From Camouflage Helmets to Blue Berets—
The Transition from Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

FROM CAMOUFLAGE HELMETS TO BLUE BERETS — PLANNING THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE ENFORCEMENT TO PEACEKEEPING by MAJ Thomas G. Pope, USA, 72 pages.

This monograph examines the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations. Since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the number of United Nations peace operations has risen dramatically. Unlike most peace operations of the Cold War, these actions have been characterized by intra-state conflict, the availability of large quantities of modern weapons and ethnic tensions. As a result, the U.N. has had to initiate heavily armed peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations to achieve diplomatic objectives.

The study first defines peace enforcement and peacekeeping based on current U.S. Army definitions. The monograph then reviews the need for establishing disengagement criteria as part of mission planning. The environment, mandate, planning and disengagement criteria in Somalia 1991-92 and similar peace operations are analyzed to determine the need for developing an effective means for the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping in future peace operations.

The monograph concludes that choosing when to commit U.S. forces to peace operations is as important as when and how to disengage them. The study provides general disengagement considerations for planning the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping. The successful transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping is a critical indicator of potential mission accomplishment in future intra-state conflicts.
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The collapse of Soviet Communism has left us with a paradox: there is less threat, but also less peace.¹

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General, NATO

I. INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War mark the dawn of a new international security environment. This new era is being shaped by the resurgence of Wilsonian idealism which envisioned an international body that would police itself and focus on global well-being. Pursuant to its position as the world’s superpower the U.S. is expected to take the lead in supporting the efforts of the United Nations to fulfill this role. Since 1988, the number of United Nations sanctioned peace operations has risen dramatically. According to U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeline Albright, "the breakup of the Soviet Union eliminated the Soviet veto at the U.N." and "permitted more peacekeeping operations in the past five years than in the previous 43."² Unlike peacekeeping operations of the Cold War, these operations have been characterized by intra-state conflict, large quantities of modern weapons and ethnic tensions. As a result, the U.N. has had to initiate heavily armed peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations to achieve diplomatic objectives.³

In 1988 and 1989, as the Cold War came to an end, the permanent members of the U.N.’s Security Council seemed imbued with a new spirit of cooperation. This cooperative spirit coupled with the internationalist nature of the U.N.’s corporate body led many in the world to believe that this organization was, once again, ready to assume a more active role in conflict resolution. This perception has enabled the U.N. to respond to a wider variety of conflicts with minimal resistance from the international community. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. has expanded its role to include a myriad of peace operations ranging from preventive diplomacy and conventional peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations directed at stabilizing conflict. These operations have extended beyond the bounds of traditional Cold War peacekeeping. Excluding Operation DESERT STORM/SHIELD, the bulk of recent U.N. peace efforts have been directed at
diplomatic efforts to resolve civil wars. As witnessed by events in Somalia and Bosnia, the U.S. is prepared to support the U.N.’s efforts as a part of its emerging "Strategy of Enlargement", in an attempt to help mold the world into a shape conducive to U.S. interests and the Clinton Administration’s vision for the future. As witnessed by the continued conflict in Somalia and Bosnia, the degree to which the U.S. has supported U.N. efforts may be inadequate. Application of traditional diplomatic and military peacekeeping measures has been unsuccessful. Given the nature of the environment in which these conflicts are occurring armed peace enforcement may be required to establish the conditions necessary for traditional peacekeeping.

The U.S. Army is a key element in implementing this strategy. New directions in U.N. and U.S. peace operations have been identified as a second generation of peacekeeping by academicians, diplomats and military leaders. These operations are characterized by intra-state conflict rising from ethnic, religious, historical and political differences within a country or region. The impact on the Army’s operational requirements in this new peacekeeping environment is currently being debated by policy makers and planners. According to the current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Peacekeeping doctrine is in full evolution. The post-Cold War world is fragile... In many nations government as we know it is disappearing in the face of civil war." In support of political objectives focused on peace and stability, the Army can expect to perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in conjunction with the development of policy and doctrine for such missions. Currently Presidential Review Document 13 is under development and will define US interests, goals, terms and policies for peace operations in the future. However, policy and doctrine development has fallen behind mission planning requirements. Military planners are currently faced with a number of actual and contingency operations termed "Operations Other Than War" in the current Army lexicon. These missions are as potentially lethal as actual combat operations during the Cold War. Recent peace operations have resulted in a greater loss of life to U.S. forces than during Operation URGENT FURY in
Grenada or Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Potential peace operations in Bosnia and areas such as the former Soviet Union and Haiti are shaping the strategic environment in which the Army may fight in the future.\(^8\)

This study’s focus is on how the military can effectively transition from missions in which soldiers wear camouflage helmets to those where they don blue berets. In addition to fighting our nation’s wars, the U.S. Army can expect to support diplomatic efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts across the globe. These operations may require the application of military force to create and maintain a peaceful environment for other supporting efforts to be effective. How the Army transitions from peace enforcement to peacekeeping missions under these circumstances is not well defined in either policy or doctrine.\(^9\) An examination of the environment in which such operations may occur in the future illustrates a problem with the transition process. Analysis of the current peace operation in Somalia compared to similar operations in the past indicates a need for disengagement criteria. This study will suggest planning considerations for United States military forces which must transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping in an intra-state environment.

\textit{Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.}\(^{10}\)

Dag Hammarskjold, former U.N. Secretary General

II. THE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

The world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 causing the international security environment to take on a new appearance. Littered with a surfeit of Cold War weapons and long suppressed animosities, the global environment is less stable and predictable. Since the late 1980’s, the world has witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and near unanimous decision to address Iraq’s unprovoked attack on Kuwait through armed intervention in the form of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. This inter-state conflict initially appeared at a time when the U.N. was struggling with the transition from a bipolar
to a multipolar world order. Since DESERT STORM a different kind of conflict has risen to prominence — intra-state war instigated by ethnic and religious differences, economic hardship and political mistrust. According to the U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, "ethnic conflict poses as great a danger to common world security as did the Cold War." How the U.N. and the U.S. intend to meet this challenge may determine the role of the U.S. Army in the future security environment. The current lack of a defined international security paradigm has resulted in a spate of peace operations which require civilian policy makers and military leaders to adapt to a new paradigm for peace.

The post-Cold War world is plagued with turmoil. Economic and military power vacuums created by the collapse of the Soviet Union have resulted in a resurgence of regional hegemonism and renewed pre-Cold War confrontations. Deep-rooted ethnic conflicts such as in Bosnia, Tadjikistan and the Ukraine have increased intra-state tensions. This turmoil is shaped by suppressed cultural, nationalistic, religious and ethnic differences which had been held in check by communism and a bipolar stand-off. In addition to these conflicts the world has witnessed an increased interest in market economies and democratization. These phenomena have led to a new dynamic in international politics characterized by zones of instability and development and zones of peace and democracy. The tension between and among these zones shape the current security environment. Nations or peoples who are not content with their positions in the world order strive for better standing. This posturing has led some factions to use violence to achieve their goals.

The international security landscape today is strewn with modern weapons and technology which are no longer controlled directly or indirectly by superpower coercion as they were during the Cold War. As the major nuclear powers continue to negotiate nuclear disarmament, lesser developed and emerging nations are attempting to acquire nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. These weapons are seen as key to securing positions of influence in the international and respective regional arenas. Without these weapons, less developed countries’ individual
bargaining power with more heavily armed countries is diminished. An unbalanced security environment coupled with the availability of sophisticated weapons at a reduced price has resulted in a spiraling arms race among third world countries.

For peace operations planners the problem of weapons proliferation must be considered when tailoring a force structure which can deter aggression and defend itself. The proliferation of antiarmor and personnel mines in the third world illustrates the challenge soldiers can expect to encounter in peace operations. Peacekeepers operating in areas of intra-state conflicts in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia must be prepared to deal with 4-7 million, 1-1.7 million and 1-1.5 million mines respectively. They must also be prepared to face an enemy with weapons ranging from inexpensive firearms to modern Soviet armor, artillery and chemical weapons. U.S. Army planners must thus anticipate that our forces deployed in current and future peace operations may face a dangerously well-armed foe.¹⁴

The once predictable security environment of the Cold War has been replaced by uncertainty. The effort of the western powers to defeat the spread of communism has been replaced with an increased international interest in developing a multilateral community of nations which promotes democracy and humanitarian efforts. However, the U.N. is having a difficult time managing the myriad of tensions in the post-Cold War era. Frustrated by the violence directed at U.N. peacekeepers, the Security Council has increased the authority for force when peace is threatened. According to the U.N. Secretary General, the transition from a bipolar to multipolar world brings challenges to stability which will require an international effort to resolve peacefully. "The U.N. has contributed frequently to the containment or resolution of first-stage conflicts and wars between states, but it now faces permanent entanglement in second-stage conflicts over territory, resources, and political control where emotions run high and there are no rules."¹⁵ During the period prior to 1989, U.S. peacekeeping efforts were minimal due to balance of power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. The total number of U.N. peacekeeping missions was also minimal. A chronology of U.N. peacekeeping operations from 1945-1985 compared to operations from 1985
to 1992 shown in Appendix B illustrates the increasing role of the U.N. in attempting to settle armed differences. Examination of the chronology shows that from 1988 to 1992 a total of thirteen operations were initiated. This total equals the sum total of operations in the previous forty years.\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps more telling of the future security environment is the fact that since 1992 the three largest peacekeeping missions in thirty years were initiated in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. These missions indicate an increased willingness on the part of the U.N. to intervene in intra-state conflicts. They may also demonstrate a new international readiness to impose force as required to rescue failed nations, promote humanitarian efforts, and contain ethnic rivalry.

Outgunned, outmanned and overextended, the U.N. has looked to the Western Powers to play a greater role in international peace operations over the last few years. Based on increasing U.N. involvement in peace questions, it would appear that the U.N. is attempting to fulfill the role it was designed for in 1945. "A United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and of promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."\textsuperscript{17}

As a part of this evolution the developed nations can be expected to not only fund U.N. endeavors but also provide decisive military forces as part of \textit{ad hoc} coalitions. To date, U.N. post-Cold War efforts have experienced difficulty due to an inability to prioritize their efforts and issue timely well staffed mandates and policy.

