In addition, the discussion, as with those about racial minorities, initially focused primarily on men. As with the lack of specific coverage of black women, the media generally ignored or avoided specific mention of lesbians. Rare presentations of lesbianism were usually deployed as a containment mechanism, as Cynthia Enloe, among others, has argued. At times when gender role anxiety was high or some other political capital was desired, the stereotype of military women as aberrant or 'masculine' led to the persecution of suspected lesbians and accusations of lesbianism against any women who too openly challenged the boundaries.²

Simply put, media presentations showed that debates in American society concerning the rights of marginalized groups have influenced their treatment by the military and that the integration of those groups into the armed forces influenced those groups' expectations and their treatment in the larger society. But connections between the two spheres, military and civilian, can be drawn most clearly in the case of race. Even though the connections are visible in print media coverage, the military has resisted being used as the site for 'social experiments.' But in fact, in some ways, the armed forces have led society as a whole in the equity of
treatment of women and minorities. More concisely, the military has probably trailed the most liberal elements and led the most conservative elements of American society in consciousness and practice. However, in the military, consciousness and policies developed primarily through considerations of efficiency, effectiveness, and personnel shortages rather than through notions of fairness or ideological consistency. Evidence from print media shows that the crux of the 'experimentation' issue, in all three cases--race, gender, and sexual orientation--was not whether the services would use marginalized groups when it was militarily necessary, but rather, whether to then recognize their service with equal promotions and benefits. Beyond that, discussions addressed questions of whether the armed forces would push civilian communities away from discriminating against minority service members, or force military personnel to ascribe to 'local customs.' The latter often prevailed, creating even more inconsistencies, more need for containment, and greater openings for challenges as expectations of fair treatment were dashed and the irrationality of discriminatory policies in the face of contributions and sacrifices became obvious.

The disjuncture was especially clear when the government or military used 'Others' to defend some national interest, or when they made important contributions/sacrifices, and then were discriminated against in the military. Later, when the military was finally forced by necessity to confront resulting internal problems, they generally did so in the name of efficiency and discipline. After the problem had been addressed internally, marginalized groups with increased expectations looked for elimination of the prejudices they faced in civilian communities. Meanwhile, the agitation of civilian groups affected the consciousness of women and minority service personnel at least to some extent. However, I
found no instances of the military leading radical social change. Instead, at times because of pragmatism, the services (and often the civilian leaders of the armed forces rather than white military men) were out in front of the trailing edge of the most conservative elements in society. In sum, the services did try new arrangements, not in the interest of fostering social change but in the interest of military efficiency. Most telling, when necessary, they found a way to make them work.  

I propose that a functional relationship exists between the enormous amount of data available to the public on servicewomen and the debate itself, the way the data was presented, and on the presentation's impact. Representational containment of military women supported actual containment in official policies restricting the conditions of their service. Representations also supported the containment of the debate itself. Both forms of containment, as well as the boundaries of gender ideology and barriers to more informed and constructive discourse, encouraged historical amnesia. How the containment of women and the debate about them functioned are key questions which a detailed review of print media presentations illuminates. Resistance to military women, to remembering the history of servicewomen, and to remembering the history of debates about their service is tenacious--and fundamentally affects debates on the central issue of democratic political philosophy, the relationship of citizenship to constructions of the state, and the structures of the militaries necessary to defend them. Gender ideology has been stronger than either memory of historical realities (i.e. the presence and contributions of women in the category 'war') or democratic political philosophy. Cultural ideology must be demythologized, as Susan
Jeffords proposes, and the debate politicized, as Cynthia Enloe argues. Historicizing the public debate, I propose, supports both endeavors.9

Historicizing the debate over women's integration into the military conflicted with my expectations. Rather than military women's relative invisibility in popular culture, I found extensive data available to the public on servicewomen (both American and foreign) and on women in war. In addition, the media and other sources of popular culture (books, movies, theater, television) presented debates in the larger society about gender roles and citizenship, showing that discursive spaces did in fact exist and that meanings were contested rather than fixed. As I argued above, though, gender and citizenship were rarely connected in the debates. That definitions were contested created anxiety that caused resisters continually to retrench against change. However, although the women and the debates were visible to the public, press representations encouraged both willful camouflaging of evidence and unintentional historical amnesia.

In our culture, historical amnesia is not uncommon but it operates in specific ways in specific circumstances. Usually it works to support social and political privilege. However, one does not have to assume a conspiracy or base motives on the part of reporters or editors in this case. Some, no doubt, honestly disagreed with including women in the services or supported allowing women to participate but felt that their roles and benefits should be circumscribed. Others may have believed that they were supportive of women's participation even if they found women's military activities humorous or troublesome. Whatever the motive, the manner of presentation helped contain military women and inhibit public memory of their service. The data presented (and to a lesser extent even
the type of data presented) trivialized women and their work, and contained them within traditional roles by emphasizing femininity, heterosexuality, and moral double standards. Psychic anxiety, related to dynamic international political situations and dramatic domestic social change, required containment to maintain previously constructed images of women. Yet, the very attention paid these concerns shows how unstable and contradictory images of women were.

In the face of tenacious resistance, women did move towards equity, integration, and acceptance. Pragmatism driven by military need, individuals and groups of women proving their capability in traditional but militarized jobs and in non-traditional arenas, and the agitation of the civil and women's rights movements furthered women's participation, recognition, and benefits. Even as these advances were publicized in the media, they had to be presented in such a way as to be controlled within a previously constructed cultural mythology in order to maintain gender ideology. This process required mental, ideological, intellectual, and rhetorical gymnastics. Malleability was absolutely essential to the ideologies' maintenance. But the very malleability of concepts functioned to destabilize the mythologies of concreteness and completely polarized gender roles.

The press deployed images of servicewomen which functioned to contain any perception of real change in ways that made it seem as if: (1) nothing had changed in the past; (2) no change was occurring; and (3) nothing needed to change. Challenges to ideology were made but were masked by the manner of presentation to the public, which hindered awareness of real changes and progress. Representation constantly shifted the focus from the professional to the trivial.
Methodology

Because the central question of this study pertains to popular consciousness of the public debate on servicewomen, I have avoided sources that were not readily accessible to the general population, such as government or military documents. I only include these sources as they were presented by the contemporary print media, as readers would have seen them. I used the New York Times as the foundation of my research because it is an important source of information for and about at least a segment of American culture and provides a starting point for further investigation. The Times also carried the major wire services and therefore gives an indication of the information readers had access to across the nation. Items presented as objective news coverage serve as the foundation of this study, but features, editorials, letters to the editors, and photographs are included because they had a powerful (some would argue more powerful) impact on the reading public. In addition, reviews of books, plays, movies, and television programs in the Times give at least an oblique view of other influences on and indicators of popular culture.

I also examined coverage in such popular periodicals as Time, Life, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and Reader's Digest. I chose periodicals that were general rather than specialized in nature. I avoided women's magazines, assuming that men seldom read them. Similarly, I avoided race targeted periodicals like Ebony, assuming African-Americans might read dominant culture magazines but that whites seldom read those aimed at black audiences.

Although I chose more widely available sources, some of the information on military women in these publications was consigned to the women's pages or buried on the back pages. On the other hand, many
photographs of women in uniform and women in action which, as powerful images, were bound to catch readers' eyes. Since these women's 'race' was rarely mentioned, photographs are extremely informative. In general, papers and periodicals covered servicewomen in the regular news pages, sometimes prominently on front or editorial pages. Since titles of articles speak to the modes of portraying the military women and the debates, I have included them, if not in the text, then in the notes.

Since context provided important comparisons of presentations of military women with those of civilian women, military and civilian men, and other marginalized groups, I read widely within my primary sources. I focused most closely on articles on American military women and, secondarily, on those on American civilian women and foreign servicewomen. I reviewed articles on the military in general more cursorily, including those on organization and defense policy, strategy, and tactics, as these might have relevance to servicewomen's issues. I skimmed indexes for material on civilian race issues, space exploration, conflicts/wars/revolutions, allied and enemy militaries, significant issues and events of national interest, and other sources of popular culture such as books, movies, and television programs.11

Recognizing that the media has printed false information (the allegations of WAAC immorality and rampant pregnancy in the services for example), this information nevertheless become part of the public consciousness and, therefore, informed the debate, sometimes from being publicly contested. Untrue or inaccurate information could also function to encourage amnesia toward and support resistance to integrating women into the armed forces. At least occasionally, the public accepted as fact unsupported, undocumented, anecdotal information created by reporters,
interviewees, or editorial writers. In fact, the more sensationalized the information, perhaps the more memorable it became.

Finally, I took into consideration that the print media sometimes acted as cheerleaders for industry, civil defense organizations, medical professions and other institutions, or fostered anti-communism, family values, racism, misogyny, or other political sentiments. I have noted where I thought these perspectives might have been operating and what effect they might have had on the discussion. Editorials, in particular, I have read as indicators of a papers' or periodical's orientation or bias in presentation. I have also read the media aware that both readers and the sources themselves act as participants in creating meaning from print presentations.

Analytical Frameworks and Historiography

Necessity dictated multiple analytical frameworks for this study. At a minimum, the work required a view of the intersection of theories of war and militarism, gender theory, political theories of the state and notions of citizenship, studies of the operations of cultural ideology, representations of women (and 'Others') in popular culture, and the impact of print media on consciousness. In respect to history, it was important to review theories of historiography in general, intellectual and cultural history, American history, women's (and 'Others'' history, social history, military history, women's military history, military women's oral histories, and oral history theories. Regrettably, I had to neglect important work on war literature, women's war literature, and literary criticism that could further inform discussions of these debates in important ways.12 The bibliography for this project is designed to
acquaint the reader with the range of materials available in the secondary sources but is by no means exhaustive.

A definition of cultural ideology is essential to the project. Andrea Press's use of cultural ideology and hegemony theory, which informs her own study of gender identity and popular culture, has been particularly helpful to my own thinking. Although her work is on visual media, probably a more powerful and accessible mediator of popular culture, I find her definitions of these two underpinnings applicable to print media. She defines ideology so that it "refers generally to the terrain of ideas so centrally constitutive of our world views that we fail to notice what they are." Press maps the evolution of "ideology" from Karl Mannheim's 1936 proposition that it is a set of "beliefs promoted by ruling elites in order to maintain and perpetuate their position of dominance," constituting a concept of reality diffused through an entire society, informing all aspects of social relations. With Antonio Gramsci and Karl Marx "a greater recognition of participation of those below" challenged Mannheim's definition of ideology as a "top down" phenomena. Agreeing that the media often plays a hegemonic role in solidifying ideologies as it unconsciously structures our conceptions of ourselves and the rules of our culture, Press notes that the media perform these functions in complex ways that are not unmediated by the audience. Her research also shows this mediation allows for resistance against hegemony.

Struggles within ideological realms, fostered by this process of mediation, show, in Press's analysis, that ideologies are not concrete but contested. Particularly in depictions of women, Press says "we can see how social ideologies mediate between changes in the real world" and images in popular culture. Press's work is instructive, as my study directly relates the history of real changes for military women to their
representations in the print media and analyzes the way ideology functioned in mediating those images of servicewomen. I examine, as Press does, "themes of discrepancies," between the images and the real world. Press's notion that feminism is presented as "sandwiched between thicker slices of commercial femininity" is analogous to my contention that articles praising the capabilities of military women advertised their achievements but were placed between "thicker slices" of trivia that repeatedly inscribed femininity. Just as Press posits that audiences play an active role in the reception of popular culture, I maintain that obvious contradictions in media accounts allowed room for "resistance to cultural authority." Press's evidence shows that sometimes viewers believe television is more representative of reality than their own experiences and that often "normative ideas of 'reality' derive from cultural representations." This accords with my proposition that the trivialities presented in the media overshadowed the realities of servicewomen's participation and the debates on their integration. Finally, Press's use of Erich Auerbach's argument that psychic anxieties develop around "unsettled ideologies" informs my analysis.\textsuperscript{13}

Susan Jeffords's work, \textit{The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War}, also influences my analysis. This and her other works are particularly relevant to the post-1973 period (including the post-1980 backlash). Jeffords maps the evolution of representations (film, narratives, reportage, fictions, etc.) of the Vietnam War, suggesting that these are emblematic of the remasculinization of U.S. culture. She argues that warfare and gender are intimately connected. I would add that even beyond warfare, military organizations are prominent sites in which the discourse of gender operates even in peacetime. One of Jeffords's central themes, that in the representation of war, fact and fiction are blurred,
supports my contention that the way representations are constructed encouraged ahistoric popular memory. The resulting confusion, Jeffords tells us, diverts attention from constructions of gender, but in the end, power relations still appear unstable, challengeable, and alterable. My argument parallels Jeffords's in that gender ideology was revealed in the print media to be contested and historically contextualized rather than 'natural' and inevitable. While Jeffords emphasizes 'masculine' portrayals, her analysis applies to representations of the 'feminine' as well. Jeffords agrees with Lynne Hanley and others, who posit that because our culture only privileges men's war stories, in popular memory, constructs war as 'men-only' space. This functions to exclude women and all those who were supposedly 'not there,' until 'women' and 'non-participants' have become synonymous. The process creates even stronger, more permanent, boundaries between genders and impairs our memories of who the real actors and victims of war have been.

Another significant aspects of Jeffords's work is her proposition that popular 'male bonding' discourse also limits women's participation and the debate about that participation. This discourse operates to code all 'detractors' from masculinity and male privilege as 'feminine'. Her work emphasizes the idea, basic to most male Vietnam literature, that the women's movement succeeded at the expense of male Vietnam veterans (female veterans are invisible) and the veteran is therefore the vehicle for white men's claims that they are the real victims of the war. Hanley argues the same in relation to Paul Fussell's work on war literature and cultural memory. I argue that similar dynamics were at work in falsely blaming the women's movement for pushing the integration of women into the military as a social experiment when in actuality the military initiated women's mobilization based on its own needs.¹⁴
As mentioned above, Jeffords proposes that popular culture reinforced patriarchal domination, demonstrating that gender rather than class or race defines mechanisms of relations supporting patriarchy in U.S. culture. "It is the crystallized formations of masculinity in warfare," she says, "that enable gender relations in society to survive, offering territory in which to adjust, test, and reformulate general social relations." She further demonstrates that this is the case by connecting 'male bonding' to racial issues. Vietnam literature posits that the fight for survival in combat wiped out color lines on the battlefield while this did not happen in rear areas, the peacetime military, or civilian society. Print media sources do show, though, that this disparity between race relations in combat and on city streets at home opened space for challenges to racial barriers in other arenas. In Vietnam war stories, women are seen as threatening to 'male bonds' and were used in the literature to cement those bonds. She says that "The belief that women not only will but want to destroy the bonds between men is necessary to insure the constant tensions that bound masculine bonds and prevent their dissolution from within through a recognition of other forms of difference." Representations, she continues, through deployment of imagery and the framing of the masculine bond, insist on the denial of race, class, geographic, and educational differences among men, and most importantly, the affirmation of difference between men and women. We also see this mechanism at work in the print sources used in this work. In both cases, exclusion of women based on sexual difference appeared 'natural' rather than social. Jeffords agrees with other researchers that, "To maintain stability of institutional power, the masculine must exclude from its arena that which it defines itself against." For instance, she cites Nancy Hartsock as arguing that the "masculine feels
itself" most in its own presence, but also in the knowledge of what it's not--feminine. She tells us also that, according to Andrea Dworkin, "the first rule of masculinity is that whatever he is, women are not." In contemporary American culture, the 'warrior' is the only role exclusively reserved as man's, but Jeffords shows us that the institutionalized exclusion of women seems less clearcut and enforceable than definitions of 'combat' and of 'warrior' as they change and are less concrete.¹⁶

Arguing that fictional constructions of war as a male-only space represent women through a "prism of sexuality" so that women's differences from men are perceived as 'natural', while differences between men are circumstantial, Jeffords examines the social construction of difference and the way it operates in real debates and policy making. She states that "It is necessary [for remasculinization] for social construction of gender to be translated into terms that will not allow gender to be considered in the same light as class or ethnicity as one of the 'faceless and nameless forces of circumstance' that govern people's lives, but instead be seen as predetermined and incontrovertible." Her contention fits this study as well; evidence from media accounts of military women show the failure of the debates to engage racial and gender discrimination.

Jeffords also argues that Vietnam war literature presents war as a biological necessity for the human male without which he would be "half-alive." As gender and biology are inverted and war is elided with masculinity, the logic dictates that stripped of masculinity (prevented from engaging in war or 'feminized') men will die. By the same token, if the country is 'feminized' it will also die. In my study, some WWII resistance to the militarization of women represented their integration as threatening to American culture. I would add that 'war,' 'combat,' and
'the military' were often elided in presentation and in popular memory; therefore, if women joined the military, participated in war, or fought the enemy they were seen as restricting men's opportunities to live full lives. Women's participation was represented as 'feminizing', destroying the most 'masculinizing' space for men and thereby destroying U.S. culture. Also, since the three categories were elided, excluding women from combat functioned to exclude all memory of them as participants and victims of war. Women had no war stories in this construct; women were silenced and even removed from the military's institutional memory. In fact, my evidence shows that the print media exposed the fact that the three categories were often used synonymously.

As have most feminists and women's historians have, Jeffords insists that 'feminine and masculine' are social constructs pertaining to patterns of sexuality and behavior imposed by cultural and social norms rather than biological imperatives. She argues that war is the most severe consequence of the mystification of gender in this respect and invokes concomitant mystification of patriarchal power relations by making masculinity synonymous with patriarchy. As opposed to feminists who avoid the study of war as antithetical to women's identities, Jeffords argues that their avoidance of the subject helps to keep women silenced, invisible, and excluded. She contends that war is the "crucible for distillation" of social and cultural relations. This distillation provides a simplicity that is also a functional part of warfare's mystification and its related power structures. Jeffords's work presents war as the distilled expression of relations of social and cultural dominance. Jeffords, citing Jean Bethke Elshtain (whose work I discuss below), argues that war creates collective identities; war creates the people; war produces power individually and collectively; and war is the
cultural property of the people—or really, the cultural property of men, as is the military. War as presented in the media is really "of men." As most military theorists believe that societies are reflected in their military organizations, militaries reflect male power and privilege and an imagined homosocial public world. In actuality, Jeffords posits that war allows for the negotiation of identities within patriarchy. Showing these identities as not concrete but contested, she says, gives room for negotiation and challenge. Although crises may not result in immediate changes in social relations, this testing opens spaces for discourse and change. Media presentations in this study show social relations as contested, and I argue, as Jeffords does, that this demonstrates that discursive spaces for alternate structures were available. Avoiding them or discounting them was a voluntary choice. Jeffords warns that change occurs very slowly, while at the same time the dominant ideology attempts to reassert itself. I also found that to be the case.17

In her work, Jean Bethke Elshtain examines the culture of war. She proposes that societies are the sum total of their war stories. Stories constructed by privileged voices, of course. Elshtain's work proposes that the greatest gap between the genders is visible in war through the cultural creation of mutually exclusive male and female identities as "Just Warriors" and "Beautiful Souls," respectively. However, she argues, the exclusivity of these categories are undermined by the realities of female bellicosity and male love. Even when we admit that women can be violent, female violence is not represented as being in the category of 'war'. Instead, our culture tends to classify female violence as unorganized, uncontrollable, and unofficial. While people may know women have worn uniforms, they perceive women to be auxiliary to the fighting. Elshtain argues that we rarely think of women who have actually fought and
we construct those we do remember (i.e., resistance fighters) as the exceptions. Elshtain's contention, though, that "sometimes the few are many" rather than exceptional is supported by my research. Information was available to the public; it was not remembered, in part at least, because did not fit into the previously-constructed cultural categories of "Beautiful Souls" and "Just Warriors." She goes on to argue that as much as our culture tries to intellectually remove women from combat because they are reproducers, they are part and parcel of structures that encourage and require war.

Elshtain also addresses the bonding issue and avers that what counts are not states and ideologies, but loyalty to one's (male) comrades. 'Male bonding,' then, is presented as central to war and victory, with men reserving the battlefield for themselves. Since women are life givers (and takers) in other realms, men need to appropriate such an arena for themselves. In this arena men are the "tellers". Male narrators, as Jeffords argues, define war by women's absence. Of course, their absence is not real but constructed. I extend Jeffords' work by arguing that women are not absent, as my evidence shows that the public was offered views of them, but that the way they are represented functioned to contain them within traditional spaces. I argue that the denial of the reality of historical evidence requires, and in turn, encourages an ideological expunging of women's presence. Elshtain's analysis parallels Jeffords's in noting that in men's war stories, men become the victims of governments, senior military leaders, uncontrollable circumstances or fate, and even of women who send them away to fight and then do not support them on the home front. According to Susan Jeffords, all the guilty parties in this construct are 'feminized.'
Most significant to my argument about citizenship is Elshtain's discussion of NOW's 1981 legal brief opposing a male-only draft, which claimed that compulsory universal service was central to the concept of citizenship in a democracy based on armed civic virtue. To gain first-class citizenship, people had to have the right to fight. NOW's lawyers argued against archaic notions about women's lack of capability, and the long-term psychological and political repercussions of the militarization of women. At the same time, more radical feminists argued against a female draft as reinforcing a patriarchal institution, expanding militarism, and supporting the notion that the military was so central to the social order that women had to gain access to it. They abhorred all three. Elshtain believes, with the less radical, that women should not have an automatic exemption from the draft. While she agrees that women might be transformed by the military, she also believes that if women were included in large enough numbers, they could also transform the military and break the warrior/victim symbiosis. No longer would men intellectually shut women out under the pretext of protection (which is not provided), and no longer could the myth exist that anyone (i.e., women) was immune to war's effects. She argues that the military and debates surrounding war and gender should be "devirilized" in favor of "politicization", which parallels my contention that avoidance of the ideological debate disallowed the possibility of a political debate on the meanings of nationhood, citizenship, and military obligation. This avoidance obscures the inconsistency between cultural ideology and democratic political philosophy.¹⁸

Cynthia Enloe's works historicize and "politicize" the debate. She exposes the historical "Catch 22" that leads to women's mobilization during periods of emergency, which are precisely the times when they are
told they cannot negotiate for themselves without jeopardizing the war effort or betraying their country. She also exposes policy makers' reliance on false notions of 'femininity' (constructed in historical memory) and shows political systems (and militaries) as more fragile and open to change than we are usually led to believe by media presentations. Media presentations, I find, have shown militaries and political systems as irrational and fragile. Still, I agree with Enloe's argument that the actual landscape of economics, politics, militaries, and wars are not exclusively male. She insists that because representations are the results of someone's decision, rather than "inevitable or natural," imagining alternatives is possible. And, as with the others reviewed here, Enloe proposes that masculinity and femininity are not natural but constructed: "they are packages of expectations that have been created through specific decisions by specific people."

In reality, the categories are not mutually exclusive. Enloe shows that "on occasion, elite men may let in a woman here or a woman there, but these women aren't randomly selected....[When] a woman is let in by the men who control the political [or military] elite it usually is because that woman has learned the lessons of masculinized political behavior well enough not to threaten male political privilege." My research shows that such women were in most cases successfully 'contained' by the military. Contemporaries called them "Aunt Toms."

Enloe proposes, and my work supports her contention, that this containment of women is necessary in maintaining notions of traditional 'femininity.' Enloe's military woman is a problem because she leaves home without the protection of father, brother, or husband and is presented in the media or in military parlance as immoral (as in the 1943 morality scandal presented in Chapter 3). In fact, Enloe suggests that "a woman
who travels away from the ideological protection of 'home' and without an acceptable male escort is likely to be tarred with the brush of 'unrespectability'. She risks losing her honor or being blamed for any harm that befalls her on her travels...." In other words, military women are fair game to be assaulted even by their own side. Or, women away from home are assumed to encourage men to act as their escorts, which requires that male soldiers neglect the military mission. If women away from home are alright without a male protector, it is because they are not feminine or 'real women'; they are imagined as masculine or accused of 'trying to be men,' which can be read as aberrant or lesbian.

More specifically, in Does Khaki Become You?, Enloe looks at the history of warfare from Crimea to Vietnam to describe how militaries have scrutinized, organized, and deployed women to meet their needs, revealing "the insidious lies of military equal opportunity: making women into first class citizens of the war machine, giving them a chance for education, financial independence and upward mobility." Enloe avers that women's military integration is "not the victory for women's liberation that the media would lead us to believe, but quite the opposite." My own work shows that the media's role providing information to the public on women's military integration has been more complex.

Most important in relation to my work, Enloe contends that "in both world wars the contradiction between the need to prevent women's presence from undermining the military's legitimizing image of manhood was softened somewhat by the very notion that the time was peculiar and finite....Lacking the finiteness and ideological peculiarity of wartime, a peacetime military force relying on women soldiers seems to have an exaggerated need to pursue more and more refined measures of sexual difference in order to keep women in their place." This position is also
supported by my research. As a result, Enloe says, the military has constantly conducted studies in a "desperate search for some fundamental, intrinsic (i.e., not open to political debate) difference between male and female soldiers to justify the exclusion from the military's ideological core—combat." If they could find the difference (contain the debate and/or the women) they could also exclude women from senior command positions. Even without the supporting studies, restrictions on women based on this supposition prevented women from gaining these positions. However, these restrictions are continually debated and barriers dismantled according to military needs to include more women. What was not planned for, nor completely successfully 'contained', was the fact that the constant changes did allow room to imagine the possibility of even more change, not necessarily in support of military need. Constant changes showed that the barriers were not rationally constructed or objectively necessary. Enloe sees the military using the restrictions on women's participation to protect itself from the onslaught of "feminization". What some resisters to women in the military saw as feminization was actually a trend toward humanizing the institution which was necessary to attract more men to the AVF. In any case, the military's goal, Enloe insists, is "to create an ideological/political climate which allows them to use women as soldiers without being threatened by them."

The military's restrictions on women, Enloe claims, have been based on biological arguments which the media has used for 'containing' representations—emphasizing appearance, sexuality, attire, and other attributes coded as feminine. These media representations, she argues, as does Jeffords, help reproduce patriarchal sexist ideas in the society as a whole. In this study, I show that this process was part of the
construction of containment necessary to prevent women from threatening the core of the military. Enloe further describes this containment:

    On the one hand, the military has internal and external needs for its women soldiers not to seem to violate conventional gender norms; they must be 'feminine', that is, smiling, pretty and heterosexual, even while being loyal and competent. Such women soldiers will not generate politically embarrassing controversy in the society at large.

Military policies restrict women and press presentations contain them. Maintaining unequal conditions of service allows the denial of women's full contributions and thus related benefits. Even though the services cannot get rid of women if the military is going to be effective, men continually challenge women's presence. Therefore women's position is always tenuous, which was especially the case, as we will see, between 1954 and 1964. Because their position is always threatened, women must keep a low profile and not challenge male hierarchies and constructions of their service as auxiliary and, perhaps, unnecessary. They refrain from outright combat against the military's antipathy towards them, because they do not want to hurt the mission or the country, nor do they want to be 'invalidated' by accusations of being 'whores' or 'masculine'; i.e., lesbians. Some women also refrain from contesting limitations because, Enloe suggests, they are reluctant to hurt men's egos or risk losing their own (perceived) privileges (not to have to do the dirty work or leave a 'pretty cage'). The women who are privileged are those most successfully contained—heterosexual, feminine, moral. In Enloe's view, they are also white, upper-class and usually officers.

Enloe goes on to address sexual harassment as another method of containment. Even though these terms were not used during the period of my study, 'sexual harassment' can be seen in the resistance to military women. My research supports Enloe's position that gender-based harassment
intensified as the numbers of women in the military increased, as women were integrated into all-male units, and as women were assigned to non-traditional jobs. She argues that these three conditions all threatened masculine spheres successively and the same three transformed lesbianism into a 'burning' issue for the military in the late 1970s. She insists that accusations of homosexuality are used to harass women in order to contain and control those who dare to invade 'masculine' spaces and are successful in doing 'male' jobs.

Enloe points out that the military's sexual division of labor does not merely reflect the larger society's sexism, but helps to perpetuate sexism in civilian society by legitimizing it with the state's authority. And, as Enloe avers and my research reflects, the military periodically adjusts its sexual divisions of labor to meet current material and political challenges. As Jeffords does, Enloe argues that these adjustments cause internal tensions and contradictions which show that the armed forces are not the "omniscient monolith" presented by the press and military leaders, but instead the military is an "often divided and confused institution," as demonstrated by inconsistent policies, changes in standards, and weak logic applied to restrictions. I would again modify the argument to allow for a more ambiguous press presentation, as my evidence shows that the press did make some inconsistencies, confusing and non-performance based standards, and weak gendered-logic visible to the reading public.

Enloe also presents cogent arguments on the debates surrounding opening combat positions to women. The women in combat debate really goes beyond the end of my study but is important in respect to her discussion of the malleable definitions of 'combat,' 'front areas,' and 'rear areas' based on military needs. If the military could not exclude women totally,
it could continue to semantically exclude them from the military's core activity, fighting. Enloe claims that "The entrenched notion of women and femininity is really a package of ahistoric assumptions: women are distractions, women lack physical stamina, women are unaccustomed to complex technology, women require special facilities." I would add to her list the assumption that women require more 'privacy' than men. When women threaten the presentation of combat as the last male-only preserve, these 'entrenched notions' are deployed in debate and as the basis for policy to contain military women. Enloe avers that in order to maintain this 'masculine space,' the military has to walk an "ideological tightrope." Rather than a geographic location or physical space, the 'front' turns out also to be a social space with direct, physical, conflict. Enloe contends that, "This sort of definition prompts military officials to perform intellectual acrobatics in their attempts to distinguish 'direct, physical conflict' from the more subtle sorts of conflict." The elasticity of the combat definition, beyond the bayonet-to-bayonet image of 'combat' in the popular consciousness, she says, is an "ideological quagmire." We will see media evidence of this even for men in Vietnam, as the U.S. government tried to deny the country's involvement in a 'war' before 1964. Enloe argues that sometimes definitions of combat have been expanded to keep women in the rear, and sometimes "squeezed" when women were needed closer to the front for nursing or for anti-aircraft artillery (AA) service.

Enloe's focus on the process of defining combat and restricting women's participation puts power back in the picture. Processes presume that decisions are made and all exercises of power derive from someone's calculation of interest and benefit. She says that militaries need women, but they need women to behave as the "gender 'women'." The print media
contributes to the process by either intentionally or unintentionally containing both women and the debate about women's militarization by framing reports of their contributions with codes for femininity—women are trivialized by being sexualized or by being made the objects of amusement.

Relevant to my work, Enloe maintains: (1) that military politics had never been as exclusively male as they have been portrayed; (2) that the military has depended on patriarchy, in other words they needed not women but 'gendered women'; and (3) that the 'norms of womanhood' rely on all women being related to each other (i.e., military wives, dependent daughters, defense workers, military nurses, camptown prostitutes, servicewomen can all be treated the same.) This last supports my contention that it is important to look at how the military as an institution as well as individual soldiers treat non-military women. Their behavior is based on their attitudes towards civilian women and reflect their attitudes toward military women as well. As to Enloe's first point, that military politics have been presented as exclusively male, I argue it has not been portrayed, but remembered, that way, partly because of the manner of the media portrayal.

Finally, Enloe speaks to the contradictions. Part of what allows for contestation of the ideological constructs related to the military and war is that commanders want incompatible things. These reveal the inconsistencies and malleability of gender concepts. They want: (1) nurses with the 'natural instincts' to nurture men—and they need them as close to the front as possible, but they can not distract men with their 'sexual needs'; (2) women as the 'feminine' to reinforce their soldiers' 'masculinity', but women can not be so 'feminine', i.e., needing protection, that they become a burden on the men; (3) to recruit women by
advertising female comradeship, non-traditional training, and physical exercise which are not coded as 'feminine' but they do not want any hint of lesbianism; (4) wives who support the 'military family' but do not let their individual families become a drain on the services or the soldiers; and (5) prostitutes for morale, but do not want them to cause harm to soldiers' health or welfare, become a burden through marriage, or act as security threats. Enloe argues, and my work reinforces, the notion that when these contradictions around women grow so acute that they threaten to expose institutional weaknesses the result is conservative backlash. I find that the inconsistencies were routinely exposed in the press.

Enloe concludes that the military needs women, but it needs to "camouflage" their use so that the military can maintain the myth that it remains the quintessentially 'masculine' social institution. The press did make military women visible to the public but contributed to the process of the containment of women and historical amnesia by the manner of presentation. At the same time, however, the history of women soldiers/warriors and press presentations of them also reveal rifts in the terrain, spaces open for discourse and change.  

On the sociology of military institutions, the works of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Judith Hicks Stiehm, and Charles Moskos have contributed much to this study. For different reasons, so too has Brian Mitchell's Weak Link. Most theorists take the position that militaries reflect their societies, and that those that do not are dangerous to the political and social order. Obviously, this view is important to any study of how gender relations do or do not in society reflect gender relations in the military and vice versa.
Stiehm's works on the Air Force Academy's integration of women (1975-1980) and the experiences of enlisted women (1972-1986), although subsequent to the period of this study, are relevant in their examination of "the underlying assumptions about and predispositions towards women in civilian as well as military culture." Stiehm has researched the ways policy towards women has been developed and changed, while at the same time describing and analyzing the uneasy tensions created by the presence of women in the military. The underlying belief system that is challenged by this presence includes three primary assumptions: war is 'manly', protectors protect, and any soldier must be substitutable for any other. She says that "These beliefs are widely held, deeply felt, and generally resistant to the available evidence that disputes them," which is consistent with my findings that cultural ideology has been resistant to change and public memory resistant to historical realities in spite of the enormous amount of information on military women accessible to the public in the popular print media. Tracking closely with my concerns, Stiehm is especially interested in how public opinion reflects the normative social order and how that affects the position of women in the military. However, while I argue that public opinion has been shaped to a large degree by the sources of popular culture, including print media (newspapers and periodicals) and film and television, Stiehm's primary concern in discussing "Meta-Influences on Policies" is on gender roles and their social construction. I agree with her position that little congruence exists between the views of the American public, the military, and the Congress and that a clear picture of public opinion of women in the military has not yet been developed. Stiehm also investigates how traditional views of biology, sex, and family clash with military service for women. In addition, Stiehm argues, other ideologies are at work in
that "underlying assumptions and stereotypes about race, class, and the reliability of single mothers combine to influence the position of women despite evidence they are good soldiers." Stiehm posits that this resistance indicates the shape and tenacity of gender roles in society. In order to get at the root of the issue, Stiehm dissects assumptions about the natures of men and women as they are brought to the foreground in discussions of war and combat in seeking to answer a question very similar to mine; why policies "so often appear to fly in the face of both logic and evidence." Denial of 'logic and evidence' creates tensions because the presence of women challenges certain functional myths (i.e., 'war is manly'). The result is a very uneasy accommodation of women under which they are stereotyped and harassed; they are classified as either lesbians or whores. These are the very mechanisms of containment that I have found in operation in resistance to women's presence in the military sphere or, once there, in the resistance to removing barriers that deny their full participation and benefits.

Our resistance to changing prevailing social belief systems and cultural assumptions about gender roles plays a part in constructing real restrictions on women's military service which are irrational and defy or ignore historical experience. This process inhibits popular memory, despite the wide range of accessible information available to the public, reciprocally affecting the debates on women's integration and participation and the real official and unofficial conditions of women's service. The mechanisms are interactive; resistance encourages amnesia and amnesia supports resistance. This analysis is consistent with Enloe's contention that the military needs women but needs them to be 'the gender women' and so must create policies to keep them 'feminized' and to stop
them from threatening shrinking male-only spaces (i.e., 'combat'). In the same respect, Jeffords argues that the intellectual and cultural exclusion of women from popular culture presentations of war/militaries acts to exclude them in fact. Beyond that, I suggest that even when women are visible, as in the print media accounts used for this study, intellectual exclusion is still operative in the containment of military women both by military policies and in press portrayals, contributing to public amnesia. Finally, Stiehm argues that women are denied full citizenship in the U.S. because they are prohibited by these policies (based on ahistoric cultural assumptions tenaciously surviving in the face of available evidence) from sharing fully in the state's defining function--the practice of legitimate force.\(^2\) As male-only spaces shrink further, the same mechanisms operate to marginalize women within the agent of the state's defining institution, the military, by excluding them from that institution's defining function, combat. Because the definitions of combat are elastic, resisters have so far been able to perform Enloe's ideological 'acrobatics' necessary to maintain patriarchal privilege, but the very fact that the malleability of the concepts require such intellectual gymnastics increasingly reveals spaces for challenge. Intellectual inconsistencies and ideological acrobatics can further be exposed by politicizing the debate, which has so far been resisted. The imperatives of democratic political philosophy must be brought into the debate and historical evidence must be recovered, analyzed, and deployed in these discussions in order for cultural assumptions to be revealed as ahistoric, irrational, and inconsistent with our defining democratic political philosophy.

This is a valid approach, I find, to opening up the core activity of the military and the state's defining functions to the 'Other' half of the population, and it is only logical and right to do so. And I agree with
Jean Elshtain that the influx of even larger numbers of women will change the military (and perhaps help change the prevailing patriarchal ideology in civilian society) more than the military will change women. Personally, however, I also look toward the day when the state's defining function is not the legitimate practice of force and the military is not the core institution of society, so that no one will have to participate in the military's defining function. In the meantime, as Elshtain posits, making everyone liable encourages the recognition that everyone is responsible. The historical reality is that women have been victims and participants in war; they are not immune from its effects. They should be remembered for having been there and they should continue to be there in less restricted ways. Forgetting, and active resistance to including information about their presence, enables ignorance and supports resistance to their full integration into historical memory and contemporary society. These allow abdication of responsibility and inhibit possibilities for positive change. Memory and recovery of information are necessary for any possibility of the eradications of state sponsored violence and the exclusion of women from male-defined spaces and men from women-defined spaces.

**Background and Outline**

Obviously military theory and history are important to contextualizing the print media's presentations I use to support my analyses. My frame of reference was developed through years of studying and reading classical military theorists like Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine Jomini, as well as more contemporary thinkers like J. Glenn Gray and Geoffrey Best. My education also includes intensive study of more traditional military histories and studies such as those written by John
Keegan and Michael Howard. For this work, I have even more specifically relied on those monographs concerned with the American military and U.S. wars including but not limited to those by the following historians: Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski, Walter Millis, Richard Preston and Sydney Wise, Russell Weigley, and John Shy. Shy pays more attention to social and cultural aspects of wars and militaries, as does Gerald Linderman. Their work and their assistance on this project has been invaluable to development of context.21

Just as military historians are starting to pay more attention to the social aspects of their field, more women's historians, African-Americanists, and those involved in recovering gay history are contributing to an expanded view of military history, developing a more whole and accurate picture of the past. D'Ann Campbell and Linda Grant DePauw have been at the leading edge of this effort. In addition, among others, Mattie Treadwell, Jeanne Holm and June Willenz have contributed to the recovery of the history of American military women. The integration of blacks in the U.S. military is treated by Allan M. Winkler and Richard M. Dalfiume, and at length by Morris MacGregor. Alan Berube, Randy Shilts, and Mary Ann Humphrey have published important works on homosexuals in the military.

A rapidly expanding body of material, extremely important to my research, is the oral histories and autobiographies/biographies of women in the military and in war. These include, especially, the works of Shelley Saywell, Keith Walker, Linda Van DeVanter, and Charity Adams Early. Researchers have recently shown much more interest in the recovery of women's war stories and more military women themselves have been inspired to tell their stories. As well, a number of personal narratives from women who served in WWII have recently been published. Biographies
of several women war correspondents and photographers with their unique perspective, including Dickie Chapell and Marguerite Higgins, have been especially useful. To a greater or lesser extent, these works explore the history of women and the American military before the starting point of this study. This information is important as the groundwork for looking into the expansion and regularization of women's service in World War II.

This study begins with 1940, but women's service with the military has a long evolution. In the Revolutionary War, legendary figures such as Molly Pitcher symbolized the tradition of American women actively participating in conflict. While some women served in support and medical capacities, others masqueraded as male soldiers in the Regular Army and with the militia. In addition, the number of women who served as irregular fighters can not begin to be estimated. Although until recently women were given little credit for their contributions to the Revolutionary War, more and more research shows that women were essential to the war effort.22

The crisis nature of the Revolution, as well as that war's conflation of the homefront and battleground, encouraged and demanded women's involvement from a pragmatic standpoint. Pragmatism also dictated that Euro-American women routinely defend their homes and families as they participated in the colonization of the West. Women's Revolutionary War experience was largely replicated during the Civil War. More than generally imagined, they served as soldiers, scouts, spies and saboteurs. Thousands more organized relief associations to support Union and Confederate forces, but most significant to this first industrialized war was women's contribution in the medical sphere. Although female nurses were not always graciously welcomed, medical personnel shortages dictated that the military surrender to women's demands for participation.23 The
Secretary of War appointed Dorothea Lynde Dix as Superintendent of Women Nurses for the Union Army in April, 1861. Doctor Mary Walker was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Union Medical Corps and received the Congressional Medal of Honor. On the Confederate side, Jefferson Davis commissioned Sally Louisa Tompkins as a doctor. Women's contributions came to be sought after and appreciated, but when the war ended the nurses and female physicians were dismissed. Recognition and benefits had increased only slightly.\(^4\)

The Spanish American War provided another opportunity for women to contribute to the U.S. military in a medical capacity. Because of the high demand for nurses to respond to a typhoid epidemic, the surgeon general appointed Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee as superintendent of over fifteen hundred civilian contract nurses. They served in the United States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, China, and Japan, and on the hospital ship Relief from 1898 to 1901. More than a dozen died from typhoid. The outstanding performance of the nurses and the support of the surgeon general, combined with the Army's desire to exercise greater control in the medical arena, prompted Congress to establish the Army Nurse Corps in 1901. Some doubted the appropriateness of this measure, but testimony from those who had served with the nurses in the war effectively countered the objections.\(^5\) The Navy followed suit, founding its Nurse Corps in 1908. Neither Navy nor Army nurses were officially part of the military so they served without rank and did not receive equal pay or veteran's benefits; female doctors could not serve at all.\(^6\) Although women's formal military status remained ambiguous, the military began to change policies based on these precedents, which further altered public perceptions of appropriate military roles for American women.
Women's contributions to the medical services continued in the First World War with 21,500 Army and 1,400 Navy nurses, many of whom were decorated for valor and devotion to duty. Approximately 10,000 served overseas and almost 300 died during the war, primarily from disease. Others were wounded and some were even taken prisoner. In return for their dedicated service, General Pershing and most of the military surgeons supported nurses being given "relative rank." This policy was formalized in 1920. As a result, female nurses could earn and wear officer rank, but did not have the pay, rights, and privileges that accompanied it. This may have constituted a slight increase in prestige, but no substantive change in status.

Outside the medical profession manpower was even more critical. World War I's industrialized warfare, combined with a doctrine that emphasized the offensive, demanded combat personnel. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, anticipated a shortage of combat sailors and decided to enlist women as skilled clerical personnel to free men for sea duty. By the end of the war there were 11,275 "Yeomen (F)" in the Naval Reserve Forces. In addition, about 300 women enlisted as "Marine Reservists (F)" and a few joined the Coast Guard. While most filled clerical and administrative positions, some served as draftsmen, recruiters, camouflage designers, translators, and messengers. While the Marine women were treated the same as their male counterparts in matters of government insurance, compensation, bonuses, medical treatment, and burial rights in Arlington National Cemetery, the female Yeomen received no such benefits. All the women were discharged after the war.

In contrast to the other services, which employed women as enlisted personnel, the World War I Army Secretary and General Staff did not want women even in civilian status. June Willenz, in *Women Veterans*, contends
that this was partly a reflection of the attitude of Secretary of War Newton Baker and partly a result of the law governing Army personnel, which, unlike the Navy's, specifically referred to "male" enlistees. Despite resistance from the War Department, demands from military leaders in the field for women workers prevailed. Pershing requested and received civilian, French-speaking, American women for his Signal Corps. They served near the frontlines under combat conditions but did not receive veteran's status until 1977 under Public Law 95-202. These women were joined by five thousand others doing volunteer work in Europe. But, at war's end, the women were once again demobilized. In spite of World War I's demonstration that future war would require the mobilization of mass armies and vast support infrastructures, and that there would not be enough men to accomplish everything, very little was done in the interwar years to integrate women into the military. Nevertheless, Edith Nourse Rogers' legislative attempts to obtain benefits for the Yeomen (F), and women's significant advances in aviation during these two decades, had a major impact on their participation in the next war.

On the legislative front, the War Department had earlier effectively killed measures introduced to form a women's corps for the Army. But in 1920, the Secretary of War appointed Anita Phipps as Director of Women's Relations for the War Department, to "counter a trend among women toward pacifism." Subsequently, in 1925, the Army appointed Major Martin Hughes to study the formation of a women's corps in case of another emergency. Frustrated by her ambiguous position, Phipps resigned in 1930 but left a plan to form such a corps. Hughes outlined a plan as well. Typically, both plans were ignored until after the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) was already in existence and had already experienced some of the difficulties reviewing these plans might have prevented.27 It was not
until the late 1940s that real progress was made to regularize women's service and make them an official part of the military.

In any case, the approach to World War II signalled the resurgence of the never ending debate over appropriate roles for women in society, the labor market, politics, war, and the military. Resistance to widening women's roles in all these areas was vehement, but among the most volatile and instructive debates were those on the expansion of women's roles in the military.

Beginning with the WWII era, the following chapters are divided chronologically, with contextual material in U.S., military, and women's history supplementing reviews of relevant materials in the Times and other sources. The first period, 1940-1945, reflects increasing interest in women's participation in the military just prior to and during U.S. involvement in World War II. More American women participated in the military in World War II than in any other conflict. This period was marked by congressional and military initiatives to allow the services to use women primarily as a replacement for much needed combat personnel. From 1946 to 1964, the American public had to deal with rapid demobilization, the reorganization of the defense establishment around new foreign policies ('Containment' and 'Massive Retaliation'), and the advent of new weapons and equipment (nuclear explosives and space vehicles) and their implications for diplomacy and warfare. In the midst of these developments at home, the armed forces and public were faced with military action in the Korean conflict, which resulted in a remobilization of women. By 1964 defense policy had shifted to 'Flexible Response,' and the escalation of military involvement in Vietnam was beginning to make itself felt among the services and society. During this period, women did not
play a large role outside the medical sphere, constituting only a token
presence among line personnel (less than two percent of total personnel).
With 1973 came U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the establishment of the
All-Volunteer Force. Both had significant impact on personnel issues in
general and gender issues in particular. As the numbers of women in the
services was increased to make up for the lack of qualified male
volunteers, the debates began to center around women's opportunities on
ships and in missile silos, flying, attending the service academies, and
participating in combat, among other issues. I conclude with a brief
overview of the operations of historical amnesia about women's
participation and integration in the military and past and current
debates.
Notes to Chapter 1

1. Margaret Chase Smith, *Congressional Record: Hearings on H.R.5915*, 9 May 1946, pp.3334-35. Smith, irate with the House Military Affairs Committee which was trying to restrict women to reserve status, told them to either integrate women fully and give them the benefits and stability of regular status or not to include them at all.


3. The bibliography to this study shows that there is an extensive (if not extensive enough) amount of secondary work available both recovering the history of military women and analyzing the meanings of their participation in war and the armed services. The notes to the text show only a small part of the information available on military women and the debates surrounding their service that popular media provided to the public.


5. Ibid., pp.154-158.


7. On the integration of blacks see MacGregor and others. For discussions of gay service personnel see Berube, Shilts, and Humphrey. Also, almost all works on military women deal at least peripherally with the issue of lesbianism and see Enloe, *Khaki*, pp.146-150.

8. This is not to suggest that there were not white military men who not only believed in, but also advocated, social equality for some or all of the marginalized groups discussed here. Working with men-of-color or women also converted some who were initially opposed to racial or gender integration as shown in my evidence for this study.


11. Other than popular culture sources whose titles specifically applied to servicewomen, I may not have been familiar with some that presented images of servicewomen. A study of film and television portrayals of military women, especially in works where they were not a primary character, might usefully illuminate the arguments made here.

12. To name just a few whose work in literary criticism or writings about war indirectly informs my thinking: Antonia Fraser, Linda Faderman, Joan Didion, Doris Lessing, Sherrie Tepper, Marge Piercy, Ursula LeGuin, Virginia Wolfe, Susan Griffin, Lynne Hanley, and Vera Brittain. The works
of Paul Fussell and Lynne Hanley explore war's cultural influences. In addition, science fiction is commonly advertised as a field where possibilities for gender role alterations are more available; however astute observers, including Cynthia Wright ("Sexism in the Military: Reality Echoed in Haldeman's Forever War and Herbert's God Emperor of Dune", Minerva, Fall, 1990, pp.16-27), have posited that male science fiction writers may approach those possibilities but almost always end by reinscribing traditionally gendered social structures.

13. Andrea L. Press, Women Watching Television: Gender, Class, and Generation in the American Television Experience, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991). I would add that when we have to articulate these views, we sometimes find them indefensible.

14. See Brian Mitchell for arguments that the women's movement and weak military and government leadership bowed to feminist pressure and 'feminized' the military, thereby rendering it ineffective.

15. Jeffords analyses the work of Michael Herr, but again Brian Mitchell's analysis of the problems of the modern American military relate as well.

16. American experiences in Grenada, Panama, and DESERT STORM in the 1980s and 1990s reveal that the categories "combat" and "warrior" continue to be challenged. In these cases women were not protected from harm by men, women did perform effectively, and they survived captivity by the enemy without significant public calls for ending the war/action on their behalf or for removing all women from the military or even forward units. At the same time, media representations of military women in these events neglected to mention that none of this was new. As this study shows, women had faced and endured the same since before 1940. The presentations implying women's proximity to war as a new development demonstrates the extent of the public's historical amnesia and how successful containment of the debates on military women has been. Myths of war as a male-only space and women's absence from war's arena still are confronted in the 1990s.

17. Jeffords. Judith Hicks Stiehm, "Book Review," Signs, Summer 1992, pp.825-829. Jeffords also uses Nancy Hartsock's work on the warrior-hero role in the formation of the polis of taming and subordinating forces that threaten the political community--female forces. Females must be excluded from the masculine community creating dualities of male/female, body/mind, domestic/public. Hartsock's work shows the "complex institutionalization of the exclusion of women" and is therefore important to any work on other male institutions that seek to exclude women.


Cold War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). This last has chapters on "Constructing the American Woman Soldier" and "Histories of Militarized Masculinity" as well as discussions of female fighter pilots and the images of Steve Canyon and Rambo. All are valuable to these discourses. The significance of the works of Catherine MacKinnon in feminist legal and political theory can not be ignored in any study of the state and its institutions. I have not gone into detail in this work, but her writing has definitely, if not specifically, influenced my perspectives.

20. Judith Hicks Stiehm, Bring Me Men and Women: Mandated Change at the U.S. Air Force Academy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). Arlene Kaplan Daniels, "Review," Signs, Autumn 1993, pp.285-288. Stiehm's work on the Academy has been criticized for technical and semantic inaccuracies which damaged her credibility among military professionals. Focusing on these minor details has allowed detractors to ignore her very important research and conclusions. Her work maintains its importance particularly because of the breadth of her contextualizing within feminist theory, military history and theory, psychological and sociological theory, and government and popular sources. Her bibliographies are excellent guides to some of the most significant works that inform studies of war/militaries and gender and the operations of cultural assumptions.


27. Ibid., p.15, p.17, p.18.
SECTION II

WORLD WAR II, 1940-1945
CHAPTER 2
THE MOBILIZATION DEBATE, 1940-1942

With the heritage of women's participation in various capacities in all previous American wars, it seems odd that gender ideology might keep women out of the military services in World War II. In the end it did not--pragmatism won out. Still, it is surprising that a debate even occurred, and that there was, in some quarters, vehement opposition to women's mobilization. However, even today, many educated, informed Americans do not realize or acknowledge that women were part of the U.S. military before the invasion of Panama. The fact that women continue to have to fight for recognition that they are an essential part of the military should indicate that historical precedent in the evolution of gender roles is not sufficient to insure informed discussion. Many readers will experience a sense of familiarity with the terms of the 1940s debate. In fact, in the 1940s a conceptual leap was required for some people to view women as soldiers or professional military personnel rather than simply as volunteers in a community service role to be utilized by the state and military without recompense, or as factory workers who many people still assumed were single or lower-class women whose femininity was either not perceived to be threatened by heavy industrial labor or who were not of concern to the larger society.

Resistance to accepting women as an official part of the military prior to and during World War II centered on three arguments: (1) women would not be able to perform adequately, physically or emotionally, and
would thereby damage military effectiveness; (2) women's participation would destroy the American home and, by extension, our culture; and (3) women's participation would destroy their femininity and again, our culture. Many believed that American servicemen were fighting specifically to preserve home and civilization and the feminine marvels that apparently symbolized these. Accepting women into the military would defeat the purpose of male sacrifices in battle. In this view, it would not matter whether the Allies won the war if we destroyed our society in the process.

All of these concerns were countered in the 1940s popular press and periodicals by politicians and military leaders asserting that women could perform in the military as demonstrated in World War I without adverse effects. But although the press further discredited popular resistance by showing women in industry, in foreign fighting units, and in harm's way (including U.S. military nurses at Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and in other dangerous situations), this portrayal was often undermined by the depiction of these women as simply protecting their American homes, whether assigned in Europe or New Guinea. Countering the prediction that the American family and culture would be destroyed, the point was repeatedly made that almost all of these women could not wait to return home to their families or to start a family. Finally, femininity was constantly shown to be alive and well in descriptions of military women reassuringly fretting about their looks and dating. The press presented military women as serving in order to counter the Nazi threat that could destroy American womanhood, and recognized their service to be a temporary and distasteful, but necessary, sacrifice. The feminized military role as it was portrayed in popular periodicals remained non-threatening to dominant gender ideology, and implied that military women might possibly
return from war as more womanly, more understanding companions to their veteran husbands—and thus improved 'Republican Mothers.'

The debate on women becoming officially militarized from 1940-1945 actually had many facets. It opened on the question of whether women should be allowed a role beyond nursing. This debate was seemingly resolved with the establishment of the Women's Auxiliary versus Army Corps in May 1942, and was followed by further debates concerning women in the other services. These were resolved with the establishment of the Navy WAVES (Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service), SPARS (from Semper Paratus, the Coast Guard Motto—Always Prepared), and Women's Marine Reserve.

One contentious issue, once Congress decided women would participate in an official military capacity, was whether women would be with or in the military. The WAACS were an adjunct to the Army and the question soon arose, since the WAVES were integral to the Navy, shouldn't all military women be in their respective service? An affirmative answer led to the WAAC being changed to the Women's Army Corps (WAC) in 1943. Whether an adjunct or an integral part, all the women's services were officially temporary, Reserve organizations. Other issues to be resolved in the wartime debates on military women included whether women could have and be compensated for dependents on the same basis as their male counterparts; whether they could be married and if so, whether they could marry a military man; and whether pregnant women would be released from service.

While line women's status was debated, women pilots, noting that British women, and some Americans, could fly for the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA), asked why American women could not fly with the Army Air Corps (AAC). The compromise was reached, that women could be hired as civilian pilots with the Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS) and
the Women's Airforce Service Pilots (WASP) but could not serve as military pilots. The prohibition on women flying as part of the military would not change until the 1970s, and World War II female fliers would not receive veterans recognition and benefits until 1979.

Finally, as other women were militarized, the existing Army and Navy nurse corps sought recognition that they were a real part of the military and should have equal pay and real, rather than "relative", rank. Whereas there had been a place for nurses since the turn of the century, female doctors did not have a place in the armed forces. During the war, physicians sought to enroll in the military as medical professionals rather than as WACs or as civilian contract doctors.

Two other aspects of the debate during World War II were important: racial issues and conscription. The Navy and the nursing corps were slow to accept black women; in the latter they were allowed only to minister to black servicemen, and in the Army black women were generally segregated. They were widely thought to have been included primarily to act as social outlets for black servicemen overseas. The services and public demonstrated similar uncertainty as to the intended or appropriate use of Native American women and women of Japanese descent. In fact, in their cases the press disproportionately praised these women for their contributions. The latter's service admittedly carried with it high propaganda value. The discussion of whether women should be drafted for military service came to the fore, especially for nurses, during the womanpower shortages of 1944 and early 1945, and will be discussed in a later chapter.

Throughout the early 1940s the media's depiction of the debate was somewhat sympathetic to the proponents of women in the military. But although photographs showed women marching, articles emphasized how cute
the "girls" looked in their miniature uniforms as they tried to imitate men. Their participation was trivialized by sarcasm and emphasis on physical descriptions, underwear, cosmetics, and dating practices, as well as military fraternization policies. The initial perception that women who joined the military must not have been quite 'women' seemed to change as they demonstrated their earnestness. Not only the press, but military leaders and enlisted men, were converted to the idea that women had become a necessary part of the military and were making important contributions to the war effort. The behavior and attitudes of the leaders of the women's services seemed to help sway the press and public. Men who actually served with military women were the most accepting, although the question remained whether the converts changed their minds because their previous fears had been conquered (i.e., women could perform and their femininity was not destroyed), or because they recognized that the war required this additional source of temporary 'manpower'. Regardless of the reason for or sincerity behind the acceptance of women in military roles, their inclusion at this juncture was undoubtedly hastened by the general conviction that, even without training, most women could perform some jobs better than most men, and that those chores must therefore be unmanly anyway. As the crisis became more acute, there was an increasing awareness of the dire circumstances endured in the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, and of women's contribution to those nations' survival. The newspapers and periodicals treated female military personnel and 'fighters' more seriously starting in 1943. The public read of European and Asian women, with Allied and enemy forces--in military units and in resistance organizations--using arms and facing danger. Undoubtedly, press depictions of them had an effect on the debate in the United States.
Ironically, in the later war years, sentiment intensified to the point that women who did not join the military were considered selfish and were berated for prolonging the war. This dramatic shift was further evidenced by the fact that those who questioned military women's morals, an activity that had previously provided great sport, were accused of being Nazi propaganda agents who were destroying the military's ability to recruit women and thereby damaging the war effort. Men who did not want their wives, girlfriends, and sisters to join were told they had old-fashioned ideas that hurt the war effort. Men were promised that gender roles would return to normal after the war; that this mobilization of women was only a temporary measure; and that American womanhood would not be ruined, but rather improved, by this experience. It is interesting to note that these attitudes originated in the same gender ideology that previously presented integrating women into the military as a frivolous experiment. Future debates would also characterize many progressive social and political measures as 'experiments' in a pejorative sense.

Finally, among the most interesting aspects of the debate were the concerns about military women serving in combat or even being placed at risk (e.g., WAVES were not allowed to be assigned overseas during the war). Although no one in the early 1940s had proposed sending women into combat, the media reflected no particular reluctance or surprise at the prospect of presenting foreign women, American nurses, and even some U.S. military women 'in harm's way'; this was another step weakening gender ideology but only slightly. These women, by all accounts, were brave, did their duty, and did not fall apart emotionally. Some of them even died. No public outcry based on the gender of the casualties was evidenced. Still, not many in the 1930s would have guessed that American women would die overseas in war but a decade later.
In the late 1930s the economy began to improve and the Depression seemed to be over for many Americans. Workers, who had begun to feel some relief as a result of the New Deal programs, were returning to work by the thousands as industry retooled, first to support the Allied war effort and later to supply our own. As the number of available jobs increased, the numbers of white women and black men and women in the labor force increased as well. Their role would expand even more as large numbers of white men were called to arms in the 1940s.

The United States only slowly emerged from its post-World War I isolationism. Even though the 1934 Vinson-Trammell Act authorized rebuilding a fleet for coastal defense, passage of the 1937 Neutrality Act indicated U.S. intent to avoid being embroiled in another European conflict. Congress was forced to reevaluate this position the very next year when Franklin Roosevelt called for rearmament "in a world of high tension and disorder."\(^1\) When general war broke out in September 1939, Roosevelt announced a "limited national emergency" that entailed a small increase in troop strength and "moral" and industrial support to France and Britain.\(^2\) The debate between isolationists and interventionists raged even as the U.S. began to mobilize industry and build its military forces. After the invasion of France in May 1940, fewer questioned the need for at least a well-armed defensive force and increased support to Britain. Despite continued ambivalence, most Americans anticipated that the United States would be brought into the war sooner or later, one way or another. America's first peacetime draft, approved by the signing of the Selective Service Act in September 1940, showed an "increasing public awareness that geographical isolation was no longer a secure defense."\(^3\)
In January 1941, it was apparent that "cash and carry" neutrality was not enough for the American people as they watched the Battle of Britain with horror and sympathy. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act (H.R. 1776) in March and the United States was virtually at war in the Atlantic by June.\textsuperscript{4} By the summer of 1941, 1.2 million men had been called to active duty with the military. By the end of the war, 12,000,000 men would be serving, along with 266,000 women; and 7,000,000 new workers, including black men, women, and retirees would be supporting new war industries and filling jobs vacated by soldiers and sailors.\textsuperscript{5}

American women reacted to the domestic and international situations in various ways. Single women of the lower- and middle-classes continued to work to help support themselves and their families. Younger upper-class women continued to pursue higher education, though their studies were meant to prepare them for 'Republican Motherhood,' defined as those professional housewives who could economically and efficiently manage their homes and train their children for citizenship; interesting and erudite spouses who could nurture their husbands and engage in meaningful conversation; and unselfish community service volunteers who would lift the unfortunate from their condition and so improve the nation. Not surprisingly, the American public believed these tasks would be enough for women to help see the country through any emergency.

Large numbers of married women continued to work outside the home despite great prejudice against them for doing so during the Depression. White and black women from the lower-classes worked on farms, in their homes, in other people's homes, and in manufacturing. Blacks were usually concentrated in the lowest paying jobs in positions defined by gender as womanly work. These women worked of necessity, as their husbands were either out of work or did not make a family wage.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, some
middle-class women worked in the service sector and in the professions. In fact, the service sector expanded dramatically in the 1930s and 1940s. These middle-class jobs had also been defended as necessary during the Depression but for many reasons their numbers did not decline with economic recovery. Upper-class women obviously could not defend outside wage labor as an economic necessity and there was a relative decline in their numbers in academia and other professions in the late 1930s. Many applied a great deal of energy toward voluntary and club activities, however.

Opportunities for women to work, and to work in higher paying jobs, continued to increase as industry expanded and more men entered the military. This did not, however, constitute a fundamental change in gender roles, but simply a redefinition of certain jobs, often temporarily, as womanly. Another method of maintaining consistent gender ideology while at the same time expanding women's participation in public life was simply to encourage or allow a woman to take a man's job as a temporary emergency measure. This approach allowed the public to continue to construe a woman's activity as womanly since it was predefined as sacrificial and supportive of the larger family, i.e., society.7

Unselfish sacrifice has commonly been appropriated as a womanly attribute (of course, so has selfishness when ideologically expedient). As war approached, increasingly many middle- and upper-middle-class women had the time and economic means to be involved in voluntary associations and society clubs. News of their endeavors filled the women's pages of newspapers and popular women's periodicals. Their activities covered a broad range of community service, including military preparedness. Not only did these women politically support U.S. aid to the Allies and funding for War Department expansions, they also joined volunteer air-raid
warning units, fire fighting brigades, and ambulance and hospital groups. These women pushed the limits of gender ideology, and significantly, they most frequently adopted uniforms. The American news-reading public had the opportunity to see photographs of them almost daily in quasi-military attire.

Many "society ladies" in patriotic and preparedness organizations appear to have been itching to get out of the house, put on a uniform, and do something more exciting than managing the children and household staff. The pages of the New York Times, in particular, are filled with their activities. The Molly Pitcher Brigade, Inc., began to train women to assist in national defense. Training included marksmanship, ambulance driving, air raid safety, and first aid. The Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) called upon members to be ready for "total defense" of their communities in the coming "total war." Daughters of the Defenders of the Republic went even further when they began weekly military drills for first aid and ambulance training. Their leader, Amanda Shaw Hirch, pointed out that many members had served in World War I and explained that even for women "the object of military training...is physical fitness and discipline." The Women Defense Cadets of America of the American Women's Association also drilled weekly under an Army officer's supervision. They emphasized exercise, first aid, mechanics, and heavy driving. A selling feature for membership--they would wear khaki, army style uniforms. The United States Women's Defense Corps, organized in July 1940, boasted three thousand initial members. Other articles and photographs in the Times feature "uniformed young women" in drivers training, marching, and shooting, also under the direction of Army officers. The Army even provided the arms and ammunition for training. Women also trained to take up the armed defense of the nation in other
arenas. Eighty-five year old Matilda Fornberg, while competing in a rifle meet, told reporters, "in these wartimes it would be well for all women to become crack shots." The Green Guards, while training members in shooting, marching, driving, and air raid service, were taking "steps through friends in congressional circles to have the corps recognized officially by the government" like the Yeomen (F) and British women's auxiliaries.

Many other women's organizations advocated the registration of women volunteers for emergency services. Both the National Federation of Business and Professional Women (NFBPW) and the American Association of University Women (AAUW) claimed to be "good soldiers...[awaiting] their orders" from the War Plans Division of the War Department when they asked their members to register and be prepared, since the military was considering women's participation in national defense. Col. Julius Ochs Adler (Retired), civilian aide to Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, told women their registration might be ordered and they might be drafted for emergency defensive service. Mrs. Pickney Estes Glantsberg responded, "Personally I have always wanted to be a soldier." The American public did not seem to object to the idea that in "total war," women should be drafted because they shared a responsibility to defend their nation. It seemed questionable whether gender ideology would act to restrict women's participation at all. Gallup Poll respondents claimed that the phrase "women's place is in the home," "sounds too much like Hitler."

The public not only saw American women in civil defense uniforms and performing non-traditional tasks, but was increasingly exposed to photographs and stories of both Allied and Axis women working in heavy industry, volunteer defense services, and in conscripted or voluntary military and resistance organizations. Many of these women were shown in
uniform and, more importantly, identified as being in danger. As the conflict heated up, the American reading public saw more and more of these women in their newspapers and periodicals. But was the public ready for women in uniform, on active duty in the U.S. military, serving overseas in combat areas, or being drafted? Part of this very debate had taken place between 1918 and 1939 and the answer in the legislature thus far had been a resounding "no". But the debate was starting to boil again.

Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, who had served as a nurses' assistant in World War I, attempted to obtain recognition and benefits for the Yeomen (F), and continued to lobby to bring women back to active duty with the military. Rogers believed future emergencies would require women's military services and she wanted to ensure they were trained in advance and would be justly compensated and recognized for their contributions. As this debate waxed and waned the American public saw foreign women in military and resistance organizations on the pages of the Times almost daily.

With all the uniformed American women in civilian defense organizations, working in defense industry jobs considered womanly only in a sacrificial sense, foreign women wearing uniforms and even carrying arms, and with the World War I Yeomen (F) experience and even earlier military nursing corps experiences, again, it would seem strange that gender ideology might keep women out of the services. To many, it seemed the time for women's full participation had come.

As previously stated, the idea of having women in the armed forces had been proposed earlier in Congress and within the military itself, but all previous plans had been shelved or delayed for various reasons. Edith Rogers continued to fight for benefits for the Yeomen (F) and "Marinettes," and proposed several plans to enlist women in preparation
for another war and to prevent similarly unjust treatment of women (lack of pay and benefit equity) in the future.

There was very little coverage of these policy issues in the newspapers or popular periodicals of 1940 and 1941, although readers did get a daily view of what foreign women were doing, both inside and outside their militaries. In the Times, an article outlined the history of military women; another article compared the American and British experiences. The historical piece included Greek women fighting the Italians and Chinese women fighting the Japanese. It recounted the exploits of Herodotus' Amazons of Asia Minor, women warriors of the Middle-Ages, wives of Mohammed and Genghis Kahn, Queen Matilda, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon's Revolutionary Women's Battalion. The reporter emphasized that American women had a long tradition of fighting, from Molly Pitcher and Margaret Corbin in colonial and revolutionary times, through the Civil War with Loreta Velasques, to the Spanish-American War and World War I.\(^\text{17}\) Readers also learned that a women's defense group in Hartford, Connecticut were questioning why women were being left out of the current war preparations, believing, "American women should receive the same opportunity as English women to aid their country."\(^\text{18}\)

The policy debate was revived in October 1941, when the Times reported on its front page that Gen. Emmons had asked the government to enlist twenty-five thousand women for air raid defense work. He said they should be promised commissions, equitable pay, and attractive uniforms. He added that the AAC should use the British example of enlisting the women in the Army to facilitate maintaining discipline that was less easily maintained in a civilian work force.\(^\text{19}\) A Times editorial two days later agreed that the military should enlist women. The editors explained, however, that they hoped the women's uniforms would be very
attractive for morale reasons and in order to assist them in getting dates.\textsuperscript{20} Even with the positive aspects of Gen. Emmons's and the editor's remarks, the emphasis on the attractiveness of the uniforms and its promotion of successful dating was demeaning. In addition to inappropriate emphasis on femininity in relation to appearance and dates, some articles also questioned the women's competence. The New Yorker took a sarcastic tack in describing a Long Island defense club's rifle team as "middle-aged Annie Oakleys," who were "in danger of shooting friendlies."\textsuperscript{21}

Not surprisingly, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and official American entry into the war, the War Department seemed to lead the way toward utilization of women when Secretary Stimson gave his support to the bill reintroduced by Rep. Rogers to the House Military Affairs Committee which would organize a corps, like the "British Women's Auxiliary Army Corps," of volunteers aged 21-45. If the bill passed, women would be given 'non-combat' duties, be officered by other women, and receive military housing (barracks) and training. Stimson pointed out that the British experience and the U.S.'s own World War I experience were proof that women could perform better than men in some areas, would release those men for combat, and would give the military more control than it had over women's volunteer civil defense efforts.\textsuperscript{22} This legislation then, contrary to what some contemporary opponents of women in the military argued, came as a result of military need and pragmatism rather than a feminist campaign for equality of opportunity as one of the defining institutions of American citizenship. This pragmatic approach by the military towards women would continue to drive efforts towards their utilization in the future.
In any case, the push to militarize American women was on, and the press clamored to cover it. Just one day's articles, for 30 December 1941, in the *Times*, gives an idea of the saturation: "Stimson Approves Women for Army: Favors Creation of a Voluntary Auxiliary Corps to Take Over Many Rear Area Line Duties"; "Secretary Backs Mrs. Rogers on Bill to Have Paid Units, to Start at $21 a Month" (AP); "New Bill Provides for Women's Army: Mrs. Rogers Drafts Measure to Organize a Corps Such as the British WAAC"; "Non-combatant Duties Could be Given to Group Living in Barracks and Training" (UP).

While policy debate continued during the early part of 1942, women were trying to enlist even before the Rogers Bill was passed. Anticipating resistance, they wrote letters to Washington reflecting their desire to serve; one woman wrote, "I only sincerely hope you can make the men see it our way." Their letters included foreign and historical examples as proof of women's competence, arguing for example "If there is any doubt about our ability, look at what women are doing in England and Russia." In addition to this support, the *Times* also reported that Mrs. Roosevelt "indirectly endorsed" the measure.

*Time* magazine began reporting on the debate in January 1942, with a rather objective article, "She-Soldiers," indicating that Rogers was receiving many letters from women who wanted to join the not-yet-existent corps. The only negative responses came from women over 45 upset that the age limit was set so low. The report stated authoritatively that "U.S. women will soon be in the war as professional soldiers," since the Rogers Bill had War Department approval. Women would not serve in combat or carry guns but they would receive military uniforms and pay and be subject to military discipline.
Newsweek, not as optimistic, reported that even though Secretary Stimson supported the Rogers Bill, a fight was expected in Congress. This article agreed with Rogers' claim that many women backed the bill, but certainly made them appear aggressive such as, "Let the men slackers stay home and knit sweaters for us--we look better in them anyway." The report reminded readers that in WWI, 11,000 Yeomen (F) and 269 "Marinettes" had served. Military women could see duty abroad if the bill passed, but Newsweek believed only nurses would be at the front. The need to free men for combat and for the military to have more control over women's civil defense groups were once again primary issues. The Military Affairs Committee opponents claimed that because "women have enough to do now," the Rogers Bill could wait; more important legislation needed attention, and other women's groups and military men opposed the proposition. The latter in particular did not embrace the idea of co-ed services. It was proper to have nurses and clerks helping outside the military, but not in it. They criticized the veteran Yeomen (F) for wanting to stay in the Navy after the First World War, for wearing their uniforms, marching around, and generally behaving conspicuously. In a surprise conclusion, Newsweek reported that, contrary to what might have been expected given the Navy women's excellent record in the previous war, the Navy was especially leery of the Rogers Bill because of that very experience, and as a result, believed women in civil service were quite enough help.26

In contrast, a Washington D.C. Times correspondent, Nona Baldwin, reported that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, in an address to the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense, said that "In today's total war women play a larger part than in any previous conflict in history--in civil defense, in the Red Cross...and possibly even in active war duty."27 It also soon became apparent that it was not just the
civilian secretaries of the services who favored the Rogers Bill. The Associated Press (AP) reported that the Army leaders had told Congress they were using women volunteers at present but it would be much more efficient to officially utilize these women in the military. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary Stimson both told Congress they supported the bill. When the House Military Affairs Committee asked about "peril", the leaders told them that these women would be in no more danger than "other civilians." They did understand that civilians might be in danger if Axis powers could mass an assault across the seas. They emphasized, though, that they were not advocating "Amazon divisions" for combat. Lt.Col. Swift of the General Staff testified, "We have got a job to do; we will do it better if we use women." The AP report encouragingly added that Rogers had not received a negative letter about the bill since its May 1941 introduction.28

In January 1942, Times reporting on the progress of the bill was a daily occurrence. Readers learned that women were not averse to hard work, scorned glamorous jobs, and were eager to serve in the military in order to free men for combat. Reports included numerous reminders of World War I lessons and British examples. Washington reporters Winifred Mallon and Baldwin predicted that Congress would take favorable action quickly. The latter insightfully pointed out that many women were as patriotic as men but could not afford to do civil defense work on a voluntary basis because pay was essential to supporting themselves or their families; it was an error to assume that upper-class women were more patriotic than lower- or middle-class women. A paid women's corps would give the others a chance to make contributions. Secretary Stimson believed their service would be significant. "There are a great many
types of duty for which women are better fitted than men..." he claimed.  

Congressional debate continued into February 1942, when Alabama's Senator Hill introduced a companion measure. According to United Press (UP) reports, the Senate's bill protected women volunteers with government pay and benefits, and provided the military an additional manpower pool. The Senate committee approved the bill, as it was, unanimously, despite opposition objections that there should be a cap on the numbers of women allowed in the Auxiliary. Meanwhile, women continued to besiege Rogers with letters asking to join the Army immediately. Some even volunteered to do so without pay.  

With all this predominantly positive media coverage, some must have been surprised that things were not going smoothly in the House. Illinois Representative Sabbath, Chairman of the Rules Committee, said the majority there were "skeptical" in spite of approval by the War Department and the House Military Affairs Committee. Rep. Nichols of Oklahoma remarked that using women the way the military had in World War I, or in a civilian or voluntary capacity, "allowed for less protection of women than game laws" did wild animals, insisting that militarizing women would increase their protection, give lower-income women a chance to contribute, and ensure the military manpower and control. Gen. Marshall moved the bill along by claiming security was "imperiled by delay" in Congress. The day after his public comment, the Rules Committee released the Rogers Bill to the full House.  

The public joined the debate as congressional wranglings made headlines. Ann Johnson, flight commander of a women's unit of the Georgia Civil Air Patrol (CAP), wanted "equality with men in non-combatant military service." She suggested drafting women for flying service and
emphasized again that some women did not have the financial wherewithal to volunteer for unpaid war service. Interestingly, she emphasized that the women she knew who wanted to serve were completely "normal" office clerks, salesgirls, stenographers, lawyers, and even mothers. In addition to support for militarizing women, there was also the inevitable backlash against servicewomen as well. Susan Sheridan contributed an article to the Times which criticized women who felt they were not helping the war effort if they were not "trotting around in a uniform." She suggested that women were not out of the picture as civilians and offered tips on how to help the cause at home, like doing volunteer work and conserving war materials.

Those who wanted to "trot" around in uniform were still writing to Mrs. Rogers in March, however, and the debate on the House floor was in full swing. Rogers heard from women in forty-six states, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia saying they wanted to extend their "gratitude for a chance to serve the nation on an equal basis with men." She read these letters to the House and predicted women would stampede recruiting offices when the bill was approved. The debate continued with consideration of pension and other benefits for women. Rep. Nichols, one of the bill's most ardent supporters, argued that if women were subject to the same military discipline (the Articles of War, but not courts martial) and were liable to serve overseas, they deserved the same benefits as men.

These women, after the war is over, will be given the same rights and privileges as the soldiers by whose side they served...I am not willing to draw a hairline distinction between active and inactive service in such narrow line as that. If you are going to take these women and put them by the side of the men,...they are entitled,...to every benefit and every protection that a man is entitled to.

Rep. Fish of New York added that enlisting women was "part of an all-out war" and even the previously recalcitrant Rep. Sabbath added, "Women...are
desirous of serving the nation and will give service of great value to the Army."37

To present balance, the Times showed readers the opposition's arguments as well. Michigan Republican Clare Hoffman claimed that women really wanted to stay home and cook and said that "If we could get a secret vote...members of the House would turn the bill down...." (Reporter Nona Baldwin injected an editorial note questioning whether Hoffman would also send women away from defense industries). Andrew Somers of New York called the WAAC Bill "the silliest piece of legislation" ever, and West Virginia Rep. Randolph said women serving in the military was a concept "'foreign' to the proper American attitude toward women of the country." Randolph apparently had not studied American history. Rep. Hare of South Carolina insisted that allowing women in the military was a poor reflection on American men.38 Most oppositional arguments, as presented by the media, lacked substance. House passage, 249-86, made the front page of the Times.

Meanwhile, there seemed to be "no concrete opposition" to the WAAC Bill in the Senate. Sen. Nye of North Dakota conceded that as long as the women in the Auxiliary were volunteers, there was much they could contribute. Sen. Bone of Washington, very excited about the prospect, added that the Army Corps women would be like the "Yeomenettes" of World War I. Sen. Hattie Caraway of Arkansas remarked tersely, "I am for it, of course." Sen. Raymond Willis of Indiana observed that "valuable woman power can replace men and [the bill] gives patriotic women a place to serve." Sen. Johnson of Colorado, less enthusiastic, said that if Gen. Marshall supported it he guessed it was all right.39

While the Senate debated its version of the legislation, Sen. Willis sent up a separate bill as an amendment to the Naval Reserve Act of 1938,
Section 104, to add Title V, the Women's Auxiliary Reserve Section 501, which was identical to the House's Maas (WAVES) Bill. Willis' asserted that "The women of this nation have a right to fit themselves into the war program in the way they are best fitted to serve." However, the news report also noted Navy Secretary Knox's silence on the issue. Willis' comments marked the first time that the debate, as reflected in the media, was couched in terms of women's rights.40

Despite Knox's silence and even though Congress was still considering these measures, the Navy had already started moving men from shore billets to make room for women. (As an interesting aside, R.Adm. Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, told the House Naval Affairs Committee that nothing in the current bill prevented women from sea duty. So, the House passed the bill unanimously, but insisted that women serve only in shore billets.) The Mass Bill's significant feature was that women would serve in the Navy.41 As a result, on the initiative of Utah's Sen. Thomas, the Senate sent its WAAC Bill back to the Military Affairs Committee for a rewrite because Gen. Marshall really wanted women in his service as well. The WAAC legislation, in an attempt to assuage earlier fears, had asked for women to serve with the Army. Marshall wanted women to be treated and receive the same recognition as men except that they would not be assigned to combat duties. He did admit that women might be exposed to enemy fire even if they were not formally placed in combat positions. Still, keeping women in an auxiliary in non-combat roles would not diminish that risk; even New York City could be attacked, exposing civilian women to enemy fire. Further, risk of harm would not be significantly different for those in versus those with the Army since their responsibilities and assignments would be the same in either case. Thomas told his colleagues that Marshall had asked for the change himself,
but the Senators insisted on a "formal request" from the Army. The Senate overruled Marshall without explanation even though it had passed the Navy Bill.42

Another concern was articulated in earlier reports on the WAAC proposal—the race of the prospective military women. Edgar G. Brown, Director of the National Negro Council, urged that the Army accept women of all races. House Military Affairs Committee Acting Chairman, Ewing Thompson, agreed. In April, Sen. McNary offered an amendment to the WAAC bill to prohibit discrimination based on race; it passed unanimously. This amendment, however, was not included in the Navy's bill. Black men were allowed in the Navy, but were segregated and given menial jobs. Previously, Secretary Knox had mentioned a "cordial spirit of experimentation" in sending two black men to Annapolis, but he did not explain why they did not graduate. There were no black officers in the Navy in 1942.43

Despite what must have seemed to readers a clear majority in Congress in favor of enlisting women in the military in some capacity, at least for the emergency, during the discussions they learned of public opposition to the idea. At a Catholic police breakfast in New York, Bishop John O'Hara condemned proposals to put women in the Army as "another threat to the sanctity of the home." He commented that the Army should have the soldiers peel their own potatoes and do other menial tasks for themselves rather than enlist women.44

Newsweek, in an attempt at humor, titled an article "Wacks and Warns in Prospect for Petticoat Army and Navy." In it, editors ran a cartoon from the Chicago Tribune featuring two women asking each other "How did you keep your [makeup] powder dry?" The report recounted the "acrid" congressional debate over "skirted soldiers and sailors." It began by
pointing out that the Rogers Bill had been thrown out in May 1941, but that after Pearl Harbor the women had won over Secretary Stimson and the House Military Affairs Committee. (Actually, the bill had been reintroduced in October of 1941, and Gen. Marshall was won over after Pearl Harbor.) It appears that it was Marshall who really convinced the Committee. Newsweek chose to quote, out of ninety-eight columns of Congressional Record, only the negative comments of Representatives Fulmer and Somers concerning morals. Rogers reportedly responded that she trusted both the Army and the women in this respect, and Charles Plumley of Vermont added, "You can not win this war without these women."

The Newsweek report continually trivialized the discussion with references to the "petticoat Army," and not allowing women a "permanent or a cocktail without a pass." The prospective WAACs, "Uncle Sam's nieces," would be "attractively uniformed" and act as "twentieth century Molly Pitchers" and "Jane Pauline Jones." Although the report points out Marshall's testimony that there were "duties...that can be done better by women," like clerking and air raid spotting, the staff at Newsweek did not appear convinced. The article clarified that while the WAACs would not be part of the Army, the "Warns" (it is uncertain where this acronym came from) would actually be in the Navy possessing "full military status with complete equity with men...in grades, ratings, pay, and promotions." Limited to shore billets they would relieve men for sea duty.45

By May, the Army, impatient with congressional footdragging, was ready to enroll 150,000 women whether in or with the Regular forces in "fields right up to the front-lines." Women would do everything except shoulder arms. Rather than suffer more delays, Brig.Gen. John Hildring, Chief of Staff for Military Personnel, told Congress to get the bill passed the quickest way possible. The Army knew this would entail
accepting the bill's original language--mandating women's participation with. This wording was approved by the Senate Committee on 9 May. In the meantime, Massachusetts Democrat David Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, had proposed an amendment to the Navy bill banning women from combat, urging that a "sharp distinction should be made between women engaged in non-combatant service and officers and personnel [men] of the Navy who are actually engaged in combat service...."46 No one had proposed that Navy women should serve in combat.

The Senate passed the Army bill 38-27, 13 May 1942. An amendment to restrict WAACs to the continental U.S. was defeated and the racial non-discrimination amendment (McNary's) was omitted. Eleanor Roosevelt felt the amendment was unnecessary because "negroes" were already protected by the Constitution. The Army promised that this would not affect the service's plans to include blacks and that they did not anticipate any racial discrimination. Opponents, including Senators Maloney and Danaher, continued to voice their displeasure. Maloney said the Army surprised him because, despite Marshall's testimony, he believed the military did not need women. According to Sen. Maloney, women's groups, many far from modern notions of feminism, were not interested in gaining entry to the military for their sisters. The Army itself pushed for women's enlistment, an interesting point for those who try to make the argument that women only entered the service as a result of the machinations of 'radical feminists' contrary to military wishes. Maloney echoed the Catholic position that forming a women's army corps "casts a shadow on the sanctity of the American Home."47

Letters to the Times, in May 1942, reflected the opinions of readers on legislation to militarize women. A. Schwab recalled that in The Seven Chiefs Against Thebes, Aeschylus wrote, "War is no female province, but
the scene of men...," and Schwab proposed that it was not too late for Americans to turn their back on the WAAC. On the other hand, William Gibson had no problem with women in the military, at least in the medical services. He urged that if more nurses were needed in an all-out war effort, "negroes" should be given a chance to serve by caring for "negro soldiers." Catholics continued their opposition to the whole idea. Massachusetts Bishop James Cassidy asked Catholic women not to join the WAAC. He claimed that the teachings and principles of the church opposed the organization.

Despite this residual resistance, Franklin Roosevelt signed the Rogers Bill into law and named Oveta Culp Hobby as the Director of the WAAC. Marshall announced that he, Hobby, and the Army had been working on the organizational plans for such a corps since September 1941. Times readers learned that there was black opposition to the law because of the defeat of the non-discrimination amendment and the appointment of a southerner as director. Black leaders complained about the "lily white traditions and Jim Crow practices" of Hobby's home state, Texas. To compensate, the National Negro Council had asked the Army to appoint Mary McLeod Bethune, a black educator, as assistant director. Bethune was not appointed, but Hobby gained some credibility when she announced that forty blacks would be accepted for officer training to provide leadership for two companies of "negro" WAACs and that black women would be recruited in proportion to their numbers in the population, just as black men were recruited and drafted. Enlistment yes, integration no.

Time also kept up with the debate, reporting the passage of the "long delayed...Petticoat Army" bill. The Army was even happier about passage of the bill than were the WAACs. Time suggested that the Navy, awaiting passage of its Women's Reserve bill, should incorporate the Army
language and scrap plans to have women serve in the Navy. This was followed with a report on the appointment of Hobby: a "slim, trim, quiet and pretty" 37-year-old mother of two who was given to "fancy hairdos and shocking hats", she was a "remarkable Texan" with an amazing career. Reporter George Dixon, of the New York Daily News, viewing the induction ceremony, was quoted as saying, "If ever a man looked as if he was saying to himself what-the-hell-am-I-doing-here, it was Mrs. Hobby." The Time report lowered the level of the entire event with extensive discussions about girdles and uniform fashions.

*Newsweek* also seemed to be going for the humor vote with headlines like "New Women's Army Will Girdle 25,000 for War." Its report also recounted Hobby's impressive career but denigrated her personally, from "cocktail parties and silly hats to...parliamentary law." She had taken "time out to have two children, but simple domesticity was too placid for her energy and ideas," so she had "gradually invaded her husband's paper [the Houston Post]." Again the effect of women's militarization on the "sanctity of home" is questioned. And again, Hobby's hats seemed to be more interesting than her qualifications.

Other *Newsweek* reports mentioned two WAAC problems: the accusations of racial discrimination and the difficulty of competing for recruits in the face of the Navy's higher pay. Despite these more serious concerns, the reporters' focus remained on make-up, nail polish, dating, the nickname ("Wacks"), the uniform, and the free girdle supplied by the Army to each recruit. No mention was made of the underwear issued to male soldiers.

In an editorial, the Times was more respectful but endorsed the formation of the WAAC within current gender ideology. It admitted old-fashioned men might wonder about it all, but the WAAC would be made a
"sensible Army of typists" rather than a "Battalion of Death" (a reference
to Russian women soldiers who fought in World War I on the front-lines to
shame the men deserting in droves). The editors assured readers that
despite uniforms and drill, "feminine quality" would not be lost. Maj.
Hobby was very well qualified and would take good care of her "WAAC
girls." But, they also asked why envious non-service-qualified "old
codgers" (male) or "young codgers" (male) could not serve in non-combat
functions.55

In spite of previous opposition and continuing media trivialization,
women arrived at the recruiting stations, and reporters from major
periodicals were there to get the story. These women were an eager and
heterogeneous lot. They reportedly left bosses, children, and their
families high-and-dry as they rushed to enlist. They left "dishes
unwashed and floors unswept." They had not told husbands and fathers
what they were up to. And, in their excitement, their "staccato questions
and treble chatter in the 440 recruiting stations" soon got on the
officers' nerves: "Ladies, please, for gosh sake, shut up a minute!"
"They are just as tough to handle in this recruiting office as they are in
civilian life." One report took a more serious, if no less denigrating
tone, asserting that, "Despite some wishful thinking by the press, the
applicants were not glamour girls...Most were working girls, usually not
very well paid, or temporarily out of jobs." Other contemporary reports
and secondary sources pointed out that, in fact, most of the initial
military entrants left good jobs and had excellent educations. The women
told reporters they wanted to serve their country, "fight Japs," gain
security, follow their men into the service, or just have a new and
different experience that they could apply to their later lives and work.
_Time_ did note that despite the press and the Catholic church making a
"small hue-&-cry about women's place being in the home,...army men wanted the WAACs to hurry up" to relieve them for combat.\textsuperscript{56}

The Catholic "hue-&-cry" must have really been heard when Mrs. Margaret Sanger suggested that the Army should give all WAACs contraceptive information.\textsuperscript{57} This should not have been perceived as even slightly radical since the military planned to discharge any women who became pregnant, and men were given prophylactics and lessons on why and how to use them. But this issue would come up again during the 1943 "Slander Campaign." Sanger's suggestion really touched on an issue larger than pregnancy in the ranks. The deeper concern, which had already been alluded to and which would arise repeatedly, was with the morality and sexuality of women outside the traditional control of home, community, and family. Although control in those locations may have been largely mythical, challenging it still brought strong reaction.

Despite these control issues, women did rush to volunteer. After the passage of the WAAC Bill, the Army had to ask volunteers to wait two weeks so it could make preparations for testing and in-processing. At the appointed time, Mrs. Jayne House was the first to volunteer to make "my personal contribution." Her husband had already volunteered. Their eight year old daughter approved, "My daddy and mommy are going to help win the war, and as soon as I grow up I am going to help them."\textsuperscript{58} This picture contrasts sharply with the 1991 Persian Gulf War media coverage of the ever-present image of women tearfully hugging children as they said their goodbyes. Just as did the 1991 departures, the recruiting scene in 1942 made front page news. The favored media approach, as usual, was humorous. Recruiting was off to a "spectacular start" as women "shouldered" their way in, "shoving aside" men, and provoking them to use "mild brute strength...to combat the feminine forces." A recruiter told the press,
"If I never see another woman again, it will be too soon." The women are constantly referred to as "whacks", and there are numerous references to their naive or silly questions about the military. 59

While women were overwhelming Army recruiters, the Navy was telling the Senate Naval Affairs Committee that it was also ready to accept women to do technical and administrative work. Officers testified that they wanted women Reservists in the Navy, in non-combat positions, stateside and overseas. However, the House version of the WAVES bill proposed civilian compensation for Navy women rather than military pensions. 60

In the meantime, letters to the editors of the Times continued to reflect the public debate. Hyacinthe Ringrose wrote that women receiving equal protection from the military should have equal rights and responsibilities. Women were as healthy and strong as men, if not so muscular, and generally had good eyesight and hearing and were as intellectual as their male counterparts. Prefiguring later debates, Ringrose saw war as a matter of machinery, rather than brute strength, and that made women equal in answering the call to arms. With women elected as legislators and governors and serving as judges and police officers already, there was nothing to keep them out of the military or aviation. Women had already proven themselves in all these endeavors. Those who protested "potential mothers" going off to war should have been worried about "potential fathers" as well. Ringrose closed her letter by asserting that inherited rights and freedoms brought with them the responsibility for women to serve in the military. 61 This letter was answered a week later by a self-proclaimed "violent feminist," Katherine Lemoine, who presented a three part argument. First, according to the "rules of the game," women had to have the children and to manage the home. It was not fair that they should also be called upon to defend that
home. Second, women already risked death in childbirth and now were being asked to risk their lives in war as well. Finally, military men got hospitalization and benefits but women would not be similarly rewarded (the newer bills passed by Congress called for more equitable benefits). Lemoine closed with, "...the day men bear children, I will concede women should join the armed forces...." She asked, if this was really an emergency, why the military did not draft all the men before asking for women.62

The summer of 1942 witnessed continual coverage in popular periodicals of the initial entry of women into the service and opposition thereto. Life was slightly more complimentary to the women than was the norm, recalling the historical background of the "Marinettes" of 1917. Reporters pointed out that three times the number of World War I recruits would be needed in this war and so far the response had been terrific. An overwhelming 13,208 women applied for the first 450 officer slots. "The U.S. Army has shown itself more feminist-minded than Germany's, less so than its Allies'." In Germany, women only worked in the factories but in Britain they manned anti-aircraft guns and ferried planes, and in Russia they were "doing it all."63 American women wanted to "do it all," as well. Some reporters, while recognizing that the tone at recruiting stations was "all business" and that the women cited "sacrifice" for their country as their motivation, teased that the prospective WAACs had little idea of the aims of the military as they reportedly wanted to fly bombers or "shoot big guns" when they would actually be typists, drivers, or cooks. While this may have disappointed recruits, it probably went far to reassure other readers that traditional gender roles were not being overthrown.64
Even if roles were not overthrown, significant Catholic opposition persisted. *Time* reported that the Catholic public and press were "perturbed" by the rush to enlist. Bishop Cassidy told his congregation that the influx of women into war activities, not just the service, was "a serious menace to the home and foundation of a true Christian and democratic country." In the Brooklyn *Tablet*, Catholics claimed WAACs were no more than opening a wedge, intended to break down the traditional American and Christian opposition to removing woman from the home and degrade her by bringing back the pagan female goddess [the Army intended to use a bust of Pallas Athene as the Women's Corps insignia] of desexed, lustful, sterility.65

The *Commonweal*, a liberal Catholic weekly, claimed that with the militarization of women, "the soul of our society will already be lost," even if the war were won. The National Catholic Welfare Conference agreed, warning "The state will use the war as an excuse for assuming control of children" of military women.66 In actuality, one of the greatest lessons learned from the war was that the government did not do enough for women with regard to childcare in order to fully utilize womanpower in industry and the military.

The *Christian Science Monitor*, on the other hand, was supportive and seemed both complimentary and serious. In describing the rush to enlist, Josephine Riley reported, "Women everywhere answered, 'Ready!'" The "avalanche response" did not include thrill seekers or glamour girls but those "sober souls" who intended simply to help win the war because, "If a man can give up his life for his country, certainly a woman can give up her time." The recruits, "plain, pretty, rich, poor...negroes and debutante," were disappointed that they would not be able to fly, fire anti-aircraft (AA) guns, or fight in combat, that no one under twenty-one could join, and that no non-citizens would be accepted. But many more
were pleased that at the last minute the Army decided to raise the maximum age from forty-five to fifty and to allow recruits to be married and to join without the consent of their husband. This may have disturbed the more conservative public, but it was balanced by a requirement for the women to be of "good moral character, pleasing personality, neat appearance, and tactful manner." Can one imagine the same requirements for male soldiers? The Monitor pointed out that the women knew the Army was "no picnic" and that the historical evidence favored them. "They'll be good soldiers," the paper claimed, since they had proved themselves at "Plymouth Rock, in the covered wagons rolling west, and they're ready to write another chapter in history today." One caption accompanying photographs of the recruits said, "It is the right thing to do...the boys are doing their bit...the girls can give them help and courage by signing up."67

While these women were already joining the Army, the Navy Bill still sailed in rough waters in Congress. Part of the difficulty was that the Senate's bill called for Navy women to get the same rank and pay as male sailors while the House version did not. Adm. Jacobs testified that in contrast to the Army "making jobs" for women, Navy women would be "direct replacements" for men going to sea. Congressmen quizzed Jacobs about combat and overseas duty and he responded that neither was necessary immediately, but that the Navy might ask for their consideration later. During these discussions, Sen. Davis called the Navy prospects "hens."68 Surprisingly, opposition to the WAVES in the House continued. Kentucky Democrat Beverly Vincent adamantly argued that non-combat shore posts should go to World War I veterans. He presumably meant male veterans, as opposed to the 11,275 Yeomen (F) and 300 women Marines who served. Rep. Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, countered that the
men's ages and lack of mobility limited their value. Vinson insisted that cryptography and photograph analysis required younger people of lower rank (women) rather than old men of higher rank.69

Despite continued congressional resistance to the Navy bill and the media's portrayal of WAAC recruiting as somewhat like a circus, the editors of the Times encouraged their readers to view the militarization of women in a positive light. They often highlighted the Allied example, that "...the British women have shown, as American women will show when called upon, intelligence, capability, and resource beyond dispute and praise." The editors were pleased both that a large number of teachers "to whom the community has learned to entrust so many tasks" had been selected for the WAAC, and that black women were selected as well. They also acknowledged the difficulty of the tests and selection process.70

The Times also indicated that some military men thought the women would do well with their new responsibilities. The Army was reportedly "enthusiastic" and "eager" for the "feminine relief force." Col. Don Faith, the commander of the WAAC basic training camp at Ft. Des Moines, had confidence. "They'll do a great job...Who can doubt it when they look at England or Canada...they'll make their mark. If I didn't think so, I wouldn't be here. Just watch their records!" he crowed. He added that they would make a great contribution to American victory and that the men were glad to see them arrive so they could go fight, soon a source of resentment. Capt. Gordon Jones, the Director of Curriculum, said, "We should have started [the WAAC] two years ago." He even acknowledged that there were some jobs women could do better than men.71 But not all military men wanted to go to combat, especially draftees. In fact, women were not initially allowed to work in personnel positions in which they might have to notify men of their selection to go into combat as the Army
felt that these men might resent women they thought were directly responsible for their having to go. Still, as the first WAAC recruits left their homes their male relations seemed generally supportive. One husband remarked, "We're sure to win the war now...."72

As the first WAACs started their training, reporters recognized that they made up a cross-section of American society, geographically and racially. Surprisingly, male veterans felt that the women fit in quite "naturally". "I've seen plenty of boys who didn't do half as well," one opined. Sgt. Walterbach, a drill instructor, was definitely surprised. He gushed that the first WAAC retreat ceremony was "...amazing, and heartening, an almost incredible performance...." A Times reporter assigned to Des Moines, Kathleen McLaughlin, continued rather melodramatically that the WAAC seemed, "Like Athene sprung fully armed from the head of Zeus," they showed no emotion or drama, and perhaps their only fault was an overanxiousness to adapt.73 In contrast to these positive reports, however, Newsweek continued to belittle the new recruits with biting sarcasm and by downplaying substantive issues in favor of concerns about bras and girdles. Women saluting "amused men trainers...Even Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, the Director, had trouble looking soldierly when she did it."

