The Doctrinal Functions of Intelligence: Are They Applicable To Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

THE DOCTRINAL FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE: ARE THEY APPLICABLE TO PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS? by MAJ Jonathan B. Hunter, USA, 49 pages.

Today's Army finds itself increasingly involved in "Operations Other Than War", specifically peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Effective intelligence support is essential for success in these operations. This monograph examines the doctrinal functions of intelligence and their applicability to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

The monograph first discusses the six doctrinal functions of intelligence; Indications and Warning, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Situation Development, Force Protection, Target Development/Target Acquisition, and Battle Damage Assessment. Next historical cases are examined to determine the tactical intelligence requirements during peacekeeping/peace enforcement. Finally, the functions of intelligence are compared to identified intelligence requirements to determine their applicability.

This monograph concludes that the functions of intelligence are applicable to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, traditional means to accomplish these functions are not effective in peacekeeping/peace enforcement. These operations require significant changes in the intelligence structure of the force, a reliance on human intelligence capability, and a intelligence focus that synthesizes military, political, and cultural aspects of the operation, into all intelligence analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God."\(^1\)

History will record the 1990's as a pivotal transition point. The early nineties saw a tremendous shift from a superpower dominated, bipolar world, to a multipolar world with nations struggling to find their place in the new world order. These struggles have produced increased intrastate and interstate tensions, and a resurgence of previously subdued ethnic and religious conflicts. The evolving situations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti are examples of the new struggles that have involved or may involve U.S. forces. The United Nations has shown some indication that it is ready to intervene in selected interstate and intrastate conflicts to preserve world peace and protect human rights. The trend for intervention has increasingly become a military intervention rather than diplomatic or political, as witnessed in recent events in Somalia.

The dynamic swing in the political paradigm that caused an evolutionary change in the world environment is also causing significant changes within the United States Army. The force has downsized and its operational doctrine has evolved to provide greater support to United Nations and other multi-national operations. Perhaps the most significant change in the Army is the new emphasis placed on "Operations Other Than War" in addition to traditional warfighting.
Operations other than war have become more common, especially United Nations sponsored peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts. These operations add new challenges and responsibilities to American military forces as both the United States and the United Nations attempt to find their proper role in a dynamic new world. The United States debates its commitment, but has pledged its armed forces to support the United Nations and other multi-lateral efforts to ensure peace. The U.S. pledge of 25,000 U.S. troops to the peace effort in Bosnia is a clear example of such a commitment. The extent of the overall commitment is demonstrated by 21,000 American Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines deployed in 71 countries conducting peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations.

As the role of the Army has evolved, so too has the role of Army Intelligence. Traditionally, Army Intelligence efforts have focused on supporting the combat commander. The research question explores the added missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and assesses if Army Intelligence doctrine should be refined to satisfy the tactical commander's requirements.

This study reexamines the six doctrinal functions of intelligence, developed to satisfy the warfighting requirements of the commander. It also examines historical examples of successful and unsuccessful peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations and identifies
essential intelligence requirements for success. Finally, these requirements are compared to the intelligence functions to determine if current doctrine can satisfy the unique intelligence requirements of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Where shortfalls are identified, recommendations for change are provided.

II. DOCTRINAL FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."4

Since the days of Sun Tzu, commanders at all echelons have recognized the criticality of intelligence. As Army doctrine has evolved, so too has Army Intelligence doctrine. FM 34-10, Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, was published in support of the 1986 edition of FM 100-5. This Army Intelligence doctrinal manual listed only four functional tasks that were required to support the commander in executing Air Land Battle. These tasks were situation development, target development, counterintelligence, and electronic warfare.5 These four doctrinal functions remained the focus of Army intelligence through 1991.6

Following the end of the Cold War and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Army Intelligence reviewed the requirements for supporting the Army through the year 2002. This doctrinal evaluation was based on the changing regional threats, a CONUS based force projection mission, a downsized force, and new
applications of technology. The newest doctrinal concepts in Army Intelligence, published prior to the 1993 FM 100-5, refined the doctrinal functions of intelligence, expanding them to: indications and warning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, force protection, situation development, target development and target acquisition, and battle damage assessment. Each intelligence function is multi-echelon in nature, designed to be applied at the tactical, operational, and strategic level concurrently, in support of the commander.

It is necessary to examine each of the doctrinal intelligence functions to fully understand their relationship to tactical commanders' intelligence requirements and thus answering the research question. The first of these, indications and warning, (I&W), is one of the oldest functions of intelligence. Indications and warning provides early warning to the force, preventing surprise, and detecting enemy actions that prove or run counter to planning assumptions, thereby reducing risk. This function is accomplished at the tactical level in various ways from observation posts and ground surveillance radars to sophisticated aerial sensors and human intelligence networks.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the most well known of the intelligence functions. IPB is of such importance that it is incorporated into the
Army's tactical decision making process. IPB not only drives the staff planning process, it also directs the intelligence cycle. IPB is a process which describes the tactical unit's operational environment and the effects of that environment on the unit. Additionally, IPB determines what the enemy can accomplish within that environment. IPB provides the basis for the development of friendly plans and is the foundation for the remaining four doctrinal intelligence functions.

Force protection is a command responsibility supported by intelligence. Force protection denies the enemy the opportunity to engage friendly forces. Intelligence support to force protection includes counterintelligence operations to counter hostile collection efforts directed against the friendly force. Force protection also includes Operational Security (OPSEC), an intelligence effort to identify and reduce friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence collection.

Situation development, the fourth function of intelligence, is a process to determine enemy current and likely future activity. Situation development utilizes "all source intelligence," including signals intelligence, imagery, and human intelligence among others, to accurately assess the current enemy situation and its impact on future friendly operations.