As the sole remaining superpower our role in this endeavor may appear self-evident. Faced with the dilemma of maintaining its unipolar influence the U.S. must decide when it is appropriate to intervene. In addition, it appears that persuading member states to contribute soldiers is more difficult because of the increased lethality of peace operations. According to Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Secretary General in charge of peacekeeping, "When nations, rather than factions were at war, the efforts of lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers to keep parties apart that had agreed to cease-fires worked fairly well. But local militias
fighting civil wars ... often are less responsive to world pressure and do not always heed agreements they may have signed.” Getting more than rhetorical support for these types of operations has been hard. Another reason for a lack of support is the belief that the U.N. should not intervene in civil wars. When the U.N. takes an aggressive stance in a civil war it may lose its neutrality. This loss can affect its ability to legitimize efforts to bring peace. The importance of neutrality will be discussed later in this paper. According to the Draft National Security Strategy the primary security challenge for the U.S. is sustaining a cordial relationship with the other six major world powers — Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The strategy document also refers to several other security challenges which have direct impact on the role the U.S. military may play in U.N. peace operations:

a. contain or resolve regional conflicts by maintaining a fighting force capable of fighting two major regional contingencies simultaneously and participating in U.N. peacekeeping activities when appropriate

b. promote democracy and human rights throughout the world

c. deal with failing states by strengthening U.N. peacekeeping forces, providing order, containing conflict and relieving human suffering

These statements may be viewed through jaundiced eyes by other global actors. Perceptions within the international community of American imperialism and neo-colonialism threaten our legitimacy when we apply our military power to situations that do not directly threaten our vital interests. These perceptions also make American service members likely targets.

For the U.S. public, and Congress, the deaths of soldiers in Somalia and the potential for increased involvement in Haiti and Bosnia raise concerns that we have embraced the role of the world’s peacekeeping policeman. Until the Administration is able to articulate a policy covering such contingencies, the military’s role in peace operations will remain unclear. For the foreseeable future, military commanders and planners should not expect clear cut policy direction from either the U.S. government or the U.N.
To date the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have given birth to twenty countries. Most of these countries are experiencing growing pains. Conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan as well as Bosnia represent the types of situations military personnel may be tasked to stabilize for the sake of world peace and justice. In countries such as Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Angola and Haiti the government has ceased to have any resemblance of an organized structure. Whether they are officially considered failed or rogue states by the U.S. government is unclear. Their direct impact on our vital interests is also confusing. Based on the draft National Security Strategy, the potential for the Army to be utilized in these areas appears likely. Whether we treat them as operations other than peace or operations other than war remains to be seen.\textsuperscript{21}

Beyond providing military forces the U.S. lends credibility to U.N. operations by providing a "political umbrella" to the organization’s efforts. Historically, U.S. combat forces involved in peace operations have been placed in the lead because of their military power and U.S. diplomatic influence. American misgivings about external command of U.S. service personnel is another contributing factor. The U.S. does offer unique command and control, logistics, transportation and civil affairs capabilities which could be used to support other nation’s combat troops. This concept permits countries to contribute based on their capabilities. Peace operations usually require infantry battalions. There are common organizations in most armies. In many cases, countries such as Britain, Ireland, Canada and the Nordic countries are more experienced in traditional peacekeeping operations. This expertise may better serve U.N. peace operations efforts if applied as a peacekeeping force once a peace has been established.\textsuperscript{22} However, current directions of the U.N. Secretary General point toward increased reliance on western power — especially the U.S. — for military support to peace operations.\textsuperscript{23}

The function of the U.S. in future U.N. sponsored peace operations is difficult to forecast. The emerging peace enforcement role of the U.N. coupled with the changing security environment have led to an evolution in peace operations. The term second generation can be applied to these operations. This concept "refers to
a growing range of contingencies, sometimes incorrectly referred to as 'peacekeeping,' in which U.N. forces face more challenging tasks." These contingencies do not include the consent of all parties or in some cases any of the parties involved. As a result the U.N. force may be faced with taking more drastic steps to enforce an internationally sanctioned mandate. Examples of missions included under the rubric of "second generation" are several in which U.S. forces have been involved recently: internal conflict resolution, assistance to interim civil authorities, protection of humanitarian relief operations and high intensity enforcement operations.24

In a report entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, the U.N. Secretary General has recognized the new paradigm for peace and the role of the United Nations. Boutros Ghali recommends a more active and non-Cold War approach by the U.N. in shaping world order through U.N. sanctioned peace and security measures. These ideas have been viewed by many developing countries as an infringement on their national sovereignty. The U.N. was set up to prevent conflict and war and bring about a peaceful resolution of differences should they occur. It is not currently structured to accomplish this mission. Recognizing the immediate and future needs of the U.N., Boutros Ghali has called upon the international community to resource the organization with a planning and operations staff which can manage the increasing number of peace operations. In addition to the continued application of U.N. forces for traditional peacekeeping operations, Boutros Ghali proposes a standing enforcement unit, under U.N. control, which can be employed immediately as deemed necessary by the U.N. Security Council.

It is unclear if such a force, or if actions taken by such a force in the name of peace, are actually sanctioned by the U.N. Charter. Chapter VI, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (peacekeeping) and Chapter VII Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression (enforcement) are included in Appendix C. The wording of these chapters is such that international lawyers have both questioned and defended the legality of U.N. missions since the end of World War II.
U.N. operations in the Congo during the 1960s and more recently in Bosnia, Cambodia, and Somalia have been informally coined "Chapter VI 1/2" operations because of their unique enforcement requirements. This ill-defined area of peace operations has become the common environment for U.N. operations in the post-Cold War era. The unclear direction provided by the U.N. Charter to these types of operations has had a ripple effect on the terms of reference used to describe the actions of the organizations involved in them. The gray area between Chapters VI and VII is one in which the U.S. Army can expect to find itself operating.

*Somalia demonstrates to us how ambiguous and difficult "peacekeeping" can be. This is real combat and we have to understand that. But it is also the military contribution to a larger, political process to bring order to this troubled nation.*  

GEN Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

### III. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

The term "peacekeeping" is frequently, though incorrectly, used to describe the broad range of peace operations. Terms such as peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building are applied to activities under the umbrella term "peace operations." Reaching consensus with the U.N., the Joint Staff and the Army on the operational terms for activities pursuant to peace involving military forces is a dynamic process. There is currently no consensus as to their exact definitions. The most common definitions applied to peace operations are included in Appendix A. This study will focus on peace enforcement and peacekeeping as described in FM 100-5, *Operations*. **Peace Enforcement Operations** are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for the insertion of a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be disposed to intervention and may be engaged in hostile activities. **Peacekeeping Operations** support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of
potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute.²⁸

On the surface the differences between peace enforcement and peacekeeping appear obvious. Peacekeeping authority is prescribed in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) although the term is not actually used in the provision. Chapter VII clearly describes the authority to use force to counter aggression and threats to peace. This application of force is usually associated with inter-state conflict such as the Korean War or the Gulf War. Recent events in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia have challenged the theoretical differences in the missions.

These second generation operations illustrate the new environment in which soldiers will have to perform "peacekeeping" missions. The blue berets of U.N. peacekeeping forces symbolize the neutrality of the force, a neutrality which, as evidenced by events in Bosnia and Somalia, must first be established before the U.N. presence can be credible and effective. A peacekeeping force cannot evolve into a peace enforcement nor can it work the other way around. The demarcation between peacekeepers and peace enforcers should be clearly delineated if either mission is to be successful. With the increased use of U.N. forces to resolve intra-state conflicts the gray area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement poses an increasingly destructive challenge to military planners and civilian policy makers.

The disengagement criteria between enforcers and keepers is not defined. Written provisions for operations conducted between the parameters of Chapters VI and VII are unchartered by the international community. Yet, the requirement for the world and the U.S. to participate in second generation operations increases daily.²⁹ Understanding the nuances between these missions is essential for military leaders who must plan and execute the transition between peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
Have we learned anything? I don’t think so ... How did the mission ever evolve from feeding a starving nation (Somalia, OCT '93), into going after a rinky-dink warlord? If there’s any lesson we learned in Beirut, it was that we should never have been there after the initial mission changed. It’s very dangerous to put U.S. forces in a hostile environment where there’s no peace to keep.  

COL(ret.) Tim Geraghty, Commander of the USMC 24th MAU in Beirut 1983

IV. A PROBLEM OF TRANSITION

There has been a dramatic increase in the discussion and development of policy and doctrine for peace operations. However, detailed and conceptual guidance on the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping in conditions of intra-state conflict is missing from policy and doctrinal publications. During peace operations the soldier on the ground must deal with strategic and tactical situations that require informed political judgments more often than correct conventional military decisions. Individual and unit actions enact policy decisions from the highest levels which can have a cascading effect on the overall peace effort on the environment in which they operate.

A danger exists in assuming that peace enforcers can transition easily to peacekeeping operations. "British troops getting ready for [peacekeeping] duties in Northern Ireland and Nordic soldiers preparing for deployment to Macedonia are specifically retrained to use minimum rather than maximum force to deal with threats they face." While the two operations will require overlap in order to conduct a hand-off of responsibility, the problem of disengagement has not been dealt with in detail by the U.N. or Department of Defense in terms of policy or doctrine.

The transition between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is analogous to a battle hand-over in conventional war fighting doctrine. Although there is not a clear break between the two missions, failure to understand the context and environment under which the forces are operating can result in tragedies like the killing of 241 Marine peacekeepers in Beirut in 1983. "Peace-enforcement is not
simply peacekeeping that is a little harder. There is a fundamental political and military difference between the two. To engage in peace-enforcement in essence requires deciding to go to war; peacekeeping does not."Military leaders at all levels as well as political decision makers must continuously review the conditions under which forces are committed to ensure they remain suited for the specific mission.

In addition, disengagement criteria should be established as part of the initial planning process to serve as a point of reference as the peace operation progresses. These guidelines should not be considered dogma but instead a general direction from which military planners can choose the most feasible and acceptable route to apply military capabilities. A common set of parameters serves as a guide for tailoring the specific disengagement requirements in a given situation. These attributes coupled with an appreciation of the context and environment in which they are employed, form the basis for developing disengagement criteria.