They felt it important to mention that the "svelte, smart, serene" Hobby did not want to get up early and asked questions like, "How can they march with men [30" step]?" and "How can feminine voice give marching commands?"74 Time reporters treated the women's training more seriously, stating, "The soldiers in skirts were evidence that creation of a skirted auxiliary was a shrewd move."

Reporters realistically pointed out that the burden of proof was on the women in basic training. They had to show, "1) They were emotionally suited to Army life; 2) they were adaptable enough to take to the Army's
ways and like them; 3) they were intelligent enough to master what they had to learn in a brief six weeks." The only problem the Army discovered was that the women worked too hard. Col. Faith had to teach them to budget their energy. Once more the lapse into gendered trivia came though--the women could not date until after graduation. And, the question was asked, what will the Army do with them--"they want ju jitsu and rifles." The answer--too bad.

As the Army women were progressing through basic training, the Navy Bill was still making slow headway. Rep. Vincent continued to lead the opposition with the claim that the entry of women would "humiliate" the Navy. He believed that, despite Navy testimony, "the Navy doesn't want 10,000 more sit down jobs." With all the other important things going on it was reprehensible to take the time "to put butterflies in the Navy." He claimed that the 70 million patriotic women in industry were embarrassed by attempts to "spotlight" a few. Vincent elicited a few chuckles with the remark, "You're not going to take $200 dressing up a girl [in uniform] and then stick her in the kitchen. Then you really would start a war." Rep. Vincent was right that women would not be satisfied with non-operational menial functions in the long term. Over the years, on the part of both the military and military women, there was a movement to expand job positions for women to include non-support and non-traditionally feminine functions. Despite Vincent's resistance, however, the House finally passed the bill and sent it to the White House for signature. Supporter Rep. Vinson remarked on that occasion that the women would do "magnificent work in this war" in clerical, photographic, cryptologic, and other jobs, and thereby release men for combat.76

*Time* reported the President's signing of the WAVES Bill and recounted the historical contribution of the Secretary of the Navy in
World War I when he argued that "Yeomen need not be male." Still, it seemed *Time* felt a need to soften the image of militarized women by quickly pointing out that the Director, Dr. Mildred McAfee, "Miss Mac," was "no career-type Amazon."\(^77\)

Despite Presidential endorsement, there were those who continued to oppose the whole idea of the militarization of women. Elsie Testa wrote a letter to the *Times* saying it was all right for bombs to break up American homes but not for the WAAC to do so. She said the WAAC would be the "chief means of gumming up the war effort and breaking morale," that morals and womanhood would hit a new low, and that she was disgusted that women would quit important war work for an attractive uniform. She added the familiar, "A married woman's place is in the home" argument, and said that a man in uniform should not have a wife in uniform. She did not consider the single woman, but commented that women should keep the home fires burning rather than being obsessed with playing an important part in winning the war.\(^78\) Agnes Robinson fired off a response to Testa. She pointed out that WAACs were not joining just for a fancy uniform, but would do important jobs for which they were well qualified in order to release men for combat. She also reassured Testa that war industry would not suffer. Robinson claimed that American men would be proud of their women for joining the WAAC, as were the English and Russian men with their military women.\(^79\)

Testa was not alone, however. Catholic opposition also continued, with comments that the most important thing for America's survival was a Christian home and that the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was destructive of that end. Somehow Catholic thinkers had connected the WAAC with the ERA, although no reports had previously linked the two. In fact, many proponents of the militarization of women disavowed feminism altogether.\(^80\)
In the face of the opposition, there were some individual conversions. One *Times* reader, Mr. Cheney, claimed he had not been "too enthusiastic at first" about his daughter joining the WAVES but later admitted, "I think it is grand and...an excellent way of contributing to the war program." He came to feel that it was imperative for women to take over the military's desk jobs.81

The military was still concerned about the details of women's service, though, and the Navy in particular was dealing with another debate over such details. This discussion, alluded to in Testa's letter, centered on whether WAVES could be married to sailors. A spokesman for the Navy claimed it would be "embarrassing to have both" a husband and wife in the Navy. There would be a problem with conflicting orders. There would be domestic difficulties if the wife became an officer. And too many homes would be broken up. He did not explain why any of these problems would occur, nor how these situations differed from those encountered by WAVES married to soldiers, which was permitted. Finally, the Navy claimed it wanted to spread the opportunity for service to more families, but recruiters never had to turn female recruits away for having too many from one family.82

Another issue, which the 1940s press addressed only cursorily and which cropped up again in the 1970s, was the debate over whether women should be involved in the college-based Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The answer at this time was no. The WAAC disbanded a program that women at the University of Indiana had started on their own.83

Other issues, such as racial concerns, also continued as the first WAAC recruits graduated from basic training. The press reported that black WAACs were being sent to England and that some among the public believed this was to provide companionship for black soldiers in Europe,
who were quoted as saying, "There's no hot music and none of our girls [in England]." Gen. Eisenhower responded that this was not the reason that black women were enlisted. The same article pointed out that the WAAC USO clubs at Ft. Des Moines were segregated.84

As the Army wrestled with its issues, WAVES training was just beginning at Smith College. Lt.Comdr. Wilson McCandles remarked that compared with the men he had trained, "They're the best I've ever had." Capt. Herbert Underwood, the training commander, commented, "They're a right nice looking bunch...these girls are going to find out that what Sherman said about war is correct."85 Apparently he thought that a "right nice looking bunch of girls" did not know that war was hell. Meanwhile, the first class of WAAC officers was graduating from training. Major Generals Uhlio and Uhl were reportedly amazed at their progress and precision, applauding at the pass-in-review rather than rendering the customary salute. The generals commented, "I've never seen anything like it....It was outstanding. Many of our soldiers would do well to emulate them. I am very proud to be part of this." Rep. Rogers was there to see the fruits of her labor as well. She told the first class of graduates, "You represent the dream which I conceived during the first World War...." Gen. Marshall could not attend but sent word, "This is only the beginning of a magnificent war service by the women of America." Maj. Hobby challenged the graduates to do their best and told the nation that their story would be a "saga of women determined to pay their debt to freedom, determined to mortgage their futures and their lives if need be for the future...."86

The mood was upbeat, but just as everything seemed to be progressing in a positive direction yet another debate was simmering. The Senate started to consider equalizing WAAC pay with their male counterparts' to
match the pay and benefits for women in the Navy. Sen. Reynolds of the Military Affairs Committee heard Army testimony that the lower WAAC pay was a detriment to recruiting as women were joining the higher paying WAVES. The pay bill easily passed both the House and Senate by late October 1942.87 (A larger debate would eventually make this a moot point.) At the same time, Rep. Rogers introduced a bill to transform the WAAC into the WAC. This would effectively mean that women would finally be in the Army, with all the rights and responsibilities accruing to male members of the armed forces. That bill would go to the House Military Affairs Committee in November.88

In the world outside congressional halls, the media was waiting when the WAACs arrived at their first duty stations. Life pointed out to its readers that this was all part of a simple idea, "women can do some of the jobs that men are doing in the Army," and thereby release men for combat. The Life report also recounted Hobby's graduation address, but highlighted her challenge to the women differently: "You have taken off silk and put on khaki. You have a debt to democracy and a date with destiny. You may be called upon to give your lives." The report did not discount service resistance, observing that "old Army men harumph at the sight of girls trying to act like soldiers." Reporters also pointed out that black officers would command black platoons with their own barracks. Although they would be segregated, they would be part of white WAAC companies and regiments. Blacks would drill with whites and mess with them (but at different tables). Life closed with the comment that upon entry into basic training the women improved quickly and "hardly ever suffer feminine lapses like group giggling....They are very earnest and often much more military than old time military men."89
Hobby, as in her graduation speech, did not shy away from the recognition that military women might die. And another Life story pointed out how much danger American military women already faced. There does not seem to have been any outcry over this realization by either the women or the reading public. In contrast, later in the debates, those opposed to women in combat constantly brought up the issue of Americans not being able to cope with their military daughters being "brought home in body bags." This, despite the fact that non-combat military women, not to mention civilian women, die by war and violence all the time, and Americans seem to cope.

In the 1940s (and more so recently), the perspective seemed to be different if the subject were medical personnel. Nurses were definitely in 'harm's way' during the war. Stories were beginning to filter back to the homefront in 1942 of the Army and Navy nurses trapped on Bataan and of other women in Japanese internment camps in Manila. The nurses not only survived the terror and confusion of the situation but were essential to the men's survival. The head nurse at Bataan, Rosemary Hogan, continued her duties despite three shrapnel wounds, saying only, "Don't worry about me." These nurses survived the Corregidor bombing and Life commented it was "hard to believe the bravery." It should not have been. The Times Magazine also praised the American nurses, "They have already written their record at Bataan and Corregidor." They acknowledged that to most Americans, military nurses were pretty girls in white on posters but that the public had to realize "there are American women as well as men in combat areas all over the world." In fact, the nurses got rid of their whites fairly early on, opting for the khaki men's uniforms for comfort, practicality, and availability. The Times article acknowledged that the nurses were just average American women working "under fire" and that, as
veterans of Bataan and Corregidor, "they [knew] war at its worst." They showed incredible courage and humor through their own illnesses and "not a single nurse complained or cracked." Reports did say the women had asked to be shot by their own troops if they were in danger of becoming Prisoners of War (POWs). Some did become POWs and survived the experience. A number of American civilian women were held in Manila including, Frances Long, 21, daughter of the Secretary to the consular body in Shanghai, and AP correspondent Jennifer White.\textsuperscript{90}

Just as women were serving in danger in the Far East, American military nurses arrived on the African front in December, 1942. Their letters home sounded upbeat and positive, prompting some of their mothers to think they were covering up for poor conditions to prevent parental worry or because of the postal censors.\textsuperscript{91} Besides this, readers learned that military women were earning 'combat' decorations. The first woman to get a Purple Heart was the head nurse at Hickam Air Base, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941. Two other Army nurses received medals for heroic deeds as well. Navy Capt. Kenneth Castleman presented these awards at the Seventeenth Annual Women's International Exposition of Arts and Industries at Madison Square Garden. After the presentations he told attendees the Navy needed far more women, stating "We have had more requisitions for Waves, from hard-boiled old Navy commanders, than we can take care of."\textsuperscript{92}

The Army needed more women as well. Women would speed the return to peace, Director Hobby told the American Legion Auxiliary. Women were essential to the military and "women in other lands taught the lessons Americans could use." In Russia, the women actually carried arms and fought alongside their men. She closed with the ideas that the rights of freedom were worth defending and privilege demanded responsibility.\textsuperscript{93}
Rights and responsibilities aside, arguments predicting women's incapacity in industry and the military began to fall apart as evidence to the contrary continued to pile up throughout 1942. *Times* readers heard from many prominent individuals that women were more than equal to the tasks. Professor Edmond Shaw claimed, "The wartime service of women in industry reveals a narrower margin of male superiority...[in fact] women can withstand a steadier drain on their physical resources...in many jobs women not only equal men but excel them." Many in the Army felt the same. Lt.Cpl. Brown, commandant of Ft. Riley, said the women were performing all their duties as effectively as the men. Brown had one other observation: women insisted on knowing why a thing was done or done a certain way. Brown said his men were working harder as they accepted the women's challenge to prove every task's purpose and every method's efficiency and effectiveness. Other commanders working with women praised them as well.

The Navy's Capt. Underwood became even more supportive of the idea of military women over time. He called the WAVES trainees "remarkable" and "unbelievable", telling the *Times* "they're good," better than men, and they learned quickly. He told stories of how men, but no women, fainted at immunizations and how the WAVES's marching made the men look bad. He obviously was very proud of his female charges.

As this publicly acknowledged evidence mounted that women were equal to the challenge, the drive to further militarize women continued. Although the Coast Guard had had an unofficial auxiliary earlier (October 1941), Congressman Bland submitted a bill written by the Coast Guard for an official women's contingent. Like the Navy, the Guard wanted "Warcogs" for shore duty to release men for sea duty. All that was necessary was to change the word "men" to "persons" in the 1941 Coast Guard Auxiliary and
Reserve Act. Significantly, this would have allowed authorized and permanent rather than just emergency service. In the proposed legislation, the women would not be allowed to command men, they would receive civilian disability compensation, and the highest rank they could achieve would be lieutenant commander. The House approved this bill unanimously in mid October, 1942. The Senate, after specifying women's duty would be limited to stateside locations, passed its version. Page one of the Times announced that the Guard had decided to call its women SPARs rather than "Warcogs".97

Last but not least, Adm. Jacobs proposed a women's group for the Marines. Since women Marines had served in World War I their enlistment was already considered legal. The commandant could rely on his knowledge of history—that Lidy Brewster had served as a Marine in combat on the frigate Constitution in 1812 disguised as George Baker—in making his decision whether to actually enlist women.98 And so he did, in 1943.

By the time each of the services had an official women's contingent at the end of 1942, the effect of wartime military service on women was already being discussed. It is difficult to ascertain how much of this debate was intended to reassure naysayers that no permanent harm would be done to gender ideology, how much was about concern for women, and how much just shows an interest in changing gender relations. Margaret Banning wrote "The 'Indispensable Woman'" for the Times Magazine in November. She began with the point that women in Britain, Russia, and even Germany were expanding their horizons by doing "utterly unfeminine" jobs in a total war. She warned readers that since the Axis powers did not believe in women's equality, their victory would mean the degradation of all women. Instead, if the Allies won, American women would have become more independent through their war work and military service,
creating a whole new concept of the "Ideal Woman" doing much more than working in the home. Banning also believed that men would realize and appreciate this change, and asserted that the horror stories that detractors had promulgated during the early part of the debate had not materialized in Britain. Factory work and military service did not make women less attractive to men or cause women to lose interest in their looks. There was very little "funny business," despite men and women working together closely, and yet the birth rate had not dropped either. She too addressed the question of whether women's work would destroy the home, and reassured her readers that women at the factory and in uniform wanted to return to their homes after the war (the source of her information is unknown), but cautioned them that these women would certainly be changed. She said they would have found out that they could do more than they ever imagined and that the barrier to any job would only be that they had slightly less physical strength. They would be more disciplined and maintain more intelligent homes for their children. In addition, they would know that in an emergency they were capable of working, and, if unmarried, that they were capable of fending for themselves. Married women would double the family's earning power in case of financial need, creating a true husband and wife team. Of course, for those who did not think a "true husband and wife team" fit proper gender ideology, this was still unacceptable and not reassuring in the least.

Even in the face of military necessity, gender ideology threatened to prevent women from joining the military and to prevent the country from utilizing their talents more fully. Pragmatism was victorious against vehement opposition but admittance did not resolve the questions of the conditions of women's service. In fact, the relatively ad-hoc basis of
their inclusion created inconsistencies that would be fuel for further debates on these conditions and for arbitrary and ill-considered gender-specific restrictions. In 1942, the issue of whether women would be officially enrolled in the military was fought out over the issues of their ability to perform both physically and emotionally, the effects their militarization would have on American culture/families, and the impact of militarization on gender roles, specifically on women's 'femininity.' Military and political leaders, as well as the popular press, cited historical evidence and allied and civilian examples that women could perform. Media portrayals of the women as simply protecting their homes, in deference to family and culture, undermined the picture of women as capable, but reassuringly framed this temporary emergency service as 'defensive.' In service to femininity and heterosexuality, the reports had to emphasize that military women could not wait to get home and start a family. The public was also reassured of servicewomen's femininity by press emphasis on such 'womanly' concerns as appearance, clothing, and dating. Of course, focus on these trivialities acted as well to undermine the seriousness of their achievements and contributions. Apparently the press and military thought the feminized military role had to be portrayed as non-threatening to be acceptable to the public.

The earliest part of the militarization debate was fought out over the issues of adjunct or integral status, and the conditions of service pertaining to marriage, dependency, and pregnancy. Eventually, all the women's services were made official parts, rather than auxiliaries, of the armed forces branches. And, in the feminized area of nursing, women fought for and won equality of rank (versus "relative" rank). In more 'masculine' areas such as flying and practicing medicine, the struggle for
equality of opportunity and service conditions would take much longer. Race issues for women, as with men, were not resolved.

Press portrayals of military women during this period were generally sympathetic, but the adolescent humor and gender-role-protecting trivialization of women's contributions vis-a-vis the more titillating questions about sexual relations, underwear, and hats undermined serious presentations. Combat may not have been an issue, but the media reflected no particular concern with or surprise at the prospect of foreign women, American nurses, and even line women serving in harm's way, undercutting arguments that there would be a major outcry from the public in such cases.

Throughout the rest of the war years, the debates on the militarization of women and the conditions of their service continued on some of the original issues and some newer ones. A major morals scandal would erupt in 1943. In the face of accusations of immorality among servicewomen on the one hand, and some doubts that they were "real women" on the other, the personalities and performance of the directors of the women's services went a long way toward garnering military and public support for military women. Converts from resistance to support multiplied as women proved that their contributions were significant to the war effort. From complaints about using the military to conduct social experiments to discussions and resistance to their being militarized, women were later blamed for being selfish for not signing up and the government and military even considered conscripting them. The final discussion, near the end of the war, would be over making their service permanent and Regular. The debate would cover a lot of ground and become more intense through the war, as we shall see in the next two chapters.
Notes to Chapter 2


2. Ibid., p.274.


4. Millis, p.278.


11. "Cadets Organize Manhattan Unit," *NYT*, 1 December 1940, Section II, p.3.


15. "Women's Clubs Awaiting Call for Active Duty" and "Organize to Aid in Emergency," *NYT*, 20 October 1940, Section II, p.4.


18. "Women to Aid Defense," NYT, 10 February 1941, p.11.
34. Susan Sheridan, "Defense without Uniforms," NYT, 1 March 1942, Section VII, p.27.
37. Ibid.

39. "Senate to Vote on Army Corps" (AP), Ibid.


49. William Gibson, "Nurses Needed" (letter), NYT, 17 May 1942, Section VI, p.4.

50. "Bishop Assails the WAAC" (AP), NYT, 19 May 1942, p.16.


55. "Enter the WAACs" (editors), NYT, 16 May 1942, p.15.

56. "WAAC's First Muster," Tm, 8 June 1942, p.71.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.


61. Hyacinthe Ringrose, "Women in War Favored" (letter), NYT, 31 May 1942, Section IV, p.7.

62. Katherine Lemoine, "Opposing Women in the Military" (letter), NYT, 8 June 1942, p.14. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women in War, (New York: Basic Books) 1987. Elshtain recognizes that most societies have juxtaposed the mother and the warrior in terms of equality of risk with those roles making equal contributions to societies. However, Elshtain suggests this is largely an inaccurate construction of historical reality, and an improper polarity.


64. Ibid.


66. Ibid.


70. "The WAACs" (editorial), NYT, 11 July 1942, p.12.

71. Kathleen McLaughlin, "Army Asks WAAC for 80,000 Women," NYT, 18 July 1942, p.3.


78. Elsie Testa, "Would Have Women Stay at Home" (letter), NYT, 23 July 1942, p.18.


81. "800 a Day Seek to Join WAVES...," NYT, 7 August 1942, p.20.
82. "New Aides Named to WAVES Staff," NYT, 8 August 1942, p.7.
86. "436 Commissioned as WAAC Officers" (UP), NYT, 30 August 1942, p.15.


CHAPTER 3
EMERGENCY SERVICE AND SCANDAL, 1943

Despite the upbeat press coverage in 1942, the debates surrounding military women continued into 1943 but they shifted from addressing whether women should be in the military at all, to simply working out the details of their presence. This shift was evidence that although injury to femininity would continue to be discussed, the issue was not really of supreme importance anymore. Of more concern would be the suspected immorality of the women who would join the military or the encouragement of immorality in otherwise "normal" women by the military. Scandals in the American women's corps contrasted with newspaper and periodical representation of foreign women, both in Allied services and in resistance or even enemy forces, making serious contributions to their respective war efforts. Some used arms and many faced dangers. Again, their visibility in American media had an effect on the debate on militarized women in the United States.

One of the debated details was whether the enlistment age for women in the military should be lowered to eighteen to correspond with the age of male draft eligibility. Rep. Dirksen introduced a bill to do so and the Times received letters in support of the move. Other details included whether to militarize female doctors, if nurses could marry, if nurses should receive real rank and pay commensurate with the WAVES and WAAC, if women should receive the same pay and benefits as men, and whether all women should be drafted or, if not, whether nurses should be
drafted. Two other debates continued from 1942—whether Navy women could marry Navy men, of high visibility, and whether the WAAC should actually become part of the Army Department (Women's Army Corps).

The story of the debate from 1943 to the end of the war is interesting and contradictory. Currents included increasing recognition of the need for military women, a backlash of feeling against women in the services, effects of that backlash on recruiting, and further reassurance to the public that military service, as suggested in Banning's 1942 article, would not destroy democracy, the home, or women’s femininity. In short, gender ideology and American culture, despite temporary accommodation to the war, would not change. In the meantime, as recruiting failed to reach required levels, women would be criticized and harassed for not doing the womanly (i.e., sacrificing) thing to assist the emergency war effort by joining the military.

The second year of American involvement in the war began with readers learning that the women-in-the-military 'experiment' was going well and that even the original military naysayers were asking for more women to replace men who wanted combat assignments. Military women, for their part, wanted to do whatever they could to help, including serve overseas. And the public discovered that nurses were not the only military women subject to enemy fire. A group of WAACs was undaunted when the Germans attacked a troop ship carrying a number of female lieutenants to North Africa. One reporter remarked the women were not only undiscouraged by the torpedo attack, but were impervious to the constant and "tasteless" humor (evidence that it was recognized as such even at the
time) at their expense in the press, among the public, and from military men. Said the article, "They don't even mind being the butt of a new genre of American humor, they are too busy to notice." Not everyone was making jokes, however. Donald Nelson, the Chairman of the War Production Board, "defended as necessary if not glamorous" the jobs of the WAACs who were part of "neither a circus nor a crusade...[but] an intense, immensely serious military project."

Even if, in the eyes of Nelson and others, they were an essential part of the military by 1943, women were still not treated equally with their male counterparts, as evidenced by continuing differences in pay and benefits. The NFBPW Clubs outlined a ten point legislative program which included some proposals for military women: WAVES and SPARs should be allowed to serve overseas; servicewomen should receive equal death, injury, and dependent benefits; and female doctors should be given commissions in the military on the same basis as their male colleagues. The NFBPW's other initiatives included support for equal pay for equal work and the ERA.

All of these issues continued to be debated even as the Marine Corps (USMC), noting the "quietly efficient British military women," decided it too would have a women's branch, directed by Mrs. Thomas (Ruth Cheney) Streeter, a lawyer and CAP pilot. Rep. Clare Booth Luce of the Military Affairs Committee applauded this action, as she felt the USMC was the "most important branch" of the military and should therefore definitely have women. Even more importantly, they would wear a "snappy uniform."

Even though all this media coverage seemed to show that the fight for militarizing women had been won, historical reviews of women's participation in war continued to appear in the periodicals in 1943. These stories undoubtedly lent positive support to continuing legislative
efforts to work out the details of placing women's military service on equal footing with men's. Life presented a photo essay of "Women Warriors Through History," citing Athena as the historical precedent for the WAAC: "Ever since man began to clutter up this earth with his needs and greeds, woman has been at his side enthusiastically assisting in the ensuing battles." The report highlighted the fact that women's participation had often been informal and not uniformed, and commented, "Though prejudice sometimes impelled these ladies to dress in trousers and false beards their efficiency was remarkable." Rudyard Kipling was quoted as suggesting that the female of the species was more deadly than the male and therefore useful in war. But no one was talking about officially sending women into combat, so this should have been a moot point. Finally, the article listed a long line of famous female warriors: Minerva; Pallas Athene, Goddess of Defensive Warfare; Queen Penthesileia, the Amazon; the Valkyrian superwomen; Queen Boadicea of England, who fought the Romans; Mother Ross of England, who fought the French; Joan of Arc; Catherine the Great of Russia; Molly Pitcher; Mary Read, the pirateer "Calico Jack"; Deborah Sampson; Clara Barton; mustachioed Confederate Loreta Velasques, who fought alongside her husband; and Kady Brownell of the Union's Rhode Island Volunteers.6

Despite these inspirational words and role models, recruiting began to lag behind expanded 1943 goals. The backlash had started. Newsweek was quick to turn from sarcasm and humor to blame, claiming that the 1942 media hype that glorified women's wartime service had been premature. Whereas eighty-four percent of men were employed or in the service, only twenty-nine percent of women were. It is unclear whether, but unlikely that, these numbers included only military members or also those who were doing voluntary war work, working at home, performing domestic services,
or staying in school. The numbers supposedly included all women over the age of fourteen, even though our society treated men's and women's ages very differently and many would not expect middle- and upper-class women from fourteen to eighteen (perhaps even twenty-one) to be working outside the home and definitely not serving in the military. The twenty-nine percent was compared to much higher numbers of British and Russian women, but the magazine also acknowledged that these countries were in considerably more danger than Americans felt themselves to be in. They also had had more time to organize women. While blaming some women for feeling no wartime responsibility, at least *Newsweek* recognized some of the reasons for the failure of women to match men's participation rates: lack of child care; "the conventional bugaboo against working wives in non-urban areas" (this was heightened by the recent Depression era criticism of women supposedly taking men's jobs); the availability of higher paying jobs in the civilian sector (although this would not have affected the twenty-nine percent number much if it included all women working in support of the war, not just military women); the military bungles that allowed female college graduates to get stuck doing menial jobs; hiring that left women idle and dissatisfied; and the lack of training programs. Rather than addressing any of the problems affecting volunteer recruiting, the article tells readers that Paul McNutt, in charge of War Manpower, instead wanted to register women with special talents for a draft if they would not volunteer.\(^7\)

Reflecting the shift away from criticizing or mocking women who wanted to join the military to criticizing those who did not, were conversions among sailors and soldiers who had previously opposed the entire idea of women in the services. As an indication that military women were finally "real news," the first male reporter to get a by-line
writing about servicewomen in the *Times*, Hanson Baldwin, recognized that
"WAVES, tentatively accepted and half-feared by the Navy" at first, were
by early 1943, "a definite and important part of the naval service." Commanders' demands for more women exceeded capacity. He commented that
the public had grown so accustomed to the WAVES that a young boy, upon
seeing a sailor said, "Oh, look mother...there's a man WAVE." Still,
Baldwin's piece belied that reported cultural acceptance when he ended by
noting that he still could not get used to "some girl yelling 'Gangway!'
and blondes and brunettes jumping to attention." The fact that women
in 1943 were still typified by their physical attributes was an indicator
that gender ideology was holding fast. This was also substantiated by
Hobby's and McAfee's comments to college women. They said that women's
military service was a temporary emergency measure and urged them to stay
in school. "Woman's place is still in the home....[Your staying in school
and completing your degree is the best thing you can do to] keep those
homes free and happy." Despite that kind of comment by the senior
military women, McAfee seemed ambivalent when she added that although
women would be willing to return to their homes after the war, she still
hoped they would be evaluated and placed in jobs based on their
qualifications rather than their sex. She observed that Navy women "are
accepted as equals when they are equals."³

McAfee had to address another problem that year. Early in 1943
racial issues resurfaced. The New York City Council passed a resolution
condemning racial discrimination in the military. The WAVES and SPARs,
although theoretically open to blacks, had no black members, whereas the
WAAC had had black women since its formation. No immediate action was
taken, but discussion continued.
The Army did not have to deal with race problems at the time but concerns in early 1943 centered on the bill to transform the WAAC into the WAC. Rep. Rogers reminded the House that she had originally wanted the women to be a formal part of the Army but that the War Department had taken the more cautious route because of Congressional resistance and the military need for quick action. It was the performance of the WAACs in North Africa that apparently solidified the military leadership in revisiting her suggestion. Brig.Gen. Person, of the General Staff's Legislative Division, told Congress that it was important that the women have a "better defined standing" in case they became POWs. There did not seem to be any legislative or public outcry relative to this remark. It would appear that the specter of women becoming POWs would neither disqualify them for combat-area service nor shock the public or military. The Senate passed the WAC Bill giving Army women the same status as their Navy counterparts. The debate continued in the House where Hobby admitted that the bill allowed for sending women to "combat areas" but that Congress would have to "trust" the Army not to misuse that authority. This is interesting since WAACs were already serving effectively in North Africa, nurses were certainly in combat areas, and the women who would follow the Allied invasion forces throughout the war would be subjected to enemy fire. On pay and benefit issues, Brig.Gen. White, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, assured members of the House that military couples would not be able to draw double allowances. Curiously, Hobby asked that the women receive the same benefits as male soldiers except for dependent benefits. Of course they were not allowed to have children and it was presumed that their husbands would not be "dependents". Still, this ignored any possibility that women might have been responsible for a handicapped husband, an elder relative, or that some soldiers' wives might.
not be "dependent" either (if they had independent incomes). At the same
time Hobby emphasized that because the women were taking the same risks as
men they should be allowed the same military benefits. She insisted that
the women needed to be covered by the Articles of War in the same way as
military nurses. Making them a Regular, although temporary, part of the
Army would accomplish that. As evidence of their value, she also informed
the House that the WAACs were currently replacing men "one for one...in
the field" so there was no wasted woman/manpower.11

Hobby’s broad and taxing responsibilities included not only constant
congressional testimony, but also responsibility for, at the peak, 100,000
WAACs. The rank that should have accompanied these responsibilities, for
Hobby and the other directors, had also been debated since before the WAAC
measure was passed. This issue was carried over into the WAC Bill
discussions and, later, into those on whether WAVES should be allowed
overseas service. The House Military Affairs Committee finally passed the
WAC Bill in March but it did not address one other issue—the
militarization of women doctors, which would continue to be opposed.

-Time reported both the change of women from auxiliary to Regular
Army status (WAAC to WAC) and the desperation with which commanders in the
field wanted more women. Again it was the military which was pushing
militarization and expansion, not 'radical feminists.' The magazine
asserted that the movement was not part of a larger equal rights movement:
"Never a public word did the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps say about equal
rights." Reporters believed that when the House Military Affairs
Committee dusted off the bill to make the female members of the Army the
equals of those of the Navy, "passage was assured." Time highlighted some
stipulations in the bill which were not reported in the New York Times.
Women could only command women (this restriction would not last long),
military women would receive no dependent benefits from military husbands, and the director would be a colonel. *Time* also pointed out that Hobby's promotion was appropriate, as the Director would be responsible for more personnel than were commanded by some male, three-star generals. Given this, it was surprising that no one asked why she was not promoted to general. Army women, by virtue of these changes, would receive free postage, death benefits, life insurance, overseas pay, flight pay, retirement pay (if the war lasted twenty years and they served for the duration), and disability pay (a tacit recognition that they might be in danger). *Time* acknowledged that, as in Britain, this "new kind of soldier" was being recognized (given Regular status) because of proven service. For the last six months the WAAC had been keeping its own relevant statistics. In some jobs women were performing better than men, relieving one and a half men from typing, clerking, and switchboard operating. In other jobs, such as driving, they only relieved three quarters of a man, because women supposedly had less strength and endurance. Of 45,000 WAACs, over two hundred of the "Des Moines debs" were serving in North Africa. Brig.Gen. White told Congress, "They do a lot better than men and learn more quickly." When asked about the truth of columnist Walter Winchell's report that the WAACs were the Army's "biggest problem" in North Africa and might be sent home, he answered that this was "not only...without foundation, but WAACs there [were] performing...so satisfactorily that General Eisenhower [had] requested many more."12

In fact, it is interesting to note that because the Army could not get enough WAACs fast enough to fulfill overseas commanders' requests, it began hiring civilian women employees to replace WAACs stateside so they could send the Army women overseas—a new wrinkle on the original
requirement to release servicemen for combat by releasing a WAAC for overseas duty. As the WAAC was beginning to have trouble filling recruiting goals, the Army hired a new agency, N. W. Ayer and Son of Philadelphia, to design magazine advertisements. One included a letter from a father to a daughter who had asked for advice about the military. The agency claimed this reflected the attitudes of men from a nationwide survey by the Army and their agency which concluded, "a woman seldom if ever makes a major decision except with the approval of, or in defiance of, a man." Since the agency did not do a survey of women's attitudes it must be concluded that the campaign was in fact geared to prompt men to take the initiative and encourage women to join and hope the women would not defy them.\textsuperscript{13}

The Marines, getting a late start on their recruiting, finally began to enroll women in February 1943. They would only accept women who did not have children under eighteen and who were not married to Marines. USMC women would go to WAVES basic training. Lt.Gen. Holcomb, Marine Corps Commandant, asked the women to come aboard, saying, "We of the Corps invite them to join us, to wear our uniforms, to share our trials and triumphs, to march with us to victory." He said that although their tasks would not be simple, he had no doubt of women's ability or determination to succeed. In answer to the fuss about what the female Marines would be called, he said they would not have a nickname, for "Marine" was distinctive enough--"no word in the dictionary means more" or would do them justice. The \textit{Times} noted that the Marine Corps was "first in World War I, and last in World War II" to accept women.\textsuperscript{14}

Although, the late-comer Marines had no trouble filling their enlistment goals, the WAACs were still falling behind inflated quotas. Talk of a draft started. Interviews with senior civilian and military
women reflected their concerns. The Assistant to the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, Charlotte Carr, spoke of the possibility of compulsory service. Director McAfee suggested that the most mobile women be drafted for the military. She claimed that both men and women had been surprised that women could do so many things—they performed well, could keep secrets, give orders, take orders, get up early, and live without luxuries, or even conveniences. Col. Hobby added that military women had disproved the "notion that women in general, and the spoiled American women in particular, can not adjust themselves to discipline." However, her next comment may have worried strict gender ideologues when she said, the militarization of women was "...an adventure, [for] an emergency...[which would have] unknown social impact."\(^{15}\)

While a draft was being discussed, overseas duty for WAVES continued under debate. Mrs. Forrestal, wife of the Under-Secretary of the Navy, predicted that the restriction would be lifted. From studying the British Women's Royal Navy (WREN), she believed that the Navy's needs for replacing men for sea duty would prevail. In fact, the limits on the numbers of SPARs was lifted as their original purpose, also to relieve men for combat, was expanded—requiring double the anticipated numbers.\(^{16}\) The Maas Bill, in addition to allowing the assignment of WAVES overseas, would have made it a permanent corps, given the director 0-6 (captain's) rank, and provided for military pensions for naval women. But the bill was not making much progress in the House. Supporters pointed out that the WAACs were already serving overseas. Rep. Vinson endorsed the bill, as did the Navy itself. Rep. Fish, however, apparently believed women needed to be protected from the possibility of even voluntary military service, as well as assignment overseas. Rep. Vincent, always the detractor asked, "Do you have to pay the womanhood of this nation to be patriotic?"—a strange
question since men in the military were of course not only paid, but many had had to be drafted as well. But he was applauded when he said, "I am not opposed to women serving in a crisis [as volunteers]. What I am opposed to is this glorifying of a few glamorous girls that are seeking to get into the limelight through the provisions of the [WAAC] bill we passed last July." His attitude toward the female directors--Hobby, McAfee, Streeter, and Cheney--were not reflected in the press, which presented these women to the public, not as "glamour girls," but as respected professionals who were soberly going about their service to the nation. Representatives C. Jasper Bell and Michael J. Bradley also voiced opposition to the bill. They recited a poem to the House which included the line, "Let's keep women at home and let the men do the fighting." Rep. Luce rose to the challenge with another history lesson, saying, "We women come from a race of fighting American women...our women used to put out the flames of their burning houses with the bloody shirts of their dead husbands. As a matter of fact, a national heroine, Molly Pitcher, was the first Waac. We have always been fighting women and never afraid to do our part."¹⁷

In addition to continuing legislative debates, military women's social lives and fraternization continued to be a hot topics in the press. When the Times reported that two thousand WAACs were on their way to Britain, the writer took the trouble to point out that the women were all widowed or single, and presumably "available". The reporter was primarily concerned with dating and the male soldiers' entertainment. The enlisted men were pleased with the regulations on fraternization, as they thought they would have a better chance with the enlisted WAACs if the officers were not competing for their attention. However, it was also pointed out that, in violation of fraternization regulations but in the spirit of
"love will find a way," officer nurses often dated male privates. At least readers were also told that while the women were excited about this new "social phase of their lives," their primary ambition was not dating but "doing my job as a Waac."\textsuperscript{18}

Combat, apparently considered less serious than dating possibilities, and thus not a big issue, was only discussed briefly. Women were starting to be assigned to AA batteries, but unlike their British sisters, WAACs would not be allowed to fire the guns.\textsuperscript{19} Earlier, the AAC had conducted an experiment in which women joined male batteries doing every job associated with the function and did them all quite well. Despite proving they could do the job, letting them shoot was not politically or ideologically 'correct', so it was never instituted after the experiment. The Navy also had something to say about women fighting. Capt. Underwood believed,

> There seems to be no limit to what these women can be trained to do. I do not advocate or believe in the necessity for training women for combat duty, but I am profoundly convinced that American women are capable of it should the necessity arise.\textsuperscript{20}

As opposed to combat discussions, the WAAC's first birthday in 1943 garnered quite a bit of print. The coverage indicated some of the key elements of the debates. \textit{Time} took a serious tone. It appears that the editors or reporters were finally converted. The WAAC had had a hard year recruiting only fifty-eight thousand—a third of its goal. This was still outstanding, in that it was over twice the original goal of twenty-five thousand, which the Army had quickly increased when it realized the usefulness of enlisting women. Even more to their credit, every WAAC was a volunteer and had enlisted despite having "endured cheap jokes and poor public reactions." The problem with recruiting, \textit{Time} hypothesized, had
been people's "slow retreat from apathy and prejudice" to realize the necessity and importance of military women.

The biggest difficulty of the WAAC, which affects recruiting the most, is one neither Congress nor the Corps can cure...[It is the public] which has stopped thinking of the Japs as funny little fellows, but which still fails to take seriously the need for women in war."

There had to be a change in public opinion which had been "clouded by a poor press, by mistaken glamour and misplaced publicity." Another advertising agency hired by the WAAC believed, based on surveys and echoing previous advertising campaign targeting, that the "main resistance to WAAC recruiting is not among women, but among the men in every woman's life--American men are notoriously softhearted about their women." Remembering the ordeal the British women had to go through before women warriors were taken seriously, Time wondered whether "anything less than the hard urgency of military necessity could break this sentimental slavery."

In contrast to the public's reservations, the services' leadership, at least, had learned the desirability of "soldiers in skirts, not merely as ersatz men, but for their own sakes and skills." Women's jobs had expanded during their first year from 4 to 140. Commanders' requests for WAACs totaled 500,000 (the Army Air Forces (AAF) alone wanted 375,000). Overseas commanders requested more than 18,000. In releasing men for combat there was not always a one-for-one swap. At one post, 56 women replaced 128 men in the mail, personnel, and records offices. They achieved their successes as "Stepsisters to the Army" who did not have the same privileges as women in the other services. The Time report went on to say that the Rogers Bill, which had been long delayed, soon would "make the WAACs full-blooded members of the Army,...[and] give the girls their rights."
Newsweek covered the WAAC anniversary as well. The original skepticism over how women would do with discipline, lack of liberty, and taking orders was still prevalent, it reported, but not among the women in charge. This article ambivalently recognized that while there were some "misfits" in the WAAC, most of the Army women were enthusiastic and their work and behavior were "splendid". Since all the women were volunteers they had high morale and the "unstable ones" were weeded out in training. Finally, par for the course, the article turns to the dating issue with the news flash that, although WAAC commanders allowed dating for morale reasons, they would limit the dates of their charges if they thought they were approaching "social burnout." Finally, the article points out that the WAACs were proud of their uniforms and even liked to wear them off duty. Their friends were often disappointed if they showed up at a social engagement in civilian clothes. These WAACs, readers were told, were "ladies first"; they did not smoke on the street and only drank inconspicuously (behaviors not included in the cultural definition of femininity). This article conflicted dramatically with later reporting of alleged WAAC misbehavior.23

The Times coverage of the WAAC birthday started with a quote from President Roosevelt conveying his congratulations and gratitude:

One year ago today a new page was written into the military history of our nation. With the organization of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps the women of our nation were given an opportunity they had long hoped for. They were to share with the men the greatest privilege of an American citizen--the right to serve in the defense of our country.24

The argument here that military service is both a privilege and a right of citizenship would be lost in the 1990s as much as it was in the 1940s, when debaters claimed that the inclusion of women was merely a "social experiment." This "social experiment" position was also in serious

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conflict with our political ideology and created continuing problems for marginalized groups in our society. Each time basic human rights appear to be a matter for debate, an open season has been created for discrimination. In any case, the President went on to say that although there were many who smiled at the prospect of women soldiers and some who were violently opposed, he had only respect and admiration for the "spirit, the dignity and the courage they have shown."

Two of the three articles discussed above continued the media trend of the trivialization of women's military service by, on the one hand, focusing on dating, fashions, and hints of "instability", while praising women's efficiency on the other. This was a perfect example of the fact that acknowledgement of usefulness does not equal acceptance, validation, or recognition of importance, and which continued as an undercurrent in these debates through four decades and beyond.

Although everyone celebrated the WAAC birthday, there was nothing to celebrate with regard to its continued "auxiliary" status. The bill to change the WAAC to the WAC moved forward at a snail's pace. The House passed the Senate Bill in May 1943, but added amendments. Fortunately, two of the amendments proposed by Rep. Vincent--prohibiting overseas duty for WACs, as well as disability benefits--were defeated. Considering that there were already many WAACs serving overseas it is hard to imagine the former passing. Three approved amendments included limiting the corps to 150,000 members even though the Secretary of War had testified that 500,000 were needed; lowering the enlistment age minimum from twenty-one to twenty despite supporters' desires to lower it to eighteen to correspond to the draft age for men; and limiting WAC officer authority to corps administration--no woman would command men. During the House debate, Rep. Rogers told her colleagues that the WAAC, who were doing a
"very fine patriotic job," would be "more valuable in the Army" than in an auxiliary. Opposition to the WAVES Overseas Bill, which had been shelved since Easter, resurfaced in this WAC debate. The WAVES Bill also included disability benefits and would make the WAVES a permanent corps. The opposition argued that women (WAVES and WACs) should not serve overseas while men who were eager to go were stuck stateside. It was not clear whether the men who were eager to go were in the right jobs, (i.e., filling the types of clerical positions for which the women were trained and eligible). A second argument, that shipping women overseas wasted space on transports which could be used for combat troops, was inconsistent with the first argument for sending non-combatant men, and was never backed by any evidence. Detractors also argued against affording women any dependent benefits.²⁶

Strangely, Congress continued arguing whether the WAVES should be assigned overseas during the course of the WAC Bill debates. The two bills were at odds in many respects, while similar in others. The WAVES Bill included giving Navy women full dependent benefits unlike the WACs, but made the director an 0-6 (Navy captain) like the Army's Col. Hobby. Rep. Margaret Chase Smith championed the WAVES cause, but was forced to compromise in discussions in the House Naval Affairs Committee, agreeing to exclude WAVES from combat aircraft and ships, to not send any WAVES overseas as long as there were available billets in Washington, and to exclude husbands from being considered dependents. The Committee approved this version of the bill. Adm. Jacobs supported the bill but joined Rep. Maas in wanting to remove the limits on the numbers of female 0-5s (commanders). The House passed the bill with Maas's amendment against the vigorous opposition of Rep. Vincent. As an aside, the Times reported that Rep. Smith got to ride on a destroyer despite the proposed ban on Navy
women serving on them. Unusual in the 1940s, this would be a common occurrence in the 1970s and 1980s when Congresswomen would be courted by the military to support budgets by allowing them to ride on aircraft and ships from which military women were barred.

The House also unanimously passed a bill, mirroring that for the WAVES, to send SPARs overseas. In the Senate, however, Walsh opposed the WAVES/SPARs Overseas Bills, saying, "The Navy...is a male organization," and complained that the original bill passed by the Senate, which specified that WAVES would only be used in the continental U.S., was good enough despite the outstanding "Yeomanettes" and female Marines' overseas service in World War I. Supporters of the bill emphasized that women were just as patriotic and willing to serve overseas as their male counterparts and were needed. In arguing against making the WAVES director a captain, Walsh claimed that since men had to work their way up through the ranks, it would be unfair to provide an automatic rank for a woman solely by virtue of her position. However, it was not entirely true that all men had to work their way up in World War II or other previous wars, as many were given immediate commissions and significant rank in conjunction with senior positions and battlefield operations, as well as for civilian fame or experience. Would the WAVES director start as a seaman or would the women's service have a male captain or admiral as director?

The debate continued in the Senate until October 1943 when it failed to pass, as the Navy finally "acceded to Senate pressure" to drop support for sending the WAVES overseas. This too contradicts a 1990s impression that radical feminists and liberals in Congress always pushed the military to accept advances for women. AP reported that the Navy was "a little disappointed" but that the Senate Naval Affairs Committee (read Sen. Walsh) felt that although the WAVES were doing an excellent job, there
were few overseas posts they could fill. It is curious that the Committee failed to note that the Navy experts disagreed. The Senate had at least agreed in the course of the debate to expand/equalize women's benefits and to allow for one captain, the director. However, the Senate amendment specifically forbade the Navy from assigning women overseas. Again, the Navy disagreed but did not want the rest of the legislation to be delayed even longer. In November, Secretary Knox vowed he would do everything possible to see that in the future it would be possible for sea-service women to serve overseas. Director McAfee, promoted to captain at the end of November, promised she would ask that the Overseas Bill be revived when all stateside billets were filled. She also commented, relative to declining enlistments, that if more women were needed beyond those who volunteered, women should be drafted. She felt that women would not object. 29

Outside of Congress, other debates continued through 1943. At the end of May the Citizens Committee of Harlem exchanged letters with Secretary Knox concerning the admission of more blacks to the Navy. He lamely responded that they were not represented in high enough numbers to warrant a larger number of replacements for casualties. In June, the Wisterians, black graduates of Hunter College, protested the Navy's "ban" on black women in the WAVES. 30 In November, the legislature offensively proposed that "illiterate negroes" be drafted before (white) fathers. Although this sounds highly offensive today, the Negro Council with its own transparent agenda, agreed to support this suggestion but only if the services would desegregate and allow blacks to serve in combat rather than just as menial laborers; if blacks were allowed to vote in Southern poll tax states; if more black nurses were admitted to the Army; and if black women were accepted into the Navy and Coast Guard. 31 The discussion
apparently was tabled after these demands. On another racial front
though, the women's corps did not seem to have any problems. They
accepted Nisei women with open arms. Of course the propaganda value was
high. The first Japanese-American was inducted into the WAC in December.
This second generation American said, "I hope to help make the land of my
ancestors pay for its unwarranted attack on my country."\textsuperscript{32}

Propaganda may have been necessary and in mid-1943, it seemed some
of the periodicals were becoming more positive about women in the
services. This may have been due partly to the shortages of women
recruits and the military decision that so many more were needed.
Articles supported recruiting efforts by addressing the post-war benefits
to women of having served in the military and by emphasizing how women
truly did retain their femininity despite their militarization.
Obviously, these issues were perceived as major concerns of families/men,
if not of the women themselves (since all the advertising surveys focused
on persuading men to encourage their women to enlist).

Having always been supportive, the \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, in May
1943, "saluted" the WAVES who were taking advantage of a "glorious
opportunity" but one that was "tough" and without "romance" or "glamour".
WAVES service would help women after the war, the \textit{Monitor} claimed,
especially in business, where they would know how to work hard, talk less,
be exacting, highlight their individuality, and practice consideration for
others. Although it may have caused some raised eyebrows among those who
did not think women should work outside the home after they completed
their "emergency service," the \textit{Monitor} did not seem to have a problem with
the idea of women working. The periodical did voice concern that the
number of WAVES applicants would drop off as the news of advances on the
fighting front and the lack of a draft incentive for women. Authors
emphasized women were needed more than ever and that there was "not a better way to help the country win the war." The article pointed out that the interviewed WAVES recruiter, Lt. Mary Daily of Chicago, was a real woman: "Besides being efficient she is very pretty, she is feminine every inch--yet every inch, shall we say, a 'sailor'." She was asked if men were reluctant to salute a woman officer and she answered "for a time," indicating that gender relations had improved as the initial opposition from individual sailors declined.33

Reader's Digest, in an excerpt from the New York Herald-Tribune, continued the "efficient but retaining femininity" theme in its salute to the WAACs, saying, "The Waacs are feminine, but they're darned good soldiers." In emphasizing how enthusiastic Army leaders were about the women, author Blake Clark recounted the story of a General, who upon welcoming a young WAAC into his unit, said, "My dear young lady, I am glad to see you...I hope you've come to take my place." Writers added, "They are doing their jobs so well that officers in the field have piled up requests for over 600,000 more." The President had even raised the recruiting target from 25,000 to 150,000, in order to replace ten divisions of combat capable men.

This Reader's Digest article also described the conversions of lower-ranking men: "Most of the officers at Fort Devens were at first somewhat dubious of the Waacs' abilities. They have changed their minds." In charge of auto mechanics and drivers, Lt. Farr wanted all WAACs, saying that at first some officers had said, "No woman is going to drive me around...[Now] if we had a thousand Waac drivers they'd all be asked for." It must have become a status symbol to have a woman driver, since Eisenhower had one. The last soldier to be won over at Devens was Sgt. John Linske who had remarked, "I'll reserve judgement until I see them
drill." Soon he was gushing, "They're so damned good they make monkeys out of some of the old soldiers around here." The WAACs really liked drill whereas the men hated it. The Post had to prohibit the women from marching at night by flashlight.

The article goes on to repeat that "the pleas of commanding officers for more WAACs have resulted in the addition of twenty-five new WAAC job classifications." And, in training, the WAACs had a "surprising ability to adjust quickly to so different a life--no talking back, no quitting, no special favors." The conversion of the Army seemed to be complete, since, "The supreme recognition that the WAACs have proved their capability came last February, when sixteen WAAC officers began classes at the Command and General Staff School of the U.S. Army at Ft. Leavenworth." This was the first time women had been admitted to the toughest military school in the country, usually open only to male majors and higher with a minimum of seventeen years field service.

The *Digest* actually focused on some of the cultural aspects of the debate. The reasons women gave for joining reportedly included that "sweethearts, wives, mothers, and daughters long[ed] to share wartime experiences with their men in uniform." If it was not already clear that people were implying that service made women better post-war partners, that was confirmed with statements like, "Most Waacs, of course, look forward to marriage and motherhood." But then for some readers came a scary thought--some women planned to use their WAAC training to work after the war. More frightening, perhaps, to those who wanted to maintain the gender ideology was speculation that postbellum, "many plan to stay in the Corps" to assist with the inevitable task of European reconstruction. The article provided a small concession to the strict ideologues, stating, "They think there is something appropriate in a woman's hand feeding the
hungry children of Europe." But the real debate over the military's peacetime inclusion of women would wait until much later in the war. Returning yet again to a central issue, writers observed that "the Waacs are good soldiers but still feminine." The media focus on underwear and dating continued in this article, too, emphasizing the flap that resulted when the government stopped issuing girdles. Of course, there had also been a flap when they started. The point was made that the women did not have much time for social relations, followed by a review of the new slang associated with Army women: Ft. Des Moines was "Mrs Hobby's Waacs Works"; WAACs were "Hobby Horses" or "Waac-asses" since trainees stayed in refurbished stables; WAAC officers were "Second Louises" (male second lieutenants were "Second Louis"), their rank insignia was "costume jewelry"; and in North Africa, women's life-preservers were "second fronts." Another bit of silliness--the only concession reportedly made to what this article identified as women's natural desires for "special favors"--was that the Army allowed them window shades. In actuality, other evidence shows that women did not ask for "special favors." Instead, the shades were provided by the military because of their emphasis on women's sexuality (i.e., protection from expected peeping Tom's).

Besides underwear and dating, another item of constant news interest from mid-1943 to the end of that year was the "Slander Campaign" against the WAAC. This is covered in great detail by Mattie Treadwell in her official World War II history of the WAAC/WAC. The Campaign seemed to start in a small segment of the media, although it can be argued that rumors of military women's immorality were previously rife in the services themselves. This is an important part of the debate on women in the military, since many aspects of the arguments reflect the three primary
fears: that military experience would change women's morals for the worse; that the American home and culture would be destroyed; and that women's femininity would be damaged. The latter is relevant only if one supposes that immoral women are not feminine—an idea subscribed to, however obliquely, by many of those opposed to the militarization of women. In other words, this view supported a moral and military double standard for men and women according to dominant gender ideology. Women must be sexually innocent and naive and reserved until marriage for their husbands. Men are perceived as having a stronger sex drive, and are implicitly encouraged to gain sexual experience before marriage. Interestingly, in attempting to discount the rumors of WAAC immorality, other elements of the press actually succeeded in keeping the issue in front of readers. One might wonder whether the motivation was patriotic or pandering.

In June 1943 the Times began reporting on a March incident originally reported in the New York Daily News. The Times stated that Eleanor Roosevelt denounced as Nazi propaganda the rumors about moral misbehavior among women's military units, adding that Americans seemed to fall for such propaganda all the time. Both Rep. Rogers and Mrs. Roosevelt believed that the totally fallacious rumors of immorality were of value to the enemy. The Times recapped that a columnist for the Daily News, John O'Donnell, had started the rumors by reporting that the War Department was issuing contraceptives and prophylactic devices to the women under a secret agreement with Col. Hobby. Rogers blasted him, asserting that these "fine, patriotic women" were releasing men for combat and such slander was a reflection on the "whole of American womanhood." Remember that, although during initial 1942 debates on the formation of the WAAC, Margaret Sanger had proposed that contraceptives should be
issued to the women, the rumors of their actual distribution were thoroughly investigated and proved false. (One must wonder how the militarization debate would have gone later if they had been true.) In fact, representatives of nine religious denominations toured basic training units at Forts Des Moines and Ogelthorpe and issued the statement, "We feel the parents concerned about the moral and spiritual well-being of their daughters can be reassured."\textsuperscript{36} Newsweek leapt into the fray as well, saying, "Part of the Washington correspondents' corps last week rushed to the defense of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. The question at issue: Waac morality."

Upon reading O'Donnell's article stating that groups of WAACs were guilty of misconduct and that many were sent home from North Africa pregnant, Rep. Vincent, who opposed militarizing women and WAAC overseas assignments from the beginning, wanted to know about the "trouble" with the women. He had read that they "had to be given protection probably by the convents or by the Mothers Superior." It is unclear why, if the WAACs had been issued contraceptives, so many of them would be sent home pregnant. In fact, of the three hundred WAACs sent to Africa only three had returned home. Only one, married to a soldier, was pregnant. In any case, WAAC supporters were angry that rumor and innuendo were made a matter of the Congressional Record by Vincent when the investigation into O'Donnell's allegations had proven them false.

Newsweek's report on the issue covers a party attended by Congresswomen and female reporters to demonstrate their disgust for the "contemptible" rumors. Representatives Smith and Rogers were there, as were Helen Essary, Washington Times-Herald; Hope Riding Miller, Washington Post; and Ann Cotrell, New York Herald-Tribune. Newsweek reported that on 9 June, O'Donnell had printed his original accusation and on the next day
he had written that Col. Hobby denied the allegation, saying "there's no foundation of truth." This article emphasized that O'Donnell, the Daily News, and the Washington Times-Herald did not really retract the report, but just acknowledged that Hobby denied it. Newsweek went on to point out that Secretary Stimson was greatly disturbed about the "sinister rumors" and that an exasperated Eleanor Roosevelt asked, "Will we ever get over believing Nazi propaganda?" Given the continued uproar, it is reasonable to suspect that the issue was getting blown out of proportion because the periodicals wanted the inflammatory and titillating, and therefore inherently newsworthy, discussion to continue.

The whole episode caused yet more problems for recruiting, which was already lagging. Newsweek pointed out that the scandal could cause Catholic leaders to order their women to stay out of the military, as they had tried to do earlier. Finally, the House Military Affairs Committee belatedly decided to launch its own independent inquiry, asking Hobby and the Army Surgeon General, Norman Kirk, for information. Although perhaps well intentioned, this action seemed to legitimate concerns.37

Time's report claimed the moral highground from the rest of the media. Many "honest" newspapermen were supposedly "outraged" by the "flashy, pompous" O'Donnell who reportedly hated Roosevelt and everything about his administration. Since he could not attack the President directly without being accused of unpatriotic motives, he thought he could attack Roosevelt through this campaign against the character of military women. Even though charges were again proved false and there were many counterattacks, the damage, as with all rumors used against military women, had already been done. Time acknowledged that while there had been previous rumors about enlisted women's immorality and misconduct, "O'Donnell (rumormonger) gave the rumors wings and beak, reporting the
rumors [as fact] and then refuting them in such a way to leave doubt whether he was taking it back or not."

_Time_ repeated part of O'Donnell's diatribe describing the militarization of women as "...a victory for the New Deal ladies [who think that] girls who want to go into uniform and fight...have the same right here and abroad to indulge their passing fancies." He quoted an unspecified "lady lawmaker" as saying "...you men think that there is nothing wrong if a soldier sleeps with a girl so long as he keeps his health. Well, the same argument goes both ways." Although calling attention to the double standard, this comment obviously added fuel to the fire.

_Time_ went on to include Hobby's refutation and Stimson's formal statement that the rumors were not only found to be false in a thorough investigation, but "anything which would interfere with [WAAC] recruiting or destroy the reputation of the Corps and, by so doing, interfere with the increase in combat strength of our Army, would [aid] the enemy..."
The Secretary continued that the,

unsubstantiated blockbuster was a cruel blow to the WAACs and the war effort...The Army wanted more WAACs...Congress was considering bills to make them a part of the Army, to allow WAVES to serve abroad. The U.S. was discovering as England did long ago, that woman power is essential to the armed forces in total war. O'Donnell's rumormongering was not calculated to speed that discovery."

The _Times_ supported the counterattack reporting Gen. Marshall's criticism of the slander, saying that the WAAC was "as fine an organization of women as I have ever seen assembled" and that he too considered the rumors an attack on the war effort. Eleanor Darnton of the _Times_ reported that similar rumors had been spread in Britain and they had proved false too. She maintained, though, that "No other country in the world would allow a
newspaper to attack the character of its women." Rep. Rogers continued the offensive, suggesting the Sedition Laws be changed to punish such rumormongering. Her proposal was eventually dropped.

Darnton's article, like Newsweek's, also recounted the chronology of O'Donnell's articles: On 4 June, O'Donnell defended the WAACs after "the gaudy stories of the gay and careless way" they act; on 9 June, he reported the infamous "contraceptives agreement" and Hobby's denial--Darnton pointed out to readers that by that time it was too late, as "the sparks of doubt over WAAC immorality were already glowing"; O'Donnell then printed other stories about WAACs being sent home pregnant, with his numbers starting at twenty-six, rising to ninety, and topping out at five hundred. Darnton reconfirmed that there were only 292 WAACs sent to Africa, and only three sent home: one had gall bladder problems, one a nervous disorder, and one was the pregnant wife of an Army officer. On 10 June, Darnton recounted O'Donnell finally reported Stimson's statement that the rumors were false and valuable to the enemy, that the "girls" were fighting mad, and that recruiting was in a slump.

Later Gen. Marshall sent a letter praising the WAAC to Hobby to try to ameliorate the situation and told all his commanders that he felt the rumors were either Nazi inspired propaganda or a distasteful joke. All this ado only confirmed what Darnton referred to as the "Whisper Campaign" that had apparently started in March 1943 or earlier. But O'Donnell, having "fanned the flames if not actually lighted the fire" in June, caused worried parents and recruits to write the Army concerned letters. In fact, the rate of dismissal from the Army among women for bad conduct was surprising low. On 30 June, the President got involved, holding a news conference in which he verified that the rumors were false and were hurting the war effort.39
Even with that, the morality issue would not die. During the August American Legion Auxiliary Convention, members were told if they heard off-color stories about servicewomen not to laugh at them and not to pass them on. The convention passed a resolution against "attacks on the character of American women serving our flag" and cited their confidence in and admiration for them.\textsuperscript{40} Later, in interviews from Algiers, the \textit{Times} reported that Capt. Francis Marquis was surprised when told of the reports that WAACs had been sent home for moral infractions. It was the "first I've heard of it" she said, adding that as the commander of the women in question, she was in a better position to know. In fact, she said the WAACs went out of their way to observe the regulations since they were the first American military women overseas in this war and knew they had to make a favorable impression. She said that, even in the bombings, "The women were magnificent...they never showed fear or homesickness."\textsuperscript{41}

Despite this unfavorable press and "Whisper Campaign," conversions of those who had previously been opposed to enrolling women in the military continued through 1943. WAVES air traffic controllers were doing "excellent work," according to Adm. George McMurray, commander of the \textit{USS Hornet}. According to a \textit{Time} article, the female controller bringing the admiral in for landing had been so nervous she "bit all the lipstick off her lips." The admiral stated that the women had "proved themselves, in a job once reserved exclusively for men, on the grounds that it calls for cool, quick thinking in the pinches, a level head at all times." This was a significant turn-around from a Navy that had felt women were not suited to situations where there was "no time for knitting." Now the WAVES were reportedly accepted where "in emergencies lives depend on their fast reactions." One woman saved an airplane during a thunderstorm when there was so much static that radio communications went out. She brought the
plane in with code signal lights. These tower operations were a breakthrough for the WAVES.

Airmen had their fingers crossed when WAVE tower operators were proposed. They doubted if they could master complex regulations, charts, procedures, meteorological and radio skills (the WAACs have shied away from it), were suspicious of how women would bear up under control-tower pressures. But now the Navy is sold.42

Sixty percent of the male operators had been replaced by women. The sole difficulty in the field had been on the first day when the sailors had stared as the women climbed the ladders in skirts. After they changed to slacks the next day, it was clear sailing. This last reference, like the constant focus on trivialities like cosmetics, even as attempts at levity, detract from the women's contributions and achievements, as well as from the seriousness of their endeavors, while showing a public and military fascination with the femininity issue. At the same time, it shows how easily differences and difficulties encountered by women serving in non-traditional fields were resolved. Since these situations were actually worked out so quickly and simply, one can only wonder why the same kind of issues had to be resolved repeatedly over the next forty years, and each time more worry and energy was expended than necessary given the available historical examples.43

*Times* subscribers also read about conversions and resolutions of difficulties. Anne Peterson reported from Pensacola that the prevailing sentiment had changed from, "This is no place for a woman" to "We're sold on Waves." Adm. McMurray told her, "I predicted before the Waves were authorized that they would achieve remarkable success....[R]esults couldn't have been better." He exaggerated that whereas the men's reluctance was "a perfectly human reaction...in twenty-four hours it had disappeared." His men came to recognize that people should not be judged
as to whether they were male or female, but on how well they did their job. The admiral believed the Navy could assimilate even more women in order to release men for even tougher jobs. He asserted that there had been no discipline problems associated with the WAVES. There had been some tears, but the men were learning how to teach the women differently and better. In fact, when women became instructors, McMurray posited, "I think the men work harder for a girl teacher." A student pilot had told the admiral that he had told himself if the woman could do the job then so could he. McMurray added that the female instructors were "just as competent...and they have more patience."

*Newsweek*’s Vera Clay spent time with both the WAACs and the WAVES. In July she suited up as a WAAC with fourteen other magazine, radio, and newspaper women at Ft. Ogelthorpe and completed all basic training except for the oath and immunizations. Her article, though written in a rather sarcastic tone, shows something of a conversion. She started by recounting how much one soldier enjoyed his job of helping the women out of the trucks as they arrived and describing the uniform as a "straight-jacket". She believed the women’s "girl scout loyalty and feverish faith in the WAAC" was childish, but gave grudging praise to their impressive retreat ceremony. She noted that between classes and other responsibilities the women had little time for leisure. And added, "civilians are more concerned about Waac morals than are the Waacs themselves," since the Army women were proud, decent, and avoided promiscuity. Because of the fast tempo of training, most of the women spent their Saturday nights ironing in the barracks rather than carousing. By the end of training, Clay had acquired a "new and profound respect for the Waac...to be a Waac requires plenty of stamina and courage. The
process is tough, the work hard, the discipline stern. That doesn't bother the Waacs—they love it."

Her later article about time spent with the WAVES at Pensacola is more serious. For the naval assignment she did not wear a uniform or participate in training. She observed that military doctors liked the WAVES because, "Waves don't get sick as much as men." This contradicted a common view that the women were not as tough or physically capable as men and that they would miss more work due to illness. She still injected some typical attempts at humor at the expense of the military women. Although she recognizes that the female flight instructors are more patient, she recounts the stories of pilots asking air traffic controllers for dates during landings and of mechanics wearing "nail polish and lipstick," reassuring the public that these women were still "feminine". As she portrayed it, WAVES life at Pensacola had never a dull moment, with dates every night. The public could be confident that these women were shopping for husbands for the post-war return to normalcy. Because of female-to-male ratios, the single women said, "the pickings are good." This not being a training base, there was no curfew on the women as there was at Ogelthorpe. One does not have to wonder long why anyone would spread rumors about military women being more wild than the girl next door with this press presentation. The WAVES did wish that the "sand crabs" (civilians) would not always watch them with expectations that they were going to do something wrong. Clay ended with, "Navy men at the base now accept women, having transitioned from interest to jealousy to business as usual."45

While magazine readers were visiting WAAC and WAVES units, the legislation turning the WAAC into the WAC continued to move. FDR finally signed the bill on 3 July 1943. The law gave the women real rank, allowed
them to have military authority over men, gave them all the rights and benefits accruing to servicemen except dependent allowances, and opened more operational jobs. In addition, they would be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The size of the WAC would not be limited and the age of members was expanded to ages twenty through fifty. Col. Hobby would stay on as director and all members would have sixty days to decide to change over or resign. *Time* proclaimed that the women could finally "shuck off the stepsister status of auxiliaries." *Newsweek* pointed out that the women would be "full-fledged" members of the armed services rather than "mere auxiliaries." It seems that making the women a part of the Regular Army gave not only WACs but all servicewomen a credibility boost in the eyes of some who had previously treated them as a joke.

As the WAC measure went into effect in August, some estimated that over twenty percent of the WAAC members would leave. Some women complained that they had wanted to go overseas and had been stuck stateside. Others claimed they were needed at home because of sick family members. Reporter Estelle McBride asserted that there were "too many laggards" among the women, saying that estimates ranged from five to thirty percent for those wanting to resign. Allied victories were apparently causing overconfidence and encouraging women to go home. The *Times* specified that none of them said they were getting out because they could get higher paying civilian jobs. In fact, the WAAC reenlisted in the WAC at a rate of ninety percent and most that left cited family responsibilities as their motive. The press repeatedly reiterated that the military did not want to lose women during the change over. Eisenhower implored the WAACs in North Africa, "If a single one of you goes home, it is too many." Ninety-six percent of the female officers stayed. As the general watched the WAC swearing-in ceremony, he thanked
those who were going home and told them if their family responsibilities were resolved he hoped they would return.

The public watched even more women ship-out to overseas assignments at the end of 1943. The WACs in Africa told reporter Drew Middleton that they wanted frontline assignments. The women envied the British female Army Territorial Service (ATS) for having the opportunity to serve in AA batteries. The WACs wanted to do the same. They were, "fed up with gags about Wacs" and they felt only contempt for GIs with "short attention spans." Their commanders wanted thousands more of these competent, hard-driving soldiers.

Tania Long reported on the WAC's wild welcome in Great Britain, which "awed several hardened sergeants." The men acted appreciative but still a little wary: "They certainly do swell--better than the men. Will ya listen to that top kick? She's got the lingo all right. She's tough too. The only trouble is I can't get used to a top kick in curls." The "top kick" was a unit's most senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO).

By their first anniversary, WACs were serving on 225 Army posts in the U.S., England, and Africa. By then, the Times claimed, "the Wacs [were] a familiar part of the American Scene" and that "the Army [had] accepted the Wacs, too." Although this may have been a slight exaggeration, the temper had certainly changed since 1940 and even early 1943. The newspaper pointed out to readers that "every Wac means that one more man can stay home with his wife and children." Hobby had used a similar line earlier in supporting passage of the WAC Bill, claiming that a woman joining the WAC could keep a father at home and thereby preserve the "core of American civilization and culture [the family]." This is another instance where gender transgressions could be forgiven if given the higher purpose of protecting the family, which can be interpreted as
a womanly role. Hobby continued that "women as a group had always been the exponents and proponents of family life. They [would] now preserve and protect it." This encouragement was needed as there was a continuing shortage of women in the services, a simultaneous dropping of limitations on the numbers of women allowed in the service, and an increase in recruiting goals. Contributing to the shortfall was the fact that a small number of the WAAC had not transferred to the WAC.

The press reported the subsequent recruiting push, as well as discussion of a women's draft to solve the shortage. In August 1943, Secretary Stimson insisted there would not be a draft. He claimed the U.S., while respecting Britain's efforts, was not like the English when it came to female conscription. However, Gallup Polls of that month showed he might be mistaken as American women backed the idea but men did not. The respondents were told, "The Army and Navy have found that women are just as good as men and often better in many of the jobs connected with the military or naval administration...," and that the proposed draft would release men for combat and make up for shortages in women's recruiting. When asked if single women between eighteen and thirty-five should be drafted for non-combat jobs, thirty-nine percent of men agreed while fifty-one percent of women did. Fifty-eight percent of women in the targeted age group agreed. Those who were opposed to drafting women said that they did not really believe women were so seriously needed and that if a woman would not volunteer she would make a bad WAC anyway. The pollsters apparently did not ask if men who were drafted made worse soldiers than volunteers, and if so, if that made any difference. They also did not ask if respondents were against a male draft as well. In an unusual example, Mr. Charles Palmer wrote to the Times insisting that women should be drafted, saying that if the Army needed 300,000 more men
because WAC recruiting had fallen off, single women between twenty and thirty should be drafted as in Britain.52

Despite increased efforts and talk of a draft, recruiting was still not going well. Publicity in the guise of news articles started to address the issue again of whether women would be ruined by military service for their presumed post-emergency role as wife and mother. While Lucy Greenbaum of the Times started her article with an anecdote about a man who wanted to know if he could enlist his wife without her knowing, she goes on to point out that in most cases men tried to prevent the women in their lives from joining. She claimed the men had a difficult time because of a lack of understanding about what the women's service would entail and its effects on them. The women themselves had questions for recruiters concerning promotions, the type of work they would be doing, and if they could get dates. She reassured husbands and boyfriends that after the war, the women wanted, "like almost every other woman," to go home and raise a family. Once again, it appeared important that women not lose their femininity, their interest in men, or their supposed commitment to not pursuing a career after the crisis had passed.53

Despite such reassurance the recruiting problem garnered front page coverage by the Times at the end of November 1943. The military was pleased with the WAC performance but did not have nearly enough women. The title of the article said it all: "Full Draft of 300,000 Men Now Indicated for January: Due partly to the Lag in Wac Enlistments...." Since this was an AP release, readers all over the country learned that women, who were often discouraged from or laughed at for joining the military, were now to blame for the necessity of drafting so many more men—quite a turn of events in two short years.54
The War Department claimed it was a hopeless task to try to fill the 150,000 WAC authorizations and that 60,000 volunteers were all they could hope to get. Although the WAVES exceeded their goal slightly and the smaller Marines and SPARs met their goals easily, *Time* cited a problem for the WAC of a "vast apathy", a continued conviction among Americans concerning "a woman's place", and a dangerous perception in the public's mind that the war was already won. While soldiers who had had a chance to work with women wanted more to join, other servicemen who had not served with women still thought a woman's place was at home. While civilian men had reportedly come around to lukewarm endorsement of the idea for other women, they were not supportive of such a course for their "little woman." As for the women themselves, they were "increasingly reluctant to give up careers" in civilian or government employment. They earned more money; believed they were sacrificing enough for the war effort; and had inherited new responsibilities and obligations at home with their husbands, fathers, and brothers gone. *Time* writers complained that a "skeptical press and public" had gotten the military women off to a bad start, which had been compounded by the "mischief of John O'Donnell" and others in spreading the scandalous gossip of the WAACs' moral wantonness. This "Slander" had hurt all the women's services and subsequent recruiting.55

In December, Col. Hobby told the public in the face of this recruiting difficulty that many more WACs were needed but she doubted if enough would volunteer. At the same time she defended American women, emphasizing that all the women were volunteers rather than draftees and claiming that the military would not have found so many men volunteers (150,000) either. One reader questioned Hobby's figures in a letter asserting that the Army had raised many more male volunteers than that in
the Spanish-American War and World War I and that after Pearl Harbor many male volunteers had come forward quickly before the draft. He scolded that Hobby's words reflected badly on the courage and patriotism of American men.\textsuperscript{56} No one seemed to be concerned about how poorly articles about the recruiting lag and possible female draft reflected on American women.

Bess Furman's article in the \textit{Times} rehearsed once more the reasons the WAC was having trouble filling its goals. She advocated compulsory women's service, citing three reasons for the failure to attract enough volunteers--bad publicity connected to O'Donnell's contraceptives rumors, the loss of women due to family reasons during the change over from WAAC to WAC, and women's objections to military discipline. All previous media reports discounted the veracity of the last. Furman goes on to say, though, that the female service leaders thought the biggest obstacle to women's volunteering was still the "attitude of men...Most men simply do not want their wives or sweethearts to go into uniform...Paradoxically, men seem to fall for the uniform once a girl has put it on." The Directors also pointed out that women sometimes objected to other women joining the service because that would release their men for combat. Here, the women leaders pointed out that if women did not join in greater numbers more men would have to be drafted anyway. Furman praised military women, who had exceeded all expectations for their performance which in fact, had increased the demand for more and precipitated the perceived recruiting crisis.\textsuperscript{57}

On the occasion of their first anniversary, the WAVES were also repeatedly praised for exceeding expectations. \textit{Times} readers were told that Capt. McAfee had spent the last year wondering whether women would be truly accepted by the Navy. McAfee told the paper that after one year
they were actually taken for granted and the Navy could not get enough of them. She told reporters that in the "experiment" to replace men, women had done far more and better jobs than expected. Although they were still restricted by law from doing so, Navy women wanted to serve overseas and to be assigned to sea duty. Congress denied both of these opportunities to serve. McAfee demurred. "We have always tried to remember that women are women...We do not feel this is a time to make an issue of rights." She did take a parting shot, though, that it was unfortunate the WAVES would be kept from doing jobs they could do to help the war effort.

Secretary Knox's comments echoed McAfee's. He said the Navy would continue to push Congress to expand women's jobs and use the WAVES anywhere they were needed. He told the WAVES that they had, "justly won [their] Navy's utmost confidence." As they cut their birthday cake, McAfee told the women they were still on trial despite their great reviews so they should not rest on their laurels. President Roosevelt sent his best wishes, saying that a total war involved all people in a democracy and giving the WAVES a "well done" for their efforts. Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander of the U.S. Fleet, took the opportunity to congratulate the women on their hard work and "sincere dedication." McAfee reviewed the WAVES birthday parade and thanked Congress and the Navy for letting women serve. She had been afraid the men would think they were "sissy". The Times report of the ceremonies included the comment that during the parade three sailors fainted while all the WAVES survived without casualty. Finally, because of their first year's success, the Navy planned to increase WAVES strength to ninety-one thousand.58

The SPARs likewise celebrated their first birthday in November 1943. Director Stratton, told readers, "Old salts changed their quizzical smiles to one of friendly encouragement" over the space of a year working with
the women. Stratton thanked the Coast Guard for their support, "first in believing in us; second, in helping us to persuade the American public that we're not Amazons or something queer, but women trained to do a job; and third, recruiting the emotionally stable young women who will serve their country...." She advocated further public education about women in the services, citing an example of a woman who asked one young SPAR, "Are you a Wac, a Wave, or a Spam?"59

Other sea service news made the papers as well. The Navy commissioned its first female civil engineer. She told reporters that her father and brother had opposed her studying engineering because it was "unladylike", but she had been bored with home economics. Another Navy woman became the first female air gunnery instructor and reporters remarked that women had proven they could handle arms effectively. The Marines admitted their first Native American woman, Blackfoot Minnie Spotted-Wolf, in August 1943. And in November, the Navy eased restrictions on sailors' wives enlisting.60 Former President Calvin Coolidge's widow went to a WAVES review at Hunter College and told interviewers that women would be better able to contribute to society after the war because of their wartime participation and would be "less willing to sit down and do nothing." The idea that women would not be satisfied to stay at home after the war may not have been such a comforting thought to some Americans.61

The post war place of women and their willingness "to stay at home" was being addressed in other forums as well. In addition, women veterans' needs had to be considered. The American Legion Women's Auxiliary Convention believed that, "many of our daughters may need medical care." But the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) rebelled at having to consider admitting women. After a three hour debate, the organization decided to
table the issue. Some members totally opposed the idea believing they would offend their auxiliary by admitting women. They also wondered what they would do if the husbands of women veterans asked for a male auxiliary. In contrast, a supporter, Chris Edell, the New Jersey Commander, asked, "What the hell is wrong with taking in women fighting side by side with men?" W. T. Suplee, a veteran of the Spanish-American War, answered, "We've done mighty good without them for forty-two years and can go along without them now."62

While discussions of female veterans found their way into print, WAC supporters and opponents continued to make the news to the end of 1943. Relative to recruiting problems, the First Lady asked for homefront support for women in the armed forces because it was more difficult for women to enlist, "very often because men in their own families don't appreciate what they are doing." She complained that even military men "had no real conception of the fact that [the women] were doing absolutely essential jobs."63

Senior military women also felt the continuing need to defend women's military service. Just as Stratton had felt compelled to persuade people that military women were neither "Amazons" nor "something queer," the press still seemed to find it necessary to reassure the public that war service would not ruin them. Twenty percent of WACs were married and the Times announced that military women could not wait to win the war so they could return to their husbands and fiancées with whom they would, as a result of their service, have more in common. The WAC average age was twenty-four, more than fifty percent were high school graduates and twenty-five percent had earned college degrees.64 One would think that these women would be assumed to be minimally intelligent and capable but Capt. McAfee had to tell an audience at Vassar that military regimentation
did not restrict a woman's freedom to think, and that it had been both amusing and irritating for women in the Navy to have to prove their competence.65

By that time Army women were being rewarded for proving their competence. The first WAC operations officers arrived in Africa in November 1943. These women, for the first time, would have operational charge over men as well as women, because they were replacing male officers. The WAC officers joined a Signal Corps company and the commander, Col. J.T. Tully, found women had a natural aptitude for switchboard, teletype, and cryptology and that the wisdom of having the WAC was proven by their outstanding performance in the Signal Corps. One of the women, in fact, saved a soldier under fire and won the Soldier’s Medal. "Pee Wee" Maloney, the only woman to win this award, "appeared" on a New York radio program and audiences and readers were told that this "diminutive girl" sustained leg injuries during her heroic feat.66 In contrast to 1990s predictions, there does not seem to have been an outcry over a woman being injured in the line of duty. She was not in a combat position nor on combat status, but she was definitely 'in harm's way.'

The final debates of 1943 centered on chaplains and military benefits. The annual assembly of the American Association of Women Preachers urged the military to accept women chaplains, and the House first proposed dependent benefits for servicewomen's husbands. The latter required that the women prove their husbands were actually financially dependent on them, although military men did not have to prove the same in relation to their wives. These dependency rules would remain unchanged until the 1970s.67 The House also took the opportunity to denounce drafting fathers again. It was an indication of an unusual pragmatism
that Congress passed benefits for military women while they were trying to forestall drafting more men.

While considerations of female conscription put the rest of the militarization debate in perspective, the WAAC morality scandal, which the press had helped create, was probably the major public and military concern relative to servicewomen in 1943. Print space dedicated to military women, other than about the scandal, was largely dedicated to the debates on the details of their conditions of service. Although maintaining servicewomen's femininity was still a primary concern, the details of integration discussed included minimum enlistment ages, the militarization of female doctors, marriage, nurse rank, equality of pay and benefits, female conscription, and the change from an auxiliary to a women's corps that was integral to the Army.

Discussions of immorality and debates on women's conditions of service continued to revolve around reassurances that women's military service would not destroy democracy, the American home, or women's femininity. Again, temporary accommodations for the war did not equate to fundamental changes to gender ideology. In the last year of the war this ideology would have to be even more malleable as the government and military came to view conscription of women, at least nurses, as a necessity. However, legislative action was delayed until military successes in the 1944 and 1945 allowed the administration, Congress, and military to push the idea aside. The more important discussion would center on whether women would be included as Regulars and a permanent part of the peacetime military.
Notes to Chapter 3


6. "Speaking of Pictures...These Are Women Warriors through History," Lf, 4 January 1943, pp.6-8.


13. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


31. "Urges Draft of Negroes" (AP), NYT, 22 November 1943.


42. "Women: Rulers of the Air," Tm, 21 June 1943, pp.67-68.

43. Ibid. Despite the totally successful use of female air traffic controllers during the war and evidence that pilots responded better to female controllers, Gen. Curtis LeMay eliminated women from Air Force controller positions after the war. According to Col. Emma Jane Riley, he felt the job was too stressful and was a "man's job." The women were extremely disappointed to be eliminated.

44. Anne Petersen, "Pensacola Alters Attitude on Waves," NYT, 27 October 1943, p.20. Again, once a discursive space existed to talk about merit and performance as measurements rather than gender and/or race one would think concepts could be extrapolated to include other marginalized groups, such as homosexuals. Instead each group has had to struggle individually for equality of opportunity.


55. "Women: 'In This Total War'," TM, 27 December 1943, p.67.


57. Bess Furman, "Recruiting for the Wac Fails to Fill the Need," NYT, 5 December 1943, Section IV, p.10.


61. "Coolidge's Widow is 'Almost a Wave'," NYT, 3 October 1943, p.51.


64. "One Wac in Five is Wed," NYT, 25 September 1943, p.12.


CHAPTER 4
THE DRAFT DEBATE AND DEMOBILIZATION, 1944-1945

During 1944 the most important discussion for American women, especially nurses, centered on conscription. Both increasing manpower needs, before D-Day, and the difficulty in recruiting women, created in part by the morality scandal backlash, drove the perception that a woman's draft might be needed.

Other discussions in 1944 and 1945 pertaining to military women included increasing attention to race, militarizing civilian female pilots (WASPs), creating a military academy for women, and women's veterans' benefits. In addition, returning female POWs received much media attention. These discussions again highlighted the disparity between contributions made by women of all races and policy inequities in the conditions of their service. Need drove some concessions to equalize gender specific conditions, especially for nurses, and while some of these concessions survived the end of the war, others were reversed or reneged when the need for women's services diminished.

Once the corner was turned after the Allied invasion, the crisis seemed to have passed. Need for nurses was still critical, but given the opposition to the ideas both of drafting women in general or only drafting nurses, this option was put aside. It would emerge again numerous times.

The second half of 1944 and 1945 were taken up with the permanency debate. If women had entered the military because of the emergency, should they have a permanent and regular place in the peacetime military
when the crisis was over? Of course, this might not have become an issue in 1944/1945 if the earlier discussions had been framed in different terms. Women's participation in the war had been defined in a limiting way, as an emergency measure rather than as militarily efficient or democratically required. Women were allowed, and in fact encouraged, temporarily to sacrifice themselves to total war. The sacrifice was made easier by feminizing certain military jobs to protect American womanhood from permanent masculinization caused by their association with the military, male soldiers, and war. This feminization of occupations also safeguarded the egos of men who were still the only ones 'able' to do 'manly' military jobs. Many questions arose. Would men returning to feminized military functions after the demobilization of women feel degraded and be treated as emasculated? Would men willingly go back to these jobs? There was already a clear difference in promotion rates between men who were fighter pilots and infantry commanders and those who were administrative or support officers, even during peacetime. What would be the impact on America's ultimate male experience if some men were required to perform tasks that had recently been relegated to women, while others risked their lives in the more dramatic context of combat?

This differentiation between perceived gallant risk-taking fighters and stalwart, but dull, support forces continues to persist in the present-day military, despite ample evidence during recent conflicts that support forces should also be recognized as being 'in harm's way.' This is particularly true since battle lines are blurred and support forces are rarely as well equipped for self-defense, while at the same time they are heavily targeted. Typists, cooks, and nurses die by enemy fire and recognize themselves as "risk takers" when they enlist. The military's
emphasis on the team effort has always been clearly hierarchical in a way that can be interpreted as gendered.

Another fear about the feminization of military culture was whether wartime service had damaged the domestic culture by allowing women into masculine arenas. In the return to normalcy, Americans did not want to create a reality in which a 'cultural aberration' (masculinized mothers and wives) necessary for war might endure as a fact of life in the post-war world, and yet the new Cold Warriors would always have to be prepared for another emergency, another total war. In such a war wouldn't there be a continuing need for 'sacrifices'? Would we ever again have the luxury of having months or years from the time of heightened tensions to total war in which to mobilize women if we did not maintain a nucleus of experienced military womanpower?

For the moment, those questions will be laid aside. More important at the beginning of 1944 was the concern over the lull in recruiting. The resulting debate over drafting women continued through 1944. At the end of 1943, even the Nazis were gloating over articles in the American press in which WAC Director Hobby intimated that all the available volunteers were tapped and that the Army might have to resort to a women's draft. Col. Hobby disputed a German report that said the WAC was fizzling out, claiming that recruiting was actually improving. Later, her response to an unknown senator who blamed the "ugly" WAC uniform for the recruiting problems was a terse, "I doubt it." ¹

Despite attempts at reassurance, the prospect of a women's draft loomed larger as debate intensified. The AAUW supported a female draft as the only logical outcome of the organization's position on the "obligations of citizenship" under which all Americans should earn their privileges. The Women's Division of the American Labor Party also passed
a resolution supporting a women's draft. The NFBPW followed suit, saying that if the volunteer method failed and more women were needed to release men for combat, women should be drafted because in a "people's war...[women] must be willing to shoulder equal responsibility with men to help win the peace." But they stipulated that women should serve with equal rank and pay.² A Gallup Poll of March 1944 reflected the voters' belief that women should be drafted for non-combat military service before the draft was extended to include fathers. Women favored the idea by seventy-eight percent and men favored it by seventy-two percent.³

The Christian Science Monitor Magazine also informed readers that most citizens favored a women's draft and that women were "willing and eager to share the responsibility of winning this war." Contrary to the magazine's prediction that a bill to enact such a draft would not run into any snags or contentious debates, the only bill to propose drafting women came in 1945, applied only to nurses, was vehemently debated, and eventually withdrawn.⁴

One female Times reader took a different angle, proposing that if the military would lower the minimum age for women volunteers to eighteen it would not only bring in more women but would also be more consistent with the male draft: "If boys can die at 18, women can give up a little freedom." Janet Weinberger believed military women would appreciate freedom more after the war. She suggested part of the problem was that by twenty, many women were already married and had other responsibilities so were less likely to volunteer. Incidentally, this discussion points out another of cultural bias: unlike men, women were not quite adults at eighteen.⁵

News of recruiting improvements continued to reflect a schizophrenic approach. On the one hand, women were volunteering, so the enemy was not
in a position to gloat and Americans could rest assured that American
women were patriotic. However, that good news could not be presented too
enthusiastically or enlistments might drop off. A threatened draft could
spur some women to volunteer, but others decided that only an actual draft
would convince them of the need for their services. Still, over-all the
recruiting news in early 1944 seemed positive. In April, the WAVES
reported enlisting a thousand women each week and wished every parent
could see the training, for that would convince them to send their
daughters. Margaret Chase Smith stressed that if some congressmen would
visit these volunteers, they would have no "cause to begrudge them their
appropriations."

Col. Hobby and the Army Chief of Staff of the Second Services
Command, Col. Sumner White, continually urged more women to enlisted. Hobby
said that "in order to live with her conscience," every American woman had
to be convinced she was doing a vital war job. She thought they should
weigh the relative importance of their civilian jobs against military
service. Sumner added that the WACs were doing a "bang-up job" and the
public had to understand the urgent need for more of them as an integral
part of the Army. Only urgent family problems should take precedence over
military need. The Office of War Information and the War Department
published a thirty-two page advertising guide emphasizing that seventy
thousand WAGs were holding over two hundred different types of jobs.
Beech-Nut started an advertising campaign for the WACs that painted a
military career as "exciting and romantic" and as one that parents could
take pride in.⁶ The recurring theme—if women did not join the Army
fathers would have to be drafted—was reiterated in the New Jersey draft
board's recruiting campaign slogan, "One Less Father." The board said it
got involved in female recruiting because "the splendid work now being
performed by the Wacs who have replaced the men has resulted in a demand for their services which can not be filled by ordinary recruiting methods." In fact, much of the WAC recruiting campaign was still aimed at men. At a Madison Square Garden anniversary celebration for women in radio, Eleanor Roosevelt scolded, "Because men do not like women in uniform, it is difficult to get women to enlist." She insisted that after the war military women would be closer to veterans and be better wives as a result. Author Margaret Caulkin Banning chimed in, "Men just think they don't want the women in the armed services. Once they're in, the men like it." Another writer, Fannie Hurst, pleaded, "Women, you've got to deliver. Please come into action."*7

The stories of recruiting difficulties and the debates over a female draft cooled down in mid-1944. It would all resurface again in 1945, especially with regard to nurses, but for the rest of 1944 the hot topic was whether the WAVES should be assigned overseas. Reader's Digest had started the year with a piece by the First Lady. Praising military women, she said, "They experience the hardships of severe climates and the actual perils of war, yet they remain cheerful...[Their] commanding officers feel that in many cases, they have performed their duties more efficiently than the men they have freed for active service." She observed that the WAC were the only military women allowed to serve overseas and continued,

This seems to me ridiculous....The restrictions on the activities of our women's military services are not due to any feeling of Congress or with the military authorities that women cannot do the job. It is due, rather, to a false chivalry, which insists that women be protected from war hazards and hardships, even against their own wishes....I think this idea of sheltering women is a shortsighted policy.*8

The Navy joined the debate in June, when Adm. McIntire said his service would seek a law providing a permanent place for women. The Navy
Surgeon General added, "...I see no reason why we should coddle women too much and not let them into combat areas....Their permanence must be assured." Even though WAVES could not serve overseas Navy nurses could. According to the Times, those in the Pacific showed "just as much courage as men, perhaps more, and faced danger readily." As promised, the Navy and Marines officially announced that they wanted to send their women to Hawaii and Alaska, at a minimum. Times readers were reminded that the House Smith Bill had been approved, but had been held up in the Senate the previous September by Sen. Walsh, despite the Navy's requests. Walsh believed that women could serve best on the home front and, contrary to what the services said, that there were enough men to fill positions overseas. Margaret Chase Smith sponsored the House bill but wrote in a restriction barring women from duty on combat ships or planes, a legal provision that didn't really keep women out of harm's way but would not be changed until 1992. The Navy finally convinced Walsh by the end of June that it wanted its bill passed. The Times told its readers to expect fast action now that the major roadblock had been removed. The Navy used the memoirs of the late Adm. Robert R. Coontz to support their position. Coontz wrote that he had almost sent the Yeoman (F) into overseas combat duty in World War I. "I had an excellent set of Yeomanettes...The Alaskan girls were strong and robust, and any one of them could have licked me in an open fight." The women had wanted to go to France and several companies had been in infantry training when the war ended. The admiral stated that if the war had lasted longer he would have sent them, "to inspire their brethren in arms." Just when the bill seemed to have cleared all the hurdles in the Senate, it was unexpectedly held up in the House again. Pennsylvania Democrat Bradley wanted Adm. McIntire to explain his comments about "coddling" women, which Bradley had taken out
of context. Then, despite the fact that the Senate committee had voted to approve the bill seventeen to four, Walsh withdrew his support saying that he had learned from an informal poll that the committee really wanted to wait to vote on the measure until after the recess. The vote was delayed.

The *Times* felt this delay was due to the anti-WASP backlash that was spilling over into anti-WAVES sentiment. California Republican Edouard Izac of the Naval Affairs Committee had killed the WASP Militarization Bill with talk of a qualified reserve of limited duty men when the military could use as pilots. Whether this was true for the AAC or not, Adm. Jacobs denied that the Navy had such a reserve to use overseas. The Senate wanted to add to the bill an amendment that Navy women would not be allowed in any aircraft. Rep. Maas reminded his Senate colleagues that radio mechanics had to get into aircraft to test their repairs. Surely frustrated by the legislative delays, Secretary Forrestal, Adm. King, and Adm. Nimitz joined the debate in July with a radio broadcast praising historic women who had influenced navies—Cleopatra, Helen of Troy, Isabella of Spain, Elizabeth I of England—and, by extension, the women who were now influencing the U.S. Navy. The bill still had to wait. When Congress reconvened in September, Walsh added the stipulation that current WAVES would have to volunteer for overseas duty while new members could serve anywhere. The bill finally passed after ten minutes of additional discussion. It allowed WAVES to be stationed only in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska—a rather limited victory. The Surgeon General was disappointed because he had wanted WAVE hospital aides to be sent to England to assist the short-manned Navy Nurses Corps.

*Time* also reported Senate passage of the bill: "A long battle against one man has been partially won." The article attacked Walsh as a "bumbling, lumbering isolationist." It reminded readers that two years
earlier he had been the one to insert the overseas restriction in the original WAVES Bill, despite the Navy's request to omit limitations. Although the House had passed the measure twice, Walsh had "demurred" without offering a reason, despite Navy leaders' reassurance that facilities were ready and that they had many volunteers for overseas duty.

Still, the fight was not yet over. Amazingly to exasperated supporters, although the House had passed its Smith Bill twice, the Senate's version failed to gain House approval when Rep. Hoffman raised unspecified objections. After additional debate the measure finally passed unanimously. The President signed the bill on 29 September 1944, pleased that the law would release more men for combat and would recognize the important place women had "carved" for themselves in the Navy. By October, the Navy had established the rules for WAVES overseas duty. They would take only volunteers with the longest service records of good conduct, perfect health, and excellent performance. The women had to be responsible, mature, stable, adaptable, and without dependents.\textsuperscript{10} We can only imagine the trouble of fielding a fighting force if these stipulations had been put on men. These stiffer requirements for servicewomen, however, had become and would remain the norm for decades. So, although opponents have continually raised the specter of unqualified women admitted to fill quotas, the opposite in fact has been true. Servicewomen have had to meet higher standards than servicemen. And, of course, quotas were actually ceilings.

The Navy was the primary focus of yet another serious debate in 1944. There were no black women in the sea service. Earlier in the year, the Army had been called to task for a rumor that there were restrictions on the number of black nurses allowed to volunteer, supposedly based on the number of wounded black men. The War Department denied that it had
set such a ceiling. But in July, Acting Secretary Robert Patterson said that while a distinction had never been made on the basis of race, the Army would increase its number of black nurses. He emphasized that black nurses were not recruited just to care for blacks, but he regretted that a limit on their number overseas had been interpreted as a ceiling. He argued unconvincingly and inconsistently that the number was actually based on the total number of blacks overseas.\textsuperscript{11} While the Army encountered trouble for having so few black nurses, the Navy was repeatedly criticized for having no black women at all. In an article on "The Negro Soldier," by Charles Houston, The Nation reported that after three years of war, "Negroes are still insulted by the Navy's barring of all negro women, except those passing for whites, from the Waves, the Spars, and Marines...." The Presidential Commission on Fair Employment Practices questioned the nation's "pious claim to moral leadership" when service in non-segregated units was based on volunteerism, and assignments and promotions were not based on merit.\textsuperscript{12} Times readers had responded to the seeming contradiction between the need for more servicewomen (especially nurses) and restrictions on the number of blacks. The conclusion that the military must not have needed women (or manpower) too badly if it was willing to exclude or limit the number of black women diminished the effect of all the hand-wringing about recruiting shortfalls and a possible draft. Mabel Staupers, the Executive Secretary of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses, wrote to the editors that only a fraction of the possible numbers of black nurses were serving because they were only allowed to care for black patients or do menial tasks. Civilian hospitals allowed blacks to nurse anyone regardless of race and she thought the military ought to follow their example. Staupers also attacked the Navy for not allowing black nurses to join at all.\textsuperscript{13}
Mrs. Wickenden, Executive Secretary of the National Nursing Council, argued that black nurses were not getting a "square deal" from civilian or military service and that they were not being fully utilized. There were only 217 in the Army. "Large numbers of negro nurses are still denied the chance to give their services to their country through military duty," she complained. Not until October 1944 did the President finally authorize black women to enlist in the sea services. The hiring of black WAVES officers started 1 January 1945, to supervise these black enlisted women. However, the October measure provided for black women to enter existing WAVES training schools rather than segregating them. Time reported the lifting of the barrier. Five to ten black administrative officers were to be given immediate commissions to assist with recruiting and training. The Navy reported that the total number of black women accepted would still depend on "the needs of the service." The Coast Guard followed suit in admitting black women but the Marine Corps claimed it had all the women it needed for the time being.¹⁵

Despite these problems in coming to grips with the enlistment of black women, the military did not seem to have a problem accepting other races, which continually made the news and contributed obvious propaganda value. Another Japanese-American woman joined the WAC in April 1944, saying, "I want to do my part and prove that Japanese-Americans are true to the United States." And, although there were few reports of Native American women joining the service, their male counterparts must have joined in droves. The General Federation of Women's Clubs claimed that more "Indians" were serving in the armed forces than any other minority.¹⁶ Advertising Native Americans' relative patriotism seemed unfair, when other minorities were prohibited or discouraged from joining regardless of patriotic feelings.
Other earlier discussions continued into 1944 as well, including those concerning WAC morals. For example, WACs developed song and dance shows. The War Department, in obvious reaction to the "Slander Campaign," had directed as early as August 1943 that WACs perform only at their home stations due to the "extreme sensitivity of the American public to WAC publicity of all kinds." One show, "Swing, Sister Wac, Sister," closed after only four performances due to objections to a harem scene. When parents saw photos, they noted that the women's "midriffs were covered." The War Department, though, insisted that the show was harming recruiting, claiming that letters from parents, wives, and mothers of soldiers complained that the WACs had "dubious taste" and had no business performing in such shows. The result was that soldiers reportedly prohibited their sisters, daughters, and wives from joining the military. The stigma that the military corrupted the moral values of women (or attracted those of questionable morals) was still a reason to keep women out of the services. In opposition, there were also reports that some families were proud of their performing WACs and supported them one hundred percent, harem scenes or no. 17

In spite of some negative publicity, other 1944 news praised military women. Time published a piece on WACs who had joined Eisenhower's Army in England in January:

For all the services the problem is the same: little glamour, long hours, low pay, strict discipline, and regular bombings. But the G.I. Janes...survived difficulties due to early mistakes in organization and many other unforeseen obstacles....They had caught on with a speed that amazed U.S. and British officers. They had distinguished themselves as nice-looking, hard-working, cheerful girls. 18

Commanding officers pleaded for more. The women's chief gripe was, "Why should we stay behind when the boys open the second front?" Their chief
wonder was why more women were not joining the forces—"What's the matter with them? Don't they want to live?" They said being a WAC serving overseas gave them all "reason to be proud" and they favored a women's draft.

