ARMY TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the US Army approach to peace support operations. It reviews the trends in Army doctrine and analyzes their historical foundations from the Cold War in order to determine the accuracy and relevance of the Army approach for its participation in future such operations. As a result of this examination, this study identifies key characteristics of Cold War era peace support operations. It then analyzes two post-Cold War operations to determine key characteristics of the recent operations. These key characteristics provide the foundation for an assessment of the nature of peace support operations. The operations also provide the basis for deriving lessons at the tactical level for future employment of Army forces. In turn, the lessons for the future provide a basis to determine the adequacy of the Army's trends in preparing forces for peace support operations. The study then presents recommendations for the preparation of combat forces for future missions at the tactical level. The recommendations consider the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training, and leader development. They provide suggestions for the Army to adequately prepare combat forces for employment in future peace support operations at the tactical level. Contrary to both past and emerging Army doctrine, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not separate and distinct operations, but are part of a continuum of peace support operations which the Army may be called upon to execute or support in the near future. Furthermore, peace support operations cannot be isolated in separate compartments such as peacekeeping operations that require minimal/non-use of force, and peace enforcement operations that require overwhelming and decisive combat force to achieve a quick victory followed by an immediate withdrawal. There are no quick and easy solutions. The key characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations which are relevant for future peace support operations are the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military relations, and the multinational flavor of such operations. These characteristics define the true nature of peace support operations. Currently the Army is moving in the wrong direction in its approach to peace support operations. Since doctrine drives organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the Army must adjust its current doctrinal view of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to the realities of the current and future international environment. Once it comes to terms with the true nature of peace support operations, the Army must develop new concepts and doctrine for use of force that address the entire continuum of peace support operations. Appropriate guidance on the use of force is critical for employing military forces in such operations. By first focusing on developing new concepts and doctrine for the use of force in the continuum of peace support operations followed by relevant changes in organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the Army will ensure that US forces recognize the complexity and diversity of such operations before they are employed. As a result, US forces will less likely be subject to the confusion and demoralization experienced by units who took part in the Lebanon 1958, Dominican Republic 1965-66, and Lebanon 1982-84 operations when they were faced with changing and diverse missions for which they were inadequately prepared. This will increase the prospects for success of US forces in future peace support operations and set the stage for further development of concepts and doctrine for such operations in other needed areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION

With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the intractable bipolar Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR that rendered the United Nations incapable of fulfilling its envisioned leadership role in establishing and maintaining international peace and security has subsided. The role that the UN will play as a result of this historic change is largely dependent upon what the remaining superpower, the US, envisions for the organization.

Already, the US has shown that it is more than willing to invoke the legitimacy and authority of the United Nations in protecting its national interests. This is particularly evident in the Persian Gulf in conducting Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, subsequent humanitarian relief efforts, and nonconventional weapons inspections, as well as recent military raids against Iraq. The US has also demonstrated that it is willing to work with the UN in a variety of peace support operations\(^1\) to counter threats to international peace and security which also threaten US national interests.

The willingness of the US to work under the auspices of, though at times under the mere guise of, UN authority, and the resultant success of this cooperation has increased the credibility of the UN in the international arena. Because of the success of this growing relationship so far, and the nature of the administration in Washington, there can be little doubt that US participation in UN peace support operations under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter will increase.

Unfortunately, US Army concepts and doctrine for peace support operations have not kept pace with the level of overall US cooperation and interaction with the UN — particularly in developing new concepts and doctrine for the use of force. Where
the Army has attempted to come to terms with the nature of peace support operations, it has tended to focus on establishing definitions to support various policy positions rather than on conducting critical analysis to determine actual requirements for force employment.

The Army's focus has caused the debate on how to best prepare forces for peace support operations to polarize to two extreme positions. The adherents at one end of the spectrum claim that the Army must form specially trained peacekeeping forces to conduct peace support operations since regular combat forces are not suited for such highly specialized missions. Those who espouse the other extreme position claim that regular combat units need to perform no special peace support training at all to conduct such missions. Unfortunately, this debate has done little of substance to help tactical commanders adequately prepare their forces to participate in peace support operations.

Still, there is ample precedent in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping and peacemaking/peace enforcement operations which, if critically examined, can provide valid insights for the development of coherent US Army concepts and doctrine for future operations. Indeed, many studies that examine past peacekeeping and peacemaking/peace enforcement operations aimed at prescribing US Army policy and doctrine have been conducted and published in recent years. These studies provide excellent discussions and analyses of various operations and offer advice for US military involvement in peace support operations. However, much of the advice offered by these studies is only valid within the context of the narrow definitions of these specific Cold War era operations which are selectively based on past experience.

The problem with accepting definitions based on selected past operations is the inherent assumption that the cases cited
are the best models for peace support operations in the future. Unfortunately, such an assumption disregards the fact that past operations were planned and executed within the political constraints of their respective time periods. The main political constraints on these operations were a result of the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers and the attendant relative weakness of the UN in promoting and maintaining international peace and security.

The end of the Cold War and the increasing role of the UN in promoting peace around the world have removed the main political constraints that confined and shaped the operations of the past. As a result, the future offers the possibility of a wide range of emerging peace support operations that transcend the traditionally defined peacekeeping and peacemaking/peace enforcement operations of the past. Thus, the key problem for the US Army is to determine the relevance past operations have for the emerging peace support operations of the future so that it can develop new concepts and doctrine.

This paper examines the US Army approach to peace support operations. It reviews the trends in Army doctrine and analyzes their historical foundations from the Cold War in order to determine the accuracy and relevance of the Army approach for its participation in future such operations. As a result of this examination, this study identifies key characteristics of Cold War era peace support operations. It then analyzes two post-Cold War operations to determine key characteristics of the recent operations. These key characteristics provide the foundation for an assessment of the nature of peace support operations. The operations also provide the basis for deriving lessons at the tactical level for future employment of Army forces.
In turn, the lessons for the future provide a basis to determine the adequacy of the Army's trends in preparing forces for peace support operations. The study then presents recommendations for the preparation of combat forces for future missions at the tactical level. The recommendations consider the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training, and leader development. They provide suggestions for the Army to adequately prepare combat forces for employment in future peace support operations at the tactical level.

II. US ARMY APPROACH TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: FOCUS ON PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Despite a dramatic increase in the US Army's attention to peace support operations, the development of concepts and doctrine concerning participation in such operations have not kept pace with the accelerating level of overall US cooperation and interaction with the UN.

In his recent report to the UN Security Council, Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized that the change in the world brought about by the end of the Cold War and the emerging consensus for collective security "affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully threats to common security." However, he also realized that, even as old threats to international peace and security fade, new threats are emerging in the form of "brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife."

Boutros-Ghali believes the UN, with the Security Council at its center, can effectively deal with the challenges to peace and security around the world. To successfully deal with these challenges, the Secretary General outlined four areas of action which, in combination, provide a coherent program for achieving peace in accordance with the Charter: preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking (including peace enforcement), peacekeeping, and peace building.4

It is clear from his recommendations, that Boutros-Ghali envisions a much greater role for the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This is particularly evident in his proposed uses of military force in every category of peace support operations, ranging from humanitarian and nation assistance to combat operations in response to acts of aggression and peace enforcement. It is also clear that the Secretary General does not necessarily view these uses of military force as separate and distinct operations as many had in the past, but views them as a continuum, flowing from to one to another and even overlapping.5 (See Appendix 2)

Even though the Army is moving to adopt the Secretary General's areas of action as its primary categories of UN peace support operations (adding peace enforcement as a category separate from peacemaking), the Army's current approach to peace support operations does not accord with the Secretary General's view. Instead, it focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, viewing them as separate and distinct rather than as part of a continuum of peace support operations.6

While the Army has not finalized its definitions of peace support operations, its anticipated definitions are similar to the UN definitions in some respects, but very different in others.7 The US Army definition of peacekeeping is similar to that of the UN:

operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict.8

However, the Army definition is more restrictive in that it equates peacekeeping with truce-keeping, emphasizes the need for
consent of the belligerents for establishing and executing the mission, and requires the strict neutrality of the peacekeeping force.9

The Army defines peace enforcement as military operations/intervention (including possible combat actions) to restore peace between belligerents who may not consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat.10 (See Appendix 2) This definition is nearly synonymous with the US Army's previous definition of its peacetime contingency operation "peacemaking."11

There is considerable precedent in past UN and non-UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations which, if critically examined, provide key insights in the development of coherent US Army concepts and doctrine for involvement in future peace support operations. Many studies have been conducted and published in recent years that examine Cold War era peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and prescribe US policy and doctrine at various levels. For the most part, these studies provide excellent discussions and analyses of various operations and offer advice for US military involvement in traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. However, most of these studies parallel the established US Army approach to peace support operations by focusing on the peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Both the Army and the various studies view the operations as separate and distinct and selectively define and analyze them in terms of traditional definitions of the operations, rather than envisioning how they may be employed in the future.