Each peace operation in the past has been unique. Second generation peace operations involving intra-state conflict will dominate the international environment for the near term. Interstate conflicts focus on border restoration between sovereign states. Intra-state conflict is generally concerned with the restoration of civil society and law and order. According to the current National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by George Bush, "It is in our national interest to help the democratic community of nations continue to grow while ensuring stability," in the post-Cold War era. The draft NSS being developed by the Clinton Administration echoes these same concerns. In fact, it identifies the promotion of democratic practices and respect for human rights overseas, "as a security challenge which is in our national interest to resolve." The draft strategy also identifies containing conflict in failing states and helping provide international order as a security challenge which must be met by the U.S. To accomplish this, the U.S. must take a leadership role and serve "as a magnet for the actions of others recognizing that our influence is proportional to our willingness to deploy
troops and deliver aid." Given these parameters, U.S. military participation in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations is likely to increase in the future.

Figure 1 on the following page depicts the problem of transition in an intra-state conflict environment our military is likely to encounter. In general terms peace operations occur in four overlapping phases: 1) planning and deployment; 2) security operations leading to conflict termination; 3) stability building operations; 4) and stable coexistence. Disengagement between peace enforcers and peacekeepers occurs somewhere in phase three — stability building. It is during this phase that peace operations forces are in a particularly vulnerable position. As a result the transition requires careful planning.

The environment in which intra-state peace operations are conducted presents a different problem for military leaders. Peace operations are not new to the Army. Events in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Lebanon in 1958 and again in 1983, Kurdistan in 1991 and today in Somalia and Macedonia represent environments in which U.S. forces faced an ambiguous threat "yet occupied ground, took casualties and maintained order in difficult, dangerous situations." Actions on the potential battlefields of peace generate fear and mistrust which can have secondary or unexpected results. Typically in the intra-state conflict environment, soldiers are in close proximity to civilian populations who are politically charged and lack any semblance of conventional law and order. Armed confrontations between warring factions are usually conducted outside the realm of the Geneva Convention. The atrocities on the Killing Fields in Cambodia and in the cities of the former Yugoslavia demonstrate the level of idiocy and hatred intra-state warfare can reach. In addition, most of the previous and current peace operations have been conducted in under-developed countries or areas in which the industrial base has been destroyed to the point that conditions are austere. Recent operations in Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Liberia and Kurdistan illustrate the types of underdeveloped areas where logistics support must be established to support the nation building efforts. The logistic support must also sustain the efforts of peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces. These environments present a logistics
INTRA-STATE PEACE OPERATIONS

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE

INSTABILITY
CIVIL DISORDER
DESTABILIZING FORCES

NATION ASSISTANCE

DISENGAGEMENT WINDOW

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

STABILITY
CIV / MIL COOPERATION
INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC FORCES

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF / SHAPE "BATTLEFIELD"

ROUGE/ FAILED NATIONS

CEASE-FIRE/ TRUCE

NEGOTIATED PEACE

EMERGING DEMOCRACY

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF / PEACE BUILDING

ESTABLISH LEGITIMATE GOVT.

PEACEKEEPING
challenge to peace operations planners. Transition from peace enforcement to
peacekeeping cannot be viewed only in terms of security and disarmament.
Protection of lines of communication and resources used for humanitarian relief
and infrastructure building is essential to establishing and maintaining a stable
environment. Resourcing the medical, transportation, civil works, life support and
other logistics needs for large numbers of people is a mission the Army is trained
and equipped for. In peace operations military capabilities can support the efforts
of private and non-governmental organizations which are also supporting
diplomatic peace efforts. Examples of this complementary relationship are
reviewed in the discussion of peace operations case studies.

There are several other factors besides logistics which shape the operational
environment. In order for peace operations to be credible they must be sanctioned
by the international community. Therefore, U.S. forces operating in the theater
should expect to work in conjunction with other coalition forces. As is the case in
any coalition, military commanders for each country respond first to their own
country’s policies and agendas under the overall umbrella of coalition warfare. In
such situations the principle of unity of command is often strained. In the case of
the U.S., our history of taking the lead in operations involving our own combat
forces is an issue which remains a confrontational matter at home and within the
U.N..

Besides the military factors there are two significant aspects of peace
operations which can have as much impact on shaping the battlefield as the
military. The information revolution has given rise to the power of the media and
its access to conflict situations around the world. As demonstrated by the news
coverage of the arrival of U.S. forces on the Somalia beaches, the media is an
instrument of power and thus must be factored into the operational equation. The
other major aspect is the role of government and non-government agencies which
are part of the diplomatic solution to the intra-state conflict. Agencies such as the
Red Cross, USAID and religious organizations usually precede the arrival of
military forces as part of an attempt to remedy a conflict situation without the
application of military force. These organizations frequently remain during all phases of an operation, and in many cases offer the greatest source of intelligence, operational experience and liaison with the destabilizing forces. Force protection must therefore include the protection of these organizations as well as military units.

Understanding the requirements for force protection provides the basis for assessing the peace enforcement versus peacekeeping environment. Essential to the shaping of this battlefield is identifying the potential nontraditional causal relationships of foreign military and civilian organizations attempting to impose international will on a civil conflict. When military forces are committed they must be adequate to defeat an armed attack. The tactical commander and his staff must understand the link between tactical actions and diplomatic efforts at the strategic level. Deep operations, designed to shape the future battlefield, for example, "will not be against a second echelon, but rather against a future event in peace operations." 39

There are four environmental planning considerations which must be analyzed prior to determining the best approach to peace operations:

1) Nature of the mandate — Commanders must translate the mandate into military intent and objectives which are understood down to the lowest level. This mandate should prescribe restrictions, goals and means available to the commander which allow for adequate operational flexibility to accomplish the mission. Mandates can change as the situation develops and changes should be viewed similar to planning for branches and sequels in conventional war. When the mandate is too vague commanders must perform careful mission analysis in order to interpret the mandate and develop an operational concept. Typically forces rushed into an unstable environment are inadequately prepared for their mission. While they may be combat ready, they are often sent in without a clear mandate or end-state. In cases where vital interests are threatened this phenomenon is rare. In peace operations vital interest is not usually immediately threatened. Taking the time to accurately access the situation is essential. Stabilizing a conflict which does not immediately threaten the vital interests of a western power often results in a prolonged debate by regional actors or the U.N. as to the desired end state and appropriate mandate. Committing an inappropriate force has led to second order effects of gradualism, mission creep and escalation of hostilities as a result of ill defined political direction and a lack of in-depth intelligence preparation. Tailoring a force for intra-state peace operations requires different planning considerations than intra-state war.
2) The source of involvement and authority — In conventional war the source of action is a nation state. In peace operations there is often not a single, clear chain. This is especially true when civilian organizations are involved. The commander must understand the authority under which they operate and the relationship between the military and the other organizations.

3) The operational environment — as it pertains to identifying the enemy. The commanders must know if outside assistance was requested and who asked for it. The consent of all parties to outside intervention is key to determining whether forces can maintain neutrality or if enforcement is required. Often the commanders’ most critical intelligence requirement is whether the enemy will comply with the U.N. mandate and the after effects of his action or perceived intentions.

4) The level of global visibility and interest — the power of the media and its influence in shaping world opinion can work to the commander’s detriment or benefit. Understanding the environment and the context in which military forces will conduct peace operations is essential to determining when peace enforcement missions are required as compared to peacekeeping. These operations are distinctly different.

Peace enforcement operations for intra-state conflict require the control or elimination of destabilizing forces in rogue or failed nations. The commitment of military force under the auspices of an international effort to separate belligerent parties is becoming a common U.N. mandate. This is routinely conducted while political parties seek a peaceful resolution. U.N. efforts in Bosnia offer a vivid example of the difficulty in performing this mission. Enforcement operations in the former Yugoslavia do not have the consent of all or any of the belligerents. As a result they are viewed by portions of the destabilizing forces as the enemy. Engagement in combat results in a loss of neutrality. Force structure and rules of engagement require that the force be able to protect itself and present a credible capability to apply military force if required. The goal of the force is to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table. Settlement, not victory, is the objective. To accomplish this a wide range of military capabilities may be required. The military body should assume that the application of force will be required to bring
about stability. Integration of the other instruments of international power must be coordinated into the plan to reduce the actual application of force. Historically, overwhelming force applied to neutralizing belligerents has often resulted in unnecessary "enemy" casualties and collateral damage. This in turn can result in conflict escalation thereby decreasing the possibility for negotiation and stability essential to humanitarian assistance, nation building and stable coexistence.

Understanding the second order effects of fighting the subjective battle are critical for the commander on the ground. His force must maintain operational flexibility by demonstrating international resolve. The commander can do this by tailoring a force capable of maintaining secured freedom of action, a credible show of power, self-sustaining logistics and decisive firepower which can be applied in a measured manner to signal the intent and will of the intervening force. The overall intent of the intervention force can also be demonstrated by working with other agencies to assist in nation building and humanitarian relief efforts. The methods peace enforcement troops use to execute their mission will have a direct impact on shaping the environment for the peacekeepers that follow.

Suppression of hostilities only to have them resume once the peacekeeping force is in-place is counterproductive to overall diplomatic efforts. Gauging the application of military force to the appropriate levels is perhaps the most difficult portion of this mission. Planning should include considerations in the tempo of the operation which may signal the requirement for a different measured response. Compounding this difficulty will be the problem of unity of command inherent to coalition operations. Coalition unity of effort could be viewed by the belligerents as the force’s center of gravity. Demonstrating coalition resolve through decisive actions should convince the warring factions that they cannot succeed through continued violence.

Peace enforcement is the most dangerous of missions across the spectrum of peace operations. "Often [peace enforcement] troops become political targets or simply get caught up in the typical feuds that require blood for blood revenge. That [peace enforcement] is just as dangerous as war can be underscored by the fact
that more troops died on duty in Lebanon than the entire Gulf War.44 Some have argued that it meets the requirements of war only in an environment which is atypical to the Cold War paradigm. Planning and execution of peace enforcement require a completely different set of rules of engagement, force structure, intelligence preparation and mind-set than peacekeeping.