The intelligence function of target development and
target acquisition is among the more recent additions to the functions of intelligence. This function provides targets and targeting data for attack by various means, both lethal and non-lethal. These means can include, fires, maneuver, special reconnaissance, or psychological operations. The critical portion of target development and target acquisition is identification of high value and high payoff targets and detecting those targets with the accuracy necessary to attack them.

The final function of intelligence is battle damage assessment, or BDA. This intelligence operation determines the effectiveness of friendly operations on an enemy force or facility. Battle damage assessment can range from a photo showing the effectiveness of an artillery strike against a command post or detailed analysis of the impact of a strategic bombing campaign on an enemy’s will to resist.

The entire Army Intelligence architecture, known as the "system of systems approach" is designed to accomplish these six doctrinal functions\(^\text{14}\). Operation DESERT STORM is considered by many to have proven the validity of these functions, however, their applicability to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the 1990's remains to be proven. Section III of this study will examine three historical examples of peacekeeping and peace enforcement to identify the specific tactical intelligence requirements of these operations.
III. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

"The blessing promised to peacemakers, I fancy, relates to the next world, for in this they seem to have a greater chance of being cursed." 15

LEBANON 1982-83

The first case study of peacekeeping/peace enforcement is the employment of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1982 to 1983. This operation that ended in tragedy, is remarkably similar to peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement situations the U.S. has entered, or is considering entering today. The U.S. became militarily involved in Lebanon's internal crisis following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. A multinational force including the United States, France, and Italy deployed in Lebanon with the mission of insuring the safe withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization guerrilla forces from the war zone. This mission was complete and the forces withdrew on 10 September 1982. The peace process came to an abrupt halt when the newly elected Lebanese President was assassinated on 15 September, followed by a retaliatory slaughter of as many as 800 Palestinian civilians by the Lebanese Christian Militia. 16 In response to a request from the Lebanese government, the Marines were reintroduced in Beirut, along with French, Italian, and British forces.

The Marine presence was intended to stabilize the situation allowing the Syrians and Israelis to complete
their withdrawal from Lebanon, and "facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty". To further complicate the situation, the Marines were soon given an additional mission of "assisting the Lebanese Army to become an adequate force, capable of enforcing the internal security of their country." This additional mission transformed the Marine mission from peacekeeping, to what would today fit the doctrinal definition of peace enforcement.

The Marines initially operated in a permissive atmosphere within Beirut, however, as U.S. support to the Lebanese Army become more active, the Marines found themselves in an increasingly hostile environment. The first direct attack on Marine forces occurred in March 1983, when a grenade thrown at a patrol, injured five Marines. The first indication the situation had drastically changed was a bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 personnel. Following this bombing, the Marines became targets of frequent artillery fire and random sniping. In September 1983, the decision was made to provide the Lebanese Army with aircraft, artillery, and naval gunfire support to assist their operations against Druze militia forces. Following this escalation of Marine involvement, the Marine forces were subject to heavy artillery shelling, prompting the tactical commander on the ground, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, to move many of
his personnel into the steel reinforced headquarters building to gain some protection from the artillery. 23 This decision set the stage for the tragedy on 23 October 1983, when a terrorist drove a truck carrying the explosive equivalent of six tons of dynamite, into the Marine headquarters in Beirut. The deaths of 240 Marines forced the U.S. to reconsider policy and strategy and led to the eventual withdrawal of forces from Lebanon. 24

The Marine experience at a peacekeeping mission which transitioned to a peace enforcement operation highlights several tactical intelligence requirements to forces committed to similar operations.

The force on the ground must have intelligence connectivity to theater and national intelligence agencies. This connectivity serves two purposes: 1.) it keeps the ground force commander aware of geopolitical changes which may affect his mission, and 2.) it provides a system to pass combat information (raw intelligence) to higher levels making them aware of the tactical environment in which they are making operational decisions. The Marine battalion in Lebanon, a tactical force, was actually conducting both an operational and strategic mission in its peacekeeping and peace enforcement functions. Forces in this setting must be provided with intelligence connectivity and support not normally associated with tactical operations. This capability was provided to the Marines, but not as
direct support. Operational and strategic intelligence was obtained via normal intelligence channels through Sixth Fleet, and through the Military Assistance Advisory Group established at the Embassy in Beirut.25

The unit's organic intelligence system must be augmented with area and threat specialists. The Marine units in Beirut initially deployed with only their organic intelligence staffs. The Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) intelligence section consisted of one officer and six enlisted men, while the Battalion Landing Team intelligence staff was even smaller with one officer and three assistants.26 Especially significant, the Marines were provided with no terrorism experts, despite the evidence showing terrorism to be a frequently used tactic of the opponents to the Lebanese Army.27 Although leading terrorism experts assigned to the embassy in Beirut assisted the Marines, all were killed in the April bombing and never replaced.28 The addition of area experts to the Marine force would have given the ground commander a clearer picture of likely reactions to the changing Marine mission and provided the expertise needed to conduct terrorism counteraction operations. The lack of functional experts was compounded by the six month rotation policy of the Marines in Lebanon. General Smith, Deputy CINCEUR in commenting on the short rotation policy stated, "you pay a price for that, you lose a sense of history, the knowledge of how you got to where you
Augmenting the force with area specialists prevents this loss and provides language, culture, and customs expertise.