Despite servicewomen's obvious commitment during some of the most dire days of the war, the tone of news articles continued to trivialized them by emphasizing their looks, their cheerful (read naive or empty-headed) demeanor, and their interest in dating instead of their contributions and accomplishments. The article mentioned above reported that the chief ambition of the WACs in England during an air raid was to run out of the barracks, crouch in a ditch, and get back to bed without fully waking up. At least the reporter pointed out that the WAC in Britain had as good a record as any. This apparently was unexpected. Even after two years of sterling service, the Army had anticipated that service in Britain would engender emotional outbursts, resentment at having to take orders, complaints about living in barracks, feuds and cliques, and general trouble with the "unpredictable nature of women."

But finally, many military men had been converted.

"Officers were quick to say that the Army's fears were generally groundless....Women had turned out more awed than men by the military structure...but except for a greater respect for authority and a greater capacity for bustling industry, they were not much different from G.I. Joes."

Most of their behavior was supposedly average for young women (and maybe even young men). "They might refer to an unpopular officer privately as 'that bitch,' but to the surprise of most males, they got along as well as men."

To be fair and not impose a 1990s feminist interpretation inappropriately, not all attempts at humor should be read as criticism. For instance, the article above pointed out the essential difference
between women and men was women's wider hips. After being set up for yet another joke at the women's expense, the reader learned that this actually became an important consideration when the Army found that fewer women could sit in their transport trucks. Planning had been based on men, who were wider in the shoulders. Another humorous comment complimented the WACs, as most wanted to go overseas and their capacity for work was impressive. They complained so much about not having enough to do that the "old soldiers fear WACs will end the time-honored 'gold-bricking' tradition."

The article concluded with an editorial comment on the recruiting lag, saying that the WACs had proved themselves by their performance and the problem of women refusing to enlist was not theirs but the Nation's. The author repeated the story of the Berlin radio show gloating over the low enlistment rate among American women. One out of every 300 American women had joined the service, but in Canada one out of 50 belonged. In Britain, where women were drafted (supposedly to provide for organization rather than compulsion), 2.5 million women belonged to the military. The U.S. had only 172,822 by January 1944. Britain also had 8.7 million women registered for national service and 7.8 million held full-time war jobs. Russian women were even more heavily involved in the war, particularly in air raid defense and partisan fighting. Over 4,000 of them had won decorations "for valor on the battlefield," and six had won their nation's highest award. American women responded to this challenge to their patriotism by reminding everyone that these Allied women were fighting on their own territory to defend their homes and that if the war came to the United States, American women would similarly volunteer. This would become a recurring theme; those who were intent on maintaining gender
ideology would accept women's emergency service even in combat, if it came to defending the homeland.

Finally, *Time* looked back to when the women's services were first proposed, recalling some "vexations" and some "laughs". Editors reminded readers that Bishop Cassidy had "deplored the idea as a 'serious menace to the home and foundation of a true Christian and democratic country.' Even Army officers joined in unconsidered and harmful wisecracks among their friends." Despite all this criticism, women kept coming with over 20,000 joining in January 1944 alone, while requests from field commanders rose to 600,000. When Col. Hobby was asked what was wrong with American women, she answered, "U.S. men--who have always preferred their women in the home." Women had excuses, too, she acknowledged--the military wasted their time marching and doing other unproductive things; they could find better work in the civilian sector; the hats were horrible; the military made female scientists mess specialists (i.e., cooks); women had no real responsibility; there was no glamour; they were segregated from men; and they received low pay. Some detracting issues, such as the bad hats and lack of glamour, had been discounted earlier. Still, many of the excuses Hobby attributed to the women fell in line with her original observation: the problem was really male attitudes and the public's gender ideology. She might have mentioned that women were the primary family care providers and there were few, if any, provisions for child care, not to mention the cultural stigma and social badgering servicewomen had had to deal with. Hobby observed, "The majority of American women are unmoved by any great sense of personal responsibility for helping fight this war."20 So, despite the fact that women performed well, many servicemen had been won over, and all the debates had seemingly cooled, recruiting still lagged.
Recruiting was not the only topic of discussion, however. An interesting Times article seemed to indicate that the military was becoming more sensitive to the objectification of women and the part that it might play in negative or discriminatory perceptions of women in the workplace. The Army decided it was improper to depict "the female form in Army newspapers" on the grounds that "this general subject is so handsomely exploited by civilian periodicals....[That the female form] is not a military subject." Of course, the Army stopped short of applying this sensitivity across the board. "Nose art" on aircraft and USO shows featuring "cheesecake" were still allowed.

Military women were also making other gains though. The directors of women in the Coast Guard and Marine Corps, Stratton and Streeter, were promoted to colonel in February with no reports of any opposition. Marine women had another reason to celebrate in February 1944. President Roosevelt helped them commemorate their first birthday at Camp Lejuene and supported the impression that many military men had finally realized the value of women in the forces. FDR recognized Lt. Helen Crean, who was the only woman to hold the French Croix de Guerre, earned for her World War I service. The President also praised the Marines for meeting their recruiting goal of eighteen thousand. Still, the Time article memorializing their birthday was filled with the typical underwear and date trivia, as well as with reassurances that no gender ideology was being broken in the most manly of the services. Despite the women's "spit and polish...girls [were] still girls....Men flock[ed] to their rec hall. Their washrooms [were] full of fluff and flutter..." and they wore fuzzy slippers, hair curlers, and lipstick. Although women were represented among the carpenters, plumbers, link trainer instructors, control tower operators, and other significant occupations, Time took notice of their
work almost as an afterthought, observing that "the photography department is now exclusively a woman's domain." Of course, on the women corps' birthday, male Marines had to remind them of their place—the "Real" Corps was 168 years old and its birthday was in November.23

Navy women also received public praise, which showed increasingly more conversions and gave proponents of women's military service more ammunition for debate. Adm. King gave them "unstinted accolades."

The organization has been a success from the beginning ...partly because of the high standards Waves had to meet...partly because no effort has been spared to see they are properly looked out for and partly because of their overpowering desire to make good. As a result of their hard work and enthusiasm, their release of men for sea duty has been accompanied in many cases...by increases in efficiency. The natural consequence is an esprit de corps which enhances their value to the Navy....They have become an inspiration to all in naval uniform.24

He noted that his comments applied to the SPARs and Marines as well. When Adm. Jacobs addressed the graduating class of WAVES at Wellesley in May, he said the women had taken to the sea like "dolphins", and after the war their training would help with their new citizen responsibilities. The President congratulated the WAVES on their second birthday in July, and Adm. King again praised them as a "vital part of the U.S. Navy...[who had] won the admiration and warm approval of the entire service." He claimed that "their military discipline, enthusiastic spirit and efficient performance of duty has been thoroughly proved." New York Mayor LaGuardia, attending a birthday parade at Hunter College, gushed over the "inspiring example" the WAVES set for everyone by exclaiming, "the flower of American womanhood is in the services today."

Other sea service advances were also publicly acknowledged. Fourteen women Marines started receiving flight pay in December as the first women mechanics on regular air crews. The pilots and male mechanics
rated them "tops". And in December, the House Naval Affairs Committee reported the WAVES had won considerable admiration, noting that "Although they were reluctantly accepted at first, they have gained the utmost respect of the men of the services because of their good spirit, hard work and efficiency."25

The WACs received their share of 1944 press coverage too, but some of it gave succor to the opposition. In May, Secretary Stimson, in supporting WASP militarization (incorporation in the AAC or WAC), still had to argue with Congress that WACs possessed essential skills and that enlisting more women was imperative. The male 4Fs (physically unqualified for military service) were not the answer to the Army's manpower problems, nor were family men who were doing essential war jobs on the homefront. His comments were spurred by Sen. Izac's claim that non-combat qualified men could do the WASPs' jobs and maybe the WAVES'. Izac, who had opposed women's military service all along, asked why the Army needed women at all. Stimson must have been surprised that the opposition could still be asking this in 1944 and responded, "The Army is more than a congregation of men...The Army is a vast organized unit of technical skills, of men and women trained, each to do a job...on which we depend for victory." He said that many jobs needed women's skills, including "quick, confident minds...[and] reverent regard for accuracy and detail." He maintained that it didn't make sense to have men fumbling to learn jobs in the Army that women could already do, while women fumbled to learn new jobs in industry.

In support of Stimson's contentions, on the WAC's second anniversary, Gen. Marshall asked for more women to enroll in a special recruiting drive, "These women in uniform are demonstrating soldierly qualities in keeping with the best of our military traditions. They have
matched their patriotism with skillful discharge of every duty required of them." As a result of their outstanding performance, their field of operation had broadened to include many "duties vital to the operation of the Army." The Chief of the AAC, Gen. Arnold, continued the celebration by expressing his "deep gratitude for the splendid work these [Air WACs] have performed for us....[They are an] integral and important part of our team." Lt. Gen. McNair of the Ground Forces added that the WAC had "lived up to the highest standards of good soldiers" and had become "essential members" of the Army. Lt. Gen. Somervell of the Services Forces, who originally had opposed women joining the services but later had a daughter enlist, added that he felt great "pride" in the women and he too thought they were "integral." Finally, Col. Hobby ended the second anniversary proceedings by affirming that "[These women] stand, as all our soldiers stand, for the best there is in America."

With publicity like this, it would appear that not only military men, but the entire country had been converted. However, from the public discussions during the rest of 1944 and 1945, it is obvious that this was not quite true. After all the praise, one must wonder how the Greater New York Civilian Advisory Committee on WAC Recruiting could have presented a November forum topic, "Have Women in the Army Proved Themselves?" In addition to basic acceptance, military women continued to have other concerns. Since their morals were constantly being questioned and their public behavior gave opponents ammunition against them, the WACs were sensitive about who was allowed to wear their uniform. Prostitutes and other civilians had been wearing the female uniforms in ways that tarnished the WAAC/WAC image in the press and among the public and soldiers. The women successfully argued for a ban on the non-military wearing of WAC uniforms, just as it was illegal for non-military men to
wear the male version. In 1944, the Army started allowing civilian women serving with the Army overseas, like messengers and chauffeurs, to wear the WAC uniform again (without insignia).²⁶

The anniversary celebration, uniform wear, and other peripheral issue discussions do show at least some conversions and increased acceptance of military women, but the debate more fruitfully should have centered on their performance and the reaction of the public to seeing them highlighted in the press as they served overseas and "in harm's way."

The news was actually filled with information about servicewomen from the war theaters and at the battle fronts. The WACs overseas wanted to stay until the war was over. Col. Hobby informed the press that the women in North Africa, Italy and England were healthy and of high morale and that the proof of how good a job they were doing was the number of requests from commanders for more of them. Hobby told graduating women Marines at Camp Lejeune that American women in the battle zones were showing "the greatest courage I have ever seen." In fact, fifty-nine WACs were honored by Lt.Gen. Mark Clark for their duty in Italy. Clark said that they had released men for combat and made everyone spruce up and watch their language; "I hope more women will follow your example....We need many more of you." He wanted to "tell the whole world how proud we of the Fifth Army are of the fine job you have performed." The WACs' civilizing effect, rather than their performance, was emphasized. Culturally, of course, this fit quite well with prevailing gender ideology, as women were expected to act as a civilizing force. The same perception existed for the WACs sent to China in late 1944, where they were greeted by Maj.Gen. Wiedemeyer. He said they were good for morale, since his men's two chief complaints were not seeing American women and the lack of beer rations. WAC's responsibilities were really much more serious than comforting and
civilizing lonely G.I.'s. On the front page of the Times in July, AP reported that forty WACs, WAVES, and nurses had died in the line of duty. They were killed in bombings, plane crashes and accidents, and their number did not include the WASPs, Red Cross women, or other non-military volunteers who had been killed, nor those who died from illness. More women were held as POWs, including sixty Army and sixteen Navy nurses in the Far East.\textsuperscript{27} It must have been extremely disturbing to military women in light of this data that their most significant service contributions were considered by some to be cleaning up obscene language and making up (at least partially) for the absence of beer.

Servicewomen's real value would continue to be publicly debated as the nation considered its post-war future. Concerns centered both on what would be required of women for the duration and on what servicewomen would be like and would do after the war. In January, as an invasion of France was anticipated, readers were told women would follow the invasion force just as they had done in North Africa, on Sicily, and in Italy. Their post-war duty, at least initially, would be the same as men's, since they were in the Army and had enlisted for "the duration plus six months." But what then? Women teletype operators had amazed everyone by keeping secrets, were told they were well prepared for an excellent civilian career.\textsuperscript{28} There seems to have been no problem with the idea of women continuing to work; in fact it was a selling feature for recruiting.

Besides touting military service as great civilian job training, the media continually proposed that military women would make better wives. Some people also suggested that a "woman's touch" would be a valuable addition to both the peace table and European reconstruction. Veterans benefits for women were advertised and some colleges started female
veterans' educational advising. Women qualified for hiring preferences as well.29

The biggest post-war question, though, was whether women would stay in the military. Gen. Philip Gage readdressed this issue in February 1944. He remarked that women were "efficient, thorough, and dependable" and that they were in the Army to stay. When asked if that meant in peacetime as well, he answered, "I certainly hope so." Others were suggesting, in light of the possibility of future world wars, that military service become compulsory for all Americans. The interesting part of this proposal was that "all Americans" included women. Dr. W.M. Lewis, President of Lafayette College, suggested a program of citizen training that would include two years of college and two years of military service for both sexes.30

By October 1944, the AAUW had endorsed similar resolutions calling for permanent peacetime military organizations for women, as well as unlimited overseas duty for WAVES and female appointments to Veterans Administration (VA) committees. A male ex-Marine wrote to the editors of the Times that all young men and women should be required to enter universal peacetime military training. Many women also supported this idea, the 'Stettinus Policy.' The wives of high ranking officers and diplomats, including Mrs. Carl Spaatz, wife of the Commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and Mrs. Rhode, wife of the former minister to Denmark and daughter of William Jennings Bryant, concurred. They said that after the war boys and girls would inherit new responsibilities as citizens of a world power and had to be prepared.31 In December, Margaret Smith, the only woman on the House Naval Affairs Committee, proposed that at least a skeleton force of WAVES, women Marines and SPARs be kept in peacetime. This 'nucleus' idea would be rekindled later.
Throughout 1944, while the public and military considered post war organizations for sea servicewomen, the debate over WASP militarization continued. In January, the Times informed readers that the six hundred WASPs wanted to be part of the AAC. They were performing two of the most difficult non-combat flying operations--target towing and mission flying--and wanted to transition from civil service classifications to real "flying soldiers." Gen. Arnold testified to the House Military Affairs Committee in March supporting a bill to do just that. The legislation would have given WASP Director, Jacqueline Cochran, the rank of colonel and all WASPs Army rank and benefits. Arnold told the committee the women would continue to expand their duties and thereby release more male pilots for combat. He specified that they would be assigned only in the U.S. Arnold claimed such a move was "militarily sound and necessary" and that the women were as competent as male pilots. The Costello Bill hit a snag in committee, though, when some members claimed that the WASPs did not really want to be in the Army. Other members countered that the numbers objecting were very small and that, "Men in the Air Force will be more satisfied if women [serve] under [the] same rules." Reports did not state whether these men thought WASPs should be in the WAC or in the AAC. Supporters emphasized that the WASP were not just doing light-weight flying but that they were even piloting 'Flying Fortress' heavy bombers and winning recognition. One WASP had received an Air Medal for flying eight thousand miles in just five days.

Although the news sounded a little hopeful, the militarization initiative floundered by April. In fact, there was a counter Congressional movement to disband the WASP. Time reported that "Hap" Arnold had to save the organization. In some ways the women were better than men, Arnold claimed. They were patient and when in doubt, they chose
to err on the side of caution. He highlighted their low fatality rate—only thirteen had died. One thousand women were already enrolled, five hundred were in training and he wanted two thousand more. *Time* claimed that while previously Arnold had not wanted women in the AAF, he was one of the more well known converts.\(^{32}\)

If there was any doubt of military support for the WASP Bills, it was dispelled in May when Secretary Stimson publicly supported the measure. He observed that although sometimes women had been killed "performing valuable service," none of them, shamefully, possessed the "rights, privileges and benefits" available to comparable military personnel. He added that neither the existence nor the militarization of the WASP would keep one qualified male pilot from service.

Then a bombshell hit in the media. While Congress debated the merits of converting the WASP to the AAF, the Army had "surreptitiously" sent female "civilians" (WASPs) to officer training. Fifty had already completed the first week of the School of Applied Tactics. The opposition was outraged. *Time* characterized the issue as a "stalemated battle of the sexes over who is to be ferrying Army planes." Detractors claimed that enough male pilots were enrolled in the Civilian Air Association (CAA) to fulfill WASP functions. Gen. Arnold had told Congress that all male pilots, including the eleven thousand experienced but non-combat-qualified men in the CAA, were needed elsewhere. But *Time* reported that at least five hundred of them would be out of jobs soon. "In a flood of indignant letters to congressmen, the men argued that their greater numbers and experience gave them priority....Another point in their favor: Women pilots in Regular service are usually grounded several days out of every month." The report did not point out that the menstrual grounding rule was not only medically unnecessary, but seldom adhered to.
Another report, at the end of May, highlighted congressional animosity to the WASP. Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the House Civil Service Committee, accused Arnold of trying to "shove" the bill through. He told Cochran that although the WASPs were "earnest, hard-working and rule abiding, [they] are nevertheless an expensive experiment." The idea of women and other marginalized groups serving in the military constituting a 'social experiment' would be a continuing theme in these and other debates well into the 1990s, despite overwhelming evidence at home and abroad of the success of the "experiments". It was also another case wherein those who define the terms of the debate, in this case 'social experiment,' have the advantage and were able to elicit a more visceral response from those who are uniformed. In any case, Ramspeck told Arnold that the serious pilot shortage could be solved by using the CAA men. He maintained that these pilots took half the time and cost to train, but did not offer evidentiary support. He also argued that the civilian ferrying positions ought to be available to returning combat pilots and that the AAF shortage actually reflected a failure to use existing (male) personnel properly. His committee report said the perceived need "to recruit teen-aged school girls, stenographers, clerks, beauticians, housewives and factory workers to pilot the military planes of this government is as startling as it is invalid." His venom and the personally derogatory nature of his comments are obvious. In addition, young men from many walks of life including the service sector, business, industry, and high schools were also recruited as wartime pilots, so the same categorizations could have been made. These women, regardless of their occupations or ages, did have valid pilots' licenses; they were mature and stable, the cream of the crop. The pejorative reference to beauticians was presumably a reference to cosmetic magnate Cochran, a very
accomplished and experienced pilot who had won many air races against both men and women and had flown for the British military prior to the U.S. entry into the war. Ramspeck thought WASP militarization was neither necessary nor desirable, and advocated curtailment of the program. He had not decided yet whether to release the report or let the debate proceed to the House floor, but it turned out to be a non-issue since the media had already released the substance of the report.  

In June, the editors of the Times supported the WASP bills. They wrote that the women who had valiantly towed targets, ferried planes, and flown radar and search light missions since 1942 with an extremely low accident rate, and piloted all types of planes had not received the reward they "desire and deserve--namely military status." The editorial also pointed out that both Stimson and Arnold favored the legislation and that the WASPs had as much right to the privileges and benefits of military service as the WAC or WAVES.

That month, Rep. Morrison, a Louisiana Democrat, claimed that five thousand male pilots would be put in the "walking Army" if women pilots were militarized. Again without substantiation, he intimated that experienced male pilots would be "cleaning windshields" for women. Morrison complained that magazines and movies glamorized the WASP and blew their contributions out of proportion. The opposition then defeated the House bill 189-169, despite the pleas of military leaders. Opponents included Minnesota Republican Joseph O'Hara of the Military Affairs Committee and Rep. Izac, an Annapolis graduate and World War I Medal of Honor winner. Both claimed militarization of women was unnecessary and unwise. On the other side, Rep. Costello and Ohio Republican John Vorys, a pilot, after seeing the women in action, were convinced the WASP should be part of the military. All the women representatives voted for the bill
except Susie Sumner, a Republican from Illinois, who was not present for the vote.34

The Senate WASP debate continued into August. In an emphatic letter to Gen. Arnold, Jacqueline Cochran urged that the WASP either be militarized (in the AAC, not the WAC) or disbanded. She answered congressional criticism with a review of the organization's outstanding record. She emphasized that twenty-eight WASPs had died in service but none had received a government funeral, survivor benefits, or a Gold Star. After her testimony, Cochran sent a letter to the Senate requesting a delay in consideration while the program continued to prove itself. Over thirty-three thousand women had applied to serve their country as pilots. The WASP had already flown over twenty-four thousand hours and their bravery had encouraged reluctant men to fly the B-26 "pilot killer." The women had no accidents in that aircraft. And the cost and elimination rates for training women were the same as for men. Still, by October Congress decided to disband the WASP unless combat losses of male pilots rose unexpectedly.

In the end, over a thousand WASPs served and Arnold showered them with praise. The government gave each of them a certificate of service rather than an honorable discharge. Thirty had been killed. The women had exceeded all expectations and in five hundred thousand hours their flying and safety records were comparable to men's. Time thought their training would not be wasted if the military was willing to ask for their assistance in future wars. Cochran gracefully admitted that while she was disappointed with the outcome of the debate, she was glad to have had the opportunity to serve. Time characterized the whole debate by saying that the WASP had done a "man-sized job" and that, "fed up with civilian status, [they] gave their ultimatum" but failed to persuade Congress.
despite Arnold's support. The women had "regrets" but as Hazel Taylor said, "Their [new] careers will be marriage." That was just the right reaction for conservative gender ideologies. It is interesting to note that although pregnancy was not used as an argument against women pilots in 1944, time lost during menstrual periods was an issue in the WASP discussion. In the 1970s, and again when combat aviation was discussed in the 1990s, menstruation was no longer an issue because there was no longer a mandatory grounding policy. That argument having failed and women being allowed to have dependents under 18, a new argument revolving around time lost in the cockpit because of pregnancy would be manufactured.

Another non-line group, nurses, were a topic of yet other debates. As late as 1944, they were still asking for equal rank and pay. In March, Congress discussed a bill to give Army nurses "real rank" and to give women dieticians and physical therapists commissions. The movement was led by Rep. Bolton, who assailed the "Yes Men" in the War Department and lobbied for permanent rather than duration rank for the women. The Army, ungratefully fighting the measure, had delayed congressionally-requested reports and Bolton scolded that in the future if this happened, the House would hold discussions without the military reports. She said that the Army seemed to view the nurses as temporary, like the WACs, when in actuality they had been part of the Army since 1901 and most likely would continue to be after the war. In May, the House Military Affairs Committee approved Bolton's bill, which Roosevelt signed in June. This equalized the nurses' benefits with other military women. The law gave nurses real officers status in July.

The nurses' rank/benefits issue related to part of the larger debate on military women. Even discussions before 1940 often centered on
reluctance to put military women in harm's way. However, throughout the war, the public constantly learned of nurses who were not only in danger but who had been wounded, killed, and captured. Supporters used much of this material in advocating for equal pay and rank for nurses. Again we must wonder why people claimed to be so afraid to put military women near the front or at risk when it was obviously commonplace for nurses to be subject to the same or greater risks. As in other cases, the popular image of nurses in starched, white uniforms in pristine hospitals captured the public psyche and this mythic vision would not be released even in the face of extensive media evidence, in both words and pictures, that reality was very different from that fairy tale.

Frontline nurses in Italy were "exposed to enemy fire, [while] they treated the dangerously wounded in forward hospitals." Readers were reassured, however, that they had volunteered for this frontline duty in combat areas with "courage and devotion." One nurse was wounded. They worked twenty-four hour shifts through "intense nervous and physical strain." Numerous articles pointed out that they had quickly traded their starched white, and even Nurse Corps olive drab, for enlisted men's more practical battlefield clothing. Later in February 1944, three nurses were killed and three others injured when a beach hospital in Italy, plainly marked with a red cross, was bombed. "The American nurses were the first in the European theater to die through direct enemy action....Praise from all the officers and men for the courage and efficiency of the surviving nurses after the attack was high." Three nurses won silver stars for gallantry in action at Anzio when they carried on their work in tents under fire as the evacuation hospital was bombed. They inspired the men with their composure, despite two more women being killed and others wounded. In March, another nurse was killed at Anzio and two others
wounded. Once again they continued to work under fire. By summer, Col. June Blanchfield, Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps, was decorating ninety-two nurses for wounds in action and heroism in war. This was not hidden from the public. By July, Times readers learned that a total of sixty-nine Army nurses had been killed in the war, twenty-four had been wounded, and sixty-six were POWs. Six of the dead had been killed by enemy action; the others had died from disease or in crashes or accidents.

In November, the Times reported that Lt. Frances Slanger was killed after the Normandy invasion. The article pointed out that the nurses had waded ashore at "D Day-plus-four" and were on duty within two hours, still wet. It was five days before they got their bags. In the meantime, they slept on the ground and worked a very heavy load of casualties. Coincidentally, Lt. Slanger wrote to the editors of the Times just prior to her death, explaining that

the army nurses are not expected to take the risks assumed by front-line troops. But because the nearer a field hospital can be to the area where men are being wounded, the better work it can do, the nurses do take risks. They save lives by going into danger. They endure hardships...Their courage, as the soldier knows, is equal to his own.31

She was buried in the Belgian "mud" in a military ceremony.

One of the last issues discussed in 1944 was a debate that would resurface again in the 1970s. Georgia Democrat E. E. Cox, the ranking member of the House Rules Committee, spoke of a combined "West Point--Annapolis--Coast Guard" Academy and proposed legislation for the continuation of wartime women's military service on a peacetime Regular Army basis. Within Cox's plan five Senators, five Representatives, and five presidential appointees were to devise a plan for a women's military academy, addressing location, administration, length of training, numbers, appointments, rank, and pay. They were also to consider whether graduates
should be members of the Regular Army or the Women's Corps. It would have been interesting to see what problems would have been engendered if the plan had gone through and the women had been incorporated into the Regular Army rather than the WAC. Cox suggested that women's abilities having been proven, "It is idle now even to speculate about whether or not women have the capacity and equipment for active participation in war. It is a proven fact....Modern war is total strength, because modern war is total war." He proposed that women should be used in the peacetime military in order to be constantly prepared for war rather than being called upon only once an emergency had started. He added that the country should have done all this much sooner and that there would be no danger of neglect of the family on the homefront. "There will always be an ample number of women who lack the training and experience for the armed forces to take care of the children." Rep. Fulton of Pennsylvania, a former Navy officer and veteran of the war, also introduced legislation in June, 1945, for a women's military academy. The bill provided for using women's colleges, "with special emphasis on the education of women for the administrative, supply, personnel and communications divisions of both the Army and Navy."  

Surprisingly, many of the earlier debates--such as that over a women's draft--continued into 1945 as well. While Clare Boothe Luce supported the draft of nurses, Congress was divided. Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee Rep. May said, "I hope it won't be necessary." But the Pentagon insisted that it was already essential. By 1945 the Army was taking all qualified black applicants and sending them to integrated training so as to help ease the shortage. President Roosevelt appealed to Congress in January to make the difficult decision quickly, and the Times reported that the three new congresswomen all
approved of the measure. Some people believed that the draft would be a relief to civilian nurses who were torn between wanting to contribute to the war and loyalty to their civilian jobs. With a draft they would feel that the military truly needed them. The central question still seemed to be whether it was fair to draft just one segment of the female population. Mrs. Roosevelt reportedly supported a draft of all women. Reports indicated that most nurses felt that it was unfair to draft only them, and many believed a draft was unnecessary. Edward Bernecker, the Commissioner of Hospitals, blamed Army red tape and delays, an age limit of forty-five, and the discharge of married nurses (by the Navy) for the shortage. Nevertheless, a reluctant Rep. Rogers drew up a nurse draft bill early in January. As punishment for not volunteering, the eighteen to forty-five year old draftee nurses would enter as privates, as opposed to the volunteers who came in as officers. The WAC would also help ease the nurse shortage by enlisting medical technicians to relieve the overworked nurses of some easier tasks.⁴⁰

For their part, nurses were disappointed that the press disparaged them. They claimed that their strong service record did not warrant such treatment. Isabel Stewart reminded Times readers that nurses "...were the first women to be formally accepted as Regular members of the military forces of the country;" originally they were not wanted, but they had fought for inclusion, and then they had had to fight for equal benefits and real rank. In doing so, they paved the way for the WACs, women doctors, and others. While many nurses did not necessarily oppose a draft, they insisted that the real problem of lack of volunteers was not a dearth of motivation but (1) age limits and other barriers to enlistment; (2) pressures from husbands, brothers, and sweethearts overseas who were saying "this is no place for a woman; don't come;" (3)
the danger of post war unemployment if they left their jobs; (4) bosses
giving them bad references so they would not be able to leave their
civilian jobs; and (5) disqualification for minor disabilities like hay-
fever. Those nurses who did oppose the draft felt that civilian health
would suffer if more nurses were taken from the home front.41

Army Surgeon General Kirk supported the draft of nurses. The Army
needed to increase their Nurse Corps from forty-two thousand to sixty
thousand and the volunteer system had failed. Time reported that the
number of volunteers had dropped further since talk of a draft began and
that all three services needed substantial increases by July. For
comparison, the ratio of nurses to patients in civilian hospitals was one
to twelve, in military hospitals it was one to twenty-six. The President
told Congress that Army nurses were being hospitalized themselves because
of overwork. In supporting the draft, Mrs. Roosevelt said, "This proposal
may well have shocked many a citizen; no other group in the U.S. had been
so singled out in World War II." But she also emphasized that this was a
military necessity and that time was of the essence.42 Once again
military pragmatism triumphed over ideological barriers. Sarah Clark, a
Times reader, supported a women's draft, especially for medical technician
positions; "...it will take all women to win this war." Bertram Bernheim
added that the military should even accept student nurses, as college
women were the largest pool of women not yet in active war work.

Seeming to realize that the public and politicians might have
unjustly impugned the character of civilian nurses by criticizing their
patriotism, Rogers changed her legislation to make draftees lieutenants
like the volunteers. But Hanson Baldwin of the Times reported in his
series, "Our Manpower," that increased efficiency would solve the nursing
shortage without a draft. He said that if the services would cease
treating their nurses worse than other military women (referring to pay, rank, and benefits—those bills would not pass Congress until June 1945), and not worry so much about medical personnel's spit and polish, there would be no need for a draft. This discussion continued into February as the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Dr. Param, argued for drafting nurses for both civilian and military service.

Many people and organizations had a chance to testify. Navy representatives (told the) Congress that "None of us likes the draft even for men and much less for women." Still, they viewed it as necessary. War Manpower Commissioner, Dr. Paul Barton, testified to the House Military Affairs Committee, in an answer to a Clare Boothe Luce question, that all the women's services should be supported by a draft so the measure would not appear discriminatory. The American Association for Nurses fought against the nurse draft. They said that if the military would push recruiting as much as it did for the WAC, the Nurse Corps would get enough volunteers. However, if instead the military was going to draft nurses, they should draft for the WAC too. The Association further complained that the Army was only using black nurses in segregated facilities. Luce directed that the Army investigate this claim before the committee took action to legislate a draft. Others claimed that the draft would further damage recruiting efforts. At Senate hearings, members also heard from both supporters and opponents. The latter included the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Women's Committee to Oppose the Draft. These groups echoed sentiments that rather than a woman's or nurse's draft, the military simply needed to use its existing resources more efficiently, use black nurses to a greater extent, and recruit harder.

Finally, in February, the Times editors, sitting on the fence, recognized the compelling need for conscription but supported increased
recruiting efforts before implementation of a draft. They emphasized the excellence of the military nurses' records and agreed with the idea that if the nurses were to be drafted, all women should be eligible for armed services conscription.\textsuperscript{44} The House Military Affairs Committee rejected the Luce Bill, which would have registered all women for the draft, but this action turned out to be moot. While the Army was claiming that it needed eight thousand more, the nurse draft vote was put on hold because the President asked Congress and the military to give cadet nurses a chance to finish their training and volunteer.

The House committee later approved a bill to draft single female nurses between twenty and forty-five. Strenuous opposition, expected on the House floor, never materialized. Members felt the idea of drafting women was "repugnant", but a necessary last resort. If the bill passed, readers were told, it would be the first time in U.S. history women would be drafted for duty in combat-zones. Actually, it would have been the first time American women were drafted at all. The passage of the measure in the House, 347-42, made the \textit{Times}'s front page. As an aside, the bill also provided for male nurses, another marginalized group, to be commissioned officers like their female counterparts.\textsuperscript{45} (We have also tended to forget about the marginalization of male nurses.) Once again, pragmatism had won.

While the Senate withheld concurrence, the Army chiefs were still pleading for a draft at the end of March. They claimed that not only was there an even greater slump in recruiting because of the draft discussion, but because of the increase in the number of wounded and that nurses who had been working so hard overseas for three years were at the limit of their endurance. The Senate wanted to give the nurses raises and promotions for their gallantry. Meanwhile, \textit{Times} editors opined that even
though the nurses would support a draft because they were patriotic, the bill was really discriminatory. The Senate, for its part, delayed action on the House bill hoping the Army would get enough volunteers. According to Times reporter Frederick Barkley, action on the bill was not expected until May, the chief obstacle being that lawmakers felt the bill was unconstitutional in targeting only one segment of the female population, and, like the media, favored including all women in any draft. "To many a US citizen the drafting of women is repugnant. The nurses believed that their record scarcely justified Congress in singling them out and making them, alone of all US women, objects of such legislation." Discussions of whether it was fair to target only one part of the female population demonstrated that a discursive space did exist to talk about why it was fair to target only the male half of the population. Some organizations like the NFAPW clubs supported the measure for a wartime draft of all men and women. Although the Army claimed it did not particularly like the idea of female conscription in any case, they continued to press for the nurse draft, wanting thirteen thousand more.

Another legislative concern was whether the nurse draft bill would actually meet the Army's needs. Time identified an element of legislative schizophrenia, in that while Congress was backing away from drafting male labor it was at the same time moving toward a draft of female nurses. Writers claimed that although Congress was listening to the Army, it was not listening to the nurses. The women did not lack a sense of duty, but were merely confused, since civilian hospitals and doctors had not been cooperative in releasing them to enlist. They were intentionally given poor evaluations so the Army would not take them. The nurses' complaints included: "U.S. women hate to be ordered around, particularly by other women"; homesick Army nurses exaggerated their troubles; many of the
complaints were directed at the nursing profession itself; Regular career
Army nurses who had been "ruling the roost" resented new civilian nurses
with more medical experience horning in; civilian nurses did not
understand the necessity for calisthenics, drill and the "boarding school"
atmosphere; medical technicians could do many military jobs; and some
military nurses were sitting around while others were overworked. If this
were not enough, some civilian nurses were rejected by the military for
petty reasons. Again, the services declined to relax physical and age
standards to forestall the need for a draft. After all the hand-wringing,
it is a little surprising that the women's conscription discussion would
be totally forgotten when the Army abandoned the drive to draft nurses in
the wake of VE day, not to arise again until 1950.46 It is also
interesting to note that with all the discussion of a general military
draft of women, one never materialized, especially given the continual
reporting of recruiting shortfalls.

Other debates relating to the military nurses swirled around the
argument about the draft. In January 1945, to prevent them from having to
resort to drafted womanpower, the Navy finally decided it was all right
for its nurses to marry. But by October, with the end of the war, the
policy of immediately discharging nurses who married was reinstated,
causing seven hundred to be automatically released.47 The media did not
discuss how utterly unfair this was to many who got caught between the two
policies. This should demonstrate that the rule could not have been based
on fairness or some eternal immutable gender order, but on a cultural
ideology that implied that women must contribute to the greater good in a
crisis without social reimbursement and, hopefully, without being changed
(read ruined) by the necessity. Sheer need for womanpower, or the lack of
that need, was the driving force for military policy with regard to women.
The claim that anything serves in an emergency can be cited for every perturbation.

Changes in racial ideology were also successfully avoided with some amazing mental gymnastics, as racial considerations also impacted the draft debate. The Philadelphia Fellowship Commission suggested to the President and Congress in January 1945 that if the military would accept more black nurses there might not be a need for a nurse draft. The National Negro Congress asked that if a draft was instituted, it include a non-discrimination clause regarding both those who would be drafted and those to whom care would be provided. They pointed out that the services were inefficient in using black nurses solely to care for black soldiers and were ignoring approximately seven thousand black civilian nurses. The Citizen Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City) also sent a resolution to the President and the House urging them to force the military to use black doctors and nurses. All the services denied that discrimination against blacks was interfering with recruiting or forcing a draft. This rang hollow, although the Army used at least some black nurses, the first was not sworn into the Navy until March 1945 and only after much public pressure. An interesting adjunct: a Japanese-American nurse, whose mother was in an American internment camp, joined the Army in April in the glare of publicity. She said that although her father was dead, he had been proud to be an American citizen. She had waited two years to get released from Bellevue Hospital in order to join. She applied for immediate overseas duty and urged other Japanese-Americans to join the service. 48

Other military nursing issues drew the attention of the news-reading public as well. The Navy, after finally agreeing to take married nurses, would not accept any women over forty-five because of the need for
stamina. And, although accepting married women brought the short-lived Navy policy in line with that of the other services, the Navy, unlike the others, insisted nurses could not have children under fourteen. In a twist, by March, the Times editors were asking why the services were not recruiting more male nurses, seemingly well suited to rigorous combat nursing conditions. Hanson Baldwin also continued to press the issue that nurses were treated unfairly compared to their Regular military sisters. He argued that the nurses resented the WAC's higher rank and pay when nurses usually served closer to the front, at greater risk, worked harder, and had more years of professional study and experience. There was no supporting evidence given for these claims. This was very detrimental to morale. Further, to protect morale and recruiting, the military had to counter rumors of nurse amputees returning home from the front. The government emphasized, with the press's help, that the sixty-six women who were Japanese POWs were healthy "under the circumstances." But, as Baldwin had reported, many of these women were obviously in harm's way. In fact, four flight nurses were killed in a military airplane crash. In addition, one nurse earned a Legion of Merit, two received Bronze Stars, and forty-two others were commended for bravery under fire. In recognition that nurses probably did face more danger than any of the servicewomen, they finally received pay and retirement benefits equal to those of other military officers.49

This measure was a long time coming and its passage may have been helped along by the media. In 1945, extensive coverage highlighted the nurses at the frontlines. Their service in harm's way was addressed in a fairly routine manner counter to the anticipation of a revolt by the public if American women were exposed to danger. Although this fear of public protest has persisted, the revolt did not occur in World War II
when ideology relegating women to a theoretically safe place was even stronger than it is today. Some have proposed as explanation that Americans believed military nurses were wearing starched white uniforms and working in rear area hospitals. The media's coverage, however, proves that the picture presented to the public constantly contradicted this myth. As an example, the most well known story was that of the "Angels of Bataan", Army nurses held as POWs by the Japanese since 1942. They were liberated on 22 February 1945 and arrived back in the United States three days later. AP reported that they were all relatively healthy and although they had missed "eating and dancing," they were ready to get back to nursing and even wanted to return to the Pacific theater. They said that during their ordeal they were too busy to worry, but did admit to crying "just like the men." None of them regretted their service, though understandably, none wanted to repeat their POW experience.

Capt. Josephine Nesbitt, a twenty-seven year Army veteran, had to be forced to return to the U.S. She said, "My real home is the Army." She could not wait to get back to Japan to be with the troops. Maj. Maude C. Davidson and Nesbitt were thanked by the President in person. On this occasion, Times editors commented, "The legend will fall short of what they stood for and what they did." They conquered fear and hardship with their devotion to duty and served as "inspiration to all women especially to those of the armed forces." Roosevelt and Marshall recognized their heroism and unselfishness and paid tribute to their "feminine tenderness joined with skill and courage." Even this praise served to once again position women in their gendered place--brave but still fundamentally caretakers simply responding to an emergency while retaining their femininity. Ceremonies to honor eleven other returned Manila nurses were held in September. They received Bronze Stars (but without the "V" for
valor that the male POWs received) in recognition of their bravery during thirty-seven months of imprisonment.  

The public read of other nurses facing front-line risks as well. The first Navy flight nurse landed on Iwo Jima in March 1945 under mortar fire and spent considerable time in a foxhole. The congressional rule against Navy women being stationed abroad ironically did not keep them from performing as flight nurses as long as their home base was not overseas. Times readers also learned of the return of 248 Army nurses from Europe after two and a half years at the battlefront. An October Newsweek article spoke of the liberated male POWs' appreciation and "grateful recognition for the help of women who had voluntarily gone so close to battle." Their proximity to combat was left up to the discretion of the theater commanders rather than the congressmen or laws. In fact, World War II supposedly found American nurses closer to the front than any other war, so close that MacArthur worried about their capture. But military 'ladies' did not worry him enough not to use them there. According to Surgeon General Kirk, these women's efforts reduced the fatality statistics from World War I from eight percent to just under four percent. In the process, the public discovered, nineteen military nurses had died by enemy action and sixty were wounded. Their heroism had been encountered so frequently, it had become routine. They had earned a thousand Army decorations and forty-two Navy awards.

These women "shared actively in war's perils from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay....They slogged through the mud, under banks and shells, lived in tents on K rations and [gave up] all feminine fripperies." Fourteen nurses, on the hospital ship Solace, had continued to minister to patients while bombs fell around them in Pearl Harbor. Flight nurses parachuted into hostile areas. Aleta Lutz received the Distinguished Flying Cross
(DFC) posthumously. She died in a crash in southern France after 197 air evacuation missions. Mary Hawkins also received the DFC when she crashed with twenty-four patients and kept all the injured alive until they were rescued. Lt. Ann Bernatitus received the Navy Legion of Merit for her courage and performance as one of those who endured the march from Manila to Bataan and then to Corregidor. The Navy also gave eleven Gold Stars to their nurse POWs who had, among other heroics, performed surgery under starvation conditions.\textsuperscript{51}

The public also read about other women in combat, those very near the front and others. In January, UP and AP reported on an American woman, Florentina Punsalon, mother of two teenage children, who had been fighting the Japanese for six months with Filipino guerrillas. In a classic understatement, she described this as a "most thrilling experience." Reportedly, if MacArthur's returning American soldiers refused to take her to Manila, she planned to go on fighting with the guerrillas. A Times article on Soviet women included photographs of women flying combat missions and acting as field nurses with naval infantry units. Reuters reported on the first U.S. woman to be held by the Germans, Mrs. Gertrude Legendre, an interpreter and secretary who escaped in March 1945 and wanted to return to the front as soon as possible. Reuters also carried a report by Maj. David James on the four hundred British civilian women he saw singing on their ten mile march to a Japanese prison in Singapore in February 1942. In October, Reader's Digest carried the story of Margaret Hastings, a WAC who crashed on a remote part of New Guinea in May 1945 and was rescued after forty-seven days. Of the eight WACs and sixteen military men on the flight, only two women and two men survived the crash. The other WAC died soon after the crash as a result of her injuries. Hastings commented, "I guess you have
to share the kind of paralyzing accident we had before you can realize that under such circumstances you cease to be two men and a woman. We were just three human beings bound together by a will to live." She mentioned that they had to sleep together but that it had not been a problem. Hastings, who nearly lost her legs, survived the wilds and an encounter with natives to tell the American public of her experience. There was no reflection of a public outcry that she had been put in this situation or that the other seven WACs had been killed.

As the end of the war approached in 1945, newspapers and periodicals started summarizing the WAC war experience in front page or near-front page articles. Robert Trumball recognized that although at first the Army did not want women in the Far East--complaining about a lack of billeting for them--over four thousand remained in theater as of October 1945. The first had arrived in Australia in April 1944 and "trekked northward behind fighting men and some [were] in Tokyo....The Wacs became such a vital part of the Army administration that many sections were unable to function without them," so they moved on with the troops. They lived and worked under the same conditions as the men and "still manage[d] to look pretty and reasonably fresh in the world's toughest climate for women." Again, their "pretty" and "fresh" appearance was highlighted to the exclusion of substantive comments about their work. However, although it probably was not meant to, this report does show that previous arguments about women's weak constitutions were misguided. Finally, Times readers learned of Pharmacists Mate, Edith Cramp, being assigned to the naval assault transport Hendry in the Central Pacific, apparently in violation of congressional constraints.52

The need for the military women continued but despite this pragmatic need for more womanpower, the military was still ambivalent on race
issues, and especially so on issues where race and gender intersected. Not all the news was negative though. On the positive side, a black WAC postal battalion commanded by black female WAC officers was sent to England in January. When the unit, under Maj. Charity Adams, arrived it was greeted enthusiastically by Benjamin O. Davis, the U.S.'s first black general officer. This unit was swamped with positive publicity. But not all the news was good. When black WACs in a medical company at Ft. Devens refused to report for duty, they were disciplined harshly. They claimed that despite being college trained medical technicians, they were ordered to do all the menial cleaning tasks. They were sentenced to a year of hard labor, dishonorable discharges, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Of the eight officers on the disciplinary board two were black. Three N.Y. members of Congress requested a special investigation and discovered that the commanding colonel had told the black WACs they were "here to mop walls, scrub floors, and do all the dirty work." The women's court-martial was reversed in April.53 There was no word as to whether the colonel was disciplined.

Of course, readers were given a look at what was happening to other military women in 1945 as well. As with racial minorities, women's public actions, as reflected in the printed media, had affected the continuing debate about whether they should be in the services in wartime. In 1945, the general debate expanded to whether servicewomen should be retained in peacetime. As a result, military women's actions and performance continued to be very public and very political.

The courts also caught the public eye and caused an interesting situation when a federal judge ruled in February that WACs were "soldiers" and therefore subject to all military benefits and punishments. In recognizing modern changes in the nature of warfare, the judge said that
although "soldier" had been used to denote combatants or fighting men, the "line of demarcation between combat and non-combat services may not be sharply drawn." He claimed that when the women changed from the WAAC to the WAC they became a "component part of the Army and had to follow the same laws and regulations as the male soldiers and were therefore also soldiers.54

Whether considered soldiers or not, the numbers of women the military needed was still a major concern. And women's motivation, patriotism and willingness to sacrifice continued to be scrutinized. The Army had started recruiting medical WACs by the thousands in January to help ease the nurse shortage. February saw recruiting drives stepped up with the establishment of a "Roosevelt Unit." Theodore Roosevelt's widow summarized some people's feelings on the issue when she recalled the fight for the vote and equal rights for women and asked, "Are we living up to these rights?" Mrs. Roosevelt questioned new WACs, "Our boys are keeping their pledge of allegiance, what about the girls?"55

Through the spring and early summer of 1945 recruiting continued apace. At the same time, the Times was publishing demobilization points required by service personnel, including women, to return home. However in May, the Army announced it would not release many WACs because all were "essential". The women had changed status from "experimental" to "essential" rather quickly. In June, the Army announced that although the three thousand WACs in Europe were eligible for release, all clerk typists and stenographers were frozen in their current assignments.56

Meanwhile, the WAC celebrated its anniversary and other news about them could be found throughout general press accounts of the war. Eisenhower remarked, "They have met every test and task." MacArthur added, "They have endured the hardships and war with the same stout-
hearted fortitude and typically American good humor as their brothers in arms." By the end of June, a seven thousand woman WAC force was being planned for the Pacific and WACs were entering areas more quickly after each invasion. On the other hand, despite all the compliments they had received on their contributions through the war years, WACs quickly lost with the coming peace whatever status they had won. In October, fifteen were left sitting at the dock in Naples when the Army transported twenty-six Italian G. I. brides back to the states instead of the military women. The WACs finally made it home some weeks later. When Col. Hobby stepped down after three years as WAC Director to return to her family, Westry Battle Boyce took the reins. Rep. Brooks of Louisiana had petitioned Congress to promote Hobby to general. "She is entitled to this because of the excellent work of this fine organization [WAC]." The movement failed. Sen. Lloyd Bentsen tried again in 1992 but President Bush denied the request a second time.57

WAVEs were also news throughout 1945. The eighty WAVE officers who qualified as navigators were recognized as the "first women in American history...eligible to serve in military flight crews." For the first time in the school's one hundred years of existence, three WAVEs started teaching at Annapolis. In July, on the WAVEs' third anniversary, a call was put out for twenty thousand more women. The military assured newspaper readers that recruits who joined the eighty thousand present WAVES and went to the Pacific (Hawaii or Alaska) set themselves up for excellent post-war careers as medical technicians.

With the surrender of Japan in August, the WAVES and other sea services announced a December end to women's training. And, just as with the WAC, the sea women fell out of favor quickly. Soldiers actually booed
the Navy women returning from Hawaii, saying with all the media attention "You'd think they won the war."58

Those who subscribed to the prevailing gender ideology may not have been swayed. But over the war years there was an apparently increasing acceptance of the idea of women serving in the military, and the women's performance converted many of the less ideological who had believed women were simply incapable. Soldiers and sailors, and some of the public, came to appreciate and accept servicewomen, at least in their emergency role. As we have seen, there were many articles throughout the war reflecting these conversions. They continued into 1945. Referring to the WAVES, Adm. King reiterated that the men had "bucked and roared at the [initial] idea...[but] they have done so well that not only has the efficiency increased in offices where they have replaced men for sea duty, but...they have become an inspiration to all in Naval uniform."59

As previously mentioned, this type of public comment prompted the increasingly pressing discussion of women's post-war status. Debate surrounded the privileges of female veterans. The American Legion decided to include women, admitting its first all-female post in August 1945. Their goal was to help the women adjust to civilian life. Others were concerned about health benefits. The Gold Star Mothers supported separate women's veterans' hospitals. They felt that, with the current hospitals being primarily for men, women patients would be restricted in their activities.60 In January, Time led with a story about post-war education for military women. The article pointed out that women were also entitled to the G. I. Bill and outlined a Rutgers University program for "serious" and "capable" female veterans. The program capitalized on their wartime training and costs were scaled to veterans' ability to pay. The NFBPW Clubs were prepared to help find former servicewomen jobs, and the VA and
War Manpower Commission stood ready to assist. In fact, Lt. Col. Mary Brown was appointed as the women's advisor to the VA. Female veterans and Times readers were reminded that male and female veterans' benefits were identical. And, in a letter to the Times' editors in December, Sol Milton, in disagreement with a November letter from Warren Burns, informed everyone that all servicemen and women were considered vets. Whether they had served overseas or not, they had all sacrificed and supported the fighting troops.  

Beyond female veteran status, throughout 1945 articles focused on what military women would do in the post war era, including whether there would be women in the peacetime military. Much print was spent reassuring readers that their lives would pick up where they had left off before the war. Gender ideology may have been stretched a bit, but would quickly return to its original shape when the emergency was over. Public preoccupations with whether servicewomen had lost their femininity, retained their desire to marry, or squelched their desire to have a family were often conflated. January found the Times trying to convince readers that military service had actually increased the WACs' femininity, and in fact, that Army women had really remained civilians at heart. Their hopes to settle down to the peace and security of home and family had merely been heightened by participation in the war. The Times reported poll results that while eight-four percent of Air WACs were single they wanted to get married. Although these women reportedly joined the military for such reasons as patriotism, personal problems, or the death of a family member or sweetheart, their experience in the Army was apparently causing them to rush home even as the nation was starting its fourth year of war. In apparent confirmation, in April, as more SPARs graduated from training, Capt. Stratton had to ask them to think twice about racing for discharges.
when their husbands came home rather than serving out their commitments. This of course constituted a double edged sword: it was reassuring the women had husbands to rush home to, had not lost their femininity and heterosexual desire for marriage and did not intend to destroy the American home by deserting it to stay in the military longer than necessary; on the other hand, the warning from Stratton indicates that perhaps women as a group lacked character and could not be counted on to fulfill their commitments. Beatrice Berg also wrote a piece the same month on whether military women had lost their femininity. She recounted that people had once said that barking like drill instructors would make women unfit as marriage companions, that they would never be able to settle down to "wifery and mothering," and that their morals would have declined below a socially acceptable level. Berg maintained, however, that "being in uniform had not deprived them of their essential femininity nor of their normal desire for husband, home, and children." Instead, she maintained, work and service had convinced the career girl that "marriage is a sacrament," highly desirable. These military women could see more clearly "women's place in the general scheme of things," which was not on one side of a "struggle between the sexes for supremacy." The issue of women working outside the home was often implicitly construed as a struggle against men for superiority, whether of Home, Family, Country, or World. Berg reassured readers that, although the war had certainly "extended feminine horizons" so that these women could continue to make contributions both in war and peace, men would still "bring home the bacon."

As with men, most military women interviewed by the media expressed a desire for a simpler life after the war. One WAC lieutenant said her increased confidence would make her a better homemaker. Some military
women wanted to work for a while after marriage "just to help out." Others intended to capitalize on new skills and new ambitions by joining the workforce. Some domestics had received valuable training in other areas. For instance, some black women wanted to embark on surgical technician careers. Other women wanted to return to college, and some wanted to return to good jobs they had left. "Strange as it may seem," some wanted to stay in the service. One WAC said she had wanted to be a soldier since she was a little girl and still did. Not thinking them "strange" at all, women who wanted to pursue military careers were supported by people like Rep. Cox, who was still studying the feasibility of starting a women's service academy.

Meanwhile, Time was echoing the reassurance that gender ideology was intact with a cover that proclaimed "Women Can Still Be Women." The report highlighted the cessation of WAVES training, a review of their wartime performance, and a glimpse of their post war plans. "There had never been any serious troubles among the women of the U.S. Naval Reserves....The Waves were doing alright. Little was heard about them by the U.S. public, but so far as Miss Mac was concerned that was all right, too." Some WAVES were "better than men" and most were "at least as competent as men." They had served in many career fields--as weather forecasters, air traffic controllers, link trainer and marksmanship instructors, metal smiths, radio repairpersons, machinists, truck drivers, lab technicians, and decoders. They had released seventy thousand men for sea duty and had served as "models of correct, seamen-like behavior before the U.S. public." The WAVES may not have liked the long hours, discipline, and hard work, "but almost to a woman they were resolved to stick it out without audible griping." Their training at Hunter College had made them "old salts" in six weeks. Black recruits were finally
accepted without "ruffling any tempers" and black female officers were eventually included on training staffs. "Navy officials had held their breaths" about this "dubious experiment" but had come to a hearty "well done." The Navy had reached a point, according to Time in 1945, when men and women could be "judged first as persons." The WAVES had definitely profited from earlier WAC mistakes. They had not used glamour girls for recruiting gimmicks, nor had they used civilian PR men. Instead, WAVES gained a reputation as dignified professionals. Captain Mac maintained that "women can be efficient and professional and still be women" (read feminine). As for post-war plans, although McAfee wanted to return to her college as soon as possible, she admitted she did not know what the other eighty-two thousand WAVES wanted to do after demobilization.  

Overseas, so pleased with their service, the British RAF wanted to keep some of their military women on duty after the war. In light of this, Col. Hobby would not give an opinion in response to press questions as to whether U.S. women should stay on after the war. On the occasion of her resignation in July 1945, she said the permanence of the WAC was "a decision for Congress to make."

As for the WAVES, on their birthday Adm. King lauded them for their excellence, discipline, skill, and morale, and Dean Gildersleeve of Barnard College remarked, "I hope that there still may be a place for women in the Navy after the war." Bess Furman pointed out that women were needed to stay on past August to help demobilize the military and reminded readers that "whether this mopping up on top of their war duty will earn them a permanent place in the military scheme depends on further acts of Congress." Rosa McIntire, the wife of the Navy Surgeon General, echoed Gildersleeves's sentiments in September when she remarked, "It is our hope, of course, that the Navy will find a place for our nurses. The Navy
will then provide a real career for those who may wish to stay in it." This idea was reiterated by Adm. Louis Denfield in testimony to the House Naval Affairs Committee. "The Navy planned to retain a women's Reserve, primarily to keep it intact for future wars with its members available for active duty in communications, aviation, and medical assignments."

On the other hand, in October, a *Times* article reported that most WACs were ready to go home and stay home unless there was another emergency. And according to a survey of retiring WACs in the Paris magazine *Overseas Woman*, if there was another emergency in the future, they wanted to serve under male officers. An abundance of well publicized wartime evidence notwithstanding, Lt. Trudy Whittman was quoted as saying, "Women cannot be regimented." These WACs complained that civilian women had gotten all the good jobs and high pay. They did not want a peacetime WAC. Even though this report seemed at odds with many others, it reinforced the idea that these women had not essentially changed, nor had the gender ideology that argued against them entering the armed forces in the first place. It seemed military service remained acceptable only in a crisis.

Despite some negativity towards servicewomen, the emphasis on their desire to return home, the continuing focus on their femininity, and apparent congressional reluctance to retain women in the peacetime services, supporters still recognized that servicewomen were needed. Mrs. Oswald Lord, the National Chair of the Civilian Advisory Committee of the WAC, maintained that they were essential. She said that one never had to ask a general what he thought of the WAC; they all volunteered praise and emphasized, "We need more." Up to July 1945, the plan had been to redeploy many WACs to the Pacific and to put those remaining in Europe in charge of female prisoners, the demobilization of the men, and post-war
community relations. Senior leaders felt that women were more effective in dealing with foreign civilians.

*Newsweek* also reported on the women who were ready for demobilization and the possibilities for their futures. In this case reporters focused on WAC medical technicians who had been taught a "lifetime career." Their numbers included hundreds of black women. These technicians had the reputation for keeping neater surgical tables and outperforming men in many areas. A chief surgical nurse maintained that all the doctors wished they had more female technicians, although the commander of the surgical technician's school, Col. Ervin, had been "wary of women in the medical department" and had warned that the school was too rugged for them. Capt. Neal, the WAC executive officer, offered the aside, "The trouble with Col. Ervin...is that he has not been a WAC very long." The women converted him quickly. At graduation Ervin remarked, "The Wacs are strictly GI...and not very much different from male soldiers when it comes to work, discipline, and military courtesy."

By July, nurses were eligible for immediate discharge because they had been overseas longer than other women. The WACs could stay on if they wanted, but the organization was dissolving rapidly since there was no pending legislation making it permanent. Newspapers reported the eagerness of servicewomen to get out of the military, but senior military leaders were talking a different story at the end of 1945. Gen. Arnold's final report, which blueprinted the needs for maintaining post war airpower, was reprinted in the *Times* and, significantly, contained a section devoted to women. He commented that World War II had required the mobilization of women and maintained that "...a nucleus of female soldiers should be maintained in peacetime" for efficient and rapid expansion in any future war. Adm. King echoed that the Navy not only
wanted a women's Reserve in peacetime, but to retain a reasonable number on active duty. Congressional approval would be key because the future of women in the armed forces was still uncertain. While there were a hundred thousand WACs on VE day, by December there were only fifty thousand. The overseas strength of seventeen thousand was scheduled to decline to thirty-five hundred by April, 1946.  

Mrs. Lord appeared in the news again in September when she reminded the public of the early difficulties and many opponents of the WAC. Many in the military, religion, and education had claimed that "woman's place [was] in the home" and that "war [was] a man's job and a man's job alone." The G.I.'s had thought the women would spend all their time powdering their noses and running after officers and that they would get all the clean sheets and real food. The common refrain had been, "They'll be more trouble than they're worth." Instead, they had proved that American women could "take it." Their "humor was unimpaired" by the experience, they had done their jobs well, helped morale, and encouraged the men to be brave. They performed some jobs, like air traffic control, better than the men. They learned a lot and wanted to put their training to work after the war. Mrs. Lord, like others, was disappointed that their future was still a matter for debate.  

In October, the Christian Science Monitor presented another thoughtful piece, "When Mary Comes Marching Home," by Alma Lutz. Many people wondered about the return home of military women, considering that it was the first time so many had served on active duty. Lutz imagined that it might be asking too much for them to help in the reconstruction. Perhaps they would rebel against continued regimentation. Maybe they would want freedom in return for their hard work and heavy responsibilities. In most people's view, "just" being a housewife
entailed neither. Lutz maintained, however, that servicewomen were better citizens for having served and were still interested in fulfilling their civic responsibilities. Newly self-reliant, they had learned useful skills and wanted to be equal partners with men in the business world as they had been in the military. They had gained a greater appreciation for their home and country, and a better sense of values, pride, and duty. They had gained the self-respect and confidence they had "sorely needed."

Lutz also noted that the traditional prejudice against women in the services, which extended even to nurses at the front, [had] been broken down to a very great extent by the fine spirit and good work of the women and by the innate fairness of American men. There is nothing that builds understanding and respect like working together.65

The men had seen that the women could "take it." Older women had joined for the economic benefits, adventure, and travel and from a desire to serve their country. Lutz believed that the performance of female officers had proven women's abilities to hold public office and that their accomplishments would support professional and business women in their quest for equal pay for equal work and the drive for equal rights under the law. She believed that whereas women in the military still constituted a minority they would be future public leaders. Lutz further postulated that these women, having seen the horror and waste of war (though not becoming pacifists), would still work to try to prevent future conflicts. They had experienced other cultures and this would decrease societal prejudices. Women were practical, whereas war against those you know was highly impractical.66 Lutz was so optimistic that it would be hard to face her today knowing how little breakdown of traditional gender views occurred and how men failed of that fairness that she presumed of future debates. The post-war backlash, actually stronger after the Korean
conflict, would put her predictions on hold until the early 1970s, when they would regain momentum and continue to cause struggle thereafter in the form of debates on women in the services, women as pilots, women in the service academies, women in combat, etc.

Whereas the Monitor's coverage was serious, Newsweek's was more representative of media presentations near the end of 1945, in not giving much credit to military women, other than nurses, who served in a more ideologically acceptable role (but in the greatest danger). Newsweek predicted that people would forget "GI Jane" quickly as the "Wac [was] vanishing speedily....It seems evident that there won't be any Wacs in the peacetime Army because it isn't taking any reenlistments." Many of the women were reportedly going home to keep house; interest in college had declined but enrollment in business and beauty courses was up. The Army had negatively changed these women, the report noted--they had gained weight and started smoking. As an afterthought, the article added that they had had some valuable experiences. They were happy to get out, but they would do it all over again if a crisis arose.67

Of course the situation of military women in 1945 reflected a larger ideological debate about gender roles, perhaps spurred in part by their participation in non-traditional arenas. The discussions concerning servicewomen should be considered, at least briefly, in the context of this larger public debate. In March 1945, the Times examined the ideological issue with a two part series and subsequent letters to the editors on "Career Woman or Housewife?" The first installment, by Edith Efron, claimed that the housewife was a "social stereotype, a symbol of cultural lag." She lamented the fact that women lived vicariously through their husbands and children. New York psychologist Karen Horney's research showed that this made women neurotic; they needed psychological
freedom. Horney advocated that women might have to be forced to work in order to see how important it was to them, as some had had to be forced to vote. Efron maintained that children did not need their mother at home all day, and that nursery schools were not only widely available but also had educational and socializing advantages over most homes. Children should be as proud of their mothers as they were of their fathers (suggesting that children were more proud of parents who worked outside the home). Efron proposed that men and women both work a five day work week from nine to three and contribute help at home. She believed that smart husbands would adjust quickly to such a change in culture and that men would then become "real fathers." She did recognize, though, that this change was bound to upset other, lesser men and cause some divorces. Regardless, women as human beings should be allowed their desires and aspirations. Marriage should be a loving friendship rather than a barter of "women's egos for men's money." Women had so much more to contribute to society. For those afraid of the upheaval, she maintained that "home" was not disappearing, simply changing in this "transitional period."

Ann Maulsby responded. Arguing that if a woman loved her husband and had imagination, she did not need an outside job to cover up "spiritual inadequacies." Women did not want jobs for self-expression or improvement, she believed, but simply for ego gratification with husbands and children taking a back seat. Maulsby claimed that women needed to appreciate their husbands rather than viewing them as a paycheck. Non-working women were more well adjusted and calmer because being a housewife was more varied and fascinating than just cooking and scrubbing. Housewives could be a greater cultural force if they read, exercised to keep a "trim figure," napped, and planned their own schedule. No happily married woman honestly wanted to work outside except in emergencies.
Children needed their mothers full-time, not nursery schools or two parents tired from outside work and housework. Women fooled themselves if they thought most outside jobs were stimulating. By staying home and resting they would be better sexual companions for their husbands. The crux of her argument was that career women "wreak devastation upon the American male" by competing with him, so if more women pursued careers the divorce rates would soar.

The letters the Times chose to print in response were varied. All but two were from women. Some supported the career woman, some the housewife, some straddled the fence, and some proposed alternatives to the "either-or" concept. One Army private advocated careers for women, while a housewife supporter decried career women as materialistic and unfeminine. Not surprisingly, one man wrote that men should have the last word. His career-woman wife had returned to housewifery and in his view was finally truly happy. He was more comfortable being a "feudal headman" and felt that the current arrangement with her at home reflected "natural law." Other letter writers thought women should choose their own course; perhaps both parents should work part time or perhaps women should be paid for housework and having children rather than being financially dependent. One writer suggested that home should be a base of operations for women, not a "prison". 68

The end of the war and demobilization in 1945 should have given the press and public a chance to reflect on changes in the ways the debate on military women had been framed since before 1940. But no articles or letters summarized variations or continuities on the themes. Early on, in the face of representations of foreign women in militaries and war and of American women joining voluntary defense organizations, the debate had
centered on whether women should be in the military or participants in war at all. These arguments largely ignored the fact that whether they should be was a moot point as they had been and already were in both the military and war in many capacities—as military nurses, as victims, as producers of soldiers, and as civilian workers, among others. Detractors focused on a lack of competence or the potential destruction of military effectiveness. In conjunction with this position and later as the mainstay of the debate once women proved their capabilities, opponents focused on the idea that "women in war" constituted a cultural antithesis, an aberration of nature or religious beliefs. This argument surfaced early and continued at fluctuating levels throughout the war.

The public debate seemed to be carried on an inch at a time with separate discussions and confusing legislative actions for each service and each step forward—the WAAC, the WAVES, the Marines, the SPARs, the WAC, black service members, and the militarization of the women pilots (WASP and WAFS) and female doctors. These were followed by related debates on whether the culture would survive intact if Navy women served overseas or were allowed to marry Navy men, if nurses gained equal rank, and if women earned equal pay and benefits. As the war continued and the need for manpower increased, the cultural aspects of the debate seemed to wane. Women were not only encouraged to serve, but were vehemently criticized for not doing their part. This shift did not indicate that the ideological terms of this cultural debate ever actually disappeared or changed. Perceptions of gender were altered only slightly to emphasize the tendency of the "feminine nature" to sacrifice for the larger good and longer term societal benefits, while reassurances that femininity itself remained uninjured were heaped upon the women and the public. This adaptation of gender norms is particularly interesting in light of early
debates' dire predictions that women would lose their feminine attributes if called upon to step outside the norms, or were allowed or encouraged to indulge unnatural desires to participate in non-traditional roles in the larger context of public spaces. The debate even reached a point where actually conscripting women could almost be ideologically supported by those originally most opposed to the entire idea of women in the military. The debaters crept to within reaching distance of what should have seemed to be most abhorrent to those wanting to keep women in the private sphere or out of harm's way. Terms of the debates deny, in the face of incontrovertible evidence, that military women were ever put in a position to be hurt or killed.

Regardless of whether women served out of self-sacrificing patriotism or unnatural desires, the need for unavailable manpower and the resort to using womanpower did result in steps forward for servicewomen— in recognition, benefits, pay, and conditions (i.e., being allowed to be married, etc.). Though rational policy seemed to be emerging, it turned out to be simply short-term pragmatism and would easily and quickly revert to the irrational after the war, as reflected in the increasing number of discussions on women veterans and appropriate post-war female roles. The press's tendency all along, even in most articles recognizing women's significant contributions, sacrifice, and courage in facing danger, was to trivialize their service by concentrating on hair, makeup, underwear, and uniform fashions, making the ideological gymnastics easier when at the end of the war gender-typing had to be restored, resurrected, reimplored.

To even indulge the debate on whether women naturally possessed or could exercise the right to act outside the home in the public realm supported the opposition's belief that these rights were not inherent in
the condition of being human, but were subject to the pleasure and
tolerance of others (read white upper- and middle-class men). Our
society's propensity to address social debates in this manner causes us to
be ahistoric when discussions arise over and over again, and creates an
environment in which detractors can continue opposition and
discrimination, whether overt or covert, even after decisions have been
made to expand public recognition of women's and minorities' inherent and
natural rights of self-determination and equal access to opportunity.
This phenomenon inhibits or prevents positive change; ghettoizes and
marginalizes the non-dominant groups in our culture; allows dominant
groups to dictate the conditions of others for paternalistically
protective or more obviously selfish reasons; and continues debates that
should have long ago been resolved, if even entertained in the first
place.

Because the debate was addressed in piecemeal and oblique fashion,
the real cultural/political issue was not resolved during World War II.
As a result, the debates continued and in 1945, one can see harbingers of
the issues of the next era under review, 1946-1964. The primary
discussion would address whether there should be Regular women's peacetime
military service other than in the nurses' corps. That debate would
eventually be overtaken, as in World War II, by the necessities the Korean
conflict and the beginning of the build-up in Vietnam forces. Other
aspects of the World War II and earlier debates would also resurface:
should women fly, should all women or just nurses be drafted, would
military women lose their femininity, would women's military service
destroy our culture? We will see again, as in World War II, that
pragmatism would win out in the short term with the ideological gymnastic
abilities of American society unimpaired, so that the forces of
conservatism could retain their power to define and maintain gender norms. Those forces, apparent from 1940 to 1945, would prove to have a very tenacious grip.
Notes to Chapter 4


14. "Decorations Given to 92 War Nurses," (AP) NYT, 7 June 1944, 16.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


34. "Recognition for the Wasps" (editorial), NYT, 16 June 1944, p.18. "Pictures Male Fliers Doing Wasps' Chores" (AP), 20 June 1944, p.11. "House Defeats Bill to Put WASPs in Army," 22 June 1944, p.19. Cochran was opposed to putting women under the WAC in part because in her meeting with Col. Hobby scheduled by Hap Arnold, she was kept waiting and Hobby did not anything about airplanes. Cochran said Hobby made some inane remark about her young son having airplanes on his bedroom wallpaper. See Jacqueline Cochran and Maryann Bucknum Brinley, Jackie Cochran: The Story of the Greatest Woman Pilot in Aviation History, Bantam Books, New York, 1986. For Cochran it was about status, believing she and her pilots were more special than the WACs, and about power. She wanted to be in charge of female pilots in the Air Corps and answer only to the commander of the AAC.


November 1944, p.30. "As the Army Nurse Sees Them" by Slanger et al. quoted from the *Stars and Stripes*, 10 December 1944, Section VI, p.22.


54. "Federal Court Rules a Wac is a Soldier," NYT, 20 February 1945, p.5.


66. Ibid.


SECTION III

AMBIVALENCE, 1946-1964
CHAPTER 5

PERMANENCY DEBATE, 1946-1949

With the Axis powers' surrenders and the rapid demobilization of the U.S. armed forces came an expected return of aspirations to achieve the domestic ideal. But industrial mobilization, the expansion of the labor force, emphasis on consumerism, and women's more visible public and civic participation had changed the practical situation. The reality of women's lives had, in fact, changed but ideology remained relatively constant. In addition, the military would be called upon, even during demobilization, to back up the nation's newest role as the leader of world democracy. With U.S. rhetoric supporting democracy abroad, race and class issues came to the forefront in discussions of real democracy at home. These public political discussions could not take place without consideration of the rights and obligations of citizenship.

The Congressional debates on the regularization of women's military service took place in the context of these enormous material, social, and political changes. Both domestically and internationally, rapid changes produced a general fear of coming crisis between the forces of 'Democracy' and 'Communism'. Legislators had to decide whether women should be a permanent part of peacetime forces. If so, should they be Regular or Reserves? Once the decision was made that at least a small nucleus of women would be retained as a mobilization base and as an experiment, the services decided that they wanted 'quality' women rather than quantity. In attempts to maintain gender ideology, 'quality' was defined as being
composed of 'femininity', morality, and heterosexuality. To get this quality, senior military leaders convinced Congress that the services had to be able to offer women careers and therefore Regular status. At the same time, gender-specific restrictions directly prevented most women from considering a military career.

For their part, the press continued to praise and to trivialize servicewomen and female veterans, thereby encouraging the public's ambivalence toward and amnesia about their past contributions. In this period, the media highlighted two special cases. In the most 'feminized' field, nursing, women gained permanency and Regular status. In one of the least traditional, flying, female pilots were not even considered for militarization. The press also continued to present portrayals of foreign women, which gave the public yet another reference point for the American debate; women in armed forces around the world were visible to the public. Moreover, images of the treatment of foreign civilian women by American soldiers could not help but show, in relief, military men's attitudes toward women in general. Military women would suffer fall-out from these attitudes and behaviors, as the objects of similar treatment at the hands of male GIs.

Beyond portrayals of foreign women, the media provided the public with a social and cultural context for the debates on women in the military by keeping discussions of women's roles in civilian society in the news. By examining more general articles on civilian women, we can validate the centrality of cultural ideology and the ubiquitous restrictions that grew out of it, in both the civilian and military arenas. There continued a domestic ideal based on myths of a race and class bound domesticity. However, in contrast to the push for women to 'return' to the home, the media showed women increasing their public roles
in politics, education, and non-traditional work. Of course, some of the most non-traditional were military women.

Military women had been admitted to, but not fully accepted by, the services. Actions taken between 1946 and 1949 did culminate in military women being ready to serve in the Korean conflict, but the restrictions on their conditions of service, developed during this integration phase, provided seeds of insecurity and lower public visibility in later decades. The same restrictions also fostered their continuing battle for full acceptance.

After a too-rapid demobilization of the services, shortages of men became critical, and senior military leaders decided that they did, in fact, need women. However, these leaders did not consider the implications of their gender-specific limitations on women's conditions of service. In 1946, the peace seemed precarious and the nation wanted a viable defense force, both to guard against aggression and to fulfill a new role as the protector of democratic nations in the Cold War. Still, by the end of World War II, not many American men were choosing to pursue a military career. As a result, the services were able to gain continuing draft legislation and a consideration of Universal Military Service (UMS) laws. Military and civilian leaders considered whether women should be included in these two measures. Although the terms of the citizenry's military obligation were not worked out in 1946, political discussion of rights and responsibilities could have informed the debate on military women. Instead, in the late 1940s, the nation would debate peacetime, Regular women's military presence, for nurses, the medical corps, and female line personnel, in a vacuum of theoretical considerations.

Although women had proven their military value and there was support for 'Regular' legislation, there was also significant opposition to such
measures for line, non-medical personnel which resulted in restrictions on women's participation. Reserve status might have been more acceptable to gender ideology, but service leaders were convinced they would not be able to recruit 'quality' personnel if the women could not contemplate a career as Regulars. Advocates of 'regularization' and permanency considered it outright abuse to mobilize women by presidential fiat, demobilize them at will, and ignore career or retirement benefits. Nurse integration was much easier to rationalize as the public and policy makers could ignore the dangerous realities of field nursing and see only a feminized profession of caretaking and sacrifice. Nurses were 'regularized' between 1946 and 1947. After preliminary consideration of 'regularizing' the women's line organizations in 1946, the debate between 1947 and 1948 was resolved by the Women's Armed Services Integration Act which provided for a small, expandable nucleus of female service members and for experimentation in new jobs. However, this Act also codified restrictions that made a career a very difficult option for most women and demonstrated the services' and lawmakers' general ambivalence toward the issue. Throughout 1949, a small group of women worked within the imposed restrictions to build their organizations and broaden the terms and conditions of their services. But they did not have time to work out all the details by the time the nation had to react to the Korean crisis.

Near the end of World War II, as we have seen, demobilization occurred simultaneously with tentative discussions about the possibility of women's peacetime, permanent participation in the armed forces. Media presentations showed that this idea was not entirely accepted by the public. During the war, women had enlisted for "the duration plus six months," but no one knew exactly what that meant. Many men and women
wanted to go home as soon as the fighting stopped. The public had generally agreed with the concept of militarizing women, but only as a temporary sacrifice. Most people considered home a proper place for women to be.

However, some military women, neither returning to family obligations nor desiring to start a family immediately, worried about finding post-war employment. Some had given up well-paying jobs to join the service and hoped to return to them. Others had learned new skills in the military that they hoped to parlay into better positions. Although women were entitled to veteran's preference in post-war hiring and educational benefits, they knew male veterans would receive even higher informal priority. Other servicewomen were not at all interested in competing for civilian employment. But whatever their desires to stay in the military, they realized Congress would have to pass permanency legislation to allow their continuation.

Unfortunately, from 1945 through 1946, despite women's wartime contributions, the military and Congress would not entertain the notion of a peacetime women's corps. The WASPs had been demobilized in December 1944 as the country became more optimistic about winning the war, more male pilots became available, and Jacqueline Cochran campaigned unsuccessfully to integrate her pilots into the AAC rather than the WAC. The SPARs discontinued training early in 1946 and immediately demobilized. As the other services cancelled their women's recruiting and training programs and seemed intent on letting the remaining women exit by attrition, another dynamic developed.

The services quickly realized that they had a continuing need for women in feminized administrative and support jobs and in nursing. The military unwittingly thought it could dictate the terms of women's service
and involuntarily extend 'essential' women on active duty. In the meantime, the services debated the meaning of "the duration"—was it the end of hostilities or the dates of treaty signings? They struggled with overseas occupation requirements overseas and argued to keep women as long as possible. Some women vociferously complained that they wanted to go home immediately. They had accumulated enough "de-mobilization points," had served well during the emergency, and were ready for their role of providing a home for returning servicemen.

As the military circumvented its own demobilization policies in the name of expediency, senior leaders came to recognize that the solution might be to maintain at least a small number of women on active duty to provide for a nucleus of trained women on which a larger Reserve could be based in case of future emergency, and to experiment in jobs for their future optimum utilization. The Army, Navy, and new Air Force came to agree that they wanted an infrastructure of Regular, active-duty women and thought they could utilize women however they wanted. They apparently forgot that they needed legislation to make the women's services permanent. After Congress saw the military's proposed 1946 military budget, which included funding for women's programs, legislators had to remind the armed forces that Congressional approval was required.

Thus the debate restarted. This time the focus would be on the terms of women's service. This debate would not be as highly publicized as the World War II discussions, but it was visible to newspaper and periodical readers. Some of the public had come to accept women's service; some wished the end of the period of "sacrifice" so that women could take up the post-war task of re-energizing the American home and family; and some resisted women's service altogether.
During the course of this debate, the treatment of female veterans, in the press was relevant to how important people thought women's wartime contributions and bore on whether women would feel disposed to contribute in another emergency if they were denied full access to benefits they thought they had earned in this one. It is also relevant that other researchers have found that eventually female veterans would play down or hide their service records to avoid being labeled by the common stereotypes--morally loose or "hormonally imbalanced," i.e. lesbians. However, before denial set in, there was some acceptance of and pride in women's military accomplishments as demonstrated by the fact that New York Times engagement and wedding announcements occasionally identified women as former military members and pictured them in uniform.¹

In spite of previous opposition, women's service for an emergency was generally accepted by the end of the war. With the emergency's end, the Times announced the February 1946 closure of WAVES training facilities at Hunter College and cessation of WAC training at Ft. Des Moines.² In addition, the military paper announced that it wanted to hire civilians to replace enlisted Signal Corps women in the Far East as the WACs returned from the Pacific theater.

The nation proudly welcomed home these and other military women home. The returning "sun-tanned and smiling [WACs]...stole the show at the pier as their boat arrived." Gen. MacArthur praised the more than two hundred who had served under the harshest conditions (both in material circumstances and those imposed or made worse by military policy), enduring "the hardships of war with the same stout-hearted fortitude and typically American good-humor as their brothers in arms."³ Throughout their service in Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines, only two had died.
Some women wanted to contribute more. Capt. Mildred Lucks, a Legion of Merit winner, declined discharge to stay overseas, intending to teach Koreans "to rid themselves of prejudice against women in the professions." Despite some women's desire to continue in service, their numbers fell from a peak of one hundred thousand WACs on duty on VE Day to less than forty thousand in January 1946.⁴

Time trumpeted this rapid attrition while at the same time informing the public that the services were considering small, permanent active-duty or Reserve women's forces. As military cut-backs continued, the Navy and Army prepared legislation, aware that "most of the girls wanted to get out, either to finish schooling or to start a family," but that a few wanted to stay.⁵

Many military women did want to get home in a hurry. One letter to the Times' editors from a "Forgotten Woman" insisted that married WACs wanted to return to their husbands and were irritated at the military "song-and-dance" about bringing British and Australian war brides home by cutting red tape, while ignoring married women in the military. "We are American wives first and WACs last. We want discharges immediately. I want children--not medals. Just wait until we hit the polls in the next election."⁶ Male soldiers too wanted to get home quickly. When demobilization slowed in January 1946, large numbers of male soldiers (especially draftees) protested overseas. When Life found a WAC amidst the unruly men, they asked her why a "volunteer" would protest her service. She responded "So I volunteered. Can I help it if I saw too many movies?" This suggested that wartime government propaganda and Hollywood films exercised a significant impact on young women considering the option of military service. However committed to emergency service, these men and women wanted out once the crisis diminished.⁷
In any case, in the face of complaints, the Army agreed to the early release of WACs in Europe and the WAVES decommissioned more training facilities. Men also were being released at a staggering pace with almost seven million sent home by May. However, the government, the military, and some portions of the public started to wonder if such rapid demobilization was a mistake. Gen. Eisenhower pointed out that the services would continue to need trained manpower. The Army asked for a draft extension and supported a program of universal military training (UMT), even though the latter was not expected to pass Congressional muster given the country's history of anti-militarism. Fear of militarism was continually apparent in debates on military women, as in the 1948 Hoover Commission report. Even with an extension of the draft, however, the press predicted the military would have to advertise itself as a viable career for young people in order to recruit enough quality personnel. Recruiters did advertise careers for women, but policies and practices militated against long-term service for women.

By spring 1946, as many doctors and nurses were being released from the services and WACs were returning from overseas, personnel shortages grew worse. Life readers saw the stark, black-and-white "Picture of the Week"--the "Last WAC at Fort Des Moines." Capt. Amelia Smith walked down a deserted, dreary street with her suitcase. The photograph signified rapidly fading military opportunities for women.

At the end of the war, women's status as veterans took the foreground in presentations to the public. At first, the government addressed women's issues sensitively and separately, forming special committees to help them find jobs, reestablish social lives, and secure education, medical services, and counseling on personal problems. Mrs.
Oswald Lord, chairperson of the National Civilian Advisory Committee for the WAC, continued to act as liaison with the War Department and local veterans centers. The media continually proclaimed that female veterans had earned the same benefits as male veterans. Reporter Charles Hurd suggested that cities set up organizations to ensure that women received these benefits because female vets not only had to face the same problems as men, but to contend with public notions that they did not deserve equal consideration. According Hurd, the opposition to female veterans' benefits argued that women, far from the front, had not served in combat and should not be entitled to equal benefits. Supporters countered that few men had served at the front, while some women had served under fire, were injured or killed. In the same spirit, the Times reprinted Mademoiselle's advice to ex-servicewomen that warned them to take a down-to-earth approach to job hunting showing that not everyone thought women should not continue to work outside the home. The women's periodical advised women, "Don't start your letter of application by exploiting the fact that you've been serving your country." Instead they suggested letting it come up "naturally" when discussing experience. The opposite advice would have been offered to male veterans, while the magazine told women not to expect to use their military training because they would "not be used widely in technical jobs." Male veterans usually had more experience and would get those jobs. The magazine also warned female veterans that they would be at a disadvantage in technical areas because civilians were more resistant to women entering non-traditional fields than the military had been. In addition, some unions would not accept women. Apparently war training, previously advertised as career enhancing for post-war work, was not; societal gender ideologies had not changed enough to accommodate them.\textsuperscript{10}
Female veterans may not have competed well for technical jobs but some did benefit after their service. Their ability to use the GI bill was not totally unproblematic, though. At Colgate University, for instance, although women could take classes, they were not able to take degrees. Credits would have to be transferred to colleges that did. New York City's publicized reunion for military women informed them of their benefits and discussed their special needs. The judge advocate general (JAG) had recently ruled that enlisted women's time in the WAAC, unlike officers', did not count toward terminal leave because they were "not members of the armed forces." The American Veterans Committee (AVC) intended to rectify this inconsistency, but the War Department clarified that WAAC officers were not allowed the leave time either (important because unused leave could be exchanged for money upon separation). Other Times articles let the public know that female vets faced more problems than men, including employment discrimination, despite President Truman having signed legislation affording equal reemployment rights.

In addition to bringing public attention to female veterans' issues, periodicals also highlighted services for them and progress in enforcing and enhancing their benefits. At the national level the VA appointed Violet Boynton, former WAVE officer and physical education specialist, as advisor for women's veterans' affairs. She was charged with developing a comprehensive policy for female veterans and VA employees. Partially as a result of programs like these, by October 1946, the government could boast that two-thirds of women veterans had applied for benefits within four months of their discharges. Most had asked for readjustment allowances and education and training benefits, while, consistent with gendered social and economic structures, relatively few asked for home or small business loans.
Nurse veterans, having served in the most traditional women's role, were widely praised for their war service and their different needs were recognized. Mrs. Norman Kirk, a World War I nurse and wife of the Army Surgeon General, started a campaign to raise $2 million for a memorial home and headquarters for rest, rehabilitation, and study to honor "the nurses and medical women" of the war. The project was endorsed by the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy. Maj.Gen. Kirk cited "the heroic role played by the nurses," and Adm. Ross MacIntire added, "The real monument to the work of the Army nurse is enshrined in the hearts of the men they served so well." Mrs. Kirk, Mrs. MacIntire, Mrs. Carl Spaatz, wife of the AAC Chief, and Mrs. Nimitz, the CNO's wife, opened the drive. Adm. Nimitz donated substantial funds for magazine advertisements for the project, remarking "there is not enough that can be said in praise of the magnificent performance of duty of the women, who play such an important part in healing and caring for our sick and wounded." Bess Truman and Mamie Eisenhower also supported the effort.14

Meanwhile, veteran female pilots, who had arguably served in one of the least traditional fields, had their day in the public view as well. Their reunions and post-war races, as well as attempts to memorialize them, were well publicized by an organization formed by two hundred former WASPs who sought to "spotlight women's place in peacetime aviation." After the war, the female pilots acted as civilian flight instructors, copilots for charter flights, and aerial photographers, as well as on airlines' ground crews. They could not fly passengers, and, of course, could no longer fly for the military. The public learned about a women's air show with bomb dropping contests to raise money for a fund to honor the forty-one WASPs killed in wartime AAF flying. They also established a scholarship for flying or aeronautical engineering studies for young
women, and for the welfare of the WASPs who had been injured in wartime service.  

Lastly, in the area of veterans activities, the AVC publicized its support for the rights of women and racial minorities at a time when race and gender rights were not usually compared or connected. Although neither an explicit link between similar oppressions nor the recognition of the double oppression of black women was recognized, the press commended the AVC for not abusing women at their convention. *Time* reported,

> Nobody dropped water bombs from a hotel window. Nobody set fire to the furniture. There were no fist fights in the lobby, no naked women running through the corridors, no drunks hell-raising in the streets. Delegates to the first convention of the American Veterans Committee, lustiest & loudest of the scores of...veterans' groups were too busy for horseplay.  

AVC men and women, with a motto of "Citizens First, Veterans Second," adopted a "left of center plan of action" opposing Jim Crow practices, anti-Nisei legislation, and a veteran's bonus. They also picketed a tavern in Des Moines when the owner had refused to serve two African-American veterans.

More about the expected post-war domestic role of women could be found in discussions about male veterans. The *Times* sponsored a radio forum, "Should women stay away from college to give veterans a chance?" Dr. Charles Gray, president of Bard College, and Dr. Benjamin Fine, the *Times*' education editor, opposed the idea. Others supported the plan. Air Corps NCO Merle Miller, former editor of the *Yank*, proposed that women defer to male vets who had given four years of their time to their country. Joan Williard, a high school senior, agreed. No one at the forum mentioned female veterans.
Ironically, in other instances, women's wholesale deferment to male veterans caused unanticipated problems. The U.S. Employment Services badly needed stenographers and typists to process jobs for male veterans. But women had left these jobs so that employers could hire male vets. Most men were unqualified for clerical jobs or did not want them so over three thousand non-administrative 'male' jobs remained unfilled because there were no 'female' clerks to process requirements and applications. Tellingly, USES reassured readers that "returning servicemen, worried about women taking their places in business while they were away, may forget their anxiety..." Female vets were not mentioned as candidates for either the USES administrative positions nor the non-traditional positions.

After 1946, while women became less visible in articles about veterans and other service issues, remaining military women continued to be trivialized by the press and by the military comedic or sexual presentations. That the services often assigned women to light-weight duties no doubt contributed to later historical amnesia or denial of their greater capabilities and achievements. As an example, the War Department sent sixty-one WACs to England to "nurse maid" war brides and children on their trip to the U.S. And nurses from the hospital ship Benevolence were pictured swimming and enjoying the sun on Bikini island. The area had been declared free of radioactivity within forty-eight hours after atomic testing. The military commonly used women's presence to signify safety.

Women were also essential to the framing of the caste/class debates among servicemen. For example, military men traded nylons for female attention. The press reported that enlisted men protested the policy of selling nylons only to officers. Military women were not mentioned, but
the Quartermaster Store at Army War College sold twenty-five thousand pair of stockings to male officers, while barring enlisted personnel. Enlisted men complained because nylons were useful on the blackmarket and as gifts to lady friends so the QM announced men would not be allowed to purchase nylons.¹⁸

Press reports emphasizing the amusement value or trivial nature of servicewomen's activities contrasted with those on women's family roles, which were highly visible and lionized by the press. In service to the myth of domesticity based on a white, middle-class ideal rather than reality, the "value of housework" discussion took the foreground. However, articles also revealed the limited hold of the myth rather than its real power as the press appealed to the public to respect women's domestic roles. Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen told a gathering of three thousand Catholic Metro-Life Company women that the three greatest roles for women were in the home, the community, and the struggle for "equity rather than equality." He added that, "the so-called liberation of women is based on the idea of equality, which means that woman is a bad imitation of man...Women have not gained anything by being equal. It means men no longer take off their hats in elevators..."¹⁹

In spite of implicit criticism of women who did not adhere to the domestic ideal, the press did cover women's involvement in non-traditional areas. The Times' reviewed Sally Knapp's book, New Wings for Women, written about female pilots "who led hazardous lives, who even fought in battle..." and said that young readers would find "a whole new picture of women proving they deserve equality with men." The reviewer believed that Knapp's thirteen biographical sketches showed role models for young women in aviation careers and that prejudices were being challenged.²⁰
Advertisements and entertainment made military women visible to the public, along with some not-so-subtle social messages. For instance, a Coca-Cola ad signified wartime possibilities but also the hope for a return to pre-war social arrangements with a photograph of both servicemen and servicewomen on a train with the copy, "A familiar custom followed them when they went overseas...Now they are headed for home...Back to their American kind of life...with its happy ways and customs." On the stage, Ingrid Bergman's Joan of Arc was the hottest ticket in town and garnered extensive press coverage. In full armor on the cover of Life, Bergman cut an impressive martial figure, but reviewers complained that the Broadway version of the story changed George Bernard Shaw's portrayal of a fiery, dangerous revolutionary to one of a sweet, feminine saint.\(^{21}\)

Military women could not escape comedic or negative portrayals. WACs in Europe were berated for their opposition to civilian women wearing their uniforms (they had also opposed the practice during the war). The WACs did not want correspondents to be mistaken for officers. According to reports, because of WAC complaints, press women had to go without winter coats because these items were not included on civilian ration cards. Reporters failed to mention that civilian men were not allowed to wear officer's uniforms either. Instead of lobbying for a change to civilian rations and failing to mention that servicewomen's reputations had previously been tarnished by civilians wearing WAC uniforms, the Times criticized military women, and at the same time, misleadingly headlined the story as one on military discrimination against women, "The United States Army today put women in their place with a vengeance...."\(^{22}\)

Military women opposed civilians wearing uniforms because they knew that the public would think badly of them all if anyone in uniform was perceived negatively. They must have read with chagrin that a member of
their Corps, Capt. Kathleen Nash Durant, had stolen the German Hesse jewels. Although Life claimed that she was the "ringleader", her colonel husband and a male major were also involved. She may have been the mastermind, but neither Life nor Time presented any evidence showing how a female captain held sway over two higher ranking men.23

Military women must have felt even worse when Victor Dallaire, ex-soldier and editor of the Stars and Stripes, decided that European women were much better companions than Americans, using WACs to illustrate what was wrong with his country-women. "It took only a few Wacs...to convince me that [Italian and French girls] were nicer [than American women] in a lot of...ways." He claimed that Army women insisted on a "loud and full share of conversation with their escorts," while the French girls let the men do the talking. His comments were not about respect though. He noted that GIs called the Pigalle section of Paris, where they went to date French women, "Pig Alley." Dallaire even admitted that, because of post-war dislocation, the women were probably more interested in what American men could give them than in the men themselves. He noted the "terrific pulling power of American cigarettes and chocolate." While the writer played down and belittled both American military and civilian women's voluntary assumption of responsibilities, their contributions to the war effort, and their losses, he extolled the participation of European women. He emphasized that they retained their femininity even in the service. Dallaire told of French ambulance drivers, who were so much more feminine than American WACs, that even after braving bad roads and battle conditions, they would return (if they were not killed) with a flower or bright scarf to show "that they were just girls after all, despite GI uniforms, clod hopper boots, and mud...they knew that their appeal lay in
feminine curves and ways and not in their ability to jockey an ambulance."

The *Times* also presented balancing views. "The Other Side" was a short piece by an American GI "with a bias toward American women." He reported that French women were snobs and quoted a soldiers' opinion of German women: "I'd rather spend an evening with an upholstered chair." The paper also printed letters both condemning and praising Dallaire. Eighty-five percent of respondents, mostly women, criticized him. One of them, held for over three years as a Japanese prisoner, told of the hardships that she and two sister prisoners faced. One died from overwork on starvation rations and the other gave her last bit of hidden money to a GI for shoes. One Navy woman wrote that she did want a share in running the country and another, Yeoman Helen Wood, made her point by saying, "It is a dreadful thing that the American woman has a mind of her own, forms opinions and likes to express them! We can see how that would injure Mr. D's male ego, but we are thankful that most American men like to talk with us, not simply at us." All the letters agreeing with Dallaire were from men. Several letters acknowledged European's women's greater suffering, but also recognized American women's contributions to the war and their acceptance of the responsibilities of citizenship beyond that for which Dallaire and male letter writers gave them credit."24

In addition to being criticized by soldiers and some of the public, military women were affected by other roles women played for military men. For instance, typically, commanders blamed military women for their soldiers' bad behavior, rather than questioning a failure of their own leadership; American military men abused civilian women overseas harming
political relations; and male soldiers blamed their poor morale on women, who served as pawns in the military caste system.

Fraternization constantly concerned commanders, and the press reported it frankly. Capt. C.F. Behrens issued a stern memorandum to take emergency action against "lovemaking and lollygagging" at St. Alban's Naval Hospital. Time reported that "sailors and marines were involved; so were WAVES and civilians. It was happening in phone booths, on the ladders, even in the middle of the corridors." The captain forbade "holding of hands, osculation and constant embracing of WAVES, corpsmen or civilians and sailors or any combination of male & female personnel."25 Overseas, despite rumors about servicewomen's lack of morals, there were no reports of military women engaged in sexual misconduct with foreign nationals, while fraternization of male soldiers with locals and the poor behavior of male GIs received a lot of attention.