The major difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is that peacekeepers enjoy the consent of the warring elements. Peacekeeping operations cannot begin until belligerent forces agree to the intervention of a neutral third party to maintain and supervise a negotiated peace. Planning for this mission assumes that force will not be required to complete the mission except in the case of self defense. Force protection thus remains a priority task for the commander.

The incidents in Beirut, 1983 and Somalia, 1993 demonstrate how a force protection failure may derail the peaceful evolution process and result in peacekeepers being withdrawn or forced into a peace enforcement role. For this reason a measured response force must be available which can react quickly to situations which jeopardize diplomatic efforts. The size, location and disposition of this force will be based on an analysis of the environment. Shows of power offshore and maintenance of a combat-ready quick reaction force at critical hot spots on the ground may be acceptable solutions. This force must present a credible deterrent to resumed hostilities. The overriding consideration should be protection of the peacekeeping force from hostile action through the ability to apply military might which will prevent belligerents from upsetting the established military balance and stability.

Such a capability should reduce the perception that the peacekeeping force could become political hostages. This has often been the case with peacekeepers operating under restrictive ROE. Peacekeepers "are not equipped, authorized, or indeed made available, to take part in military activities other than peacekeeping. Their main strength is the will of the international community which they
symbolize." The transition from a force as lethal as peace enforcers to one as seemingly vulnerable as peacekeepers is difficult to plan.

To date little policy or doctrinal guidance has been published in open sources about the disengagement criteria for these two types of forces. Perhaps the adjustment from traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War to the ambiguous and potentially more volatile peace operation environment of today presents a more difficult paradigm for civilian policy makers and military leaders. Clearly one of the goals in peace operations is to coordinate their transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping so as to capitalize upon the efforts of the enforcement troops and shape the environment for a successful peacekeeping mission.

The premature departure of an enforcement unit may jeopardize the mission’s overall success. Based on an adaptation of the battle handover planning considerations for conventional war, several key criteria can be applied to the development of disengagement criteria for peace enforcement operations.43

Planning the transition from enforcement to peacekeeping requires the enforcers provide an environment in which they can pursue diplomatic objectives through more peaceful means. The transition from one mission to another will undoubtedly require some overlap of forces on the ground. Because of the loss of neutrality, change in rules of engagement and mental preparation required by the soldiers, a different unit should be used for peace enforcement. Both of these types of forces are required during the disengagement period. The actual official transition between forces can be symbolized by the signing of a truce. Preparation and implementation of the truce requires the presence of both types of forces in order to maintain credibility.44

Each peace operation is different. Unlike the establishment of the status quo ante bellum common in inter-state warfare, intra-state conflict is difficult to manage and usually must include eliminating the factors which led to civil war. Ethnic, religious and political animosities often impair rational thought. The actual disengagement process may be lengthy and require a gradual redeployment of
enforcement troops as a mean of insurance against renewed hostilities. Based on
the situation, an enabling force from the peace enforcement unit may be needed to
create a relatively safe and stable environment for peacekeeping and peace
building. The tailoring of a force which can bridge the gap between peace
enforcement and peacekeeping is situation dependent. In general terms, such a
force would be capable of deterring armed aggression by shows of force. When
required it may serve as a credible quick reaction force. As a member from the
enforcement unit it would visibly display international resolve to maintain the
peace. In addition this force would help with logistical requirement which may
overburden the peacekeeping force. This assistance would be temporary and be
required only until adequate force structure was built up. An Army force which
may be considered for such operations is the Heavy Divisional Cavalry Squadron.
Self-sufficient, the Squadron has air and ground reconnaissance capabilities which
can be moved rapidly to deter or defend against a hostile enemy. In order to retain
their credibility and the peacekeepers' neutrality, augmenting the enabling force
with peacekeepers may not be prudent. An accurate assessment of the
environment and the context this enabling force will operate in is essential to
proper force tailoring. Not all areas or threats within the theater of operation will
be the same.

The often fractionalized nature of civil strife may require the establishment of
protected and conflict suppression zones. Protected zones could provide a safe
area for peoples wishing to flee from the carnage of internal conflict. Development
of these types of areas would prevent the refugee problems common to civil war
and help contain the conflict to a specific region. Within these protected areas,
peacekeepers and peace builders could focus on stabilizing the nation from the
inside while demonstrating to those still fighting that there is a better way. Conflict
suppression zones would be established where more heavily armed forces would
restore stability and maintain the conditions for cease-fire. These zones could also
be used to isolate the conflict which would allow for easier control of the
belligerents and an easier process of completing the transition from a peace
enforcement environment to one of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{45} By reducing the belligerent's base of support a counterinsurgency type of operation may be required to eliminate destabilizing forces. Eventually the increasing size of the protected zones would have a cascading effect on the destabilizing forces in the country thereby providing a means of effectively transitioning.

Forms of this technique of using zones is not uncommon. In the early 1960's the French counterinsurgency forces applied a similar method whereby they developed safe havens in the Algerian countryside then expanded them in lieu of fighting the insurgents directly. The "ink spot" technique helped them gain control of the countryside by expanding their base of support from the inside out. Unfortunately the French application of excessive force towards the enemy derailed their diplomatic efforts.\textsuperscript{46} More recently, the U.N. establishment of safe havens in Yugoslavia had great potential to develop into protected zones. However, the U.N. "peacekeepers" were unable to enforce the protection of Fojnica and Gorazde because their force structure did not provide a credible deterrent to Serbian aggression. Serbian forces, realizing they could not be defeated by the U.N., demonstrated their ambivalence towards the international community by firing artillery and mortars into the safe havens.\textsuperscript{47} The actual criteria for disengagement should be considered as critical as the planning for getting forces into the theater.

Based on the overall diplomatic plans for stability operations and the desired political end state, military planners should define measurable criteria and conditions under which both types of forces will operate. The criteria and conditions established must lead to the shaping of the battlefield which leads to the reemergence of stability and civil institutions. This in turn will eliminate the need for military forces. Based on their in-depth understanding of the environment, planners will need to evaluate the risk associated with tasking peace enforcement elements to accomplish missions to ensure they are not counterproductive to the overall diplomatic effort. During the disengagement period both types of forces
will be operating in tandem. Objectives which the peace enforcers should achieve prior to executing the battle handover could include:

1) eliminate the combat power capability of destabilizing forces; disarm warring factions; eliminate known minefields and other obstacles which may impede a return to normal operating conditions

2) establish the conditions for an international police force to enter the theater to conduct internal security and training of indigenous personnel to serve as policemen

3) establish a logistics base and secure interior lines of communication suitable for required humanitarian relief and peace building efforts

4) reestablish basic infrastructure which will permit essential commerce, life support functions and humanitarian relief

5) eliminate all conflict suppression zones

6) secure election sites

7) insure freedom of movement within country for public and private transportation

8) deter intervention from outside forces wishing to capitalize on the weakened nature of the country

9) provide a credible quick reaction force capable of free movement anywhere in the country quickly and with decisive combat power; this force should be used for force protection only as it will not be viewed as a neutral force by elements which feel betrayed by the peace process

10) provide a secure environment for non-military elements in the international force to: reopen schools, subsistence markets, reestablish basic industry and agriculture; reestablish health care and humanitarian relief centers

11) transition the peacekeeping commanders and staffs

The planning and execution of successful disengagement is dependent on not only careful planning but also careful mission analysis. Peace enforcement elements which do not retain operational flexibility, continuously reevaluate the environment and demand a clearly defined end state will have a difficult time with peace
operations. An achievable end state is required to develop a synchronized plan for disengagement which includes well defined military objectives.

... the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue.  

GEN Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

No one starts a war — or rather, no one in his senses should do so — without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.  

Carl von Clausewitz

V. Historical Examples

The transition from the war-like environment of peace enforcement to peacekeeping in intra-state peace operations is difficult. Both missions, while distinctly different, must be conducted partially in tandem in support of diplomatic efforts to rescue a rogue or failed nation. Typically these military actions require a harmonious working relationship with private and non-governmental humanitarian efforts (PVO/NGO) to establish conditions conducive to the development of a legitimate government and stable environment. Events in Somalia since 1991 provide the foundation for analyzing the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping in intra-state peace operations. Experiences from past peace operations in the Congo, 1960-64; the Dominican Republic, 1965-66; and Lebanon 1982-84 contribute to this analysis of the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping. Analysis of past actions provides conclusions for the future based on an examination of the role of the environment, mandate, planning effort and disengagement criteria in the transition process of these operations. Somalia represents a second generation peace operation in which a failed nation requires external military intervention to rebuild after a civil war.
SOMALIA OVERVIEW\textsuperscript{51}

U.N. involvement in Somalia during the 1990's is representative of post-Cold War peace operations. Due to its position on the tip of the Horn of Africa, Somalia was in an important geo-strategic position. Both the Soviet Union and the United States bought the allegiance of Somalia's leader, Mohammed Siad Barre, with economic and military aid. As a result, weapons were easily obtained. Although not ethnically divided, Somalia is a country marked by individual clan interests. These interests were held in check for over twenty years by Barre whose clan held the power base from which money and internal military control was generated. In 1988 rival clans mounted an armed resistance to Barre which toppled the government in January 1991. U.S. aid to Barre was terminated in 1988 when the fighting began. This loss of external support, together with drought, famine and the animosity left over from the Ogaden War with Ethiopia contributed to the plight of the local population during the 1987 to 1991 period. Second order effects to the fight for survival include the mass exodus of 300,000 Somalis into drought stricken Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{52}

In January 1991, Barre fled the country signaling the complete collapse of the government. Since early 1991 no less than 15 rival clans, armed with Cold War hardware, have fought for control of the former nation. This multifactional civil war led to armed anarchy and destroyed the country's infrastructure. By November 1991 two primary clans had emerged as the region's power brokers. Ali Mahandi Mohammed was supported by most of the nation's clans in July 1991 when he was sworn in as the interim president by the United Somali Congress (USC). General Mohammed Farah Aidid, military leader of the USC, opposed his appointment. Differences generated by tribal animosity, quest for power and mistrust generated by the inability of either side to control the violence of gangs, led to increased fighting in November 1991. Humanitarian relief efforts by the U.N. were deemed too dangerous to continue in November. Though the Red Cross remained in Somalia, their efforts were severely hampered by tribal war and
looting. The fiercest fighting was focused in and around the capital city of Mogadishu.