Tactical commanders must be provided with analyzed intelligence to be successful. A major finding of the congressional reviews into the Marine headquarters bombing was that the Marine force in Lebanon was overwhelmed with raw data from the intelligence system. Analyzed, fused intelligence was not provided to the Marines, but had to be developed by the aforementioned limited Marine intelligence staffs. Although raw data is very useful, it requires manpower with functional expertise to turn it into useable intelligence. It was this quality manpower the marines lacked. Capable of providing analyzed intelligence support to the Marines in Lebanon were the intelligence centers of Sixth Fleet, U.S. Navy Europe (NAVEUR), and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). These organizations had both the manpower and functional expertise to provide tailored intelligence, yet failed to do so. Tactical commanders can facilitate proper intelligence support by insuring their intelligence requirements are recognized throughout the chain of command. They must be persistent, revisiting their requirements to ensure the desired support is provided. More important, commanders must articulate their specific intelligence requirements, while recognizing the limitations of their intelligence.
support staff. This prevents commanders establishing conditions that result in more intelligence than their staff can assimilate, thus missing the critical intelligence pieces, as happened with the Marines in Lebanon.

The Marines used aggressive patrolling during the early months in Lebanon. In addition to the security these patrols provided, they provided tactical intelligence to the force. However as the Marines learned, the patrolling can quickly become monotonous. Specialized training of patrols, to include intelligence and observation training, must be conducted prior to each patrol mission and throughout the operation's duration. Observation training for security patrols is essential in peacekeeping environments where the slightest change in activity within a given area can be an intelligence indicator. Command involvement, to include intelligence debriefings of each patrol, is essential to these operations.31

Finally, the Marine experience in Lebanon demonstrated the advantage of having aerial reconnaissance support readily available. The Marines were supported with sufficient aerial reconnaissance and target acquisition systems to allow them to conduct their mission, once it evolved from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Aerial reconnaissance support of the Marine force was conducted by aircraft assigned to the U.S.S.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, afloat in the Mediterranean. However there may be drawbacks to the use of certain systems for reconnaissance, as was demonstrated in Lebanon. While the evidence shows these resources are critical and essential to mission success in peace enforcement, it may itself be considered a belligerent act, and create repercussions greater than the benefit of the support. The tactical force must conduct a risk/benefit analysis before authorizing intelligence collection missions. In the case of the Marines, their use of fighter aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance led to false perceptions, and an escalation in hostilities toward the Marines.

In summary, the Marine experience validated the following critical tactical intelligence requirements:

1. Connectivity with all levels of intelligence and intelligence organizations.

2. Augmentation of the intelligence staff by functional and area intelligence specialists.

3. Usable or tailored intelligence products must be provided by higher echelons, not raw data.

4. Patrolling is best source of tactical intelligence, however requires command involvement and special training.

5. Aerial reconnaissance and target acquisition capabilities must be available to the tactical commander, although employment of these systems may be considered a
hostile act by one or more of the belligerent parties.

NORTHERN IRELAND

The British military operations in Northern Ireland are characteristic of possible peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions the United States is currently debating; specifically the intervention of United Nations forces to enforce a political settlement to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The conflict in Northern Ireland embodies elements of religious strife as well as nationalism. The lessons learned by the British have direct application to U.S. military forces involved in peacekeeping/peace enforcement under similar circumstances.

The conflict in Ireland stems from 1608 when protestants from England and Scotland migrated into Ireland, and forcibly subdued the catholic inhabitants of the region.\textsuperscript{34} Within 100 years, the protestant minority owned over 85% of the land in Ireland and over 95% of the land in what would eventually become Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{35} By 1800 Ireland was both politically and economically dominated by the protestant minority, leading to the unification of Ireland with England and Scotland. In the mid 1800's movements to gain Irish independence from England gained momentum. In 1886 a settlement granted Ireland autonomy from England. However, radical elements, religious and political, on both sides of the issue prevented a real political
settlement until the 1920 Government of Ireland Act.36 This act partitioned Ireland into two separate entities, the Republic of Ireland, with an overwhelming catholic majority, and the British province of Northern Ireland, commonly known as Ulster, with a two-thirds protestant majority, and a large catholic minority.37 The conflict in Northern Ireland stems from this partitioning, that placed one third of the Irish population under British subjugation. Promises of equal representation in government went unfulfilled eventually leading to the use of violence in an attempt to accomplish representation and political objectives.

As a result of an upswing in violence in Northern Ireland in 1968, the British committed troops to Ulster where they have remained to this day.38

Terrorism is the weapon of choice of in Northern Ireland. Attacks are directed against political, economic, and military targets, as well as indiscriminate terrorist acts against ordinary citizens. The Irish Republican Army and its various splinter groups to include the Provisional Irish Republican Army, have gained notoriety for their brand of terrorism directed against the British government and supporters of Northern Ireland. However, the protestants have also conducted similar acts against the catholic population of Ulster through such right wing organizations as the Ulster Defense Association.39 It is in the midst of this
centuries old conflict that the British military finds itself currently deployed to enforce the peace by separating the population.

The British have become experts on operations in this environment and have produced several valuable lessons applicable to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

British forces had to adapt their organization to the situation on the ground. In Northern Ireland the Brigade is the optimal force package. However, while deployed as a brigade, it actually operates as separate battalions, each in a geographic area. This mode of deployment requires augmentation within specific sections of the force such as intelligence. Normally higher level intelligence organizations provide most of the intelligence support for subordinate units. In this case the British have had to augment their battalion intelligence staffs to provide the specific tailored intelligence required by each individual battalion. In Northern Ireland the battalion intelligence officer is augmented by a warrant officer, two senior noncommissioned officers, and a number of junior noncommissioned officers. This gives the battalion the intelligence capability to support independent operations within their area of operation. The specific intelligence functions charged to the deployed battalion intelligence staffs are:

1. Maintain a data base on suspected IRA members and
sympathizers within the battalion area of operations.

2. Locate weapon and explosives caches

3. Provide intelligence to police forces which serves as evidence allowing arrests.

4. Provide general intelligence in support of battalion operations.42

Senior supporting staffs must understand the specific situation of each battalion and the specific conditions within its area of operation. This requires frequent visits to each subordinate and perhaps the assignment of intelligence liaison personnel. These personnel ensure full situational awareness at the higher headquarters and tailored intelligence support to the unit conducting operations.