In Japan, Lt.Gen. Robert Eichelberger prohibited "public displays of affection...[as] prejudicial to good order and discipline" after watching soldiers "strolling arm in arm with Japanese girls...lolling amorously on the grass...[and] making love in the back of Army Jeeps." Life's photo essay on the American occupation included Army photographs of "Fraternization Do's and Don'ts." Rules forbade "encirclement with arms," giving rides in military jeeps, and giving away cigarettes. However, couples could apply for special permits from Tokyo's provost marshal for public handholding. This small allowance reportedly served one of the Army's missions,

to keep itself happy under the mildly trying conditions of a strange environment where the girls speak a strange language and fail to match domestic beauty standards. Despite the latter handicap, in view of the Japanese enthusiasm for their conquerors, it is not surprising that 'fraternization' seems an even more inappropriate euphemism for what goes on in Nippon than it is for similar activities elsewhere.
In this area, the general had decided against damaging morale further and elected to "let nature take its course" to minimize bad behavior until the Army could send its men home.²⁵

Soldiers in Europe had a worse reputation--"fat, overfed, lonely." An Army chaplain wrote in the Christian Century that male GIs had three primary interests: "1) to find a German woman and sleep with her; 2) to buy or steal a bottle of cognac and get stinking drunk; 3) to go home." He complained that the American soldier "was a bad propaganda agent for democracy" whose insufferably "superior attitude" made him barely tolerable. The chaplain said, "The conduct of the average soldier...was at least noisy and boisterous. At the worst it was criminal. The average was odious and disgusting. The G.I. (and officer) considered any young woman fair prey." As evidence the Chaplain's assessment was correct, Time reported male soldiers' epidemic VD rates, skyrocketing numbers of AWOLs, and rampant disrespect for authority. In Frankfurt, the Army issued armbands to U.S. wives to protect them from the harassment soldiers showered on German women rather than preventing and punishing the behavior altogether. Gen. Joseph McMarney unsuccessfully attempted to improve discipline and morale in Europe but the Nuremberg Officer's Club changed its twice weekly "Fraulein Night" (days on which American women stayed away) to the policy, that "Every Night is Fraulein Night." Reports detailed the scene: "German girls (some wearing U.S. quartermaster stockings) give up resisting U.S. attacks by about 10 p.m. Petting in various degrees develops--described conservatively by a U.S. Army nurse who watched the scene briefly, as 'not very pretty'."²⁷ As a result, female officers were not comfortable frequenting their own club. Military women also suffered the fall-out from these institutional policies or leadership's impotence, and had to endure the demeaning treatment of GIs.
Abuse of civilians had implications for international relations in other locales. Reporters posited that the majority of male soldiers did not realize that their "impact on the liberated and the conquered was crucially important" to the nation. In one instance, while negotiating extension of U.S. wartime use of their airfields, Peruvian officials complained to the American embassy. Soldiers had insulted some officers' wives and girlfriends and had not only started a brawl, but injured several Peruvians.28

The press also publicized the military's mixed messages as to what was acceptable male behavior and soldiers' more serious criminal behavior. The JAG and President Truman gave leniency to Pfc. Joseph Hicswa, found guilty by a military court for the murder of two Japanese civilians during a drunken brawl. His death sentence was reduced to thirty years of hard labor since there was no Pentagon precedent "of a U.S. serviceman having been executed for the murder or rape of a German or Japanese."29 Criminal conduct should not have surprised readers as the press continued to report Gen. Eichelberger's difficulties controlling his troops as "he appealed to his men to end drunkenness, malicious beating of Japanese, housebreaking, rape and organized thievery...[because their behavior] endangered the mission of the occupation." Time reported that Pfc. Leo Christensen was sentenced to death for killing a Japanese boy, assaulting a married woman in her home, and attacking another local civilian.30 There was no public outcry about how American soldiers treated foreign citizens. Behavior, tacitly condoned, became the norm and spilled-over into treatment of others at home, especially women, including those in the service.

Gen. McNarney continued to have trouble in Europe even though he told the press that discipline was improving. Abusive GI behavior, amounting to terrorism, caused Germans to stay home after dark each time
GIs received a liquor ration. A soldier was shot by a comrade in a fight over a sixteen-year-old German girl. Two German women committed suicide in U.S. officers' apartments. Six days after her arrival in Germany, police found a civilian stenographer's body outside an Army captain's quarters.31

Angry and abusive soldiers blamed their lack of discipline on two primary factors: they wanted to go home and they resented the military's officer-enlisted "caste" or class system. Women were often the terrain over which the latter battle was fought. *Time* quoted the *Stars and Stripes*:

Enlisted men have had all they want of being treated as "second class citizens." They have watched officers in forward areas enjoy bigger and cheaper supplies of liquor, better clubs, the best seats in theaters, all the dates with nurses (officers) and Red Cross girls.32

As noted earlier, GIs complained that only officers could buy nylons, that officers' clubs still held their "Fraulein Nights," and that officers took German women out in military jeeps, while enlisted men had no access to nylons, officers clubs, or jeeps. Their access to women was impaired by this disparity. Enlisted men also complained that officer's wives were treated like royalty. In trying to remedy the gap between wives, the military decreed there would no longer be a distinction in official terminology for female spouses between "officer's ladies and enlisted men's wives." While this change was taken in "full recognition of the dignity of man," women continued to be the objects of contention. I found no public comment in the media on their positionality as objects of class designators.

Complaints about who got the "best" women and whose women were treated well continued. Former-GI (enlisted and later officer) Robert Neville, writing for *Life*, explained that the caste system was to blame
for the worst military morale problems and access to women constituted a significant discriminator,

Dances are, of course, given separately and, as a natural consequence separate lists of young women available for these affairs are also kept, with the result that there comes to be the female equivalent of rank—in other words, officers' girls and enlisted men's girls. The officers' girls, need it be added, are invariably the best looking, the smartest, the most socially acceptable.

Neville did not mention that some of the "best" women held rank in their own right. Accompanying photographs, however, are revealing. The smiling officers in bathing suits lounged on the beach among shapely Navy nurses (also officers). The enlisted men sat in uniform, without women, and "[made] do with canned beer." Enlisted men also complained that USO actresses were "stolen by the brass." Finally, soldiers complained about civilian women outranking them. Even though the press had previously castigated only female officers for supporting rules forbidding civilian women from wearing officers' uniforms, apparently enlisted men had complained too. "Red Cross girls, whose main job was to work with the enlisted men, had the simulated rank of second lieutenant. All were privileged to eat in officer's messes, to go to the officers' PXs, to stay in officers' hotels, to wear officers' clothes."33

Finally, as an example of caste segregation and significant for gender debates, Neville told an anecdote about latrine etiquette. Although he used it to show class discrimination, it has significance for class and race issues, showing that the military provided facilities for each separate group:

[The caste system] reached its finest flowering at Maison Blanche Airport in Algiers, where there were partitioned off and carefully marked a general officers' latrine, a field officers' latrine, a company-grade officers' latrine, a latrine for nurses and WAC officers, another for enlisted WACs and a final one for enlisted men.34
Later, when the discussion over the cost of separate facilities emerged as a reason why women should not serve in certain positions and areas, it was obvious debaters were not familiar with the history of latrines.

Whether resulting from the military caste system or not, the treatment of civilian women did impact servicewomen. Media presentations of public discourse on gendered social roles must have informed perceptions of military women. A Life editorial near the end of 1946 encouraged women to take advantage of careers and other opportunities, arguing that a disparity in numbers of men and women meant that not all women would marry. Even for those who did, the editorial complained, "Americans divide up their spheres of interest too sharply after marriage," and insisted that men needed to help more at home, while women needed to consider participating in politics. Life's editors felt that basic sociological structures had their implications and could be applied to military women in very specific ways:

If American men still need civilizing, the American woman still needs politicizing...Our urban industrial society, which rests on a division of labor, even tends to freeze women in their subservient social role. This very danger makes political equality the essential means to their final emancipation. For politics, in a democracy with weak social traditions, shapes our customs and manners, as well as our laws.35

Ideas like these on gender relations sound rather progressive. However, the grip of opposing ideology, most resistant in relation to the military and in other male dominated fields, refused to let go easily.

The American public also got to see how other countries were working out their political and military needs against prevailing gender
ideologies and customs. Positive images included those of European resistance women and others who had suffered from German and Japanese atrocities during the war. The Times praised "Greek Heroine" Lt. Catherine Bastias, a Greek army nurse, and West Point cadets honored former partisan Maria Gulovitch, who received a bronze medal for military operations in Czechoslovakia. Other articles memorialized women killed in the service of western militaries. Nazis were convicted of killing British and French military women, captured WAAF and nursing Yeomanry officers who had parachuted into France to assist the Resistance, who were drugged and burned alive at Struhof-Natzweiler concentration camp. Maryse Bastie earned Croix de Guerre with Palm and was the first woman to earn the title, Commander of the Legion of French Honor. The aviator, wounded in 1940 in military service, continued to aid the Allies even while a Nazi prisoner. After she was liberated from a POW camp, she continued her air work and was wounded a second time in the line of duty. A Life photo essay highlighted Jadwiga Dzido, a messenger for the Polish underground, who endured Nazi medical treatment at Ravensbrueck. Anna Lea Lelli of the Italian underground had been imprisoned several times during the war. Also, the Times reported that "nearly every young woman in Palestine [was] in the Haganah underground resistance movement and [took] equal part with men in carrying arms." At least two members of the Working Women's Council, who had earlier escaped from Europe to Palestine, volunteered to parachute behind German lines to spy for the British. They were caught and shot. 36

Beyond presentations of foreign women's contributions during the war, American readers saw others in non-traditional areas following it. Articles detailed both war time and post-war activities. In Japan, 920 women applied for fifty police jobs. In Iran, the AP reported that women
were among the two thousand Russian troops sent to Teheran. And, in a feature article on Soviet women, Oriana Atkinson of the Times showed Russian women in non-traditional jobs including soldiering and flying. A GI in Russia was quoted as saying, "The chick in charge of the women's labor gang on this job could lift a hundred pounds without batting an eye....I saw that dame in the summer when it was unnecessary to wear heavy padded clothing to keep warm. She was some babe." Thirty-year old Tatanya Fedorova, in charge of the anti-tank barricades during the Moscow siege, won the Order of Lenin among other awards. Evdokie Bershanskaya, a pre-war flight instructor, was promoted to commander of the Taman women's air squadron. The squadron, whose average age was nineteen, flew bombing missions in Russia, East Prussia, Poland, and Germany. Bershanskaya, the "mother of the regiment," won twelve government awards and medals. Stalin personally thanked the squadron for "gallantry." Atkinson emphasized that the people who knew this extraordinary woman said "when not on duty with the army she is a feminine person, witty, charming, and delightfully gay." Thirty-two year old Zinaida Troitskayaya, "tall, strong, modest...[with] high cheekbones and blue eyes...Her mouth curl[ed] pleasantly into ready smiles," fought public approbation to become a general and a locomotive engineer and during the siege of Moscow she drove in supply trains under fire. Atkinson continually emphasized, and concluded with a focus on, femininity:

All this may sound as if Moscow Amazon's (sic) are a collection of lady Herculeses, Atlases and Portias, but believe me, the girls have their lighter moments....when all is said and done it is as wives and mothers that the women of Moscow find their ultimate satisfaction and unquestionable supremacy.

Foreign military women and others in non-traditional occupations were shown to be in danger on some occasions, not only from the enemy but
sometimes from their own troops. In 1946 in Saigon, French Lt. Micheline Florence of the Directorate of Information was assaulted by French paratroopers. They shaved her head, tied her hands behind her back, and walked her down main street for publishing a petition asking recognition of the Republic of Vietnam. Other women were accused of directly abetting the enemy. The Chinese punished Manchu princess Chin Pi-hwei (Radiant Jade), known as "The Queen of the Spies," "The Mata Hari of the East," and "The Human Devil." A Japanese diplomat had raised her as his warrior son but later "seduced her." She allegedly disguised herself as a man and as a Korean prostitute to gather intelligence for the Japanese during the war. After 1937, the Japanese made her a military commander. Later, as a prisoner of war, the Chinese starved her and administered, then withheld, the fifty morphine injections a day she had become addicted to. Two years later she was executed.38

Foreign women's exploits were not the only ones publicized as heroic. American women were very visible to the public, as well. The press presented readers with numerous articles highlighting the wartime achievements of servicewomen and civilian women in military employ. President Truman addressed the twenty-fifth annual Women's Overseas Service League (WOSL) praising the "splendid participation of American women in both world wars," and Air WACs who had served in England were lauded by Col. John Edmondson.39 Other civilian women who had braved danger during the war were also recognized for their contributions and were asked to consider joining the service. Gen. Arnold thanked the WASPs and President Truman signed the citation for the Air Medals presented to the first husband and wife team to be simultaneously decorated. Nancy Harkness Love, the executive officer of the WASPs, earned hers for

Military nurses were also highly praised for service under extreme conditions and in harm's way. The *Times* presented a number of book reviews, such as that on *Navy Nurses* by Page Cooper, which told of heroic deeds of military nurses from the Pearl Harbor bombing through the post-war on-going rehabilitation of the wounded. Cooper wrote of the nurses who had served all over the world and constituted one-fifth of the D-Day casualties; others spent over three years in Japanese prison camps. She related that braving significant dangers, "At times [nurses] found themselves in the fury of battle. The first Navy flight nurse to set foot on a battlefield flew in over Iwo [Jima] while the battle was still blazing, and evacuated wounded Marines." Cooper reminded her readers that these were normal, heterosexual, moral women by saying that they "took time out for two things: romance...and Christmas celebrations." Military nurse fiction was popular among young women readers as well. Elizabeth Lannings wrote a series *Nancy Naylor, Captain of Flight Nurses*, which romanticized adventures of an "extraordinary able and pretty Army nurse and her pilot fiancee." The fictitious Naylor and the real nurses surely served as role models for some of the young women who would later nurse in Viet Nam.

The government rewarded the nurses returning from overseas. At an Arlington memorial service in October 1946, Secretary Patterson reminded
Americans that 196 nurses, killed during the war, had fulfilled their faithful pledges "to appear fearless in the presence of danger and quiet the fears of others to the best of their ability." He announced that Army nurses alone had received 1,606 decorations including 62 purple hearts.41

In fact, though, as early as May 1946, the armed forces realized that it was bringing home and demobilizing nurses too quickly. The Navy, pleading that their nurse corps was overtaxed and understaffed, advertised its needs for many more recruits. The Corps accepted graduates of accredited nursing programs between twenty-two and thirty but restricted membership to single U.S. citizens. Military men were not restricted by either criteria. The Army, issuing another plea for nurses in July, had already directed voluntary recalls of former members. Pleas must have been unsuccessful because in October the Army involuntarily extended a thousand nurses on active duty.42

Along with nurse shortages, the armed forces started to react to other shortages. Young men no longer seemed to feel that the military offered desirable career opportunities, while draft legislation was due to expire in July. The services were not hopeful that Congress would renew the draft. Secretary Patterson requested a one year draft extension which both Adm. Nimitz and Gen. Eisenhower endorsed. As shortages became more pressing, the Army relaxed male physical standards and reevaluated 75,000 4-Fs. The military classified non-fathers with "crooked spines, hernias, moderate psycho-neuroses and even mild mental deficiencies" as eligible. Time reported that the Army could "no longer afford to be choosy about its manpower. Local [draft] boards were ordered to make a drastic cut in physical requirements." The Army would enroll men if they could fulfill a civilian job even if they stuttered, suffered partial paralysis, or had

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been previously disqualified for "mental deficiencies, mild in degree." At the same time, the War Department announced that this measure might "result in considerable reduction in overall efficiency." With over a million 4-Fs the Army might be able to fill current shortfalls, but the service insisted it still needed renewed conscription legislation if the quality of the forces was not to deteriorate further. 'Lowering' standards provided ammunition for arguments for both a male draft and providing a permanent corps of more qualified women.43

Line military women had no place in the armed forces six months after hostilities ended if Congress did not pass permanency legislation. Still, the services continued to court on qualified women to extend their time in service even without the legislation. In February 1946, although the Army was not accepting any new women, it asked former members to apply for reentry to substitute "womanpower for manpower" during demobilization. Women between twenty and fifty could reenter. The Army would waive marriage and age rules for those with usable skills willing to go overseas. And, by the end of June, with 35,000 WACs and 44,000 WAVEs left on active duty, the Army and Navy announced that they intended to propose legislation for permanent corps. The War Department, former CNO Adm. King, and Chief of Naval Personnel V.Adm. Denfield supported permanence for line women.44

But until legislation passed, the services had to release women in large numbers. The Marines intended to disband their entire women's corps. While praising women for freeing men to fight, the Corps notified women on their third anniversary that they were to be expelled. Despite this disappointing news for those who wanted to stay, there were counter indications. Three WAVEs were sent to Johnson Island in the Pacific for payroll distribution and storekeeping, as the first Navy women to be
assigned west of Hawaii. No mention was made of remaining Congressional strictures against WAVE overseas service. In addition, Col. Westry Battle Boyce, WAC Director, announced that six hundred Army women were to be sent overseas since Congress had not yet decided what "the duration plus six months" meant. She also announced a reenlistment drive. Meanwhile, the QM Corps was conducting a nation-wide anthropometric survey of ten thousand female figures to improve and trim-up women's uniforms and began wear-testing in August to gauge military and civilian reaction. If the military had not been confident of continuing women's service, all the assignments, recruiting, and uniform work would have constituted a gross waste of resources.45

In fact, the Army and Navy planned to keep at least some women. As stated earlier, the Army had gone so far along the path to regularize women's service that they included funding in their 1946 budget request. The "plans for the Army to maintain a permanent Women's Army Corps" were buried in a $7 billion request. During House discussions, the War Department finally realized it would require legislation to keep the Corps, and after clearing the proposal with President Truman and the Budget Bureau, requested that the Military Affairs Committee sponsor measures. Edith Rogers predicted easy, rapid passage in deference to "a recognition of [women's] services." But in fact, restrictions on women's service were already being negotiated. Limited to two percent of the force, women would be assigned to the same type of jobs they did during the war in clerking, communications, intelligence, medical fields, supply, and training. Previously-done heavier work was not mentioned. By the time of the WAC proposal, the earlier WAVE bill, which had not been reported on by the press, had been favorably reported out of the House Naval Affairs Committee and was progressing through the Rules Committee.
In July, the Navy asked two thousand women to return to service. The sea service wanted over five thousand Reserves on duty pending Congressional action on legislation for Regulars.46

The forces had had to reconsider more openly whether they needed peacetime women's corps, because of growing awareness of military "manpower" and nursing shortages. As we have seen, the discussion would take place against a backdrop of dynamic events pertaining to the American military, in the nation, and around the world. Casualty lists from the war, lists of returning POWs, and military awards continued to be publicized by the press. The Allies held war crimes trials which helped keep a fear of German resurgence alive and which drove continued occupation by the Allies and set the stage for growing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, acted out in the Berlin blockade/airlift among other arenas. Americans also watched with foreboding as the communist revolution continued in China. Poll results showed that most people approved instituting either a system of UMT/UMS, a draft, or both. And, proponents of strict internal anti-communism acted out in numerous ways, including criticizing the arts and entertainment industries for disloyalty. Congressional Un-American Activities Committees worked long hours trying to ferret out spies and sympathizers, real or imagined, from neighborhoods to the halls of government.

During this period of external fears and internal stress, President Truman signed the National Security Act in 1947, creating the unified National Military Establishment (NME) and the Air Force in an attempt to develop a modern military capable of handling the Cold War and "World War III." He also continued to press the services to get along better since they were at odds as to how to organize and direct such a force. While Secretary of Defense and former CNO James Forrestal sought even more unity
than that provided in the law, the Navy and Air Force struggled over roles, missions and strategy. The Air Force favored an emphasis on strategic bombing and putting all atomic weapons under its purview. Interservice rivalry and the appeal of "air power" with hopeful emphasis on long range wars dominated the press. The military was reorganized almost yearly as the government continued to react to a changing world and nation. All of these issues would affect military women one way or another sometime in the future.

During these anxiety-producing times, one of the most significant and well-covered arenas for internal military change came in the sphere of racial discrimination. The services, with their persistent Jim Crow policies, were very visible sites of contention. The battle would show up in HUAC and SUAC arenas, as well as in the halls of the Pentagon and at field units around the world. The NAACP and some women's organizations were so active in protesting civil and military segregation that the Committees accused them of disloyalty. In the end, Truman lived up to his campaign rhetoric and issued the executive order desegregating the armed forces, and this administration pushed for the desegregation of state National Guard organizations. Despite presidential initiatives, on the eve of the Korean war, U.S. forces were still racially segregated; it would take the military needs of this next conflict to make official pronouncements more than just words on paper.47

In some ways, servicewomen's situation was similar to the situation of racial minorities in the military. Having been made Regular and permanent, the women's line forces would be ready in time for the Korean emergency. Getting to that point was not as easy as many had anticipated. And once again, both line women and nurses would prove themselves in time
of need. Pragmatism would again be the basis for further integration policies for both women and non-white men.

The press offered ample evidence of servicewomen's record as their wartime military service continued to be extolled, women received numerous military and civilian awards, and the media announced promotions and retirements of senior women. Although military women were not invisible, the number of articles on women and the armed forces did diminish throughout the period from 1946 through 1949 and, more often, women were included in articles primarily about men, including those on veterans. 48

Manpower crises, as usual, drove changes. In 1947, in a measure to counteract part of the shortages problem, the Army assigned enlisted women to West Point for the first time (female officers had served at the Academy for many years). The new superintendent, Maj.Gen. Bryant Moore, took the announcement in stride regarding the women as "just that many more soldiers who are needed to relieve men for other duties." Fraternization rules prohibited officers from dating (or associating too closely with) enlisted members or cadets, but no regulation had been written barring officer candidates from dating enlisted women. Later, those regulations would be installed but at the time Moore remarked, "If the cadets want to 'date' the Wacs, there certainly won't be any prohibition." 49 WACs assignments to West Point were meant to relieve shortages of men at other posts, but the measure was only a drop in the bucket.

Still, as with the Army at West Point, the military relearned that shortages could be partially filled by women. The draft and UMT continued to be discussed as solutions to the long-term problem. The War Department had decided early in 1947 to push Congress for UMT for every eighteen-year-old male. Despite the supposed transition to "push-button war," the
military finally realized it would continue to need more soldiers until nuclear and long range delivery technologies developed further. However, the services also knew that manpower had to be "pre-fabricated" so it would not take too long to deploy adequate forces into the field.

The Army was willing to give up the draft if it could enroll all eligible eighteen year olds in UMT. In experimenting with the "Umtees", the Army changed another traditional practice, deciding trainees did not need their spirits broken. The "experimental" groups were treated like human beings and not expected to emerge from training as automatons. Later, the "softening" of the military would be blamed on the influx of greater numbers of women but evidence shows "softening", or humanizing, occurred much sooner and continually.50

While initial polls showed that seventy-four percent of Americans favored male UMT in mid 1947, opposition emerged. Ohio Sen. Robert Taft argued that conscription hurt discipline, morale, and the health of American youth, as well as being un-American. Church leaders, labor leaders, and many educators voiced "moral" objections to compulsory training. At the same time, many airmen and sailors did not believe UMT could provide soldiers ready for technological wars. Advocates including Truman, Forrestal, Secretary of State Marshall, Air Secretary Symington, Eisenhower, CNO Denfield, and USAF Chief Carl Spaatz persisted. Every major presidential candidate in 1948 supported the proposals except Taft and Henry Wallace. High school students who would be the most affected, favored UMT by eighty-two percent. Despite public exposure and apparent support, Republican congressmen kept UMT legislation locked in committees in both houses, preventing discussion.

As Congress avoided the issue, the specter of troop shortages was compounded by a sense of the growing worldwide danger of a general war.
In March 1948, when President Truman addressed Congress following Soviet actions in Europe (Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Greece), he called for economic support to western European nations, passage of a UMT law, and approval for a peacetime draft. *Time* reported that the American public agreed that the Soviets were a threat and that the country did indeed require a larger military if not immediate mobilization.

The *Times* reported that those opposed to the draft were labeled as communists. The Women's Christian Temperance League (WCTL) vehemently opposed a peacetime draft. Most of Congress opposed UMT but supported a draft. Black leaders opposed both draft and UMT proposals meant to fight communism abroad until democracy was achieved at home. They pledged to conduct a campaign of civil disobedience if either program was forced on them, but the government warned they might not be able to defend blacks against any resulting terrorism from whites who did not believe African-Americans should be exempt from service. Catholics and Presbyterians risked charges of disloyalty in opposing both UMT/UMS and a draft. They believed compulsory training was antithetical to U.S. traditions and that the existence of either program would lead to war. Citing military VD rates, religious groups claimed military officers were poor role models, a far cry from the kind of public respect the male military commanded during the war.

Whether people supported the draft or UMT in 1948, according to *Life* and other publications, most Americans believed the military had become dangerously small and weak through de-mobilization and budget cutbacks. Supporters of the measures were diverse. The NFBPW and the American Legion Auxiliary both favored UMT. The *Times* editors supported both programs as "insurance" against future crises. The American Bar Association specifically stated they favored UMT for both men and women.
Since most other coverage implied they were discussing male-only programs, this was unusual.51

The public knew the services needed manpower and they were reminded often that the need for medical personnel was even more critical. In the interests of increasing the attractiveness of military careers, the services lobbied Congress to regularize the Nurse Corps organizations to make them integral parts of the Army and Navy. In January 1947, the Army commissioned three hundred nurses without previous military experience and the media reminded discharged nurses that they could re-enlist. In February, a House Armed Services Subcommittee approved a bill to integrate the two nurse corps. The measure would make permanent the temporary wartime legislation giving nurses "real rank." The House approved the bill and passed it to the Senate in March. New York Democrat Adam Powell, Jr., had tried to add an amendment specifying membership would not be restricted by "race, color, creed, national origin or ancestry" but it failed 187-47. Margaret Chase Smith, supporter of the women's services in general and sponsor of the nurse bill, opposed Powell's amendment as "serving no useful purpose. Negro nurses were already serving and the Navy had agreed to accept all applicants." At the time, the Army had ninety black nurses, the Navy had one. The bill, which sought to "encourage nurses to join the corps and make it a career," was endorsed by the military sans amendment and included the following provisions: permanent commissioned status for Army and Navy nurses and personnel of the Women's Medical Specialists Corps; pay, leave, allowances and other benefits equal to other officers (read "other female officers"); promotion opportunities equal to male officers but on separate promotion lists; equivalent retirement provisions to men except a lower age for
mandatory retirement; and equal provisions for pay and allowances between the two corps. Press reports did not mention restrictions on marriage, children, limited numbers, and limited rank. The measure passed without opposition and the President signed the law in April 1947. On the eve of the Korean conflict, shortages had not abated as the Army nurses celebrated their forty-eighth birthday. All the senior leaders sent messages commending them for their service and the public was reminded that in World War II sixty-three had been kept prisoners by the Japanese for three years, sixteen had died in action against the enemy, and 1,619 had been decorated.

In fact, the press reminded the public often of women's war contributions. In June, Dwight Eisenhower, as the president of Columbia University, addressed graduates at Presbyterian Hospital's School of Nursing, "I have never been prouder of American womanhood than while watching the nursing corps at work during the war." Eisenhower added that he wanted to,

> pay my personal tribute to a noble profession and to the individuals in it....I am coming here as a soldier of the past war to try to tell you just a little of what the nurses meant to American victory....I had to bear responsibility for the lives, the comfort, everything that affected three million men, three million Americans in an atmosphere and an area of tragedy and of drama....Naturally anyone bearing such responsibility on his shoulders had to have tremendous and well organized assistance. Among those I had, none was more necessary, none more brilliantly performed its work than the nursing corps.

Of the forty-five graduates, nine were veterans. No doubt the services hoped they all would join the new Regular nurse corps. By August the Air Force was giving direct commissions to nurses and the Army was training WACs as LPNs to help relieve shortages.

Nursing was not the only medical field short of personnel. The services needed doctors so badly that they finally asked Congress to
authorize female doctors. The Navy announced in October 1948 that it would take women who had finished internships at civilian hospitals and would send twenty-five to Navy hospitals for their internships. More surprising perhaps, in another pragmatic reversal of strictly gendered separation of labor, in 1948 the military discussed accepting male nurses.55

After, nurses had achieved more secure footing with the passage of the 1947 Army and Navy Nurse Act, women of the line were the next subject for debate and regularization. When President Truman issued a proclamation in January 1947 ending hostilities as of 31 December 1946, the AP reported that five thousand wartime laws would end including those temporarily incorporating women into military line organizations. When women Marines celebrated their fourth anniversary, Director Ruth Cheney, anticipating dissolution of the active-duty corps, told two hundred "lady leathernecks" that as many as possible should enlist in the inactive voluntary Reserve, saying, "We hope our services will not be needed again; but if they are it would be a tremendous help to have a trained nucleus of personnel around whom the organization could expand." The "trained nucleus" argument would be used throughout the regularization debate to support women's permanent, Regular, line active duty status.

Whereas the Marines initially intended to have only an inactive women's Reserve, the Army wanted female Regulars. In March 1947, the War Department announced its intention to make the Corps "an integral component of the Regular Army." The new law would make the "women's service innovations of the last war" permanent, as the nurse act had done for them. Draft legislation specified a two percent limit on the line force and a maximum of one temporary O-6, as director. Current members
would either be absorbed by the Regular Army or could join the Reserves. The War Department publicized several reasons for the measure: it would provide a trained nucleus of women expandable in an emergency; it would foster development and test application of plans for using "woman-power"; it would allow for the most economical use of all personnel by utilizing women in positions where their 'special aptitudes' best filled Army requirements; and, it would assist in filling personnel requirements by voluntary enlistments rather than conscription. The *Times* editors wholeheartedly supported the notion of making the "war-born" WAC permanent, using nurse regularization as a model, saying,

Even the most brass-bound old Army colonel, or sergeant, must admit that in the war the Wacs did a fine job. Not just in running typewriters and keeping records and other such stenographic chores which most men dislike, but also in certain specialties where it was discovered that a woman's talents were superior to those of men....The women of America have been doing a good many different kinds of jobs for a good many years. In most fields they have shown equal abilities with men. In some they have shown superior abilities...the Army should take advantage of this fact as business and many professions have done.55

Expecting easy passage of legislation given the swift enactment of the Nurse Corp Act, the services continued to enlist former WACs and WAVEs for their active duty Reserve organizations as the bill was debated. The prime reason for Reserve recruiting and permanency legislation was to partially compensate for anticipated manpower shortages which exacerbated the need for occupation forces overseas. *Times* reporter Anthony Leviero reported on the plan for a permanent women's corps when Army personnel director, Maj.Gen. Willard Paul, announced the War Department's goal to eventually field an all-volunteer co-ed force. Paul was confident that 20,000 women could be recruited "provided there was assurance of a permanent Army career for women."57 However, as we shall see, for the next forty years the military would struggle with internally-imposed and

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Congressionally-mandated gender-specific restrictions based on a cultural ideology that would inhibit women from thinking of the military as a career.

The Navy also used the "career-quality" argument in asking for permanent status for the WAVEs and women Marines. On the eve of committee hearings and despite women's war record, personnel shortages, and support from the military leadership, the Times reported "[The bill] is expected to arouse a controversy. Some religious groups and some women's organizations have expressed opposition....But strong support has been indicated by educators and [other] women's organizations. Proponents of the bill are confident of its passage when it reaches the final test."

Reports proved to be overly optimistic though as the debate would continue for another year. According to Jeanne Holm and others, the most vehement opposition would be voiced in House debates, based on "secret" meetings and correspondence from lower ranking male officers, enlisted men and veterans who disagreed with the armed forces' senior civilian and military leadership. Resistors were wary of relying on past performance to address future possibilities, but WAVES Director Capt. Hancock replied that the Navy was not asking permanent status solely on the basis of women's war record, arguing that their record could be applied to future emergencies. "The wartime experience has proved," she insisted, "that women perform certain tasks more efficiently than men, besides releasing men for more rugged duty." Reporters cited past experience as they pointed out, "Women...were particularly effective in repetitive work of a monotonous nature, tiring less quickly than men. In some mechanical projects...their manual dexterity was far superior. Thirty percent of the wartime Waves served in naval aviation, principally as instructors in which they proved particularly adept." The Navy appreciated women's
capabilities enough that they supported going beyond experience. Their bill permitted overseas assignments, which had been prohibited in World War II. However, they retained the restriction that women serve only in shore billets. Unlike the WAC, the Navy women would not form a separate corps but would be integrated into the line of the Navy but their promotion lists would be kept separate (i.e. they would only compete against women).

In July, Gen. Eisenhower and Adm. Nimitz launched an "all-out legislative offensive" to regularize women because the women's corps would be abolished within six months if the legislature failed to act. The men insisted that "women performed better than men in some military jobs and pleaded that they receive permanent legal status by this session of Congress." Twelve other senior leaders testified or sent endorsing statements to an armed services subcommittee one-day hearing. No opposition witnesses testified.

Senior military testimony revealed key terms of the regularization and permanency debates. Eisenhower testified,

I want to emphasize the urgency of action by this Congress....Due to the critical shortage of trained infantrymen we have recently permitted all combat men presently holding military desk jobs to be reassigned to the infantry. We need replacements for these soldiers; the Wacs are the most logical source of replacement. The time has come when we must stabilize the Women's Army Corps in order to offer those still in uniform and prospective members a career with prestige and security. We cannot ask these women to remain on duty, nor can we ask qualified people to volunteer, if we cannot offer them permanent status...This bill is nothing but plain efficiency....for the particular tasks for which women are qualified, they are far better than men.

His appeal, which Nimitz echoed, was based on military effectiveness and pragmatism (quality, trained, capable, available personnel) and fairness (career opportunity, security, prestige, equal benefits). Both of the men reported that disciplinary problems in the women's services had been
"practically non-existent" which contrasted heavily with what the public read about male soldiers. The general added that the Army eventually wanted an all-out volunteer force and if they could not recruit a sufficient number of men, "it would be 'very foolish' to cut off the women's share of the manpower base." While the Army requested approval for only 20,000 female Regulars, Eisenhower even recommended that Congress increase that number. Other witnesses testified that WWII experience had shown that women performed particularly adeptly in jobs including codes and ciphers, crypt-analysis, interpretation of aerial photographs, air traffic control, technical hospital jobs, and communications. Witnesses included Mrs. Lord; Gen. Spaatz, AAF chief; R.Adm. Sprague, Navy personnel chief; Gen. Jacob Devers, Ground Forces Commander; Maj.Gen. Raymond Bliss, Army Surgeon General; Maj.Gen. Luther Miller, Chief of Chaplains; R.Adm. Clifford Swanson, Navy Surgeon General; and V.Adm. Donald Duncan, Deputy CNO for Air. Generals MacArthur and Lucius Clay also endorsed the measures. 58

The Times' editors wrote of the hearings,

Most men who had an opportunity in service to see the job done by our women in wartime uniform will support this testimony. The Wacs and Waves not only made it possible for able-bodied men to get into the field, to sea duty, or to Naval shore-based units overseas, but they also did a better job at many of their assigned tasks than the replaced men would have done. They raised morale where they were on duty; they raised the morale of the men released for more active service overseas. They also served overseas with distinction and reliability. There is a manpower problem in the services now just as there was during the war. The Wacs, the Waves and the Marines help meet the problem as we struggle to keep up to strength on a volunteer basis. They deserve permanence on the grounds of service record and felt need. 59

Again, the emphasis was on military need and women's capabilities. No mention was made of an ideology that would restrict women to traditional work. As well, editors did not mention an obligation or right to serve,
but hinted at the idea that opportunity for service was an earned privilege. Press coverage did not draw a comparison to African-American men's service which had not prevented post-war military or civilian racial discrimination. Reports on military leaders' desires to move toward an all-volunteer force, articulated repeatedly, would not be realized until 1973 but senior officers realized that, even then, a volunteer military would require more women.

Before the bill went to the full Senate, the Times' Leviero reported its rapid progress in committee. He discounted any resistance based on gender ideology in favor of military need, saying,

The American child of the future may be able to brag that mother was a veteran of the Regular Army. For that matter, mother or sister could also be a line officer of the Navy, or a Regular Marine, if Congress passes pending bills....A few days ago the two men who fought the biggest battles of World War II told Congress that a woman's place is in the Army and Navy and the Marine Corps as well as in the home....The testimony of these two realistic military men was studiedly non-chivalrous and non-gallant. They argued strictly on the grounds of military necessity. But if they avoided any appeal which smacked of sentiment, the Admiral and the General could quote from the wartime record of women in uniform. They did so unstintingly....That record, they said, was splendid in every respect--morals, discipline, esprit de Corps, and, above all, keen know-how in assigned tasks.

Leviero went on to detail provisions: the WAC would be a separate corps while the Navy and Marines intended to integrate women; minimum age would be lowered to eighteen (those under twenty-one required parental consent); and women's numbers would be limited to two percent of the force.

Restrictions addressed in the press coverage and others not mentioned reflected persistent wartime fears surrounding the militarization of women--losing femininity; destroying the "home", destroying the culture. Press reports evidenced those fears in discussions of a reunion of over 2,000 WAVES. A Times reporter focused on the 'unladylike' behavior of participants, saying, "If Davy Jones whirled
faster than usual in his deep sea locker yesterday afternoon" the WAVEs were to blame with their "shrieks...[and] shouts and shoulder slaps" as they called each other by last names (like men did), and exchanged gossip. R. Adm. Monroe Kelley had to yell "Pipe Down!" at the boisterous bunch, who roared with laughter again a few seconds later. Director Capt. Hancock regained order when she read a telegram from Secretary Forrestal congratulating the WAVEs for proving themselves to be "a vital force in the all-out successful effort to crush the enemy during World War II...." Capt. Hancock then described proposed legislation to give women "full partnership" in the Navy.61 The media had not reported it separately, but Hancock passed on to the attendees that the Senate had passed permanency legislation almost unanimously.

With such positive progress in the Senate, the challenge that emerged in the House debates caught the services unprepared. At a WAC reunion, Lt. Col. Mary Milligan told attendees that the Army also wanted peacetime servicewomen. "The House is expected to pass it...," Milligan predicted, "the need for women as a part of the Army was demonstrated during the recent war, and all Army planning is sure to include women....In demanding the right to help win the war, women also gained the responsibility of helping maintain the peace." As one of the few places where women's right to serve was articulated, this argument was carefully juxtaposed with "responsibility" and recognized the traditional connection between women (even military women) and peace work. This sentiment was repeated when WAC veterans, not intending to rejoin the service, were encouraged to work with women from other countries to "foster understanding and peace."62

Throughout the 1947 debate, the press kept women's wartime service in the public eye. Each time the Times reported changes in the women's
staffs, reporters reviewed the corps' histories, as well as the accomplishments of retirees and promotees. From the war years to passage of the permanency bills in 1948, this positive coverage of senior military women surely influenced support for the measures.63

However, the press reported nothing new on the permanency measures, until military leaders re-publicized their support for the legislation at the beginning of 1948. Running out of time, Forrestal and other civilian leaders along with the leading men of the armed forces, again urged passage of the Senate version in House hearings, insisting that if the military could not offer women 'career opportunities' (i.e. Regular status), they would lose their "most competent and experienced women members." Eisenhower insisted that the integration of women was "no longer an experiment but an invaluable boon." He added, "My knowledge of the contributions of the Women's Army Corps has convinced me that a modern army must have Wacs." And when the subcommittee asked him about requests for preferential treatment, Eisenhower recalled that only one woman had asked for a favor, "she wanted to know how she could get closer to the front." He told committee members that women submitted easily to discipline training and had few disciplinary problems in the field. Another account of the testimony emphasized the general's conversion when he said, "Like any old soldier...I was horrified at the thought of putting women in uniform and sending them to war." Again, Eisenhower warned that legislation for temporary/Reserve women's service expired in June 1948. He predicted that everyone would have to be trained for future wars, and that very likely, the military would have to draft both men and women. His replacement, Gen. Bradley, also testified that the Army wanted to fill personnel shortages with women saying, "Not only have women demonstrated for five years that they have a distinctive contribution to make to the
success of Army operations...but, the plain fact is that we need them badly now...." Bradley was joined by the CNO, Adm. Denfield, and by Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, USAF Vice Chief of Staff, in praising the women and in re-emphasizing the need for a trained cadre for expansion in emergencies.64

The House subcommittee agreed with the concept of a Regular women's force and debated race considerations as well. They did not, however, pursue citizenship discussions. Given overwhelming senior military support, the subcommittee approved a 13,000 member WAC as "sufficient for peacetime," rejecting Lyndon Johnson's suggestion for an increase to 26,000 (four percent rather than two percent of the force). For the second time in relation to a gender issue (the military nurse debaters had considered it), racial considerations were connected to gender discussions. Before approval, Leslie Perry of the NAACP made a plea for an end to Army segregation asserting that the only terms of women's service should be "on the basis of citizenship rather than color." But Congress and the Army were not yet ready to listen to racial arguments, and few others conceptually linked the issues of gender and racial rights, or linked gender inequality to the larger issue of the relationship between military service and citizenship. The failed race amendment notwithstanding, to nearly everyone's astonishment the full committee rejected the proposal for Regulars, instead only approving continuation of the Reserve women's corps. Opposition arguments were not made public.65

However, we know from government sources that the rejection incensed Margaret Chase Smith, the bill's sponsor. Apparently, subcommittee and full committee members had held "behind-the-scenes, off-the-record" executive sessions with unnamed members of the Navy Department. Smith unsuccessfully tried to find out who these were since in the Senate all
the Navy testimony supported Regular status. The off-the-record opposition focused on not wanting women onboard ships. And if they could not serve on ships, they would disrupt men's ship-to-shore assignment rotations. Navy Legislative Counsel Ira H. Nunn reassured Smith that the off-the-record reports did not represent the Navy's official position, but it did no good.

Armed Services Committee Chairman W.G. Andrews resisted even Eisenhower's support, because of remaining difficulties with integrating women into promotion lists, retirement plans, and rotation schedules. He remarked, that although there was no antagonism to women on Regular status, there was "antipathy". Gen. Bradley argued against resistance based on the idea that women should not be Regulars if they could not serve in combat. He informed legislatures that this was irrelevant since only a small number of men ever heard a hostile shot. The full committee, disregarding all the testimony and Gallup Polls showing majorities of both men and women favored regularizing women, rejected the Senate version, saying they did not think it could pass the muster in the House. "Half a loaf" was better than none, they insisted. Charles Clasen disagreed since the "full loaf" had passed the Senate so easily. Legislators did not ask military witnesses to testify again, and, in fact, Rep. Leroy Johnson, who converted from support to opposition, complained that Congress had only been listening to senior leaders and not the "many, many officers" he thought opposed women Regulars.55

The Times' editors immediately condemned the committee's action and called for the bill's passage in the interest of security. "One way of not strengthening our national defense is sharply illustrated by the 26-to-1 vote" in the HASC against making women a permanent part of the military. Editors insisted that this was "incomprehensible in view of the
serious shortages President Truman has called on Congress to fill" and the services would have to draft unwilling or unqualified men in the place of qualified women volunteers. The editors focused on key elements of the bill's progress and terms of the debate. Service leaders had proposed the measure, all the service chiefs had endorsed it, not one voice of opposition had been heard publicly, and many women wanted to enlist. The paper called on the committee to "promptly reconsider" its position, once again citing women's outstanding war record and discipline, their utility in releasing male soldiers for combat, and their ability to do some jobs better than men.

Part of the argument, then, was based on a traditional gendered division of roles. But the editors went on to add that, "to deny American women the privilege of serving in peacetime is downright foolish," in the first explicit reference to women's service as a "privilege" rather than "right" or "responsibility". The Times' editors drew connections from manpower shortages to other serious issues like the draft, UMT, the retention of older, less physically capable officers ready to retire, and the refusal to discharge younger soldiers seeking release. A week later, the Times' editors attacked again. Complaining that no one had yet explained the committee's action to the public's satisfaction, they said,

Women served the nation legally and well in the war. Their effort was endorsed by our military and naval leaders...[they] undertook tasks they could better perform...and freed thousands of trained fighters for the battle fronts. Many are still at work in vital areas--experts in cryptography, photography, intelligence, medicine, hospital practice and the law. To dispense with their services would be a sorry blunder. Replacements for them simply cannot be found.

The situation was especially puzzling since the Senate so overwhelmingly supported the measure and public arguments had been so one-sided in favor of the bill. The Times called its readers to action, saying, "There is
still hope that [the committee] will reverse itself. Public opinion, properly concentrated, will speed that hope."

But the hope was not speeded when the following month, April 1948, the HASC again rejected the Senate versions for female Regulars, 66-40. Once again, the House version only authorized Reserves. Representatives defeated an amendment to return to the Senate version despite supporters' insistence that unless the services could offer women a 'career' based on permanent and Regular status, they could not attract the caliber of women needed. House committee members did not articulate what they found different between the approval of the Regular nurse corps and the disapproval of the Regular line corps, but we know that nursing was considered a female occupation. Still, the military expected to use line women primarily in feminized jobs too. Michigan Republican Paul Shafer, the bill's floor manager, remarked that "the happy solution seems to be to put women in Reserve status at the present" as they would still receive the same pay, opportunities, and benefits as Regulars when they were on active-duty. He was wrong. Reserves did not obtain the same "opportunities" as Regulars. Mobilizing women for each crisis and demobilizing them immediately after each constituted outright abuse in neglecting necessary training ahead of time and deserved benefits afterward, not to mention the disruption to women's lives of being called up at the pleasure of the government.67

In the full House debates, opposition committee members had tried to sell their "happy solution" as a "compromise" between the extremes of totally rejecting women or fully "injecting" them into the Regular forces. They tried to convince other representatives that, despite testimony to the contrary, the military did not want female Regulars. During the debate, following arguments asserting that military men opposed the plan
and warning problems with pregnancy, menopause, and costs, the House approved only Reserve status. But after the Joint Senate Conference and Margaret Chase Smith's castigation of Secretary Forrestal, demanding that he find the source of negative unofficial statements, Congress decided that the only remaining sticky points, pregnancy and command over men, would be left to the service secretaries.68

In the face of the House committee opposition, the public voiced support for female Regulars. Among others, New York's Federation of Women's Republican Clubs sent a resolution to their Congressmen favoring the legislation. Continuing high-level military support and public appeals had an impact as by mid-May it appeared that permanent Regular status might become a reality after all. In a "brisk" debate of the full House, which the media did not report in detail, Republicans generally opposed the legislation but the press did not record their arguments. The compromise bill would transfer Reserves to Regular status over two years rather than immediately. PL265 passed, 206-133, and President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act on 12 June 1948.69

Nona Brown detailed the new law for Times readers. The first opportunity to become Regulars would be given to Reservists currently on active-duty, in September recruiting would be open to veterans who had "doffed their uniforms with reluctance," and later, enlistments would be open to those with no previous military experience. A Washington press conference with the heads of the women's services revealed that they expected women to fill jobs in which they had proven themselves during the war including medicine, communications, supply, and administration. Reports did not mention other non-traditional fields (except engineering and law for officers) or plans for 'experimentation'. Congress did reiterate the most stringent restriction on women: "under no
circumstance, however, will women in any of the services be permitted to serve as combat personnel."

'Combat-zone' debate would be discussed later during the Vietnam conflict and the 'women in combat' debate would be addressed repeatedly from the late 1960s. Although few in 1947 would have argued for sending women overseas to fight from foxholes, the definition of 'combat personnel' would be contended for more than forty-five more years. The seemingly obvious distinction between 'combat' and 'support' personnel had not made sense for a long time and it would continue to become more ambiguous for both nuclear war forces and conventional limited war forces.

With the final passage of legislation, several Times articles identified the new women corps leaders, reviewed their careers, and outlined their plans for their charges. The Air Force chose Geraldine May as its first director. She, like many new WAF, had served as an Air WAC during the war. Mary Hallaren would head the WAC, Joy Hancock would lead Navy women, and Julia Hamblett would direct female Marines. These senior women had confidence that many veterans would volunteer. The directors' made it obvious at the press conference that each service had its own expansion plans and conditions of service (which would bring further debate later). 70

Throughout the summer of 1948 the Times reviewed the passage of the Integration Act, the terms of women's enlistments, and criteria for recruiting women. The paper also continued to advertise enlistments and the formation of women's units. WAVES would attend 'boot camp' at the Great Lakes Training Center, where "women sailors [were] going to get the same recruit and advanced training as men, or 'as closely as possible'." The Marines advertised for former and present Reserve members to join their Regular corps as well. And the Air Force decided that all its
enlisted personnel would be called 'airmen' as it "desexed its official language." They claimed this was consistent with the Army's gender neutral term 'soldier' and the Navy's 'sailor'. All four services agreed to use the terms "enlisted men" and "enlisted women" in official orders and publications, with one male officer remarking, "There obviously has to be a line drawn somewhere." 71

Press coverage detailed the expansion of the new women's line organizations. Overseas WACs transferring to the Regulars got their pictures in the stateside papers. The Navy began to send women overseas almost immediately to "selected bases" (where women, service wives, resided already) and planned for a women's assignment rotation policy because disruption of men's ship-shore and assignments rotations had been at issue during the debate. Recruiting veterans for the Navy and SPARs (the latter could only serve as Reserves until the 1970s) continued until mid-November when these services started accepting non-vets. Readers learned from articles concerning Selective Service Registration and the draft that women were "flocking" to recruiters, too many in fact. The services found the prospect of a military career pretty popular among female veterans. When five hundred New York City women applied for the Navy in September when they learned that the sea service planned to accept only twenty women per month from that location. Undoubtedly publicity of this situation turned some women away from considering enlistment.

Press coverage and the debates about military women rarely referred to race after the war. However, the press did report that the first WAC accepted in New York City was an African-American woman, Esther Corbin. In another report, a photograph of five enlistees showed that three blacks. Of these former WACs, four joined the Air Force. The report did not call attention to race issues but African-American women had seldom
been photographed in military scenes before 1947. Perhaps women of color
found the Air Force the most attractive service because it had been the
most racially integrated from its inception in 1947. It also found favor
with men and women as the newest and most technical branch. In addition,
the AAC, had earned a better reputation for gender relations than the
other services because most of the male officers were newly commissioned
civilian aviation experts rather than tradition-bound service academy
graduates. Female veterans largely agree they were best accepted by the
AAC and the experience of the Tuskegee airmen, while not completely
positive, no doubt attracted some blacks. 

The military wanted to attract 'quality' women but did not recognize
that restrictions drove some qualified women away. In what would be a
recurring theme in all the services, Col. Hallaren clearly articulated the
WAC goal of looking for quality rather than numbers despite extreme
personnel shortages. She unintentionally disparaged World War II veterans
by saying that the war years' quantity emphasis had ended; quality was the
new priority. She said, the WAC had to be selective because in case of an
emergency, the few NCOs would become the leaders of newly mobilized women.
Hallaren wanted women who wanted an Army career, but she did not
acknowledge that gender-specific policies restricting marriage and
children still limited women's career possibilities. Former WACs who had
married since their release could reenlist, but all new prospects had to
be single. If women married later they would be released a year after
their wedding. The services did not allow women to have children.

The services did change their policies on women's marriages.
Previously the service, in deference to prevailing mores, willingly and
immediately released any woman who married. But deference gave way to
pragmatism when the service realized this policy wasted training and
resources invested in female recruits. The services' willingness to constantly change policies in this area, as during World War II, should have called into question the visibility of marital and parental status as service considerations. Policies did not restrict men's marriages or fatherhood. More consistent with cultural ideology and despite passage campaign rhetoric, military women would still serve primarily in traditionally female rather than 'experimental' roles. The WAC wanted women with aptitudes as medical technicians, translators, and administrative specialists. None would be employed for staff-car or truck driving as they had been during the war because though women could drive as well as men, the Army decided they were not strong enough to load and unload cargo.\textsuperscript{73}

When the first Regular WACs completed basic training in December 1948, reporter Bess Furman attended their graduation parade. Furman and ceremony speakers emphasized peace, saying servicewomen represented a "symbol of a new peace movement among women." Articulating a peace-making role for military women was part of reassuring the nation that despite moving into public roles, these women still performed feminized functions. Maj.Gen. Paul, identified as the person most credited with supporting women's entry into the Regular forces, told graduates that the public understood that the nation could only attain peace through strength and that currently the U.S. was "losing the peace." He suggested that these women would help the country regain a winning posture.\textsuperscript{74}

But all was not smooth sailing for the first female Regulars. The services continued to put their senior women in ambiguous leadership positions. The WAC Director had the most clear-cut administrative authority with her separate corps but the other directors had little official authority, while at the same time the branches held them
women leaders insisted on integration, which came at a high price in the
short-term. They hoped it would enhance acceptance in the long-term.\textsuperscript{75}

The \textit{Times} published several general articles at the end of 1948,
reviewing the debates and passage of the Women's Armed Services
Integration Act and the flurry of progress since. The Air Force sent its
first eighty-four basic training graduates to advanced training or OCS in
January 1949. At their graduation, Nona Brown started her \textit{Times Magazine}
essay from Lackland AFB, Texas, saying,

When 412 young military recruits started humping and saluting
in three new training schools this fall, something new was
definitely added to the American way of life. These recruits
were women--girls, really--the first in the nation's history
to sign up for three-year hitches in the Regular military
services. There was little, however,...to show that this was
a major milestone in the relentless feminine march toward
equal pay, equal rights, and equal responsibilities with men.
To the women involved...the historical significance of their
act was far less important than the varied career
opportunities which the armed forces offer.

The services were supposedly "eager" to let women do almost any job they
thought they could do because the services wanted to find out, under
peacetime conditions, what types of work woman did best. Job
'experimentation' did not happen until later, when the conflict in Korea
drove the necessity.

When Brown reviewed the fight to gain passage of the 1948
legislation, she indicated the issue of military legislation as necessity,
saying, "Top military brass had to present very cogent reasons to the
Eightieth Congress in order to persuade the somewhat reluctant male
legislators that women not only can but must have a place in contemporary
military organizations." Senior leaders had pointed out that the closer
the world came to a "push-button" war, the closer women on the homefront
would find themselves to the battlefield so that military women faced no
greater risk than civilian women. Officers said, "From the standpoint of safety, home and the frontlines would almost be indistinguishable. Furthermore in any future war the United States must be able to use every last ounce of human strength. Obviously, this means womanpower as well as manpower."

The arguments Brown specified for the debate from 1946 to 1948 approximated many arguments used to obtain the temporary and Reserve women's forces for WWII and some that would be used in debates after 1950. Military leaders had recognized the risk in waiting to bring women back to active-duty and trying to train them after an emergency started, or in sending them to the field without adequate training. If Congress had disagreed with this premise, any form of a Regular Army was insupportable because male Reservists could be activated in an emergency too. The military had convinced legislators that "although Reserves form the bulk of our fighting forces in wartime, they are only as effective as the direction given them by men who have made military matters their life business." The same was true for women. Still, leaders failed to recognize that societal attitudes and the services' ideologically based restrictions on women militated against most women considering the armed forces "their life business."

However, Brown reported, that even without realistic career opportunities, the women did not mind being "laboratory specimens" in the determination of what jobs women could do best. Complaints against using the military for social (including racial) 'experimentation' would have rung hollow for the military leaders of the World War II and post-war eras as they constantly conducted 'experiments' to increase efficiency and effectiveness, including those with racial or gender implications. Results of their 'experiments' with female officers in both traditional
and non-traditional fields—medicine, law, meteorology, chemistry, physics, supply and finance, public information, personnel—virtually every shore or non-combat job pleased the services. However, since the Navy and Air Force had planned for co-ed training and duty systems, eliminating the need for separate female staffs, only a few female officers served in supervisory positions.76

Policies on women's work assignments, like training policies, demonstrated the services commitment to 'experimenting' with the nature of women's post-war service, at least in the short term. The Navy imposed a twenty-five percent ceiling on the number of women assigned to clerical work and the Army wrote a similar plan. WAF Director Gerry May stated the concept succinctly, "After all, it is no secret that women are excellent office workers. Why should we waste the 4000 enlisted women the Air Force can have in proving what we already know." The USMC was the exception. Col. Towles explained that the essential nature of the corps as a combat force militated against assigning women to anything but administrative posts.

Other than in the Marine Corps, then, women would work with men rather than replacing them. The press advertised that women could apply for virtually any non-combat job so the other services could gain "a clear, documented answer to the question of where women fit best in the military, where they can be used most quickly and contribute most in event of total war." The media noted that this willingness to 'experiment' arose from WWII experience reporting,

under the necessarily haphazard assignment system evolved in the frantic emergency conditions of the last war. Then, the services quickly found that women were actually better than most men not only at office work but in many hospital jobs, in crypt-analytic and communications work, in postal and supply billets, and in personnel jobs. Further, they found that women's manual dexterity was valuable not only on a typewriter
keyboard, but in maintaining and repairing the multitude of intricate small instruments essential to mechanized warfare.

The press indicated that as in World War II, arguments for the largely gendered division of labor in both civilian and military employ relied on beliefs that women were adept at 'feminine' jobs because they did not mind routine, boring work; were patient, attentive, and quick (valuable in naval communications); had keen eyes and quick fingers (important for Army photo interpretation); had more patience with other people (necessary for flying and aerial gunnery instructors and medical personnel); and were loyal, conscientious, and extremely attentive. Consistent with these notions of gendered divisions of labor, the military had made up its mind already in some areas, such as in jobs requiring more physical strength or the use of small arms. (The military did not evaluate strength requirements for nursing.)

In any case, with the 'gender experiment' started, the services intended to collect important data. Women had proved themselves capable but doubts remained as to whether the "right kind" of women would want to join. For those who wondered if recruits would be "real" women, reporter Brown reassured readers that not much distinguished the post-war recruits from their predecessors and, for those worried about lost femininity, the "masculine eye probably would have noted that the new recruits were generally good looking and pleasantly young."

From the start though, women also found the masculine military environment limiting. Though they most likely did not identify as feminists, they had not considered that men might think of women as incapable or not want to work with them. Most of the men Brown had interviewed at Lackland did not mind women in the service—"in somebody else's outfit!" and some men would not mind having a woman in their unit,
if "she'd keep her mouth shut." For people who feared radical ideas, Brown reassured readers that when asked why women enlisted the "answers came back without any missionary or feminist overtones." Some joined for educational or training opportunities they could not have afforded otherwise. Others felt a patriotic responsibility. One related that her "grandmother has what you might call a crazy idea—that every member of the family owes some service to her Government and her country. We've all gone along with her, either in civil service or the military. This seemed to me a wonderful way to discharge my obligation." Others escaped boring jobs and some followed in their father's or brother's footsteps. In other words, women joined for much the same reasons men did. Few men or women cited patriotism as the key.

Brown's generally complimentary report continually, implicitly, or explicitly, addressed concerns about military women's femininity. 'Quality' dictated that servicewomen, unlike servicemen, be high school graduates. Many had attended college and others had held responsible civilian jobs. Brown, like Hallaren, disparaged wartime recruits, saying,

The conclusion is inevitable that the services in peacetime have attracted a much higher caliber of enlisted woman than the average wartime enlistee. To be sure these first recruits have been most carefully selected and there is some question as to whether this high standard can be maintained, but the services are optimistic.

Of course, the Army intended to maintain quality by drastically limiting numbers. This may have been a preemptory defense against a resurgence of wartime rumors that servicewomen had discipline, work, or morality problems. But with so little evidence in the press of such transgressions, it is interesting that reporters or the services felt a need for a preemptive posture.
Defensive posture might be a natural result, though, of these criticisms haunting virtually all servicewomen in all militaries, in spite of their outstanding and well-publicized achievements and contributions. Rumor campaigns, as with the 1943 Slander Campaign, are really about maintaining control and resisting changing gender relations. In trying to combat stereotypes and rumors by drastically limiting their numbers, the women themselves implied that most women lacked sufficient 'quality' (femininity, capability, and moral character). They contributed to the "queen bee" syndrome, that only a few women were different or special enough to belong. The stance also encouraged the persistence of patriarchal attitudes, sexist behavior, and restrictive policies. By their unwitting collusion, understandable under the circumstances, the women's services gave up a measure of freedom of action, and relegated themselves to token status and ghettoized jobs. Their insistence on being "ladies first," while consistent with 1940s and 1950s ideals, played into white, upper-class patriarchal definitions of femininity, appropriate female jobs and spaces, and acceptable behavior. These ahistoric ideals, synergistically combined to reinforce the view that most women were not qualified for military jobs and to support gender-specific restrictions on conditions of service and on benefits.

When *Times* reporter Brown detailed the "troublesome factors" that the new women directors faced, she started with the World War II 'bugaboos', femininity, ability, morality. She said the first challenge entailed was "convincing mothers, fathers, brothers, Congressmen, service men and junior officers that women really can be military without being camp followers or without being converted into rough, tough gals who can cuss out the chow as well as any dogface." Another leadership challenge necessitated insuring that women were trained and assigned in a wide
variety of jobs. "All too clearly do the policy makers, both men and women, know that the mass of military men cling strongly to the idea that if women won't stay in the kitchen, they should surely go no further than the typewriter and filing cabinet," she wrote. Getting the men and women to work together "on equal terms" constituted a third problem. This last, Brown maintained, required educating the public and "the uniformed male animal...[it being] no secret that men, traditionally lords and masters of the better jobs, are both resentful and skeptical of the whole idea of distaff equality." Brown's article was the first I found that overtly identified protection of male privilege in the resistance and one of the few in the post-war period explicitly addressing the cultural debate. The fact that at least this reporter could articulate the effects of ideology on women's admittance and acceptance, or the lack of the thereof, shows openings for debate of cultural issues did exist.

Those spaces were presented for race discussions as well. Early in 1949 Congress connected racial and gender discrimination when they voted for Vito Marcantonio's (American Labor Party) amendment to a bill establishing a Coast Guard women's Reserve that barred discrimination and segregation based on race, color, or creed. The amendment passed with bipartisan support 193-153 (opposition from the New York area came from Republicans); but Herbert Bonner, a Democrat from North Carolina, immediately moved to recommit. His motion carried 107-89, with many who had just voted for the anti-discrimination measure abstaining.

Positive women's service news made the news also. On their seventh anniversary, with only five women serving outside the U.S., Navy women learned that enlisted WAVES would be assigned overseas." Under the headline, "Nothing's Sacred! Women Join the MP's," the Times reported
"This man's Army [was] becoming more of an anachronism as Wacs [took] on duties....The ranks of the Military Police--heretofore regarded as muscular, martial prototypes...have been invaded by skirts and frills." Reports described two women shown in MP uniforms, noting, "The private is blonde, 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighs 116 pounds. The sergeant is an inch shorter, six pounds lighter and a brunette." Pvt. Majorie Sheperd thought MP duty would be "interesting" and hoped to get a job as a probation officer or social worker with the Seattle police department after her service career. She knew judo and how to use a rifle, bayonet, and automatic hand gun. Sgt. Beulah Coates, a veteran of Military Intelligence, had worked with the Resistance in France and Germany. While both women wanted to get out to the field, not surprisingly, their duties confined them to paper work. The women reported having to get accustomed to strange looks because of their "MP" armbands. The Times and its readers must have probably already forgotten wartime reports on WAVE MPs.

While some ex-servicewomen like Sheperd and Coates joined the small Regular forces, the services were also trying to enlist Reservists. The WAC surveyed New York's forty thousand female veterans for interest and eligibility. The "slim, blond" officer-in-charge (OIC) of the effort, Capt. Mary Stanton, said many jobs were open to them despite the fact that, "Too many Army officers still believe that all a Wac can do is type." Over fifty types of positions were open from truck driver to dental technician, musician to playwright, accountant to geographer, and the service also needed cryptographers and psychologists for psychological warfare units.

Hundreds answered the call for Reservists and Stanton voiced surprise at how many veterans had "turned housewife and mother [but were still] anxious to combine Reservist status with domesticity." When a
married woman referred to her one-year-old as a future WAC, Stanton neglected to say they would not take women with minor children in their homes for more than thirty days per year. She did report that the applicants were about "fifty-fifty, career girls and married women" which revealed interesting dynamics. One sergeant asking for reenlistment as a medical technician described herself as "an old maid."

The press played issues of the femininity and morality of these career girls, old maids, and married women as comedy around the issue of uniforms. The Army sent ten "hardy" WACs to Mt. Washington, New Hampshire for three weeks "to find out whether a girl can stay 'warm and comfortable in a standard G parka'." The study, conducted in the interest of "science and warm WACs," hoped to find the "solution to the problem of cold-weather clothing for women." Researchers expected temperatures to reach forty below zero with hundred mile-an-hour winds. A letter to the Times' editors asked the questions for those with traditional concerns. How were the WACs selected for the test and what were the morality standards in a mostly male environment or when off in the field? The writer suggested that although the Army intended for the women to stay outside, "If the Weather Boys are at home they will invite the ladies in to lay off their parkas and mukluks and stay a while. For it gets lonely up there in mid-winter." Would the WACs choose duty or warm companionship?

More seriously, in another report suggesting military women's immorality, the District Attorney's office accused an adoption broker, Alice Satterthwaite, of illegally placing "hundreds of babies...through brazen bedside solicitation." Her defense attorney asserted only that through Mrs. Satterthwaite's "good offices...[and] with the knowledge of officials of the Army and the American Red Cross,"
many babies born to Army nurses had been placed with foster parents...during the early years of the war...a number of Army nurses returned to the United States in a pregnant condition. The Red Cross Nursing Service at the request of the Army took care of these girls...many of these mothers were far from home and it was essential to the Red Cross that a good job be done in helping these mothers place their babies for adoption with a minimum of publicity and assurance of proper placement and good results.

Since the services did not allow women with children to remain in the service it may have been true that a number of servicewomen, married or not, had given up their babies. At the same time, although there had been public concern over loose morals and illegitimate births among servicewomen, official statistics reflected fewer illegitimate births among military women than in the general population. The military may have covered up a problem it had partially created or there might be other explanations. One can not be sure if the news report, the Red Cross, or the attorney had classified all military women as 'nurses'. Or, perhaps some of the women were not military at all but civilian workers, ARC women, or American GIs' civilian lovers. Whether rampant sexual misbehavior prevailed among the women or not, the armed forces needed nurses. Apparently, pregnancies among line personnel were not of public concern. Still, having the case in public view did not help people resolve anxiety over imagined morality problems of servicewomen because any reported misbehavior of any woman in uniform reflected on them all. Reports did not illegitimate children of servicemen, although we know about them from previous reports of their treatment of foreign women.

In fact, the American press continued to report on foreign women. This coverage, in reviewing WWII history, constituted part of the public experience of women in war, women in the military, and women in danger. They included the victims of enemy atrocities and the heroines who served

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in harm's way in combat or Resistance efforts. For instance, in 1947, the U.S. posthumously presented Medals of Freedom to two Filipinos, Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Escoda, for "directing and taking part in organized efforts to smuggle supplies, along with messages, to war prisoners...." After the Bataan Death March, they delivered supplies to American and Filipino POWs. Later, they were caught and executed. Florence Finch earned a Medal of Freedom for aiding allied prisoners in the Far East from June 1942 to February 1945, and Emilienne Marechaux merited one for helping downed allied airmen in France. In 1948, Amanda Stassart, of the Belgian underground, was reunited with two of the pilots that she brought through German lines after they were shot down in 1943. At age twenty-five, she had successfully helped sixty British and American fliers travel from Belgium to Paris to Madrid. Captured in 1944, held prisoner for over a year, and barely escaping execution, she was returned to Belgium under an exchange of prisoners. Other articles on WWII foreign women as POWs including French, Polish, Russian and German prisoners, showed the public that women had experienced and survived those situations. The possibility that they might be captured or killed had not dissuaded their government from putting them in harm's way.83

Although the press reported wartime examples of foreign women pilots, no public debate occurred about whether women should fly for the USAF despite the war records of the WASP and WAFS. Other nations took the plunge. The Netherlands accepted women into its Air Force for the first time in 1949, after the Royal Netherlands Army and Navy had already accepted women volunteers. The British RAF accepted non-combat women pilots for the first time in March 1947. Air Minister Philip Noel-Baker announced then that the WAAF, who had only performed clerical and other ground work previously, would serve in flying duties. The USAF never
considered this step even though WAF Director May visited Britain to exchange information with the WRAF's Commandant, Felicity Hanbury. Col. May returned with ideas on improving mess services and opening a few more traditional jobs to women. According to the colonel, British airwomen were "being utilized in many trades which we haven't attempted at all." But May "hardly thought the WAF's would soon emulate the parachute-hopping and flight-mechanics records of their British counterparts; but she did think they might give service in hospitals." This report ran counter to her earlier statements that the services need not concentrate women in tasks the military already knew women performed well.44

After Congress had resolved the debate about women having a permanent and Regular place in the military, the services and government--by necessity and in a piecemeal manner--constructed women's condition of service. They wanted 'quality' career women. They would pursue the idea of attracting such women against a backdrop of media reviews of women's contributions in WWII, foreign women's martial exploits, uncertainty and dislocation on the home front, challenges to gender role ideals, and increasing consciousness of racial injustice, not to mention fears of a nuclear holocaust.

As tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union grew, considerations of a World War III invaded the public's psyche; Civil Defense and loyalty were the watchwords, conformity the religion. With fears of rampant espionage, the press was no longer the government's or military's partner and conservatives suggested anyone who disagreed with their rabidly anti-communist, aggressively capitalistic vision of America's future was suspect. There was less room for racial debates, as even veterans' groups were labeled disloyal for broaching issues such as the fact that African-
American's had paid with their lives for democracy elsewhere while enduring discrimination at home. It is not surprising that there would be little room in the news in the future for discussions of women's issues.

When the military attempted to move from rapid demobilization and peace to total ideological mobilization for the Cold War, domestic considerations included gendered roles mobilized to protect a "way of life" that, although largely mythical, was perceived to be part of the war against 'Communism' The debate on the militarization of American women then pitted a cultural ideology against military pragmatism and both against fairness. In spite of the strength of the domestic ideal, perceived defense needs and efficiencies and manpower shortages drove the government to regularize nurses and women of the line. But in service to the myth, the terms of women's service and restrictions on their opportunities and benefits reinscribed the ideals of white, middle-class patriarchy. As a result of restrictions, although the first women Regulars definitely laid foundations for more change, the fruits of their labor would only be realized much later. The restrictive terms of their service simply reinscribed dominant values and did not significantly contribute to immediate changes in cultural ideology either internal or external to the military. The real debate between conflicting cultural and political ideologies remained unresolved and as a result women, having been allowed admittance to the military, would continue to struggle for acceptance. Restrictions on their service circumscribed their ability to contribute and allowed for unequal, unfair treatment and trivialization. Failure to resolve the real issues of women's citizenship functioned to ghettoize military women. This would lead very nearly to their total exclusion after heroic and needed contributions in another crisis. As it
was, the Regular women's forces were barely ready in time for the unforeseen emergency in Korea.
Notes to Chapter 5

1. For instance, NYT, January 1946, a Navy woman's engagement is announced in the society pages. She was photographed in uniform. See also June Willenz on WWII veterans. The impetus for women to conceal veteran's status was even more pronounced after Vietnam, according to Keith Walker's oral interviews and Lynda Van DeVanter's account.


5. "Distaff, Dismissed!" Tm, 11 February 1946, p.23.


18. The military asked the WASPs to fly some of the more dangerous aircraft to prove to men they were safe, challenging the egos of those who were afraid. "66,000 War Brides Will Arrive Soon" (AP), NYT, 5 January 1946, p.15. "A Peaceful Scene on Bikini" (AP), 4 July 1946, p.4. "Sale of Nylons 'to Officers Only' Stirs More Resentment Against 'Caste' Regime" (AP), 20 March 1946, p.25.


25. "Lollygagging", Tm, 14 January 1946, p.22.


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34. Neville, p.108.

35. "The American Woman" (editorial), Lf, 21 October 1946, p.36.


40. "Gen. Arnold is Guest," NYT, 9 November 1946, p.18. In addition to the servicewomen who were recognized, the thousands of women who served as telephone workers for the military were honored by the services as well. "Boston Pair Decorated," 16 July 1946, p.25. "Task of Occupation Declared in Peril," 24 November 1946, p.28.

"Patterson Praises Army Nurses" (AP), 21 October 1946, p.28. "Letters From an Army Nurse in Japan," 14 April 1946, Section VI, p.21, 57.


47. NYT, 1946-1950.


49. Charles Grutzner, "West Point's Head Urges World Role," NYT, 2 February 1949 (two photographs were published on 3 February 1949), p.25. None of the women are African-Americans.


59. "We Need Wacs and Waves" (editorial), NYT, 5 July 1947, p.10.


68. Sherman, pp.47-48 and Holm, Women in the Military.


73. Five-foot tall Maj.Gen. Jeanne Holm (USAF, Ret.) had served as an enlisted WAC truck driver in World War II. Col. Emma Jane Reilly told me in an interview in May 1988 that trucks had been modified by removing two of the rear wheels to save rubber making them even more difficult to drive. "Wac Training Center is Opened" (AP), NYT, 5 October 1948, p.20. "Women Officer Training Begins" (UP), 12 October 1948, p.31. "Wac Leader Cites High Quality Goal," 15 October 1948, p.26. Female staff car drivers had become status symbols for many male officers.


76. The Army also conducted joint training, but retained their separate corps for administration consistent with Army organizational structure.


78. "Civil Rights Vote is Won, Then Lost," NYT, 5 April 1949, p.34. "How Members From This Area Voted in Congress During Week," 11 April 1949, p.6.


CHAPTER 6
KOREA: NEEDED AGAIN, 1950-1953

When the front pages of American newspapers announced on June 25, 1950 that North Korea had invaded the South, two thousand Americans were on the Peninsula. Within days, eight missionaries had been taken hostage by the North. President Truman ordered a blockade, and on July 16, announced the U.S. would defend the Republic of Korea. State National Guard units were mobilized and Congress was "jolted" out of complacency. Legislators invited the military to ask for any measures deemed appropriate for the crisis while Secretary of Defense George Marshall warned that the nation was in for a prolonged period of partial mobilization. In August, the Chinese massed forces on the northern border and Soviet tanks appeared in battle. UN forces joined the Americans early in November but allied troops were in full retreat by the end of the month. In December, the President declared a national emergency to encourage civilian mobilization and provide the administration with executive powers given up in 1946.

On the eve of the Korean crisis, discussions of armed forces organization and personnel issues continued. These issues were important not just for the Korean conflict but also for the anticipated climatic battle between 'Communism' and 'Democracy.' Defense debates included discussions about racial integration of both the regular forces and the National Guard, as well as UMT and the draft. Civilian mobilization was
also considered important, because some strategists anticipated that 'the' Korean conflict would become the apocalyptic confrontation and require the use of nuclear weapons. Every citizen--man, woman, and child--was expected to be prepared for civil defense.

Given the Cold War need for perpetual preparedness, even before the conflict started, the armed forces suffered from personnel shortages. To remedy this situation the American Association of Universities called for the "democratic universal sharing of the privilege and obligation" of defense service. No one argued that "universal" meant all American citizens; it was obvious that "citizens" meant "men". However, crisis dictated the recall of both male and female reservists. Still, shortages were so severe that the services stepped up recruiting campaigns for both men and women and reduced minimum ages and standards for men. As in World War II, the government also considered drafting women.¹ Eventually, through altering policy and "lowering" standards, the services were able to obtain sufficient personnel, but the stop-gap measures and failure to explicitly consider universal citizen privileges and obligations created other problems which surfaced later.

As these events unfolded, the press gave front page coverage to the discussion of defense policy including widening the war and using the atomic bomb. Experts agreed that the Soviet Union had developed atomic bomb technology which would move defense policy from 'Massive Retaliation' to 'Mutually Assured Destruction,' neither of which, we would learn, was a realistic strategy.

The type of defense policy, war strategy, and military forces the nation has had at any particular time has always affected how marginalized groups have been utilized.² Reliance on high-tech weaponry lessened the urgency of drawing on these groups for "manpower". In the case of the
Korean conflict, military necessity once again drove calls for more servicewomen beyond the small women's corps established by the 1948 Integration Act. But, also once again their use by the armed forces would constitute abuse. In addition to having to meet higher standards, women's conditions of service were limiting, which effectively proscribed 'career' considerations and provided for unequal pay and benefits. While volunteers were recruited, veterans and reservists were voluntarily, as well as involuntarily, recalled. Some standards and restrictions were 'lowered' for women, but not nearly as far as for men. In addition, the armed forces changed some gender policies to widen the pool of eligible women. The services' took action in response to need, with no attempt to be fair or to address a coherent concept of the responsibilities and rights of citizenship. Outside the military, a large part of the press coverage and perceived public concern continued to focus on servicewomen's femininity, heterosexuality, and morality--sometimes in very contradictory ways. Again these emphases were coded as issues of/about 'quality' and lent themselves to trivialization of women's contributions, thereby inhibiting the nation's historical memory of women's service and the debate over their integration. The military's approach and the media's treatment provided easy avenues by which to reinscribe dominant gender ideology when the crisis ended.

From 1950 to 1953, conservative forces tried to hold the line on women's integration. But it was also evident, in both the military's treatment of men and minorities, and in civilian discussions of women's roles that spaces existed for discussions of citizenship that could have moved the debate beyond strength, femininity, and other less material considerations. The personnel needs of the Korean conflict opened these spaces, but the services and government once again avoided an explicit
discussion of cultural ideology in relation to political philosophy, responding with lightly considered stop-gap measures that prevented long-term, substantive change in women's conditions of service and ensured that the debate to continue in repetitive, unproductive fashion for many more years. In addition, once again the defense establishment showed that it was not completely adverse to 'experimentation' in times of need. The military treated women as it had blacks and as it later would respond to 'other' groups, gays, handicapped persons, etc., in similar terms.3

Shortages of qualified men drove recalls, extensions of enlistments, recruiting, and new training and job opportunities for women. Dire necessity also drove discussions of the draft and UMT to consider the inclusion of women again. Most policy limitations remained, but some were loosened or temporarily lifted, including higher education and experience qualification standards, bans on motherhood and marriage, male spouse dependent benefits, sea and combat zone duty, the two-percent limit on numbers, ROTC and Academy admittance (in the 1970s), age, rank, and gender-typing of jobs. Informally, double standards for appearance and behavior were both restrictive and conflicting. The 'quality' issue came up repeatedly as in the Air Force's Cochran-May-Vandenberg episode. And as earlier, nurses and other women served in harm's way and as POWs, and the public was constantly exposed to images of foreign women in military and non-traditional roles. But overwhelmingly, while serious discussions of women's place in politics, the economy, society, education, and war mobilization took place, popular representations of women continued to trivialize or sexualize their every activity. I believe that maintaining a cultural ideology inconsistent with reality in a thoroughly feminized profession like nursing is a perfect example of how historical amnesia was created.
Discussing personnel shortages, the *Time* Nona Brown seemed totally unaware of women's service, arguing that the four ways to solve the crisis were to broaden the age span for the (male) draft, extend the period of (men's) service, limit (men's) deferments and exemptions, and lower (men's) standards. She did not suggest removing the two-percent ceiling on women. Instead, Brown discussed drafting married non-fathers and accepting non-combat fit men. The services typically complained of poor personnel quality while restricting the membership of 'higher quality' individuals whose membership was limited by service policy and law. If the decision was to take non-combat qualified men, then women could have fit the bill. However, the services and legislature favored the enlistment of mentally deficient, psychologically unstable, or physically unfit white men rather than qualified women or black men. Actions taken to obtain enough white men, like 'lowering' standards, would affect the efficiency of the services and their relation to the civilian population for many years. And the vision of being able to field an all volunteer force, competing with a notion that universal or selective service (a male draft) was more democratic and less militaristic, would not reach fruition until 1973.⁴

Military medical personnel shortages, severe before the Korean invasion, became extremely critical. Nurses were the first group of military members requested to extend their service. Veterans were asked to return to active duty, Red Cross workers helped offset part of the problem, and the services trained line women as medical technicians. Although nurse recruiting efforts increased, there was no additional effort to recruit black nurses.

Nurses continued to be the one group of women in the military that the nation had no qualms about sending into danger. Although line women
were not initially sent to the Korean Peninsula because the services asserted that the fluid battle lines posed too much of a risk for women, there was no discussion about the risk to nurses. They arrived in Korea four days after the invasion. The reading public knew from articles and pictures in newspapers and magazines that the women were in harm's way. In fact, since women could become casualties of war, daughters were written into the "sole surviving son" exemption from combat zone duty.⁵

The inconsistencies in gendered divisions of labor became even more indefensible when the services began accepting female doctors. Male doctors, some trained with military funds, would not answer the call for volunteers in sufficient number, so a male doctor's draft was implemented. When this measure fell short, the Army and Air Force finally asked legislators to allow female physicians to serve in their Medical Corps in July 1950. Even though they had told Congress they thought the public's "unfavorable" attitudes toward female doctors had improved, military leaders assured the public that women would have to pass the same standards as men. Meanwhile they told the women they would receive the same opportunities and benefits as male doctors.⁶

As usual, the debate turned more intense than expected. The Senate insisted on a uniform system for all the services. The Army and Air Force wanted female doctors to be the equals of male doctors, which would have given them higher standing than line women and nurses. Wyoming Democrat Lester Hunt pointed out that line women had limits on rank and lower mandatory retirement ages and therefore fewer benefits and opportunities. Navy women doctors had the same status as WAVES and nurses, giving them fewer opportunities and benefits than male doctors. No one suggested resolving the inconsistency by putting women (line personnel, nurses, and physicians) on equal footing with men as a matter of practicality and
fairness. Because of the need for military doctors and an impasse with the forces, Congress capitulated and passed the Army-Air Force female physician's bill without resolving the discrepancies between genders and services. And through this debate, male nurses gained ammunition for their battle to enter the nurse corps later.\(^7\)

While Congress debated the inclusion of female physicians, nurse shortages grew even more severe, but service policy continued to be a limiting factor in remedying the situation. Before the invasion, the Army had estimated it needed a hundred new nurses per month because "of those who drop out to get married." After the invasion one of the most pressing problems was that the services, because of their own policies, could not recall reserve nurses who had married or had children. Publicly acknowledging that it was not to be an attempt by women to avoid service, the military recognized these as a normal part of women's life cycles and societal expectations. It did not help that all the services' rules on marriage and children were different from those for men and different from one another's.\(^8\)

In contrast to news about nurses, fewer military line women gained press attention between 1947 and 1948 than during World War II, but there would be a resurgence in public discussion of servicewomen from 1950 through 1953. Rather than being addressed separately though, women's recruiting was covered in manpower articles with men's recruiting and draft news. Meanwhile, female veterans organizations started to disband as women felt they were either included in male groups or that women no longer needed their services and articles about female vets disappeared.

In fact, although *Times* reports praised female vets' contributions, articles still trivialized them in discussions of appearance, attire, and fraternization. WWI Yeomen (F) had replaced men for combat, but reporters
wondered how "they survived their quaint uniforms." These "forerunners of the Waves" recalled combatting some prejudice, but generally remembered that "[the women] were well received...and some of the old Navy men were even fairly friendly when they got used to the idea." They also remembered the concern for morality demonstrated as protection from predatory sailors or from a young woman's inability to control her desires. While a young woman stood watch "an elderly yeomanette was assigned to watch the watcher if she was pretty and her station was close to piers for incoming Navy ships."³

Femininity, morality, and an emphasis on physical attributes were also the order of the day for reporting on active duty women. "Four Brunette WACs are Army Guests" told of the four "Outstanding Soldiers of the Month" chosen for "neatness, military bearing, courtesy, attitude and leadership" earning a holiday in New York. The city planned differently for the WACs than for male soldiers. "[T]he girls were getting no nightclubs. 'The Stork Club didn't want to admit Wacs unescorted in the evening'." Instead the women were "thrilled" to go to a Fifth Avenue beauty salon. In the meantime, sister servicewomen posed in their new uniforms adding "glamour to [the] WAC." Reporter Virginia Pope gushed that Army women would "be as smartly dressed as any civilian." Most impressive were the "feminine charm in cut and silhouette and the pleasing color ...[with] trim round collars..." The new hat, tilted downward with an off-center insignia, was considered to be extremely fashionable. And the uniform slacks were "designed with a high belt to give a well-defined and snug waistline."⁴

Despite some light weight media treatment, the press also reported that servicewomen were putting their newly won regular status to work in
non-traditional areas. Mary Redfern graduated from Navy parachute riggers school by successfully completing the required free-fall jump, becoming the first regular WAVE "Parachute Rigger, Airman." Lt.Cmdr. Bernice Walters, the first female medical officer ordered to sea, was the first woman officer besides nurses assigned a regular tour of shipboard duty.¹¹

Regulars were busy training, but in the press their femininity was more newsworthy. Life covered a WAC "field conditions" bivouac, "Like any soldier, a Wac [had to] learn to live where there are no houses, no plumbing and no modern kitchen." Lisa Larsen reported that the women "not only thrive on [rigorous field training] but really enjoy it." The trainees survived gas drills, fired carbines on the range, and competed in relay races with full packs. They "ate like men," but could still fit into their "lady clothes" for dates. And, their first stop after training was the beauty shop.

The New York Times Magazine featured WAF training with a highly visible cover photo and article. Gertrude Samuels investigated what WAFs were trained to do, why the Air Force needed them, why women joined the Air Force, and what effects military life had on them. She found that training was intended to develop skilled, career-minded airmen. Long marches and combat skills had been dropped from the women's program but they did train in survival and physical conditioning. Samuels also found that the new WAFs were part of an "experiment in democratic [i.e., racially integrated] living." She also told her readers that the women, like men, enlisted for adventure, job training, or career security rather than for patriotic reasons. Enlistment standards differed from men's though, and included being single, having no dependents, and showing emotional stability, some of which meant avoidance of stereotypes coded as not feminine, i.e. lesbian. "The last thing the Air Force wants is women
who want to ape male airmen, as is gently conveyed to the few who arrived
in dungarees, ready to rough it, with hair chopped off."

But the key questions, Samuels claimed were, "How do men in the Air
Force feel about their sister airmen? How do women measure up in wartime?"
Military leaders said they had "measured up" pointing to the "amazing
record of women in World War II," from the beginning, when the services
balked and allowed women in only four traditional fields, to serving in
over 200 jobs categories including technical areas because "the Army so
desperately needed replacements." But how did the men feel? Before his
"conversion," Gen. Eisenhower, concerned with morality but finding
efficiency in using women in feminized arenas, had told Congress in 1948,

When this project [to make women part of the regular military
establishment] was proposed in the beginning of the war, like
most of the old soldiers I was violently against it. I
thought a tremendous number of difficulties would occur that
would be difficult to handle; that maybe we were exposing
people to various types of temptation and other things that
would get us into trouble. None of that occurred. The
efficiency of a woman in the job that she is particularly
fitted to fill is on average far above that of the man.
Moreover, you don't get the men for it. That is a vital point
about the thing.

Samuels went on to describe the rationale for the Integration Act--testing
which jobs women could do and forming a nucleus for mobilization. She
went on to say, however, that "for many kinds of administrative and
technical jobs, you learn, women are more dependable, more precise, more
careful about details than men. They stick to a job no matter how
demanding." Women in OCS had raised intellectual standards for all
trainees as they entered with higher educational levels and men did not
want to be outdone so they worked harder.

Samuels found none of the predicted problems with enlisted men
taking orders from female officers. She did note that while there were a
few issues to be worked out, "some problems appear to be only in the minds
of men. For example, some psychiatrists whom I interviewed not only took a dim view of women in military service but also of women in any profession, including law, medicine and journalism. (One wondered who needed the psychological help)." Women were not allowed in ROTC nor the service academies at the time and Samuels said military leaders at OCS were "Frankly baffled about training women for military leadership." Senior military men told the reporter,

With women coming into what is traditionally a man's field...they're bound to be resented on the part of the men, and even more so by the camp's women--the wives and girlfriends of the men.

They did not explain the reason for male resentment but showed a concern with what wives and others might suspect to be going on between their military men and servicewomen, implying again that military women were morally loose. Their concern fed parental and public suspicions.

The Air Force's female leaders were not worried about the quality of recruits or their politics. Col. May reassured the public,

We are not the least bit feminist. We come into a profession which until very recently [1942] has been strictly for men. We're not trying to push the women into anything because they're women. We simply feel that the Air Force can use the ability, the skills and the natural aptitudes that women possess for the jobs. The whole experimental program is keyed to this goal.

She noted the 'experimental' nature of the program and reassured that the whole program might be temporary if it did not go well. In another interview, the director re-emphasized "quality" insured by small numbers, "We are being very choosy about this, we certainly do not want everybody."12

The Navy put WAVE trainees through their paces as well. From six-thirty in the morning to nine-thirty at night women attended classes on discipline, Navy traditions and history, first aid, chemical warfare,
seamanship, and swimming. They adjusted well, but griped "good and loud about [the] blisters" they got swabbing decks. The Navy made "one of the few concessions" by giving each woman their own room with "pastel bulkheads and maple furniture." Men surely saw this as special treatment, but, the public seems to have accepted the WAVES as evidenced by businesses giving them "servicemen's preferences." They were given better seats at theaters and treated more courteously at stores.

For female Reservists training, the Navy's pseudo-ROTC "Rocs" attended six weeks of training for two summers while in college. Upon graduation they would receive reserve commissions. In 1951 the Marines started a similar program, WOTC. Olive Goldman, representative to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, suggested that all the services establish these programs. "I have been struck with one great gap in women's education...and I should like to see an R.O.T.C. for women having a part in [state] universities." Later, Rutgers offered those attending New Jersey College for Women a chance to join USAF ROTC.¹³

Women's training programs had been developed just in time. A year after deciding they needed female regulars on permanent military status, when North Korea invaded the South, the services, not surprisingly, decided they needed many more women. The services claimed that "The armed forces made no distinction between men and women when they called for volunteers and enlistments. If a woman can fit into a specialist grade, the services maintain she is as welcome as a man." Advertisements failed to mention that the terms of women's service still limited opportunities.¹⁴

As recruiting picked up even more, the Marines expanded job opportunities and the WAC, following the male lead, finally "lowered" qualification scores. Reminiscent of the last war, the services called
women to free men for combat and sea duty. Although the Marines had asked Congress only for clerks in the 1948 integration legislation, fortunately women were not limited to these positions by the law because the Corps now wanted women in "non-combat jobs in aviation, communications, supply, post exchanges, electronics and administration." Once again an emergency pushed women out of the job ghetto. More changes were made in policy as further mobilization calls were issued. The Marines reduced women's minimum age to eighteen (the lowest in Corps history) and the Air Force changed its policy on marriage which was previously grounds for automatic discharge. The WAC doubled recruiting goals and shortened training.15

Although women were supposed to replace men for combat and stay ashore, shortages drove the Navy to train WAVES aboard ship. Sexual or humorous angles dominated Life's photo essay "A New Kind of Navy" with WAVES swabbing a destroyer's decks watched by a seated, coffee-drinking, grinning male sailor. Photos showed seasick women and those with fingers in their ears as the 40mm guns were fired. No wonder men were not enamored with the idea of women at sea, "One old sailor grumped, 'The whole thing is a laugh'." Bypassing discussions of job performance, reporters added "Younger and less salty hands eyed the Waves more appreciatively...the gobs and Waves were behaving like any other group of boys and girls on a moonlight cruise" as they arranged for dates.

As manpower needs increased, even more drastic measures were taken. The President considered discontinuing the draft exemption for married men and extending the draft age from twenty-five to thirty-five. The services continued to "lower" male standards. While the Navy involuntarily recalled reserve male doctors and female corpsmen for the first time, the Army recalled three hundred WACs, nurses, and medical specialists in its first involuntary recall of women. According to Times interviewers, "Some
female veterans of the last war said they were glad to get back in the Army.\footnote{16}

The increasing number of servicewomen created unanticipated situations--especially with military marriages. Times reporters interviewed a male veteran and his wife who joined the USAF Reserve together. The paper noted that times had changed with women transitioning from camp-followers to service members.

Legend has it that women once followed their soldier-husbands to many distant lands, often making long treks afoot to be with their spouses. Modern woman has improved on this archaic practice, however, by enlisting for military service and thereby becoming one of the troops herself.

Rather than taking a more serious approach, the report focused on comic representations of gendered authority issues.

Armies being what they are, Sergeant Wright is "the boss" during the week-end training at Mitchel Field, but Private Wright said she did not mind that too much. "After all," she said smiling, "it's only two days a month and it gives Harold a chance to express himself." She winked a dark brown eye knowingly.

After the wife had her say, the husband was allowed to voice his concerns.

The tenor remained humorous.

It's really a strange feeling for a fellow to have his wife in uniform walking alongside him on a military base, but it's fun...I guess this idea of a husband and wife joining the reserves is sort of new because they haven't provided quarters yet for married couples--I have to say good-night to Helen outside the W.A.F. barracks.

In 1951 Life ran a feature story with a cover photo of a Navy couple. Seaman Betty Sluis had to wait outside the officer's club for her husband and fraternization regulations dictated that to socialize together at least one had to be in mufti whether it was at the theater, chapel, or unit parties.\footnote{17}

While publicizing concerns about mobilizing women, and in addition to articles about military marriages, the press also continued to
emphasize femininity as a reassurance to those who feared that militarization "masculinized" women. As usual, articles focused on women's appearance and emphasized gender stereotypes. The "Girl Paymaster at Lakehurst Air Station" was "trim in a smart-fitting blue [skirt] uniform, with a .45-caliber automatic strapped to the belt around her slim waist...Miss Belka is 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighs 135 pounds, wears her hair in tailored feather bob, and has blue-green eyes that change with the weather." Despite her gun, the WAVE was "still a woman."

The smiling and efficient girl paymaster frequently hears a youthful seaman in her payline remark to a buddy that she is a "pistol packin' mamma" and sometimes that she is "a darn good-lookin' ghost." But she says that such remarks do not mean insubordination and that a girl paymaster, carrying a .45 on her hip has to expect them from youths just out of school or college.

Disrespect was casually dismissed. The tension between emphasis on careers versus femininity and heterosexuality was still there, however. "As for a career in the Navy, Ensign Belka smiles engagingly. 'Yes,' she said, 'unless of course, some day I decide to marry'."18

As the Korean conflict progressed in the fall of 1950 the military changed more personnel regulations and eased more limits. The two-percent limit on women's force strength, although not needed, symbolized the ambivalent relationship between the law and military on one side and women on the other. The AAUW asked Congress to repeal the law but they only temporarily lifted it in 1952. Congress did finally modify laws allowing for servicewomen's husband's to receive dependent benefits. However, unlike men, women had to prove their spouses were financially dependent on them.

Numbers limits and spousal benefits were not the only areas where the war encouraged reassessment of traditional limits and restrictions.
A women's draft was also repeatedly reconsidered. During Senate debates on the ERA, Washington Republican Harry Cain argued for the measure "as a matter of having the 'woman of tomorrow' if necessary in the frontlines of the 'war of tomorrow,'"

people should be drafted for the job to be done, regardless of sex...the last war had proved that the Russians better understood what total war really meant than all the rest, including Germany and Japan. "If a woman was fitted to be a sniper because her eyesight was keener, a sniper she became...The adoption of this amendment would make available American manpower regardless of sex."

Maj.Gen. Lewis Hershey, head of Selective Service (SSS), informed the public on radio broadcasts that women could not be registered for the draft unless Congress changed the present law, "it might become necessary to register women if the country faced a situation requiring 'about all the people its got'..." He added that the SSS had done "quite a little planning" on registering women. Others also supported a draft of women as a response to a possible total war. NFBPW president Sarah Hughes told television audiences that women should be drafted to be "used for any kind of duty for which they are qualified, even combat service." Reference to combat was new and Hughes "suggested that one of the results of drafting women might be to keep more fathers at home to look after their children and prevent another breakup of homes such as occurred during the last war." Hughes reversed the usual argument that "allowing" women into the workforce and military in large numbers had caused the breakdown of the family. She continued, "If we are going to have war, it will be total war...If it comes women should be drafted for civil defense, production and the three services. They have the rights and privileges of government, they should take the responsibilities, too." But America's wars turned out to be limited and the women's draft debate never progressed to a more extensive discussion of women's citizenship.
Meanwhile, news of foreign women continued to inform American awareness of women in war and the military. When Israel decided to draft women in February, 1950, the Times reported that all unmarried women, eighteen to twenty-nine, were subject to a year of training in basic military instruction or office work and liable for another year in agriculture or emergency work.20

Other women in non-traditional spaces and female images in popular culture informed the public as well. A brief review of representations of women in war movies reveals sexual or comedic approaches encouraging trivialization of real women, and later, historical amnesia is instructive. The nurses in Mister Roberts are novelties on board ship and victims of the Peeping-Tom sailors. The Navy women in Francis Joins the WAVES played the "ass" ends of the talking mule's jokes. The advertisements for The Admiral Was a Lady showed several men gawking at a woman in a modified uniform replete with saber, short-shorts, heels, tri-cornered hat, and epaulets on a sleeveless, low-cut, push-up, bare-midriff blouse. The promotions read "The Admiral was a Lady...but she taught these ex-GI's maneuvers they'll never forget!...What a pair of see-legs!"21

Two even more interesting cases of the media's representation of women in non-traditional spaces were the reports on two of its own in Korea: war-correspondent Margueritte Higgins and photographer Margaret Bourke-White. Both cases highlight the disparity between the treatment of civilian women and nurses who worked in war-zones and line women who were barred from combat areas. The reporters also disproved some of the myths about women including their frailty, special needs, and anticipated masculinization, and disproved the myth that their serving in harm's way would elicit a public outcry.

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Higgins became a G.I. hero when the Army ordered her out of Korea as "part of a plan to remove all American women from Korea except nurses....' This is just not the type of war where women ought to be running around the front lines.'" Once again rhetoric constructed nurses as neither 'man' nor 'woman' so that the military could use them in war zones. Higgins' editor wrote that if newswomen were willing to take the risks and performed well they should not be "discriminated against." Even with his support Higgins still fought social mores to get into the thick of things,

When Lieut. General Walton H. Walker returned Maggie to Japan with the advice that war is no place for a woman, she protested to General MacArthur: "I am not working in Korea as a woman. I am there as a war correspondent." MacArthur removed the ban and sent her back to Korea ...One officer, who had worked with her for several weeks, delighted her with this dubious tribute, "You're the kind of girl I'd like to have for a brother."

*Life* highlighted Higgins's exploits in "Girl War Correspondent." The thirty-year-old "small, slight blonde, sometimes described as winsome" had been "at the front or in front of the front" since two days after the invasion "prov[ing] alarmingly brave, extraordinarily durable and pretty, even in her fighting clothes...in the thick of the fighting." Apparently she was not at risk of being assaulted or of distracting GIs from their mission.

A group of angry GIs under intense enemy attack complained to Maggie that U.S. tanks were failing to support them. Just then a retreating tank passed and its commander shouted down, "Hey, lady, you're in the wrong place." Miss Higgins shouted back, "So are you!" and the beleaguered infantrymen got up out of their fox-holes and cheered...[Gen.] Craig ordered a cot set up for her...she preferred to sleep on the ground. The general was understandably impressed. "Maggie's the only gal you can brag about sleeping with and not be a cad." "We've learned Maggie will eat, sleep and fight like the rest of us," said Colonel Richard Stephens of the 21st Infantry Regiment, "and that's a ticket to our outfit any day."

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Higgins landed with the Marines at Inch'on under fire and went right on working, despite her injuries from a jeep crash. Soldiers especially respected her for,

completely disregarding her own personal safety, voluntarily assisted [in an attack, under fire] by administering blood plasma to the many wounded...The Regimental Combat Team considers Miss Higgins' actions on that day as heroic, but even more important is the gratitude felt by members of the command towards the selfless devotion of Miss Higgins in saving the lives of many grievously wounded men.