Although both sides agreed to a cease-fire in March 1992 humanitarian relief efforts were impeded by rival tribal fighting, looters and general chaos. U.N. operations in Somalia (UNISOM) were established in April 1992 to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor humanitarian relief efforts. Fifty unarmed observers arrived concurrently with relief supplies in July. By August the U.N. had approved a 750-person security force to try and protect the efforts of the relief organizations. This proved ineffective due to the on-going battles between clans and general lawlessness of the region. There was neither a Somali government nor an infrastructure for nation building. The United States began Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in August to complement the U.N.'s attempts to provide humanitarian relief. These operations did not include U.S. combat forces. By November 1992 it was apparent that the U.N. was ineffective in stabilizing the situation and shaping an environment which would foster a negotiated settlement between warring clans, thereby establishing a legitimate government structure. What occurred next represents a shift in the peace operations paradigm. Under the military title of Operation RESTORE HOPE, the U.N. sanctioned "authorized military intervention in what is essentially an internal conflict to secure the provision of humanitarian relief" to rescue a failed nation. This represents the first time the U.S. has intervened militarily under U.N. auspices to resolve an internal dispute. In December 1992, the President directed that the Commander, U.S. Central Command employ a Joint Task Force in Somalia to conduct direct military intervention. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a U.N. approved but U.S. led coalition effort to establish a secure and stable environment in Somalia which could then be handed-off to U.N. forces for peace building efforts. The U.S. led Operation RESTORE HOPE ended 4 May 1993 with the transfer of responsibility to U.N. Observer Force Somalia II (UNISOM II). Based on the peacekeeping efforts of UNISOM II and other similar peace operations it is apparent that the transition from enforcement to peacekeeping is critical to diplomatic efforts to
resolve intra-state conflict. Success requires an understanding of the peace operation environment, appropriate mandates, careful planning and disengagement criteria.

**THE ENVIRONMENT**

Understanding the peace operations environment provides the cornerstone to planning and executing any operation. The context in which peace enforcement troops are sent into an area assumes that they do not have the consent of at least one of the warring factions. Peacekeeping assumes that both sides have agreed and demonstrated that an absence of armed hostility is favorable to continued combat. This situation affords peacekeeping forces the advantage of maintaining neutrality in a comparatively benign environment. In the best cases, peace enforcers are viewed by only one of the sides as an impediment to their desired goals. Enforcers are supposed to establish peace through the threatened or actual use of force and contributing to diplomatic efforts to do the same.

Deciding upon the conditions which will enable peacekeeping and peace building to achieve diplomatic objectives must be done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is reflected at the strategic level by a mandate and end-state from which military commanders can develop their plans. Military leaders at the strategic, operational and tactical level must evaluate the environment continuously as part of their assessment of how best to achieve diplomatic objectives. Failure to understand the environment in the past has led to the use of inappropriate rules of engagement, misguided efforts by forces on the ground and inappropriate force tailoring. The environment assessment process is analogous to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield prescribed in our current warfighting doctrine. This process can be adapted to meet the unique requirements presented in the peace operations environment. Correctly identifying the enemy (s), their intent and capabilities is fundamental. Identification of first and second order effects of opposing factions and international peace force operations is also essential. Continued assessment of the environment allows the commander to maintain flexibility by anticipating requirements. Other than security related matters the
military commander must understand how he interfaces with other supporting efforts to the peace process. Non-military actors play a large part in establishing and maintaining a stable environment for the peace process to work. Often these organizations offer invaluable insights and timely intelligence to matters affecting military operations. Likewise, the military offers resources and protection essential for non-military efforts to take place. The complementary relationship cannot be overlooked—together both elements shape the environment.

Force protection is the most critical aspect of understanding the environment. If conducted improperly it can lead to the needless loss of friendly and enemy lives. The inappropriate use of force by the peace forces can lead to a loss of legitimacy within the coalition, the country and the international community. Inadequate use of force can lead to peace forces being placed in harm’s way. U.S. Army and Marine units were deployed to the Dominican Republic in April 1965 in response to an attempted coup d’état which had turned to civil war. Their mission was to protect American lives, restore order and prevent the spread of communism. At its height almost 24,000 U.S. forces were committed to the operation. Applying today’s doctrinal terms, U.S. forces were sent on a peace operation which required an initial period of peace enforcement to establish the conditions for peacekeeping and peace building. Eventually, peacekeeping responsibilities were consumed by a multinational peace force called the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). During the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic from 1965 to 1966, General Palmer, Commander U.S. forces, "was called upon to perform different missions, each tailored to support changing diplomatic initiatives." This required Palmer to modify his rules of engagement frequently. His ability to adapt to the changing environment directly contributed to a minimum loss of life and a negotiated settlement.

The Marines conducting peace operations in Beirut in 1983 did not fare as well as U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic. In September 1982, U.S. Marines deployed as part of a multinational force to Lebanon. Their mission was to "establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military
forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Force (LAF) in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area. From September 1982 until Spring 1983 the environment was relatively benign. On 18 April 1983 radical factions destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Shortly thereafter the Marines were in direct combat fighting these factions. The U.S. Government policy remained to support the position of the Lebanese Government and its Armed Forces. Neither the political nor military leadership understood the hostile environment the Marines were in on 23 October 1983 when a terrorist bomb attack killed 241 U.S. service members in a Headquarters building in the vicinity of the Beirut Airport. A DOD commission which studied the incident cited the need for U.S. policy makers to reevaluate their objectives in Lebanon. The report also noted that the Marines failed to adjust their force protection commensurate with those required based on increases in hostile actions prior to the incident. "The ROE, and supporting instructions were all written to guide responses to a range of conventional military threats," — not terrorism. In Somalia, U.S. forces involved in Operation RESTORE HOPE adopted appropriate force protection measures but they misread several other aspects of the environment. Initial intelligence indicated that Marine forces assigned the mission of securing the air and sea ports in Mogadishu would be met by hostile forces. Instead the Marines amphibious night assault was met by television cameras, reporters and hungry Somalia's ready to help them ashore. Understanding the intent of the rival factions should be part of the continuos IPB process. Identifying the factions, their intent and capabilities as well as the personalities of their leaders became essential elements of information.

As the 10th Mountain Division conducted a myriad of missions, peace enforcement oriented intelligence became critical. These missions included convoy escort, shows of force, minefield clearing, physical disarming of rival gangs and mediation between warring factions. Part of creating the conditions for peace and stability in intra-state wars like Somalia is to present the warring factions a better alternative to fighting. In Somalia the military support of humanitarian
efforts previously curtailed became essential to success. With over 80 relief organizations operating in the country and no American Embassy with a viable country plan, military planners have had to fold relief and nation building efforts into their peace enforcement mission. Neither humanitarian relief nor nation building are missions common for the Division. Staff planning and unit execution required great flexibility. It also necessitated a restructuring to provide adequate liaison teams and support to non-military organizations. The measured use of military force and the application of military capabilities to create the conditions for peace enforcement to transfer to peacekeeping is shaped by the environment. However, it is controlled to a greater extent by the international mandate under which the peace forces operate.

THE MANDATE

Historically, peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions which have a clearly defined mandate from which military objectives and appropriate rules of engagement are drawn are more successful than peace operations which lack these clarifying factors. In theory, the U.N. Security Council prescribes the initial "commanders intent" through the venues of a mandate and rules of engagement based on an in depth analysis of the environment and possible courses of action. Usually this results in ambiguously phrased political guidance which provides military planners little direction from which to develop military objectives to meet a desired end-state. These cases have led to a pattern of gradualism in the application of military capabilities to meet diplomatic evolving diplomatic objectives.

The U.N. must provide guidance based on "military and political consultations, followed by rigorous military planning and deployment in which the political echelon avoids intruding in day-to-day military functions." For U.S. policy makers and military planners this translates to a defined end state and adequate preparation time. This does not imply that the U.S. military should not be capable of responding to no-notice threats to our vital interests. It does imply that these peace missions are considered operations other than war and as such are not the
U.S. military’s primary training task. It also implies that the U.N. has historically committed troops to peace operations before deciding what was required or the end state they wanted achieved.

One of the most famous examples of an unclear mandate for intervention in an intra-state conflict was the U.N. operation in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire) from 1960-1964. Boutros Ghali has compared the situation in the Congo, 1960, to the current situation in Somalia.63 In 1960, the Congo’s efforts to form a legitimate government as part of its decolonization process failed. The Belgian colony consisted of 70 major ethnic groups subdivided into several hundred tribes. During colonial occupation tribal differences were held in check by the Belgian government. When the Belgians pulled out the Congolese government was unable to gain control without U.N. assistance.

Tribal wars and a failing infrastructure resulted in the deployment of a small number of U.N. forces intended to help stabilize the situation and monitor the withdrawal of Belgian troops which had remained to assist in the decolonization process and humanitarian relief. The mandate did not authorize the use of force by U.N. forces, set objectives for the operation or define the end state desired for the hand over of responsibility to indigenous security forces. By the end of the first month’s buildup, 18 July - 19 August 1960, there were 14,491 U.N. soldiers in the Congo.64 Since U.N. assistance was requested by the Congolese government, they assumed that the U.N. was going to help in bringing order and putting down resistance to the government. When they did not, the U.N. lost their legitimacy with the government. Already considered the enemy by factions opposing the Congolese government, U.N. forces became targets for all factions as they attempted to conduct humanitarian relief efforts and build consensus on forming a legitimate government.