Just as the Marines learned in Lebanon, the British in Ulster have discovered that aggressive patrol operations are necessary for both security and intelligence collection. The British forces use foot, vehicular, and air patrols, having found the foot patrols to be the most effective. Aggressive and continuous patrolling allows for the development of trends and spotting the abnormal. In Northern Ireland the British patrols are so active that the intelligence produced details the area of operations allowing patrols to recognize practically every activity and inhabitant in the area. This makes it easy to identify new personnel and spot abnormal trends.43 The intelligence staff is
actively involved in the planning and debriefing of each patrol, keeping a detailed database that often proves valuable months later.

To prevent the loss of intelligence during transition periods between rotating battalions, the intelligence officer of the replacement battalion deploys in advance. During this period he conducts patrol planning and debriefing with the outgoing battalion and becomes fully aware of the situation and area of operations prior to the battalions arrival. This advance deployment of intelligence personnel has proved essential to successful rotation of units in Northern Ireland.

The British have found the use of observation posts valuable for intelligence collection. Both overt and covert observation posts are used by the British. The covert observation posts are the most effective. These covert observation posts are typically hide sites placed near known border crossing sites and suspected terrorists safe houses or arms caches. The team employed in the hide site is equipped with specialized surveillance equipment to include long range optical systems, specialized audio collection systems, and communications to allow direct links to the battalion intelligence staff and security patrols operating in the vicinity.

British forces also discovered that traditional technology based intelligence collection systems were of
limited use against the Irish Republican Army. Human
intelligence (HUMINT) has proven the most effective
source of intelligence in support of tactical
operations. Patrolling and the utilization of
observation posts, are forms of human intelligence. The
focus is on covert and clandestine offensive HUMINT
operations to support tactical military operations. At
the tactical level, the most effective offensive HUMINT
operation may be low level source operations. These
efforts are designed to provide essential information
with limited risk to intelligence personnel and sources
and are often politically acceptable. These operations
do not require the lead time required by strategic HUMINT
operations, and provide tactical information that the
commander can exploit.

Finally, the British found that interrogations of
suspected terrorists and sympathizers could produce
intelligence valuable to the tactical commander. Military interrogation specialists, with area and
language expertise, must be provided to the tactical
force to assists in immediate interrogations. Much of
the intelligence gathered in these interrogations is time
sensitive. This requires mechanisms to be in place
allowing dissemination of this intelligence immediately
to the appropriate force or commander. Additionally, the
military and police forces have established protocols to
exchange intelligence produced by military or police
interrogations as required.\textsuperscript{47}

In summary the British experience in Northern Ireland highlights the following lessons concerning tactical intelligence requirements:

1. The organic intelligence structure of a force needs to be adapted to the specific conditions of a peacekeeping/peace enforcement operation.

2. Higher echelon intelligence support must be tailored to each specific unit within the area of operation.

3. Aggressive patrolling is essential for intelligence and security.

4. Observation posts, covert and overt, produce critical intelligence on hostile activity.

5. HUMINT is best source of intelligence, especially offensive HUMINT operations.

6. Interrogator augmentation at the lowest levels is essential to facilitate effective on the spot interrogations.

7. Liaison with police provides a key source of intelligence.

SOMALIA

The peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia, provide valuable lessons, and another venue to examine the research question. Operation RESTORE HOPE, the initial mission in Somalia, was the first major
force projection peace enforcement operation undertaken by the United States.\textsuperscript{48}

Operation RESTORE HOPE began on 3 December 1992. A Presidential directive committed U.S. forces to assume leadership of a United Nations effort to establish a secure environment in Somalia and ensure the unimpeaded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Somali people. This operation had four phases: 1.) secure lodgement and establish ARFOR; 2.) expand security operations out to relief distribution sites; 3.) expand security operations; and 4.) transition to United Nations operations.\textsuperscript{49} U.S. Army and Marine forces conducted combat operations to insure a secure environment that included: 1.) offensive operations to locate and seize weapon caches; and 2.) actions to disarm armed factions operating within the area of operations. Operation RESTORE HOPE officially ended 146 days later on 4 May 1993, with the transition from a U.S. led United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) to a United Nations controlled operation UNOSOM II, also known as CONTINUE HOPE.\textsuperscript{50}

It was after this transition that difficulties began for U.S. tactical forces. While UNOSOM II was a United Nations effort, the U.S. maintained a rapid reaction force in Somalia, along with security, logistic, civil affairs, special operations forces in support of the U.N. effort. In June of 1993 rival clan leaders met to discuss a peace agreement. UNOSOM II officials declared
this to be illegitimate since it was conducted outside the auspices of the United Nations. The situation rapidly deteriorated, resulting on 5 June in an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers, during which 24 were killed.\textsuperscript{51} The United Nations reacted with a mandate to capture the warlord deemed responsible, Mohammed Farah Aidid. The United States redeployed combat forces to Somalia to assist in this effort, including Ranger and other Special Operations Forces. The mission had dramatically changed, with U.S. forces now engaged in peace enforcement operations targeted against a specific warlord. The security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated, finally culminating in a disastrous attempt to capture Aidid, resulting in 17 Americans killed, and 77 wounded.\textsuperscript{52} Of note, this was the highest U.S. casualty rate for a single operation since the Marine bombing in Beirut.