Life proclaimed that Higgins had proved "that women are just as brave and sometimes braver than men. She has underlined recent scientific findings that women frequently have more stamina than their male opposites. She has won the universal affection of the troops..."22

Two years later Margaret Bourke-White, traveled to Korea as the first female Life reporter to "risk her life...stray[ing] far from the current battle lines to cover the guerrilla war, overcoming objections of many officials who thought it was no place for a lady." Her photographs brought the horror and pains of war including the capture and punishment of female guerrillas into American living rooms. The public saw the danger she risked in order to get the news.23

While these civilian press women impressed the public, the military and government restricted military line women from "combat" areas. Since most male soldiers respected women who endured the hardships they did, American military women could never win favor or prove they were as tough as these civilians or nurses or foreign fighting women. Despite volunteering for military and/or war-zone service and being in danger or even injured, line women were not perceived as taking equal responsibility for the war or national defense and were, again, criticized or ignored.
Besides participation in war and militarization, issues for women in the 1950s included the ERA, careers, education, civil defense, political roles, and proper social spheres. All bore on the public view of military women.

Discussions of the ERA were especially relevant. Tennessee Democrat Estes Kefauver worried that the ERA would affect the draft, equal rights would "cause such confusion I don't see how we could have any armed services...there would be no way of establishing which parent would stay at home and take care of the children if war came." Others from both parties supported the ERA. Margaret Chase Smith averred that the ERA was, "designed to give full measure and expression to the American way of life" with all citizens shouldering responsibility and none asking special treatment. "Women are as subject as men to the old saying, 'You can't have your cake and eat it too'," she said. "There is no priority of either women or men. It is time to quit thinking of women as second-class citizens."

The press continually highlighted tension around gendered social roles, education and careers. Winthrop Sargeant in "Fifty Years of American Women" wrote that "womanhood was on the decline." Ignoring riveting "Rosies" and military women completely, he theorized that only in wartime do the sexes today achieve a normal relationship to each other. The male assumes his dominant heroic role and the female, playing up to the big strong male, assumes her proper and normal function of being feminine, glamorous and inspiring. With the arrival of peace a decline sets in. The male becomes primarily a meal ticket, and the female becomes a sexless frump, transferring her interest from the male to various unproductive intellectual pursuits or to neurotic preoccupations such as bridge or politics.

Former World War II WAVES Director and president of Wellesley College, Mildred (McAfee) Horton, and Vassar President Sarah Blanding agreed that mixing career with family was not without "pitfalls." Horton told women that they would have to sacrifice social privileges for equal rights and set an example in the work place to pave the way for others. Prefiguring
Betty Friedan, Dorothy Barclay wrote that the "modern women's dilemma" was that the world was changing rapidly and women's roles were not well defined.25

The discussion of images and social realities continued and are important to compare to the media treatment of military women. Margaret Mead added to the discussion stating that there was a contradiction between the domestic ideal's power to dictate social behavior and roles, and economic realities. Dr. K. Frances Scott recognized that after World War II women's wholesale entry into industrial work, any sexual division of labor was a "farce". "In our type of civilization ...the job belongs to the person best fitted to do it...Our thinking has not kept pace with reality." President Kenneth Sills of Bowden College, worried that as "young men increasingly had their college years occupied by military service...." American culture was in "Danger of Feminization."26

The most famous civilian woman mobilized was Anna Rosenberg. Her appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense made the front page of the Times in November 1950. The editors enthusiastically endorsed her appointment and speculated whether Rosenberg's appointment meant that the administration was considering drafting women. Truman's staff denied that a female draft was under consideration saying Rosenberg was an "expert" rather than just an "expert on women."27

The start of the decade was also significant for the nation and the military other than on the Korean peninsula. Treaties had finally officially ended World War II but hot and cold conflicts arose around the world with the Soviet Union trying to counter U.S. influence, Mao consolidating power in China, Ho Chi Minh struggling against the French in Indochina, and the establishment of a number of mutual defense pacts. Meanwhile, the American search for internal enemies continued with

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discussions of media censorship and disloyalty, as well as Congressional Un-American Activities Committee accusations against non-conformists including members of the NAACP and other civil rights organizations.

The NAACP had much to argue about as the military continued to drag its feet on integration, practicing the doctrine of "separate but equal" despite Truman's 1948 order to end discrimination. Although the Army announced in January, 1950, that it would drop racial quotas (ceilings), integrate non-combat units as vacancies occurred, and start housing and messing races together, some resistant Army leaders warned, "fighting efficiency might be impaired by breaking down the barriers that have kept Negro and white troops segregated." By 1951, however, the Army needed soldiers in Korea. To break the resistance, and admitting that despite the executive order "field commanders generally had persisted in limiting Negroes" to "house-keeping" jobs, the Army announced it would assign blacks to white combat units.28

Manpower shortages became more severe with increasing involvement in Korea further continuing the UMT and draft discussions. Although the administration continued to press for both programs, even proposing that those physically incapable (men) of military service could be drafted for some kind of national service, Congress was slow to act. Lyndon Johnson pushed for establishing draft priorities; first taking reclaimed 4-Fs and married men (non-fathers).

The fairness and viability of selective service was already in question. Many professional athletes were given 4-F status (or obtained "safe" National Guard or Reserve slots), and Southerners failed mental examinations at a rate of almost thirty-nine percent. The military wanted the athletes and intentional "flunkers". Those men who could not meet
standards were to be given remedial help or be conscripted for non-combat jobs. Authorities emphasized that only a small fraction of men in uniform ever saw combat and anticipated lowering physical standards further. Women were not mentioned in these discussions either in relation to non-combat drafts or changing the two-percent limit, which might have prevented the further lowering of male standards.

Civilian women were split on the UMT and draft issues, generally ignoring the issues of military women, but discussing support or non-support for military mobilization more generally. The GFWC wrangled over UMT but generally supported the administration's desires. Leslie Wright, legislative division head, told members that they should support the military because Congress had blamed women for the hasty demobilization after the World War II, and if it had not been for "certain left organizations and some emotional mothers ...[we would have had UMT a long time ago and] we wouldn't have sent untrained boys into Korea." This constituted yet another way to blame women for military ineffectiveness and another 'stabbed in the back' by the homefront myth, and thus ignored 1946 reports of GI protests and policy-makers' insistence on rapid demobilization for fiscal, political, and social reasons. The club did endorse male UMT.29

Into this second year of the war, the military continued to ask women to volunteer, but again, policy makers did not consider counterproductive limitations. Recruiting and enlistment articles increased in urgency throughout 1951, and as before, efforts emphasized that women would replace men for combat and that women could do some jobs better than men. A study to determine which jobs women could fill, which was to have been done earlier, was finally slated for early 1951. Experts anticipated that women could fill one out of ten jobs. And, enlistment
standards for military women, although altered slightly in 1950, remained higher than men's. While Congressmen vowed to study how to make military careers more appealing, they did not discuss repealing the numbers ceiling, equalizing men's and women's standards, allowing qualified women to be promoted beyond colonel, or allowing women to marry/have children. Instead they again considered drafting women.

In trying to attract more women, recruiters emphasized training and experience that would help women get jobs when they left the service, which assumed they would continue wage work despite the domestic ideal. The WAC and commanders in the field wanted twenty thousand volunteers. The WAVES planned to triple their numbers and the USAF advertised that women were no longer confined to clerical jobs.

Armistice Day 1951 saw an extensive effort by women's clubs and others to assist in recruiting. New York City decreed "Women in the Armed Services Week" and Governor Dewey proclaimed

"the threat of world-wide Communist aggression" is a compelling reason for increasing the size of the armed forces..."I sincerely trust that the young women of our state will patriotically respond to this urgent call of duty to our country."

The Times' editors added their plea. While acknowledging that the services did not have a proven track record of equal rights, the paper appealed to the ethic of womanly sacrifice.

Opportunity for a career in the services is being offered young women, an indication of new thinking among our military men. Whether a woman can have a career in this field equal to that of a man remains to be demonstrated. But more important than opportunity for personal advancement is opportunity of service to one's country.

President Truman used the occasion to add that defending against aggression was,

...a woman's job too. There is great work to be done by the women of this country in every part of our national effort.
Take our military forces, for example...Our armed forces need these women. They need them badly. They need them to undertake every type of work except duty in actual combat formations. Women are now serving in every branch of the armed forces...They have won for themselves a full place as regular members of our armed forces. This is a tribute to the young women of our country. But it is more than a tribute—it is a great opportunity, too. For the armed services have much to offer the young women who join our active forces. These women have an opportunity to make a vital contribution to our national security. They have an opportunity to learn new skills that will help them advance in their chosen fields of work...[women] can help secure the peace and safeguard freedom in the world.

Women had not yet won a "full place" in the armed forces, but unfortunately, although the public and the press recognized the limitations on women's military careers and they had pushed for removing barriers to opportunity in regards to race, in recruiting women they relied more on military need as enticement rather than redressing gender inequities. And, even in times of great need and recruiting commotion, traditional concerns persisted. Rosenberg assured the mothers of prospective recruits that "their girls [would] be safe and welcome in the armed services." She said that women were not making a great sacrifice in enlisting but that it was a privilege for them "to join men and women who have put duty before personal privilege and personal advantage."

In addition, even the women's service directors started to highlight a mythic equality of opportunity, along with traditional recruiting concerns. Emphasizing the constantly recurring themes of femininity and morality, Capt. Hancock assured the public that the Navy did "not attempt to 'defeminize' its women...and cited also the character-guidance program for the development of moral-standards." USMC Col. Towle added that "military service is one occupational field where, by law, women are assured equal pay for equal performance of duty." All the directors advertised "careers", but none mentioned the restrictions on women.
In addition to these other "career" efforts, recruiting was spurred when Truman and Marshall, deciding to make women's military issues a top priority, commissioned the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) in August 1951. Forty-nine women would advise the Department of Defense on policies concerning servicewomen, including recruiting and the proper employment of women relative to job opportunities and career possibilities. Rosenberg and the rest of the initial cadre of college presidents and deans, some of the former women's corps directors, actors Helen Hayes and Elizabeth Taylor, the wives of industrial magnates, and several political and media women were to serve one year terms.31

DACOWITS was not a feminist group. The committee was charged to operate in the military's interest and initially failed to publicly address those issues of concern to military women themselves--gender segregation, unfriendly work climates, and restrictions on numbers, marriage, and motherhood. Unfortunately, no one was willing to apply or adapt the lessons of racial integration to gender issues. Instead, the recruiting focus continued to be on adventure, on opportunities for education, and on convincing the public and parents that the military would take good care of their daughters. DACOWITS' and military personnel specialists' primary concerns were trying to enroll eighty thousand women, and whether to keep the women in traditional fields or to expand opportunities in non-traditional areas (as in World War II)--"glamour versus grease."

At the first DACOWITS meeting, members were introduced to the new SECDEF Robert Lovett, the DoD, and the specific issues of recruiting, housing, training, education, and recreation. The service chiefs told the committee of their plans for women. The Army had little to talk about
except overseas housing for service wives, but the Air Force, according to Chief of Staff Vandenberg, wanted "45,000 bright young women right now to make the Air Force their life careers. Of course, he promised that they would have equal chance for promotion with men." He could not keep this promise given legal restrictions and that women were barred from high profile command and combat jobs that gave extra consideration for promotion.

And, if recruiting was not successful enough, a draft loomed ahead. Service leaders pointed out that since voluntary enlistment was only partially successful in World War II, conscription might be necessary. They ignored the fact that recruiting had always been hampered by cultural ideology and slander against military women, and that women's enlistment standards were higher than men's. In any case, by the end of September recruiting goals were raised from 80,000 to almost 113,000. Despite DACOWITS' recruiting plans and the military's need for women, Congress denied all funds for advertising, insisting glossy posters were unnecessary with a draft in effect. When the Committee pointed out that women were not drafted, Congress agreed to reconsider.

At the end of the year President Truman met with the Committee and urged them on with stories of his Grandmother who "routed Indians" with a "rifle and skillet." Preaching to the choir, but informing the public as well, he recounted tales of petticoated pioneers who fought redskins, cold, hunger and other perils in frontier cabins. Fighting Indians was a man's job, but there were times when it had to be a woman's task, too. Americana is rich in stories of courageous women who doubled in handling long rifles and keeping the hearthfires burning...During Indian attacks on wilderness forts the women not only made bullets but took their stations on the firing platform with the men. Often woman's wit and good sense saved the day.
He continued with stories of Jemima Johnson and other women who broke the siege of Bryant's Station, Hannah Dustin who killed the ten sleeping captors who had killed her infant, and "Bonny Kate" Sherrill who outran a dozen braves and vaulted the palisade of Ft. Patrick Henry. The President reminded everyone, "The list of these heroines is long. Of all that has been said in tribute to the women of America no one has ever expressed it better than did Lord Cornwallis. Said he: 'We may destroy all the men in America, but we shall have all we can do to defeat the women'."  

As we have seen, the women's draft issue, like recruiting, resurfaced often during manpower crises. Draft discussions gained momentum again early in 1951, embroiling DACOWITS. In favor of a female draft, Mildred Horton strongly criticized the "folly of a national policy of discussing manpower in a national emergency as though it were only male-power...such an attitude put women in the category of a national luxury instead of an available asset..." She added, however, that women should be limited to non-combat service because, "the heavy industry of combat ought to be assigned to the physically strong and it seems to me much more efficient to deal with one sex rather than two under combat conditions." She was right by contemporary social mores, just as the services were when they argued that it was easier to deal with one race in combat rather than two. In neither case, however, did anyone mention that service policies of segregation interfered with efficiency rather than skin color or genitalia. In any case, Horton's argued that,  

the skills needed behind the lines of all the armed services are not distributed on sex lines. They are shared by men and women...It seems to me only sensible to register the youth of our land (male and female) to discover the skills, resources, aptitudes and interests of the total age group and select the people who can do the work which needs to be done with the least disruption of our economy.
Horton also cited national economic and industrial interests as factors, "Why should an able-bodied boy of 18, highly useful in agriculture or some other necessary occupation, be drafted as a stenographer in uniform while his sister, already trained as a stenographer, is left as a civilian?" She recognized that "If as a people we go to war...we go together--men, women, little children. Total war makes it hard to draw the line of demarcation between military and civilian participation." She asked why Congress limited the number of women in the services rather than having their number determined by the available personnel and the job to be done. Horton believed that women obtain "not only the rights but the obligations of citizenship."

Others like Wilbur Jordan, President of Radcliffe, opposed a women's draft, arguing that women were already making their maximum possible contribution to the economy and to 'Republican Motherhood.' He declared that women's ultimate task was "the conservation of values of a free society." While Horton emphasized military efficiency and obligations of citizenship, Jordan called for traditional gender divisions of labor and argued for women's moral superiority. Neither pursued the discussion of draft vulnerability vis-a-vis concepts of citizenship. Lyndon Johnson settled the issue for the time, saying that Congress had "no thought of drafting women for the armed services" but instead would consider repealing the two-percent limit on women's force strength and make service careers for women more appealing. Johnson and the President favored drafting eighteen-year-old men, reclaiming 4-Fs, and instituting male UMT before drafting women.

In the midst of the draft debate, Director of Women's Programs for the DoD and Personnel Policy Board member, Dr. Esther Strong was concerned with femininity, highlighted the malleability of gender ideology. She
called for the utilization of women for national defense in both military and civilian service but agreed with Johnson that women should not be drafted. "They will be recruited on a voluntary basis and will serve in jobs where they can render most effective service--nursing, in communications and other necessary duties...While doing this they will serve as partners with men in the fight for democracy without losing their identity as women." She reassured the public that military experience was not masculinizing, and called on women to "be prepared to carry their share of initiative and responsibility." While women's biology might not maintain a woman's identity, restriction to sex-typed jobs apparently could. But, job sex-typing was not critically examined. Of course, all official military jobs had originally been "male". Later, all except clerical and medical jobs were. Still later, only "combat" was restricted. So, in fact, the services constantly reformulated which jobs were "feminine" (or reassured the public that women who temporarily did non-traditional work retained their femininity).

Other women also took up the draft debate in public. Former SPAR director Dorothy Stratton, urged women's registration to ascertain aptitudes, skills, and experience. "Our potential enemies do not make the mistake of neglecting women as a war-time force and their manpower sources are much greater than ours." She also advocated raising the two-percent statutory limit to ten-percent, but no one asked why a limit was necessary at all. In any case, Stratton recognized that to get ten percent "would require public support and approval to a degree not attained during World War II." Sarah Hughes urged that "women be drafted to meet the immediate need of our country in building a strong defense...Men are being drafted so, too, should women. As citizens they should share with men the responsibility of defending the country." Again, the discussion of the
responsibilities of citizenship was not pursued further. Hughes' NFBPW unanimously supported women's registration and conscription "when it may be advisable in the interests of humanity." But, at the same time, they urged that "any women's draft legislation provide against the disruption of homes and families when the welfare and security of children may be jeopardized by such a draft." This seemed a moot point since married men had been deferred, fathers were almost always exempted, and women with children were not even allowed to serve.

As the draft and two-percent ceiling discussions continued, Lewis Hershey said the government might have to draft women and women should be prepared. However, Anna Rosenberg did not expect women to be drafted, "But when men are being drafted and women are not...women should insist upon and assume some equality of sacrifice." She also insisted that the government should lift the two-percent limit. Sarah Blanding responded to problems with recruiting by supporting women's draft registration saying that the problem was that women were reacting as they had in the last war, "If our country needs us, why do they not draft us?"

In early 1951, the administration announced it would not ask for a women's draft or UMT but would support lifting the two-percent limit. Congress finally agreed to do so temporarily. The services asked for increases as follows: Army four percent, Air Force ten percent, and the Navy and Marine Corps seven percent. Some did not think it would stop there. In early 1952 the National Committee Against Conscription warned, despite government disavowals, that the Army would eventually insist on a female draft, "A law drafting women has been an Army ambition ever since the wartime use of Wacs, Waves and other women's units."33

Women appeared more vulnerable to a draft as personnel shortages became even more critical and the services took more drastic steps to get
men. Childless husbands were to be called and 150,000 4-Fs were to be upgraded. Male mental and physical standards were lowered again for those who could do useful non-combat service. Again, in this article, suggested that higher quality women could be used for non-combat jobs. And in yet another move to get more men, the services disallowed deferment for unborn children (previously counted from conception). The military required a doctor's certificate that conception occurred before a man was called for service. Apparently, a not insignificant number of men had gotten women pregnant to avoid the draft.34

For all the dire need for personnel and news about conscription debates and recruiting efforts, press reports on active duty women continued to concentrate on trivial matters and "quality"; it was obvious that many had already forgotten lessons from previous wars. When eight WAVES clerks were allowed to visit their unit's submarine, old problems surfaced. The female "submariners" discovered "neat, high-heeled black pumps were not designed for sea-going duty." World War II women had learned to wear pants and oxfords if they had to climb ladders—the WAVES learned again.35

The Air Force and Army were constantly concerned with "quality", sometimes to the exclusion of practicality. In 1950, the Air Force had formed a consultant's board on the use of women. The group, including Barnard Dean Millicent McIntosh and editor in chief of Flair magazine and associate editor of Look and Quick, Mrs. Gardner (Fleur) Cowles, was to survey USAF programs involving line women, nurses, and medical specialists. Three other civilian women served on the board and Jackie Cochran was appointed as chairwoman.
While the press portrayed the U.S.'s premiere airwoman as glamorous and feminine the Air Force's male leadership worried about its women. When the all-male Wings Club honored wartime women pilots, Cochran reminded the press and public that a thousand women flew all types of military planes. However, instead of emphasizing flying ability or other skills, the Air Force decided to focus on "glamour" in their never ending quest for "quality". When the service hired two WAFs specifically "to give glamour to its recruiting," the Times realized that the "two striking examples of its glamour...seemed more likely to attract young men than Wafs." They could not aspire to much, "I was always making and flying model planes as a kid with my brother," although Pvt. Hylton said she knew she could not be a military pilot like her brother. Interest in aviation could only lead to flight attendant duty, which was not highly valued. The "vividly blonde and blue-eyed," Cpl. Troy told of her most harrowing experiences: bringing back amputees from Korea and "playing nursemaid" to more than twenty babies enroute to their soldier-fathers in Germany. Non-models considering enlistment could breath a sigh of relief to learn that "It is not strictly necessary that all recruits be as beautiful as the specimens now on display in New York."

Cochran and glamour/femininity as "quality" were also the breaking points between Gerry May and the Air Force. One reason for her "resignation" was the naming of Cochran as special adviser to the Chief of Staff and her subsequent unsubstantiated, anecdotal report claiming that WAFs did not meet "quality" appearance standards. Mentioning "hormonal imbalances" (lesbianism), Cochran pushed the services' femininity-morality-heterosexuality buttons.

Cochran's 1951 report was guaranteed to attract high level and media attention. The Times simply reported Cochran's "study" on expanding the
WAF from a peacetime to a mobilization basis but other newspapers gave the gory details. Vandenberg, who had wanted Cochran to be the first director and who already thought USAF women came up short compared to the WAVES, appointed ex-WAVE Mary Jo Shelley as the next WAF director. The Times then reported that the WAF were "embittered" over May's "firing" and the appointment of an "outsider". Other papers reported, that while May had resigned for "personal reasons," Vandenberg had limited her choices. Since the services were limited to one female colonel, if May lost the directorship she would be demoted.36

The press finally reported that the uproar was the result of a difference of opinion between May and Cochran over the role of Air Force women. May believed that "since women have the same privileges, benefits and pay as the airmen, they should accept the same annoyances and inconveniences of military life. Furthermore, in all jobs open to women--almost all but flying and combat--ability should be the criterion." Cochran played to Vandenberg's dislike of women in non-traditional fields by arguing for special jobs and conditions for women. She also fed the chief's inferiority complex over how beautiful "his women" were by arguing for stiffer physical standards to insure femininity. Drew Pearson reported that "Gen. Vandenberg Want[ed] More Glamorous Women in the U.S. Air Force" and the "WAF'S Ire Mount[ed] at Jacqueline Cochran Who Call[ed] Them 'Tattered' and 'Bedraggled'." Cochran's "confidential report" stated that the WAFS were too short, too fat and too unattractive. The air force, she said, should pay more attention to shapely figures in recruiting women. Vandenberg agreed that the navy seemed to be getting better looking females into the Waves and that the WAFS could go in for taller women. The chief of the air force also suggested that the WAFS ought to be more feminine and stick to secretarial work instead of trying to be mechanics, truck drivers and grease monkeys...To say that this
has the ladies of the air force in a hair pulling mood is putting it mildly.

Even though she was only a "special consultant," on one trip to Lackland AFB, Cochran supposedly instituted a four week grooming course for basic training. Without documentation, Cochran complained that the WAF were not "ladylike", their uniforms were hideous, and that recruiters were enlisting "misfits". She proposed that "physical inspections" (for appearance) of all potential WAF be done at USAF headquarters; anyone not passing would get a free ticket home. Publicity around her report fed suspicions of servicewoman might be aberrant.37

Others were aware that women were needed for the war rather than fashion contests. In fact, women were tested for non-glamorous combat-zone jobs during the Southern Pine field exercise.

For the first time in any full scale field maneuver, forty-six Wafs...participated in the exercises as part of the Ninth Air Force. The women in uniform, mostly stenographers, typists and secretaries, have been part of the team at Ninth Air Force Headquarters in an attempt to help the Air Force determine the feasibility of utilizing Wafs as part of a tactical air force in a combat zone in time of war.

Apparently World War II Air-WAC experience was irrelevant, but at least the 1948 promise to experiment with women in non-traditional jobs was revived. And as the need for women grew more critical, the Air Force agreed to accept all qualified women dropping all quotas (ceilings). However, officer candidates still had to meet stiffer requirements than men—a bachelor's degree and three years of supervisory or management experience. In addition, while women were finally allowed to be married, they could not have children.38

The military also started to ask line women to share the burden of serving overseas and in Korea, but getting them there was also debated because of the ban against them serving in combat zones. Some, like Gen.
Ridgeway, did not seem to have a problem (or know the rules). He told the
Tokyo WACs

When your corps was organized not so very long ago it was
often said that you would release soldiers for active duty.
Those words were poorly chosen to express what was really
intended. For you are soldiers, performing soldiers' duties,
subject to soldiers' discipline and proudly ready, as I know
you are, to share whatever the country's service may demand.

Others agreed. Anna Rosenberg reported to DACOWITS in November 1951 that
Gen. VanFleet had requested an additional six hundred women to allow
assignment rotations for male soldiers from Korea. Ridgeway reportedly
asked Rosenberg, "When are your girl's coming? We need them very much."
She assured commanders that women would be sent and told DACOWITS, "[The
forces in Korea] need women desperately to do work, to share jobs, to let
men get home...There is a limit to human endurance. If this country is
going to have the proper respect for its women, the women have to take a
share of the responsibility."

The plea for respect for women was a new component in the debate,
but exclusion was military policy and the relationship of women to the
military was still ambivalent. One day after Rosenberg's statement, the
Army staff released a comment that only Gen. Ridgeway would decide when
and how women would be assigned to Korea. Rosenberg told a subsequent
news conference that the services first had to recruit more women and work
out administrative details like housing--obviously a smoke-screen since
nurses had been serving in the war-zone in small groups since four days
after the invasion. Then the Army announced that Pusan was considered a
"combat zone" and therefore WACS were banned by law. No one publicly
questioned the inconsistency of allowing nurses to be there nor how the
legal problem would be resolved if Ridgeway decided he wanted WACS.39
Some members of the government, the services, and the press continued to try to change public and GI attitudes toward military women. The Postmaster issued a three cent stamp in 1952 to honor the forty-thousand women in the Armed Forces. And DACOWITS recommended that servicemen receive an orientation course "on how to get along with women in the military." After inspections of several bases, even though Chaplains already conducted compulsory character guidance lectures for both men and women, the committee felt men should "be taught that women in uniform are going to be working with them and merit their respect and courtesy as full-fledged members of the defense team." The group also recommended: (1) that communities near bases, many not knowing women were part of the regular forces, provide recreational and social outlets for women who "are making as much of a contribution as men;" (2) that civilian groups help recruit nurses and medical specialists; (3) that the services provide more character guidance materials for the "younger girls" (18-20); and (4) that the services provide housing with more privacy allowing for "the feminine touch."40

Although recruiting still lagged, the committee agreed that the services should emphasize "quality" rather than quantity and noted that new recruits were scoring very high on entrance tests. As usual, quality was the theme of the WAC's tenth anniversary celebration. The Times claimed that women were full partners in the Army, that they served around the world on an equal basis with men, and that their meritorious performance overcame awkwardness logistics and slander. A WAC's poem illustrated the struggle, "The soldiers didn't like us much,/The papers printed tales,/And even families worried/If they listened to the males." The story was repeated for any who may have forgotten: Starting as auxiliaries, contrary to the wishes of some members of Congress and the
military, the women took routine jobs to release men for combat; as needs expanded they entered new and non-traditional fields; despite their outstanding performance their numbers dwindled with demobilization without legislation to make the Corps permanent; and legislation had been passed for regular and permanent status "at the insistence of the Army itself."

Gertrude Samuels' report identified differences from the WWII years. Married or unmarried women without children between twenty and fifty enlisted for patriot reasons without thinking of a career. Just as for men, there was little incentive to stay in the service; most expected to return to civilian life, especially since, unlike the men, they had to face "scorn and cynical gossip." In 1952, requirements had changed; women had to be high school graduates, eighteen to thirty-five, of good character and unmarried. And, while women still released men for combat and heavier field work, they enjoyed "equal pay, privileges, security, and retirement benefits, rank for rank."

Today the Army is frankly "a field of employment" for women. It offers careers, in open competition with the civilian world for skills and talents. It philosophizes that if the military wants capable, enthusiastic and ambitious young women as well as young men in the service, it must give them opportunities for progress in a particular career field of work...Today, because of the number of women who have already served with the WAC and gone back into civilian life, and because of the thousands of young women serving now, the public is far better informed as to what women do in the Army--what facilities there are for their supervision, for housing, and for training.

Samuels failed to mention limitations on women's careers. She contradicted herself, but endorsed DACOWITS' concern for lack of public awareness, "There has not been enough public awareness of career opportunities offered to women: the 'unknown,' to some extents, is still troubling some mothers and fathers, who, as a result, have not been encouraging their daughters to come into the service."
In any case, Samuels described basic (poise, self-assurance, service pride, tent pitching, saluting, marching, leadership) and technical training and how the women ("girls really") were adjusting to the military (early reveille and weekly inspections and parades) and adjusting the military to women (bringing dolls and teddy bears). She said the women were patriotic and idealistic and often more dependable and meticulous in jobs requiring patience and concentration. Again, contrary to the DACOWITS findings, Samuels averred that the military men she met accepted and respected the women, but added "The need for these young women now--and for wider public understanding of the immense contribution that WACs are making for defense--are perhaps the military's biggest headaches."\(^{41}\)

The WACs also experienced problems when the femininity-morality-heterosexuality issue surfaced again. They received bad press when the wire services publicized the court martial of several female soldiers in 1951/1952. Six had beaten a private so severely that she spent twenty-five days in the hospital. The victim alleged it was retaliation for her testimony against their friend in an earlier court-martial. The press reported that the private "had witnessed an affair" involving the court-martialed NCO and another woman. One could jump to the conclusion that this entailed sexual involvement, but it could have been simply a violation of training standards or some other problem. An explicit discussion of homosexuality would have fed already prevalent stereotypes but the media refrained from going into detail or speculation. On the other hand, if it was not a sexual affair, the ambiguous wording was calculated to titillate readers. The whole story was odd (or incomplete); the NCOs allegedly lured Carol Kierce to a remote area, beat and kicked her until she was unconscious, threatened to throw her in the river, waited until she regained consciousness, and then were persuaded to take
her back to the camp where she was taken to the hospital. Showing that
despite repeated slander campaigns women did not usually pose disciplinary
problems, the Army had difficulty finding a prison for the six as no
military woman had ever received a prison sentence. A final report left
more questions. Kierce had testified against an NCO who had allegedly
struck her (not the one she witnessed in an "affair"). The defense
attorney contended that the subsequent "fracas" took place after a beer
drinking spree and amounted to "just a brawl among young women unused to
drinking." The incident did not improve negative stereotypes by any
means. Similar cases of fighting among male soldiers would have been
considered routine, hardly newsworthy.

There was other, more flattering, if still problematic, publicity as
newspapers' and magazines' coverage of the directors of the women's corps
highlighted service limitations and the constant emphasis on femininity.
When Irene Galloway replaced Mary Hallaren as WAC director, the latter had
either to resign or to accept demotion. Ruby Herman had been scheduled to
become director but had opted to become a housewife instead. Time gave
the Army credit for avoiding "feminine gushiness" in its announcement of
the new director as "wholesome, energetic, efficient" meaning "feminine,
moral, and skilled." Reporters did note that male generals were usually
referred to as "fearless, brilliant, and dynamic." They did not state
explicitly that using the same terms for women would have meant "reckless,
overly aggressive, too competitive;" in short, the worst connotation of
'masculine' or lesbian. Not 'masculine' at all, Marine Julia Hamblet
became the youngest woman director to date. Since she could only serve in
the position for four years, she would also eventually be demoted, or
faced with a much earlier retirement (and lower retirement pay) than male
counterparts. Reporters pondered,
When the Marine Corps began recruiting women back in 1943 there was doubt in a great many minds as to just how the ideal young lady leathernook ought to look and act. But hundreds of officers and men, as well as hundreds of admiring sister marines, gave no more thought to the problem after one look at a tall (5 ft. 10 in.), attractive brunette lady lieutenant named Julia E. Hamblett. "Judy" a Vassar graduate (economics and field hockey) from Winchester, Mass., looked like a girl who was born to pose for a recruiting poster.

*Time*, while noting that Hamblet was intelligent and "had a flair for leadership," thought, more importantly, that she was the "Youngest and Prettiest...woman ever to command the female branch of any U.S. military service."

While limits on women's rank and the focus on femininity continued, because the services needed more women for Korean service, some restrictions were dropped and a few differences between male and female service were narrowed. The services decided to accept women with GEDs and to recruit women of color more seriously; pictures of non-white recruits began to appear more frequently. The first two WACs finally reported to the combat zone in December 1952, and in 1953 the Navy sent enlisted women to sea. The latter were hospital corpswomen of the Military Sea Transportation Service sent to relieve nurses. The Navy assigned a minimum of two women to each ship with female billets and assured the public they would be supervised by male officers.

Easing restrictions was never completely smooth, however. The *Times* reported that when the first four enlisted women arrived on their ship they were welcomed with sandwiches and ice cream by the admiral, captain, and other high ranking officers. The Navy went all out for the "sea-duty debut of the comeliest sailors, the WAVES, who have been sailors in name only since the origin of the WAVES eleven years ago." These four, accorded all the 'courtesies any admiral's lady could hope for,' were the first officially assigned to sea duty. Despite the special treatment, the
admiral insisted the Navy would not "babysit" the women. He added that there was a certain amount of anxiety on both sides (male and female), despite the fact that nurses and female officers had served on ships and that transport vessels routinely carried servicemen's wives. The media attention, deferential treatment, and somewhat trivial jobs were bound to cause male resentment and speculation that the women's presence would disrupt operations. The Navy reassured the public that the women would serve in traditional jobs caring for civilian dependents of servicemen traveling to overseas posts. Under the watchful eye of the male brass, the WAVES "deftly turned aside [press] questions to encourage them to say they looked forward to dating shipboard personnel." The tension between wanting to appear normal, feminine, and heterosexual once again conflicted with the need to reassure the public of the women's high moral standards. As well, career aspirations conflicted with engagements. Interestingly, the article questioned whether anyone in the Navy who did not serve at sea (i.e. women as a class), could be "real sailors." In fact, their jobs could be seen as the equivalent of wives, dependents, or servants. The women were also assumed to be available dates or the "admiral's lady".44

Women contested another area of limitation--motherhood--unsuccessfully. In January, 1952, reservist Loren Thompson challenged Congress and the DoD to countermand Army rules believing that "a woman can serve her country and raise a family at the same time without loss to either." The thirty-three year old major and her reserve colonel husband had had a son, but since the Army had just spent $10,000 educating her about Asia during her ten years of active (1942-1948) and reserve service, she argued that it was wasteful not to utilize her training and experience. Her career had included a tour in 1948 as assistant to the chief adviser to the Korean Government. She spoke French, Japanese,
Korean, Italian, Chinese, and Tibetan and clearly would have been a wartime asset. She asked the SASC and Anna Rosenberg to amend reserve laws to allow mothers to serve. While Rosenberg thought a woman could serve in the reserves without "harm to her relationship with her children," if a mother was called to active duty, it would jeopardize the child's welfare. She replied "The duties of a military officer require complete and full-time devotion and certainly this is no less true of motherhood." This was not true for fathers and DoD senior officials; Rosenberg was also a mother. Though the three services were in complete agreement on the policy, the fight was not over. In May, Thompson asked the Senate "If business, labor and government cannot afford to lose their married women, how can the armed forces afford to be so profligate?" No one called attention to the conflation of marriage and having children. Louisiana Democrat Russell Long supported the major, asserting that mothers should be able to leave the service voluntarily but not be forced out--it was wasteful. *Time* joked it would be easier to integrate baby carriages than face "assaults from lady veterans as well trained as Mrs. Thompson." In a surprise move the NFBPW staunchly opposed the change and rejected a female draft or registration. Judge Libby Sachar had argued in favor, saying that it was "imperative that we eliminate every discrimination against women on the books...[the U.S. must] keep a stockpile of trained women on hand for emergencies just as men with children were kept on reserve status." Opponents charged that women "wished reserve status simply for the benefits without any intention of going back into the service; women with minor children should remain in the home." In June the Senate voted to allow reservists to have children even though they might be called to active duty. But the regular forces would not be able to stand this inconsistency.  

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Although the Regular forces did not immediately accept mothers, women were making headway in non-traditional areas. The Navy commissioned its first female engineer and an Air Force NCO took charge of a 450 person co-ed unit. The latter, a "red-haired twenty-two year old," had previously lead a WAF squadron and had assisted a male first sergeant with a mixed unit. The Air Force was in the process of integration, which would eventually put more women in charge of men. It did not seem that this would be a problem despite earlier worries. "Sergeant Kealy was described as 'well liked, personable' and quite a change from the traditional first sergeant." But the article's title implied that the soldiers would call the first sergeant "darling"--clearly insubordinate and disrespectful. The Times editors surmised that men who had "survived previous wars" had to be "shaking their heads" at the thought of a female first sergeant. But there were no affirmative action allusions here.

More power to her! Obviously she wouldn't be in that job if she couldn't handle it. She must be a good soldier and the men who serve respect a good soldier. There may be some arched eyebrows and even an occasional whistle, but we doubt that the morale or the competence of the service will have declined. The times have changed. If a lady can be a top-kick, we'll go along with her. She has our prayers, and we hope she doesn't need them.46

Although dismissing wolf-whistles in the work place is offensive, the piece reassured readers that morale and unit effectiveness would not be harmed because the woman was qualified for the job.

Other servicewomen impressed the media while the public learned yet again that some women could perform well in situations requiring strength and bravery and as ungendered role models. SSgt. Barbara Barnwell was the first woman to earn the Navy-Marine Corps Medal for heroism for saving a Marine from drowning. And, USMC Pvt. Antoinette de Viser was given the American Spirit Honor Medal for "outstanding qualities of leadership best
expressing the American spirit—honor, initiative, loyalty and higher example to comrades in arms."\textsuperscript{47}

Still, despite stories of firsts and heroism, servicewomen's appearance and trivialities related to feminine ideals continued to capture press attention. SECDEF Charles Wilson took time from countless weighty responsibilities to approve a program to teach women "how to put on lipstick, fix their hair and dress better." Teaming with the Toilet Goods Association, the DoD started a "good grooming" drive targeted only at women. "A manual will be published and motion pictures will be made to help the women spruce up." There had been no complaints about women, except from Jackie Cochran, while there had been numerous complaints about the shabby appearance of servicemen. In contrast, the services had only recently given up trying to make women wear khaki underwear and had switched from cotton to nylon stockings only in late 1953. It is surprising that either case was of interest to the press or public.

Make-up and clothing were not the only issues; femininity was questioned in motivation for joining the military as well. As before, some had asserted that "feminine" women would not want to enlist and the armed forces did not want unfeminine women. When the Army studied the reasons given by women for enlisting, it found contradictions—"masculine identification" and "a desire to express femininity." To help recruiters guard against lesbians and 'whores', "A new regulation advises psychiatric officers examining female volunteers that 'particular attention must be given to the nature and quality of motivation for service'." Motivations included, "patriotism, financial and personal security, masculine identification, refusal to accept female role, escape from environmental or situational conflicts, occupational change, glamour and excitement, opportunity to express femininity, etc." These were not by themselves
considered acceptable or not, but were to be considered in the context of "stimulating ill-considered action." Obviously, in this construct femininity related to sex and culture rather than biology; feminine women were sexually attracted to men and wanted to dress glamorously--"express their femininity." Refusing to accept their social role or having a "masculine identification" were problems which challenged the domestic ideal, male privilege and authority, gender ideology, and/or heterosexuality. This article did not mention that the services' own contradictory policies and society's conflicting ideologies might have created the disparity.

Moving from non-traditional and line areas back to the most traditional, no one questioned nurses' femininity and the military continued to experience critical shortages of them into 1951 and beyond. Press coverage constantly revealed the contradictions between images of nursing as a 'feminine' space and the realities of warfare, "'Savage' was the term applied yesterday to the enemy in Korea by a pretty, blonde captain in the Army Nurse Corps...." The public learned from Capt. Anne Steele, one of the first sent to the war-zone, not only that conditions were harsh but the nurses served bravely under fire. "During the battle for Taejon [Steele] led a rescue train on a thirty-six hour mission to evacuate more than 100 wounded soldiers from a clearing station in Kumchon. The city fell thirteen hours after she left it."

The only Army nurse who has been decorated in the Korean campaign said yesterday that mobile surgical units have moved medical care so close to the fighting that field hospitals are known now as "rear echelons"...Rarely was her unit out of the sound, sights and smells that go with combat; often it was no more than two miles from the unstable front.
The unstable front was the rationale used in the first year to keep line women out of Korea and later Vietnam--it did not hinder the military's use of nurses and civilian women in-country. Capt. Margaret Blake, who had earned a Bronze Star for service during World War II in North Africa and Europe, specifically asked for Korean duty, was severely burned on her face and hands at a mobile hospital. The Army assigned her to recruiting duty.

Anniversaries were always a good time to boost recruiting and herald contributions. On their fiftieth, the Army's chief nurse averred that women joined the military to help people and the nation. Other anniversary news focused on those celebrating it in Korea: nurses working their fifth consecutive twenty-hour day in their fifth month of duty (no R&R). "Observing these trim, efficient, skillful young women, most of whom appeared to be in their twenties, perform their duties, it was hard to believe that they possessed the physical stamina to endure such a pace." A Times editorial praised their valor, and did not shy from telling readers of the danger the women faced. "They have been steady under fire and even reckless in their disregard of personal danger. They have had their jobs to do and have done it under any required conditions, however perilous." Their work required the "tough capacity to endure. Even more than that, however, it demanded, always, the qualities of gaiety, lightness of heart, quick sympathy and deep humor...The Army nurse has done her grim job, times without number, with flashes of wit or understanding smiles. She has had to bind up wounds of the mind as well as the body, to hear the confessions of the living and transmit the messages of the dying." From Korea, Gertrude Samuels commented that the nurses expanded the definition of "womanly", if not "feminine",

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in their Army slacks and olive drab sweaters pulled over rough shirts, they don't even look like women, but like field soldiers. Yet they are women in the richest and most merciful sense--women who sometimes show stress at the demands on their skill, endurance and courage; who react with human, though controlled, emotions to terrible sights and conditions--but never quit.

They lived and worked under harsh conditions, in danger from enemy fire and epidemic disease, while working torturously long hours. The nurses had volunteered for these hardships, so few complained. Their sparse and communal quarters exploded myths that nurses had plush billets and that women required more privacy than men. Samuels's pieces were gripping and thoroughly complimentary, but still reflected the requirement for femininity--nurses became morale boosters by wearing make-up and getting permanents, thus supposedly alleviating soldiers' homesickness.

Things were not all rosy between the public and the nurses, however. They were also accused of immorality and held to a double-standard. Reminiscent of the 1943 WAC "Slander Campaign," in 1951 the American Nurses Association resolved to "take immediate appropriate steps to combat the idea that immorality among the members of the nursing services of the Army, Navy and Air Force is more prevalent than among comparable civilian groups." Military nurses were not more moral than civilian nurses, but apparently they were supposed to be more moral than other women and definitely better than men. Unbelievably, the myth of a totally feminized, sterile, white, non-dangerous space persisted in the face of news coverage of nurses in both World War II and Korea. Their job had been irredeemably feminized, which hampered the public's ability to remember their hardships and achievements. Debates on service women took place in the context of this amnesia. Contrary to popular memory the public did not see the nurses in white very often and knew they served at considerable risk.
Still, shortages were the primary concern. One means of solving the shortages involved an interesting inversion of gendered debates. The services did not accept male nurses. Intersections of competing ideologies are shown in relief here—a clash between feminized role and masculine location. A Times editorial charged reverse discrimination and insisted the armed forces give "men nurses the professional standing to which they are entitled in the armed services." Although the same argument could have been made for female doctors or pilots, the paper thought it more unfair that male nurses were drafted as infantry privates and women received commissions. It was only military policy that required separate facilities, because segregated units based on a gendered division of labor did not allow for exceptions and did not provide the same opportunities as the civilian world.

Dr. Howard Rush called attention to the fact that barring male nurses was akin to the military's policy of not allowing female doctors. By then the Army had three women doctors and the Navy twenty-one and the services should halt their "discrimination against men." Rush claimed the inequity stemmed solely from "tradition" and was unrealistic in times of extreme shortages. So, a space existed for an anti-tradition argument relative to gender and race, but the press did not make it for women.

Morris Wolf, an RN, wrote to the Times that barring male nurses was unjust and inefficient, especially since male nurses would presumably make better battlefield nurses with their greater strength and under cultural ideology that dictated combat as a male space. The DoD's and services' responses to Wolf identified three issues of contemporary gender ideology (which were usually used against women). Legislation did not exist to allow for men in the Nurse Corps; administrative problems of integrating men would be difficult to resolve; and it was not proper for a male
officer to perform nursing duties. This last excuse highlights the subservient, dirty-work orientation of feminized professions. Male and female officers could not have been equal in the eyes of military or the public. As to the first problem, Wolf pointed out that legislative and administrative difficulties had not hindered the government from utilizing female nurses in the last war and said "Nursing is supposed to be dedicated to the relief of suffering. Does the sex of the practitioner matter? Certainly, men nurses are more appropriate for an army--unless the fiction of the 'woman's touch' or the presence of 'mom' in times of trouble makes the attendance of a woman imperative." Wolf closed with "I hope that the nursing profession and an enlightened public opinion will continue to work for the rectification of this inequity."50

The integration of male nurses required critical thinking about a feminized profession in a masculine culture. No one suggested men entered nursing to get dates with women. How would these men be treated by other military men--like women in non-traditional areas. Would male nurses be labeled homosexual? Instead, once men entered the profession would pay and benefits increase or conditions improve, or would these men be treated like women? Would restrictions, like those on dependents' benefits and marriage/children, change for women or be imposed on non-traditional men? Would the male nurses follow the rules for Army men or Army nurses? The answers to these questions are beyond the purview of the present study but would make for interesting research.

Nurse shortages persisted into 1952 and the Times' cheerleading continued. An editorial celebrating the nurses' fifty-first anniversary again presented readers the danger and hardship historically ignored for nurses as in the following introduction to news of the birthday.
The Army Nurse Corps does some of the hardest and dirtiest work in the world. It doesn't often make headlines. There is little of the "glamour" or "romance" about its deadly serious day-to-day routine of jobs that require an infinity of patience, endurance and good temper...[The Army Nurse Corps] is known for its record of high courage, deep devotion and broad service... Members of the Corps are good, sound American women who know their job and do it.

Nurse procurement became a number one DoD priority, but policy was still a problem. Pregnancy was one cause of low retention. Instead of removing the restriction, the military blamed women for lack of commitment and increased recruiting to replace experienced nurses who may not have wanted to leave the service.

Recruiting efforts for this increasingly unpopular war went so poorly throughout 1952 and into 1953 that the forces considered several measures. WACs were trained as corpswomen and LPNs relieved RNs for more intense duty. Nurse reservists were involuntarily recalled and a draft was reexamined. While senior military women favored a draft, the ANA felt that nurses should be registered but only called for national emergencies. The Association also supported commissioning male nurses and the improvement of education, employment, and utilization of minority nurses.51

The public learned that some of the medical forces' training was quite rigorous, again exploding the myth that feminized professions were "easy" or did not involve strenuous work. At the same time reports reaffirmed nurses' femininity. On their fifty-second anniversary, nurses had (again) "won the respect and admiration of the men in Korea from all nations of the free world." The women lived and worked in tents near the front lines, but "they have found a way [despite army uniforms] to preserve the way of a woman with clothes...On cold winter nights the nurses make out [catalogue] order forms for sheer lingerie, dressing
gowns, mules and other accessories..." Another article focused on a GI who ran the beauty shop at Yongdugpo. "The nurses flock here so that the tangles can be taken out of their war abused hair and the bloom can be put back on their faded cheeks...No one had given a thought to the nurses and the hair troubles that beset them...The doctors used to say that it was easy to tell how long it had been since a nurse had been on leave by the state of her hair." When one woman asked for a trim from the former hairdresser at the barber shop and got a perm as well, she and her friends started going regularly and "went around looking like the queens of the Korean peninsula." The hospital commander asked, "How about fixing the rest of them so they look like that?" With men fighting and dying, one could forget the women's importance through the tangle of hair-care and lingerie. But the public also saw evidence of their achievements. The Women's National Press Club honored "the American [front line] nurse in Korea" as 1953 "Woman of the Year."52

If seeing American nurses working and training under harsh conditions was not enough to impress the public all over again that military women served well in dangerous situations, as in the past, readers also saw foreign women in military and non-traditional roles. Media coverage included views of both allied and enemy women in Korea, as well as in other countries not involved in the conflict. Many of these foreign women served under fire.

Allied women were presented as role models. Turkey, the Netherlands, Thailand, and Greece assigned nurses and line women to Korea. In fact, Turkey sent fighter pilot Maj. Sabiha Gokcen, but Soviet women had been forgotten as she was identified as the "world's first woman warbird." Time highlighted RN and ambulance driver Andree-Claire Montboisses a World War II Resistance fighter and Croix de Guerre winner. Her
clothing and tent were described as "feminine" and she was afraid of mice, but she was also shot at and endured the harsh field conditions. She was pleased no soldier had made a pass at her: "It is one family, and I am their sister."

South Korean women helped their own cause when the Women's Military Corps assigned ten rifle-women to each division and corps. Former teacher, commander Kim Hyun Sook, set up the Corps after Americans had arrived "with radical beliefs in female dignity." Kim's dream was to establish an infantry division based on marksmanship records showing women were better with rifles and machine guns. However, after one was killed and three were captured, the ROK Army issued orders for the women to take over rear area clerical jobs. But the South Korean government took this action in concern for "appearances", not wanting anyone to think it officially sponsored "comfort units." And, although women's effectiveness in battle was never questioned, some of the younger soldiers resented women serving in combat. Other Koreans, impressed with the women's combat service, felt they had earned equality. The Times editors applauded "these little Korean Wacs" who had had "their share of combat casualties."

While Korean women had served in combat briefly, they were not allowed to serve as military nurses until 1953. When the first ROK military nurses' class graduated, half were sent to the front.53

The American press was less sympathetic to enemy fighting women. North Korea's Son Hi flew her first bombing missions against allied troops in 1951 and China claimed an all female jet unit in 1952. American GIs reported that a number of women fought as guerrillas, one of whom shot seven American prisoners "in cold blood." In addition, Canadians reported killing "the woman in black," an infantry commander, at Yonchon. The South Koreans captured a number of female "officer communist guerrillas."
The ROK held 430 nurses, soldiers, camp followers and civilians prisoner. By August 1953, the UN wanted to return 450 women with the first group of prisoners to be exchanged. Chinese, Korean, and Vietmihn forces all held numerous American and foreign civilian women including Canadian nuns and French civil servants. There was no report of more public concern about female prisoners.54

Other nations also found new spaces for women. Britain's reconstituted Home Guard allowed women but restricted them to administrative positions. East Germany announced it would train 1200 "girl parachutists" by 1954. The U.S. decorated French military nurses. And Italy and Russia employed female spies. In Israel David Ben-Gurion moved to amend the Compulsory Military Service Law to include women who claimed religious exemptions. They could serve in agriculture, social work, or military offices rather than field units. Rabbis advised Orthodox women to resist conscription fearing that militarization led to immorality. On the other side, Israeli Defense Force leaders demanded that the religious loop-hole be closed because women were "shirk[ing] their duty." The Knesset approved Ben-Gurion's bill 62-28. Later, the law was amended further to specify that religious objectors would serve in agriculture, nursing, or teaching and still later changes allowed modest religious women not to wear "unmaidenly" uniforms and allowed them to return home every evening. Zealots claimed that the army planned to stock prostitution houses with Orthodox girls. Opposition posters announced "Daughters of Israel Must Prefer the Stake to Conscription." Moslems were not immune; in response to Israeli Egyptian law allowed female military nurses for the first time.55

Besides examples of foreign women, images from American popular culture also informed the debate. The "dumb blonde" was the prevalent
film image of women with Judy Holliday's award winning portrayal in Born Yesterday establishing the prototype. There was no outcry over this belittling portrayal but Catholics condemned "feminists" who let their daughters participate in beauty pageants and sports. Films depicting fighting women were available to the public, but were not critically acclaimed. The Times panned Guerrilla Girl, a drama about the communist resistance in Greece and gave mixed reviews to films portraying American military women. Skirts Ahoy!, billed as a "frothy salute to the distaff side of the Navy," featured three WAVE recruits trying to catch husbands. Never Wave at a Wac presented Rosalind Russell with "a covey of cuties...[and] a small posse of pursuing males" negotiating hardships in the post-war Army and proving "WACS can be wacky." The Army helped make this 1950s Private Benjamin, which actually boosted enrollment, and Gen. Bradley gave Russell an award for assisting recruiting.  

Women's real political, economic, and social roles continued to be discussed extensively by the media from 1951 through 1953 and again these articles offer a yardstick with which to measure public views of military women. During the Cold War, women's clubs urged their members to participate in the USO and civil defense work. A significant number answered the call. 'Republican Motherhood' was an ideal toward which they could also contribute. They were encouraged to take interest in their children's political education and even take on political tasks as men neglected them in favor of business. Oliver Carmichael, president of the Carnegie Foundation, saw it as a women's duty to conserve America's heritage against the country's "moral and spiritual disintegration." At the "Women in the Defense Decade" conference, Eleanor Roosevelt and other speakers questioned whether women were living up to their citizen's responsibilities. Others argued that women wanted to accept
responsibility, but were often barred from doing so; limitations on women hurt defense efforts. "How can you presume to solve manpower questions when you block out the representation of half of the population of this country, namely, womanpower?" one woman asked. Conference attendees favored supporting female draft registration for the armed forces, nursing, defense jobs, and community service. Some even argued that men would have to take a more active role in the home.

Some 'Republican Mothers' were rabid anti-communists while others called for moderation. The AAUW supported a "bold attack against communism through a whole-hearted commitment to all that democracy stands for." But, these women also decried "witchhunting, character assassination, and demagoguery." They were in a double bind; if they spoke against communists they were called fascists, if they supported equal rights for women or minorities they were called communists. But, these women wanted both freedom and national security.

In 1953 the AAUW voted to oppose the ERA, 1,355 to 1,219, despite Lt.Col. Mary-Agnes Brown's speech in favor. The National League of Women Voters also opposed it on the grounds that women would lose protective legislation. Many labor and church groups were also against the amendment. The NFBPW supported the ERA, believing that "protective legislation" was thinly disguised discrimination. Still, they had to reassure everyone they were not radicals saying, "Above all, in advancing the cause of women in all channels, we should resolve to remain what we are intended to be--real women, not aping men, but retaining the charm, the fundamental femininity and the essentially personal outlook that are characteristic of our sex."57

Women were shown in action in other areas, as well. The public was constantly reassured that businesswomen were not trying to compete with
men but wanted to be an effective part of the team. For those not in wage work, a noted economist praised housewives, recognizing that their jobs had gotten more complex as they were expected to be "domestic scientists," a category that encompassed child psychologist, economist, sociologist, nutritionist, chemist, physicist, biologist, and "of course...a good cook." Experts noted that more and more of these housewives were also employed outside the home, some in dangerous or traditionally male arenas. An interracial group of "73 Girls in Shorts" took the New York City police physical tests. The women were "bored stiff" with other jobs and wanted civil service job security. For its part, the police were not looking for "female Samsons" but women who had strength, agility, and intelligence. Other women proved they could handle physical and dangerous jobs. An American nineteen-year-old "Samson", gored in a Mexican bull fight, had won twenty fights and expected to be back in the ring quickly. And, Jackie Cochran, the U.S.'s only female jet pilot, broke two records with the Saber jet. She held all international men's and women's speed records except one.58

After World War II, and despite all the forays into non-traditional areas, Americans continued to discuss the "woman question." Books included The Revolt of American Women on freedoms that women had won in the last ten decades. Reviewer Charles Poore identified the double standards in ideology, saying there would never be a similar men's book because,

No one inquires whether men can successfully combine marriage and careers; no one denounces the cut of their bathing suits or worries very much about their morality; no league of men voters has been formed; no equivalent of Philip Wylie, the enemy of 'Mom' has risen to pepper Pop with maledictions as a menace to national well-being.
Alice Louchheim opined that "women have been educated beyond their opportunities, have confused feminism with femininity..." Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* was also translated in 1953. Clyde Kluckhorn thought the book was magnificent but inaccessible. He recommended Margaret Mead's *Male and Female*. And children's books, contrary to popular memory, urged girls to aspire to be flight nurses, space travelers, or modern day Joans of Arc.59

With an armistice and U.S. foreign policy moving from armed support in Korea to financial support of friendly forces in Indo-China, the significant military stories of 1953 included conflicting policies of budget cuts and manpower slashes along with continuing pushes for maintaining the peacetime draft and a UMT plan. Racial and gender components of citizenship remained unresolved during the Cold War while the armed forces continually reorganized and new defense policies regularly appeared.

With the reorganizations, the biggest military manpower cuts were to be taken in support areas where women were concentrated. Cuts in DoD civilian personnel were to be drastic as well and the forty-thousand-person reduction was to be in "Desk-Holding Personnel" or the headquarters' "chair corps"—both euphemisms for women. Increasing military technology could have opened more places for women and smaller men but did not. Even with an emphasis on brains versus brawn in the Air Force and Navy, they had recruited all the men they needed during the Korean conflict due to volunteers who joined rather than take the chance of being drafted for two years of Army infantry duty. As long as there was a Army draft, the other two services got high quality men and had little motivation to recruit women.
Other areas where women could have made inroads were also blocked by budget cuts, including the new Air Force Academy and ROTC programs. Georgia Congressman Carl Vinson, supporting an air academy and pointed out in the Times that there was more to officership than flying, that the Academy would not just produce pilots, and that the AF needed its own academy to develop a separate air perspective. Academy graduates were the dominant influence in the services. Since the emphasis was on career professionals, not "combat leaders," and since a shortage of qualified male volunteers for the school still prevailed, attendance did not necessarily have to be limited to pilots (men). Since the AF had been officially (if not actually) integrated from the beginning, USAFA could have been as well. A space existed for women, but given the restrictions circumscribing military careers for them, that space was tiny. In addition, because of manpower reductions, the USAF decided to require all ROTC cadets to fly. Barred from flying, women could not make inroads into these programs either.60

With conflict's end and the drawdowns also came recriminations for the stalemate and morale problems, as well as innumerable analyses of these. Hanson Baldwin wrote several, recognizing the problems of limited war. While Baldwin decried the resulting public apathy and deterioration of the "moral tone" of the country, he also believed that service "derelictions, misappropriation of funds, falsification of accounts, gambling, bigamy, drunkenness, deceit, and violations of honor and decency" had lowered the military's esteem. Baldwin spread the blame, "the services can be no better than the nation from which they spring." But he and others held the military leaders most culpable for declining integrity. The leadership was responsible for poor morale, and soft discipline was caused by "democracy in the forces."
None of the senior officers, however, would accept responsibility. Consistent with earlier home front "stab in the back" theories, (and Susan Jeffords' work on the notions of a feminized nation, government, and press arrayed against a military "band of brothers," ) Gen. Ridgeway blamed outside criticism and Gen. Bradley blamed Congress, the press, and the public. Senior officers maintained that the whittling away of pay and benefits, as well as harsh living and duty conditions along with unwarranted criticism were at fault. Contradictorily, they averred that, formerly, soldiers were not externally motivated by money, but by internal esprit de corps--warrior bonds. Civilians had destroyed these bonds. No one mentioned that part of the problem was caused by the military "lowering" physical and mental standards for white men rather than taking more qualified women or minorities.61

Morale issues were eventually broadened to a discussion of Civil-Military relations. A two year study moved the military to look at citizenship training. In Korea, American POWs knew less about their country's political philosophy than the enemy did. Partly because draftees were poorly educated, military leaders believed democratic training should include orientation to: (1) the dignity of the individual; (2) respect for the truth; (3) the sovereignty of the people; and (4) spiritual values. Although field commanders were not sold on the program, Pentagon officials claimed that because the enemy used psychological warfare, soldiers needed to know the "meaning of American citizenship." This discussion could have provided the forum to discuss racial and gender discrimination vis-a-vis citizenship, but did not.

A primary reason for concern for GI education had surfaced because of high rates of desertion and POW conversions. S.L.A. Marshall's 1951 study had indicated that less than twenty-five percent of soldiers in
direct combat had fired their weapons. Factors included fear, lack of confidence, hoarding ammunition, lack of confidence in the weapon, lack of motivation or will to fight, seeing enemies as individuals, fear of retaliation, fear of disclosing one's position, a distortion of sportsmanship, and indolence. When the Army reported that over forty-six thousand GIs had deserted by January 1953, Truman blamed a critical press and Gen. MacArthur's insubordination. Blacks POWs and deserters were said to be especially susceptible to conversion to communism. Captors recognized the disparity between our political philosophy and the unequal treatment accorded minority servicemen and had told black GIs, "there is no reason for you to like America because you are black men and you are treated badly there. You should come over to our side where you will be treated fairly."

Race issues continued to plague the military, but rather than a sense of fairness or adherence to a democratic political philosophy, it was lack of combat troops and the ability of the enemy to use racism against Americans that spurred further moves to desegregate. The press praised non-white soldiers but contradictions were apparent. Pvt. Eddie Cleaborn was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism in combat. The medal was presented at his all-Negro high school in Memphis. A plaque at a county courthouse in Virginia for servicemen of World Wars I and II was banned because it did not list the one Indian and ten black veterans. The United Daughters of the Confederacy felt they were being "discriminated against." They explained, "We thought the colored people would like to recognize their servicemen with a plaque of their own." A mayor of a California town brought flowers to a Filipino-Japanese war bride after a local citizen sent her a note condemning her marriage to a white soldier. Hideo Hashimoto, who had spent World War II
in an American internment camp, was named a hero in Korea. Puerto Rican
soldiers, hampered by language difficulties, were accused of fighting
poorly. They fought very well under a new commander. And, ROK soldiers
were recognized for bravery despite claims that they fought poorly.

Black leaders felt the way to break barriers was to fight for
nondiscrimination clauses in draft legislation. Illinois Democrat William
Dawson appealed for an explanation of how to earn first class citizenship.
"Give me the test that you would apply to make any one a full-fledged
American and by the living God, if it means death itself, I will pay it--
but give it to me." A World War I volunteer, he was commissioned and led
infantry troops into battle.

I served in a segregated outfit as a citizen trying to save
this country. I would give up this life of mine to preserve
this country and every American in it, white or black. Deny
to me, if you will, all that American citizenship stands for.
I will still fight for you, hoping that under the Constitution
of the United States all these restrictions will be removed
and that we will move before the world as one people, American
people, joined in a democracy towards all the world. God
didn't curse me when He made me black any more than He cursed
you when He made you white. I say to you who claim to love
America in this hour of its stress that the greatest argument
the Soviet Union is using among the black peoples of the world
to turn them against us is your treatment of me, me an
American citizen.

House members applauded but voted down his amendment to the draft bill 178
to 126.63

Although enemy nations chided the American military for racism,
anti-communists accused civil rights advocates of communism. Politically
active black civilians and servicemen were often accused of disloyalty.
USAF Lt. Thomas Shepard, a Korean war veteran, was finally cleared after
being accused of participating in his brother's activities as a member a
union. Another serviceman was persecuted for associating with his father
and sister; both active in the NAACP.64
Minority men had served honorably and well and hoped to be treated as full citizens. They certainly did not expect to be accused of disloyalty. Women had also served, but it is harder to tell what their expectations were around citizenship, at least at this time. Connections between race and gender equity were rarely drawn. Later we will see that minority men's experiences did inform women's struggle for equity both external and internal to the military. Both men of color and all women would raise the volume on the question of why, if they served, they were not full citizens. Space existed.

These spaces to discuss race, gender, and citizenship and military service as obligation, burden, right, or privilege were avoided once again in 1953. An even larger space for their consideration, again completely ignored, were the draft and UMT discussions. In 1951 UMT was meant as a long term measure to deal with future emergencies of the Cold War. The draft, meant to put men in the field in the short term, was increasingly perceived as unfair given the treatment of racial minorities and 4-F athletes. When the UMT plan was revived in January 1953, supporters asked for the President's help in fighting opposition from Congress, church leaders, school and college officials, and some labor and farm groups. The Times supported more equitable Universal Service rather than Selective Service and the public continued to call for a fairer sharing of the "burden" of defense. While talk of the responsibility of young men to protect the nation dominated the discussions, there was little mention of women's responsibility.

Our burden of defense is the concern of all and it should be borne by all. This does not mean that a nuclear physicist ought to be made into a combat rifleman, but it does mean that the way should be open so that each person can serve and to the best advantage... responsibilities for [the nation's] defense should be shared as equally as possible by all its citizens.
If "citizens" here had included women there would have been room for them to serve in the military, to be drafted, and to become first class citizens. If women had not already been 'forgotten'--not invisible but "contained" in WWII--they might have been included in this vital debate.

The 1953 presidential manpower commission urged both a draft and UMT, asking three questions: Did the country want a reserve? Should it be trained or untrained? Should it be comprised of veterans or non-veterans? Everyone recognized that the military had to have effective weapons and skilled soldiers with high morale; unfair conscription hurt morale.

We proclaim equal rights, equal benefits, and equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, we should all share equally the obligation to serve the nation, to protect it and sacrifice for it. Whenever this is not so, whenever [some] are required over and over again to protect the others; the spirit and morale of the nation is weakened. In a democracy as in no other form of government, all citizens should watch the ramparts. All should be vigilant against the ever-present dangers which can strike out from half-way across the world at any moment; all should attempt to avoid danger by preparing for danger; all should share the duties, the discomfort and the dirty work.

Although it sounded as if "citizens" could be of either gender, the announcement continued, "All free men should be willing to guard their liberties and each free man should take his turn at guard." However, the commission also asserted that the "physical and mental standards of the armed services are unrealistic. These should be readjusted to make use of men who could drive a truck or serve as clerks even if they were not fit for combat duty." Again Congress and the President, as well as the commission, ignored the possibility of enlisting non-combat women.65

With the crisis past women were not included in the 1953 draft and UMT discussions and they would not be included in career incentive debates. Indeed, between 1954 and 1964 their continued military
participation was seriously questioned. During this period of relative
peace they would not be needed. But, the need driven by the Korean
conflict from 1951 to 1953 had in turn pushed some improvements in the
conditions of women's service. Mostly limited and frequently temporary.
Women went to sea and to the "combat zone," they were allowed dependent
benefits, their numbers could exceed two-percent, they could marry, and
they could enlist at younger ages. Some women's ROTC programs were
established and the services decided to hire female doctors and male
nurses. Women served at risk, held non-traditional jobs, and won awards
for their courage and achievements. The establishment of DACOWITS helped
in some areas, but it was a military organ rather than a 'feminist' one.
Its value was in its potential. Debates went to the opposition when it
came to the draft, UMT, jobs classified as "combat," motherhood, limits on
ranks (and therefore retirement benefits), and equality of qualifications
for enlistment (and the ERA).

During the Korean conflict the services needed people and used stop
gap measures, without long range strategies, to get them. Stop gap
measures allowed for the use of minorities and women, but also constituted
their abuse. There was no comprehensive discussion of citizenship and the
military obligation to guide racial or gender integration, but the debates
on the individual issue shows that space for such a discussion existed.
Failure to address the larger issue and the trivialization of women by the
emphasis on femininity, morality, and heterosexuality allowed for women's
marginalization, ignoring reality, the continuation of gender myths, and
historical amnesia. As a result the debate in succeeding years and crises
will sound all too familiar.

When SECDEF George Marshall stepped down from his post in 1952, at
the time of the first DACOWITS meeting, his parting words included a
warning that the country needed an enduring defense policy to protect the
defense establishment from "the fluctuations of public opinion." Policy,
he argued, should be based on "what's right" and consistent with our
political philosophy rather than constantly changing to fit with a
particular time-and-space-limited, historically constructed cultural
ideology.  

Instead, the nation has dealt piecemeal with Cold War concerns, as
well as civil rights, internal security, and gender issues. After 1954,
more and more print was dedicated to Indochina as the French were on the
verge of leaving Vietnam. Times editorials called for an end to
colonialism in early 1953, while the press reported on American financial,
political, and military involvement in South East Asia. Our participation
in the conflict there would not become official until after the 1964 Gulf
of Tonkin incident so the next chapter addresses the period from the end
of the Korean conflict to Tonkin. A look at US military women and nurses,
as well as the military's treatment of other women associated with the
services, reveals that Korean era advances were only temporary and that
military women were once again rendered invisible. But center stage
national and service issues, both in the short and long term, affected the
conditions of women's service and military nursing, which became extremely
important from 1964 to 1973, and which must be looked at in relation to
the contradictory images of nurturing and combat in relation to the
perceived lack of need of line women in the armed forces. The Korean
conflict left few permanent improvements for servicewomen, but the gains
were never permanently lost. The debates would arise again in full force
in later eras.
Notes to Chapter 6


3. Although the military has appeared to lead in social change, and certainly advertises that it has, the picture is really more ambiguous. When it has led, it has not done so out of a notion of "what's right" but out of military necessity or political pressure, the latter not being as effective a mechanism as the former. MacGregor points out that in regards to race, the services actually introduced segregation in areas of the country where integration was the norm in the 1950s. Also during this period, while some people complained that the Navy should not refuel in South Africa because of its policy of Apartheid, others pointed out such a policy would also make some Southern bases off-limits. Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, (Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1981). The military has also used homosexuals when it has been expedient but in no way can be construed as leading in the area of gay/lesbian/bi-sexual equal rights. Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993).


8. All nurses had to be single. Minimum ages for dependents for the Air Force women was fourteen while for the Army it was eighteen. "Nurses Joining the Air Force Here," NYT, 4 August 1950, p.12. Brown, "Nurse Shortage is Acute, Both Civil and Military," and Furman, "Army Issues Call for Women," 19 November 1950, Section IV, p.16.

9. "Yesterday and Tomorrow in United States Navy," NYT, 11 March 1950, p.17. Although the article stated that the Yeoman (F) had retired with full benefits, that particular battle was actually fought in Congress after the war along with the fight by the 1917 "phone girls" to obtain government benefits. "War Women Ask 'Status'," 9 April 1950, p.47. The phone girls' had responded to Gen. Pershing's call for French-speaking telephone operators. They argued, "We served overseas living under the supervision of the Y.W.C.A., wore Army uniforms with Army buttons and Signal Corps insignia, and served under Army rules, regulation and pay." They did not win veterans benefits.


12. The defense that women are "just being integrated" into a predominantly male environment was amazingly used again in 1994 by the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy to explain higher than normal female attrition rates (Dayton, May 1994). The concern with wives' opinions, not surveyed in other areas of military policy, became an issue again for those like conservative Elaine Donnelly who served on President Bush's Committee on Women in the Armed Forces, 1991-1992. Gertrude Samuels, "It's 'Hup, 2,3,4' and 'Yes, Ma'am'," NYT, 3 September 1950, pp.10, 30-31. "WAC and WAF Open Drive for Recruits," 9 May 1950, p.5.


23. Female guerrillas were treated as harshly as the men; they were given long prison sentences or shot. "A Gallant Woman Joins Men Who Report War," "The Savage, Secret War in Korea" (photographs by M. Bourke-White), \textit{Lf}, 1 December 1952, pp.23-36.


31. Initially DACOWITS had no female military members or male members.


"Draft of Women Bruited" (UP), 2 July 1951, p.13. Furman, "Services to Open Drive for Women," 27 September 1951, p.21. "Gold Star Mother Gets Draft call in Chicago" (AP), NYT, 2 January 1950, p.2. "Gold Star Mother Reclassified 'Strictly 4-F' After a False Registration as Strictly 1-A," 3 January 1952, p.23. Despite the decision not to draft women, Joe Willie Riley received an induction notice after a thief had registered in her name in order to cash stolen checks. She had to tell the Chicago draft board repeatedly that she had been named after her two aunts, Joanna and Willie. Although she was a Gold Star mother, she told the Army she was willing to serve since she had had a difficult time finding employment as an older woman.

34. Women have routinely been accused of getting pregnant to avoid service or shirk duties. "U.M.T., Drafters Decide, Is a Strictly Stag Party" (UP), 5 February 1952, p.15.

35. "8 in WAVE Reserve Pay Visit to 'Sub'," " WAVES Attached to Submarine Service" (photo), NYT, 5 August 1951.


48. At the Air Force Academy in 1990 a cadet's too-short haircut prompted a class for freshman (doolies) women on "femininity." When challenged, the title was changed to "professionalism" but was still for women only. The majority of the time was spent on hair and make-up. Personal experience, 1990, and Cynthia Wright, The New Republic, (1991). As of 1990
the Air Force continued to issue women unattractive underwear at the Academy and at OTS provided a one time lingerie allowance (men were issued undershirts and shorts). Personal experience. "Service Women Spruce Up" (AP), NYT, 4 April 1953, p.15. "Army Yields--Nylons for Wacs" (UP), Ibid, 25 November 1953, p.12. "WACs Are Analyzed" (UP), Ibid, 13 November 1953, p.20.


1951, p.2. "Women Described as Communist Guerrillas" (AP photo), "Allies' List of Missing Civilians," 31 December 1951, p.2. "Women's Red Air Unit Reported" (UP), 8 March 1952, p.2. "Camps for Men and Women Prisoners on Koj" 22 May 1952, p.3. "Chinese Reds Still Hold 34 U.S. Civilians, Seized Since Intervention in Korean War," 20 July 1953, p.2. "U.N. to Return 450 Women With the First Prisoners," 2 August 1953, p.3. "Women Reds Demonstrate" (AP), 8 August 1953, p.2. Lindesay Parrott, "Poe Sends 112 G.I.'s Back; Reds' Women Stage Scenes," 9 August 1953, pp.1,2. "Poe Speeds G.I. and British Return; Holds South Korean Captives Back," 10 August 1953, p.2. "Hysterical" (AP photo), 10 August 1953, p.3. "Chinese Free 2 Nuns on Christmas Day," 27 December 1952, p.2. "Chicken Soup on Sunday," Tm, 2 February 1953, p.22. A more detailed examination of the 2 August 1953 POW return would be interesting. Was this returning prisoners of least value to the enemy or chivalry? Since the North traded mostly blacks for them, what was the perceived equivalency of military value, or lack thereof, of women and men of color? Were these personnel who would not return to fighting or if they did, would they be less effective than (white) men? Or, were both sides trying to win over world opinion? Were women prisoners perceived to be more trouble to keep? They had rioted and were reported to be "hysterical." Were they crazy or just better resisters? Women POWs were definitely treated differently. Twenty-three children were born in captivity. Were they the result of consensual relations with the enemy or rape?


CHAPTER 7
INVISIBILITY? 1954-1964

As we saw at the close of the last chapter, although less and less attention was paid to the issues important to military women, other issues that arose during the Korean War did affect their long-term integration into the military. Cultural ideologies about gender remained tenacious even in the face of wartime military personnel needs. When the need for "manpower" was perceived to be less urgent, military women virtually disappeared--during the period 1954-1964, especially so. But military women were not as invisible as many of the secondary sources have suggested. The fact that the public does not remember them does not mean that servicewomen did not appear in the media. Instead, this amnesia was encouraged by continued press trivialization and by the containment of these women by service restrictions on their conditions of service as well as by "feminized" media portrayals. Both trivialization and containment buttressed a cultural gender ideology that encouraged the construction of mythical memories rather than recollection of actual reality; this process kept "protagonists" from addressing, or even recognizing, the real issues of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the contradictions between the theory and practice of political ideology in relation to racial and gender issues.

During this part of the Cold War (later 1950s and early 1960s), despite some hot spots (including slowly growing involvement in the conflict in South East Asia), military women experienced themselves as
what Jeanne Holm described as a token force, increasingly isolated and segregated.\(^1\) They remained in sex-typed job ghettos. They continued to suffer from restrictions their male peers did not, including those on single parenthood. Their leaders tried to maintain the corps' standing by insisting that smaller numbers meant higher "quality", but military men and the public continued to define quality as something beyond professional competence, as femininity, heterosexuality, and morality. Despite all attempts to present an appropriate and professional image, military women still struggled against reputations for immorality and stereotypical masculinity. These stigma were often used to keep women in their "proper" places. Containment succeeded as female leaders adopted a low profile rather than resist overtly so as not to jeopardize the existence of the women's corps altogether. The combined strength of these corps remained below one-percent (30,000 in 1965), never approaching the two-percent ceiling (265,500 in 1965). Even so, servicewomen were later accused of filling quotas as affirmative-action hires. In any case, retention and recruitment (except occasionally for nurses) were not major concerns in an age of budget cuts and manpower reductions. In fact, contradictions abounded in the continuing debates on male nurses and female doctors, showing again the ease with which some held conflicting ideologies, and the kind of mental gymnastics that were necessary to maintain gender myths in the face of reality.

With the end of the conflict in Korea and, therefore, lower personnel requirements, and with a draft in place to secure enough men, women were simply not "needed". USAF Gen. Curtis LeMay supported putting all women out of the service, saying that since the military wanted normal women and the only women who would want to join the military had to be strange, no women should be in the military. Rumors of the dissolution of
the women's corps circulated in 1959, but bureaucratic inertia and attention to more pressing issues helped the corps survive threats of extinction.²

One might ask, then, why even study the debate over military women in this period? In part, because the "more important" issues and women's militarization had reciprocal effects which became apparent after 1964. Reviewing service women's situations and the contexts of their service circumstances from 1954 to 1964 tells much about how military need and cultural ideology intersect with concepts of citizenship and service obligation. This chapter briefly reviews some of the larger issues initially broached in the last chapter and which continued to be of concern into the late 1950s and early 1960s in order to place the debate in context. Then it reviews the press treatment of military women during the period. The presentation of servicewomen in the press and popular culture continued to be trivializing, comedic, and constricting. Larger public concerns included civil rights and racial unrest, contested class structures, conscription, civil-military relations, America's role on the world stage, defense policies needed to support that role, and the military organization required to carry out defense policy.

Racial issues were moving center stage in American politics by 1954 and deeply affected the military. Although Truman's executive order directed integration in 1947, it was the combat needs of the Korean war, supported by civil rights activities at home, that finally overcame commanders' reluctance to mix forces racially. The fight was not yet over, however, and race issues would continue to consume military and public attention for many years to come. The services might have been officially desegregated but blacks, like women, continued to serve in
ghettoized jobs, experiencing inequality of service at every turn, and fought the notion that separate could be equal. The services continued, albeit less frequently, to defer to "local customs" both at home in the southern states and abroad in South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Northern Europe, and elsewhere. As these debates over race drew attention, a space opened including gender in discussions of discrimination, but this, not surprisingly, once again, seldom if ever happened.  

Military class structures, although not as pervasively discussed as they had been immediately after World War II, continued to affect military morale. As with race, separate facilities continued to be required for officers and enlisted personnel. And, although male friendships across military ranks could be classified as improper fraternization, women continued to be the real area of contention. The caste system, disparaged by both officers and enlisted men, was little understood by the civilian population, except as it pertained to draft exemptions (advantaged young men could stay in school or obtain occupational deferments) and fostered perceptions of unfairness. Perceptions of conscription inequities fueled anti-draft and anti-military sentiments which would become even more important in the subsequent period of this study.

As long as the draft continued there was little military incentive to change racial or gender restrictions (law or policy) as the military could obtain through Selective Service all the educated, physically fit, psychologically stable white men it needed. But as ideas shifted, the draft boards began to consider blacks and less educated white men as cannon fodder for conscription and later, combat. The NAACP vociferously challenged the Jim Crow practices of an Army that wanted to use blacks at the same time that gross racial inequities persisted. Again, use constituted abuse both in the military and in an unaccepting civilian
society at home. Eventually anti-draft movements would contribute to the establishment of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) of the 1970s under which women and minorities would be more heavily recruited and depended upon, and therefore gain leverage with which to demand fairer treatment. Success would be at best mixed officially and would remain fairly dismal on the unofficial level of actual life in the military.⁴

Another draft-related area of discussion centered on the fact that as more men were needed by the military and the services complained that the civilian population could not meet mental, physical, or psychological standards, the armed forces once again lowered their standards. Again, this proved two things: (1) that standards were not immutable, nor based on universal and proven requirements for combat or military service (need and expediency always won the day), and (2) that women were not the cause of altered military standards (the military manpower composition changed to reflect the composition of American society at large).

A final draft-related issue was the view of military service by the public. Service had originally been defined as a responsibility or obligation of citizenship, but in the face of the limited, unpopular Korean War experience it had come to be seen as a burden to be avoided. From either perspective this discussion provided an arena for debating the requirements and rights of citizenship, and the intersection of racial and gender cultural ideologies with democratic political philosophy. But again, rarely if ever, did this occur.

As the unfairness of conscription practice was challenged and gender ideologies were more quietly questioned, the imperative to maintain a low profile scared away all but the most staunch or foolhardy equal-rights warriors. Anyone who rocked the boat could be accused of disloyalty. The Congressional Un-American Activities committees and internal security
organizations and committees flourished, tarring both civil-rights and women's rights supporters with the brush of communism. Also, although the civilian population was concerned about militarism and discussions of civil-military relations received much attention, communism was perceived to be a larger threat than a fascist takeover. Right wing, political conservatives celebrated a hey-day by supporting a cultural ideology which worked directly against women trying to make it in the civilian world or asking for equity in the military realm, thus providing another arena for "containment". Extremist organizations like the John Birch Society opposed women working outside the home and refused to recognize the economic needs that required many to do so. Outside wage-work and inattention to the family supposedly created juvenile delinquency. The press presented unflattering comparisons to "unfeminine" Soviet women who were employed.

With concerns about communist infiltration at home, it was not surprising that the U.S. should take on an international mission to protect other countries from communist expansion or influence. Part of this containment policy included becoming the role model for democracy. Marginalized groups tried to expose the hypocrisy of this self-image in the face of rampant racism and sexism at home. Americans were also exposed as poor role models when U.S. military forces, rather than showing foreign populations the benefits of the American way-of-life, abused and showed contempt for local foreign populations, especially women. As long as foreign and/or civilian women were abused, American military women should not have been surprised by the treatment they received from individual soldiers. Abusive behavior was based on GI views of women in general. Little was done to control or punish such abuse which constituted tacit acceptance and even encouragement. Such tolerance
lowered the threshold of acceptable behavior for men. Military women did receive one advantage in this respect, however. Despite stereotypes to the contrary, political and military leaders recognized that female soldiers made better unofficial ambassadors than male soldiers for just these reasons. Apparently, as we will see, the Navy forgot this in the case of Navy wives. In any case, U.S. foreign policy was based on a philosophy of containment and military policies had to be mapped around its requirements.

Massive Retaliation and the later MAD policies lost some of their credibility when the Korean conflict and incidents in Eastern Europe and elsewhere showed that such policies, lacking some threshold of limited conflict, constituted impractical and ineffective foreign policy. Eisenhower's "New Look" (with its gender implications) were intended to reduce the need for personnel. Except for SAC, his administration, despite vigorous criticism and resistance, aimed at military downsizing. With Kennedy's the move toward Flexible Response after 1961, changes in the military had to follow. Instead of a small, technical, "come-as-you-are-force" required by a quick nuclear response, a larger force, with a nucleus augmented by reserves, would be required for conventional actions in numerous hotspots. Conventional combat forces, would require more support forces including logistics, communications, administration, and maintenance. These areas were spaces already legitimately open to women and minorities. As these functions expanded, more of the marginalized, including mentally and physically less fit men, would be recruited more vigorously. The military would "experiment" with their use.\(^5\)

The military's size, organization, and budget, the sorting out of roles and missions, were worked out throughout this decade against these changes in defense policy. The smaller nucleus of forces might not need
women or minorities, but the larger reserve forces and support areas did. The change from strictly nuclear and technical emphasis to a reassertion of requirements for ground forces again opened spaces for male minorities as cannon fodder. Technical forces, like those of the Navy and Air Force, might not have needed women in the fighting forces/operations since women were barred by law from combat ships and aircraft and by policy from all others. But at the same time, a high-tech military could rely more on brains than brawn, possibly opening more spaces for women. Fighting at a distance with longer-range weaponry would also affect views of whether women could serve in warrior units without being exposed to battle-field conditions and the possibility of capture by the enemy. At the same time, however, ground war was becoming increasingly more fluid, combat zones shifted unpredictably, and war was therefore more dangerous to those in the immediate area, whether support forces or civilians. Limited war and guerrilla warfare went hand-in-hand to work against women making inroads into some military arenas.\

So, the decade from 1954 to 1964 was a period of relative invisibility for military women. Gender ideology was not confronted head-on, but the contradictions within American political philosophy did show up in discussions of other issues perceived to be more pressing. With less need for higher numbers of military personnel and the emphasis on these larger issues, servicewomen moved to the background to consolidate the small gains of the previous fourteen years while civilian women worked on cultivating the seeds of the women's movement that would flourish in the subsequent two decades. The debates on issues of more public import, including civil rights, conscription, America's global role, defense policy, and military structures and strategies, would all impact military women in later periods. But during this particular decade, with
servicewomen's invisibility, they might have disappeared from the scene all together. In fact, in 1963 the GAO recommended the women's corps dissolution because of the cost of their maintenance in the light of perceived retention problems. 

But 1963 was also the year of John Kennedy's Commission on the Status of Women and the publishing of The Feminine Mystique. The subsequent re-energizing of the fight for the ERA and the women's movement, the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and the rediscovery of the need for women as military nurses in Vietnam, in addition to the later need for military women in general for the AVF, would, as we will see, present a much different picture. The discussion of women and military women from 1954-1964 must form the groundwork for those events.

Civilian women were in the news in 1955 when some alarmists thought the U.S., being "controlled by aging females," was on its way to "matriarchal rule." The Population Reference Bureau reported that "In terms of voting power, ownership of land and corporate equities, the United States could be seen as on the road toward a geomatriarchy." The prospect of giving women weapons, when they already held such economic and political power, could have been terribly frightening to some. Some may have seen this potential when they read that Carola Mandel won the 1956 co-ed skeet shooting title and broke three world records. On the other hand, perhaps this should have inspired the military to put more guns in women's hands. In 1962, John McClure Snook of Alabama saw the potential and using women in para-military roles and started a "girl army." As owner of a telephone company he armed his operators with M-1 carbines and submachineguns in fear of a Communist invasion, which the women were to help fight off. Other right-wing paramilitary organizations, including
the Minutemen, also armed women, who were trained as guerilla forces to live off the land and repulse invasions. This created a contradiction between the conservative view of women's place as in the domestic sphere the defense of the domestic sphere requiring female fighters. Still, the idea that women should bear arms challenged those who believed that women were not capable of fighting.³

Paramilitary women were obviously not content to be contained in a limited domestic space and live the myth. Other women did not fit the mold either. Denise McCluggage, a New York Herald Tribune reporter, made news for personalized sports reporting, driving race cars, and competing in downhill skiing. This "tom boy" grew up with smashed fingers from softball and was easily the "best [football] back on the block." After her Phi Beta Kappa graduation as a philosophy major she worked for the San Francisco Chronicle before "penetrating the conventional misogyny of the craft" and persuading the weekly news review to hire her. According to Time, "She wanted to prove she was as good as any man" and competed with them intensely, which made her a curiosity. "Once at a party," the report said, "she...flipped a husky male reporter in Indian wrestling. To earn money on the side, she posed in the nude for adult art courses. Pitching for the Chronicle's all male softball team, she fell in love with the second baseman of a Mister Roberts road company team and married him in 1953. The marriage lasted one year." Later, she moved to New York to work for the Herald because Maggie Higgins had done so well there. Still, she had to write women's features until the sports editor discovered her. The athletes appreciated her but she said of her male co-workers, "They hate me...and I hate them."

The public got a look at other non-traditional women as well. The Times published reviews of books on Amelia Earhart and Willa Cather in
1960. Cather was identified as a willful individualist, "sister-in-art" to the robber barons. And Earhart was called "a splendid national symbol of womanhood at its best and freest...the goddess of popular imagination."

In the meantime, policewomen in New Jersey won anti-discrimination suits allowing them to compete for sergeant positions. The five-man bench was unanimous in its condemnation of municipal laws as "archaic" and unconstitutional. Despite the police force's plea that the post required "great physical dexterity and endurance," the judges wrote, "If there's room in the department for 278 women, there's room for women supervisors."

The legal challenge, brought by a twenty-year police veteran who held a bachelor's and two master's degrees, argued that women held higher positions in other cities' departments and that women in the military were eligible for promotions.⁹

Women were drawing attention in other legal fields as well. The Governor of North Carolina appointed Susie Sharp to that state's supreme court in 1962. Sharp did not see herself as a path breaker though. Women were capable of holding high office and she would not have hesitated to vote for the right woman for Governor or President. However, she said, "...I'm of the opinion that the average woman's field is in the home, as a wife and mother."¹⁰

Women in another non-traditional area, doctoring, were also considered newsworthy. Surgeon Else LaRoe's autobiography recounted that she had fought cultural ideology in Germany to start her career and then to continue it in New York. But despite a powerful message on the possibilities for women, LaRoe maintained that, "a woman's happiness in life often depends on the sinuousness of her curves." In other words, many non-traditional women were still contained by their physical appearance in the service of the male gaze. One who combatted that
subject position more successfully, Dr. Mary Walker of Civil War fame, was honored in a display of portraits of medical women. Walker, a Union surgeon and spy, almost always wore male attire but was still invited to functions at the White House. Bess Furman's article on the exhibit states that, ironically, she died at eighty-five as an indirect result of a fall on the capitol's steps while protesting the taking away of her "bronze medal" for her work in the war. Other women attached to the military and highlighted in the Washington exhibit included Clara Barton, Florence Nightingale, and Dorothea Lynde Dix.\textsuperscript{11}

The public was also reminded that foreign women had contributed to their armed forces' efforts during World Wars I and II. In Yugoslavia controversy surrounded actress Milena Vrajakova, the Army Chief of Staff's wife, because unlike the wives of the ranking Communist party members, "She had not fought during World War II." Hanna Reich, Germany's only female jet test pilot, published her autobiography in 1954. She worked almost exclusively in the military realm. On the other side of Nazism, the rest of Anne Frank's story was told in 1958. Her days at Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen served as another reminder to the public that women had experienced all the horrors of concentration camps--that many had showed great strength and courage and some had survived.\textsuperscript{12}

Many foreign women were lucky to survive American soldiers' treatment. GIs especially liked assignments to South Korea:

Fraternization is the order of any evening in Seoul, and the frizzled heads of willing Korean misses, in military tow, bob around town in jeeps...If an officer prefers a "stateside reject"--his term for the Caucasian girls from the civilian relief agencies [or American military women]--he takes her to "Round Eyes Night" at Seoul's Chosen Hotel. But "Moose Night" is more popular. The brass show up with their "musume"--a Japanese word whose literal translation "daughter," has been indescribably enriched by the U.S. troops.
When the shocked Gen. John Collier tried to prohibit prostitutes (four thousand registered professionals in Seoul alone) from his officers club and the officers simply "mounted new assault waves on Moose night at the Chosen," he eventually lifted the ban in frustration. American GIs continually got into trouble in Korea. A company commander ordered his men to shave the heads of two registered prostitutes caught in the barracks, accusing them of having broken in and "caus[ing] a high venereal disease rate." The incident evoked an outcry from Korean officials and a call for punishment of the GIs. The Korean press urged ROK court jurisdiction over the matter. The Army acknowledged that no such punishment for trespassing was authorized. The captain in charge was punished by the Army with a letter of reprimand and relieved of his command. In other words, as was often the case with assaults on women, he was not court-martialed but simply reassigned for appearances sake. The UN command compensated the women monetarily and announced that the women were satisfied with the amount. The U.S. press constantly identified the two as prostitutes and apportioned no culpability to the men who routinely sought their services and obviously played an equal part in spreading VD.

The soldiers' promiscuity and poor treatment of foreign women was not a secret. On the contrary, it was well publicized in the media and the press even commiserated with the GIs that no matter how nice it was to consort with Asian women while homesick, "A Hooch is not a Home."

In the fading light, American soldiers cruise by to inspect the merchandise, pinching buttocks and tilting faces toward the light. The girls, who are known scornfully as "mooses," giggle timidly and plead: "Come on to my hooch."

In fact, ninety percent of GIs were estimated to consort with prostitutes regularly. Those who had their regular girl and hooch complete with furniture, often sold the entire lot, including the woman, to an incoming
soldier when he left, for around $250. Although GIs could not often afford "pillow fees," if they stated an intent to marry, the woman could receive the much coveted PX privileges and resell items on the black market. Military commanders reportedly tried to curb the homesickness that induced hard drinking and promiscuity with (monthly) required Character Guidance sessions and radio programs from the States like "Date with Diana." Servicemen were also encouraged to work off their excess energy by helping to build orphanages or teaching English or softball to the children. Japanese women did not have as bad a reputation but still appeared in American popular culture as soldiers' prostitutes as in the 1961 novel Valhalla. They also had the dubious distinction of being the first "mooses."

While their husbands were playing in Korea and Japan with "daughters," American wives were being scrutinized as to how well they supported their husbands' careers and represented the United States overseas. The Times gave front page space to the Navy's decision to grade officers' wives on their performance and appearance as "key" to their husbands' careers. The Navy admitted this had been an informal practice for years and that they had simply made it official. Most wives opposed the idea, but the service defended it saying the State Department also considered whether wives were an asset in representing the U.S. to foreign countries. When the matter became public Congress expressed surprise and reservations. Rep. Samuel Stratton warned the HASC that the Navy might lose some experienced and competent officers if their wives were not "social butterflies." In less than a month the Secretary of the Navy decided the idea was flawed, realizing that some good officers could be lost to the system or not merit promotions. No mention was made of GI behavior overseas as a negative reflection on the U.S.
Foreign women in military and other non-traditional roles continued to be visible to the American public. Sweden hired policewomen and the Czech Air Force commissioned female pilots. The latter were extolled as "true fighting comrades of our men in the air." Russian women, who had been in the forefront of the fighting in World War II, were extensively reported on in the American press. Max and Tobia Frankel's *New York Times Magazine* piece of December 1959 and Elena Whiteside's of November 1963 were both quite extensive. Although for years they "dressed the part" of fighters and workers alongside men, according to these authorities, they were becoming more feminine. Russian women had won equal pay, rights, and opportunities (comprising half the labor force, including heavy industry, and three out of four doctors) so now they could be concerned with their appearance. "Where masculinity was the fashion for lady Comrades of yore, Russian women today are dressing and behaving like their sisters elsewhere...Her acquisitive nature and her desire to be well-dressed--her desire to charm--appear to be as enduring as her natural desire and ability to bear children." The Soviet government supported the feminization of women. During the communist revolution and war, women had rushed to become pilots and managers in government and industry. Equality took women from the "urban salon to the front-line trenches," married women kept their maiden names, they won the right to choose abortions, and became full-fledged Comrades.

But in a typical backlash, Elena Whiteside reported that the Soviet government rebelled against the women's revolution when the men in charge became aware of the "ever-dwindling patter of new little comrades' feet." They made divorce more difficult and abortion illegal among other judicial changes. As in the U.S., women were no longer pilots, but stewardesses, and protective legislation kept them out of some of the "heavy" and better
paying jobs which they had proficiently performed in the past. The Times ran another feature on Soviet women in 1963 saying that actually not much had changed for Russian women, who had borne a double-burden for generations. But not to worry, "Despite their hard work, the Russian women...were all vitally interested in femininity and fashion." Gone was the ideal of the thirties, when women workers and soldiers were supposed to be indistinguishable from their male comrades. Femininity, marriage and family apparently had became as important to the Soviets as they were to the right wing in America.\textsuperscript{15}

Soviet women were being trained for more than family life though. Jr.Lt. Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman in space on 17 June 1963. Premier Khrushchev was quoted on the front page of the Times, "Now you see what women are capable of." The Soviets intended to study the effects of space flight on both sexes to further research in the medical-biological arena. A parachutist and president of a skydiving club, Tereshkova had volunteered to be an astronaut after Yuri Gagarin's flight. Praised for her stamina, she was the first astronaut with no previous pilot training. "Her physical toughness and courage astounded her male colleagues and at times made them almost envious." But, as in the U.S., it was important to mark her as a real woman. She wore a snow white dove embroidered on the left breast of her space suit.

American scientists agreed that testing women for long range space plans was a worthwhile endeavor, although they doubted, unlike British scientists, that women might be better suited. In fact, the Lovelace Foundation in New Mexico had previously tested twenty women pilots against physical standards for astronauts and thirteen had passed. Although American scientists said it was smarter to use male test pilots as astronauts because one could be sure these men would pass initial
qualifications, they also believed "the differences between individuals are almost certain to be greater than any that might exist between men and women as groups." This would become a key argument for those who supported women's moves into non-traditional areas. And, while NASA announced it had no plans to use women in space, prominent women pilots had been protesting their exclusion for at least two years prior to the Soviet feat. Jerri Cobb had been appointed as a consultant to NASA in 1960 but complained she was the most "unconsulted consultant" in government. In fact, she had lobbied Vice President Johnson a year earlier to look into putting a woman in space before the Soviets did. (LBJ replied that he did not have the authority to affect NASA's decisions.) Congress also felt that there would not be any problems with women in space, but that NASA should move at its own pace in integrating them. NASA did not intend to do so.¹⁶

Foreign military women like Tereshkova may have been heroines to some, but French army nurse Genevieve de Galard-Terraube seemed to be a role model for all. Nursing was more a feminine 'space' than space travel. The "Angel of Dienbienphu" was honored extensively by Americans and valorized in the press and in monographs on the War in Indochina. Times' editors praised her,

[She] chose to stay to cheer and comfort the victims of the battle. France has always produced her Jeanne's d'Arcs as well as soldiers who laugh at death, but none of her valiant daughters wears the cross of the Legion of Honor more worthily than the intrepid young woman the troops call "the angel of Dienbienphu."

The twenty-nine-year-old, the only woman in the battle and after being marooned, kept on with her duties. The entire garrison was lost and, as a result, the French granted Vietnamese independence a decade before the Gulf of Tonkin incident that pulled the U.S. officially into the war. The
French gave Galard their Air Medal; South Vietnam decorated her with its highest medal, the order of the Nation, and the Order of Valor (with palm); and the U.S. Congress invited her to tour the country after her release from a POW camp.

On the occasion of Galard's visit to the U.S., the Times' editors again lavished praise upon her for bravery under fire, in part, as tribute to nurses everywhere.

[She] arrives on our shores today as a heroine of the noblest order, a woman who has taken up the lamp borne just a hundred years ago by Florence Nightingale as she walked among the ill and wounded soldiers of the Crimean War...Few nurse have the opportunity to display the determination and courage that were shown by Mlle. de Galard, but they share the same spirit of devotion to their noble calling. The white-capped woman in the operating room; the vigilant nurse at the bedside of the suffering patient--they too, serve under the banner of Hippocrates. When we honor Mlle. de Galard we honor all of them.