In February 1961, the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force as required to end the civil war, establish a stable environment and form a legitimate government. The U.N. formally backed Central Government of the Republic of the Congo and demanded an end to the illegal secession of Katanga. While U.N.
efforts were generally successful in most of the country, stabilizing the situation in Katanga required 13,500 troops. Nearly 20,000 troops were deployed at the operation’s peak in 1961. The operation was terminated in June 1964 with Katanga’s leaders announcing an end to their secessionist movement and the disarming or dispersal of rival factions. The U.N. left the country without settling the political problems or establishing an infrastructure which supported the development of democratization. Instead, the U.N. withdrew its support once it restored freedom of movement. Although not the official mission justification, the U.N. left once it ended Katangan secession. However, in October 1965 rival faction leader Mobutu seized power and remained in control of the Congo for 25 years.\textsuperscript{65}

Initial U.N. efforts in Somalia are analogous to events in the Congo. The inadequate U.N. mandate for UNISOM I resulted in the inability of U.N. forces to complete their mission of protecting humanitarian relief efforts throughout Somalia. As a result President Bush directed the execution of Operation RESTORE HOPE. This operation was U.N. sanctioned but U.S. controlled. Taking the lead, the U.S. defined the mission’s desired end state as "to create an environment in which the U.N. and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts."\textsuperscript{66}

Operation RESTORE HOPE rules of engagement were tempered for specific situations but at no time placed such restrictive measures on peace enforcement troops that they were placed in undue danger or that allowed for an unmeasured application of military force. Since the hand over of the Somalia mission to the U.N. in May 1993, UNISOM II forces have been unable to maintain order in Mogadishu. Like Katanga in the Congo campaign, conflict in Mogadishu poses a major road block to diplomatic efforts. While the U.S. led coalition efforts during Operation RESTORE HOPE did an admirable job, the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations was short lived. At this writing additional U.S. Army forces are deploying to form yet another JTF Somalia with the mission of enhancing the U.N’s role as an instrument for peace and stability, setting
conditions for the conduct of safe humanitarian efforts, protecting U.N./U.S. forces and establishing the conditions for future U.N. operations in support of diplomatic objectives. Forces arriving will be equipped with heavier weapons to include M-1 tanks and armored personnel carriers. As the U.S. moves more forces to Somalia, the U.N. Security Council struggles to redefine the mandate.

**PLANNING**

Planning intra-state peace operations offers military personnel an opportunity which they may face more often in the post-Cold War world. Successful planners will develop a system which continually assesses the environment then adapts the plan to insure it meets the requirements for an effective transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations. The focus of this transition should be force protection and the creation of conditions conducive to peace building and peacekeeping efforts. This requires planners to integrate military capabilities into the entire restoration of order process from "combat operations to political negotiations and reconstruction of the national infrastructure." As evidenced by events in the Congo, Dominican Republic and Somalia these operations will likely be conducted simultaneously and in conjunction with non-military agencies which are also a part of the diplomatic solution. Understanding the depth of operational flexibility required and the context in which military force may have to be applied relates directly to developing a tailored force structure which may be different than the organization was originally designed.

Compelled to act, political leaders often commit military forces into ambiguous situations prior to fully comprehending the situation and the proper response required. Within 48 hours of the U.N.'s passage of the Congo mandate, troops began arriving in the nation to assist in humanitarian relief. They arrived without the political or legal authority to accomplish their mission. Only after several thousand more military forces were introduced to the theater did they accomplish their intent. The same has already been mentioned under the rubric of the mandate for the UNISOM I force which arrived in Somalia in the summer of 1992. The inability of U.S. Forces in Beirut to adapt to a changing environment resulted in a
force placed in harms way by its leadership whose mission analysis called for a peacekeeping instead of peace enforcement operation. U.S. military leadership in the Dominican Republic recognized the environment and context in which they fought. On 28 April 1965, U.S. forces invaded the island. By 21 May 1965 a cease-fire went into effect. Five days later the Inter-American Peace Force took responsibility for the peace operation. By June U.S. Marines withdraw and U.S. Army forces began a gradual withdrawal until after the elections on 1 June 1966. These forces provided the credible force required to create the conditions in which peacekeeping and peace building would lead to the restoration of order and a legitimate government.69

Planning for Operation RESTORE HOPE also represents somewhat of a success story. Planning for the operation began in mid-November 1993. "Operation RESTORE HOPE was a four-phased operation that secured the area for humanitarian relief efforts and eventually returned control to U.N. forces."70 However, for the 10th Mountain Division the planning cycle was too short. Of the 15 days of crisis action planning the U.S. military had, the 10th Mountain received only 3 days. The nuances of this operation other than war require more time in order to tailor the proper operations planning and force structure which are not inherent to U.S. Army combat divisions.

In adapting to the requirements of establishing conditions conducive for peacekeeping the experiences of the 10th Mountain offer valuable insight into the difficulty of this mission. The absence of a governmental or U.N. infrastructure in Somalia compelled military commanders to extend beyond the traditional interpretation of the security mandate. The military had to disarm and persuade the competing armed factions that fighting was not in their best interest. This required armed enforcement by a credible and more capable force than the warlords could compete against. It also included supporting the efforts of other agencies to provide humanitarian relief and rebuild the infrastructure which is intended to serve as a precursor to further violence. Military leaders of all ranks also found themselves in positions as mediators. As part of the process of bringing order back
to the country the 10th Mountain Division also had to establish a police force and judicial system. The expanding role of the military is called "mission creep". These types of missions should be expected by the military in the future since the goal is to establish a secure environment.

A greater understanding of these types of requirements and a more focused intelligence preparation of the battlefield is essential. "IPB must be expanded in scope and tackle the ambiguities of the threats in the inherent complexity of underdeveloped regions." Failure to identify enemy clans, their intent and possible courses of action prevented U.S. forces from sending a more tailored force package. The initial mission analysis should have also identified the potential likelihood for "mission creep". In a perfect world, force structure changes may have included additional military police, civil affairs units, special forces teams and cargo handling companies. Under the blanket of fog which surrounds peace operations the commander must insure force protection is the priority. Without a credible force on the ground the efforts of coalition forces in Operation RESTORE HOPE could have been dramatically different. In enforcement operations, stopping the armed confrontation is fundamental for the transition to follow on missions.

**DISENGAGEMENT CRITERIA**

Transitioning from peace enforcement to peacekeeping requires the establishment of disengagement criteria for the enforcement force which creates the conditions necessary for peacekeeping forces to eventually operate by themselves. Essential to this transition is the maintenance of the peacekeepers as a neutral force. Peacekeeping implies impartiality and requires the consent of all parties involved. Beirut serves as an example of the importance of perceived impartiality. The image of the Marines "in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim." After the Marines engaged in direct fire support of the Lebanese Armed Force they were no longer neutral.² In the Dominican Republic U.S. forces passed peace monitoring and peace building to a Organization of American States (OAS) peacekeeping force once the proper conditions were established. In the case of the Congo, the original U.N. efforts of
establishing a stable environment for the emergence of a democratic government were never met. The political end state must be understood in order to develop military objectives and subsequent criteria for disengagement by the enforcement unit.

Phase IV of Operation RESTORE HOPE was the transition of a U.S. led coalition to a U.N. controlled force. This U.N. force is responsible for security and operations of the humanitarian relief and peace building efforts. Clearly the mission of the U.S. led force was peace enforcement. However it is unclear if the 4 May 1993 transition should be called a transition between a peace enforcement and peacekeeping force or a relief in-place by a U.N. enforcement unit. UNISOM II forces do not enjoy the luxury of neutrality required for peacekeeping. While most of the countryside has been stabilized, events in Mogadishu indicate the civil war continues.

The 10th Mountain transition plan was well thought out in terms of identifying functional areas and events which required a hand-off with UNISOM II forces. The disengagement criteria was driven by the successful transition of responsibility in six functional areas: 1) logistics; 2) local police security; 3) communications; 4) medical services; 5) engineer services; 6) morale, welfare and recreation services. In addition the transition included measures for the transition of command and control and security operations. Even though the transition was completed the conditions were not established for a transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations. To date there is no credible cease-fire agreement. General Aidid continues to sanction attacks on U.N. forces. As witnessed by the events of 3 October 1993 when 18 U.S. servicemen were killed, rogue factions within the country have not been disarmed. The recently deployed Joint Task Force has been given the mission to support U.N. efforts to create the conditions for peacekeeping no later than 31 March 1993. To accomplish that, hostile offensive actions must cease, interior lines of communication secured and a distribution system for humanitarian relief and nation building put in place. How the U.N. intends to transfer from peace enforcement to peacekeeping remains
unclear. Disengagement criteria have either not been released to the public or are as yet still under development. Planners should expect to be placed in situations where a solution to the transition problem will be required to save American lives in the post-Cold War environment of peace operations.

*When our vital interests are challenged or the will or consciences of the international community are defied, we will act — with peaceful diplomacy wherever possible, with force when necessary.*

President William J. Clinton, January 1993

...*peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement have been where the rubber meets the road for the international community in the post-Cold War period. It has been one of the principle areas where new challenges to international order and traditional international means have met.*

Charles E. Nelson, President United States Institute of Peace

**VI. CONCLUSIONS**

Cold War termination has created a challenging international security environment which has resulted in second generation peace operations as a part of post-conflict activities. Unchecked by bipolar diplomacy and military coercion, ethnic, religious and nationalistic desires have led to a resurfacing of past differences and jockeying for position in the emerging world order. The failure of many governments to meet the rising political and humanitarian expectations of their growing populations has resulted in violent differences over the form governments should take in a multipolar world. The international community has called upon the United Nations to fulfill its role of maintaining peace and security for the peoples of the world. Since 1989 U.N. response has resulted in the execution of thirteen peace operations — a number equivalent to those performed in the previous forty years. Complicating the U.N. mandate has been the resurgence of intra-state conflict as the primary threat to peace in today’s multipolar world and the commitment of the community to intervene collectively
to solve sovereign problems. This added responsibility is something the U.N. and international community grapples with on a daily basis. Neither the current organization nor charter is structured to handle the increased work load.

As the most powerful nation, the United States has been called upon to increase its participation in these missions. "In the summer of 1990, we had 6,000 soldiers on these types of missions ... now we have over 20,000." The U.S. provides credibility and a resource base unequaled by any other country. Commitment of U.S. forces in these U.N. sanctioned missions presents a double edged sword. Faced with the primary purpose of the military to fight the nation's wars it cannot be over committed to peace operations which dull its ability to fend off potential aggressors.

Historically, our prominent participation in international efforts has led many to the perception that the U.S. is the key actor in all actions and hence U.S. forces are a preferred target to influence national and international policy. The perception of the U.S. as an imperialist state can be countered by our judicious commitment of resources to international efforts. Recognizing the opportunity and responsibility to shape the new world order the U.S. military has found itself committed to a myriad of peace operations over the past few years. Operational effectiveness in these operations requires civilian and military leaders to better understand the nuances of the peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions they commit U.S. personnel lives to, and the parallel requirement to maintain military readiness to fight the nation's wars.