Important intelligence lessons for peace enforcement operations have surfaced based on the Somali experience. The tactical commander must be supported by intelligence preparation of the battlefield more expansive than normally required by a tactical force in conventional operations. Tactical forces deployed to Somalia reported that the application of traditional "warfighting" IPB failed to identify the unique character of an operation other than war.\textsuperscript{53} IPB in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation requires more of a emphasis on
cultural intelligence. Demographic analysis and political allegiance of various factions needs to be included in the IPB process and must place emphasis on identification of intent and capabilities of each faction identified within the area of operation. This includes military, paramilitary, and political groups which may impact on the operation, and requires analysis of intent and activities of non-governmental organizations that may be operating within the country. This process would resemble a U.S. application of "Dau Tranh" focusing on the political as well as military aspects of the operation. Additionally a more complete IPB process would have facilitated tailoring the force package within Somalia. Tactical forces were assigned areas of operation based on geographic considerations. A more appropriate IPB process would have allowed force alignments to be made according to warlord and clan areas of control, aiding the commander in his role as a political and military mediator within his area of operation.

There is a need for faster dissemination of intelligence, both up and down the chain of command, than is required in traditional warfighting. The intelligence system is currently geared to operate within a 48 to 72 hour decision cycle. In Somalia this cycle was condensed, and often intelligence required to make critical, and in many cases irretrievable, decisions was
not available. In several cases this was not because the intelligence had not been collected, but that the chain of processing from collector to decision maker was lengthy and too time consuming.

Tactical operations within Somalia confirmed Marine and British experiences that human intelligence (HUMINT) was the dominant intelligence discipline required in peace keeping and peace enforcement. However, HUMINT requires the greatest time to establish an operational capability. The Army tactical HUMINT capability is very limited and needs to be augmented with additional personnel for operations like Somalia. In addition to augmenting the effort, teams need to deploy early to begin the collection process. That effort establishes operational support mechanisms such as bases of operation and personnel contacts with various factions, agencies, and the local population. Additionally, these HUMINT assets must be augmented with transportation and communication capabilities. This additional support allows the HUMINT teams to make more daily contacts and report via radio rather than in person as was initially done within Somalia.

Tactical commanders must leverage theater and national HUMINT systems operating within the area of operations. Special Forces teams proved to be an exceptional HUMINT collection capability within Somalia. Additionally, the commander must pursue the mechanisms to
allow timely reporting from strategic HUMINT systems to
the tactical level without the normal delays due to
higher echelon filters.

While HUMINT has proven the most required form of
intelligence, there is still a requirement for the more
technical forms of intelligence such as signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT).
Faulty intelligence preparation of the battlefield in
Somalia failed to identify the reliance of the warring
factions on radio systems for the majority of their long
range communications. Due to this oversight, ground
based SIGINT systems were not initially deployed by Army
or Marine units to Somalia. This resulted in a
lucrative source of intelligence not being exploited by
the tactical intelligence system. Forces deploying in a
peacekeeping/peace enforcement need to utilize their
SIGINT capability to full potential. The operational
mandate must allow this type intelligence collection to
support the mission.

Imagery intelligence can be of critical importance.
Somalia identified the need for a day/night-capable, high
resolution, near-real time, imagery system to support the
requirements of the commander in peacekeeping/peace
enforcement. This system should not present a threat to
the factions of the conflict as did aircraft in Lebanon.
Somalia proved that the unmanned aerial vehicle is an
ideal platform for this mission. The importance of a
near-real time capability is that it fills the gap left
by the "snapshots" provided by national systems, plus it
is responsive to immediate requirements of the tactical
commander. This capability can be used for monitoring in
peacekeeping or for target acquisition in a peace
enforcement environment.

The requirement for augmentation of the force with
area experts was revalidated in Somalia. Especially
significant is the requirement for linguist support to
the tactical commander. The Somali language was not even
taught at the Defense Language Institute when forces
began deployment to Somalia.\textsuperscript{60} Most linguists provided
to the Army were either soldiers with a native skill in
the Somali language or civilians hired to augment the
force after deployment. It is essential that the
tactical commander identify his requirements for language
capability at the beginning of the mission planning
process so that these requirements can be filled prior to
deployment. The majority of the intelligence collected
in a situation such as Somalia, requires a language
capability at every level of the force, down to patrol
level.\textsuperscript{61}

Somalia again proved the criticality of aggressive
patrolling. Patrolling remains the primary intelligence
collection means in a peacekeeping/peace enforcement
operation. The Marines reported that some of the best
HUMINT developed in Somalia was produced at the patrol
The withdrawal of patrols from the streets of Somalia led to a loss of essential and easy to get intelligence. For example, the Quick Reaction Force that was tasked to rescue the trapped Ranger force, was surprised and unaware of roadblocks that had been established on the main roads in Mogadishu.

In summary, U.S. experience in Somalia indicates the following tactical intelligence requirements:

1. Extensive IPB adding cultural and political dimensions of the environment.

2. Faster dissemination of intelligence both up and down the chain.

3. Greater reliance on HUMINT capabilities.

4. Leverage theater and national intelligence systems operating within the area.

5. Identification of the requirements, if any, for technical intelligence collectors early in mission planning.

6. Responsive imagery systems including the unmanned aerial vehicle.

7. Augmentation by area experts will be essential.

8. Aggressive patrolling is primary intelligence means.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF DOCTRINAL FUNCTIONS

"Doctrine is a statement of how America's Army...intends to conduct war...it must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide."63

The three historical examples served to develop and validate tactical intelligence requirements in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Having developed these requirements a comparison can now be made to the doctrinal functions of intelligence discussed in section II of this study.

Indications and warning are clearly applicable to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The primary purpose of this function is to keep the commander aware of enemy activity, providing early warning and preventing surprise. In Beirut the indications and warning system failed to pick up the evidence of the terrorist threat to the Marines. In Northern Ireland the British have placed emphasis on this function to allow them to be proactive rather than reactive in their response to threats.64 Somalia again showed the validity of this function with the failure to anticipate the outbreak of hostilities toward the United Nations forces by Somali warlord Mohammed Aidid.