The paper seemed to have forgotten its own articles on the courage of the American nurses of World War II and the Korean conflict even when they publicized that some of those women from the U.S. military nurse corps and armed forces accompanied Galard in a triumphant parade in New York City. The French awarded Galard and seven other the French Cross medal for service in Indochina. And, in 1955 Galard's heroics were recognized by Paul Gruwin in Doctor at Dienbienphu.17

The press and public were also interested in women in the Far East other than prostitutes. Japanese women under U.S. occupation gained many rights. Periodic articles on Japanese women contrasted western influences with traditional roles, as well as featuring Japanese women in non-traditional occupations and leisure activities. One experiment tried under the occupation, the employment of policewomen, worked wonderfully. The women were paid the same as men and received the same benefits and opportunities.18

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Korean women still served in the army and the chief of their WAC visited the U.S. to study the American corps. Col. Kim Hyun Sook first founded the Korean Women's Police in 1945 and then founded the army corps in 1950. The press reported that she had had it doubly tough with the war going on and traditional gender ideology. Although she and other women fought on the front-lines at the start of the war, they worked primarily in administration and communication and were accepted for a "job well done." Despite their contributions, military leaders refused to publicly recognize their value. In 1953 when Kim wrote to field commanders to ask how many WACs they needed and received no answers, she recalled all the women to Seoul. The subsequent response from the field came promptly and emphatically that the ROK WACs were needed and wanted. Kim was awarded medals for fighting guerrillas and one for being wounded while fighting, and received an American Legion of Merit for organizing the corps. These exploits were admirable, but women like Kim had the potential to undermine gender myths. She had to be contained. The press was quick to point out that Kim was married and had children and that her appearance was feminine.

Chinese women were not as nicely described by the media. "Her feet are unbound, but she wears outsize men's boots--for, in gaining the equality her mother never knew, she lost her femininity as well as her human freedoms." Was this a high price to pay to avoid the traditional maiming? Part of "looking like a man" reportedly included army service and the wearing of uniforms. Time decried the emerging Chinese matriarchy, reporting on International Women's Day: the celebration honored ten thousand "Hero Women" including one who lost both hands in fighting the Kuomintang, former peasant girl and pilot Capt. Chen Chi-yen, and all the eager women of the militia. Supposedly, they all read Silver
Blossoms in the Sky, the story of female paratroopers, for inspiration and they sent their husbands out to market, "the weirdest sight of all." The Nationalist Chinese also used women in the military as reports of their WAVES marching smartly in parades for Chiang Kai-shek's birthday made the American papers.19

Vietnamese women were at the center of the on-going struggle in South East Asia in many ways. No one was immune from the danger of armed violence. Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, the first lady, and her children survived a bombing at the Presidential Palace. The president's sister-in-law created much controversy as she tried to "rewrite her country's ancient social code." She intended to advance the position of all women. Mme. Nhu's efforts were also directed at the martial arena as she started a course of small arms training for women and was photographed inspecting uniformed women with rifles. Although her social policies were largely progressive, she was a devout Catholic who kept some of the more patriarchal influences of the church and vehemently opposed Buddhists. Her policies were seen as revolutionaryizing family relations and social life.20

In the Middle East, Israel and Arab enemies both employed women in their militaries. Israel elected a woman Premier, Golda Meir, known as plain, old-fashioned, and very forceful. Women were in a special position in their beleaguered country and, as most knew, were liable for the draft. Their service, the public was told, "could include combat duty, but usually is limited to auxiliary work." Zionist women had a history of fighting valiantly, as publicized in Woman of Valor in 1961. Contrary to popular memory, those who the Israelis fought also used women. Syria accepted women into their armed forces and national guard in 1957. Syrian
feminists hoped their inclusion and devotion would silence the opposition to women's role in defending the nation.  

Women who fought as irregulars in Cuba and Mexicans were challenging gender roles as well. Cuban rebel women's units, under the command of Dr. Isabel Rojas, actively fought Batista's forces and called themselves "Mariana Grajales" after the mother of patriot leader Antonio Maceo who had fought Spain. These female commandoes won a skirmish with government troops in October 1958. Women in Mexico had gained several government posts but encountered the same incongruence between rights and abuse as in North America, i.e., "a woman's place was in the home--except during wartime, when she was supposed to fight like a man." previously, even though women were expected to fight and possibly die for the country, they had no economic or political rights.

Women who fought as irregulars in Cuba and Mexicans were challenging gender roles as well. As in earlier periods, during the decade 1954-1964, besides seeing foreign women, the public was able to view martial and non-traditional women characters in popular culture presentations as well. Ingrid Bergman added her fourth portrayal of the most well-known female combatant in history, Joan of Arc. In addition to her Broadway, Hollywood, and Italian opera versions, she added another big screen version of the saint's story. 'Francis the mule', who had joined the sea service on film in 1952, joined the WAC in 1954. Army women were the butts of more screen jokes in the 1956 film The Lieutenant Wore Skirts, in which a husband tries desperately to get his wife out of the Air Force and back from Hawaii by making her look like a Section Eight case--mentally unbalanced. Of course all the young women in the film were "firmly packed beauties." True to the genre of "service comedy," Operation Petticoat, set in the Pacific during World War II, used feminine stereotypes to get
laughs—from a pink submarine to Army nurses in need of a rescue. *Times*
reviews repeated the assertion, "there's nothing like a dame to occupy the
interests of men plagued by the tediousness of war." The movie's thesis:
"Five shapely Army nurses are placed in a Navy submarine already crowded
with an aggressively masculine crew." The shtick was fairly standard—how
to berth the nurses in exceedingly limited space, how to explain the
complex bathrooms to mere women, how to "compel the sailors to keep their
well-diverted minds on their work." But the most vexing, "There's the
matter of Lieutenant Crandall. She has a particularly interesting shape,
which she can not conceal completely in a borrowed shirt and jeans." The
commander has to order that wherever she goes she gets "free passage."
But, "The order is not dutifully obeyed." This constituted another cheap
gag at the expense of a professional military nurse, but the formula was
used again in 1961's *The Wackiest Ship in the Army*. A reviewer of
Brigitte Bardot's World War II spoof, *Babette Goes to War*, complained that
the star wore too much clothing. A Bob Hope comedy, *Iron Petticoat*,
starring Katherine Hepburn as a Soviet Air Force officer, was banned in
Burma after a Soviet Embassy protest that the film "cast a slur on Soviet
womanhood" because the officer was shown as "a woman of loose character."
The Russians released a film of their own in the U.S., *The Forty-First*,
which featured a "pretty Bolshevik guerrilla." But the *Times* review
criticized the ending which endorsed the woman's contention that "might
makes right." The female soldier killed forty-one enemy officers, hence
the title. The *Times* also panned the drama *Seven Women from Hell*, about
a group of battered prisoners who escaped in New Guinea with their
sadistic captors in hot pursuit. The reviewer notes the only redeeming
feature of the movie is that the women "perspire freely and with absolute
conviction." Finally, the paper also panned *Flight Nurse*. The comedies
were not criticized for showing disrespect for servicewomen. But here the reviewer insisted that the courageous nurses and Air Force personnel who med-evaced the wounded were "deserving of a better tribute...[than] this vapid musing in the love life of a flight nurse in Korea...[The film] is concocted so that the dominant theme of Grade A, irradiated love obscures the war with its attendant medical devotion and dedication to the relief of suffering." More modern, *A Yank in Vietnam* released in 1961, climaxed in a fight between the hero and his allied Nationalist guerrillas over "a pretty gun-toting girl."

Besides movies, the *Times* also reviewed non-fiction books. The story of Sara Emma Seelye, who rode with the Union's Civil War generals, was published in 1955. Two years after the war Frank Thompson--spy, nurse and generals' aide--was discovered to be this Canadian runaway. Once unmasked, she wrote the best-selling wartime book *Nurse and Spy*. A book on Clara Barton's service under fire with comparisons to Florence Nightingale was published in 1956.23

Most important to any study of American military women, Mattie Treadwell's official WAC history was published in 1955. The Army announced that the tome gave a "full defense" of its women against the "widespread and sometimes vicious campaign of slander in World War II." Apparently the press still felt one was required. The Chief of Military History, Gen. Orlando Ward said, in understatement, that the Army "did not always understand the corps, its needs and temperament and the many other things that man 'being the son of woman,' should have known but did not, much to his continued embarrassment." The *Times' review praised the detailed and carefully planned volume and called it the best of the Army's special studies series. Ralph Gardner pointed out the historical issues, problems and achievements the women encountered:
The Women's Army Corps did not get off to an easy start. Public skepticism and masculine hostility were directed at the corps during the first year of its existence. And within the Army there was a conservative element that had scarcely recovered from the shock of mechanized cavalry when it was confronted with the militarized woman....Adverse criticism--some justified, some not--seemed inevitable, and the author admits that it hurt. A number of misfits who had infiltrated the corps had to be eliminated, and there was evidence of the commissioning of some unqualified officers. There was also concern over reports "received from all training centers of cases in which women's advancement was allegedly based on matters other than merit...[Other] reports reflected proof of the volunteers' abilities and, from North Africa, General Eisenhower's headquarters expressed enthusiasm for their performance and forwarded requests for many more enlisted women.

Gardner added that Treadwell's work should serve as a model for other women's histories and guides for business and industrial planners incorporating women. He recommended that the volume could serve wherever information was needed on job capabilities, clothing and housing needs, and the effects of their employment on health, conduct, morale, and recreation. Although Gardner's review is complimentary, his allusions to immoral and homosexual behavior or large numbers of other 'misfits' does not fit with evidence that the small number of women integrated were held to very high standards of behavior and performance--much higher than men. Innuendoes about unqualified women being promoted may have been true, but were not pervasive and certainly not so different from some male promotions.

Other non-fiction on military women was also published. In 1957 the Army Nurse Corps published its history to less fanfare. Finally, a 1964 work, Service Women and What They Do, could not have been more timely as a precursor to the upcoming Vietnam era recruiting efforts. The reviewer, noted military journalist Hanson Baldwin, claimed the book would "surprise, astonish, and enlighten readers, excepting old-timers who believe women's place is in the home, to whom it will be depressing."
Baldwin recommended the book especially as a reference for prospective female military recruits. He identified only two minor flaws, that such books become outdated quickly and that this one failed to address the issue "often discussed by many dyspeptic senior male officers of the services [actually more by the defensive younger men]--whether women in uniform in peacetime are really worth their cost and trouble." He did not mention the related questions--if you do not include women in peacetime, will they be suitably trained for an emergency, and is it fair to call on women in emergencies but offer them none of the military's peacetime benefits? He did answer one of his own criticisms though, that "The authors are wise in evading this $64,000 question, for the Wacs, the Waves and the rest are--like the atomic bomb--here to stay whether we like it or not."

Real military women had more important concerns than the farces which were more similar to (or repetitions of) episodes in the non-fiction works. Nurses continued to support their male colleagues as a Korean war issue was again discussed--integrating male nurses. The ANA supported giving male RNs reserve commissions in the ANC in 1954 as Congress considered H.R. 7898. The measure meant to "insure them the opportunity to serve effectively in meeting national nursing needs." Specifically, the ANA wanted to attract more men to the profession and thought an Army commission would further that goal. Col. Ruby Bryant, chief of the ANC, estimated that a hundred new nurses per month were needed to replace nurses leaving the service to marry. But debaters did not discuss the rule forbidding marriage or changing policies to encourage their retention. Robert Stevens, Secretary of the Army, wrote to the HASC that
he supported commissions for male nurses. Congress finally approved the measure so the services could integrate men at the end of 1955.

The first man in line to receive his commission was Pvt. Edward Lyon, "The swearing-in close[d] a 14-year fight to give qualified men equal status with women." That headline made it sound as if the women had been fighting against male equality, it also diminished women's struggles in other areas fighting the discrimination of sex specific roles and jobs. Articles did not state whether male nurses would have the better benefits of military men or the lesser benefits of female military nurses. The Army did say that they would use men close to the front lines, in small isolated stations, and in urology and psychiatric wards where women could not serve. But female military nurses had served in all these places and situations previously. The Army at least recognized that male RNs might help wartime nursing shortages. Although discursive possibilities existed, the same rationale was not used to talk about integrating women into areas such as non-combat flying while pilot shortages would be bemoaned every year.

As with the issue of women in non-traditional fields, the press made a great effort to reassure the public that Lt. Lyon was all-male, highlighting his sports activities and his size (6'5"). The media also carefully noted that Lyon originally wanted to be a doctor but had to shorten his studies to take care of his widowed mother and could not afford medical school. As would be the norm for test cases, Lyon's qualifications were impeccable. And, as was par for the course for the processes of gender integration, Lyon could only serve as a reservist rather than a regular. Need, more than fairness, was still the impetus. And by 1961, the need became even more acute driving the Air Force to launch an all-out recruiting campaign for male nurses. Because of the
military build-up male RNs would eventually be given direct commissions. The services started, but then stopped, an involuntary recall of reserve and National Guard medical personnel late in 1961. And by 1964, even before Tonkin, the DoD was again drafting doctors and advertising extreme medical personnel shortages.  

Women were not drafted, nor were they encouraged to become service doctors. Instead they had to continue to fight inequities in the face of almost overwhelming armed forces needs for their services. In 1954 the Army initiated a program to allow nurses to complete their final year of academic studies while on active duty. At cross purposes, the ANA voted not to endorse the ERA in order to maintain protective legislation for women. Without the ERA the military seemed to offer the best opportunity to many nurses for pay and advancement. But the young president of the Student Nurse Association ran up against still-existing restrictions. She held the conflicting goals of serving in the Navy while marrying and having a large family.

Nurses combatted other restrictions as well. In 1957 they continued to urge Congress to approve the rank of brigadier general (rear admiral, USN) for the chiefs of the corps. The House passed a bill, but only for the chiefs to wear the permanent rank of colonel (captain, USN). In another issue debate, in 1958 the chiefs pushed for nurse corps unification coincident with the discussion of unifying the services. They claimed that the policy of having all officer RNs and LPNs under the corps as supervisors, female medical technicians under the WAC, and male corpsmen under male supervision had to be changed to a clear line of authority from the Surgeon General to one chief in charge of all officer RNs, warrant officer LPNs, and enlisted male and female technicians and corpsmen. Front pages announced call-ups in 1961 when the Pentagon
recalled over eight hundred reserve women along with drafting male doctors and dentists.26

More than the restrictions on the conditions of their service, the public had to be aware of the danger many military nurses served in and of their outstanding contributions, as in earlier periods. In 1954 the Navy named Comdr. Wilma Jackson, whom the Japanese had held as a POW after her capture on Guam in 1941, as head of their nurses. Throughout the decade, those women appointed as chiefs of the corps had served in World War II and Korea. Press announcements of their appointments reviewed their service careers for the public. And, in 1955 Queen Elizabeth honored Korean War nurse, USANC Capt. Ruth Dickson. In 1959 the Times published a feature pictorial on the "Angels of Anzio." Nursing under fire at the beachhead, Army nurses had "proved their valor." Reporter Jack Foisie noted that, while the Anzio nurses served under continuous artillery fire and bombing raids, other nurses served under fire as well. A hospital ship was bombed at Salerno, the Nazis captured a field hospital during the Battle of the Bulge, and island hospitals were infiltrated by the Japanese. But, of the hundreds who served on the Anzio beachhead, he reminded readers on the fifteenth anniversary of the landing, that many were wounded and five died. Their tents, despite their red-cross markings, were dive-bombed repeatedly. Doctors, patients, a Red Cross worker, and three nurses were killed on 7 February 1943. A few days later two more nurses were killed in a bombing raid. These women were eulogized but there had been no public outrage or calls to end the war or to remove women from the battle area. Even in the face of tragedy, in fact, male emphasis on physical attributes rather than real contributions remained; the nurses became the "beachhead's live pin-up girls." When the women finally got out of their coveralls and into dress uniforms for a sight-
seeing tour, they had attracted a caravan of male followers. As the nurses passed the men in foxholes, cheers went up. But when friendly artillery fire could be heard and the men told the women not to be scared—as if they had not just gone through a number of bombing raids—the women responded indignantly, "What makes you think we're scared...?" Foisie told readers in closing that at ANC reunions the comment "We're from Anzio" was still a "badge of courage." Women's courage had been relied on again in the face of the Berlin crisis, showing the government was more than willing to put women—nurses—at risk.27

In 1962 on the other side of the world, the press recognized civilian nurse veterans of World War II for serving under new dangers in South East Asia even before the U.S. was officially involved in the conflict there. When a jeep she was riding in crashed over an embankment, despite broken ribs and severe facial injuries, Tirzah Morgan administered aid to another passenger before losing consciousness. In July 1964, nurses posted at a U.S. Special Forces camp came under fire. The officers praised the "magnificent show of courage" by the nurses who treated the wounded under fire and crawled along the ground to strip the dead of needed medical kits. Several of the nurses were wounded. A larger concern relating to "risk"—that of enemy capture—again came to the public view. A female missionary doctor had been captured and forced to work for the communists. POW status for women was nothing new and, as in the past, caused no domestic outcry. By October 1964 flight nurses were flying on med-evac missions from Vietnam and, by November, 223 Americans were reported to have been killed there since 1961. Soldiers, statesmen, businessmen, and the women and children who accompanied them, as well as military nurses and line forces, obviously lived in growing danger.28

Some positive changes in the medical arena occurred during the
decade. In 1958 women could finally obtain training through the Army Reserve's Medical Specialist program. Frances Iacoboni was the first woman sworn-in under the program as a private, and after training was commissioned as a lieutenant. In 1962, for the first time in ten years, the USAF commissioned two female doctors into the medical services. So, even though they were allowed to enroll women as early as 1953 (male nurses had used the argument that women could be doctors in their campaign to become nurses), the services were not encouraged or directed to enlist large numbers of female doctors.29

Military women besides nurses were kept in the public view in other ways. Historical treatments of military women were presented to the public in discussions of veterans benefits and anniversaries of the women's corps. The Army opened its WAC training center at Ft. McClellan in 1954 with Gen. Ridgway calling the WAC an "indispensable part of the Army." The same year, President Eisenhower signed a bill to extend veterans benefits for service in the WAAC equal to those of the WAC. But WAAC service did not count for active duty time until Congress approved a separate measure in 1959. In 1955 the first female veteran entered the U.S. Soldier's Home. The men welcomed her and part of the facility was renovated in anticipation of other women veterans joining her as they retired. In 1964, Congress approved the naming of a new VA hospital for Edith Nourse Rogers who had been essential to the integration of women into the Armed Forces in World War II. And in 1957, a World War II WAVES veteran became the first female national officer of the American Legion. And the following year, one of the first WACs on Omaha Beach during the D-Day invasion was recognized on her retirement. The first WAC to retire with twenty years of service was honored in 1962. And NBC honored Life
war photographer Margaret Bourke-White with a television special. Large celebrations and honoring ceremonies heralded the of the WAC on its fourteenth and fifteenth anniversaries.

The Corps history was repeatedly reported. Director Mary Milligan remarked, "We feel a justifiable pride in the realization that the history of our corps has proved that American womanhood can serve effectively in our nation's army." WAVES anniversaries were also publicized. In addition, the Times printed a special piece on historic military/war posters. Howard Chandler Christy's World War I posters featuring women were totally neglected, but for World War II, the article included several which featured WACs or pictured women working, and others which used women symbolically to attract male recruits.30

Oveta Culp Hobby's retirement from public service was occasion for retrospectives of her years as WAAC/WAC director from 1942 to 1945. Much fanfare accompanied her departure, since she was the only woman in the Eisenhower cabinet, and the second woman Cabinet member in U.S. history. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey called the HEW Secretary "the best man in the Cabinet." In later years she would be remembered for her legal, newspaper, and political accomplishments more readily than her contributions as the organizer and director of the largest women's corps in the history of the military.31

Active duty line women and current gender issues were in the news less than they had been during World War II and Korea, but were still visible to the public. Manpower shortages and retention problems from 1955 on were most significant for their impact on the military's desire to recruit more women. Servicemen were unhappy with their low pay and benefits that did not allow them to provide adequately for their families. Promotion systems and assignments were also sore points. The men
continually complained of problems with diminishing military prestige and
the decreasing authority of NCOs, as well as a sense of a lack of
leadership and guidance in new world and national situations. The
services could have put more effort into recruiting women as disgruntled
men left the services in large numbers but did not. Moreover, the public
decried lapses in military leadership, but did not consider incentives to
increase the motivation of young men, or women, to pursue military
careers.

Under these circumstances, women's recruiting received the most
media coverage. Uniform changes were meant to attract young women to
recruiting offices. Fashion shows were held at the Waldorf-Astoria prior
to Armed Forces Day 1954 to "familiarize the public with the uniforms of
the various services." In fact, the new green WAC uniform was seen as
single-handedly attracting more women in 1961. Lt.Col. Helen Corthay,
chief WAC recruiter, admitted that besides the uniform, high school
graduates who could not go on to college joined for job training, and
college graduates searched for careers. Fashion was not everything, but
the services still thought that "glamour" was what would attract most
women to the military. Those not interested in feminine fashion or
glamour were, of course, suspect and undesirable. 32

A 1961 recruiting brochure announced "WACS Will Be Girls So...When
a Wac goes off duty, so does her uniform. This means that on her own
time, and at unofficial parties and dances, a Wac is free to wear all the
finery in the feminine world!" The brochure was adorned with photos of
women doing jobs like medical laboratory work and drafting, but
highlighted a photograph of a young man in a suit pinning a corsage on a
white-gloved young woman in a strapless, black evening dress. The Times'
copy reads, "Booklets on WAC Stress Glamour: Femininity of uniforms and
Job Variety Emphasized." This was a far cry from World War II when women's focus on glamour in the military (if there was any) was ridiculed; the public and services wanted women to take war duty seriously and consider it a sacrifice, not fun or glamorous. In both periods, though, recruiters fought the stereotypes of militarized, masculinized women by buying into the emphasis on femininity and heterosexuality, rather than with a call to patriotism, equal rights, or career possibilities (whether real or fictitious). One of the color brochures remarked that "There is no figure more feminine, more dashing, more trim, than that of a young woman in a tailored, smartly-styled ensemble of the Women's Army Corps." Reporter Anna Petersen added that the emphasis on femininity came through on other items of the WAC wardrobe from high-heeled pumps to new "summer dresses that may be bought for variety and glamour." Living accommodations were glamorized too. The Army claimed basic trainees at Ft. McClellan lived in barracks that provided "all the comforts of home, and more...a fascinating, enjoyable human experience." (No wonder Private Benjamin had such unrealistic expectations.) The brochures enticed with allusions to off-duty romance, recreation, travel, adventure, and job training. Another "womanly" concern, making friends, was compared to choosing a large bouquet from a huge garden, rather than one rose from a backyard bush. Officer brochures assured candidates of job security and variety but did not mention gender restrictions. The military still considered "quality" female recruits to be feminine and, mostly, white. No non-whites were pictured in reports on the brochures.

However, a 1955 article recounted a contest between the WACs and WAVES to impress a future recruit, a ten year old black girl. There were black WACs in the newspaper photographs of her visit to Ft. Jay as well. Frances Livingston had written a letter to the women's corps about wanting
to join the service but not being able to decide which branch. The Navy sent some books but the WACs invited her to spend a day with them. She learned that in the Army, "You get money, you get to type, you get food and you get to travel and I like them all." Her sponsor, Capt. Schulz met with her, "I told her to study and get good grades. And when she gets older to discuss it with her parents, because she will need their consent if she enlists at 18. And I suggested that maybe she would want to go to college first and try for a commission." Gender considerations were apparent. Men did not need parental permission at eighteen and Schulz may not have known whether Livingston could afford to go to college. Unlike men, ROTC scholarships and Academy appointments were not options for prospective female recruits.

Livingston had not considered the Marines or the Air Force, but they too were concerned with female enlistments, more or less. In 1954 recruiting efforts, the Marines emphasized that their women were a "real part of the corps." They advertised that "an excellent career is open to college-trained women who are interested in assuming a vital role in the national defense picture." Advertising did not mention restrictions on careers or inequities with male benefits and opportunities, however. On the other hand, the Air Force said it was not recruiting women but certainly welcomed applications. Their emphasis on insuring quality by keeping numbers small continued. Only five-percent of applicants were likely to be accepted despite complaints of losses of women who resigned to get married. Again, no mention was made of rescinding women's no-marriage/no-children policies or that 'quotas' were really 'ceilings'.

Apparently, all the services knew there were misapprehensions retarding their efforts to attract women, so the DoD and Department of Labor issued a pamphlet titled "Careers for Women in the Armed Forces" in
1955. Specifics common to all services included (1) three choices of jobs ("and almost always gets one of them"), (2) working with men and being assigned interchangeably with them (only in select fields), (3) working eight hour days, maybe on shifts, but free to do whatever they wanted off-duty, except that overseas bed checks were conducted "for safety reasons," (4) the opportunity to become officers, (5) little marching after basic training, (6) wearing uniforms only on duty (unlike World War II when many liked to wear their uniform off-duty), (7) living "with a group of women at a post where the average ratio of men to women is twenty to one" (the emphasis was on the availability of men--but, an oppositional reading could have focused on living with women), (8) permission to marry, but could not leave service early unless pregnant. Qualifications included a highschool diploma, age eighteen or over (under twenty-one required parental consent), single, no dependents, and good health. Only the last applied to men.

All the services were concerned with attracting more quality women and retaining them. In 1958, the USAF advertised the same requirements as above with the added maximum age of thirty-four. Women had to be single but could marry after basic training and stay in. They would be trained to "take over" men's jobs. By 1961 the Air Force was working on keeping experienced women longer but did not enlarge the five thousand woman force, while the Navy cut its term of enlistment for women from four to three years. Changes in policies regarding dependents and increased opportunities and benefits (rank, retirement, etc.) were not discussed.

Ambivalence was the order of the day though, especially with budget and force cuts. In 1958, the USMC decommissioned eighteen women's units and the number of female Reservists was to be cut from 630 to 227, all of whom were to be incorporated into male units. In addition, paid hours for
the Reservists would be cut and more would be put on inactive status. By 1960, typical of the Eisenhower Administration, the government was trying to save even more money through military cuts, this time suggesting that service families be returned from overseas. Times editors defended service people who were being asked to bear a disproportionate sacrifice by having to endure even longer and more frequent family separations. This worked against the military's attempts to provide adequate family benefits to encourage retention and careers for military members, rather than totally relying on conscription.

Within two years, the government and services spun around again. "Flexible Response" gave new emphasis to all non-SAC forces. And in spite of the burdens of military life, young "men and women" flocked to recruiters when President Kennedy made a plea to expand the services to deal with hot spots in Berlin, Cuba, and elsewhere, and the draft was increased. In fact, the Times photo accompanying the JFK story pictured female recruits including a number of women of color. A special appeal was made to women, particularly those who might qualify as officers. One eighteen-year-old Finnish woman who could not afford college said she had been thinking about the Army or Navy for five years and that the President's speech simply speeded her decision.33

Berlin, though, was not the crisis that would require the most soldiers, male or female. As the situation became progressively hotter in Indochina during the decade, military women were sent there and served at risk, even before the Tonkin incident; the first WAC was sent in 1955. MSgt. Florence Friedman served as secretary to the commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAGV). Still, not much was said about women in Vietnam until 1962, even as bombings and unrest in the South increased.
American involvement continued to escalate and by October 1964 the Vietcong had captured and held for two years seventeen Americans, including one woman. The POW status of Dr. Eleanor Ardell Vietti, who had run a leprosarium, did not elicit any public outrage. Neither did it dissuade the military from allowing military wives and children to accompany their husbands to Vietnam, or from sending female advisors to the South Vietnamese Air Force in December of 1964. The South Vietnamese wanted to triple the size of their women's corps for clerical duties and asked for an American officer and an NCO adviser to assist them. American nurses were already serving in Vietnam but the line advisers were all male. The women would be stationed in Saigon and not be involved in combat operations or training, which should have been obvious since they were restricted by law and policy from filling those roles at home.34

Although combat was not really one of them, issues of differing conditions of service for line men and women were still being debated and sorted out. In 1955 the Air Force recognized that they were losing many WAFs to marriage. Director Phyllis Gray commented, "We have found that women are as essential to the Air Force as they are to the telephone company, an automobile firm or any other business, and their skill and intelligence make them good wives." Therefore, they often married GIs and resigned as soon as possible with no one proposing to equalize gender-specific marriage policies. By 1962 President Kennedy, in comments on his Commission on the Status of Women, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, praised them for "the advances you have brought about by opening increased opportunity for women in the Federal service and in the higher ranks of the armed forces." Apparently, no one told the President that women were still limited to the rank of lieutenant colonel (commander, USN) except for one colonel (captain, USN) director per service. Despite Kennedy's
upbeat message, true or not, in an ironic twist in late 1963 the USAF decided to eliminate women from the Flight Hostess/Stewardess job. Flight specialists had catered to military passenger comfort and safety since 1952 and the job had been particularly popular among female recruits (and their presence was popular with the men). The Air Force decided, though, that with civilian contract flights providing more passenger transport and new aircraft in the inventory requiring more complicated training and heavy work, they would use men. Men could handle the tasks of steward, assist in moving cargo, and perform other required work. USAF spokesmen were quick to point out that the five thousand WAF did other important jobs such as air traffic control, communications, and administration.

The draft and UMT continued to be issues that increasingly related to women and affected their military service, especially as the country got more heavily involved in South East Asia. In 1954 Mildred McAfee Horton continued to advocate that if a UMT program was to be adopted, it should include women. Retiring Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ridgeway also praised the military for its development of "American citizens," lauding the armed forces' training programs for teaching young men to be good citizens. Members of the media asked the president whether he felt Cold War popular opinion and military need warranted drafting women, citing Gen. Mark Clark's comment that another major war could not be fought without conscripting women for non-combat service. In response, Eisenhower only pointed out that Gen. Clark's opinion, based on having fought in Europe and recognizing women's outstanding contributions, was that in a future war requiring full mobilization, women could help immensely. On the other hand, Eisenhower emphatically recognized the problem of requiring young men to fight for their country without having the right to vote. He favored lowering the voting age, but did not
associate this situation with the inequity of the conditions of women's military service. The president of Smith College, Dr. Thomas Mendenhall, told YWCA members that cultural changes in women's lives had brought up the question whether young women should be liable for peacetime national service. He answered that they should respond to the call for workers and volunteers in shortage areas, but not necessarily militarily. But it was not the inclusion of women that dominated the UMT/UMS discussion. By 1962 most people recognized that young men were not enamored with the military and viewed service not as an obligation of citizenship but as an imposition, an annoyance. The Selective Service System was highly inequitable for men. Prof. Eli Ginzburg of Columbia recommended national training for all and a lottery system within a universal service system. Still, by 1964 under President Johnson, more women were included in Federal service. Besides promoting women, the administration had two other agendas: first, to insure that the armed forces used civilians in support jobs to free men for combat (here read "civilian" as women), and second, to insure that military personnel were considered "first class citizens in every respect." Racial minorities and women wanted the same. Minority men could argue service obligation should confer it, women could not.35

Another debate with increasing significance surrounded commissioning sources for female officers. ROTC and the Academies were closed to women. Ft. McClellan was called the "West Point of the WACs" but obviously did not have even close to the same programs, facilities, or esteem. McClellan was "The world's only pastel-tinted fort," according to the media, which concentrated again on reinscribing femininity rather than officership. "The women wear uniforms designed by Hattie Carnegie and take physical training for added grace and poise instead of muscle
building. Now and then there's a cake baking contest." Developing a competitive spirit was essential for men, culinary talents apparently more important for women. Although the center looked like a college campus, women could be seen marching about during the day. Femininity was ubiquitous however. After duty hours, "a transformation begins. Clothes lines begin to sag with pink things and pretty dresses are brought out. Swains appear in the lounges and dancers fill the service center." But earlier WAC hardships of being treated like men had had to be overcome. "The WACS wore a severe uniform patterned after those of their male comrades in service. Barracks were bare of feminine frills. Women officers were under the close direction of male advisers. In the early days no one was sure just what the WACs could do or were supposed to do. Then, the pendulum swung back. Everyone got very protective." The Times reporter obviously did not consider the wartime context or imperatives in recounting the bleakness of quarters or the protectiveness engendered partly by the Slander Campaign. In any case, by 1955 the service thought they knew enough about women and what they needed. And, what they supposedly needed again reassured the public that women were not becoming masculinized by the service. "One of the most natural instincts in women is to cook a little something now and then. Women just want to whip something up every so often." So the Army built the new barracks with small community kitchens for "sparetime cooking." The Army was sensitive to women's special needs, "...the theory is that women react much more quickly than men to drab surroundings. Accordingly the lounges and the barracks rooms themselves are of pastel tints, and the barracks exteriors are cream colored." The women donated some of their own funds, augmented by PX profits, to buy silver services. The leadership continued to be interested in parental concerns and therefore sent regular letters from
the chaplain, post commander, and company officers concerning daughters’ activities and progress. The chaplain remarked that the women came for fewer personal interviews because they had fewer problems than men.

Other women’s training initiatives made the headlines as well. In 1956 Sen. Irving Ives, New York Republican, proposed a service academy for nurses to train "cadettes." Co-ed training was not considered, except in 1957 when the Marines, pressed for space, integrated some of their barracks. The twenty-nine women at Henderson Hall in Washington D.C. were housed on the second-floor, which was made off-limits to male personnel.  

ROTC was another story. No provisions were made to admit women to the cadet corps but anyone could take the military courses. Abby Hill decided to do just that at Queens College in New York in 1956. She was interested in becoming an Air Force officer after college but being a member of the corps was not an option. Ms. Hill apparently created some pretty difficult problems for the men to solve. "The supply sergeant could not outfit her from his store of blue trousers and size eleven shoes, some officers deemed it unwise to equip her with an M-1 rifle and the instructor for her first class this morning is still uncertain how to change the traditional order: 'Gentlemen, be seated.'" Two years later a WAF ROTC program was established at Gettysburg College. By that time nine colleges or universities nation-wide had women's programs. In 1959 the Air Force was changing its program from training reserve officers to training careerists and ROTC would become the largest commissioning source for officers.

The AAUP, however, was not completely happy with what they viewed as a militarization of colleges, and students protested compulsory ROTC at fifteen major universities. At 154 schools, basic Army ROTC was required for every able-bodied, male, non-veteran freshman and sophomore. Eighty
more schools had small volunteer units. The Navy's newer voluntary program, based on scholarships, was very successful and the Air Force was revamping its semi-compulsory ROTC program. The Army was "retreating sidewise" and decided it could probably still match the 69% of officer candidates ROTC afforded without compulsory attendance. Allowing women to participate officially was not discussed in considering possible shortfalls in a totally voluntary program.37

The male-only service Academies were something different altogether. The real push to integrate women would not come until after 1970, but rumblings were beginning as early as 1956. High school student Mary Ann Bonalski wrote to Rep. T. James Tumulty, New Jersey Democrat, to ask for an appointment to Annapolis. Ms. Bonalski pushed the 'equal rights' (to scholarships) and 'equally qualified' angles of the debate, but it did not take her very far. Tully did say he took the request seriously and would write to the Secretary of the Navy for advice. He arranged for Bonalski to take a preliminary test for applicants. The Secretary of the Navy vetoed the plan for her appointment, saying, "I can't conceive of one girl over there with all those midshipmen." He apparently did not consider that appointing a number of qualified women would solve this problem. Despite Secretary Thomas's concerns about one woman among all those midshipmen, Susan Johnson successfully infiltrated Annapolis in 1958. The seventeen year old high schooler "masqueraded for several hours as a midshipman." She attended evening meal formation in a midshipman's white uniform--marched to the dining room and ate with the brigade. The girl's mother insisted it was just a prank and there were no moral issues involved. For their part in this "immature prank," senior cadets were demoted from their leadership positions for not reporting it. The two midshipmen directly involved were restricted and the girl's
friends "disciplined" her. Her father grounded her and her sorority disqualified her for missing a meeting.

Co-ed academies were not the answer in this decade. Rep. Tully reportedly was considering submitting a bill to establish a separate school for military women, and the NFBPW legislative committee supported the idea of a national military academy to train women for careers in the services. The idea was to "give young women the same opportunity which we give to young men." They intended to put the question to their national body in July, 1957, and propose a bill for Congress. The organization did not consider the restrictions on the conditions of women's service that mitigated against many choosing a military career.

Although young women could not be cadets, the Navy's shortage of instructors and their decision to assign female officers to Annapolis made the front pages. The move was traumatic for some. "One of the last sanctuaries of the male--the cloistered academic halls of the United States Naval Academy--may soon be opened to women." WAVES were to help fill a shortage of qualified male instructors especially in physics, math, and engineering. There was a value hierarchy--military men, civilian men, military women, and civilian women. The public learned that the Academy used 475 instructors including 189 civilians. "One woman civilian did apply, but the Navy said sternly that if women had to be used to instruct midshipmen, they would be women in uniform."

Actually, all the services had previously used women to train men. Tellingly, the move to include female Academy instructors created controversy that was seemingly resolved much earlier. The issue was not just about women training men, but was also about women supervising men; even about women in the service in general. Hanson Baldwin used language which was sure to push buttons in reporting,
The proposal to feminize the classrooms of Annapolis has caused consternation and soul-searching at the Naval Academy and in Washington. There is still controversy about the place of women in the services. Recently a number of Navy petty officers suggested strongly that no men in uniform should be placed under the supervision of women in uniform. The suggestion was rejected by Naval authorities.

"Feminizing" was certainly an intentional choice of words. Objectors did not remember that women trained Navy and Marine pilots in World War II or that Navy nurses supervised medical corpsmen. Despite Navy reluctance, the new Air Force Academy apparently had no problem putting women on its staff. Capt. Naomi McCracken became the first female staff member there in 1957 as Assistant Director of Cadet Records. Although the possibility of integrating female students was not extensively debated in the press, the discussion about female instructors and the media presentation of service academy disputes questioning their competence and viability could have presented a space for considering the appointment of women and, at the very least, included important considerations and terms that would arise again when the inclusion of women was debated in the 1970s.

With the establishment of an Air Force academy having been discussed since the Army and Air Force separated in 1947, in fact, a space had existed for discussing the inclusion of women, as shown at the end of the last chapter. The possibility was not acted upon primarily because of inertia and existing paradigms, but these were being questioned more as evidenced by the Navy's discussions above. By 1954 Air Force leaders were down to a choice of sites for the new school. Like West Point, the goal was seemingly non-gender specific, "to train, indoctrinate and educate, at the undergraduate level, youngsters who desire lifetime careers as professional officers." Graduates would motivate and animate the Air Force for years. The most important part of the training was the
"inculcation and the character formation so long a part of its two sister academies." Despite not having a strictly male curriculum or staff, women were not to be included as students. But they were still currency in military debates. The service finally chose Colorado Springs although it lacked one desired feature, "a nearby girls' college." USAF Secretary Harold Talbott highlighted the priorities in the choice of locations. The school was excellently located for football and once the Academy was established "somebody will see the wisdom of starting a girls' college."

To his credit, the first USAFA superintendent had different goals in mind. Again, these were non-gender specific. Hubert Harmon insisted that the school would be "neither a trade school nor a football factory." The emphasis would be on humanities along with the social and physical sciences. Each cadet had to take three years of both English and history with no special allowances for athletes. Whereas the emphasis would be on graduating those with pilot aptitudes (which ruled out women unless flying policies changed), the academy would also not be a "flying school." The point was to "develop officers first rather than 'plane jockeys'."

The USAFA opened in the summer of 1955 without either the security or encumbrances of tradition. It was open to many possibilities but integrating female students was not one of them. The school was envisioned as a place to develop more of the "band of brothers" for long term careers and for developing future generals. The language used to articulate this institutional mission, along with women's rank restrictions, ruled women out even though the curriculum and educational goals were not gender-specific. The primary goal was to produce a whole person, "broad enough to speak to Congressional committees, to take his [sic] place at the conference table, to comprehend the intricacies of
diplomacy and geo-politics, to handle small talk at tea parties and large actions in war."

By 1962, the USAFA, (contrary to Brian Mitchell's 1980's assertion that the integration of more women and concessions made for the AVF softened the military), was changing the harsh training traditions of the other two Academies. Customary harassment, "hazing", had been inculcated to weed out cadets considered "weak sisters." Superintendent William Stone decided this training method was inappropriate. Recognizing that hazing fueled attrition, but that not all who left were "weak," he banned counterproductive practices, stating, "A lot of this stuff is sophomoric." When "doolies" (freshman) started to visit faculty homes as part of a more humane program, they discovered "that an officer is like any other [male] American. He has a wife, kids, and weeds in the lawn. We don't just play bridge and get drunk all the time." However, the "new ideas" were older than some of the hazing traditions at West Point and Annapolis. In fact, doolies were taught the 1879 thesis of Maj.Gen. John Schofield, "The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment."39

Public anti-Academy criticism and shortages of male applicants drove the changing (sometimes lowering) standards and humanizing and civilianizing measures at the institutions. But this did not mean they would allow women into the cloisters. By 1954 the services had noted a considerable apathy towards the military in the decline in applications for Academy and flying slots, and were taking almost any young man who could pass the tests. By 1957 the services noted the trend that academy graduates were resigning as soon as their commitments for school were fulfilled. Officers cited civilian opportunities and the impact of their unstable lives on their families as the two primary factors in their
leaving the armed forces. The Pentagon at that point decided to push for pay and benefit incentives, which were unassociated with other, and later, initiatives to bolster the 1973 AVF.

In 1958, Hanson Baldwin reported on the Academies' realization that they had to improve both their appointment systems and output to account for the problems. Although the services were calling for higher entrance qualifications at the same time they were lowering requirements, USAFA lowered physical requirements, once again showing they were not immutable but based on non-validated combat standards. "The new rules make youths with minor physical defects eligible for selection." This constant lowering of standards again could have (but did not) allowed for considering accepting women.

Lowered standards were not just a military problem and criticism came from both inside and outside the forces. The Eastern College Athletic Conference quashed the Navy's answer to deteriorating standards. The Navy had been paying the expenses of prospective football players at preparatory schools for special instruction designed to help them pass rigid admission standards later. The Academies were allowed to, and the Army did, pay for six weeks of tutoring to prepare athletes for entrance tests. Later the military started its own "prep schools," where athletes studied math and English to prepare for SAT exam re-takes and could participate in sports without losing a year of eligibility. These schools were not specifically started for athletes--in fact they were designed to help enlisted members and minority candidates prepare for entry--but they quickly changed emphasis to athlete preparation. Internal criticism came from some very senior service members. Adm. Rickover criticized the academic programs and accused the Academies of "harboring juvenile nonsense." He said that the Naval Academy lagged in education because it
spent too much time in military training instead of classroom studies. Rickover, an Annapolis graduate himself, had told the House Appropriations Committee that Academy graduates were "about two years behind graduates of good engineering schools." If lowering the standards and other issues provided a small space to discuss the possibility of women attending the academies, by 1962 that opening had shrunk. The first commandant of USAFA, Maj.Gen. Stillman, disputed Rickover and charged that the Air Force put too much emphasis on academics and not enough on physical training, "too much brain and not enough brawn." He argued that the taxpayers had not built the Academy to compete with MIT but to train military leaders.

The debate between the two schools of thought continued. Surprisingly, the Times sided with the "brawn" when the Secretary of the Navy agreed with the Rickover proposal to appoint a civilian professor as academic dean at Annapolis and replace all but the naval science instructors with civilian teachers. Although Fred North said it was not his intent to "reduce in any way the present emphasis on basic naval indoctrination, discipline, leadership, and motivation to command at sea," editors were not sure this would not be the effect. The editors wrote, "The service academies exist for one purpose--and one only, to produce officers of character dedicated to military careers and to the service of their country." They considered Rickover's an unwise step toward civilianization, but forgot that the commandant's staff would still be military and that most specifically military training took place outside the academic classroom. They also forgot that a large part of the athletic and physical education staffs were civilians, which had not elicited an outcry from the taxpayers, newspapers, or services. In any case, the editors appreciated the West Point program of training officers.
to be better academic instructors rather than hiring better qualified civilian academics.

The debate on the purpose and viability of the Academies continued on the eve of the Vietnam conflict and would only grow more heated as gender issues were explicitly added later. When President Kennedy addressed USAFA graduates in 1963, he reminded them that there were no purely military or purely political problems, and officers had to be broad enough to understand reciprocal relationships between the two. He also called for a broad education and understanding of economics, politics, foreign relations and history, and called for military preparedness to fight with any and all weapons at any level of conflict. Kennedy communicated that the armed forces were increasingly more technical and that defense policy had moved to a global commitment to Flexible Response to contain communism and threats to democracy.

Officers, to their credit, were realizing that the world looked more Kafkaesque than Jominian by 1963. *Time* pointed out that such a world required military officers of "unprecedented competence, character and wisdom." But this also called the Academies' competence into question. Harper's blasted the schools as "so full of narcissistic preening that it may be too unreal for the real world." David Boroff, World War II Army intelligence specialist and NYU English professor, analyzed the institutions as follows: "Surprisingly good students flock to the Academies but something goes wrong when they get there." He called Annapolis "rambunctuosly adolescent," finding seniors writing papers on the history of cross-country running at the USNA. He found young men at West Point to be "bright dutiful boys with a conventional cast of mind." The USMA was "a second-class college for first class students." The students had no incentive to probe intellectually, especially in the
humanities, and were too tired to do so because of too-rigorous training schedules. Although Boroff criticized short tour officer instructors at West Point for using canned lesson plans, he more harshly critiqued "less flamboyantly spartan" Annapolis, where he said officer department heads were embarrassingly uninformed. The "brother rat mentality calls the first-rate foreign language department 'dago' and the catchall humanities department (English, history, and political science) the 'Bull Department'." And at USAFA, called by the others "Disney Land East," Boroff complained that "even the bright cadets did not seem different from the duller ones; they all inhabited the same constricted intellectual and moral universe." Boroff did praise such Air Force initiatives as reducing vocational (flying) training; making the curriculum more flexible; allowing academic majors; adding enrichment courses, an MA program, and more humanities (50%); hiring more instructors with PhDs; and developing open minds. Still, as at the other schools, "Cadet culture has a Boy Scout flavor...[but] it is estrangement from civilian life at all the academies that I find most disturbing." In spite of his harsh criticisms, he did not agree with Rickover that they should be closed. Instead, he recommended more time for cadets to read and study independently and possibly establishing a separate school for training "intellectual philosopher warriors." Such a school could have presumably included women. Time recognized that the "ring knockers" would "gnash their teeth" and respond viscerally to Boroff, even without interjecting the woman question.  

DACOWITS did not publicly address any of the service academy issues, but continued in its commission to support the military on women's issues. Press coverage of the committee's work, meetings, and leadership changes helped keep military women in the public eye. President Eisenhower
praised the committee in 1954 for its help with morale and waxed eloquent, as a soldier himself, on how much he appreciated the contributions of military women. In 1955 the committee met to "stimulate the interest of young women in careers in the armed forces." The DoD and Labor Department, as mentioned previously, had put out a booklet to describe increasing job opportunities for women. However, the committee pointed out that the booklet was not inspired by "any great need" for recruits in the women's services but was an effort to make better qualified women aware of suitable careers. The emphasis was still on small numbers, insuring quality, and those numbers were still restricted by the two-percent ceiling. Besides the traditional career fields of personnel, medicine, and administration, the pamphlet pointed out that women were also adept at and being employed in communications, intelligence, drafting, photography, finance, supply, and air operations support. The feminized ghetto was slowly expanding. In 1958, the media reminded the public that the civilian committee's purpose was advising the DoD "on the feminine role in the military."  

The public also got to see servicewomen's other achievements through press coverage. Some of the "firsts" were actually not, but the media, the public, and possibly the military had forgotten about earlier women's accomplishments. In addition, the services continued to "experiment" with which jobs women could do to free men for heavier, more dangerous work, over, and over, and over again. In 1955 the first woman aide-de-camp was recognized for her performance with the First Army. The New York National Guard accepted its first woman officer in 1956, Nurse Capt. Norma Parson, who had served on active duty in World War II and Korea. The new federal law allowing her enrollment after three hundred years of an all male guard had been passed earlier in the year. WACs were allowed to 'man' radars in
anti-aircraft brigades at Ft. Meade for the first time in 1957—previously, these had been considered combat positions. Reports mentioned that British women had handled the big guns during the Blitz but failed to mention successful U.S. experiments with women in AAA during the war. This late 1950s incident was presented as the first Army experiment "to determine whether women soldiers can help man AAA unit, including those handling Nike guided missiles."

Other women broke into non-traditional areas as well, but they were always considered exceptions. Lt. Sally Osborne bested men in the military police combat course which included arming and disarming mines, infiltrating through barbed wire, throwing grenades, and running a combat infantry assault course while firing the M-1 rifle. Osborne took the same test as her male counterparts scoring 91.5 out of 100. Interestingly, her photograph, besides the weapon and uniform, looks feminine enough, but reports do not mention a husband, fiance, or children. This broke the mold of compulsorily inscribing of femininity and heterosexuality. Lt.Cmdr. Natalie Bell was recognized for her service as chief disposal officer at the Bayonne Supply Depot. Between college and joining the Navy in 1943 she had worked as a bank teller and at a number of secretarial jobs. Despite being in a masculine field, she was appropriately contained, i.e., she lived with her mother, her photo looks very feminine, and her job was classified as "keeping house." Some real housewives went beyond the confines of doing housework in the home, though. In 1961, the Navy hired a suburban housewife to travel to various stations and paint water-colors of the activities of the WAVES. During her two year stint she was to bring the Navy's collection of paintings up to date by adding some depicting Navy women at work. The purpose of this project was to put military women in the public and military members' views.
Military women continued to be visible in fact, but their history was not well remembered. In July, 1961, the media mistakenly reported that the first woman would be assigned to line sea duty. Lt. Charlene Suneson would be the first officer aboard the transport vessel U.S.S. Mann. Because of the shortage of men, the Navy again wanted to see which jobs "women can do effectively." Suneson was anxious to go to sea, despite not knowing what her job would be, because "that's where the Navy's mission really is." No mention was made of the legal strictures against assigning women to "combat vessels" or of Navy policy classifying all but hospital ships and troop transports as "combat." When Suneson reported for duty she was joined by two nurses and a contingent of servicemen's wives. Later, some Navy wives, forgetting or unaware that women had served at sea previously, would complain that women on ships were detrimental to their husbands. In 1962, the Marine Corps' chief of education and information, Lt.Coll. Hazel Benn, had to testify before the Senate subcommittee on preparedness. She apparently did much better than a group of Marines under interrogation by Sen. Thurmond on the politics of the Cold War. She opined that Marines needed to be trained to know their place in their unit and fire team, and how to use their weapon, but she thought that many were limited by age and experience from absorbing details of the philosophy of communism, government facts, and enemy weapons. She refused to be baited by conservative Senators about the appropriateness of troop indoctrinations and civil-military relations and control issues. Her strength and poise, as well as her position of authority, were highlighted and served as an opening for this reporter to talk about Marine women in general. They supposedly were well accepted, although they were not serving in combat, despite performing combat support tasks well; they also exercised command over male subordinates.
without any trouble. The public was reminded once again of their participation and achievements in the World Wars. Lt. Col. Benn was old enough, apparently, that the public would not have to worry about her femininity and morality. She was portrayed as a cheerful old maid living with her pets and maintaining several "feminine" hobbies like cooking.42

The other senior servicewomen most noted in the media were the directors of the women's corps. Women still struggled against trivialization and articles definitely emphasized the standard "quality"--femininity, heterosexuality, morality--along with competence, but this had to be done in a different way. To have a "career" long enough to achieve senior positions, most women had to be single. They then had to be contained by the usual physical descriptions augmented by identification as spinsters. The press implied that their morality was monitored, as many lived with their mothers. In articles about changes of command, their individual accomplishments, as well as their corps' histories, helped to remind the reading public of the contributions and trials of military women. Col. Mary Milligan, the "Little WAC" in the big job came with a "high reputation for diplomacy." When she went to Ft. DesMoines in 1942, she remembered, "there were also protests by male soldiers who saw women swarming over their old cavalry post." She was "charming and extremely bright," and inspired a "cult of personality." In keeping with the patterns, reports on her promotion pointed out that although she had never been married, her mother lived with her.

Acceptance of women by servicemen was the concern. When Emily Gorman took over the WAC in 1962, and she was asked the inevitable question, "Has she found that the men she deals with, Army veterans with a tradition of salty language, are inhibited by her presence; for that matter, by the presence of women in general in a profession that was
exclusively male not so many years ago?" She replied, "It strengthens their character. It's good for them. Indeed, it's a compliment to the men that they can rise to new standards of self-expression." She added that "the veteran Army officers who once sneered or hesitated when women in uniform took places in the Army, now accept the WACs without question...[women] proved they could serve usefully." The patriotic and adventuresome Gorman was described as a rather tiny lady with a pert smile and reputation for strict efficiency that conflicted with her reputation of being like the "one teacher at a girl's school that everyone liked."43

From 1954 to 1964 the token women in the military were not totally invisible but Jeanne Holm tells us they nearly became extinct because of their small numbers and diminished military need. The 1963 GAO report indicting their low retention numbers and, in the Air Force, Gen. LeMay's definite dislike for women in the service, could have driven their complete ouster if it had not been for the bureaucratic inertia of the military and government and their attention to more weighty issues. Service members stayed in sex-typed jobs except for the small number of male nurses and female doctors, and gender specific restrictions continued to limit women's contributions, as well as their opportunities to parent, attend service Academies, or enroll in ROTC. Besides not benefitting from free military educations, nor reaping the career benefits of inclusion in the general officer development programs, their rank, pay, dependent benefits, and retirement possibilities were circumscribed as well. They had to meet stiffer requirements to enter the service but the small number, besides ensuring token status, was meant to insure quality. Containment was the watchword in many ways. Not only were military women contained by the emphasis on quality as femininity, heterosexuality, and
morality, they also could not contest discriminatory policies and laws for fear of being accused of political disloyalty. Nor could they risk the military paying too much attention to them and possibly disbanding the corps. Keeping a low profile was essential; women could not insert themselves into debates on citizenship and service obligation and no one else in a position of power did.44

American and foreign military women and others in non-traditional arenas were, in fact, visible to the public. Historical amnesia concerning their presence could have been intentional; lack of awareness could be attributed to laziness. Amnesia was buttressed by the continued trivialization in press reports, the containment of these women by restrictions and "feminine" portrayals, and by a cultural ideology that encouraged the remembering of myths rather than reality.

The women were still there and they would be increasingly affected by those more pressing issues that allowed the military and public to ignore them much of the time. Those issues affected them, nonetheless, and would increasingly do so, opening additional discursive spaces for the debate on militarizing women in subsequent years. Civil rights, class conflicts, conscription, civil-military relations, America's world role, defense policy, and the requisite military organization would all shape the debate.

From 1965 to 1973, the services would again need women, this time for the Vietnam conflict. Civilian and foreign women in Indo-China contributed to the efforts of both sides and were at risk. The need for military nurses became extremely critical, and as usual, they served at great risk but were only minimally recognized. Line women, albeit not in large numbers, also contributed but were removed further from the public view. Both nurses and line women continued to run up against restrictions
that contained their achievements and ability to contribute. They fought pregnancy restrictions, unfair dependency policies, exclusion from ROTC and the Academies, and exclusion from some jobs. They also fought against increasingly anti-woman backlashes, both inside and outside the military, coming from, among others, conservative politicians and servicemen's wives.

The next period will see severe military racial problems as well as the inclusion of women finally, in civil rights agendas. It will see anti-draft, anti-war, and anti-military sentiments drive the government toward an All Volunteer Force which would eventually rely on more women. And it will see a second wave of women's rights advocacy struggling against containment on the civilian front, which will eventually carry over into military policy debates. ERA debates would force the public, government and military to discuss women and the draft, service Academies, and combat, as well as air and sea duty. Although almost all military women denied any association with feminism, even before 1973, military women would challenge the standards of femininity, heterosexuality, and the moral double standard. Many women's careers would be short-circuited because of these struggles—they would be accused of everything from lesbianism to witchcraft in the increasing ferocious backlash. The resisters may have been relatively less vociferous from 1973 to 1980, but with the election of Ronald Reagan, the deep seeds of resistance to women's full inclusion would bloom again. The debates of this decade, as well as those earlier and later, would surface again ad nauseam as though they had never been discussed nor disproved or resolved. Once again, the failure to debate the "cultural versus political ideology" contradictions and the trivializing presentation of military women inscribed the memory of a domestic, non-martial myth, rather than the remembering of the real
achievements, contributions, and capabilities of women in the armed forces.
Notes to Chapter 7


3. Major issues included challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment and to Plessy v. Ferguson. School integration, composition of juries, and voting in the southern states were all on the front burner. For examples see Arthur Krock, "No Clue to the Separate Schools Case" (editorial), NYT, 6 May 1954, p.32.


5. NYT et al 1954-1964. VD rates overseas were very, very high; in many cases approaching 100% (according to John Shy).

6. Another area of much concern to the military was the unprecedented numbers of GI's who buckled under pressure in POW situations in Korea. Many studies were done after the war to determine whether the cause lay with different enemy practices or differences in the GI's and American citizens of the time. In any case, studies prompted the military to change its soldiers' code of conduct to be more humane and practical. The point here is that men are not very good at being prisoners of war and yet there is disproportionate energy put into worrying about women as POWs and men's reactions to women POWs. This all becomes moot for speculation since we have historical evidence of how women are treated and react as prisoners.

7. Holm, p.163. As usual, the study did not address the gender-specific service policies that, in part, caused the retention and recruiting problems for women. Many of these policies could be, and later were, easily altered without detrimental effects.


p.84. Walker was actually awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. The Army did indeed take it away. It was finally reinstated in 1976.


is signed by a female instructor. "Woman on Air Academy Staff" (AP), 27 April 1957, p.10.


43. Most of these articles are relatively long and/or accompanied by photographs. "Little WAC in Big Job," NYT, 5 January 1957, p.4. "New Chief for the WAC," 16 February 1962, p.14. On Winifred Quick, "Montana Woman Named New WAVES Director" (UP), 12 April 1957, p.14. On Emma Jane Riley, "New Head of Air Force Women" (AP photo), 27 August 1957. On Margaret Henderson, "A Texan Commands Women Marines" (AP), 3 March 1959, p.18. On Elizabeth Ray, "Change Set in Top Post of Women in the Air Force" (UPI), 8 August 1961, p.21. On Barbara Bishop, "New Chief of Women Marines" (UPI photo), 4 January 1964, p.46. Because there was only one female colonel authorized per service many of these women's predecessors, if they did not have twenty-years service to qualify for retirement or wanted to stay on active duty over twenty-years, were demoted from full colonel to lieutenant colonel when their duty as director ended.

44. Holm, Women in the Military, pp.166-185.
SECTION IV

VIETNAM, 1965–1973
CHAPTER 8
TONKIN TO TET, 1965-1968

In 1964 North Vietnamese aircraft allegedly launched an unprovoked attack on U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and Lyndon Johnson ordered American forces to retaliate. With that, the U.S. officially entered the Vietnam Conflict increasing the number of troops in South East Asia, including line women and nurses, rapidly and dramatically. The politics and the battles of the conflict absorbed the majority of print space that the Civil Rights movement did not. Issues that attracted attention in the previous decade continued to do so at even higher levels of concern; some were magnified by the involvement overseas: the draft was unfair, blacks shared an unequal burden of service obligation and were not treated as first-class citizens at home, and the public increasingly questioned the U.S. role in South East Asia and as the world's defender against of communism. Some worried that the military had become too large, too expensive, and too powerful in domestic politics. This tension would build until the nation seemed to break apart in 1968 after the Tet offensive. The Vietnam War, with its increasing demand for manpower and its politically disruptive impact, is the central concern of this chapter, but of great collateral importance for the role of women in the military are two other related issues--race relations and the Selective Service System.

Although line women served in South East Asia, surprisingly, they were less visible to the public than in the decade before. And nurses,
essential to the war effort and making great sacrifices, were not given much more attention by the press. Servicewomen and nurses again took a back seat to the larger issues; issues that had affected them before and would continue to do so. Still, even at a diminished level, military women were visible to the public, both in their own right and as part of the larger puzzle of the condition of American society. The armed forces, government, and public would continue to work on that puzzle through and beyond 1973. Issues pertaining directly to the women, as in the past, were their service in harm's way; what jobs they could do; if they should be drafted; and if their numbers, ranks, conditions of service, and benefits should be restricted. Also, as in the past, some of the resolutions of these questions were to be found in arenas that were not strictly gendered or strictly military. Not used in relation to military women themselves, discursive spaces did exist to talk about service's women's issues.

While military line women were initially prohibited from going to Vietnam because of the dangers associated with guerrilla war, nurses were expected to go and served at great risk. And civilian women, including family members, employees, and others needed by the military, faced the dangers in-theater. Foreign women, both in Indo-China and elsewhere in the world, were often presented to the public as fighters or as in danger; sometimes that danger came from allied forces. But cultural myths remained intact; military women were supposedly kept free from risk. However, the reality was that nurses and other women faced danger at every turn. And even the line woman's world started to change as the women's movement captured an increasing amount of media attention. Lyndon Johnson, understanding that racial injustice was not the only civil rights problem, advocated applying the movements' principles to other
marginalized groups and supported changes to equalize conditions for women. In 1967, he signed the bill that lifted the two-percent limit on the women's corps and restrictions on women's rank, equalizing conditions of men's and women's service to the greatest extent thus far.

Even though Johnson made the connection between the black rights movement and inequities other groups faced, many people did not. Although some claimed that inequality between men of color and whites was inherently different than inequality between men and women, just as they had during earlier suffrage debates, a space opened for the discourse. The same was true for discussions on conscription related to race, class, and the general unfairness of the Selective Service System. The conditions of women's service, while not center stage, were part of these discussions. If they had been brought to the center, the discussion potentially might have expanded to a debate of cultural ideals and myths vis-a-vis political ideology and military necessity, a discussion of what citizenship entailed in terms of rights, responsibilities, and privileges regardless of skin color or genitalia. And, in this period (and moreso later), sexual preference could have been included in the debate concerning service obligation and opportunity.

The continuous discussion in the press about American women's social roles, both mythic and real, as always, provides a useful context within which to place military women's portrayals. The re-energizing of the women's movement is especially salient after 1963. The women's movement was increasingly referred to between 1965 and 1973 in discussions of military women. Servicewomen themselves seemed to ignore or try to distance themselves from feminism; they were still trying to stay safe by maintaining a low profile generally, and were still contained within the quality rubric of femininity, morality, and heterosexuality. 'Women's
Libbers' were often portrayed as having problems in at least one, if not all, of these areas. In addition to the contextual material of civilian women's status, this chapter will show how the press represented military women and nurses, both in general and in the Vietnam conflict, to the American public. Again, I will also look at foreign women both in their portrayal in military roles that could have informed U.S. debates and in terms of how they were treated by American forces. The latter influenced, as always, how soldiers and military leaders related to women in general and influenced how U.S. military women and nurses were treated.

This chapter also looks at two representations of the more significant issues that bore on military women's conditions of service—racial tensions in the forces concurrent with racial unrest at home, and anti-draft sentiment among the public. These actually came to a head and will be treated again in the next chapter, but it is important to set the stage here for continuity in the debate concerning how citizenship relates to a military or national service obligation. Evidence shows that class was definitely a component of both debates.

Finally, the press also started giving more attention to homosexuals in the military. Although some suspected and admitted gay men and lesbians were persecuted earlier, particularly during the witch hunts of the McCarthy era, their presence became a growing concern. Discussions about their participation are also part of the 'first-class citizenship versus military obligation' debate and mirrors racial concerns. Questions of homosexuals' competence mirrors concerns about women's abilities. And, for some, if genitalia allowed discriminations that skin color finally would not, sexuality would allow for even more prejudice than gender did.
Among civilian women, the 'second wave' of feminism had been
touched-off by, among other things, Betty Friedan's Feminine Mystique
(1963). The women who founded the National Organization for Women and
other activists renewed the push for an ERA. The larger agenda was
actually mapped out in American Women: The Report of the President's
Commission on the Status of Women and Other Publications of the Commission
published in 1965. Editor Margaret Mead announced the conclusion that
"any barrier whatsoever to full participation on the level of the
privileged white, adult, American male...should be treated as a handicap
so that it can be overcome." Times' reviewer, Edward D. Eddy, found these
goals of the Commission "curious and disturbing." The theme of the report
was "the necessity for freedom of choice among different life patterns."
But Eddy's response was typical of men either openly or unconsciously
trying to protect prevailing gender ideology largely based in historical
myth: Any slight change in the relative balance of power was seen as a
complete reversal entailing the subordination of men to women. Echoing
the tenets of 'Republican Motherhood', Eddy complained, "If adopted, this
will immediately place the white adult American male in the disadvantaged
group." Eddy pushed the view that there might be "something inherently
wrong" with a woman's desire to be a wife, mother, and careerist. Not
surprisingly, he conflated biological difference relating to social
relationships with constructed gender differences relating to political
rights.

The same issue of the Book Review included Elizabeth Janeway's
review of Andrew Sinclair's The Better Half: The Emancipation of American
Women and Karl Stern's The Flight From Woman. Later, Gloria Steinem
reviewed Born Female: The High Cost of Keeping Women Down for the Times.
Steinem describes Caroline Bird's response to those who came to
conclusions similar to Eddy's. Bird contested the crux of opposition arguments including that the militarization of women was masculinizing and that women who contested gendered bases for political, social, and economic relations were unfeminine. Some understood the conservative agenda and apprehensions, but discounted them. Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary of Labor said, "fearing neuterization is an old and illogical defense against the discrimination that really exists." Steinem gave high praise to Bird: "Born Female is enough to convince anyone from male chauvinist to female Uncle Tom, that the superstition and restrictive prejudices on which our system of work is built are depriving the country of nearly half its talent." Bird's purpose was to debunk myths such as that women controlled U.S. economic power, that women had more manual dexterity when it came to poorly paid factory work (but not brain surgery), that women were poor investments for employers who justified not hiring women because they quit to get married or have babies, when in actuality, they stayed longer, at lower pay, unless forced to leave when they married or had children (as in the military); and 'flatteringly' argued that women were more moral and less tainted by power, so they would rather "be loved than be equal." Their success was not untainted, though, because they were often subjected to the emotional blackmail of being labeled "unfeminine." Whereas fears of being called "unmasculine" might have driven men into wars, the opposite had kept women in the home. Finally, Bird argued that equal employment opportunities should be based on individual ability determined by mental and physical tests. "Both sexes would be liable to military and jury service and equally entitled to exemption. As in Israel, women in the military could relieve men with dependents for whom service is a real hardship." Her proposals were meant to liberate both sexes, but she was not hopeful of quick resolution.
"Equity speaks softly and wins in the end, but it is expediency, with its loud voice, that sets the time of victory," Bird concluded.¹

The agenda for the women's movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s included as its number one objective the passage of the ERA. Although the Amendment was not centrally concerned with the armed forces, debates surrounding the ERA would be especially significant for military women in terms of restrictions on their conditions of service, draft laws, service academy attendance, and their jobs/positions on aircraft and on board ships, along with concomitant discussions of the possibility of using women in combat. In this particular period momentum for support of the measure had not yet been built in Congress or among candidates for national office. Later, the ERA would be debated heavily in both major political parties. Supporters felt that the ERA was a necessary foundation on which to build a more fair and equitable gender balance.²

As always, studies and surveys were used to gauge public opinion. One such study showed that husbands liked their wives to work outside the home, "provided, of course, her activities don't interfere with her husband's comfort." Another study found that "woman is not a member of the weaker sex." Dr. Kermit Krantz announced "the female is biologically superior, no question about it." Another researcher discovered that "all mature, intellectually creative women were tomboys when they were young." Dr. Thomas Boslooper found, "Most outstanding women are physically active in one way or another." This minister and history PhD also found evidence in the Bible citing virtuous women who were active at home and in the fields and those who "deliberately strengthens her arms and her abdomen." However, Boslooper also echoed Bird, saying that many active women tried to keep their athletic abilities hidden because of the social stigma that physically active women lacked femininity. The publication of these
monographs and studies and discussions of them in the public view demonstrates that a space did exist in which to talk about all the issues of gender specific conditions of military service that limited women's opportunities to contribute. ³

Some women challenged dominant gender ideology, but professional women still had to be contained within 'femininity'. If single, being 'married' to one's work was acceptable. In 1965 Irene Parsons was named the head of all VA personnel, making her the highest ranking woman in the Government's third largest agency. Being single, she said she devoted most of her time to work. She had served in the Coast Guard in World War II and with the VA since 1946. Supervising 170,000 workers, the press called her the kind of female executive President Johnson was looking for, "attractive and feminine; decisive without being dictatorial; intelligent, and instinctively considerate of others. Parsons put equal job opportunities were at the top of her personal agenda. More than anyone in the limelight previously, she connected race and gender and was quoted in Ebony as saying, "I've always said that anyone who discriminates against the Negro will discriminate against women. If they do it toward one they'll do it toward any group."⁴

The Times connected race and gender in another way, focusing on minority women's issues. Despite the double jeopardy that women of color had always faced, they had continued to make advances. Betty Mac Jumper was the first woman elected as a chairman of the tribal council of the Seminole Indians of Florida. Since the Seminoles had never signed a treaty, the forty-four-year-old working mother vowed to continue their war against the United States in the courts rather than on the battle field. Other Native American women in New York City were featured in an article about how "Indian chic" disturbed them. Even these "remarkably
assimilated" women were caught up in the "renaissance of Indian culture," fueled in part by the Black pride movement. The women interviewed did not feel oppressive discrimination, but were still largely confined to the female ghetto as teachers and nurses.

Black women not only faced the same problems as white women, but additional ones as well. They often resented the emphasis on the "feminine mystique" of women they did not consider their sisters. Black women interviewed by the Times felt forced to consider what their actions in the women's movement might do to help or hinder black men. They agreed that they owed their first allegiance to their race. However, they still found the greatest frustration in the hypocrisy concerning working women. Many had to work, but they knew doing so put them at odds with middle-class gender ideology. They felt they were criticized for lack of "balance." President Johnson and others decried the "collapse of the family unit," especially in the African-American community.⁵

If working outside the home was still an unresolved issue, work in non-traditional fields continued to be a matter of even greater concern. The NFBPW complained that protective legislation forced employers to discriminate and the group won agreement from Johnson to change Executive Order 11246 on equal employment to include sex as a category of discrimination. Some states refused to include women in their civil rights acts, as did Johnson's home state, Texas. In spite of inconsistencies, some women in non-traditional fields commonly linked to military service, like fire fighting and police work, gained from the new laws and new awareness. In fact, Long Island boasted two female fire commissioners and the New York State Commission on Human Rights ruled that policewomen were entitled to the same pay as their male counterparts.⁶
In all, the American public had to be very aware of the "Second Feminist Wave" by 1968. They continued to struggle for the passage of the ERA, enforcement of Title VII in gender cases, and the repeal of protective legislation. But, as Caroline Bird had written, women who fought the "subtle limitations imposed by custom," often reinforced by specific barriers, were pejoratively labelled "feminists" and that translated as "unfeminine." These activists also specifically connected racial and gender discrimination, pointing out the fallacy that "the myth of the 'contented woman', who did not want to have suffrage or other civil rights and equal opportunities, had the same social function as the myth of the 'contented Negro'." But not all would go so far, the press categorized feminists as radicals, revolutionaries, or evolutionary pragmatists. We will find military women largely in the camp that Betty Friedan complained about when she said, "For years feminism has been an apology. All those ladies' auxiliaries like the League of Women Voters, saying, 'Don't get us wrong; we're not feminists.' What self-denigration! I call them Aunt Toms. Aunt Toms think there are three kinds of people--men, women and themselves." Ti-Grace Atkinson, classified as a militant theorist, agreed with Friedan, "We've always been so defensive. Oh, no, we're not feminists, but can we just have a little more, huh? Please? Huh?' I think it's time we went on the offensive." And that they did. Partly through their efforts, in 1967 the United Nations unanimously passed a Declaration on Women's Rights. Article one laid the foundation, "Discrimination against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offense against human dignity." Article three called for the "abolition of customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women." Applying these tenets to women in the services
would indeed have been revolutionary; military women claiming allegiance to such sentiments publicly would have been simply dangerous.

Even without allying with feminism, some servicewomen were clearly high achievers. Promotions of senior military women were covered by the press as they had been in the past. However, in this period, the reports grew in importance as the limit on women's ranks was protested and finally lifted in 1967. Before the limit was lifted, in 1965 the services announced the promotion of Lt.Col. Jeanne Holm to colonel and her appointment as director of the WAF. Holm would play a significant role for Air Force women for many years to come. The Navy finally promoted a woman to regular captain, Mary Keener, an aviation medicine specialist. The Times reported that this was the first time in Navy history that a woman with a regular commission on active duty had achieved this rank.

In 1966, Congress started work on the bill to allow these women and others to compete for promotions beyond lieutenant colonel (USN commander), allowing them to become permanent colonels, captains, generals, and admirals. The press reported that the military had asked Congress to initiate the process for change. Although the military had favored the restriction in the 1948 integration act, by 1966 the services admitted that women were having to retire prematurely. Also, their inability to compete in "near equality" with men in promotion and retirement, caused a morale problem. The Pentagon still limited opportunities, though as military leaders told Congress, the numbers of flag rank women would remain small. The higher ranks would go with certain positions rather than individuals. Women did not compete for commanders' jobs. There would be very few "women's jobs" that would warrant the higher ranks. When President Johnson signed the bill in
November 1967, he mistakenly, but hopefully, said the measure would "assure equal opportunity for women in the armed services." He added, "There is no reason why we should not someday have a female chief of staff or even a commander in chief." The press warned that "although none could qualify to be raised in rank to general or admiral, they could someday compete with men for those ranks." By the end of 1968 women were competing and the Army named six women as colonels in the first promotions since the new law. The Times reported that the measure had put women on "the same footing as men" for promotions. With the remaining restrictions on women's service this was not completely accurate.

Still, positive coverage of women in the services and their accomplishments continued to be news. In March 1966, Ens. Gale Gordon was the first woman to make a solo flight for the Navy as part of the instruction to become an aviation experimental psychologist. In 1968, the U.S. Postmaster issued a stamp honoring women Marines on their twenty-fifth anniversary. (Obviously, the Postal Service did not consider the World War I Women's Reserve to be relevant.) Nevertheless, the press reported their history of service from 1917 onward. The stamp on the commemorative five cent postal card depicted a "pert woman Marine in her green uniform, against a red background." Presumably these cards may have reached more Americans than the announcement in the papers. Other women were praised for contributions in World War I and the Civil War. As to the latter, Mary Massey's book Bonnet Brigades was published in 1966. Her story of how the war impacted women showed that the event was "an important link in the chain of events that enabled women to escape the close quarters where...their menfolk had caged them." Reviewers praised Massey's work for both the breadth and depth of its coverage of how women handled wartime circumstances. The book honored,
Those women who influenced statecraft and even fought in the war (albeit in disguise)... Those who stayed at home in the time-honored womanly way, and suffered deprivation, bereavement, worked the land and then sometimes lost it... those who elected the only slightly less "womanly" roles of teacher of freedmen or Army nurse.

Nurses, spies, camp followers, and "Government girls" had their stories told and Massey included the humorous as well as the serious.

General Rosecrans's fulminations against women in camp in or out of uniform... his disgust at the "flagrant outrage" occasioned by one of his sergeants, who "was delivered of a baby... in violation of all military law and of Army regulations..."

The only fault the reviewer found was with the treatment of black women, "who were unable to leave a written record" and who Massey unjustifiably criticized for their failure to realize that "emancipation brought grave responsibilities."

Some of the news on servicewomen was not as positive, as they did experience some casualties. However, as in the past, no one called for the disbanding of the corps. For instance, two WAVES who were assigned as live-in caretakers for an admiral's invalid wife, died in a fire at his home. The admiral saved his wife but died in the "act of heroism." The two sleeping WAVES died of smoke-inhalation. They were not alerted by the admiral, who presumably could have used their help, or by his two Filipino stewards, who also escaped uninjured. The report focused on the admiral's illustrious career and mentioned the WAVES' only briefly. The press made no issue of the use of military personnel for caretaking and servant duty which was common practice. Later, in 1967, a WAC parachutist died. The only female member of the Ft. Leavenworth Sport Parachutist Club had made forty-five previous jumps; on the forty-sixth her parachute failed to open. There was no outcry against military women or female parachutists. If there had been, it seems it would have been visible to the public. For
instance, in 1965, as a result of two seventeen year old male soldiers (volunteers) being killed in combat in Vietnam and complaints from parents and Congress, the Pentagon decided to withdraw all those under eighteen from any service in Vietnam (not just infantry).10

Although no one called for putting women out of the service because of these deaths, some did complain about the military's treatment of women after reading about Marine training techniques. Nan Robertson did not mention in her Times article that men also cried during basic training when she reported, "[Women] cry when they get here. They cry when they leave. They also cry a lot during training, but they are encouraged to weep in the showers, so as not to upset the other members of their platoon." Robertson gave the familiar line that Women Marines had no nickname like the WACs. But, whereas in the past this was said to be because they were fully accepted, Robertson reported that the men did have nicknames for them, just none "fit to print." Drill instructors came in for special attention. "The instructors are magnificent specimens of autocracy in action. While the female of the species is not as savage as the male, she is a fearsome authority symbol," Roberts reported there were eight female instructors and two males. The women were presented as rougher, since "the men are not allowed to bark, bellow or bawl at their charges. The women D.I.'s are--and do." The men were also not allowed to use profanity. The requirements for men to gain the coveted post of D.I. included being married, "mature", and having their wife's approval. The male instructors lauded the women for learning to drill better. "Ninety per cent of them have better rhythm than men. They learn faster, they like to please us and they like to show themselves off," they claimed. The purpose of training was for the women to "learn teamwork, pride, military snap and instant response to commands." They did not have to

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carry weapons or packs but did have to run and do calisthenics. Robertson implied that even this physical training was unnecessary by reporting that the World War I Marinettes had "faced no greater terror than stenographic duties" and modern day recruits had to face a fearsome female D.I. who drilled them on such important USMC regulations as what color lipstick had to be worn with the winter uniform. The correct answer: "it must harmonize with the bright scarlet cord on the cap." More importantly, the recruits took classes in Marine history and customs and courtesies, the "Communist menace," the "American Way of Life," social diseases, and "sex instruction." The latter two, an admission that "quality", defined as morality, might have to be learned by modern women, would have created a whole new scandal for the 1940s WAC, but it did not in 1968. Thirteen training hours were devoted to "image development." Formerly called "grooming," this was also an admission that female enlistees might not naturally be "feminine enough in clothes and hair styles and hygiene." Maj.Gen. Ormund Simpson, Parris Island Commandant, felt femininity could be learned and discussed the plan to double the number of hours of such training. "We don't want them to be like men--if we did we'd go out and get some more men," he said. He ignored the fact that women were enlisted, by-and-large, when there was a shortage of men.

Female DIs and officers who were veterans of World War II saw an immense difference in recruits between 1943 and 1968. Earlier recruits were dedicated, skilled, independent, and needed a minimum of training. Members of the current pool were 18 to 20, from lower income families, and had been drifting around in unskilled jobs. A high percentage came from broken homes. One officer remarked, "These days the girls don't know what they want to do. The Marines are not a career for them--it's an interim period for them to find their way...They're so quick to say, 'I can't do..."
it.' They degrade themselves." But, readers should have remembered that all these young women were volunteers and had other options. And, veterans also denigrated young men entering the service for much the same reasons. The differences between men's and women's qualifications and conditions of service remained as they had been and, as a result, it was still difficult for women to consider a full military career. Women could marry after basic training, but were not allowed to have children. Marine women, previously limited to CONUS assignments, were allowed to serve all over the world, including Saigon.

Some readers may have gotten satisfaction that female Marines received the same training as men, but others complained. Philip Piaker wrote to the Times' editors that no competent behavioral scientist could support humiliating recruits during basic training "to turn them into reliable fighting men." He suggested that the Israeli military had the right answer in showing "that respect for individual human dignity does not diminish the fighting spirit of its soldiers." Even if the military thought it had to humiliate and degrade men to train them for combat, certainly female typists should not have to endure the same process to "convert them from civilians to obedient soldiers." Piaker added that, since the Corps was probably not a "haven for female misfits or delinquents," there was no point treating them in a "childish way." He thought these training methods especially inappropriate since the Marine women were all volunteers rather than conscripts and that the Corps would choose to "salute their women" in such a manner.11

Other news about military women was more negative. Morality was not only a standard for female member's "quality", immorality became a publicized reason for discharges. The ACLU took the case of a WAC who lost her security clearance and job as a photographic technician after a
two-and-a-half hour Pentagon interview "about her intimate life" and "seven reports of...her immorality." Security officers refused to show Carolyn Tatnall the reports or to name her accusers. Several months later in 1968, eight WACs were discharged for alleged homosexuality. They filed suit at Ft. McClellan to stop dishonorable discharge proceedings. On the other hand, perhaps there was a problem with being too moral. An Air Force mess attendant was dismissed by the military and then re-instated by the Senate after she refused to work Saturdays because she was a Seventh-Day Adventist. The services would not be allowed to practice religious discrimination in this case.¹²

Other negative publicity for women in the services in 1968 surrounded the court-martial of Marine Corporal Mary Burns. Her offense was not immorality but disobedience as she "expressed opposition to the Vietnam war and asked to be released from service." She refused to wear her uniform, refused to report for duty, and refused to accept her pay check. As a devout Catholic, she believed in the "primacy of conscience" and had come to abhor the horrors of war. Time chastised her because her "secretarial job involv[ing] relaying personal radio messages from Leathernecks in Viet Nam to their families at home was scarcely belligerent." Reporters described her as a "pert blue-eyed blond" who explained her "starry-eyed dissent" came after she had joined directly out of high school to "learn from other people and to travel." Her twin brothers had also refused to submit to the draft or accept a student deferment. The press felt it important to note that she wore "a yellow turtle-neck and beige culottes" at her hearing. Almost every press account included a photograph of the attractive Marine. She received a general discharge, while some male military members were resigning or
defecting in opposition to the war and, of course, some young men left the country rather than be subjected to the draft for an "unjust war."\(^{13}\)

While some military women were protesting the war, others were volunteering to serve in Vietnam. The public was definitely aware that those assigned there served in harm's way. The first two WACs assigned to Saigon arrived in January 1965 and lived through a coup d'état and anti-American riot within their first few weeks. Their duties included advising the South Vietnamese women's corps. The press reassured, though, that the WACs were "not to participate directly in combat against the Vietcong guerrillas." One of the American advisers, Maj. Kathleen Wilkes, was an expert in the economics of developing countries including those of South East Asia, and a veteran of World War II and Korea. Others also wanted to serve in-theater and at a 1966 press conference, when told that women in the services were "distressed because they are not being called upon to serve in Vietnam," President Johnson promised he and Bill Moyers would look into the situation, answering, "there is always a chance of anything taking place when our women are sufficiently distressed. I will explore your inquiry...."

The public learned that for some women even non-combat duty would not be enough from the headline, "Blonde, 21, Seeks to Join the Combat in Vietnam." If a person was only identified by physical attributes, readers could take for granted the subject was a woman. Jennifer Johnson of Seattle, who was auditing her eighth ROTC military science course, told reporters "I'm willing to die." She attended class and did the required work but received no credit nor a commission for her ROTC studies. She also did not receive a response from the State Department on her request for a passport but she insisted, "I've been interested in general warfare for as long as I can remember...People are always pushing girls into the
WAC or nursing when they want to help the country, but that doesn't really interest me. I really want to do my part."

A year after LBJ's news conference, although Ms. Johnson would not get her wish to join in the fighting, the public learned that the services would send more women to the war zone. By February, 1967, the Army announced a twenty-percent expansion of the corps and an increase to 120 WACs assigned in South Vietnam. The Air Force announced an increase in total strength by six times and that they would assign ten WAF to Saigon. A month later, the Marines announced that they would send ten women to a "combat area" for the first time in their history. By mid-1968, war needs prompted the Army to expand its corps of 10,000 women by another third.\textsuperscript{14}

The service Academies would continue to bar female students, which would only become a major issue with ERA debates and AVF establishment after 1973. However, women's relationship to the schools was discussed during this period as it had been earlier. The House decided to study admissions requirements in 1965 with an eye to lowering academic standards. The House subcommittee mission was outlined as follows: "to determine whether the present laws, policies, and regulations, including test scores, assure a future professional military force truly representative of a cross section of the American people." The founder, South Carolina Democrat L. Mendel Rivers, said he believed tests could not, "determine motivation, dedication, sincerity, nor...potential leaders of men." Although a true cross section should have included women, since the 1948 integration act some men had learned to serve under women, and women had proved their motivation and dedication; a reference to "develop[ing] combat leaders and professional military men" effectively prevented a discussion of women's inclusion. Instead, Annapolis continued to pick Color Girls and West Point hired a female instructor. The press
forgot, in the case of the latter, that there had been women there previously and thought the fifty year old divorced art teacher had breached the "impenetrable gray bastion of masculinity." Cadets responded enthusiastically, "...it's great having a woman instructor...You get tired of seeing men all the time." "We're not used to getting a female point of view...It's been a long time since I've had a woman teacher, but I think it's a good idea." Lewis, used to mostly male environments, had previously worked for Pan American World Airways and served as a merchant marine in World War II. Although Lewis appreciated the school more after she dispelled her negative first impressions, Adm. Rickover and others continued to criticize the service schools as setting up "a man for 'permanent adolescence' rather than command in the Navy." The admiral felt that Annapolis was run "like a boys' military preparatory school" instead of educating future officers.15

Nurses had been sent to Vietnam before line women and were acknowledged to be at more risk. The public repeatedly saw that military nurses served in harm's way. But, again, casualties among the women did not prompt their withdrawal from the war zone, nor calls for the corps' dissolution. Instead, many more were sent and line women were added to the forces there. Navy nurses injured by a terrorist bombing of the officers' quarters in Saigon on Christmas eve, 1964, were awarded Purple Hearts. They were identified as the first American women to receive the award in South Vietnam. The four nurses had refused medical attention until they had treated all sixty wounded men. The theme was that women volunteered in response to military needs. In articles like "Doctors at Work Near Battle Line," readers learned that ten nurses assisted the seven doctors at an Army field hospital near the fighting and Jack Raymond reported that shooting could be heard as he interviewed doctors and
Lt. Col. Margaret Clark, who had twenty-two years of service already and had volunteered for the war zone "because we are so needed." Clark, eventually the chief nurse in Vietnam, was named the U.S. Army "Nurse of the Year" in 1966. Lt. Hansine Johnson had volunteered for Vietnam after serving two years at West Point, "because there's a need here." The women, though not unafraid, were brave enough to take the very real risk of injury or death. In September 1965, when nurses started being sent into the countryside en masse, the previously mostly male military spaces outside of Saigon were shocked. "The Quinhon Officer's Club had never seen anything like it. Every bar stool was occupied by a [American] woman." They were to open the largest field hospital in South Vietnam. "The staff of more than 300 doctors, surgeons, and nurses--male and female--and enlisted personnel," included thirty-nine female nurses and seventeen male nurses. One woman said, "They didn't tell us we were going to Vietnam until we got on the boat...We've never lived in tents before, it will be quite an experience." All the women had volunteered for service, but not all had volunteered for South-East Asian duty.

Many nurses did volunteer for Vietnam and front-line service though. The press recognized one, USAF Capt. Barbara Smith, for her contributions to her alma mater to be used to train more nurses. Readers learned from her letters to her former teachers and classmates what life was like for military women in the war-zone and the dangers they faced. In describing her station at Gamranh she talked of the beauty of the "jungle-covered hills--full of Vietcong. At night we can see and hear them shelling the hills and dropping flares...." She told of working in sand-bagged tents that were impossible to keep clean. The sand-bags, she explained, were to protect against mortar attacks. Smith had volunteered for war duty "because she wanted to serve her country where she was most needed." She
and others also participated in civilian assistance programs to help "win the minds and hearts" of the Vietnamese people. Smith went out on her one day off a week to help those in need and to keep busy. If anyone had previously doubted that there was a real threat, they could not have after reading this report. Smith told of visiting a village without armed escorts. Although authorized to do so to protect their patients, none of the medical personnel carried weapons "as a matter of principle." On this visit the hut where they worked was attacked. No one was hit, but Smith survived a very close call. She also wrote in one letter that the hospital was not immune to North Vietnamese shelling. Smith told the nuns at her former school, "I'm sure your prayers had something to do with the poor aim of the Vietcong. If you have a few spare prayers floating around we could use them over here."

Other nurses were also commended for their bravery. President Johnson presented medals to "two very brave ladies": Army nurse Maj. Marie Rodgers earned the Bronze Star for her service near the fighting and Air Force Col. Ethel Hoefly earned the Legion of Merit for serving as chief nurse caring for Vietnam casualties and others in Japan and Okinawa. Although race was not mentioned in the report, Rodgers may have been the first black woman so honored. The Times later misidentified Lt. Jane Lombardi as "the first woman decorated in the Vietnam war." Nonetheless, Lombardi's bravery under fire earned her a Bronze Star when, as a flight nurse, she helped evacuate patients under a rocket, mortar, and small arms attack at Danang.16

The country had been plagued by nurse shortages which always became more critical during conflicts. In Vietnam, the 1955 measures to allow for male military nurses demonstrated its usefulness. Male nurses could be drafted without debate. The Army put male nurses in the same draft
category as doctors and dentists, 3-A; they had to prove extraordinary hardship or vital community service to escape conscription. In fact, when SECDEF McNamara launched a recruiting drive for male and female nurses in early 1966, he pointedly reminded everyone that he had the power to draft male nurses if the drive failed. To make the prospect more inviting, he authorized the forces to give both men and women direct commissions as warrant officers if they had completed a two year LPN course or had two years of nursing experience. However, the drive was a bust and shortly thereafter the Pentagon announced its first draft of nine hundred male nurses. Always quick to recognize situations that were unfair to men, the House passed a bill immediately afterward to authorize regular commissions for male RNs who had only been authorized reserve commissions in the 1955 legislation. The press crowed, "The House voted today for equality of sexes among nurses in the armed services," and, pointed out that the men still had to put up with laws and regulations that identified nurses as "she" and "her" in a number of places. Unfortunately, the press and Congress did not feel similarly moved to extend equal benefits and privileges to female nurses in relation to children and dependency, nor to military line women. Nor did they worry about changing any male-specific language in regulations or laws. Although there had been previous debates in World War II and Korea about drafting female nurses because of shortages, there was no such public debate about drafting them between 1965 and 1968. The only limit to the draft would be on the number of physically qualified male nurses in the country.

The services could not draft female nurses or doctors, but there were not enough available, qualified men in either profession to fill military needs. In 1966 the "Vietnam War Spur[red] [the] Army to Recruit Women Doctors," according to the AP. "A Pentagon announcement today said
there had been an insufficient number of male physicians volunteering for active duty to meet the build-up requirements in connection with the war in Vietnam. ...women could care for the sick and injured equally as well as men in the various medical specialties." Women doctors had been commissioned since 1950 and the Army used twenty-three during the Korean War. But in 1966 the services offered guaranteed first assignments to the women, although once again they did not consider making their conditions of service equal to those of men.\(^{17}\)

Other foreign women joined allied forces, primarily medical, to aid the South Vietnamese. New Zealand sent nurses and doctors. The latter brought their wives and children to live in Saigon. The British also sent doctors and nurses. And, a Cuban exile team of medical personnel, including women, also joined the allies.\(^{18}\)

Away from Vietnam, the American public saw in the press that other countries were still using or were starting to employ military women. The Communist Chinese drafted young women and the Swedish Air Force planned to enroll female pilots. In Sweden, although some might have expected very different responses, officials reported that more men had started applying for the service because they were attracted by the possibility of being trained by women. At the same time, Swedish women were disappointed to learn that they would only be used in non-combat capacities. The Congolese employed female paratroopers. Twenty-four, fifteen to twenty-year-old members of the regular Army made their first jump for President Mobutu and diplomatic corps members. Mobutu, who had been trained to parachute by the Israelis, was very pleased with them. The League of Malawi Women, formed in 1958, was called the "Amazon Army" and when new Prime Minister H. Kamuzu Banda held a rally just after independence, he announced the women in uniform would repel any attempted invasion.
Nyasaland officials pointed out that there were Israeli and Chinese precedents for women's armies. And, in 1966, for the first time, Portugal allowed women to volunteer for military service so fewer men would have to be drafted and those in service could be released for combat duties. And, the Soviet Union gave paramilitary training to all its citizens.19

Military line women and nurses were not the only women in danger in Vietnam. Civilian and foreign women were as well. And again, as with Marguerite Higgins and Margaret Bourke-White, many of these women braved great danger became GI heroines, while military line women never got the opportunity to prove their courage, being largely restricted from serving in Vietnam. And nurses, despite evidence to the contrary, were still believed to be in safe feminine spaces. As shown in the last chapter, the wives of military and government workers, as well as female civilian employees, were at risk in the war-zone. Most American dependents were evacuated after terrorist attacks in 1965, but no one seriously considered removing all women from the theater or suggested stopping the war on their behalf. In fact, USO and independent entertainers, Red Cross workers, and other business and government civilian employees were sent to Vietnam until American withdrawal in 1975. Most survived but some were killed, wounded, or held as POWs. The American military, press, and public were not revolted by this situation.

Newspaper and magazine readers, however, saw the danger. In 1965 servicemen's wives and children were evacuated from a pool at an American base in Saigon when a bomb was found there. Later, the barracks for headquarters personnel was bombed at Pleiku. The bombings in the South continued with an attack on an apartment building in Saigon housing American civilians. When the U.S. embassy was bombed in March 1965, an
American secretary was killed in the blast. Sixteen other American women were wounded. Decision makers did pause, but not for long.

The death of Miss Robbins gave rise to discussion here about the withdrawal of American women from South Vietnam. The evacuation of dependents began last month after a bloody Vietcong raid on the United States installation at Pleiku led to the airstrikes against North Vietnam. However one high-ranking official said he doubted the 100 women, most of them secretaries, would be replaced by Army clerks. He said the women were indispensible and most wanted to stay. Informal talks with the women did not bear him out. "We are scared to death," one girl said. "You know how little protection you really have," said another. "I would not want to go home, but I would like to go to another post."

Vietnamese women were also killed in attacks against Americans including the bombing of a GI hotel and a number of bars in Saigon in December 1965. The American military felt it possessed authority over all women "serving with or accompanying" U.S. forces (foreign or American), subjecting them to the UCMJ, although it seldom felt responsible for their welfare.

Still other American and foreign women continued to come to the warzone and serve in harm's way in various supporting roles for the U.S. military and South Vietnamese government. USO workers and entertainers continued to support the troops. George Jessel's troupe, including singer Laura Manning, was fired on during their flight to Beinhhoa in 1965. Pianist Philippa Schulyer, who was working in Vietnam as a press correspondent, was killed in a Marine helicopter crash near Danang, when on her second trip to Vietnam, she had been evacuating a group of elementary school children. Beauty pageant winners were also popular among the GIs. Rock bands were scheduled through the armed forces recreation services to tour installations. Some came under fire and several band members were killed. One female singer was wounded. In addition, the Red Cross continuously recruited women to assist with recreation, entertainment, and medical care in the combat zones.20
Other American women working in Vietnam came under attack; some were captured and survived their incarceration as POWs. War photographer for *Life, Reader's Digest, National Geographic*, and others periodicals, Dickey Chapelle was a veteran of the fighting at Iwo Jima, and in Cuba, Hungary, Kashmir, Algeria, and the Dominican Republic. She was killed when she stepped on a land-mine near Chu Lai in 1965. Chapelle was remembered for never having asked for special treatment and for being able to "take punishment like a man." The men bragged that she could do fifty pushups in helmet and fatigues. She roughed it with whichever front-line troops she accompanied. She had been captured and tortured during the Hungarian revolution and had parachuted into Vietcong territory in Vietnam and returned to write about it. An admiring Marine Corps commander said, "you couldn't tell her from one of the troops, and she could keep up with the best of them."

Another female news correspondent wrote about her experiences of covering the war as a woman. Liz Trotta said her assignment assumed the experience differed by gender. Her point of view, "Stories have no gender." Her associates thought if she tried very hard she might "do as well as the worst guy we have out there" and anticipated embarrassment if she was killed. She hated Saigon and found the real "story" out in the boonies with the fighting men; men who talked a lot about their fear. She wrote about the impact of the first "television war" on both correspondents and the soldiers; of being involved in "hair-raising helicopter assaults under enemy rocket and mortarfire" and of being with the dead and wounded and of the heat, depression, and frustration. Her central point again, "being a man or a woman doesn't alter the situation a bit. Everyone is afraid--and surprisingly not ashamed to admit it. Those who claim not to be, and they are few, do not belong in Vietnam."
She was often asked about a key component of the 1990s debate but not much discussed earlier than that; the "male protective attitude." She considered a "sensible question, too, for in most cases it is the basis for an unconscious prejudice about women, i.e., anything in a skirt needs assistance." Indeed, since skirts would be impractical jungle and combat attire, anyone in a skirt would probably need help, unless of course one talks about kilts. Trotta was not concerned as she thought this attitude made it easier for her to express her fears "and not worry about ego problems." She did not have any "locker-room traditions to uphold." But, the significant point, "this does not mean that, when the shooting starts, every guy within helping range is worrying about my safety." She said people at home usually asked about the "problems" women in the field would have. She assumed this meant how did she use the bathroom and answered "this quaint query with the announcement that I shall write a book entitled, "Latrines I Have Known--A Survey from Bush to Barracks'." It was not an issue. Another non-issue was clothes, "Presumably a woman's primary concern." She shattered illusions, "Some harbor the suspicion that lady war correspondents beat about the bush in well-tailored, safari-style miniskirts. She wore fatigues and boots except during her R&R trips to Hong Kong. Trotta related that the Special Forces that she went into battle with asked no questions about women reporters and were very accommodating to the news crews. She was, however, in direct and imminent danger of being wounded, killed, or taken prisoner. She said the overriding feeling, even more than fear, was disbelief that such a thing could be happening. The joy of survival and the earning of one's own "war story" were significant to her and the others. She reported that her male colleague's attitudes had ranged "from good fellowship and respect to contempt and downright distrust." The latter was the majority
unfortunately. As for the Marines in the field, as each one saw her they registered shock and delight. Many asked the inevitable question, "What's a nice girl like you doing in a place like this?". Her response highlighted the equality of the danger and fear, "Never mind that. What's a nice guy like you doing in a place like this?". His closing remarked summed it up for this many, "You know, I never thought of that."