Even more troubling, since peacekeeping and peace enforcement are viewed as separate and distinct operations, there appears to be a trend in emerging US Army peace support doctrine
to place the operations in two separate categories with regard to use of force. As a result, peacekeeping is viewed as a minimal/non-use of force operation. In turn, peace enforcement is viewed as an finite operation requiring quick, decisive, and overwhelming force followed by a rapid withdrawal of military forces. While this view may be understandable given the Army's definition of peacekeeping operations, it ignores past US experience in peace enforcement operations that clearly show that a range of force utilization and missions during the course of such operations are the norm. In fact, an examination of the nature of peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations reveals many similarities between the two.

**THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Traditional Cold War era peacekeeping operations are normally associated with the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). These operations are perceived as prototypes of UN peacekeeping operations in the US Army, and form the basis of the Army's traditional definition of peacekeeping.\(^{12}\)

The establishment of UNEF I to defuse the Suez Crisis of 1956 represented the first deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (as opposed to an observer force).\(^{13}\) UNEF I was a hastily assembled force, created on an ad hoc basis to respond rapidly to the crisis in the Sinai Peninsula. The mission of UNEF I was to support the ceasefire between Egyptian, Israeli, British, and French forces by interposing itself between the belligerent forces and assisting in their withdrawal.\(^{14}\)

The main principles governing the creation and employment of UNEF I were also born out of necessity to quickly deal with the crisis. These principles were: the consent of the belligerent
parties to the dispute; the objectivity and neutrality of the force; and the non-use of force by the peacekeepers, except for the minimum required for self-defense.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the underlying assumption that developed from the UNEF I experience was that peace, or the desire for peace by the belligerents, must exist before a peacekeeping operation should be conducted. Because of the relative success of UNEF I, it became the de facto model for future UN peacekeeping operations.

UNEF II, established in the Sinai in 1973, and UNDOF, established on the Golan in 1974 in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, were both modeled on UNEF I and were great successes as well.\textsuperscript{16} However, today the principles of consent, neutrality, and minimal/non-use of force used to originally establish UNEF I are espoused not only as characteristics of successful peacekeeping operations, but as specific principles for the establishment and conduct of future peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{17}

The principle of consent of all parties to the dispute recognized the UN's inability to impose or enforce peace due to the Cold War stalemate in the Security Council over the use of Chapter VII. Without the leverage of the "Great Powers" as originally envisioned by the UN Charter, UN forces could only operate freely in sovereign countries to promote peace at those countries' behest. (See Appendix 1) This placed UN forces in the role of facilitators rather than arbiters of peace.\textsuperscript{18}

Due to their role as facilitators in the various disputes, UN peacekeeping forces were required to maintain neutrality and objectivity so as to enhance their credibility as honest brokers. By acting impartially, peacekeeping forces served as conduits for conflict resolution and confidence-building measures between the belligerents.
Traditionally, the principle of minimal/non-use of force has also been critical for military forces engaged in peacekeeping operations. It places great emphasis upon the consent of all concerned parties, including nongovernmental actors, to ensure the security of the force. The security of the force is, in turn, reinforced by its perceived neutrality and objectivity. The issue of force also recognizes that traditional peacekeeping forces could not "enforce" the peace, they could only "keep" it.

There are other common characteristics of peacekeeping operations as well. The precedence of political over military considerations in peacekeeping operations is one such characteristic. Peacekeeping operations are conducted for the explicit purpose of furthering political diplomatic goals aimed at promoting and maintaining peace and security. In these operations, political constraints and guidance affect military forces down to the lowest level, to include the critical area of rules of engagement (ROE) for the use of force.

Civil-military relations are also critical in building force credibility and maintaining force security in peacekeeping operations. Good civil-military relations based on consensus, communications, and confidence with the local populace ensure freedom of action for peacekeepers in their area of operations. Furthermore, such relations alert them to potential security threats.\textsuperscript{19} Minimal use of force is key to establishing and maintaining good civil-military relations in a peacekeeping environment.

In addition, nearly all peacekeeping operations, both UN and non-UN, are multinational in their makeup. In the past this has provided the cloak of legitimacy for peacekeeping forces, since multinational forces are normally viewed as more neutral or objective than a single national force. As a result, military
forces participating in such operations must be able to function effectively with foreign forces, both on staffs and in the field. In addition, the coordination of ROE for the use of force among the various multinational elements is particularly important since different armies often have dissimilar concepts and doctrine governing use of force. However, coordinated and consistent use of force among the multinational elements is crucial for the overall credibility of the operation.

**THE NATURE OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS**

There is considerable debate as to what do and do not constitute peace enforcement operations, which were formerly defined by the Army as peacemaking operations. However, recent studies persuasively argue that US military action in Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965-66, and again in Lebanon from 1982-84 constitute such operations. An examination of these operations reveals the nature of peace enforcement operations.

The US military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 is instructive because it appears to have set the basic pattern for subsequent US operations. In 1958, US forces intervened in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese President who was facing internal dissent and insurrection due to various political factors. Thus, the US intervened at the request and consent of only one party to the dispute, the recognized national leader. In addition, the US intervened on the requesting side with the objective of shoring up the Lebanese Government. It did not intervene as an impartial, neutral, or objective force.

Finally, the US intervened with a military force intending to conduct combat operations to defend Beirut against an external attack. The US deployed massive combat force to support such operations. However, as the force realized that no external threat to Beirut existed, political constraints and considerations
led to changes in military objectives and methods during the conduct of the operation.21 As a result, military forces were required to adapt to more stringent ROE on the use of force and restrictions on the conduct of operations that approached those of traditional peacekeeping operations. US forces were not trained for such restrictions and, as a result, experienced difficulty in adapting to them.22

US military action in both the Dominican Republic in 1965–66 and Lebanon from 1982–84 followed the same basic pattern as the 1958 Lebanon operation:

1) Intervention in the interest of the recognized government without the consent of all parties.
2) Intervention on the side of one of the disputants and not as an impartial party.
3) Preparation to conduct a specific type of operation with established ROE for the use of force, but required to adapt to new ROE and military operations and objectives.

In the Dominican Republic, the US intervened against leftist rebels to prevent a communist takeover of the country following a coup against the recognized government. Initially, US forces were to evacuate US nationals from harms way, but the mission changed due to the new political goal of preventing the communists from seizing power. As a result, massive numbers of combat troops, prepared for conventional combat operations, were deployed to the Dominican Republic, but they became engaged in low intensity operations governed by changing and restrictive ROE for the use of force. The operation evolved into a multinational peacekeeping effort commanded by a Brazilian General.23

Likewise, in the 1982–84 military action in Lebanon, the US initially intervened at the request of the Lebanese Government as part of a multinational "peacekeeping" force (MNF I) to facilitate
the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Beirut. Upon completion of this mission, American forces withdrew. The US then re-intervened, again at the request of the Lebanese government, in the wake of the assassination of the Lebanese President.24

The initial mission of US forces in this second deployment (MNF II) was to help reduce the violence in the country and to assist the legitimate government reestablish its authority. However, the combat forces deployed ashore were restricted by very stringent ROE for the use of force based on their original MNF I "peacekeeping" mission, even though considerable naval combat forces were deployed in support of the operation. Still, US forces initially appeared to retain the mantle of impartiality based on its performance in MNF I.

As US political goals changed, the military mission of MNF II evolved into assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). However, the LAF was one of many participants in the growing Lebanese civil war. As a result, US forces became identified with that faction and lost any pretense of impartiality they had at the beginning of the operation.25 Thus, the Lebanon operation evolved from a peacekeeping type of operation, at least in name, to a support operation for the LAF. Unfortunately, the original restrictive ROE for the use force imposed at the beginning of the operation was not changed. This caused US forces ashore to operate under peacekeeping ROE in a combat environment while accompanying US naval gunfire and aircraft attacked belligerents in support of the LAF.26

These examples also reveal that US Cold War era peace enforcement operations, like peacekeeping operations, have other common characteristics as well. The first is the interaction of political and military considerations. Peace enforcement
operations, like any military operation, are conducted in accordance with political goals. The exact impact political considerations have on tactical military operations depends on the specific situation. In general, however, political considerations gain increasing prominence as the level of force moves from combat to peacekeeping. As is evident from the examples, political constraints can have the greatest impact on a peace enforcement operation through restrictions on ROE for the use of force.