More important than its validity however are the unique characteristics of indications and warnings in a peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment. This function cannot be carried out in the traditional ways
during these missions. No longer can the intelligence system remotely monitor the movement and activity of enemy units to determine the threat level to U.S. forces. In peacekeeping/peace enforcement the intelligence system must analyze the activities, capabilities, and ideological goals of the various factions. Then with synthesized intelligence produce a determined range of capabilities of various factions and provide a detailed intelligence product to the tactical commander. The system must quickly recognize a change in relationships among the players and provide this intelligence to the commander. This will assure him time to take proactive measures to resolve the situation and/or prepare his forces. The 240 Marine dead in Beirut attest to the criticality of indications and warning in a peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, (IPB) is also totally applicable to peacekeeping/peace enforcement. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the most critical intelligence function to ensure proper intelligence support to the tactical commander. IPB is the basis for the entire intelligence system. All three historical examples presented evidence of various components of IPB being conducted in support of tactical operations.

Like indications and warning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield in peacekeeping and peace
enforcement has different characteristics than in traditional warfighting. IPB in peacekeeping/peace enforcement is essentially the same as traditional IPB in analysis of the area of operations. However, the analysis of the enemy is significantly different. In peacekeeping/peace enforcement there is no traditional enemy. Description of the "enemy" must include a detailed analysis of each faction in the dispute and third parties that may be influencing one or more of the factions. This analysis goes beyond military capability to an analysis of the culture, demographics, political organization, ideology, and goals of each party. In IPB the intelligence staff must analyze likely actions and reactions of each party to friendly operations.

Finally, the IPB process must include analysis of what the factions will do if the U.S. mission transitions from one of peacekeeping to peace enforcement. This analysis done early in the planning cycle can help the tactical commander ensure he deploys with the necessary forces to conduct a successful mission transition to peace enforcement if necessary, as in Somalia and Lebanon. In recognition of the specific requirements of IPB in these situations, FM 34-130 includes a section on IPB in peacekeeping in the 1993 edition. It is limited in scope and needs expanding.

The third function of intelligence, force protection, is paramount in both peacekeeping and peace
enforcement. The experiences of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Somalia paint a clear picture of the danger posed to both peacekeepers and peace enforcers. The role of intelligence support to force protection is critical to insure the security of U.S. personnel employed on these operations. Force protection takes on different characteristics during peacekeeping than peace enforcement. During peacekeeping operations it is implied that the direct threat to the peacekeeping force is low since all parties have agreed to the presence of the peacekeepers. In this situation the role of intelligence is to monitor the situation for any signs of the situation deteriorating and a threat to U.S. personnel develops. This requires an emphasis on the political situation, keeping the commander aware of the changes in political dialogue that signal a change in the ground situation. Through proactive measures the intelligence system foretells expected changes in the operational environment and warns commanders of force protection risk.

Once the situation shifts from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, force protection increases in importance. Experiences in Lebanon and Somalia indicate that in a peace enforcement environment, factions will try to force the removal of, or at least limit the effectiveness of units engaged in peace enforcement missions. Historically, causing significant American casualties has
proven a means of achieving this end (Lebanon and Somalia). The American center of gravity is our political will and resolve to remain committed to the mission once casualties have been taken. In peace enforcement it is essential for the intelligence system to provide the tactical commander intelligence on every capability of the rival factions to affect friendly operations. This function also plays a critical role in the determination of rules of engagement. The capabilities and intentions must be analyzed early and rules of engagements developed with these capabilities in mind.

The intelligence system must be proactive and offensively oriented. The historical examples show the reliance on HUMINT, aggressive security patrols, covert and overt reconnaissance sources, and strategic HUMINT networks. The intent is to provide intelligence to the tactical commander in a timely fashion. Failures in the intelligence function of force protection have jeopardized the entire mission and caused major policy shifts of the governments involved.

Situation development is applicable to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but with requirements much different than traditional warfighting. Situation development is the primary role of the intelligence system in traditional warfighting. This function is in essence, the intelligence cycle of directing, collecting,
processing, and disseminating intelligence to the users. Intelligence assesses the current situation and, based on the opposing forces capabilities, indications, and intent, anticipates future activity. The intelligence architecture to accomplish this task was designed with a cold war Soviet style threat in mind. The current Army Intelligence system is technology based, relying on sophisticated systems designed to capitalize on vulnerable signatures of Soviet type forces.

The evidence from peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions shows that the most likely threat is going to be a threat force with very limited technical capability. Therefore we find our forces having to operate a technical based system against a low tech enemy. The peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Somalia all found themselves in a similar situation. Human intelligence has proven to be the dominate form of intelligence in peacekeeping and especially peace enforcement. This requires a shift in the way the tactical intelligence system today conducts situation development. The intelligence system must increase the speed of the intelligence cycle, while relying on HUMINT, traditionally the slowest form of intelligence.

More resources are required at the tactical level to insure success. Area expert augmentation to the tactical force is required. Additionally a greatly improved language capability must augment the tactical
force, not just the intelligence force. Finally resources must be allocated to facilitate the intelligence collection mission, even if it takes away from combat power. This includes the use of combat forces as intelligence collectors through patrolling and reconnaissance missions. This is exceptionally difficult in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement situation where the force available is generally less than manpower requirements.

Commanders must prioritize requirements and assume reasonable risk (force protection). Providing the commander complete "situational awareness" is the ultimate objective of situation development in peacekeeping and peace enforcement and serves to determine the risk to the force. From this awareness, rational decisions on future actions are possible.