Other women faced as much, if not more, danger and trauma. The Vietcong and Vietminh captured and imprisoned some. In 1968 an English teacher with International Volunteer services, Sandra Johnson, and her friend, Dr. Marjorie Nelson, were kept hostage from January through April. Dr. Patricia Smith's hospital, which she had operated under the auspices of Catholic Relief Services since 1963, was attacked at Kontum. She and four nurses escaped, but a German nurse and a Montagnard nurse were taken prisoner. The Vietcong took Michele Ray, a French freelance news correspondent, prisoner in 1967. Ray had accompanied American units on combat patrols for five months. The former model and divorced mother of an eleven-year-old daughter was treated well by her captors, "not molested in any way."21

Civilian South Vietnamese women helped and supported U.S. and allied forces, while others opposed their presence. Those on both sides were willing to risk death for their principles or to support their families. South Vietnamese Catholics held rallies protesting Henry Cabot Lodge's trip to the country in 1966. Buddhist nuns and other young women continued to protest U.S. policy by self-immolation.22 Some civilian women fought beside their husbands. When the V.C. attacked an outpost in Tay Ninh and all the men were out on patrol, their wives "grabbed rifles and tommy guns and coolly held off the attackers until the men returned."

In the Dong Xoai battle at least one machine-gunner's wife ran across open
fire zones repeatedly to supply him with ammunition, until both husband and wife were wounded. Many soldiers' wives advised them militarily and officers' wives accompanied their husbands to battle and often fought, and died. The "Tiger Lady" of the 44th Battalion was Commander Le Van Dan's wife. The mother of seven was a .45-carrying master sergeant who had won three medals in battle for combat bravery.

A draft of Vietnamese women was considered and then abandoned as it would have ruined the economy, but South Vietnam also employed military women. In fact, Vietnamese women celebrated a martial tradition in the Trung sisters who led the revolt against Chinese overlords in 40 A.D. And in the regular army, some Vietnamese WACs had been trained in the U.S. In 1965, U.S. female advisers gave refresher courses to seven hundred women who were already members. That year the government launched a recruiting campaign and within days had processed over six hundred applications. As usual, the women were to do clerical and medical duties to free men for combat; they would not engage in fighting. Nonetheless some served in danger. In 1968 South Vietnamese forces overran a Vietcong compound and freed a number of emaciated prisoners, including thirteen women.  

The North, also inheritors of the Trung sisters' heritage, used women in even more extensive military roles. Kim Loan was one well-known guerrilla company commander. Although press reports claimed that V.C. women seldom fought, they continually reported on those who did. In 1967 an estimated twenty-nine percent of the Viet Cong guerrilla forces were women. By 1968, reports claimed the rebels fielded some all-female combat units and that women made up from one-third to one-half of the "V.C. main force troops." Moscow papers claimed that the deputy commander of the Vietcong forces was a forty-five-year-old woman. She had joined the anti-French revolutionary forces at seventeen after she and her brother were
beaten in prison. She was arrested again two years later with her husband and days-old son and held for over two years before being released because of a heart condition. She became chief of the revolutionary forces in her home province in 1960 and served there until her promotion to her present post. The Soviet article described her forces as a very well-organized and well-controlled army. One local heroine near Hanoi commanded a women's militia unit guarding a vital bridge. James Cameron described Nguyen Thi Hang as a "pert, trim, young woman" and a "Resistance pin-up," then described her forces as "a covey of most nubile little girls." Armed women also patrolled the rivers of North Vietnam. By 1966, the media reported that the Vietcong recruited women between seventeen and thirty as "shock brigades supporting fighting forces at the front." Despite these reports, Western papers claimed that the Vietcong only used women for military duty and auxiliary services when male shortages demanded.

Communist and nationalist women were also used extensively in clandestine operations and for terrorist attacks. A number were arrested by American and South Vietnamese forces. An eighty-year-old was arrested with drawings of an American Marine base in her banana baskets. These older women were used for operations because they attracted little attention, while younger women served as fighters. Press photographs often showed captured women such as those from a grenade factory and others being interrogated. In 1967, Saigon police believed they had captured the "Dragon Lady." She had been gunning down people from the back of a motorcycle, including two Americans and a Nationalist Chinese intelligence officer. Two other women terrorists were arrested at Cholo when they tried to assassinate a government official there.24

The North ran a wide intelligence collection network of bar girls and prostitutes in Saigon.
One sweetie surfaced from Viet Cong ranks last April when South Vietnamese police caught a 'pretty, well-shaped and lovable' 17-year-old girl named Nguyen Thi Nga, which meant 'Moon Fairy.' She and two friends had been making themselves lovable around the U.S. officer's mess at Soctrang Airbase, which they planned to blow up....

The Vietnamese police held a twenty-two-year-old who supposedly "charmed military information from United States helicopter pilots." She collected information at the bar where she worked to pass to Vietcong guerrillas. Not enough American men caught on that the women they cavorted with might be spies or fighters.

Nor did they bother much about VD. Fewer Americans or allies treated Vietnamese women well and many abandoned Amer-Asian children, who were to become a huge problem. As in the past, American male treatment of foreign women would reflect attitudes that would be displaced onto American military women. No one commented on the standard involvement of GI's with Vietnamese mistresses, however. Such practices were common knowledge and were covered heavily in the press. Young women in Vietnam felt they could contribute to their families' well-being by being involved with GIs. In fact, as economic problems beset these families, they often decided that their daughters should work in the bars to help out. One family learned this after their extremely "plain" daughter was able to find an American lover. He gave her enough money to put her family in a larger apartment and send her five brothers to school. Her neighbors ostracized her but her father felt that they were just jealous of her success. Although it would ruin their chances of marrying a respectable Vietnamese man, the father felt it imperative that his daughters learn English so they could work in the bars. He hoped the war would be over in time "to spare his 10-year-old daughter from following her sisters into the hostess trade."
Americans showed only a slight understanding of the problem, albeit in racist terms.

The sight of thousands of their young women degrading themselves as bar girls and prostitutes is humiliating to the Vietnamese. Their feelings might be roughly comparable to the probable reaction in California, where there is some prejudice against Orientals, if a civil war broke out there and a wealthy army of Nationalist Chinese troops moved in and began consorting with white women.

Senator Fulbright had to apologize for his comment that "Saigon had become an American brothel." Although he may have meant it as an apolitical analogy to American "arrogance of power," his apology rang hollow. "I had not thought I was maligning the brave young Americans in Vietnam. What I was referring to was the inevitable impact on a fragile Asian society of Western soldiers of a different culture, with much money to spend, behaving in the way that is to be expected of men at war." In fact, many Vietnamese and Americans may not have wanted to hear it, but soldiers had turned the country, figuratively and literally, into a brothel. Both American and Vietnamese officials in-country cooperated in setting up and trying to control the business and medical problems that came with widespread prostitution. In fact, both countries had medical teams in the field to give the girls regular examinations. "The Americans recognize that acceptance of quasi-official prostitution here will not be popular in the United States but they consider it the only practical alternative to rampant venereal disease." Military leaders thought it was a fact of life, as in 'boys will be boys, and excused the behavior: "If you get 12,000 or 16,000 boys together, some of them will act like jerks. They think they aren't men until they get V.D. and smoke pot and there's nothing you can do to stop them." If this was how young men defined masculinity, it would not be surprising that their definition of femininity was temporally and culturally constructed, nor that it would be
rather skewed. Military leaders who tacitly condoned problem behaviors later were surprised when narcotics, morale, and discipline crises spun out of control.25

The expectations of men's behavior in war, including exploiting other human beings, even of their hosts and allies, apparently ran from more simple abuse to inflicting unacceptable civilian casualties and to committing individual murders and cruelties. Already in 1965 and 1966, the Army's use of tear gas against civilian women and children in the countryside, suspecting all villagers of possible Viet Cong ties, was being criticized in the press. Along with disregard for civilian casualties, American and allied soldiers apparently felt less restricted in killing and abusing women. In this early period, they were often punished; later there was a greater chance they would be punished lightly, if at all. In 1966 a woman selling bread in Saigon was shot by a GI shooting at a taxi driver in an argument. The soldier was eventually sentenced to life in prison for killing the thirty-three-year-old mother of seven. In 1967, five GIs were convicted of the rape of a pregnant mother of six. The soldiers were convicted of leaving their posts to rape and to rob the South Vietnamese. Another soldier was convicted in the rape of a thirteen-year-old in a POW compound where he was an interrogator. Similarly, an Australian officer later admitting torturing a woman he was interrogating.26

If abuse was not the order of the day, exploitation might be. Besides the bar girls and prostitutes in Vietnam, GIs had access to others at R&R locations throughout the Far East. Officials at these R&R locations thought American GIs were both boon and bane. Some five thousand servicemen visited popular Taiwan every month where a "well organized group of girls" greeted the visiting GIs. Whereas the
government got a fair bit of currency from the GIs, officials felt too much of it went "into the girls' purses." A government brochure put out the following tips for visitors:

The women of Taiwan do not enjoy the same freedom in their relations with men as the women of Western culture. A free and easy approach will be resented and may lead to trouble. Treat them with reserve...Chinese law states that you will buy them [bar girls] no more than four drinks per hour. If you desire the company of one of these girls, her company can be bought from the bar for a 24-hour period for U.S. $15. If you do get a signed contract from the bar manager. Do not pay until you have received the contract. This is a requirement of the Chinese Government. This contract is for your protection. Do not purchase the company of a girl for more than 24 hours. They seldom look as good in the morning as they did the previous night. A final word of caution: Venereal disease is rapidly becoming a serious problem, so be forewarned.

Hotels in the countryside offered order-up service where the maids would bring a number of girls by for GIs to choose from for $5.00 for a few hours. In Bangkok, one young officer told his men that they could expect "any bar girl to go back to their hotel for about $10 a night, but he warned: 'Your chances of coming into contact with venereal disease are about 50-50. If you become infected, go to the dispensary during duty hours and get treated." Other countries were not as accommodating.27

Some more well-meaning GIs married Vietnamese and other Asian women rather than simply using and then discarding them. However, Army psychologists depicted the marrying kind as 'troubled'. On the other hand, they found no problems with soldiers who exploited foreign women. Those marrying Vietnamese they said, were usually "divorced, sexually inhibited, afraid of American women and embittered by some aspects of the American way of life." Oriental women were seen as "passive and understanding." These men were slightly older than their comrades, less well educated, and spent longer tours in-country. "A significant number lacked strong male models for identification [coming from broken homes],
and undoubtedly, because of the dependence on the maternal figure, they developed ambivalent feelings toward women in general. That their girl friends or fiancées have their own needs and desires is not perceived too clearly." On the other hand these men found American women "aggressive, demanding, domineering, only interested in money and position, taking too much for granted, wanting to keep up with the Joneses." Conversely, those men who did not marry, the control group in the Army study and apparently more 'normal', said of the Vietnamese, "They are cute, but only for the year I spend in Vietnam. Otherwise I don't care for them too much." Another GI compared them to "a 3-year-old child back in the states." The control group characterized American women in contradictory language, "She must be able to stand by me and accept my decisions. She must have a strong will on her own."28

The American military and GIs did not only display racism towards Asian women and abandoned babies. Race was also a major concern in American society and the military. A simmering pot of racial issues had begun to boil. Looking at these race discussions offers insight in several debates concerning women, including the treatment of marginalized groups' by the public and the military, class issues, military standards being changed to support manpower needs, and cultural and ideological requirements for first-class citizenship as related to military service. These debates demonstrate that discursive space existed to include gender as a category. And, ultimately, racial concerns would play a huge part in discussions of "obligations of citizenship" relating to the draft.

The services did make some headway in promoting a token number of black men to senior ranks and in bringing a larger number of blacks into the National Guard and reserve forces. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., was the
first black to be promoted to lieutenant general, in 1965. In 1965, the Navy gave Cmdr. Samuel Gravely Jr. command of the destroyer Taussig. In 1966, President Johnson had agreed with the National Urban League recommendation that "more negroes be promoted to officer ranks in the armed forces." And in Saigon in 1968, Frederic Ellis Davison was promoted to general. As with other black officers, his credentials were so impressive there could be no question of an undeserved affirmative action promotion. With President Truman's executive order, Davison said, "the Negro was able to enter the main stream of the Army." However, reporters noted that bars against blacks were only gradually being dropped.29

Other changes came slowly too. National Guard forces were largely white and that organization became the haven for many who had enough money or influence to avoid service in Vietnam. Very few blacks had the resources to even consider this option, but in 1967, New Jersey sought to rectify the situation. The Army agreed that the state could increase their forces by five percent for blacks only. The governor was concerned that all-white forces used to control racial disturbances only incited protesters to more violence. The five-percent increase was meant to prevent the Guard from having to turn away whites in favor of blacks. And officials assured the public that standards would not be lowered for racial minorities. Still, some whites who had been on the waiting-list complained that blacks would jump ahead of them while waiting whites would be vulnerable to the draft. Senior Guard officers seemed to feed white animosity, commenting that the action could "very well violate Federal discrimination statutes." The governor, on the other hand, was impatient with white guardsmen and senior officer complaints and implemented the plan over their objections. In any case, once again, this plan was less about doing the right thing for integration than about the pragmatism of
countering a specific problem, in this case, controlling domestic racial unrest. In addition, typically, when past injustices were rectified the dominant group would see it as discrimination against them rather than as a move toward equity. No one mentioned that blacks who may have been better qualified had been shut out previously. 30

Officer commissioning programs also tried to rectify extreme and obvious racial imbalances. In 1965, the Defense Department said it would withdraw ROTC programs from schools that were not integrated or had no plans to become so. The same year, President Johnson ordered a study of why there were so few blacks at the Naval Academy. Not all was rosy though. In 1966, when the press lauded Rep. Prentiss Walker of Mississippi for nominating a black for the Air Force Academy, he responded angrily that the rumor had been promulgated by his opponent to make him look bad in his reelection campaign among Mississippi voters. In 1967 the Navy planned a separate recruiting campaign for black officers and to expand the number of ROTC programs at predominantly black colleges and recruit more blacks for integrated ROTC units and for Annapolis. In 1968 the DoD advertised a concerted effort to recruit qualified, minority-group men for the service Academies including blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and others. Officials blamed the lack of minorities at the school on the lack of public awareness of the opportunities available for all races. 31

While the military showed some consciousness of racial issues, the level of concern was not consistent. As in the 1950s, the debate about using ports in South Africa, with its restrictive race laws, arose repeatedly in the 1960s. Civil Rights groups also were concerned when, in 1965, a black test pilot accused the Air Force of bias when he failed to be accepted for a NASA astronaut program. Although he did not criticize the space agency, he asserted that blacks' opportunities in the services
were limited. He had written a report to DoD officials on discrimination and on "lily white" USAF traditions, but had only received a perfunctory notice of receipt. His comments were published in Ebony.

The Coast Guard's drive to recruit more blacks, especially for officers, was not very successful. Recruiting minorities became a priority after President Kennedy had observed that there were no blacks in the USGC contingent in his inaugural parade. Officials remarked, "We've made a greater effort to beat the bushes to get them to apply to the Academy. But when they've got the know-how and ability to make the grade, they choose other more lucrative fields." They thought five-year service commitments dissuaded applicants, but no one asked if reluctance might be related to how minorities were treated at the school or on active duty.

The pace of Navy integration also "lagged" according to reports from aircraft carriers in the war-zone. Blacks constituted less than one-percent of the officer corps, which some claimed exacerbated race relations and violence between groups of white and black sailors was not uncommon. The press contrasted the Navy situation off-shore with multiracial ground forces which got along much better in the "first truly integrated war ever fought by the United States." Infantrymen knew, "The only way to stay alive in a fight with the Vietcong is to help everyone around you....In battle they don't judge people by the color of their skin." While some whites and blacks felt the war afforded some true integration, even among the ground forces off-duty, the races tended to self-segregate socially.

The Navy commissioned studies of racial incidents at several war-zone bases in October, 1968 when some service clubs were forbidden to serve liquor and the China Beach recreation facility was temporarily closed. One black sailor said that urban whites and blacks got along fine
but that the "negroes and rednecks" from the South were the troublemakers. Navy officers speculated that blacks avoided the sea service because the Navy had "done nothing to assure these people that they would be made welcome." For instance, after World War II, the all-black stewards and messmen contingents were supposedly integrated, but the Navy employed Filipino stewards since then and carefully segregated their billeting.\textsuperscript{32}

Minority communities did not lack for war heroes, but while blacks won medals for bravery in Vietnam, their families complained of the discrimination they had to face. One family who lost a son in Vietnam and had another son reassigned from Germany because of racial discrimination said, "Two of our sons were soldiers. One died in support of freedom in one place, and the other couldn't get freedom in another."\textsuperscript{33}

With the growing power of Civil Rights movements at home, from their virtual exclusion from fighting in World War II except in a very few segregated units with white officers, to the military pragmatism of integrating manpower-starved combat units in Korea, to the use of high percentages of racial minorities in front-line units in Vietnam, black soldiers were suddenly very visible in the press. Criticism started growing in 1966 that a higher percentage of blacks than whites were dying in the war. The military responded that a high number of blacks volunteered for combat units and black reenlistment rates were three times that of whites. No one added that part of the reason for this truism was the lack of opportunities for minorities in civilian communities in the U.S. The \textit{Times} reported, "In contrast to World War II and Korea, Negroes have not been limited in their military service opportunities to supply and service assignments. With increased opportunities many of them have made careers of the service and won an increasing number of assignments as noncommissioned officers." Military officials did admit that Civil Rights
groups were probably accurate in complaints that blacks "were being compelled to fight in a war overseas to assure democratic rights abroad that were denied Negroes in the United States." 34

Blacks were more visible in the Vietnam war than previously. Times interviews showed that, "Vietnam is like a speeded-up film of recent racial progress at home. But Vietnam also shows that the United States has not yet come close to solving its volatile racial problem." Here the word "military" could be substituted for "Vietnam." Pragmatism once more outstripped prejudice; need and talent won out in a war. The military led civil society in the change, experimentation or not. Some sociologists cited the fact that many blacks, like women, had no sense for their own history as part of the problem of awareness.

The war in Vietnam is filled with ironies, and one of the biggest is that the ordinary Negro fighting man...is not aware of the Negro's participation in previous American wars...They feel they're the first Negroes to fight because their history books told only of white soldiers, and their movies showed that John Wayne and Errol Flynn won all American wars.

Few knew that Benjamin Banneker had encouraged other freedmen to fight for Revolutionary forces against the British and that blacks fought on both sides during the Civil War. Frederick Douglas recruited several regiments for the Union, and during World War I, W.E.B. DuBois wrote, "First your country, then your rights...we have gained [our rights] rapidly and effectively by our loyalty in time of trial."

Black GIs in Vietnam and those who were career military were reluctant to embrace the civil rights movement nor did they accept the campaigns of anti-war blacks such as Cassius Clay and Martin Luther King, Jr., just as military women were reluctant to embrace feminism's more radical theories and actions. Both were called "Toms" by the less accommodating, which divided the forces of reform and revolution. The
fight for individuals' acceptance within the military all but required this. Servicemembers knew that admittance was not acceptance. Minority soldiers' identification was more military than gender or race-based. However, some thought that they were doing more for change from within than agitators outside the services were accomplishing. Col. David James Jr., an Air Force pilot, spoke out against Stokely Carmichael in 1967 for acting as if James and other militants spoke for all blacks. "They don't, and they've set civil rights back 100 years," he claimed. However, James had not always been averse to militant actions. In the 1940s the military police arrested he and 100 other young black officers who refused to leave the all-white officer's club at Johnson Field, Indiana. Others, like Capt. Earle McCaskill, viewed the war as an event that put the domestic rights movement in perspective: "What we are trying to accomplish here is to guarantee personal liberty, economic opportunities and educational opportunities for everyone...and that is what we Negroes need in the States." While he claimed that the racial situation soldier-to-soldier was better than at home, he admitted witnessing "subtle traces of discrimination" in promotions and assignments to key staff jobs. Blacks felt as if they were only competing against other blacks, constituting an "informal quota system--only so many Negro officers make major, even if all the Negroes are the best qualified." Women could have said the same, but without the key assignments, neither black men nor any women would be considered the best qualified.

Still, since the military seemed to lead society, Rev. Ralph Abernathy felt that this proved mandated change could force some progress and that the military could serve as the model for civilians. "With strong, direct leadership at the top and with orders not to discriminate, America has proven democracy can work--but for the wrong reason.
proof is needed back home where the problems are growing," he said. Black officer's, too, thought they had a better chance in the military. Capt. Sylvan Wailes believed, "You see, the Army is a forced society. The Army can make people conform. When they say there will be equal opportunity, there will be, regardless of individuals." As the war went on, blacks increasingly felt as if they were being asked to accept a double standard through the usual hypocrisy of white America--make your contributions and sacrifices toward full citizenship and then be denied that in civil society. "The Negro here has achieved his blood-spattered equality in America's most unpopular war. While some Americans praise him as a hero, others condemn him as a mercenary," according to Bernard Weinraub. Some servicemen were upset at being portrayed as race traitors or assimilationists, arguing "We brought democracy to the service by sticking it out...Many people called us Uncle Toms, but we were actually holding the line." Others experienced a conscience crisis, since "No honest Negro can stay in the service. I can't send a man to die to give the Vietnamese democracy that he does not have himself."

Many showed signs of increasing unwillingness to go along. Maj. Lavell Merritt expressed his impatience with black officers being denied opportunities and called on fellow blacks to "act like men....The black military officer group is the largest collection of identifiable accommodationists." He defined them as "Uncle Toms." Other black service members, including women, brought forth numerous complaints both of unfair treatment and then of official response to complaints. On the other hand, some whites targeted black NCOs and officers with fabricated complaints meant to ruin their NCO or officer careers. Most blacks, whether at the bottom of the military hierarchy or in positions of authority, worked doubly hard to prove themselves and many senior service leaders felt they
had more than aptly demonstrated their abilities, bravery, and dedication.

Civilian communities were another story. Black soldiers wore their uniforms off-base more than their white counterparts, especially in the South. Many related that they were tired of being referred to as "boy" and being ordered around by civilians. They were angry at the proudly displayed rebel flags and comments about going "cross burning" and they were tired of having to keep a low profile. Both black and white servicemembers were still being advised to comply with local civilian customs and segregation policies "without protest," and were told that expressions of their opinions on such policies could result in disciplinary actions against them. President Kennedy's Gesell Commission's report blamed commanders on this score. Base commanders did not believe "that the problems of segregation and racial discrimination in the...local community should be their concern." Senior officers did not think it their responsibility to "rearrange the social order, that it is not part of the military mission to change community attitudes, that any pressure could be misunderstood and merely stir up trouble, that questions of this kind should be left up to the courts, that military personnel are traditionally nonpolitical and should not involve themselves in controversial questions." The Commission's report recommended that commander's try to impress the local community with the economic importance of the base as well as working with community committees to decrease prejudice and discrimination. If that failed, the report recommended terminating operations and closing bases in recalcitrant communities. This "economic blackmail" was shouted down by Senators John Stennis of Mississippi and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina.
If they were against this kind of interaction with and cajoling of civilian communities, some senior officers rebelled even more against the idea of social experimentation within the armed forces and taking the lead in the areas of race, gender, and sexual orientation, except when it has been necessary for manpower, 'good order and discipline', attracting skilled technicians or professionals (medicine, law, etc.), or political capital. In 1966, Daniel Moynihan, an administration domestic strategist, advocated using the military as the only hope for the disadvantaged of any race. "Very possibly our best hope is seriously to use the armed forces as a socializing experience for the poor—until somehow their environment begins turning out equal citizens," he wrote.

History may record that the single most important psychological event in race relations in the nineteen-sixties was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens of the nation. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of the oldest known routes to social equality—from the Catholic Irish in the Mexican War to the Japanese-American Purple Heart Division of World War II.

Some Pentagon and government officials warned that such a civil-rights program for establishing a more stable society would be counterproductive. If the nation took marginalized groups, taught them no useful civilian skills, put them through a "horrendous war" in which they would surely be aware of the contributions their group made, and then returned them to civilian society with greater expectations but no greater opportunities, then veterans could become a destabilizing factor. The answer for SECDEF McNamara was to add Project Transition, the "salvage" program. McNamara's plan would induct unqualified men by lowering standards and then giving them increased training and education. The majority of those brought in under the program were members of educationally, economically, and socially disadvantaged minorities. Adam Clayton Powell and other militants called the program racist, but others
saw it as a "civil rights program." The National Urban League assisted the DoD with plans to ease black veterans back into civil society.

Conditions for returning black servicemen were a subject of much speculation as unrest at home grew. Although many did not support his anti-war activism, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the subsequent race riots affected both black and white soldiers in Vietnam. It moved some blacks to vow activism upon their return to the States; many whites grew increasingly uneasy. In fact, activists were eager to recruit returning black GI's because of their ability to talk legitimately about fighting for democracy overseas and white hypocrisy at home. Their martial skills were also appreciated by the more radical groups. Establishment forces also wanted these experienced fighters to join in police and Guard forces for riot control. The returning black GIs who stayed in the service and was asked to help put down racial unrest faced very difficult experiences. One Negro officer told reporters gently, "There is no doubt about it. You'll have a new Negro coming out of Vietnam who has seen that America will allow him to die without discrimination, and he'll want to live without discrimination." He added emphatically, and sadly, that these young men only wanted what whites took for granted everyday, not special privilege or status.

Some black veterans became extremely disgruntled about their use/abuse by the nation and military. David Tuck averred that Vietnam was a racist war: "This country uses its minorities to do its dirty work up front in Vietnam--Negroes, Puerto Ricans and hillbillies. I think its deliberate. These groups are the most despised in American society and nobody will miss them." Tuck asserted, "Black people should not be called on to assume the duties of citizenship when they don't enjoy the rights and privileges." Statistics showed that, for whatever reason, blacks were
more likely to be in the military, once there more likely to be sent to Vietnam, once there more likely to be sent to the front-line, once there more likely to become casualties. Blacks were not invisible. They had won their share, if not more, of medals and been praised in newspapers, had their photographs on magazine covers, and been praised in public by Gen. Westmoreland. But still, people did not want to recognize the significance of their contributions or the irony of the discrimination against them--and the same was true for women, gays, and other marginalized groups.  

Race and conscription intersected in many ways, while gender became an increasingly contested category in this constellation. The central questions related to the draft orbited around the rights and obligations of citizenship. Liability for military obligation, even if liability was unfairly apportioned, in theory earned one citizenship rights. Although drafting women (especially nurses) had been considered at various times in response to military need, during the Vietnam conflict the services could get the men they needed, so there was little mention of female conscription except as a measure of fairness to men. The terms of the draft debate related to women had clearly changed. Women supposedly had citizenship rights and were therefore unfairly excused from military obligation. The growing anti-draft movement was based on the general unfairness of the implementation of draft regulations (by race, gender, class, and celebrity status) and the feeling that some deferments and exemptions were inappropriate. This anti-draft sentiment fed the anti-war sentiment as well. Eventually the trauma of administration the system and fending off protests led to a reform of the system based on a lottery with few exemptions, and finally, to the AVF with increased pay and benefits incentives. By then the military wanted more women because white men,
soured by the Vietnam experience, failed to respond to recruiting drives. And minority men found even better opportunity in the services as well. Some of the public and those within the military saw the growing percentages of women and minority men as a significant problem. Still, it was the operation of the draft system that started the influx of a larger number of black men.

As early as 1966, the DoD released statistics that showed blacks were more likely to be drafted than whites. Part of the reason for this entailed a class bias, as well as the fact that blacks were less likely to be able to gain deferments for college or ROTC. Another reason was strictly racial, in that blacks were not accepted in representative numbers into the National Guard or Reserves, an avenue to avoid the draft/combat. Whereas some did not think the draft system itself discriminatory, they agreed that its implementation was. All-white draft boards were the target of many complaints. The American Veterans Committee (AVC) demanded representative draft boards, especially in southern states. The ACLU filed suit to halt the draft in Georgia and South Carolina until blacks were proportionately represented on selection boards. More radical activists urged young black men to dodge the draft as long as they were denied full citizenship. When the first woman was appointed to the New York draft board (South Dakota had appointed the first woman, Sioux Indian Emma Tibbets), some could have argued that since women were not drafted she was not representative of those who were vulnerable. However, her appointment did signal creation of a board increasingly representative of the community at large. The draft law had been amended in July 1967 to allow for women to serve. Even after the change, officials did not anticipate that many women would serve on draft boards because vacancies were infrequent and the jobs were unpaid. 36
Although citizenship vis-a-vis military service was an extremely salient issue, the implications were avoided and downplayed by the establishment. The House granted citizenship posthumously to an Irish immigrant who was killed in service in Vietnam in 1968. Richard Williams, a Shoshone given a five year sentence for draft avoidance, refused to "fight a white man's war" in Vietnam, claiming that he was a member of the Shoshone nation and not the United States according to a Civil War treaty between the tribe and the Army. Black activists appreciated the connection, saying, "As long as black people in the United States are denied their rights, they shouldn't have to accept the duties and obligations of citizenship because they are not treated as citizens."37 Manpower needs continued to be the driving force behind categories of "rights" and "obligations" as well as the willingness of the services to engage in "social experimentation." Ideological acrobatics continued to be required in order to avoid reforms.

Unlike in WWII and Korea, women were not to be a major part of the solution to the manpower crisis for the escalation following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In September, 1965, the Pentagon announced hiring civilians to replace G.I.'s for combat. "Civilians" could be read as women, but interestingly this had always before been clearly stated. The idea was not to bring in more military women, in fact, but to hire male and female civilians to work in fields typically filled by military women-supply, administration, medical and food services. By December, 1965, the services held the largest draft call (over forty-five thousand in one month) since the Korean War and by 1967, the services were advertising a critical pilot shortage. The press cited no mention of allowing female pilots to fly non-combat transport missions to relieve men for fighters and bombers, although the Army-Air Forces had proved such a practice was
viable in World War II. This time the services could have had the advantage not only of experience, but of increased control by using military women rather than contract civilians (WASPs). It was a matter of policy, not law, to classify all aircraft as "combat." Also, no one called for shutting down the military pilot program because of the cost of training and low retention rates (as the services and GAO did repeatedly for women's programs); instead they looked at incentives to encourage unmotivated men to stay.38

They may not have courted women, but as usual, when there were shortages, the military adjusted its standards for men downward. This was always an indication that the requirements were not universal or immutable, nor founded on reality-based combat or military duties. After a 1965 review, Pentagon officials said male mental standards might be lowered. By 1966, quotas for Category IV men were given to each of the services to prevent the Army from getting them all; the Army would get 52%, the USMC 18%, the Air Force and Navy 15% each. (As an aside, if any of the services reached their quota of Cat IV's with men of color, when higher qualified minority men applied they were turned down in favor of less qualified whites.) Quotas were not affirmative action-mandated minimums but were used as ceilings. This practice helped perpetuate the stereotype that minority men were not as intelligent or effective as whites. Under SECDEF McNamara's "salvage" program, to mobilize men judged mentally or physically unfit (1-Y), the records of over two million men were reviewed. Hanson Baldwin's report for the Times showed that these men adapted fairly well to the military and made significant contributions under Project 100,000 or the "New Standards Men" program. This 'experiment' was apparently one that worked and demonstrated that the standards were not adequate indicators of future success and were largely
arbitrary. However, later the debate would partially devolve to the issue of whether the services wanted smarter women or less intelligent men. Some would see it as a question of white women versus minority men as previous civil rights struggles had been perceived. Others would see it as one of physically weak women versus stronger men of any race. The answers, other than those based on racism or sexism, would depend on the job—were position shortages in the front-line infantry or in the more technical positions? A high-tech but 'low intensity' conflict requiring conventional ground forces required both brains and brawn. In any case, the DoD planned to continue the "salvage" experiment because effectiveness could not be adequately judged until a large enough number of "New Standards Men" had been through training and combat, and perhaps reenlisted. Note that this experiment predated the AVF of 1973 and the mass influx of women that came with that change.  

Because of manpower needs and information that young men were marrying to avoid the draft, in 1965 the Government decided to stop the deferment of childless married men. As couples rushed to marry before the deadline, the SSS reminded people that husbands, fathers, and students were not exempt but simply in a lower draft category. They were still vulnerable because the only true exemptions went to "ministers of religion and sole surviving sons." "Sole surviving" was further explained (and narrowed) "Men whose fathers or one or more brothers or sisters were killed in action or died in the line of duty while serving in the American armed forces in any war."

As stated repeatedly, there was a growing sense of the unfairness of the draft—minorities bearing a heavier burden, reclassification of men in lower mental categories to qualify, educational deferments for those who could afford college and graduate school, changes in family deferments,
the unofficial exemption of most professional athletes, and even women being exempt. Serious calls for reforms and changes increased in intensity throughout the period. The *Times* editors addressed the unfairness issue in 1966. They criticized draft boards for reclassifying those with deferments as 1-A if they protested the draft or the war.

Other issues arose that informed the debates on wives and mothers being drafted and the recognition that women had not only had served in the military earlier but had suffered casualties as well. *Times* editorials called attention to the "Unequal Burden." Given that it was the "theory of public policy in a democracy that the burdens [not the rights or privileges] of the nation, should be shared as equally as possible, but this seldom happens in practice and never happens in time of war," the editors specifically called for the attention of the public to such cases for athletes. Joe Namath's was among the most noteworthy. He was disqualified because of a knee injury, but one that did not prevent him continuing to play professional football. The editors recognized the demoralizing effect on other draftees. While some like Namath were largely left alone, others like Muhammad Ali were criticized by the public and sought by the military. Ali had previously been rejected as below mental standards, "For two years the Army told everybody I was a nut and I was ashamed. And now they decide I am a wise man," he said. In addition, as charges of favoritism towards athletes being allowed to join Reserve units rather than be drafted came to light, the DoD directed that the National Guard and Reserves fill vacancies on a first-come basis. Meanwhile, draft deferments for students also came under fire as racially and class-contested terrain.

Jack Raymond wrote a major piece on the draft for the *Times* in 1966. He claimed that people did not recognize that many anti-war protesters
were actually reacting to the unfairness of the draft. "Loopholes" allowed some Americans to get deferments and experience the "best of American life" while shying away from "the responsibilities which citizenship entails." Raymond reminded readers of coercive methods to obtain military manpower used by the Government from the days of the Revolution onward. He listed the primary criticisms of the draft: (1) conscription was undemocratic, (2) unfairness ruled the operation of the current draft law, and (3) obtaining military forces by a draft was inefficient and entailed significant hidden costs due to poor morale and retention. Raymond called attention to the fact that young men with minor physical ailments were exempted even though "only a comparatively small number of men in uniform ever engage in unusually strenuous physical activity or engage in combat." He averred that local draft boards sometimes used their power to send away young men of different races or religions or those considered troublemakers in the community.

While even supporters admitted that the draft would likely always be unfair, most agreed that there was room for improvement. Some critics argued that it was not efficient to take those who did not want to go and who felt like "suckers" for getting caught by the system, who then just saddled the military with morale, retention, and disciplinary problems. Most reform proposals included a minimal training period for all American men even those with mental or physical disabilities and there was increasing support for a lottery system with very few exemptions or deferments. Some reformers suggested that it was not that the burden had to fall equally on all men, since the military could not use all those qualified anyway (why the standards had to be lowered was not addressed), but "that all should recognize and presumably accept the conditions under which conscription is imposed." The General Council of the Peace Corps,
William Josephson, went further: "Now it is my belief that if an effort were made to create an atmosphere of voluntarism, so that no man—and as a matter of fact, no young woman—would achieve social status without having made a service contribution, manpower requirements in the armed forces and other national services would be met."\(^{40}\)

Calls for reform of the draft laws continued throughout the period and would become more strident in the next. Suggested reforms included implementing Universal Service (military or national), changing to a lottery, including women, or transition to an AVF. The draft was increasingly criticized for being "fundamentally unfair," "discriminating against the poor and underprivileged who could not afford to marry or go to college," and because "the burdens of national service [were] not falling fairly upon the nation’s youth." Congress had not been warm to the salvage program and others; legislators criticized the idea of special army training for the disadvantaged to allow them to be drafted. Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Wisconsin Democrat, said "Public confidence in the draft is at an all-time low. To set up an elite category of young men who need not serve because of advantages of education, innate ability or wealth violates the very concept of equality."

As early as 1965, talk of ending conscription in favor of a volunteer army hurt recruiting, according to the services. But Barry Goldwater and other presidential candidates supported a volunteer system based on the principle of equal sharing of defense responsibility that had been lost under the current draft system. One study advocated an increase in pay and benefits for military members. It did not advocate recruiting more women or changing their conditions of service to compensate for fewer male volunteers. To get more recruits and to combat the anti-war/anti-military sentiment of the public more and more of the public called for
improvements for servicemen—better pay, better housing, better work conditions. The services did recognize that low re-enlistment rates, high turnover, and lowering standards hurt efficiency, quality, and morale.

Some were still thinking of universal service whether male or female, military or civil. Dwight Eisenhower spoke out again in 1966 in favor of military training for all young men advocating one year of service/training for all eighteen-year-old male citizens with the most minimal exemptions. He maintained that the two classes at opposite ends of the spectrum, targets of anti-draft rancor, were the privileged and the unfit. (One wonders why, since women were exempt, why they were not "objects of rancor"?) He also said non-military alternatives for service should be considered and if conscription did have to be retained, the nation should institute a lottery system. Other administration and DoD officials thought women should be included in the plan in some capacity, arguing for "the opportunity for all young men and women to learn to work, to serve all the nation's and the world's needs, and to make sense of their own lives." At a 1966 conference on transitioning to a volunteer force, Margaret Mead proposed a draft of all young men and women regardless of their physical or mental health. Her plan, allowing all to choose between military or welfare work, met with considerable criticism. Director of the SSS, Gen. Lewis Hershey advocated using the armed forces to raise the "educational, physical and moral standards of the nation's youth." He approved the DoD's practice of lowering mental and physical standards for men, while he opposed a volunteer army and selective conscientious objection. "When the country gets to the point where the average citizen doesn't want to defend himself then I don't think it makes much difference if anyone else does. We're goners." He also advocated drafting women. He said "when we need women we should draft them."
confirmed that most talk of drafting women in the past had revolved around nurse shortages but he would not have limited the discussion to the medical arena. He also reassured the public, though, that there were no plans in the works to draft women. Sargent Shriver advocated including women in induction registration and testing at sixteen for non-military service. He testified to Congress, "Thousands, possibly millions, of young women would like a chance to help their country by performing recognized national service" and complained about the class composition of the officer corps.

In 1967 President Johnson came out in favor of draft reform; specifically, he favored a more equitable lottery system with fewer exemptions and deferments. Under such a system, fathers would lose their automatic exemptions. Key House Democrats opposed the proposal. Others saw women's exemption from military obligation, if framed as a burden of citizenship, as unfair. The first public complaint in this period appeared in the press in mid-1968 when "a draft resister asked a Federal judge for a jury hearing on his claim that the military draft is unlawful because it applies only to men and not women." Lawyers for the youth argued that the law discriminated on the basis of sex under the Fifth Amendment's definition of due process. But gender ideology had a firm grip. The judge asked, "The theory was that women would stay home and have children so there'd be some soldiers for the next war, wasn't it?"

On the other hand, Charlotte Lee Williams took matters a step further and disguised herself as Clarence Arthur Williams to register for the North Carolina draft in 1962. She was found out in 1966 and arrested. The charge was not specified, her motives were not explained, and the resolution of her case was not publicized. The draft board had had cases of men dressing like women to get out of the draft but could not recall
any other woman posing as a man to be included. As with this curiosity, cases of 'reverse discrimination' usually got press space. Male nurses were drafted, even those with hardships as was the case with one father of eight who was eventually exempted. One widowed father of five was mobilized for Vietnam and refused to decline the assignment because he did not want to lose a career in which he had invested thirteen years. If he declined the assignment, he would have had to resign. The article did not remind readers, that no matter how much time they had invested in military careers, servicewomen were not allowed to have children and could definitely not stay in the military as single parents.41

Finally, some people recognized the connection between various requirements for and symbols of the rights and obligations of citizenship. A majority supported the move to lower the voting age to eighteen. Sending young men off to fight, but not allowing them a voice in the political processes of the nation could not be countenanced. Still some Republicans vehemently resisted the move. These would have been the same resisters who did not feel that military obligation was unfairly apportioned among the citizens.42

Chronology of appearance in the public view of the 'bonding' issue dictates that I make an aside here to discuss terms of the debate on integrating women in a gendered context before the discussion actually occurs. In this chapter we have seen, in relation to racial issues, that soldiers of different races serving in harm's way together seemed to get along better and work together more efficiently than those who may have been more removed from adversity. One could say they 'bonded'. This phenomena could also be read into reports of men and women working together since women were enrolled in large numbers during WWII even
though it was not explicitly discussed in these terms. Male soldiers bonded with military women they worked with and with the nurses who cared for them. They also bonded with civilian women, such as the female journalists, who joined them at the front. Bonding in this sense entailed a mutual respect and in some ways mutual dependence; it was believed (whether consciously stated or not) to increase the efficiency of the forces both in the field and at headquarters.

Later the terms of the debate on integrating women would start to include a new focus of discussion. This new focus was not the bonding of those who work toward a common goal or who face adversity together and had to rely on each other for survival, but a variation on the theme, 'male bonding'. The idea that there was a gender component to bonding was not new. Sociologist Lionel Tiger had been doing research on "Men in Groups" since the 1960s. But the idea that a peculiar phenomena constituted a biological imperative only applicable to men—that only men can get along in certain circumstances, especially those requiring aggression, and that this should bar women from participating in those situations, and that this should keep women from joining a work group, really came up in the popular press more recently. In the 1980s and 1990s women in the military and women-in-combat debates began more and more to revolve around a discussion of whether women and men could bond together effectively and not hurt the efficiency of the armed forces. In fact, some would argue that it had to be shown that not only could cross-gender bonding be possible but that it increased the effectiveness of the military in order to include women at all. This standard had not been used earlier—that a measure had to be prove a priori to increase effectiveness in order to tried. And part of the discussion on homosexuals in the military
implicitly questioned whether this was not only a cross-gender issue but a cross-sexuality issue which Tiger did not address.

I believe this detailed stage setting is necessary to provide context for a discussion of a feature by sociologist Charles C. Moskos, Jr., written for the New York Times Magazine in 1967. Moskos, a major participant in the military gender and orientation debates of the 1980s and early 1990s, accompanied enlisted men of combat rifle squads in Vietnam to research "a profile of the American combat soldier and his attitudes." The piece is not really about 'bonding', but given the latter debates and Moskos's first-hand Vietnam experience, it provides insights that some conservative sociologists seem to have forgotten or dissociated themselves from more recently. First, Moskos recognized that "in any large-scale military organization, even in the actual theater of war, only a fraction of the men under arms personally experience combat... approximately 70 per cent of the men in Vietnam cannot be considered combat soldiers except by the loosest definitions." Moskos averred that the definition of Vietnam as a "no-front war" was politically self-serving for government officials and rear area troops so they could receive combat pay and awards. Of course women were not always eligible for these (war zone service for line women was also restricted) as they were barred from "combat duty." In any case one would have expected then that Moskos would have thought the restrictions on women inappropriate.

Second, for those in actual combat, Moskos reported that one of the greatest traumas was "not only the imminent danger of the loss of one's own life or, more frightening for most, limbs, but also the sight of one's comrades' wounds and deaths." No mention is made of the combat nurses who not only served at risk, but had to deal with the injuries and deaths of thousands of their comrades-in-arms. Although many tell of trying to
distance themselves from their patients in order to psychically survive, evidence shows that they could not always do so effectively and suffered as severe PTSD as any combat infantryman.

Third, at the same time he argued that Vietnam was not a "no front war," Moskos proposed that "the soldier's distaste for endangering civilians is overcome by his fear that Vietnamese of any age or sex can be responsible for his own death," indicating that danger was not only faced at the front between clearly identifiable opposing adult, male military forces. He failed to recognize that the tacit condoning of GI abusive behavior (shown repeatedly in this study as being in clear public view from the post-World War II period on) towards foreign peoples (especially women) encouraged an attitude that did not protect civilians from being abused as groups or individuals. The culmination of lack of leadership and behavioral standards, mandated by the services in many other arenas, contributed to later incidents such as that recounted in "Casualties of War" (magazine article and later a movie) and reports of the My Lai massacre. To Moskos, Vietnamese women and children were the most fearsome enemy because they could not be clearly identified as "combatants" and because they did not fight by "the rules." American women were also a threat because the anti-war movement, of which many were supporters, "engender[ed] more support for hawklike attitudes," among the soldiers in the field. Susan Jeffords argues that popular culture representations are coded all anti-war activism and sentiment as "feminine."

Finally, and most importantly, Moskos wrote of the extensive war literature on "the semimystical bonds of comradeship which tie men together in combat." He reminded readers that these bonds were generally "self-serving," i.e., "the individual soldier must necessarily develop and take part in small-group relationships" for survival. Support of squad
members is essential and was "forthcoming largely to the degree with which he reciprocates. Ultimately, the soldiers overriding concern is to stay alive." This would have been supported by S.L.A. Marshall's earlier research on World War II combatants. Moskos went on to say that "bonding" was situational and short-lived. It disappeared quickly once the soldier left combat, "despite protestations of lifelong friendship during the shared combat experience."

Moskos had argued, then, that the bonding of soldiers did not occur because they were male, as Tiger had, but because they shared adverse experiences and must rely on each other for survival; bonding is based in expected reciprocation of support. The phenomena was observed among males because of the laws and policies concerning the American military at this particular time in this particular war by this particular observer. But, it does not seem, given the conditions for bonding Moskos outlined, that blacks, women, homosexuals, or any other group would be unable to bond with each other or across group boundaries given the same circumstances of recognition that mutual support is one's only hope for survival. Would mission be secondary to one's own or one's comrade's survival, male or female? Moskos does not provide an answer to this question, but given his argument one would assume the answer would be yes, just as it was for many who fragged NCOs and officers during this conflict and just as it was for American Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993. Other historical evidence, including WWII oral histories of women in resistance movements and more recent revolutionary movements and during basic cadet training at the service academies, suggest bonding does in fact occur across genders.

When Moskos pursued questions as to what made America the best country in the world and whether that had anything to do with liberty and equality regardless of differences such as race, gender, religion, or
sexual orientation, soldier responses focused on "creature comforts" or the "material aspects of American life." So although soldiers seemed to begrudge rear area personnel and civilians back home their physical comforts, it was from envy rather than an attitude that the rugged life of soldiering was inherently better. This attitude would encourage animosity both toward military line women in the rear echelon and women at home who were not subject to military obligation. It also showed that men did not find the "male world of combat" essential in defining their identity.

Moskos then seemed to contradict himself, however when he wrote that a factor (only one of many) in combat motivation was the "notion of masculinity and toughness which pervaded much of the soldiers' outlook toward warfare. Being a combat soldier is seen as a man's job." Front line soldiers often questioned the virility of rear echelon troops. But a hierarchy existed, in that airborne forces saw ground forces as less masculine as well. Who was more manly and what did that count for? But Moskos then burst the balloons of those who might think that questions of virility and masculinity really have anything to do with the actual mission. He says both that soldiers attributed North Vietnamese success to their soldiers' bravery rather than to insidious guerrilla and terrorist contributions and to American soldiers' drug use. He also suggested that "the combat soldier's vision of manly endeavors is a carryover from the teen-age subculture." He stressed, in fact, that an exaggerated masculinity ethic is less evident among soldiers after their units have been bloodied. As the realities of combat are faced, more prosaic definitions of manly honor emerge. In other words, notions of masculinity serve to create initial motivation to enter combat, but recede once the life-and-death facts of warfare are experienced.
"Heroes" were those who recklessly endangered the unit's welfare. His thesis here would be supported by Marshall's research and Paul Fussell's interviews of World War II soldiers.

The importance of this early appearance of the "bonding" issue last discussion to women is that, if masculinity is a "created" motivation, one would assume that effective leaders could "create" an alternate motivation to enter combat. Once in combat, Moskos seemed to think cultural concepts of gender were no longer as important as the reality of survival. In addition, his research showed that those who had actually served in combat and those who had served with women placed less emphasis on gender than on technical effectiveness and mutual support, than those who had never served in combat or those who had never served with women. Thus, senior male leaders who had not served in harm's way or had not served with women would be more likely to argue for their exclusion, as would those civilians who had never had to serve under such traumatic conditions. To these, mythical notions of the importance of culturally-defined "masculinity" and the ability to rate one's "virility" by which unit one served in, might hold more significance than historical realities or research evidence as to ability and cross-group bonding. They could be seen as better indicators of combat success or military effectiveness apparently.

Finally, Moskos addressed racial issues. He recognized that blacks were willing to fight and die in Vietnam in "the only institution in this society which seems to really be integrated," and where promotion and benefit was based on merit, achievement and contribution, rather than to live in a civilian society where they were treated as second-class citizens. (He did not address whether the Army was truly free of discrimination and prejudice or whether that was simply a perception, nor
whether the service was simply the lesser of two evils). But the military continued to disavow its ability to lead civilian society in respect to women, homosexuals, and other marginalized groups. Moskos also did not address, in 1967 nor in the early 1990s, why it was so hard for the public, government, and military to understand why women, gays, and 'Other' groups might fight for equality of opportunity in the military.

In conclusion, Moskos wrote of the soldiers' dislike of all civilians whether they "support[ed] the boys" or opposed the war because civilians "don't know what it's all about." As long as women as a class were perceived to be "civilians," civilians could successfully be feminized and then treated as less privileged both in knowledge and scope of action. Even military women would then be judged by this yardstick. More importantly, the rubric encouraged, even among military men who served with military line women and nurses, to forget that they served.43

Increased involvement in South East Asia brought, and increased, need for military manpower, and therefore, higher draft calls. As usual in times of need, standards for disadvantaged white men were lowered and women and minority men were recruited (and the latter drafted) in larger numbers. Also, as in the past, some people recognized the unfairness of a system in which contributions were not repaid with respect and civil equality, and so discursive space once again existed to discuss citizenship vis-a-vis rights and military obligations.

Although this space existed most obviously in racial debates, it took place during a period of resurgent feminism in which adherents pushed for an ERA and challenged all social and legal barriers to women's opportunities. Military women, less visible than in earlier periods but still seen in the media, gained increasing consideration, and some
restrictive policies began to fall, such as the restrictions on rank and numbers. Many more remained that would be challenged further after 1968.

While military women did make some advances and received some recognition for their contributions, and the public saw more foreign women in martial activities, American military nurses were still not appreciated and male soldiers still abused foreign women. All these women faced danger constantly. Military line women served in the war-zone, and civilian women on all sides became casualties and some suffered as POWs. Again, many of the civilians were respected more by military men than were the line women who were supposedly kept out of harm's way, but were simply prevented from making fuller contributions and did serve in danger.

Whether they were perceived as being in danger or not, depiction of military women by the press had begun to shift. The media put less emphasis on servicewomen's femininity, but made more mention of "quality" problems in relation to morality and loyalty, i.e. homosexuality or anti-war protest involvement. Race issues continued to consume more and more space on the military stage and these definitely had implications for the debates on women, even if those connections were not yet articulated fully. These racial debates also formed one basis for the anti-draft and draft reform discussions that provided opportunities to talk about the essence of citizenship in terms of rights and obligations. Once again, the issue of male nurses highlighted many of the contested fields of the draft, feminized spaces, and the masculine provinces of war and battle. Finally, nascent terms of the continuing debate on the militarization of women, especially "male bonding," were beginning to gain currency in the popular consciousness.

After the turning point of the war in 1968, from the disillusionment following the Tet Offensive to the transition to the AVF in 1973, all
these issues continued to be played out in public view and with popular involvement. The change in perceptions about the winability of the Vietnam conflict, the veracity of government and military officials, America's proper place in the world, and the realities of the Cold War would all have significant impact on women in the armed forces. Servicewomen continued to stand in the background of the coverage of the war, racial upheaval, and draft debates but the connections were undeniable. And, at home, the ERA debate, including how its passage might affect women, the draft, and combat restrictions, would be a central issue in both American politics and the feminist movement. The larger issues still got the most press attention but since these were human and citizenship issues they were identifiably women's issues.

Women in the Civil Rights, student, and anti-war movements correctly perceived that their treatment had not changed much. They would struggle against old dichotomies between the passive, supportive female roles and the active, dominant male roles. Raised consciousness and the experience of activism would be invaluable to a whole generation of women. And the increasing need for women in Vietnam (especially nurses) and an anticipated need for line women in a volunteer force would bring further military integration of women, with all its concomitant challenges. Without the central issues being confronted head-on though, change would continue to be piecemeal, based on expedience, and ideological inconsistencies would then leave debates as to appropriate fields of women's participation to be rehashed continually after 1974.
Notes to Chapter 8


5. "Seminolese Select First Woman Head of Tribal Council," NYT, 10 May 1967, p.29. Klemsrud, "The American Indian: Part of the City, and Yet...," 18 September 1968, p.34. Lisa Hammel, "Negro Women Explore the Perplexities of Their Family Role," 20 August 1968, p.34. Nan Robertson, "Johnson Discerns Crisis in Families," 30 July 1965, p.29. Although a lot of media attention was given to black men in their fight for racial equality and in the inequities of military service and the draft for black men, there was some attention to minority women's issues. Although feminists may not have championed her cause, Gloria Jon fought to keep her "Miss New York" title after she alleged lost it due to her race. Contest organizers insisted her race was not an issue except in a positive way as they were going to exploit evidences of racial progress to attract more financial and popular support. On problems in black communities and families and blaming black women (matriarchy) for them see reference to Moynihan report in note 35.


interview with Retired USAF Col. Emma Jane Riley, WAF Director 1957-1961 and Retired USAF Col. Geraldine P. May, WAF Director 1948-1956. Both said that Johnson had initiated work on the bill when he wanted to promote a woman lieutenant colonel to colonel and was told that the law on rank restrictions prevented him from doing so. He was said to remark, "What good is being president if I can't promote someone to colonel." "Six WACs Named Colonels" (UPI), 6 December 1968, p.41.


11. As mentioned before some critics ignore the fact that the Positive Motivation Model-type training was instituted in anticipation of the move to the AVF and in response to severe morale problems linked to the Vietnam Conflict, racial injustice, and the inequities of the draft, rather than because women required "easier" or "softer" training. Nan Robertson, "Marines Salute Their Women," NYT, 13 February 1968, pp.37+. Philip Piaker, "Women's Boot Training" (letter), 28 February 1968, p.46. Brian Mitchell, in The Weak Link, associates the increase in the numbers of women, induced to save the AVF in 1973, as the source of the military's weaknesses after that time.

12. "Woman Who Lost Army Job is Supported by A.C.L.U." (AP), NYT, 4 May 1968, p.36. "Wacs Contest Ouster" (UPI), 26 October 1968, p.20. In 1966 there had been a flurry of press coverage of homosexuals in the military. A nation-wide ring targeted senior academics, professionals, and military officers for extortion. Later, eleven enlisted Coast Guard men from Cape May were dismissed for homosexuality. Shortly thereafter, fifteen homosexual rights groups announced the formation of the Committee to Fight Exclusion of Homosexuals from the Armed Forces. The Committee argued that ending the ban would help ease the manpower shortage for Vietnam. The move was called the "first major effort of homosexual groups throughout the nation to organize a unified self-improvement program." Neither lesbians nor lesbian organizations were specifically mentioned in any of these news articles. Jack Roth, "Nationwide Ring Preying on Prominent Deviates," NYT, 3 March 1966, pp.1+. "11 in Coast Guard in Jersey are Ousted as Homosexuals" (AP), 15 April 1966, p.20. Peter Bart, "War Role Sought for Homosexuals," 17 April 1966, p.12. "Adventist Regains Job After Sabbath Appeal" (AP), NYT, 9 August 1967, p.3.

and anti-draft movements, for example see, Paul Hoffman, "War Foes Stage Macabre Protest," NYT, 31 May 1966; "Coed Sets Herself Afire on a Campus" (AP), 24 November 1965, p.29; and extensive coverage of Women's Strike for Peace activities. Other women favored American involvement in South East Asia and only protested the Administration's limiting the scope and the violence of the conflict there, such as in "D.A.R. Decries Rein on War Objectives" (AP), 20 April 1967, p.4.


24. "Vietnamese Girl is Accused of Collecting Data From G.I.'s" (UPI), 
"Vietcong Said to Have Woman Deputy Commander" (Reuters), NYT, 13 July 
Seymour Topping, "War Role of Vietcong's Women Widens With Shortage of 
Men," 2 August 1965, p.3. "Interrogation in Vietnam" (AP photo), 15 
August 1965, p.3. "Woman Vietcong Suspect Captured" (AP photo), 27 August 
James Cameron, "From Hanoi...," 10 December 1965, p.12. "Vietcong Reports 
a Drive to Recruit Shock Brigades" (AP), 24 February 1966, p.14. "Patrol 
in North Vietnam" (UPI photo), 7 June 1966, p.3. "Alleged Vietcong Shown 
danang" (UPI), 11 August 1966. "Prison Camp Near Pleiku" (AP photo), 
"Saigon Police Say Suspect May be the 'Dragon Lady'" (AP), NYT, 23 
"The Women," Tm, 8 November 1968, pp.43-44.

25. Langguth, "In Saigon the G.I.'s Mistress Gives her Parents a Better 
Life," NYT, 14 August 1965, p.3. Apple, "Four G.I.'s are Accused of 
"How Saigon Sees All Those G.I.'s," 8 May 1966, Section IV, p.3. 
"Fulbright Declares He Regrets Charge of U.S. 'Arrogance'," 18 May 1966, 
p.8. Article on soldiers' experiences in Vietnam, 30 October 1966, 
Section VI, pp.100+. "Saigon Plan to Close Clubs is Protested by Bar 
Girls" (AP), 21 November 1967, p.9. Bernard Weinraub, "Footnotes on the 
Vietnam Dispatches," 20 October 1968, Section VI, pp.34+. See Cynthia 
Enloe's work on how militaries deploy women as prostitutes in another case 
in which they need women but refuse to recognize the importance of this 
relationship. Enloe claims the camouflaging of this and other deployments 
obscures women's roles in national and international politics and gender 
relations within politics and militaries.

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1 May 1968, p.9. "G.I.'s on Australia Leave, First Since World War II" 
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30. Ronald Sullivan, "Jersey Will Add Negroses to Guard," NYT, 17 August
1967, pp.1+. Again, see Stiehm and Jeffords for white, male sense of lost
status when having to compete with previously excluded groups.

31. "Pentagon Will Drop All R.O.T.C. Units Balking Integration" (AP),
NYT, 8 May 1965, p.15. "A Seminole to Get Degree in Florida," 9 May 1965,
p.46. "Johnson Orders Study on Annapolis Negroes" (UPI), 4 August 1965,
p.19. "Mississippi Nominates Negro to Air Academy" (UPI), 16 February
1966, p.37. "Mississippian Denies Aiding Negro's Air Academy Bid" (UPI),
October 1967, p.32. "Negroes Urged to Apply to Military Academies," 25
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32. "South Africa's Bar to Negroes Cancels U.S. Carrier's Visit" (AP),
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February 1967, p.12. "Coast Guard Bid for Negroes Lags" (AP), 12
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"Navy is Studying Racial Incidents" (AP), 22 October 1968, p.7. Apple,

33. "U.S. Gives First Medal of Honor to a Negro Marine" (UPI), NYT, 22
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Vietnam," 14 October 1968, p.3.

34. Raymond, "Negro Death Rate in Vietnam Exceeds Whites'," NYT, 10 March

35. This is just a sample of numerous articles. Information in the
preceding paragraphs was taken from these sources listed in chronological
order. Martin Waldron, "Seven Marines Testify a Drill Sergeant Beat
a Marriage in Maryland" (AP), 12 February 1966. Gene Grove, "The Army and
the Negro," 24 July 1966, Section VI, Cover and pp.4+. "A Negro Colonel
in Danang Scores Carmichael Stand" (AP), 11 August 1967, p.3. "Young
Cites 'Freedom to 'Die in Vietnam'" (UPI), 26 August 1967, p.23. Apple,
the Black G.I. Comes Back From Vietnam," 24 February 1968, Section VI,
p.27. Weinraub, "Rioting Disquiets G.I.'s in Vietnam," 8 April 1968,
p.35. Thomas A. Johnson, "The U.S. Negro in Vietnam," 29 April 1968,
Weinraub, In Vietnam, G.I.'s Express Grief, With a Touch of Bitterness,
7 June 1968, p.28. "Army Denounced by Negro Major" (AP), 14 October 1968,
p.3.

Tuck's comments could have been applied to debates about gays in the
services after the presidential election of 1992. Some rights activists
commented that as soon as gays refused to fight in the country's wars on
the basis of civil and social discrimination, they would be in high
demand. As soon as discriminators learned they could "kill two birds with one stone" they most likely would have favored sending the hated/fearred minority off to battle to save the heterosexual, middle-class, white soldiers for the building of domestic society.


43. Charles C. Moskos Jr., "A Sociologist Appraises the G.I.," NYT, 24 September 1967, Section VI, p.32. See also Lionel Tiger, S.L.A. Marshall, and Paul Fussell. For discussions of nurses in Vietnam and PTSD see bibliography and especially Keith Walker and Lynda VanDevanter. For discussions about the "feminization" of civilians in popular culture during and after the Vietnam war see Susan Jeffords. Jeffords argues in fact that cross-racial male bonding was overemphasized in popular culture representations as a strategy to further exclude women. Jeffords, Lynne Hanley, and others argue that women are also excluded from agency in telling war stories by their mythic exclusions from the battlefield and war and the military in general. Enloe and Stiehm also discuss male bonding and critique Tiger's work.
CHAPTER 9
TOWARDS THE AVF, 1969–1973

After the drama of the Tet Offensive in 1968 showed that the U.S. was not 'winning' the Vietnam war, problems within the military, including troubled race relations and perceptions of the unfairness of the draft, took on added importance. Civil unrest at home, centered around some of the same issues, exploded. Although these issue were not specifically about women, they impacted civilian and military women at every turn and were impacted in turn by the women's movement and the push for the ERA. Additionally, racial unrest highlighted inequities based on gender; women of color dealt daily with double marginalization. Women were at once some of the strongest supporters of the anti-war and anti-draft movements, as well as a personnel source the military would have to draw on if the draft was to be abolished. Some military leaders began to think of reforms that would be necessary to attract both male and female volunteers of high quality and recognized that motivated female volunteers might be more effective service personnel than men who were less qualified or who might have qualms about military service and/or the war. Women were blamed by "hawks" on Vietnam for feminized opposition to government and DoD actions, and were chastised by "doves" for believing that greater equality of opportunity in the military might bring women first-class citizenship. Those in the service, for the most part removed from the immediacy of these debates, continued to fight for an improved class of citizenship within the services. They struggled for removal of gender specific
restrictions, such as those on children, and limitations on rank, promotions, and benefits. Most restrictions were weakly but repeatedly defended by a DoD that knew they were archaic and irrational.

Many historians credit the Vietnam conflict, especially after 1968, with being a primary factor in creating a morass of disillusionment with traditional authorities within American society. If the government and DoD could have been so wrong, could political and military leaders ever be trusted again? What other institutions should be investigated and changed? Certainly racial conditions were being contested at every turn and they were most vehemently struggled against within the organization in American society which was supposed to put merit and efficiency on a pedestal—the "most integrated institution in society," the military. As in the years 1965-1968, Civil Rights activists continued to question why more blacks were drafted, why more volunteered, why more saw combat and were killed, and why, after their significant military contributions (and fulfilling every assumed requirement for citizenship), they could still face discrimination in the military and be treated as less than full citizens at home.

Women's rights activists asked, if we could so clearly ask what the proper questions concerning race, even if we yet did not have the answers, why did we not see that women were asking the same questions about equality, discrimination, and full citizenship? If women continued to be limited in their opportunities as a class, despite civil rights legislation that supposedly included them, should the Constitution be amended to specify that sex may not be used as a category of discrimination. Military women asked the same of the armed forces.

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By 1969, it was clear that war issues and racial issues were inextricably entangled. C. L. Sulzberger of the *Times* informed any who were unsure of this when he wrote that, "American Negro soldiers in Vietnam used to consider the war and the civil rights movement as separate things but the past three years have had an exacerbating effect. For the first time black G.I.'s ask: 'Why should I defend someone else's freedom if no one defends mine?" In fact, however unwillingly, the military had been thrust—again—into the center of racial controversy. Even though soldiers seemed to get along fine in the fox holes, they struggled off-duty and away from the war-zone. Although the editors gave the Army credit for advances, they expected the services, having led the way, to stay in front.

The U.S. Army has achieved a revolution in integration. General Eisenhower didn't consider it the military's responsibility to force the pace of integration ahead of civilian government but later commanders have taken a more positive line. After all, the Army asks a lot of a man--his life--and must insist on other equities. But even the military is not moving fast enough. It should reprogram its training of officers and enlisted personnel to make a still more serious attack on the civil rights problem. It cannot afford to have black soldiers feel like mercenaries rather than full participants....Americans must learn from the arduous Revolutionary Warfare experience in Vietnam what we must do to reform the weaknesses of our own society. We have no business fighting for democracy if we don't practice it.

Indeed, although the "services had become an instrument of social change" according to many contemporary thinkers, and despite "career military men [not being] used to this new role," violent racial incidents between servicemen, and civil injustices against them, continually being publicized finally garnered the attention of military leaders. The military could not overlook the contributions of black soldiers nor the problems in a world where fighting against men of color in the first major
conflict since Korea, when the services were more fully integrated, gained a "sudden visibility" in the "first television war."

Most of the press and public recognized that the military not only led society in integration but was "totalitarian" enough to enforce nondiscriminatory individual behavior and institutional practice. Where better than to put the political principles the nation espoused into practice and demand appropriate behavior? But the military leaders had made some mistakes by allowing or ignoring behavior that could and did quickly turn into racial incidents, which hurt unit cohesion, the military mission, and community relations. "Individually retained and deliberately practiced prejudice" in the military, as well as accepted civilian patterns of discrimination near by military installations were damaging the military record on racial integration. Senior leaders finally became active on this issue.

For instance, in 1969 the Marine Commandant clearly stated what behavior was acceptable and what he expected of his officers in terms of enforcement. Tacit toleration of discrimination and harassment would be grounds for dismissal or even punishment for dereliction of responsibilities. Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. cited the USMC's policy of non-discrimination and a policy of firm, impartial discipline as the foundation for conduct. He emphasized that no matter what the conditions of civil society, the issue for the Marine Corps was one of military effectiveness, stating that "the truly integrated spirit that pervades the battlefield must pervade in the barracks and on liberty as well." He was concerned with perceived injustices as much as with those that were real and emphasized that communication and proper openness to and handling of complaints was essential to fairness and perceptions thereof. Clumsy
processing of complaints about harassment and inequities has plagued the military in every instance of integration.

Women were at the center of some of the most serious racial incidents. In 1969, a black sailor trying to cut-in on white sailors dancing with white women and the refusal of a black WAVE dancing with a white Marine to let a black Marine cut-in led to altercations and even a death. But Marine officials took the easy way out and made the club off-limits to WAVES but the problems obviously were much larger and getting worse.

The press continually blamed service leadership and senior officers for not handling the problem better; at the same time, they recognized that until improvements were made in civilian society the services could only do so much. Newspaper and magazine readers saw evidence of inept leadership or senior resistance to improvements. An ad hoc investigation by seven officers at Camp Lejeune yielded a report that admitted to "a general lack of compliance on the part of officers and noncommissioned officers with Marine directives on equal treatment ....Unfortunately, the major offenders in this regard are among the relatively senior officers and enlisted Marines."¹

Racial problems continued in civilian communities close to the military. Families continued to have to struggle to get their service relatives buried in racially restricted cemeteries. And, the Times editors took the Administration to task for mouthing the words of civil rights but signaling the South racial traditions there would not be challenged because, "No one expects racial integration to be accomplished overnight." The editors charged that government had to tackle the "hard problems of enforcement and leadership." For all its protestations against taking the lead, the military continued to do so. Finally
realizing that the money brought by the military into communities near bases could be used to press those communities to respect all the military personnel assigned there, the DoD gave overseas commanders authority to make housing and other public and private community facilities off-limits to all service personnel if those civilian authorities practiced racial discrimination.\(^2\)

As for more general attempts to address the problem, in 1971 the Army started basic race relations classes for all personnel. Although Brian Mitchell has asserted that these kinds of "social actions" courses were started because of the military leadership’s weakness in the face of feminist agitation for thought control, the approach in fact has a different and more successful history. Courses started at Ft. Dix because of a need to "dispel popular images and fears" included lectures, films, and discussions of "black history, black awareness and inter-group relations." One of the instructors explained that the purpose of the course was to "examine racial attitudes realistically, to broaden experiences of the new inductees and to open lines of communication between black and white soldiers." In 1971 SECDEF Melvin Laird ordered all armed forces personnel to attend such courses and periodic refreshers. The stated purpose was "to prevent racial unrest, tension or conflict from impairing combat readiness and efficiency." The program was expected to have an effect on the country as a whole, both in civilian communities near military bases and nationwide as servicemen returned to civilian life. The press immediately recognized that such a program again placed the military in the forefront of social change no matter how vehemently military leaders denied that that was where the services should be. The armed forces equal opportunity director, L. Howard Bennett, insisted that top-level involvement was essential to overcome the entrenched attitudes
and practices of senior officers: "If it comes from the top, from commanders and from the Secretary of Defense, it makes a difference and the difference is tremendous." As long as those at the top voiced the concerns but did not insist on enforcement the problems remained. Once the senior leadership explicitly defined the limits of tolerance and the expected standards of behavior the solutions had a real chance to work. According to Thomas Johnson of the Times, "And so the ironies of modern America must convince many a grizzled old sergeant that for the military to do its job of fighting, it must now lead a social revolution." In fact, on every service members' evaluation for promotion, a statement was to be included as to the members' attitudes toward equal opportunity. Military pragmatism, and not some alleged capitulation to "political correctness," was the impetus behind these first steps.

The Navy started its social actions classes and encounter discussion groups in 1973. After near mutiny incidents the previous year, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., chastised after senior Navy officers for not exercising leadership in relation to racial issues. Zumwalt warned that he would discipline commanders who had "violated either the spirit or the letter of our equal opportunity program." Zumwalt insisted, "It is my view that these racial incidents are not the results of lowered standards, but are clearly due to failure of commands to implement those programs with a whole heart...We have tended to fail wherever a 'real' change from hallowed routine was required...." He was one of the very few to combine at this time, even if only in fleeting remarks, racial and gender discrimination, saying "Fully aware of the realities [of trying to change behavior, not thoughts]...I attempted to devise programs to defuse racial and sexual discrimination tension....Equal means exactly that. Equal." He called his officers to action,
No program promulgated by any Chief of Naval Operations can really change an attitude... Nor can you bring about real change by obeying the letter and not the spirit of a program. Uncomprehending response or response which lacks commitment from the "heart"—no matter how correct—is essentially obstructionist.... What I am asking for, and what this Navy must have if it is to continue to fulfill its mission—especially in an all volunteer environment—is something more than programs. We must not administer programs; we must lead men and women. It is not a push to the far edge of the untired I am suggesting, gentlemen. It is a return to our oldest and most proven traditions. Command by leadership.3

Zumwalt knew that an authoritarian structure, although conducive to mandated change, only went so far in enforcing the real acceptance of equal opportunity. Lack of senior to mid-level officer commitment to equality helps explain the lag in full integration of both minorities and women in the military.4

In the face of harsh criticism and a stirring call to action, the Navy defended its record. During a 1973 minority recruitment campaign, the Navy blamed "lowered standards" (for the AVF) and "poorly educated blacks" for its racial ills. This new recruiting drive, including advertisements in Ebony and Jet, meant to emphasize 'quality'. This sounded very much like the 'quality as containment' practice used for women in the 1950s. In the Navy's eyes, "Blacks of quality" would not be troublemakers. In reality, if the Navy failed to solve the problem of white discrimination, neither 'quality' personnel nor 'Toms' were the answer. One recruiter admitted to reporters privately, "It appears the Navy wants blacks it can control" and said it was no wonder blacks had rebelled, historically, because the Navy had given them all the dirty work. There was a special effort made to recruit blacks for Annapolis with a goal of matching the percentage in the population at large but as recently as 1971 there were only three in a class.5
While the Navy was trying to recruit more black men, the new SECDEF, Elliot L. Richardson, "expressed 'shock' at the absence of women and representatives of minority groups in top civilian jobs in the Army and other services. He ordered an immediate effort to change the situation." Richardson reminded senior leaders that the Army "had often taken the lead" in the area of equal opportunity hiring. He declared,

We are working against a deep-rooted and widespread discrimination against minorities and women...The challenges we face are intensified by societal changes which have made rising expectations and growing frustrations a double-edged manager's nightmare. But succeed we must--the symptoms will not go away and more explanation of the complexities of the roots of the present injustices will not redress the grievances of those who deserve a fair share of the American dream.

He called for action, saying simply, "I expect improvement." His remarks applied to civilian positions but senior civilian women in the DoD made an impression on the public awareness of women in the defense establishment and could have served either as role models or "Aunt Toms" for military women.6

For its part, the press (as it had done with women continually), reminded readers of the history of black military achievements and contributions. No one should have been able to claim ignorance or amnesia. And, as with women, the postal service and the mint issued commemorative stamps and coins in honor of black military history. Some recognized the problem of invisibility, perhaps not in the press but in the history books, of both prominent blacks and the masses of blacks and their participation in American heritage. Veteran black pilots from World War II publicized their trials and contributions during their reunions. Coleman Young, later long-time Mayor of Detroit, told of fighting to prove himself as a pilot as well as trying to preserve his dignity as a man and officer when black pilots were forced to ride in the back of the buses and
eat at the back doors of restaurants while Axis prisoners received the same treatment as white American citizens. One issue that arose repeatedly was the Army's reluctance to allow black officers to wear uniforms off base so that white enlisted personnel would not have to salute them in public.  

And black veterans did their part to keep their heritage and current concerns in the public eye. The United Black Veterans of America formed a coalition of black and other minority group veterans to "seek more educational, employment, and medical facilities for discharged servicemen." They charged that the public did not recognize or remember their contributions adequately which was evidenced by their unequal treatment and benefits. They also charged that other veterans groups like the American Legion did not relate adequately to their issues.  

By 1972 the face of the racial issue had changed and a small backlash had set in. No longer was white prejudice and discrimination seen as the major problem but "voluntary segregation" had to be combated. The Marine Commandant, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. ordered an end to "voluntary segregation" in living quarters on land and at sea. On the other side, Gen. Gushman also prodded his commanders to continue to be more vigilant in the practice of putting segregated off base bars, restaurants, and other facilities off-limits to service personnel. From the goals of his directives it appears that Cushman was trying to combat both real and 'imagined' racial problems and as well as white misperceptions of reverse discrimination.  

Backlash would come later for the women's movement, but the debate was more heated all the time. Two of the major issues the movement had to address in the early 1970s were the exclusiveness of its membership and
how the draft debate related to the ERA debate. At this time, though, the questions related to women in the military were very basic. Could one be a feminist and not a pacifist? If one argued against women's conscription, could one argue for first-class citizenship? These dilemmas constituted ammunition for the anti-feminist forces to try to exploit splits between feminists.

The debates on the ERA heating up during this period would be boiling in the next. The Nixon administration clearly favored equal rights and the President's Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women made it clear that all forms of discrimination were connected. The press called attention to the fact that the ERA had finally been released from House committee.

When the vote came in the House ERA clearly had momentum; the press reported, "While neither side seems confident of victory, the equal rights amendment, as it is known, looks more and more like an idea whose time has come." Supporters emphasized that although it was geared towards equal opportunity for women, it would also bar discrimination against men. Supporters recognized that, if the amendment passed, if men were drafted women would be as well. Similar exemptions and deferments might be instituted for women, and women would "probably" not be assigned duties they were unqualified for, including combat. The opposition targeted the dismantling of protective legislation and measures that favored women. The debate on the ERA approached a real discussion of linkages between forms of discrimination and political philosophy versus cultural ideology but never quite got there. Opponents claimed Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act covered women and favored letting the Supreme Court rule on problematic state laws as these were challenged individually. At the same time, opponents also maintained that the ERA would put a burden on the
courts to interpret the simple amendment in specific cases of application.\textsuperscript{10}

The amendment, proposed for forty-seven years, passed the House 350-15 in August of 1970. The Senate had passed it previously. Both the chairs of the Republican and Democratic National Committees favored the ERA. Although many people thought its time had come, that time quickly passed. The leader of supporters, Michigan Democrat Martha Griffiths, praised for her quiet persuasiveness and disdain for the tactics of the more militant women's liberation movement members, responded that the term "protective legislation" had become a shield for restrictive laws, and others responded that where "physical differences have a real effect on the law," they would continue to be recognized. The ERA would not invalidate rape laws. But it would call for fair appraisal of alimony apportionment and would make women susceptible to a military draft.\textsuperscript{11}

The Women's Strike for Equality in New York and elsewhere showed Congress the kind of support the women's movement could muster. Ten thousand people, mostly women, flooded the street and attended the following rally.\textsuperscript{12} Despite mass and high level government support the ERA ran into trouble in the Senate. The Senate had its detractors. North Carolina Democrat Sam J. Ervin, Jr., proposed an amendment meant to specifically exempt women from compulsory military service and that would permit passage of any law "reasonably designed to promote the health, safety, privacy, education or economic welfare of women, or to enable them to perform their duties as homemakers or mothers." Supporters argued that Ervin's suggestion would nullify the intent of the measure but they were split as to whether the ERA meant women would be drafted. Birch Bayh, Indiana Democrat, said that "women would remain exempt from the draft because Congress could decide that women were not physically suited to

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combat and that since all soldiers must be trained for combat duty, there
is no reason to believe that women would be drafted any more than men who
are not considered, in the judgement of Congress, to be suited, are
drafted." But women were already volunteer soldiers and were not trained
for combat duty nor assigned to "combat" units. When Sen. Ervin's longer
amendment was defeated, he proposed an amendment specifically forbidding
the drafting of women into the military. Supporters of the original ERA
admitted it would be hard for Senators to cast a vote which looked like a
vote for drafting women. In October the Senate passed a version with two
amendments. One allowed for school prayer (50-20) and one limited the
draft to men (36-33). Ervin was ecstatic, saying "I'm trying to protect
women from their fool friends and from themselves." 13

Press reports confirmed that the aspect of the ERA most heavily
debated was whether women would be subject to the draft. California
Republican Charles E. Wiggins told representatives that the general
counsel of the DoD had told him, "it would be impossible for the military
to operate if the [ERA] were adopted. Not only would the services be
forced to draft more women than they wanted, but separate barracks and
other separate facilities would not be permitted." He did not explain the
rationale for these comments and he was blasted by Michigan Democrat John
Conyers, Jr., who asked why "if the military was concerned, it had not
asked to testify."

In 1971 Rep. Griffiths went on the offensive again. This time she
blasted the House for not including women on the most important committees
considering the ERA including the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and
Judiciary Committees. Besides numerous state laws that discriminated
against women, Griffiths also mentioned the higher standards women had to
meet to volunteer for the military. She specifically noted that the Air
Force policy requiring female recruits to submit four photographs of themselves—"full-length and facial close-ups, in profile and front view."
No doubt this practice was left over from the 1950s Cochran controversy and the 1960s emphasis on 'quality' as femininity and appearance. Griffith's comment, "I would like to ask who retains the pictures of those girls with their addresses. And for what purpose are these required in the first place?"

The debate continued as ERA supporters decried the Judiciary Committees' passage (32-3) of the ERA with the draft exemption and permission for "reasonable state laws based on sex differences" to stay in effect. Rep. Wiggins had proposed the additions to "keep mothers from being drafted." And the measure would allow for laws that "reasonably protect the health and safety of the people." Martha Griffiths stated that she did not think the ERA would require the drafting of women, but if it did "perhaps women would take a different view of the Army and there would be fewer wars." The House passed the ERA again in 1971, 354-23, without additions. The draft exemption was defeated in the most vociferous debate, 265-87. By 1973 the ERA, having been passed through Congress and twenty-eight states, was debated by the remaining states (38 were needed), where it would languish. Supporters emphasized that with the AVF the draft was not an issue but if it was ever reinstated, "we will not draft young mothers; we shouldn't draft young fathers, either." Fathers had almost always been in one of the lowest draft categories.

As usual the Times covered women's issues quite extensively. Other than the front page treatment of the ERA and the magazine's feature pieces by noted academics and activists, and editorials and letters to the editors, most of the pieces ended up in the women's pages—"Food, Fashions, Family, Furnishings." Marilyn Bender suggested in 1969 that a
"new breed of middle-class women" was emerging. After a decade of examination of "the woman thing," they suffered from the "Feminine Mystique." Bender thought the 1970s would see this new breed out and about after the baby boom, return-to-domesticity era of 1946-57, with its "motherhood mania" and revalidation of femininity.

Meanwhile, Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* garnered much media attention. *Times* reviewer Christopher Lehmann-Haupt asserted that Millett proved "sex is a status category with political implications" and that the system of patriarchy exploited women in innumerable explicit and implicit ways. Millet argued that man's fear of women drove him to polarize the sexes, stunting man's feminine nature and women's masculine nature and leaving both sexes incomplete. Lehmann-Haupt criticized Millett for being too objective and mentally tough--"too masculine, itself a denial of femininity." He purported that she "has done what she so bitterly accuses the male world of having done for thousands of years--namely, shutting off the valves that supply subjectivity, intuition, sensuousness....Ponder the virtues and vices of a revolutionary book that must achieve its ends by committing the crimes of the old regime."

Lehmann-Haupt claimed Millett ignored the effects of hormones, but others did not. Dr. Edgar F. Berman, a retired surgeon and member of the Democrats' Committee on National Priorities, disagreed with giving women's rights top priority because of the danger of "raging hormonal influences" in hypothetical cases like "a menopausal woman president who had to make the decision of the Bay of Pigs,...[or] a slightly pregnant female pilot making a difficult landing." Not only did his comments provide political dividends to the Republicans and incite a near riot among women in the Democratic party, but he was rebutted by endocrinologists, psychiatrists, and practitioners of industrial medicine. They denied that raging
hormones of the menstrual cycle and menopause "limit women's potential in the executive spheres of business and politics."

Despite the experts' testimony related in detail in the press, Dr. Berman was not changing his mind, "I think the capacities of women and men are different....As far as national priorities, women's rights are not high on the list." Hawaii Rep. Patsy Mink argued for Berman's resignation, saying his "disgusting performance...displayed the basest sort of prejudice against women, characterizing us as mentally incapable to govern, let alone aspire to equality, because we are so physiologically inferior." Berman replied in a "Dear Patsy" letter that her tone was an example of the influence of a "raging hormonal imbalance." He wrote that "even a Congresswoman must defer to scientific truths... physical and psychological inhabitants limit a female potential." Berman did finally resign but refused to back away from his contention that women would be "emotionally erratic leaders....Women are different physically, physiologically and psychologically, regardless of politics."

No one in the early 1970s mentioned the 1948 discussion about menopause during the debate on the regularization of women's military service which had also been discounted by medical witnesses who said that men experienced similar changes as they progressed through their life cycles. The largest part of the 1970 debate was covered in the women's pages of the Times. But Reader's Digest published a 1970 piece by endocrinologist Dr. Estelle Ramey from the opposite perspective--"Man: The Weaker Sex." "The female of the species, almost any species, is sturdier than the male from infancy to the last hurrah...the male is less able to tolerate life's everyday stresses," she wrote. Testosterone was a large part of the problem in fact, and men suffered from other hormonal problems as much if not more than women did from menstruation or menopause. Women
might actually do better in senior positions as the blood supply to their brain was maintained better over a longer period of their lives. In addition, federal studies showed that women took fewer sick days and stated that male suicide was a more serious problem than women crying at work. Standardized tests showed that IQs did not differ by sex.

Few brilliant women have tried to develop their intellectual talents, simply because there has been a very small market for brilliant women in this country....No society [though] is so rich that it can afford to waste educated brain power....Societal roles cannot be assigned on the basis of stereotypes. We must learn to answer as Samuel Johnson did when he was asked, 'Which is more intelligent, man or woman?' Replied Dr. Johnson: 'Which man and which woman?'

But as early as 1972 the backlash became visible, as Virginia Lee Warren reported it was evidenced in a "new lift for old-fashioned femininity." Maurine and Elbert Startup published The Secret Power of Femininity with advice for women such as standing in front of a mirror and perfecting a "pretty pout" while saying "I am just a helpless woman at the mercy of you big, strong men." The Mormon couple from California also conducted "Femininity Forums" as part of the American Family and Femininity Institute.

The same year saw the beginnings of discussions of "Men's Lib" as well. The movement grew out of the women's movement's questioning of accepted roles and demands for corrections of social inequities. White, middle-class, well-educated men between twenty and fifty met for consciousness raising. But why would anyone "voluntarily abdicate a position of power and superiority?" The answer (1) Men suffered as much as women from a fixed set of rules based "generally on mores, rather than biology," (2) relationships with equals would be more rewarding and durable, (3) family bread-winning and decision-making could be shared, (4) men could show emotion without having their masculinity impinged, (5)
neither sex would be bound by traditional patterns and could instead do what they liked and were good at. But the onus was still on women to demand a change and be unwilling to put up with their "subservient role," according to men in the movement, as there was "no known case of people in power giving it away." Some men came to agree with gender liberation on their own, being "tired of proving masculinity twenty-four hours a day." Others gained insight elsewhere, as did one whose daughter thought that she could only be a nurse because "only men were doctors." This man noted, "My daughter was not going to be able to do certain things because she had been conditioned that she would be incapable. I was partly responsible by treating her as a very feminine little girl instead of a little human being who was a girl." Men in the nascent movement however agreed that "Men might have to be dragged kicking and screaming into their own liberation."16

Most interesting in terms of popular culture and popular response, perhaps, were several essays and editorials and the letters from readers responding to them. These included work by Gloria Steinem, Lionel Tiger, and others who were also important in debates on military women.

In her article, "What would it be like if women win?" Gloria Steinem tried to explain that women did not want to exchange places with men, nor did they want to imitate men; both proceed from ruling-class ego and guilt questioning, "what if they could treat us as we have treated them?". She compared women's oppression to that of blacks. She did not claim that women were morally superior but that since women had not yet been corrupted by power, had not been socialized to war games and fighting, and were not taught that womanhood depended on violence and victory, if women had a more equal share of power and economic systems were based more on merit, the country might be rid of some of its "machismo problems." Men
might have to give up some ruling-class privilege but in return they would get many benefits including not being drafted. She gave examples of societies where sex roles were not as strictly defined including, "In Israel women are drafted, and some have gone to war." Steinem insisted "the most radical goal of the movement is egalitarianism." Niceties need not be lost but would proceed from mutual affection and human respect rather than "sexual blackmail." One woman put it, "I like to be helped on with my coat, but not if it costs me $2,000 a year in salary."

In the same issue of Time, reporters presented a larger piece on the women's movement and the fiftieth anniversary of women's suffrage (the Nineteenth Amendment). The article attempted to explain some of the key agenda items of the movement and the more general effort to restructure patriarchal society. Reporters again reviewed Kate Millett's Sexual Politics, the reading of which one English professor described as "like sitting with your testicles in a nutcracker." Patriarchy, the institutional foe, was labeled as the "most pervasive ideology of our culture," providing our "fundamental concept of power." The history of the movement was also outlined from the publication of The Feminine Mystique to the experience with and inequalities within the civil rights movement and, finally, the formation of NOW. More radical women went beyond that largely white, middle-class, middle-aged, and tamer organization to found their own more radical groups. While Ti-Grace Atkinson, one of the more radical thinkers, bemoaned the lack of a more unified movement, others took on the issue of the "lavender herring," lesbianism. Susan Brownmiller explained men were able to dismiss women's complaints with charges of lesbianism. Such a strategy was used very successfully by military men as Randy Shilts later discovered and I will discuss further. As to actions and solutions, reporters discussed
consciousness raising and legal challenges based on the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Millett and others argued that legal challenges were not enough because real change required a "cultural revolution;" families had to change ideological programming of gender roles. She targeted Freudian psychology, the great myths of mankind of women's evilness (Eve and Pandora), and the social inculcation of values. To accusations by Lionel Tiger and others that she ignored some biological evidence and created new myths to replace old ones, she responded simply that she had intentionally over-stated her case because, "nobody was listening. All I did was substitute a cliche which we all know--it's a man's world." Margaret Mead, in sympathy with the women's movement, cautioned women that they could easily provoke men to kill them if they were not careful.

On the other hand, some women did not understand the movement either. Totally missing the point, some complained that they wanted men to whistle at them and to be able to wear frilly dresses and tell their husbands how great they were while serving them breakfast in bed. Reporters said that black women also did not go along. Anne Osborne explained, since "they're just beginning to get the kind of good treatment as women that white women have always had--they don't want to give it up too fast." But Elizabeth Morgan argued that the predominantly white mainstream movement was just too foreign to blacks and had made no effort to be more inclusive; racial oppression was more important to black women than sexual oppression.

Lionel Tiger, relied on by many in opposition to both the women's movement and women in the military, and in contradiction to historical and anthropological evidence, maintained that there must be something to the fact that the status quo--male dominance of females--worked in "every
society." His work, *Men in Groups*, was an examination of human society's "hunting history" and breeding system. He cautioned that since males were sexually fragile, if males could not dominate females (and the mood wasn't "just right") they might not be able to perform sexually and the species would fail to procreate. Tiger said "[Males] can only operate in very fantasy oriented structures—like the Pentagon and the U.S. Government—with seals and all the wings and eagles...Males are always in drag, in a sense, even if they're in the Pentagon, always constantly elaborating these highly mythical structures." Tiger's work was heavily relied upon by those who argued against women's equality and women in the military.

Tiger's long piece for the *Times*, based on his 1969 *Men in Groups*, followed the same lines and generated a huge reader response. His anthropological point was the same; men did dominate societies, but this was not a sexist plot, simply the result of biology and evolution. He claimed he was not arguing that the situation was fair or good, but that it supported the continuation of the species, i.e. procreation and child rearing. One of the most formative occasions in human evolution was the development of male hunting groups which led to "bonding" which subsequently appeared in politics, war, sports, and male lodges. He claimed that war-fighting was universally a male practice but admitted that occasions for women in combat had appeared. One of Tiger's central emphases, and most important to the resisters to military women, was his discussion of male aggressiveness, which he actually lamented.

Almost certainly the most dismal difference between males and females is that men create large fighting groups, then with care, enthusiasm, and miserable effectiveness proceed to maim and kill each other. Feminists associate this grim pattern with _machismo_—the need for men to assert themselves in rough and tumble ways and to commit mayhem in the name of masculinity.
Tiger argued that male aggressiveness should not be seen as "superiority or courage." But he also maintained that "cross-cultural, universal sexual divisions of labor" were genetically induced. Men and women got together to procreate, but hunted (accounting for less than twenty percent of the diet), produced food, and created artifacts separately. The male, being less under control, was then forced through painful initiations and training "in the active manly arts," and was gripped by symbolic fantasies of heroic triumph. This led to Tiger's explanation of the deep emotional ties of male bonding--as important in politics as male-female bonding was to procreation and most prevalent in "the bizarre and fantasy ridden male enterprises called armies." He maintained that the two most pressing problems of the world were war and over-population and the former was actually caused by male-bonding. Instead, he went on to claim that distinctions between the sexes were "not necessarily sensible or logical. Still and all, we are an animal as committed to sexual segregation for certain purposes--particularly those having to do with hunting, danger, war, and passionate corporate drama--as we are to sexual conjunction for others--in particular for conceiving and rearing children, and sharing food." He did not explain the contradiction between such a system not being "sensible or logical" but supporting human evolution so wonderfully. He also ignored historical evidence that sexual divisions of the activities he named were not so neatly divided in reality as they were in cultural myths.

Tiger's article received more responses than any other single piece I saw. NOW leaders wrote to correct his portrayals of feminists philosophy and agendas and women's history. Barbara Smith wrote, "culture is part of the 'nature' of human beings, and it allows all of us, men and women, to extend and transcend our biologically determined limitations."
She and other letter writers also asked why there were no black men in the photographs of the groups of bonded men. And asked if the absence of blacks and women could be explained with attention to "cultural selection and historical patterns of behavior." Other women wrote that they did not want to be men, had always been treated fairly, and if others were honest they would admit, too, that it was nice to have an excuse for mistakes for "at least for 10 out of every 28 days." Emily Adler wrote however that Tiger failed to address the fact that institutionalized sexism went beyond biological determinism and decried his "value free" science. S.H. Lunt applauded Tiger hitting on the answer for stopping war, anti-testosterone pills.

Katharine Moseley, though, most clearly addressed the issues associated with military women in her response. The task of forming raiding and fighting parties was not "universally" male, since "numerous historical accounts attest to the strategic role played by female troops" including the Greek and Dahomenian Amazons. Moseley argued "The atypical behavior of the Amazons itself suggests that the socio-economic needs of the dominant males can be as important in defining the feminine role as are biological factors." Tiger maintained that, rare examples to the contrary, his position could not be denied.

In 1971 Steinem wrote a piece for the Times on the "Masculine Mystique." In contrast to Tiger, she argued that the assumption that men were naturally more aggressive than women and therefore better suited to politics, was not based on any kind of rational study but strictly on observation of the status quo. She went on to explain that male and female hormones did affect people's systems in predictable ways but that this information was then used to convince people they were locked into roles by "nature". She commented instead that the same arguments, in the
nuclear age, could be used to favor the calmer, less aggressive woman in public office. She claimed that hormonal differences between men and women were much less great than our similarities as human beings, "the forces locking us into so-called masculine and feminine roles turn out to be cultural, not biological. The brainwashing comes from all sides--parents, peer groups, art, education, television--and its very effective."17

Black women and lesbians took issue with the women's movement in the early 1970s. The movement struggled mightily with issues of its whiteness, middle-classness, and heterosexuality. The Times continually emphasized the wariness of black women towards the movement. Readers were constantly reminded that blacks were nearly absent from organizations like NOW. Toni Morrison wrote a piece for the Times, in which she worried about blacks being used once again in the service of whites and wondered if the movement would put white women ahead of black men and women. She also worried that the relations between black men and women were probably more important than the feminist agenda accounted for. There were problems, but she was hopeful.

There was hope for lesbians and bi-sexual women too. When Kate Millett revealed she was bi-sexual in a Time article in 1969, the periodical suggested she had discredited herself with the women's movement. A year later NOW brought out its closeted "demented child," lesbianism, to express solidarity with homosexuals who were also struggling for liberation in a sexist society. NOW's official statement of support read, in part,

Women's liberation and homosexual liberation are both struggling towards a common goal: A society free from defining and categorizing people by virtue of gender and/or sexual preference. "Lesbian" is a label used as a psychic weapon to keep women locked into their male-defined "feminine
role." The essence of that role is that a woman is defined in terms of her relationship to men. A woman is called a Lesbian when she functions autonomously. Women's autonomy is what women's liberation is all about.

This statement would be prophetic for women in the military. They had suffered quietly from such epithets earlier, but during the backlash against them in the 1970s and 1980s it would be a chief weapon against them. Activists admitted the strategy was effective, since "Many women in the movement were afraid to confront it...." Many agreed that the "attempts to use Lesbianism as a weapon against the women's liberation movement [was] 'sexual McCarthyism'."\textsuperscript{18}

On the other hand, more and more doors had started opening to military women after President Johnson signed the law removing many of the restrictions on their service in 1967. Between the time the public had figured out, after Tet in 1968, that the country was really embroiled in a much bigger war in South East Asia than they had thought and that it was not going as well as they had believed, and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, military women continued to make their contributions at home and abroad and in the war-zone. Their presence and achievements continued to be noted in the press. Of the 7,500 military women estimated to have served in Vietnam, the majority were nurses who worked as close to the battlefield as any women did. Although they received less media attention than their WWII counterparts, they were visible in the press and their hardships were recognized. Still, the popular memory of them was that they were safe 'behind the lines.'

The ERA battle, transition to the AVF, and the women's movement's consciousness raising were all part of the dynamics of a changing role for women in the military. As more women entered the services after the two-
percent ceiling was lifted and as the services promoted them to higher ranks once limits on their ranks were lifted, both line women and nurses started to push more and more against remaining restrictions on their full contributions and benefits. In planning for the AVF, the services decided they would recruit more women to fill short-falls in male recruitment. As women's numbers grew and they entered more formerly-all-male job areas, their presence engendered antipathy, animosity, and sometimes downright hostility from their male peers and superiors. But especially in anticipation of the passage of an ERA, the services knew they would have to make further adjustments to accommodate more women.

With the anticipated AVF and ERA things were changing for the military, and the public could see in press accounts just how much that was so. Reports covered everything from the changes the military initiated to attract women, continued highlighting of senior women's achievements and 'firsts', to recruiting and anniversaries, to the changes that military women started demanding and were willing to take the services to court over.

In addition to discussing the WAC history, in 1972 the papers advertized the advances the service was making toward equality as a result of the HASC accusing the DoD of "tokenism". The Army announced it would double the corps by 1978, open all jobs except combat, and maybe give them "pantsuits". The purpose of these measures was, according to Army officials, to make up for not meeting AVF male recruiting goals. Brig.Gen. Bailey said, to attract more women, the uniform was being restyled to make it more attractive, more comfortable, and easier to maintain. The skirt length, one inch below to one inch above the knee, would remain the same. Women would be allowed to work in all but 48 of 484 specialties and all 48 "involve carrying a rifle."
One of the adjustments the services made was to include women in more job areas than they had previously been open to them. In 1972, *U.S. News and World Report* announced that military authorities had begun "a sweeping expansion of women's roles in the armed services" because of the plans for an AVF and anticipated passage of the 27th Amendment (ERA). The Army, with women serving in only one third of its jobs, said it would open all those except those "involving combat" (which meant not those that involved fighting necessarily, but all those classified as 'combat' positions). The Navy embarked on a program "to eliminate sex discrimination," ending its "200-year-old tradition" of not sending women to sea. Adm. Zumwalt announced that, although by law women were prohibited from serving on any ships besides transports and hospital ships, with the passage of the ERA the Navy would plan to open larger combat vessels to them. He said they would be assigned immediately to the Navy's only hospital ship, the *U.S.S. Sanctuary*, which would be out of overhaul in five months. Zumwalt ordered "limited entry of enlisted women" into all job ratings including "combat oriented ones such as gunner's mate and torpedoman." Women officers would be considered for command positions and the service was establishing a training program for women aviators. Zumwalt supported women in the services saying,

I believe any man or woman should be able to serve his country in any capacity he wishes....When you look at the level to which our society has developed, there is no reason in theory, in sociology or in equity why women should not have the same kind of opportunities the men have.