Civil-military relations are also important in terms of building force credibility and maintaining force security in peace enforcement operations, especially at the lower end of the combat intensity scale. However, good civil-military relations may be extremely difficult when forces are inserted into areas on behalf of parties to which the local populace is hostile. This was particularly evident in the 1982-84 Lebanon intervention.

Still, understanding the local culture, abiding by accepted customs, and speaking the appropriate language can have a significantly favorable impact on civil-military relations, both with the host government and the local populace. Minimal use of force and limiting collateral damage can also be key to establishing and maintaining good civil-military relations in peace enforcement operations.

In addition, while there is no requirement for peace enforcement operations to be multinational, the use of multinational forces often provides legitimacy to an operation. The US adopted this concept in the three peace enforcement operations cited in this study. For example, even though British forces did not take part in the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the US planned the operation with British help and devised contingencies involving British forces. In addition, the Dominican Republic operation included Inter-American Defense
Forces in its latter stages and the MNF in Lebanon in 1982-84 contained US, Italian, British, and French forces.

Because of the often preferable use of multinational forces in peace enforcement operations, military forces should be able to function effectively with foreign forces, both on staffs and in the field. The coordination of ROE for the use of force among the various multinational elements is particularly important because various armies have different concepts and doctrine governing the use of force.

III. ASSESSING THE US ARMY FOCUS ON PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

In assessing the nature of Cold War era peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, it is clear that there are both similarities and differences. As noted earlier, traditional peacekeeping operations are defined as requiring the consent of all the belligerent parties, neutrality and objectivity of the peacekeepers, and minimal/non-use of force. On the other hand, peace enforcement operations have been implemented without the consent of the belligerent parties, in a partial manner favoring one of the parties, and incorporating a wide range of force utilization from conventional combat to traditional peacekeeping-type operations.

However, despite the clear distinction between the accepted traditional definition of peacekeeping and the experience of peace enforcement operations, it is instructive that all three of the US peace enforcement operations which were examined incorporated peacekeeping in their execution. These operations may not be considered "proper" peacekeeping operations because they do not meet all the criteria of the accepted Army traditional definition. If the Army definition is accurate, these "improper" peacekeeping operations only serve to blur the actual nature of past peace
enforcement operations and should correctly be treated as aberrations, or separate occurrences from the operations.

Furthermore, if peacekeeping and peace enforcement were completely separate and distinct operations, then there should be little similarity between them. However, as noted earlier, both operations have much in common in the realm of political influence on military action and use of force, the importance of civil-military factors, and the tendency toward multinational operations, differing only in degree. In addition, despite the traditionally defined difference in the use of force between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (i.e., a range versus minimal/non-use), it is the critical factor in the employment of military forces in both operations.

SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OPERATIONS, OR PART OF A CONTINUUM?

The considerable similarities between Cold War era peacekeeping and peace enforcement indicate that, far from being separate and distinct, they are actually operations on a continuum of peace support operations. The difficulty with the Army's traditional definition of peacekeeping is that it sets specific and unchanging criteria for an operation to qualify as proper peacekeeping. The problem with the definition is that it does not take into account the context in which the first peacekeeping operations were formed, the changed international situation and status of the UN today, or the nature of future peace support operations.

The specific criteria used to define traditional peacekeeping operations were the result of ad hoc measures taken to promote peace in the face of the Cold War stalemate in the Security Council that prevented the UN from enforcing peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (See Appendix 1) The requirement for initial peacekeeping operations to obtain the consent of the
belligerents, remain neutral, and use minimal force was simply due to the weakness of the UN resulting from its inability to use the provisions of Chapter VII. The criteria were not derived from a model or theory of peacekeeping and were certainly not intended to form the basis for implementing or judging future such operations.

Today, the Cold War constraints on the UN have largely disappeared and the UN is gaining increased responsibility and authority for maintaining international peace and security, to include enforcement under Chapter VII. As a result, the criteria that defined traditional peacekeeping operations are obsolete. Even though the criteria may be sufficient for successful peacekeeping operations in the future, they are by no means necessary. For example, the criteria of consent of the parties which is normally defined as willing consent may be replaced by enforced/imposed consent through Chapter VII actions. In addition, the concept of minimal/non-use of force may be altered to encompass the requisite use of force needed to maintain a truce or ceasefire, as long as the force is applied impartially.

Thus, while it may seem that the traditional distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have blurred, in reality, the operations have never been totally separate and distinct. Operations have only been portrayed as such by selectively citing specific examples that meet the requirements of the simplistic traditional definitions. This method of portraying peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is unacceptable because it ignores significant past peacekeeping operations that did not fit the definitions, such as the UN operation in the Congo from 1960–64. It also ignores the true nature of Cold War era peace enforcement operations.

In addition, the Army definitions do not adequately address the nature of emerging post-Cold War peace support operations like
Operations Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia. These operations clearly show that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are part of a continuum of peace support operations. They also show, like the three examples of Cold War era peace enforcement operations cited in this study, that a military force deployed to conduct one type of operation must often conduct the other as well, in addition to a whole range of operations in between.

As the UN role in peace support operations increases, the traditional distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations will become less and less evident because the constraints that prevented the UN from enforcing its efforts to promote peace in the past have largely disappeared. As a result, to effectively prepare and employ military forces in peace support operations, the Army must first recognize the true nature of such operations and develop appropriate concepts and doctrine for their use. An examination of two post-Cold War operations, Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, reveals common characteristics which are used to clarify the nature of peace support operations. It also identifies specific tactical lessons for the Army to conduct such operations in the future.

IV. NORTHERN IRAQ: OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

The recent experience of the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT) in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq provides an excellent example of emerging post-Cold War peace support operations. An analysis of the operation identifies common characteristics of peace support operations and highlights tactical requirements for the Army to participate in such operations in the future.
BACKGROUND

Following Iraq's military defeat and withdrawal from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in February 1991, internal revolts against Saddam Hussein's government erupted in the Kurdish dominated areas of northern Iraq and the predominately Shi'a areas of southern Iraq. After his generals negotiated ceasefire terms with Coalition leaders at Safwan, Saddam quickly reorganized his military and unleashed it on the rebelling Kurdish and Shi'a populations. By the end of March 1991, the Iraqi military had largely defeated the uprisings in the north and south and had turned to brutally suppressing the rebellious populations. To avoid this suppression, hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Shi'a left their villages and cities to seek refuge in areas less accessible to the Iraqi military.

The Kurdish refugees in particular attracted considerable worldwide attention because many were stranded in remote mountain areas near the Turkish border in extreme winter conditions without adequate food or shelter. In addition, Turkey had closed its border to the refugees because of concerns over its own dissatisfied Kurdish population and its inability to adequately assist the refugees. In response to the situation, on 5 April 1991 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 688 which condemned Iraq's suppression of its internal population and claimed the action created a threat to international peace and security. The resolution further demanded that Iraq cease its actions against its internal population and allow access to the refugees by international humanitarian relief organizations.28

INTERVENTION AND OBJECTIVES

In response to the crisis, and using Resolution 688 as legal basis, US European Command established Joint Task Force Provide Comfort (JTFPC) to direct humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq.
and southern Turkey. Operation Provide Comfort began on 6 April 1991 when JTFPC arrived at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The US expanded the operation on 16 April 1991 to include multinational forces and to establish a security zone in northern Iraq. The enlarged mission also called for constructing temporary relocation camps to provide shelter from the winter and encouraging displaced people to return to their homes. As a result, JTFPC was expanded to Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (CTFPC).²⁹

From its inception, the execution of Operation Provide Comfort was driven by political considerations. The US and its coalition partners wanted to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds, but they did not want to support the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state due to the concerns of Turkey. In addition, some Arab states did not want to see Iraq dismembered. As a result, ROE were restricted to the force necessary for self-defense and to provide security for humanitarian relief operations to the Kurds. Iraq agreed to initial operations in Turkey, but protested the expansion of operations into Iraq.³⁰

CTFPC established two subordinate JTFs - JTF-A and JTF-B - to accomplish its mission.³¹ JTF-A was tasked to provide immediate relief, establish infrastructure in refugee camps, and transfer refugees to transit camps in JTF-B's area of operation in northern Iraq. JTF-B's mission was to build transit camps, receive and care for refugees, secure the area, return refugees to their homes, turn relief operations over to civilian organizations, and withdraw from Iraq.³²

Upon deployment for Operation Provide Comfort, 3-325 ABCT operated under the overall control of JTF-B, along with US Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF), and military forces from France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. Fortunately, most of the coalition forces either
belonged to NATO, or had worked with NATO forces in the past, providing a common basis for operational procedures.\textsuperscript{33}

The 3-325 ABCT’s participation can be broken down into four phases. Phase I consisted of deployment and initial operations. In Phase II, the security zone in northern Iraq was expanded. 3-325 ABCT maintained security and coordinated operations in what amounted to a Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) in Phase III. In Phase IV, the operation was handed off to civilian relief organizations.