Target development and target acquisition, is often considered nonessential in peacekeeping operations. In fact it is fully applicable in peacekeeping, and vitally important in peace enforcement.

Target development and target acquisition was included as a function of intelligence largely as a result of the increased emphasis on deep fires in Army doctrine. This function is critical to the effective accomplishment of deep battle and the decide and detect phases of the targeting process. It is a technically based function that in essence has a goal of identifying
a critical target to a degree of accuracy, and within the necessary time, to allow friendly fires to destroy the detected target.

In peacekeeping target development and target acquisition take on a different character, often referred to as non-lethal targeting. In peacekeeping it is a necessity to keep track of various forces and equipment, such as artillery, of the opposing factions. The process whereby this is accomplished is the same targeting process as in combat operations, except that the end result is not "steel on target", but perhaps observation and monitoring. A dilemma to the tactical commander of a peacekeeping force is posed by the necessity to conduct this function of target acquisition, while being restricted by political limitations. He may not be able to use the target acquisition systems such as reconnaissance aircraft, elements of TACFIRE, and counterbattery radars. The Lebanon experience demonstrates the necessity of a risk to benefit analysis early in the planning process and the development of a clear mandate specifying what intelligence systems will be permitted for employment in support of peacekeeping. All factions must be told that the systems are for force protection and they will be used to target to protect the force.

In peace enforcement operations however, the delivery of measured force against specific targets
whether it be an artillery location as in Lebanon, or a warlord as in Somalia, is essential. Therefore in peace enforcement the full capability of the intelligence systems function of target development and target acquisition must be deployed in support of the tactical commander. At this point the dilemma presented earlier reemerges; a technology based intelligence system is often incompatible with a low technology environment. Target acquisition in peace enforcement tends to rely on HUMINT, especially in situations such as Somalia where a specific individual is the target for apprehension. One might recall that in Panama, the attempt to apprehend General Manuel Noriega had similar difficulties.

However, both Lebanon and Somalia indicate that there still exists a need for high technology systems in target acquisition. The unmanned aerial vehicle is invaluable as a near real time target acquisition system responsive to the tactical commander in peace enforcement. However, even this system is virtually ineffective in a situation where the target is an individual or specific group, in which case HUMINT once again is the primary means of target acquisition.

Finally, the intelligence function battle damage assessment is surprisingly relevant to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. While the term battle damage assessment is misleading, its purpose is vital in peacekeeping. For example, a military unit occupies a
specific location in violation of the peace agreement. Peacekeeping forces request the party to remove its force from the position. The peacekeeping force must determine if the move was made. In fact this is battle damage assessment as it relates to peacekeeping. It is determining the effectiveness of friendly actions, in this case a request, upon one or more of the belligerents. In peacekeeping a robust capability is required to accomplish this intelligence task. It does not necessarily require an additional intelligence capability, but the utilization of maneuver forces to verify movements and report these in a timely manner. The verification of Somali removal of checkpoints in response to U.S. demands is an example of how this function is applicable in peacekeeping.

In peace enforcement battle damage assessment is more important and more difficult. While it is easy to determine whether an individual was apprehended or an artillery location destroyed, determining the effect of peace enforcement operations on the effectiveness of rival factions in the conflicts is extremely difficult. In Somalia this dilemma became apparent when U.S. offensive operations failed to calculate the capabilities of Mohammed Aidid's forces, resulting in an unacceptable loss of life. Once again the vital importance of HUMINT in peacekeeping and peace enforcement must be emphasized. An effective HUMINT capability may be the only possible
source for battle damage assessment as applied to a peace enforcement mission.

V. CONCLUSIONS

"Peacekeeping is a growth industry, ... countries such as ours are going to be asked on a regular basis to contribute troops to conflicts where there is no peace to keep."66

A review of the six doctrinal functions of intelligence and recent peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Somalia, makes it clear that the current doctrinal intelligence functions are applicable to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However the application of these functions to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations presents unique challenges to the tactical commander.

In peacekeeping and peace enforcement the tactical force conducts missions with operational and strategic implications. Tactical intelligence must provide the intelligence support necessary to operate within this expanded operational environment.

In each of the case studies, the intelligence organization designed for combat was insufficiently resourced to conduct the intelligence operations supporting peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The experiences of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Somalia, indicate the tactical force is normally not capable of providing the intelligence support required by the tactical commander without significant augmentation.
The functions of intelligence developed to support combat operations remain relevant in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, a solely technically based intelligence architecture designed to support the tactical commander in combat operations may not be appropriate for peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The commander is responsible for driving the intelligence effort. Early in the mission planning process, IPB must be accomplished to the detail discussed in this study. This IPB should be the basis for an intelligence force packaging. Intelligence requirements, by function, should be clearly articulated, and then a force designed to achieve these goals. Especially important is insuring the force has the inherent capability to transition from peacekeeping to a peace enforcement role quickly. Just as combat power is apportioned based on threat, the intelligence force should be structured based on the threat and identified intelligence requirements of peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

Accomplishing the doctrinal functions of intelligence in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations requires more than military intelligence personnel and systems. Every element of the force has potential as an intelligence collector, and should be tasked appropriately. As each case study showed, aggressive patrolling throughout the area of operations
is perhaps the commander's most vital source of intelligence. Command involvement to the lowest level is essential to ensure this capability is fully maximized.

In each case study, tactical commanders reported that human intelligence (HUMINT) was the most valuable source of intelligence in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, it is the intelligence discipline least resourced in the Army's tactical intelligence units.