Many reports on the Navy and women on ships surfaced and the Air Force, not intending to allow women to fly, started planning to admit women to its Academy. Air Force women could serve in thirty-two of forty-eight career fields or almost all jobs that did not involve combat. And women like Col. Norma Brown commanded major coed military units.
Although the services were patting themselves on the back, feminists reminded the public of continuing "tokenism" (women still only made up 1.5 percent of the forces). Bella Abzug commented, "If the Federal Government were covered by the Civil Rights Act, the armed forces would be in flagrant violation." At least women who got married or had children were no longer automatically discharged, and a review board decided whether a pregnant woman could stay. The *U.S. News and World Report* article noted, however, that married women did not have the same benefits as men; in most cases they were not given housing allowances or dependent benefits. At the time when twenty of the needed thirty-eight states had ratified the ERA, reporters thought the remaining inequities would change "when" the amendment passed.  

*U.S. News* reported the next year that women in the services were entering "Men Only" jobs and asked if combat roles were next. The services were putting women into new job areas--photographs showed them in Army engineering units, at jump school, and as jet-engine mechanics. All the branches said they were taking increasing numbers of women to make up for declining (male) enlistments caused by the end of the draft. The women interviewed said that recent Supreme Court rulings that removed inequities between men and women in the services were making the military a more attractive option. And competition from women at Officer Training School was improving men's performance. The armed forces were rather afraid of the prospect that women might "total half of all those in uniform" and said they intended not to move so fast in removing barriers to women that military strength was weakened, saying, "We will find little satisfaction in giving women their rights if it results in a military reversal that causes needless loss of life." The public was made aware of some military men's worries that "basic differences" between men and women
were not being adequately considered. One colonel with two tours in Vietnam commented, "There are situations and times when women just can't cope in a stress environment." A Navy officer cautioned, "If a woman can do the job, fine. But we are fooling ourselves if we reach the point where we are putting women in jobs only men can handle, just to avoid a return to the draft." Service women felt their time had come and cited the example of Israel, where women were "used routinely in the military without an apparent detriment to effectiveness. And the Russians made the fullest possible use of women in wartime." Some men also remembered fighting women. Gen. John Meyer, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, cited a personal WWII experience: "I was assigned to escort a young woman in the Russian party. She was in her early 20s, feminine, and attractive, and I took her to be a secretary. At dinner, however, I discovered she was a Soviet fighter pilot who had already shot down seven German airplanes." Even though Meyer echoed the stereotypes, i.e., military women were not expected to be feminine and attractive, and young women were probably secretaries, he sounded as if he had been converted when asked about women in war. "Physically, intellectually, or emotionally, I cannot see any reason why some women can't be first-rate fighter pilots," he said. Reporters reminded the public that women were still "forbidden by law or service regulation" from "serving in jobs that would expose them to fighting." Readers learned that while women might serve in many new areas Army and Marine leaders felt that "the public is not yet ready to accept women in ground combat." However, they pointed out what everyone seemed to ignore in the history of servicewomen, according to WAC director Gen. Mildred Bailey, "This is not to say they will not serve where they are in danger, as they did in Korea and Vietnam." The report did not mention that nurses and others had already routinely served in harm's way.
Articles did point out, though, that women were restricted from flying even though not all planes, like transports, were necessarily used for combat, and the Navy did not assign women to any ships except for the one hospital ship, even though not all ships were combat vessels. The other remaining restriction was attendance at the service academies which was then being argued in court. To the services’ surprise, despite the limitations imposed on them, women in previously male-only jobs had performed so satisfactorily that the services once again decided to re-examine other positions to see where women might be used. The same had been proposed at least in 1948 and 1951, as we have seen.

Trivialities still snuck into most news reports. It seemed important to note, "Hard-bitten regulations on uniform are sometimes softened for coed soldiers. Notably, says a WAC officer, a woman with attractive legs can usually ignore the regulations limiting hemlines to two inches above the knee. Rules banning earrings and other jewelry are not always enforced, either." One wonders whether male soldiers would be upset if the women did not follow regulations or pleased that they got to see more leg and adornment.

In all, the results of integration and recruiting larger numbers of women was considered a success. Senior officers decided that "competition between the sexes is a good motivator," when men in coed training scored much higher than men in male-only classes. The turnaround in attitudes, the report said, was so marked that some service leaders said the recruiting ceilings would end up being floors. Adm. Zumwalt believed women would be assigned to warships and the Naval Air and Air Force officers thought women would eventually fly non-combat aircraft.21

The Times continued to be a source of cheerleading for military initiatives and recruiting campaigns. Reporter Judy Klemesrud recognized
that young women had to overcome the anti-war, anti-military peer pressure and "objections from parents who remembered that some military women had unattractive reputations during WWII." The latter had obviously become bigger than life in the American memory considering that the worst was the 1943 scandal, fabricated by the press and discounted by all senior government and military officials. Once in the recruiter's office though, young women found out in 1971 that the services had 'New Attractions' for women. The old attractions were the same--travel, adventure, "snappy uniforms, an abundance of men." The reasons they gave for joining, the paper reported, were "humorous, serious, financial, or patriotic." USMC recruiter Capt. Fullerton said she often had to talk to prospective recruits' parents and reassure them about their worries that "their daughters might encounter Lesbianism or lose their moral values in the Marine Corps." Fullerton said,

I tell them what we have is Alice America--a good cross-section of American girls. In the Marines, a girl who performs a Lesbian act is discharged almost immediately....As far as the looseness is concerned, I tell parents that if they've done their job, they shouldn't have to worry. Each one of us takes pride in this uniform--it's like a sorority pin--and we're kind of fussy. What one of us does reflects on the rest of us.

The new attractions included easing stringent regulations including eliminating bed checks. Klemesrud told readers that the Army and Air Force led the way on easing policies against motherhood. No longer would women be summarily discharged for pregnancy but would meet a board to determine their fitness to stay on active duty as mothers. The boards, however, would not usually keep pregnant single women. Women could also obtain dependent benefits for civilian husbands. Pregnancy policies and even having to meet a board would be challenged further. Klemesrud
pointed out that men and women got paid the same except for combat or flight pay.

Military women by and large were not feminists. Some WAVES wanted to serve at sea and some WAF wanted to fly, but "few of the servicewomen--even the most liberated--expressed a burning desire for combat." Interviewees said, "Its just not feminine to carry a flame thrower or charge a hill, or crawl around in the mud." Capt. Fullerton mentioned that "Lib is great" but that with equal pay one could still get respect for femininity and chivalry. Klemesrud mentioned that "Personal appearance" was the site where the double standard had not changed. Some WAVES were disappointed that changes had not gone far enough. Meanwhile black women reported that they faced more discrimination because of race than because of gender. One Marine claimed there was as much racism in the military as on the outside, "even though everybody seems to be working very hard to suppress it."22

By 1973, it appeared that military women thought the services should have changed more when Spec. Elizabeth Gomez complained, "It's still a man's army, just like its still a man's world." But the services had just made announcements opening all but combat jobs to women and were reviewing all policies that discriminated against women in the interest of doubling enlistments in the next four years. The press reported though that "Still the changes do not necessarily mean that the military has become a model of equality, or even that it has adopted that as its ultimate goal." Reports indicated that the women's rights movement had just started to pay more attention to servicewomen's issues and that military initiatives for equality were made out a sense of pragmatism--personnel requirements--rather than idealism. The Times identified remaining barriers including restrictions against combat. The Pentagon had developed a "wait and see"
attitude about what the ERA would mean. Automatic dependent allowances for men was another sore point. Brig.Gen. Mildred Bailey said that these were "completely discriminatory." The DoD supported a bill equalizing benefits. Higher entry standards was another reason for concern. As for job training for skilled positions in the outside world, Bailey remarked, "the Army's mission is national defense, not to create job opportunities or to help people in civilian life." However, the services had initiated experiments in non-traditional job placement, when four women entered flight training in April 1973, and women's assignments to the hospital ship Sanctuary had been very successful. Adm. Zumwalt expected the changes to go father with the ERA and envisioned women serving aboard all kinds of ships. The Marine Corps did not promise extensive changes; they claimed they were restricted by basic training space and by the combat mission of the Corps. However, Col. Brewer, the Marine's senior woman, said that Marine policy was being reviewed for "great changes." She added that the Corps would not do anything impulsive, like some of the other services were currently doing.

Recruiting commanded a lot of energy. The Marine's challenge was finding "qualified women to fill all the jobs they could hold." The Air Force had increased from 7,000 women in 1968 to 17,000 in 1973. Director Billie Bobbitt suggested that it was partially economic conditions that encouraged some young women to join the services, but also said that the Air Force was most popular because of the technical training it provided. Bobbitt pointed out again that women's careers were cut short for pregnancy (unlike men's for fatherhood). She posited, "Society gives more prominence to the mother's role than the father's."23

Anniversaries of the foundings of the women's corps always gave an opportunity for reviewing their history, and the press always obliged as
in remembering that the WAVES were mobilized in World War II under Mildred McAfee to free men for combat and over 86,000 had served in that war alone. In an interview on the occasion of the Navy women's birthday McAfee said she was still interested in the problems of servicewomen. In recognition that a significant part of the public had succumbed to an anti-military attitude because of Vietnam and looked unfavorably on those in the military, including women, she said, "I think it must be hard for women in the armed forces today who are faced with public disapproval. We had the benefit of a very hopeful public who knew we were there to help end the war as quickly as possible, to stop the dying. It was an honor to be in uniform." Newsweek noted that many fewer women had that honor in 1972 with less than 7,000 Navy women on active duty. Capt. Robin Quigley, Asst. Chief of Naval Personnel for Women, told readers that the Navy no longer had a separate organization for women like the WAVES as they had been integrated into the line of the Navy. When asked if more military jobs should be opened to women, McAfee said she was opposed to women serving in combat but she would agree with a female draft. Subscribing to the cultural ideology of her professional cohort group, she commented,

But I don't think women should be drafted for actual combatant roles. Though we might tend to exaggerate the stereotypes, there is something good to be said for the idea that women embody compassion and creativity rather than aggression and toughness.

She also, however, understood the feelings of women that they were oppressed by the service restrictions. "I myself never felt oppressed as a person because I was a woman....But if a woman feels she is not respected as an individual on her own, then she is perfectly correct in protesting that inhibiting status."24

WAC anniversaries also provided an opportunity for the press and public to review their history. An introduction to a Virginia Warren
piece in 1972 seemed to say it all: "Today, when they are not taken for granted, they tend to be forgotten. But when the first women signed up they were a sensation. And what they had to endure their first year or two is now almost impossible to believe...it's a good thing they had their patriotic fervor to see them through." This particular report was positive but it might have had a tendency not only to re-awaken the old rumors but to emphasize them against more accurate histories. Warren related that people thought it was logical that women be asked to serve, but

[t]he trouble was that woman's place was still pretty much in the home, an office, or schoolroom. And so when Congress debated whether there should be an Army auxiliary there were such comments as, 'Think of the humiliation! What has become of the manhood of America'? and, 'Take women into the armed services, who will do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble homey tasks to which woman has devoted herself?

Warren also said, though, that when FDR signed the legislation, there was such a rush for enlistment that the Army was not ready for the women. She noted a phenomena that had not been noticed in the press in 1942, that male officer trainers did not know how to deal with "sycophantic and show-off Wacs whose tactics were transparent to the other women. What's more, the male officers had a tendency to consider the prettiest Wacs or the loudest-voiced ones the most suitable to become leaders while the women themselves would have picked those with mature judgement and a sense of responsibility...." Warren noted also that when it was time to send the first WACs overseas, as typists and telephone operators primarily, they finally realized that their auxiliary status would keep them from benefits that protected male soldiers. She recounted that the bill to make the WAAC the WAC was delayed by the slander campaign. Even as Eisenhower and others in the field recognized the value of the women and were requesting more be assigned, "tongues had begun to wag viciously at home." Warren
came up with 'news' that had not been reported in the press in the 1940s. She said that during WWII there were stories about, "women soldiers ganging up on sailors and Coast Guardsmen to rape them, Waacs being brought home pregnant (more of them as the gossip grew, than had actually been sent overseas), and tales of Army physicians who, it was said, were rejecting all applicants who were virgins and were issuing prophylactics so the Waac could fulfill the 'morale' purpose to which they had been recruited." The British, she noted, had been through a similar slander campaign. Warren quoted wartime director Hobby as years later saying, "I now believe that it was inevitable; in the history of civilization no new agency requiring social change has escaped a similar baptism." During WWII the good news was that the services, anticipating the reverse, found that three women could replace four men in some jobs and they performed so well they were assigned around the world including the beachhead at Normandy immediately after the invasion. After reaching a peak strength of almost 100,000 in early 1945, enlistments were closed. Just when it seemed the women were no longer needed though, by February 1946, the Army asked Congress to authorize a permanent, Regular women's corps which became law in 1948. Warren reported that Wacs also served in Korea and there were approximately 160 serving in Vietnam in 1972. Others were stationed around the world. Application requirements were spelled out and Brig.Gen. Mildred Bailey said that women were no longer in the service to free a man for combat. Instead the mission of the WAC was to provide the Army with the individual skills of each woman.

When Warren asked Bailey about the impact of the era of equal rights on the services, especially in relation to combat, Bailey responded that whether anyone agreed or not women still bore the brunt of family life. In an all-out emergency women would not have to be drafted because they
would volunteer. However, they had not volunteered in WWII in sufficient numbers. If the war had gone on longer it was highly likely that women would have been conscripted. Bailey's opinion on women commanding men was less clear-cut. She said, "theoretically, I agree that a woman should be able to have command over a man, but, practically, I don't. A person with that kind of authority needs experience in all phases of military duty including combat. Women are non-combatants and do not receive combat training and duties." She did not say whether they should be trained and assigned to combat.²₅

_Time_ was interested in "Dames at Sea," as CNO Adm. Zumwalt, known for his humanizing and liberalizing the Navy, announced that women would be assigned to the _Sanctuary_ when it left dry dock and that he fully expected to send women out on warships when the ERA passed. Zumwalt cited the WAVES WWII record and the AVF as being the influence for the move to put women to sea. The Navy planned to do a study group, again, to look at all laws and regulations that should have been removed. Zumwalt also intended to make the progression to flag rank "essentially" the same as for men and to open all but non-combat jobs, including aviation, to them. He said after he had issued his "Z-Gram" on non-discrimination he had realized he left out the category of gender. When he was asked when women would be assigned to warships by the press, he replied by asking them when the ERA would be passed. The Navy had recently opened its ROTC programs to women and was investigating opening Annapolis. The problem, however, was that Navy wives, apparently upset about sending women out to sea with their husbands, had started a petition drive. Mrs. Barbara Stone of Norfolk led the Norfolk wives in circulating a petition. They were blunt about their "conjugal mistrust" in answering reporters, "You're right. I don't trust mine." and "It's different aboard ship. If it's the only
game in town, My husband is going to go and play it." They of course assumed that military women would want to "play" with their husbands, that both the men and women would not act professionally, that women working on shore with their husbands were not a significant threat to their vows, and that their husbands did not engage prostitutes or have affairs on shore leave anyway. Wives said they were concerned their husbands would not be able to have fun, run around in their underwear, curse, or act like "animals". Some admitted they were jealous, while others said they just did not believe women could handle the job. The flip side was that they believed men would not be able to do their jobs either because they would be looking out for the helpless women. The wives threatened to talk their husbands out of the Navy or leave them if the senior leaders did not respond to their pleas. 26 Some wives were supportive saying they would have joined a women's corps if they could have. They thought if women were qualified, mentally and physically, they should have any job available. One disagreed with her neighbor that the move would create "floating whorehouses." She also said there was no evidence that ship modifications cost an unreasonable sum or that there was a "hue and cry" coming from the public not to follow through. A female lieutenant's reply to the wives' worries was, "They must be unsure of their relationships with their husbands. Their marriages are not going to be jeopardized by me or any other woman aboard a Navy ship. I'm not at all interested in their husbands. I consider it my personal mission to change the stereotype image of the Waves of World War II." She did not say what that reputation was. In fact, nothing in the record of the 1940s specifically identified a real problem with the WAVEs at all. 27

Adm. Zumwalt answered press questions about other issues. About facilities and privacy on board ship, he answered that the work would be
easy, minor, and inexpensive. When asked about physically arduous tasks, he responded that some arduous tasks men could not perform, women could. On problems of male animosity on the influx of larger numbers of women, he said he anticipated there might be concerns at first, but the "long term effect on Navy morale...cannot help but be good." 28

Reaction was swift. The Army announced that naval and ground combat were very different. When the Secretary said he was "opposed to women being in the kind of life that goes with combat in the Army," he did not elaborate. More positive and less contentious, but still relevant to the general issue, the promotion of senior female officers to general got media attention. When President Johnson lifted the rank ceiling in 1967 the possibility arose for women to be promoted to flag rank but it took several years for this to happen and rank was apportioned by position. Only certain positions were designated as general officer positions. As women were still only qualified for a time to hold 'women's' positions, there were few that were classified, after 1967, as flag rank billets. That would change as women were also allowed to serve in command positions over men. More of them could compete on a more equal footing with men. However, women still did not have the backgrounds (Academy graduation), the jobs (command), nor the experience (combat) to be considered qualified for very many of the promotions.

The first two female generals picked by Richard Nixon in 1970 were Elizabeth P. Hoisington, WAC Director, and Anna Mae Hays, Director of the Army Nurse Corps. As with all the first few women to be appointed general, these two had served during WWII and the Korea conflict; both had excellent records which were recounted in articles about their promotions. The publicity centered on male colleagues congratulating them with kisses rather than hand shakes. The kissing generated adolescent interest and
news headlines as trivial as ever but framed significant events as in the article which cheered, "A general kissed generals today at the Pentagon today as the Army handed stars to women for the first time in its 196-year history."

Another article, on the first women generals in the American military, focused on the "mini-skirt" craze and how it might affect uniforms. Articles also continued to mention that the generals did not believe the women's movement had anything to do with their promotions. Hoisington emphasized that the separate WAC did not compete with men and Hayes's Nurse corps was largely a woman's world. "Military Brat" Hoisington's entire family were senior officers or married to them. And, her grandmother had talked her into enlisting in WWII. She said she had always found military men helpful and that women no longer served only to release men to fight. She did not foresee a day when women would be drafted nor would they join in combat like the Israelis. She said, "The men of America wouldn't let us. They still want to keep women on a pedestal." Hayes' family taught her to live a life of service. She had served in India during WWII and later in Korea. She believed that, although in 1970 servicewomen could not have children, a day would come when the services would give maternity leave. Reporters picked out what was most important for reporting on military women: "Both generals consider themselves good housekeepers," unfortunately, "neither woman can cook--nor wants to." This article is a perfect example of the framing of images of women's accomplishments being overshadowed by trivialities. It opens with the comment that if Gen. Hoisington had learned to type, a stereotyped female skill, she would not have been a general. At the end, we find out that neither general wanted to lower uniform skirt hemlengths to the 'in' midi style--as the headline proclaimed. What might readers
remember about the women's WWII records or any accomplishments with such an emphasis? 29

When these first two female Army generals retired during the summer of 1971 the Pentagon announced their replacements, Col. Mildred Bailey and Col. Lillian Dunlap (USANC). The first female Air Force general, Jeanne Holm, was appointed in July. President Nixon asked the five female generals in the armed forces, Holm, Hayes, Hoisington, Dunlap and Bailey, why none of them had two stars, saying "you need more than one" and "Whoever gets the first second star, I get to pin it on." He may not have known that since there were only two female general officer positions in each service, the line director and the head of the nurse corps, and both of those were one star positions, something would have to change before the five could be promoted again. By 1972 the chief of the Air Force nurse corps joined the others as a brigadier. The Navy had not yet appointed a female admiral for their line component or nurses, but SECDEF Melvin Laird promised there would be one soon. 30

Finally, in April the Navy appointed Alene Duerk of the nurse corps as their first female admiral. The Navy admitted that the women's movement and appointment of few male flag officers in the other services put pressure on the Navy to follow suit. People were apparently thinking, according to the Surgeon General, "Why haven't you given your girls a break in this regard?" He went on to say that Duerk won out over "the competition of several qualified girls" and that her promotion might stimulate female recruiting for the AVF. Consistent with the mode of presentation, the Times reported that Duerk was not a self-proclaimed feminist. She answered questions about the effects of the women's movement with, "Women have simply been moving into positions of responsibility. It's a natural thing." But the Navy nurse recruiter was
more positive there was at least one effect, saying "[Young women] can see that the sky's the limit now."

A month later the Navy appointed its first female general of the line, Robin Quigley, who was reported to "swear like a sailor." She admitted that sometimes pressures caused her to use some "salty language." When asked by a man whether it was true that women enlisted to find husbands, the single captain answered, "I don't think that's a myth. Some of us just don't make out very well." Their promotions engendered the now-traditional kisses from male colleagues and superiors. When Adm. Zumwalt was asked about kissing her, he responded "you should have recalled that nobody reaches the place I'm at without kissing a lot of admirals."

The Marines appointed a new director for their women with the retirement of Margaret Brewer. She was to be replaced by Jeanette Sustad. Capt. Mary Bachand was appointed to command a Reserve unit in the Coast Guard. The first woman to be appointed as a commander, she said her nomination was "a tribute to SPARs in general and a tribute to the Coast Guard that they've gotten used to us being around." And the Air Force decided to put female senior officers in command slots over mixed units for the first time in 1972 with the appointment of Col. Norma Brown as head of an intelligence unit at Ft. Meade, Maryland. The Air Force announcement said, "Her assignment indicates the continuing commitment of the Air Force to full utilization of qualified women in responsible command and management positions."

In January 1973, President Nixon got his wish when he pinned on Jeanne Holm's second star. She became the first woman in U.S. history to hold that rank. Shortly thereafter the Marines chose Mary Bane as its first female company commander. She became the first in the 198-year
Marine history to be given direct command over men. The USMC said it was committed to offering women every opportunity to advance save combat service.\textsuperscript{32}

The press continued to advertise military women's "firsts", and at least sometimes they were accurate (some had actually been accomplished earlier which also supports my contention that popular culture functions in constructing historical amnesia). Surprisingly, the Air Force did not lead the way with female pilots. The Navy announced it would accept eight for training in late 1972. They could not be used in combat airplanes according to the law, but at least one of the services recognized that not all planes had to be classified as combat aircraft by policy. The first to attend training was, Judith Neuffer a fighter-pilot's daughter and computer science major, who said she had no desire to be a combat pilot. The article about her nomination to pilot training recounted the history of female military aviation with a review of the history of the WASPs. Attire always being a matter of concern, the article specified that the women would wear standard flight suits and use the same flight equipment as men. But reporters were quick to point out the rules did not prohibit taking "feminine gear such as makeup" in the large flight suit pockets, "just as a man is allowed to carry personal objects." The Navy intended to send more women to flight training if this 'experiment' was successful. Also in 1973 the Navy commissioned the first female chaplain in any of the services and commissioned a female physician as the first nun Navy officer. Lorraine Potter, the chaplain, anticipated some difficulties. She had encountered resistance to even becoming a minister and expected some problems in the military as well. She said that neither men nor women took her seriously and expected her to quit as a minister as soon as
she got married. When Mary Salerno of the WAC was highlighted as the first female MP in the Armed forces, she was in fact at least the fourth to be the "first". The press was concerned with whether men could get used to female supervisors, noted that she cooked well when she prepared sandwiches for her own welcome party. Her male counterparts said, "We give Mary hell, but because she's a second lieutenant, not because she's a woman." The Army thought it had the first two female parachute riggers in 1973 as women went through their five qualifying jumps for the job. Their sergeant said that in pre-jump training, "They did as well as the men, if not better." The women were the first Army women in any case to complete airborne training and were very excited about it.

The National Guard advertised its 'firsts' as well. The first black woman, and only the sixth overall, joined the National Guard in 1971. Iowa did not get its first female Guardsman until the following year. New Jersey's and New York's Guards got their first female members in 1973. Articles on the Guard most often failed to note that the Guard had only started taking women when the draft was curtailed and after U.S. involvement in Vietnam stopped in 1973. Shortages had become a problem almost immediately. Guard leaders wanted to emphasize that the women could not make up for the lack of male enlistments, "But at least it will sweeten up our ranks a little."

Finally, in an area related to the military, discussions re-started in 1973 about including women in the space program. NASA did tests on at least a dozen women that year for physiological stress. The studies sponsor, Dr. David Winter, commented, "I don't see any difference [between the reactions] of men and women to flight conditions. Nor do I expect anything dramatically different." Time's reports were fairly explicit, "heart monitors [were] tucked into their bras and pill sized sensors that
transmitted temperature data from the vagina" were only two of the tests the women endured. The magazine pointed out that NASA usually chose test pilots who were in great shape but top physical condition (male standard) might not be necessary for shuttle travel. The guinea pigs were Air Force flight nurses between twenty-four and thirty-four. NASA announced the tests were successful.33

Officer training was another area where the papers showed the public that women moving into new roles in the military. The Coast Guard accepted women into its OCS for the first time since WWII in 1972, in line, its leaders said, "with President Nixon's intention that every woman ha[ve] the freedom to chose whatever career she wished and an equal chance to pursue it."

Women started entering ROTC units in 1969. At Temple University, by taking Military Science courses with the ROTC unit, they could get gym class credit but were not eligible for a commission. Some of the men in the Army wanted female ROTC cadets and were extremely frustrated. But the WAC director Gen. Hoisington opposed the idea explaining, "Conceivably we could end up with just too many women in the Army."

Women could actually join Ohio State University's Air Force ROTC unit in 1969 and a woman led that unit by 1971, the first woman to command a cadet unit. The Air Force was trying to recruit young women in an "experimental" program to replace men lost by the end of the draft. In the Air Force program the only thing women could not do was fly. But this apparently was not a problem as, "Male prejudice aside there is considerable sentiment in the Air Force that women do not possess the psychological drives needed to make a good combat pilot according to Capt. Nancy Buzard, Chief WAF advisor to Air Force ROTC." She was quick to
reassure everyone that she was not a "feminist" when she said, "I'm not a champion of women's rights--I'm not that type. But I don't think I should have to suffer because I'm a female, that I should receive lower pay in private industry because of my sex." She told recruits that women received the same pay as men in the service but they would not receive pilot bonuses. She said the Air Force did not start women's ROTC inclusion because of male recruiting shortfalls but because, if it was a good way to train male officers, it should be a good way to train female officers as well. She said so far the experiment was highly successful and that the Air Force had decided to integrate women into 125 colleges by 1971. Capt. Buzard said, "We want a cross-section of mature and enthusiastic girls" and that so far the male cadets had had no problem taking orders from female officers and cadets. One female cadet officer said "They treat me with respect, although they seem to get a kick out of it when I give one of the guys a demerit for not being close shaven." She was also concerned that she did not have an adequate voice for giving orders on the parade field. Sometimes "I have to correct my boys when they salute me" and say 'Yes, sir',' she noted. The Times pointed out that the ROTC units were very selective and rather exclusive: "All of the female cadets come from white middle-class backgrounds." They had apparently joined to travel and because they had "ambitions" to do more than get married and have children. The first female cadet commander, Susan Orkins said she had grown up with brothers so she knew how to compete with men, but she quickly added she was not a tomboy anymore. She said she was not an advocate of women's liberation but just wanted to do her own thing. She did concede that women had to try harder to succeed in a man's world, "but she doesn't feel women should lose their femininity." She remarked, "I'm not a women's lib advocate. It's up to the individual
to prove his worth. I think I've shown girls--women my own age--that to go into R.O.T.C. that it's possible to achieve a commander's position."

Still the important news had to be framed by femininity and triviality. "Lipstick is Part of Uniform" as a title sets that tone very well. Although women still got to train in simulated parachute drops and precision drill in the sun, they also would get classroom instruction in modeling and makeup. This particular article closed by saying that besides Vietnam and thinking about combat, the most important thing that interested the female cadets was the new "pretty" uniform they had received. Another Times article began typically with contextualizing of female roles: "Like cheerleaders watching a game that slightly scares them, the young women stood in small groups off to the side of the rifle range and covered their ears as the men fired round after round during target practice...." The article went on to say the women took up the weapons and fired away just as enthusiastically as the men had and that the Marines and Navy finally felt that "Training military officers without regard to sex is an idea whose time has come." But it kept coming back to the adjustments that were being made for women, "Having women in another previously masculine domain has prompted adjustments--somewhat more proper language from tough talking instructors, for example." In some cases, and with the same instruction, the women were performing better than the men. The Navy unit commander at Purdue said there had not been a lot of discussion, the women were just accepted. The Navy admitted it needed female officers and female cadets were welcomed as another humanizing influence on the Vietnam-era military.

Other coverage brought up some interesting points. After the Navy opened its ROTC to women in 1972, high school girls were allowed to join
Junior ROTC in 1973 and did very well, sometimes monopolizing the cadet command and staff positions in their units.

In 1972 the Army announced a five year Army test program at ten schools for a coed program and fully expected to expand beyond that quickly. Part of the reason for the shift in policy was the declining number of young men who enrolled. The Air Force program was already well advanced by 1972, and like the other two services required much the same training for men and women with a few "exemptions for femininity," like a modified physical training program and optional long marches. That seemed enough of an accommodation to engender complaints from the male cadets about special privileges and "lower" standards. Only four career fields were closed to women; pilot, navigator, missile operations, and security police.

The Air Force claimed women were fully integrated into its officer needs. Col. Perselay, the Assistant Director commented, "I think the women's R.O.T.C. programs are in part a response to the drive for equal rights. And the services believe now that a woman can do almost anything a man can do short of combat." At a number of schools instructors reported that women were doing better than men in the classroom both academically and in participation. Women had been attracted by travel, scholarships, adventure, curiosity, or family military background. They were well received by their male classmates who had never known ROTC without women. Some said it was "fun and natural" not to have all male classes. Some of the older students had reservations about the programs, saying "I just don't associate the Navy and men's jobs with women." One young man complained that the officers never yelled at the women.34
The only commissioning sources that remained closed to women were the service academies but these were soon to be challenged as well. In 1971, Senator Jacob K. Javits, New York Republican, announced that he would nominate a woman to attend Annapolis. A spokesman for the Navy said that they had notified Sen. Javits that while there was "no strict law" barring women, the Federal law governing admission did specify that the school was open to "sons" of naval personnel and enlisted men. The law also precluded women from serving on combat ships and aircraft and that was what the academy trained officers for. The Navy also replied that there were other commissioning sources open to women.

Sen. Javits said the only way to proceed might be to nominate a woman and then fight about it. Javits was beaten to the punch by Michigan Rep. Jack McDonald who nominated University of Michigan freshman Valerie Schoen. She wanted a nomination because she "wanted the best education possible and to serve her country." McDonald said, "I hope they judge her not because she is a woman, but on her ability alone." Sen. Javits then nominated Barbara Brimmer who said she was "raised in the tradition of the Navy" and wanted to follow it. Her father was an Annapolis graduate and her mother had been a WAVE officer in WWII. Javits said that if the Navy would not accept Brimmer he would introduce legislation to force the academies to accept women. Javits added that the only argument the Navy presented that held any water at all was that women were prohibited by law from serving on combat vessels. But he responded that they were not prohibited from serving on hospital ships and that Brimmer wanted to be a Navy doctor.

Time reported that both young women were exceedingly well qualified for academy attendance. Javits insisted, "I seek only to have the academy conform to the Navy itself. Some 3.6% of naval officers are women.
Shouldn't a similar percentage of Annapolis' entering class and graduates also be women? Shouldn't there be at least one?" The Secretary of the Navy said that since the law establishing the Naval Academy stated only that "sons" of servicemen killed in action were eligible, he chose to interpret that narrowly to enforce a male-only policy. He added that Navy regulations also prohibited admitting women. Javits responded that the law "simply provides that the Secretary of the Navy shall be in charge of the Navy--and says nothing about excluding women." The magazine suggested that perhaps WAVE officer school could be moved to the Chesapeake Bay to establish coordinate campuses. The press reported that Sen. Javits had received over 200 letters plus telephone calls criticizing his nomination.

Secretary Chafee announced a compromise in February 1972, that the Navy would open ROTC and provide scholarships but it would keep Annapolis closed to women. Chafee said that women were barred by law from serving at sea which was what the USNA trained men for. Actually the law only specified combat ships and Adm. Zumwalt was reopening women's assignments to the hospital ship Sanctuary and planned to open transport ships to them as well. Chafee also said the school lacked adequate facilities for women. Sen. Javits and Rep. McDonald said they would draft legislation to allow women. Brimmer intended to pursue a Navy career in any case and Schoen said, "I did not apply to Annapolis as a woman's liberationist or to break down any sex barriers. I want to serve my country."35

By mid-1972 the Air Force undertook a "contingency" plan for what seemed to be inevitable. If the ERA passed they would admit eighty "qualified" women into the class of 1979 (entering in 1975). The House had approved the ERA in 1971 and the Senate in 1972. Reporters speculated that if the Amendment did pass and the Academies were opened to women, they would not be able to impose ceilings or a quota system but instead a
"best qualified" criteria would be used. Because the Congress had established limits on attendance, the women would push men out of consideration. In any case the Air Force was looking into uniforms, facilities, and physical training programs. The school did not plan to ask for construction funds but would only modify existing cadet quarters. For the physical training the Academy intended to hire at least four female instructors for the athletic department. The USAFA Chief of Staff said plans were proceeding without Air Force direction or guidance just so the school could get a jump on any eventuality.

The Center for Women's Policy Studies filed a class action suit against the Naval and Air Force Academies in Federal Court to ask for female admissions in September 1973. The next month Rep. Pierre DuPont of Delaware proposed legislation to allow women at the academies. The Senate voted to approve the measure (by voice vote with no audible negative) and sent it to conference committees. The ERA did not pass and the services were off the hook until 1974/75 but finally admitted women to the service academies in 1976 for the class of 1980. Even without the ERA sentiment had moved far enough to make this move a reality.36

The other issue closely linked to the ERA was the draft. Talk of conscripting women was most prevalent in articles about the ERA, which I have presented earlier. Combat, the remaining issue, only came up in relation to the ERA. No one really seemed to consider it a pressing issue until later, though the two were inextricably tied. The draft law of 1967 was challenged in court in November 1970 as discriminatory against men for exempting women. The brief said, "The classification of women as unfit for military service is without reason and unconstitutional." The defense intended to obtain affidavits from sociologists and women leaders to prove
their case saying, "The basis by which men are conscripted is the product of myth and a chivalric concept that is now outmoded. The women's rights amendment sets forth the proposition that as a social decision women are equal to men." The defendants maintained that it had been proven that there was no "biological or physical reason" to exempt women from the military and now "there is no social reason." 

Of course, as stated earlier, some feminists felt that until women received full social equality instead of lip service to democratic principles, they should not submit to a military obligation. As these challenges arose in court, it showed that not only were women not the social equals of men, but that women in the military had not achieved full equality by any means, despite the promotions of female generals and the opening of ROTC and additional jobs to them. Reproductive rights, motherhood, dependency benefits, and sexual double standards were fought out largely in the courts as the military dragged its feet in equalizing standards and policies for women and men.

In 1970 an unmarried enlisted woman who terminated her pregnancy was slated for discharge for poor moral judgement. She argued she was being discriminated against because the stillborn's enlisted father was not to be discharged and, "servicemen were not subject to the same moral standard as women." Anna Flores argued that if men were not discharged for having extramarital or pre-marital relations, then neither should she be. The significance of her case increased when she asked the court to ban all military regulations based on sex. James Wooten, writing for the Times, thought that this case would be in the spotlight because of the women's movement, the drive to liberalize abortion laws, and the effort to pass the ERA. The ACLU made her case a class action suit for all military women. Wooten noted however, that she seemed not to want to be a martyr.
or champion of women's rights, but just to reverse her discharge. The Navy's position was that to retain her "would imply that unwed pregnancy is condoned and would eventually result in the dilution of the moral standards set for women in the Navy." Being from Dallas, Flores asked for Sen. John Tower's support in a letter asking "Who in the world is guiltless? Who is free of error? Am I the only person in naval uniform to have ever made a mistake?"

Certainly those who read the newspapers and magazines would have seen, from the multiple examples of post-WWII occupation forces abuse of occupied nations to the Amer-Asian children and brothels of Vietnam—all widely presented to the public view—that Flores was not the only person in the military to have indulged in what the services claimed they saw as sexual improprieties. Her point was that they were only viewed as improprieties for women. In fact, in the brief for the Florida Federal District Court, ACLU attorneys argued that although pregnancy is an official basis for discharge from the Navy for women whether they were married or not, Navy men had intercourse with women to whom they were not married, fathered children out of wedlock, and contracted venereal disease but were not dismissed. Obviously Navy men were not subject to the same moral standards. Ms. Flores and her fiancé still intended to marry. Her records showed that she performed well during her two years in service. 38

After this the cases started to come fast and furiously. Air Force Capt. Tommie Smith brought suit against the 1947 law that terminated a woman's commission if she gave birth, assumed custody, became the step-parent, or allowed a child to reside in her residence for more than thirty days per year, arguing the law was blatantly inequitable sex discrimination because the same did not apply to male officers. Capt. Smith, in the service since 1966, was to be transferred to the Philippines
in 1970 and was told she could not take her son. A day after this news hit the papers, the Air Force reversed its rule on adopting or gaining custody of minor children given that its long-standing regulations were "not considered to be in consonance with the recent emphasis on women's rights, or in line with the Defense Department's equal rights policies." Capt. Smith, a lawyer and one of only seven female judge advocate general corps members, pointed out that men were always allowed to take their dependents except to war-zones.

The services were being forced to stop piecemeal changes as individual challenges emerged, and to review their gender specific policies more comprehensively. Only a few months later, a Federal judge issued a restraining order against the Air Force to bar the dismissal of Airman Gloria Robinson who was pregnant and unmarried. The news about her case mentioned that it was similar to Capt. Susan Struck's the year before which was also being fought in the courts. Air Force regulations directed that "an enlisted woman will be discharged with the least practical delay after a medical determination that she is pregnant." Robinson had already decided that she would put the child up for adoption after the birth, so she would not have fallen under the single mother regulations of the services by then.

The following spring the Army stepped in front to permit female officers and enlisted personnel to have children. In the past, pregnancy, adoption, or abortions had been grounds for immediate discharge. The Times called this the latest of the moves to try to eliminate the "traditional double standards for the sexes." But this was the only rule change that was advertised as having been initiated by the services. The article said the Air Force had eased their rule in March and the Navy was expected to follow suit soon, and earlier in the year the Army had
approved the recruiting of married women. This was not the end of the story, however. Although female parenthood in any form was no longer grounds for automatic discharge, all pregnant service personnel would meet a review board to decide if they could stay on active duty. The woman had to have a supporting statement from her commanding officer, a statement that her child would not interfere with work or her work result in child neglect, and a proper medical history. Requests from enlisted women also had to include an explanation of the "circumstances involved" in her pregnancy. If the request was approved the mother would be granted pregnancy leave from the seventh month of the pregnancy to six weeks after delivery. The same procedures applied to married women who adopted and women who aborted. As in the past, unmarried women would be discharged automatically. But if they adopted children or aborted a pregnancy they could appeal their discharge. The Army said they would handle each case individually.39

By October of 1970, Capt. Struck had lost her initial case against the Air Force. The Vietnam vet was refusing to resign from the service. She was the first woman to contest the regulation mandating honorable discharge for pregnancy. Struck intended to appeal the decision, complicating the situation. If she had the child before the case was resolved she would fall under a new regulation allowing women with children to remain in the service. In December 1970, she had a baby girl and ACLU lawyers said they had received numerous calls from other service women who were considering filing suit under the same conditions. Struck lost her appeal. However, when she appealed to the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas blocked the Air Force discharge action. The Solicitor General argued that "it was not unreasonable for the Air Force to conclude that pregnant women have sufficient disabilities for military service to make
it appropriate to discharge them" and the regulation long predated Struck's entry into the Air Force. He did not explain why 'pregnantly disabled' married women would then be allowed to stay. Both Struck and Airman Robinson gave their babies up for adoption. Both wanted to make the Air Force a career.40

The District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Air Force in November 1971 on the basis of "a compelling public interest in not having pregnant-female soldiers in the military establishment." They did not address the situation created by the fact that the services allowed married women with children to remain, making it obvious that the issue was marriage and morality and not the physical condition of pregnancy or, later, having children to care for. Also, since pregnancy was not permanent and most women were capable of getting pregnant the court decision amounted to a discharge notice for all women. The court used an example stating that if Capt. Struck had been assigned to a field hospital in Vietnam, as she once was, and had a miscarriage during an attack she would have become a liability and a burden to the Air Force instead of an effective team member. Again, this showed a lack of awareness that sudden illness or injury in a combat-zone could affect the performance of any soldier, male or female, and it showed that women did serve in combat-zones. Men were prone to different conditions but they were just as debilitating. Both the Air Force and Navy offered discharged pregnant women the option to return in twelve months or they could have abortions.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Struck would argue her "fundamental right to decide whether to bear children" and that regulations limited her freedom of religion by encouraging her to have an abortion against her Roman Catholic faith. The Air Force argued that "pregnancy diverts personnel from the primary function of fighting or
support and thereby impairs the readiness and effectiveness of the fighting force." Again they did not explain why people were not discharged for other temporary disabilities nor why married pregnant women could be retained. The Times pointed out that these rules against pregnancy also pertained to other high visibility women's jobs like school teaching which fostered the suspicion that the issue was really "a Victorian instinct to ignore reproduction." By December 1972 the Air Force decided to drop its attempt to discharge Struck, but did not change its rule. They simply gave her a waiver after the two year expensive court battle but left the rule to be challenged again later.41

One of the other significant struggles by women for equity also was fought in court against the Air Force. In 1970 Lt. Sharron Frontiero argued that she should be entitled to the same spousal and dependent benefits to which male officers were entitled. She was denied a housing allowance and dependent and medical benefits for her civilian husband who was a full-time student with only his veterans benefits as income. Male officers were entitled to both without being affected by any income their wives received. The Federal court ruled in 1972 that the Air Force was within the constitution in giving male officers automatic benefits for wives and dependents, while female officers had to prove the dependency of their spouses in order to qualify. The Judges said the service could allow for "presumption of dependency" and that there was a "rational connection between the classification and a legitimate government end." Checking on all servicemen's wives would be an impossible administrative burden, the justices ruled. It was not unconstitutional if it did not "unduly burden or oppress one of the classes upon which it operates." The court did, however, invite Congress to reexamine the policy.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in October 1972. In May 1973, the Court ruled in Frontiero's favor, 8-1 (William Rehnquist dissented) but the justices refrained from making sex an "inherently suspect" class of discrimination along with race. The comparison between gender and race had been made, and discounted, in a minor defeat of the women's movement agenda (the vote was 4-4). The public was reminded that by then, thirty of the required thirty-eight states had passed the ERA.

Sharron Frontiero was the first military woman who identified herself as a "flaming feminist" in an interview with the Times. Mr. Frontiero was only slightly sensitive. He said, "some of the guys at work don't believe that I do half the housework and iron my own shirts. But it doesn't bother me. I mean, Sharron works hard too, and is just as tired when she gets home."

The services finally decided that they were not going to win these considerations and changed their policies and regulations. In 1973, the Army canceled more restrictions against marriage and pregnancy for recruits. In fact, the Army announced a review of all its policies based on gender which was a far cry better than the piecemeal reforms or incremental, expensive court challenges. "Moral character" was an area of special concern. Married women would be allowed to enlist and women who had had an unwed pregnancy would no longer need a waiver. In addition, the requirement that women supply three letters of recommendation with their applications was removed. These strictures had been challenged in court but the cases had not yet been heard.42

The debate continued at various venues. The Navy announced the abolition of its top WAVES job. The women would no longer have a separate women's adviser for the personnel chief. And a Coast Guard unit cancelled its ninety-five Playboy subscriptions. The commander said that recent
issues had gone beyond the bounds of propriety. The magazines had been paid for with unit entertainment funds. The Joint Economic Committee of Congress was told in mid-July 1973 that the military discriminated against women. Casper Weinberger was to appear before the committee the next day to answer questions. Lt.Col. Jacqueline Gutwillig, chairperson of the Citizen's Advisory Council, reported that the services had opened eighty-one percent of their jobs to women, except the Marine Corps which lagged, with women only being allowed in thirty-six percent. Gutwillig reported that women were discriminated against in recruitment standards; they required a high school diploma and higher academic test scores. She suggested, then, that one might expect to have higher representation in more senior grades. This was not the case. Women's promotions and jobs were limited. Gutwillig expressed doubt that any real equality would arrive until "women are accepted into the military services in much larger proportions than they are now and with full promotional opportunities and under the same standards as men." By the end of 1973, the House voted to give women equal rights in the Coast Guard Reserve including the right to serve on combat vessels and to give orders to lower ranking men.43

Despite the emphasis on progress, there was also some negative coverage of military women during this period. Primarily it concerned the issues of anti-war activism and racial disturbances. Navy Nurse Lt. Susan Schnall received a "six months at hard labor" prison sentence for wearing her uniform at a peace demonstration and an Air Force Lieutenant was dismissed for witchcraft in 1972. The latter sought reinstatement and claimed she had been persecuted after reporting security violations at her job. Her supervisors argued that she was unfit. A psychiatrist, formerly ruling her competent, decided later that she had a hysterical personality
disorder. Her husband was warned to "dump her" if he wanted to continue his Air Force career. In 1973, the Army gave "undesirable" discharges to two women who married each other in California. When a Wave lieutenant challenged her discharge for not being promoted (in an "up" or "out" system) and claimed racial discrimination, the Supreme Court upheld the Navy's freedom of action. Another WAVE was discharged for not being promoted after being commended by Pres. Nixon for a suggestion on personnel procedures which saved the Navy a large amount of money. A court order delayed her release until the judges could review her discharge. Six black WACs at Ft. Meade were slated for discharges for participating in a racial conflict. Some of the members of Brothers and Sisters for Equality had invited the base commander to hear their grievances at the WAC barracks but none of the "brass" attended. The CQ (Charge-of-Quarters, NCO assigned to manage the barracks during off-duty hours) asked the men to leave, which they did, but they marched around the base to publicize their grievances. The MPs asked them to disperse but there were scuffles and two soldiers were taken to jail. The WACs were then arrested at a protest outside the provost marshalls office. There was also trouble at Ft. McClellan, the largest WAC base in the world, where twenty percent of the WAC were black. After a white civilian bus driver said he would not carry "niggers", five WACs were run over by a panicky white MP. Later a white worker was beaten for being in the wrong place at the wrong time during a racial protest in which, the base commander believed, black female soldiers "probably spurred the black men on." When the "brass" decided to meet with the blacks to hear their complaints and a female reporter was found among the WAC protesters, they subjected her to an "unladylike pummeling" and the base deputy commander remarked, "It would have taken 50 MPs to stop those women."44
From 1969 to 1973, the United States tried both to extract itself from involvement in the Vietnam war and to deal with racial issues at home. At the same time the women's movement progressed to state ratifications of the ERA. These three areas of activity impacted seriously on questions of how the military should be structured, whether women should be afforded equal conditions of military service and equal opportunities to advance and contribute, whether the draft should continue and the ERA be passed, and whether women could be drafted. Should women be afforded the opportunity to attend the service academies, which carried with it possibilities for more exposure, better jobs, and higher promotions? All of these issues were discussed in the period under study but had impacts into the next era, from the inception of the AVF in 1973 to a period of remasculinization of the culture and backlash after 1980. The issues have had interactive effects and are difficult to separate, but one thing is certain: debate on each issue considered the ideological beliefs that rationalized inequality, both within the military and in civil society. It seemed, though, that the central issue, of the link between citizenship and military obligation, was still only touched tangentially, especially because of the move from a draft to an all-volunteer military. So women continued to make advances either because of service initiatives intended to attract another population to insure the success of a no-draft military, or through challenges in the courts. Women still fought a long, hard battle that was amazingly repetitive, and at times the military's positions seemed so contradictory to political philosophy one has to wonder how situations of such irrationality could exist and persist.

The period, after 1973, promised to be one of ever increasing advances toward full equity of consideration for military women as the ERA
appeared on the verge of passage and women were finally standing up for themselves. But disappointment loomed when, after so many years of progressing toward that equity, the services seemed to lose their memory and began to "reinvent the wheel" of gender integration, or to push women out of the services altogether after 1980. The cultural issue had not been debated at sufficient depth, and discussions of the political inconsistencies between citizenship and military service had been avoided, so that although there was some progress, it was piecemeal and easily reversible.
Notes to Chapter 9


2. Only much later were commanders authorized to make off-base civilian facilities off-limits in the U.S. if they practiced racial discrimination, were known for illegal activities (like gambling or prostitution), or served a homosexual clientele.


4. For all their espousal of the principle "leadership by example," these men failed to set the example for subordinates. Subordinates then felt qualified to question, subvert, or ignore non-discrimination policies and treat marginalized individuals with lack of respect as fellow professionals because that was the behavior shown to be acceptable and tacitly accepted by their superiors no matter what the words were that were spoken.


9. "Ban on 'Voluntary Segregation' Ordered by Top Marine General," NYT, 1 August 1972, p.9. Whites worried about "false accusations" of discrimination by blacks. None were publicized in the press. But there were accusations by white soldiers of abuse by black training instructors. The black NCOs were cleared of all charges. Dominant populations often use the specter of the oppressed using this strategy to get to them or the strategy of reverse discrimination or oppression. Men talk of fears of false accusations of sexual harassment or rape by women as well. Commanders also complained, rather than that the majority whites harassed black servicemen, that blacks from their units who took leave in the city were often influenced by groups like the Black Panthers into causing trouble on their return to their units.


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SECTION V
THE AVF AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 10

INTEGRATION AND BACKLASH, 1974–1994

The standard assumption has been that there is little on the history bookshelves that either includes women or focuses on them. This has been especially true for military histories, even moreso for military women. I would not argue against this. Nor would I argue that the disparity has yet been resolved. Much more must be done in the recovery of women to include them in all areas of history to make the story of the past whole. Equally important, beyond recovery and inclusion, further analysis is essential of the ways gender as a category and cultural definitions of social roles function. Having said this though, we should also recognize that there is a rapidly growing body of work on "women and war" and "women in militaries." This study offers one possible starting point for information on historical gender issues in the sociology, politics, or history of armed forces and wars.

Before beginning this research, I was aware of the increasing number of secondary works in the general area of my subject. I was also aware that redundancy in the debate on the integration of military women from 1940 to 1973 was partly the result of the fact that military women and the debate itself were obscured from the public view, because so much of the debate had taken place in the halls of Congress and the offices of the Pentagon. Being convinced that the public was ignorant of the issues surrounding women's military service, I was unprepared to find such a full account in the popular press about both military women and the debate,
visible to all who cared to see it, throughout this period. The amount of evidence available should call into question any plea of ignorance or lack of awareness of the historical record about women's military participation, about the recurring debates, or about the conditions of women's military service.

I have offered here an explanation for what made military women so forgettable, and for what stalled the debates about their full inclusion on every specific point of their conditions of service, rather than the issue being debated in terms of the fundamental relationship between citizenship and military obligations in a democratic society. The military had always needed women in at least some capacity, but during the period during and after World War II, the issue was "contained" by framing women's service as temporary and emergency, generally confined to feminized jobs, and by imposing gender-specific restrictions on their service. Press accounts presented both military women and the debate around them to the public but these accounts emphasized trivialities, codes of 'femininity,' and the details of service camouflaging the real achievements and contributions of women and the inequities of the restrictions both on their participation and benefits.

In both arenas, with reciprocal effects, assumed public anxiety around gender roles encouraged press accounts and military restrictions to be constructed in a way that 'contained' military women within traditional notions of femininity, heterosexuality, and morality. This double confinement sharply constricted debate. Still, the fact that women's participation at risk of harm, capture, and death was visible to the public and the fact that the military, on the basis of need, had repeatedly adjusted standards and restrictions on women and minorities, showed that cultural ideology around gender roles was contested terrain.
and that possibilities for challenges did exist just as these challenges were also taking place in civilian society. Still, and again, modes of public presentation and military policies interacted to mask the fact that women's citizenship was at issue, that changes in social relations were occurring, and that changes in these relations were necessary. The synergism of press representations of military women, and the historical amnesia engendered by the manner in which those presentations functioned, confined the debate to trivialities and visceral responses rather than opening it to discussions of the core issue of the meanings of citizenship.

My evidence shows, in fact, that the media reported extensively on women in non-traditional fields including the most non-traditional, the military. It also shows that assumptions about the responsibilities and rights of female citizens were contested in both civilian and military arenas. Finally, it shows that changes were necessary both in the interest of military effectiveness and national defense, and most importantly, in the interest of actually subscribing to the democratic political philosophy that we posit rhetorically. That spaces for this discourse were present was shown in media presentations of: (1) military women's presence, performance, and experiences; (2) changing military standards and social 'experimentation' based on military needs; (3) conversions of opponents to military women; (4) debates over civilian women's rights and responsibilities; (5) civil rights debates; and (6) foreign women in non-traditional spaces, in wars, and in militaries. It is nothing new to point out that the existence of these spaces for challenges show that gender ideology was not concrete. It had to be malleable enough to compensate for political and social changes over time.
The very elasticity of the ideology operated to make room for challenges to patriarchal ideology and structures.

**Overview**

Historicizing the debate on the integration of women into the American military between 1940 and 1973 should inform current debates on the roles of servicewomen (i.e., 'combat', etc.) and intersecting debates about other marginalized groups to assist in policy making concerned with their participation. The debate must move away from the particulars of the conditions of service and the inclusion of specific groups, to the fundamental issues of citizenship and military obligation in a democratic society.

Research of representations in the popular print media tells the story of women's military participation. During World War II the initial induction of women was challenged over questions of whether they were in fact needed by the military, whether they needed to be an official part of the services, and whether they could do military jobs. Opponents argued that while they might be needed they could better serve as non-military volunteers and that militarized women would be too expensive and not very effective. More visceral resistance posited that women would not be able to accept military discipline and that inducting women would change them ('masculinize' them) and American culture irreparably. By 1943, rather than servicewomen's 'masculinization', the press and public were primarily concerned with rumors of loose morals. The Scandal Campaign was sensationalized in the press and used by some to smear the reputations of military women. Senior leaders and the women battled against the rumors of immorality by insisting on servicewomen's non-sexual femininity and high moral standards. At the same time, they waged a battle to integrate
women into the Army and to recruit the higher numbers being requested by commanders in the field. Many of these senior officers had been resistant to the prospect of working with women but had been converted to acceptance by the capabilities and dedication demonstrated by them. What should have been an easy fight turned out to be a tough struggle though, despite having been preceded by the Navy's example of female integration and by the military's senior leadership's insistence that they not only needed more women, but also more control over their utilization. In addition, military women and recruiters insisted that, as auxiliaries, women lacked military and government support and GI acceptance, were discriminated against in pay and benefits, and were constrained from utilizing their talents fully to contribute to the war effort. In fact, recruiting efforts floundered because of the association of the WAAC with the scandal and these other concerns.

The battle against the Scandal Campaign was eventually won with high level support, from the President and First Lady to the most senior military leaders. But, according to historian Mattie Treadwell, the struggle skewed the public view of women in the services, particularly in the Army, forever. The episode further encouraged a standard component of the integration debate, i.e., the mythic widespread immorality of military women. The public remembered sensational and titillating rumors longer than they remembered the crucial work women accomplished and the hardships they endured. In fact, the ugly rumors grew bigger and influenced recruiting even in the early 1970s if not longer.

By 1944, when women had proven to be so effective and the military needed even more manpower, the services and government were prepared to use the issue of emergency need to defend violating gender ideology to the furthest extent by conscripting women. Despite military need and allied
examples, resisters opposed such measures vehemently. Supporters either framed the measure as just another emergency sacrifice to be coded as 'feminine' (i.e., defending the home), or posited that the service obligation should be shared by all citizens equally. Still others who supported the idea of drafting women disagreed with the plan to limit conscription to nurses. They argued that a draft that set apart a specific group of women was inherently unfair, but most did not think of a male-only draft as problematic. By the time it looked as if the debate would be resolved in favor of at least a nurse draft, positive developments on the battlefields diminished the perceived need for more 'manpower' and the female draft discussion was set aside.

Before the war's end, and down to the Korean emergency, the form the debate took was whether to make a transition from women's temporary, emergency service to a permanent, Regular role in the armed forces. The same battles were waged again--on physical strength, biological 'impairments' like menstruation and menopause, emotional stability, 'masculinization', and destruction of American culture. At the time, a large part of the public agreed that the whole nation was anxious for a rest from war and wanted to return home. And that home was supposed to be a safe place, where wives cooked dinner, and mothers nurtured children. Despite aspiring to this ideal of domesticity, some women wanted or needed jobs and were not content to give up even small wartime economic and status gains. Some wanted careers, and a few wanted military careers. The peacetime military saw utility in retaining some women for jobs that they had proven they could do better than men, jobs that they could do just as well, and jobs that had been 'feminized'. Beyond these considerations, as the Cold War started, many people believed that the country might soon face a more extensive mobilization. If a confrontation
did occur between 'Democracy' and 'Communism', supporters argued that they
needed a nucleus of military women to build on in an emergency. They also
suggested that during peacetime, 'experimentation' in the jobs women could
perform would also save valuable time and critical resources in
preparation for another crisis. Women were even included by some in
proposals for UMT/UMS.

Even though a Congressional consensus had been reached by 1947 that
a permanent nucleus of women's corps and job experimentation might be
worthwhile, not every one was convinced the women needed to have Regular
status. With senior officer support, and having breezed through the
Senate, legislation to regularize military women stalled in the House.
Resistors offered the compromise of limiting women to a Reserve role,
meaning they could be mobilized at the government's pleasure but without
equality of pay and benefits. Senior military leaders testified it would
be impossible to recruit 'quality' women for such a corps. House
opponents argued that although military leaders unanimously testified they
needed women and needed them in Regular status, the rank and file
disagreed with the utility of their inclusion. No one ever got to the
bottom of the unofficial animosity toward women but Margaret Chase Smith
played a significant role in squelching the counter-move by insisting that
if the military needed women it should make them Regulars and if they did
not need them, they should exclude them entirely, pushing Defense
Secretary Forrestal into more openly supporting the measure, which finally
passed with Senate support and House grumblings.

If animosity was not the order of the day before the Korean
conflict, ambiguity certainly was. Although legislation gave women
permanent Regular status in the military and they were encouraged to
aspire to service 'careers', they would be largely discouraged from doing
so by restrictive service policies. Cultural anxiety about changing gender roles still required continued 'containment' of women within traditional constructs. And along the way, they had to be represented to the public as feminine, heterosexual, and moral. The press again accommodated this vision by framing accounts with trivial considerations and stereotypic images. Gendered 'containment', categorized as 'quality', required that equality be insured by keeping servicewomen's numbers small. Women would comprise a non-threatening token force restricted by inconsistent, irrational, and unequal conditions of service. If they aspired to a career, they would have to violate gender norms by fulfilling these conditions. They would have difficulty being wives and they could not be mothers. In order to win their place and provoke as little antagonism as possible, even the female service leaders supported the idea of recruiting and retaining only small numbers of 'lady's first' in relatively traditional female jobs. Military women maintained a low profile to avoid being accused of disloyalty in a time when politics conflated the dangers of a nuclear war with suspicions about enemy infiltration at home creating a virulent anti-communist program for internal security. (Perhaps worse for some, servicewomen could be accused of being 'masculine', i.e., lesbianism). Civil rights advocates were tarred by the same brush of disloyalty. The containment of servicewomen continued by policy and was reflected in public representations. Later, both women and black men who chose to consolidate gains in the military rather than challenging too many barriers too rapidly would be labeled "Toms" by those who refused to assimilate.

During this period, while the military insisted on 'quality' in their female recruits and tried to insure this by severe restrictions on their service, which sometimes militated against other military goals, the
public saw blatant media images of male soldiers' misbehavior and abusive treatment of foreign populations, especially women. Soldiers' behavior indicated morale problems, discipline problems, failures in leadership, and the intersections of superiority complexes and imbalances of physical and economic power which encouraged American soldiers' attitude that they could do anything they wanted to civilian foreign nationals. Military women, as well as civilian women at home, suffered the fall-out from the male military and government leadership's condoning or lack of control over such offensive, and sometimes criminal, behavior. In a circular process, this situation reinforced negative male attitudes and propensities to objectify women both in military policy decisions and in press portrayals.

At the end of the 1940s, the status of female doctors and male nurses were two of the most interesting sites of gender challenge. The military first showed interest in women as doctors and received legislative approval for their incorporation, near the end of WWII, but their utilization languished in practice until the military needed them again in Korea. The status of male nurses was also resolved during the Korean crisis. But as with women in non-traditional fields, male RNs had to contend with the question of how to integrate newcomers in previously single-gender fields. This site of contested gender roles highlights the fact that even within a militarized space, such as the military/war, some jobs had been representationally feminized. Battlefield nursing requires strength, psychological and emotional stability, bravery under fire, and willingness to risk capture and possible POW status. All these attributes were coded as 'male', but qualified men had been kept out of the field. This particular case shows in relief how myth was more relevant to policy than reality. An idealized perception of nursing as an environment of
(female) 'angels in white,' in safe sterile surroundings, offering motherly comfort, and 'girl next door' morale boosting for GIs was perpetuated in the debate even while the media presented the realities of harsh conditions and violations of both safety and cleanliness images.

As with doctors and nurses, and as for black men, needs for the Korean conflict caused the military and government to worry much less about appropriate gender and racial spaces and allowed violations of restrictive service conditions. In some cases, even if changes were originally intended to be temporary, barriers were breached beyond repair. Military necessity provided women and black men openings again to fight against arbitrary racial- and gender-specific barriers. However, although the military utilized women and black men more extensively by changing restrictions, this did not translate to full equality in civilian communities at home. And, while there was some discussion in the press about racial barriers to full-citizenship, there was little centered on women and military obligations or discrimination by gender in civil society.

During the troubled 'peace' between 1954 and 1964, although historical accounts depict military women as maintaining a low-profile and not making demands on the military for equality in order to consolidate their positions, contemporary press accounts show that, although they did not receive as much coverage as during WWII, military women were actually quite visible to the public. Still, the media did pay more attention to other significant issues including America's world role, the draft and UMT, military organization, internal security, and racial tensions. Although not often directly addressed in these contexts, military women would be affected by debates on these issues during the next decade under review.
During this period, although even female military leaders continued to buy into the notion of recruiting only small numbers of 'quality' women, they continued to push at least lightly against the boundaries of containment in a continuing struggle to equalize women's conditions of service and contributions, and make rhetoric about career possibilities real. All the while the public continued to see press accounts of military men behaving badly which contrasted with expectations of women, not to mention that servicemen's attitudes toward women in general and their behavior directly affected military women.

In the early 1960s, just as it looked as if the military was going to launch a campaign to eliminate the few women it had retained because of lack of need under the defense policy of 'Massive Retaliation,' because of lingering cultural resistance to their presence, and because of the 1963 GAO report that claimed women cost more to maintain, several circumstances turned the tide again. First, Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* was published, finding wide resonance with women, especially in conjunction with the release of President Kennedy's Commission on the Status of Women report. Second, the renewal of the struggle for an ERA and the explosion of the civil rights movement influenced the public's view of women and other minority groups. And, as it looked more and more as if the ERA would finally be passed and cultural anxiety about gender role changes increased, a nascent backlash could be detected. Within the ERA debate, resisters exploited rhetoric claiming it would require women's conscription (of fifty percent of the required manpower) and women would be required to be assigned to 'combat' jobs. Finally, the expansion of U.S. involvement in South East Asia following the Gulf of Tonkin incident indicated that the wars of the future would not necessarily be quick
actions of massive destruction but could be protracted, non-nuclear conflicts requiring increases in manpower.

The military needed women, especially nurses, again. In the long involvement in South East Asia the services could scarcely hide how essential women had become. Recognition of the need for women and the favorable views toward them in the Johnson administration, supported some advances for military line women. Some of the most onerous restrictions on their services were finally removed in the mid to late 1960s. However, images of military nursing as feminized remained along with 'camouflaging', albeit less successful, of how much the military needed and used women. The camouflage operated to keep line women contained within traditional gender ideology, especially since manpower crises could solved by drafting men in large numbers. But using the draft instead of trying to build incentives for citizens to fulfill military obligations and the failure to communicate the goals of South East Asian military intervention to the American public resulted in an increase in critical attitudes towards the appropriateness of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These considerations, as well as the blatant unfairness of the Selective Service System, resulted in complex forces which contributed to a loss of trust in government leadership and military expertise. War and draft protests, racial unrest, and the youth revolt provoked the kind of psychic anxiety one relates to periods of massive political and social upheaval in which cultural assumptions are challenged. President Nixon tried to control the situation in at least one quarter by withdrawing U.S. forces from Vietnam and transitioning from a male-only draft to an all volunteer military in 1973.

Even though the Vietnamization of the conflict meant that fewer men were needed to populate the military and the services were drawn down, the
experience also meant that thousands of young men would never consider joining the services. As a result, white and minority men would be courted by the services, initiating a humanizing trend, eliminating some of the harshest restrictions on personal behavior, and increasing incentives such as pay, benefits, educational opportunities, and job skill training. In addition, since the number of available men in the population was declining, the services increasingly recruited more young women to make up for the short-fall in personnel. Women were recruited by advertising the same humanizing trends and the same packages of pay and benefits. Perhaps more significant, when recruiters used the rhetoric of the women's movement on equal pay, opportunity, and chances for advancement to attract women, inconsistencies and inequalities in conditions of service could not be masked as easily as they had been in the past. As a result, the military changed some restrictive policies on its own, women pushed for changes in others, and the courts had to step in more often.

Recent Debates

Since the debates under consideration here carried beyond the scope of this project, a brief review of changes since 1974 is warranted before concluding. As the first class of women entered the service academies in 1976, the doors to opportunities for women seemed more open than they had ever been. From the mid-1970s through the 1980s barriers and restrictions were successively removed as the military opened more and more jobs to women, including 'non-combat' flying, missile launch, and shipboard duty. 'Combat' and 'Combat Support' were continually redefined to allow for integrating more women. Eventually, the Risk Rule was designed to categorize military jobs based on the risk to personnel of directly
engaging the enemy, being killed by hostile fire, or being captured by enemy forces. Significantly, the military, having repeatedly violated its own gender boundaries—exposing the inconsistencies of gender restrictions when it needed women and others since the earliest years of this study—could not fend off the ever-increasing willingness of marginalized groups to insist on more equitable conditions of service and greater authority and responsibility.

From the early-1970s, the need for women, and the need for more volunteers in general, waxed and waned with the changing economy and defense requirements. Under the Nixon and Carter administrations, spaces for women continued to open. President Carter, in particular, had made it clear that he intended to further integrate women into the military and open more jobs to them. He also challenged the military to better define 'combat'.

At the same time, it seemed to many people (mistakenly) that the "time had come" for the ERA and more equality in the military. But trouble points remained, including 'combat' jobs and the draft. The two were tangled and often elided. Not many people would have considered putting women in foxholes with M-16s but the draft was another story and was inextricably mixed with the ERA debate.

Critics of the AVF amassed more and more ammunition as recruiters less and less often met their goals despite huge sums of money spent on incentives for enlistment—including more equitable military pay and benefits. Ceilings on women's and minority males' enlistments (to the extent of turning away some qualified applicants) did not keep opponents from complaining that the services' effectiveness had been ruined by taking too many females, too many black men, and too many Category IV men (lowest intelligence level accepted). Unfortunately, some debaters
equated minority men and Category IV enlistees. In either case, both ends of the political spectrum felt that to recruit black men in numbers much higher than their percentage in the population would cause domestic social problems (left) or military problems (right), or both. To some, it was a question of taking more women than Category IV men. But to others, 'non-combat' qualified females were the biggest problem.² Most of the opposition believed that a return to the draft would insure adequate intelligent, white, middle-class manpower and would recast the military properly as more representative of American society. Of course, they did not intend to make the military fifty percent female.

White-male-recruiting difficulties alone may not have precipitated a return to draft registration but when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter and his advisers decided to ask for legislation for both male and female draft registration and decided to support a military build-up. At the same time, women's advocates, pleased with the extension Carter provided for state ratification of the ERA, found themselves addressing the issues of female conscription and women in combat. Led by Phyllis Schlafly, the anti-ERA forces latched on to these two issues (and unisex bathrooms) to scuttle the ratification drive. Schlafly argued that an ERA would require a women's draft (at fifty percent of numbers conscripted) and would require women to serve in combat units involuntarily. She argued that this would not only violate 'natural' gendered divisions of labor but would also destroy military effectiveness. Those who were ignorant of selective service mechanisms and requirements for combat units panicked. Although pro-ERA forces were divided, at least they debated the issue from the standpoint of citizenship rights and responsibilities. Some feminists opposed any, male or female, draft but said if men had to go, qualified women should share
equal responsibility for defense. Of course, they believed this was consistent with their support of the ERA. Other feminists argued that until an ERA passed women bore no obligation for military service. Only an ERA would symbolize and guarantee full citizenship. Feminists on both sides understood that a draft of women in itself would not void laws barring women from combat, that women would be eligible for the same deferments and exemptions as men, and that unqualified women would be rejected and women who could not pass physical standards would not be placed in combat units but would perform non-combat service, just as male draftees who were non-combat qualified. Anti-ERA forces ignored all of these realities.

When it looked as if Congress would endorse draft registration the focus returned to whether women should register. Outside the feminist camp of ERA advocates, citizenship obligations and rights were not addressed. Opponents of women's registration mistakenly argued that the draft was solely geared to conscripting the combat eligible and as long as women were barred from combat by legislation and physical standards, they should be excluded. In any case, the issue was decided in court strictly by the numbers. The population of young men was large enough that another pool of personnel was not needed.

Registration, however, did not fill the enlistment rolls or dismantle the AVF. Women were still the answer to male recruiting shortfalls. The increasing number of women in the services, the increasing number in formerly all-male areas, and the assumed threats to the last remaining male-only spaces elicited reactions from the male rank and file. Antipathy became animosity, antagonism became outright hostility as challenges such as joint assignments of military spouses, single parenting, and different medical needs were addressed. These were
all categorized erroneously as 'women's problems' rather than acknowledging that men were involved as well. A growing backlash was also reflected in accusations of widespread lesbianism, charges that women distracted men from their mission, and complaints that women did not carry their weight on the job, that women interfered with male-bonding, and that women received benefits they had not earned or were not qualified for through affirmative action programs.

Most of the issues emerging in the 1960s and 1970s had arisen before and solutions may have been readily available from historical examples of the integration of women or racial minorities. Although this history was largely ignored, the military did deploy 'human relations' strategies it had learned from dealing with racial tensions to try to diffuse male animosity. Specifically, the services adapted training programs and complaint processes developed through EEO or social actions offices to educate service members on sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexist (i.e., unprofessional) behavior. Other than these programs, policy makers largely forgot or ignored historical debates and issues that could have been instructive. The primary requirements though, as shown in the fight against racism, were strong leadership and common sense. Unfortunately these were lacking in many instances. By that time, senior leaders who had served with women in WWII had retired. The new generation of male flag officers had risen up through the ranks at a time when women had constituted a token force ghettoized in feminized jobs and their essential services were camouflaged as auxiliary and inessential to the defining feature of the armed forces--combat. At the same time, there was a move in popular culture to discredit the 'feminine' and to 'remasculinize' the cultures of both America and the military, positing that the country and military had been feminized and it was time to re-
separate masculine and feminine spheres and to support a renaissance of masculine values.\textsuperscript{3}

With the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, proponents of 'remasculinization' won at least rhetorical support in Washington. Opponents to women being in the military, sensing that they finally had a friend in the White House, almost immediately commissioned studies to try to prove that women impaired military effectiveness, submitted anecdotal reports concerned with women's negative effects on units, and initiated a rehash of discussions repeatedly addressed since the 1940s. These moves only encouraged more junior men to either model their superiors' negative attitudes and behaviors toward women, or to at least feel that their bosses would condone outright hostility toward, and possibly abuse of, women.

At the same time, however, the administration decided to flex its military muscle around the world. As it did, military leaders quickly and repeatedly discovered that women had been too far integrated to remove them without harming military efficiency. For example, during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, female C-141 transport pilots were told after takeoff that they had received waivers to fly combat missions. In other words, they would do the work and be subject to combat conditions (the risk) without the benefit of specific combat training, reward, or recognition. As well, as ground troops were mobilized, women in combat support units, including MPs, were told to report for duty, then sent home because by law they were restricted from 'combat', then brought back again because their units would have had to operate short-handed without them, which would have endangered both men and mission. In the 1986 Libya raid, KC-135 aerial refueling crews would have been eligible for combat Air Medals, but since women served on the flight crews the missions were
classified as 'non-combat' and no one received the medals, which are important to promotion and, therefore, pay. In the 1990 Panama invasion, women MPs were shot at and shot back; Capt. Linda Bray led her troops against enemy forces. Bray was not classified as a combat soldier. Female medical technicians drove ambulances through the city under fire at risk of capture. They were not classified as combat soldiers. Through Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990-1991, military women were killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. None served in 'combat' positions. Military women gained visibility for their contributions. But the press also showed the public battle-dressed 'mommies' tearfully hugging their babies good-bye, sensationalized sexual activities between men and women in the field, and advertised pregnancy rates among deployed servicewomen. Reminiscent of earlier times, military women were portrayed as 'sluts', sexual distractions, damagers of readiness, and 'homewreckers'.

Once again, their history was obscured and women's activities in these recent conflicts were portrayed as new events despite the enormous amount of print media that had been available to the public for the last fifty years. In fact, the public seemed surprised so many women were in the military and were surprised at the jobs in which they served. And, once again, press accounts of military culture showed that resistance to women's participation was alive and well, no matter how necessary and successful their contributions. In the aftermath of DESERT STORM, the 1991 Tailhook Incident and other harassment cases, and struggles against the integration of women into state-sponsored military schools (VMI and The Citadel), show the same redundant pattern, the same ignorance of women's military history and contributions, the same antipathy and antagonism by the male military, and the same amnesia about previous debates and women's service contributions.
In fact the DESERT STORM experience prompted many questions about how far women had been integrated. Some felt that women had finally proven themselves and merited complete equality in the military. They had served well under combat conditions one more time, in clear public view. Realities did not need to change, all that remained was to simply recognize the reality and alter policy to account for it. And the rest of the remaining boundaries should be lifted in recognition that they were counter-productive and illogical. To this end, Rep. Pat Schroeder recommended an experiment with women in combat assignments. The services ahistorically argued that the military should not be the site of social experimentation. They claimed tests could not approximate real combat conditions even though the military has experimented and conducted training by just such combat simulations for years. If one could not experiment to get data and one avoided the evidence of women's past experience, where was one to go for information? The debate would be stalled once again.

The question "should women serve in combat," was moot. They had served and are doing so now. The questions "could women handle being captured by the enemy" and "what would be the public reaction" had already been answered. Women have endured being POWs numerous times, and while the public may find the idea disturbing, it did not create any more problems or public reaction than male POWs had. But for some, the fact that women had served in the combat-zone, suffered casualties, and been taken prisoner was cause for much concern and an indication of problems for the military and the country just as it had been in the 1940s.

As a result, President George Bush decided to appoint a commission to study the issue of women's assignments which translated to asking, should the few remaining, but most challenging and highest status,
military jobs closed to women be opened to them? Some people were surprised that Bush did not ask DACOWITS to take on this project, with that body's long and distinguished record of assisting the military with the mobilization of women. When he named the members of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services, however, it was no longer a mystery. The committee was stacked with conservative members who would argue against expanding combat roles and might recommend taking a step backward to limit women even further. After two years of study and thousands of hours of testimony, touring bases and interviewing a wide variety of people, and Congress lifting bans on women flying fighter and bomber aircraft in the meantime, the Commission's findings were not very progressive but at least they were not reactionary. The very few moderate-liberals in the group supported arguments that assignments should be based on abilities and real standards rather than by gender. The moderates, including some conservatives who had been driven to the middle by more radical conservatives, could not countenance women in ground combat and were worried about possibilities of capture for women in fighters and bombers, but they agreed to opening all shipboard positions to women except those on submarines (because of privacy issues). Moderates admitted that their position was based less on ability than on imagined public opinion and cultural ideology about proper spheres of activity for men and women. The conservatives initially walked out rather than sign on to the moderate solution. They contended that women (officers primarily) only wanted inclusion for monetary and selfish reasons, that they were incapable of performing tasks under real combat conditions, and that they would disrupt male-bonding and unit cohesiveness. In addition, as when women were sent to sea in the early 1970s and when missile jobs were opened to women in the 1980s, they even
argued that service wives did not approve of the integration of women because of the possibility of illicit sexual activity. They argued that, not only should women be barred from all combat positions—land, sea, air—but even recommended the services take a step back, removing women from some career fields, and lowering the number of women overall. Finally, they insisted that proponents of opening combat jobs would not only have to prove that women did not harm effectiveness but that they enhanced it. Given that they did not believe in using historical evidence and that they argued against the validity of tests and experiments, all they could present were anecdotal evidence and visceral cultural responses. To these conservatives, not only should women not be in combat, the extension of their argument was that of women being totally excluded from the services. Conservatives ahistorically blamed feminism for pushing changes for military women and crippling service effectiveness.

This 1990s episode shows that the same debate struggled thorough from the 1940s remains unresolved, and is argued in much the same terms as earlier. In these last few pages I allow myself to make some observations based on my work but expressed on a more personal level. We argue women's abilities and military efficiency, (the most objective measures), ad nauseam. We can argue less tangible concepts like unit cohesiveness and the qualities of a good fighter pilot, ad infinitum. But we will not discuss the disjuncture between our cultural ideology and democratic political philosophy; or how discrimination and inconsistent and contradictory restrictions hurt efficiency; or how constantly changing non-reality-based standards hurts the credibility of policy makers; or how failure to live up to our rhetoric affects morale and integrity.

The 1991 Tailhook incident points to some troubling attitudes and behaviors prevalent among male military members. Besides the total lack
of self-control and self-discipline exhibited by some men, the failure of leadership to effectively counter the years/decades old culture of unprofessional and possibly criminal behavior, and the lack of integrity of officers who covered for each other, even more problematic issues arise. Men did not show a propensity to protect women at the expense of their comrades. Instead they protected their comrades at the expense of their integrity.⁸

In blaming the victim, which is offensive on its face, some have asked, "if women whine about the guys having a little fun, how will they handle combat and enemy abuse as a POW?" They do not imagine how different it might be to be raped by one's colleagues than by an enemy or stranger in war. And, if military (or any) women are in danger in stateside hotels in peacetime, do we have to protect all women from military men all the time? There is evidence in this study that women have needed protection from their protectors. Is such a situation ever acceptable or conducive to military efficiency and public trust?

These questions can be asked in the other current debate that sometimes intersects and sometimes parallels debates on race and gender. The discussion on the expulsion of homosexuals discovered in the military, addressed as a given during the earlier years of this study, actually becomes more of an issue in the 1970s and 1980s and is currently one of the primary challenges to the armed forces.⁹ Although the military has discharged a higher percentage of women on accusations of lesbianism than men for homosexuality, press coverage had emphasized several prominent male cases. In addition, although both lesbians and gay men suffer at the hands of a similar prejudice, practices of discrimination against them operate in distinctively different ways. And, as I have pointed out earlier in this work, the threat of accusations or rumors of lesbianism
functions to contain all women in the military within acceptable gender roles and is often used as sexual harassment. One of the cliches current in the services is that the military attracts 'traditional men' (read heterosexual) and 'non-traditional women.' This cliche highlights the fact that all military women are subject to suspicions of homosexuality, while few military men are. Interesting questions for researchers to examine in more depth would be the privileges given to stereotyped demeanor. The military does not just want men, it wants 'masculine men.' It does not want any women, but if their services are essential, it will accept 'feminine women' it can contain. If more personnel were needed, would the military prefer to have 'feminine men' because they are male or 'masculine women' because they are 'masculine'? Of course, I am not positing that gay men are 'feminine' nor that lesbians are 'masculine', only that those are the stereotypes from which the uninformed or bigoted work. In fact, heterosexual women are often called 'masculine' if they are aggressive, assertive, competent, et al. And of course, that's why many are labeled as lesbians.¹⁰

The history of homosexuals in the military in some ways parallels debates on women and minority men. Each constitutes a marginalized group that will be utilized when needed and as long as it can be 'contained' (forced to 'act straight') but are then denied equality of benefits and opportunities to contribute to the extent of its talents. Randy Shilts' review of the Perry Watkins case is instructive in this regard as were some cases from the 1992 Gulf War.¹¹ In the latter, homosexuals who revealed their orientation just before they were deployed were most often still sent, but were processed for discharge upon their return. The services, which have historically been able to out-process suspected gays very quickly, used the excuse that it would take about the time of the
length of the deployment to finalize discharge paperwork. It was
disgustingly transparent that gays were asked to risk their lives for
national defense and then denied a continuing service career and the
benefits that would pertain, and they would not enjoy the formal guarantee
of equal rights in their civilian communities that other marginalized
groups have obtained partly through military service.

As with other marginalized groups, some homosexuals have sought
service to gain recognition as full citizens. Moreso than other 'out'
groups, closeted gays can pass for straights (although some people of
color have passed for whites, and in the last century, women passed for
men. More recently, in the same vein, some women have simply become 'one
of the guys'). But if closeted gays can 'pass' they can come closer to
enjoying first class citizenship at the expense of their emotional well-
being. This is essentially the rubric from which the current 'don't ask,
don't tell' service rule works. It seems patently unfair to demand that
someone refrain from challenging dominant group sensitivities in order to
secure equal rights by 'passing', but containment of women and racial
minorities operated/operates in the same way.

What seems more disturbing is that we have structured a system in
the military--a defining institution of our polity--in which out-groups
are either ostracized, banned from participating, or limited as to
opportunities and benefits, either overtly or covertly. Members of such
groups are then resented, discriminated against, forced out, worn down,
'glass ceilinged,' or in some other way limited from 'pulling their
weight' or 'being part of the team' of 'Democracy'.

If the pattern fits for homosexuals as it has for other marginalized
groups including blacks and women, the trend seems to go as follows: The
out group is first deemed not fit to serve or not capable; in an emergency
or for a temporary crisis they will be utilized and judged fit to serve in a menial capacity with justification for limiting their benefits and opportunities to advance. They are segregated and not really a part of the team. As they prove themselves and need for their services continues or increases, they gain expanded roles and might gain access to more opportunity and possibly more benefits. If need does not increase or continue they have no chance to consolidate their gains and may be threatened with or actually excluded. As long as the threat exists, especially while their services are deemed inessential or auxiliary, they have to maintain a low-profile and not challenge dominant groups or values. If they do, they will be judged disloyal to the cause at the least and charged with damaging efficiency or harming the cause at the most. If need for marginalized groups does continue, they may gain some integration and related benefits as it becomes more obvious that they are being used and abused in the name of expediency. If not limited or contained by official policies, they are most likely to be still limited by the dominant groups' unofficial prejudice, discrimination, or harassment. Official limitations are sometimes justified in the name of protecting the minority from the prejudice of the majority, or they are not further integrated with the excuse that the leadership does not have the power to control harassers or abusers from harming them. However, the leadership may come to recognize that prejudice, segregation, and abuse all militate to limit military efficiency, dash expectations and possibly, breed revolt, or drive up manpower costs.

Gaining admission to the military or even permanent access, does not guarantee acceptance. In fact, the minority will continue to struggle for many years for that. Usually, as some in the military have resisted integration of minority groups, senior leaders have vehemently opposed
inclusion of 'out groups' as complicating management and 'good order' with different challenges than the white male middle-class brings to the military. These may be pregnancy rather than alcoholism, menopause rather than rampant VD, single parenthood rather than paternal irresponsibility or abandonment. While I do not equate natural biological factors or life cycle imperatives with illnesses or disciplinary problems, these 'problem' challenges show that each group has it's own special needs which require different management solutions, but only white male needs are considered the standard and routinely dealt with--all others are deemed 'obstacles' and injurious to efficiency and budget limits.

As senior leaders are converted by military necessity, rational argument, or exposure to the capabilities of a minority group they will support utilization until full integration is a necessity. However, the example of opposition they have set serves as a model for the rank-and-file. Junior members think that (A) inclusion must have been forced on their leaders and/or (B) that their prejudice, discrimination, harassment, etc., will be condoned by senior leaders who feel the same but are not in a position to resist. The minority can not perform well when it is being abused and so might fulfill the prophesy that they are not capable or decide the battle is not worth the cost.

Since exposure under the right conditions to a minority usually breaks down negative stereotypes, minorities need increased numbers as they struggle for acceptance. Limits on their contributions must be dropped. Strong leadership is essential. Demand for appropriate behavior must be made and enforced.

In addition, marginalized groups must have an accessible history and public memory of their contributions to make advances and to play a part in constructive change. Minority groups, including blacks, women, and
homosexuals have been denied their history/memory as well as their voices. Retrieving it is essential to their struggle against inequality and exclusion. If they are denied their history as women have been, they can not use it in the service of current debates on limitations of their terms of service.

It is blatantly unfair that it is so easy to call-up a group for service and dismiss them when they are no longer needed. After the first time the group is mobilized, it gets increasingly easier for the government to call them up in succeeding crises. It is so easy to use them, but so hard to gain legislation for their benefits and true integration. And so it's easy to forget them, over and over again.

Citizenship

An examination of the 1940-1973 period aids our understanding of what evidence is available and where the debate on the integration of women into the military needs to go. When the nation needed military women, they were integrated with minimal benefits and maximum restrictions; continuing service needs impelled constant changes in those limitations, showing the malleability of gender concepts and the elasticity of standards, as well as the spaces for negotiating patriarchal structures. Lack of comparisons of racial debates to gender debates and gender and racial debates to sexual orientation debates, shows how limited our application of available evidence has been. Historical information is not a blueprint for progress but certainly the data taken from past experiences are preferable to ignorance and amnesia. And, while ignorance can be remedied through historical investigation, amnesia must be examined in more detail. I have argued that it is so easy to exclude or use and forget marginalized groups because we have not addressed the fundamental
issue of their participation. Instead of focusing on trivialities or visceral resistance engendered by ahistoric cultural ideology, we must concentrate on the meaning of citizenship—the rights and responsibilities of non-criminal, mentally sound, adult citizens especially in relation to military obligation. The consideration of this obligation is important because the military is the defining institution of the state. It is only the members of the nation's armed forces who are authorized to wield legitimate force to protect national sovereignty which includes not only the ability to protect the nation's borders and citizens, but the ability to engage in economic and political endeavors defined as the nation's vital interests.

In fact, in the debates on who is obligated to serve, who has an 'inalienable right' to serve, and who has earned the 'privilege' of serving in the armed forces, after all the resistance to marginalized groups' participation should have been discredited by scientific or historical evidence, what remains on the table is the issue that should have been resolved first. What remains is what was most important to begin with, the disjuncture between our ideology and our democratic political philosophy. This discussion should be a continuous one as we are forced to reevaluate our definitions of nationhood as well.

Before discussing all the details and trivialities of conditions of service, not to mention organizational management policies, and uniforms, underwear, and dating regulations, the fundamental issue needed to (and needs to) be addressed. Since this discussion has never taken place to the extent required, debates on trivialities and details will continue, ad nauseam.

In fact, for the debate to progress, the first order of business is to decide on the definitions of citizenship. Does it really allow for
full political participation regardless of race, religion, national origin, and gender for all adults who are not mentally impaired or felons? For the most recent debate the question extends—are homosexuals citizens or not? Are they mentally impaired? Are they 'felons' by their sexual practices or in their very existence? Does citizenship require any other condition or action—voting, paying taxes, owning property, swearing allegiance to the constitution, or providing military service?

Beyond the qualifications of citizenship belongs a discussion of 'inalienable' rights accruing to all human beings. Coming from a belief system that posits the possession of free will, these rights include the freedom to make choices and to be allowed the opportunity to do and be whatever one wants without prior restraint unless the government/community can prove a compelling interest to deny (or not enforce) that opportunity. We posit that citizens must be human and adults, as such citizens are assumed to exercise free will and basic intelligence; therefore they have the right to make decisions for themselves based on informed consent. A citizen might make a faulty decision but their freedom to do so should not be restricted by the government. Are women fully adult humans? Knowing the risk of capture, torture, and death involved in serving in the armed forces, should their free decision to put themselves at risk be restricted? In fact, shouldn't one's freedom to make exactly such choices be protected by the collective? Is archaic gender-specific protective legislation required here? If women's free will is so constrained, can they, in fact, be full citizens? Concomitantly, does constraining or dictating an adult's decision on who to love or how to love another consenting adult fall under the rubric of 'inalienable' rights or compelling state interest?
After we have defined the basic qualifications for citizenship and posited that all humans have 'inalienable rights,' the question of citizens' responsibilities and obligations is crucial. If these are considered 'qualifications,' citizenship should not be granted to any who do not uphold the obligation. Throughout my examination of the debates on women's participation in the armed forces, I was struck by how uncritically debaters of the draft, UMT, and other military issues could discuss the "obligations of citizens" to serve in the armed forces and mean, and assume all others understood, they meant "men only" (and, at times, white men only). And that, when women were included in the discussions, their consideration could be so easily dismissed as unnecessary by sheer numbers or notions that if they were 'incapable' of only one military function--'combat'--they therefore should be barred from all service. Even though I would not agree with the position that each citizen has different qualifications or obligations to meet (i.e., all male citizens are obligated for military service, all female citizens are obligated for nursing service and all citizens physically unqualified for either are obligated for some other national contribution\textsuperscript{16}), even that argument would be preferable to ignoring the debate. How can we require military service for full citizenship, not offer an alternative requirement for those not physically qualified, and still consider those who don not serve citizens? If anyone who is physically qualified for any job in the services does not fulfill a military obligation, can they be full citizens? Does citizenship require the willingness, the liability for, or the actual practice of fighting, dying, killing, and/or enduring enemy capture for the community? Given the sheer number of people (men) who have not served in the armed forces and who we accept uncritically as 'citizens' (even though we might disparage them, i.e. President Bill
Clinton), I would suggest that this nation has not formally defined military service as an obligation or qualification of citizenship. However, we do act as if military service (at least for men) confers some added status or earned privilege in our society. If either is true, how can we then bar anyone who is physically qualified from service and continue to consider them citizens? Can we believe that this nation offers or protects all its citizens' equal opportunities to earn the status or privileges of citizenship? How can we justify exclusion and then persecute, discriminate against, or even simply hold poor opinions of those we exclude? How can we place ceilings on the numbers of those accepted from certain categories, as we did for ethnic minorities, as we still do for women? Should we not accept all citizens who qualify physically and intellectually on the basis of 'first come, first to serve.'

This brings us to earned privileges or the privileges that accrue to the status of 'citizen'. Beside the point that those (men) who serve in the military gain social/political status or privileges in civilian society in the most recent discussions, some anti-homosexual debaters uncritically argued that military service, rather than being a right of equal opportunity to gain economic benefit or social/political status or an obligation or qualification for citizenship, is an earned privilege. They did not say what heterosexual men who have the most access to military opportunity (since women's numbers are restricted and gay men are excluded) had done to earn this privilege. Since the debate deals with sexuality, I imagine that it implies one has to demonstrate heterosexual behavior or state a willingness to do so in the future. On what basis do citizens either earn this privilege or become barred from it? It is obvious, I think, that we have not treated military service as a
'privilege' or 'right' simply accruing to citizenship (like voting) because of the ways we have and do restrict 'citizens' opportunities to serve in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{18}

The preceding discussion speaks to the point that in order to resolve the debates on military service--both membership and roles within the military--we must start with a consensus on definitions of citizenship and nationhood. And as global communities continue to evolve, we will have to continue to reexamine those basic definitions and insure that our political practices are consistent with any changes in practice or philosophy. So far the historical evidence shown here, and visible to the public, reveals that we have not only largely avoided this discussion but we have also uncritically used notions of 'inalienable rights,' 'obligation', and 'privilege' in debates that demand more concise definitions and reasoning. Uncritically accepting the myths promulgated through our largely unconscious cultural gender ideology, and using it differently and inconsistently in service to the myth that women (and other) groups have not contributed to or suffered in the sphere of 'war', supports our ignorance and amnesia. It also supports our continued exclusion of whole classes of people from formal citizenship functions and a part in decision making, and the benefits and status afforded in civil society to those who are otherwise qualified. At the very least, it justifies limiting their participation as full citizens. Exposing the inconsistencies shows that there are spaces for challenges and change.

Historicizing the debate concerning one of the groups that has been restricted from full participation in the military, women, can help inform a more rational, less visceral, discussion of citizenship and what kind of military we need and want, as well as illuminating the reality of
twentieth-century war and combat conditions. Institutions must be changed in order to increase consistency with our purported political ideology and to provide consistency of benefits and opportunity. Relying on problematic cultural ideology serves neither military effectiveness nor democratic society. It is particularly important, in this period of rapidly changing domestic and international conditions and the reorganization of our armed forces, to review and revise our current orientation to this issue. Revision becomes even more important as the military shrinks and adjusts to its new roles. If the military is made smaller, members must be versatile. The inflexibility of women as a group is based on gender-specific service restrictions which, in turn, is based on uncritical acceptance of cultural ideology that conflicts with democratic political philosophy, rather than on lack of ability.

As stated in my introduction, our resistance to changing prevailing social belief systems and cultural assumptions about gender roles plays a part in constructing real restrictions on women's military service which are irrational and defy or ignore historical experience. This process inhibits popular memory, despite the wide range of accessible information available to the public, reciprocally affecting the debates on women's integration and participation and the real official and unofficial conditions of women's service. The mechanisms are interactive: resistance encourages amnesia and amnesia supports resistance. The imperatives of democratic political philosophy must be brought into the debate and historical evidence must be recovered, analyzed, and deployed in these discussions in order for cultural assumptions to be revealed as ahistoric, irrational, and inconsistent with our defining democratic political philosophy.
Also, as in the introduction of this work, I believe historicizing and politicizing the debates on women and other marginalized groups in the armed forces is necessary to opening up the military as a core institution of our nation and opening the military's core function, combat, to all those physically and mentally qualified and by basing standards on 'real' performance criteria.\textsuperscript{19} Whereas there is a danger that the military will change these 'others' by its patriarchal nature, I agree with Jean Elshtain that if 'marginalized' groups are allowed in in greater numbers, they will change because of the synergism between the military institution and civil society, they will change the military (and perhaps dominant patriarchal ideology) for the better. Making this institution more representative of its parent society will help make it more representative of our political philosophy and hopefully our social practices. Assuming our culture can evolve from patriarchy to true democracy, making the military more representative of our society and humanizing this institution further, would not be a bad thing militarily or culturally. But, again, even more, I believe through this strategy we may get closer to redefining the 'state' and its 'defining function.'

I also agree with Elshtain that increasing the number of members of marginalized groups in the military and making everyone liable for service in the practice of legitimate force by the state in support of national interests encourages the recognition that everyone is responsible for defining those interests and contributing to decisions on when to use state-sponsored violence to achieve them. If not, how can we expect citizens to assist with or be committed to what are supposed to be national or community goals? By the same token, no citizen should be able to abdicate responsibility in this arena. If and when a citizen disagrees
with policy, or the use of force, he/she will no longer be able to
silently acquiesce, tacitly condone, or cheer others on from sidelines.

Either you need these racial minorities, or you do not. Either you
need these lesbians and gays, or you do not. Either you need these women
or you do not. Either they are citizens with full rights, obligations,
and equal opportunities to earn the privileges of citizenship, or they are
not. If we do need them, we must recognize in thought, word, and actions
that they are full citizens of this Democracy. If we do not consider them
to be full citizens, either because we can not or will not, we must admit
we are not what we thought we were.

"We have no business fighting for democracy if we don't practice it."

- New York Times editorial
Notes to Chapter 10

1. In 1993 SECDEF Les Aspin directed that "or" be changed to "and" allowing wider assignment of women.

2. In fact, Brian Mitchell blames women for AVF recruiting difficulties.


4. From conversations with Capt. Sandra Kearney, USAFR, C-141 pilot on Grenada and Capt. Debbie Dubbe, USAF, KC-135 pilot, on the raid of Libya.


10. Publicized cases include those of Watkins, Matlovich, and Berg. See Enloe, The Morning After, pp.84-94.

11. Shilts, Conduct Becoming.

12. Felons are presumed to have forfeited their rights (perhaps, lose adult standing) and privileges. Sometimes they have been given the opportunity to fight rather than serve their prison term.

13. Containment can be seen as an extension of men framing their participation in war as fighting 'for our way of life' rather than a political ideology, i.e. 'Democracy'. They are actually fighting in part for cultural precepts and say that they are 'protecting' women. Really in the heat of battle they are fighting to protect themselves and their buddies, as well as 'masculinity' and citizenship rights. Criminals might be given a chance to enlist; thereby they can regain 'adulthood' or 'masculinity'. Ways of life being fought for can include racism, classism, political power, privilege, etc. when in fact soldiers are supposed to be defending national sovereignty (the broad sense--economic and territorial integrity) and in the interest of political philosophies.

14. There is an argument that says that whether women would chose it or not is not the issue, but that because men would naturally be adverse to a woman being wounded or captured, he would sacrifice the mission to take care of her, and male POWs could be made to talk out of their willingness
to try to protect any female prisoners from abuse. Men's protective urge is posited as being 'natural'. There is no comment about domestic abuse or Tailhook-like incidents.


16. The classifications would not best be divided by gender/class/race (as in the example I used) to be non-polarizing but based on individual talents. In addition, in such a system obligations would have to be considered of equal value and to earn equal privilege, if privileges were in fact based on the obligation to perform "state service."

17. Men in men's fields gain status, women in men's fields don't always, nor men in women's fields.

18. I would argue that we do not treat voting like an 'inalienable human right' but one that accrues to one who is part of a particular polity.

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