\textbf{CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION}

Prior to deployment the 3-325 ABCT was able to spend at least a week making initial preparations for its upcoming peace support operation. The battalion’s preparations were based on an analysis of the unit’s likely missions and threats in Iraq, and battalion commander LTC John P. Abizaid’s previous experience with peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. As a result, the 3-325 ABCT focused on developing checkpoint drills and conducting countermine training to augment its combat training. The battalion also educated its soldiers on the ROE and the need to shift their mentality from a focus on close combat operations to the requirements of the upcoming peace support operation. Particular emphasis was placed on training platoon and squad leaders to accomplish the mission without resorting to force.\textsuperscript{34}

In addition, the 3-325 ABCT redistributed its organic transportation assets to attain 100 percent mobility for its forces since the projected area of operations (AO) was large, rugged, and isolated. The battalion acquired small engineer excavators for quick deployment, Satellite-Linked Ground Reference System (SLGRS) navigational aids to compensate for inadequate maps of the AO, laser rangefinders to aid target location, and
additional M60 machineguns for greater force protection against light infantry or irregular forces.  

In Phase I, JTF-B deployed to Zakhu, Iraq on 20 April where it established patrols and checkpoints to remove the Iraqi military and secret police presence there by 27 April.  

3-325 ABCT deployed into Iraq and conducted initial operations to create a security zone under the operational control (OPCON) of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of JTF-B after Zakhu had been secured. This command arrangement required the 3-325 ABCT to conduct communications and liaison with joint and coalition forces. 

Once Zakhu was secured, JTF-B entered Phase II and expanded the security zone in northern Iraq. On 1 May, 3-325 ABCT was placed OPCON to the British 3 Commando (Royal Marine) Brigade (CDO) which had been given the mission to expand the security zone to the east and south to clear or isolate all Iraqi units in the area. During this phase, 3-325 ABCT found itself in an extremely dynamic environment that required constant offensive maneuver to eject Iraqi forces from the zone. Rules of engagement provided for force protection and flexibility, however, the battalion could neither initiate contact, nor seek combat with enemy forces due to political considerations which defined the operation as primarily humanitarian in nature.  

Therefore, instead of using combat force or action, the 3-325 ABCT had to force the enemy out of the zone through maneuver and threat of action. As a result, in a typical meeting engagement, the battalion deployed infantry in defensive positions in view of the enemy, brought up supporting TOW carriers to overwatch the position, and began to maneuver another force around the enemy's flanks, all the while keeping air cover circling over the enemy's position. This tactic was normally sufficient to
force an Iraqi withdrawal.\textsuperscript{38} The key to success in these operations was for lower level leaders to show determination and resolve, while maintaining tight control over their forces to prevent an escalation.\textsuperscript{39}

The 3-325 ABCT also conducted "flying checkpoints" using mobile combined arms forces to set up hasty roadblocks and checkpoints at key intersections to intercept enemy forces.\textsuperscript{40} As the 3-325 ABCT continued to expand the security zone, it had to increasingly communicate and conduct liaison with local (and often rival) civil leaders and factions, International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) providing humanitarian relief, and the general population.\textsuperscript{41}

Once the security zone had been expanded, the 3-325 ABCT implemented Phase III where it maintained security and coordinated operations in an assigned AO or HRS. The size of the sector (35 km wide by 40 KM deep) necessitated widely dispersed and decentralized operations by the battalion's subordinate units. Operations consisted of manning checkpoints and conducting patrols, with the associated problems of guerilla/factional fighting, refugee and riot control, and humanitarian relief.

The key to successful operations during Phase III was close liaison and negotiation with local civil leaders, decentralized decision making and conflict resolution by junior leaders, and constant intelligence and information gathering by all forces throughout the sector. Critical problem areas consisted of an inability to effectively coordinate or control the activities of humanitarian relief organizations, press, and SOF that operated independently in the battalion's sector.\textsuperscript{42}

By the end of May 1991, the mission of forcing the Iraqi military and secret police from the zone, rebuilding the
infrastructure, and resettling the displaced Kurds was complete. On 7 June 1991, Phase IV was implemented when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assumed responsibility for most of the operation. However, due to the limited ability of UN guards to provide security in the zone, coalition military forces were gradually withdrawn from Iraq. The withdrawal of forces was completed on 15 July 1991.43

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS

An analysis of Operation Provide Comfort reveals that the operation has key characteristics in common with the previously examined Cold War era peace support operations: the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military relations, and the multinational flavor of such operations.

The importance of political considerations in Operation Provide Comfort was evident throughout the conduct of the operation. The limited political goals of the coalition members drove the execution of the operation by limiting the degree of support provided to the Kurds and restricting the ROE of the military forces. As a result, while ROE provided for force protection, 3-325 ABCT had to devise innovative methods for ejecting Iraqi forces from the security zone since they could not initiate contact or seek combat with enemy forces.

Civil-military relations were critical to the successful execution of Operation Provide Comfort. Due to the humanitarian nature of the operation, 3-325 ABCT had to establish liaison and communications not only with local civil leaders and population groups, but with a variety of IOs, NGOs, and PVOs as well. In addition, the continued close contact with the Kurdish population required the use of linguists, an understanding of the local culture, and restraint on use of force in responding to crisis situations.
The multinational makeup of the operation was also key to its success. The use of a coalition provided legitimacy for intervention in Iraq that a unilateral US operation would have lacked. Fortunately, a common NATO doctrine helped the coalition military forces function effectively together especially in coordinating and implementing ROE.

V. SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.

The experience of the 10th Mountain Division (10th MTN DIV) in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia also provides an excellent example of emerging peace support operations. An analysis of the operation reveals key characteristics in common with Operation Provide Comfort and Cold War era peace support operations. It also highlights many tactical lessons similar to those from Operation Provide Comfort useful for the Army to execute such operations in the future.

BACKGROUND

The overthrow of Somali President Siad Barre in the beginning of 1991 destroyed the power of centralized government in Somalia. This resulted in widespread civil war between factions competing for dominance and large-scale famine among the population. By January 1992, much of the Somali population was starving and the distribution of relief supplies was becoming increasingly difficult due to the continued civil strife and growing power of factional warlords who controlled various parts of the country. Death tolls were estimated at 500,000 or more.\textsuperscript{44} In addition, as many as 1.2 million Somali refugees thronged to adjacent countries in search of asylum from the fighting and relief from the famine. This exodus, in turn, caused considerable political, social, and economic disruption in the region.\textsuperscript{45}

In response to Somalia's internal problems and their destabilizing effects in the region, the UNSC adopted Resolution
733 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to embargo the delivery of weapons and military materiel to the warring factions in Somalia. In addition, Resolution 751, adopted in April 1992, provided for the creation and deployment of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). UNOSOM, planned to consist of 4,200 troops, was intended as a peacekeeping operation functioning in areas only with the consent of the belligerents and using force only in self-defence.