Peace operations are considered operations other than war yet their lethality may be just as great. The Army's principal function remains to deter, and if required, defeat aggression against our enduring national interests. The Army also has a commitment to help secure national policy objectives as set forth by the President. As defined by the National Security Strategy, support of peace operations is one of these objectives. During the Cold War bipolar interest prevented the U.S. from participating in extensive peacekeeping operations. Norway, Sweden, Canada, Fuji and a host of other countries developed a doctrinal
base for peacekeeping while the U.S. maintained its credibility as a force capable
of enforcement operations anywhere in the world. The current international
security environment requires military resources which can conduct peace
enforcement and peacekeeping. Applying the lessons of past peace operations
coupled with the requirements for future missions there are several conclusions
which can be drawn regarding the transition from peace enforcement to
peacekeeping. 79

1) Peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions are different. They require
different mandates, rules of engagement, and force structure. The loss of neutrality
by peace enforcers requires the replacement of the force by another which is
trained and equipped for peacekeeping.

2) Support of diplomatic efforts by the peacekeeping force can be enhanced by
changing the countries responsible for providing the two types of forces and
expediting the withdrawal of peace enforcers once the situation is stabilized.

3) Peace enforcement troops must provide a secure and stable environment for
the peacekeeping forces in which to operate. This requires both sides to develop
mutually agreed upon disengagement criteria which will facilitate the
peacekeepers’ maintenance of neutrality and force protection conducive to nation
building efforts. To conduct this an enabling force tailored to the environment’s
requirements may need to be considered.

4) U.S. policy makers and senior military leaders must overcome the Cold War
paradigm of responding immediately with combat forces to conflicts which do not
directly threaten our vital interests. Extensive mission analysis and intelligence
preparation are required in order to tailor an appropriately trained and equipped
force for peace operations. The planning equations used for executing quick and
decisive victory for inter-state wars may prove inappropriate or even
counterproductive in stabilizing intra-state conflict. Political and military leaders
must understand the peace operations environment and how the commitment of
U.S. forces shapes the environment. Fighting a peace enforcement battle is similar
to fighting counterinsurgency. Reliance on a doctrine which subscribes to the idea
that we will win future wars quickly through the application of decisive combat
power may not apply in peace operations.

5) Peacekeeping dulls the edge of combat forces. It requires a different type of
mental preparation. Historically these operations have resulted in the protracted
commitment of forces to monitor stability operations pursuant to nation building
efforts. Maintaining the ability to respond to two major regional contingencies
requires the U.S. Army to not piecemeal its resources throughout the world.
Capitalizing on the peacekeeping experience of other nations and the groundswell in internationalism the U.S. could consider providing unique non-combat forces to peacekeeping efforts after it has assisted in the peace enforcement role. These resources could come primarily from the reserve components and include such capabilities as civil affairs, civil engineers, psychological operations, medical, strategic lift and Army aviation. Not only would this thinking allow other countries to participate with the capabilities they have inherently available, it would also reduce the commitment of combat forces for non-combat tasks.

Choosing when to commit U.S. forces to peace operations is as important as when and how to disengage from the problem. Recognizing the environment in which peace operations are conducted and planning accordingly will allow military and political leaders to weigh the risks before placing forces in harms way. The successful transition from camouflaged helmets to blue berets in peace operations is a critical indicator of potential mission accomplishment of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era.
Appendix A: Terms of Reference for Peace Operations

**UNITED NATIONS**


*Preventive Diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

*Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

*Peace-keeping* is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

*Peace-building* in post-conflict is action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**THE JOINT STAFF**

Source: Memo from Lt Col Charlie Arnold, Joint Staff J-5/UN "Legal Authority, Terms and Definitions" (Washington DC: SEP 93)

*Peace Operations*: All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and those Chapter VII operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate.

*Preventive Diplomacy*: Actions taken to resolve disputes before violence breaks out.

*Peacemaking*: Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.
Peace Building: Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Traditional Peacekeeping: Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement in the dispute.

Aggravated Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerent parties, poor command and control of belligerents forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.

Peace Enforcement: Armed intervention, involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression.

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE


Peacekeeping Operations: Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute.

Peace Enforcement: Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in hostile activities. Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement, therefore,
cannot conduct maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared to apply elements of combat power to restore order, to separate warring factions, and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline.

Source: FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Draft) (TRADOC, FT Monroe, VA: 1 OCT 93), pp. 2-1 to 2-3.

Peace Operations: The umbrella term encompassing observers and monitors, traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, imposing sanctions, peace enforcement, and other military, para-military, or non-military action taken in support of diplomatic peacekeeping operations.

Preventive Diplomacy: Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts, or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs. e.g.: the stationing of troops in Macedonia in 1993

Peacemaking: Process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations. e.g.: military forces are usually not included in these operations except in support roles such as security assistance operations.

Peacekeeping: Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. e.g.: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) operation in the Sinai.

Peace Enforcement: A form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions -- the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community. e.g.: the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965

Peace Building: These are post conflict actions to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It includes mechanism to advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing, and support economic reconstruction, and may require military as well as civilian involvement.
Appendix B: U.N. Peace Operations from 1945-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)</td>
<td>1947-1951</td>
<td>Investigate guerrilla border crossings into Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)</td>
<td>1948-present</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires along the Israeli borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observer Group in India &amp; Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</td>
<td>1949-present</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire in Cashmere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Monitor infiltration of arms &amp; troops into Lebanon from Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation in the Congo (ONUC)</td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>Render military assistance, restore civil order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Monitor arms infiltration into Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
<td>1964-present</td>
<td>Maintain order, separate Greek/Turk Cypriots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire in 1965 India-Pakistan War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Force II (UNEF II)</td>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>Separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
<td>1974-present</td>
<td>Monitor separation of Syrian &amp; Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good offices mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afganistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Supervise Namibia’s transition to independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire and creation of a new army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>Monitor buffer zone after the Gulf War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>Conduct referendum on independence from Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>1992-present</td>
<td>Replace Yugoslav forces in Serbia areas of Croatia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: U.N. Charter, Chapters VI & VII

CHAPTER VI. PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of the international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such items of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

47
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.
Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

**Article 49**

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

**Article 50**

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

**Article 51**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Appendix D: U.S. Department of Defense Participation in U.N. Peace Operations, 10 November 1993

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>UN TOTAL*</th>
<th>US DOD</th>
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<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>653</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>SOMALIA (UNISOM II)</td>
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<td>166</td>
<td>3,399</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<td>8,123</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>3,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
* UN totals are as of 30 September 1993.
** UNPROFOR is supported under the Foreign Assistance Act. A total of 324 personnel are assigned to observer duty in Macedonia. Exact figures on other participation was unavailable.
ENDNOTES

1 Based on the text of a speech in Brussels on 10 September 1993, Manfred Woerner explained the future of instability as seen through his eyes as the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Less Threat, but Also Less Peace," ROA Security Report, November 1993, p. 46.

2 In a speech at the National War College, Madeline Albright explained that not only were the number of UN peacekeeping missions increasing but the Clinton administration "was ready to do its part," to strengthen the U.N.'s capability to conduct these types of operations in the future. "Know When to Say No" Army Times, 11 October 1993, p. 35.

3 The U.N. is struggling with the management of increased peace operations. In recent years, these operations have relied more on peace enforcement measures than traditional peacekeeping. Grier, Peter. "New UN Role: Make, Not Just Keep, the Peace," The Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1993, pp. 1,4; Mouat, Lucia. "Can the UN Be the World's Cop?" The Christian Science Monitor, 6 October 1993, pp. 9, 12.

4 On September 22, 1993 Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor gave a speech at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. During the speech, Lake referred to a strategy of enlargement as a successor to containment. This strategy provides for the US participation in an international effort to counter aggression, oppose states hostile to democratization and the protection of human rights. "The Four Pillars to Emerging Strategy of Enlargement," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 93, p.19. Five days later, President Clinton addressed the United Nations reaffirming his commitment to democratization and protection of the world's people against inhumane treatment. But, Clinton cautioned the corporate body to be prudent in their commitment of peacekeeping resources without clearly defined mandates and objectives. "Clinton: UN Must Adapt to Different World," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993, p. 19.

5 John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993" (Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence RI, 1993) Mackinlay and Chopra's article provides a primer to understanding the evolution of current peacekeeping operations and the direction they are headed in the future. They refer to recent operations in Somalia and Bosnia as "Second Generation" missions. These peace operations reflect a change from the traditional peacekeeping conducted during the Cold War. Characteristics of second generation missions include: 1) lack of bipolar influence; 2) international concern; 3) requirement to conduct peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping; 4) significant effort placed on humanitarian relief by international private and governmental organizations and 5) tendency to be classified as
intra-state conflicts. This article coupled with Boutros Boutros Ghali's report entitled *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992) provide a framework for current debates in the study of peace operations.

6 Frank Wisner, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces on 14 July 1993. In the prepared statement submitted by Wisner, he testified that peacekeeping operations posed one of the most difficult and critical tasks currently facing the DOD. He also explained that peacekeeping in the post-Cold War environment is different than we are accustomed. He referred to the current struggle within DOD to develop policy, force structure and doctrine which adapted to the nuances between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. He also explained that because of its increased importance a new assistant secretary of defense position had been developed which will focus on peace operations.


8 According to FM 100-5, *Operations" The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat." The manual includes peace enforcement in its list of activities in *Operations Other Than War*. Although it recognizes the "use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease or desist hostile actions" it reinforces the confusion amongst military leaders and civilian policy makers that peace operations do not include combat. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, (HQDA, Washington DC, June 1993) p. 13-0 to 13-7.

9 There are currently no formally agreed upon definitions for peace operations. Appendix A provides a listing of definitions used by the U.N., Joint Staff and the Army. This paper will use definitions from Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*.