As the Army becomes more and more involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, Army leadership must reevaluate the intelligence systems being fielded to support the tactical commander. There must be a balance between the "flagship" systems of the Army Intelligence community, Guardrail Common Sensor and the Ground Based Common Sensor, and the more traditional and manpower intensive HUMINT systems.67

The Army will continue to face the daunting challenges posed by peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Success requires the tactical commander to execute all six doctrinal functions of intelligence. In peacekeeping and peace enforcement, unlike any other operation, intelligence is truly a weapon system designed to defeat the opposition and protect the force. Intelligence can be a "Sword for the Peacekeeper."
ENDNOTES


2. There is a slight difference in definition of these two terms between Army Doctrine (FM 100-5) and Joint Doctrine (Joint Pub 3-07.3), for clarification, both are provided:

   **FM 100-5:**
   **Peacekeeping** - operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel, at the request of the parties to a dispute, to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties.
   **Peace enforcement** - military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat.

   **JT PUB 3-07.3:**
   **Peacekeeping** - Operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict.
   **Peace Enforcement** - Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activity.


3. This figure is current as of Spring 1993.


6. The first official listing of additional doctrinal functions of intelligence is found in the Coordinating Draft of "U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept" (Fort Huachuca: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, April, 1992). Field Manuals published through 1991 still listed only four functions of intelligence.
7. This review is known as the MI Relook. The goal was to identify the major internal and external influences impacting the development of the Army's Intelligence and Electronic Warfare structure, including threats, personnel, equipment, organizations, and resources, through the year 2000. The Relook was conducted jointly by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, and Training and Doctrine Command.


10. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is integral part of the mission analysis process a battle staff uses when preparing for tactical operations. For details on the integration of IPB into staff planning process see U.S. Army, ST 100-9, Tactical Decision Making Process, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 2-1 - 3-31.


12. FM 34-7, 2-4.

13. "All source intelligence" refers to the intelligence products resulting from the "fusion" of information from various individual intelligence sources or collectors.

14. "U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept", 5. The "system of systems" is the integration of National, Theater, and tactical intelligence assets. This integration allows a seamless architecture, providing responsive, tailored, balanced, all-source intelligence support to the commander.


19. Taubman, 50a-b.


23. Taubman, 50c.

24. Ibid., 49.


26. Taubman, 52.

27. Ibid., 50.


29. Ibid., 26.

30. There are definitive differences between information and intelligence. Information is unprocessed data, direct from a reporting source, often referred to as combat information. Intelligence is information that has been "processed". Processing converts combat information into intelligence through analysis. The key difference is information is unanalyzed, while intelligence is analyzed as to how it impacts on the current or future situation. U.S. Army FM 34-8 Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence (Washington: Department of the Army, 1992) 2-1.

31. Ibid., 28.

32. Malone, 16.

33. The marine force was supported by F-14 Tomcats from the U.S.S. Eisenhower. The F-14s were perceived by the Lebanese as a show of force. These were eventually proven to have been detrimental to the neutrality claimed by the marines. Malone, 17.


37. Janke, 2.

38. Ibid., 18.


40. Dewar, 177.

41. Ibid., 185.

42. Ibid., 186.

43. Ibid., 180.

44. Ibid., 181.

45. Although details on HUMINT Operations are rare in unclassified sources, British HUMINT operations in Northern Ireland are considered the preeminent example of offensive intelligence operations designed to penetrate a hostile low intensity threat. U.S. Army Intelligence School training at one time included British HUMINT tactics in Northern Ireland, taught by British Intelligence Officers with experience in Northern Ireland. "Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction Course" (3CF14/244-F8) November 1985, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ

46. Janke, 22.

47. Dewar, 147-160.


49. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operation Restore Hope" Revised Final Draft, (Fort Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, May 1993), 3. The revised final draft was approved and signed by Commander, Training and Doctrine Command 15 Nov 93. Hereafter, Army "Restore Hope Lessons"

50. Hoar, 56.

52. Louis Lief and Bruce Auster, "What Went Wrong in Somalia?" U.S. News and World Report (October 18, 1993) 34.


54. Dau Tranh was the political/military strategy of the North Vietnamese used in the Vietnam Conflict. It is based on Maoist thought and was designed to achieve synthesis between the political struggle and the military struggle. For more detail on Dau Tranh see Christopher Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, (California: Presidio Press, 1986) 212-252.

55. Ibid., 6.

56. Ibid., I-6.

57. United States Marine Corps, Operation "Restore Hope" Collection and Lessons Learned Project (Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, April 1993) 2-B-25, 27. Hereafter referred to as USMC "Restore Hope Lessons".


59. USMC, Restore Hope Lessons, 2-B-20, 21. Marines indicated the UAV is a necessity for peacekeeping and other humanitarian, as well as combat operations. The UAV system currently fielded by both the Marines and Army is the Israeli Pioneer system. This UAV is equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and Night Observation System (NOS) with a real time video downlink to the ground control station. The Army identified the identical requirement for a UAV system in Somalia. See also Army "Restore Hope Lessons", XIV-14.

60. Army "Restore Hope Lessons" XIV-29, This problem was not just an Army issue. The Marines experienced similar problems due to a lack of Somali qualified linguists. See also USMC, Restore Hope Lessons, 2-B-29.

61. USMC, Restore Hope Lessons, 2-C-32, 33.

62. USMC, Restore Hope Lessons, 2-C-33.

63. FM 100-5, 1-1.

64. Dewar, 138.


67. Guardrail Common Sensor is a near real time airborne COMINT/ELINT/DF system reporting by downlink to Corps, Divisions, and Brigades. This system is being fielded to the Corps Military Intelligence Brigades as of this writing. Ground Based Common Sensor, also known as the Electronic Fighting Vehicle, is a ground based system with COMINT/ELINT/DF and COMINT Jamming capabilities which will be deployed at Division level. This system is to be fielded FY 97/98. Intelligence Center and School, "U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept", Annex L, 63-73.
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