The US began its significant humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia with Operation Provide Relief on 16 August 1992. However, as the situation in Somalia deteriorated, UNOSOM was unable to accomplish its mission. This prompted UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to recommend to the UNSC in November 1992 that more forceful measures be adopted so that humanitarian relief could continue. In response to the Secretary General's recommendation, the US offered to increase its involvement in Somalia by leading a multinational effort to ensure the safety of relief operations under US vice UN command and control. The UNSC accepted the US offer and authorized military action on 3 December 1992 with Resolution 794.46

**INTERVENTION AND OBJECTIVES**

The US Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated the First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) as HQ, JTF Somalia on 27 November 1992. A subsequent 2 December 1992 message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff named the commander of IMEF as commander of JTF Somalia. The mission of Operation Restore Hope was to secure Somalia for humanitarian relief efforts and subsequently return control of the operation to UN forces (in this case, UNOSOM II).47 Unfortunately, due to a variety of political factors, a clear endstate was not adequately defined or enforced, resulting
in "mission creep" which took the operation beyond its initial objective. 48

10th MTN DIV was alerted to begin planning for Operation Restore Hope on 1 December 1992 and was designated Army Forces (ARFOR) Headquarters on 4 December 1992. The 10th MTN DIV identified four phases in its operations. In Phase I, forces deployed to Somalia to secure sea and air ports in Magadishu and Baledogle. The force expanded operations in Phase II to provide security for humanitarian relief sites. Phase III consisted of forces extending security operations into outlying areas and, in Phase IV, forces handed off theater functions and responsibilities to the UN. 49

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

Prior to deployment, the 10th MTN DIV was required to plan for participation in a joint and combined peace support operation in an austere theater on short notice with minimal intelligence and information on the operation or AO. Unfortunately, the division was neither staffed nor equipped to participate in short-notice joint and combined peace support operations. Due to these shortcomings, the 10th MTN DIV was not able to adequately interface with JTF planners which resulted in problems with properly sequencing forces into theater. These problems caused the unnecessary deployment/redeployment of more than 1,000 items (18 percent) of Army equipment deployed by sealift into Somalia. 50 In addition, the 10th MTN DIV had to reorganize and train staffs as it deployed in order to adequately prepare for the peace support operation and the associated joint and combined requirements. 51

During Phase I (9-16 December 1992), the 10th MTN DIV secured a lodgement in Somalia and established an ARFOR headquarters. JTF Somalia commenced Operation Restore Hope by
securing Mogadishu air and sea ports on 9 December 1992. On 12 December 1992 the 10th MTN DIV command and control element arrived in Mogadishu and the initial Army combat element secured Baledogle.\textsuperscript{52}

In establishing its headquarters in Somalia, the 10th MTN DIV was required to establish communications and/or liaison with adjacent, higher, and lower headquarters of other Army, joint, and coalition forces. In addition, in order to effectively coordinate the political, military, and humanitarian activities in its AO, the division had to establish communications and/or liaison with other agencies, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, and local civil/factional leaders.\textsuperscript{53} Conducting face to face meetings and negotiations with factional leaders in an impartial manner became imperative for military forces to maintain their credibility and freedom of action.\textsuperscript{54}

From the beginning, Operation Restore Hope was driven by political considerations. US Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff held daily meetings with key JTF Somalia (later renamed UNITAF) staff to review activities and generate discussions on future political, military, and humanitarian operations and to establish close collaboration among the political, military, and humanitarian components of the operation.\textsuperscript{55} As a result, the operation's ROE were both driven by and synchronized with political objectives.

During Phase II (17-28 December 1992), the 10th MTN DIV advance elements operated with joint and coalition forces to secure major HRSSs and the division's main body began deployment.\textsuperscript{56} Security operations included conducting cordon and search air assault operations, manning static guard posts, and dismantling unauthorized checkpoints.
As its AO expanded, the division was required to conduct convoy security operations and to establish communications over long distances with dispersed subordinate units. Maintaining communications was key to protecting dispersed forces.\textsuperscript{57} Operating in a country without a legitimate national government required substantial reliance on Civil Affairs units and the JTF Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), as well as the establishment of Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) in the various HRSs to coordinate military support for humanitarian activities.\textsuperscript{58}

During Phase III (29 December 1992-17 February 1993), forces expanded their presence in HRSs, continued security for humanitarian relief efforts, and began to locate and seize weapon caches.\textsuperscript{59} Due to the lack of adequate intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), and SOF teams became key in collecting and providing real-time, accurate information to tactical commanders. Maneuver forces also had to collect intelligence in their respective areas of operation since they were in constant contact with the population and organizations on the ground. In addition, aviation assets were crucial for timely reconnaissance and security operations, medical evacuation, and air assault/air movement of soldiers and equipment over large areas.

Engineer operations also played a substantial role. Key contributions included providing maps and imagery products; detecting and clearing land mines; building base camps; improving roads, bridges, ports, and airfields; and participating in civic action projects.\textsuperscript{60}

As 10th MTN DIV’s mission expanded from providing security for humanitarian relief efforts to locating and seizing weapons caches, maneuver forces conducted extensive military operations in
urban terrain (MOUT), requiring even greater emphasis on detailed local intelligence. Riot control techniques and equipment, as well as enemy prisoner of war (EPW) handling techniques were also used extensively in security operations.\textsuperscript{61}

As the mission changed, ROE had to be skillfully integrated to comply with operational and political concerns. The key to successful implementation of the ROE, and overall mission accomplishment, was well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers. The major consideration for leaders was to adjust the mindsets of soldiers from combat to execute peace support operations.\textsuperscript{62}

During Phase IV, (18 February 1992-4 May 1992) the operation was eventually transitioned to UN control under UNOSOM II. As in the entire operation, the key to successful transition to UN control was close communication, liaison, and coordination among all the parties involved despite the continued problem of "mission creep."\textsuperscript{63} Upon completion of transition on 4 May 1992, Operation Restore Hope ended and UNOSOM II's Operation Continue Hope began.\textsuperscript{64}

**COMMON CHARACTERISTICS**

As with Operation Provide Comfort, an analysis of Operation Restore Hope reveals key characteristics in common with the previously examined Cold War era peace support operations: the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military relations, and the multinational flavor of such operations.

Ambassador Oakley's persistent efforts to coordinate political, military, and humanitarian operations clearly underscore the prominence of political considerations. These considerations not only drove the ROE during Operation Restore Hope, but, in conjunction with other political factors, led to the "mission creep" from providing security for humanitarian relief to
widespread disarmament operations. As a result, military forces were compelled to conduct operations for which they had not prepared.

Civil-military relations were also critical to the successful execution of Operation Restore Hope, especially in light of the complicated array of tribes and armed factions vying for control of the country. Like Operation Provide Comfort, the humanitarian nature of the operation required military forces to establish liaison and communications not only with local tribal/factional leaders and population groups, but with a large number of IOs, NGOs, and PVOs as well. Not surprisingly, effective civil-military relations required an understanding of the local culture and restraint on use of force.

Finally, the multinational makeup of the operation was also key to providing legitimacy for intervention in Somalia in support of the UN. Unfortunately, the forces lacked a common doctrine and therefore experienced difficulty in conducting operations, especially in coordinating and implementing ROE.

VI. TACTICAL LESSONS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

An analysis of the experiences of the 3-325 ABCT in Operation Provide Comfort and of the 10th MTN DIV in Operation Restore Hope reveals many common lessons at the tactical level in the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training, and leader development. By learning these lessons, the Army can help its tactical commanders adequately prepare their forces to participate in future peace support operations.

Doctrine

Perhaps the most important doctrinal lesson from Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope is that the traditional distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have eroded to the point of irrelevance at the tactical level. As
a result, these types of missions must be viewed holistically as a continuum of peace support operations, rather than as separate and distinct. The nature of peace support operations is such that participating units must be able to conduct a whole range of operations under varying ROE, from traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to combat.65

Due to the nature of peace support operations, establishment and adherence to common, realistic, yet easily understood ROE by all participating forces is imperative for coherent employment of forces and successful mission accomplishment.66 These are dangerous and stressful operations that require well-disciplined, educated soldiers who understand the nature of such operations.67 As a result, well-trained combat units make the most effective forces for such operations. Military forces so committed should be equipped to fight and win engagements, and trained to conduct specialized tasks.68 Furthermore, common doctrine enhances successful mission accomplishment, particularly in combined/multinational operations.69

Organization

Organizations earmarked for peace support operations must be staffed and equipped to participate in short-notice joint and combined peace support operations. Requirements include personnel with adequate joint and combined experience as well as access to the Joint Deployment System for interface with higher joint headquarters.70 In addition, liaison and/or liaison officers (LNOs) to other headquarters, IOs, NGOs, PVOs and civil leaders are crucial to plan and execute synchronized operations.71 Civil Affairs personnel are key for liaison with non-military entities, and conducting civil-military missions.72

Military units do not normally have authority over civilian organizations and agencies located and/or operating in their AOs.
As a result, establishment of CMOCs is critical for coordinating political, military, and humanitarian operations. In addition, location of such organizations in military sectors with inadequate transportation assets to provide adequate humanitarian relief can be a significant problem. However, management of military transportation assets can provide a degree of control to units by regulating the placement and movement of such organizations.