Much has been written recently on the turmoil of transition which the world is currently undergoing. From 21-30 January 1993, an international seminar on United Nations peacekeeping operations was conducted in India. During the course of the week papers and discussions were conducted in an attempt to come to terms with the direction peace operations was headed. The conference findings are indicative of similar seminars and academic studies conducted since 1990. The emerging trends commonly identified for peace operations were:

a. future conflict will probably be instigated by domestic disputes
b. peacekeeping forces will likely have to deal with rogue or failed governments
c. these governments may or may not have control of irregular forces in their area; peacekeepers will have to contend with forces that are hostile to peacekeeping efforts
d. feuds between ethnic/religious factions may cross traditional territorial boundaries; inter-state conflict may closely resemble intra-state war
e. the proliferation of weapons will increase the devastation capability available to governments and rival factions
f. violations of UN agreements and mandates are increasing as new actors view the UN as an instrument of the status quo, western colonialism or threat to their ideals for the group they are protecting. While there are many source materials which illustrate these points the following were the helpful in completing this study: Jacob W. Kipp and Timothy L. Thomas "Ethnic Conflict: Scourge of the 1990s?" (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: August 1992); Pacific Armies Management Seminar "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Conference Papers" (New Delhi, India: 21-30 January 93); Doug Bandow. "Avoiding War," Foreign Policy November 89, (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 156-174; Lawrence Freedom "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1991/1992), pp. 20-37. "Quadripartite Study on Peace Operations in Situations of Chaos: Study Report," (Staff College, Camberley: 26-30 April 93).

Applying the principles of spiral arms escalation rationalized during the Cold War, the post-Cold War environment should expect countries and factions to defend their interests with a multitude of readily available weaponry. Factors shaping current proliferation and prospects for the future are beyond the scope of this paper. Several sources provide a basis for further study into this area: Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 211-230; Jervis, Robert Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Knopf, 1949). The source of the number of mines in Cambodia,
Bosnia and Somalia are from Peter Grier. "World's 100 Million Landmines," The Christian Science Monitor 9 November 1993, p.3.


Durch, Evolution, pp. 8, 10.


National Security Strategy of the United States (Draft), 9 September 1993, pp. 1-6. The language in this draft document is consistent with the actions of ongoing UN operations in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.

Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson's treatise on the perception and temptation of the US embracing a foreign policy of imperialism is a legitimate fear amongst many international actors. The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose. (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992).


The United States Institute of Peace initiated a study on the future of peacekeeping operations immediately following the Persian Gulf war. The results of the study are recorded in a report entitled The Professionalization of Peacekeeping, (USIP, Washington DC: August 1993). The group concluded that the level of professionalism in peacekeeping operations should be raised to the level of the militaries that participate in them.

Mackinlay, pp. 1-23. This Brown University study has proven to be a catalyst for recent peace operations discussions.

In Somalia, 3 October 1993, "18 US soldiers were killed and 77 others wounded in a pitched street fighting that lasted more than half a day while one soldier was killed and 12 others were wounded in a mortar attack two days later." Dennis Steele, "Mogadishu, Somalia: The Price Paid," Army (AUSA, Arlington
VA: November 1993), p. 25. In response to the events in Somalia, General Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, responded to questions from the Army Times on 4 and 8 October regarding events in Somalia. He also described the types of missions the US Army needs to be prepared to conduct in the future. "Sullivan: 'We're asking a lot of our soldiers,'" Army Times (18 October 1993), p. 24.


27 The term peace operations is generally accepted by the national and international community as applying to those operations pursuant to the support of diplomatic peacemaking operations. They include military, non-military and para-military actions acting alone or in concert with each other. Appendix A provides definitions used by the UN, Joint Staff, and the Army.

FM 100-5, p. 13-7.


On 23 October 1983, 241 US servicemen were killed while conducting peacekeeping duties in Beirut Lebanon. Although not conducted within a UN framework, the peacekeeping role of the Marines provides an example of peacekeepers placed in harms way as a result of US policy decisions to support the new Lebanese government. The Marines lost their neutrality — the key ingredient to traditional peacekeeping operations. The quote from COL (ret.) Geraghty was taken from an interview with Chris Lawson, "Peacekeeping turned sour 10 years ago, too," Army Times, 25 October 1993, p. 11. An assessment of the Beirut disaster can be found in — DOD, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, (Washington DC: 29 December 1983); and Anthony McDermott and Vjell Skelsbaeck, eds. The Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984. (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991).


The genesis for the believing a requirement exists for disengagement criteria between peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces is based on discussions and correspondence with MAJ Mike Bailey (former UN observer in Cambodia and currently Peace Operations Policy/Strategy analyst in the DA DCSOPS) and MAJ Rick Brennan (policy analyst for the Undersecretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement). The contents of this paper do not reflect official DOD or US Army positions and should not be misconstrued as a means of imposing new policy direction within the DOD.

There is a multitude of books written on past peace operations. Three good sources are: 1) William J. Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, 2) United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, (New York: United Nations, 1990); and 3) Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge *The Thin Blue Line*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University press, 1974). Analyses of these case studies indicate that past "peacekeeping" operations have all been unique. Considering the period from which they were written and the depth of their analysis this assumption appears true. In addition, it also appears that the Brown University categorization of a second generation of peace operations is also accurate. Most Cold War peace operations focused on inter-state conflict. They were oriented primarily on traditional peacekeeping. Since the mid-1980's this trend has changed to a focus on intra-state conflict. Many of the recent peace operations were initiated to support ongoing humanitarian relief efforts.


*National Security Strategy of the United States* (Draft), (Washington DC: The White House, 9 September 1993), pp. 3-5. In this draft strategy the Clinton Administration identifies four security challenges in the post-Cold War period: 1) sustain major power cooperation; 2) contain or resolve regional conflicts; 3) promote global economic cooperation; and 4) promote democracy and human rights abroad. With regards to peace operations the strategy also states that "establishing an effective multilateral peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement capability to deal with conflicts that could affect our national security before they do so is essential to continued American strength and flexibility." (p. 9).

These comments are based on the after action review conducted by the Battle Command Training Program after conducting a senior leadership seminar with the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps. The after-action report raises concerns of the participants regarding preparation for a potential mission in the former Yugoslavia. "ARRC Seminar on Peacekeeping JUL 93" (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: CAC, August 1993). pp. 2-4.

These criteria are based on planning considerations for peace operations in FM 100-23, pp. 3-1 to 3-4. Additional considerations closely resembling these factors are included in Joint pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations, (Washington DC: Office of the Chairman, JCS, December, 1992), p. IV-1 to IV-22.

Abizaid and Wood, "Preparing," p. 6. The term peacekeeping was replaced by peace enforcement in this text to accurately reflect the environment at the time. In 1983 there was no doctrinal differentiation between the terms.


FM 71-123 Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team, (Washington DC: HQDA, September 1992), pp. 6-1 to 6-16, 6-52 to 6-77 and 6-109 to 6-112. This TTP manual provides generic planning considerations for conducting battle handovers and reliefs in place. They can be applied conceptually by commanders in peace operations.

See Richard Connaughton's work on Military Intervention in the 1990s, (London: Routledge, 1992) for an excellent discussion of the strategic and operational principles which will be required for peace operations in the future intra-state environment.

A discussion of the application of these types of zones in peace operations is provided by Marshall Hoyler and John Tillson in a draft article entitled "Conflict Supression/Protected Zone Operations" (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, November 1992).

reference is Joan Gillespie's *Algerian Rebellion and Revolution*, (New York: Praeger Inc., 1960). Both describe the method applied by the French of establishing safe havens in the countryside then expanding them out as a means of fighting insurgents indirectly. However, the oppression force applied by the French in the cities and subjective combat in the countryside ruined their legitimacy with the Algerian people.


See Figure 1. Intra-State Peace Operations, for a graphic depiction of the gray zone in which the transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping occurs.

Unless noted otherwise, the basis for information about the events in Somalia from 1991-1993 are either derived or confirmed from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation RESTORE HOPE Revised Final Draft (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Command, 16 August 1993), and US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (LI) After Action Report Summary (Fort Drum, New York: Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (LI) 2 June 1993).


Lawrence M. Greenberg. "The US Dominican Intervention: Success Story," Parameters (December 1987), p. 26. In 1965 the US intervened on behalf of the Dominican Republic government. The US based its decision on the belief that the country would become like Cuba — a communist country within striking distance of the US coast. Almost 24,000 US forces were committed to the successful operation. Strict adherence to a gradually restrictive ROE is believed to have contributed to the ability of the US to restore order, initiate elections, and avert a communist a communist take over. The US was also able to transition its peace enforcement forces to an OAS led peacekeeping force once a stable environment was established. See also Lawrence A. Yates. *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth paper No. 15, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).

DOD. *Commission on Beirut*, p. 3.

DOD. *Commission on Beirut*, p. 130.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Somalia*, p. 6.


Briefing to Mobile Training Team Seminar for Somalia by LTC Johnson, Campaign Operations Group, CGSS. The briefing was conducted 2 November

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Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Somalia*, p. 3. The four phases were as follows:
- Phase I. Secure Lodgement and establish ARFOR. This phase included the securing of air and sea ports by the Marines and initial elements of the 10th Mountain Division.
- Phase II. Expansion of security operations out to Relief Distribution Sites.
- Phase III. Expand security operations in country.
- Phase IV. Transition to UNISOM II.


Briefing to Mobile Training Team Seminar for Somalia by LTC Johnson, Campaign Operations Group, CGSS. The briefing was conducted 2 November 1993 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


"One reason for the change in attitudes is the rise of a generation of Third World leaders with a stake in the international order. Concerned with the practical problems of nation building and faced with the bankruptcy of the confrontational politics of the Cold War, they look to the United Nations for practical assistance. This means help in coping with economic difficulties and environmental problems, but it also means receiving help in keeping the peace so that scarce resources can be used for development instead of defense." Gardner, Richard N. and Joseph P. Lorenz. *Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UN Collective Security System: Two Views on the Issue of Collective Security*, (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, June 1992), p. 25.

FM 100-1 *The Army*, (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 1991), p. iii. Provides the Chief of Staff's guidance and vision for the overarching direction and purpose for the Army. FM 100-7 *The Army in Theater Operations*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: HQ TRADOC, July 1992), p. 7-8 states that the Army has a responsibility to prevent, control and terminate conflict across the operational continuum. This requirement includes the conduct of "peacekeeping" (peace operations) in support of diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring and maintaining peace in areas actual or potential conflict.

Durch, *Evolution* pp. 8-10.

This information was transposed from Pacific Armies Management Seminar, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," pp. 317-323.

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