Typical Army units also require additional augmentation for specialized tasks. For example, SOF is key in collecting and providing accurate local information on a real-time basis due to often inadequate intelligence support. Communications and liaison problems between maneuver units and SOF operating in the same AO due to separate chains of command inhibit synchronized operations, but can be remedied by either augmenting units with SOF, or, as a minimum, closer coordination. Furthermore, linguist augmentation down to company level is particularly important in successful civil-military and intelligence operations, as well as nearly every functional area of the operation. In addition, media interest in peace support operations requires coordinated public affairs officer (PAO) activities and augmented public affairs organizations.

Materiel

Units conducting peace support operations often require materiel augmentation. Additional communications equipment is needed in order to communicate with other joint and combined headquarters, civil leaders, and IO/NGO/PVOs directly or through LNOs. Decentralized operations by subordinate units over large geographic areas also require additional radios, radios with longer ranges, and greater numbers of power sources to maintain force security.
Austere, isolated, non-mature AOs require additional transportation assets to provide sufficient force mobility and support. Aviation assets provide considerable capabilities to units, especially in remote and rugged terrain. A wide range of aviation assets are crucial for timely reconnaissance and security operations, as well as medical evacuation, transport, and resupply over large areas. In addition, large amounts of Class IV barrier and construction material are needed for construction of Checkpoints, Observation Posts (OPs), refugee control facilities, etc. Due to the austere environments, minimal infrastructures, and resupply problems often associated with peace support operations, Class IV management can become critical.

Increased engineer support is also important for such operations in non-mature theaters for providing maps, conducting anti-mine operations, building base camps, improving infrastructure, etc. SLGRS and laser rangefinders provide excellent navigation and target location capabilities in remote areas where good maps are scarce. In addition, riot control and refugee operations require specialized equipment for successful execution.

Training

Both the 3-325 ABCT and 10th MTN DIV identified many training lessons from their operations. One key lesson is that it is difficult to accomplish short-notice joint and combined missions with incomplete and/or ad hoc staffs since there is no time for detailed training and integration. Due to the joint and combined/multinational nature of peace support operations, individual and battlestaff training in such operations will improve units' abilities to perform effectively.

Current individual and collective training adequately supports peace support operations in the area of basic small unit
tactics, techniques, and procedures such as security operations, patrolling, reconnaissance, MOUT, operational security, and night operations. However, soldiers must still be trained in additional skills normally conducted in peace support operations to successfully accomplish their missions. Such tasks include operating flying and static checkpoints, conducting anti-mine operations, performing riot and refugee control, employing negotiation and conflict resolution skills, etc. A general guideline for dividing training time is 85-90% training for combat skills and 10-15% training for specialized skills, to be modified as the mission requires.86

There is also a need to train for different types of intelligence and information gathering in peace support operations. The best way to obtain accurate and timely intelligence in an assigned sector is to use local information gathering operations incorporating both specialized collection assets and all subordinate units. In addition, the focus of intelligence efforts should shift from enemy forces to the local civil population once the threat from enemy forces has been minimized.87 However, despite this greater reliance upon local intelligence assets for timely information, all source intelligence collection and analysis is still needed.88

Leaders should also ensure soldiers adjust their focus from close combat missions before conducting peace support operations.89 Educating soldiers on ROE and the need to shift from a focus on close combat operations to the requirements of the upcoming operation is critical for preparing soldiers for the new type of operation.90

Leader Development

Leader development for peace support operations should emphasize training platoon and squad leaders to accomplish the
mission according to the ROE. Trained and disciplined small unit leaders, especially non-commissioned officers, are key to effectively applying appropriate ROE. In addition, face to face negotiation by military leaders with factional leaders in an impartial manner is imperative for force credibility, freedom of action, and overall mission success. Therefore, negotiation and peaceful conflict resolution by military leaders are crucial for successful mission accomplishment.

VII. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US ARMY ROLE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Contrary to both past and emerging Army doctrine, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not separate and distinct operations, but are part of a continuum of peace support operations which the Army may be called upon to execute or support in the near future. Furthermore, peace support operations cannot be isolated in separate compartments such as peacekeeping operations that require minimal/non-use of force, and peace enforcement operations that require overwhelming and decisive combat force to achieve a quick victory followed by an immediate withdrawal. There are no quick and easy solutions.

The key characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations which are relevant for future peace support operations are the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military relations, and the multinational flavor of such operations. These characteristics define the true nature of peace support operations.

Political considerations take much more prominence over purely military concerns due to the more inherently political nature of peace support operations. The exact impact political factors have at the tactical level depends on the specific situation. However, political considerations tend to gain
prominence as the level of force moves from combat and peace enforcement to peacekeeping. Political influence can have the greatest impact on a peace operation through constantly changing missions and objectives as well as restrictions on ROE for the use of force. As a result, a military force deployed to conduct peace support operations must be able to conduct a whole range of missions in the same environment, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.

Civil-military relations are critical in building force credibility and maintaining force security in peace support operations especially in an area containing a complicated array of tribes and factions. Civil-military relations are even more important in operations of a humanitarian nature due to the requirement for military forces to establish liaison and/or communications not only with local tribal/factional leaders and population groups, but with a large number of IOs, NGOs, and PVOs as well. Doctrine that emphasizes minimal use of force to accomplish the mission while limiting collateral damage to the local populace is key to establishing and maintaining good civil-military relations.

Finally, the multinational makeup of the operation is key to providing legitimacy for many interventions. Unfortunately, forces often lack a common doctrine and experience difficulty in conducting operations, especially in coordinating and implementing ROE. To correct this problem, doctrines and rationales for the use of force must be coordinated among the multinational elements to ensure successful operations.

Currently the Army is moving in the wrong direction in its approach to peace support operations. Despite numerous examples of peace support operations from the Cold War that indicate the contrary, the Army continues to view peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations as separate and distinct, requiring separate types of military forces.

Even two recent post-Cold War peace support operations which were led by the US contradict the current Army view. Lessons learned from Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Restore Hope not only support the argument against the Army’s current concept of peace support operations, but confirm the key characteristics of the operations. Analysis of these operations also reveals considerable common points as to what the Army must do to adequately prepare combat forces for employment in future peace support operations at the tactical level in the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training, and leader development.

Since doctrine drives organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the Army must adjust its current doctrinal view of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to the realities of the current and future international environment. The Army must realize that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are part of a continuum of peace support operations envisioned by the UN Secretary General that incorporates other emerging missions such as those encompassed in preventive diplomacy and peace building.

Once it comes to terms with the true nature of peace support operations, the Army must develop new concepts and doctrine for use of force that address the entire continuum of peace support operations. While the Army must address a whole range of topics to adequately prepare its forces for peace support operations, appropriate guidance on the use of force is critical for employing military forces in such operations.

To be successful, the Army’s new concepts and doctrine for the use of force must address the key characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations which are relevant
for future peace support operations: the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military considerations, and the multinational flavor of such operations. New concepts for the use of force must be versatile enough to cover a wide range of situations and missions as well as rapidly changing ROE. Specific, realistic, yet easily understandable ROE should also be developed and standardized. If possible, standardized doctrine for use of force and ROE should be formulated in concert with the UN and/or potential coalition partners in peace support operations.

In order for Army forces to successfully participate in future peace support operations, critical organizational requirements must also be addressed. Organizations should be fully staffed, trained, and equipped to participate in peace support operations which often require conducting joint and combined operations. Full staffing includes critical functions in peace support operations such as civil affairs personnel for civil-military operations, special operations coordinators for SOF operations, and public affairs specialists for media operations. It also includes fully trained LNOs to provide liaison and communications to other headquarters, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, and local civil/factional leaders. Organizations must also be augmented with sufficient qualified linguists to enable mission accomplishment.

Additional materiel requirements are primarily associated with operations over large areas in austere, isolated, non-mature environments that appear to be a trend in peace support operations. Common requirements consist of additional communication equipment for communication and liaison with various headquarters, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, civil/factional leaders, etc., as well as with subordinate units conducting decentralized
operations. Large operating areas also require long distance communications capabilities and their requisite power sources. Austere environments also often necessitate additional ground and air transportation assets to ensure adequate mobility, security, and resupply of forces; SLGRS for accurate land navigation; and additional Class IV for checkpoints, OPs, refugee facilities, etc. In addition, peace support operations usually require specialized equipment for riot and refugee control.

In terms of training, the key requirement is to educate soldiers on ROE and the need to shift their mental focus from strictly combat operations to the upcoming peace support operation. Soldiers should also be trained in skills and tasks normally conducted in peace support operations to augment their combat training.

Preparation for peace support operations requires units to do more than train for war, yet does not require specialized "peacekeeping units." Instead, units should conduct an appropriate mix of training between combat skills and specialized peace support operation tasks. A general guideline is 85-90% training for combat skills and 10-15% training for specialized skills, to be modified as the mission requires.

Due to the often joint and combined/multinational nature of peace support operations, individuals and staffs should be trained to conduct joint and/or combined operations, as appropriate. In addition, all soldiers should be trained to gather and report local intelligence due to importance of such tasks.

To adequately prepare leaders for peace support operations, particular emphasis should be placed on training junior leaders to accomplish the mission within the established ROE. Leaders should also be trained in crucial negotiation and conflict resolution skills which can have a dramatic impact on mission accomplishment.
By first focusing on developing new concepts and doctrine for the use of force in the continuum of peace support operations followed by relevant changes in organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the US Army will ensure that US forces recognize the complexity and diversity of such operations before they are employed. As a result, US forces will less likely be subject to the confusion and demoralization experienced by units who took part in the Lebanon 1958, Dominican Republic 1965-66, and Lebanon 1982-84 operations when they were faced with changing and diverse missions for which they were inadequately prepared. This will increase the prospects for success of US forces in future peace support operations and set the stage for further development of concepts and doctrine for such operations in other needed areas.
APPENDIX 1: FOUNDATION OF UN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

UN CHARTER

The justification and legal basis for UN involvement in peace support operations is clearly outlined in the Charter of the UN which was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945. The UN Charter provides the underlying foundation for UN involvement in peace support operations in the first purpose defined for the organization in Article 1(1):

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace.95

Article 1 does not identify specific measures the UN may take, but it provides the basis for the concept of collective security upon which overall UN efforts to promote and maintain peace are based. Specific measures addressing the UN's role in peace support operations are identified in other sections of the Charter.

CHAPTER V - THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Chapter V of the Charter assigns primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security to the Security Council which is empowered to act on behalf of the UN membership as a whole. In turn, the Security Council's activities are dominated by its five permanent members, France, Britain, China, the USSR and the US, any of whom can veto the Council's actions. The intent of establishing the permanent memberships and veto authority of the five "Great Powers" was to ensure their full agreement and support in any future collective security measures undertaken by the UN.

Chapter V further stipulates that the specific powers granted to the Security Council in this area are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the Charter.96 The key
articles are contained in Chapter VI, which deals with the "pacific settlement of disputes,"97 and Chapter VII, which addresses "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."98 Chapter VIII emphasizes that regional organizations should deal with disputes prior to, or in concert with, UN action99 and Chapter XII addresses trusteeships.100

CHAPTER VI - PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Chapter VI provides the basis for UN involvement in mediating and negotiating peaceful settlements of disputes. Article 33 of the chapter mandates that the parties to any dispute which is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"101 must first attempt to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. Chapter VI also allows any such dispute to be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly and specifically empowers the Security Council to call upon the parties to settle their dispute through peaceful means, to investigate any such dispute, and to "make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute."102

CHAPTER VII - ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Chapter VII provides the basis for UN action, to include armed force, to settle disputes that pose a threat to international peace and security. It is the UN's enforcement mechanism. Article 39 gives the Security Council the responsibility to determine any such threats to peace and authorizes the Council to "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." It also allows the Council to take "provisional measures" to end the conflict before resorting to Articles 41 and 42.103
Article 41 empowers the Security Council to take measures to maintain or restore peace that do not involve the use of armed force. Specific measures include interrupting economic relations, interdicting lines and modes of communication, and severing diplomatic relations. If the Security Council decides that measures taken under Article 41 are inadequate, it may take measures under Article 42 using armed force.\textsuperscript{104}

Under Article 42, the Security Council may direct “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{105} Chapter VII further empowers the Security Council to call upon UN members to furnish military forces to implement the enforcement measures under Article 42 and establishes a Military Staff Committee to aid the Council in planning and executing the measures.\textsuperscript{106}

Articles 41 and 42 form the heart of the collective security system originally envisioned by the Charter.\textsuperscript{107} However, the key to the system, and prerequisite for implementing measures under the Articles, is unanimous consent by the permanent members of the Security Council - defined by the lack of a permanent member veto. Unfortunately, the Superpower rivalry and global competition between the East and West since 1945 resulted in a stalemate in the Security Council which precluded use of Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII and undermined the envisioned collective security mission for the UN. As a result, the UN was forced to seek alternative ways to deal with threats to international peace and security.

"CHAPTER VI 1/2: PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS"

UN peacekeeping operations evolved out of a need to assist in the resolution of international disputes without resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter. Many disputes arose, "particularly during the process of decolonization,"\textsuperscript{108} that could not be
resolved peaceably. To assist in the peaceful resolution of such
disputes, the UN developed various ad hoc ways to solve the
problems. Thus, peacekeeping operations evolved as "holding
actions" to prevent the spread and escalation of conflict.
These operations were not developed from any particular theory or
document. Instead, they "were born of necessity, largely
improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring
action."\textsuperscript{109}

Most UN peacekeeping operations are authorized by the
Security Council and involve the use of military forces in concert
with civilian efforts to maintain or restore international peace
and security. UN peacekeeping operations encompass a variety of
missions to include investigation and reporting, observation and
monitoring of ceasefires, implementing truce agreements,
supervising disengagement and withdrawal of military forces, etc.
However, a key distinction is that, as a general rule, the
military forces conducting peacekeeping operations have not
normally been allowed to use force to attain their objectives,
except in self-defense. Thus, they normally lack the "enforcement
action" provided to the UN under Article 42 of Chapter VII.

In attempting to define UN peacekeeping operations, Dag
Hammarskjöld said they should fall under "Chapter Six and a Half"
of the UN Charter because they go far beyond the negotiated
settlement means of Chapter VI, yet fall short of the enforcement
means of Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{112}
APPENDIX 2: EMERGING UN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the intractable bipolar Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR that rendered the UN incapable of fulfilling its envisioned leadership role in establishing and maintaining international peace and security has subsided. Indeed, the increased involvement of the UN in maintaining and promoting international peace and security from the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula to the jungles of Kampuchea has led to increased calls from around the world for the UN to take its intended place at the center of the global collective security mechanism originally envisioned by the UN Charter.

In response to these calls, and at the invitation of the Security Council to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity for the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, submitted his report, Agenda for Peace, in July 1992. In his report, Boutros-Ghali recognized that the change in the world brought about by the end of the Cold War and the emerging consensus for collective security afforded new possibilities to meet threats to common security. However, he also realized that, even as old threats to international peace and security fade, new threats are emerging in the form of "brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife."

Boutros-Ghali believes that the UN, with the Security Council at its center, can effectively deal with the challenges to peace and security around the world. To successfully deal with these challenges, the Secretary General outlined four areas of action which, in combination, provide a coherent program for
achieving peace in accordance with the Charter: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (including peace enforcement), peacekeeping, and peace building.¹¹⁶

The US Army is moving to adopt the Secretary General's areas of action as the primary categories of UN peace support operations, with the addition of peace enforcement as a category separate from peacemaking. While the US Army has not finalized its definitions of peace support operations, its anticipated definitions are similar to the UN definitions in some respects, but very different in others.¹¹⁷

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

The Secretary General defines preventive diplomacy as actions taken "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."¹¹⁸ The concept of preventive diplomacy recognizes that it is much more desirable and efficient to stop a conflict before it starts, than to try to end a conflict in progress. It also recognizes that, should a conflict erupt, swift action taken to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict should contain or end the dispute. The UN identifies the primary components of preventive diplomacy as confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones:

- Confidence-building measures are actions taken, or sanctioned by the UN to increase the flow of information between potential belligerents to reduce misperceptions and to build mutual trust and good faith. Examples are the exchange of military missions, formation of regional risk reduction centers, and monitoring of arms agreements.¹¹⁹
- Fact-finding, both formal and informal, can provide accurate information which can help defuse potential conflicts based on misperceptions and distrust.  

- Early warning, based on the timely acquisition and analysis of indicators can provide time to prevent military attacks, or to prepare for natural or manmade disasters.  

- Preventive deployment represents a major shift in traditional use of military force by the UN. It entails deploying military forces prior to a conflict to discourage hostilities. In crises between countries, forces can be deployed along a border in either one or two countries at either the request of one, or the consent of both parties. The UN also envisions preventive deployments within a country during internal crises at either the request of the government, or the consent of all parties concerned.  

- The establishment of demilitarized zones to deter a conflict is also a new concept and appears to be a subset of preventive deployment. The actual demarcation and occupation of a UN demilitarized zone would serve as a significant symbol of international concern over a potential conflict.  

**PEACEMAKING**

The Secretary General defines peacemaking as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI" of the UN Charter. In addition to the pacific dispute settlement measures under Chapter VI, the UN definition of peacemaking includes expanded use of the World Court and ameliorating problems through assistance. It also includes Chapter VII measures such as sanctions and special economic problems, use of military force, and peace enforcement units.
Recognizing that the World Court is an under-utilized resource for arbitrating international disputes, members of the UN should accept the jurisdiction of the Court and use it for the peaceful resolution of disputes. 126

The UN can facilitate peacemaking by taking international action to ameliorate factors contributing to a crisis. For example, the UN can, if so empowered, coordinate the resources of international agencies to provide humanitarian assistance of various types to a country to forestall internal or external crises caused by refugee flight, droughts, disasters, etc. 127

Under Article 41, Chapter VII, the UN can impose sanctions not involving the use of military force to include interrupting economic relations, interdicting communications, and severing diplomatic relations. 128

The UN definition of peacemaking also includes the use of military force in response to outright aggression under the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, Chapter VII. as well as the use of "peace enforcement" units as a "provisional measure" under Article 40 for truce and ceasefire enforcement missions. 129

The US Army limits the definition of peacemaking to the process of ending disputes and resolving issues underlying the conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement. The use of military force by the UN under Chapter VII is addressed separately by the US Army under peace enforcement. 130

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

The US Army defines peace enforcement as military operations/intervention (including possible combat actions) to restore peace between belligerents who may not consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat. 131 This definition is nearly synonymous with the US Army's previous
definition of its peacetime contingency operation
"peacemaking." 132

PEACEKEEPING

The UN defines peacekeeping as
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the
field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties
concerned, normally involving United Nations military
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as
well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and
the making of peace. 133

While noting that peacekeeping tasks have both increased and
broadened in recent years, the Secretary General states that the
conditions for the success of peacekeeping operations at the UN-
level remain virtually the same: a clear and practicable mandate,
the cooperation of the parties, the continued support of the
Security Council, the readiness of member states to contribute
required forces, effective UN command, and proper financial and
logistic support. 134

The US Army definition is similar:
operations conducted with the consent of the
belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated
truce and help promote conditions which support
diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in
areas of conflict. 135

However, the US Army definition appears more restrictive in that it
equates peacekeeping with truce-keeping, emphasizes the need for
consent of the belligerents for establishing and executing the
mission, and requires the strict neutrality of the peacekeeping
force. 136

PEACE BUILDING

The Secretary General defines his new concept of peace
building as "action to identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse
into conflict." 137 Examples include disarming former
belligerents, destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees,
monitoring elections, and reforming/strengthening government institutions. Peace building may also include combined undertakings between countries to increase economic and social development, the rebuilding of roads and bridges, and/or the removal of minefields.138

The US Army definition stipulates that peace building may require specialized military forces for nation and humanitarian assistance missions, as well as civil affairs operations.139

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: "BEYOND PEACEKEEPING"

It is clear from his recommendations to the Security Council, that Boutros-Ghali envisions a much greater role for the UN in maintaining international peace and security than it has since 1945. This is particularly evident in his proposed uses of military force in every category of peace support operations, ranging from humanitarian and nation assistance to combat operations in response to acts of aggression and peace enforcement. It is also clear that the Secretary General does not necessarily view these uses of military force as separate and distinct operations, but views them as a continuum, flowing from to one to another and possibly overlapping.

The current approach by the US Army to peace support operations does not, however, accord with the Secretary General's view. The current US Army approach focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and views them as separate and distinct rather than as part of a continuum of peace support operations.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 6.

4. Ibid., pp. 7-12.

5. Ibid.

6. The Army approach to peace support operations is examined because the Army comprises the largest land force in the US military and is the most likely force to be deployed for such operations for an extended period of time. In addition, the Army is the lead agency for the new joint manual on peacekeeping, Joint Publication 3-07.3 and has therefore significantly influenced the manual. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Revised Final Draft) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1992), enclosure, hereafter referred to as Joint Pub 3-07.3. The Chief of Staff, Army, Strategic Fellows' presentation is used as a primary source because the fellows, in cooperation with the Strategy and Plans Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army (DAMO-SSP), played a leading role in defining Army peace support operation doctrine during 1992-93. See Chief of Staff, Army, Strategic Fellows, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement," slide presentation (dated 6 Jan 1993) delivered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, mid-January 1993, hereafter referred to as CSASF and Allen, Johnson, and Nelson, pp. 53-61.

7. CSASF. For a comparison of definitions from various sources, see Beyond Peacekeeping, pp. B-2 - B-9.


16. See *The Blue Helmets*, Chapters IV and V.

17. Urquhart, p. 198.

18. For a detailed review of the foundations of UN peace support operations to include chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, see Appendix 1.


22. Ibid., p. 41.


27. Spiller, p. 10.


30. Fishel, p. 56.


33. Rudd, p. 25.


35. Ibid., pp. 13-14.


38. Ibid., p. 15.

39. Ibid., p. 16.

40. Ibid.


42. Abizaid, pp. 16-17 and Interview.


45. Ibid.


50. Ibid., pp. 5-6, 9-10 and I-2-I-6.

51. Ibid., pp. 7-8, 10-11 and I-2.

52. Ibid., p. 3.
53. Ibid., pp. 11-12 and IV-24, Oakley, pp. 48-50 and Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 62-62.

54. Lessons Learned, p. III-3 and Oakley, p. 52.

55. Oakley, pp. 47-48 and Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 61-64.

56. Lessons Learned, p. 3.

57. Ibid., pp. 12 and III-4 – III-5.

58. Ibid., p. 13, Oakley, pp. 48-50 and Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 70-71.

59. Lessons Learned, p. 3.

60. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

61. Ibid., pp. III-4 – III-5.


63. Ibid., pp. 18-19 and Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp 71-72.

64. Lessons Learned, p. 3.

65. Oakley, pp. 54-55 and Lessons Learned, p. III-16.

66. Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 64-65 and Lessons Learned, pp. 12, 18 and XIV-2 – XIV-3.


68. Ibid. and Interview.

69. Oakley, p. 50 and Rudd, p. 25.

70. Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 62-63 and Lessons Learned, pp. 5-6, 9-10 and I-2 – I-6.


73. Oakley, pp. 48-50.


75. Lessons Learned, p. 13.


77. Interview and Lessons Learned, pp. XIV-32 – XIV-33.
78. Interview and Lessons Learned, pp. 12 and III-4 - III-5.
79. Abizaid, p. 19 and Interview.
81. Interview and Lessons Learned, pp. V-8 and V-14 - V-16.
82. Ibid., p. 14.
84. Ibid., pp. III-4 - III-5.
85. Ibid., pp. 7-8, 10-11 and I-2 and Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, pp. 62-63.
87. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
88. Ibid., pp. XIV-13 - XIV-14.
89. Ibid., p. 12.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 18.
93. Ibid., p. III-3.
94. Interview.
96. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
97. Ibid., p. 19.
98. Ibid., p. 22.
100. Ibid., pp. 39-45.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., pp. 19-21.
103. Ibid., p. 22.
104. Ibid., p. 23.
105. Ibid.
107. The Blue Helmets, p. 4.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., p. 5.
112. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
114. Ibid., p. 5.
115. Ibid., p. 6.
116. Ibid., pp. 7-12.
117. CSASF and Allen, Johnson, and Mims.
118. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11.
119. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
120. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
121. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
122. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
123. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., pp. 20-27.
126. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
129. Ibid., pp. 24-27.

133. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11.


137. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11.

138. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

139. CSASF, slide 16A and Allen, Johnson, and Nelson, p. 56.
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